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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13482
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dc.contributor.advisorSciaraffa, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDoubleday, Nancyen_US
dc.contributor.advisorWaluchow, Wilen_US
dc.contributor.authorIverson, Noel S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-18T17:04:09Z-
dc.date.available2014-06-18T17:04:09Z-
dc.date.created2013-09-25en_US
dc.date.issued2013-10en_US
dc.identifier.otheropendissertations/8309en_US
dc.identifier.other9433en_US
dc.identifier.other4627657en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11375/13482-
dc.description.abstract<p>A fundamental problem in political philosophy is how the freedom and equality of persons can be reconciled with the authority of social morality or law. The Kantian solution is to hold that the exercise of authority can be legitimate if and only if it is freely endorsed by the subjects of its exercise; thereby allowing persons to act as both subject and legislator. However, the fact of reasonable pluralism makes this approach problematic. A recent attempt to solve this conflict between authority and the free and equal idea, while also accounting for the fact of reasonable pluralism, is the theory of public reason liberalism developed by Gerald Gaus. The aim of this thesis is to give a critical evaluation of how successful Gaus is in solving this fundamental problem, while also situating public reason liberalism within the larger debate. The first chapter gives an overview of Gaus's theory and introduces some preliminary worries about the possibility of successfully converging on a workable set of socio-moral rules under public reason liberalism. Chapter two goes further, developing an internal critique of Gaussean public reason liberalism, and showing how this critique could play out using real-world examples. Chapter three explores alternative approaches to realizing the free and equal ideal in an attempt to situate Gaus's theory within the larger debate; finally concluding that Gaussean public reason liberalism is deeply problematic, both on a theoretical and a practical level, yet still offers important insights into the relationship between social-morality and the freedom and equality of persons.</p>en_US
dc.subjectGerald Gausen_US
dc.subjectPublic Reason Liberalismen_US
dc.subjectPublic Reasonen_US
dc.subjectSocial Moralityen_US
dc.subjectEthics and Political Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectEthics and Political Philosophyen_US
dc.titleGaussean Equality: A Critical Evaluation of the Free and Equal Ideal in Public Reason Liberalismen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Philosophy (MA)en_US
Appears in Collections:Open Access Dissertations and Theses

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