Truth and Non-Existence in Aristotle

Abstract

<p>This work critically examines Aristotle’s statements regarding truth in relation to what does not exist, and defends a cohesive interpretation of Aristotle on truth and non-existence against contemporary commentators. Aristotle speaks of what does not exist in various contexts within his works, and questions about things that don’t exist arise at every level of the structure of reality Aristotle lays down in Chapter One of <em>De Interpretatione</em>. Aristotle refers to things, affections of the soul, and statements as truth-bearing. However, the ways in which each is said to be true or false suggests that Aristotle applied the notion of “truth” more strictly at some times than at others. In the following chapters I examine what Aristotle conceives of as non-existent; how it is possible to speak about these things; the apparent contradiction between the <em>Categories</em> and <em>De Interpretatione</em> regarding what is true to say of what does not exist; how fictional entities are conceived and to what exactly it is that words that signify the fictional refer; Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth with regard to what does not exist; the definition of truth as applied to non-standard truth-bearers (objects, perceptions and <em>phantasia</em>); and how Aristotle avoids the contemporary problem of “empty” terms. This work, as a whole, finds a great amount of complexity in Aristotle’s concept of truth, evidenced by his accounting for what does not exist. What does not exist does not in fact cause much trouble for Aristotle, either with respect to how they are objects of thought, or with respect to the utterances that can be made about them, or with respect to the truth of those utterances.</p>