Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/11375/25007
Title: | Real World Secret Leaking |
Other Titles: | REAL WORLD SECRET LEAKING: THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A PROTOCOL CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEAKING DOCUMENTS UNDER SURVEILLANCE |
Authors: | Knopf, Karl |
Advisor: | Samavi, Reza Stebila, Douglas |
Department: | Computing and Software |
Keywords: | Security;Cryptography;Secret Leaking;Whistleblowing |
Publication Date: | 2019 |
Abstract: | In scenarios where an individual wishes to leak confidential information to an unauthorized party, he may do so in a public or an anonymous way. When acting publicly a leaker exposes his identity, whereas acting anonymously a leaker can introduce doubts about the information’s authenticity. Current solutions assume anonymity from everyone except a trusted third party or rely on the leaker possessing prior cryptographic keys, both of which are inadequate assumptions in real-world secret leaking scenarios. In this research we present a system called the attested drop protocol which provides confidentiality for the leaker, while still allowing leaked documents to have their origins verified. The protocol relies on identities associated with common communication mediums, and seeks to avoid having the leaker carry out sophisticated cryptographic operations. We also present two constructions of the general protocol, where each is designed to protect against different forms of adversarial surveillance. We use ceremony analysis and other techniques from the provable security paradigm to formally describe and evaluate security goals for both constructions. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/25007 |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Knopf_Karl_H_2019September_MSc.pdf | 790.82 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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