An Account of James' Pragmatic View of Truth

Abstract

Misinterpretations of William James' pragmatic account of truth are due to three main factors. First, the failure to see the connection between James' account of truth and his account of reality (that is, the connection between pragmatism and radical empiricism). Second, the failure to see James' philosophical project as essentially involving the reinterpretation of traditional philosophical concepts. Third, the mistaken belief that pragmatism provides a formula or rule for determining the truth or falsity of beliefs. In this thesis, these three factors provided a framework for my own interpretation of James' account of truth. In the introduction, I briefly discuss the connection between pragmatism and radical empiricism. In the first chapter, I show that philosophical notions like 'consciousness', 'perception', 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are reinterpreted in James' account of reality. In the second chapter, I show how his reinterpretations of 'correspondence', 'coherence', and 'utility' lead to what is better called an 'account' of truth instead of a 'theory' of truth. The third chapter provides further elaboration on his account of truth by examining conceptual systems and 'necessary' truths. In the conclusion, I examine the emphasis which separates James' pragmatic account of truth from other versions, namely, the emphasis on individual experience in determining and constituting truth.