Explanation and Causation

Abstract

<p>This thesis deals with the nature of theoretical explanation and causation. In chapter one, I examine Wesley Salmon's S-R basis of scientific explanation, through which prior events or conditions are sought out that are statistically correlated to explanandum. However, it seems that Salmon's account fails to explain events. Salmon attempts to provide a causal account of the statistical relevance relations. This is done by providing a novel account of causality.</p> <p>In chapter two I discuss Salmon's treatment of causality. Salmon's treatment comprises four components. First, he takes "processes" rather than "events" as the basic entities of the universe. Second, he argues that through causal processes causal influence is propagated, and such propagation by causal processes is the "necessary connection" between cause and effect. Third, Salmon distinguishes three sorts of causal forks that are explained in terms of causal processes and certain statistical relations. Fourth, he maintains that it is causal interaction which produces causal marks of processes that are capable of being transmitted. Events are occasions where causal processes intersect, interact, and undergo changes. Thus in our attempt to explain, what we seek are causal processes connecting the event-to-be-explained and the events that constitute the S-R basis. If no such connecting processes is found, we may try to fmd common causes leading to both the event-to-be-explained and the statistically relevant events contained in the S-R basis. For Salmon, only knowledge of the causal processes, or common causes, counts as explanatory knowledge.</p> <p>This, however, does not settle the question of justification. What right do we have to impute causal relations to events and processes in the universe? Salmon makes appeal to the pragmatic efficacy of science. But science itself cannot prove the reality of causal processes or relations; rather these are among the basic presuppositions of the scientific enterprise. The justification of causality, if any is possible, must rest on different grounds.</p> <p>Thus in chapter three, I introduce Rescher's metaphysical realism in an attempt to offer a possible justificatory strategy. For Rescher, the objective causal order of the universe is a metaphysically necessary presupposition. This much can readily be reconciled with the principle of "fallibilism" in science by making reference to, most prominently, the interaction between mind and nature. This approach dissolves the question of whether or not science ever has to reach, or will ever reach, the "real" truth by asserting that scientific truth is, while objective, always conditioned. The "conditionedness" of scientific truth does not, however, detract from the universality of scientific truth or mind-independent reality of causal relations.</p> <p>I will address two specific problems concernmg the objectivity and universality of causal explanation: (1) the seemingly pragmatic aspect of causal explanation; and (2) whether intentional actions can be understood and explained causally. I believe these problems do not pose any difficulties for causal explanation, and I believe that the validity of causal explanation can be established.</p>