Global tensions, global possibilities: Everyday forces of conformity and contestation

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Global tensions, global possibilities:
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-Introduction-

Global tensions and/or possibilities? Toward dialogic hope …

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Academics theorizing and analyzing the impacts of globalization on everyday life are conventionally divided between those who highlight the (overt or hidden) opportunities and advantages afforded by globalizing processes and others who emphasize their negative impacts on populations across the world. The former tend to focus on such things as increased access to paid labour, faster modes of communication, and technological ease of transportation (of people and information) across global networks. The latter, in contrast, generally stress the vicious implications of globalization's systemic processes, which continue to exacerbate polarization between rich and poor and, invariably, mean uneven access to labour, communication, and transportation.

With this division in mind, the Graduate Student Research Group of the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition held a conference titled *Global tensions, global possibilities* in September 2007. The conference organizers intended to bring together graduate students to challenge the above oppositions which often characterize contemporary globalization theories. By gathering an eclectic group of young scholars from various disciplines and backgrounds, the key aim driving *Global tensions, global possibilities* was to question disciplinary and attitudinal divides in theorizing globalization. A secondary, and related, intention of the organizers was for the conference to be a space in which participants (i.e. presenters, discussants, and audience) would together (re)think the implications of globalizing processes in non-dichotomizing ways that transcend such traditional divides.

The organizers recognized that their intentions were not necessarily revolutionary. The works of several prominent scholars in various disciplines have denoted the need to be critical of further polarizing contemporary globalization theory (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Mudimbe-Boyi 2002; Ong 2006). For example, in their discussions of globalization, Jean and John Comaroff (2001) have indicated that globalizing processes and their attendant consequences can be neither classified nor understood in simple terms. Like the Comaroffs, the conference organizers felt that one cannot deny the intense messiness of any investigation of globalizing processes. Instead, they wanted to stress that globalization is simultaneously creative and destructive, enabling and constraining, beneficial and detrimental.

Given that it has come out of the conference, the same line of reasoning forms the driving force behind this graduate student volume of the Working Paper Series. Below, we discuss our rationale for organizing the volume in the way we have. We begin with a brief discussion of our understanding of the need to move beyond theorizing globalization as either liberating or oppressive. Throughout the following sections, we move back and forth between our theorization of this necessity and the specifics of how the dichotomy beyond which we want to move re-emerged in the context of the conference. In the final section, we provide a brief description of the papers and our motivation for organizing them as we have.

Moving beyond dichotomizing theories

The need to move beyond traditional and starkly opposing understandings of globalizing processes and their consequences can find support in the work of Aihwa Ong (1987; 1999; 2006). Over the last twenty years, Ong has increasingly moved away from polarized, axiological understandings and analyses of the implications of globalizing processes. In *Spirit of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline* (1987) and *Flexible Citizenship* (1999), Ong explores emergent forms of agency and resistance in relation to an increasingly globalizing capitalist logic. In the latter book, there is already a slightly different emphasis. Although the notion of agency still frames her undertaking, in *Flexible Citizenship*, Ong has already begun to move away from a deliberate emphasis on the notion of resistance to investigate the potential agency of those she calls flexible citizens – people who are well adapted to globalizing capitalist structures and processes as a result of their socio-economic capital and multiple passports, which in turn translate into easy mobility. Flexible citizens are thus especially privileged by globalizing processes and able to find increasing possibilities to exercise their agency.

While both of these texts contribute greatly to theorizing globalization, in her most recent work, Ong seems to have shifted her focus. In *Neoliberalism as Exception* (2006), Ong does not have the same, almost exclusive, emphasis on resistance and agency. Rather, she implies that notions such as resistance and agency are increasingly less pertinent to developing nuanced understandings of globalizing processes. In this book, published almost twenty years after *Spirit of Resistance*, Ong urges that it is necessary to explore the complexities of globalization. Indeed, in *Neoliberalism as Exception*, she explores the increasing globalization of neoliberalism and "new meanings and practices of the human," which are its attendant consequences. From this perspective, a thorough and responsible understanding of globalization must take into account the ways in which it simultaneously provides people with new opportunities for agency and constrains that same agency. In other words, the focus becomes on the (im)possibilities afforded by globalizing processes and their entanglements with multiple power relations.

Despite the organizers' intentions that (like Ong's latest book) *Global tensions, global possibilities* would be a site where the nuances and complexities associated with globalization would be highlighted, and participants would move beyond oppositions between globalization's disciples and critics, traditional dichotomies rapidly (re)emerged: presentations, discussions, and questions became quickly polarized. Some were incessantly *hopeful* about the prospects afforded by globalizing processes and people's ability to resist its oppressive facets and assert their agency; they stressed new opportunities in the labour force for, and the adaptive abilities of, various social groups. Others were unrelentingly *hopeless* about the impacts of globalizing processes on people's lives and their potential to improve life conditions. From their perspective, the ideals which form the basis of global and globalizing plans for improving life conditions are often distorted, thereby further marginalizing those they claim to help, reproducing exploitive processes, and increasing global social inequities. As the debates between the hopeful and the hopeless became increasingly polarized, Ong's plea for more symbiotic analyses of agency and exploitation seemed to fall on deaf ears.

In fact, the conference itself became a site of contestation between hopeful and hopeless academics' interpretations of globalization. While some understood the very occurrence of the conference as grounds for hope about a lack of apathy, others argued that the location of the conference seemed to reinforce and (re)produce asymmetrical power relations along a North/South or West/East divide. They maintained that we were hosting a graduate student conference in the Ivory Tower. In this sense, they argued, we were reproducing a division of labour between ourselves and our research subjects, and between the sites where we conduct our research and those where we analyze and present that analysis; research participants were still marginalized and excluded from the circuits of knowledge/power.

As Michel Foucault (1980) has indicated, all of us are inextricably entangled and play some role in maintaining asymmetrical power relations and circulating knowledge/power. Thus some insisted on the need to critically examine our own undertaking. What, if anything, they asked, can such a conference contribute to ameliorating the negative effects of globalizing processes? Can our endeavours really make a difference or are we, naïvely or not, denying the asymmetries and binarist conceptualizations such a conference helps to reproduce? Put differently, it became a question of whether we could "account for the persistence or recurrence of the binaries colonizer/colonized, center/periphery, Empire/its Others, local/global, premodernity/modernity, all of which are still prevalent despite widespread public discourse on globalization" (Mudimbe-Boyi 2002, xi). Despite the organizers' visions of the conference as a space that would "convey the ambiguities, the ambivalence and the contradictions, as well as the continuities and ruptures, inherent to transnational and transcultural contexts" (Mudimbe-Boyi 2002, xiii), with the quick polarization of discussions it appeared that the proceedings could more readily convey contradictions and ruptures than they could ambiguities and continuities.

In this way, clearly defined and seemingly diametrically opposed perspectives on globalization emerged throughout the conference. The conference closed with a screening of b. h. Yael's (2005) *Palestine Trilogy: Documentations in History, Land, and Hope*.[1] Yael's trilogy, the second part of which highlights the work of grassroots peace movements in Israel/Palestine and the international networks of activists on which they draw, became a key intervention in the contests between hopeful and hopeless interpretations of globalization. Both Yael's trilogy and the discussion with her that followed the screening provided an opportunity to reconcile what had come to be envisioned as two opposing positions of hope and despair. In this context, Yael's key intervention was to argue that hope is not necessarily about looking at a current or future situation with a positive lens. Rather, hope relates to a willingness to engage a current situation with the aim of interceding in or changing it *despite* immediate ambiguity and uncertainty as to the final outcome (see also Bloch 1986).

Yael further argued that the clearly passionate engagement of those who were present, and our very disagreements, spoke to the simultaneous conjunctures and disjunctures associated with globalizing processes. For her, in some instances, it is the very hopelessness of a situation that provokes engagement and forces one to act in a way that makes change possible. In other instances, people may choose to take on a situation because a more equitable outcome appears possible. Ultimately, she argued, hope and despair are often two sides of the same coin. Yael explained that the trilogy we had just seen was not what she had been in Israel/Palestine to film. Once she had obtained video footage documenting global and local collaboration between activists, however, she felt compelled to make the trilogy: it was her contribution to the asymmetrical circuits of knowledge-production about Palestinian-Israeli relations, an attempt to make room for silenced voices and to ensure that an almost absent story is heard.

How is hope the way to go?

As reminded by Yael, hope is not a necessarily naïve concept, nor are the hopeful inevitably unaware of the power relations in which particular people or situations are imbricated. Instead, hope, even if idealistic, may motivate political engagement and drive us to work towards social change. So, too, can the despair apparent in a particular situation motivate us towards the same end.

How was it that we had so easily lost sight of Yael's pragmatic and grounded comments about hope? Why is it that our discussions so easily (re)played a classical divide between disciples and critics of globalization along the axis of hope? Perhaps, as graduate students, familiar with dominant academic perspectives on globalization, we are already indoctrinated into taking up our arguments along these dominant divisions of labour. Our very thoughts, discourses, and codes of meanings are necessarily shaped at a profound level by our academic predecessors in ways that simultaneously enable and limit our practice as graduate students and researchers.[2]

Such limitations to human practice (both academic and not) have been the topic of much enquiry. Whereas Cornelius Castoriadis (1991, 149-50) refers to such restricting ideational frameworks in terms of a "magma of imaginary significations," the Bakhtin circle defines them as ideologies (Gardiner 1992, 65). In contrast to Castoriadis, who maintains that it is difficult to act beyond the magma, or to break down its influence on practice, Bakhtin (1990) and his contemporaries understand and conceptualize the possibilities of a "novel act," one that moves actors beyond any one ideology. In a way that is reminiscent of Gadamer's (1976) fusion of horizons, they posit that a novel act begins by putting various discourses and codes of meaning in conversation with one another. If one could speak of agency in the views of the Bakhtin circle, it would be defined as a creative act, as the enactment of the unpredictability of the human condition in ways that do not fit precisely in a fixed code of discourses, symbols, and meanings (Gardiner 1992, 75).

For such a creative act to emerge, it is essential that a plurality of voices can speak and be heard, and that each actor be willing to acknowledge his/her own unique position in the spectrum of possible perspectives (Holquist 1990, 164). Bakhtin's dialogism is necessarily, to use his term, "unfinalizable;" it is open-ended and polyphonic. It is also an embodied ethical and epistemological stance. Dialogism relies on the co-existence of and engagement between a multiplicity of voices, perspectives, and subject positions and, as such, it may be taken as a movement towards a fusion of horizons (Bakhtin 1993, 73-5). Dialogism has the potential to enable co-creative actions and to produce new possibilities for understanding (Gardiner 1992, 111-3). In this sense, dialogism's refusal of a single, dominant, monologic voice can be grounds for hope. Recognizing the subjectivities reflected by each voice in the dialogue, and understanding the specificity associated with a particular subject position, dialogism may enable us both to appreciate the importance of our own or others' contribution to a discussion and to recognize its limitations.

As presented up to this point, dialogism may seem naïvely hopeful, perhaps a utopic vision. Indeed, recognizing the power relations at play in the circulation of knowledge, one cannot deny Spivak's (1988) warning that some people do not have access to the arena of signification, that some voices are marginalized, and that when, for example, subalterns attempts to speak, their speech is silenced because their situation is overdetermined by more dominant voices. In speaking about dialogism, it is thus important to recognize that it is not formulated as a liberal, romantic perspective in which all voices have equal potential to be heard. Rather, the concept refers to one's own stance as a social actor, to the necessity of forging a symbiotic relation to other perspectives in order to enhance understanding of oneself, of others, and of specific socio-historical contexts (Gardiner 1992, 96). Through acknowledging the power relations that permeate and entangle even the most mundane social interaction, and insisting on bringing a multiplicity of (asymmetrically related) voices into conversation with one another, dialogism becomes both an ethical starting point for the fusion of horizons and an embodied contestation of dominant power relations (Gardiner 1992, 90).

In the context of the conference, the binary division between globalization's critics and disciples, the notion that globalizing processes must be understood as *either* oppressive *or* liberating, was reinscribed as a privileged monologic discourse. Although it is important not to lose sight of the continued monologism of this binary either/or discourse, we must also recognize the intensely messy entanglements of power which shape, and are shaped by, globalization (Collins 1990). Any thorough analysis of the implications of globalization must, therefore, be able to account for its oppressive *and* liberating potentials and repercussions.

As suggested above, dialogism, as an engagement of various perspectives, ideologies, discourses, meanings, and symbols may open up possibilities for creative thoughts and acts. In this instance, perhaps a dialogic approach may allow us to (re)think and (re)analyze globalization in non-dichotomizing terms. In putting together this volume, we hope that the difficult debates that began in the conference setting may become a dialogic starting point for opening up the discourses, meanings, and symbols which continue to frame, and limit, current perspectives on globalizing processes (Gardiner 1992, 95-107).

Chapter outline

In the spirit of dialogic hope, the current issue includes an eclectic group of papers. The papers collected here represent a diversity of ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and methodological commitments. We have attempted to maintain this diversity of perspectives by imposing a very minimal structure to the volume, grouping papers according to large, overarching themes. Our intent is not to reduce the tensions that exist between and among the perspectives presented by the authors of these papers. Rather, it is to foster and stimulate debates and discussions and a genuine engagement across disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological divides, as well as engagement across the classical binary divide in academic approaches to globalization.

In the first section, entitled *Differentiating globalizations*, four graduate students provide various images of specific globalizing processes. The aim here is to complexify the meanings and imaginaries associated with various globalizing processes and to present multiple ways in which such processes influence and shape everyday life. James Gaede and Jeremy D. Kowalski focus their attentions on the social imaginaries emerging out of the technological dimension of current globalizing processes. Whereas Gaede focuses on continuity, arguing that current globalizing trends can be understood as continuous with ninetieth-century transformations towards free markets, Kowalski maintains that increases in surveillance since 9/11 represent “a transformation in our very life circumstances” towards a praetorian globality. The authors of the two papers that follow, Rhiannon Mosher and Teresa Kramarz, address the ways in which the social imaginary of globalization is often in competition with other locally based social imaginaries. Drawing out similarities between globalization and Europeanization, Mosher argues that Europeanization cannot be understood as a smaller-scale version of globalization, but rather, as a competing social imaginary. Kramarz’s work adds to the discussion by examining the role of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in shaping the parameters on which the global social imaginary is enacted. She takes biodiversity governance as her site of analysis, examining competition between different players in PPPs to set the standards of biodiversity governance.

The second set of papers is grouped under the heading *Institutionalizing globalizations*. The authors included in this section explore the implications and unevenness of national and international regulations for people’s everyday lives. Kathryn Mossman is interested in “how global processes unfold in local contexts,” and she examines this through a focus the implications of “the World Trade Organization’s recent removal of quotas on imported textiles” for the lives and livelihoods of immigrant women working in the Winnipeg garment industry. In contrast, focusing on economic liberalization in relation to the cotton industry in Tanzania, Adam Sneyd shows that while liberalization may be an increasingly global process, its effects are unevenly felt and distorted at specific local sites. In a similar fashion, Luis Alfredo Marroquin-Campos explores the interactions between globalizing neoliberal reforms and the local history of El Salvador, highlighting the implications for “poverty, social exclusion, and environmental destruction.” Finally, using multiple regression analysis, Rob Downie examines the correlations between local socio-political structures, namely types of democracy, and measures of population health.

The authors grouped under the third section, *Embodying globalizations*, highlight the body as a site of contesting or enacting global social imaginaries. They focus on tensions between various ways that the physical body may be conceived, managed, and regulated. Heather Battles examines the anti-vaccination movement's growth in relation to the globalization of biomedicine, arguing that physicians and scientists need to engage the ideas of anti-vaccinationists so that the body becomes a site of "negotiated meaning." Adrienne Smith, Ahmed T. Rashid, and Joanne Nowak place their emphases on understanding the management of variously conceived *foreign bodies* in Canada, respectively refugees, professionals and domestic workers. Smith explores the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board's practice of categorizing refugee claimants in order to accept or deny their claims for refugee status. She stresses the "the ability of institutions to racialize and construct the refugee claimant in opposition to the decision-making tribunal and the nation-state that governs it." Rashid is more interested in the Canadian government's recent emphasis on "skilled" migration. By highlighting the differences which emerge when the specifics of each profession are taken into account, Rashid shows this category of immigration to be highly complex. In a similar fashion, Nowak argues that the Canadian government's apparent support for migration is, in fact, socially differentiated and protected through specific regulations of bodies and borders. Liam Riley, in the final paper in this section, attempts to understand the problems faced by orphans in Malawi from the orphans' perspectives. He argues that Malawian childhoods tend to be quite different from those of children living in the North, pointing to "the global variability of childhoods."

In the fourth section, *Teasing globalizations*, we have regrouped various critical attempts to destabilize current understandings of and ways of investigating globalizing processes. The authors in this section explore these processes in uncommon places while keeping in view the multifarious complexities of their implications. Samah Sabra reflects on immigration and national belonging as "important sites for academic analyses of globalization," examining "if and how immigrant services and 'official' representations of immigration may (re)produce ideas about national belonging and identity through defining '(un)desirable' immigrants." In a similar vein, David Haldane Lee explores potential interconnections between the AIDS pandemic, globalization, and laissez-faire neoliberal ideologies by reflecting on the affective and symbolic dimensions of non-specialists' understandings of these processes. In the following two papers, Greg Shupak and Arun Nedra Rodrigo each lament the loss of the common which accompanies various globalizing processes. Shupak provides literary insights into the mechanisms by which globalization undermines subaltern class-consciousness as (illegal) migrant workers form divisions along ethno-cultural lines and face linguistic barriers to accessing a shared means of communication. In contrast, Rodrigo begins with a personal narrative and meditates on Canadian multiculturalism's inability to provide a social context in which variously located national subjects can relate to one another and to their shared metropolitan context in a genuinely engaged, meaningful, non-consumerist way.

The papers in the final section of the volume, *Engaging globalizations*, represent attempts to develop nuanced understandings of the implications of globalizing processes in various contexts. Trying to reconceptualize sites of exploitation and repression, as well as sites of agency and resistance, these authors attempt to engage directly with the messiness of globalizing processes. Lauren Scannell reminds readers that the fair trade coffee movement "appeals to both sides of the debate" about globalization, arguing that although the movement remains within global capitalism, those who participate in it are attempting to use a market-based economy in ways that reinforce social responsibility and reduce the widening gap between rich and poor and, importantly, between North and South. Naomi Achus argues that despite feminist claims that globalizing processes either reduce or increase gender inequities, "globalizing forces have both constructive and detrimental consequences, and these contradictory effects are dependant on unique regional and economic contexts." In a similar fashion, Ethel Tungohan points out that although co-development projects may theoretically appear to have a shared goal, there are multiple ways in which they are practiced across specific locales. She highlights the complexity of the relationship between migration and development and argues for a better understanding of these intricacies before implementing co-development policies. Finally, Jean Michel Montsion argues that we need to get beyond debates about universalism and relativism if we are to understand labour repression and resistance in Southeast Asian societies in order to get a better sense of "local forms of labour repression and resistance as distinctive (im)possibilities."

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-Differentiating globalizations-

Globalization, technology, and development: Finding continuity amidst constant change

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Globalization is the manifestation of development being tied to ostensibly imminent technological progress. The result is a modernity in which, as Marx noted, "that which is solid constantly melts into air" (Marx 1978, 476). Political and social identities are forced to reorient themselves to conditions of constant flux or risk superfluity.

In an attempt to illustrate the continuity between what are sometimes seen as similar, yet distinct, eras, this paper explores the above themes by connecting analyses of the ninetieth century transformation to free-market economics with literature on globalization. Both transformations are rooted in a tension between those committed to economic and political *improvement* and those desiring stability and security, or *habitation*. In both cases, an imbalance favouring the proponents of improvement results in development being understood as the rapid imposition of prevailing technological practices by "trustees" and leads to social dislocation and de-development. Rather than decry as inherently unstable the techniques which constitute the doctrine of development in a globalizing world, I argue that it is the *speed* of the process of improvement – economic or otherwise – which threatens social stability, especially when it is needlessly divorced from local cultural and institutional legacies.

What is globalization?

Held et al. argue, "[i]n its simplest sense globalization refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness" (Held et al. 1999, 67). The two most important dimensions across which these processes take place are space and time, thus contributing to the stretching of human interaction across greater distances and shorter spans of time. This is what Anthony Giddens (1990, 60) labels "time-space distanciation," something which is increasing under globalization. Thus, the effects of a natural disaster in distant parts of the world can affect the stock market in New York and, presumably, the stock market in New York can in turn affect distant parts of the world.

Globalization, therefore, pertains to both a condition in which the interdependence of people, communities, and states is pervasive, and the processes by which such interdependence is increasing, deepening, widening, and/or speeding up (Keohane and Nye 2003, 82). It must be seen as more than mere internationalization or regionalization. Globalization is also qualitatively different than past transformations. It denotes social and political relationships and interactions based on networks, not single linkages, which span across continents, propelled by advances in computer and communication technologies (Castells 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 223). Furthermore, globalization can be conceptualized as the growth of "supraterritorial relations" between people, wherein the concept of social space becomes less territorial-based and more oriented towards "transworld or transborder" connections (Scholte 2000, 85). In summary, globalization is often seen as faster and more extensive than previous eras of integration.

Rather than an ahistorical fact specific to this current time period, globalization is perhaps better understood as one direction of a transformative process which need not be linear. In this sense, its quantitative dimensions can be seen to ebb and flow: at times they may expand or accelerate connections between social and economic actors, becoming more inclusive, pervasive, and complex; at other times, they may recede into autarkical exclusivity, contracting relations, breaking off communications, and disengaging from the outside world. Globalization may be qualitatively different than past major transformations, but its root dynamic remains the same: at heart is an imbalance favouring teleological conceptions of linear improvement, wherein human development is tied to the ostensibly immanent advance of technology, over stable conditions of organic and cyclical habitation.

Transformative dynamics

The common factor between the nineteenth century *la belle époque* of integration (Hirst and Thompson 1999) and the current era of globalization is the aligning of human development with *la technique*, external, autonomous technological progress. *La technique* encompasses all the tools, instruments, machines, organizations, methods, techniques, and systems that the more common term technology is sometimes used to describe in part. It is, as Jacques Ellul (in Winner 1977, 9) describes, "the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity." Indeed, the concept is so broad that Winner (1977, 11 -12) divides *la technique* into three principle elements: apparatus (i.e. tools, machines, instruments, appliances, weapons); technique (i.e. skills, methods, procedures, routines); and organization (forms of social organization such as factories, workshops, and bureaucracies).

The rise of *la technique* in the ninetieth century was well covered by Karl Polanyi (2001). It was during this century that "an entirely new institutional mechanism was starting to act on Western society" and history "consisted largely in attempts to protect society against the ravages of such a mechanism" (Polanyi 2001, 42). The new mechanism was, of course, the self-regulating market, a crucial element of which was machine production. Machine production, Polanyi had argued, "[involved], in effect, no less a transformation than that of the natural and human substance of society into commodities" (Polanyi 2001, 44). Commoditization of the fictitious commodities – that is, commodities not specifically made to be bought or sold, such as humans, land, and money – meant a disembedding of the economy, where "instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations [became] embedded in the economic system" (Polanyi 2001, 60). Thus, advances in productive technology (apparatus), combined with doctrines of self-control and self-regulation (technique), required dramatic changes in social organization for economic progress to continue unabated.

This great transformation brought far greater and more widespread social dislocation upon England than had the enclosure of common farmland into private livestock fields in the seventeenth century. During the enclosure period, the medieval system of agriculture, according to which peasant land holdings took the form of a series of narrow unfenced or open fields where cattle grazed openly after harvesting, was commercialized by conversion of the land to private pastures. Great numbers of peasants were rendered superfluous since a single shepherd could now manage flocks grazing over land that once fed many humans (Moore 1966, 12). The British Crown made some attempt to mitigate the effects of these trends, declaring that "the poor man shall be satisfied in his end: Habitation; and the gentleman not hindered in his desire: Improvement" (Polanyi 2001, 36). The end result, however, was strikingly similar to the end of Polanyi's Hundred Year Peace: collapse, dislocation, and war.

In both cases, transition to new *technique* was, to a certain extent, imminent; it was outside the control of any one person or state and offered great potential while requiring drastic change. The relentless spread of the capitalist economy – *la technique* of the ninetieth century – was celebrated by

Marx as a progressive force, unleashing as it had a “massive and more colossal productive power than have all previous generations put together” (Marx 1978, 477), and offering, in the end, potential social liberation:

> Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face with sober sense the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men (Marx 1978, 476).

Moreover, as Berman (1982, 4) elaborates, constant revolutionizing of production and social reorganization was a necessary requirement of the development of the capitalist *technique*:

> Everybody within reach of this economy finds himself under pressure of relentless competition, whether from across the street or across the world. Under pressure, every bourgeois, from the pettiest to the most powerful, is forced to innovate, simply in order to keep his business and himself afloat; anyone who does not actively change on his own will become a passive victim of changes draconically imposed by those who dominate the market. This means that the bourgeoisie, taken as a whole, “cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the means of production.”

Whatever the personal disposition of the typical bourgeois, developments outside his control required him to keep pace, lest he become a passive victim of change. New technologies, as soon as they arrived, had to be incorporated; new methods of production, once found, adopted. The imminence of transformation was thus tied to advances in *technique*.

The role of development

As described above, even as it was propelled by the decisions of individual improvers wishing not to be left behind and rendered superfluous by its immanent advances, *la technique* became external to the locus of development – i.e. the factors internal to change and open to manipulation by capable and knowledgeable agents. This submission of society to *technique* was indicative of a fundamental shift in conceptions of change, progress, and development. As Cowen and Shenton (1996, 13) argue, “the effort to construct state order was the climax of a wider intellectual confrontation, beginning in the late seventeenth century, over received ideas concerning the nature of human history and the destiny of states.” Under older conceptions of change, deliberate attempts at order were assumed to eventually regress into disorder. Statecraft was seen as a means to forestall degeneration.

In the modern era, this view was supplanted by the liberal, teleological conception of development, under which “[the] idea of progress connoted a linear unfolding of the universal potential for human improvement that need not be recurrent, finite or reversible” (Cowen and Shenton 1996, 14). All that was needed was a proper understanding of the laws of nature, either to be revealed through God or to be acquired through reason, which would establish the natural social order.

Cowen and Shenton call this the doctrine of development, which at root refers to the intent to develop; the ambition to reconcile the concept of progress with that of order and to counter, as Polanyi put it, the deleterious effects of imminent change. Ensuring this natural order could materialize was the job of the enlightened few, who, through their superior perception, knowledge, and understanding of *la technique*, could rationally govern according to *technique's* principles. These development trustees were essential, as the purely progressive view had:

> [E]ntrusted personal interest with the realization of that great precept [problems relating to the distribution of wealth], without wondering whether any individual, no matter how keen his insight, could judge within the limitations of his environment, being, so to speak, in a valley, the totality of which can only be seen from the highest mountain peaks (Iggers in Cowen and Shenton 1996, 23-24).

The duty of trusteeship was, therefore, not to protect that which was vulnerable to the imminent commercialization of agriculture or spread of capitalism, but to develop its capacity for success under the new system, to reconcile the old order with the needs of progress. Its responsibility was to ensure continued improvement by freeing the internal – land, labour, money – from the bonds of habitation. Trusteeship alone could provide for development in a world in which "all that is solid melts into air" (Marx 1978, 476).

The possibility of a better world

This paper has strived to walk a fine line: that globalization is the product of an imbalance favouring improvement at the expense of modes of habitation, but also that a globalized world is not necessarily unstable or undesirable. The tension between the desire for improvement and the need for habitation is not new; indeed the concepts come from the seventeenth century. As Polanyi succinctly revealed, this tension also explains much of the history of the nineteenth century. I have argued that the common factor between both eras, and that of globalization by extension, is the elevation of *la technique* – understood as the totality of technological methods – to a level in which its advance becomes ostensibly imminent and automatic. This was matched by a shift in conception of development away from recognition of cyclicality, towards the possibility of infinitely progressive linearity. The ninetieth century belief in perpetual progress could be ensured through the efforts of development trustees.

The modern focus on human development is not much different. The concept entails the enhancement of the personal capacity to excel in a modern world economy, often through appeals to advancing freedoms (Sen 1999). This requires the intentional development of the internal by those well-versed in *la technique* to ensure the continued advance of the external, which can be detrimental to social and ecological stability. In a revealing study of water management systems in Bali, J. Stephen Lansing (2006, 6) highlights "the failure of a Western social science preoccupied with modernity to adequately encompass the Balinese world." The story is all too familiar: in the interest of national development, traditional farmers were urged to adopt modern techniques, machines, and fertilizers to increase output. Of course, the rapid introduction of *la technique* had the obverse effect; agricultural yields were lower and the new fertilizers and farming methods exhausted the fragile ecological conditions. Lansing then explores how the traditional system had evolved in intimate interaction with local ecology to produce a solution whose complexity early developers had not appreciated, but which maintained a delicate balance between agricultural output and social security.

It is my argument that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the tenets of *technique*, whatever they may be in a particular age, and that instability and dislocation result from too rapid a transition to new methods of political, social, and economic organization. Put another way, it is not the condition of a globalized world that threatens security, but the process of improvement – economic or otherwise – when it is needlessly divorced from or ignorant of cultural and institutional legacies. The implication is that many of the elements under criticism from some of globalization's detractors – neoliberal economics, international human rights, modern production techniques (agricultural or otherwise) – are not in principal wrongheaded. In many cases, modern *technique* properly applied can lead to improved quality of life through greater affluence, diversity, education, and personal freedom.[1] While the enclosure of farmland in the seventeenth century certainly caused a great amount of dislocation, it surely played an equally large role in establishing the social and economic institutional framework for the larger transformation in the nineteenth century (Moore 1966). Furthermore, while Polyani saw the commodification of the fictitious commodities as a travesty of the doctrine of the self-regulating market, the labour market, private property, and exchange rate markets are integral parts of twenty-first century world economy. Moreover, I would suspect that in the case of the Balinese water management system, if given time, elements of modernized *technique* could be successfully implemented in a way to provide greater production as well as more personal freedom for the farmers without disrupting the traditional modes of habitation.

Stephen J. Gould (1996, 15), grappling with the tendency of people to portray "a pitifully limited picture of one little stream" of the development of vertebrate life as betraying the teleological principles of evolution, argued that such a tendency results from:

> [A] more extensive fallacy in [our] reasoning about trends – a focus on particulars or abstractions (often biased examples like the lineage of *Homo sapiens*), egregiously selected from a totality because we perceive these limited and uncharacteristic examples as moving somewhere – when we should be studying variation *in the entire system* and its changing pattern of spread through time (Gould 1996, 15, emphasis in original).

What needs to happen, Gould argues, is the next stage in the "successive dethronement of human arrogance from one pillar after another of our previous cosmic assurance" (Gould 1996, 17). The lesson, here, is that there is nothing fundamentally different about globalization from previous periods of transformation. There is nothing special about our time, except that the technique we have tied our own development to is more complex and diffuse than in the past. While the ninetieth century had the machine, the twenty-first has the computer – a suitable technological metaphor for the automaticity, speed, and complex nature of political, economic, and social interactions under globalization. With time perhaps, we will gain a fuller understanding of the complexity of our relationship with *la technique*, and how better to apply its principles in a more sustainable fashion.

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Praetorian globalities: Electronic surveillance and perpetual lucidity

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> Swarming city, city full of dreams,
> where a ghost in day-light clutches a passer-by!
> Mysteries everywhere flow like sap
> in the narrow channels of the great giant.
> -- Charles Baudelaire, *Les sept vieillards*

In the wake of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States of America (USA) and other countries typically codified as constituting the West have used the declared War on Terror as a discursive mechanism. This discursive mechanism is strategically deployed to substantiate the need for the securitization of the various systems, linkages, and pathways in which and through which our economic, political, and social systems operate. As such, the War on Terror is used for justifying the need for the material hardening of the nation-space and the citadelification/fortification of various infrastructures. Consequently, if one looks beyond the pyre of 9/11, one can see the emergence of a different type of multiscalar infrastructure that is being (re)configured and assembled: "an intensive surveillance infrastructure" (Haggerty and Gazso 2005, 170). This surveillance infrastructure is multiscalar as evinced by its intensification and expansion at the local, national, and global scales.

Although surveillance and its concomitant infrastructures have been utilized and developed by various government security apparatuses for decades, the intensification and expansion of surveillance infrastructures are "shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be" (Giddens 2003, 19). In effect, ordinary citizens living in modern societies can now find themselves under surveillance in virtually all of the spaces that constitute their life-worlds. Therefore, surveillance, irrespective of its subtlety, can no longer be perceived as something that is incidental to our lives. Surveillance, today, represents a transformation in our very life circumstances. Being under the surveillance of a figurative and literal electronic eye, and being caught in an electronic web, is how we now live (Giddens 2003, 19).

In his text *De-coca-colonization*, Steven Flusty (2004, 199) observes:

> By all appearances, then, the earth's surface in its entirety is fast on its way to becoming jittery space. But as we have seen, the higher the viewpoint, the lower the resolution. Overviews overlook, and what the satellites must necessarily overlook is global formation itself in its innumerable everyday practices.

Following Flusty, if one is to develop an understanding how the earth's surface is quickly becoming a jittery space, it is necessary to identify particular localized processes and configurations of jittery space(s) and to analyze how these localized instances of jittery space find expression in the global.

Using the Flustian concept of praetorianism (Flusty 2004, 171) as a theoretical framework, I intend to reveal that a particular global-city constellation emerges that is not only critical to the glocalization of surveillance and jittery space, but is critical to the production of praetorian globalities.[1] However, before continuing, it is necessary to define what is meant by praetorianism and jittery space. Although Flusty provides an impressionistic conceptualization of praetorianism in his text *De-coca-colonization* (2004), a more robust definition was articulated in a private dialogue I had with the author: praetorianism, according to Flusty, is a general philosophy and corollary society predicated on an irrational terror of a Hobbesian "state of nature" where privacy and anonymity give way to increasing levels of surveillance and interdiction to assuage that terror (Flusty 2007). The concept of jittery space, then, refers to a specific form of space produced as a result of the enactment and deployment of this praetorian philosophy. Flusty defines jittery space as: "space that cannot be utilized unobserved due to active monitoring by roving patrols and/or remote technologies feeding to security stations" (Flusty 2004, 73). It is now to the praetorian global-city constellation that I will turn.

In order to develop a conceptualization of praetorian globalities, it is necessary to identify the constellation of nodes that represent the sites of (re)production of praetorian globalities. To identify and explain the function of these nodes I use a global city concept and the technoscape concept of global flows and exchange to frame my analysis (Appadurai 1996; Sassen 2001). Commonly, the conventional global city concept is characterized by cities that function as primary control centers and command points for the movement, circulation, organization, and regulation of global capital and related information (Tyner 2000, 62). Using these characteristics, cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Paris can be codified as the leading cities for this type of global city (Sassen 2001, 4).

However, how one conceptualizes and/or defines global cities is contingent upon the variables of analysis used to interpret global cities. If one shifts the variables of analysis new global cities, processes, and dynamics emerge. Thus, if one uses a praetorian typology to classify global cities, a particular configuration of global cities comes into our field of view. For the purpose of my argument, the praetorian typology I use is limited to electronic surveillance and signals intelligence as variables of analysis. Furthermore, I situate my analysis in a Western context and attempt to identify the control centers and command points responsible for the glocalization of surveillance and the production of praetorian globalities. If one supplants the conventional defining characteristics of the global city (the centers and command points of capital as conceptualized and defined by Sassen) with the electronic surveillance and signals intelligence variables, the following praetorian global-city constellation emerges:

- Primary praetorian nodes: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; Arlington, Virginia, USA; Fort Meade, Maryland, USA; Chantilly, Virginia, USA; Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, England; Wellington, New Zealand; and Canberra, Australia.
- Secondary praetorian nodes: CFS Leitrim, Canada; Sugar Grove, West Virginia, USA; Yakima Firing Center, Washington, USA; Bad Aibling, Germany; Misawa, Japan; Morwenstow, England; Menwith Hill, England; Waihopai, New Zealand; Geraldton, Australia; and Shoal Bay Australia (Pike 2005).

The locations specified on this map represent both the locations of the headquarters of the signals intelligence apparatuses of Canada, the USA, Britain, New Zealand, and Australia and some of the listening posts for these signals intelligence apparatuses. Moreover, the praetorian global-city constellation represented here also formulates the body of the ECHELON system (ECHELON refers to a comprehensive signals intelligence network comprised of a multitude of international security apparatuses).

The praetorian global cities I have identified are integral for the production of praetorian globalities because of the functions they perform. In effect, each of these praetorian command centers


LEITRIM, CANADA
OTTAWA, CANADA
SUGAR GROVE, WEST VIRGINIA
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND
CHANTILLY, VIRGINIA
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
YAKIMA FIRING CENTRE, WASHINGTON
MENWITH HILL, ENGLAND
BAD AIBLING, GERMANY
CHELTENHAM, ENGLAND
MORWENSTOW, ENGLAND
MISAWA, JAPAN
Global Praetorian Constellation
● Primay Praetorian Nodes
● Secondary Praetorian Nodes
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control points (understood as global cities) produce a particular techno*scape* (Appadurai 1996, 33), which is foundational to the development of praetorian globalities, the glocalization of electronic surveillance, and the production of jittery space. More specifically, they signify a particular technoscape.

Praetorian globalities develop and materialize in and through the "negotiation of these disjunctive global scapes" (Flusty 2004, 38). However, to apprehend how praetorian globalities, the glocalization of electronic surveillance, and jittery spaces are generated through and materialize in the disjunctures, overlappings, and interpenetrations of the technoscape, rather than performing "an aerial reconnaissance" over this technoscape, an exploration and investigation must proceed "by spelunking through the chasms that riddle the settings through which [praetorian] globalities are generated" (Flusty 2004, 39). In effect, one must be on the ground and in the technoscape.

If one wants to be on the ground and in this scape, one must situate oneself in specific localities where this scape is produced. An example of a praetorian global city that (re)produces technoscapes is Fort Meade, Maryland. Fort Meade is the location of the headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA), which, incidentally, is the nucleus of the ECHELON system. Given the objectives of the NSA and the activities the NSA undertakes to protect the USA and its allies, the disjunctive technoscapes (re)produced here are, to varying degrees, being globally dispersed and globally configured. However, to develop an understanding of how this locally (re)produced scape is materializing globally, thereby producing the glocalization of electronic surveillance, jittery spaces, and praetorian globalities, one must identify the techniques and technologies used to (re)produce this scape.

As part of the expansion and intensification of centralized electronic surveillance infrastructures in the post-9/11 security environment, improved surveillance technologies have and are being developed and deployed by the state as instruments used not only to identify those who belong in certain spaces and those *others* who do not, but also to keep on *eye* on the myriad spaces inhabited by the mass populace. Some of these new technologies include biometrics, personal identification cards with embedded programmable chips, linked Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras with enhanced neural network facial recognition software, and advanced communication measures including web-based surveillance and tracking (Lyon 2003, 68). In addition to using these state controlled and centralized technological forms of electronic surveillance, however, security apparatuses like the NSA are combining their techniques and technologies of surveillance with more decentralized, networked, and ubiquitous forms of everyday commercial surveillance (Molz 2006, 380).

These ubiquitous forms of everyday commercial surveillance concern:

> the mundane, ordinary, taken-for-granted world of getting money from a bank machine, making a phone call, applying for sickness benefits, driving a car, using a credit card, receiving junk mail, picking up books from the library, or crossing a border on trips abroad (Lyon 1994, 4).

In performing each of these seemingly benign and mundane activities electronic traces of ourselves are recorded and stored in searchable databases "to obtain, retrieve, classify, and concatenate personal data" (Lyon 2006a, 403). Put another way, "each of these unremarkable acts produces a record which forms part of our data double: the electronically visual or documentary trace of ourselves that we leave behind in our encounters with mundane institutions" (Haggerty and Gazso 2005, 171). In part or whole, the electronic information collected and used to form our data double can be very revealing. Consequently, utilizing this form of (electronic) surveillance – data-mining – has become an important component of the praetorian calculus.

As the collection of commercially available data suggests, a significant proportion of the different forms of (electronic) surveillance activities being conducted, whether centralized or decentralized, are "not being directed at criminal or terrorist suspects. Instead they involve a generalized observation of everyone that uses specified services, spaces, or technologies" (Haggerty and Gazso 2005, 177-8). Consequently, the (electronic) surveillance activities conventionally associated with security apparatuses are now being conducted by other public and/or commercial institutions (i.e. banks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), telecommunications companies, public libraries), whether through encouragement or legal requirement. Cumulatively, the effect of the coordinated alignment of centralized and decentralized electronic surveillance systems is the facilitation of the "deeper penetration of surveillance" and the increased transparency of subject populations in virtually any modern locale (Lyon 1994, 38).

It is precisely through the electronic surveillance technologies and techniques of visibility developed and utilized by the NSA and other praetorian apparatuses that technoscapes are locally (re)produced. Furthermore, through the international signals intelligence and electronic surveillance networks established by arrangements like ECHELON, the localized technoscapes of the praetorian global cities I have identified circulate, emerge, and find expression in the global. Although the technoscapes found in and (re)produced by praetorian global cities differentially combine, separate, overlap, and materialize in the local and the global, the general result is the same: the production of a pervasive and glocalized panoptic and synoptic surveillance society.

According to Lyon (1994, 71), "the Panopticon offers a powerful metaphor for understanding electronic surveillance. The prison-like society, where invisible observers track our digital footprints, does indeed seem panoptic." As the panoptic model of power implies, (electronic) surveillance is presented as a hierarchical power relationship between centralized state institutions and individuals. In this hierarchical power relationship, the few (i.e. spies of the NSA and Communications Security

Establishment) asymmetrically watch the many (subject populations). Moreover, because advanced information technologies have effectively digitized our bodies and have provided spaces where one can exist beyond the physical pale, the panoptic gaze has extended to occupy the digital realm. However, with the panoptic extension into the digital realm a synoptic form of surveillance has also come into force as a technique and mechanism of (electronic) surveillance and visibility.

Unlike panoptic surveillance, which is local and centralized by design, and is meant in principle to immobilize localized subject populations "or at least to prevent autonomous, contingent and erratic movements" (Bauman 1998, 52), the synoptic form of surveillance is decentralized and global. According to Bauman (1998, 52),

> the act of watching unites the watchers from their locality – transports them at least spiritually into cyberspace, in which distance no longer matters, even if bodily they remain in place. It does not matter any more if the targets of the Synopticon, transformed now from the watched to the watchers, move around or stay in place. Wherever they may be or wherever they may go, they may – and they do – link into the exterritorial web which makes the many watch the few.

Furthermore, whereas the panoptic form of (electronic) surveillance is hierarchical (state and individual), the synoptic form of (electronic) surveillance is horizontal and rhizomic (individual to individual and commercial/non-state and individual) (Molz 2006, 379). Similar to the cult of celebrity where star-struck individuals voyeuristically observe and track their favourite celebrity, the cult of fear and terror which has emerged is causing individuals who may work for commercial institutions or other non-governmental organizations to observe, track, and report on potential terrorists or suspicious activity.

To return to the main trajectory of the argument, praetorian global cities, (electronic) surveillance technologies, and the techniques of visibility embodied by the alignment of panoptic and synoptic forms of surveillance (re)produce technoscapes that are locally produced, but have material global implications and expressions. To explain these material implications and expressions, I will now go further to ground, delve deeper into this scape, and explore the jittery spaces that emerge.

There are perhaps no better localities to explore the material effects of praetorianism and its various expressions than in the various spaces that constitute the urban form. Although (electronic) surveillance and the technologies of visibility were not alien to the urban form previous to the attacks of 9/11, the counter-terrorism measures instituted after the violent spectacle in New York are notably augmenting the role of (electronic) surveillance and visibility in the urban environment. Indeed, one of the most visible forms of (electronic) surveillance and technologies of visibility is the use of CCTV cameras and networks. CCTV cameras and networks are being widely and increasingly used in many cities (New York, Washington, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Toronto) and urban spaces (public parks, government buildings, parking lots, shopping malls, open streets, banks, subway stations) around the world. According to Norris and McCahill (2006, 97), "the spread of CCTV over city-centre streets [and other spaces] represents the most visible sign of the 'dispersal of discipline' from the prison to the factory and the school, to encompass all of the urban landscape."

The overall material effect of the use, expansion, intensification, and integration of CCTV networks and cameras throughout cities and urban spaces around the world is the glocalization of electronic surveillance and visibility and the proliferation of jittery spaces. Even less conspicuous than CCTV cameras as evidence of the praetorianization of cities is the use of electronic surveillance to monitor one's data double. As cities offer all of the amenities necessary for one to carry out one's life, and as services are increasingly electronic and automated, electronic surveillance produces jittery spaces in a very insidious way: the naturalization of jittery space to the point that one does not know that one is occupying a jittery space at all.

The use of electronic surveillance technologies and the techniques of visibility have become so pervasive in urban environments that virtually all spaces, whether public or private, to some degree or another, have been rendered into a state of perpetual lucidity. Regardless of how benign or innocuous the space, or how mundane the activities, occupying jittery space is no longer the exception but the rule. Moreover, as the fear of global terrorism and the War on Terror continues, the anxieties produced by that fear and the vulnerabilities produced by waging that war will perpetuate the perceived need for the proliferation of praetorian infrastructures and tactics at the local, national, and international scales. However, in order to achieve these scales of praetorianism, certain configurations need to exist to support and create the conditions necessary for the expansion and intensification of praetorian infrastructures.

As electronic surveillance and signals intelligence are considered vital tools in the War on Terror, the praetorian global cities identified in this paper represent a critical constellation for the expansion and intensification of the USA and its allies "dream of guaranteed security" (Lyon 2006b, 40). Therefore, these global cities and the network that joins them become not only critical for the glocalization of electronic surveillance and the production of jittery space, but for the production of praetorian globalities.

As the War on Terror continues and respective governments continue to harden the nation space in the declared interest of security, the gaze of electronic surveillance will continue to increase. In the current security environment, which shows no sign of dissipating in the near future, it is imperative to develop a comprehensive understanding of local and global processes of electronic surveillance and how these processes collide, combine, overlap, transform, and/or pull apart with socio-spatial effects. Therefore, I believe that it is necessary to broaden and deepen of our understanding of the local/global relationship of electronic surveillance and its socio-spatial impacts.

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Contesting Europe: Tensions and possibilities in building the *New Europe*

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In a world of new possibilities, tensions, contradictions and entanglements, borders have been of particular interest to scholars of globalization. Resulting from contemporary processes, borders increasingly operate unevenly as intensified moments of Othering; new boundaries are imagined and mobilized, while others lose consequence; novel identities may be cultivated, suppressed ones find new life, and dominant ones fade away. As the birthplace of modern nationalism and the nation-state, the establishment and maintenance of European boundaries has played a major role in the continent's recent history. Even setting aside key events of the past century that contributed to the reshaping of the continent's internal boundaries (i.e. widespread and localized armed conflicts, the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, decolonization, international migration), it is apparent that Europe is a space constantly under construction. Through an anthropological perspective, this paper will explore how, from the top-down, the supranational entity of the European Union (EU) imposes a vision of a *New Europe* that competes with popular negotiations of national, regional, local, and other identities to conceptualize both Europe and Europeans. Borders are imagined, built, contested, and negotiated across various fronts – political, economic, historic, cultural, geographic – by a plethora of actors ranging from political elites at diverse levels of government, to resident nationals, legal and so-called illegal (im)migrants, and others precariously situated on the margins or outside of Europe, as well as by those who study such processes, such as anthropologists and other scholars.

A decade ago, John Borneman and Nick Fowler (1997) wrote an article for the *Annual Review of Anthropology* about Europeanization, which is, like globalization, or Europe itself, difficult to pin down. For Borneman and Fowler, the term refers to "a strategy of self-representation and a device of power … [that] is fundamentally reorganizing territoriality and peoplehood" (1997, 487). In this way, processes of Europeanization appear to share many traits with the contemporary intensification of developments encompassed by the catch-all term globalization. While globalization has been conceptualized in many different ways, there are several features that appear to be generally agreed upon. For the purposes of this paper, globalization is understood as the accelerated, but uneven flow of capital, goods, ideas, technology, and people across borders. The localization of these flows is subject to many factors, including local actors' engagement with them via co-optation, co-operation, redefinition, incorporation, or rejection.

As many have argued in relation to globalization, Europeanization is likewise not a new process. For instance, successful efforts at instilling a pan-continental religious identity (Christianity) can be traced to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Borneman and Fowler 1997, 489). The reason that processes of globalization or Europeanization might appear to be recent phenomena is due to their increased prominence on the present-day world stage. Unlike in the past, contemporary Europeanization is simply more apparent (and arguably more prevalent) due to processes which have contributed to the increased speed and extent to which capital, people, goods, and information cross state boundaries. Some of the more notable factors in this equation include changes in the market economy and the rise of supranational governing bodies like the EU which have cultivated more flexibility in certain modes of state border-crossing.

While it may be tempting to liken Europeanization to globalization on a smaller scale, a number of significant differences – notably, the key figure of the EU – highlight how such a conflation is problematic. Both processes of globalization and Europeanization generate diverse new interactions in relation to borders, but an undeniable discrepancy exists between the two processes: the EU has in fact been the *main* force guiding (and actually driving) Europeanization, where there appears to be no comparable institutional counterpart steering events on the global stage.[1] Although process (Europeanization) and institution (EU) are intricately linked, they nonetheless remain distinct to some extent. Yet the expansion of the EU in terms of geography, as well as the economic, political, and, to a lesser extent, social areas that fall under its administrative and organizational direction has placed many of its institutions "in an important, if not crucial, role in any process of Europeanization" (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 11). For instance, the very question of belonging in Europe, when defined through a country's EU membership or an individual's EU citizenship raises some interesting questions about the unevenness of this process. Considering that countries wishing to join the EU – to join Europe, in a sense – must go through an application process, it is appropriate to question who has the authority to prescribe the boundaries of (the new) Europe, and from where such power comes. Or, to ask what such discrepancies mean for the construction of Europeans when obtaining EU citizenship may be easier than becoming a national of an EU member state.

The effects of Europeanization have been significant for the contemporary study of borders in Europe. While these include the ongoing project of integration (not solely economic) backed and driven by the organizational bodies of the EU, the promotion of a European self-consciousness through the creation of a common history and culture, as well as external Others, is key (Borneman and Fowler 1997, 488-9). Many of these projects have been first and foremost the innovations of the EU. Predictably, these efforts at Europe building have had varying levels of success as they meet resistance, reinterpretation, co-optation, or adoption after being set in motion through policy carefully shaped by Eurocrats[2] in Brussels, Luxembourg, or Strasbourg.

In order to understand the EU's vision for the New Europe, anthropologists have focused on the agents most directly involved with the EU. One leading anthropologist of the EU, Cris Shore (2000, 26; emphasis in original), indicates that these consist of

> those forces and objects through which knowledge of the European Union is embodied and communicated as a socio-cultural phenomenon: in other words, *all* those actors, actions, artefacts, bodies, institutions, policies, and representations which, singularly or collectively, help to engender awareness and promote acceptance of the 'European idea.'

Accordingly, anthropologists have analysed the products of EU institutions, such as the Maastricht Treaty or the introduction of the common currency known as the Euro, policies that seek to encourage cross-border cooperation and integration, affiliated organizations, and sponsored projects, like the Eurostat office or the European Space Research and Technology Centre (Shore 2000; Wilson 2000; Zabusky 2000). Through these channels, the EU frames and broadcasts its version of Europe across (and beyond) its member states. For Eurocrats,

> the idea that there exists a common European culture, and that this can be developed to underpin the more technical, legal and economic aspects of the integration process, has come to occupy a strategic place in the thinking of EU policy-makers and supporters (Shore 2000, 40).

The creation, presentation, and reception of carefully prepared Eurosymbols – the EU flag, the single currency, the EU-embossed passport, the European Parliament building, the more trivial

Eurovision song contests, sporting events, and media outlets – are all part of the EU's branding project. Intended to bridge international borders, such projects create common memories and interests, and they redirect the focus away from the differences within to shared qualities and goals.

However, "[c]onstructing Europe requires the creation of Europeans, not simply as an objectified category of EU passport-holders and citizens but, more fundamentally, as a category of *subjectivity*" (Shore 2000, 30; emphasis in original). To date, cultivating this sense of belonging and meaningful self-identification as European among those living in the context of the EU has been one of the greatest setbacks facing the supranational institution's Europeanization project. Although the reasons for this have been manifold, bottom-up anthropological studies have shown that a common thread has been the fact that those appealed to do not necessarily share the EU's vision of Europe, or the role of the EU in their lives. This again points to an essential difference between the processes of Europeanization and globalization. Where it is difficult to point to a central entity governing diverse forms of flows or the messy cultural, political, and economic entanglements that ensue from globalization, the EU's principal role in Europeanization is evident.

In spite of its visibility, there is no uniform reading of the EU's role, mission, or politics. This is exacerbated when the discrepancy between supranational and local projects of Europeanization is not clear-cut, when the boundaries envisioned by multiple parties – borders defined not only in the physical sense, but socially, culturally, politically, and historically as the delineation of an identity as well as a place – meet at odd angles, or utterly clash. As Thomas M. Wilson (1993, 4) has demonstrated in his discussion of the predecessor of the EU, the European Community (EC), part of the mismatch results from the "model of the nation-state [being] so pervasive in European political culture, and so persuasive when one attempts to conjure up a model for a supranational EC, that many Europeans can only see the EC in terms of their nation, their state, or both." Yet, the centrality of the nation-state in European identity politics does not preclude the proliferation of claims and projects at local, regional, or other levels of identification. Moreover, while these projects may be read as antagonistic, they may just as often draw upon each other to their mutual benefit (Smith, 1993).

To return to Europe as viewed through the lens of the nation-state, in 2005 EU member states were in the process of ratifying the Constitution. Most federal governments passed it without formal consultation of their populations, whereas a few countries, notably France and the Netherlands, held referendums on the matter. On 29 May 2005, the French voted 50 percent against the Constitution, and 61.6 percent of the Dutch voted to reject it three days later. While both of these outcomes have been pivotal in halting the ratification of the EU Constitution – and highlighting the very real power that states hold in the shaping of both national and supranational projects – the reasons for the No ballots differ significantly among French and Dutch voters, pointing to dissimilar motivating factors behind each country's decision. Many voters indicated that their ballot was not cast against the principle of a united Europe (Mulvey 2005, 1).

These reactions speak to voters' relationships with and attitudes toward the EU, Europe, national, regional, and even local identifications. For the French, news reports indicate that the No "argument more often focused on France than Europe, a debate refracted through a mood of national pessimism and gloom about its economic prospects, and the belief that its much-cherished social model is now under threat" among the expanding and increasingly integrative arena of the EU's New Europe (Wyatt 2005, 1). In the Netherlands, the political parties divided on the issue and appeared to provide a unified voice for either camp, but Dutch voters described much more varied reasons for their decisions. As with voters in France, many felt that the Constitution would move Europe away from socialist values and transform it into a place where business interests and profit were more highly valued than people. Yet this was only one of many reasons Dutch voters gave against the Constitution:

> One person talks about the euro, the next about domination by bigger EU states. Another will talk about Brussels bureaucracy, or the threat to Dutch liberal values, or loss of sovereignty and national identity, or the motor of European integration speeding out of control (Mulvey 2005, 1).

These diverse reasons for opposition to the proposed Constitution span the Dutch political spectrum. As a testament to this, it is worth noting that alongside the Socialist party, and appealing to the same Dutch values of tolerance, permissiveness, inclusion, and participation, the right-wing List Pim Fortuyn party also campaigned for the No side (Mulvey 2005, 1). For those in these referendums' No camps, the connections made between national and continental levels highlight just how closely individual visions for Europe may be tied to local understandings and how differently such images may be conceived relative to those sponsored by the EU. From the example of the Constitution it is clear that when Europe-building is equated with nation-building or other identity politics projects, such as those at regional or local levels, Europe becomes an even more complicated space.

At the heart of this complexity is one of the most effective strategies of identity construction, one especially favoured in nation-building: the creation of an external Other against which a clear sense of (national) identity, culture, unity, and sovereignty can be fostered. For some, such as the Danes who rejected the Maastricht Treaty during a 1992 referendum, the promise of European integration is equally a threat of disintegration at possibly more meaningful national or regional levels of belonging (Jenkins 2000, 168). For the Danes, as for others, local identifications may blatantly contradict EU designs, where being a national "may be about something other than being a European," or may instead correlate with a regional "sphere which is seen as distinctly *not* European," such as the Scandinavian world (Jenkins 2000, 168; emphasis in original).

In the current climate of Fortress Europe, the xenophobic and racist construction of the European or national subject, regardless of formal citizenship status, is perplexing in a contemporary, postcolonial context where international (im)migration (and settlement) is increasingly prominent. As residents of EU member states, and perhaps European, even if not national citizens, immigrants and ethnic minorities – from first-generation to those who have been settled for many generations but, perhaps, still considered foreigners by their autochthonous neighbours – may themselves identify as European, in turn renegotiating the boundaries of Europe. In the Netherlands for instance, residents who may not be ethnically Dutch may hold Dutch nationality, *Nederlanderschap*, "the status of being Dutch" (van den Bedem 1994, 106). This status signifies legal belonging in the Netherlands and in Europe and points to a redefinition of Europeanness that is beyond ethnic, racialized, religious, or even cultural difference.[3] Concurrently, powerful (contradictory) discourses of belonging and Otherness that dictate who is accepted and who is marginalized complicate the matter at the level of everyday experience. These nationals may experience the discrepancy between legal belonging, personal experiences, and identity claims – whether this stems from maintaining "a unique alliance with the country of origin … [or the inability] to consider themselves 'Dutch' as long as they are treated as foreigners" (van den Bedem 1994, 103). In a similar vein, the status and debate surrounding Turkey's application for EU membership also provides an intriguing commentary on how Europe's borders are daily contested from within and outside.

On the other hand, many citizens in EU member states "are aware that they are Europeans by birth and culture" (Wilson 1993, 11) but may find other identifications, such as those at the regional or local levels, offer greater significance for their lives (Smith 1993; Jenkins 2000; Wilson 2000). In this way, the EU, rather than Europe, may be reconceptualized as a product or tool that can be used to build local as opposed to European identities, regardless of other boundaries imposed from above. For example, one study has drawn attention to the ways in which cities have bypassed the state and gone directly to the EU to secure funds for local events, or infrastructure improvement (Smith 1993, 50).

Likewise, regional authorities have banded together to cultivate provincial networks and lay claim to EU resources in order to build their own economic sectors and identities beyond national claims (Smith 1993, 50).

In similar instances, the EU may serve as a tool of nations (frequently framed as regions through EU policy) to gain a level of political legitimization and autonomy while side-stepping the states that they may have long struggled against (Wilson 2000, 140-2). Wilson (2000, 140) points to certain borderlands, which are "areas of cultural contest and integration, in which national identity and citizenship are often not the same thing, and where states and many of their people dispute widely held beliefs about state sovereignty." Europeanization schemes of the EU – i.e. encouraging cross-border development between Ireland and Northern Ireland, or the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation – can help suppressed identities find new life.

The borders of and within the New Europe are daily built, imagined, contested and negotiated by myriad players. Contradictions and entanglements arise from the ways in which different visions compete in the same arena, often drawing upon the same tools but perhaps with very differently conceptualized ends. The embracing of a common identity, whether continental, regional, national, or local, based on a shared history and culture derived from ethnic or racialized distinctions, religious, sociocultural, political, economic or intellectual traditions, or shared goals for the future suggests a number of tensions and possibilities for the New Europe, and the borders and identities therein.

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International organizations and public-private partnerships for biodiversity conservation: From policy entrepreneurs to norm entrepreneurs?

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Transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a burgeoning, but relatively recent, phenomenon in global environmental governance. International governmental organizations (IOs) have embraced partnerships with business (TNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a *de rigueur* policy for global environmental initiatives. PPPs have been lauded as textbook examples of co-operation, which may be justified if one considers how far IOs, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, have gone to embrace old adversaries in partnership arrangements. While the historical relationship between business and the UN was characterized more by animosity than co-operation, today most UN agencies, regardless of their mandates, have a special unit to secure partnerships with the business sector (Bull et al. 2004). A similar story describes the partnerships that the World Bank has forged with the same NGOs that, not long ago, denounced the financier's lending practices (Andonova 2007).

Around the 1992 Earth Summit, the UN and World Bank attitude towards business and NGO sectors respectively seemed to shift from distrust to engagement. Ten years later, at the Johannesburg summit, partnerships with the private sector gained momentum, and were endorsed as a key policy strategy for effective global environmental governance. One of the official outcomes of the summit was the announcement of over 200 partnerships between state and non-state actors. Entrepreneuring PPPs, framed as symbols of co-operation and coordinated action, have become cutting edge policy at IOs. They have been described as win-win arrangements for environmental conservation (UNDP 2004). This new attitude of co-operation has encouraged some scholars to argue that there is an emerging normative consensus, or a new synthesis, in multilateral governance (Therrien 2007). A closer look at what partnerships actually do, however, reveals a very different picture. Far from illustrating consensus, PPPs seem to characterize fragmentation.

Whereas the literature now recognizes IOs as partnership entrepreneurs, scholars tend to focus largely on the policy effectiveness of the resulting PPPs while leaving unexamined the specific normative underpinnings of these partnerships and the conceptions of appropriate governance they propagate. This gives rise to my two research questions. First, if norms are "standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 5), and IOs are powerful teachers of norms (Finnemore 1993), then what standards of biodiversity governance do IOs advance through the partners they select and practices they promote? Second, how do different actors' standards of environmental governance compete with one another within PPPs and how does one gain authority over others, as evidenced in the discourses and projects that partnerships deploy?

The case of partnerships for biodiversity conservation is particularly apt for analysis because, like climate change, the appropriateness of varying responses is heavily contested[1] and divided along North-South, global-local, public-private lines (Backstrand 2006). Yet, unlike climate change, biodiversity has received much less theoretical attention in the environmental governance literature. In Latin America, one of the most biodiversity rich regions of the world, conflicting visions of conservation are readily apparent. They demonstrate competing ideas of who ought to be the beneficiary of conservation efforts and which biodiversity is important to conserve (Molnar et al. 2004).

The fact that IOs have emerged as partnership entrepreneurs is particularly noteworthy because IOs are recognized as important norm diffusers (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004). But the literature on norm socialization typically takes norms as givens. It traces one norm that is accepted by a particular community and describes conditions that account for its spread (Hoffman 2007). Existing models of socialization do not adequately explain why one, among many, equally compelling, norms gains traction over others. Nor do they explain the direction in which actors are likely to be socialized in the absence of a single established standard of appropriate behaviour. There is also a bias in the literature, which privileges explanations of norms that appear to have worked, neglecting those that never made it.

To study what norms emerge and how, we must allow for variance in our dependent variable (Kowert and Legro 1996). Given the above shortcomings, we need to examine if IOs which entrepreneur partnerships with non-state actors legitimize certain norm orders and not others, and if they reconstitute a global standard of appropriateness.[2] "In an ideational international structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 894), but there has been little systematic, comparative analysis of PPP cases to evaluate their normative effects (Linder and Vaillancourt 2000). I propose an analytical framework that can fill in this gap.

First, I suggest mapping partnerships along normative categories in order to later examine what forces shaped those normative choices. I classify partnerships using three normative paradigms that have characterized environmental discourses: liberal environmentalism, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism (Backstrand 2006). For each of these, I identify the authority that is entitled to prescribe behaviour; the prescribed process of conservation; the discourses that signal adherence to a particular paradigm; and types of projects that partnerships use to implement their normative preferences.

In the second part, I advance four variables to elucidate the scope conditions that may account for convergence or divergence in the normative outcomes of different partnerships: identity of actors involved in the partnership, the location of actors within the partnership network, the response and effect of the developing country where biodiversity conservation took place on the partnership's project choices, and the relative distribution of material resources among partners (including partnership financing commitments).

I define IO partnerships as hybrid governance arrangements between state and non-state actors, where the public sector is represented by an IO and the private sector is broadly understood to include business and/or civil society actors. These actors jointly agree to norms, rules, decision-making, and implementation procedures. These partnerships are not ad-hoc forms of interaction or political lobbying (Andonova 2007). A memorandum of understanding or project document defines their mandate, actors' responsibilities, and funding commitments. One of their most tangible outputs is the financing of projects that meet PPP goals.[3]

Analyzing normative outcomes across PPPs

To begin mapping the normative terrain, I extend an existing classification of three competing paradigms in environmental governance (Backstrand 2006). I make connections between these paradigms and specific responses to biodiversity loss. These paradigms are liberal environmentalism, green environmentalism, and civic environmentalism.

The first, and perhaps the one that has received the most attention due to the high visibility and rapid growth of carbon trading schemes in the climate change regime, is the paradigm of liberal environmentalism. This is a market-based approach to conservation that has been described as a compromise between previously adversarial forces: economic growth and environmental protection (Bernstein 2001). Some of its defining characteristics are decentralization, internalization of externalities, self-financing, and efficiency gains. The market is recognized as the appropriate authority to regulate actor behaviour.

A Latin American example of this paradigm is illustrated by the World Bank and the National Biodiversity Institute (InBio) in Costa Rica, which promotes partnerships with pharmaceutical companies interested in bioprospecting ventures and with tour operators interested in ecotourism contracts. These actors' efforts are guided by the principle that one of the best ways to save nature is to sell it. The focus is finding "revenue generating ventures based on biodiversity and its secondary products" (World Bank Biodiversity Resources Development Project 1998).

Second, green governmentality involves a top-down, regulatory approach to environmental governance. Some of its defining characteristics are centralization, command and control, and a compliance focus. Here, the state is seen as the appropriate authority. In Brazil, for example, a World Bank/World Wildlife Fund partnership attempts to lock people out of Amazon lands following a principle that nature is best preserved when the state builds fences around parks to keep wildlife in and people out. The rationale used to justify this policy option is that the focus of protection is to secure biodiversity for global benefit. Since the Amazon is a globally important site of biodiversity, hosting rare and endangered species, it is important to safeguard it from local intrusions.

A third paradigm is civic environmentalism. Some defining characteristics are transparency and public accountability to transnational society, but also ecological justice. Civic groups are the appropriate source of authority. World Bank partnerships with local NGOs in Mexico illustrate aspects of this paradigm. These PPPs not only give people access to use biodiversity rich areas in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, but also grant legal title to community foresters in these lands. Such partnerships would argue that the poor who live in closest proximity to nature are, de facto, the ones who conserve most of the world's biodiversity. Hence, granting them legal land rights is just and helps ensure a long-term vision of the resources at their disposal. This approach reflects a different understanding of who should benefit and which biodiversity needs to be conserved. The partnership directs its resources to types of biodiversity that are not necessarily categorized as "globally significant," but are an important source of food, income, and medicines to the rural poor (Molnar et al. 2004).

This categorization of governance approaches highlights two central normative dimensions: the "who" and "how to" aspects of biodiversity protection. The first refers to who is considered the appropriate authority and final arbiter of environmental governance, and thus, entitled to prescribe or proscribe behaviour: the market, the state, or the people?[4] The second dimension concerns the varying conceptions of appropriate responses or means to the desired goals embedded in each paradigm.

To operationalize these analytical categories, we need to establish a method for recognizing the existence of a norm. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that norms constitute actors' motivations for political action, like interests or threats. As such, we can only gain indirect evidence of their presence. Since norms are shared assessments of what "ought" to happen, however, they often manifest themselves in justifications. The authors thus propose examining the long trail of communication between political actors that these justifications tend to trigger.

Although I examine partnership discourses to uncover reasons for action, PPPs are not just argumentative exercises. Specific practices receive varying amounts of partnership funds. These are also indicators of which norms are viewed as most appropriate and have emerged, at least for the time being, as dominant within a given partnership. Hence, my research uses two types of indicators: partners' discourses and project choices.

Mapping PPPs: Analytical dimensions and empirical indicators

Normative paradigms of PPPs	Source of authority	Governance approach	Discourses	Project choices
Liberal environmentalism Expected outcome of the PPP[5]: Bring the public sphere closer to the market. Remake multilateral governance in the market's image.	The market	Commodification	EFFICIENCY Sell nature to save it, entrepreneurial, innovative, voluntary, efficiency gains, self-financing, internalize externalities, enviropreneurial	Ecosystem services, privatize protected areas, ecotourism ventures, bioprospecting. certification schemes, develop biodiversity offsets, develop supply chains of biodiversity friendly products.
Green governmentality Expected outcome of the PPP: Financial risk and burden shifting from public to private spheres.	The state	Command and control	INTEGRITY Centralized, top-down, fortress-conservation, scientific, regulated, compliance, eco-managerial, public goods	Institutional strengthening of line ministries/ protected area (PA) offices/ specialized state institutes, Strengthen or expand size of PA borders. Increase park rangers/arm them against poachers, outsource park management.
Civic environmentalism Expected outcome of the PPP: Power sharing.	Civic groups	Integrated conservation and development	EQUITY Eco-justice, participatory, democratic, legitimate, accountable	Development projects in buffer zone communities, revise land tenure/titling, community governance of natural resources, ecoagriculture.

Analyzing process: Normative contestation in PPPs

The next step is to elucidate potential scope conditions for convergence or divergence between PPPs. I hypothesize that four variables will influence partnerships' choices in governance approaches. These variables, discussed in detail below, are identity, location of actors within the partnership network, normative consonance with the domestic context where partnership activities are implemented, and distribution of partners' resources.

Norms inform actors' identities, understood here as institutional histories and missions, and these identities in turn guide their interests. We may expect that business partners will tend to entrepreneur projects that commercialize environmental issues while community-based NGOs will advocate integrated development and conservation approaches. But these are only general approximations that need to be tested. Thus, we need to examine the effect that institutional identities of NGOs, businesses, donor and recipient states, UN agencies, and the World Bank have on normative preferences within the partnership.[6]

Beyond the impact of institutional identity on norm preference, the relative position an actor has within a network can explain their influence on shaping norms. I suggest borrowing from the study of social network analysis to diagram network activity and partners' influence within the partnership. In these diagrams each partner becomes a "node" and the connections between nodes are labeled "degrees." We can stipulate that a connection is formed by frequent and significant communication. If we study who interacts with whom, how often, and how significant those interactions are to formulating a strategic vision for the partnership, we may gain a better picture of which actors are in a privileged position to shape normative outcomes.[7]

The framing literature in IR draws our attention to the importance of normative consonance, defined here as the extent to which partnership norms align with those of the developing country that will host the ensuing conservation activities. The economic and political realities of the developing country may influence which norms finally gain traction. Thus, any remaining normative contestation between partners may be settled in the domestic sphere, where global norms will be accepted, rejected, and/or adapted to local conditions. This suggests the need for a congruence test between transnational partnerships and local communities' goals and means to conservation.

Finally, we need to consider the distribution of material resources between partners. The question of who are the largest financial contributors to the partnership, or are themselves the wealthiest actors, needs to be matched to the ideational power variables described above. The relative distribution of resources, and potential threat of withdrawing partnership funding, tends to give wealthier partners an advantage in promoting their normative preferences.

Conclusion

This analytical framework provides a platform for systematic, comparative analysis of partnerships that IOs entrepreneur to explore how the problem of biodiversity loss – and its corresponding solutions – are constructed and then institutionalized via IOs. Using this framework to analyze partnerships can contribute empirical and theoretical insights to the existing literature. Empirically, mapping a large number of IO partnerships can tells us what governance norms are emerging as we move beyond intergovernmental decision making. Theoretically, tracing the process of norm contestation and selection within a smaller number of partnerships can shed some light on the still largely under-explored question in the constructivist literature of why some ideas become institutionalized, and not others (Adler 2006).

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Sewing discontent: The experiences of immigrant women in the Winnipeg garment industry

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In this paper, I explore how global processes unfold in local contexts. Specifically, I examine the experiences of immigrant women workers in the Winnipeg garment industry. The paper focuses on how they have been affected by and responded to the World Trade Organization's (WTO) recent removal of quotas on imported textiles, which has led to the loss of thousands of local manufacturing jobs in this area.

Background: The global garment industry

Today, the garment industry can be considered global in scope. It is one of the most widely distributed industries in the world, in both developing and industrialized nations, officially employing six million people worldwide (Collins 2003, 8). In this global context, not only are manufacturers around the world competing with each other, but so too are workers in each country forced to compete with those in many other countries. By the end of the twentieth century, most apparel firms could effectively locate or subcontract their production in almost any part of the world (Collins 2003, 5). Due to processes of globalization, whereby liberalized trade and capital flows have encouraged multinationals to move production to different locales in the pursuit of lower labour costs, labour groups have generally faced a loss of power (Newland 1999, 52-3).

Competition on a global scale has been guided by a number of international agreements encouraging trade liberalization and the opening up of markets. Overseas competition, associated with the low wages and government subsidies available in a number of less developed countries, has already had an impact on local industries throughout the world, including that of the Winnipeg garment industry. Moreover, the removal of quotas on imported garments in January 2005 intensified competition and the response of Winnipeg's garment industry.

In 1995, the WTO's Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), which had allowed for the application of quantitative restrictions on the import of certain textile and clothing products by importing nations (namely Canada, the United States of America, and countries in Europe), was replaced by the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) (WTO 2005; Hale and Burns 2005, 211). For the period from 1995 to the end of 2004, the ATC set out the transitional process leading to the ultimate elimination of these quotas, which took place on 1 January 2005 (WTO 2005). This has greatly affected industrialized countries like Canada which had used the quotas to protect their manufacturers from having the domestic market flooded by cheaper goods from less developed countries.

The WTO agreement is expected to result in greater concentration of production in a few low-cost sites, with an expected overall shift of production to China (Hale and Burns 2005, 232). The main beneficiaries of this process, however, will be Northern-based companies, which will profit from reduced restrictions on their global operations, while workers will suffer the consequences of the elimination of quotas through massive job losses and downward pressure on wages and working conditions.

The WTO and the Winnipeg garment industry

The recent WTO agreement has greatly affected the Canadian garment industry and the urban centres where production is concentrated. Manitoba is currently the third largest Canadian centre of garment production, most of which takes place in Winnipeg (Apparel Human Resource Council 2005). While the garment industry in Winnipeg has waxed and waned throughout its history in the city, the future of its manufacturing operations is currently in question given the impact of the ATC. In response to the impending elimination of quotas on clothing and textiles, a number of Winnipeg garment companies closed down local plants and laid off their workers, often to relocate overseas and take advantage of lower wages in places like Guatemala, Mexico, Bangladesh, and China (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2004). The decrease in production and loss of jobs has been drastic in this sector. In 2004, there were 5,000 garment workers employed at more than ninety apparel companies in Manitoba; by 2005, the estimated employment of sewing machine operators (SMOs) in Manitoba was 2,965 positions, with the long term trend being that work in garment manufacturing will move offshore (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Manitoba Advanced Education and Training 2005).

The Winnipeg garment industry in historical perspective

First established in the late ninetieth century, the Winnipeg garment industry has a long history of providing jobs for new immigrants. This was largely due to the poor working conditions and low pay associated with the industry which few Canadian-born workers were willing to accept. Due to its inability to recruit Canadian-born workers, the garment industry claimed that it was difficult to find skilled, experienced workers in Canada and pushed for the recruitment of immigrant workers, mainly women, through the help of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The garment industry's recruitment target was not only fuelled by the notion of women's inherent ability to sew and construct garments, but also by the industry's interest in hiring new immigrants as beginners and paying them low starting wages (Lepp, Millar, and Roberts 1987, 155).

Through such strategies, employers often attempt to recruit and administer an efficient, low-cost, and orderly labour force. For example, between the years of 1966 and 1970, industry representatives made numerous trips to Italy and the Philippines, bringing in a total of 700 workers, most of whom were single women, all of whom were skilled (Lepp, Millar, and Roberts 1987, 158). The trend of recruiting workers from overseas continued into the 1970s. Lepp, Millar, and Roberts (1987, 161) note that, "after 1978, at least 26 percent of the three thousand workers added to the industry were overseas recruits." By the 1980s, however, while garment work was still predominantly performed by immigrant women, the ethnic origin of these women had shifted from mainly Eastern European in the first half of the twentieth century to mostly South Asian in the second half (Ghorayshi 1990, 281).

In today's workforce, the influences of the past are still evident, since ninety-four percent of SMOs are women, and seventy percent are visible minorities, with low average earnings of $21,000 per year (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Manitoba Advanced Education and Training 2005). As a result, it is mostly immigrant women garment workers who have felt, and will continue to feel, the effects of the removal of quotas on imported garments. Ironically, most garment manufacturing jobs are being relocated to South Asia, including to some of the same countries that these immigrant workers originally left to find work in Winnipeg.

Immigrant women in the Winnipeg garment industry

As part of my master's research, I interviewed former and current immigrant women garment workers in Winnipeg in order to elicit their experiences of immigrating to Canada, working in the local garment industry, and dealing with the declining prospects of garment work resulting from the ATC. The aim of this research was to explore how local immigrant women workers interact and engage with an increasingly globalized industry.

Desiring a better future for themselves and their families, like many immigrants, the women in this study immigrated to Canada with the hopes of improving their financial situation. Although often accessing support from networks of family and friends to pursue these goals, immigrant women face a number of barriers to training and employment that influence their economic outlooks. The lack of recognition by Canadian employers of immigrant women's education and work credentials from their home countries often prevents them from pursuing employment in their fields and participating as equal members in Canadian society (Ng 1988, 189). A lack of English language skills is another barrier to finding employment, as is lacking awareness of other training programs and employment activities when they arrive in Canada. Consequently, the choice of jobs and economic opportunities available to immigrant women are often severely limited, and many found employment in the garment industry due to overseas recruitment or a lack of other job prospects.

In their employment in different positions at different garment factories, garment workers face many challenges. Work conditions appear to have improved in recent years, but long hours, job-related fatigue, and eye and joint strain continue to be difficult aspects of this work. Pay is also relatively low for workers in this sector, at around ten dollars per hour on average for those paid by piecework rate and eight dollars an hour for workers being paid hourly without piecework; this was not very far from Winnipeg's minimum wage of $7.25 per hour in 2005. In general, however, the workers in this study often described being happy and satisfied with the work they did in the garment industry, in some cases, simply because it met their immediate financial needs in a context that offered them few other employment opportunities.

There are certain assumptions about the inevitable upward mobility of immigrants in a new society, including the presumption that initially working at low-paying jobs, such as those in the garment industry, will eventually lead to higher-paying jobs. This is often not the case, however, and only a small number of the women interviewed experienced upward mobility with respect to their positions either within or between factories. Those who did move up either had background education or work experience in garment construction in their home countries or were able to use social contacts to further their advancement. Over two thirds of research participants, however, stated that there were no opportunities for job advancement in their current or former companies.

The WTO's removal of quotas: Impacts and responses

Recent changes related to the ATC have made workers more concerned about the stability of this area of employment. Many women, most of whom worked at large companies, had noticed a drastic decrease in the number of workers in their factories. In this context, numerous garment workers said they lacked job security, and expressed a loss of bargaining power. In one telling example, Dalila, a recent immigrant from Tanzania, recounted how she and other workers demonstrated over a decrease in available work at their factory.[1] In response to this demonstration, her boss told them that he pays less for the work performed overseas and that if he continued to pay his employees in Winnipeg the way he has been, the work will be sent to these other countries. Her boss now insists on renewing the workers' contracts and giving them a choice between two different pay-rate options, both of which will result in lower pay. Garment companies have regularly used the threat of relocation to discipline workers, and the growing use of such threats is particularly insidious as workers have no legal grounds for redress (Collins 2003, 184).

It should be noted that garment workers in Winnipeg engage in a number of strategies to deal with the low pay of their positions and their lack of job security due to rapid job loss related to the WTO agreement. Around one third of these women regularly or occasionally work overtime. Others also work at jobs outside of the garment industry to supplement their income and provide a contingency plan in case they are laid off from their work in the garment factories. Several women have started preparing themselves for employment in different areas through training programs, and some have switched to different fields of work after being let go from jobs in the garment industry.

In discussing the areas of employment outside of garment work they might consider or are already pursuing, the fields most often mentioned included healthcare, especially work as a healthcare aid, as well as restaurant work, retail work, and cleaning or housekeeping. This was typically due to having previous experience in these areas, being aware of job opportunities in these fields, and feeling that their lack of skills restricted them to these areas of work. The restaurant, retail, and cleaning fields reflect the typical jobs available to immigrant women. The only difference appears to be their interest in the health field which, in Winnipeg, is currently a growing area in demand of labour, making it an attractive option for some current and former garment workers.

Still, many of the same barriers that compelled these women to find employment in garment work have now impeded their ability to find work in other fields. Due to the lack of English required for work in the garment industry, many garment workers do not become fluent in the language, and over half of those interviewed noted that a lack of English skills would be a personal barrier to finding a job outside the garment industry. Lacking education or skills in other fields was also considered a barrier to working in a different area, as was a lack of recognition of education and skill credentials from their home countries. Since there are currently no specific retraining programs in Winnipeg directed towards laid-off garment workers, their transition to other areas of employment has been, and continues to be, a challenge for many in this situation.

Garment workers in this study tended to have negative views about ATC and its resulting impact on the local industry, which they associated with the relocation of local factories overseas, factory closures, the loss of jobs and work, and the creation of a very difficult employment context for workers. In response to being asked for their opinion about the removal of quotas, a few women simply stated, “I hate it.” Several women noted their concern for the plight of other workers, with a focus on how new immigrants will be affected by the impact of the WTO agreement, while others thought it was beneficial for overseas workers, but unfortunate and difficult for workers here. Some women described this phase-out of quotas and its impacts as unfair and unjust. Shannon, an immigrant from the Philippines who has worked as an SMO in Winnipeg for twenty-five years had this to say:

> I can’t do anything because the rich people wanted it and I’m one of the people, the workers, the immigrant workers, the women who come in the garment industry, we don’t have that strength or whatever, because we are all poor, and the people, the employers, they are all rich, they want more money, and they can get that more money sending the work there because of the cheap labour there, and I think it’s a huge enemy, and we’re the small people. Poor people against the rich people; we cannot do anything.

Conclusion

Throughout their lives in Canada, the immigrant women garment workers in this study have faced economic barriers and challenges that not only caused them to find employment in the garment industry when they first arrived in the country, but often kept them from pursuing employment in other areas. While strategizing to improve their situation and deal with these constraints, often through social networks, the ATC has led to further challenges through the rapid loss of jobs in this industry. Now, garment workers find themselves directly confronting these barriers to employment in their need to pursue new forms of work which are often limited to jobs in other low-pay, under-skilled areas. Therefore, this global process of the increased liberalization of the garment industry through the WTO has intensified the inequalities and economic tensions experienced by local immigrant women garment workers, especially in a context where company owners are profiting from cheaper overseas labour and local workers are losing their livelihoods.

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Perpetual possibilities, perpetual poverty?
Cotton and truncated liberalization in Tanzania

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Government and donor community narratives concerning various possibilities for the alleviation, reduction, and eradication of rural poverty are a perpetual feature of Tanzania's national political discourse. Into the late 1990s, tensions were evident between the government and its donors over the appropriate policy frameworks and options to meet anti-poverty objectives. However, in the so-called "post-conditionality" era, at a time when the doctrine of aid effectiveness is seemingly ascendant, Tanzania has been increasingly held to be a "donor darling." Presumably, this shift away from discord is rooted in the less than accurate perception that the government has demonstrated a strong commitment to market reforms through, amongst other actions, liberalizing its agricultural sector. As Brian Cooksey (2003) has shown as regards the maize, coffee, and tobacco sub-sectors, follow-through on the rhetoric of liberalization has not been thoroughgoing.

Cotton, currently Tanzania's second largest foreign exchange earning crop and purported exemplar of donor-inspired market reform amongst the country's traditional exports, has not been immune from the tendency Cooksey identifies. Beyond the freeing of prices and the privatization of seed cotton purchasing and ginning there is little evidence that liberalization in this sub-sector is comprehensive or that changes have led to net benefits for producers.[1] Impoverished cotton growers continue to confront illiberal rent-seeking amongst regulators and private operators when they attempt to procure seeds and pesticides and to market their seed cotton. They also experience downwards pressure on their productivity and incomes as an immiserating consequence of this *de facto* regulation. Incentives are currently lacking for the empowered players in the cotton game to end the ongoing implicit taxation of smallholder cotton cultivators through adopting liberal norms more fully.

Even so, newer and non-traditional development actors targeting cotton production, or seeking to better growers' conditions of life, are pushing liberal norms and other left-liberal ideas. With few notable exceptions, this small subset of the aid biz, including civil society advocates, non-governmental service deliverers, and "ethical" entrepreneurs, is accelerating anti-poverty outcomes in its limited zones of intervention. The possibility that producers will be able lead lives free from poverty is, therefore, subject to the country level tensions between equity-oriented liberals and a status quo that has effectively truncated attempts to impose hyper-liberal laissez-faire. At the global level, the story is much the same. The incoherence between several bilateral donors' aid and trade policies that has led to the glut of cotton on world markets documented and exposed by Oxfam (Watkins 2002) continues to fuel a North-South tension as regards liberalization of the world trading system. Consequently, liberalization at both the domestic and global levels seems to be more significant for its incompleteness and even absence than for its presence.[2] The attempts of principled liberals at both levels to work with the marginalized and give voice to their concerns constitute the limits of the possible when it comes to moving beyond cotton poverty in Tanzania.[3]

To develop the above argument, this paper begins with a brief description of the multidimensional and uneven nature of cotton poverty. The subsequent section details how liberalization, which aimed to alleviate an aspect of cotton poverty by raising producer incomes, has been stymied by the failure of contractual relationships and viable input markets to materialize. In the conclusion, some initial evidence is presented regarding the impacts non-state actors are having on the factors that limit the possibilities for poor smallholders to overcome the multiple tensions to which they have been subjected.

Cotton poverty does not simply stem from low prices paid at the farm gate to smallholders whose cash incomes derive principally from the sale of seed cotton. Over the past decades, the concept of poverty has been extended or "stretched" beyond an economistic or income-based understanding of absolute deprivation. While the World Bank's infamous dollar-per-day measure[4] still lingers in development policy circles, even Tanzania's (2000) first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was structured around the separation of 'income' and 'non-income' dimensions of poverty. The division of the goals articulated in the current National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (2005) into three headline clusters indicates the Government's explicit recognition that poverty is about much more than a lack of shillings. Roughly half of fifty-five "elite" interviewees (including government officials, donors, researchers, civil society advocates and non-governmental service deliverers) with strong knowledge of, or direct interests in, the sub-sector also noted the multiple roots of poverty when I asked them to explain their definition of the concept to me earlier this year. A minority, however, did claim to be suspicious of the term. One respondent believed poverty to sometimes be a "bullshit rationalization for policy failure" and another lamented the ways that use of this "Western" and highly relative concept can hasten the end of "traditional" life ways. Yet, all agreed that poverty describes a genuine circumstance in rural Tanzania. Similarly, amongst the two-dozen cotton producers interviewed in Mwanza and Shinyanga regions who responded to my question about the existence of a local meaning of poverty, many considered it to be principally about a lack of access to assets such as animals (cows, goats, and chickens), money, knowledge (especially production techniques and marketing), and land.

So, what is cotton poverty? As the meaning of poverty has been broadened to the point that it is difficult to pinpoint where the concept ceases to apply and others such as inequality or development begin, let alone to explicate the multifarious factors that impoverish people and communities, it is tempting to seek refuge in the blanket claim that cotton poverty is simply "over-determined." While there might be a grain of truth in such an answer, it clearly would not do justice to the output of an entire industry that is devoted to the explication and resolution of poverty problems, nor assist the poor themselves. In my view, cotton poverty is essentially about a lack of material, knowledge-based, and socio-political assets that results from the interrelated factors of policy frameworks, under-investment, and institutional failure at multiple levels. It is differentially rather than uniformly experienced and bears most heavily upon women.

For example, based upon field research undertaken amongst cotton producers in Geita District, Mwanza, near the Southern shore of Lake Victoria, a typical woman experiencing extreme cotton poverty cultivates and weeds her small plot with hand tools and does not have access to labour-saving technologies such as ox-traction. It is probable that she lacks formal property rights or title to the one or two hectares of cotton plants she tends to, or even to her subsistence food plots. Her opportunities to earn off-farm income are slim due to a lack of time or means of transportation. She is likely to be the principal food preparer, water gatherer, and caregiver for any aged members of her household, young children, or one of her husband's other wives. She is also likely the go-to in the event that any of these people experience ill-health. As she is preoccupied with multiple tasks, probably illiterate, and lacking technical training, her time horizons are short. Consequently, she is not attuned to the future environmental impacts of her cotton cultivation or the concept of sustainability. She might be found to be drinking water from an old pesticide bottle while broadcasting (throwing) rather than planting seeds at the start of each season. If chemicals are available at the right time, and she happens to procure scarce credit facilities to purchase chemicals, in all likelihood she will spray her field with her feet exposed, owing to the fact that she owns no shoes. Her access to organic or inorganic fertilizer is also slim to none, and she does not have the ability to ensure her entirely rain-fed crop against losses. At harvest time, she gathers together a communal group to help with the cotton picking (a difficult task if she is a community "outsider") and prepares a work-inducing feast for the team. With the crop in traditional baskets or plastic sacks, her husband takes charge of transporting the crop to a buying post. Having no means, such as a cellular phone, to compare the prices on offer at various locations, and in all probability having no access to anything approaching an effective producers' union, he is a price-taker rather than a price-maker at the point of purchase. The upside for him is that he controls the earnings from "his" cotton and can proceed to purchase necessary goods for the household, or if he so chooses, to spend a significant portion of the proceeds on an intoxicating local brew.

The above scenario depicts a gross lack of material, knowledge-based, and socio-political assets that might appear somewhat farfetched. Nevertheless, if imparted to six young children whom I encountered working the fields as a team for the equivalent of 1,000 TSh (roughly $1 CAD) per afternoon, it might seem to them to be downright rosy.[5]

To gloss a few of the prominent historic factors implicated in this sorry state of affairs for cotton, and for the agriculture sector more broadly, the imposition of a climate of retrenchment and budgetary austerity that coincided with the slow transition to a market economy from the mid-1980s stands out. The result has been under-investment in rural roads, education, agricultural research, extension (including producer skills and technology upgrading), and in raising the capacity of the Ministries and crop boards to enforce new pro-market regulatory frameworks. Some of this was not only due to a dearth of funds, but was also the consequence of an orgy of rent seeking amongst the political class that eventually led to an aid "strike" by several donors and the creation, in 1995, of a "Group of Independent Advisors" by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Chairmanship of Gerald K. Helleiner, University of Toronto Professor Emeritus. Exchange rate devaluations and the removal of productive input subsidies also substantially raised the costs of imported pesticides for producers. Smallholder access to formal credit at subsidized or market rates remained at an abysmal 3.1 percent amongst the roughly 80 percent of the population engaged in agriculture (URT 2006, 11). Moreover, few foreign investors chose to enter the sector due, in no small measure, to the perception that socialist legacies lingered even after multiple marketing channels were enabled during the vaunted sub-sector "liberalizations" of 1994.

Based on the insights of Gibbon (1999; 2001), Poulton and colleagues (2004), Baffes (2004) and Kabelwa and Kweka (2006), it is evident that the move from an inefficient and high cost monopsony (single-buyer) system to competitive seed cotton buying and ginning has not been a panacea for cotton poverty. While Baffes has argued that the producer share of the fob price[6] for lint has increased and spot payments to producers are now the norm (rather than the promissory producer payment system and long payment delays documented in Gibbon, 2001), yields have dropped precipitously to about 20-25 percent of their potential due to the rising costs of imported pesticides and the aforementioned breakdown in extension services. Seed cotton has suffered serious quality declines in this context, a phenomenon also attributable to grower "disincentives" to produce a quality product due to the periodic disappearance of grading (the separation of clean and white cotton from dirty or wet cotton) and a lack of regulatory oversight at the point of purchase. Downstream, this inattentiveness to quality has, in some cases, reduced the historic premium price Tanzanian lint fetched on the world market to a discount.

These trends are unambiguously maintaining cotton poverty, but liberalization alone should not shoulder the blame. Building upon Cooksey's analysis, to hold liberalization responsible for ongoing impoverishment would seriously exaggerate the extent to which market liberalization has been implemented and discount the powerful "anti-liberalization" forces operative within Tanzanian society. Cooksey's research details barriers to the establishment of smoothly functioning liberal markets, including the re-empowerment of marketing boards, ineffective market regulation, hyper-taxation, and aid regime support to non-performing administrative systems. He underscores the anti-market impulses that stem from these government failures and what he considers to be the ongoing high potential for corruption amongst the "political bureaucratic elite" during the recent period. Based on my research in the cotton sector, the elite do not stand alone in their refusal to embrace idealized liberalization. Private sector actors are equally responsible for truncated liberalization in the sub-sector. Consequently, an analysis that focuses upon the public *and* private sector impediments to liberalization is necessary to tease out the ways empowered domestic players are implicated in the maintenance of cotton poverty.

Turning to the nominally private side of the equation, then, there is a general tendency amongst established cotton buyers to treat cotton growers simply as suppliers. Contract-based farming is now virtually non-existent amongst conventional cotton buyers. When farmers have signed contracts with buyers and the latter have provided growers with inputs on credit, buyers have had troubles not only as regards credit recovery, but also securing a supply of cotton itself. This has been attributed to unauthorized traders known locally as *machingas*, or other firms encouraging such farmers to part with their cotton (side-sell) for a purportedly higher price than they would receive from the company that provided their inputs and agreed to purchase their product. This lack of coordination amongst market players has given rise to a pervasive idea that it is the 'government's job' to pick up the tab for any future input distribution schemes. In the words of one large ginner: "it is not the meaning of investment for me to assure supply. I borrow, pay back the banks and pay the farmer for the cotton. I shouldn't have to worry about [my supplier's] input shortfall!"

Given this pervasive mentality and context, both authorized and illegal buyers of conventional cotton have made inconsistent use of contractual relationships, a fundamental for all transactions in "liberalized" markets. For example, established ginners often sell their lint forward on a contract basis to their international buyers, but fail to make use of contracts with those that supply their raw material.[7] Colin Poulton's team (2004) underscores the need for inter-buyer or "relational" coordination to eliminate this evidently two-tiered market (buyers with contracts and "suppliers" without) in the apparent absence of regulatory capacity or incentive to do so.

Regarding private actors and the current input subsidy and distribution system, in 2006, a Ministry of Agriculture circular signed by the Permanent Secretary mandated a move towards the private operation and management of the so-called "crop development funds." As a direct result of this initiative the Cotton Development Fund (CDF) – a fund previously managed jointly by public and private actors and designed to curb the costs of seeds and pesticide for poor producers through the collection of funds from the ginner – is in the process of adopting a new governance structure. Despite the new policy, ginners have pushed hard to ensure the government's ongoing involvement with some success. According to a CDF insider the rationale for state participation is straightforward: there "must be fifty-fifty involvement into the Fund's operations." The overriding concern he imparted was that ginners should "not take too hard a hit to their margins" for supporting "cotton suppliers" and, if there ever was a move to support the scaling up of the input system to achieve a universal "four [pesticide] spray-system" or other objective, business contributions must be "balanced by the government."[8]

Private ginners have also failed to embrace the intent of liberalization insofar as they are now pushing for price controls *and* a limited system of effective fiefdoms around their respective ginneries. One ginner claimed he could rationalize his transport costs and consequently give farmers a better price if he was given a 50 kilometres exclusive "zoning radius" around his ginnery, and that the "government has been very reluctant to give us protection on this … they have refused to grant us local monopsonies." The same operator suggested to the Cotton Board that he really wanted to see a "minimum buying price" and that cotton prices should "be controlled by the TCA [Tanzania Cotton Association] and the Board on a fortnightly basis." Buyers generally continue to reject the idea tabled by the Cotton Board that their *machinga* concerns would be alleviated through the establishment of an auction system that would put an end the currently ad hoc and inefficient distribution of seed cotton buying posts and establish free market pricing. Far from reflecting a competitive spirit, major players in this supposedly hyper-liberalized sub-sector desire a negative freedom from competition, rather than a positive freedom to compete. While the story of market players seeking to minimize the costs of competing is an old one, these anti-competitive sentiments bring home the point that the private sector has become an impediment to the functioning of the idealized 'liberal' market dreamt up in Washington and imposed across the South during the post-stabilization era of structural adjustment.

So-called "liberalization" was also highly subsidized by poor taxpayers in rich countries. Donors made an inordinate amount of cheap credit available to prospective private sector operators whose business plans met their lending criteria. Marianne Nylandsted Larsen's (2004) unpublished doctoral dissertation on cotton details the inefficient result of this veritable credit bonanza. She determined that the post-liberalization rated capacity of ginneries in Tanzania hovers around three times the actual (effective) capacity utilized. The misallocation of donor resources potentially enabled the (subsidized) creation ginning over-capacity. Ironically, no donor funds whatsoever have been forthcoming to the embryonic Tanzania Cotton Growers' Association. Under the leadership of man whose Dar es Salaam education was largely funded by earnings from cotton, this organization seeks to "unite" producers in a comprehensive democratic structure similar to West African organizations such as Sénégal's Fédération Nationale de Producteurs de Coton (FNPC).

In sum, the lack of liberalization evident in this sub-sector is not simply attributable to a rent seeking political class whose enforcement of the law, or lack thereof, can often be for sale to the highest bidder.[9] The current state of affairs must also be chalked up to private sector players. While their self-protective sentiments and failures to embrace norms necessary for the functioning of economically, socially, or ecologically "efficient," liberal markets are by no means unique to private entrepreneurs in one of the countries categorized by the United Nations as "Least-Developed," they are significant as the opening of this sub-sector was heralded as free market liberalization *par excellence*. In hindsight, the case for liberalization might have been a little oversold. As John Kenneth Galbraith (1967, 201) pointed out at the height of the Keynesian consensus forty years ago, all "countries with highly developed agriculture have moved towards planning in this industry and systems of price control." It might be that governance of the sub-sector returns to the direction identified by Galbraith as stakeholders are forced to confront the problems of low yields and quality control, and engage with new global actors pushing technologies such as transgenic (Bt) cotton and the ideal of a "Green Revolution" for Africa.

To close on a positive note, non-governmental actors and ethical entrepreneurs who seek to advance the moral cases for distributional and ecological justice while advancing their own organizations and careers are having an impact on cotton poverty, albeit in a highly concentrated way. On the established bioRe Tanzania organic cotton project, education, training, and local employment generation are prioritized. A new training facility and demonstration farm are now operational. Extensionists visit contracted producers at least once every two weeks, a practice that has resulted in relatively high yields due to the elimination of seed broadcasting and the introduction of trap crops such as sunflowers, as well as the use of botanical pesticides. Growers have access to a comprehensive range of ecologically friendly inputs and productive implements available on credit, and receive a significant price premium at the market. They also benefit from establishing a long-term relationship if they comply with the strict standards. During the 2006/07 drought, bioRe provided school lunches in many of the villages where it operates through the foundation of its parent, Remei AG, the largest organic textile manufacturer. bioRe has begun to turn a profit after a subsidized start-up period. Oxfam Great Britain has also been operative in bioRe's neighbourhood. Their work has focused primarily on a community-targeted campaign of post-drought relief. Through village level meetings convened by Oxfam, local people themselves have identified the most needy amongst their number, and Oxfam has provided those people – many of them conventional cotton cultivators – with five free goats and 100,000 Tsh as an incentive to keep them. There is an evident, though limited, demonstration effect occurring as well: two new donor-backed organic projects have sprung up. The downside alluded to above is that bioRe purchased just under 1 percent of the total amount of Tanzanian seed cotton "officially" marketed in 2005/06. Consequently, there are possibilities at country level – many with global origins – that might be able to alleviate, reduce or eradicate aspects of the tensions that perpetuate poverty detailed in this note. Whether these possibilities can be rendered probable is an issue I hope to take up in a more substantial exercise.

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El Salvador: Fruits of injustice, food (in)security, conflict, and alternatives

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In order to develop a deeper understanding of the threats to food security for ordinary people in El Salvador, we need to take a look at several issues. These include the root impact of colonization and land expropriation on food access; the relationship between food, land, and the history of violence in El Salvador; and the problems arising from ongoing colonization through foreign-controlled corporate ownership of land, water, and genetic resources. In this paper, I address these issues through a brief examination of the relationships between food insecurity and the political economy of land and conflict in El Salvador. I explore different local patterns of rural transformation, including the reversals of land reforms, and the impacts of globalizing neoliberal policies on the persistence of rural poverty and repression in the country. I also assess the contemporary context of economic dominance by global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank, as well as the factors threatening food security and the local alternatives to this dominance as presented by grassroots organizations to address food insecurity in rural El Salvador.

While some optimists may call it an encounter of cultures, others state that what took place in the Americas in 1492 was a violent colonization by Spaniards. Columbus set into motion a sequence of greed, cruelty, slavery, and genocide that has few parallels in the bloody history of human kind (Koning 1991). Therefore, it can be argued that the modern agrarian history of El Salvador is in many ways a colonial product. More specifically, it is a product of the Spanish conquest, domination, and exploitation of the indigenous peoples of El Salvador dating from about 1524 (Kincaid 1989). From cocoa, to indigo and coffee, export agriculture has been the primary determinant of agrarian structures and political economy in El Salvador since the colonial era.

Kay and Salazar (2001) cite C. D. Brockett to argue that there is enough research to suggest the existence of a significant relationship between land ownership models, changes in how the soil is used, and social and political conflicts. This complex and conflictive relationship is illustrated in El Salvador by the insurrection of the *Nonualcos* led by *Anastasio Aquino* (Kincaid 1987), the insurrection and massacre known as “La Matanza” in 1932 (Kincaid 1987; Taylor and Vanden 1982), and the civil war from 1980 to 1992. In fact, when those in power have perceived brewing conflicts, they have used land transference or agrarian reform programs in attempts to deescalate tensions. Unfortunately, when the perceived conflicts have subsided, elites have also used high levels of repression to regress these same agrarian reforms (Kay and Salazar 2001).

Although the 1970s were prosperous for agricultural elites, they also saw the marginalization, exclusion, and polarization of the vast majority of Salvadorians, on the one hand, and of economic and political elites on the other. Such marginalization was exacerbated by such things as the deepening of abject poverty, lack of fundamental social services, absence of political spaces for individual and collective freedoms, and the cruel repression against those who dissented. This situation was intensified during the early years of the civil war (1980-1992) as rightist hardliners, led by Major Roberto D’Aubuisson and aided financially by wealthy Salvadorian exiles in Miami, developed death squads to deter political mobilization through intimidation and violence. The rightist hardliners also founded the National Republican Alliance party (ARENA) to contest for power in elections. During this time, both the Salvadorian army and the death squads were involved in gross human rights violations, such as the appalling massacres at the Sumpul River on 14 May 1980, the Lempa River on

20-29 October 1981, and El Mozote in December 1981 (Taylor and Vanden 1982). The violent repression forced activists to resort to armed struggle in order to protect themselves and to advance the cause for social change. Thus, the foundation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN, Spanish acronym) in 10 October 1980 was an event that marked another important chapter in the history of the Salvadorean struggle.

The Right's strategies to prevent possibilities for social change, however, were not limited to military operations to suppress discontent and political measures to ensure the protection of the interests of the elite. Their strategies also included economic measures, such as the creation of a new organization: *La Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social* (FUSADES, Spanish acronym). FUSADES was created in 1983 by a group of wealthy Salvadorian business people. Driven by the Reagan administration's enthusiasm for private enterprise, and committed to creating a string of business organizations throughout Central America to support export-oriented policies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played an important role in FUSADES's rapid growth (Foley 1996).

According to Michael W. Foley (1996), FUSADES grew rapidly, becoming the most influential think-tank in El Salvador. The organization's Department of Economic and Social Studies drafted the structural adjustment plan which became the basis for the economic program of the new ARENA government in 1989. The explicit aim, particularly in creating FUSADES, was to promote a package of economic policies that the administration in the United States felt was needed to foster political stability and economic growth. USAID's project had the support of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The USAID appeared to pursue a dual strategy: on the one hand, it supported the Salvadorean government in its attacks on organizations that it associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with the Leftist opposition; on the other hand, it was able to dominate those elements of the Salvadorean business elite that it viewed as "progressive" by building up a new type of organization, heavily financed by the United States (Foley 1996).

In 1992, the Peace Agreements between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN put an end to the civil war – during which 75,000 Salvadoreans had been killed, mostly by the government's military – but saw neither a clear military winner nor a resolution to major economic issues. In fact, at the time of the Peace Accords, fifty-two percent of the population employed in agriculture was landless, and the landless and landpoor together made up eighty-three percent of the farming population (Kowalchuk 2003).

Although the agrarian problem was an important part of the Peace Agreements, the implementation of the Land Transfer Program (PTT, Spanish acronym) has been a major failure. In theory, the PTT was to provide land to demobilized FMLN combatants, demobilized government army soldiers, and landless peasants who had lived in conflict zones during the civil war. The failure of the PTT may be due to an anti-agrarian macro-economic policy, a very low number of beneficiaries, and lack of the necessary financing, technical support, and infrastructure to enable beneficiaries to produce on the land, thus bringing the dreams of the Peace Accords to fruition. As a result, Land Reform beneficiaries have been forced to sell their land.

In fact, the delay and failure of the implementation of the PTT has been due to the obstacles posed by the government whose main interest was to block the process (Movimiento Popular de Resistencia 12 de octubre 2007). Part of the problem was that the PTT was conceptualized by the United States and forced on the Salvadorean government and elite as a political and counterinsurgency instrument. In fact, the last phase of the agrarian reform in El Salvador was a copy of the program designed by Roy Prosterman to pacify Vietcong in Vietnam (Revista Envio 1983).

The imposition of a neoliberal economic model has been a huge leap backward. The gravest issue of the neoliberal economic policy has been the complete abandonment of the agricultural sector and the reversal of the agrarian reform process. Especially during the last 18 years, this reversal has been the result of an intentional effort of the ARENA government to reorient the economy. The economy has been reoriented in favour of adopting models of accelerated accumulation of wealth through (1) prioritizing the increase of commercial activities, (2) privatizing the bank system, (3) opening up the country to the establishment of sweatshops, and (4) weakening the peasant movement, which had gained significant and widespread development during the 1980s as a result of organizational levels during the Agrarian Reform and the civil war.

These neoliberal measures have had a negative impact on Salvadoreans. *El Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo* (United Nations Development Program, PNUD), indicated that the levels of poverty reached 42.9 percent in 2002 (PNUD 2003). This means that 42.9 percent of 6.5 million Salvadoreans experienced poverty and, of these, 23.7 percent experienced extreme poverty (PNUD, 2003). In rural communities, the dimension of the levels of poverty is even greater, reaching 55.8 percent (PNUD, 2003). At the national level, the PNUD reports in 2003 that the total percentage of the population that experienced extreme poverty in the rural area is 62.4 percent, in comparison with the 7.6 percent in the urban area.

In this deep economic crisis, remittances become a fundamental factor of relative economic stability and a mechanism to disguise poverty. There are two main reasons for the importance of remittances. On the one hand, almost every Salvadorean who successfully emigrates contributes to palliate the poverty levels of their relatives with the remittances they send. On the other hand, since most of the Salvadoreans who seek to emigrate are poor, the levels of poverty reflected in statistics are reduced.

New legislation, known as the “Ley arrendamiento de tierras” (Tenant Agreement Law),[1] reflects the active roles currently played by the World Bank and the Salvadorean government to reverse the achievements of minimal agrarian reform gained in the 1980s and 1990s. The Tenant Agreement Law would give the government the right to take away land granted under the agrarian reform. Presently, the Salvadorean constitution prohibits any one person from owning more than 245 hectares. Under the new law, the constitution would allow an investor to rent the land owned by co-operatives or individual small scale farmers and to decide what to grow. The investor would keep ninety percent of the profits, paying the other ten percent to the owners of the land (Equipo Maíz 2007). In addition, at the end of the tenancy agreement, the small-scale farmer would have to pay for any investment made by the investor (i.e. processing plant, infrastructure, and machinery) in order to recuperate his or her land.

Although the Salvadorean government argues that any land rented by investors will be used in the best interest of the nation, the Tenant Agreement Law provides the legal framework to pursue an economic end which is detrimental to the country’s impoverished vast majority. Investors are generally interested in huge extensions of the land to grow and process fruits for export to the United States, a process facilitated by the Free Trade Agreement with North America and Europe. Also, under the Tenant Agreement Law, sweatshops will be declared “rural enterprises” and employees of the *maquilas* will earn 88 American dollars on a monthly basis instead of the 157 dollars *maquilas* are presently required to pay their employees (Equipo Maíz 2007).

Today’s investors and the Salvadorean economic elite seem to need more land in order to respond to the promise of rapid profits to be derived from the growth of cotton destined to the *maquilas*, the growth of corn and sugarcane destined to the production bio-fuels, and tourism operation (Equipo Maíz 2007). Indeed, the growth of corn and sugarcane destined for use in the production of ethanol seem to require huge extensions of land.[2] Multinational corporations also need to have the right to explore and exploit precious metals found in the northern area of El Salvador, where Canadian mining companies have started the process of exploitation of precious metals, a right afforded under this law.[3] It is unnecessary to enumerate the tremendous repercussions suffered by rural populations. Suffice it to say that with the introduction of the government plan to produce ethanol from corn, the price of this basic food staple has increased as a result of speculation.

Since the Salvadorean government and the elite know that the *campesinos* have learned from past experiences to organize, mobilize, and struggle for their rights, the ARENA government has also created the Anti-Terrorism Law – designed almost as a carbon copy from the Anti-Terrorism Law from the United States. Contrary to what the name and content of this law suggest, it is designed to repress any sign of discontent among the Salvadorean population, and not necessarily to fight an external threat of terrorism. The Salvadorean Anti-Terrorism Law labels as terrorism various actions that in other democratic nations are considered legal and democratic rights.

The most recent example of the wrongful application of this law occurred in response to the plans of a group of peasants and other social activists to participate in a Popular Forum in Suchitoto on 2 July 2007 to discuss the impact of the government plan for the privatization of water. In what seemed like a plan to provoke the population, the government decided to choose the same city where the Popular Forum was taking place to announce its plan of "Decentralization of Water Management," considered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that oppose privatization as a first step towards the privatization of water. The Salvadorean government was unnecessarily accompanied by a large military contingent. Prior to the arrival of government officials, this heavy military contingent seriously repressed the peaceful event and captured fourteen participants, including leaders of the Association for the Development of El Salvador (CRIPDES). Those arrested are charged with acts of terrorism and could face up to 60 years in prison if they are found guilty.

Alternatives?

Although the civil war of 1980-1992 was a painful reality for many Salvadoreans, its impacts were not entirely negative. During the war, "liberated zones" were spaces where ordinary citizens began their own processes of democratic participation. The "liberated zones" were regions where the rebels had gained territory and space wherein to organize their armed struggle. During this time, hundreds of civilians living in these spaces learned the concepts of solidarity, self-governance, and self-sufficiency. With the help of revolutionaries and social activists under the leadership of the Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango (CCR, Spanish acronym), a significant number of people learned not only how to protect themselves from the government's military repression, but also how to care for one another. From the provision of food, health care, education, legal council, and the enforcement of respect for one another, civilians in liberated zones were instrumental in exercising the meaning of the *poderes populares locales* or the "local popular power councils," a concept that promoted democratic participation at the grassroots level. With the end of the war, under the leadership of CCR, CRIPDES and the Foundation for Co-operation and Communal Development of El Salvador (CORDES, Spanish acronym), these regions became leaders in rural development under a grassroots model characterized by emphasis on the participation of the members of a community.

Many civilians living in these areas became beneficiaries of the PTT. Co-operatives were created in which communities started building a "solidarity economy" in which people's quality of life is the centre of concern. The emphasis in solidarity economies is on creating regional self-management through projects which address the challenges of food and income security and gender inequality. CRIPDES and CORDES are organizations that complement each other in the challenging task of promoting rural development in areas that the central government has profoundly neglected. CRIPDES is a Salvadorean NGO that promotes and supports the process of organization within rural communities in order to stimulate economic and social development and to strengthen participatory democracy on a local, national, and regional level. CORDES is a Salvadorean NGO which coordinates and provides technical assistance for sustainable agricultural, social, and economic development projects designed in close conjunction with rural communities in order to meet their needs and priorities.

With the participation of all the members of the community, and in seven of the fourteen provinces in El Salvador, both organizations develop and implement numerous rural development projects that follow the principles of the economy of solidarity. That is to say, the aims of their projects include the reduction of poverty, the promotion of social change, and the empowerment of members of rural communities to become critical thinkers and agents of transformation in the social, political, and economic dimensions of their lives. The rural development work in the area of agriculture, as in the area of ecotourism and other development activities, takes into account the organic and biologic alternatives. This is in congruence with fair trade principles in regards to the promotion of economic development in a way that is respectful of biodiversity, human health, and consumers at large.

To understand the PTT is to gain a better insight into the past and future of El Salvador's agrarian reforms, rural development, and post-war political conditions. In the current Salvadorean context, agrarian reforms and other redistributive programmes of rural development currently face a bleak future. Given all of the above, any agrarian reforms and rural development responses must not only address poverty, social exclusion, and environmental destruction, but also facilitate the social, political, and cultural development of the community members.

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The impact of social structure on population health measures

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The economic and social conditions that influence the health of individuals, communities, and countries are known as social determinants of health (Raphael 2004, 1). Social determinants inherently involve economic and social policy issues (Braveman and Gruskin 2003; Raphael 2004; Opare, Astle, Mill, and Ogilvie 2005). In contrast to individually-focused biomedical and behavioural risk factors, an approach to health which takes social determinants into account considers how economic and social resources are organized and distributed, and how that distribution affects health at the individual and macro level.

In the mid-ninetieth century, Friedrich Engels was among the first to show that the health conditions of working class people in England were affected by material conditions of life like poverty, diet, and lack of sanitation. Engels argued that daily living conditions led to diseases that were common among the poor and that individuals often adopt health-threatening behaviours, like excessive alcohol consumption, as a means of coping with daily stress (Engels 1987). The science of pathology developed around the time when Engels was making these arguments: Rudolf Virchow, a German physician, investigated a typhus epidemic and concluded that the lack of democracy, the presence of feudalism, and unfair tax policies were primary determinants of poor living conditions, which resulted in inadequate diet and poor hygiene and thus fuelled the epidemic (Raphael 2004, 3).

Current research indicates determinants of health include income, education, employment, gender, social status, aboriginal status, environment, biology, personal behaviours, and health services (Health Canada 1998). According to Dennis Raphael (2004, 5), studying the social determinants of health means we must consider two broad research questions: “What are the societal factors leading to health inequality (i.e. income and education)?” and “What are the societal forces that shape these societal factors (i.e. economic and social policy)?” This paper expands on these questions and current research perspectives by examining if the social structure of “type of democracy” has a significant impact on specific measures of population health.

Theoretical perspectives on health inequality

Two prevailing perspectives on health inequality are cultural/behavioural and materialist/ structuralist (Townsend, Davidson, and Whitehead 1992). In the cultural/behavioural framework, individual behavioural choices determine health outcomes. This perspective dominates Canadian public discourse on health and disease where the focus is on life-style approaches to disease prevention. In contrast, materialist/structuralist explanations emphasize the impact of material living conditions on health outcomes. Today, mounting evidence suggests that material socio-economic factors play a major role in health differences between individuals, groups, or countries (Raphael 2004; Opare, Astle, Mill, and Ogilvie 2005).

Material living conditions create social stratification and differentially influence health through physical, developmental, educational, and social cohesion pathways; they create gradients of social advantage/disadvantage over the life course. One important outcome is psychosocial stress that has cumulative negative impacts on health. Chronic exposure to stressors weakens the immune system and increases susceptibility to infection and injury. Stressors can prompt the adoption of health-threatening behaviours like smoking, regular alcohol use, and less than optimal nutrition as a means of coping with life circumstances (Engels 1987; Raphael 2004).

Forms of government

The influence of power and politics must be considered when analyzing social determinants of health because social and economic policies affect income and social inequalities over time (Navarro and Shi 2002). Governments take many forms across history. Autocracies and oligarchies are among the oldest, while younger monarchies, constitutional monarchies, and democracies are the most recent. Democratic governments co-exist as ideological and social competitors with autocratic governments. Like all forms of government, democracy is implicitly or explicitly represented as an ideology – a comprehensive set of ideas introducing normative change and stability in society. However, the meaning of democracy is not consistent across nations which profess the same ideology.

Janoski's (1998) work shows ideological multiplicity exists under the banner of democracy. He specifies three types of modern democracy: social, liberal, and corporatist. According to Janoski, both liberal and social democracies actively integrate social policy promoting equity and well-being. Social democracy is rooted in post-World War II Western Europe, notably Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Mann (2004) writes that this social democracy emerged from a historical matrix of class and nation focused on collective social action embedded in a working class ethos. It emphasized gradual legislative reform of the free-market capitalist system to make it more inclusive and equitable for all members of the society. Economic freedom, civil liberties and individual rights are central to Liberal democracies as found in Canada, Australia, and the United States of America. Liberal democracy embodies rule by a dominant social group sharing a distinct cultural ethos. Success or belonging is based on merits set forth by the dominant group. Predominant social injustice hierarchies replace the more equitable and inclusive social arrangements found in a social democracy. Similar to Liberal democracies, corporatist democracies (predominantly Catholic countries of Western Europe) have hierarchical, segregated, or elitist institutional arrangements that introduce exclusionary dynamics based on social rank, privilege, or group membership (Janoski 1998; Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001).

Emergent democracy has been a fashionable focus of Western ideology, policy, and rhetoric since the late 1980s (Alexander 2006). Foreign policy initiatives by Western nations have supported democratic movements in developing nations controlled by autocratic forms of government. Boix (2006, 2) identifies two distinct views of an emergent democracy. "Idealists" argue that if democratic elections occur, then the country has become a new democracy. "Realists" argue that democracy is present only when there is relative equality of living conditions and a strong civil society (Schwedler 2002). Following Boix, this study will compare population health measures under autocratic governments, "idealist" or emergent democracies, and "realist" forms of democracy (social, liberal, or corporatist democracies).

Gender and health

Research has established that poverty and income inequality are directly related to both disease and gender. The impact of gender on health is frequently greater for women, especially those living in developing countries (Stephenson 2003). Lack of improved sanitation and potable water are major health concerns, along with infant mortality, malnutrition, malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, the absence of vaccine programs, armed conflict, and lack of education for women (Heymann 2005). Gender differences are embedded in male-female social relations involving education and employment/income. Girls who attend school, marry later, and have fewer children are better able to care for and nurture their children to a healthy start (UNICEF 2004; Mill, Ogilvie, Astle, and Opare 2005).

Research hypotheses

National differences in health are often explored at the socioeconomic and policy level. The literature points to possible structural variables like “form of government” as significantly impacting population health. Materialist arguments are useful in determining sources of health inequalities. This approach also explains differences between nations, since it considers health outcomes related to population-level income and resource distributions. These groups may be further differentiated by measures including income, gender, age, or education (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). This paper’s analysis considers three research questions: (1) What effect does “form of government” have on population health measures?; (2) What is the relative impact of this structural variable on health measures compared to other established social determinants of health?; and (3) What is the impact of gender on health when we include “form of government” in the analysis?

Data source and variables

No single public-use data source was available that incorporated the social, economic, and structural variables used in this analysis. Country-level data for this study was compiled from four online public-use data sources – (1) United Nations, Millennium Development Indicators (2004); (2) World Bank, World Development Indicators (2005); (3) United Nations, Human Development Reports (2005); and (4) CIA – The World Factbook (2005). The dataset contains 21 dependent and independent variables for 216 countries (see Table 1). Choice of specific variables was driven by both research literature and availability of data for at least eighty percent of countries for each variable. Two variables – the dependent “under-five mortality rate” and the control “male-female literacy ratio” were from 2004 data. All other variables were from 2005 public data sets. The analysis includes four interval-level dependent measures of population health. These are (1) under-five infant mortality rate (000s); (2) female HIV infection rate (000s); (3) new tuberculosis cases in last year; and (4) the Health Development Index (a 0 to 1 composite scale measuring country-level poverty, literacy, education, life expectancy, child welfare, physical and social well-being, and standard of living).

Table 1: Variables in analysis

Dependent variables (Population health)
- 1 Under 5 mortality rate (‘000s)
- 2 Female HIV infection rate (‘000s)
- 3 New TB cases diagnosed in previous year (N)
- 4 Health development index (HDI)

Independent control variables
- 5 GNI per capita
- 6 GINI coefficient
- 7 Militarization (% in military)
- 8 Fertility rate
- 9 External aid (US$)
- 10 Child labour (% in labour force)
- 11 Female economic activity (% LF)
- 12 Female-male literacy ratio
- 13 Female-male school ratio
- 14 GDP spent on health (US$)

Independent test variables
Form of government
- 15 Emergent democracy
- 16 Social democracy
- 17 Autocratic government
- 18 Liberal democracy (reference category)

Health programs (% population affected)
- 19 Improved sanitation
- 20 Improved water
- 21 Vaccination programs
    - Measles
    - BCG
    - DPT

Independent test variables include one categorical "form of government" and five interval-level "health program" variables. Coding for form of government followed Janoski's (1998) previous work. Social democracies represent a small group of Western European/Nordic nations with a long-established record of this type of government. Liberal democracies (here including Janoski's corporatist form because of similar social issues) represent a larger group of nations that have an established history of civil society, electoral responsibility, and economic development. Emergent democracies were coded using Boix (2006) "idealist" category – if democratic elections had occurred in the last three to five years, the country is considered "emergent." This categorization does not consider political stability, economic well-being, or electoral choice. Countries never having or without regular and recent free elections were coded as "autocratic governments."

Five interval-level independent variables represent health-program factors shown to significantly impact population health. These are: (1) percent of population with improved sanitation; (2) percent of population with improved (potable) water; (3) percent of population receiving measles vaccination; (4) percent of population receiving BCG vaccination; and (5) percent of population receiving DPT vaccination. Ten interval-level control variables were selected for the analysis. These represent previously established, significant structural and demographic factors related to social determinants of health. In this analysis they provide a measure of strength and significance of the test variables that is independent of the included determinants of health. These controls include (1) "Gross National Income" (GNI per capita); (2) "GINI coefficient"; (3) "militarization" (percent of labour force in military); (4) "total fertility rate"; (5) "external aid received" (US$); (6) "child labour" (percent of children in labour force); (7) "female economic activity" (percent of women in non-agriculture labour force); (8) "female-male literacy ratio" (0 to 1 score, with 1 being full equality in literacy); (9) "female-male school ratio" (0 to 1 score, with 1 being full equality in schooling); and (10) "percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on healthcare" (US$).

Methods

Bivariate analysis showed high intercorrelations (0.76 or more) between all five program-related social determinants of health. Factor analysis revealed a single component, labelled "health programs" for the analysis. As well, there were high levels of intercorrelation (0.76 to 0.93) for the 10 control variables. Factor analysis revealed four distinct components representing the control variables. These 0 to 1 scored components are labelled "education equality" (1 representing equal female-male schooling); "micro income inequality" (1 representing high male-low female income at the household level); "macro income inequality" (1 representing high male-low female income at the national level); and "foreign aid and health spending" for the analysis. The Human Development Index (HDI) variable showed a predominant positive skew. Regression models were constructed using HDI in an exponentially transformed and untransformed form. Lack of significant difference between models allowed untransformed HDI scores to be used in the analysis. One multivariate linear regression model was constructed for each of the four dependent variables. Independent variables were entered stepwise, providing a single comparative model for each population health measure (see Table 2). Regression diagnostics were used to check model fit and significance, examine the data for multivariate outliers, and account for explained variance.

Results

Table 2 summarizes the regression model for each population health measure in this study. Each column shows values only for the significant relationships. The constant (B) is a standardized average of each measure across all countries collecting and reporting data for each variable. For example, the international average for "under-five mortality" is just over 59 children per thousand, with significant differences across countries (p<.001). The presence of an emergent democracy, as compared to the reference liberal democracy, increases this mortality rate by almost 19 children per 1,000 (p<.05), independent of health programs and socioeconomic inequality. There is no significant difference in this mortality rate between autocratic and other democratic forms of government.

The presence of integrated health programs will reduce the under-five mortality rate by just over 14 per thousand (p<.001), independent of inequality measures. The control factors in this analysis have large, significant impacts on the under-five mortality rate. When females have equal literacy scores and access to education to males, the under-five mortality rate decreases by just over 32 per thousand (p<.001). When household female income is very low, compared to male income, the mortality rate increases by 11.6 per thousand (p<.001). When female-male income differentials are large at the national level, the under-five mortality rate will increase by slightly over 22 per thousand on average (p<.001). Foreign aid spending does directly impact the under-five mortality rate. This analysis also shows that the female HIV infection rate across all reporting countries averaged 33.5 per thousand, with significant differences between countries (p<.001). The test variables (form of government and health programs) do not significantly affect HIV infection rate. Income and education equality factors do significantly impact the infection rate. Providing females with equal opportunity for education acts to reduce this rate by almost 7 per thousand (p<.001). Low female income at the micro and macro level will act to increase this rate (3.3 and 6.3 per thousand respectively, p<.001). Foreign aid spending does not significantly influence the female HIV infection rate.

There are, on average, just over 148 new cases of tuberculosis (TB) per year across countries and significant differences between these countries (p<.001). New TB infections are not significantly influenced by the form of government or education and income inequality. However, improved health programs such as water, sanitation, and vaccination programs act to reduce new TB cases by over 100 per year (p<.001) and foreign aid spending on health programs acts reduce new TB cases by 79 cases per year (p<.001). Using the HDI provides a model of the overall impact that these independent variables have on population health. The constant shows the average HDI across countries is 0.711, with significant difference between countries (p<.001). Emergent democracies have an HDI score that is, on average, .052 less that social or liberal democracies or even autocratic governments (p<.05). The HDI score of a country is positively affected by health programs (0.053, p<.001), female education equality (0.071, p<.001), and foreign aid spending on health (0.037, p<.001). Macro-level female income inequality negatively impacts the HDI score (-0.055, p<.001).

Discussion and conclusions

Results show the presence of an emergent democracy results in negative outcomes for some population health measures. Such health crises transpire not only from open warfare, but from situations of political instability and widespread social disorder that result in destruction of public facilities and disruption of essential health services. It is the loss of primary social and public infrastructure that has the direct negative impact on population health measures. These social situations often devolve into gender-based education and economic status that result in higher morbidity and mortality for elders, women, and children. Further, the loss of infrastructure prevents data collection and surveillance necessary to plan and deliver effective interventions (Burkle and Noji 2004).

This analysis failed to assess direct effects of gender on health, in part because of the lack of gender-specific health data. In this analysis, gendered social relations are embedded in unequal access to education, the labour force, and access to economic resources. Female income and education inequality create gradients of social disadvantage that significantly reduce levels of population health through reduced implementation, effectiveness of, or compliance with health care programs. Micro-level income inequality increases gender-based disparities in income and access to the labour market and gender and age disparities in access to economic resources, placing women, children, and elders at higher risk of illness or disease.

Table 2: Summary regression models showing significant relationships ($p<.05$)

	Population health measure			
	Under 5 mortality (000's)	Female HIV rate (000's)	New TB cases (N)	HDI
Constant (B)	59.29	33.54	148.78	.711
Test variables				
Form of government				
Emergent democracy	18.85			-.052
Social democracy				
Autocratic government				
Liberal democracy (reference)	-	-	-	-
Health programs	-14.39		-101.12	.053
Control variables (factors)				
Education equality	-32.22	-.6.68		.071
Micro income inequality	11.62	3.35		
Macro income inequality	22.22	6.32		-.055
Foreign aid/health spending			-79.14	.037
N	186	112	185	172
Adjusted R^2	.865	.685	.658	.827

Results show that implementing primary health programs and promoting female education significantly improves the health status of women and children. Such programs can off-set negative social situations that prevail in emergent democracies. Considering the complexity of relationships between health, economic, and demographic variables, the high degree of intercorrelation among variables indicates that disease, health, and structural variables are interrelated and integral components of a global socio-political system in which nations with poor economies, weak infrastructure, and large populations have higher disease rates of all types (UNICEF 2004; Mill, Ogilvie, Astle, and Opare 2005).

This analysis offers support for a materialist perspective as it shows the significant impact that material life conditions have on health outcomes. There is also support for a cultural/behavioural perspective as it relates to education and economic-driven health choices and behaviours. This leads towards a structure-agency argument, such as put forth by Giddens (1984), in an attempt to avoid determinism. By not focusing solely on the individual actor or societal structure, we can consider social practices like health care to be ordered across space and time. From this perspective, social structures make healthy living possible at the same time that healthy choices create those very structures.

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-Embodying globalizations-

"The body is not a battleground": The anti-vaccination movement and ideas about biomedicine, health, and the body

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"Opposition began with the first vaccinations, has not ceased, and probably never will" (Wolfe and Sharp 2000, 432). Not only has opposition to vaccinations not ceased, but with the globalization of biomedicine, it is described as a growing movement in both developed and developing countries (Nasir 2000; André 2003). In light of this, "[r]esearch clarifying the relationship between alternative health care beliefs and immunization practices is urgently needed" (Nasir 2000, 733). Colgrove (2005) views the anti-vaccination movement as worthy of examination not only for its own sake but also as a lens through which to address issues at the heart of modern democratic states, including the appropriate extent of government intervention in people's private lives, the legitimacy of some forms of knowledge over others, and the impact of science on decisions involving health and the body. This paper responds to these calls by examining the ideas about health and the human body and the perceptions about biomedicine which underlie vaccine non-acceptance and anti-vaccination advocacy. While this study focuses on analysis of contemporary articles posted on the Internet, primarily from Britain and North America, I also pay attention to the history of anti-vaccination movements and current international circumstances. Finally, I explore the implications of this work for public health and biomedicine and suggest directions for further research.

I argue that rather than simply seeking to identify the beliefs and attitudes of anti-vaccinationists in order only to challenge them and to obtain their submission to routine immunizations, physicians and scientists within the biomedical system might gain understanding of and appreciation for differing perspectives. Doing so could lead to changes in their own clinical practices and scientific models of health, illness, and the immune system. This could lead towards constructing the body less as a "battleground" and more as a site of negotiated meaning.

Results

Attitudes toward biomedicine

The first theme which becomes apparent in online anti-vaccination literature is opposition to the militaristic attitude of biomedicine and its use of the war metaphor. Anti-vaccinationists see the allopathic assumption that disease is an enemy as the root of many problems. They argue that "the mentality of war" prompts laws for compulsory vaccination which "[read] like the story of martial law in an occupied country" (Neustaedter 2007, §3). They resist militaristic analogies, insisting that "[t]he body is not a battleground. Hostile enemy forces are not threatening our way of life and biochemical warfare is not the only solution to illness" (Neustaedter 2007, §5).

Anti-vaccinationists express skepticism and suspicion of biomedical teachings and assumptions. One author laments that "we are seen as machines, which have to constantly function equally well all the time" (Petek-Dimmer 2002, §6). Neustaedter (2007, §9), a homeopathic doctor with a degree in "Oriental medicine," compares a physician's advice to a "car salesman's pitch." He argues that vaccines should be considered consumer goods to be researched “even more carefully than other purchases” (Neustaedter 2007, §9). Furthermore, vaccination is seen as part of a dogmatic religious belief in biomedicine. Moskowitz (1992, §8) argues that vaccines “have become sacraments of our faith in biotechnology” and views them as “ritually initiat[ing] our loyal participation in the medical enterprise as a whole.” To Peggy Brusseaux, vaccination is “a perverse social baptism by blood, pus, and sputum” (quoted in Tyler 1991, §11).

Philosophies of health

Authors of online anti-vaccination articles express a number of basic philosophical differences between the allopathic approach to health and alternative medical practices. First, they charge that biomedicine is based in fear and that “people are trained from the beginning of life that the responsibility for their own body's health is something they can't be trusted with, but must rely on outside authority” (O’Shea 2001, §43). Neustaedter (2007, §2) urges parents to “examine their beliefs” because the acceptance of vaccination “implies tacit approval of the allopathic medical philosophy.” The writers contrast what they see as the mechanical perspective of biomedicine with an alternative viewpoint which regards the body as a holistic unit (Neustaedter 2007). Anti-vaccinationists compare their own “nurturing” approach to biomedicine’s “assaults” with toxic chemicals. They describe “a shift in consciousness” (Neustaedter 2007, §9) and a “growing acceptance” of alternative approaches (Boykin 2007, §25). Petek-Dimmer (2002, §7) calls for “a new relationship to diseases in general … relearn[ing] to accept illness as a normal part of life.” Moreover, they argue that illness may actually be beneficial, strengthening the immune system and cleansing the body.

Perceptions of vaccines

Not only do anti-vaccinationists reject the typical biomedical viewpoint of infectious disease as something to be avoided at all costs, they also perceive the vaccines, which others view as protection, as “horrible substances” that pose a serious danger to the body (Brusseaux quoted in Tyler 1991, §11). The online articles are characterized by an overwhelmingly negative view of the physical makeup of vaccines. They were frequently described as “poisons” (Jeri 1998, §7; Loglia 2007, §65, 72, 80), “toxic” substances (Boykin 2007, §1; Neustaedter 2007, §6, 8) containing “virulent free-floating genetic material … with all kinds of poisonous cancerous agents” (Loglia 2007, §32), “a concoction of bacteria and viruses that are manufactured using … aborted fetal tissue, dead animal flesh and formaldehyde” (Boykin 2007, §1), and “ethylene glycol (antifreeze)” (Jeri 1998, §7). Gregory (2007) describes vaccination as a pollution of the immune system.

Another common objection to vaccines is that they are injected directly into the bloodstream, bypassing the usual route of infection. Also expressed was the idea that once a person is injected with the virus, it does not leave his or her bloodstream and that this amounts to chronic illness. This is related to the tragic stories found on countless anti-vaccination websites, told by parents of “vaccine-injured” children who believe that their children’s medical conditions or deaths were caused by vaccinations they received. The perception that vaccines damage the immune system is also widespread. Petek-Dimmer (2002, §29) describes vaccination as upsetting “the ecological balances between human beings and microbes.” Tyler (1991, §1) sums up the general sentiment that vaccines are “dangerous and pointless assaults on children’s bodies.”

Ideas about the body

For the anti-vaccinationists, the main source of resistance to infectious diseases is not in any kind of medical intervention but in the body itself. Proper self-care as the key to good health is a central message of many of the articles. Boykin (2007, §25), for example, refers to "the value of a balanced, harmonious lifestyle including exercise and a sensible diet as a way to promote health and fortify the body."

Finally, the last major theme across the articles is an appeal to a basic sense of what is "natural," not only in a biological context but in a spiritual sense as well. Staver (2005, §23) argues that "[t]o be good stewards of God's creation, we must act our conscience and obey the laws of nature." Vaccines are seen as "unnatural," conferring "artificial immunity" as opposed to "natural immunity" (O'Shea 2001, §14-6) and are an "interference with nature" (Petek-Dimmer 2002, §16). As Davies et al. (2002, 24) found in their study of online anti-vaccination activists, the websites "represent a return to an idealized, natural existence," often one of spiritual or religious significance. For example, O'Shea's (2001) article is entitled "The Sanctity of Human Blood," and the article by Staver (2005, §5) emphatically proclaims that "Our Bodies are the temple of God's Holy Spirit." If "vaccination defiles the body" (Staver 2005, §31), not only are vaccines physically poisonous, but potentially spiritually toxic too.

Discussion

Wolfe and Sharp (2002) see many similarities between the anti-vaccinationism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the contemporary movement. The similarities suggest a continuity of beliefs. For example, the idea that vaccines are "poisons" which interfere with the body's natural system of health maintenance goes back to the early years of chiropractics (Campbell, Busse, and Injeyan 2000).

The anti-vaccination articles posted on the Web express general views of biomedicine as militaristic and authoritarian, vaccines as chemical pollutants, health as a holistic, balanced concept, and the body as sacred and powerful in its own right. These beliefs correspond with the results of previous studies and with the views expressed by alternative health care practitioners in interviews conducted by Emily Martin (1994). These similarities are not surprising considering that many authors of anti-vaccination articles are doctors of alternative health systems such as chiropractics and homeopathy.

Some recent studies have approached this topic with the purpose of developing educational materials and methods of countering anti-vaccination rhetoric and persuading people to submit to vaccination recommendations. Wolfe and Sharp (2002, 432) pose the question, "how should the mainstream medical authorities approach the anti-vaccination movement?" Rather than simply studying their beliefs in order to challenge them, how might we learn from anti-vaccinationists' perspectives on biomedicine and re-examine its assumptions and practices?

As Hobson-West (2003, 281) argues, the current public health strategy of risk communication "fails to appreciate the meaning of anti-vaccination. At least some resistance functions as a critique which problematizes the basic assumptions upon which vaccination rests … about the relationship between … health and disease." Leask and Chapman (1998, 17) state that biomedical responses to anti-vaccination must go beyond addressing concerns about safety and "be grounded in a reframing of the ideological appeals that currently frame the contents of anti-immunization discourse."

The results of this study support the assertion that physicians, public health officials, and policy-makers who wish to promote immunization should consider the basis of much resistance to vaccination to understand why appeals to statistics and biomedical arguments may not work (Hobson-

West 2003). Based on such an understanding, they need to either modify how they seek to convince those who are reluctant to vaccinate or consider how to change their own thinking about vaccination. For example, the perspectives of anti-vaccinationists might inform a re-evaluation of the use of the problematic war metaphor in immunology (see Weasel 2001). In Martin's (1994, 69) interviews with alternative health care practitioners, she found that all of them argued for "the inadequacy of models that see the body as a defended fortress set apart from and at war with the rest of the world."

Furthermore, much could be learned about how to improve the clinical encounter between doctor and patient. As Wolfe and Sharp (2000) argue, people with anti-vaccination-associated beliefs turn against allopathic medicine because of its homogenous approach which focuses on the body in discrete parts and systems rather than on a whole person in both a physical and spiritual sense. Greater attention to individuals' understandings and perspectives on health and healing, as advocated in cultural competency training, would be useful for all patients whether they come from a different "cultural" group or not.

This potential shift in thinking about the relationship between biomedicine and anti-vaccinationism represents an opening for a dialogue that has the potential to transform the conflict and antagonism into a "creative tension" (Wolfe and Sharp 2002, 432) which would be mutually beneficial, addressing the goals of both sides, perhaps simultaneously leading to increased vaccine acceptance (or at the least not the feared growth in non-acceptance) and to changes in some of the assumptions of biomedicine. Finally, it might result in a greater respect for those whose worldviews fall outside the mainstream.

In their article, Wolfe and Sharp (2002, 432) quote a passage from Martin Emil Marty, a theologian and scholar of American religion, which also summarizes my thoughts here: "The insistent questioners of mainstream practice will not go away and will not be silenced. They will trouble majorities. The wise goal is to promote understanding that can at least see to it that the troubling is creative and not merely disruptive."

Conclusion

This study examined English-language websites from Western countries. As Stanton (2004) observes, however, there are significant cultural and national variations in terms of views of specific vaccines. In light of recent reactions against vaccination in a number of countries due to rumours of contamination or sterilization conspiracies, which in Nigeria led to five northern states banning the use of the oral polio vaccine (see Obadare 2005), and of the advances in technology and molecular biology which are rapidly producing a number of new vaccines (Feudtner and Marcuse 2001), it would be useful to examine also the basis of existing philosophically based resistance to vaccination in non-Western settings and among immigrants to the West.[1] As Stanton (2004) argues, "when the importance of preparatory behavioural and anthropologic research is … considered [as] integral to the introduction of new vaccines" as is epidemiological work, "new levels of success" will be reached, whether this is measured by increased rates of vaccine acceptance, greater trust between doctors and patients, or changes in biomedical approaches.

Despite the significant historical and sociopolitical differences between Western and non-Western (especially postcolonial) states that create very different meanings of vaccine resistance in each context, the "ticklish conjuncture at which health, politics, and history coincide" (Obadare 2005, 274), the common thread between the Western anti-vaccination movement and controversies about the polio vaccine in developing countries such as Nigeria appears to be a lack of trust between individuals and the state, as well as individuals and representatives of global biomedicine such as physicians and health officials (Obadare 2005). However, as this paper has shown, there are often deeper understandings and beliefs that go beyond the trust gap, which may also be contributing to the problems of communication. Feudtner and Marcuse (2001) call specifically for dialogue which incorporates both “empirical reasoning” and moral concerns, which physicians and public health officials often fail to address.

While analysis of global religious and political circumstances can explain much of the emergence of anti-vaccination sentiment, anthropology could potentially provide greater understanding of perspectives and beliefs about health and the body which contrast with the dominant Western biomedical approach, keeping in mind when necessary the continuing impact of colonial histories as well as anthropology’s own colonial past. Martin (1990) argues for the particular usefulness of comparative ethnography in re-imagining both bodies and societies. Anthropology, with its holistic, cross-cultural approach and recognition of the culturally constructed nature of knowledge and the value of negotiated meaning, has much to contribute to improved communication and dialogue towards reducing the conflict over vaccination and the battle over bodies.

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Determining a refugee’s identity by means of categorical principles: The role of evidence in the refugee determination process

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> The premise that objective, current and reliable information is essential to good decision-making is central to the philosophy that inspired the creation of the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and continues to govern its activities. The provision of Country of Origin research to all parties in the refugee protection determination process makes a valuable contribution to informed decision-making and the integrity of Canada’s refugee protection system (Immigration and Refugee Board 2007).

Evidence determines the credibility, legitimacy, and, eventually, the identity of the claimant in question. The responsibility of the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board towards the integrity of the refugee determination process is substantial, as authoritative evidence can sway the decision-maker and provide fuel for either accepting or rejecting a claimant’s story. As the paragraph above indicates, the Research Directorate is an authoritative source for a wide range of information on country conditions and human rights situations in a claimant’s country. The information coming from the Research Directorate, including issue papers and national documentation packages, makes up a significant contribution to the evidence presented in a refugee’s hearing. Hence, it becomes imperative to test the accuracy, reliability, and influence of the information from the Research Directorate. The Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre (IRBDC) is a main source of information for the Research Directorate.

Canada’s refugee determination system underwent significant changes in the late 1980s in order to address an increase in persons claiming protection in Canada. The new refugee system included the development of a quasi-judicial tribunal to conduct oral hearings to assess all the components of a refugee claim, including evidentiary matters. Alongside the development of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), a research centre was set up to compile background information to help better assess the validity of claims. Canada, as a signatory of the Geneva Conventions, was compelled to provide a resource centre for both decision-makers and claimants in order to fulfill stipulations set out in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook. This handbook discusses two principles that became part of the basis for the development of a resource centre. The UNHCR Handbook (1988, §196) states that “claimants are not in a position to obtain relevant objective evidence,” and that “objective evidence will be a determinant in the bulk of refugee cases.” The sovereignty of Canada’s refugee determination system meant that the enactment of the resource centre also influenced the need to restore credibility and integrity to the system through the facilitation of accurate and fair decisions.

This research undertakes to show how these institutions construct and, subsequently, categorize the elements of a refugee identity for the purpose of maintaining a system that excludes claimants who do not fit into a particular category. These categories facilitate the ability of institutions to racialize and construct the refugee claimant in opposition to the decision-making tribunal and the nation-state that governs it. The practices of the Research Directorate are laden with similar issues that serve to increase the control of the adjudicators in the refugee determination system over the fate of the claimant. Information that is overly generalized, biased, or applied wrongly in the refugee hearing is indicative of the strong potential for making incorrect decisions, as well as the fact that decisions based on false information are indeed made. This not only threatens the credibility and integrity of the refugee system, but also highlights the lack of agency the refugee claimant has in determining her future.

Questioning reliability, accuracy and influence

The influence of the Immigration and Refugee Board Research Directorate and the IRBDC on the credibility of the refugee adjudication process is extensive. Evidence and information presented in the hearing room is a decisive factor in a Board member's decision to either accept or reject a claimant's case. Hence, it becomes imperative to ensure the information from the IRBDC is held to the highest standards of accuracy and reliability. Inaccuracies or misuse of this information can have drastic consequences on the credibility of the refugee determination process.

The neutrality of the IRBDC, alongside the bias of refugee protection officers and Board members, has been questioned since its conception. The interconnectedness of political patronage and the refugee process has been a core characteristic of the Centre throughout its development. Accusations have ranged from the use of evidence laced with an institutional bias, to the discounting of evidence by refugee protection officers, to the anti-refugee position of select Board members. Given the importance of evidence in shaping the identity of the claimant, it becomes imperative to question how the wrongful application of this evidence could be used to reject a claimant's proposed identity and, subsequently, to refuse her/his claim for protection. The following discussions will question if the IRBDC fulfills the role of providing reliable information given the reality of the problems stated above.

The categorization of identity by refugee protection officers

The position taken in this paper is that the determining factor in a refugee claim is a claimant's credibility; notably, credibility is dependent on proving one's identity (Dauvergne 2005, 83). Proving one's identity is strongly influenced by information and evidence that gives legitimacy to a claimant's assertions (IRB 2003, §6.16). However, decision-makers must be made aware that evidence may discount the fluidity of identity and, therefore, may affect the accuracy of the decision. This section will illustrate how a complex identity is purposefully ignored in the refugee process, through the misuse of evidence in order to easily categorize the claim.

The most common form of the misuse of evidence from the IRBDC is through the selective use of information. The IRB supports the selective use of evidence when deciding a refugee claim, as shown in the following statement: "It is not a reviewable error for the Board to rely on some documents and not others" (IRB 2003, §6.8.4). Relying on select information is a common technique employed by refugee protection officers (RPOs) in the refugee process. One of the RPOs' many roles is selecting the important information needed to help ascertain the truth of a claimant's story (IRB 2006, 11). This role has particular importance over the outcome of a claim decision, as all relevant evidence must be disclosed in order to reach an informed and fair decision (IRB 2006, 12). The RPO is also supposed to provide the context and background information to the claim and to pinpoint the preliminary issues in the hearing (Informant 2, 2007).

The impartiality of an RPO may be questioned if they engage in the selective use of evidence. The selective use of evidence is indicative of a desire to sway the outcome of the claim, most often in favour of the Board. The IRB acknowledges that the selective use of evidence may occur and takes no avenues to prevent this besides recommending that "the panel must do more than simply search through the evidence looking for inconsistencies or for evidence that lacks credibility, thereby building a case against the claimant, and ignore the other aspects of the claim" (IRB 2004, §2.1.1). Many accusations have surfaced of the adversarial approach taken by RPOs, commonly described as an "energetic" questioning that gives the appearance of arguing against the refugee's claims (IRB 2004, §2.6.4). The selective use of information in the refugee process indicates a noticeable political agenda on the part of the refugee protection officer.

The above examples confirm a political bias, on the part of certain RPOs, affecting the legitimacy and accuracy of decisions. In a report titled "Refugee claims: The role of Board members and hearing officers," the IRBDC is stated as the main resource for an RPO to gather the needed information for a hearing (Laredo 1989, 5). The selective use of information from the IRBDC is a technique used by an RPO in order to reach a sought-after decision. A preferred decision is a claim based on an identity that is easily categorized and supported by evidence from the IRBDC. An RPO may use her/his influential role to construct a claimant's identity for the purpose of slotting them into a definable category (Dauvergne 2005, 102). This misconstrued identity is supported through the selective use of information from the IRBDC and results in faulty decisions, erring on the side of rejection.

The authoritative weight of IRBDC research

Evidence presented in a refugee hearing is supposed to be given an equal assessment of its authoritative weight, regardless of its source. The IRB (2003, §4) describes the term "to weigh evidence" as:

> to assess the reliability and probative value of evidence that has already been determined to be relevant. The probative value of evidence is its value in assisting in determining the matters in issue … the more trustworthy and probative evidence is given more weight in coming to a decision on the matters in issue.

The IRB recommends using "the application of common sense" to determine the weight assigned to evidence. The method of applying common sense is problematic in many ways; most notably, if the political bias of Board members permeates into their common sense. This bias may result in less weight assigned to information that will help prove the claimant's case.

There have been many instances since the development of the IRBDC of less authoritative weight being assigned to evidence not produced by the Research Directorate. This practice was especially problematic earlier in the history of the Board when claims were assessed with little information available on a claimant's situation of persecution. One informant gave a typical example of the discounting of evidence when s/he discussed the situation of homosexuals seeking protection from persecution in Russia. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, an array of information describing the persecution of homosexuals began filtering out of Russia.

> The first report provided by a gay rights organization was called 'The Pink Book.' Many [Board] members discounted this information because it was from a gay rights organization. This is ironic because when there was first persecution of Christians in China, it was first reported by the Churches and didn't receive the same kind of reaction (Informant 2, 2007).

This is one example of Board members placing no authoritative weight on credible evidence due to the source of information being perceived as having an interest in gay rights in Russia and, therefore, in the outcome of case decisions. The amount of authoritative weight has significant influence on the extent to which an information source is valued as helping to credit or discredit a refugee's claim (IRB 2003, §4).

If the information presented in the hearing by an RPO or Board member contains an authoritative source, it is extremely difficult for counsel to disprove its accuracy and validity. One informant discussed a case where evidence presented by the Board contained a very biased viewpoint. When counsel questioned the document as credible, the Board had problems in revealing its sources of information. The informant expressed frustration with challenging evidence presented by the IRB that has an obvious bias. "If you challenge them [the IRB] and question 'who is the expert' in this document, they say 'We cannot tell you in order to protect the confidentiality of the expert'" (Informant 1, 2007). In this case, the informant needed to produce vast amounts of information to prove the IRB document was biased and should not be given weight in determining the claimant's case. This example pinpoints a common accusation directed towards the adjudicators in the refugee determination process of how they tend to support and prioritize the claims produced by the IRBDC and their researchers. Although IRB research policies explicitly state how evidentiary information is assessed on criteria such as questioning the bias of the author/publisher and the tone of the document, it fails to discuss the methods taken to address this common problem (IRB 2007a).

It is important to note that many of the adjudicators in the refugee determination process perceive the researchers within the IRBDC as neutral and objective sources (IRB 2007a). This commonly leads to the appearance of an institutional bias, whereby the evidence from the IRBDC is presumed to be authoritative and correct. It is clear that this perception is inaccurate since the fact-finding missions and researchers are rarely able to provide a wide spectrum of information from a variety of viewpoints. Most commonly, the viewpoint is from a readily available government spokesperson who is unlikely to be critical of the actions of the government. An informant emphasized this problem when s/he discussed a situation when researchers undertook a recent fact-finding mission for the IRBDC: "the government in Mexico may be readily available to talk, but the researcher may not be able to go into the slums in Mexico City and talk with people there" (Informant 2, 2007). Hence, the reports and evidence that are produced through the Research Directorate may possess a state-supported bias. Therefore, it is vital that the information produced by the Research Directorate is assessed by the same stringent criteria as other information gathered and is not presumed to be void of biases and inaccuracies.

Conclusion

This research project undertook to show how institutions, such as the IRBDC, construct and categorize a refugee's identity to maintain a system that excludes claimants who do not fit into a particular criterion. As Canada's refugee determination system continues to be subject to widespread criticism, such as accusations of political patronage, increased transparency must develop within the practices of the IRB. In particular, a focus on preventing incorrect evidence from permeating the refugee determination process is a recommended reform. The players within the refugee system continue to have significant influence over the application of evidence in the hearing room. Therefore, the conduct of these players must be scrutinized and held accountable for decisions that harm the integrity of the decision-making process. Specifically, misuse of information by RPOs and Board members is currently not regarded as an acute problem.

In examining the guidelines and codes of conduct for both RPOs and Board members, there is a tendency to err on the side of the decision-maker. For instance, the decision-maker determines which evidence is important in proving a claimant's identity, ignoring information that could be pertinent to the case (IRB 2003). The common assumption by Board members that identity is easily definable through specific traits may result in the discounting of information in the hearing room. In order to make the IRB's practices more accountable, questioning the decision of a single Board member to dismiss important evidence must be well received, if not encouraged.

The use of incorrect evidence in Canada's refugee determination process can generate a chain reaction that has unforeseen consequences on international refugee systems. Canada's Documentation Centre has considerable responsibility as it is used to help decide refugee claims from London to Sydney and, thus, must adhere to the highest standards of accuracy and reliability (Dauvergne 2005, 107). The consequences of incorrect information could trigger the dismissal of an unprecedented number of refugee claims internationally, resulting in the return of many individuals to situations of persecution.

This research project is meant to pave the way for future discussions on the role of the IRBDC. This research was conducted within a framework that recognizes the importance that a refugee's identity carries in the refugee process and the role of evidence in shaping this identity. This project has questioned the practices of institutions in constructing identity in order to subsequently reject a claim for protection. Future research would benefit from an examination of the extent to which incorrect evidence appears in refugee hearings and finding concrete proof indicating the number of incorrect decisions annually. In addition, conducting a content analysis of documents within the IRBDC to examine the frequency of bias would be beneficial. An examination of decisions based on false information must be placed at the forefront of the issues currently being researched at the IRB. As the number of incorrect decisions continues to climb, consensus on the authoritative nature of evidence in the refugee determination process requires a certain degree of urgency in producing this research.

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“A reserve army of labour”: Patterns of mobility and integration of migrant skilled workers in Canada

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In the last two decades, international migration of skilled workers has emerged as an increasingly critical policy issue for both sending and receiving countries. Skilled immigration has been growing at a faster rate than total immigration in many receiving countries (Kingma 2001, 208). According to one estimate, there are one and a half million professionals from developing countries in industrial countries (Stalker 2000). The significant increase in migration flows has led to a greater attention on the quality of migrant workers’ skills.[1] In both scholarly and policy circles, there has been a tendency to focus on the net effects of skilled migration on different countries. Skilled migration, however, is not a blanket process, but rather affects specific occupations within a country, and/or certain groups of countries that are closely linked by flows of workers (Lowell and Findlay 2002).

The objective of my paper is to explore the patterns of high-skilled migration and labour market integration of professionals in Canada. In analyzing the patterns of migration and integration, two professions are considered – healthcare (medicine and nursing) and information technology (IT). The IT profession and industry are relatively free of national and professional control while healthcare professions are nation and profession bound (Iredale 2001). Therefore, these two professions allow for an interesting comparison of the flows and patterns of migration and labour market integration. Canada provides a good context for analyzing skilled migration and integration, not least because it is considered as one of the main competitors in the international market for talent. Moreover, recent changes in immigration policy in the country have focused increasingly on skills of immigrants.

On the basis of the discussions, I argue that the migration of professionals has become an increasingly complex process which is mediated by a host of factors like the nature and characteristics of occupations, labour market situation, and state immigration policies. In particular, any understanding of the trends in flows of skilled workers must take account of the considerable differences among professions. On the one hand, analyses of the integration of migrant healthcare workers in Canada demonstrate highly exclusionary social and occupational practices. On the other hand, labour market integration of IT workers shows relatively positive outcomes. The differential outcomes in labour market integration are explained by the differences in the regulatory mechanisms governing these professions.

Theoretical perspectives on professional migration

The process of skilled migration can be viewed from different perspectives. One set of theories explain migration as determined by individual motivations and calculations of cost-benefit analysis (Castles and Miller 1998; Massey et al. 2005). An example of the individual-oriented approach is the push-pull theory, which views the decision to migrate as influenced by push (poor wages, economic, and political instability) and pull (better or more comfortable living and working conditions, higher wages, and opportunities for advancement) factors. This approach focuses excessively on the individual level, ignoring meso and macro factors. There is little scope for incorporating the impacts of institutional factors or racial and ethnic cleavages. Economic disparities between sending and receiving countries constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for emigration (Massey et al. 2005). Thus, over time macro perspectives locating the movement of the highly skilled within broader processes of domestic and global economic restructuring received increasing attention. The strength of these developments has been to place more emphasis on the demand rather than the supply side (Koser and Salt 1997).

The politics of highly skilled migration takes place within a considerably interrelated regulatory mechanism that exists on at least three intersecting levels of policy-making: global (multilateral), regional, and unilateral (nation-state) frameworks (Christian 2000). The major labour importing countries, driven by the need to maintain competitiveness in the globalizing economy, are increasingly competing for skilled workers (Kapur and McHale 2005). As a result, these countries are following a path of liberalization in their policies of regulating and facilitating the migration of high-skilled workers.[2]

Saskia Sassen (1998) uses the term "*de facto* transnationalization" to describe the capacity (or more appropriately the lack thereof) of nation-states to have control over their immigration policies in the context of economic globalization. Nevertheless, the extent and nature of movement of people ultimately depends on individual states and, more specifically, their immigration policies. Immigration policy, including policies that facilitate skilled immigration, is a function of the influences of global as well domestic economic considerations, divergent national political forces, and professional bodies. According to James Hollifield (2004), states are increasingly forced to strike a balance between economic and political forces to regulate migration. He articulates the potential contradiction between these forces as the *liberal paradox*: on one hand, economic pressures push states towards greater openness, while on the other hand, the international state system security and domestic political concerns drive them toward closure.

How can we integrate the different levels of analysis of skilled migration? Moreover, how can we account for the diversity of individual motivations, immigration policies, and the impact of global economic restructuring? One possible avenue is to focus on specific professions (Iredale 1999; 2001). An explanatory framework for international migration of the highly-skilled needs to recognize the disaggregated nature of the modern labour market in which specialist skills and training mean that the workforce is segmented into self-contained and often non-competing groups (Salt and Findlay 1989, 163). The focus here is on distinguishing specific occupational types and their relationship with labour market processes and institutions.

Iredale (2001) outlines a typology of skilled migration by the nature of profession. His typology incorporates key issues like the type and level of regulatory mechanisms, the level of internationalization of the profession, the relative influence of the market, the state, and the profession, and the global labour market demand/supply situation. This framework helps us to delineate the qualitative differences between the IT and healthcare professions in a number of ways. First, while demands for both IT and healthcare professionals in industrial countries are high, differences do exist in terms of the nature of the demands. With regard to health professionals, the demand appears to be structural, and the current period of shortage will continue in the foreseeable future (Ray et al. 2005). In contrast, it is the market that primarily determines the flow of skilled professionals in the IT industry (Iredale 2001). Generally, migration of workers in corporate sectors such as IT has increased significantly with economic globalization and the emergence of transnational corporations (Koser and Salt 1997).[3] The demand for workers in IT is more cyclical compared to the health profession. Second, healthcare and the IT industry are governed by quite different regulatory mechanisms. The migration of health workers is distinctive because of the influence of the regulatory frameworks of individual governments that control the licensing, recruitment, and deployment of health professionals (Bach 2003). On the other hand, skills are more easily transferable in IT and the industry is relatively free of national controls (Khadria 2001).

A focus on specific professions also helps us to understand key dimensions of the integration of skilled workers into the labour market, particularly in relation to the effects of the structure of professions in receiving countries on skilled migration. According to the professional dominance perspective, professions use legal and clinical autonomy to control other groups competing for positions in their labour market (Freidson 1970). In fact, the goal of professional projects includes strategies of advancing the goals of professionalization through regulatory controls (Larkin 1983). Critical dimensions of professional power thus include control of the market by means of the licensing mechanism (which determines the boundaries of legitimate practice), the supply of personnel, entry criteria, and rates of entry of new practitioners into the field. Because these regulatory bodies constitute key components of the economy, governments are generally unwilling to alienate them. Accordingly, these regulatory bodies constitute an important factor in the institution of possibilities for integration of skilled migrants into the labour force in receiving countries. Yet, the processes of integration also have social dimensions. Thus, institutional closure often goes hand in hand with social mechanisms of exclusion (MacDonald 1995). Studies have focused on the experiences of discrimination, adaptation, and accommodation of immigrants at the individual and societal levels (Remennick 2002; Shuval 1995).

Integration of migrant professionals in Canada

In Canada, race-based restrictions on immigration were removed in 1967 with the introduction of the points system – a standardizing tool for the selection of economic immigrants. In this system, migrants are positively selected with respect to human capital characteristics such as education, occupational status, and skills. The need for skilled labour from abroad was a necessary response to, among other things, the transition to a knowledge economy and the aging of the population in Canada (Reitz 2004; Kapur and McHale 2005).

In 2006, as much as forty-two percent of the total permanent residents were in the skilled worker category (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2007). There was also a shift in the sources of recent cohorts of immigrants, with China, India, and the Philippines being the leading source countries in 2006. The emphasis on skills in immigration resulted in the creation of a large pool of highly educated immigrants who tend to be better educated than the Canadian-born population. For instance, eighty-three percent of principal applicants who were admitted via the skill stream in 2000 had a bachelor's degree or better (Kapur and McHale 2005, 44). According to the 1996 Census, new immigrants who arrived between 1991 and 1996 were 1.6 times more likely to have a university education, 2.2 times more likely to have a master's degree and 4.3 times more likely to have a doctorate (Zhao et al. 2000).

Let us now look at some statistics on labour market outcomes of professionals in Canada, using Hawthorne's (2006) findings from the census data for 1996-2001 for degree-qualified immigrant groups in all immigration categories.[4] By 2001, sixty-five percent of degree-qualified 1996 -2001 arrivals had found work of some kind; the rest were unemployed and not in the labour force. Among those who found work, only thirty percent held professional positions, five percent had switched to administrative or managerial work, with very substantial additional numbers clustered in lower skilled positions. By the early 2000s, skilled class immigrants were actually more likely to enter low-income and be in chronic low-income than their family class counterparts (Hawthorne 2006, 19).

Migrant IT workers fared significantly better than their counterparts in healthcare (Hawthorne 2006). By 2001, fifty-seven percent of recently arrived IT degree-qualified Eastern Europeans had secured professional work in their field, forty-nine percent of those from South Eastern Europe, forty-three percent from Hong Kong, thirty-seven percent from India, forty-one percent from China, thirty-eight percent from Other Middle East and Northern Africa, thirty-two percent from the Philippines. In contrast, both nursing and medicine show less favourable outcomes. Approximately twenty-two percent of recently-arrived Indian nurses secured work in their field, twenty-two percent of Filipino nurses and thirty-two percent from North Western Europe. Large numbers of recently arrived nurses from China remained unemployed in Canada (twenty-eight percent) or were categorized as not in the labour force (twenty-five percent). Medicine also had far more negative outcomes. Only three percent of Filipino doctors had found medical positions by 2001, compared to four percent from China, eight percent from Eastern Europe, eleven percent from Iraq, twelve percent from other South and Central Asia, nineteen percent from India, and thirty-one percent from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Overall, the data confirm considerable negative outcomes of labour market integration of skilled immigrant workers in Canada. Deskilling and unemployment appear to be significant problems. This is perplexing given that immigrant professionals are more likely to be better skilled than Canadian-born professionals.

Two possible explanations have been forwarded. Reitz (2001) attributes the downward trend of employment of immigrants to institutional changes including rising levels of native-born education, the increased significance of education in Canadian labour markets, and the increased difficulty immigrants face in gaining market recognition of their qualification. The last of these factors, the undervaluation of skills and accreditation problems faced by immigrant in the Canadian labour market, is highly significant and will be elaborated below.

The second explanation has to do with racial discrimination (Reitz and Breton 1994; Reitz 2001). More recent immigrants, mostly from non-European backgrounds, have greater difficulties in securing employment than immigrants from European backgrounds. Analyzing the 1996 Census, Kunz, Milan, and Schetagne (2000, 23) found that less than half of foreign-born visible minorities who have a university education work in jobs which require high skill levels. Findings from Hawthorne's (2006) study also indicate that professionals from non-white countries tend to do worse. A counterfactual of this argument is that IT professionals from a number of non-white source countries tend to do better than their counterparts in healthcare professions. In this context, a more pertinent question to ask is why IT professionals have more positive outcomes than those in healthcare. How can we explain the differences in outcome for IT and healthcare professionals?

For the most part, the greater success in IT compared to healthcare can be explained by the nature of the two professions. More severe problems of unemployment, underemployment, and blocked mobility in healthcare are due to the regulatory mechanisms in place.[5] In Canada, healthcare is regulated at the provincial level by colleges and professional associations, often based on government statutes. Foreign-trained health professionals face difficulties in obtaining certification. One study found that as many as two-thirds of the foreign-trained nurses who began the process of licensure in Canada failed to complete it (Labonte et al. 2005).

Certification requirements represent a form of discrimination in that criteria are created which are universally applied to the Canadian born and foreign born alike, but have disproportionate effects in restricting access to trades or professions for the foreign-born. Boyd and Thomas (2001) argue that while the purpose of licensing and certification is to assure public health and safety, these practices are also the defining characteristics of occupational internal labour markets which create monopolies on products and/or services by controlling labour supply. The justifications employed by professional bodies to establish institutional qualification standards thus represent a strategic effort on the part of members to protect their professional, social, and economic interests by excluding non-members and foreign professionals (Girard and Bauder 2007; Bauder 2003).

The significance of racial discrimination cannot be underestimated. In fact, race seems to interact strongly with the institutional barriers. Race plays a significant role in restricting the mobility of immigrant professionals. One study found that overseas nurses in Canada often perceived that they were treated very differently from their Canadian colleagues, with more intensive controlling supervision (Hagey et al. 2001). Incidences of racial discrimination were also noted in a hospital in Ontario where black migrant nurses were streamed into long-term care whilst white nurses were offered a choice of specialties (Hagey et al. 2001, 390).

Conclusion

This paper underscores the contradictions resulting from globalization and the liberalization of immigration policies. While there is greater mobility of skilled workers worldwide, their social and economic experiences in receiving countries are not always positive. Focusing on the unique dimensions of specific professions can help us better understand the dynamics of skilled migration and integration.

This paper particularly highlights the importance of the regulatory frameworks in explaining the differential outcomes in IT and healthcare professions in Canada. Regulatory institutions actively exclude immigrants from the upper segments of the labour market. The paper also shows that as the immigration policy in Canada has evolved to prioritize skilled workers, the problems associated with access to professions have intensified simultaneously. The presence of barriers of licensure and registration is puzzling given the fact that the demand for migrant health workers in Canada is quite high. It can be argued that Canadian immigration policy is divorced from the existing regulatory mechanisms. While the government has less expenditure for highly educated migrants, the skilled migrants are faced with numerous challenges in applying their knowledge and skills. The outcome, at least in case of skilled migration in healthcare, is the creation of a reserve army of health care labour in Canada.

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Geographic mobility and social mobility: Friend or foe?

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At the turn of the century many scholars anticipated a decline in the role, and power, of the state as a result of globalizing economic forces. In particular, many pointed to the increasing size and speed of capital and labour flows putting pressure on states' control over their borders (Castles and Davidson 2000, 8, 61). One of the most significant flows has been the large number of workers migrating between the developing and developed world (Castles 2005, 25-6). Many have argued that, faced with an increasing number of individuals attempting to cross their borders, Western states are no longer able to effectively manage these labour flows (Castles 2005, 21-2). In addition, many of these governments, including Canada's, have supported a retrenchment of state intervention in the economy in order to facilitate the self-regulating flow of capital and labour (Mitchell 2004, 12-13, 43-44, 218).

While it may appear that Canada promotes a hypermobility of flows across its borders, the government's support for migration is socially differentiated. In the 1990s, the federal government created the Business Immigration Program*,* which enables wealthy foreign capitalists to jump the queue and immediately immigrate if they create businesses and invest in Canada (Mitchell 2004, 58). Similarly, the government also has a temporary worker program for low-skilled occupations – most notably those of agricultural and domestic work (Daenzer 1993; Macklin 1992). Rather than jumping the immigration queue, however, a limited number of low-skilled migrants are permitted to enter Canada for a temporary period. Thus, while the government may have loosened its control over certain labour flows, its control over the mobility of low-skilled migrants has remained extensive – particularly in the case of foreign domestic workers and caregivers. The main argument of this paper is that the government's regulation of the border, as well as its strict control over the mobility of these migrant workers, limits their short and long-term prospects and consequently perpetuates existing social stratification in Canada.

This paper begins with an examination of the specific methods of government control over the flow of foreign domestic workers and their living and working spaces. Following each of these points, the relationship between mobility rights and social stratification in Canada will be discussed in order to explore whether access to geographical mobility challenges or perpetuates social stratification. Building on the work of scholars studying migration and inequality (Huang et al. 2004; Pratt and Yeoh 2003), the emphasis of this paper is on the importance of incorporating a spatial dimension when analyzing the lived experiences of foreign domestic workers and caregivers in Canada. Finally, it should be noted that the state is not considered the only political actor in this analysis. Migrant workers protest the control over their mobility through their everyday actions as well as their participation in advocacy networks and social movements (Meagher 2000). My intent in this paper is not to reinforce the depiction of these women as passive victims (McKay et al. 2001); rather, it is to illustrate how these women's ability to assert their rights and their access social and economic opportunities in Canada are significantly restricted by the state's control over their spatial mobility.

Regulation of borders

In contrast to predictions of state retrenchment, the Canadian government has increased its control over borders so as to shape the types of low-skilled migrants entering its territory. One of the most direct examples of this control has been the government's ability to influence the particular geographical regions from which foreign caregivers and domestic workers predominantly come to Canada. For instance, in the 1960s a significant number of the domestic workers admitted into Canada came from the Caribbean (Browne 2002, 100; Macklin 1992, 692-3). During this time, the admittance criteria included a minimum standard of health, unmarried status, and at least an eighth grade education (Macklin 1992, 689; Barber 1991, 23). Since then, however, the Canadian government has progressively increased the admittance criteria. The most recent version of this migrant program, the 1992 Live-in Caregiver Program*,* requires that applicants have a grade twelve equivalent education and at least six months of formal training in the domestic or related field (Daenzer 1993, 126-8; Macklin 1992, 757-8). Rather than a neutral policy decision, these new admittance criteria have significantly affected who can cross the border under the program.

Today the vast majority of live-in caregivers in Canada originate from the Philippines, with fewer and fewer coming from the Caribbean (Langevin and Belleau 2000, 20).[1] Many have suggested that this geographical shift in sending countries is largely a result of the increased education and training criteria, which discriminate against women from countries where access to higher education is more limited (Langevin and Belleau 2000, 31). In response, the government has argued that increases in education and training requirements benefit Canadians by improving the quality of childcare being provided. Moreover, these elevated education requirements facilitate migrant workers' eventual transition from the domestic to other sectors in Canada's knowledge-based economy (Chapman 1992, 25-8; Langevin and Belleau 2000, 24). The consequences of these technocratic decisions, however, extend far beyond Canadian borders. Ultimately, the decision to change the admittance criteria enabled the government to change the sending regions from which it sought to recruit potential applicants. Thus, rather than being a passive actor in these spatial processes, the Canadian government plays a significant role in shaping the make-up of migrants entering its territory.

Not only does the government control who can cross its border, once migrant workers enter Canadian territory state control over their mobility increases. The most glaring example of this disproportionate control is the temporary status accorded to foreign domestic workers and caregivers. More specifically, these migrant labourers retain a temporary worker status until they complete twenty-four months of live-in caregiving or domestic work for a government-approved employer. If they do not complete this service within a thirty-six month period they are vulnerable to deportation (Pratt 1999, 37; Amnesty International 2002, 11).[2] Thus, in contrast to other migrants, such as those under the Business Immigration Program who are granted permanent resident status and full mobility rights upon entry (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2007), domestic workers have limited mobility rights for several years. These "low-skilled" workers can also lose all mobility rights if they do not fulfill the working criteria despite months, or years, of service to Canadian families.

One might argue that business migrants are given additional rights because their skills are in high demand. For instance, the Mulroney government pointed out that facilitating linkages with business migrants from certain key regions would expand Canada's networks in the global economy (Mitchell 2004, 58-60, 105). During House of Commons meetings, however, senior government officials have also admitted that foreign live-in caregivers fill key care-work labour demands in Canada (Chapman 1992, 28). Despite this fact, the government rarely mentions the dependence of Canadian families on low-skilled foreign caregivers (Fudge 1997, 120, 138-141). Thus, although both business migrants and domestic workers are necessary to the country's future stability and growth, the Canadian government appears to open its borders selectively, making it easier for its *preferred* to enter and remain in the country.

These actions have many social implications. In the short term, the differentiated provision of rights and legal status perpetuates stratification within the immigrant population in Canada. It also diminishes the contribution of domestic workers and caregivers to Canadian society (Fudge 1997, 132). Limited public valuation of the domestic and childcare work of these women underscores the sector's low-skilled and undervalued status to Canadians, thereby reinforcing their disadvantaged position in society. In the long-term, providing business migrants with additional mobility and legal rights allows these already economically advantaged migrants to increase their influence in neighbourhoods and improve their quality of life. For instance, Mitchell (2004, 148-9) describes how Hong Kong business immigrants in Vancouver have been able to challenge their neighbours in local politics to achieve their desired housing reforms. While providing business migrants with these rights is important, such opportunities should be granted to all immigrants. The precarious temporary legal status given to low-skilled domestic migrant workers, however, significantly increases the potential costs of challenging their employers on any issue, as they might risk losing their jobs if they anger their employers (Fudge 1997, 127). While it is important to note that foreign domestics in Canada have protested their living and working conditions (Fudge 1997, 126-7), their ability to do so is significantly restricted by the program's requirements.

Overall, the spatial and legal restrictions these temporary workers face increase social stratification between migrants, as the former face significant structural barriers to accessing the same opportunities and rights as other immigrants. Moreover, the limited rights and disadvantaged legal status of these workers differentiates them not only from other migrants, but also from the general Canadian population. Thus, these spatial restrictions perpetuate inequalities between migrants and within Canada more generally.

Regulations of the living and working space of domestic workers

Another example of the Canadian government's control over foreign domestics is its extensive control over these worker's bodies. The most direct example of this control is the program requirement forcing participants to reside in the home of their employers. In essence, this requirement necessitates that domestic workers live and work in the same space. Many non-governmental organizations, scholars, and United Nations officials have signalled the potentially exploitive scenarios from this situation. For instance the workers may be forced to work lengthy overtime hours, since their employers can request their assistance at virtually any hour (Amnesty International 2002, 11-13; Grandea and Kerr 1998, 7-9). In addition, the women have very little privacy as a result of the near constant presence of a family member (i.e. employer) in the home. Certain employers have even extended their control over these women from regulating their working duties, to monitoring their personal activities. For instance, several reports detail how some employers scrutinize their nanny's personal phone calls and inquire about their personal activities during days off (Makeda in Arat-Koc 1989, 42). Arguably, these spatial and time restrictions over the women's free time would make it difficult for them to engage in regular activities outside the home, such as training courses, to upgrade or maintain previously acquired skills. Consequently, this spatial control over these women's lives can lead to the decline of their skills, as well as limit their opportunity to develop new ones. As a result, their ability to leave the domestic and caregiving sector and to increase their socio-economic status, in the long-term, is hampered.

A final consequence of this extensive control and limited privacy is that many domestic workers and caregivers find it extremely difficult to stay in touch with their families back home. As a result of this limited communication, many women suffer significant emotional loss over the initial months and years in Canada. Migrant workers have even seen their families fall apart due to the prolonged separation (Cohen 2000, 84). Thus, the spatial requirements of this program can create significant consequences for these women in many spheres of their lives in the short and long term.

In addition to highlighting these more direct consequences, it is important to consider the more indirect effects of the spatial requirements. To begin this more nuanced analysis, one must recognize that the walls of employers' homes are not the only mobility barriers in migrant workers' lives. While the spatial structure of the home is made up of material and physical elements, the social relations and meanings present within this space also constitute the make-up of the home (Massey 1994). Thus, one must also assess how employers' and domestics' understandings of their home affect the social processes within it. For instance, many employers of foreign caregivers do not perceive their home as a place of work. As such, they do not consider themselves to be real employers with strict work schedules and responsibilities towards their employee (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, 139-41). Moreover, many employers do not perceive certain activities which reduce the free time of caregivers (such as playing with children after their work hours) as paid labour necessitating compensation (Grandea and Kerr 1998, 8-9).

Not only does this family ideology affect how employers understand their role within the home and how they relate to their domestic workers, it can also affect how the domestics understand their own work, as well as their labour and mobility rights. As Silvey's (2003) study of migrant labourers in Indonesia suggests, one must take into account how the place in which migrants work can influence how they assert their rights. It follows that if domestics and caregivers are constantly being told they are part of their employer's family, and as they become increasingly attached to the children they care for, they may feel that complaining about their working or living conditions would be betraying the loyalty of their host family. Thus, deconstructing the home reveals that not all spaces are neutral and that living inside the employer's home often creates a situation of excessive control, limited privacy, and exploitive labour relations (Carmalt 2007, 81).

Although this seems like a pessimistic scenario for securing the rights of these workers, it should be noted that the Canadian government does provide some assistance. However, rather than taking an active role in this area, the onus to protect one's rights is placed on the workers themselves. While provincial governments are responsible for enforcing labour codes and standards, it is the responsibility of the worker to report any abuse to the government (Fudge 1997, 126-7). Thus, although it is notable that some support exists, it is difficult to access. For instance, foreign domestics and caregivers are often unaware of their basic legal rights (Fudge 1997, 127; Bakan and Stasiulis 1995, 305). In addition, the spatial requirements of the program severely prohibit this type of action: since these workers are required to live in the home of their employers, who can regularly monitor them, it is difficult to contact the government and report abuse as they may fear retaliation from their employers (Langevin and Belleau 2000, 29-31; Fudge 1997, 127).

While one might suggest that these domestic workers could come together and form a union in order to increase their power against abusive employers, current labour laws prohibit such collective association on spatial grounds. More specifically, for a union to be created many provinces require that the work site employ more than one employee (Fudge 1997, 132-4). Since it is unlikely that households would need (or could afford) two domestic workers, there is a very small possibility that such unions could develop. As Fox (2005, 176) suggests, one must have access to the appropriate institutions, as well as the capacity to exercise one's rights, in order to use them effectively. Since the spatial requirements of the program severely limit these women's ability to collectively associate, and/or to contact government officials to report any abuses they experience, their ability to protest these conditions is hampered. Notwithstanding these restrictions, several domestic worker associations have been created in Canada, most notably INTERCEDE in Toronto and the West Coast Domestic Worker Association, to inform workers of their rights. While these groups represent important sites of action, it is essential to explore how the spatial control over these workers influences their ability to participate in these groups and to fully exercise their rights.

Conclusion

Despite the growing flow of capital and finance across borders, the mobility of foreign domestic workers and caregivers is increasingly being restricted. At the individual level, the spatial restrictions enforced on these workers limit their social and economic success in Canada. At the societal level, the government's extensive spatial control over their mobility, living, and working conditions perpetuates stratification in Canada as it limits the ability of foreign domestic workers to access the same level of rights and opportunities as other groups in this country. Not only does this suggest that the continued power of the state must be further researched, but the relationship between geographic and social mobility must also be reconsidered. While many assume that access to mobility between countries ensures social and/or economic mobility, this analysis demonstrates that this assumption should not be taken for granted. Moreover, one should not limit this analysis to mobility between countries, but also consider how limited mobility rights within the host country can alter migrants' quality of life.

The conclusions offered in this paper are preliminary and necessitate further research on the links between migration, geographic mobility, and social inequality. To do so effectively, future research must analyze how the social, economic, legal, and spatial conditions migrants face shape their lives in important ways. While highlighting examples of resistance by these workers is important, as is evident this paper, it is also important to highlight often-overlooked spatial requirements, such as those of the Live-in Caregiver program, in order to raise awareness of how these requirements affect migrants' lives on a daily basis. By highlighting the negative direct and indirect impacts of these requirements this study can be used in future research to develop comprehensive policy recommendations which can assist foreign domestics and caregivers in improving their social and legal status in Canada. Only in considering these numerous dimensions, in concert, can one can create a comprehensive and accurate picture of the realities migrants face, and suggest strategies to best address these challenging conditions. Since we find ourselves in a situation where "never before could we enjoy so much mobility, [yet] this mobility never before separated so much one group of citizens from the other," (Rodriguez et al. 2005, 12) a deeper understanding of the relationship between mobility, inequality, and social stratification is necessary in the short and long term.

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Food and education in the lives of orphans in Malawi

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In this paper, I discuss preliminary results of qualitative fieldwork recently conducted in northern Malawi in collaboration with the Ekwendeni Hospital AIDS Program (EHAP). Although the focus of this project was originally on the livelihoods of children orphaned by AIDS, the impracticality of identifying the cause of parents' deaths and the social stigma attached to the disease led to the inclusion of all types of orphans. The objective of the research project was to understand the problems faced by orphans from the perspective of the orphans themselves.

While reaching Malawian children across linguistic, cultural, generational, and sometimes gender differences was a complicated endeavour, recent research in children's geography provided the inspiration and methodology that supported the research project. My focus here is on two problems that emerged most often when speaking with orphans in Malawi: food security and education. These topics highlight the extreme vulnerability of this group relative to most others in the world and reveal the challenges in interpreting social problems in a cross-cultural context.

Re-thinking childhood

The research approach was inspired by academic literature in the area of children's geography. One of the main premises of this body of literature is the idea that children are more profoundly influenced (than adults) by the spaces they inhabit because they have less power to change their surroundings (Aitken 2001; Holloway and Valentine 2000). By investigating children's everyday experiences, including where they play, work, and study and how they feel about these places, the adult-outsider can begin to imagine what the world is like from the child's perspective.

The first step in this project was to think critically about the meanings attached to childhood. The dominant Western image of orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is supported by a cultural tradition of viewing children as helpless and dependent. However, many scholars argue that the social category of childhood is a relatively recent development associated with the modern worldview (Prout 2005; Aitken 2001; Holloway and Valentine 2000; Panter-Brick 2000), which can be broadly characterized by its tendency to dichotomize reality (i.e. man/woman, culture/nature). In this framework, child is conceived in terms of its opposition to adult: being irrational where the adult is rational, associated with nature where the adult is associated with culture, and dependent where the adult is independent. The idea that children are socially constructed as less-than-adults opens up the possibility that children's inferiority is not natural, but rather a product of a socially constructed conceptual framework.

The most obvious objection to such a re-conceptualization is the argument that because most children do evolve into adults, children naturally comprise a distinct group of adults-to-be. However, this position ignores, or at least de-emphasizes, the continual evolution throughout the life course and the fact that categories such as infant, child, adult, and elder are contingent on localized cultural norms that vary among societies (Prout 2005; Chirwa 2002; Aitken 2001; Katz 1993; 1991). Prout (2005, 83) offers a possible way out of the minefield of constructivist/naturalist debates in suggesting that "while the biological immaturity of children may be a fact, the real interest and future of childhood studies lies in the study of how cultures interpret such immaturity" – a multi-dimensional approach which allows childhood to be analyzed from both constructivist and naturalistic standpoints. Prout's approach also provides a fruitful framework for a study of orphans and vulnerable children in SSA because their struggles are at once profoundly determined by both the biological reality of disease and food insecurity, and the cultural reality of social categories and ways of coping with disasters.

Research site and interview methods

Ekwendeni is a small mission town and trading centre in northern Malawi. Among other services directed at AIDS-related problems, EHAP operates relief programs aimed at OVCs, providing such things as school uniforms, school fees, housing, and recreational programs to the almost 8,000 OVCs in the catchment's area of about 500 square kilometres. They are the most established relief organization in the catchment's area, having constructed the mission more than a century ago.

A total of twenty orphans between the ages of seven and fourteen were each interviewed twice, with about a month passing between the interviews to allow for emerging themes to be explored. Half of the participants were female and half were male, and five children were drawn from each of four districts within the catchment's area: Bwabwa, Luhomero, Zombwe, and Ekwendeni Trading Centre (ETC). Participant selection was purposive, as an attempt was made to learn from children facing a wide spectrum of conditions, in particular with respect to food security and access to social services and the cash economy. Bwabwa, about fifteen kilometres from the trading centre by mostly dirt roads, was the least food secure location as it is notoriously dry. Almost all households rely entirely on farming. Luhomero is similar to Bwabwa, but is about twice as far from the trading centre, contains a mechanized maize mill, and tobacco farming provides cash income in good years, such as the year of the fieldwork. Zombwe is less remote and is more food secure because it is on an alluvial plain. Finally, ETC is unique in that there are several schools, a hospital, and a relatively highly integrated cash economy, as well as being on the main national highway.

The first set of interviews focused on the children's everyday activities, such as the games they like to play, what they study in school, and their favourite foods. This served as an icebreaker and provided background information for more specific, personalized interview guides for the second interview. The second interview covered more emotional topics, inquiring about such things as the period during which parents were sick, how their lives have changed since their parents died, their worries and aspirations for the future, as well as questions that pertained to individual circumstances learned in the first interview. For example, Cora (ten) lost her mother and mentioned in the first interview that she cares for her four-year-old brother, so in the second interview she was asked detailed questions about how she felt about this role.

The centrality of food

Food security is a central problem for people in northern Malawi (Bryceson and Fonseca 2006; Bezner Kerr 2005; Mtika 2001) and, in the course of research, it became clear that food was a topic of great concern for the children interviewed. Whereas the research was intended to focus on psychosocial needs, worries about food frequently emerged from the children themselves. For example, when asked whether they have worries, most affirmative responses pointed to worries about hunger. There were only four participants who expressed worries about other loved ones dying or memories of their parents' deaths rather than food. Nine claimed not to have worries, although it is likely that they were also burdened by hunger since more than half of all participants claimed to eat fewer than three times per day and half had not eaten breakfast on the day of the first interview. Furthermore, three children said that it was not unusual to spend an entire day without eating a meal. In addition to worries about food, the amount of time dedicated to agricultural work also indicates the centrality of food for most of the children interviewed. The centrality of food in the worlds of Malawian orphans is a feature that distinguishes it from most childhoods in the North and serves as an example of the global variability of childhoods today.

The experiences of Wilson (twelve) of Luhomero and Said (eleven) of Bwabwa serve as examples of the spectre of food insecurity faced by many of the children interviewed. Wilson's parents have both died. Although his father had never lived with Wilson because he was a labourer in the south, he would come once a year with some money and purchased goods such as clothes or shoes. Now orphaned, Wilson is the main breadwinner for himself, his sick grandmother, and his younger sister. He must do agricultural piecework for around one dollar per week, cultivate his inherited fields for food, and attend school. His harvest this year was meagre, and the maize stored for the entire household for a year was roughly the amount recommended for an adult for a month. Despite the lack of food, when asked if he is proud of what he has accomplished he replied: "Yes, of course, because when I sell the harvest I find money and hand it over to grandma for salt." He has made it to grade six with little help, but when his grandmother dies he will be solely responsible for himself and his sister and it seems unlikely that he will be able to continue studying. Such immense responsibility is seldom seen in the North at such a young age, and Wilson's ability to continue providing for his household contradicts the assumption that children are essentially dependent and weak.

Said's entire family has been devastated by a shortage of food. When his father died, his mother remarried and her new husband did not accept him so he stays with other relatives. When his mother visits and gives him food, her husband yells at her. He said it is not unusual to go a day without food and when he complains he receives no sympathy:

> Researcher: So what do people say when you are complaining about food?
> Interpreter: What do people say when you complain about food?
> Said: They just say you don't have to be worried that's how life is.

Said has no one to look out for him and was visibly starving at the time of the second interview, constantly sticking out his tongue and struggling to focus his attention. Questions like "what do you want to be when you grow up" seemed completely alien in such dire circumstances. In this case, the idea that children will reach maturity, which is taken for granted in most conceptualizations of childhood, is not necessarily true. Said's case provides an unexpected example of why it can be important to study children in the present: sometimes circumstances are such that the fact of a child's future is elusive. Although these are two extreme cases, even those who lived in relative food security are generally only one poor harvest removed from the possibility of hunger.

Educational challenges

Most conceptions of development cite education as a key pillar. For example, the second Millennium Development Goal is universal primary education (UPE) (UN 2007), and article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) grants all children the right to free primary education (UNICEF 1990). With the broad acceptance of these principles by governments worldwide, they can be characterized as global in nature. From a standpoint critical of an essentialized view of childhood, the idea of universal principles may seem problematic. The principles, however, are flexible enough to account for socio-cultural variation. It is the yardstick used to measure and compare progress across diverse regions and countries, usually based in enrolment figures and test results, which impedes the reconciliation of these principles with the global diversity of childhoods.

For example, the Government of Malawi supports UPE as an entitlement of its citizens and in 1994 was among the first countries in SSA to remove user fees for primary education. This was widely heralded as a step forward for child rights because the enrolment figures grew dramatically. However, several studies have concluded that, in most cases, the free education provided is of poor quality (Kendall 2007; Chimombo 2005; Kadzamira and Rose 2001; 2003) and that while enrolment may be high, attendance is often partial. In Malawi, the implementation of UPE failed to account for such things as the low value placed on formal education within communities, children's seasonal obligations for agricultural work, and the peripheral costs to education such as reading and writing materials, school uniforms, and lost household labour.

The data collected shows that many Malawian young people were not well served by UPE. While all of the children interviewed were attending school, many of those in the more rural areas attended school infrequently. For example, Ireen (seven) claimed that she had just stayed around the house the day of the interview and had no concerns that her teacher would say anything about her absence when she returned. Afterwards, one of the women in the village said that the school was extremely short of teachers, to the extent that there were only three teachers and a headmaster for hundreds of students. The sense of infrequent attendance was highlighted in the interview with Said, who could not remember his teacher's name, and the interview with Abraham (eleven) of Bwabwa, who was in standard one, the first grade usually completed by age six.

Patricia (twelve) of Bwabwa and Maya (eleven) of ETC provide two contrasting examples of the problems and possibilities of UPE in Malawi. Patricia's mother died a few years ago after being ill for two years. Her father's second wife now runs the household and, according to Patricia's testimony, favours her own children when dividing up food and household chores. When Patricia complains, she beats her and her father says nothing. She has no one to turn to outside of the village when her stepmother treats her like a maid and beats her for insubordination.

Patricia is a bright child, and might have an opportunity to change her situation if she had access to a decent education, but the school is under-resourced and cannot provide even basic literacy to most students. The following conversation helps to illustrate Patricia's view of her own future:

> Researcher: Do you admire anybody?
> Interpreter: Is there anybody you admire, that you would want to be like that person?
> Patricia: No
> Researcher: What kind of job would you like to do?
> Interpreter: What job do you want to do in the future?
> Patricia: No, there's none.

Patricia's circumstances have left her with few options for her future. Her sister is fifteen and already married with a child. While it is difficult for many people in the North to imagine starting a family at such a young age, given the environment of abuse and depravation at home, and the lack of opportunity for financial independence that an education might provide in different circumstances, marriage for Patricia emerges as a realistic survival strategy.

Maya lives near the trading centre and is at the top of her standard eight class. Her father was a schoolteacher before he died, and her mother worked in an office before she passed away. Maya now lives with her grandparents and her uncle, who is a professor at a nearby university. While she has rarely travelled to the regional urban centre where the university is located (about twenty minutes away by car), her uncle frequently brings her books from the library there. Her family cannot afford to send her to a private school, but Maya is able to receive a decent free education at a church-run primary school, and she aspires to be a university professor. Given her supportive household and teachers, she will likely have the chance to realize her potential.

While there are several factors separating Maya's experience from Patricia's, it seems that Maya's school experience and her family's level of education have given her a sense of expanded possibilities for the future. The following conversation contrasts sharply with the conversation with Patricia cited above:

> Interviewer: So what would you like to be when you grow up?
> Interpreter: What would you like to be when you grow up?
> Maya: I want to be a teacher
> Interviewer: Teacher! A secondary school teacher or university?
> Maya: At university
> Interviewer: What would you like to teach?
> Maya: English and Chichewa

While it is difficult to isolate educational experience as the defining factor of Maya and Patricia's different outlooks on the future, where home life, place, and poverty levels also play crucial roles, it is also difficult to dismiss the argument that a decent education could provide Patricia with expanded opportunities and the hope of leaving poverty.

Conclusion

The cross-cultural understanding of children's issues is enhanced by a critical perspective that does not assume children to be weak beings inferior to adults, but rather unique individuals with valuable worldviews. Approaching children in such a manner and inquiring into their daily experiences and the meanings they attach to them can help to understand phenomena from their perspectives. In contemporary Malawi, where a plethora of problems including HIV/AIDS, food insecurity, and poor social services has created an unprecedented number of orphans, improving our understanding of children's lives is a project of practical as well as theoretical significance.

The topics explored in this paper, food security and education, bear particular relevance to globalization: the lack of food in many parts of rural Malawi illustrates the gulf of material inequality in the world today. Moreover, the question of education and personal development from the child's perspective touches on the tension between the need for global standards in child rights and the need to respect socio-cultural diversity. Globalization from the perspectives of marginalized individuals, such as Malawian orphans, can help to expand debates into topics such as food and education that are of critical importance to the relatively poor global majority.

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(Un)desirable subjects: Globalization, immigration, and national borders

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Foucault's writings on biopower and governmentality have challenged taken-for-granted understandings of the state as a single, coherent, centre of power. Drawing on this claim, Begoña Aretxaga (2003, 395) argues that we must ask how a state becomes "a social subject in everyday life." I engage this question in my dissertation research in the context of exploring immigration as a physical and metaphorical border within the nation-state.[1] Based on my interest in theoretical literature on nationalism, immigration, and governmentality, this project reflects my sense that analyses of the (re)production and contestation of metaphorical borders may elucidate how a particular nation-state is imagined, experienced, and constituted by differently located actors. As such, I aim to explore how everyday political authority to define ideas about Canada, and Canadianness, is represented, (re)produced, experienced, and/or contested in the relational categorical constructions of and interactions between *newcomers*, *new Canadians*, and *Canadians* (with no modifiers) through immigrant services and documents produced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).

Following from the above, for my dissertation research, I explore how (1) official CIC events and publications addressing "newcomers" and (2) immigrant services in the city of Ottawa may shape differently located people's understandings of themselves in relation to one another and to dominant Canadian national narratives.[2] I use my analysis to examine immigration as a potential site where global processes are contained through the management of physical and metaphorical national borders. My starting point is a desire to explore if and how immigrant services and "official" representations of immigration may (re)produce ideas about national belonging and identity through defining "(un)desirable" immigrants.

In this paper, I provide an overview of my current academic imaginary as it pertains to my dissertation. I outline my research interests, methodological considerations, and the theoretical insights I have found helpful for thinking through this project up to this point. While these insights have been indispensable to me, what I can imagine at the current juncture is likely to shift as I conduct my research. Thus, what I present here is a preliminary, theoretical understanding of my dissertation research. The opportunity to discuss these issues with colleagues and research participants is an avenue for re-examining the same theoretical ideas which presently frame my project.

Part of my rationale in undertaking this work is my understanding of immigration and national belonging to be important sites for academic analyses of globalization (see Abu-Laban 2000, 509). I see this project as an avenue to study local manifestations and negotiations of globalizing processes. How, for instance, are notions about Canada and Canadianness shaped by globalizing processes such as immigration, and how, in turn, are the effects of an increasingly globalized world negotiated at specific sites as ideas about Canadianness are (re)valued and (re)produced?

Moreover, from my perspective, a thorough, responsible understanding of globalization must begin by recognizing that the term refers to more than processes at play in the twenty-first century. Today's Canada, for example, is the product of centuries of contested and forceful globalization in the form of immigration and colonization. Canada's present composition has been shaped by socio-historical processes imbricated with multiple classed, racialized, gendered, and sexualized colonial – and thus globalized and globalizing – power relations which continue to shape the meanings of Canadianness. This is to say, although CIC just celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of Canadian citizenship, immigration and globalization are not new to Canada, nor are contests over the physical and metaphorical constitution of its national bodies and borders.

Methodologically, my work is influenced by George Marcus's (1995) notion of multi-sited ethnography.[3] Marcus represents multi-sited ethnography as a way to meet the objectives of ethnographic research at the current political and historical juncture wherein (previously seeming local) cultural processes both shape and are shaped by global movements of and interactions between people, discourse, capital, and conflicts. As a method of research, multi-sited ethnography is intended to reveal specifically located, and often contested, implications of large socio-cultural processes and intricate connections between seemingly disparate sites.

I find Marcus's strategy of following the metaphor a fitting approach to my dissertation research. In discussing how one might "follow the metaphor," Marcus (1995, 108) argues that "when the thing traced is within the realm of discourses and modes of thought, then the circulation of signs, symbols, and metaphors guides the design of ethnography." In my case, the discursive construction of "the newcomer" and "the new Canadian" seems to be a relevant starting point: through analyzing documents, conducting interviews, and undertaking participant observation, I aim to draw out similarities and differences in constructions of the categories of newcomer, new Canadian, and non-modified (read normative) Canadian, and to use this as an avenue for understanding how the "limits" of Canadianness are (re)produced, experienced, and contested.[4]

The methodological approach I have outlined has been shaped by my interest in academic literature on nationalism, immigration, and governmentality. Thus, I also hope this project may allow me to explore the nuanced interconnections between these bodies of literature through, for example, an analysis of how the newcomer, the new Canadian, and/or the Canadian are produced as objects of government through immigration documents and services, which I understand as sites of national management (Hage 1998). Given that these bodies of literature theoretically frame my dissertation project, I want to illustrate how they shape my academic imaginary before moving on to describe the specifics of my research methods.

Over the last three decades, nations, nationalisms, and states have been decreasingly seen as the exclusive purview of historians and political scientists (Kelly and Kaplan 2001). Influenced by the work of Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernest Gellner (1983), most scholars of nationalism now assume nations' historical production and inventedness. Most also recognize that nationalism, colonialism, and immigration cannot be understood outside analyses of the power relations that constitute and locate multiple actors – as citizens or immigrants, for example – in relation to one another and to various nationalist discourses (Das and Poole 2003; Hall 1999; Mackey 1999; McClintock 1997).

At the same time, despite academic examinations of their discursive constitution, nation-states retain their influence because access to such things as capital, mobility, and human rights is often tied into having a legitimate relation to a legitimate nation-state. In this way, nation-states emerge both as practical necessities and as oppressive socio-historical constructs (Agamben 1996; Hall 1999; Mackey 1999). Given this tension between nation-states as practical necessities and (oppressive) socio-historical constructs, I argue that we need to recognize the effects of the (simultaneously local and global) construction of nation-states in people's everyday lives. I think that this may be a fruitful way to emphasize the personal implications of social abstractions such as *nation-state* or *globalization*; by grounding our studies of such abstractions in their implications for people's everyday lives, we may be able to highlight the ambivalence that surrounds them and to gain a better understanding of their practical meanings and consequences.

For my part, I want to ground my understanding of nationalism and globalization through a focus on their negotiation in the area of immigration, "a key institutional site in the public construction of the nation and its boundaries, particularly in terms of policies of selection and exclusion" (Vukov 2003, 343). Although immigrants have long been represented as potential threats to national order, immigration policies in Canada are not simply anti-immigrant: Canadian immigration policies and media depictions continue to welcome "imagined desirable immigrants while simultaneously repelling undesirable immigrants" (Vukov 2003, 336). Such policies rely on and reproduce racialized, gendered, classed, and sexualized differences between immigrants through a political arithmetic that aims "to produce and regulate the population while securing the state and its national borders against a whole range of 'undesirable' others" (Vukov 2003, 336; see also Kanaaneh 2002). In Canada, the specific discourses of "undesirability" have shifted over the last century – ranging from "mental deficiency," to "disease," to "criminality," to "fraud," to "terrorism" – but the idea that it is necessary to manage "foreign" or global "threats" has remained constant as a dominant discourse, and it has often co-existed with notions of immigration as a national asset, necessary for nation-building.

Thinking through potential ways to explore everyday practices and experiences of national management (nation-building and securing), I have found the insights of governmentality scholars especially useful. In particular, I appreciate the simultaneous emphasis of these scholars on the dispersion of the state and the importance of processes of subjectification which occur in multiple, everyday interactions within states. The key point I take from this body of literature is that governmentality is a particular form of rationalized power/knowledge which combines disciplinary power's techniques for creating docile bodies with sovereign power's concern to maintain a particular social order within a specific territory. Foucault's (1991) key insight, taken up by governmentality scholars, is that the state paradoxically reaffirms its authority by dispersing it through multiple arenas of governmentality. From this perspective, the state is not a unified entity but a multifarious collection of governmental bodies and discourses which use and reproduce particular forms of knowledge/power in order to produce self-disciplining populations.

Yet, where Foucault focused his attention on the ways government seeks to influence and shape people's conduct – and is thus about subjectification – others, such as Mitchell Dean (1999), stress that government also relies on, and may thus be challenged by, the agency of the political actors involved. In this way, Dean opens up a space for understanding the ways in which government may also be resisted by those it seeks to govern. From this perspective, governmentality is necessarily linked up to issues of subjectivity, agency, and identity.

On the basis of these theoretical insights, I argue that if the state exists as multiple, dispersed political authorities and authorizations, which aim to delimit desirable behaviours and subjectivities, then methodologically, multi-sited ethnography seems an appropriate way to examine (re)productions of state authority in daily interactions. It is also a route to access what Uli Linke (2006) calls "the sensual life of the state": moments in everyday life when particular actors come into contact with states through specific agencies, policies, discourses, or interactions. In such moments, political authority is (re)defined and power relations (re)produced, perhaps through constituting particular actors as representatives of "the nation-state" with the knowledge/power to "teach" national culture.[5] There are multiple locations and moments when particular actors may be (or feel) endowed with political authority to speak for/as the state. These locations and moments likely shape, and are shaped by, narratives about a national body's desirable constitution and dangerous constituents.

Based on preliminary research, and given my interest in immigration, I have identified two particular focal points where I may investigate "the sensual life of the state" in a way that takes into account the dispersion of states' authority by exploring everyday (re)productions and contestations of political authority to speak for/as the state (read to represent Canada or Canadianness). Each focal point relates to a particular tension I have identified in the relationship between immigration and national belonging in Canada. First, although immigration is officially represented in political and media discourses as necessary for nation-building, it is also represented as threatening to national integrity (Mackey 1999; Pratt and Valverde 2002; Vukov 2003). Second, although immigrant services organizations tend to represent immigration as a national strength, the services they offer (while quite practical) simultaneously seem to govern immigrants in ways that (re)produce dominant conceptions of "desirable" national subjectivities. As mentioned, for each tension, I have a corresponding research focus (CIC and immigrant services respectively) where I may explore whether it is experienced as a tension in practice.

My specific methods for collecting data vary at each focal point. First, CIC is the national department responsible for defining the relationships between immigration and citizenship. Formed, as such, in 1994, CIC is described on its website as reflecting "the government's belief that citizenship and immigration spring from common values and objectives" (CIC 2005, §1). At the same time, CIC's discourses clearly distinguish between immigrants and citizens and, more specifically, between "newcomers," "new Canadians," and "Canadians."[6] Since I aim to examine the interrelationships between these sociopolitical categories, the ways in which they are constructed and juxtaposed by CIC is pertinent to my research: CIC's documents, media releases, and public events form part of the Canadian government's official, public representations of immigration and citizenship, and thus, of national belonging.

CIC produces many documents and media releases and the department hosts several public events a year. As a result, I cannot undertake a full analysis of every CIC document, policy, and event. Given my specific focus, I will limit my analysis to the ways this government department represents, and thus (re)produces, the categories of "newcomer," "new Canadian," and "Canadian" in (1) their "mandate and mission," (2) their *Guide for newcomers*, and (3) their discussion of immigrant services (specifically, settlement services and language instruction courses). I will also attend and document three public citizenship ceremonies organized by CIC, paying close attention to representations of the categories of, and relationships between, "newcomer," "new Canadian," and "Canadian" at, and through, these ceremonies.

Secondly, I will conduct ethnographic fieldwork (including participant observation, informal conversations, and semi-structured interviews) at an immigrant services organization in the city of Ottawa.[7] I will discuss the services offered by the organization with service recipients and providers and will ask for permission to attend Language Instruction for Newcomers courses and other events/activities hosted by the organization. I will conduct semi-structured interviews with those who are using the services as well as with those who are providing them. In my analysis of the interview data, I will focus on how differently located actors within the organization understand, represent, and engage (both to accommodate and to resist) (1) the categories of "newcomer," "new Canadian," and "Canadian," (2) the relationships between these categories, and (3) the implications of these categories for perceptions and senses of national belonging and political authority.

I understand my methods at these research sites (CIC documents/events and immigrant services) as avenues for considering everyday experiences and (re)productions of national belonging, management, and authority. I juxtapose analyses of CIC's documents and events with ethnographic research methods at a site where citizens and immigrants engage with and negotiate national belonging and authority, and by extension, the meaning(s) of Canadianness. Part of my aim is to examine how national narratives, borders, and subjectivities are experienced, (re)produced, and called into question on an everyday basis by differently located actors. I hope that such an approach allows me to elucidate: (1) the co-constitution of national belonging, political authority, and globalization, and (2) the ways these may shape and be shaped by the interactions of multiply located social actors.

At a time when immigrant detention centres – which go by different names in each country – are an increasingly common global reality, understanding representations, (re)productions, and experiences of (un)desirability and political authority seems particularly pertinent: being labelled undesirable is not simply about categorical placement and metaphorical borders. Rather, it has the potential to be accompanied by placement within the physical confines of detention centres and/or removal from (or denial of entry into) the physical space of Canada. Thus, for me, the constitution of immigrants as (un)desirable, and the oppressive necessity of belonging are pressing concerns. How is it that a "newcomer" who arrives in Canada is (re)produced as an object of national fears and/or (re)formed into a "new Canadian"? What are the implications of such reproductions and reformations?

My aim is not to discuss globalization as either hopeful or hopeless, but to move beyond such dichotomies. I approach this research to look for neither agency nor subjectification, but for a better understanding of their mutual influence on one another. Our choices, actions, and hopes are always already constrained. To imagine that it is otherwise is to reproduce neoliberal celebrations of individual choice and responsibility – often euphemisms for assigning "personal" blame in ways that detract attention from systemic injustices and inequities. My project is not just about the tensions evident in (inter)national policies; it is also about how people may experience and negotiate the tensions between nations as practical necessities and oppressive socio-historical constructs. In other words, it is about immigration as a vehicle of (im)possible hope(lessness) for those defined as (un) desirable.

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HIV/AIDS: An opportunistic infection of globalization?

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In my graduate studies I am interested in the link between the laissez-faire policies of neoliberal globalization and the AIDS pandemic. There appears to be a congruence between the downsized social safety net of the multinational neoliberal state and the incidence of HIV infection. While globalization offers advantages to many people in the world, it also coincides with extremes of uneven wealth distribution. According to critics, capital and labor become more liquid and unaccountable in a globalized era often resulting in existential insecurity (Bauman 1998). Debtor governments are mandated to implement austerity measures that downsize the provision of health care. As a result, the AIDS pandemic is exacerbated and people are sent an implicit message that their lives do not matter.

In their historical coincidence, neoliberalism, globalization, and HIV are discursive fellow travelers. Each arises within an historical context, related to the collapse of communism, deregulation, erosion of social safety nets, and a multinationalism facilitated by communication technologies (Bourdieu 1998; Hardt and Negri 2000). Globalization, neoliberalism, and AIDS each connote an unprecedented surge of economic growth and geographic interconnection. Highjacking free love, free markets, and the strength of weak ties, how does HIV hitch a ride on the richly interconnected globe? Barnett and Whiteside (2002, 4) call AIDS "the first epidemic of globalization." Baer, Singer, and Susser (1997, 159) describe AIDS as a "disease of the global system." Where the tentacles of globalism extend their reach, so too does the incidence of HIV seropositivity. On a road map of rural Southern Africa, per capita cases of HIV infection erupt like abscesses along the trucking routes of an ever-widening world system.

In this paper, I will ask some provisional questions for my doctoral research into AIDS, globalization, and neoliberal ideology. In sketching my research interests, I have allowed myself considerable conjectural license. As a communication student, I am interested in meaning and symbolism, especially those that are implicit or inferred. At the dawn of the last century, Georg Simmel (1950) sketched a suggestive portrait of the urban dweller in his essay "The metropolis and mental life." According to Simmel (1950), the urban citizen has a blasé outlook. I believe that this blasé attitude, lacking in felicitous emotions, has come to characterize the jaded globalized citizen of our time. At the highest levels of public policy, an attitude of free market fundamentalism can imply a blasé lack of concern with social responsibility. A dogmatic faith in the market's invisible hand may place concern for others on the back burner of policy considerations. Similarly, among those most affected by the AIDS pandemic, a lack of concern for one's own health may precipitate high-risk sexual behaviour.

While there is already voluminous social scientific research about neoliberal policy and the AIDS crisis (O'Manique 2004; Poku and Whiteside 2004; Barnett and Whiteside 2006), I am interested in how sense is made of these phenomena, among non-specialists, on a symbolic and affective level. In particular, my concern is with attitudes of resignation, nihilism, and demoralization resulting from poverty and injustice (or fostered by a cynical market mentality), which provides a breeding ground for HIV and other opportunistic infections. How do people connect globalization and free market attitudes with opportunistic infections of poverty such as HIV/AIDS? With the hegemony of free market fundamentalism, has sentiment, chivalry, and caring been "drown[ed] in the icy waters of egotistical calculation" (Marx and Engels 1948, 128)? What do people, according to gender, class, and ethnic identity, consider to be the "take away message" of globalization, neoliberalism, and its associated illnesses?

In *Anti-Dühring*, Friedrich Engels (1947) posited that, after a brief period of socialism, the state would wither away. Like the return of the repressed, this teleological tale has been ironically realized in the twenty-first century, although not like Engels had imagined. After the demise of planned economies in the Soviet bloc, as well as a mood of deregulation in the west, state structures that protect the public welfare are not always at the top of the neoliberal agenda. The neoliberal attitude, reduced to caricature, seems to be "every woman and man for themselves." Capitalism, triumphant and emboldened after a century-long battle with its ideological nemesis, hoists the flag of free trade in place of numerous other conceivable freedoms, such as freedom from medical bills, unemployment, or debt. For Rosa Luxemburg (2004), humanity had reached a fork in the road: "socialism or barbarism." Has barbarism won, albeit a kinder, gentler barbarism, softened by the ideologies of globalization and neoliberalism?

Thomas Hobbes (1950) used the phrase "the war of all against all" to describe human relations in a state of nature. Hobbes's phrase, intended to describe a world without government or states, is an evocative image for the globalized world. While it would be one-sided to characterize globalization solely in such terms, it may be perceived as such by the billions of people living in poverty today (Chakravarty, Kanbur, and Mukherjee 2002). Under capitalism, fierce competition and market freedom are advanced while social responsibility is often downplayed. In the wake of Keynesian "general theory" (1964), which took a page out of the Soviet experiment in planned economies, "dog-eat-dog" free market fundamentalism has returned, but it goes by the euphemistic name of neoliberalism. The lack of empathy in neoliberal policy has not gone unnoticed by its critics. For example, according to a report by Useche and Cabezas (2005) neoliberal policies have been complicit in the uneven incidence of HIV infection. They maintain that, in its emphasis on the bottom line, neoliberal structural adjustment policies have been insensitive to the AIDS pandemic.

As a student of speech, interpersonal, and small group communication, I am interested in how such free market fundamentalism trickles down to the micro level. Might blasé indifference, attributable to neoliberal policy, send a message that human life is insignificant? When lives are accounted for in purely cost/benefits terms, people become objectified. As a result of perceived indifference on the part of governing bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, might people be internalizing a message that their lives are not valued, and hence, engaging in high-risk behaviour?

Eric Eisenberg, Lloyd Goodall, and Angela Tretheway (2007, 19) maintain that capitalism today operates under a "new social contract." Under the old social contract, loyal workers were compensated with job security and an expectation of care from their employers. Under the new social contract, values of loyalty are jettisoned outright, in favour of an ideal worker who is more flexible, mobile, and adaptable to layoffs and downsizing. While the new social contract offers apparent advantages to the globalized employer, I wonder if there is any value added for workers who are bound by it? Under the new social contract there exists only a loose fastening of labor to capital. In turn, a lack of job security may result. In order to medicate against this feeling of insecurity, people may turn to alcohol and drugs. Their judgment having been impaired, people may then engage in unprotected sex, which facilitates the spread of HIV. Baer, Singer, and Susser (1997, 125) describe this vicious cycle as "self-medicating the hidden injuries of oppression." Anesthetization is a theme that is suggestive of a blasé, insensitive attitude.

Emily Martin (1994) has argued that the discourse of flexibility and dynamic, open systems corresponds to trends in business such as outsourcing and downsizing. In the book *Flexible Bodies*, Martin (1994) suggests how the discourse of flexibility (which is trademarked by a temp agency), may reflect a ruling ideology that seeks to divest itself of social responsibility. Perhaps the new social contract, broadly considered in the context of globalization, might foster weak ties, superficial affect, and general demoralization for many of its subcontracted peoples. A blasé attitude of cynicism or nihilism, as engendered by contemporary capitalism, might be implicated in the AIDS pandemic. Critiquing "new capitalism," Richard Sennett (1998; 2006) argues that moral character and a sense of usefulness are casualties of an ideology which emphasizes the bottom line. For Zygmunt Bauman (1998; 2003; 2004), globalization results in broken interpersonal relationships and purposeless existences. I am interested in how such consequences of globalization may engender trauma and, in turn, facilitate the spread of HIV.

John and Jean Comaroff (1999, 284) document the congruence of neoliberal ideology and a resurgence of superstitious beliefs in South Africa. They describe an "occult economy" where the end of apartheid and neoliberal ideology combine to release normative prohibitions. How does suspicion towards biomedicine couple with superstitious folk beliefs about the causality of AIDS? Former South African president Thabo Mbeki notoriously doubted the role of HIV in the etiology of AIDS (Power 2003). South African health minister Manto Tshabala-Msimang has been criticized by Desmond Tutu and certain AIDS activists for dismissing biomedical science about HIV and recommending folk cures (Associated Press 2007). Resorting to folk cures reflects incredulity towards Western biomedicine and is itself a product of the perception of indifference or malevolence on the part of globalism and colonial legacies.

Anomie is a term derived from the ancient concept of *anomos* which implies a lack of rules and temperance (Merton 1996). Folk discourse about the ambiguous causality of AIDS is an indication of anomie under neoliberalism and globalization. Anomie suggests a need without the means to realize it. Due to poverty in Southern Africa, the treatment protocol for HIV infection is often complicated by comorbid health problems, such as malnutrition, tuberculosis, malaria, or parasites (Stillwaggon 2006). On a trip to Namibia in 2005, for example, I spoke with a health care provider who could not start HIV patients on antiretroviral drugs because of comorbid infections and malnutrition. So there is disconnect between biomedical interventions better suited for more affluent patients, versus a litany of folk cures; the hegemony of Western medicine is backgrounded by conditions of poverty. Actually, there is truth to Mbeki's claim that poverty, not HIV, causes AIDS illness. I view erroneous folk beliefs about AIDS as both a symptom and a function of neoliberal ideology: a sick, mortally challenged populace is easier to control. In *The Shock Doctrine*, Naomi Klein (2007) persuasively argues that capitalism takes advantage of crisis in order to push through neoliberal policies while the populace is in a state of shock.

According to Eileen Stillwaggon (2006) there is an overemphasis in AIDS research on sexual behaviour and a lack of attention to poverty. HIV illness is comorbid with illnesses like malaria, tuberculosis, and parasites that are virtually unknown in the affluent world. A focus on sexual promiscuity might minimize the structural violence that fosters the AIDS pandemic (Farmer 1992; 1999; 2003). Yet, at the risk of blaming the victim, from the perspective of communication, structural conditions are not the sole determinant of social realities. While reality isn't entirely socially constructed, there is at least a dynamic interplay between agency and constraint (Eisenberg 2007). My training in interpersonal communication suggests that helpful interventions can be made at the micro level of behaviour modification and education. For the communication field, social reality is (at least partly) an emergent property of interpersonal interactions and, with this in mind, I will mention some interpretive tools from my graduate training which might be useful for AIDS interventions.

In my experience, the discipline of communication is actually a blend of approaches originating in speech and public address, philosophy, rhetoric, social psychology, dramaturgical sociology, systems theory, cultural studies, women's studies, and other fields. They converge upon an interest in conversation and orality as a constitutive process. I think there is a communicative aspect of the AIDS crisis that goes beyond the explanations of a medical model. Where medicine focuses on the "identified patient" with a viral infection, I plan to study the complex interpersonal networks through which the virus is transmitted. Here, family systems theory (Hoffman 1981) and interactional perspectives (Condit 2006; Bateson 1972; Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson 1967; Baxter and Montgomery 1996) might approach communicable disease as located within the relations between people, instead of skin-encased individuals.

Sexual abuse, gender inequality, and transactional sex are major concerns for AIDS activists. According to Stephen Lewis, United Nations Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS, gender inequality constitutes "the fundamental centerpiece of the whole blessed crisis!" (in Epstein 2006). The "sugar daddy" phenomenon is a form of transactional sex which appears to be implicated in the spread of AIDS (Stillwaggon 2006, 148). The myth of "the oldest profession" suggests a commodification of the body that predates capitalism, as such. In terms of the philosopher Martin Buber (1998), social interactions predicated on the "I-It" relation tend to use the other as a means rather than an end. The "I -It" relation, epitomized by mercenary sex, takes the concern out of intimacy and reduces it to a market transaction. This appears to be a lack of caring that the HIV virus takes advantage of. In order to heighten mutual concern, relational dialectics suggests an interpersonal technique called "recalibration" where a sex partner would withhold intimacy in order to leverage equality (Baxter and Montgomery 1996, 65).

Concerns about emotions have helped me augment what I perceive as an overemphasis on discourse in the communication field. Patricia Clough (2007, 2) defines "affectivity" as "a substrate of potential bodily responses, often automatic responses, in excess of consciousness." The focus on affect can help account for extra-discursive responses to globalization and the AIDS crisis. While the "waning of affect" hypothesis has been questioned on semantic grounds (Massumi, 1995, 88), I am specifically concerned with a lack of empathy. Draconian austerity measures and unprotected sex, alike, are symbolic of such an emotional deficit. As an adaptation to the grim realities of contemporary life, such as postcolonialism, poverty, and anomie, perhaps people have become "cold-blooded," so to speak? Similarly, free-market fundamentalism, with its implicit discourse of "survival of the fittest," seems remote from emotions like empathy and pity.

I am interested in the metaphor of poikilothermy or cold-bloodedness as a sort of occupational hazard of globalization. Poikilothermy, a term from reptilian biology, is akin to cool (hooks 2003) posturing that claims to be unconcerned with the health and well-being of oneself and others. Poikilothermy is redolent of the blasé attitude (Simmel 1950) and is suggestive for the "savagely cosmopolitan" pandemic of AIDS (Comaroff 2007, 198). I wonder how this sort of glib nihilism, a hidden subtext of neoliberalism, might underwrite the spread of HIV? Perhaps the self-interested approach of the free market may have provided a friendly medium for the micro-organism of HIV to germinate? Here, I am concerned with the rhetorical and attitudinal corollaries of high-risk sexual behaviour among those most at risk for infection. Jean Comaroff (2007, 201) refers to Africa as an "axis of irrelevance" presumably because of the apparent lack of concern on behalf of neoliberal, laissez-faire policies. Perhaps such lack of empathy on the macro level is internalized on the micro level and the progress of the pandemic is worsened? When at risk populations numbly engage in high-risk behaviour, in imitation of neoliberal apathy, it could be described as trickle down poikilothermy.

But the lack of caring may also foster a quietism or resignation about the AIDS crisis among affluent people. As a student and activist, I'd like to interrogate the blasé attitude among globalization's losers but also its beneficiaries. To be sure, neoliberalism, global in its reach and remarkable in its transformative power, is not without its appeal and tangible benefits for many. The fantasy of capitalism's beneficent invisible hand may often be true, although in the case of the AIDS pandemic, such laissez-faire insouciance seems to be in want of more compassion. As the hegemonic worldview, free market fundamentalism can only benefit from the observation, raised by activists, that it casts a shadow called AIDS. At the very least, this represents a public relations problem for globalization, not to mention a human tragedy of untold proportions.

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“The shadow class was condemned to movement”: Globalization and class-consciousness in *The Inheritance of Loss*

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At present, there is little scholarship on globalization and literature. When the two are discussed together, the analysis tends to be done within the realm of postcolonial studies. The connection between them is logical and can be constructive, particularly given postcolonialism’s interest in subaltern studies.[1] Revathi Krishnaswamy (2002, 106) argues that both postcolonialism and globalization “emerge at the intersection of imperialism, capitalism and modernity.” There is a gap between postcolonialism and globalization in that postcolonialism’s primary concern tends to be with the discourses of the European imperialism that formally ended in the 1950s and 1960s, whereas globalization studies tends to be interested in the particularly neoliberal brand of global capitalism that has emerged over the last thirty years, led by the United States of America and much of the northern hemisphere. While postcolonial literary studies can give a sense of the experience of globalization that is captured in books written in English by authors from former British colonies, it is not at present a discipline that has room for the Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern, or Indigenous experiences within contemporary globalization, to say nothing of the working classes within developed nations. The varied mandates of postcolonialism and globalization indicate the need for the study of globalization and literature to emerge as its own discipline, however often it may intersect with postcolonialism.

Kiran Desai’s novel *The Inheritance of Loss* is a worthy case study for the discussion of globalization and literature. Much of Desai’s novel deals with a character named Biju who leaves India to work in the United States, so the text provides an example of the relative development of class-consciousness among illegal migrant workers in the United States of America. In the book, when these labourers are brought together to work from various countries, they differentiate themselves along ethno-cultural lines rather than identifying with each other as members of a subaltern economic class. *The Inheritance of Loss* draws attention to the linguistic barriers and physical upheaval that characterize the experience of the contemporary migrant worker, while also demonstrating the limited means of communication available to the global subaltern. In these respects, Desai’s novel suggests that globalization undermines class-consciousness.

During his time as a migrant worker, Biju has to stuff pancakes and newspapers down his shirt to keep warm when he works as a delivery person for a Chinese food company (Desai 2006, 51); he has to surrender his tips and have his pay cut to one quarter of minimum wage so that he can live in the kitchen where he works and have rats gnaw at his hair while he sleeps (Desai 2006, 146-7); and Biju eats so seldom while in New York that he starts buying clothes from the children’s rack (Desai 2006, 233). Within this context of impoverishment, it is in the economic interests of the subaltern characters in this novel to develop class-consciousness across ethno-cultural divides as a starting point to resist global capitalism.

It is also important for the subaltern characters to acquire a sense of class-consciousness because members of the dominant class act on behalf of their own bourgeois economic interests, not in support of the ethno-cultural group to which they belong. One of the places that Biju works is in a restaurant owned by Harrish-Harry, a fellow Indian. When Biju is injured at work and Harrish-Harry refuses to provide compensation, Biju says: "without us living like pigs, … what business would you have? This is how you make your money, paying us nothing because you know we can't do anything, making us work day and night because we are illegal" (Desai 2006, 188). In this passage, readers see a migrant labourer receiving inadequate pay and working unregulated shift lengths for a manager who will not compensate employees for work-related injuries. Thus, Harrish-Harry puts his economic interests ahead of any sense of national or cultural kinship with Biju. Harrish-Harry and Biju demonstrate that globalization tends to involve the replication of national dominant-subaltern relationships within immigrant communities. Indeed, readers see the same process when Biju delivers food to a group of Indian students that is described as "a meeting between Indians abroad of different classes" (Desai 2006, 50). With a dominant class that values economic interests over nationalistic ones, it is imperative to any challenge of global capitalism that subaltern classes become conscious of their own economic interests and develop a sense of solidarity with people facing similar material realities around the globe.

The Inheritance of Loss suggests that the system of globalized capitalism, however, has a series of built-in defences against the development of subaltern class-consciousness. The novel presents characters brought together to work from around the world that are blind to their similar material realities but highly aware of their ethno-cultural differences. For example, the narrator explains that

> from other kitchens, [Biju] was learning what the world thought of Indians: In Tanzania, if they could, they would throw them out like they did in Uganda. In Madagascar, if they could, they would throw them out … In China, they hate them … South Africa. They don't like them (Desai 2006, 77).

Irrespective of whether people in the countries mentioned actually hold such views of Indians, these prejudices jeopardize the possibility of the characters with disdain for Indians coming together with Biju to recognize their shared economic interests. It is hardly surprising that there is animosity when a group of people is brought together in a foreign country under exploitive working conditions, from various backgrounds, and various national historical experiences.

When Biju's co-workers discuss visiting some prostitutes, there is a similar emphasis of ethno-cultural identity. The women are described as "Dominican women in Washington Heights – only thirty-five dollars! … '[F]ucking cheap women you'll get some disease … all black and ugly'" (Desai 2006, 16). Biju and his acquaintances do not see these women as exploited sexual labourers. Instead, these men define the women in terms of their race and nationality as black Dominicans. Without trying to essentialize the differences between sexual workers and kitchen staff, the point here is that the kitchen staff sees the national and ethnic differences between themselves and these women rather than their shared subalternity, though I hasten to add that misogyny certainly plays a role as well. I make this argument to challenge the idealized visions of globalization put forth by theorists such as Néstor García Canclini (1995). In *Hybrid Cultures*, García Canclini defends globalization as an opportunity for constructive cultural contacts and the development of new cultures. Fredric Jameson (1998, 66) criticizes García Canclini's view for lacking "economic specificity and [for being] rather inconsistent with the quality and impoverishment of what has to be called corporate culture on a global scale." Desai's novel provides the specificity that Jameson endorses in that it demonstrates the most destructive features of globalization: exploitation and the ethnic tensions that impede the development of an organized resistance to that exploitation.

Another example of cultural conflict in the novel is the one between Biju and the Pakistani man with whom he works in a restaurant. They argue in the kitchen: "'Pigs pigs, sons of pigs …' Biju shouted … '[S]on of an owl, low-down son-of-a-bitch Indian.' … [And then] [t]hey threw cannonball cabbages at each other" (Desai 2006, 23). Though Biju and his co-worker labour in identical material conditions, it is the long-standing feud between India and Pakistan that drives the way that these two workers interact. It is quite predictable that years of violence would encourage Biju and his co-worker to mimic a war using cabbages rather than develop a consciousness of their shared material interests, particularly when Biju has a father who warns him to "Beware. Keep Away … [d]istrust" people from Pakistan (Desai 2006, 22). After Biju and the Pakistani are fired for their fighting, they walk out of the store "Paki one way, Biju the other way. Rounding the corner, meeting each other again, turning away again" (Desai 2006, 23). Though both men find themselves unemployed and impoverished in a foreign country, Biju and the Pakistani man are still acrimonious toward each other. Even in, or perhaps because of, the most destitute socio-economic circumstances, these characters relate to one another as ethno-cultural enemies rather than two economically marginalized subalterns. Biju's co-worker is not named; he is known only as the Pakistani. This man's ethno-cultural identity is thus his entire identity so that he cannot transcend Pakistan's historical rivalry with India and develop a consciousness of the economic interests he shares with Biju, an equally nationalistic Indian.

That Biju and all of the co-workers I have described do not engage in productive cultural exchanges disarms theorists like Canclini who celebrate globalization as an opportunity for levelling cultural barriers. Desai's novel specifically undercuts such arguments in that it foregrounds both the economic miseries of the global subaltern and the ethno-cultural tensions among these characters. Given these divisions and the material realities that Biju and his co-workers face, Desai also problematizes the arguments of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), both of whom are harsh critics of global capitalism. In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri contend that the institutions of global capitalism cannot ultimately control international labour migrations and that migrant workers are, therefore, most likely to pose a successful challenge to globalization. This scenario is difficult to envision, however, without the kind of broad, trans-cultural, class-consciousness that the hostilities in Desai's novel undermine.

Desai's novel, moreover, brings readers' attention to the problem that language can pose to the development of class-consciousness. Consider, for example, this passage about the crowded Harlem basement where Biju lives with other migrant workers: "if anyone turned on too many appliances or lights, … the entire electricity went, and the residents screamed to nobody, since there was nobody, of course, to hear them" (Desai 2006, 52). The point here is not that the tenants literally fail to comprehend each other's screaming but that they cannot communicate well enough to address the causes of the screams. Since the tenants are variously fluent in English, Spanish, or Hindi, there is a barrier to their organizing to address their shared interests and, for instance, working out a rationing schedule or confronting Jacinto, the landlord, to demand that he provide more electricity (Desai 2006, 51). Thus, the linguistic gaps between migrants amount to a loss of agency: without the ability to communicate coherently, these subaltern characters do not have the power to articulate resistances to Jacinto's authority. Further complicating this matter is that Jacinto is the only person in the building who can speak parts of enough languages to communicate with all of the tenants. In this sense, Jacinto controls the means of communication, an enormous problem for any group of tenants who may wish to organize and oppose Jacinto's policies.

The Inheritance of Loss, furthermore, draws attention to the travel and rootlessness characteristic of globalization, liberalization of labour flows (in the language of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank), and the problems this process poses to class-consciousness. When he begins a friendship with Saeed, an African Muslim, Biju is confused and wonders if he "liked Muslims and hated only Pakis? … [L]iked Saeed, but hated the general lot of Muslims? … [H]ated all black people but liked Saeed?" (Desai 2006, 76). When Biju is finally able to move past these prejudices and form a friendship with Saeed, the so-called liberalization of labour flows threatens their relationship. Saeed briefly goes back to Zanzibar and then returns to New York to work retail at Banana Republic. Readers are told: “Biju knew he probably wouldn’t see him again. This was what happened, he had learned by now. You live intensely with others, only to have them disappear overnight, since the shadow class was condemned to movement” (Desai 2006, 102). Here, subaltern characters overcome ethno-cultural divisions to develop a sense of kinship, but the ceaseless fluidity of labourers within global capitalism undoes these bonds very quickly. Biju is caught up in this process himself as he rapidly changes jobs and residences before ultimately moving back to India. With labourers moving rapidly from one locale to another, it becomes very difficult for the economically marginalized to develop and maintain a sense of class-consciousness with fellow subalterns, let alone organize and form an effective resistance to globalization. The ever-shifting location of the global subaltern, therefore, is another security barrier built into global capitalism as a means of protecting itself.

Globalization doctrine surmises that worldwide channels of communication, particularly electronic communication, allow people to maintain bonds wherever labour and capital flows may take them around the globe. Arjun Appadurai (1996, 4) argues “electronic mediation and mass migration mark the world of the present,” and that this process is “neither purely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern.” Such proclamations are deeply flawed when they ignore the question of access to technology. Regardless of how advanced electronic communication becomes, it is of little use to migrant workers who are paid less than minimum wage or to the subaltern classes of the Third World. For instance, when Biju is in New York and his father is in India, the two have an extremely difficult time staying in touch. Readers are told that Biju and his father

> would never know how many [of their letters] went astray in all the rickety connections made along the way, between the temperamental postman in the pouring rain, the temperamental van across the landslides …, the lightning and thunder, the befogged airport, the journey from Calcutta all the way to the post office on 125th Street in Harlem (Desai 2006, 95).

Developments in electronic technology are irrelevant to Biju and his father, who rely on letters and the fickle channels through which they travel between India and New York. Desai demonstrates this problem again when Biju and his father struggle through a broken, static-filled telephone conversation using a calling card combination that a homeless man had stolen (Desai 2006, 229-32). This barrier to communication among global subalterns is a critical limitation to the development of class-consciousness. Economically marginalized peoples are less likely to be able to recognize their shared economic interests when they cannot maintain contact with others among the exploited classes.

Having these problems staying in touch with his father, and aware of an outbreak of violence back in India, Biju becomes worried about his father’s welfare and ultimately returns to India. He withdraws from the migrant workforce, the economic dimension of globalization, when globalization fulfills neither its promise of economic enrichment nor its cultural promise of instant, worldwide communication. By refusing to be exploited any longer, refusing to participate in neoliberal capitalism, Biju commits an act of resistance to global capitalism.

The Inheritance of Loss suggests several conclusions about contemporary global capitalism. That Biju and his fellow migrant labourers work in abject conditions and live in a wretched economic reality calls for the development of a global subaltern class-consciousness. While its advocates claim that globalization facilitates cultural understanding, readers of Desai’s novel see that national, ethnic, and linguistic divides are among the central characteristics of Biju’s interactions with other globalized subalterns when he is in New York. These tensions, combined with limited access to communication and brisk labour flows, inhibit the characters' abilities to develop an awareness of their shared economic interests. *The Inheritance of Loss* thus leads to the conclusion that globalization is a process that is primarily defined by economic exploitation and by the barriers it creates to resisting class-based dominance.

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Glocal anaesthetics – Or how corporate multiculturalism can knock you politically unconscious

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I lied to get here. During the trial that was euphemistically called a hearing, my family and I underwent a polite interrogation, during which we spouted the lines we had rehearsed over and over until we could no longer tell truth from adaptation. Networks of information were in place, and the Canadian government was in a refugee-recognizing mood at the time, but sources were limited, so we were confined to speaking about *recognized* militant groups, rather than the nameless men who occasionally showed up at our gate to threaten us by saying they knew we were Tamil, and they would *take care* of us soon enough. One of the questions on our immigration forms was whether we had ever been accused of a crime in our country of origin. This was not without irony, when being Tamil is considered a crime, often punishable by death. However, this was not something I could point out at the time. I did exactly as I was told: "Just deal with this for now. You don't want any problems." Problem is a strange euphemism for deportation, not unlike troubles, the name Sri Lankans gave to the ethnic riots of 1983. No, I did not want any more troubles/problems. Five years later, I was eligible for citizenship and, shaking with fear and bitterness, I pledged my oaths to the old colonial masters, the divide and conquerors; our history had come full ironic circle. I wear this mantle of citizenship, earned by my falsehoods, and know that my conscience would always keep me at one remove: among, but not of. The skyscrapers of this city gleamed like swords guarding the entryway to legitimacy; I would only stand at the gates. It didn't occur to me that I had done anything revolutionary in problematizing nationhood. There was no sense of play in my use of forged documents. We were denied political participation in the country we came from, but it was we who felt we had transgressed somehow in challenging the meaning of nationality and citizenship. Above all, we felt guilty at the thought of those left behind – the ones who did not have the privilege of being middle-class and able to put together the means to leave in search of the promise of democracy. To work, to go to university, to vote freely, to build something without fear of retribution, without the dread whenever a group of strangers stood outside your gate, it sounded like utopia.

It is approximately this kind of democratic utopia that advocates of globalization, significantly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), claim that transnational networks and solidarities will eventually bring about through successful resistances and hybridizations. The new Empire, as they see it, is not bound by spatial or territorial boundaries (though even Hardt and Negri want to confine it to a *civilized* world); it creates an order that suspends history, or arrives at the end of history; seeks to rule over human nature through the employment of unprecedented forms of biopower; and is dedicated to peace, even though the practice of Empire continues to be bathed in blood (Hardt and Negri 2000, xiii-ix). Any attempt to subvert or contest Empire itself takes place on Imperial terrain. That Hardt and Negri remain optimistic about the new Empire in spite of these ambiguous arguments is explained away by their faith in the multitude and the concept of the constitution advertised by the United States of America, which occupies the most privileged position in the Empire. They make the claim that the new global network is one where the role of industrial factory labour has been reduced and communicative labour has come to take priority. Its logic of rule is the realization of the world market, in which the multitude may participate in some sort of ideal social and economic democracy. The unexamined leaps made here are that consumption equals consent, and that access to the tools, leave alone the labour, of communication for some equals access for all. Given the privileging of the concept of networks, there is little or no examination of why it is that some networks succeed while others are doomed to fail.

A significant source of the problem is the very shift in priority from industrial labour to communicative labour. It is a shift that privileges an already relatively privileged oligarchy, and skims over the majority of the global workforce who are still caught up in low paying factory work or menial construction labour. As Jean and John Comaroff (2001, 294) point out in *Millennial Capitalism*, success in the global marketplace continues to be measured in terms of purchasing power rather than the enjoyment of rights. North American economists like Alice Amsden (2000) and Robyn Meredith (2007) still tend to speak in terms of *reforming* markets in China and India, without paying sufficient attention to why these protectionist economies have managed to survive as long as they have, and what problems may exist for their labour force today, apart from their lack of purchasing power. The very titles of their recent works, quite apart from the content, bespeak a normative otherization that is by itself quite troubling, though possibly a topic for another paper. However, these normative assumptions in the realm of economics find their parallel in cultural production when little or no attention is paid to how legislatively and economically sanctioned representation may further marginalize disadvantaged communities. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on multiculturalism in Toronto to draw out the ways in which cultural production is shaped and influenced by globalization, creating canonical texts/identities that dominate the process of hybridization and determine who has access to networks, and through borders.

Cultural experience in the age of globalization is packaged not unlike a combo in your favourite fast food restaurant. Its production is affected by the efficiency with which it can be recreated and marketed. Diversity prioritizes an otherness that plays a useful role in the marketplace, insofar as it can be advertised and consumed without necessarily being engaged with. Entertainment is more valuable than engagement in the marketplace, in the pursuit of the bottom line. My own entry point into Torontonian culture, however, happened not at the hub of its marketplace, but at its seedy margins: at Church and Wellesley, in Kensington Market, and in Parkdale where, according to fellow poet Cad Lowlife:

> Drunks spend their welfare cheques on booze
> in a bus shelter, someone takes a snooze
> and you can always find something really cheap at a garage sale,
> in Parkdale, scummy Parkdale.[1]

In among the Desis and the fags and the pimps and the punks and the users and the whores, a refugee was not too much out of place. Through them, I learned to speak again, and I am sure they would consider it a bit of a coup that I now refer to them in an academic paper. Who mourns the disappearance of the common world as condos go up in Parkdale, the community and conscience driven Desh Pardesh has given way to Rogers' Masala Mehndi Masti, homophobia is swept underground for Pride Week, Yonge and Dundas has its gleaming new square right next to what used to be the Eaton Centre, and the punk hang out Planet Kensington goes down (it's been replaced by a much-needed Restaurant Makeover style bistro) as loft spaces go up? That events like Masala Mehndi Masti and the Chinese Lantern Festival have the possessive Rogers' added to them shows that cable corporations know their demographics and, at as much as twenty-five dollars for a specialty channel, are certainly willing to promote market privileged representation.

Slavoj Žižek's (2002, 11) indictment of current *tolerant* multicultural practice as "an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while practices like wife beating stay out of sight)" highlights the paradox inherent in market-privileged representation. The project of dismantling borders and hegemonies is made more difficult by the presence of horizontal differences we can be entertained by, while vertical antagonisms remain unchallenged. The Other thereby enjoys a cultural identity that deprives him of his subjectivity. He ceases to be an individual with the experience of particular material conditions, and becomes instead a representative of a culture without history. We cannot reprimand him for his wife-beating, because they come from a "passionate culture," very different from ours. The hypocrisy of the liberal fallback of "who are we to judge" … and so on, is revealed when the Other becomes *homo sacer* during a state of emergency, and we trot out his wife-beating as a sign of his having always been beyond redemption. Multiculturalism can thus be shown to have a negative effect on the politicization of its subjects denied their subjectivity. In what Guy Debord (1994) calls the society of the spectacle, the possibility of *realpolitik* and an engagement with another is negated in favour of entertainment and sanctioned representation. Debord's (1994, 19) claim that "the fetishistic appearance of pure objectivity in spectacular relationships conceals their true character as relationships between human beings and between classes" is borne out under the rubric of multiculturalism, when difference is celebrated primarily in exhibition spaces or in parades. Culture limited to spectacle remains outside of history and, while its subjects are tantalized by what is ostensibly "possible," borders and barricades remain in place to silently maintain what is "permissible." One must keep in mind that even the parades are now further removed from engagement by the presence of barricades, especially visible during Caribana, where the line between spectator and participant is clearly demarcated and not to be crossed for fear of chaos. The purported intent is to protect *innocent* spectators from the violence that may potentially erupt among these *dangerous* Others. The Other is endowed with the mask of either Spectacle or Spectre, depending on the market or media driven requirements of the time. To return to Žižek, the result of global subjectivization is not the disappearance of objective reality, but the disappearance of subjectivity itself. It is not only the Other who loses in the reductive global equation, but also the self, denied the possibility of transformation. The consumer remains insulated from the producers of the designated culture, which keeps the interaction at the level of a commercial transaction, rather than cultural engagement.

This is hardly a one-sided equation. Sections of these minority communities do respond to a certain value recognition by promoting the more entertaining aspects of their culture. The colourful songs and dances of Bollywood are more easily staged and more likely to sell merchandise than poetry on violence and plays on displacement. Corporate-sponsored events like Masala Mehndi Masti advertise that they represent almost all aspects of South Asian culture, when Pakistan and Sri Lanka had no representation at this year's festivities and, with the exception of a Goan fusion band, neither did South India. North Indian commerce and Bollywood-inspired heterosexist aesthetics thus become accepted and canonized in mainstream Toronto culture as representative of South Asia in an alarming lapse into Orientalism that erases the experiences of refugees and queer South Asians. While it would be easy to place blame on the organizers of the event, no doubt their good intentions are swamped by popular demand. The workshops on diasporic issues are not nearly as well attended as the song and dance extravaganzas, and the burden of representation ought not to fall on the shoulders of a few individuals who must then walk the tightrope between commercial demand and the dictates of conscience. Yet, the fairground of the Exhibition Place in Toronto allows for only certain kinds of interaction. Bollywood film stars become glocal celebrities, people purchase a few outfits, some knick knacks, get a Mehndi tattoo, and go home from a festival feeling happily multiculti, with no recognition that they have only reinforced the otherness of one ethnic group to protect the self of their nationhood.

In *Fear of Small Numbers*, Arjun Appadurai (2006, 3), an advocate of globalization from below, attempts to understand what globalization may have to do with terror and ethnic cleansing by drawing attention to the problem of a national *ethnos*: "No modern nation, however benign its political system and however eloquent its public voices may be about the virtues of tolerance, multiculturalism and inclusion, is free of the idea that its national sovereignty is built on some sort of ethnic genius." Behind the smiling face of Canadian multiculturalism lies the battle between the two solitudes, in which the First Nations' Peoples continue to be invisible. That this pluralist policy arose from a fear of separatism positions it essentially as a compromise between hegemonic cultures to retain a national whole. Yet, by our very presence, political refugees trouble this notion of a pure and unsullied national whole. Few refugees can give up on the land they were displaced from. Ties of affection, blood, and loyalty still link us to the people *back home*, regardless of the political party in power at any given time. In the face of state-sponsored ethnic genocide in our native lands, we are unable to easily dismiss those who offer resistance to this slaughter as terrorists. As corporate multiculturalism becomes the norm, our city's plural community becomes more and more segregated. As the global War on Terror encourages slippages and elisions in the mainstream media, Sikhs, Tamils, and Jihadists come to occupy the same space in the Canadian national imaginary, with even well-meaning non-Tamil Canadians feeling entitled to rail against Tamil terrorists. Cultural practice does not end; it continues in the margins and the segregated pockets of our city – invisible to the mainstream. What remains visible is the polarization between those who view themselves as legitimate Canadians and those who increasingly view themselves as illegitimate. Unable to find a point of entry into mainstream cultural discourse, we are left outside of political discourse as well. The complexities of our struggles eclipsed by separatism and terrorism, as though non-separatist, pacifist Tamils do not exist. In the fugitive spaces we occupy, we come to understand that we are outside the bounds of sanctioned plurality and, like other marginalized groups, we are edged out of gathering places by bohemian condos and Starbucks coffee houses which inadvertently also diminish the coveted character of the spaces they appropriate.

When Hardt and Negri, the optimists of globalization, promote the challenging of borders and a loving militancy (2000, 412-3), we might have found the idea of St. Francis of Assisi with an AK-47 charming, if not for the anxiety we experienced getting here, and we were among the privileged who could afford the trip. The villagers in Jaffna who must pack up their meagre belongings at a moment's notice and walk miles for resettlement, only to be forced at gunpoint to pack up and move again – human pawns in the game between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan military – remain outside our political consciousness. Their losses of livestock and much-needed food stores do not factor in the global marketplace or in global networks. They are living, and dying, proof that we do not need to cross borders to be displaced. The poverty-stricken remain invisible on the global radar; for them, crossing borders remains a metaphysical, as well as economic, impossibility. Undisputedly, there are those who thumb their noses at borders already. We call them multinational corporations: they have no need to challenge these boundaries, and their militancy is often far from loving. It is those of us who most need to challenge borders that come face to face with the man in a uniform with a gun. And then, long after we've crossed those visible geographical borders, we come across the invisible ones, the ones that say "You make us uncomfortable, can we change the channel now?"

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-Engaging globalizations-

Ethical grounds and imagined brew: The fair trade movement and specialty coffee retailers

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When consumers stand at a coffee shop counter, the variety of coffee that can be poured into their mugs seems endless. Coffee is sold by region, type, roast, brewing method, label, or certification and increasingly appears in specialty forms. The drink has percolated into Western culture, stimulating a cosmopolitan coffee house culture. Drinking coffee has become part of daily life for millions of people. Cafés appear on street corners of even the smallest towns in North America.

With this intensification and influence, the coffee industry has expanded, offering a wealth of options to consumers. Among these alternatives is fair trade certified coffee. Fair trade aims to offer "the most disadvantaged producers in developing countries the opportunity to move out of extreme poverty through creating market access, to northern consumers, under beneficial rather than exploitative terms" (Nicholls and Opal 2005, 6). Alternative Trading Organizations (ATOs) are the "origins of fair trade … creating 'alternative' trade patterns to secure incomes for the world's poorest producers, who were not necessarily benefiting from 'business as usual'" (Nicholls and Opal 2005, 80). The concept of fair trade carries with it notions of fair pricing, transparency, responsibility, and balancing of power, which might be embryonic norms within an evolving world economy. I argue that the relationships, practices, institutions, and ideas that link the fair trade movement's specialty roasters, retailers, and consumers are enabling individuals and organizations within the movement to imagine they are part of a global social force that stands opposed to the traditional coffee industry and the conventional coffee commodity chain.

In this movement, new institutions are enforcing standards to rebalance the commodity chain between producer and consumer, seemingly offering more benefits to producers. Rich world consumers are moving beyond the consumption of relatively "homogenous commodities," and quality standards are becoming evermore important as niche markets expand (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, 162). Raynolds (2002, 410) refers to fair trade as a set of "civic norms and qualifications that are based on collective responsibility for societal benefits – thus extending domestic conventions to socially and spatially distant peoples and spaces."

At the same time, fair trade is rooted "in commercial conventions as it deals with mainstream distributors and retailers" (Raynolds 2002, 411). Social equality and environmental standards seem to be considered before price. As such, within the movement, people can imagine that their work is rocking the foundations of traditional global coffee trade. According to Roseberry (1996), certain possibilities to alter business as usual have emerged as the specialty coffee industry has taken flight. For example, quality standards are rapidly developing where previously coffee was treated as a simple bulk commodity. Similarly, labelling and certification of coffees based upon origin and relationships with producer communities are taking off (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, 185). Thus, tensions between fair trade and the old coffee business exist.

Roseberry (1996) and Harvey (1989) suggest that today's more flexible and differentiated system of accumulation creates possibilities for people to stake out positions that can enable them to transcend exploitation to a certain degree. New products, such as specialty coffees, can be absorbed more readily in the context of a global trade that is constantly adjusting and adapting to meet demands for products with new characteristics. While this new kind of trade might "absorb" the fair trade movement, it also enables it. Roasters and retailers are a key link in the commodity chain where inherent contradictions are evident. Unlike consumers and non-governmental organizations, roasters and retailers are trying to run a business, and to gain capital, out of fair trade. Most consumers, on the other hand, "make the final choice of what coffee goes in their cup in front of the supermarket shelves or the coffee shop counter" (Waridel 2002, 54). In this sense, I argue that roasters and retailers represent a privileged site for examining the contradictions that characterize fair trade's existence within the global economy. Fair trade potentially engages people to consider alternatives to existing dominant structures and social forces.

To make this argument, I analyze the fair trade movement through two complimentary conceptual frameworks, one having to do with the commodity chain, the other with the social imagination. Using commodity chain theory (Appadurai 1986; Bestor 2001; Talbot 2004) and analyzing information which contributes to the social imagination (Appadurai 1996; Gaonkar 2002; Khasnabish 2004), the retailers' relationships and ideology in the fair trade coffee chain and movement will be illuminated.

First, the commodity chain is an effective way of looking at social relations embedded in the market. It traces the steps in the social production of commodities from producer to consumer. Coffee flows up from the growers who start the chain to the consumers who complete it (Talbot 2004, 31). John Talbot (2004, 1) states that,

> when you drink a cup of coffee, you are completing the final link in a global chain of activities that made that cup of coffee possible … The way this global chain of activities is organized has enormous implications for the millions of people involved in it, and the societies in which they live … The chain of activities that brings you your cup of coffee is also a direct link between the North and the South, the rich and the poor.

I am most interested in the social networks and relationships created along the coffee commodity chain.

Second, I am framing fair trade as a social movement that engages social imagination. Fair trade falls outside the typical social movement literature because fair trade acts as a business model, development project, a lobby group, a transnational organization, and an ideology. I am concerned with first-person subjectivities, through the use of images, stories, symbols, and ideologies by which people make sense of their own identities and their place in the world (Khasnabish 2004, 3).

The idea of the imagination allows us to link the meaning or significance of a behaviour and its mobilizing structures. What connects people to each other within this framework? What connects the consumer to the producer in a way that breaks apart the alienation of economic exchange and creates social justice? Appadurai claims that the imagination, in collective forms, creates ideas of moral economies and can become the fuel for action (Appadurai 1996, 7). How is a collective identity created within the imaginations of the people involved in the fair trade movement?

Methodology

As this is an exploratory project, I set out to investigate the role of the coffee roaster and retailer in stimulating change within the world economy through fair trade. I investigated the extent to which fair trade principles and practices inform retailers' decision-making in their business. With hopes to qualitatively define the role of the retailer within the fair trade movement, I interviewed eleven coffee roasters and retailers in Halifax, Nova Scotia. With their responses, I aimed to illuminate their role and imagination concerning ethical business, moral economies, and the fair trade market. I also attended the Specialty Coffee Association of America's (SCAA) Conference and Exhibition in Long Beach, California. A coffee trade show provided inside knowledge from those intimately involved in the coffee industry. In the limited space of this paper, I will focus on retailers' responses from the interviews I conducted. I am most interested in the independently owned shops, as opposed to Starbucks, Second Cup, and Tim Horton's, for example.

Specialty coffee shops: Fuelling a movement

Specialty coffee roasters and coffee houses began to appear more frequently from the 1970s on in the United States of America and Canada (Pendergrast 1999, 312). These specialty coffee shops started selling whole beans, which were freshly roasted in the shop, to consumers. Mark Pendergrast (1999, 293) describes the emergence of these specialty shops as a "quality crusade" led by a small group of coffee connoisseurs who "sniffed, sipped, swooned and sold" better tasting coffee to a growing base of eager consumers. Like those interested in fine wines, "the coffee connoisseur would seek those modest luxuries that most can still afford" (Pendergrast 1999, 311). In 1983, it was believed that the specialties comprised less than one percent of coffee business in the US market. The following year, three or four new specialty coffee roasters entered the trade every month. By 1985, it was estimated that specialty coffee accounted for five percent of the industry, and a new roaster emerged every week (Pendergrast 1999, 338).

Most certified coffees, such as Fair Trade or Rainforest Alliance, have found a niche in the specialty coffee industry's sustainability sector. Roasters, wholesalers, and retailers support certified coffees because of the socio-economic and environmental qualities they boast. It was these specialty "coffeemen" who first began to question the conditions under which their coffee was produced,

> specialty coffeemen had concentrated only on providing the 'perfect cup,' fighting the robusta blends of the big boys. Now they were challenged to consider the inequalities built into the system of coffee cultivation, processing and export. The beans that produced their high-priced cups were harvested by poverty-stricken campesinos (Pendergrast 1999, 354).

Nicholls (2002, 80) argues that "developing and stocking fair trade products offer retailers the opportunity both to enhance their own public profile in terms of corporate social responsibility and to achieve commercial success in a growing niche market."

Relationships, practices, institutions and ideas

Relationships amongst people connect ideas, institutions, and practices. Roasters and retailers are a key link in the commodity chain and, within the fair trade movement, they can imagine their work stimulating change with business as usual. A restaurant owner explained her motivations for serving fair trade coffee:

> on our menu we have 'A restaurant with a conscience' and that just came, it wasn't born. Before we opened this restaurant, I was trying to describe what we do. I was like, well, we are a restaurant with a conscience, I have a conscience, and the whole restaurant is going to be having a conscience. So what do we do, what do we buy, is it hurting anybody, anything? Me buying this product, how is it affecting somebody else?

The practices of the roasters and retailers with whom I spoke flow from such ideas and, in a sense, result in new developments within the industry. These practices are different from those which define the traditional system. They include the search for high quality coffee; sending particular messages to consumers about coffee and the particular business; and informing consumers about fair trade messages.

One roaster recognizes the need for farmers to grow quality coffee, but told me that consumers need to be aware of quality coffee as well. As this roaster describes her/his first experience with fair trade, s/he applies this concept to the whole fair trade commodity chain:

> when we first came on to the scene, fair trade coffee didn't have a good reputation. It wasn't considered good coffee, it clearly was a cause and it was bought for that. Now, we bought Bridgehead coffee and it was within the specialty coffee range, it was better than a Maxwell House, but it wasn't their thing. They had a different motivation and did that well. So I think we were just dumb lucky that the co-op that we managed to connect with in the very beginning was one of the early co-ops, so they had really developed their systems to produce sophisticated coffee. So I would suggest that we broke the mould with fair trade. I feel we have set the standard. Others that have come after us know that if they don't produce high quality they are not going to last. So I think we did the right thing.

Leading roasters and retailers in the specialty industry first search out quality coffee and then use the fair trade label as a means to attract consumers. They have found that when the quality is there, so is the taste and, if it is labelled, the consumer feels they are supporting something.

There have also been some institutions, such as the SCAA and fair trade organizations such as the Fair Trade Labelling Organization (FLO) and TransFair that have developed as a result of global forces that stand opposed to the traditional coffee industry and the conventional coffee commodity chain. The emergence and purpose of these organizations is for roasters and retailers to establish a relationship to these institutions through licensing, pricing, and obtaining information. In relation to licensing, one retailer revealed,

> the biggest complaint I have is the licensee fees with TransFair Canada. What we pay in licensee fees, we send them four cheques a year and they are $2,000 a cheque so we send them $8,000 and I asked them about it before, when we started there were fifteen other licensees in Canada and I was sending them cheques I remember they were $80 or $90, and they were surviving and now we have two hundred licensees, why are we spending so much money? I would think the price per kilo would be an incentive to get more people on. The quarterly reports are a real pain. I was all for when they said they were going to give a price increase to the farmers. It should be more than $0.10. You should give that $0.13 a kilo that we pay in licensee fees to the farmers, I would rather see some of that go to the farmers. If I knew that that $0.13 a kilo that we pay and half of it was going to the farmers, I would have no issues paying it.

The idea to give farmers a higher price as a cut from the licensing fee is not a capitalistic notion. Such ideas influence each of the relationships, practices, and institutions involved in the fair trade coffee industry. These ideas also allow roasters and retailers to imagine they are part of a movement.

Roasters have been participating in educating consumers about where their coffee comes from with the hopes that they will support fair trade products or simply be more informed consumers. Two retailers described their motivations as capturing the imaginations of their customers,

> I think that is one thing we have been able to do is to capture people's imaginations and I think that what we have gone for is to actually engage people in feeling that they are doing something. We are at the point now that so many of our customers want to travel with us. It has just kind of blown them away.

Another retailer hopes to start with coffee education and graduate to larger projects if the interest is there:

> Well, what I want to get into is to have a coffee education corner and refresh it every week, put new research, new pictures. It would be such a great resource to have, to be able to communicate with people where their money is going. I want to get into that sort of thing, consumer awareness, because I think that can reach really far. You can reach far into someone's imagination and stir up some things that someone hasn't thought of before. I think that could have far reaching effects. I want to share our coffee story.

Following in line with the same notion, another retailer I interviewed explains

> the interesting and controversial features of fair trade. There is an attempt to marry responsible consumerism and responsible corporate practices with a market-based economy. Essentially, I would say they are trying to humanize capitalism and that's a really quite fundamental challenge and question in my own mind. Clearly, fair trade does not attempt to challenge or fundamentally alter market-based relations. Rather, it tends to transform market relationships in ways that will ensure that they are less exploitative and more socially responsible and the benefits of capitalist activity are more widely distributed.

Fair trade retailers and roasters understand their work as attempting to humanize global trade by altering the scales of power accumulation. Proponents of fair trade wish to correct the distortions of exploitation with hopes that both the rich and the poor reap the rewards of the market. As the retailer above points out, fair trade attempts to transform market relationships and distribute the benefits of global trade. As we can see from the roasters' and retailers' responses, fair trade attempts to marry responsible consumerism and responsible corporate practices.

The evidence I have presented above points to the relationships, practices, institutions, and ideas that link the fair trade movement's roasters, retailers, and consumers. These four factors are enabling individuals and organizations within the fair trade movement to imagine they are part of a global social force. This is in opposition to the traditional coffee industry and the conventional coffee commodity chain. Although there are contradictions and diversity within the responses of the retailers and roaster whom I interviewed, they often spoke to similar concerns. It is their imagination that enables this to occur.

As with the theme of this conference, researchers of globalization appeal to one of two opposing imaginaries: one where globalization is a negative force expanding the gap between the rich and the poor and another which understands globalization as opening spaces of possibility. The story of the fair trade coffee industry speaks to both sides of this debate. The retailers with whom I spoke recognize that there are negative economic forces which increase the gap between reach and poor. They hope, however, that through fairer trading systems there are increasing possibilities of closing this gap, or at least, of making it smaller.

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Empowerment or exploitation: Women and economic restructuring in developing and post socialist states

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The emergence of a global marketplace has produced an ongoing debate among feminist scholars. One side of the debate sees the integration of women into the global economy as a positive tool to empower women by making them more economically independent, thus reducing gender inequalities. The opposing side argues that a gendered hierarchy still exists within the processes of globalization and that women's interests have been further devalued within the global marketplace.

My argument in this paper is that globalization is a multifaceted process which produces contradictory effects for women. Globalizing forces have both constructive and detrimental consequences, and these contradictory effects are dependent on unique regional and economic contexts. The focus of this paper is on global restructuring in three different spaces within the global economy: Mexico, the Czech Republic, and sub-Saharan Africa. Each case highlights the dual effects of complex forces of globalization for women. The paper concludes with an assessment of how transnational associations operate to diminish such contradictory effects.

Globalization: Defining a complex process

A universally accepted definition of globalization may be a daunting task to develop. Although globalization involves "a complex economic, political, cultural, and geographic process," the focus of this paper is on its economic facets (Moghadam 1995, 367). More specifically, economic globalization pertains to the integration of markets, states, and individuals by technologies and communications which make transactions cheaper and faster than before (Onyejekwe 2004, 27). Market exchanges are also intensified, which allows the flow of goods and services to move more rapidly across borders. This has been demonstrated through increased foreign direct investment and international trade (Lourdes et al. 2000, vii).

Additionally, it is important to note the underlying neoliberal ideology of economic forms of globalization. Neoliberalism emphasizes the liberalization of markets and capital; it advocates increased government deregulation, the privatization of services, and reduced capital controls on financial transactions (Lourdes et al. 2000, ix). The rationale behind this ideology is that markets are the most efficient way to allocate resources. This market logic, often referred to as the Washington consensus, is represented by such financial institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) (Lourdes et al. 2000, ix). These institutions have enacted policies which have various implications for actors in the global economy. The gender-neutral language of such institutions often presents globalization as a universalizing process with equal benefits for men and women.

Within this paper, gender is understood as a social construct. As such, gender is reflected in the relationships between men and women in all social institutions and interactions, including the marketplace. The construction of gender may operate by advancing institutions and processes associated with masculinity while subordinating those associated with the feminine (Moghadam 1999, 12). Marianne Marchand (2005, 99) argues that hegemonic masculinity is related to "high powered spheres of global finance and the export sector" while civil society is connected to "reconstructed femininities and subordinate masculinities." She stresses that the power of representation reinforces gender inequalities between men and women (Marchand 2005, 269).

Marchand's perspective is useful in highlighting how structural components can reproduce gender-based inequalities. Because her perspective does not engage the other side of the debate, however, it tends to relegate women's experiences to mere victimization. While it is necessary to adopt a "gendered lens," one also has to incorporate the more affirmative implications of economic globalization. A feminized labour force may also experience empowerment with increased market participation.[1] The process of economic restructuring reflects how these contradictory forces shape the actions and choices available to women in the global marketplace.

Gender and economic restructuring

Restructuring processes are often undertaken by states to reorganize their domestic economies. National governments may restructure their economies to promote market liberalization and to attract foreign investment. This may be both a voluntary and a coercive process, involving financial institutions like the IMF and the WB. When these institutions are involved, they often administer structural adjustment programs (SAPs) as conditions for receiving loans. These programs entail:

> (1) [the] lowering of trade barriers, exposing local producers to foreign competition; (2) reduction in subsidies and price controls to remove distortions in the market-set prices at the local level; (3) a restructuring of financial systems by withdrawing controls on capital movements; (4) attracting foreign direct investment and reducing capital flight by removing state controls; (5) minimizing state intervention in the management of the economy, and also in the provisions of social services (Rai 2002, 128).

As heavily indebted countries search for new loans to pay off old ones, SAPs have become standard practice.

Export processing zones and female labour

Many countries have established export processing zones (EPZs) as part of the restructuring process. These zones often provide reduced regulations and tax exemptions for corporations. One of the most notable has been Mexican centers known as *maquiladoras*. In *Reproductive Rights Violations*, Fenneke Reysoo (2005, 127) contends that although the maquila sector did not begin with SAPs, its activities have intensified as a response to IMF pressures and the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement. What has changed is the increased concentration of women as they move towards these industrial centers to benefit from stable and regular incomes (Reysoo 2005, 128). Yet, there is a tendency of firms to use hiring practices that support a gendered division of labour.

Manufacturing firms in the maquila sector are inclined to hire unskilled, unmarried, and young women (Reysoo 2005, 128). Some factories have been shown to hire up to eighty percent of women in their factories at an average age of seventeen. Their gendered hiring practices are based on presumptions that women are more obedient, their hands are more nimble in completing repetitive tasks, and they are less likely to unionize (Reysoo 2005, 127). The positions offered by these factories are highly flexible as women are expected to leave after they get married. Further, preconditions for securing employment include mandatory pregnancy tests in combination with questions about sexual history. The rationale for pursuing this strategy is to ensure that factories do not absorb the cost of maternity benefits (Reysoo 2005, 132, 134).

This presents contradictory effects on women's involvement in EPZs. On the one hand, these factories recognize the productive capacity of female workers. On the other hand, women's reproductive and civil rights may be violated by the management of the maquila sector. Other spaces may also reveal dual effects for women, which are specific to their own domestic realties.

Post-socialist states and restructuring: The Czech Republic case

The ending of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe produced an economic and political transition in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Much like Mexico, the former socialist states were undergoing dual processes of economic integration and state reconstruction (True 2000, 78). They also adopted the SAPs necessary to receive loans from international financial institutions.

Focusing on the Czech Republic, Jacqui True (2000, 78) argues that the adoption of neoliberal reforms has produced both "winners" and "losers" among women. Neoliberal reforms were introduced as a way to give the Czech economy "shock therapy." Changes included the introduction of private property, increased privatization, and deregulation. Women have seen both increasing opportunities and difficulties associated with involvement in the marketplace. At the same time, neoliberal reforms have served to redefine gender relations.

One factor which defines these relations is a dual labour market. As a result of reforms, the labour market has become separated between high skilled and low skilled positions. The former have high job security and enjoy larger wages while the latter are faced with low wages and job insecurity. Although many women have entered higher skilled positions, the majority of women continue to be employed in the lower skilled positions (True 2000, 78).

In the same way, the public and private sectors have also been subject to gendered divisions of labour. In 1994, men accounted for more than sixty-two percent of jobs in the private industry while women represented over sixty percent of those employed in the public sector. However, the shift from the public to the private sector has left women's wages below the national average (True 2000, 80). This division of labour is largely supported by male union leaders who are unmotivated to see change in gendered wage gaps.

Reductions in social expenditures have also transferred the burden to women in the domestic sphere (True 2000, 85). Women have had to balance their role as primary caregivers within the home while working in an uncertain job market. This has subsequently led to a declining birth rate in the country (True 2000, 87). Overall, the Czech case demonstrates that there are dual processes which occur with restructuring. As in Mexico, the case in the Czech Republic exhibits that although women can increasingly participate in the labour market, they often face lower wages and increased job insecurity than their male counterparts. While these repercussions may negate the benefits of labour participation, the situation highlights the contradictory effects of economic restructuring.

Women and the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa

The informal sector refers to forms of self employment, small scale enterprises, and home-based work (Moghadam 1999, 374). It often requires low start-up costs and a minimal level of education (Sher 2006, 1). Work in the informal sector is often taken up by women when they are unable to enter the formal sector due to such things as domestic responsibilities or a lack of employment opportunities. Developing regions within sub-Saharan Africa have large informal sectors which include high levels of female participation.

While it is often difficult to record data, it is estimated that informal sectors make up a large part of overall economic activity in sub-Saharan countries. The WB has estimated that the informal sector constitutes thirty percent of South Africa's gross national income. This figure increases to sixty percent in Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Moreover, there are large percentages of women involved in informal trade: eighty-one percent in Mali and ninety-two percent in Benin (Sher 2006, 4, 9). These figures demonstrate that the informal sector is a space in which women tend to be over-represented.

In *Women in the Informal Sector*, M. A. Chen (2001, 75) argues that women and men in the informal sector are often subject to lower wages than in the formal sector. Women tend to be traders and to engage in sub-contract work, while men tend to be employers. Further, women often engage in low-income activities, such as the sale of food items. Thus, although women engage more in the informal sector, there remains a gendered income gap, with men generally earning more than women (Sher 2006, 15). Chen (2001, 78) also points out that the informal sector does not provide benefits such as healthcare and pensions. Therefore, the costs of such benefits have to be absorbed by informal workers, which perpetuates the overall cycle of poverty associated with informal sector work.

In Zimbabwe, the effects of economic reforms have seen an increase in the amount of women in the informal sector. Increased deregulation, privatization, and market liberalization have led to overall declining wages. The implementation of structural adjustment programs has also raised the number of informal workers to 1.56 million. This rise has negatively influenced women who have seen increased competition when selling goods (Sher 2006, 15).

Yet, there are some positive implications which emerge from opened up markets. In Burkina Faso, for example, women who traditionally collected Shea nuts for export to European markets recently saw a shift in export focus to cotton, which meant they had to find new ways to supplement a declining demand for Shea nuts. Non-governmental organizations have helped women to produce processed Shea butter for sale to multinational corporations (MNCs) (Sher 2006, 16-7). The MNCs buy from domestic producers and export to European cosmetic companies. This maintained a demand for the women's labour despite the refocused domestic economy.

Overall, the general trend in sub-Saharan Africa has been a shift from the formal sector to the informal sector. This has the negative effects of increased competition and a reduction in real incomes. However, the Burkina Faso case demonstrates how domestic producers are able to become involved in exporting to foreign markets. While there may be a higher degree of negative implications in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, this is not the entire story of informal sector work. This case draws attention to the potential importance of transnational networks in reducing the negative implications of restructuring on women. This is what Marchand (2005, 267) refers to as "globalization from below," where civil society actors within transnational networks resist the negative effects of neoliberal restructuring.

Transnational activism and resistance: The response of civil society

In Mexico, women's groups have responded to the impacts of global economic restructuring with collective actions with the support of local and transnational networks. International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and domestic agencies like the Maquiladoras Health and Safety Support Network have continued to resist the violations of women's rights (Reysoo 2005, 132). These have been effective first steps to protect women rights within this regional space.

In sub-Saharan Africa, women's unions have continued to grow in western countries such as Ghana, Sénégal and Côte d'Ivoire (Xaba, Horn, and Motala 2002). They represent both rural and urban informal workers who look for more government protections. Other home-based informal workers have formed an international alliance called Home Net. Similarly, there has been the formation of an international alliance for street level workers called Street Net. Members of these alliances were able to draft declarations to protect their individual rights as workers. The declarations were supported by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and became the template for the ILO Convention on Homework in 1996 (Chen 2001, 80-1).

Transnational networks have also begun to permeate multinational institutions like the United Nations. Conferences like the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Rio Earth Summit and the United Nations Beijing Women's Conference have helped to highlight the gendered dimensions of restructuring processes (Steinstra 2000, 209). These conferences were particularly significant in bringing national, regional, and international networks together.

There are still tensions within the organization of these networks, however. The make-up of the leadership in women's caucuses reveals deep divisions and power imbalances between Northern and Southern women's groups. Presently, women from the North still represent the primary leaders of theses caucuses. With the United Nations Headquarters being located in New York, Northern women's organizations enjoy easier access and greater influence in transnational networks (Steinstra 2000, 217). Despite these tensions, these caucuses have been instrumental in voicing the needs of women in the global economy in documents like the *Beijing Platform for Action*. They have called for greater accountability on the part of financial institutions when implementing restructuring programs (Steinstra 2000, 218). They also urge these institutions to analyze the links between economic restructuring and women's poverty. The work of such caucuses has laid groundwork for continued consultation with actors at local, national, regional, and global levels.

Conclusion

Above all, the economic processes of globalization do not represent an all-encompassing gender-neutral process. The overall argument of this paper is that globalization has often produced contradictory effects on women. It is not simply a case of "winner" and "losers," where women play a victimized role. The case studies discussed above highlight how women can be economically empowered through employment even as they experience the detrimental consequences of restructuring processes.

Women's networks have also served as a strong voice of resistance to negate some forms of restructuring policies. They have started to support the rights of women in local informal sectors through unionization and collective organizations. At the transnational level, women have been successful in achieving a platform for voicing gender issues in international institutions like the United Nations. While they have faced opposition, their efforts lay the groundwork for change. Future efforts may hopefully reduce the negative effects of restructuring and stress the positive ones.

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Global migration and development: Is co-development the answer?

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International labour migration from developing to developed countries is considered a widespread phenomenon. As such, attempts at developing coherent co-development policies can be lauded as progressive because they make the effort to utilize migration to the benefit of both sending and receiving states, theoretically placing them, and all parties involved, in a mutually and equally beneficial relationship. Although co-development has numerous definitions and is applied in varying contexts, its main thrust is a "win-win" philosophy where labour migrants, their families in their communities of origin, sending countries, and receiving countries are able to accrue concrete economic and human development benefits (Chou 2005). I, therefore, recognize the potential benefits of co-development policies as migration and development tools. Nevertheless, in order to ascertain the ways in which co-development has been historically deployed, I present a comprehensive critical overview of co-development research and practices.

Defining co-development

Initially, co-development projects were not tied to migration, but rather conceived informally as a way for aid-sending and aid-receiving countries to enhance the successes of their developmental projects through partnerships with local organizations (Chou 2005). Since their initial introduction, however, the relationship between development and migration has been firmly established, consequently leading various thinkers to posit various definitions of co-development which explicitly link it to migration. Co-development can therefore refer to:

1. A consensual relationship between these countries, ensuring that sending countries do not suffer from great losses through immigration.
2. A concept between two or more organizations which establishes mutually beneficial projects or activities that advance human development.
3. Initiatives that enable mutually beneficial and mutually helpful projects undertaken by two or more organizations in receiving and sending countries.
4. A line of work that favours the active participation of migrants in engaging with their communities of origin (Pedreira 2006).

These four definitions appear to be similar from the outset, but they contain subtle differences. Through the utilization of "collaborative metaphors," all of these definitions appear to promote mutually beneficial developmental policies for sending and receiving countries. The key question, however, is whether such policies are premised on recognizing the equality of all stakeholders, including migrants, sending and receiving communities, diasporic organizations, and multinational groupings (Moreno 2006). Therefore, one can conclude that there are multiple ways co-development is practiced, even if it superficially appears as though co-development has but one goal.

Development and migration

The type of approach taken with respect to co-development depends largely on the specific country, organization, or group's underlying outlook on the relationship between migration and development. One perspective affirms the neoclassical economics model, which depicts migrants as individual decision-makers who choose to migrate because of wage differentials. Such a perspective, as a result, neglects larger structural conditions spurring migration (Icduygu et al. 2001). The most widely accepted "migration and development" approach is the world systems theory perspective which sees migration as occurring from "peripheral" developing countries into "core" developed countries. In contrast to the neo-classical economic approach, the world systems theory perspective argues that rampant underdevelopment causes migration. As such, this theory ignores the decisions compelling individuals to migrate (Icduygu et al. 2001).

Philip Martin (1997) criticizes both theories, arguing that the decision to migrate cannot be analyzed without looking at both micro-level decision-making processes and structural causes. He argues that decisions to migrate hardly occur at the level of an isolated individual, but result from various considerations, including household needs and economic and social conditions in migrants' home and host communities. Moreover, Martin notes that increasing development in developing countries does not lead to reduced migration and may even encourage further migration because of raised expectations wrought by existing migration flows. Indeed, the "new economies of migration model," which "considers conditions in a variety of markets (not just labour markets) and views migration as a household decision," seems to show that "the demand for remittances from migrants increases as development proceeds and both investment opportunities and returns on investment increase" (Icduygu et al. 2001, 41; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002, 10). In short, Martin attests that there is a "migration hump" that occurs after a level of socio-economic growth is achieved. As such, migration does not necessarily decrease because of increased development, and may actually be encouraged through more development.

Another migration-development approach is the transnational approach to migration, which holds that migration occurs as a result of various factors. One of its proponents is Douglas Massey (1990), who asserts that various economic and social factors at the international, national, regional, and household level lead to the continued trend of cyclical migration, where migration flows persist despite attempts to limit migration. Cyclical migration persists as a result of the "interconnections among individual behavior, household strategies, community structures, [international] and national economies … and migrant networks" (Massey 1990, 18). I believe that Massey's perspective, in comparison to neo-classical and world systems theory, provides the best explanatory framework for understanding international migration. While the lack of a coherent theoretical perspective that encompasses these diverse influences at multiple scales might make it hard to promote a coherent policy of co-development, I argue that it is important to recognize that migration flows continue to be cyclical and that the relationship between migration and development is complex, rather than linear. In turn, doing so will enable policymakers to promote co-development policies that are relevant to the needs of receiving and sending countries, migrants, and migrants' communities. Indeed, it is important to consider the aforementioned influences, as well as political causes (i.e. political tumult in migrants' home communities) and sociological factors (see Appadurai's (1996) contention that imagined spaces of privilege, spurred by globalization, encourage migration) because only when all of these factors are assessed can the complex reasons behind migration be understood.

Coercive versus comprehensive co-development

Given the multiplicity of contrasting perspectives on the relationship between migration and development, it may be easier to classify co-development policies on the basis of motivations and goals. Indeed, I support M. H. Chou's (2005) contention that co-development can be either coercive or comprehensive. Coercive co-development emphasizes a hierarchical, non-co-operative approach where the needs of powerful actors (i.e. receiving countries, financial institutions) are prioritized, and where migration is deemed a problem needing to be curtailed. This approach is primarily based on the world systems theory perspective, where increases in development in "periphery" countries lead to proportional decreases in migration. In contrast, a comprehensive approach is one that sees migration as cyclical, and which promotes horizontal partnerships that, in turn, promote policies enabling development practices that meet the needs of all actors. Such an approach sees migration as a holistic phenomenon that needs to be better managed, but not curtailed. Although Chou (2005) ultimately shies away from complete advocacy of comprehensive co-development because of institutional and bureaucratic difficulties, she seems to think that comprehensive co-development is a goal that must be pursued. Barring this, she argues that a combination of comprehensive and coercive approaches is needed. While Chou does not specify what this entails, one assumes that such a combination involves attempting to establish non-hierarchical development partnerships between sending and receiving countries and migrants even amid governmental restraints on migration.

The vagueness of Chou's proposal notwithstanding, I affirm the importance of minimizing the impacts of coercive co-development through a more comprehensive approach. In the ensuing section, I delineate the way various countries and organizations' co-development policies are both coercive and comprehensive. The presence of coercive and comprehensive elements in the following co-development programs is thus reflective of conflicting and oftentimes contradictory agendas operating in each country/organization.

Government-initiated co-development

France was the first country to implement a formal system of co-development. In 1994, the French government created the Plan for Local Development and Immigration (PLDM, French acronym), where the emphasis was put on returning migrants to their countries of origin and initiating a dynamic of local co-development utilizing the skills the migrants acquired while they were living in France (Pedreira 2006). Indeed, the PLDM had two formal objectives. The first was to participate in the formation of a development strategy that prioritized local development and development restructuring. The strategy aimed to create employment opportunities following an economic overview of the country in question which invariably involved financing local development initiatives. The second objective was to help immigrants reintegrate into their countries of origin by providing assistance to returned migrants' attempts to launch new business initiatives (Pedreira 2006). With these objectives in mind, the French government allocated 5 million francs for a time period of thirty-six months to Mali, Sénégal, and Mauritius in 1995. It also funded 400 projects in Mali and Sénégal between the years 1996 and 2000 in order to support migrants' development projects, which resulted in the voluntary return of forty-seven percent of these migrants and the forced return of fifty-three percent of them (Pedreira 2006). To complement the PLDM, the organization Migration and Economic Initiatives was established.

Following the PLDM's initiatives, the term co-development, as a theoretical concept, was formally conceived in 1997 by Sami Nair, a French political scientist working for the French Inter-ministerial mission on co-development, who saw the need for an established "assisted return" policy that allowed the French government to place stricter control on migration flows while at the same time assisting with sending countries' economic development:

> Co-development would allow the host country to control migratory flows and support micro-projects in the migrants' countries of origin … the migrants would also

> contribute, if not ensure, the success of these micro-projects by putting the knowledge they acquired in the host country to practice in their home country (Chou 2005, 4).

Specifically, Nair conceived of co-development as being derivative of the PLDM. He saw it as a policy response to the French government's desire to limit and decrease escalating migration flows to France from African countries, specifically Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. According to French policy at this time, the promotion of select, controlled migration allowed labour migrants to spend a limited amount of time in France working and improving their skills, which they could subsequently apply in their "home" countries to development projects funded by the French government (Salazar 2006). Co-development as conceived by Nair had an equal emphasis on the importance of "stabilizing" migration flows in France and on the creation of development opportunities in migrants' countries of origin. Co-development, in short, was seen as a collaborative endeavour, albeit with an inevitable power dynamic embedded in its structure.

Because of France's influence, the European stance on co-development was initially a coercive one, where co-development was conceived as a way to curb migration to Europe. Nevertheless, recent trends seem to indicate that there is a growing movement towards a comprehensive co-development approach that departs from the coercive assisted return model. More recent approaches seem to be based on horizontal partnerships between sending and receiving countries, as prompted by several European Union (EU) wide policy papers and communications. For example, the 2005 EU communication, *Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations*, reiterates the case for a less coercive approach to migration. The communication also emphasizes the inevitability of circular migration and the need to promote development in migrants' home countries through direct partnerships with migrant diasporic organizations in migrants' host countries (Salazar 2005). Of course, it is alleged that the communication nevertheless might still contain coercive elements that limit migration because of its maintenance of a "pick and choose" policy enabling European countries to preferentially select migrants meeting their country's labour needs. Nevertheless, I believe that its recognition of cyclical migration trends and developmental responsibilities is a sign of progress.

Grassroots initiated co-development

In contrast to co-development programs endorsed by national governments and international institutions, co-development projects initiated by grassroots actors are less institutionalized, less bureaucratic, and premised on the establishment of horizontal partnerships. Because grassroots co-development programs are mostly based on small-scale partnerships between diasporic migrant groups and organizations in their home communities, competing state interests and hidden stakeholder motivations do not play a role, at least theoretically. Most grassroots co-development projects' support initiatives are small-scale and have a specific end-goal in sight, whether it be the financing of a new school, the creation of a community hall, or continuous funding for health and educational community endeavours. Therefore, some of these initiatives engage primarily in micro-development instead of partaking in large-scale macro-development ventures.

Grassroots co-development projects do not start out of a specific government policy. Instead, they are initiated by migrants themselves, thereby making it easier for development projects to be rapidly mobilized (Newland and Patrick 2004). One example of a horizontally based, non-governmental grassroots based co-development organization is the Union of Local Initiatives for Development (UNILCO), a diasporic organization based in France that supports development projects in Sénégal. According to its mission statement, UNILCO endeavours to support community development in Sénégal by liaising between migrants and their home communities. The main belief behind this initiative is that projects that reflect "people's motivation" promote more effective development than government-led development projects (UNILCO 2007). Although UNILCO's role is primarily advisory, it amasses the expertise of migrants who have promoted their own co-development projects, thereby strengthening migrants' co-development knowledge base. UNILCO also publishes articles on co-development through its online newsletter, where articles from migrant organizations in 30 different countries are solicited, consequently enabling better information exchange among various migrant labourers and migrant groups.

Hometown Associations (HTAs), defined as "organizations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin" are another example of grassroots co-development (Orozco and Rouse 2007, 1). More often than not, HTAs have a primarily voluntary membership base. They rarely have official non-profit status and the bulk of their funding comes from their members through small-scale fundraising initiatives such as raffles and special events. Of course, the developmental objectives of HTAs and other migrant diasporic groupings depend largely on the demographic characteristics of migrant labourers, which dictate the level of organization occurring within HTAs. For example, a comparative study of Colombian, Dominican, and Mexican HTAs in the East Coast of the United States illustrates how migrants' age, legal working status, and level of education determine the type of projects they support. Younger, less educated, temporary (illegal) migrants are more likely to endorse more locally oriented projects and to have closer bonds with their home communities (Portes et al. 2007).

Conclusion

In general, understandings of the relationship between migration and development greatly influence the type of co-development endorsed by a country or an organization. A coercive approach to co-development is based on the view that migrants tend to move out of poor peripheral countries and into rich core countries. Such an approach sees migration into core countries as problematic and seeks to limit migration flows into receiving countries; its co-development agenda is invariably influenced by the end goal of reducing migration flows. A comprehensive co-development approach, in contrast, sees labour migration as a cyclical trend that cannot, and should not, be limited. As such, co-development initiatives are seen as an excellent opportunity for the creation of horizontal partnerships, where migrants' transnational identities are utilized to spur development projects that originate from their host countries and that impact their communities of origin. Both approaches are well-represented in national, regional, international, and grassroots co-development programs, with the majority of these programs showing adherence to a combination of both coercive and comprehensive mandates.

To conclude my review, I emphasize that it would be in the best interests for sending and receiving countries to envisage ways to support migrant labourers. Co-development presents an excellent opportunity for sending and receiving countries to work together to establish mutually beneficial programs. Sending countries benefit because of the economic and human development impacts wrought by these projects. Receiving countries, on the other hand, benefit because catering to the needs of their migrant workers through co-development allows them not only to promote migrants' well-being but also to ensure that migrants become better integrated into their host communities. Furthermore, by helping fund migrant-led development projects, receiving countries actively recognize that they are partially complicit in the mass exodus of workers from sending countries. While the departure of vast numbers of individuals may lead to development problems, co-development will generate economic and human growth in sending communities, therefore minimizing some of the potential developmental harms caused by mass migration.

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(Mis)Conceptualizing labour repression in Southeast Asian societies: Manifesting (im)possibilities through social rhythms

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Many Western politicians, labour activists, and academics denounce various labour practices of Southeast Asian governments, notably their use of child labour and the limitations they impose on workers' civil rights to associate. The universalistic aspirations of these Westerners are, in turn, denounced by Southeast Asian government officials claiming a sovereign right to develop following their own customs and cultures (Frost, George, and Shepherd 2003, 10-1; White 1999, 134-6). The debate about the incommensurability of universalism and relativism is not the right starting point to better understand labour repression and labour resistance in Southeast Asian societies. When Western scholars, government officials, and labour activists utilize the issue of Southeast Asian labour repression to take a political stand in this Modern debate, they appropriate political activism and labour resistance in Southeast Asia in a self-interested way, thereby distorting, colonizing, and disciplining political practices to make them fit specific claims (Shaw 2003, 204).

To move beyond debates between universalism and relativism, one may attempt to develop, in the words of Richard Rorty (1982), a pragmatic relational ethics from which to investigate the improvement of working and life conditions (Brassett and Higgott 2003, 45; Hyndman 2004, 311). Rorty's pragmatic approach to ethics has pretensions to reduce tensions between universalism and relativism by emphasizing linkages between moral knowledge and local community beliefs in terms of practical application and expression (Rorty 1982, 161-2). The question then becomes: what are the specific contextual developments that enable us to perceive local Southeast Asian forms of labour repression and resistance?

In light of the work of Henri Lefebvre (2003; 2004), it is my contention that a focus on social rhythms will allow us to grasp the distinctive location of labour issues in Southeast Asian societies – including forms of labour repression and labour resistance. Rhythmanalysis is a clarifying exercise because it sheds new light on our understanding of the links between everyday negotiations of public and private matters for workers and the region's historical developments and power relations. After a brief presentation of rhythmanalysis, I discuss the Southeast Asian specificities that contribute to the particular location of labour issues in the region, stressing local forms of labour repression and resistance as distinctive (im)possibilities.

Social rhythms and (mis)understandings of social life

Michel de Certeau (1984) has argued that social life is best apprehended through everydayness, which is defined as the ensemble of operating ways in which individuals are asked to participate in society. Everyday life comprises both mainstream ways we participate in society and the ways we refuse to do so. It serves as a social matrix and social imaginary from which specific and various (im)possibilities of action emerge. In line with this view, Henri Lefebvre (2003; 2004) has developed rhythmanalysis to make sense of the various ways individuals and social groups negotiate the instituted operations of social life on an everyday basis, notably by focusing on the repetitive actions reproduced by individuals and groups. Although Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis can be criticized as being too deterministic and fatalist, in line with more conventional Marxist analyses, it seems that by focusing on Brechtian forms of resistance as interruptions and modifications of social rhythms, one can shed new light on various (im)possibilities of action.

Henri Lefebvre understands social rhythms as experienced and practiced moments. They are important beliefs and social rituals enacted in various social contexts by specific forms such as individuals, associations, and states (Lefebvre 2003, 190-5). Social rhythms have three identitfiable dimensions: repetition, difference, and measure. Whereas repetition is understood as the absolute necessity to reproduce an action in time, difference constitutes the uniqueness of every action as everyday practice builds on, adapts to, or changes previously performed actions in light of current intentions. Measure constitutes the (un)concious project and motivation behind the action. Measure gives substance to rhythms as a project gives meaning to particular actions, eventhough intentions can also be transformed, distorted, or blocked.

On an individual level, social rhythms include the act of eating, the act of working, and the act of faith. Although all of these require constant (re)enactments, each action represents a specific moment during which individuals enact something they believe to be true, as part of a project. Through each meal, work day, or celebration, individuals believe their actions to make a difference for themselves, as these actions are embedded in more in-depth (un)conscious projects (Lefebvre 2004, 6-9). For example, the act of working for a salary involves a direct participation in the belief that, at this specific time, money is required to live and to achieve specific goals.

Lefebvre's main focus, however, is on collective rhythms, instituted and maintained by individuals, such as religious rites or national holidays (Lefebvre 2004, 94-6). By observing such collective social rhythms, and focussing on various combinations of them, the author seems able to identify and elucidate specific social processes which are present in Mediterranean cities but absent from Nordic ones. For any instituted form, a look at the combinations of social rhythms, and their constant evolution and transformation, allows Lefebvre to stress ontological differences implied by participation and refusal (Lefebvre 2004, 5-32). For him, rhythms are individual and collective expressions of (un)conscious politics towards instituted life, which is given meaning through combinations of rhythms.

One can associate silences, interruptions, and modifications of social rhythms with various forms of everyday adaptions and redefinitions of local (im)possibilities. As described by Walter Benjamin (1973), these Brechtian forms of resistance are based on visual observations of how people on an everyday basis adapt to dominant social rhythms. Brechtian forms of labour resistance acquire importance in combination with other social rhythms such as religious beliefs or local responses to biological needs (Benjamin 1973, 100; Scott 1985, 29). Because they represent enactments of local (im)possibilities rather than progressive and confrontational forms of resistance to exploitation and repression, however, they also require and rely on the existence of dominant exploitative social rhythms.

Rhythmanalytical foundations of Southeast Asian societies

In order to understand labour repression and labour resistance in Southeast Asia, one must first focus on the collective social rhythms of these societies. When talking about the "Asian miracle," we usually think of the industrialization process in East Asia since the 1960s and the ways in which it integrated new economic processes to the already existing social matrices of the region. The Asian miracle profoundly modified most Southeast Asian societies' social rhythms, notably by (re)situating labour issues outside conventional public and political processes (Truong 1999, 135-7).

A process of industrialization constitutes a bridge between former power relations and a new economic situation. As such, the social transformation emerging from a given industrialization process translates economic benefits into institutions and social compromises while reproducing distinctive cultural and historical characteristics (Polanyi 1957, 86-95; Truong 1999, 140-9). Whereas the Western industrialization process was based on a re-scaling project that was perceived as nationally based, the Southeast Asian industrialization process had different requirements. It involved a regional re-scaling project in order to support the productive forces unleashed by redistributing land, labour, and money throughout the region (Gardiner Barber 2000, 405-6; Peck 2002, 331-9). For example, Singapore, Malaysia (Johor), and Indonesia (Riau) created a growth triangle, which benefited all as Singapore gained access to the land and labour necessary to support its economic growth and the less developed regions of Malaysia and Indonesia gained the required investments and resources to stimulate their local economies (Stubbs 2005, 173-4).

Given these conditions, we ought to dissociate Southeast Asian governments' actions since their involvement in a regional industrialization process from Western correlations between democratization and economic development (Truong 1999, 140-9). By making economic development a national priority, Southeast Asian governments contributed to a particular industrialization process. As part of this process, social compromises involving a strong collusion between political and economic elites were necessary: the *developmental state* has, indeed, devised a national plan for its economic development based on a redefinition of state-market relationships in a corporatist fashion. This redefinition generally benefited transnational economic actors to the detriment of civil society actors (Hewison, Robinson, and Rodan 1993, 10-1; Stubbs 2005, 232-4).

As states reinforced a national political project of economic development, and as productive forces were re-structured at a regional level, labour movements were caught between national political projects and the regional restructuring of labour forces and labour issues were relayed to the private sphere (Kelly 1999, 381-92). On the one hand, the Southeast Asian regional industrialization process created particular migration patterns as specific groups followed the perceived chronic labour shortages created by the constant re-location of labour-intensive industries throughout the region (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995, 183-4). Based on the importance of remittances sent back by migrant workers to their national economies, less developed countries of the region, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, have even developed a highly profitable industry of sending migrant workers to fill perceived labour shortages (Asis, Huang, and Yeoh 2004, 198-9).

Furthermore, most Southeast Asian governments do not recognize the legitimacy of most labour claims raised within the public sphere. When they were not historically considered communist insurgencies, labour protests were depicted as illegitimate obstacles to sustained economic development, as pension plans, education, and social benefits were already given to the population (Huizer 1980, 179; La Botz 2001, 122-5). Labour claims are not considered proper public claims as governments and corporations have already negotiated working conditions and benefits in an exclusionary corporatist fashion (Hewison, Robinson, and Rodan 1993, 173-4).[1]

Manifesting (im)possibilities

By focusing on the Asian miracle as a profound restructuring of collective social rhythms in the region, the privatization of labour claims can be understood as offering both particular forms of labour repression and resistance. This is not to say that the repression of labour in Southeast Asian societies is either inexistent or worse in comparison with Western societies. The use of rhythmanalysis, however, which allows for an investigation of local Brechtian forms of resistance in relation to labour repression, helps us trace various local (im)possibilities (Holston 1999, 167; Scott 1985, 29-33).

The privatization of labour issues allows Southeast Asian governments to avoid addressing the contribution of workers to the industrialization process and the various untenable working conditions on which this industrialization is built (Young, Wolkowitz, and McCullagh 1981, 147). For example, internal labour mobility is usually characterized by a lack of public regulations, hence leaving the quality of working conditions in the hands of employers (Holston 1999, 162). As such, states' repetitive decisions not to intervene to regulate working conditions in export-processing zones constitute one of this form's (i.e. the state's) social rhythms that demonstrate the negative effects of both the exclusion of labour claims from the political process and the collusion between political and economic elites. By targeting women, in particular, to work in these zones, states create structural conditions of exploitation through recruitment practices and paternalistic norms that allow multinational corporations to practice gender-biased policies and to maximize their profits to the detriment of female workers (Asis, Huang, and Yeoh 2004, 198-200; Elias 2005, 207-9).

Moreover, the development of a regional approach to manage regional migrations remains negligible, as both sending and receiving countries limit the politicization of issues regarding migrant workers' rights (Royal Thai Embassy 1999). National labour unions are reluctant to advocate migrant workers' rights because of the perceived opposition to their local members' interests. The reluctance of national unions to advocate for their rights often means that migrant workers are caught between the political rhetoric of national development and regional economic necessities. This situation leaves migrant workers vulnerable to a particular state's willingness to address publicly their working conditions and acknowledge its own role and responsibility in shaping regional migration patterns by sending and receiving migrants for its own economic interest (Piper 2004, 223-5). For example, both the Philippines and Indonesia are known for their aggressive overseas employment program intended to extract revenue from the remittances system. Once recruitment procedures are finalized, however, both governments refuse to formally address their workers' conditions within receiving countries, with the exception of highly politicized and publicized cases (Silvey 2004, 146; Tyner 2000, 132-9).

At the same time, however, the major regulatory gaps created by the Southeast Asian regional industrialization process enables specific social groups to improve their life and working conditions through various Brechtian forms of resistance (Elias 2005, 217). Migrant workers choose to migrate and to participate in dynamic remittances systems, which remain very difficult for states to regulate. By becoming transmigrants, migrant workers can redefine their allegiances to friends and family by choosing how to redistribute their resources to specific groups regardless of their states' preferences (Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1995).

Transmigration can be depicted as a Brechtian form of labour resistance as it sabotages national systems of social support and income tax. It refers to a condition of social support that is more than an action, it is an interruption of the national functioning of things. Transmigration follows the needs and strategies in resource redistribution of one's family and friends across national borders. Thus, it does not make any progressive or public claims to organizing the labour force. Although it does not stop exploitive processes, this form of resistance emerges out of the glitches of the system, which are, in this case, associated with the dislocation of scales between political projects and economic developments.

Women's increased participation in intra-regional migration supports the above idea, as women often actively choose to migrate (Mack 2004, 156-7). Although there are factors contributing to forcing women to migrate, transmigration gives many women the tools to break with state controls and parental authority by becoming financially independent. For example, transmigration can help specific individuals to resist paternalistic social rituals and other dominant social rhythms, notably by making women financially independent and an important source of income for the entire family. Whereas leaving your family behind to find work may be considered emotionally difficult, it is necessary to recognize the freedom some social groups, such as queer and transpeople, may acquire in leaving their homes while continuing to contribute to their family's wellbeing through remittances. Many female migrant workers also choose to overstay in receiving countries once their visa expires in hopes of finding a better job or to get married (Asis, Huang, and Yeoh 2004, 205; Mack 2004, 157; Ong 1987, 199).

Moreover, transmigration can be part of a family strategy to take advantage of dominant state-centric social rhythms (Lohan 2000, 107-8). For example, Indonesian workers refer to the practice of *merantau* to describe temporary circular migration, which enables them to create better economic and educational opportunities for their families by accepting to work abroad under difficult conditions (Mack 2004, 158-60). Such practices have profound impact on the sociological profile of Southeast Asian societies as young Filipina women from working class backgrounds can afford to send their children to the same schools as children from upper class backgrounds through money sent back by family members (Gardiner Barber 2000, 402-3). As sending governments have chosen to have little or no control over their migrant workers abroad, and receiving countries have chosen not to publicly acknowledge these migrants' economic contribution, migrant workers extract individual and collective benefits by playing on their in-betweenness, at times through private and illicit economic activities (Hyndman 2004, 314-5).

Conclusion

Whereas many politicians, scholars, and social activists in the West prefer to address labour claims within a conventional understanding of the public sphere, the developmental state has produced an environment in which such public negotiation of labour conditions seems difficult and socially disembedded. The privatization of labour issues, however, does not mean that action and resistance are impossible. Considering everyday people as agents of change and (mis)conceptualizing their repetitive and rhythmical efforts as real political stands, rhythmanalysis enables us to understand the symbiotic relations between repression and resistance. Accordingly, Brechtian forms of labour resistance rely on forms of exploitation and repression without any dialectical hope for sustained changes in the future. By stopping, slowing down, complicating, disturbing, and messing with exploitative forms of labour repression in very specific and localized ways, Brechtian forms of labour resistance provide a good representation of local (im)possibilities, as they emerge from specific forms of labour repression while remaining attached both to them and to the local imaginaries out of which what is (im)possible is manifested.

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Endnotes

Chapter 1 (Introduction)

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1. Yael is an Israeli-born, Toronto-based filmmaker, whose films include *My Mother is a Dangerous Woman* (1987), *Fresh Blood: A Consideration of Belonging* (1996), *In the Middle of the Street* (2002), and *Triskaidekaphobia* (2003).

2. Moreover, the conference setting necessarily shapes what is or can be communicated; it requires us to turn complex, nuanced arguments into neatly structured, and simplified, arguments in the form of fifteen minute presentations.

Chapter 2

1. Howard-Hassmann (2005) argues that the social effects of globalization cannot properly be observed in the short-term, but that in the long-term, it could be as progressive a force as the initial spread of capitalism has become in the developed world. This positive development is, however, by no means guaranteed: capitalism is a "necessary but hardly sufficient condition for democracy." Protection of human rights requires social action.

Chapter 3

[*] I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank Professor Steve Flusty for his invaluable comments and suggestions regarding the crafting of this paper and the larger version from which it was extracted and modified. I would like to thank my brother-in-law for helping me develop the map that accompanies this paper. As well, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and criticism. Any mistakes, misappropriations, and/or deficiencies are my own.

1. In this sense, the term globalities refers to the embodied and emplaced material forces, dynamics, processes, and practices, operating at both local and non-local scales that enable these same forces, dynamics, processes, and practices to become realties at the global scale.

Chapter 4

[*] The final version of this paper has greatly benefited from the thoughtful comments provided by many throughout its development. I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Daphne Winland for her early direction; those who offered new ideas and critiques during the paper's presentation, especially our enthusiastic discussant Dr. Karen Balcom, and my fellow panelists Katrina Schaafsma, Joanne Nowak, and Samah Sabra; as well as those involved in the McMaster Globalization Graduate Student Research Group for organizing the conference and providing this valuable opportunity.

1. Although some scholars (see Ritzer, 2004) have attributed a similar role to supranational economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, it is clear that such a distinction creates a narrowly circumscribed definition of globalization as a specifically (neoliberal) economic phenomenon.

2. Eurocrat is the phrase commonly used when referring to civil servants working under the EU (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 17).

3. With the obligations placed on applicants seeking to naturalize and become Dutch citizens to pass a series of tests designed to promote cultural integration into Dutch society, the tolerance of cultural difference in the Netherlands has become the subject of debate in recent years (Sunier and van Ginkel 2006).

Chapter 5

[*] I thank Matthew Hoffman, Patricia Greve, the editors of this issue, and the anonymous reviewers of the Working Paper Series for their helpful comments on this paper.

1. Among conservation NGOs alone, one study identified twenty-one different conceptions of biodiversity conservation, each demonstrating conflicting views on what is the target of environmental protection, the focus of conservation, and how decisions should be made (Redford et al. 2003).

2. This references March and Olsen's (1998) differentiation between the logic of appropriateness versus consequences.

3. One of the weaknesses in the transnational PPPs literature is the absence of conceptual agreement. This, and a propensity by IOs to call any form of co-operation a partnership, has made it difficult to compare findings (Nelson 2002). I use a narrow definition of IO-led PPPs to focus on direct opportunities by non-state actors to impact biodiversity governance. Partnerships represent a significant shift in International Relations because they enable non-state actors to adopt governance roles that formerly belonged solely to sovereign states (Schaferhoff et al. 2007).

4. Arguably, the people are represented in the market, because consumer choices help direct the market, and also in the state since presumably the sum of all domestic democracies can be considered (albeit indirectly) a global representation of the people's will. However, I use the term the people here in the civic sense.

5. The list of expected outcomes in this column references Linder (1999).

6. However, these actors are not monolithic entities. Not all NGOs represent the same constituencies or have the same interests. Identity categories need to be refined to reflect in-group differences. IO's identities also need to be considered in terms of their new roles as partnership conveners.

7. There are three basic measures of centrality in a network: point centrality (who has the most active connections with other partners and can be characterized as a "hub" of partnership activities); betweeness centrality (who is the nexus between separate clusters in the partnership and can play the role of broker or gate-keeper); and closeness centrality (who needs to "travel" the least distance to communicate with most partners and is in the best position to monitor all the information flowing through the partnership) (Scott 2000).

Chapter 6

[*] I would like to thank Dr. Raymond Wiest for his support and encouragement during my MA thesis research on which this paper is based. This research would not be possible without the financial assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Manitoba Government, the University of Manitoba, and the Manitoba Research Alliance on Community Economic Development in the New Economy. I would also like to express my gratitude to the

immigrant women who participated in this study, and the numerous individuals and organizations in Winnipeg that supported this research. For a more thorough list of those who assisted with my study, please see my Master's thesis completed in the Department of Anthropology at University of Manitoba in 2004.

1. All names of participants referred to in this article have been changed for the purpose of maintaining their anonymity and confidentiality.

Chapter 7

[*] Thanks are due to William D. Coleman, Brian Cooksey, Henry Gordon, Joe Kabissa, Lauren Scannell, Sam Wangwe, Ann Weston, and to the eighty people I interviewed or spoke with about cotton production while I was in Tanzania in 2007. In Dar es Salaam, the Economic and Social Research Foundation provided excellent logistical support and a home base. This research-in-progress is supported by William D. Coleman's Canada Research Chair, the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition's Globalization Research Scholarship and a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

1. The betterment of agricultural producers' incomes provided the rationale for moves to "get prices right" or liberalize agricultural markets in sub-Saharan Africa during the Structural Adjustment era, a case that was initially detailed in the 1981 Report by Eliot Berg for the World Bank.

2. This should not be taken as an endorsement of domestic liberalization, or as an assumption that global liberalization will automatically lead to increased producer incomes. The latter would be an especially problematic leap of faith in Tanzania where buyers often face unscrupulous competition and might have an incentive to plow prospective gains from world lint price rises into operations, rather than raise the prices they pay their "suppliers."

3. Underlying both of these prominent tensions is the rarely articulated assumption that the livelihoods of several million rural Tanzanians are best served through the continued production of a heavily resource and labour intensive crop that is ecologically costly and inedible except for products made from processed cottonseeds. Save for the new literature on rural diversification, to my knowledge no empirical work has been done on the evident counterfactual: the problems and prospects for people in a rural Tanzania that did not produce this difficult and risky commodity that is subject to volatile price swings and relatively inelastic global demand. Due to spatial constraints, the global level of analysis remains underdeveloped at the end of this short draft in favour of some short anecdotes about global possibilities operative at country level.

4. Robert Wade (2002) has comprehensively elaborated problems with the Bank's poverty headcount.

5. This is a widespread problem in rural Tanzania: depending upon the source consulted, an estimated 16 to 28 percent of children are engaged in child labour (see URT 2006, 26).

6. Fob denotes the "free on board" price as opposed to the cif (cleared, insured, and forwarded for delivery to a European port) price. Kebelwa and Kweka (2006) question if this trend still holds in 2007, and note that producer prices have by and large remained stable despite high levels of competition and entry into the trade.

7. The 2006/07 edition of the Tanzania Cotton Association's (TCA's) "Cotton News" notes that certain ginners entered into contracts with farmers during the pre-drought season (2005/06). In 2007, one prominent local subsidiary of a major international conventional cotton-trading company had

abandoned its plan due to mass defections, while an established local ginner maintained a limited out-grower scheme.

8. Peter Gibbon (1999) and Marianne Nylandsted Larsen (2004) have raised the specter that these costs are already borne by producers in the form of lower farm gate prices. As growers only receive subsidized inputs based upon what they have sold during the previous season, the system has an in-built bias towards established producers. For those working marginal plots whose crops failed during the 2006/07 drought season when lint production declined 47 percent, the CDF subsidy for 2007/08 was effectively zero.

9. Interviews with donors, officials, regulators, and private operators were peppered with elliptical references to these practices and the dark side of the trade more generally.

Chapter 8

[*] I am indebted to the thousands of landless salvadorean campesinos, who with their continuous struggle and determination for building a better nation, continue to inspire me. I am particularly indebted to CRIPDES, CORDES, and MPR-12 de Octubre. I also acknowledge the support and opportunity given by the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition at McMaster University to share my research interests with a wider audience.

1. In October 2002, the Board of Directors of the World Bank approved its new strategy for rural development called “Help the rural poor” and, in May 2003, it published its report on Land Policies for the reduction of poverty and growth. Both documents have determined the policies in regards to land and rural development in developing nations of the region. (FESPAD, 2007).

2. Los gobiernos de Brasil y de Estados Unidos se asociaron para desarrollar en El Salvador un proyecto piloto de utilización del etanol como combustible, en lugar de derivados de petróleo. Los sectores privados de los dos países controlan la empresa ARFS (American Renewable Fuel Suppliers), una planta de deshidratación de alcohol controlada por las empresas Crystalserv (Brasil) y Cargil (Estados Unidos) Clips de Energía No 6 Año 2007 Publicación Semanal de Cubaenergía con la actualidad Energética.

3. The Canadian Pacific Rim and Au Martinique Silver Mining Company are two of the Canadian companies in El Salvador. Much of the land which the mining companies plan to explore was transferred to ex-guerrillas as part of the PTT and the Peace Accords in 1992.

Chapter 10

[*] I would like to thank Dr. Shelley Saunders as well as the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

1. This is not to overlook the colonial roots of resistance to vaccination and fear and distrust of the state, Western powers, and representatives of biomedicine; in his discussion of the polio controversy in Nigeria, Obadare (2005, 284) touches on the role of disease in the colonial encounter and observes that the failed “martial” approach of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the World Health Organization “seems to recall the old colonialist attitude towards ‘preternaturally diseased’ African subjects.”

Chapter 11

[*] The author is greatly indebted to Dr. Tariq Amin-Khan for his supervision on this project. His advice and suggestions played an integral role in the shape and outcome of this research paper. In addition, I

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Chapter 12

[*] I thank Dr. Ivy Bourgeault, Department of Health, Aging and Society, McMaster University and the reviewers for their comments and suggestions.

1. What constitutes skills is an issue of much contestation. In this paper, skilled worker is defined as having a university degree and/or extensive experience in a specific field (Iredale 2001, 8).

2. For case studies of liberalization of policy facilitating migration of skilled workers in the United States of America and Germany, see Cornelius and Espenshade (2001) and Lavenex (2000) respectively.

3. For example, the information technology boom in the early 1990s caused American companies to push strongly for increasing temporary H1B visas which permit temporary entry of skilled IT professionals such as programmers (Chellaraj et al. 2006).

4. The broad categories of immigration are economic, family, and refugee.

5. Similar problems have been identified in other regulated professions. See Boyd and Thomas (2001), and Girard and Bauder (2007) for the engineering profession.

Chapter 13

[*] I would like to thank Dr. Rachel Silvey for her insightful direction and comments on this paper, as well as Dr. Monica Boyd and Dr. Patricia Landolt for their assistance in expanding my research on this topic.

1. In addition to changing the types of domestic flows, the absolute number of these “low-skilled” workers has decreased. Over the course of the 1990s, particularly after the inception of the new Live-in Caregiver Program in 1992, the number of domestic workers admitted into the program decreased significantly (Langevin and Belleau 2000, 32).

2. Circumstances that can interfere with these requirements are the requirement of sick-leave or instances where a domestic worker wishes to change employers and has difficulty finding a new position (Pratt 1999, 37).

Chapter 14

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Chapter 15

[*] The ideas for this paper have developed out of many insightful conversations. Although these may be too numerous to count, there have been a few people whose thought-provoking questions and critiques have been particularly helpful. I would like to thank Eva Mackey, Julie Gregory, Jasmin Habib, Bill Rodman, Harvey Feit, Peter Nyers, Davina Bhandar, and William Walters for their invaluable comments, questions, and reading suggestions which have helped me formulate much of

my current thinking. I would also like to acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for their support of this project.

1. I understand metaphorical national borders as ideas which constitute boundaries about who is to be included in or excluded from the national body. In other words, these are borders which define national identity both through including those who fit and through excluding, and thus defining, national Others.

2. In their everyday interactions, people often experience gradations of citizenship and belonging. Thus, despite the specific "rights and responsibilities" often assumed by each of these categories, part of my project involves drawing out the various ways they come to be experienced or understood.

3. Marcus (1995, 105) urges researchers to design multi-sited ethnographies "around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, and juxtapositions of locations." He provides readers with six ways to trace the logic of association or connection between their multiple sites: (1) follow the people, (2) follow the thing, (3) follow the metaphor, (4) follow the plot, story, or allegory, (5) follow the biography, and (6) follow the conflict (Marcus 1995, 106-10).

4. I do not understand Marcus' multiple strategies as mutually exclusive. Thus, by "following the metaphor" I am also likely to find and follow conflicting constructions of the same metaphors.

5. An example is when a "Canadian-Canadian" (Mackey 1999) tells an immigrant-looking (i.e. racialized) person that, in Canada, *we* don't cut in line or *we* don't barter for prices. In such instances the person in question (re)produces her/himself as a normative authority who speaks for a "we" which represents an imagined, coherent entity called "Canada."

6. The categories of newcomer, new Canadian, and Canadian tend to be roughly mapped onto the categories of immigrant and citizen. In such instances, newcomer corresponds with (potential) immigrant and Canadian corresponds with citizen. New Canadian rarely refers simply to new births in Canada. Instead, it is usually reserved for those who have recently taken the citizenship oath. As such, it signifies immigrants who have recently become hyphenated-Canadians. Currently, the relationships between these categories seem to me to be represented in a linear way, where they seem to symbolize gradations of belonging and political authority.

7. Most immigrant services organizations in Ottawa – particularly those which offer Language Instruction for Newcomers courses – are at least partially funded by CIC.

Chapter 16

[*] For the title, I wish to thank Dr. Robert Semper, Columbia University. I also wish to thank Dr. Richard B. Lee, Dr. Ida Susser, Dr. Rob Semper, Dr. Nancy Howell, Dr. Stacy Holman Jones, Dr. Fred Steier, Dr. Eric Eisenberg, and Dr. Ken Cissna.

Chapter 17

[*] I would like to give special thanks to Dr. John C. Ball of the English Department at the University of New Brunswick. His editorial insights were vital to this paper.

1. In this discussion, I use the term "class-consciousness" according to its definition in *The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism: "class consciousness* refers to the awareness on the part of a social class of their situation and collective interests … By becoming aware of this consciousness the proletariat becomes capable of politically significant action" (Childers and Hentzi

1995). However, I am writing about class-consciousness among a global, ethno-culturally diverse class of men and women, so I use “subaltern” rather than “proletariat.” According to *The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism: “Subaltern* is an adjective meaning “of lower rank”; subaltern is used as a catch-all designation for members of subordinated populations – the colonized, women, blacks, the working class” (Childers and Hentzi 1995).

Chapter 18
[*] My thanks to the reviewers at the Globalization Graduate Student Research Group at McMaster for their incisive and useful feedback on this paper. I hope I was able to do some justice to your concerns.

1. From an unpublished poem titled *Parkdale*, reproduced with the kind permission of the author.

Chapter 19
[*] Thanks to Lindsay Dubois, Adam Sneyd, and Susan Vincent. The Dalhousie University Faculty of Graduate Studies and the Specialty Coffee Association of America provided instrumental financial support.

Chapter 20
1. In this instance, empowerment is understood as the personal upward ability associated with marketplace involvement. This can be a result of factors such as increased opportunity for consumption and the ability to contribute to, or supplement, household incomes (Reysoo 2005, 130). Some women may also wish to provide a safety net for themselves in the absence of male breadwinners. In other situations, empowerment is derived from a social or cultural autonomy; as working situations bring a degree of freedom from traditional patriarchal household structures (Reysoo 2005, 134).

Chapter 21
[*] I wish to thank the Gender, Migration, and Development team of UN-INSTRAW for helping make this research project feasible and for the guidance and mentorship that they have given me.

Chapter 22
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1. This is not to say that the exclusion of labour claims corresponds to their total exclusion from the public space in Southeast Asian societies. Labour issues can be legitimized through the activities of other social groups, like students and church associations, which have important roles in the strategies of the developmental state and are vilified by national interest groups concerned with the national threat migrant workers pose (Chang and Groves 2000, 73-82; Koo 2001, 87-8; Yeoh and Huang 2000, 415-22). However, labour claims seem unable to stand alone in the public space of Southeast Asian societies.

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Global tensions, global possibilities: Everyday forces of conformity and contestation

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