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|Title:||Culture and the Abstract Inividual: An Analysis of Will Kymlicka's Defense of Minority Rights|
|Abstract:||<p>In this thesis I examine will Kymlicka' s argument in defense of minority rights within a liberal society. In the first chapter, I outline the basic tenets of his argument and extract some of the issues that prove especially problematic in later chapters. In the second chapter, I examine in depth Kyrnlicka's distinction between a culture's character and its structure. It is argued that this distinction cannot be sustained upon closer examination. I conclude the chapter, however, by suggesting that this distinction may not even be necessary to defend minority rights within a liberal framework. The third chapter of this thesis deals with the issue of moral agency. I make some distinctions within the notion of moral agency and suggest that a thick view of agency is compatible with the liberal principle of revisability. After an examination of the argument in which Kyrnlicka presents his criteria for determining which cultural communities are to be protected, I conclude that his criteria would be incompatible with revisability. In other words, I argue that the attempt to enhance the conditions for moral agency may result in undermining it.</p>|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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