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|Title:||Three Essays in Bank Financial Reporting|
|Abstract:||This thesis investigates three important issues on bank financial reporting quality: 1) the impact of banks’ retail versus wholesale funding structure on their earnings quality, 2) the implications of economic and monetary policy uncertainty for banks’ earnings opacity, and 3) the relationship between banks’ bad time history and accounting conservatism. In the first essay, we examine the implications of banks’ funding strategies for banks’ earnings quality. We find that banks’ greater reliance on retail deposits over wholesale funds is negatively and significantly associated with the magnitude of earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions, the likelihood of meeting-or-beating earnings benchmark, and the extent of income smoothing through loan loss provisions. This finding is consistent with the arguments that retail deposits are relatively more stable and information-insensitive, represent a more conservative business model, and attract more intensive monitoring from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) than wholesale funds, thereby improving banks’ financial reporting quality. In the second essay, we investigate whether economic and monetary policy uncertainties affect banks’ earnings opacity. When economic and monetary policies are relatively uncertain, it is easier for bank managers to distort financial information, as unpredictable policy changes make assessing the existence and impact of hidden “adverse news” more difficult for investors and creditors. Policy uncertainty also increases the fluctuation in banks’ earnings and cash flows, providing additional incentives for bank managers to engage in earnings management. Our results show that uncertainty in economic and monetary policy is associated with greater magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions, higher likelihood of just meeting-or-beating the prior year’s earnings, and lower levels of accounting conservatism, suggesting that economic and monetary policy uncertainties lead to higher banks’ earnings opacity. In the third essay, we examine the impact of banks’ bad times on the conservatism of accounting policy. Specifically, we investigate two types of bad times: banks’ own past experiences of undercapitalization and their experiences of witnessing the failures of other banks in state-wide and county-wide crises. We find that both types of banks’ bad times are positively related to timelier recognition of earnings decreases versus earnings increases in accounting income. We also find that following exposure to bad times, banks increase their allowance for loan losses. Collectively, our results suggest that bank-specific bad times and macro-level banking crises lead to greater bank accounting conservatism. These findings support the arguments that banks exposed to past crises overweight their bad time history, and become more cautious and pessimistic about their future earnings performance and loan quality.|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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