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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13463
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dc.contributor.advisorHitchcock, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.advisorGedge, Elisabethen_US
dc.contributor.advisorArthur, Richarden_US
dc.contributor.authorCasurella, Peter W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-18T17:03:58Z-
dc.date.available2014-06-18T17:03:58Z-
dc.date.created2013-09-24en_US
dc.date.issued2013-10en_US
dc.identifier.otheropendissertations/8283en_US
dc.identifier.other9385en_US
dc.identifier.other4618120en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11375/13463-
dc.description.abstract<p>This thesis looks at one example of a Bayesian argument for the existence of God in order to evaluate the quality of such arguments. It begins by explicating a general trend in philosophical apologetics towards probabilistic arguments for God's existence, most notably represented in Richard Swinburne's 2004 book, <em>The Existence of God</em>. Swinburne's arguments are presented as the pinnacle of the probabilistic movement. In order to judge the worth of such arguments, I carefully lay out the principles and assumptions upon which Swinburne's case is based. I show that his argument requires both the truth of substance dualism and the valid application of the simplicity principle to a set of possible hypotheses which purport to explain the existence of the Universe. Swinburne depends on the willingness of philosophers to accede to these points. I proceed to show that no agreement exists on the topic of dualism, concluding that Swinburne has a lot of work ahead of him if he wants this assumption to firmly support his argument. I then show that, while the simplicity principle is generally agreed to be a good tool for real-world situations, there are important differences when attempting to use it to adjudicate between hypotheses to explain the universe. The simplicity principle requires both background knowledge and a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of hypotheses in order to be properly applied, both of which are here lacking. If I am right, then we will be unable to reasonably assign several values necessary in order to utilize Bayes' Theorem. Thus the Bayesian approach cannot be used for the problem of the existence of God. Finally, I show that Swinburne's own assumptions can be used to generate a different conclusion, which casts further doubt on his methodology.</p>en_US
dc.subjectbayesianismen_US
dc.subjectexistenceen_US
dc.subjectgoden_US
dc.subjectswinburneen_US
dc.subjectargumentsen_US
dc.subjectprobabilityen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.subjectReligious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religionen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.titleBayesianism and the Existence of God: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Arguments for the Existence of Goden_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Arts (MA)en_US
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