Free Will and the Possibility of Radical Evil in Kant.

Abstract

<p>Kant's ethical theory is often characterized as one in which freedom is identified with obedience to the moral law. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, however, free will appears to be characterized as the ability to choose either to obey or disobey the moral law. Hence, an evil act could be freely chosen, whereas according to the usual ethical conception, evil appears to have to be interpreted as a manifestation of lack of freedom. The problem treated in this thesis is whether or not Kant's account of radical evil in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is compatible with the conception of free will given in the ethics. If the two conceptions are aspects of one developed theory of free will, does the theory hold together; if they are actually two theories of will, what are the implications for Kant's ethics?</p> <p>Chapter I presents the problem and summarizes the two Prefaces to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as its first essay, "On the Radical Evil in Human Nature." Two conunentators, L.W. Beck and J.R. Silber, view Kant as developing one theory of free will. To show that this is so, they focus on Kant's distinction of will into two parts, Wille and Willkür, as a key to resolving possible contradictions. Their arguments are discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III analyzes the primary sources which Beck and Silber bring to corroborate their versions of the theory, and briefly sets forth the arguments of Emil Fackenheirn, who regards the essay in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone as repudiating the ethics. It concludes on the inconclusive note that the problem may be unresolvable.</p>