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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10570
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Parlar, Mahmut | en_US |
dc.contributor.advisor | Hassini, Elkafi | en_US |
dc.contributor.advisor | McCabe, Peter | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Leng, Mingming | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-18T16:51:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-18T16:51:54Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2011-07-28 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | opendissertations/5607 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 6630 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 2120224 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10570 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>In this thesis we focus on applications of game theory in supply chain management (SCM). Most significant---and interesting---topics arising in SCM are concerned with the coordination/cooperation and competition among supply chain members. Since the theory of non-cooperative and cooperative games is used for the analysis of situations involving conflict and cooperation, it has become a commonly-used methodological tool in investigating supply chain-related problems.</p> <p>We start with an introduction in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we briefly describe game theory and SCM, and the organizational structure of this thesis. Next, we present a literature review for game theoretical applications in SCM in Chapter 2. This chapter reviews more than 130 papers concerned with supply chain-related game models, which are categorized based on a topical classification scheme. In Chapter 3, we consider a free shipping problem in a B2B setting. We model the problem as a leader-follower game under complete information with a seller as the leader and a buyer as the follower, and compute the Stackelberg solution for this game. In Chapter 4, we analyze the problem of allocating cost savings in a three-level supply chain involving a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. We use concepts from the theory of cooperative games to find allocation schemes for dividing the total cost savings among the three members. Chapter 5 considers game-theoretic models of lead-time reduction in a two-level supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer. In this chapter, we first develop a leader-follower game where the manufacturer determines the components of his lead-time and the retailer decides on her order quantity. This game is solved to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. We also investigate the cooperation between the two members and design a linear side-payment contract for this supply chain. Our thesis ends with a conclusion in Chapter 6.</p> | en_US |
dc.subject | Business | en_US |
dc.subject | Business | en_US |
dc.title | Competition and cooperation in supply chains: Game-theoretic models | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Business | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
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File | Size | Format | |
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fulltext.pdf | 7.14 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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