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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Hitchcock, David | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Ohler, Amy | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-18T17:05:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-18T17:05:29Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2013-12-23 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2004-09 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | opendissertations/8711 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 9741 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 4943784 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13879 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>In <em>Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument</em> (2000), Ralph Johnson claims that the practice of argumentation, of giving and receiving arguments, is characterized by manifest rationality: argumentation must appear to be rational to all the participants involved. Because argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality and because the purpose of argumentation is rational persuasion, Johnson proposes a two-tier definition of 'argument' , the product of argumentative practice. In addition to an 'illative core' composed of premises offered in support of a conclusion, Johnson claims that an argument must possess a 'dialectical tier' , in which the arguer anticipates and responds to objections, criticisms, alternative points of view, and the consequences and implications of his or her own view. However, Johnson's definition of argument, and his claim that argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality, rest on the specification of rationality as using, giving, and/or acting on the basis of reasons. I argue that this specification of rationality provides inadequate justification for his insistence that an argument must have a dialectical tier and empties of substance his claim that argumentation is manifestly rational.</p> <p>As a remedy to these problems, I supplement Johnson's conception of rationality in argumentation with Chaim Perelman's conception ofreasonableness. Because what counts as reasonable is a function of the historical and contextual situation of the audience we seek to persuade, in constructing an argument, appeal to the audience is justified. Thus an arguer engaged in the task of rational persuasion must appeal to the expected position of the audience, with respect to the topic under discussion, and the current standards for argument and argumentation the audience holds.</p> <p>This revised conception ofrationality not only justifies more adequately the addition ofthe dialectical tier to the definition of argument and provides a richer interpretation for the claim that argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality but also provides the resources to solve two problems for the dialectical tier raised by critics: infinite regress and discrimination.</p> | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.title | Rational Argumentation and the Dialectical Tier | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Master of Arts (MA) | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
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fulltext.pdf | 3.42 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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