The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10717

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.advisor	Radner, Michael	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Jones, Kenneth	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2014-06-18T16:52:22Z	-
dc.date.available	2014-06-18T16:52:22Z	-
dc.date.created	2011-08-08	en_US
dc.date.issued	1969-11	en_US
dc.identifier.other	opendissertations/5745	en_US
dc.identifier.other	6769	en_US
dc.identifier.other	2137918	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10717	-
dc.description.abstract	<p>Perhaps the most puzzling of the mind-body issues is the problem about the nature of the felt qualities or "raw-feels" of experience. Most philosophic positions on the mind-body problem - materialism, mind-body interactionism, evalutionary energent theories, epiphernomenalism, neutral monism - are positions taken in answer to this problem. The scope and content of this thesis is limited to examining one such position - the current identity theory that raw-feels are identical with physiological occurrences.</p>	en_US
dc.subject	Philosophy	en_US
dc.subject	Philosophy	en_US
dc.title	The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences	en_US
dc.type	thesis	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Philosophy	en_US
dc.description.degree	Master of Arts (MA)	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Open Access Dissertations and Theses

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