The Defense of Theism in Schubert Ogden and Hans Kang

Abstract

<p>In this thesis I examine the responses given by Hans Küng and Schubert Ogden to the "problem of God", or the question of whether there is an objectively existing divine reality. Küng and Ogden employ the "transcendental method" in their defenses of theism in as much as they argue that belief in God is the condition for rationally maintaining the attitude of trust or confidence. Belief in God is realized in the context of the conviction, opposing nihilism, that life is worthwhile and opens up possibilities for fruitful existence (Küng) or that what one does really matters (Ogden). Reflective faith in God has the function of articulating this more basic faith, expressing in concrete terms the rational ground or basis for trust, and providing reassurance.</p> <p>Despite their similarities, I found that there exist some significant differences between the positions of Küng and Ogden. In particular, it seems to me that Küng develops the idea of trust in a more positive way than does Ogden, in that he speaks of trust as a conscious and reflective reaction to the world. Consequently Küng presents a deeper understanding of faith in God by describing it in terms of answering the question about the uncertainty of reality--"Why is there anything at all and not nothing?".</p> <p>A number of critical questions may be put to Küng and Ogden. I will argue that they have failed to provide an adequate connection between the idea of a "ground or basis for trust" and "God", an identification on which their defenses of theism depend. I conclude that the phenomenon of "trust" or "confidence" would more rationally be given a secular understanding, and that Küng and Ogden indirectly help to make the case for atheism rather than theism.</p>