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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/20995
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DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisorSwingle, P. G.-
dc.contributor.authorSanta-Barbara, John-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-23T19:49:19Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-23T19:49:19Z-
dc.date.issued1972-05-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11375/20995-
dc.description.abstract<p> An important issue in the study of conflict behavior concerns the manner in which one party involved in a conflict situation, can influence his protagonist to resolve the conflict in a way Which is mutually rewarding (i.e. cooperative). The present thesis is addressed to this issue. In order to study the relationship between preasymptotic interaction patterns and stable states of cooperation and conflict, the data from a. variety of two-person, mixed motive games are organized such that: a} criteria are established for defining stable states of cooperation and conflict; b) preasymptotic interaction patterns are clearly distinguished from these stable, asymptotic states; and c) the role of each dyad member is considered separately. </p> <p> Organizing the data in the manner outlined above allows the description of strategies used by real subjects Which lead to high levels or cooperation and conflict. Dyads who attain a high level or cooperation are found to use a cautious trust strategy. This strategy consists of two components, a cooperative signalling component and a firmness component. The cooperative signalling component is operationalized in terms of the difference in the proportion or cooperative choices between one dyad member and the other. The firmness component is operationalized in terms of the level of retaliation against an uncooperative action (D reciprocity). Dyads who attain a high level or conflict. are characterlzed by an inappropriate signalling compcinent, and/or the absence of a firmness component. Data are presented which indicate how the requirements for a successful cooperative signalling component vary as a function of other variables. </p> <p> The implications of focusing on stable outcomes in a conflict situation, and organizing the data in the manner developed here, are discussed in terms of notions current in the psychological literature on conflict behavior. Data from the present thesis are used to argue that strategic variables are relatively more important factors in determining stable outcomes in a particular conflict situation, than either predispositional or personality factors. </p>en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectConflict Resolutionen_US
dc.subjectStable Outcomesen_US
dc.subjectprotagonisten_US
dc.subjectpreasymptotic interactionen_US
dc.titleModes of Conflict Resolution and Stable Outcomesen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPsychologyen_US
dc.description.degreetypeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)en_US
Appears in Collections:Digitized Open Access Dissertations and Theses

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