MODEL OF VIOLENCE ILLUMINATES WAR

By

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ABSTRACT

A conventional view of events in contemporary Iraq since 1990 suggests that there were two wars in 1991 and 2003 between Iraq and a US/UK led cohort of countries separated by an interval of relative peace marked by the imposition of economic sanctions on the country. This dissertation proposes an alternative view, arguing that the war with Iraq was one continuous war that began in 1991 and ended in 2003, followed by what is correctly called “belligerent occupation”. A process oriented model of violence bridges two divergent literatures in the field of Anthropology—the anthropology of war and the ethnography of violence—and acts as a lens with which to see war with greater definition; and subsequently, to see that there was but one war with Iraq. The understanding of violence I propose illuminates the substance and process of war and is articulated through a careful analysis of three realms of violence. The Physical Realm is where harm is done to the bodies of individuals. This realm exists in the immediate context of the Network Realm, where violence is embedded in social institutions and processes. The Network Realm is in turn sustained by the Symbolic Realm, where violence is enmeshed in broader cultural symbol systems that have the power to create and sustain an ethos in which harm towards others is enabled. Each of these realms contributes to the creation and sustenance of war, yet the symbolic realm remains the primary key to enabling violence in both network and physical realms. Each realm of violence is illustrated in this dissertation by examples from the US/UK – IRAQ War, 1991-2003, drawn from my experience of living in the country and extensive historical research. The argument of this dissertation imposes a different structure on how the course of events now unfolding in the geographical region of Southwest Asia is understood. In this narrative there is a series of escalating stages. A long-standing conflict between the governments of Iraq and Kuwait was escalated when the Government of Iraq occupied the country of Kuwait in 1990. When a cohort of countries led by the US government intervened in the occupation of Kuwait, the conflict escalated into a state of war which lasted until 2003. Eventually that war was ended by yet another occupation; this time, however, it was the country of Iraq that was occupied. At the time of completing this dissertation there is a great deal of internal resistance to the occupation of the country—the contours of how it will finally unfold remain uncertain.
Dedicated to

Eva McCutcheon & Tamara Fleming
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This project has spanned almost two decades, accumulating many debts along the way. To all those who have been patiently watching me wade through this valley of bones, I thank you sincerely. I apologize if you are looking for your name and it does not appear here because I have forgotten that kind word, the encouraging gesture, a simple touch on the shoulder after some talk or other along the way. In my heart these gestures are cumulative and not forgotten.

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For many years I have had the pleasure of working with good people—students, staff and faculty—at Menno Simons College, a college of Canadian Mennonite University that is also physically located on the campus of and affiliated with the University of Winnipeg. I appreciate support that they have given to me while I have been carrying full-time duties and working part-time on this thesis. I thank in particular John Derksen, Lois Edmund, and Dean Peachey for conversation, kindness, support, and understanding offered freely over the past several years. Students have engaged me in lively conversations over the years about my ideas, and I thank them for it, for these ideas are stronger for having been tested by intelligent inquiring minds in many classrooms.

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Along the way the Quaker community of which I am a part, especially Friends at Hamilton Monthly Meeting, has consistently provided me with communal support and company through hard times when it felt like the ocean of darkness was overwhelming, and joyful times when Light finally found its way through the darkness. As well, the broader movement aligned against the violence directed at Iraq was my activist home, but the people attached to it are far too numerous to single out here. *Je me souviens.*

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Dr. Mark Vorobej has the distinction of being both a true friend and a formidable intellectual contributor to my academic growth. He has both challenged me to be more precise in my argument and encouraged the direction of my inquiry as worthy and timely. His probing questions have substantially altered the foundations of my thinking in a definitive and positive manner. And his friendship, actualized through dozens of long phone calls and visits throughout the process of developing, writing and eventually defending this thesis has been invaluable. Thank you Mark for such an exceptional gift. It will not be forgotten.

At a time when I did not expect to return to doctoral studies Dr. Richard Preston encouraged me otherwise. He brought me into the Department of Anthropology at
McMaster University, agreed to supervise my work, shepherded me through the coursework and comprehensive examinations, read copious notes and ideas as I developed a thesis, and then, most importantly, waited for me to get my act together and finally finish writing the thesis. His generosity was matched by the consistent welcome Betty Preston afforded me as I slept in their basement, at times for days on end, writing and exploring ideas with Dick. I suspect that many other students have had the misfortune of losing their advisor upon their retirement; in many ways I found mine. Together we persevered through the good times and the not so good times; eventually it was with tremendous pleasure that I was able to defend this thesis under his tutelage as his last doctoral student. For his help, advice, steadfastness, and encouragement over many years I am deeply grateful.

This thesis is dedicated to two remarkable women: Eva McCutcheon and Tamara Fleming. The former, my mother, created the conditions within a large family to allow me to imagine doing advanced study although she herself had only a grade six education. She, however, saw her son for what he is and consistently over many years provided the space within which I could pursue my own life path. The latter, an extraordinary woman to whom I am married, created the conditions for me to finish this project. Without her, without a doubt, I would not have finished this project. To both of them I offer my continued love.
There was an enormous advantage in waiting six years to finish the book, for the world changed a great deal in that time. Probably one must write a book about his society in order to really understand what change is, in society and in one’s self. Something else happens when one writes a book about which he feels deeply: he becomes a creature of his book, for as he pours ideas and emotion into it the process shapes him, so that he can never be the same again. Writing clarifies positions and commits one’s soul—often far beyond what one ever imagined possible. In order to remain placid and uncommitted, I would say, never write a book that has deep meaning for you.

Jules Henry

*Culture Against Man*
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There is a common cliche about the Middle East that goes something like this: travel to the Middle East for a week and you will come back with a lot to say; travel there for a month and you will come back with a few cautious words; travel there for a year and you will return reluctant to speak at all. I expect this platitude could be applied to many other places in the world, but in my experience of the Middle East it has certainly proven to be true.

I could not have known that I would still be consumed by the subject of Iraq some seventeen years after my initial visits to the country in 1991. Frankly speaking, the country of Iraq and the politics that swirl around it would not have been my first choice as a subject to focus my intellectual work. In different historical circumstances I would likely have focused my studies on the Indian subcontinent because that is where I had started my intellectual journey for personal and family reasons. But that is not what has happened. Instead, a war began which I then intuitively believed would be significant for years to come, and my concern for peace issues drew me into trying to understand it. Subsequently I was drawn into a vortex of complex and sometimes gut-wrenching questions about war and peace—questions for which I still do not have all the answers. This dissertation, however, does give an initial answer to a few of the questions I have been able to isolate and investigate over the course of many years of thinking about it.

My first trip to Iraq opened my eyes to the consequences of violence more than anything in my life had done previously. On a trip to India some years earlier, for example, I had been caught up in sectarian violence during national elections and watched as a major riot swirled around me and individuals were violently struck down in front of me. Indeed it was my first experience of having human blood on my hands from lifting an assaulted person into a taxi-cab. That experience paled in comparison to what I saw in Iraq. I had gone as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) worker to do an initial needs assessment for the Canadian Friends Service Committee (CFSC)—the peace, justice and international development arm of Canadian Quakers. When I arrived in Amman, Jordan in March 1991, it became immediately apparent that getting into the country would be very difficult. For politically sensitive reasons entry visas were hard to come by. At that point the internal strife to the south of Baghdad was unfolding in full force. Eventually, after much patient (well, admittedly, sometimes very impatient) waiting in offices and working with other aid workers, I was one of a handful of NGO representatives able to travel into Iraq for a week in March. When we drove into Baghdad it was early evening. I have a striking memory of a city of several million people without lights. Even more striking was an afternoon trip to Karbala, which was the focal point of the internal fighting going on at the time. Memories of seeing the immediate
impact of the fighting on the physical infrastructure of the city only hours after troops had withdrawn remain vivid. I have written about that experience elsewhere, but I mention it here to indicate that those initial experiences had a profound effect on my view of the world. Most importantly, it helped to make what had been an abstract notion of “Iraq” become the real home of people experiencing tremendous violence.

My second trip to Iraq came six months later, this time for two weeks. I had returned with a colleague to investigate a possible CFSC project to help to rebuild a hospital’s infrastructure, and to collect children’s art to be used in a project to engage public conversation about the impact of war on children. On the advice of an experienced American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) aid worker, Henry Seltz, the CFSC decided to raise money to repair ambulances in Karbala. We also collected about 200 pieces of children’s art that were turned into the Iraqi Children’s Art Project (ICAP) which was developed and displayed in numerous places in Canada to good effect. I learned a lot from those projects, but even more from the many dozens of public speaking engagements that grew out of those first two trips. Although I did not keep track of how many talks and media engagements I did across the country in those years, it is not an exaggeration to speak about hundreds of talks. In those talks and media appearances I tested the initial ideas that later came to form the basis of this dissertation. Whether it was speaking in Kingston to an audience primarily made up of military families, in Ottawa with civil servants and ambassadors in the audience, in high school auditoriums in small and large cities in every province, in university classroom settings, or in church and community hall basements in small towns speaking to what is sometimes called “the general public”, I learned a great deal indeed about the dangers and opportunities of talking about war and peace, Iraq and the Middle East.

After those initial first two trips I had several offers to return to Iraq, but for many years chose not to do so because I had become convinced early on that the problem was not in Iraq, but rather, closer to home; actually, mostly in the US and UK. In 2000, however, during my first appointment to the faculty of Conflict Resolution Studies at Menno Simons College I was asked if we (meaning myself and my wife Tamara Fleming) would be interested in going to Iraq to live as NGO field representatives. Although I remained convinced of my earlier conclusion that the problem was centred in North America and Europe, I nevertheless decided that the opening to live in Iraq for a more extended period of time was an important opportunity to reconnect with what was happening inside the country first hand. Also, as an ongoing graduate student in anthropology I knew that opportunities to experience first-hand a country governed by a one party dictatorship were very rare. Although there would be many limitations on my activities in the country, I believed that the experience itself could significantly improve my appreciation of the effects of the war on people living in Iraq; I was clear from the
beginning that I would travel there as an NGO representative to facilitate aid projects and not to gather evidence to prove an argument for a PhD thesis. That evidence already existed in the historical records readily available to me in North America. Thus in early 2000 we travelled to the Middle East and lived in Iraq for about eight months of a one-year assignment to the region as Mennonite Central Committee and American Friends Service Committee field representatives (the remaining approximately four months were spent in neighbouring countries doing administrative work that could not be done while in the country, or waiting for visas and other travel permits). While living in Iraq we helped to facilitate projects that ranged from rebuilding schools and hospitals, to establishing water filtration units at institutions without access to clean water, to the coordination of food aid deliveries eventually distributed to a wide range of social agencies for direct distribution to families in need. As I will discuss in the body of this dissertation, there were significant limits on what kind of research I could do in the country, or even what I could record in a more informal manner. I believe that the experience of living in Iraq while it was under Saddam Hussein’s rule, however, grounded me in the subject of this dissertation more thoroughly than any amount of library research ever could have. As a result, I feel confident that as different as my argument is from those found in mainstream discourse, it has a validity that grows out of an extended critical and thoroughly tested thought process rooted in personal experience.
1.

AN ORTHODOX VIEW OF IRAQ

Theoretically this study is concerned with how we understand and represent war, and the relationship between war and violence. At its heart, however, it is about war with Iraq; even more specifically, it is about two competing narratives that describe war with Iraq. The first of those narratives is common, asserts that there were two short wars with Iraq separated by a period of relative peace, and presently I shall give a summary version of it; the second narrative that focuses on the idea that there was but one war with Iraq in all these years is shared by a small minority of commentators including myself, and the purpose of this study is to present it to a wider audience. At the centre of this second narrative is the assertion that the more common narrative is wrong.

In the pages that follow, then, I shall be arguing that there was one war between Iraq and the United States/United Kingdom between 1991 and 2003. Following the war there was an invasion, followed by the ongoing belligerent occupation of Iraq by US forces. The problem is that we did not see the war while it was happening from 1991 to 2003 because it was represented as something less than war. Now we misunderstand the occupation—an occupation that can be understood as one aspect of neo-colonialism—because in a true Orwellian twist it is portrayed as something other than occupation, namely, war. As I shall explain presently, there are others who have raised this issue, but to my knowledge no one has presented a sustained academic argument supporting this position, complete with a theoretical model and data to prove it.

SITTING UNDER THE AL-HAMRA TREE

A question that had dogged me for years prior to living in Iraq in 2000 came into sharp focus while sitting in the shade of a tree in the courtyard of the Al-Hamra Hotel, located in a suburb of Baghdad. According to mainstream public discourse in Canada and in places where I travelled in the United States and Europe in the years following my first two visits to Iraq in 1991, the country of Iraq was no longer experiencing war. “The Gulf War,” according to this discourse, had ended in 1991. Yet in the years following 1991 everything I knew about the unfolding situation in Iraq suggested neither resolution nor a return to normalcy.

While living in Iraq nine years later I saw and experienced evidence of a country under severe duress. The continuing economic, social and physical devastation of the country; the air raid sirens and sounds of bombs exploding that I heard in the north,
centre and south of Iraq; these indicators spoke to a violence that smacked of war. There was a significant disjuncture between, on the one hand, my own observations, experiences, and perceptions gained by years of critically reading reports generated by observers and researchers on the ground and speaking with a constant stream of people returning from the region, with, on the other hand, the mainstream understanding of “the Gulf War” as a past event. That disjuncture has continued to disturb me. Sitting under a tree in the courtyard of the Al-Hamra Hotel in 2000, I asked: “Why did we stop calling this a war?”

As I continued to reflect on this question I came to see that there is a powerful master narrative about war with Iraq that is assumed in both a popular imagination most readily articulated in mainstream media and in a plethora of academic journal articles and books. With time I came to see that that narrative itself is a significant problem needing to be addressed, for it frames the very questions we can ask about war in relation to Iraq. I now call that master narrative the orthodox view of Iraq, and will do so throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

WHAT I MEAN BY “ORTHODOX”

Pierre Bourdieu offers a helpful way of looking at what I refer to as orthodox with his analysis of doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy. For Bourdieu, doxa is the universe of the un-discussed or undisputed. Here is his definition: “...when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization ... the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call doxa, so as to distinguish it from an orthodoxy or heterodoxy belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs.” Within doxa, then, there is a realm of discourse, which we can also call the realm of argument or opinion, comprised of orthodox and heterodox views. The power struggle over who controls information, knowledge and symbols is waged in the realm of discourse. The relationship of orthodoxy and heterodoxy within that realm is crucial:

Orthodoxy, straight, or rather straightened, opinion, which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal state of innocence, of doxa, exists only in the objective relationship which opposes it to heterodoxy, that is, by reference to the choice—hairesis, heresy—made possible by the existence of competing possibles and to the explicit critique of the sum total of the alternatives not chosen that the established order implies. It is defined as a system of euphemisms, of acceptable ways of thinking and speaking the natural and social world, which rejects heretical
remarks as blasphemies. But the manifest censorship imposed by orthodox
discourse, the official way of speaking and thinking the world, conceals
another, more radical censorship: the overt opposition between “right”
opinion and “left” or “wrong” opinion, which delimits the universe of
possible discourse, be it legitimate or illegitimate, euphemistic or
blasphemous, masks in its turn the fundamental opposition between the
universe of things that can be stated, and hence thought, and the universe
of that which is taken for granted.

It would be merely correct description, in other words, to refer to my argument as a
heterodox view which aims at dislodging the orthodox (a term that I shall use
interchangeably with conventional) view of Iraq within the realm of discourse where
arguments over power, knowledge, information and analysis are engaged. (Indeed, it is
possible that for some scholars my views would qualify as heresy or blasphemy—
fortunately heretics are no longer burned at the stake, although metaphorically some
academics may try to do the equivalent.)

THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF IRAQ

Prior to 1990, Iraq was on the periphery of most people’s vision, at least in North
America. If known at all, it was known as the country that was at war with the then
(and recently resurrected) “evil” Iranian government. Indeed, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq
War (which before 1990 was commonly—now sometimes confusingly—called the Gulf
War) was amongst the most significant inter-state wars in the latter part of the 20th
Century. With its attempt to exert control over the territory of Kuwait in 1990,
however, the country of Iraq was catapulted into the centre of both controversy and
attention on the world stage. Although the intensity of the attention ebbed and flowed
over the next decade and a half it nevertheless remained steadily present, and there is no
indication as of 2008 that this interest will diminish in the foreseeable future.

The conventional view of Iraq as a description of an historical event consists of a
pre-war period, the central event of which was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in
1990; the six-week period known as the Persian Gulf War, which occurred in January
and February of 1991; an inter-war period which was dominated by the administration
of, and controversy over, UN-based comprehensive economic sanctions, from 1990 to
2003; the forty-four days from March 20 to May 1 in 2003 generally now known as the
Iraq War characterized by the invasion of Iraq by US forces and the toppling of the Iraqi
government; and finally, the post-Iraq War period, most commonly called the “war in
Iraq.” A competing narrative used in some analyses, including this one, refers to this
period as the “occupation of Iraq.” Although it will not be a focus of this thesis, the post-Iraq War period is often analyzed with reference to the “war on terror,” a larger and more vague contextualizing narrative that informs foreign policy discussions in the US and other countries. The final period is ongoing and thus an orthodox view has not yet been consolidated—it represents, in other words, contested ground.

The following explication of the orthodox view will be descriptive in nature, drawing on a variety of voices that have articulated and consolidated this orthodox view. I recognize that my selection of these texts imposes a narrative on the material that is my own; however, the diversity of voices included here, drawn from across the political and ideological spectrum, supports my contention that a consistent master narrative undergirds the conventional view. Here I merely outline the contours of three major periods which constitute the conventional view: (a) the Gulf War, which will include a discussion of the pre-war period; (b) the inter-war sanctions regime; and (c) the Iraq War, which necessarily includes a discussion of subsequent developments. Although entire books have dissected each of these constituent parts, the present brief summary captures the gist of the core orthodox narrative.

**The Gulf War**

The cornerstone of the narrative which forms the conventional view of Iraq is the assertion that in 1991 there was a war in the Middle East called “the Gulf War.” It has been summarized by political scientists and military historians repeatedly, subjected to an ongoing repetitive analysis, and has informed war-related inquiries in the social sciences and humanities and mainstream media coverage since March of 1991. Here is one pithy example of how “the Gulf War” has been summarized:

> Whatever its origins, there is little dispute that the Gulf Crisis began with the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, while the subsequent Gulf War began with the first Coalition airstrikes on Iraq and Kuwait on the night of 16/17 January 1991, and ended with the unilateral ceasefire by the Coalition forces on 28 February 1991. ⁴

This paragraph, the content of which is constantly repeated or implied in legions of journal articles and books, expresses a social fact so deeply entrenched that it appears unquestionable: “The Gulf War” was a short war—to be precise, forty-four days long—between a coalition of countries led by the United States (a democracy) and Iraq (a dictatorship), led by Saddam Hussein, who, according to this narrative, is this generation’s “Hitler.” ⁵ According to this orthodox narrative, then, “the Gulf War” began on January 16 (in North America) or 17 (in the Middle East) and ended on 28 February
1991. After a few days of negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was signed in the village of Safwan on March 3. With varying degrees of sophistication this basic framework is asserted by virtually all commentators to this day.6

What has become a part of the lore about the beginning point of the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis is a meeting that was held between Saddam Hussein and US Ambassador April Glaspie on 25 April 1990. In that now famous conversation, which continues to be a part of the conventional story, Hussein expressed his concerns about the cooling of the US government’s relations with Iraq, particularly with regard to the policy of dropping oil prices, and the negative media campaign initiated against himself. He expressed the desire for better relations with the US, and asked Glaspie about US intentions with regard to Iraq. In her response she emphasized that “President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East.” She further noted: “We understand that [Iraq's need for funds and concern about dropping oil prices] and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.”7 In the conventional view, this conversation is often seen as a key turning point which was a catalyst for the events which followed, most importantly, the decision of President Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

In the week after the Hussein-Glaspie meeting, a meeting between Iraq and Kuwait was held in Jidda, Saudi Arabia on 31 July 1990, at the invitation of King Fahd. This meeting, known as the Jidda meeting, was convened explicitly for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Conventionally understood, and as indicated by statements issued by, or on behalf of, the respective governments,8 the issues at stake revolved around sovereignty and territorial integrity—ownership and access to the Rumayla oil field and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan—and adherence to OPEC oil quotas.9 The Jidda meeting ended without agreement on the issues.10

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was swiftly undertaken upon the return of the Iraqi delegation from Jidda. It began with two Republican Guard armoured divisions that began the invasion at 01:00 on August 2, moving quickly south toward Kuwait City. Helicopter units took strategic sites in the country, including the islands of Bubiyan and Warba. Some 140,000 Iraqi troops and 1,800 tanks in total were involved in the occupation. Freedman and Karsh describe the speed with which the Iraqi military accomplished its mission:

This operation was nothing like the agonizing invasion of Iran a decade earlier. The 16,000-strong Kuwaiti Army was not fully mobilized, in line with the Government’s attempt not to provoke the Iraqis. It was no
match for the overwhelmingly superior invading forces and was crushed within hours, though intermittent armed resistance continued for several days. The fiercest resistance was reported around the Emir’s palace in Kuwait City, which was taken only after two hours of tough fighting involving heavy machine-gun fire and air strikes. The Kuwaiti Air Force managed to keep flying and attacking armoured columns until their base was overrun the next day. But this was the exception that proved the rule: within twelve hours of the invasion Kuwait was under Iraq’s control.

Although the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait had been building throughout 1990, many in Kuwait, including the Emir himself, were taken by surprise by Hussein’s decision to invade the entire country. The fact that the Kuwaiti Army was not fully mobilized, and that the Emir and members of the ruling al-Sabah family barely escaped by helicopter to Saudi Arabia before the arrival of the Iraqi Army and Air Force in Kuwait City, indicates that the Government of Iraq’s move had not been foreseen.

The international community strongly condemned the Government of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. In the words of one commentator, the invasion was seen as a “textbook case of aggression” which violated international law and must be opposed by the international community. The opposition to the invasion, led by the US, was immediate and widespread:

Almost immediately, the U.S. activated diplomatic channels in Britain and France to arrange an official joint condemnation of the Iraqi invasion and a demand for immediate Iraqi withdrawal, and then moved to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, ban Iraqi trade and halt all arms deliveries to Iraq. The USSR then suspended military shipments to Iraq, while the 12-member European Community condemned Iraq though it refrained from adopting economic sanctions or freezing Iraqi assets. The price of crude oil jumped 15%, amidst speculation about Iraq’s control of the world’s fourth largest proven reserves of crude. Late in the day, in an emergency meeting hastily called by the U.S., the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 660 unanimously condemning Iraq’s invasion and demanding immediate withdrawal. Whatever its ambiguity before the invasion, the Bush administration wasted little time in utilizing its resources to internationalize the conflict.

Another account has indicated that Japan and many western European countries did indeed freeze Iraq’s assets, and that a European Community decision undertook to freeze assets of, ban oil imports from, and stop arm sales to both Iraq and Kuwait.
The response among Arab states was more measured; most wanted a peaceful Arab solution. A number of Arab leaders, particularly King Husayn of Jordan, made efforts to resolve the Iraq-Kuwait dispute peacefully between August 3 and August 10, but the attempts proved abortive. On August 8, Iraq declared that Kuwait had been annexed; President Mubarak of Egypt issued a statement condemning the Government of Iraq’s actions, and later many Arab foreign ministers supported a resolution condemning Iraq at an Arab League meeting called by Mubarak on August 10. Two days later, Hussein proposed a three point plan to resolve the conflict along with several other ongoing crises in the region. Both the US and Egypt rejected his proposal.

Within days of the Iraqi invasion, the UN Security Council had met again to discuss measures to reverse the Iraqi invasion. On 6 August 1990 the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in Resolution 661, which was passed with Yemen and Cuba abstaining. The sanctions will be discussed in more depth in the next section.

During the months of its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq was accused of widespread human rights violations against Kuwaitis, such as large-scale executions. These allegations were later shown to be either false or exaggerated, although the conventional view does not tend to mention that the allegations were found wanting.

From August until November, there was a high level diplomatic exchange between the US government and various coalition partners. The US sought to enlist a coalition of both Western and Arab countries, so as to resist the charge of attempting to conduct a Western imperialist intervention in an Arab region. The focus of George Bush’s effort was to get majority support in the Security Council for military action against Iraq. A series of resolutions was passed during this period. Phyllis Bennis provides a succinct summary of the sanctions:

Resolution 662 (August 9) rejecting Iraq’s claimed annexation of Kuwait, and 664 (August 18) calling for the release of third-country nationals held in Iraq and Kuwait, were both adopted unanimously. Resolution 665 (August 25), tightened the economic embargo with a naval blockade; it passed with Yemen and Cuba again abstaining. Resolution 666 (September 13) tightened the embargo again with greater restrictions on food and medical supplies imported to Iraq; Yemen and Cuba opposed. Resolutions 667 (September 16) and 669 (September 24), both passed unanimously, called on Iraq to restore protection to embassies and diplomatic personnel, and took responsibility for the increasing requests for financial assistance from countries impacted by the anti-Iraq embargo. Resolution 670 (September 25) expanded the blockade to aircraft; only
Cuba voted against. Resolution 674 condemned Iraq’s treatment of foreign nationals, claimed other instances of violations of prior resolutions, and called on the Secretary General to use his good offices to help resolve the conflict; Yemen and Cuba abstained. Resolution 667 (September 28) condemned Iraq’s effort to change the demographic composition of Kuwait; it passed unanimously.22

In the months following Iraq’s invasion, US efforts to build a united Security Council seemed to be producing the desired results, although controversy over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, prompted by the killing of at least nineteen Palestinians by the Israeli military at a Muslim holy shrine in Jerusalem on October 8, threatened to unravel the unity.23 The US used economic, political and military threats and pay-offs to ensure that the fragile unity was secured.24

The adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990, has been widely regarded as a significant step for the UN. The resolution was passed with twelve votes, with Yemen and Cuba opposed and China abstaining. This resolution authorized “all necessary means” to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait if it did not comply with all previous resolutions on or before 15 January 1991.25 Invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which covers “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”26 Resolution 678 has been seen as a major turning point for the UN, because it is one of the few times that the provision for military action has been authorized by the United Nations.

The six week period between November 29 and January 15 saw some attempts at peace talks. In the week before the January 15 deadline, two promising efforts were initiated, one by Iran and another by a non-aligned group of leaders; however these did not produce results. The meeting between UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on the eve of the deadline also did not avert what many had come to see as inevitable: a US-led military offensive, heavily augmented by the UK, to push Iraq out of Kuwait.27

Military build-up in Saudi Arabia had begun as early as August, with by far the largest share of the forces sent by the United States. Other nations, including Egypt, Morocco, Syria, France and Britain early on started deploying military personnel.28 By the final six weeks, military forces from thirty-eight countries had joined the Coalition. The US estimated that the Coalition had 540,000 troops, 1,736 combat aircraft, over 3000 tanks, 4,510 other armoured vehicles, 1,288 major artillery weapons, and that forty-two multiple rocket launchers were in the theatre of war,29 sixty B-52s were waiting outside the theatre along with a naval force which consisted of “six carrier battle groups, two battleships, several submarines with cruise missiles, and an amphibious force of 17,000
Despite the breadth of the Coalition and the UN support for the military initiative, the US military was clearly in command of all military operations. As Cordesman and Wagner describe it,

The US was not simply prima inter pares ("first among equals"), it exercised de facto command over most of the planning before the war, controlled the way in which the war was fought, and made the [sic] most of the key decisions regarding conflict termination. While there was a joint command in the field, the US led this command in close cooperation with Saudi, British and French commanders. While Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, and the other members of the Coalition made national decisions about the role of their forces, they did not play a major role in the overall command system.

At the time the Government of Iraq made the decision to invade Kuwait it had the dominant military force in the Gulf region, with an army that in size ranked fourth in the world, a claim often repeated by proponents of the conventional view. The large and battle-hardened Iraqi Army was the main strength of Iraq’s military forces; US estimates of the total ground forces cited “1.2 million men, 69-71 divisions and forces commands, 5,800 tanks, 5,100 armoured personnel carriers, and 3,850 artillery weapons.” Less is known about Iraq’s air forces; although it was clear that technologically they were no match for the Coalition, it was also clear that they were operating some highly sophisticated combat aircraft. The Iraqi naval forces, on the other hand, were quite weak. In terms of the military forces that Iraq had active in the theatre of operations, US estimates indicate that by the beginning of Desert Storm, Iraq had deployed 819 combat aircraft and a ground force “of around 336,000 men, 12 heavy and 31 light divisions, 3,475 battle tanks, 3,080 other armored vehicles, and 2,475 major artillery weapons.”

Operation Desert Storm, as it was called, began on 16 January 1991 with a massive air bombardment that prefigured the “Shock and Awe” tactics used in March 2003. Cordesman and Wagner describe the effectiveness of the offensive air campaign, noting that the “Gulf War was the first war where air power was able to play a critical role in defeating a well-positioned ground force before supporting ground attacks began. It was also the first war in which aircraft had sufficiently advanced avionics and weapons to destroy large numbers of dug-in armor and artillery weapons.” They go on to describe how the Iraqi army had been hit by more than 40,000 attack sorties by the time the ground offensive began on 24 February 1991. The US estimated that the five week air campaign
caused the desertion of as many as 84,000 Iraqi personnel and destroyed 1,385 Iraqi tanks, 930 other armoured vehicles, and 1,155 artillery pieces... [and] severely damaged Iraq’s nuclear reactor facilities, three chemical and biological weapons production facilities, and 11 storage facilities, as well as 60% of Iraq’s major command centers, 70% of its military communications, 125 ammunition storage revetments, 48 Iraqi naval vessels, and 75% of Iraq’s electric power generating capability. It had cut Iraq’s flow of supplies to the theater by up to 90%.

As the weeks of the Coalition air campaign wore on and it became clear that Iraqi military forces were severely debilitated by the overwhelming air offensive, some commentators began to wonder if a ground offensive would be necessary at all. While the air campaign had inflicted significant losses on the Iraqi forces, it had also destroyed their communications systems and consequently their ability to coordinate the various divisions. The Coalition air campaign had also cut off the Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theatre of operations from their own air protection.

The force with which the Coalition attacked Iraq was not confined to the military; the effects of the war on the civilian population of the country were devastating. Statistics about civilian casualties in Iraq were finally revealed on February 6 to be greater than 7,000. Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark made a trip to Iraq February 2-8 and reported widespread destruction of civilian areas and facilities with no apparent connection to any military activities. As the civilian suffering became more apparent to the outside world, many media commentators started criticizing the Coalition campaign. One columnist writing on 17 February 1991 in the Washington Post called the aerial campaign “a sadistic ritual of daily bombing” in which civilian infrastructure was being targeted and innocents slaughtered:

Relentless aerial bombardment—lately about as surgical as operating on a cornea with machetes—is a systematic destroying of Iraq’s electricity, water, and sewage facilities. That, plus blowing up bridges and obliterating neighborhoods, is called “softening up” the enemy.

On February 12, waves of U.S. bomber pilots, confident they would face no firefights from Iraqi pilots and only minor antiaircraft threats, pulverized downtown Baghdad, with twenty-five major explosions turning buildings into rubble. On February 13, back the fearless warriors went, this time to obliterate with smart bombs what the Pentagon called an Iraqi “command bunker” but which the world now knows was sheltering hundreds of civilians trying to make it through another hellish
night. Scores of noncombatants—women and children—were slaughtered. International pressure to stop the Coalition campaign grew as the weeks wore on. Huge demonstrations against the war were held in the US, Europe and the Middle East. Diplomatic efforts by Mikhail Gorbachev to get Iraq out of Kuwait before the Coalition launched the ground offensive resulted in an announcement by Iraq on February 15 that it would comply with UN Resolution 660 and withdraw completely from Kuwait. US leadership, however, dismissed this announcement as a “cruel hoax” and pushed ahead with plans to conduct a ground war. Gorbachev’s continued efforts to mediate the situation continued, but to no avail.

When the ground war was launched on February 24, it went very easily for the Coalition. Ground troops advanced on two axis, and “enveloped” the Iraqi army in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations by surrounding it and blocking all means of exit. This was accomplished under cover of massive air bombardment within only two days. A withdrawal from Kuwait was ordered by Saddam Hussein on February 25. Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait were attacked from the air in an unprecedented “turkey shoot” which one media correspondent called “one of the most terrible harassments of a retreating army from the air in the history of warfare.” Much of the attack occurred along Highway 80, the main road between Kuwaiti City and Basra, and later along the road from Jahra to the Iraqi border town of Umm Qasr. By the morning of February 28, both routes “had been turned into a gigantic scrap yard, with some 2,000 military and civilian vehicles destroyed, some charred, some exploded, some reduced to heaps of tangled metal, with dead bodies and their severed limbs scattered all over, some corpses petrified in their vehicles, and others incinerated, with their faces reduced to grinning teeth.” The degree of killing that occurred on the Highway of Death, as it came to be called, has been contested. One account downplays the attack, arguing that “the so-called highway of death west of Kuwait City was really more of a highway of destruction and panic” from which most of the Iraqi personnel had fled with their lives.

On February 28, the Iraqi government agreed to a temporary ceasefire according to conditions demanded by the US-led coalition, which included compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, a declaration that the annexation of Kuwait was void and a commitment to paying reparations. A ceasefire line was established which left one-sixth of Iraq’s territory under Coalition control.

In total, the Coalition’s war had been shaped and defined by a method of warfighting termed “AirLand Battle” by US planners: “AirLand Battle is a recipe for mobile, comprehensive warfare. Ground forces coordinate their operations with the air forces so that both services’ efforts complement the other. Airland Battle doctrine stresses
four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization." This method of war
fighting was far more advanced than methods used by the Iraqi military. The
 technological advancement of the Coalition forces, and their ability to coordinate the
various elements of the fighting using sophisticated communication tools gave the
Coalition an advantage over Iraq which far outweighed troop numbers. These differences
resulted in

a mismatch in which one side was fighting in the style of the First World
War (or at best the Second World War without air cover), and the other
was using methods devised for the next century. As one of Schwarzkopf’s
staff observed: ‘The Iraqis were not capable of figuring out what was going
on and telling someone. We fight fast and in three dimensions, and they
were stalled at fighting World War I again.’ Or, as a captured Iraqi
brigadier-general (no doubt boosting his enemy’s reputation to mitigate his
own defeat) concurred: ‘You attacked us with the same NATO force that
was designated to attack [sic] the entire Warsaw Pact, and the entire earth
shook.’

However, it is generally acknowledged by the orthodox view that a part of this
tumultuous time was the subsequent uprising of Shi’a in the south of Iraq, and of the
Kurds in the north. Within days of the signing of the ceasefire, Shi’a rebels started a
revolt which involved hundreds of army deserters and spread to most of the major Shi’a
centres in the south of Iraq. Although initially it was viewed as an internal conflict, the
stakes went higher when Iranian President Rafsanjani made a public call in support of
the uprising and called for Saddam Hussein to resign, and there were reports of large
numbers of armed men crossing the border from Iran. The Iraqi government swiftly
reassembled its forces and attacked the insurgency on March 9. By March 13 all Shi’a
centres except Najaf and Karbala were retaken; there was much stiffer resistance in these
two cities, the sites of significant Shi’a shrines. By March 18, after a bloody battle in
which many civilians lost their lives, government forces had regained these two cities.
The US and other allies did not take any action; although the US offered a verbal
warning to Hussein to stop the counter insurgency.

While the government military forces were occupied with the south, Kurdish
rebels in the north began their uprising. On March 14 Kurdish auxiliary forces of the
Iraqi army switched sides, and twelve major towns were taken by the Kurdish
nationalists. Within one week the coup extended to all of the three northern governates
of Suleimaniya, Arbil and Doahak, and substantial portions of Tamim, including the oil
city of Kirkuk. On March 28 the Iraqi military began its counter-insurgency with a major
assault on Kirkuk, followed by the retaking of town after town, until total control was re-
established by April 6. As the government re-established control of the north, large numbers of Kurdish people began fleeing to the mountains. Unlike the Shi'a, however, the plight of the Kurds aroused the concern of the international community. This outcry resulted in Operation Provide Comfort, in which US and allied forces set up safe havens and provided aid for Kurdish refugees. This operation was not a UN initiative, although the three Western permanent members of the Security Council argued they were entitled to send troops to northern Iraq under Resolution 688, adopted April 5, which condemned the repression of the Iraqi government against civilians, demanded that it should cease, and called on Iraq to allow international humanitarian organizations access to the country to assist those in need. No aid, however, was given to the Shi’a uprising in the south.

The ceasefire on February 28, and the subsequent provision of humanitarian aid in Operation Provide Comfort is generally considered to be the end point of “the Gulf War”. At this point the conventional narrative moves into a discussion of the sanctions regime, if it even makes it onto the radar screen. For military historians the military story now jumps to 2003 and “the Iraq War,” with the sanctions regime considered to be a brief interlude and lead up to the “real” story of the next war.

The Sanctions Regime

Between the end of “the Gulf War” and the beginning of “the Iraq War” the master narrative focuses on the question of sanctions. As noted above, on 6 August 1990 an international sanctions regime had been put in place through UN Resolution 660 to try to force the Government of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. After the Ahtisaari report of 20 March 1991 revealed “near-apocalyptic” destruction of the economic and life support infrastructure of Iraq, a number of UN members began calling for the easing of sanctions. Despite these pressures, the Americans, British and French pushed through the ‘mother of resolutions’—Resolution 687, passed by the Security Council on 3 April 1991—which was the longest in the organization’s history. It placed key aspects of Iraq’s internal affairs under close supervision. In addition to having to accept the inviolability of the boundary with Kuwait, to be demarcated by an international commission, and UN peace-keepers on the border, it was to present the United Nations with full disclosure of all its chemical and biological weapons and facilities, its ballistic missiles stocks and production capabilities (over 150 kilometres range) and all nuclear materials, and then co-operate in their destruction. It was also to
facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property and agree to compensation to those foreign nationals and companies which had suffered as a result of the occupation of Kuwait. All sanctions remained in place for anything other than 'medicines and health supplies'. They were to be reviewed every sixty days, and Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions would be considered a key element of any decision to reduce or lift sanctions. No oil could be sold.\(^{57}\)

Through Resolution 687 stringent conditions were imposed on Iraq in the wake of the war; the sanctions regime put in place in August 1990 was reinforced rather than eased.\(^{58}\)

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established in 1991 to carry out inspections in Iraq to ensure that the Iraqi government was complying with Resolution 687's demand to disclose and destroy all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons systems. UNSCOM first entered Iraq in 1991, and continued until December 1998. The work of the Commission was often contested by the Iraqi government, which frequently resisted the inspectors' efforts.\(^{59}\)

It was also at this time that "no-fly zones" began to be implemented. The "no-fly zones" forbade Iraqi airplanes from flying over Iraqi territory, and were established to protect the southern Shi'a and the northern Kurds from potential attacks by Saddam Hussein's forces. The first of these was put in place over the northern Kurdish areas above the thirty-sixth parallel in April 1991, while the southern no-fly zone was established up to the thirty-second parallel in August of 1992. The southern no-fly zone was extended closer to Baghdad, up to the thirty-third parallel, in 1996. Patrolling of the no-fly zones was initially undertaken by the US, Britain and France, although France later withdrew from the task. The US and UK carried out "daily patrols of the no-fly zones, with periodic attacks on Iraqi anti-aircraft emplacements and major bombing episodes triggered by alleged large-scale movements of Iraqi armor in border areas or intensified anti-aircraft fire."\(^{60}\)

For the most part, between 1991 and 1995 surprisingly little critical notice was taken of either the sanctions against Iraq or the "no-fly zones" in either academic literature or popular discourse. By the mid-1990s, however, a critical mass of careful studies—some of which I shall return to later in this thesis—had been produced that began to alert the international community to the widespread negative impact of the initial massive bombing of Iraq and the ongoing sanctions regime on the civilian population.\(^{61}\) A United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsored report, which asserted wide-spread abnormally high infant mortality rates as a direct result of the sanctions regime, was an especially prominent study that began an intense debate about the morality and efficacy of using sanctions to change state behaviour.\(^{62}\) Over the
years the study generated much controversy and was challenged by alternative reports. The controversy over sanctions itself became the key and dominant narrative about Iraq for the years between 1991 and 2003, overshadowing other activities in the region.

According to the conventional view, these negative impacts are ascribed to the intransigence of the Hussein Government, especially on the question of weapons inspections. In what is seen as a conciliatory gesture, there was an oil-for-food program put in place in 1996 that allowed Iraq to sell specified quantities of oil at a price not set by them, in direct exchange for humanitarian supplies for the population. At this point the UN then had to set up offices in Baghdad to monitor the Oil-for-Food program, which it did until 21 November 2003. During this period of time, UNSCOM inspectors were in a constant state of conflict with the Iraqi government over weapons inspections. Meanwhile UNICEF was releasing reports that documented the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi population. The sanctions remained in place throughout these years until they were finally lifted on 22 May 2003, after the invasion of Iraq by US forces.

The Iraq War

"The Iraq War" is the final part of the conventional view, although in popular discourse it is a rather nebulous label that is still contested. Shortly after the destruction of the World Trade Center and the partial destruction of the Pentagon by suicide bombers on 11 September 2001, the US government decided to invade Iraq, which it eventually did in 2003. In military terms, the invasion of Iraq was both successful and complete in the sense that it toppled the Government of Iraq and captured Saddam Hussein. As with "the Gulf War" the demarcation of "the Iraq War" was quickly made by military historians and political scientists. It too has been characterized as a short war, "lasting only twenty-one days, from 20 March to 9 April." According to this narrative, the fall of Baghdad and the removal of the Iraqi government marked the end of the war: "In a campaign that lasted barely three weeks, US and Coalition military forces erased the evil regime of Saddam Hussein—a notable achievement." Although military historians have identified the fall of Baghdad on April 9 as the terminal point of "the Iraq War," combat operations ended formally on 1 May 2003 with an announcement by US President George W. Bush aboard a US aircraft carrier.

Within days of hijacked airliners crashing into the World Trade Towers, killing nearly 3000, the US government began to set into motion plans for the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of its government as a part of a larger response to the 11 September 2001 attack. In the Fall of that year the US unilaterally, but with help from Britain and other countries, invaded Afghanistan and toppled its government because of its close links with
the Al-Qaeda organization. By December of 2001 military plans for the war on Iraq were substantially in place. In January of 2002 the president of the US included Iraq in what he called an “Axis of Evil” along with North Korea and Iran. By 12 September 2002 George W. Bush addressed the United Nations in a speech which condemned Iraq, calling it a “grave and gathering danger”. On October 10, the US congress approved the use of force against Iraq; while the United Nations adopted Resolution 1441, which insisted that UN weapons inspectors who had left in 1998 return to Iraq to assess and monitor the full disclosure of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In what is considered to be one of the most significant events leading up to the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN suggesting that there was evidence proving that Iraq continued to possess weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to use them. In March the UN Security Council came short of authorizing the use of force against Iraq; however, the US and UK unilaterally launched a war on Iraq with a massive aerial bombardment followed by a ground invasion. By 9 April 2003 Baghdad was taken by US/UK forces, and Saddam Hussein went into hiding, along with most of his senior level officials. In a much publicized declaration of victory on the U.S.S. *Abraham Lincoln* aircraft carrier, given under a banner proclaiming “Mission Accomplished”, Bush said “Major combat in Iraq has ended” while warning that the “war on terror” would still continue. In May the US dissolved the Iraq Ba’ath Party, and UN Security Council Resolution 1483 granted the US-led coalition provisional authority in the form of a mandate to administer Iraq. Subsequent to the fall of Baghdad, waves of violence began, starting with the destruction of the Iraqi National Museum and Library. Saddam Hussein, who had been in hiding, was eventually captured on 13 December 2003, and subsequently and controversially put on trial in Iraq. He was summarily executed on 30 December 2006.

**Endgame Scenarios**

Subsequent to the fall of Baghdad, without a functioning government and without adequate post-war plans, widespread chaos descended on the country of Iraq. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion internecine violence broke out and many historical sites and artefacts were looted, some tragically so. Over the course of the next year, the actions of the US government—now the occupier of Iraq—came under intense international scrutiny. Within the year a significant resistance movement had developed inside Iraq, which focussed its attention on guerrilla activities meant to thwart the US military presence. Without a functioning government, the US occupying force more actively took control of state functions. The ongoing military operations—now to
combat indigenous and what are surmised to be foreign guerrilla resistance fighters—have slowly accrued significant US casualties. As the resistance movement has become more effective in killing US soldiers and capturing hostages to raise their profile, the US government’s justification for remaining in Iraq has taken on new dimensions. Most important to the justification for remaining in Iraq has been the professed desire to help to establish democracy in Iraq and, more broadly, to defeat “terrorism.” “The Iraq War” in the dominant narrative has been equated with the “War on Terrorism,” or what some have referred to as war without end. 69

EMOTIONAL APPEALS AND THE FACTS OF WAR

Psychologist Adam Curle has suggested that a key task for those working with issues of conflict is to blow away the haze of emotion. 70 I do not think that Curle is suggesting that emotions are bad, of course, but rather that they create a cloud that obscures the conflict itself. In the case of Iraq a number of emotion-laden tertiary narratives have accompanied the master narrative. All of them in one way or another function as justifications for the master narrative, but are not themselves the narrative. The key ones are these: a) Saddam Hussein was an evil madman; b) weapons of mass destruction are present and dangerous; and c) we must stop terrorism in its tracks. Each of these tertiary narratives evokes strong reactions in people—that is their raison d’etre. They purport to offer an “explanation” of why the actions of the US government were necessary and just, but in doing so they play a much more insidious role, and that is to act as a smoke-screen to hide the facts of war. Unlike the master narrative itself, which is fixed in time and place, these emotional appeals are not fixed. They are in constant flux, coming and going like the clouds that act as a metaphor for them. By the time they are proven wrong, the game has already moved on to its next round.

A part of my argument is that these emotional appeals need to be separated from the actual facts of war. One key strategy used by the US/UK political and military leadership and supported by mainstream media to sustain this war has been to raise these emotion-laden tertiary narratives to such prominence that the facts of the war itself were hidden to people living outside of the country of Iraq.

Hence one of my aims is to join with other intellectuals who have been working to challenge the framing of the case of Iraq over the past two decades. While there are a substantial number of scholars and commentators who have unquestioningly adopted and promoted the conventional view, 71 there are some who have raised questions even from within that framework. 72 My intent is to take these critical questions a step further,
beyond a critique framed within the conventional view, to one that challenges the conventional view at its core.

WHAT IF THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE IS WRONG?

If I am correct, then any person reading the summary of the conventional narrative above will not have been surprised by anything in it. The features of the narrative hold true in large part because they are built on events that did, in a physical way, happen. So even though I have clearly written it from a critical perspective—one that believes the extent of the violence was not necessary—still the contours of the narrative are well established. Here is one of my central points: it does not matter where on the political spectrum individuals may place themselves, the narrative remains the same, because it is built on the same underlying logic. The cornerstone of that logic insists that there was a short war in 1991 that had minimal casualties and was won handily by a US-led coalition. Indeed, I suspect for many, the narrative itself is so embedded in our brains that we no longer pay any attention to it. The power of the narrative resides in its having become invisible, and therefore uncontested, along with the underlying mindset that supports it. When was the last time you read anything current about Iraq that mentioned the “Gulf War”? Only rarely does it now surface in popular or academic discourse—it has been “done”. Furthermore, it should not be a surprise that reading this narrative is now boring, even uninteresting. So why does challenging the orthodox version matter? I would like first to turn this question on its head, framing it differently. What if the conventional master narrative is wrong? What might it be hiding, and what are the implications of challenging it?

Some indication of the implications of my argument begin to surface when we ask what is the underlying logic that undergirds the master narrative as I have just explained it. That logic, I believe, is founded on the idea that foreign policy must be grounded in militarism. So long as that deep frame, to use George Lakoff’s language, remains in place, the facts of war will be obscured in order to pursue it. Albert Einstein was right: to prevent war, we have to change the way we think about it. If we build our foreign policy—whether in the US or Canada—on a presupposition that militarism holds the answer to all problems, then war will be pursued even when it does not make sense.73 Indeed, significant efforts will be exerted to make it make sense, even when it does not.

Henry Giroux captures the heart of this concern in his pithy analysis of mainstream North American media. His exposition of the underlying logic of militarism with reference to Iraq is persuasive. Referring to the occupation of Iraq, Giroux writes,
Americans have witnessed an extension of the concept of war to include not only traditional, defense-oriented objectives, but also to discipline society, reproduce numerous aspects of public life in the image of official power, and establish the ideology of militarism as the very foundation for effective governance. Accompanying this increasing form of discursive and material repression is an attempt to refashion the tools of language, sound, and image in order to diminish the capacity of the American public to weigh evidence critically, exercise thoughtful discrimination, and make informed judgments. As the critical power of language is reduced in official discourse to the simulacra of communication, it becomes more difficult for the American public to engage in critical debates, translate private considerations into public concerns, and recognize the distortions and omissions that underlie much of the current government policies. What happens to critical language under the emergence of official newspeak can be seen in the various ways in which the Bush administration and its official supporters both misrepresent by misnaming government policies and engaging in deceit to cover up their own regressive politics and policies.  

The net effect of this phenomenon is political disenfranchisement and indifference to human suffering. Quoting Dwight Macdonald, who was writing after World War II and the Nazi Holocaust, Giroux situates this in the broader context of authoritarianism. Macdonald, according to Giroux, argues that, “as more and more people are excluded from the experience of political agency and exhibit ‘less and less control over the policies of their governments,’ ethics is reduced to the status of near platitudes and politics becomes banal.” He goes on to argue that, 

as the state becomes more tightly controlled, organized, and rationalized, it empties politics and morality of any substance and relevance, thus making it difficult for people either to care about the obligations of critical citizenship or to participate in the broader landscape of politics and power. Under such circumstances, language becomes the mechanism for promoting political powerlessness in that it is used by the state to misrepresent the truth. It also trivializes experience as a collection of mere platitudes reinforcing moral indifference and political impotence. In the current American political landscape, the truth is not merely misrepresented, it is overtly mocked.  

In challenging the conventional narrative about Iraq my purpose is: a) to challenge the underlying ideology of militarism and authoritarianism that is a feature of current
politics, b) to seek a closer proximity to truth about Iraq, c) to empower those who have been disempowered while opposing this war, d) to awaken those who have become indifferent to suffering caused by our foreign policies, and e) to provide tools to cut through the haze of emotion and reveal the facts of war.

We need a new narrative about Iraq; I shall propose one in the remaining pages. To get to it, however, I shall first have to work through an analysis of violence to illuminate this war in all its dimensions. The next task is to provide an intellectual inventory of what has gone into my thinking about the theoretical question of war's relationship to violence.
ENDNOTES

1 Although I shall not be dwelling on George Lakoff's ideas, the idea of framing has been developed most thoroughly by him. On his use of the idea of framing as a political analysis tool, see George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004). These ideas are traced to his earlier well-known book written with Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980). I first became aware of his use of these ideas in an essay widely distributed via email starting in December, 1990 and now available on the web, "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf," Viet Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter 3, no. 3 (1991): np. Available at, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html, accessed on May 25, 2008.


10 Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf; 1990-91, 114-17.


12 For an alternative account which suggests they left by a convoy of limousines see Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (London: Paladin, 1992), 102.


15 Niva, "Battle is Joined," 56.

16 Hiro, The Second Gulf War, 112.


18 Hiro, The Second Gulf War, 102.


20 Hiro, The Second Gulf War, 149-50.


25 Lauterpacht, et al., The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, 98.


41 Niva, "Battle is Joined," 68.
44 Niva, "Battle is Joined," 68-9.
46 Niva, "Battle is Joined," 70.
47 *Quoted in Hiro, The Second Gulf War*, 387.


While there are differences in the way militarism and foreign policy may (or may not) be linked in the US, the UK, and Canada, still there are questions to be raised. With reference to Canada’s tradition of peacekeeping, for example, a starting point for the discussion could be found in Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats & White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
75 Giroux, "Representations of the Unreal," 18.
76 Giroux, "Representations of the Unreal," 18.
Upon returning to Canada in May 2001 after living in Iraq for much of 2000-2001, I reread Zygmunt Bauman's *Modernity and the Holocaust*. In its opening pages he tells the story of how he searched sociological literature in vain for anything that would elucidate the Holocaust, which had for him deeply personal significance. He writes:

Such sociological studies as have been completed so far show beyond reasonable doubt that the Holocaust has more to say about the state of sociology than sociology in its present shape is able to add to our knowledge of the Holocaust. This alarming fact has not yet been faced (much less responded to) by the sociologists.¹

While I do not equate the Holocaust with the tragedy of the US/UK – IRAQ War, invasion and occupation, this passage did strike a chord with me. First, in a similar vein to Bauman's obsession with the Holocaust, I am concerned to understand the war with Iraq which has grown to have deeply personal significance. It became clear quite early on that I was not interested in the highly manufactured events called “the Gulf War” and “the Iraq War” as proclaimed by the conventional view of Iraq; but rather, my interest was in the war that I had come to know over the course of almost twenty years of direct involvement with it. I realized that to do it justice I needed to come to the subject with a “beginner's mind,”² allowing myself to question the core assumptions that much current work on the subject accepts without question.

Second, under the guidance of my advisor I became quite influenced by questions raised in the discipline of Anthropology. Previous work in the Department of Religious Studies had dried up for me, which is not to say that it was suddenly without meaning. Quite the opposite, it was taking courses in Religious Studies that led to an interest in the theoretical questions raised in Anthropology. A core shift was the move away from issues of faith and belief towards issues of power and knowledge in the secular world. However, in terms of the specific question of Iraq, while I found plenty of anthropological literature useful in my efforts to understand it³ I was surprised that the *anthropology of war per se* could not provide me with a framework for understanding the problem. “With a few notable exceptions,” Anna Simons observes in a review of anthropology and war, “anthropologists have barely studied modern wars, and when modern war is treated as a subject, it is the why behind the fighting and the aftermath of it—not the how or the process—that receives most attention.”⁴ It is notable that throughout her paper Simons draws attention to numerous wars in the decade prior to her article, but the war with Iraq
in any form is barely mentioned in passing.\textsuperscript{5} Indeed, the war with Iraq is rarely mentioned, let alone analyzed, in numerous collections of essays and review articles published by anthropologists on the subject of war and violence between 1990 and 2003.\textsuperscript{6} A few anthropologists have addressed this startling lacuna, although they have always framed it by other concerns such as racism, globalization, environmental degradation or “the war against terror,” and never with attention to definitional and theoretical problems raised by the war with Iraq as a subject itself.\textsuperscript{7} Carolyn Nordstrom helpfully identifies the core problem, however, when she observes: “Being in the USA and trying to understand the [spring 2003] war was perplexing: I could not find the war. I don’t mean the constant barrage of news coverage on ‘the war,’ the political mud-slinging among people of opposing views, or the video clips of military advancements. I mean the way war smells, feels, tastes, looks, and acts.”\textsuperscript{8} Perhaps at this juncture the war with Iraq has more to say about anthropology than anthropology has to say about it?

Although some anthropologists responded with modest statements at a political level to various stages of the war with Iraq,\textsuperscript{9} I became concerned, like Bauman in the case of the Holocaust, by the lack of analytical discourse and persuasive argument that has characterized the response of anthropologists to this significant world event. My concern to engage this issue more thoroughly is informed by Nancy Scheper-Hughes’s call for a “politically committed and morally engaged anthropology.”\textsuperscript{10} So a part of this thesis has turned also to asking how it may be possible to reframe the question of war and Iraq so that this discipline—so centrally concerned with the study of large scale human behavioural patterns—can address one of the most significant wars since World War II, a war which has fundamentally reshaped, because of its region-wide implications, all of Southwest Asia? What contribution can we make to help to understand this violent phenomenon?

**CLARIFICATION OF ARGUMENT**

The problem of a conventional view of Iraq has led me to narrow my explicit concern to two main objectives in this dissertation. The first is to demarcate the war against Iraq—\textbf{to name it}, in other words, and not to be distracted by the emotional haze that accompanies it.\textsuperscript{11} The second objective is to develop a theoretical understanding of violence and war that will illuminate war with Iraq in a new and fresh way. I have discovered that no existing anthropological model is sufficient to support my main contention that there was a single ongoing war waged with Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Yet I believe that it is vitally important to have a model that allows us to understand how war was waged between Iraq and the US/UK continuously for almost thirteen years with
virtually no wide-spread mainstream acknowledgment of it as war. To understand this phenomenon will help to uncover the hidden mechanisms of war-making and collective violence.

To achieve these goals and to aid in the deconstruction of the conventional view of Iraq, I have developed a model that helps us to see how war is sustained by (a) mobilizing violence through the physical application of force, (b) activating and organizing a network of institutions and their processes that cause harm, and (c) promoting symbol systems that enable and sustain an ethos to do violence without activating a wider, “corporate critical self-consciousness.”

My analysis of war with Iraq will require talking about the concept of violence. Although it is a contested concept, I will show how violence can provide a grounded theoretical lens through which to see the war against Iraq. The core of this model consists of an expanded understanding of violence as process that is situated in three primary conceptual realms—a physical realm, a network realm, and a symbolic realm—which are derived from a wide reading of anthropological studies and other social science based research. As my own narrative unfolds, I will illustrate each conceptual realm with examples from my experience of the war with Iraq and extensive historical research. This narrative will form the foundation for a heterodox view of Iraq.

In the final analysis, what I am saying is that "the Gulf War" and "the Iraq War" are socio-cultural fabrications in mainstream North American culture, representing in crass form the political and social construction of knowledge with the power to enable and to sustain, for long periods of time, war “right under our noses.” To be very clear, there was no “new” war with Iraq in 2003 as an extension of the “war against terrorism;” for the war with Iraq, quite literally, had continued for some thirteen years. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was indeed the final chapter in the war with Iraq. The effect of the war with Iraq (1991-2003) and the subsequent occupation of Iraq (2003-?) will be felt for decades, if not longer, in the Middle East, North America and globally. For men, women and children in Iraq it was a very long war that came on the heels of another very long war. And now they experience occupation and the violence it occasions.

Consequently, my narrative imposes a different structure on how the course of historical events since 1990 in the geographical region of the Middle East is understood. In this counter-narrative there is a series of escalating stages that I shall unpack in a later chapter. Basically it argues that a long-standing conflict between the governments of Iraq and Kuwait was escalated when the government of Iraq invaded and occupied the country of Kuwait. When a cohort of countries led by the US government intervened in the occupation, the conflict escalated into a state of international war. Some thirteen years later that war was ended by yet another invasion and occupation; this time, however, it was the country of Iraq that was occupied. At the time of completing this
thesis there is a great deal of internal resistance to the occupation of the country, and the makings of an indigenous government have been put in place (although not realized). The contours of how or when the occupation will end are still unfolding at the time of writing.

OTHERS ALSO SEE THE PROBLEM

Although I have stated my ideas strongly in the opening pages of this extended thesis—insisting on the idea that there was one continuous war with Iraq between 1991 and 2003—I do not wish to leave the impression that my argument stands alone. Others see the problem that I have identified as well.

The most important group of people who recognize the problem that I have identified live in Iraq. They are not academics. Not once to my recollection, after articulating the ideas I outline in the present dissertation in conversation with people in Iraq, were the ideas disputed. Indeed, the response was uniformly strong affirmation that the idea of “one war” mirrored the experience of those who lived with it on a daily basis. I suspect that there are some who would disagree with me who reside in the region (I just did not happen to speak with them); nevertheless, for me to know that my argument is supported by informants in Iraq is crucial for this reason: as I see it, the argument that I am making is primarily directed at an English-speaking North American and European audience. I am not convinced that the argument needs to be made in much of the rest of the world. If it can be used in these places, I shall be pleased. Nor should it be a surprise that the one clear example of a scholar who has pointed to a similar idea in the North American context is a distinguished Arab-speaking political scientist.

In the already large (and repetitive) English literature on the subject of Iraq there are a few writers who make specific reference to the idea that the war against Iraq did not end in 1991. Unfortunately none of these commentators provide an explicit justification for their view, a systematic analysis of the problem, or a development of the implications of it for an academic audience. That they do see a problem, however, supports my contention that there is a problem with the orthodox view of Iraq worthy of careful scrutiny.

In a trenchant documentation and analysis of US foreign policy, political scientist Naseer Aruri’s article, “America’s War with Iraq, 1990-2002,” supports the idea of “one war” (although his prose occasionally lapses into that of the conventional view). To his credit, when commenting in 2002 on the possibility of an invasion of Iraq, Aruri presciently states that “if it occurs ... such an invasion will not only be a continuation of the same war, America’s war against Iraq, which began in 1990-91 and entered a new
phase in January 1999, but also a war to reshape the strategic landscape in the Middle East."\textsuperscript{14} Aruri goes on to document the political machinations of successive US administrations in their engagement with Iraq. However, in the end his purpose was not to provide an analysis of why he chose to give the article the title that he did. My work goes some way to providing that argument.

In the same volume, Elsayed Omran also supports the idea of a continuous war against Iraq, apparently indebted to Aruri whom he references numerous times.\textsuperscript{15} The point of Omran’s article does not have to do with arguing that there has been a continuous war, but rather points out the discrepancies that exist between the human rights rhetoric employed by the US to justify its actions in the Middle East and its behaviour in a variety of other settings. Even more than Aruri, however, Omran frequently resorts to aspects of the conventional view to support his argument.

Although the dust-jacket comment suggests that the author will emphasize “the historical perspective—that this war began when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990,” the reader will search in vain for any such historical perspective in journalist Christopher Hitchens’ book, \textit{A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq}.\textsuperscript{16} In the interest of being thorough, I mention it in passing here because he does in fact mention the idea, once, at the end of the book. After a scurrilous and \textit{ad hominem} diatribe against any and all who questioned the idea that Iraq needed to be invaded in 2003, and drawing on the same emotion laden rhetoric used to justify war, he contemplates the significance of the invasion while “grinding up the road from Kuwait to southern Iraq” in March 2003: “I was watching the closing moments of a war that had begun on August 2, 1990, when the armed forces of Saddam Hussein had smashed in the opposite direction across the Kuwaiti frontier. That conflict had supposedly ended on February 27, 1991, with the official restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. But it had smouldered on for more than a dozen years, like a fire raging in a bad old mine, and was only now being brought to a conclusion.”\textsuperscript{17}

Another illustrative example comes from well-known author Arundhati Roy who explicitly said in 2003 that “what many do not know is that the war did not end [in 1991].”\textsuperscript{18} Within the same paragraph she then wrote about “the decade of economic sanctions that followed the war [sic],” which illustrates how difficult it is to consistently write against the conventional view.

Two related streams of inquiry that run parallel to the line of thought developed in my dissertation are indicative of the problem as well. The first suggests that there were three consecutive wars: The Gulf War, The No-Fly Zones War, The Iraq War. The best expression of this perspective is given by Roger Lee, who calls himself “The History Guy” on the Internet.\textsuperscript{19} He argues that “the Gulf War” was followed by the “No-Fly Zones War,” which in turn was followed by “the Third Persian Gulf War.” He documents, as I
have done over the years, the ongoing military engagement between the US and UK coalition and the Iraqi military. He writes:

In historical terms, the No-Fly Zone War is considered to have ended on March 19, 2003, when "Operation Iraqi Freedom" began and this conflict segued into the larger war. All three of the U.S.-led Coalition wars with Iraq (the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the 1991-2003 No-Fly Zone War, and the 2003 Gulf War 2) can really be seen as one long, extended conflict, but for classification purposes, are seen as separate conflicts. 20

Although he offers no theoretical discussion, nor self-reflective analysis of his argument, I believe he has correctly seen that the way the conflict has been framed in the conventional view is lacking even in descriptive terms, let alone theoretical.

Another related stream of thought—one that I am particularly supportive of—is to see the sanctions in terms of siege warfare. 21 Although this view generally accepts the paradigm asserted by the conventional view, it counters the hegemony of that view by asserting that something more was going on with the UN-based sanctions than meets the eye. Joy Gordon argues that sanctions are “nothing less than a deadly weapon.” 22 And she asks the pointed question, based on her analysis: “Can this modern-day equivalent of siege warfare be justified in ethical or political terms?” 23 In a similar vein, the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, argues that the sanctions regime comprised a “different kind of war.” 24

In his legal assessment of international sanctions done for the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, lawyer Marc Bossuyt provides one of the clearest rationales for understanding the period between 1991 and 2003 as continuous armed conflict. In a passage worth quoting in full, excerpted from his report that discusses sanctions regimes in numerous countries, he writes:

Any sanctions that are imposed as a result of war or as a part of war are regulated by the laws of armed conflict. Of course, the “six-prong test” is still applicable, but in the Iraqi case it must be interpreted in the light of established armed conflict law. The sanctions against Iraq were first imposed in the context of Iraq’s military invasion of Kuwait, were maintained during the Gulf war and then were extended indefinitely after the first phase of military hostilities ended. Also, the continued air strikes by United States and United Kingdom planes qualify the situation as an armed conflict. Thus, the strict measures stipulated in international humanitarian law for the protection of civilians in armed conflict is applicable to the sanctions regime and its instigators, and violations of those laws can be prosecuted as war crimes. In this vein, reference should be
made to the argument presented earlier under “Limits to sanctions in humanitarian law”, especially the section on the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Particularly germane are the provisions of the Geneva Conventions allowing for exemptions for medical supplies and for goods needed for the survival of the civilian population, the prohibition in Protocol I, article 54, paragraph 1, of “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare”, and the provisions relating to the protection of women and children, the two groups most injured by the sanctions regime. Finally, humanitarian law, in accordance with the Martens Clause, clearly establishes that the “dictates of the public conscience” are to be considered binding in cases where the law is not specific. The popular outcry against the sanctions, as mentioned above, constitutes these dictates, rendering the sanctions illegal.25 (Emphasis added.)

Philosopher C.A.J. Coady recently also raised the question of an ongoing war. Citing reliable reports indicating that up to 2003 the US had “averaged more than 34,000 military sorties per year since 1991” resulting in significant civilian deaths and much property destruction, he concludes that “it should be clear that this sustained bombardment lasting well over a decade is a poor candidate for the title of something short of war.”26

It would be a mistake to think that my work either sets itself up against or is in competition with these commentators,27 because in fact my aim is simply to add fuel to their fire by creating a synthetic, holistic view of war with Iraq. Together we are part of a nascent movement to create a revised language to talk about a major piece of unfolding, current history.

A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL INVENTORY

The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is “knowing thyself” as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.... Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.28

As I have worked with the problem of the conventional view of Iraq, I have become conscious that my general orientation to anthropology and to this study, which draws on disciplines other than anthropology, has been shaped by several key thinkers and schools of thought. Their influence is sometimes obvious and explicit, while at other times it is less direct. The work of these scholars was the subject of examinations
completed for my graduate studies, or is currently used in courses that I teach for an undergraduate program in Conflict Resolution Studies at Menno Simons College. In some cases these scholars have been a part of my intellectual growth for a long time; several of them I have met personally. At this point in my narrative, then, I wish to follow the advice of one of those scholars—Edward Said—and undertake a brief “personal intellectual inventory” that indicates a variety of significant influences and contributions to my intellectual world view. I do this because the counter-narrative about Iraq that I am developing requires transparency in its origins. Nothing less can instill the confidence that its claims to authority are any more or less worthy than the often unstated intellectual influences that have shaped the conventional view of Iraq.

ANTHROPOLOGISTS

Edward Sapir

As part of his tutelage, Professor Richard Preston has had me read and reflect on all of Edward Sapir’s seminal papers on theory in Anthropology. Although my study is not Sapirian—meaning adopting wholesale the approach used by Sapir—one of his primary concerns very clearly informs my approach to the problem. Sapir has little patience for studies that deracinate abstract theoretical discussions from the lived experiences of human beings, as he says, simply trying to get on with their quotidian lives. His concern is consistently to make sure that the social scientific arrow of inquiry always points back to the human subject. In a celebrated passage, about which Preston has written at length, Sapir articulates this concern in this way:

Now fantasied universes of self-contained meaning are the very finest and noblest substitutes we can ever devise for that precise and loving insight into the nooks and crannies of the real that must be forever denied us. But we must not reverse the arrow of experience and claim for experience’s imaginative condensations the primacy in an appeal to our loyalty, which properly belongs to our perceptions of men and women as the ultimate units of value in our day-to-day view of the world. If we do not thus value the nuclei of consciousness from which all science, all art, all history, all culture, have flowed as symbolic by-products in the humble but intensely urgent business of establishing meaningful relationships between actual human beings, we commit personal suicide.

While my argument is not Sapirian in form, I nevertheless have a constant concern to try to make sure that the arrow of my inquiry is always pointed at those who have
experienced the local consequences of war with Iraq even when I am explicating what are sometimes rather abstract theoretical concepts.

Clifford Geertz

My first serious reading of Geertz happened while I was a graduate student in the Department of Religious Studies in the late 1980s in a course taught by anthropologist Ellen Badone that focused on the anthropology of religious movements. Geertz has, of course, written key papers on the subject. My decision to move to anthropology from religious studies can in part be traced to that course and my awakening to the power of culture to explain very complex human phenomena. For my comprehensive exams in the Department of Anthropology, I chose as one of my three topics the idea of cultural systems. My approach to the problem of Iraq has been influenced by that study, which included not only the work of Geertz on cultural systems, but the critique of those ideas as well, and related concepts—most notably that of ritual. The insight from that study that continues to influence me the most is captured by the well-worn Geertzian metaphor of the turtle. Geertz recounts an Indian story, or at least one he heard as an Indian story “about an Englishman who, having been told that the world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in turn on the back of a turtle, asked ... what did the turtle rest on? Another turtle. And that turtle? ‘Ah, Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down.’” He goes on to conclude, in a turn that has shades of the preceding Sapir quote, by saying,

The danger that cultural analysis, in search of all-too-deep-lying turtles, will lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained—and with the biological and physical necessities on which those surfaces rest, is an ever-present one. The only defense against it, and against, thus, turning cultural analysis into a kind of sociological aestheticism, is to train such analysis on such realities and such necessities in the first place.

Perhaps his work informs my own approach most clearly in his efforts to look behind the obvious, to be sensitive to that which is not spoken as much as to that which is spoken, to distinguish the wink from the blink.

More directly, my study of cultural systems is the backdrop for the exploration of the symbolic realm of violence that I shall come to in a later chapter, for in the end it is in the context of symbol systems that I find a key determining influence on the capacity to create and sustain violence in both physical and network realms. In symbols and
cultural systems I find the roots of violence, which is not to say that one culture or
another is more violent; 37 it is to say that some symbol systems have the capacity to be
used for violent ends, while others have the capacity to encourage more peaceful forms of
conflict resolution. Understanding the content of symbol systems opens doors of inquiry
for anthropologists that are unique and go beyond the literature on propaganda and the
creation of an enemy.

Bernard Cohn

Another anthropologist who was introduced to me early in my graduate studies
was Bernard Cohn. It is his work that most specifically suggested to me the possibility
that there is a legitimate stream within anthropology that takes culture as its core
concern, but that finds its data in the historical record. 38 In his core essays on the
relationship of the disciplines of history and anthropology 39 I came to see that there is a
rich area of study that blends together insights from several disciplines in the humanities,
and is augmented by a social scientific concern for the realm of experience and observing
the other with a view to explaining complex phenomena. It is also Cohn, as
anthropologist, who, in roughly the same period as Edward Said (to whom I will turn
below), began to look at the question of colonialism and how the interaction of imperial
powers and indigenous peoples transformed many areas of the world. 40 This was a
particularly powerful insight for me because India, which is Cohn’s primary regional
focus, was also my initial academic interest with my MA thesis on Mohandas Gandhi,
violence, Indian religious life and social movements.

The abiding influence that Cohn has had on this study, and one of the most
significant influences on my understanding of the anthropological enterprise, is the basic
recognition that it is entirely legitimate to study history through the lens of
anthropological theory. It is also for this reason that I have decided not to try to argue
that my work is ethnographic, although I believe that elements of ethnography make
their way into my work at many points. I do not think that this weakens my position,
although there are some anthropologists who remain convinced that the only legitimate
form of anthropology is that which includes going to “the field,” learning the language,
observing “the natives,” and returning to tell “us” about them. While I continue to find
some value in that method when it is done with a great deal of sensitivity to the
enormous theoretical problems that it presents, it is not the path I have chosen to take.
TWO HUMANISTS

Edward Said

A further influence on the approach that I have taken in this dissertation is also one of the most important. Edward Said's oeuvre was the subject of a comprehensive exam for my doctoral studies, which was later turned into a senior undergraduate seminar called "Conflict and the Construction of the Other" first taught at McMaster University and developed more fully at Menno Simons College. The field of postcolonial theory and discourse analysis, which forms the basis of that course, was greatly influenced by Said's work. It remains one of my enduring interests, never failing to engage my intellectual curiosity.

It must be said right away that Said had an uneasy relationship with the discipline of anthropology. One of my goals is to massage that dis-ease into a more constructive relationship. Although I will not be dwelling at length on an analysis of Said's work, I wish to highlight here that, as with the work of Cohn, Said's ideas point in the direction of a well-grounded critique of the relationship between larger cultural processes and their local consequences as revealed in current events.

More specifically, Said is on to something when he points out the disconnect between the realm of culture and the realm of politics in many studies. The key concept around which this revolves is representation, which has already been identified as a core concern of this study. He writes:

In much recent theory the problem of representation is deemed to be central, yet rarely is it put in its full political context, a context that is primarily imperial. Instead we have on the one hand an isolated cultural sphere, believed to be freely and unconditionally available to weightless theoretical speculation and investigation, and, on the other, a debased political sphere, where the real struggle between interests is supposed to occur.

To look at culture in the context of war—a highly politicized subject—suggests that we cannot ignore culture's complicity in creating conditions that make the choice of war easier and more acceptable. This is not to say, as some have erroneously attributed to Said, that culture itself is violent, or even that some cultures are more prone to violence than others; it is to say, however, that the cultural realm within which humans create and sustain meaningful life-worlds and act on those meanings is of preeminent significance and has profound political implications.
I am also very intrigued by Said’s ability to weave together the personal, the political and the critical in the context of his suggestion that we need to return to the concept of humanism as a primary category in academic discourse. Undergirding this dissertation is the primary impulse of the humanist; I trust that what that means will become clear in the course of this work, which attempts to weave the personal, political, and critical into one consistent narrative about just one war.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith

In the early 80s, when I was still a fetal scholar, I became entranced by the work of Wilfred C. Smith to the point that by the second year of my undergraduate degree I had read all of his major books and scores of his articles. I do not know why his work grabbed me so, but at its heart I sensed a deeply compassionate man who was also an formidable scholar (his most significant book was almost exactly half text and half notes, but the notes were in much smaller type). By the end of my undergraduate degree majoring in Religious Studies, I had finished reading all of his books and had collected all of his articles, some having been tracked down over many months—in a few cases, even longer. I assembled these into a bibliography of Smith’s work that he later said was the most thorough compilation of his work he had ever seen—it became my first academic publication when a graduate advisor included it in a book of essays about Smith. At one point in the undergraduate degree, about 1984, I had the temerity to suggest to my advisor at Brandon University that perhaps Professor Smith would come to visit us; with a smile that I still remember, he suggested I write to Smith and ask him, perhaps including my bibliography of his work. If Smith said yes, then my advisor would come up with the money to bring him. I wrote Smith. Some weeks later I got a letter addressed to “Richard McCutcheon, Esq.” I have never forgotten it, and have kept the letter. In it he said that he would be willing to come for a few days to Brandon, because he had never had an opportunity to visit the university. I think my advisor was more than a little surprised, but he did come up with the money. Smith visited us for several days, and I was able to spend significant time with him. As a student, the highlight was a small senior seminar in which many of us had been reading several of his seminal books. To have Smith all to ourselves in a small room in the historic tower that had been inhabited by Tommy Douglas and Stanley Knowles was very special. I have never forgotten the impression those few days had on me, during which I recognized that one could be a scholar, and a humanist, and compassionate all at the same time.

His ideas are too well known to need much elaboration here, but the idea that is directly relevant to my efforts to develop a counter-narrative to the dominant conventional view of Iraq is the notion of a corporate critical self-consciousness (I have
already referred to it above). Throughout his body of work, Smith is at pains to show that the core constructs of Western religion are exactly that—constructs. His most direct analysis of that idea is found in *The Meaning and End of Religion*. In this book he deconstructs the idea of a monolithic Christianity, and shows that the idea of religion as we know it is remarkably recent. What came before it was a universal notion of faith. While faith is a universal, growing up around it throughout history were what he calls “cumulative traditions.”

As his work matured he came to believe that religious dialogue could help to transcend the misunderstandings and even animosity between religious traditions. One way to that *rapprochement*, of course, was to recognize that no religion in an ultimate sense could claim a more ancient or primordial origin. Beyond the cumulative traditions was his idea that when we truly look into the shared faith of humanity (not the diverse accumulated religious traditions), there we find a growing awareness of the need for a corporate critical self-consciousness. He believed that all traditions in one way or another were encouraging their adherents towards this self- and corporate enlightenment, and that a movement towards that recognition could lead to significant changes in the attitudes of different traditions towards each other.

At its heart, I think Smith’s program was that of a historian and a humanist, centring itself in the capacity for humans to understand each other. This is not far from what Edward Said has written with reference to Giambatista Vico’s discovery that humans make their own history, therefore they can understand and change it. For Smith, indeed, the measure of any good scholarly work that examines a tradition other than the author’s own, was whether those from the tradition being studied could find in that work hints of themselves. He was convinced that cross-tradition dialogue would allow us to collectively move to a group understanding that resided in a critical awareness of our own condition—his “corporate critical self-consciousness.” There is in that idea a great deal of room for disagreement, but I also find in it a potent antidote to the rampant forms of skepticism, indifference, and judgmentalism seen in current popular discourse.

**FEMINIST SCHOLARS**

A final influence on the ideas in this paper is feminist scholarship. Over the years this school of thought has increasingly provided me with foundation stones for my own analysis. Many books and essays have had a lasting impact on me. Three of the most influential works include Betty Reardon’s *Sexism and the War System*, Cynthia Enloe’s *Bananas, Beaches & Bases*, and an essay by Carol Cohn called “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals.”
A significant contribution that Betty Reardon has made to my thinking is clarifying the concepts of sexism and militarism in a way that informs my own analysis, although indirectly. In this thesis I am not taking up the much larger questions of sexism and militarism but I think that they hover consistently in the background of my work. At a minimum it is useful to share her understanding of three key terms:

Sexism ... is a belief system based on the assumption that the physical differences between males and females are so significant that they should determine virtually all social and economic roles of men and women.  

Militarism—the belief system that upholds the legitimacy of military control of the state—is based on the assumption that military values and policies are conducive to a secure and orderly society. It has served to legitimate both warfare and civil use of coercive force ... in the interest of ‘national security.’

Militarization—the process of emphasizing military values, policies, and preparedness, often transferring civil functions to military authority—assumes that when a society is in crisis or threatened, the crisis or threat can best be weathered by strengthening the military.

"The military," she goes on to say, "then, is the distilled embodiment of patriarchy; the militarization of society is the unchecked manifestation of patriarchy as the overt and explicit mode of governance." These terms highlight for me the complex interweaving of large abstract concepts that play themselves out at micro levels of human behaviour. They also raise for me questions about the relationship between what happens in interpersonal level conflict and in large scale conflict. To put it more bluntly, how are cases of spousal abuse linked to cases of sexual misdemeanour in the military; how is the treatment of women in our society linked to our attitudes towards the Other in war? In a similar vein, Carol Cohn asks us to consider how the very language that we use on a daily basis reflects what Reardon is talking about with sexism and militarism.

For me, the theme that cuts across these works is how power is writ both large and small on the body and body politic. A recent book by Enloe recounts an experience which illustrates this well. In this case, she is summarizing work by Carol Cohn who—with her colleagues Sara Ruddick and Felicity Hill—in 2002 brought a feminist curiosity to the question of the politics of weapons inspections. In the context of the looming invasion of Iraq, and the so-called failure of weapons inspections, George W. Bush had dismissed the Hans Blix-led UN weapons inspection team’s findings as not credible, “thus justifying its own continued build-up for a military invasion.” Cohn had identified the question of “credibility” as a principal currency in international politics. So
she began to ask questions like: Who creates credibility? What undermines it? And, in
whose eyes? What she discovered, and reported to a 2005 meeting in Stockholm of the
prestigious Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, was that

the Bush administration repeatedly cast doubt on the credibility of mere
diplomats. The powerful strand of American political culture that values
manly shows of overt strength over allegedly “softer” or more feminized
demonstrations of patient, careful negotiations had become even more
dominant in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Thus, in
various public settings, the Bush administration portrayed the civilian UN
inspectors as somehow less trustworthy and less credible because they were
following a course of action that was less committed to a demonstration of
physical force. The drama of the months leading up to the U.S. military
invasion of Iraq was a contest between masculinities. 59

The story, however, did not end there. The meeting had been attended by
numerous high-level diplomats and ambassadors. Most of them apparently were not at
the time convinced of the results presented by Cohn and her colleagues. Yet several
months later a prominent member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
went out of his way to tell Cohn that as he had thought about her analysis, he had begun
to think that “ideas about, and demonstrations of, masculinity may have been decisive in
the final outcome.” 60 The initial 200 page report that was produced by the Stockholm
meeting did not mention the feminist analysis of masculinity and power presented by
Cohn; only because of the efforts of one of the few women on the Commission (an
experienced international civil servant), who was in the room when the draft document
was presented, did even a brief mention of it appear. The lone woman’s comments
convincing the drafters to include one brief paragraph referring to the Cohn presentation.
It says that women “have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed
forces have often been influenced by the misguided ideas about masculinity and strength.
An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to
remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation.” 61

This account cuts across two levels of analysis, and illustrates how this perspective
has influenced my thinking. On the first level, the feminist curiosity brought to the
question of weapons inspections clearly illuminates the dynamics of masculine power at
work in the case of Iraq. But the account also illustrates how, on the second level of
analysis, those insights are then minimized by the very power that has been uncovered.

For a variety of reasons I do not pretend that what I bring to this analysis is
feminist in the way that these scholars are able to bring it to the table. But the incisive
analysis they provide has had an abiding impact on the kind of curiosity I have brought to
the task of asking core questions about the conventional view of Iraq. Indeed, whose narrative is it? Why does it have credibility? And in whose eyes?

HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

I come by my distrust of method, in the formal sense of the term, honestly. The story goes that when he was asked what “method” he used to arrive at his insightful commentary on Cree narrative, my advisor Richard Preston replied, “I thought about it a lot.” At one point in his career, W.C. Smith articulated a similar distrust of method. Edward Said has also been criticized for his lack of “method.” And Clifford Geertz, too, has raised the wrath of more scientifically minded anthropologists with his humanities driven narrative.

I cannot identify a specific method that informs my analysis, other than to say that I have thought a lot about the problem. At a practical level I have systematically collected historical accounts (including books, articles and monographs written from a variety of perspectives) and reports from NGO representatives and UN officials who visited the country, cross-referenced media reports with those accounts over time, consistently checked my ideas against many different sources from differing political perspectives, tracked the evolution of the debates as they unfolded over time, and observed changes in my own thought processes. Finally, I repeatedly tested my ideas in public forums and academic settings. The absence of an articulated “method” does not mean, of course, that there is no order to the narrative. It would be more accurate, I think, to describe the general approach that I have taken to the material. I characterize it as “historical anthropology” and will explain what I mean by returning to the work of Bernard Cohn as my guide.

There are three aspects to historical anthropology that are relevant to this thesis. Cohn, more than any other anthropologist I have read, lays out these basic ideas, although they are not exclusively tied to him. Although he published his seminal essays on the subject between 1960 and 1985, many of Cohn’s observations on the relationship of historical and anthropological inquiry are instructive today. While some progress has been made towards the achievement of a “historical anthropology,” still today disciplinary boundaries seem to be quite entrenched. The key elements of a historical anthropology, as introduced by Cohn, have been informed by the work of other scholars and support the work undertaken in this study.

One of Cohn’s observations that remains as true today as it did in 1980, when he most clearly articulated the idea, is that anthropology needs the historical context. Cohn was amongst the first generation of anthropologists who saw that the synchronic
proclivities of the anthropological method, traditionally understood as fieldwork in another geographical place, resulted in an objectified and reified Other. “Anthropology as it tends to be practised,” observed Cohn,

takes what can be observed or drawn out of various performances and statements elicited or heard in the daily flow of activities and seeks to establish abstractions, relations, structures and meanings to organize the data he or she observes. But because his methodology is synchronic, what the anthropologist always tells us about Anthropologyland is a reification and an objectification. Studying in an historical mode would shift the anthropologist away from the objectification of social life to a study of its constitution and construction. 67

Similarly, the historical project vitally needs the anthropologist’s moment in time, for “the work of the historian proceeds outside the archive as well.” Or, to put it more prosaically, as Tawney argued (according to Cohn), historians need “Fewer sources and stouter boots.” 68

In my own attempts to weave a counter-narrative to the dominant narrative about Iraq, I am attempting to marry the experience of having been in Iraq multiple times during these events—which I believe grounds me in at least a few of the realities present on the ground—with my concern to understand cultural patterns in North America that have significantly contributed to those very same realities. This give and take of experience and historical context remains for me a very promising avenue of inquiry.

A key element of historical anthropology, for Cohn, is to see culture in terms of fluid patterns of behaviour that, while remaining constant over long periods of time, nevertheless have the capacity to change, to be transformed, even to be obliterated in the present. Cohn defines culture as “systems of concepts, meanings and beliefs which are incorporated in and made manifest by symbols.” 69 He further argues that “culture is continually being invented or modified, without being totally transformed. Men [sic] live in a world of intention and consequence. Intention and action are turned into culture by history.” 70 This view of culture is very much in line with both Clifford Geertz’s idea of cultural systems and Richard Fox’s idea of culture as process. 71 It is a view that undergirds my own work, i.e., to see that cultural patterns in Iraq and North America have constancy, but are also being radically transformed in the present.

Moreover, the cultural realities of the Iraq case can only be understood in what Cohn termed “the colonial situation ... in which the European colonialist and the indigene are united in one analytic field.” 72 Understanding what has happened in Iraq requires us to examine that analytical field which includes, and this is a crucial point, the cultural patterns and transformations that are occurring in North America and Europe.
today. Some would perhaps suggest that this is precisely what Arjun Appadurai and others are arguing when he talks of globalizing culture, although I do not think we necessarily have to accept that argument to see the one analytical field argument. For Cohn, “the study of the construction, constitution and representations of culture is accessible not only for the study of the ‘others’ but for the study of ourselves as well. We tend to overlook the facts that our cultures constantly undergo a process of construction and that the process of representation is just as much a part of our experience as it is a part of the experience of the colonial world.” This insight builds on one of the central foci that unites anthropology and history, in Cohn’s view: the concept of the Other. For the anthropologist, the Other is found in a different place, speaking a different language, living a different reality; while for the historian, the Other is found in a different time, always in the past. While the anthropologist attempts to understand what is in the minds of those in a spatially different location, the historian, according to Cohn, is reading the detritus of the minds that happen to have survived in written records, or, to extend the argument, into the archaeological records. This unifying concept of the Other, which I continue to believe is one of the most coherent organizing principles that has arisen out of the humanities and social sciences, undergirds the danger and opportunity found in conflict. When there is a negative construction of the Other, I believe the outcome is predisposed towards violent conflict. The dynamics of how the Other is constructed is directly related to the representation of violence, most explicitly in the conceptual realm that I refer to as the symbolic realm later in this dissertation.

EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD

As described in the preface, I have travelled to Iraq on three different occasions, once to live for an extended period of time as an NGO representative. I have travelled to other parts of South and Southwest Asia including Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and India, but I still do not consider myself to be well-versed in the internal and regional dynamics of the Middle East. Although I do not have a fluent command of Arabic—I can sometimes decipher the script and greet people in Arabic—I was able to communicate with many people I met in Iraq, especially those with whom I would come into contact as an NGO representative, because English is spoken widely (taught in many schools from an early age, a by-product of a colonial relationship with England).

When I lived in Iraq (2000-2001) Saddam Hussein was still the president of the country; his idiosyncratic, repressive policies and his Ba’ath government were still firmly entrenched. It was a one party dictatorship; a fact that need not be debated. That I was allowed to live there at all took significant time and effort to plan. In the spirit of
transparency, I think it is important to emphasize that the only reason I was able to travel to Iraq and subsequently to travel quite extensively inside the country, was completely tied to the fact that I was there as an NGO representative. To my knowledge, no foreign anthropologists would have been allowed to travel in the country had they presented themselves as anthropologists intent on independent research. My conversations with UN officials, some of whom were well trained social scientists, confirmed that researchers of any stripe were generally not welcomed in the country during this period of time. One soon to retire archaeologist with whom I spoke confided in me that the only reason he had signed up with the UN Baghdad mission and secured time away from his university was so that he could visit some of the famous archaeological sites that he had dreamed of seeing in Iraq. What he had discovered was that because he was with the UN he was not allowed to go and see any of those very sites (e.g., Babylon, Ur, Nimrud). He was a very sad and frustrated soon-to-be-retired archaeologist, and I did not have the heart to tell him that I had travelled to all of those sites and enjoyed walking through them at leisure. My experience confirmed that if foreign trained social scientists were allowed in the country, it was with severe restrictions far beyond what I as an NGO representative faced—and those were quite substantial. Even we were assigned a government minder who spent a considerable part of each day with us. We were allowed to travel inside Baghdad on our own, but any travel outside of the city, or even to some sensitive regions inside the city, required an application process; in all of these travels it was necessary for our government appointed official to accompany us and make reports to his supervisor about our travels including exactly where we went and with whom we visited. We also were required to live in a hotel suite which was occasionally searched; and our movements in and out of the hotel were monitored.

While those from the region may have been able to sense, if not explicitly and consciously, the boundaries of safe conversation and the implications of any particular conversation for local people, as a non-Arabic speaking foreigner I consistently took the safe route of not trying to push any boundaries, knowing full well that any person I interacted with could be questioned (and clearly was in some cases) by the “secret” police who were not so secret and who monitored all foreigners in the country. The experience of living in a security state was itself a revelation. Within days of our arrival in Baghdad, in response to my wife pointing out the car window at a Presidential Palace, our driver immediately instructed us to “point with our eyes, and not our fingers,” especially around government buildings, military sites and images of the president. Experiences such as this one throughout our time in the country raised for me significant questions about how one would study these very complex multilayered authoritarian-style governments. Related to this I pondered how anthropologists can interact with people in a war zone that is also a security state.
As I have puzzled over these questions I have had to think through how my work is ethnographic, because clearly I have not tried to claim too much in this area. Indeed, there are only a handful of stories from my time in Iraq, for example, because the central concern here is the **framing of Iraq**, which is primarily a theoretical question not an empirical question. As I indicated in my preface, it was never my intention in travelling to Iraq to collect evidence for the argument presented in this thesis. However, that is not to say that as an anthropologist I was not interested in the experience of people in Iraq in light of my evolving historical research. Where stories do come up in the thesis, they take what John Van Maanen calls an impressionist form. He distinguishes between three forms of ethnography (he calls them tales): realist, confessional and impressionist. Realist Tales provide a rather direct, matter-of-fact portrait of a studied culture, unclouded by much concern for how the fieldworker produced such a portrait. Confessional Tales ... provide sharp contrast to their realist counterpart. As the name implies, confessional tales focus far more on the fieldworker than on the culture studied. Both of these forms are distinct from the Impressionist Tales of the field ... [which] are personalized accounts of fleeting moments of fieldwork cast in dramatic form; they therefore carry elements of both realist and confessional writing.78

An impressionist tale, as Van Maanen tells it, is often an “imaginative rendering of fieldwork”79 that has the capacity to capture a special moment or startle an audience. They are “not about what usually happens, but about what rarely happens.”80 As I have reconstructed some of my NGO experience I have occasionally written what I take to be an impressionist tale; at no point have I produced what Van Maanen would call a realist tale. I’m not sure that I have a confessional tale to tell either, as I think they often blend into impressionist tales like the one that follows.

**Laughing Soldiers**

Not all of my experiences were negative or thoroughly coloured by security concerns. One experience that captures the lighter side of my time in Iraq occurred in Nasiriyah, a town about 375 kilometres south of Baghdad. My wife and I came to love it while we lived in Iraq, and travelled there several times. Biblical scholars know it by its biblical name, Ur, the place where Abraham is said to have lived for about 65 years. Someday, when times are different, I would consider going back to live in Nasiriyah to learn more from the people there; to get acquainted, perhaps, with the works of Haboobi (our government minder Abu Khaldun loved to emphasize the “boobi” in “Haboobi” for...
us), the patron poet of the city, whose statue stands in the centre of the round-about in the heart of the town.

Nasiriyah is located on the banks of the Euphrates river. The Al-Janoob Hotel, where we stayed whenever we visited Nasiriyah, is on the road that runs along the river. We will never forget this hotel, which had probably not been cleaned since about the Iran-Iraq War. When you exit the front door of the hotel, walk across the road, and pass through a small park not more than ten metres across, you come to a paved promenade with a low wall running along the Euphrates’ bank. It is a short hop over the wall and down to the water’s edge. It is truly a beautiful spot—I see it in my mind’s eye this very moment as I write this sitting at my desk.

One morning I woke up quite early. Sleep would not come to me, so I thought I might as well get up. I happen to be an avid amateur photographer. The idea—perhaps rooted in some romantic notion of the Euphrates—came to me to go down to the water’s edge in the early pre-dawn light to take a picture of the river. I knew that this was not something that I was supposed to do—that is, to go out on my own, especially in a southern town known for its anti-government tendencies. In retrospect, I might have got Abu Khaldum into trouble, not to mention myself and my wife. But I went ahead and got dressed, slung my old Nikon camera over my shoulder, and headed for the river.

It was magical. Everything that I had imagined it would be—even more. Clambering over the low wall, kneeling down at the water’s edge, river bank growth around me, I watched the river as dawn broke. The river, slow, gentle and majestic at this point, slid by quietly. Mist, rising from the water as the air began to warm, cast everything in soft ethereal light. Soft light, what photographers sometimes call sweet-light—I crouched by the water’s edge and snapped a few pictures of the mist shrouded river. The sun breaking the horizon chased tendrils of mist across the water. Silence enveloped me.

After a short time, I sat down on the promenade wall to watch the river come to life in the morning light. At some point, the rhythmic beat of feet hitting the pavement of the promenade intruded on my silent reverie. I looked to my right, and saw coming towards me a group of soldiers out on their regular morning exercise. I experienced anxiety, if not fear. Should I hide the camera under my shirt? Should I head immediately for the hotel? Clear in my memory is the worry I experienced about getting people in trouble because of the possibly silly notion of getting a picture of the famous Euphrates in the famous city of Ur. As I cast about in my mind for a way out, the group of soldiers advanced along the promenade. My mind
worked slower than they marched, and before I had time to do anything they were upon me. So there I sat on the wall.

As they came abreast of me the young man in charge of the group, walking to the fore, barked a sharp command, and immediately behind me they snapped to a full stop in perfect unison. I quickly cast my eyes over the group. Really, they were quite young—I would guess most were in their mid to late teens. Their uniforms looked much as I imagine most soldiers’ uniforms look. Dark green, these ones just a bit scruffy, perhaps from morning calisthenics. By then I had stood up to turn towards the group, and for lack of any better course of action, I smiled.

The leader issued another order and, to my great surprise, the entire group wheeled about in formation and gave me a crisp salute! I was not quite sure of the appropriate response, so I rather weakly raised my hand and gave a half-hearted wave, with a smile pasted on my face the whole while. Promptly the leader gave a further command, and the group fell into order and continued their march down the promenade, leaving behind a bemused foreigner.

Slowly silence again descended on the river bank. The sound of their feet striking the pavement echoed ever so lightly on the mist covered river. Then, in the midst of the morning silence, I started to catch a different sort of echo opening up in the space between us—the unmistakable sound of teenage boys starting to giggle. About twenty paces up the promenade, I watched as their giggles turned into thigh-slapping laughter. The entire group broke formation to turn and wave at me with huge smiles on their faces. I enthusiastically smiled and waved back. They re-formed and carried on their way—a bunch of boys sharing a good laugh at the expense of an unsuspecting foreigner.

This is a rare story of levity from my time in Iraq, because most other times were filled with visiting hospitals and schools where sadness prevailed. The story serves to show that it was possible to have experiences within a security state and in a state of war that reveal a more human dimension of existence within its borders.

To come back to the central theme of this thesis, my concern is primarily to explore the relationship of violence and war in a cultural mode of analysis, and more specifically the violent processes that have had and continue to have dire local consequences for people living in Iraq. My problem is the conventional view of Iraq, which I think is wrong. Both the audience for and the focus of my study is the English-speaking world, primarily in North America and Europe (I suppose, the argument could be made that English is becoming a common language on the global scene).

To this point I have laid out the conventional view of Iraq, framing it as a significant problem. Now I have used broad brush strokes to outline a brief intellectual inventory of the ideas that have shaped the way I shall be framing a counter-narrative to the conventional view. In pursuing this problem, the next step is to explore the ways that
social scientists have tried to understand war. I take as the central organizing principle the work of anthropologists, which I expand by including the work of other social scientists.

2 "In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert's there are few." Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind: Informal Talks on Zen Meditation and Practice (New York: Weatherhill, 1970), 21.


5 Simons, “War,” 83n9, 84.


11 In the conflict resolution studies program where I teach this would commonly be referred to as “punctuating the conflict”.


14 Aruri, “America’s War,” 283.


17 Hitchens, *A Long Short War*, 93.


27 There are two organizations that have in general terms suggested the idea of “one war”. See Research Unit for Political Economy, *Behind the Invasion of Iraq* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003); Müge GürSöy Sökmen, ed. *World Tribunal on Iraq: Making the Case Against War* (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2008).
28 Antonio Gramsci quoted in Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 25. Said, who is included in the discussion that follows, insists that no intellectual work is complete without first conducting such an intellectual inventory; this discussion augments the brief notes about how I came to this study found in the preface.
29 A College of Canadian Mennonite University affiliated with the University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.


36 Geertz, "Thick Description," 30.

37 Although I think this opens an interesting conversation along the lines of Sapir's controversial thoughts on genuine and spurious culture. See Edward Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious [1924]," in *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality*, ed. David G. Mandelbaum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).


Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, 16.

Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, 14.

Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, 14.

Reardon, *Sexism and the War System*, 15.


The journal, *History and Anthropology*, of course, speaks consistently to the subject.

Collected in *An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Cohn, "History and Anthropology," 43.

Quoted in Cohn, "History and Anthropology," 49.

Cohn, "History and Anthropology," 40.

Cohn, "History and Anthropology," 43.


Cohn, "History and Anthropology," 44.


74 Cohn, “History and Anthropology,” 45.

75 The only anthropologist that I know of who traveled in the country, which is not to say there were not more, is Barbara Nimri Aziz, who I have not yet met. She currently works as a journalist in New York. See Barbara Nimri Aziz, “Gravesites: Environmental Ruin in Iraq,” in *Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium* (New York: International Action Center, 1997); Barbara Nimri Aziz, *Swimming Up the Tigris: Real Life Encounters With Iraq* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).

76 At a practical level, in this context the very idea of asking for or obtaining “informed consent” of any form (verbal or written) was out of the question.

77 For an overview of recent efforts to discuss the complexities of this kind of work see Kevin Avruch, "Notes Toward Ethnographies of Conflict and Violence," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 30, no. 5 (2001): 637-48.


80 Van Maanen, *Tales of the Field*, 102.
3.

ANTHROPOLOGY, WAR, AND VIOLENCE

My theoretical and disciplinary home-base is Anthropology. Although my investigation has ranged widely, I have focussed on the main streams of thought on the subject in this discipline in order to put some constraint on the vast literature about war. I have augmented them with perspectives from other disciplines as it seemed useful. My purpose in doing this walk through the literature on war and violence in Anthropology is to present the backdrop against which I have built my own processual model of violence to illuminate war. Earlier in this paper I remarked that the anthropology of war, *per se*, was not able to help me directly address the conventional view of Iraq. However, the effort I expended in trying to understand these various perspectives, and the theoretical lay of the land, certainly led me to the material I needed to construct my own theoretical perspective. Therefore this chapter begins with a brief overview of the historical development of the study of war and violence in anthropology, then moves to an analysis of three primary representative streams that have continued to develop in the past two decades, and concludes with a critical discussion of a core debate over the role of experience in the study of war and violence that forms the backdrop for my own theoretical contribution. The perspectives that I shall examine include the sociobiological, cultural materialist, and interpretive schools of thought. In the latter I shall look more closely at three sub-streams: cultural, social-interactionist, and postmodernist. One of the central questions that arises from my engagement with the anthropology of war and violence revolves around questions of narrative, experience, and the Other. In the end, I hope that my theoretical contribution to the anthropology of war is to begin the process of situating war within a broader conceptualization of violence, which itself is then embedded in the still larger category of conflict.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The literature on the anthropology of war reviewed by Keith Otterbein in 1973 indicates that prior to World War II there was limited interest in the subject. Most anthropologists "virtually ignored the subject" with the exception of brief comments within longer ethnographies and a few synthetic works. Otterbein suggests that this early neglect arose from three factors:

1. The peoples studied by most anthropologists, even in the nineteenth century, had ceased to wage war long before the anthropologists arrived on
the scene; hence warfare was not an ongoing phenomenon while they were conducting their fieldwork. (2) Many anthropologists have been morally opposed to war. Two of the founding fathers, Tylor, a Quaker, and Boas, a German expatriate, were pacifists.... (3) Early anthropologists failed to appreciate the important role that warfare can play in the affairs of primitive societies. Although these anthropologists were omnivorous readers, many of them focused their attention upon the humanities rather than upon the writings of historians and political scientists. Thus they were more likely to “discover” the importance of, for example, folklore and mythologies among primitive peoples than military organizations and warfare.2

Brian Ferguson adds that the research concerns of early anthropologists simply could not accommodate the issue of warfare. He suggests that the concern of several schools of thought in anthropology to preserve knowledge about dying cultures, and the dominant concern to identify constant structures and equilibriums, does not fit the episodic nature of war.3

World War II resulted in a spurt of interest in the study of war including, for example, well-known essays by Malinowski and Mead, and Turney-High’s full-length treatise on the subject.4 The interest generated by World War II did not hold, however, and in the next decade only five articles on the subject of war appeared in the two major North American Anthropology journals.5 Why exactly the early anthropologists’ and post-World War II interest in war was not more extensive requires further analysis, for it seems that there must be more reasons than those already given by Otterbein and Ferguson. This is an unresolved problem in the history of the subject, and would be worth further study.

By the 1960s the subject of war began to receive much more concerted attention, progressively expanding and broadening the range of inquiry. In 1967 the Vietnam war provoked a plenary symposium on war at the American Anthropological Association (AAA) meetings which resulted in a diverse range of essays.6 In the mid-70s the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES) conference on war also produced a substantial collection of essays.7 As well, beginning in the 1970s the subject area broadened to include more explicit interest in peace and nonviolence.8 By 1983 the attention by the AAA and the ICAES resulted in the formation of the Commission on the Study of Peace, which remains active today (albeit with minimal institutional support).

The subject of war has been a growth industry in anthropology9 since the initial build up to the war with Iraq in the late 1980s.10 A significant benchmark was
established when Brian Ferguson and Leslie Farragher published a thorough bibliography of work related to the anthropology of conflict, violence and war.11 Several collections of essays helped to establish the parameters of the subject into the mid-1990s.12 One of the significant debates that emerged in that literature—I shall later return to one subtle effort to address it—is found in the differing approaches of an etic, “materialist” view of war13 and an emic, “interpretive” (sometimes called “postmodernist”) view of violence.14 In brief, what the cultural materialist perspective takes as absolutely essential—scientific rigour, theoretical precision, and methodological uniformity15—the interpretive view of violence takes as both dangerous and misguided.16

By the latter part of the 1990s and into the new century those disagreements began to give way to attempts to find more common ground where anthropologists can work collegially on this most pressing of human problems. A significant number of scholars began to bridge the gap with works that tried to take into account a multitude of variables and processes of war and violence.17 At the same time there was a broadening of the subject to focus on particular forms of mass violence involving ethnicity and identity, genocide, terror, structural violence, and suffering as an overarching category.18 These efforts run parallel to a burgeoning interest in understanding the transforming dynamics of war and violence in a world characterized by global processes, as evidenced by an expanding catalogue of works on the subject from across the political and disciplinary spectrum.19

THREE BROAD THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The remainder of this chapter identifies key works and debates in the anthropology of war and violence, laying the groundwork for my own contribution to this area of study in later chapters. There are three primary streams of thought within anthropology that I shall briefly discuss through representative works: sociobiology and aggression, cultural materialist, and interpretive. Within the three streams there is a great deal of overlap, and I use the labels only for analytical reasons. With the exception of the sociobiological and aggression perspective, this material could also be understood in terms of what we might call the “anthropology of war” and the “ethnography of violence”. Generally speaking literature on the anthropology of war has correlated with a materialist perspective while the ethnography of violence has deployed an interpretive stance writ large. In the end, I think David Riches is correct when he concludes that “social and cultural factors, together with ecological setting, are the chief factors influencing the type and frequency of violence in any social situation.”20
Sociobiology and Aggression

A theme related to violence and war that focused on aggression once occupied centre stage in anthropology and related literature, although it no longer constitutes a body of active anthropological literature in the same way as war and violence. In wider academic circles, however, the "sociobiology of conflict and the conflict about sociobiology" remains one of the more vociferous areas of discussion. And with the exception perhaps of the IQ controversy, the issue of conflict and violence is the most provocative aspect of sociobiology. Although an assessment of the details and subtleties of the argument is not germane to this dissertation, I believe it is important nevertheless to grasp the general parameters of the discussion, first because it surfaces in a variety of anthropological attempts to understand war and peace, and second, because it is ever present as the backdrop to popular knowledge as an explanation for war and violence.

The two related areas of study that feed into the sociobiological discussion are ethology and biology. The impetus for much current speculation on the nature of human aggression came about through Konrad Lorenz's *On Aggression*. This book is an important contribution to the history of ideas because Lorenz attempted to present a well reasoned and restrained view of aggression within species. He did not leave a great deal of room for speculation on the relationship between his research on animals and the question of human behaviour. In his popularization of Lorenz's work, however, playwright Robert Ardrey extrapolated freely from animal behaviour to human behaviour on the subject of aggression in ways that are clearly unwarranted and not supported by subsequent research.

Recent research that builds directly on Lorenz's work remains significant. The hypotheses and research findings of Franz de Waal, for example, carry forward a justifiable interest in animal behaviour. In his *Peacemaking among Primates* de Waal argues that aggressive behaviour is a "fundamental characteristic of all animal and human life, but ... this trait cannot be understood in isolation from the powerful checks and balances that evolved to mitigate its effects." Although he believes this to be the case for all animals, of which humans are a sub-set, he carefully provides a context for understanding this assertion when he despairs at how Lorenz's work on the innate abilities for love and affection were completely lost to the idea that humans possess a killer instinct and lack the inhibition to control it. The work of de Waal explicitly attempts to correct this misconception and in this process provides a stimulating rejoinder to those still holding to the idea of a human killer instinct. De Waal suggests that, "it is time for us to seriously investigate the natural mechanisms of conflict resolution. For as a result of these mechanisms, aggressive behaviour is not always disruptive, and there is both a destructive and constructive side to interpersonal conflict." If Lorenz's work and de
Waals work are read together sans Ardrey we find relevant and helpful additions to our understanding of human behaviour. In the end, however, I remain convinced by Edmund Leach's observation about sociobiology and aggression, written in response to the early debate engendered by Lorenz. He suggests that, "man only becomes dangerous when he is equipped with weapons, and weapons are a product of culture, not of nature." 30

Besides the impact of Lorenz and company specifically on the topic of aggression, the broader sociobiological debate has been deeply influenced by Edward Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. 31 Segerstråle provides a succinct description of what sociobiology was meant to be as a scientific investigation and what it has become as a political issue.

By now, 'sociobiology' has unfortunately become a very loaded word among academics and laymen alike. Because of Wilson's 1975 book and the attack on it, it is often ignored that sociobiology (or behavioural ecology, as the English will have it) is really a new discipline attempting to explain the evolutionary basis of animal social behaviour with the help of new insights from evolutionary biology. Instead many have come to believe that the primary aim of sociobiology is the biological explanation of human social behaviour both in the United States and Europe. 32

The entire field of sociobiology has come to be associated with unsavory earlier attempts "to justify social inequalities, social supremacy, etc." (Here Nazi medical experiments are generally cited.) The assumption is that any attempt to investigate the biology of human nature or social behaviour "cannot be scientifically motivated but must have political reasons of the most sinister kind." 33 Segerstråle notes numerous so-called "left-wing" biologists and scientists who have not been concerned by Wilson's scientific investigations (he cites Salvador Luria, George Wald and Noam Chomsky). But like Ardrey's distortion of Lorenz's work, the popularization of Wilson's work has also led to distortion.

The contentious nature of this discussion rests in part on the way that research findings in the realm of genetic research can be so easily construed to support particular preconceived popular ideas. Two widely held popular conceptions are that some people are innately smarter than other people, 34 and that humans are innately violent. This latter conception remains a most powerful form of popular knowledge on war and violence. I have personally encountered it repeatedly in my public work on the war with Iraq when audience members—there is always at least one in every audience willing to argue this point—insist that humans must go to war against Others—meaning people in the Middle East, South East Asia, and so on—who are obviously less civilized and innately more violent than are we.
The idea that humans are innately violent creatures remains deeply entrenched in popular opinion and is illustrated, for example, by Gwynne Dyer's diatribe on the 1996 killing of school children in Dunblane, Scotland. He argues that there is nothing much we can do about such events because humans are innately violent. He proves his point by citing anthropological ethnographies of simple societies. Given the depth of this popular knowledge, any scientific knowledge that can be marshalled to support it has an immediate impact and becomes part of a much broader network of shared cultural patterns. In the much narrower confines of rigorous scientific and social scientific research, however, the claims of sociobiologists are merely working hypotheses for which there is extremely limited hard evidence.

There is also a related issue of professional competition for the public's attention and funding. Segerstråle borrows from the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to argue that this debate is closely related to "the scientists' routine quest for peer recognition [which] should be regarded as nothing but a competitive struggle for symbolic capital." Prestige, money and ethics all cloud research on human genetic development. Why do so many people know about anthropological findings related to war in simple societies, but not also the significant research on societies at peace? It could be, as one peace researcher suggests, that peace is boring and therefore is not likely to attract large research grants.

The reason I believe it necessary to address sociobiology as a separate stream is that it provides a strong undercurrent to much current anthropological analyses of war. A notable example of this theoretical position is Napoleon Chagnon's re-writing of his own research on the Yanomamö in the context of what he refers to as the "new biology". In this formulation, Chagnon argues that warfare directly correlates with human somatic and reproductive needs. In the broader neo-Darwinian evolutionary view, he believes that "conflicts of reproductive interests occur commonly in band and tribal societies and that these often lead ... to intergroup conflicts that we traditionally consider to be warfare." Thus, such factors as "rape, abduction of females, failure to deliver a promised bride..." are prime causal agents of warfare (narrowly defined) in simple societies (also narrowly defined). I have grave doubts about Chagnon's claims for the explanatory power of this model. When contrasted with the layered accounts of Canadian Inuit camps by Jean Briggs, just to touch on one example of a non-materialist approach to war and peace, it seems impoverished. For Briggs the methods of coping with conflict reside in the learned patterns of childhood rearing, especially through ritualized play. The implications of Briggs' research are relevant across cultures and scale because of their rootedness in learned human behaviour. But here I am getting ahead of myself.

The concerns of sociobiology should not be rejected out of hand. The problem of violence and war is so pressing that I remain open to any research which may help provide understanding of its origins with a view to controlling its most virulent forms.
Relatively recent reports indicate that progress is being made in understanding chemical and biological factors that promote or hinder exceptional forms of violence at a micro level of analysis. However, while this research may help us to understand limited forms of violence I have not yet seen how it might be applicable to large scale violence. If Franz de Waal is correct and there is indeed both the innate capacity for violence and altruism, then it seems to me that we are back to square one. Acknowledging both the capacity for violence and altruism leads to asking what are the external factors or processes that facilitate one or the other. Thus, although this research has some potential for helping with exceptional cases, the answers to questions about mass violence will not likely be found in sociobiological research.

The Cultural Materialist Perspective

The anthropology of war, which until recently has been dominated by a cultural materialist perspective, has a well developed body of literature. While the cultural materialist position—which is rooted in infrastructural determinism and carries an ethos of what might be called “realist” discourse—is overwhelmingly present, there is also a strong current of criticism and alternative thinking, to which I will turn momentarily. First, to summarize the cultural materialist position:

Cultural materialism posits that all social systems consist of three levels or layers: infrastructure, structure, and superstructure. The bottom layer, the infrastructure, is seen as the base or foundation of a society wherein lie the material conditions of human life. These include the strategies by which people relate to and reproduce in their environment; how they produce food, tools, and shelter, and the technologies they employ in doing so. In short, the material conditions of a society are the ways in which humans survive and reproduce in a given setting. The second layer is society’s structure, its social and political institutions. These include the myriad forms of familial and nonfamilial organizations and associations found among human populations, as well as the political structures that organize human social life. The final and top layer is society’s superstructure, its system of secular and religious ideologies and values.

The cultural materialist model of society asserts that all three levels are in a continuous dynamic state and that there are significant and predictable relationships between them. The model suggests that changes in a society’s infrastructure are primarily the result of changes in a human population’s relationship to its environment. Moreover, cultural materialism holds that,
over time, changes in a society’s material base will lead to functionally compatible changes in its social and political institutions (structure) and its secular and religious ideology (infrastructure).45

Two crucial elements of this theoretical position are that a) it understands itself to be "scientific" in the strictest of terms, and b) as with all theoretical positions that grow out of a Marxist influenced perspective, there is very little room for individual agency to impact on historical processes. One of the leading exponents of this view as it applies to war is Brian Ferguson.

In his application of this general theoretical orientation to war, Ferguson attempts to modify the model by introducing what he calls a “hierarchy of constraints.”46 To his credit, Ferguson clearly sees the inherent problem of trying to apply the cultural materialist perspective to war, for to follow this course eventually raises the question of human agency, which it is ill-prepared to do. In the study of war, questions of “freedom” and “responsibility” take centre stage. He asks, “How can one reconcile the idea of a high degree of determinism with substantial latitude for autonomous processes?”47 (Here, “autonomous processes” refers to the role of individuals in the course of history writ large.) His answer, perhaps the only one he can give, is that “there is a lot of determinism to go around.”48

Although materialist explanations of war come in many varieties,49 at this point I shall focus on the ideas fuelling the most recent attempt by Ferguson to present a materialist synthesis of theory, aiming to provide a comprehensive explanation of war in stateless societies.50 He asserts that one of the great short-comings of contemporary studies of war in anthropology is the lack of general theory. Ferguson believes that the cumulative growth in understanding war has resulted in the need to impose some order on the current “explanatory chaos”. To do that he proposes a theory consistent with the research strategy of cultural materialists who build on the work of Marvin Harris.51

Ferguson builds his theory on three mutually reinforcing premises. The first premise is the causal primacy of the infrastructure, which is also the core premise of Ferguson’s reformulation of materialist theory. He describes it in this manner:

Basically, this is the proposition that variables relating to demography, technology, the organization of work, and interaction with the natural environment shape structural patterns of kinship, economics, and politics, and that the latter in turn combine with infrastructural variables to shape ideological or superstructural patterns. The causal primacy is expressed both in the existing organization of society, and in its patterned responses to new circumstances.52
Ferguson argues that his model is different from other materialist models because it involves a “nested hierarchy of constraining factors,” meaning that structural and superstructural factors potentially carry as much weight as infrastructural factors, although they are generally more specific. He is at pains to make this point, seeing that many “well-substantiated findings about the incidence of war have been made without reference to the infrastructure.”\footnote{53} The implication is that these “well-substantiated findings” may be incorporated into a materialist perspective, without necessarily challenging the basic materialist premise of primary cause.

The second and third premises are secondary to the first. The second is that there is competition between and selection among groups. This premise asserts that unlike biological models concerned with reproductive patterns (an allusion to Napoleon Chagnon), here the concern is for cultural “traits” concerning military capacity. By way of example, he suggests that if one cultural group is eliminated by warfare, another group will take steps to avoid that outcome. The third premise addresses human motivation, which in Ferguson’s view is tied to three possible material goals including the maintenance or improvement of (1) available resources, (2) work situations, and (3) security against threats.\footnote{54} This is a significant point in the argument because it is on the issue of human motivation that materialist views run aground. Ferguson insists that the motivational premise that is at work with regard to war can be summed up in one general proposition: “Wars occur when those who make the decision to fight estimate that it is in their material interests to do so.”\footnote{55} In the end, the point is that “decision makers...act in accordance with their material interests.” Hence, in this view the war against Iraq is fuelled by decision-makers acting in accordance with their strategic interests in oil and geopolitical power structures. Does the proposition that oil and geopolitical concerns explain the war against Iraq, however, truly reflect the complexities of it? I think not, but this example does serve to highlight how the materialist perspective works.

**Resource Scarcity**

Ferguson’s argument dovetails with a broader argument found outside of anthropological literature. This debate, which focuses on the suggestion that scarce resources are the primary cause of war, was popularized by Robert Kaplan in his 1994 article, “The Coming Anarchy.”\footnote{56} Central to that discussion is the potent mix of variables including population growth, resource scarcity, cultural clashes and the disintegration of the nation state—all of which come under the rubric of a materialist perspective. What Kaplan has done is to bring together a group of scholars whose research is mutually reinforcing. Hence, Thomas Homer-Dixon’s research on resource scarcity is linked to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations, which finally is
summarized by Martin van Creveld's dire predictions for warfare in the twenty-first century. If Kaplan were to want to add an anthropologist to this argument he would likely add Brian Ferguson.

For Homer-Dixon, the combination of marked population growth and a rapidly changing environment sets up the conditions for a great deal of conflict. He describes his theory about the relationship of the environment and conflict in this summary passage: “Scarcity of renewable resources are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts may foreshadow a surge of similar violence in coming decades, particularly in poor countries where shortages of water, forests and, especially, fertile land, coupled with rapidly expanding populations, already cause great hardship.” Homer-Dixon suggests that environmental changes are at the heart of the matter, not resource scarcity strictly speaking. According to him, often one nation or another has gone to war over a resource. He gives as an example Japan's concern to secure oil and mineral rights in China during World War II. He predicts that environmental conditions will set in motion social and political turbulence that will follow a very different pattern. It is not straightforward clashes that will be the shape of conflict, but rather, scarcities of renewable resources will “often produce insidious and cumulative social effects, such as population displacement and economic disruption. These events can, in turn, lead to clashes between ethnic groups as well as to civil strife and insurgency. Although such conflicts may not be as conspicuous or dramatic as wars over scarce resources, they may have serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed and developing world.”

The three ways renewable resources are made scarce include: 1) people use them faster than they can be renewed, 2) there are more people all the time using the resources, and 3) internal displacement of resources by concentrating wealth in the hands of a few resulting in little resources for lots of people. Working singly or in concert these three sources of resource scarcity then affect countries and regions, resulting in conflict. To give a current example, Bangladesh’s population has been growing at a fantastic rate. The United Nations predicts that the current population of 120 million will grow to 235 million by the year 2025. Already, however, there has been a large migration of Bangladeshis into adjacent states in India. The result of this enormous population flux, according to Homer-Dixon’s research, has been “pervasive” social changes. “Conflict has been triggered by altered land distribution as well as by shifts in the balance of political and economic power between religious and ethnic groups.” The changes were brought to a head during a federal election when the local people from Assam accused those Bengalis entering their territory of taking up the best farmlands. The result was that Lalung tribespeople (the local group) massacred some 1,700 of the Bengalis who had
migrated from Bangladesh. In this fashion, then, Homer-Dixon links the larger issues of
population growth and land scarcity to a tragic episode of violence.

In combination with Samuel Huntington, Homer-Dixon's ideas take on still
greater weight; for Huntington strengthens the weaker element in Homer-Dixon's
writing, which is the cultural. Huntington argues that, "the fundamental source of
conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.
Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.
The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."60 I shall not go through Huntington's
article in detail, but link it here to Homer-Dixon's research to show that a pattern is
developing in these articles. Kaplan draws this link for us when he concludes that in the
context, first, of a changing environment marked by population growth and scarce
resources, then by the disintegration of states into cultural groups large and small, the
inevitable conclusion is that, "a large number of people on this planet, to whom the
comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks
existence a step up rather than a step down."61 In this context the suggestion of Martin
van Creveld, a military historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, that huge state
military machines are about to go extinct and be replaced by what Kaplan calls,
"something far more terrible," takes on an air of predictability.62 Van Creveld and
Huntington and Homer-Dixon all lead to Kaplan's conclusion that "people find
liberation in violence."63 And what idea lies under this conclusion? "Physical aggression is
a part of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational and
cultural standard is this trait tranquilized."64

These arguments can all be traced to some combination of the human killer
instinct theory and the materialist propositions represented by Ferguson in anthropology,
Homer-Dixon in peace and conflict studies, van Creveld in military studies, and Kaplan
in journalism. It would not be too difficult to expand on these representatives at length,
for they are clearly at the forefront of the current dominant mode of understanding war
and collective violence. It is to this dominant stream that interpretive analysts like
Robarchek, Riches and Nordstrom respond with a balanced view that shows humans are
indeed capable of violence, but they are just as prone, indeed, some research may say more
prone, to dwell in harmony.

In Chapter 5 I shall develop a response to this dominant trend that links to
interpretive attempts to provide a balanced account of the human capacity to engage in
war and collective violence. In it I shall develop an interdisciplinary model that attempts
to acknowledge the significance of human needs while giving primacy to the construction
of Others. In the construction of the Other, we engage in the construction of our wants. My model will develop a nuanced understanding of how conflict is a complex product of human creation operative at personal, social and cultural levels.

The Interpretive Perspective

I see interpretive modes of analysis as emphasizing the role of symbol and ritual understood in broad terms. They correlate with the main thrust of cultural anthropology in the past three decades. Models that emphasize symbolic and ritualistic dimensions of culture generally grow out of Clifford Geertz’s work on cultural systems and Victor Turner’s work on the subject of ritual. When applied to the question of violence and war, these approaches are well represented by the work of Clayton Robarchek, David Riches—who emphasizes what he refers to as “interpretive-interactionism”—and Carolyn Nordstrom. Although Nordstrom’s approach fits into the general rubric of interpretive anthropology, it has also sometimes been called postmodern in its approach; here I dwell on its predilection to focus on the role of experience for understanding war. (Its focus on the local, which leads to building global theory, reminds me of the subaltern studies group that begins closer to the ground to get higher up in its analysis.)

Clayton Robarchek has little patience for materialist explanations of war. A review of his objections to the premises at the heart of Ferguson’s proposed synthesis of materialist perspectives reveals that the materialist position is very limited in its explanatory power. It also shows, however, that interpretive theoretical models have not been sufficiently developed. In other words, the critique of the materialist perspective is strong, but the attempt to suggest interpretive alternatives still has a ways to go.

Robarchek has done extensive fieldwork with the Semai Senoi, who live in the mountains of central West Malaysia. He and Carole Robarchek have also pursued these questions in their joint studies of the Waorani, although I shall emphasize here the work by Clayton Robarchek on the Semai. Robarchek’s theoretical constructions reflect his interaction with humans engaged in the mundane process of living to a much greater degree than does Ferguson, who has also done fieldwork, but whose writing remains highly theoretical. The Semai are best known for their non-aggressiveness and avoidance of physical conflict and violence. There is certainly conflict among the Semai; pettiness, jealousy and theft exist, but they do not result in violence.

In two especially dense articles, Robarchek contrasts the Semai mechanisms for understanding and dealing with conflict with materialist explanations of war. The conclusions he reaches are persuasive. I shall first summarize the ethnographic data that he presents, and then his arguments about how this data refutes materialist premises. Here is a summary of a specific conflict.
It has been recently discovered that members of one kindred, and especially its acknowledged leader, Nyam, a bright and articulate young man (son of the previous headman and himself the probable next headman of the band) had planted large numbers of durian trees in places claimed by other individuals and other kindreds. They complained to the headman (whose territory had been infringed), and he informed an elder of the offending group that a *becharaa*: a formal debate and discussion by the involved kindreds, would be convened in several days, and that all members of his kindred should attend.

Several young men whose territories had been usurped were threatening that if something wasn’t done they would pull out the trees or chop them down. This would have escalated the conflict, since Nyam now had a legitimate claim to the young trees on the basis of understanding (predating...the idea of exclusive territories) which confer ownership of fruit trees on whoever planted and/or tended them. Talk in the villages in the intervening days stressed that “We must get this settled or there will be fighting, people will start cutting down each other’s trees and shooting each other with poisoned darts.”

The process that ensued to resolve this conflict is called a *becharaa*: The principal characters involved in the event were the headman who felt he was wronged, Nyam, poised to become the next headman, and a headman from a neighbouring band, who was asked to be a facilitator.

People gathered in the headman’s house where the headman from the neighbouring village would oversee the discussion. As people arrived the conversation was casual, and the dispute was not mentioned. Indeed, Nyam, the focus of the dispute, engaged Robarchek in dialogue. Robarchek notes that his ear, however, was tuned to the general discussion. Eventually, after the various parties to the dispute had already begun to discuss the issues, Nyam entered the conversation and stated his case. The headman from the neighbouring village related stories about how this situation could lead to bad things, and that Nyam had been raised by a former headman and knew better than this. There was back and forth discussion for several hours. Robarchek summarizes the concluding discussions.

Finally, Entoy [the neighboring headman] asks if everyone’s mind is at ease. When all agree that they have had their say, he lectures the group … admonishing them not to disturb each other’s rights, not to quarrel. Nyam is given all the trees he planted in others’ territories, but told not to plant any more. In a long summing up, Entoy emphasizes the sharing of food.
and how we are all siblings, how we must all stand together; “We can’t make a house with one support post; even six isn’t enough; we need nine.”

Discussing the affair the following day with Tidn and others, I asked why it was that Nyam, who nearly everyone agreed was in the wrong, had been allowed to get away with it. One man, in whose territory Nyam had planted, said, “It’s as if he had forgotten the law; he is forgiven this one time, but he mustn’t do it again.” Tidn says, “If we treat Nyam too harshly [interestingly, the word he used was “kill”], we lose a man, so we let him plant; we take pity on him.” Specifically asserted several times was that “these quarrels don’t matter for us, because we will all die soon; but they are important because they will result in dissension among our children and grandchildren because of the conflicting claims to inherited land and trees.”

This process, the becharaa, is situated in the Semai’s view of human wants, the image of the band, the world and the person. Materialist explanations of war revolve around human needs—the crucial distinction that Robarchek wants to highlight was that in the case of the Semai human needs must be translated into human wants. “That is they must be cognized by the actors themselves before they can become relevant to people’s actions.” Material needs, for Robarchek, cannot be motivational factors until they become conscious human wants. Even then, once cognized, “a material want is still not a determinant of behaviour, but is merely one factor (perhaps a very salient one, perhaps not) in a complex motivational equation.”

The Semai image of human wants revolves around the concept of pehunan, which refers to “a state of being unsatisfied in regard to some specific and strongly-felt want.” The reciprocal nature of this concept is that the community is the source of satisfying those individual wants. There develops, then, a dialectic of communication and transference of resources that both nurtures the community and satisfies the individual’s wants. Robarchek summarizes this dialectic in three important points:

1. For Semai, the non-satisfaction of a band member’s wants is explicitly a social as well as an individual fact.
2. The response to situations of frustration, a response entailed by the cultural definition of the state of non-satisfaction, is not the anger and aggression expected in our own cultural context. Rather, fear and actions directed at alleviating the threat are the normal responses.
3. Pehunan and related conceptualizations emphasize that there are no independent individuals and that without the support of the band, individual survival is impossible.
The view of the band and the world are complementary in that the band is tightly circumscribed as the place where a person can feel secure, and the place that the person is bound up with until death. The world, meanwhile, is simply the opposite: it is the place of unremitting hostility and danger. It serves to reinforce the tightly circumscribed security of the band. The image of the person is closely related to these views of the world, because the person is tied to the security and the nurturance of others. "Semai culture stresses not individualism, self-reliance and independence, but rather dependence, affiliation, and mutual aid." These images of the band, the world and the self become fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality. Robarchek summarizes that reality well.

They are thereby components of motivational complexes (the action strategies they use to operate in such a world) and channel individual behavior choices into nonviolent directions. The collective behavior of individuals thus directed in turn constitutes the learning environment of the next generation. It is an environment where children have little opportunity to learn how to utilize violence. In a reality so defined, violence simply does not come to be seen as a means for settling disputes or resolving difficulties.

How then does this ethnographic example and observation relate to materialist explanations of war? The key issue is the assertion by materialist oriented researchers that the primary cause of war is found in material infrastructures. Here, however, material infrastructure is secondary to the culturally constructed patterns of nonviolent social behaviour. Reflecting on the conflict resolution process and the underlying cultural patterns leads to the following observation about the relationship between material causes and cultural contexts. It represents the antithesis of Ferguson's three premises reviewed above.

Although this was a conflict over significant material resources whose outcome would have serious long-term consequences for the material well-being of both individuals and groups, it was also, in the final analysis, a conflict among specific human beings acting within specific psychological, social, and cultural contexts. No accounting of the material correlates and consequences of their actions, whether in terms of resource control or inclusive fitness, can explain the result without taking account of their decisions and the intentions and goals of those who made them, and without taking account of how those material factors were translated into human concerns, motives, and goals.
Understanding the trajectory of this dispute requires putting the brute material "facts" of the matter into psychological, social and cultural contexts and attempting to comprehend how the situation was conceptualized and defined by the people involved. Their decisions and the actions that flowed from them were not epiphenomena incidental to the working out of some inexorable logic of transactions in material substances; rather, they ultimately constituted the outcome of this conflict.

I have not attempted here to explore the full complexities of the arguments advanced on all sides of this discussion. Ferguson certainly develops a full explanation of how he believes simple societies understand war, and he suggests that his materialist model may be of use in the study of contemporary war. Robarchek, too, advances a clear argument that gives priority to the complex dynamics of human action within psychological, social and cultural contexts.

David Riches comes to the question of violence from an explicitly social interactionist framework. Although he has not developed his ideas beyond a few essays on the subject, I believe that his early work still represents a significant contribution to the understanding of violence (less so the subject of war), and I intend to build on it by using this general orientation myself. Here I shall only discuss the salient points that bear on this selective review of anthropological approaches to violence and war.

Riches sees violence in terms of relationships and meaningful action. He too does not favour the cultural materialist approach, although he approaches the subject with more explicit theoretical attention to the relationship between actors than does Robarchek. There are three parts to Riches' analysis: a distinction between, on the one hand, perpetrators, and on the other hand, witnesses and victims (victims, in this scenario, fall under the rubric of witnesses); the contested nature of legitimacy and illegitimacy in judging violence; and the differentiation between practical (instrumental) and symbolic (expressive) goals of violence. Riches concludes that violence embodies multiple layers of possible meaning as social action and therefore is seen to be highly efficacious.

For Riches, as is consistent with the general approach of the broader social-symbolic interactionist school of thought writ large, violence is primarily understood as performance; or, another way of putting it is to say that violence arises from relationships shaped through social interaction. Riches begins his discussion by making a distinction that is common to many analyses of violence, that is, by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate violence. This is directly tied to the question of actors. He suggests that the de facto Western cultural position is that for witnesses (including
violence is inherently illegitimate, while for performers it almost goes without saying that violence is legitimate.

The analysis then revolves around the essential contestability of legitimacy, for the perpetrators are intent on persuading witnesses that their violence is legitimate. For their part, witnesses must be convinced that the physical harm done in the form of social action is legitimate. “What marks the contestability of violence” says Riches, “is that, as acts of physical hurt unfold, performers, witnesses, and even victims may be expected to alter their opinions about this legitimacy.” He refers, for example, to the use of violence by governments, which is not referred to as “violence”, but rather, characterized as governance (an observation, Riches notes, that was made long ago by Radcliffe-Brown). This basic distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence, and the contested nature of it, is easily and well illustrated in numerous current historical events. For example, the events of 11 September 2001, as an act of violence and the representation of that act, are highly contested: those who perpetrated the act clearly saw it as legitimate, and there are witnesses in other countries who clearly saw it as legitimate; while those who experienced the violence directly either as victims or as witnesses in North America, clearly saw it as illegitimate, certainly not a form of “good governance”. “The salient point,” says Riches, “is that when a witness or victim invokes the notion of violence, they make a judgment not just that the action concerned causes physical hurt but also that it is illegitimate.”

Next Riches clarifies the function of violence, which for him is twofold; first, it is instrumental in the sense that it intends, in a most practical way, to disrupt what is seen as orderly. In an even more pragmatic sense, the function of violence is to physically alter other persons for practical ends. The second function of violence is expressive, or, in other words, symbolic. The violent act as a performance is meant to send a message to those who witness it, although that message, as Riches says, is often not clear and in most cases involves the perpetrators taking a risk that the action itself will speak to its legitimacy. When it works well, it has the potential to subvert the known order and open the possibility of social change. It is precisely the “potency of violence” that makes it “highly appropriate both for practical (instrumental) and for symbolic (expressive) purposes: as a means of transforming the social environment (instrumental purpose), and dramatizing the importance of key social ideas (expressive purpose), violence can be highly efficacious. So it is that the desire to achieve a very wide variety of goals and ambitions is a sufficient condition for acts of violence to be performed.” It is for this reason that violence can be seen as a “strategically, consciously employed resource,” which is in direct contradiction, of course, to the sociobiological position I have discussed previously. However, he does not dismiss these factors outright (a position I have also taken above): he suggests that most anthropologists agree that “social and cultural factors, together with
ecological setting, are the chief factors influencing the type and frequency of violence in any social situation."86 He also goes on to explicitly clarify his position vis-à-vis cultural materialism by suggesting that “in every instance, the relationship between social structure and violence is one of influence and opportunity; there is no suggestion that social structure compels violence—there are always alternative courses of action.”87

This argument compels Riches to suggest that the “core purpose” that effectively unites both the instrumental and expressive functions of violence is “tactical pre-emption”. He explains why he focuses on it in the following manner:

I suggest that the core purpose of violence stems from a contradiction in this situation which performers have to face. In the first place, violence is a means of social advancement whose recipients—victims or witnesses—are, by definition, unwilling recipients. But, at the same time, victims and witnesses have to be persuaded of the act’s acceptability, for the performer will certainly wish to dampen down the possibility of a like reply. The purpose of violence which best meets this contradiction—through which advancement is achieved and a measure of legitimacy claimed—is tactical pre-emption, i.e. securing practical advantage over one’s opponents in the short term through forestalling their activities. For performers of violence, then, the notion of tactical pre-emption is vital, in that pressed to give account of themselves they can offer defence through making the idea explicit—though it is hardly necessary to say that when someone insists that the need to meet this purpose outweighs the suffering caused victims and witnesses may well not concur.88

This tactical pre-emption derives from the idea that in the struggle for legitimacy, much can be gained for the performer if violence can be presented as unavoidable, and that the immediate effect of the violence is “to impair a victim’s faculties.” Therefore, “the ultimate defence for all violent acts will accordingly be given as the unimpeachable necessity of immediately halting some aspect of the social activities of the person to whom violence is imparted.”89 Hence it is through this core purpose that the legitimacy of violence is argued.

In conclusion, Riches suggests that there are three main factors that undergird “violence as a social and cultural resource.”90 First, violent action effectively combines both instrumental and expressive functions as parts of a larger social interaction. Of these the instrumental goals of violence are paramount, because if there was no instrumental aim, the act would never be undertaken. However the expressive purpose has a longer lifespan, and may do more to change the status quo than the actual act of doing physical harm. Second, violence is easily manipulated. Therefore it becomes a “highly appropriate
medium for the expression of broad political opposition" because people with very different socio-politico-cultural ideas will nevertheless be able to read the basic meaning of the act. And finally, violence requires very little in the way of specific resources and knowledge, and is therefore highly accessible. These suggest that violence is a central aspect of much social interaction.

More than any of the scholars discussed to this point, Carolyn Nordstrom raises what I see as the core questions about the study of war and violence. Here I wish to merely give a taste of her work, and in Chapter 5 I shall dwell more specifically on her understanding of war, violence and their relationship. At the outset, it must also be said that Nordstrom rejects the idea that studying war can be done without also studying the process of creative responses to it. Indeed, much of her work is focused on creativity as a survival strategy in contexts of violence. "What emerged as paramount" for Nordstrom, was "not only the devastating impact of war on a country, but the remarkable creativity that average people employed in their efforts to defeat not one side or the other, but the whole notion of war itself." 91

A crucial idea that animates Nordstrom's analysis is her observation that violence is a "fluid culture" and therefore she had to release "ethnography from its traditional moorings in place" and locate it "instead in the study of process." 93 To study that which is fluid necessitates movement on the part of the analyst as well. Processes are fluid; things are static. This attitude helps to clarify her concern for where war is not located. She writes:

Traditional political and military science situate studies of warfare primarily in political institutions and the actions of elites. This may be where political violence is conceived, but it is not where it is carried out. Political institutions and elites operate in war and in peace; their existence does not mark the inception of violence. If institutions and their ideologues are not the staging ground of war, where, then, is it? Logic supplies a single answer: war comes into existence when violence is employed. Political aggressions may become enflamed, threats may be flung back and forth, military exercises may take place, but it is only when weapons are employed and people are harmed and killed that war is said to exist. But war is far more than the maiming and killing of humans. War is a cultural system that becomes reproduced in the minutia of daily living and the constructs of what it means to be human. And it is here that terror warfare is waged, resisted, and ultimately defeated. 94
In contradistinction from those in the Western academy who would insist on locating war in either abstract concepts or reified “things”, Nordstrom situates violence and war in process.

In the West, violence is subtly but powerfully presented as “thing-like.” This is evident in the linguistic habits surrounding violence: violence is avoided; violence is controlled; violence is surmounted; violence is turned inward or outward in anger; violence is released in cathartic mock-aggression; violence is held in check. As a fixed phenomenon, violence becomes a manifest thing: set, enduring, concrete. In this worldview, violence exists; it has a specific given nature.95

The antidote to that “thing-like” quality is to see that “one of the goals of terror warfare is to reproduce the hegemony of violence in the minutia of everyday life.”96 Once violence is inscribed on the body, literally, and on the mind, war itself begins to unsettle the very basis of society itself. This dynamic is one that concerns me a great deal as I have tried to understand its implications for the people of Iraq, who have lived through thirteen years of warfare. As Nordstrom observes, “peace accords may be finalized, but for many the war never fully ends. Terror warfare is predicated on this principle: its goal is in part to undermine the fundamental ontological security of an entire society.”97

Nordstrom consistently draws upon voices in war zones to illustrate her work. Sometimes those voices resonate strongly with my experience of Iraq. For example, when I first read the passage that follows I immediately recalled conversations I had with people who live in Iraq. On occasion the subject would come up in conversation about why they chose to stay in Iraq, especially in a time of such severe hardship and repression. The woman whose words Nordstrom captured could easily have been speaking for those that I spoke with in Iraq.

I don’t know if anyone really knows war until it lives inside of them. A person can come here and see the war, fear the war, be scared of the violence—but their life, their very being is not determined by the war. This is my country, the country of my parents, my family, my friends, my future. And the war has gotten into all of these. I know everyone has suffered a loss in this war: a family member killed, a loved one captured and never heard of again. But it goes much deeper than this, to the very heart of the country, to my very heart. When I walk on the road, I carry nervousness with me as a habit, as a way of being. When I hear a sharp noise, I do not stop and ask “what is that?” like a normal person. I start and fear my life is in jeopardy. And I do this for my family as well. Whenever I am parted from them I have this gnawing worry: will I ever
see them again, is something terrible happening to them at this moment? I cringe for my very land, soaked in blood so it can't produce healthily. This lives in me—it is a part of my being, a constant companion, a thing no one can understand if they only enter here and worry about their own safety from one day to the next. I want to leave Mozambique, to go away and work or study.... I want to get away from all this, to run from it for a little while. But the even stronger feeling is that I can't stand to leave my country, for I can never leave the war. I will carry the war with me, and that inflames within me a passion to be here, to be a part of my country and help even in its worst moments. For if I leave, when I come home my most cherished things may be ashes, what is a part of me may have died, and I wouldn't have been here to know, to have tried to do something. The passion that makes me want to flee my country's problems binds me to my country so that I can't bear to leave. 98

One of the central questions that arises from Nordstrom's approach is the question of experience. Here she clearly suggests that to categorize war's experiences into broad categories is to cover over the core processes of intersection between person and history that comprise war. The key is that war is embodied; and therefore

Precisely because violence is embodied, it is profoundly personal. Each person experiences war according to a unique intersection of history, culture, immediate contexts, and personality. War is not primarily about adult male soldiers doing battle. Combatants and noncombatants cannot be stereotyped into "mass" categories, nor can the lines between them be clearly demarcated. Children and adults, men and women, fight and die. The battlefields are home to rogues and honorable citizens: to old and young, rich and poor, political and apolitical. In all of these categories, each person has an individual experience of war, a unique "war story." 99

Other scholars have noticed this emphasis on experience, enough so that they have felt the need to respond. I shall bring this chapter to a close with that discussion.

The Role of Experience

One of the central problems which arises from this overview of literature on the anthropology of war and violence and more specifically on the work of Nordstrom at a theoretical level is the contested nature of the role of "experience" in the study of violence and war. A great deal hangs on this question within the discipline as a whole—professional careers, research dollars and political influence, being a few examples—even
if the divide is less sharp than it appears at first blush. In an essay that attempts to bridge
some of the differences that appear in the violence and war literature, Schröder and
Schmidt suggest that there are three broad theoretical perspectives currently being used
to study the subject.

(1) The operational approach “links violence to general properties of human
nature and rationality and to general concepts of social adaptation to material conditions.
It aims to explain violent action by comparing structural conditions as causes affecting
specific historical conditions.”

(2) The cognitive approach “portrays violence as first of all culturally constructed,
as a representation of cultural values, a fact that accounts for its efficacy on both the
discursive and the practical level. Thus, violence is seen as contingent on its cultural
meaning and its form of representation. It should be approached with careful attention to
the socio-cultural specificity of the historical context.”

(3) The experiential approach, for Schröder and Schmidt “focuses on the
subjective qualities of violence. It views violence as something the basic impact of which
on life can only be grasped and is only reflected through individual experience. Violence,
here, is highly contingent on individual subjectivities, and its meaning unfolds mainly
through the individual’s perception of a violent situation.”

Schröder and Schmidt conclude their overview of these three theoretical views
with the suggestion that their “degree of compatibility ... decreases from the first to the
third” of these perspectives:

While the operational perspective looks for parameters transcending
cultural specificity and the boundedness of violent events in time, space
and society, the cognitive perspective derives its parameters from the social
construction of the world by a collectivity bounded in time and space—
which, after all, contains elements well suited for comparison. The
experimental perspective tends to neglect cultural generality in
favour of pure fragmented subjectivity... [T]he extreme proponents of this
post-modernist view subscribe to a randomising view of violent events that
negate the possibility and usefulness of anthropological comparison.

Although Schröder and Schmidt say in passing that all three of these perspectives
are necessary to gain a full picture of violence and war, it is clear that when push comes to
shove “an anthropological approach should adopt an analytical, comparative
perspective in order to contribute to the understanding and explanation of violence.”
The not-so-subtle criticism embedded here is that the experiential perspective,
characterized as “fragmented subjectivity” generating a “randomising view of violent
events,” has little to contribute to the understanding of violence and war because it has
“abandoned an analytical approach in favour of a subjectivist focus on the impact violence has on the everyday life of individuals (including the researchers themselves).”

Moreover, this perspective may “interfere [sic] with any effort to view one specific violent confrontation from a historical or comparative perspective.” Those who hold to what has here been called an experiential “postmodern” view, not surprisingly, have a different view of the matter.

“Violence,” according to Nordstrom and Martin, “is not a socioculturally fragmented phenomenon that occurs ‘outside’ the arena of everyday life for those affected.” If we are to understand it, then it is “to people themselves, to the social dynamics and cultural phenomena that inform them, that we must turn.” They recognize that this “stands at odds with traditional studies of sociopolitical violence that have long focussed on the formal institutions credited with defining, waging, and resolving aggression: political, (para)military, security, and legal.” Within those formal institutions “warfare is viewed as a contest between opponents who consciously, if not rationally, compete for control of resources, employ strategies and develop weapon systems.” In a core passage they explain that:

It is not only naïve to assume that conflict takes place within an arena demarcated by the formal institutions designated as responsible for waging and controlling aggression. It is dangerous. On average, 90 percent of all war-related deaths now occur among civilian populations. What ethnographic voice conveys the social reality of these unarmed victims of aggression ... if researchers focus on the politicomilitary systems whose members may declare war, but certainly do not bear the brunt of it? Worse, who gives resonance to those repressed, tortured, and disappeared in undeclared wars? Violence starts and stops with people that constitute a society; it takes place in society and as a social reality; it is a product and a manifestation of culture. Violence is not inherent to power, to politics, or to human nature. The only biological reality of violence is that wounds bleed and people die.

This perspective fits in a well-developed anthropology of violence literature. In the end, this perspective understands violence to be a “socially and culturally constructed manifestation of a deconstitutive dimension of human existence. Thus there is no fixed form of violence.” For these scholars,

Violence is not an action, an emotion, a process, a response, a state, or a drive. It may manifest itself as responses, drives, actions, and so on, but attempts to reduce violence to some essential core or concept are counterproductive because they essentialize a dimension of human
existence and lead to presenting cultural manifestations of violence as if they were natural and universal. Violence is not reducible to some fundamental principle of human behavior, to a universal base structure of society, or to general cognitive or biological processes. We want to keep such misguided essentialist approaches in check by remaining closer to the experience of violence and focus on its empirical manifestations.

Although the proponents of this view de-emphasize the relationship, at least in part this perspective grows out of a view of the world shaped by postmodern thinking, which owes a great deal to the work of Michel Foucault. For this influential stream of thinking, scholars are ill-advised to seek any form of grand narrative in human experience. Hence the focus on staying close to the ground. For Robben and Nordstrom, it is both “unrealistic” and “dangerous” to go to the field “with ready-made explanations of violence so as to ‘find truths’ to support our theories.” Therefore, they “do not attempt to provide any overarching theory” in which to ground their work.

In contrast to Schröder and Schmidt’s suggestion that this view has “abandoned” an analytical approach, these scholars argue that an experiential approach is the only way to arrive at a theoretically valid model. In her studies of Mozambique, Nordstrom illustrates that “distance from the enactment of violence has a good deal to do with the way we theorize about it. The space between violence and theory has enabled researchers to ascribe a reasonableness to warfare that belies the civilian experience.” Nordstrom and Martin propose that the direction of their work, and that of their colleagues, represents, in fact, “an initial step in designating theoretical frameworks for studying violence that elucidate field realities that enhance knowledge of conflict processes and human(e) dynamics with a more critical and global perspective.”

While I tend to concur with Schröder and Schmidt that a social constructionist (cognitive) view is to a greater or lesser extent useful to both a materialist (operational) perspective and what they call a postmodern (experiential) perspective, I believe the weight of the argument goes against their conclusion that the social constructionist view better aligns itself with the materialist perspective. Due to a common interest in an elicitive methodology that operates within a socially constructed field reality, the social constructionist theoretical perspective actually aligns itself better with an experiential approach to violence and war. In this dissertation, my approach begins to integrate “experience” into a model that can potentially be used in a comparative fashion.

The result of my theoretical exploration leads me to look at the relationship of war and violence. Throughout this text I anchor my exploration of the subject in a model that proposes three conceptual realms where violence is enabled. In chapter 5 I expand the utility of the violence concept by contextualizing it with the concept of conflict. My
focus on three conceptual realms—physical, network and symbolic—elucidates how violence is utilized by war-makers in multiple inter-related realms, all of which are aimed at the same thing, namely, the destruction of the enemy; put differently, to physically harm individual human beings. In stark contrast, those who provide leadership and justification for war-making regularly avoid the subject of violence, preferring to talk about things like political ends (such as security concerns), weapon systems and “collateral damage.” Using violence itself as a lens means that the central reality of war becomes unavoidable. Through this lens we can begin to see war from the perspective of people who are directly affected by it in their day-to-day lives. The concern to see war is captured by Brian Fawcett, who 20 years ago in his study of Cambodia, said, “The ugly truths of our time are neither dark nor silent.” He goes on to say that they “have been rendered opaque by full-frequency light that admits neither definition nor shadows, and they are protected from the voices of the suffering and the disaffected by an accompanying wall of white noise.” In what follows I suggest that examining violence in three conceptual realms will allow us to set the contrast knob to produce more definition and less white noise. It will serve to highlight the multifaceted impacts of war on those who have lived with it in Iraq for a very long time.
ENDNOTES


6 Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, eds. War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1968).


There were many indicators of the Government of Iraq's deeply entrenched dispute with the Government of Kuwait during the years prior to the Government of Iraq's decision to occupy Kuwait in 1990. I will return to this in Chapter Six.


24 Lorenz, *On Aggression.*
29 de Waal, *Peacemaking Among Primates,* 5.
37 Howell and Willis, *Societies At Peace: Anthropological Perspectives.*
40 Chagnon, "Reproductive and Somatic Conflicts of Interest," 82.
43 When this question comes up in public presentations I generally respond by pointing to research that indicates both violent and altruistic capacities. It continues to surprise me that those asking the question seem not to have even thought of this possibility, yet this is precisely what the core argument suggests, as I discuss later in this
chapter. To acknowledge the one without the other is nonsensical. My favorite example is to point out that when we drive on the highway, we humans tend to get by more-or-less, otherwise it would be literally impossible to get from point A to point B. We clearly have a capacity for both forms of behaviour. Why distract ourselves from the crucial questions by either denying the existence within us of these capacities, or making more of them than they deserve?

44 Ferguson, "Infrastructural Determinism."
45 Murphy and Margolis, "An Introduction to Cultural Materialism," 2.

(Emphasis added)

47 Ferguson, "Infrastructural Determinism," 25.
48 Ferguson, "Infrastructural Determinism," 26.


50 Most clearly articulated in Ferguson, "Studying War," and "Explaining War."

52 Ferguson, "Explaining War," 28.
54 Ferguson, "Explaining War," 29.
64 Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," 73. (My emphasis.)


70 Robarchek, "Motivations and Material Causes," 58.

71 Robarchek, "Primitive Warfare," 914.

72 Robarchek, "Motivations and Material Causes," 64.

73 Robarchek, "Motivations and Material Causes," 64.


76 Robarchek, "Motivations and Material Causes," 68. Similar conclusions are reached by Jean Briggs in "'Why Don't You Kill Your Baby Brother?' The Dynamics of Peace in Canadian Inuit Camps."

77 Robarchek, "Primitive Warfare," 915. (My emphasis.)


A useful extended discussion of this is found in Peter W. Macky, *Violence: Right Or Wrong* (Waco: World Books, 1973).


Nordstrom, "Terror Warfare," 115. (Emphasis added in penultimate sentence.)


105 I believe the authors intend this to be "experiential," although it is possible they mean to say that all experiential approaches to war and violence are also "experimental."


THINKING THROUGH VIOLENCE

My overall goal in this dissertation is to illuminate the war with Iraq in such a way as to change the way we think about how war is represented. How we think about war as intellectuals is conveyed through careful attention to definitions and through theory which "provides a way of seeing the world." In the previous chapter I worked through a number of different ways of "seeing the world" of violence through anthropological theory—the focus of this theory is often causality and explanation. It asks the "why" question.

Here I want to turn to a subject rarely dwelled on by anthropologists: a careful examination of how we define violence. To talk about a definition is another way of asking about the nature of violence. Definitions do not necessarily explain why particular human beings are violent at a soccer game. It asks the what question about violence. Definitions and theories are of course intimately related: to define a term is not, however, necessarily to understand the phenomenon to which it refers. At its most basic level a word is a symbol. To explain human behaviour we need to use words, which are sometimes condensed and often terribly contentious, as is the case with "violence". This examination of how violence is defined is yet one more of the building blocks that I want to put in place before presenting a model in the next chapter.

A secondary, but still important reason for this conversation about definitions is that I want to help anthropologists work through a subject they do not tend to spend much time discussing. To do this I will be drawing on discussions in the broader interdisciplinary study of the subject. Much of my own understanding has been drawn from my immersion in interdisciplinary studies through teaching in a program for many years that uses as its core organizing principle the concept of conflict. The anthropological study of violence and war is certainly cognizant of this broader discussion; here I only wish to make that awareness more explicit and to attempt to blend together several ideas to eventually produce a composite model that addresses central concerns in anthropology while working with others to nudge it towards a better understanding of violence and war.

A LABORIOUS SORTING JOB

We have already sensed that violence is a difficult conceptual domain to get a handle on. There is no scholarly consensus about how to define violence, therefore each
person who comes to the subject is forced to choose or create a way to put some order to the subject for their purposes. It has taken me some time to realize just how closely connected are efforts to define violence, and efforts to develop explanations (theories) about it. At one level we know intuitively that they are connected, but in the case of violence the ground is particularly treacherous. How we define violence seriously constrains the very possibility of entertaining some theoretical positions for explaining it. Likewise, some theoretical positions rule out certain definitions of the term, in some cases leading to a conscious decision not to attempt to define it at all. All this confusion results in a very laborious job of sorting through the different threads of the conversations; furthermore, there is in my experience no end point to the conversation ... yet. Without trying to say too much, I have observed that those with a politico-philosophical bent dwell at length on matters of definition, often devoting a chapter or more to the subject, while those with a social scientific bent tend to categorize different approaches to theories that propose causal explanations, while offering somewhat less in the way of a nuanced discussion of definitions. In any case, I think it is essential "to recognize that the term ‘violence’ is notoriously contested, and that its scope and meaning change through time and from space to space."  

TWO CORE DISTINCTIONS

As I have reviewed a wide range of ideas about how to define violence I have identified two conversations—the first a question of scale, the second a question of morals—that consistently cut across all other discussions, no matter how the issues are conceptualized. I think that identifying these two large issues is a helpful way to engage the problem. From there I will move to a discussion of narrow and wide definitions, with specific attention to the question of typologies in this conversation. My goal is to provide a definitional backdrop for the ideas and model found in the next chapter.

Collective Violence and Individual Aggression

The first overarching issue is an analytical differentiation based on scale. The end points of that scale are “collective violence” and “individual aggression”. I think there is interesting work to be done on the question of scale; how individual acts of violence (e.g., homicide) relate to large-scale collective acts of violence (e.g., genocide) is very important. At an analytical level I think we can separate them, but at an experiential level I think it is much harder to do so. Some acts of violence happen at the level of specific individuals and others are clearly coordinated between many actors, with a wide range of
permutations in between. My interest is primarily directed at the collective end of that scale in this study, but ultimately individual actors are always involved. I will come back to this question in the next chapter when I problematize the relationship of violence to war—clearly a collective and coordinated set of actions.

**Legitimate and Illegitimate Acts**

A second cross-cutting conversation—one that is more thorny—is the question of morality and violence. This is generally framed in terms of “legitimate” versus “illegitimate” acts of violence. A related question revolves around power and the use of force. I want to raise these questions at this point because they constitute one of the more contentious aspects of thinking through violence, and they will come up in the final chapter of this work.

The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence is a moral distinction. As we develop analytical distinctions, this moral question is inseparable from the analysis and we cannot escape it. I am aware that I have thought through consciously my “feelings” about the moral dimension of the US/UK – IRAQ War. It would be dishonest to suggest that my moral qualms about this war are not a significant catalyst to my study of it. While theorists acknowledge the question (as I am doing here), in the end it is generally seen as adding little to the actual process of understanding violence. For some disciplines, like political philosophy, the question of legitimate versus illegitimate violence takes a pre-eminent place in the conversation. For these scholars, the debate around legitimacy is related to questions of freedom, choice, and goodness. Indeed, for those concerned with politics and subjects like democracy and civil life this is perhaps one of the central discussions. Where it comes to the fore is in the process of judging acts of violence, something we all do—intellectuals or not.

A further dimension of the legitimacy debate revolves around the question of power—yet another difficult to define, diffuse term—and the use of force. When we talk about power and force we are essentially talking about how we (citizens of any state) identify who is authorized to be violent and who is allowed to use physical force; hence, police officers, militaries, some security officers (e.g., airport guards) and so on are seen as legitimate agents of “violence,” while others are not. When these authorized conduits of violence are sanctioned by governments, or some other body that confers legitimacy, then acts of violence are no longer labelled as violence.

An example will help to illustrate how these diffuse categories collide in the study of violence. Here is a statement that is currently being debated in Canada: police officers subdue criminals; police officers do not violently—sometimes lethally—assault citizens without reason. The following case provokes the debate over the legitimacy of state-
sanctioned violence. In August 2006, a police officer, Constable Cole Brewer, was called to investigate a complaint about a man tenting in the woods outside the small community of Williams Lake, British Columbia. The man, Donald Lewis, was sleeping in his tent when Brewer found and woke him. According to Brewer, Lewis was evasive in answering questions, and fled into the woods when Brewer attempted to arrest him for obstruction. Shortly thereafter he was found by other officers handcuffed to a tree, dead from a bullet wound in his chest. After the incident his wife explained that her husband, an American, had been in the process of trying to get Canadian immigrant status, and had been camping in the woods because he was chopping wood to sell for money. As of June 2008, a coroner’s inquest is being conducted into the incident.

There are two other examples of similar incidents happening in British Columbia: in a 2004 case, an unarmed 29 year old man named Kevin St. Arnaud was shot by police while being chased in Vanderhoof, BC; in 2005, 22 year old Ian Bush, also unarmed, was shot while in custody at a Houston, BC police detachment. In both of these cases the police officers were exonerated of any wrong-doing.

These cases illustrate a public struggle over power and the legitimate use of force. In the cases of Kevin St. Arnaud and Ian Bush, both of which involved unarmed citizens who lost their lives, the officers involved were found to be observing all correct procedures, and no blame was attached to their actions. Furthermore, at no point were their actions labelled as illegitimate violence by the court of inquiry; quite the opposite, these were considered legitimate acts of social control. In the previous chapter David Riches observed that much of what we take as an analysis of violence, especially as presented by media commentators, is actually part and parcel of a struggle over legitimacy, over what is labelled as violent and who labels it. In other words, it is a struggle over legitimacy to ask why it is that when police officers shoot a person it is at most presented as an unfortunate accident or over-reaction. These cases clearly show how the moral question—whether we see violence as legitimate or illegitimate—is closely tied to the dynamics of power and the use of force in social life.

We cannot engage the moral question about whether the US/UK – IRAQ War was right or wrong if we cannot see it. The very act of refusing to name the war is to my mind a deliberate decision that promotes a particular world view, one that I shall discuss in the conclusion. Therefore, even though the multi-layered complexity of the moral question is intertwined with my analysis, the point of the analysis is to clarify the historical event to enable us to properly raise the moral question. At a more general level, the question of whether violence—or for that matter war—is right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate, is ever present even while we continue to study the dynamics of violence and representation of war.
WIDE AND NARROW DEFINITIONS

With these over-arching distinctions in hand, I now want to turn to definitions proper. There is severe disagreement between scholars about how to define violence. It provokes some of the most heated language that I have seen in academic literature. The principal argument is about wide and narrow definitions, both of which refer to the scope of the definition. This argument has often been framed as an either/or debate, which is a mistake. My own penchant for thinking about processes and oscillating relationships is clearly at odds with this framing and asks if there is a third option. The best way to get a handle on this debate is to discuss specific examples, otherwise the conversation gets far too abstract too quickly. First I want to talk about wide definitions, the first from sociologist Johan Galtung. Galtung's early formulation has become the prototype for many others that have followed. In the next section I will look at elaborations of the theme established by Galtung, including brief examinations of ideas put forward by medical anthropologist Paul Farmer, and social anthropologist Stephen Lubkemann. I then want to contrast these wide definitions with narrow definitions by examining two narrow definitions put forward by political philosopher John Keane and moral philosopher C.A.J. Coady. Finally, I want to discuss two variations on narrow definitions that explicitly include a typology as a part of the definition. Here I will look at a model developed by political scientist Charles Tilly, and a typology presented by the World Health Organization.

WIDE DEFINITIONS

In this first part I shall dwell at length on the seminal work of Johan Galtung, because its influence can be seen throughout the literature that emphasizes a wide approach to violence. I shall then turn to a few elaborations of the idea to illustrate how these innovative ideas have been deployed in a variety of ways.

Johan Galtung

There is an essay that still needs to be written about the impact of Johan Galtung’s presentation of “structural violence”—an idea that has gained a great deal of traction over the past forty years—on the humanities and social sciences. Although Galtung is frequently identified as the author of this idea, the truth is likely a bit more subtle than that (there are few islands in the intellectual ocean). A close reading of the article itself—especially with some attention to the endnotes—indicates that he was
working in the context of a group of scholars in Europe who were exploring this and related ideas. The idea of institutional violence was also being bandied about by these intellectuals, but Galtung preferred the use of the term structural violence because he believed it was more abstract and therefore more inclusive. As scholars were developing these ideas in Europe, developments in other parts of the world were simultaneously bringing to the fore an idea of structural violence. Most notable were the liberation theologians of Central and South America, who, with their Marxist-inspired radical critique of social conditions there, had developed a clear analysis of how social structures were themselves violent. As theologian Leonardo Boff has noted, at the heart of liberation theology is the structural analysis of socioeconomic oppression.

The broader historical context is also germane, for the years when this idea came to fruition were tumultuous times on the global scene. Structuralism itself as an intellectual movement was fresh and the Cold War, replete with its East – West dichotomy, was the contextualizing political paradigm. Much on people’s minds was the question of how to end the Cold War and secure true “peace”. It was this latter question about peace that led Galtung to write his often quoted paper on “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” the purpose of which was principally to aid in the process of defining peace for the purposes of peace research, not to focus on violence. A close reading of the 1969 paper shows that it is far more complex than what current commentators give him credit for: of the numerous articles I have read commenting on Galtung’s 1969 paper, none have mentioned, for example, that he actually articulated six dimensions of violence in a web of violence. It is true that he came to focus on the one binary opposition of personal and structural violence, but his original thoughts were significantly more nuanced. Although I ultimately will not be adopting carte blanche the idea of structural violence because of its shortcomings, nevertheless in the next few pages I want to explore it thoroughly because it has proven to be resilient for so long, continues to be modified and enhanced, and has served as an inspiration and foil for my own work. I intend to work through the idea as Galtung expressed it, frequently using his own words, then go on to explore elaborations of a wide definition of violence before coming to my own discussion.

Galtung’s main concern was framed by his desire to clarify a definition of peace that was all encompassing. To get to his definition of peace, one that went far beyond the absence of one (in his view) specific dimension of violence, he believed it was necessary to re-conceptualize the notion of violence. In what has become the most significant passage from his 1969 article he articulates a clear break from a dictionary based, narrow definition of violence. This is his core statement:
As a point of departure, let us say that violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. This statement may lead to more problems than it solves. However, it will soon be clear why we are rejecting the narrow concept of violence—according to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence. If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence, an extended concept of violence is indispensable but that concept should be a logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.  

It is crucial to see that what Galtung is concerned with in this passage is the rejection of a narrow concept of violence in order to actualize a wide definition of peace (a focus of criticism by later critics). His concern is that a peace constricted by this narrow violence cannot be “held up as an ideal.” Shortly after this opening statement, Galtung then introduces what has come to be a crucial distinction between “personal or direct violence” and “structural or indirect violence.” He elaborates this distinction by emphasizing the lack of an actor who directly harms another person.

We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect. In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of these words, and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.

The most important point of this distinction, he goes on to say, is that “if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as during a siege yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized today.”

Having stated his central thesis, Galtung now turns to an exploration of the six dimensions of violence. It is here that we most clearly see that the pairing of personal and structural violence is only one of several dimensions of violence.
The first distinction he makes is a distinction between physical and psychological violence. The key idea here is the differentiation between “violence that works on the body, and violence that works on the soul; where the latter would include lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities.”

The second dimension of violence is the distinction between “the negative and positive approach to influence.” Galtung explains this dimension by suggesting that “a person can be influenced not only by punishing him when he does what the influencer considers wrong, but also by rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right. Instead of increasing the constraints on his movements the constraints may be decreased instead of increased, and somatic capabilities extended instead of reduced. This may be readily agreed to, but does it have anything to do with violence? Yes, because the net result may still be that human beings are effectively prevented from realizing their potentialities.”

Third, he makes a distinction based on “whether or not there is an object that is hurt.” The main focus of this distinction is threat. When an actor displays the means of physical violence, whether on a small or large scale, a knife or a guided missile, “there is nevertheless the threat of physical violence and indirect threat of mental violence that may even be characterized as some type of psychological violence since it constrains human action.”

Then we come to what has been the most important distinction, put simply, the distinction between “whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts.” This is his distinction between personal and structural violence.

The fifth dimension is concerned with intention, but Galtung puts his own spin on this idea. While distinguishing between “violence that is intended or unintended” Galtung stresses that the issue of intention has mainly been significant for determining guilt “in Judaeo-Christian ethics and in Roman jurisprudence.” He argues for the importance of his own definition, which does not distinguish on the basis of intention but rather on the basis of consequence, because “ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets—and may hence be catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose.” When I first read this fifth distinction I read it too fast. What Galtung is saying is that it is possible to have unintended violence—that is a very significant distinction, for it challenges a central concept enshrined in Western philosophy writ large as culture. Unintended violence is an accident, at least that is what we have generally believed. He must have this as a possibility, however, because the idea of structural violence requires it.
Finally, the sixth distinction is between manifest and latent violence: "Manifest violence, whether personal or structural, is observable; although not directly since the theoretical entity of 'potential realization' also enters the picture. Latent violence is something which is not there, yet might easily come about." He gives examples of both latent personal violence and latent structural violence: "For personal violence this would mean a situation where a little challenge would trigger considerable killing and atrocity, as is often the case in connection with racial fights. In such cases we need a way of expressing that the personal violence is also there the day, hour, minute, second before the first bomb, shot, fist-fight, cry—and this is what the concept of latent, personal violence does for us;" while for latent structural violence "we could imagine a relatively egalitarian structure insufficiently protected against sudden feudalization, against crystallization into a much more stable, even petrified, hierarchical structure."

These six dimensions of violence are rarely enumerated when analyzing Galtung's understanding of structural violence, but here I want to demonstrate that Galtung situates this concept in a much larger conceptualization of the extremely complex number of factors that must be taken into account when thinking through violence. He follows his discussion of these six dimensions by dwelling on the relationship of personal and structural violence.

It is imperative that Galtung differentiate personal and structural violence at a conceptual level, otherwise the argument will quickly be brought to bear that in fact the structural violence he wants to place on the table always has as an antecedent personal violence. The whole point of his argument is to say that at a conceptual level there are two distinct forms of violence. In the part of the paper that I once viewed as the most obscure, this vital distinction is in fact asserted most forcefully, although in what I find to be a very convoluted fashion. Essentially, in trying to talk about the relationship between these two postulated, conceptual forms of violence, Galtung is actually asserting their sometime lack of relationship. Therefore he needs to prove that these two forms of violence are, at least sometimes, not related. Hence we find the statement that he rejects "the position that violence presupposes a pre-history of violence of the same or opposite kinds."15 He is unwilling, in other words, to be drawn into a discussion of "the original sin". He summarizes this when he says that "the two types of violence simply do not seem to be more tightly connected empirically than logically—and as to the latter, the whole exercise is an effort to show that they may be seen as logically independent, even though they are continuous with each other; one shades into the other."16

Although I am left unsatisfied by his argument I nevertheless see why he has attempted to make it. Perhaps it is not possible to have our cake and eat it too, in this
case. Galtung is forced to either allow for the possibility of direct violence being the anchor of all wide definitions, or he has to construct a typology that requires a logical separation, one that in all likelihood cannot be sustained in reality. To my mind this is where structure-based arguments run aground because they cannot deal adequately with dynamic processes that obviate the need for these kinds of rigid definitional boundaries. What has helped me to finally understand this approach is to remember Aristotle’s original assertion of what it means to define “a thing,” which is to identify its nominal essence and its real essence. From that basic Aristotelian distinction we have an entire scientific classification system based on genus, family, species, and so on. What I think Galtung is trying to do is to establish that what we have long thought was one species is in fact two, much as we have had to differentiate between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. In the far distant evolutionary past perhaps there was a common denominator, but for scientific classification purposes, these two humanoids are clearly different species even as they are from the same family. So too we have thought that violence was one family; what Galtung has done is to provocatively suggest that they are two species. Therein is a brilliant intervention that has resulted in a great deal of insight.

Having now clarified how the two primary forms of violence are related, and situated these two key concepts in a larger constellation of six different dimensions of violence, Galtung then turns to the implications of this definition for the concept of peace, and for peace research, which is the main concern of the paper. At this point he introduces the idea of negative and positive peace—a stock-in-trade of much current work in the field of peace and conflict studies—which grows directly out of his splitting of violence along two main axes.

With the distinction between personal and structural violence as basic, violence becomes two-sided, and so does peace conceived of as the absence of violence. An extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace. Just as a coin has two sides, one side alone being only one aspect of the coin, peace also has two sides: absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence. We shall refer to them as negative peace and positive peace respectively.

The implications of this bifurcated concept of peace for peace research are very significant, for it opens up the door to including “social justice” as an absolute necessity for true peace. In this passage we also see the Cold War context of two political camps, and Galtung’s attempt to provide a third path.

We may summarize by saying that too much research emphasis on one aspect of peace tends to rationalize extremism to the right or extremism to the left, depending on whether onesided emphasis is put on ‘absence of
personal violence’ or on ‘social justice’. And these two types of extremism are of course not only formally, but also socially closely related and in a dialectic manner: one is often a reaction to the other. When put into practice both may easily develop into well-known social orders where neither of the two aspects of peace are realized: gross social injustice is maintained by means of highly manifest personal violence. The regime usually tries to maintain a status quo, whether it means forceful maintenance of traditional social injustice that may have lasted for generations, or the forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice brought in by an attempt to overthrow the old system. 20

Lest anyone think that there is a hierarchy of peace values, Galtung goes on to insist that both aspects of peace are equally important. It is from this assertion that the common phrase found throughout activist circles—“Peace with Justice,” or, via negativ, “No Peace, No Justice”—comes:

Both values, both goals are significant, and it is probably a disservice to man to try, in any abstract way, to say that one is more important than the other. As mentioned, it is difficult to compare the amount of suffering and harm that has been caused by personal or structural violence; they are both of such an order of magnitude that comparisons appear meaningless. Moreover, they seem often to be coupled in such a way that it is very difficult to get rid of both evils; more likely the Devil is driven out with Beelzebub. In view of this difficulty, so amply testified through human history, we should be very careful in passing moral judgements too readily on those who fail to realize both goals. To realize one of them is no mean achievement either, particularly if we consider the number of social orders and regimes that realize neither. 21

The long, sometimes convoluted discussion of six dimensions of violence with its emphasis on two major types, and the somewhat shorter rumination on how this helps to clarify the idea of peace, lead to Galtung’s conclusion; indeed, the whole point of this article is to set the stage for a clarion call to do peace research. Throughout the article there is no indication that Galtung advocates research on violence (he seems to be quite clear that we now know what it is); quite the opposite, his effort culminates in a forward looking research agenda focussed on peace. Having clarified that peace is comprised of the absence of personal violence and the presence of social justice, he then suggests that the aim of peace research is to investigate how to achieve these two goals. He confidently asserts that “...once the double goal has been stated—that peace research is concerned with the conditions for promoting both aspects of peace—there is no reason to believe
that the future will not bring us richer concepts and more forms of social action that combine absence of personal violence with fight against social injustice once sufficient activity is put into research and practice.”22 With this Galtung rests his case, until twenty years later when, in 1990, he was moved to introduce the idea of “cultural violence” into the mix.

In his 1990 article on “Cultural Violence” Galtung reasserts the original idea, although stripped of its nuance, and addresses the question of culture. In this article he suggests that there is a still larger category than structural violence, which he calls “cultural violence.”

By ‘cultural violence’ we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”23

He qualifies this definition of cultural violence by assuring us that “entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent” only to take away this reassurance by suggesting that “cultures could be imagined and even encountered with not only one but a set of aspects so violent, extensive and diverse, spanning all cultural domains, that the step from talking about cases of cultural violence to violent cultures may be warranted.”24 Once he has gone down this path, however, he is then able to suggest that there are three “super-types” of violence: direct, structural, and cultural. He offers us the image of a violence triangle to express the relationship between these three types of violence.25 The relationships between these three types runs along two axes: time and causality.

Galtung appears to be drawing on the Annals school of history when he asserts that “Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a ‘permanence’, remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformations of basic culture.”26 When Galtung then turns to causality, his narrative begins to get far less precise. He asserts a general line of causality first:

Generally, a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified. The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, acts on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and counter-violence to keep the cage intact.27

He then qualifies his statement by saying that “there are linkages and causal flows in all six directions, and cycles connecting all three may start at any point.”28 Having then
established his new paradigm, he provides examples from each of the six culture domains—religion, ideology, language, and so on—that he identifies in his definition of cultural violence.

It appears to me that in terms of “cultural violence” Galtung treats culture as virtually static (consider his use of the word “invariant” above). Later in the article, without any adequate explanation, he refers to the difficulty of changing “the cultural genetic code.” There is clearly an internal inconsistency to the idea of talking about culture in these reified terms while in the same breath affirming that causal flows happen in all directions, suggesting that direct and structural violence can have a relatively immediate impact on cultural forms of violence. Something here is not thought through; indeed, these ideas make it hard to accept the later 1990 adumbration as a significant enhancement of his original 1969 seminal articulation of structural violence. One aspect of this article, however, that I think is of use is the idea of seeing three dimensions to the over-arching problem of violence—I will explore that idea in my own model, albeit in very different terms. The original 1969 ideas have led to some very intriguing reflections by those wanting to preserve the idea of structural violence, while recognizing its problems. These more recent redactors have helped to revitalize the idea of structural violence.

Elaborations and Modifications

Structural violence as an idea has been exceptionally resilient. Scholars from many disciplines regularly reference it in the context of wide definitions. In this section I want to highlight three examples to give some indication of how other scholars have modified—in some cases quite extensively—the idea of structural violence, while maintaining the intent that fuelled Galtung’s original work on the subject.

Medical anthropologist Paul Farmer has become quite well-known as an advocate of the idea of structural violence. Although he uses the term loosely, he suggests that “... a growing number of anthropologists now devote their attention to structural violence.” What he means by this, as I understand it, is that although they might not call it structural violence, a great deal of what current anthropologists study is, in fact, what he calls structural violence. Farmer does not modify the idea so much as re-assert it in his own field of study. He does, however, put his own gloss on the way it is presented. Farmer understands structural violence to be violence “exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order: hence the discomfort these ideas provoke in a moral economy still geared to pinning praise or blame on individual actors. In short, the concept of structural violence is intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression.” He uses a strong metaphor to get at what he means by
the link between oppression and structural violence when he says that structural violence is both “structured and stricturing. It constricts the agency of its victims. It tightens a physical noose around their necks, and this garrotting determines the way in which resources—food, medicine, even affection—are allocated and experienced.” Clearly there is no hint of bashfulness about putting forward an explicitly moral position. He is at pains to make his point that studying oppression, something many anthropologists do, is really about studying structural violence. To support his position, he situates this in a “materialist” understanding of anthropology, but he means by that something quite specific. He explains:

By ‘materialist’ I do not mean ‘economic’ as if economic structures were not socially constructed. I do not mean ‘biological’ as if biology were likewise somehow immune from social construction. I am not trying to establish a bedrock category of reality or engage worn-out or false debates ... any social project requires construction materials, while the building process is itself inevitably social and thus cultural. The adverse outcomes associated with structural violence—death, injury, illness, subjugation, stigmatization, and even psychological terror—come to have their ‘final common pathway’ in the material. Structural violence is embodied as adverse events if what we study, as anthropologists, is the experience of people who live in poverty or are marginalized by racism, gender inequality, or a noxious mix of all of the above.

The most interesting aspect of Farmer’s presentation is his discussion of the importance of the relationship between historical memory and structural violence. We need to examine “the roles played by the erasure of historical memory and other forms of desocialization as enabling conditions of structures that are both ‘sinful’ and ostensibly ‘nobody’s fault’.” He goes on to suggest that “erasing history is perhaps the most common explanatory sleight-of-hand relied upon by architects of structural violence. Erasure or distortion of history is part of the process of desocialization necessary for the emergence of hegemonic accounts of what happened and why.” In the end, “those who look only to powerful present-day actors to explain misery will fail to see how inequality is structured and legitimated over time. Which construction materials were used, and when, and why, and how? Our attempts to freeze social process in an ‘ethnographic present’ have in the end only complicated our task.” For anthropologists, he hints at the role symbols might play in this dynamic as “symbolic props”.

Indeed, one could argue that structural violence now comes with symbolic props far more powerful—indeed, far more convincing—than anything we might serve up to counter them; examples include the discounting of
any divergent voice as ‘unrealistic’ or ‘utopian,’ the dismal end of the socialist experiment in some (not all) of its homelands, the increasing centralization of command over finance capital, and what some see as the criminalization of poverty in economically advanced countries. 38

And symbols are closely tied to the construction of knowledge, leading us back to the erasure of history, for to “tally body counts correctly requires epidemiology, forensic and clinical medicine, and demography. The erasure of these broad bodies of knowledge may be seen as the central problematic of a robust anthropology of structural violence.” 39 The linking together of “structural violence,” “symbolic props,” and “bodies of knowledge” is intellectually stimulating.

Another anthropologist offers a concept of structural violence that is “narrower, more dynamic, and emphasizes subjectivity over objective criteria” in contrast to Galtung and Farmer’s emphasis on external objective measures of violence. Stephen Lubkemann sees a problem with the fact that most “analysts who use the term ‘structural violence’ tend to reserve for themselves the right to determine where that threshold lies and what constitutes it.” 40 Thus, Lubkemann uses the idea of structural violence—in a fashion quite different from the previous two scholars—

to refer to the subjective sense of acute deprivation produced by changing socioeconomic and political conditions. By ‘deprivation’ I am referring to the subjective package of sentiments—of disappointment, disempowerment, loss, and frustration—that results when groups or individuals perceive that their own experience is falling short of some standard they expect and believe they have a right to achieve. 41

This turning of structural violence on its head is an innovative and significant modification to Galtung’s proposal that comes out of an anthropologist’s sensitivity to the ethnographic privileging of informants’ experience. As intriguing as the idea is, it has its own difficulties, of course, for it hinges on the question of how one determines or accesses this subjectivity. He makes a key elaboration when he notes that “social inequality by itself does not always produce a subjective sense of deprivation” and therefore “social inequality without a subjective sense of deprivation on the part of those disadvantaged by it is not structural violence—it is merely social inequality.” 42 People, he explains, are often socialized to accept social inequality as normal. What this leads to is a definition of structural violence that is “inherently wrapped up in dynamic processes of change,” opening up the door to a different approach.

More than absolute thresholds or social differences, it is the way in which social transformation can reduce the capacity for subjects to realize their
own expectations—and most particularly those they associate with normal everyday living—that matter most in generating sentiments of loss and deprivation. Structural violence thus occurs when changes in the broader social, economic, and political environment render everyday and strategic life projects dramatically more difficult or even impossible to realize.43

What is particularly engaging in this proposal is the potential for moving past the investigator’s own moral world view through an immersion into the subjective realm of the violence experienced by people with whom she studies.

One final example of scholarship that builds on the idea of structural violence comes from Felipe MacGregor and Marcial Rubio Correa. They revise Galtung’s core definition of violence (the one that refers to the difference between actual and potential realizations) to make it more limited and specific; and then they elaborate the two forms. Their main adjustment of the core definition addresses the question of agency. They helpfully suggest that violence is always exerted by a person on another person, regardless of whether the pressure is direct or indirect.44 The upshot is that violence cannot simply be measured only according to its results, as Galtung insists; rather, there is always a human actor involved. MacGregor and Rubio Correa go on to specify the types of pressure that constitute violence, and introduce the idea that this pressure can be exerted at a group level, even if the violence is not identifiable at the individual level. This leads them to a definition that is more restricted than Galtung’s position. Violence for them is a “physical, biological or spiritual pressure, directly or indirectly exercised by a person on someone else, which, when exceeding a certain threshold, reduces or annuls that person’s potential for performance, both at an individual and group level, in the society in which this takes place.”45 They emphasize in their discussion that “the potential of performance is relative to each society.”46 With this general definition in hand, they then go on to the question of direct and structural violence.

For the most part they accept the idea of direct violence as Galtung articulates it, but they make significant changes to the idea of structural violence. They suggest that structural violence “happens to a person from and within society’s structures, which are shaped, maintained, and eventually transformed with margins of plasticity by human beings, and in many cases this also includes the victims, all of whom are shaped by the same structures.”47 In other words, “structural violence is contained in the very structures of society itself.” The key, then, is to ask, “What precisely are society’s structures?” To which they answer:

They are people’s ways of relating to each other according to accepted rules, to such a degree that these rules become virtually the very essence of human interrelations. They exist in the intersubjectivity of people, and in
each person in so far as she or he belongs to the group. That is why we say that structural violence stems from the structures (that is, the rules regulating human behaviour) but is also, simultaneously, within the structures (which make up the individual and the collective psyche). In other words, the relationship between culture and structural violence is very intense; in some cases, we could say, they may even be identical. 48

The last sentence introduces a problem. At one level they distinguish culture from structural violence, but at another level they suggest they are virtually the same. Clearly structures, by this way of thinking, need to be resilient. They suggest that although “the rules vary and the structures have a built-in, internal flexibility, they tend constantly to reproduce themselves, with certain adaptations.” 49 But in trying to work in the concept of culture they perhaps do more harm than good. Falling back on Galtung’s later work, MacGregor and Rubio Correa think that he is right “when he says that some violent aspects of a culture justify direct and structural violence,” but they then go on to conflate the two concepts by saying that “culture in itself is very often structural violence.” 50 While I think the former clause is worth looking into, the latter I do not find helpful.

NARROW DEFINITIONS

In the next few pages I want to contrast these wide definitions with examples of narrow definitions. In each case I want to highlight how a narrow definition is itself not as straightforward as it might seem, while also suggesting that these narrow definitions run into problems not dissimilar to those found in wide definitions.

John Keane

Even though political philosopher John Keane dismisses explicitly Galtung’s wide definition of violence, his own effort to provide a more restricted definition itself moves into rather fuzzy categories of violence. He asserts that “a political theory of violence needs to be aware of the need for sharp-edged categories that are as necessary as they are dangerous.” 51 Despite the fact that the scope and meaning of violence changes “through time and from space to space” and varies enormously, Keane insists on the need to preserve its original and essential core meaning, untainted by loose metaphorical allusions (as when a standard or treaty is ‘violated’ or somebody is said to suffer a ‘violent convulsion’ or shakes ‘violently’ or whose speech acts are described as ‘violent’ because they are passionate or immoderate) or unhindered by questions of motivation (people can be
violent for a bewildering variety of reasons) or legality (violence can be, and is often, not merely the unlawful exercise of physical force) or weighed down by mistaken, if commonplace, presumptions, such as the conviction that violence against things is somehow equivalent to violence against people, as if people are the same as property. 52

For Keane we have to “preserve” (a word he uses several times in his discussion) an “older and more precise meaning of violence” in the face of efforts, like Galtung’s (who he specifically mentions), to stretch its meaning, which “effectively makes a nonsense of the concept.” 53 Keane then provides what he considers to be an older and more precise definition of violence. He suggests that violence is best understood as “the unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others, which are consequently made to suffer a series of effects ranging from shock, bruises, scratches, swelling or headaches to broken bones, heart attacks, loss of limbs or even death.” 54

As precise as Keane tries to be with this definition (bruises, scratches, swelling), he then goes on to elaborate the idea in ways that effectively broaden the concept to include phenomena that go well beyond shocks and bruises. Referring to suicide and “voluntary euthanasia”, he includes in his understanding any “enforced self-violation” either “consciously intended or half-intended.” 55 Then, with reference to Michel Foucault’s work on prisons, he introduces the rather interesting idea of “institutionalized” violence which occurs in prisons, hospitals and asylums. 56 What he means by this is that “the bodies of subjects are confined, against their will but in the name of their improvement, in houses of discipline and punishment in which, so to say, violence is redeployed from public sites of punishment, sanitized and camouflaged” 57 within the walls of these institutions. With this elaboration, Keane comes close to accepting that there are forms of violence embodied in structures created by humans. This possibility is opened up because in his definition Keane does not address the question of who does violence; therefore, it is possible that an institution is an agent of violence because it interferes physically against the will of those who are experiencing the violence. What he is not willing to grant, I believe, is that there are forms of violence happening in these institutions not bounded by the physical dimension.

Keane goes on to explain that “violence is a relational act in which the object of violence is treated, involuntarily not as a subject whose ‘otherness’ is recognized and respected, but rather as a mere object potentially worthy of bodily harm, or even annihilation.” 58 He rounds out his argument by coming full circle to tie these more ephemeral relational and institutionalized forms of violence to the body. “The imagined, historically rooted, collective identities of a civil society, geographic communities or
religious groups for instance, are damaged or annihilated when their constituent members are violated;” however, in a significant qualifier, “violence only has this effect because ultimately it bears down on and threatens embodied individuals, who are treated as mere objects, and whose bodies are deemed worthy of a kick and a punch, or a knife, a bullet or a bomb.” In the end, Keane is especially concerned to remind us of the contentious nature of this discussion. “It is true that the term ‘violence’ is riddled with nuances and ambiguities,” he concludes, “and that the concept of violence, like all concepts within and beyond the social sciences, is idealtypisch, and that it therefore selectively highlights certain aspects of reality, which nowhere exists in their pure form. So long as it continues to be used, the concept of violence ... will for that reason of selectivity—and the complicated ethical issues it raises—forever remain controversial.”

C.A.J. Coady

Coady begins his defence of a narrow definition with a general critique of contemporary violence theorists. He asserts that they “offer explicit definitions of the term ‘violence’ that exhibit both ... deafness to linguistic patterns and, more significantly ... blindness to political and moral realities.” From this all-encompassing criticism, he then goes on to say that any definition of violence must “cope with the untidiness, indeterminacy, and variety of purpose involved in natural languages and ordinary speech contexts,” and that these concepts often reflect “diverse moral and political outlooks or visions.” With these words he has set a high bar for himself and others who tackle this problem. In the end I do not think his own work comes up to his own standard.

What I find most interesting about Coady’s advocacy of a narrow definition is how mundane it is, because in the end he offers nothing more than a defence of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of violence. The way he goes about this is to critique other scholars in the belief that by proving their definitions are inadequate, the OED definition remains the best choice. He suggests that restricted definitions are “typically those that concentrate upon positive, interpersonal acts of force, usually involving the infliction of physical injury.” Coady argues that this is the “normal or ordinary understanding of ‘violence,’” since this is the commonly used dictionary definition; besides which, he argues that those who would propose a wider definition “take it that they are offering an extension of just such a normal or usual idea.” Of course, we have already seen that theorists like Galtung, Farmer, MacGregor and Rubio Correa do not at all assume that they are ‘simply’ extending any sort of dictionary definition. Far more than that, they are literally proposing a social scientific classification system for a particular family of human behaviour. Even so, Coady thinks that a restricted dictionary style definition is “the most politically neutral” way to define the concept,
although he admits that this reveals his own "liberal" stance, which he situates half-way between what he calls the left and right (in other words, socialist—liberal—conservative). He is basically arguing here that the "left" tends to want a wide definition that will include "a great range of social injustices and inequalities" under the umbrella of violence. "This not only allows reformers," according to Coady, "to say that they are working to eliminate violence when they oppose, say, a government measure to redistribute income in favour of the already rich, but also allows revolutionaries to offer, in justification of their resort to violence—even when it is terrorist—the claim that they are merely meeting violence with violence." 

To suggest that scholars like Galtung or Lubkemann are somehow supporting terrorism is quite a stretch. Oddly, on the other end of the spectrum, the political right, Coady does not offer an example of such a definition, although he implies one by the critiques offered by the left, which assume a conservative definition. The definition that arises from the right he calls a "legitimist" definition, and it "arises naturally in the context of conservative or right-wing liberal political thought, for it incorporates a reference to an illegal or illegitimate use of force." Writing from the context of Australia, Coady has the temerity to suggest that this definition has the most usage in the United States. He does not however provide us with any examples from this school of thought, although he does reference extensively a so-called left-wing commentator who, according to Coady, "accepted this sort of definition in order to argue a kind of left-wing case by purporting to show that the concept of violence is incoherent." Once again, Coady is stretching the use of language beyond what these authors would accept. Basically he is saying that this right-wing definition, which I think boils down to the assertion that any act that is sanctioned by the state is legitimate and therefore not violent, must somehow be a definition on the same order as others we have looked at, even though it clearly falls into the debate over legitimacy and illegitimacy that applies across the board to all these definitions.

Eventually Coady does get around to providing a justification for a narrow definition. The *Oxford English Dictionary* definition that Coady defends is "the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage to persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this." Coady admits that there are problems with this definition; for example, the omission of psychological violence, and cases where great harm is done without the use of force (he gives as examples poisoning, and the idea of a siege or blockade). Nevertheless, he justifies the restricted concept of violence by noting that there is a particular, distinct type of hazard "that many people fear very greatly, namely, the forceful intrusion into their lives of those who are intent upon inflicting harm and injury upon their person." He is at pains to convince us that this hazard is clear and distinct from other life hazards, such as harm from "natural disasters and
accidents, or by disease, or the indifference and lack of consideration of our fellows, or by social arrangements that are to our disadvantage." It is remarkable, given some of his earlier comments, that Coady has lumped together here “natural disasters” and “social arrangements that are to our disadvantage.” That he would juxtapose these in defence of a restricted definition is not theoretically sound. Probing deeper into his thought, we find that the philosophical basis for Coady’s concerns is found in Hobbes’s world view. Drawing explicitly on *Leviathan*, Coady asserts that there is indeed good reason for people to fear “forceful intrusion into their lives” because, without his having gone into a defence of Hobbes, he clearly believes that life is “worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

A rather striking feature of the long chapter in which we find Coady’s defence of the OED definition is the amount of space he gives to a critique explicitly focussed on Galtung’s idea of structural violence. I take this as a sign of how widespread and pervasive the idea of structural violence has become. For the sake of thoroughness I want to briefly outline Coady’s criticism of Galtung in order to illustrate the degree of controversy that exists on this subject.

As I have noted on more than one occasion, Coady also sees that the idea of structural violence as articulated by Galtung “has become a stock-in-trade for both popular and academic discussion of social and political problems to the present day....” He suggests that its validity, however, is “...usually merely assumed rather than argued for, and detailed criticisms or defences of the idea are rare.” Although he does not cite any of these rare criticisms or defences, he goes on to provide one of his own. The main thrust of his general critique of a wide definition is that they run together phenomena that should be kept separate, causing confusion. Here is the core passage where he explains how he sees this problem:

> When people speak of structural or institutional violence, they often run together three things that should be kept separate. First, there is what Galtung is principally concerned with, namely, the way in which people are injured and harmed by unjust social arrangements even though no violence in the restricted (or “personal”) sense is being done to them. Second, there is the phenomenon of ordinary person-to-person violence with pronounced social or structural causes (for example, police harassment of racial minorities, race riots, and prison brutality, to name just a few plausible candidates). Third, there is the widespread readiness to resort to socially licensed violence that is implicit in much of social life. Galtung puts this into the category of “latent violence” but still appears to treat it as a type of violence, which seems wrong for the perfectly generally
reason that tendencies and dispositions should not be confused with their display. 77

With specific reference to Galtung, Coady argues that “some rather curious features” allow for certain acts to be named violent which Coady suggests most people would not recognize as violence. Coady illustrates this critique by expressing doubt that “a young child is engaged in violence if its expression of its needs and desires is such that it makes its mother and/or father very tired, even if it is not in any ordinary sense ‘a violent child’ or engaged in violent actions.” 78 Coady’s example is itself mischievous because Galtung’s definition would not suggest that the child’s expression is violent, although a surface reading may give this impression. What Coady is referring to is Galtung’s phrase about violence being present when a person is being influenced such that their actual realizations are below their potential realizations. To suggest that tired parents are influenced in this way is a distortion of Galtung’s intent.

What I have come to see is that Coady’s true concern with Galtung’s definition appropriately focuses on Galtung’s attempt to define peace through a clearer definition of violence. Recall that Galtung said that peace must address both the negation of personal violence and the presence of social justice. In Coady’s words, which are quite different from Galtung’s, this concept of peace ensures that “highly unacceptable social orders” cannot be allowed to exist. For Coady, this “muddled or mischievous (and just possibly both)” justification is the central concern.

If the suggestion is that peace cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total ideal, then the suggestion is surely absurd. A multiplicity of compatible but noninclusive ideals seems as worthy of human pursuit as a single comprehensive goal, and, furthermore, it seems a more honest way to characterise social realities. Galtung finds it somehow shocking that highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace, but only the total ideal assumption makes this even surprising. 79

Three words stand out in this brief paragraph: absurd, honest, and shocking. Although I too have some concern about the way Galtung has placed peace in a particular box, I am quite sure that his argument is not “absurd”. Quite the opposite, I think he has made a strong case for a comprehensive understanding of peace even if we choose not to accept it exactly as he has articulated it. To suggest that this is somehow less “honest” than any other way of talking about peace is itself mischievous, for how can advocating a comprehensive understanding of “peace” be perceived to be pulling the wool over anyone’s eyes? Or, even less, how can it be seen as “propaganda” that is any different than the apparently constrained form of peace to which Coady ascribes? At no point in
my reading of Galtung does he seem to be “shocked;” he is disturbed by social orders that do tremendous violence in so-called times of peace. That seems to me to be an honest effort to address what are clearly dishonest government policies with reference to issues like war, racism, poverty and inequality.

In response to Galtung’s project, Coady suggests that there are three important replies that need to be made. First, “the similarities between personal violence and structural violence seem to be too few and too general to offset the striking differences between them.” Both produce harm, but “the types of harm and the conditions of their production are terribly different.” 80 To my way of thinking, what I hear Coady saying has some validity at least as a way to see the striking divergence of thought on the subject of violence. To go back to one of my earlier analogies, in which I suggested that Galtung is saying that there are two species of violence in one family of human behaviour, Coady is saying that in fact there are two families of behaviour that are entirely different and should not share the same label. In other words, to draw on the same analogy, where Galtung is saying that there are Homo Sapiens and Neanderthals, Coady is saying there are Homo Sapiens and elephants. In some far distant past they obviously both came from the ocean, but to study them requires different tools, definitions, words and concepts. Coady goes on to say that while both personal and structural violence are moral concerns, “the way in which each relates to morality seems to be different.” 81 Most importantly for Coady is his belief that a wide definition like Galtung’s “is likely to have undesirable practical consequences.” 82 I find that Coady’s explanation of this has some cogency. He argues that personal violence and social injustice for example may need to be addressed independently; and they most certainly will require different strategies and techniques to ameliorate them. However when Coady says that wide definitions will possibly encourage “the cosy but ultimately stultifying belief that there is one problem, the problem of (wide) violence, and hence it must be solved with one set of techniques” 83 he does an injustice to the sophistication of Galtung’s argument, because as one reads the final pages of the 1969 paper, Galtung very clearly asserts that there will need to be multiple forms of intervention that will address these diverse manifestations of violence. Moreover, the whole point of Galtung’s essay is to promote peace research as an avenue to explore a multitude of strategies and techniques to deal with all forms of violence.

Although I cannot accept Coady’s conclusion that the underpinnings of wide definitions are “theoretically unsound, and the practical consequences of adopting them are likely to be, at the very least, disappointing” 84 I want to affirm that it is in this criticism that we begin to see shortcomings in both wide and narrow definitions. What I find most intriguing about this sometimes vociferous exchange (I suspect that there is a personal dimension to this discussion as well) is the way it illuminates, with crystal clarity, how one’s political and moral world view will thoroughly colour social scientific concepts.
TYPOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS

The two final examples that I want to discuss come from the World Health Organization, and a paper by Charles Tilly. The reason I want to end with these examples is that they will act as a bridge to the next chapter, because although Tilly and the WHO are very clear about using a narrow definition, they also present expanded typologies based on their definitions, something neither Keane nor Coady does.

Charles Tilly

Tilly frames his effort to define violence by emphasizing that theoretical explanations that try to explain why humans engage in violence are different than definitions that demarcate the subject matter, which in his case is collective violence. He begins with a brief synopsis of different theoretical approaches to the study of violence—propensity driven behaviour, instrumental interaction, and cultural form—all of which he summarizes in one paragraph (we have already seen all of these in the previous chapter in different guises): propensity driven behaviours refers to internal dispositions to violence, instrumentalism refers to the broad category of interactionist theory that posits causes are found in social interactions, and cultural form—a less than precise label—refers to “the ready availability of certain ideas, practices, models, and beliefs [that themselves] promote violent action”). He reminds us that these are efforts to determine causality, not define violence, before moving to the main subject of his paper, which is the definition of collective violence.

Like others, he argues that the term violence is almost always used in a context of “moral charge,” and thus often used to name “varieties of harm far outside the range of direct, short-term infliction of physical damage on one person by another.” In these few words he has already eliminated the possibility of a wide definition along the lines of Galtung or Farmer. Although he acknowledges the moral context of all efforts to define violence (presumably his own as well), Tilly argues that we can “nevertheless discipline the inquiry [into public violence] by adopting a restrictive definition of the phenomenon under analysis.” Having clarified that his concern is with collective violence, he defines violence: “Collective violence ... refers to episodic social interaction that a) immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects ... and b) results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts.” This definition has the advantage, he argues, that on the one hand it excludes “strictly individual, private, impulsive, and/or accidental damage to persons,” while on the other hand it also excludes “long-term, incremental damage such as communication of infectious disease ... and
death hastened by neglect or social pressure." With this in hand he turns to what I think is an innovative attempt to deploy this restricted definition in a typology of his own.

Tilly's proposed "crude typology of public violence" situates violence in seven different locations which are mapped onto a two dimensional space defined by two axes. Along one axis is the "extent of coordination among violent actors" and along the other axis is the "salience of short-run damage." Using these criteria Tilly arrives at seven "locations" that demarcate different realms and actors engaged in violence that bear some "family resemblance." Without going into great detail, these seven locations range from "organized outcomes," "coordinated destruction," "opportunism," "dispersed resistance," "violent ritual," "brawls," to "individual aggression." Tilly opens the door to the possibility that there may be other factors to distinguish types of public violence besides coordination and salience, but these, according to him, are the ones that "capture a significant part of the systematic variation about which social scientists have produced useful ideas and findings."

There is an inconsistency in Tilly's typology, which he admits. One of the seven types, "individual aggression," allows for the possibility of individual acts of violence, even though Tilly's definition explicitly excludes such acts, because he is concerned to use a restrictive definition of collective violence, not the term violence itself. He covers himself on this point by arguing that he includes the individual aggression in the typology "to mark its presence as a limiting case, to point out that the line between collective brawls and individual aggression remains blurred...." This inconsistency speaks to the difficulty of staying strictly with the collective end of the spectrum of behaviours associated with violence.

What is unique about Tilly, in comparison with Keane and Coady, is his use of a narrow definition with a typology that points toward process as a central concern, or at least a level of interaction amongst actors. The idea of "structural violence," however, does not seem to have a place in this definition of collective violence.

World Health Organization

The 2002 WHO World Report on Violence and Health is a comprehensive document that links together in a UN-based institutional report health issues and violence. The document was written by a team who clearly had to weigh a number of political and cultural factors as they prepared the document, resulting in what might be considered a consensus document for large international organizations. Somewhat in line with the general approach found in the previous section, this document adopts a modified narrow definition, and provides a typology to "expand" the narrow definition.
The WHO typology is by far one of the most precise currently in the literature on violence.

The definition proposed by the WHO restricts violence to the realm of direct violence, therefore situating it in the same family as the previous three definitions. What distinguishes their definition is that they explicitly add the concepts of power and intent. Thus, violence is the “intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.”96 Quite clearly this definition “associates intentionality with the committing of the act itself, irrespective of the outcome it produces.” So while the definition is restricted to direct violence, it does “expand” the definition in ways that are unique by including “power”. The result “broadens the nature of a violent act and expands the conventional understanding of violence to include those acts that result from a power relationship, including threats and intimidation. The ‘use of power’ also serves to include neglect or acts of omission, in addition to the more obvious violent acts of commission. Thus, ‘the use of physical force or power’ should be understood to include neglect and all types of physical, sexual and psychological abuse, as well as suicide and other self-abusive acts.”97 It is important to note the inclusion of neglect and all types of abuse, whether self-inflicted or otherwise, as a part of this wide definition of power—perhaps a fruitful way of expanding a narrow definition without including explicitly the concept of structural violence and allowing for more latitude than what the WHO itself intends. At another level of analysis, the WHO definition may not cover enough. As one of my advisors has commented, the WHO approach

says nothing, for example, about the unintentional use of power. So it overlooks violence that results from patterns of abuse and oppression that are so ingrained that they do not involve or require any form of intentional activity. Oppression, for example that results merely from the (well founded) expectations of the victims of violence. Expectations that no longer require any overt action from the oppressor(s).98

The second distinguishing characteristic of this definition is the insistence on addressing intentionality. This introduces a very complex calculation into the mix, as we shall see. The WHO considers unintended events that cause harm not to constitute violence, however, “the presence of an intent to use force does not necessarily mean that there was an intent to cause damage.” An example of this is when a parent “may vigorously shake a crying infant with the intent to quieten it. Such an action, however, may instead cause brain damage. Force was clearly used, but without the intention of causing an injury.”99 The second point related to intentionality is “the distinction
between the intent to injure and the intent to ‘use violence’.” With this the WHO is attempting to address cultural variations, which are, of course, a huge issue for a UN-based organization. They go on to clarify that

Some people mean to harm others but, based on their cultural backgrounds and beliefs, do not perceive their acts as violent. The definition used by the World Health Organization, however, defines violence as it relates to the health or well-being of individuals. Certain behaviours—such as hitting a spouse—may be regarded by some people as acceptable cultural practices, but are considered violent acts with important health implications for the individual.  

Although the examples of the parent shaking the child and spousal abuse seem fairly straightforward, it is not difficult to come up with examples where this distinction is difficult to uphold. One controversial example is the practice of female circumcision, called by its opponents female genital mutilation (FGM), a practice whose proponents argue does not intend to do harm. Those who oppose it argue that it is an intentional act of harm frequently visited upon minors and women who are vulnerable to adult power or male privilege. This is an invasive surgical procedure with serious health consequences in many cases. So the question is, who decides what cultural practices are intentional acts of violence, and which are intentions to use force without the intent to cause damage?

Of principal concern to the WHO is how to measure and classify the violence they have now defined. To aid in this process, they present a very detailed typology of direct violence. Unlike the Tilly typology which focuses on locations, the WHO categorizes violence according to a) characteristics of the violence actors, and b) the nature of the violent acts. In the former case, there is self-directed, interpersonal and collective violence. Each of these is further subdivided into more specific categories. The category of collective violence they clarify as meaning “violence inflicted by larger groups, such as states, organized political groups, militia groups and terrorist organizations.”  

In terms of the nature of violent acts, there are four categories: physical, sexual, psychological, and involving deprivation or neglect. Using these categories they create a grid with a total of forty boxes into which specific acts of direct violence can be placed. The whole purpose of this, as is fitting for a health organization, is the prevention of violence by first identifying it (you cannot cure a disease until you have diagnosed it).

One final note that I want to insert is to point out a striking inconsistency in the WHO discussion of collective violence in Chapter 8 of the report, where they establish that the forms of collective violence are complex emergencies, armed conflict, and genocide. They clarify their understanding of collective violence by saying that it is “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group—
whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity—against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives.” 102 Quite inexplicably, they explicitly exclude “forms of political violence that do not have political objectives, such as gang violence, mass hooliganism and criminal violence associated with banditry.” 103 Perhaps this inconsistency is just an oversight, but obviously banditry, for example, employs violence for an economic goal. I see this as an unfortunate omission from what is otherwise a thorough and engaging discussion of violence.
ENDNOTES

5 A good discussion of this is found in Peter W. Macky, *Violence: Right Or Wrong* (Waco: World Books, 1973).
8 Claude Levi-Strauss’s seminal work in structural anthropology was published in this same time frame, to give one example.
9 I shall also be referring to a later article in which Galtung clearly is solidifying his notion of structural violence as a central concept, although it was presented as part of a constellation of ideas in the 1969 article. Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305. Perhaps it is a kindness to Galtung for them to focus on the earlier, more provocative article, because as I shall explore in the following paragraphs his later article is much less useful, and far more open to attack.
14 All quotes found in the bullets that follow are from Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 169-72.
17 When checked against both the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Wikipedia I am pleasantly surprised that my memory of this basic distinction remains intact. I do not here wish to imply that I am overly familiar with the works of Aristotle, whose works I had to study in undergraduate philosophy classes. But I do see here a correspondence that I think holds. The distinction can be found by searching for the definition of "definition" in both encyclopedias.
18 His first mention of these two aspects of peace was in a 1964 article without reference to violence.
29 Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 301.
30 Most recently I noted that the much referenced SIPRI 2008 Yearbook on armaments worldwide includes a full discussion of direct and structural violence. See Appendix 2C in SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Summary (Oslo: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008).
31 One of his more well-known books that builds on the idea is Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

41 Lubkemann, *Culture in Chaos*, 112.

42 Lubkemann, *Culture in Chaos*, 112.

43 Lubkemann, *Culture in Chaos*, 112.


56 Keane does not provide much elaboration of his use of Foucault, which seems to me to be quite problematic. He seems to want to excerpt from Foucault’s analysis of power a specific reference to physical harm done in prisons, without accepting the implications of Foucault’s analysis for his own argument. Foucault is not interested in violence *per se* so much as he is interested in the relationship between power and knowledge. Although I cannot pursue this at length, it seems to me that Keane wants to co-opt the academic legitimacy offered by Foucault, without accepting Foucault’s much larger agenda.


59 Keane, *Reflections on Violence*, 68.


Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 16.

Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 17.

Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 17.

Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 17.

Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 17.


Tilly, "Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories," 18.


98 Personal correspondence with Dr. Mark Vorobej, copy on file with the author.


100 *World Report on Violence and Health*, 5.


5. VIOLENCE AND WAR AS PROCESS

In the previous two chapters I reviewed basic approaches that anthropologists have used to look at the subject of violence and war and then examined the complex question of defining violence. Several things will become more clear in this chapter: I situate myself in the interpretive stream of anthropology; when thinking about violence I emphasize realms and processes; and I resist the idea that violence can be put in a box. As we have seen, within the interpretive stream of anthropology there are many different ways to look at the subject of violence and war—some emphasize symbolic dimensions, others social interaction, and still others focus on the ethnography of direct experience. Although I have been influenced by all of these approaches, my main interest is in the idea of culture as process, the theoretical upshot of which is to think of both violence and war as processes as well. A central focus in this chapter, therefore, will be to explore the interplay between a) a web of symbol systems in constant flux, b) networks of institutions, bureaucratic and social processes, and c) the infliction of psychosomatic harm in the physical realm.

It will also become clear that I reject both wide and narrow definitions of violence, believing that they buy into an intellectual tradition that tries to theoretically “tame” violence in unproductive ways. The taming of violence in the West has distorted the realities of violence as experienced by people who have lived with it on a daily basis in war zones. This has frequently resulted in inauthentic narratives that purport to be about violence when they are in fact about the theoretician’s own worldview. Carolyn Nordstrom captures the concern for taming violence in this central passage:

Violence [in the west] is presented as something both integral to the human condition and as antithetical to it. This portrayal has led to a tendency to fetishize violence, fueling a fascination with the topic while banishing it to the outer margins of human life and everyday reality. It is cast as the excessive, the abnormal, the other, and yet as intrinsic.... This conception can most clearly be seen in the curious fact that most writing about violence in western theory never deals with actual violence. People write about writing about violence; they write about second-hand historical narratives of violence; they write about what people say about violence—all as if this represented the actual experience of violence. But in most of these cases people are writing from the safety of a nonviolent situation. The irony is not that people write about writing about
violence—for this is as viable a technique as any—but that this is unquestioningly accepted as representing violence, real violence.... What results is not a true discussion of violence, but a taming of it into something we can manage. It is no longer violence per se, but it is safe.¹

This takes on significance when we realize that the person writing about violence cannot escape their own cultural positioning. It is Nordstrom’s experience, which resonates with my own, that “much of how we perceive violence, write about violence, and respond to others’ presentations on violence has less to do with the actual violence than it does with our own personality and idiosyncratic worldview.”² If we do not have a critical sense of how we are constrained by our own cultural worldview, then we may be tempted to “essentialize violence theoretically” which means “to reify it” according to our own viewpoint. To do so results in losing “not only the experiential force of violence lived but to endanger an adequate understanding of complex dynamics that define this phenomenon in thought and action.”³ The tendency to be blind to our own positioning is understandable, for the subject of violence is fraught with so many dimensions, including, as we have already seen, difficult ethical dilemmas. Putting violence in a theoretical cage becomes an attractive idea.

Theory has all too often been a zoo in which we cage the wild beasts of violence that inhabit our worlds. We then gaze at these beasts from a safe distance, we contemplate them, we theorize how they would act in their own environments—and we never go to those environments where the beasts roam freely to actually check our theories. To do so would be disastrous. It would point out the absurdity of our analyses and the illusion of safety so carefully crafted.⁴

With Nordstrom, my “stand against the theoretical taming of violence is not a plea to unleash violence. Just the opposite. In trying to tame violence in theory, violence in reality is left unchecked.”⁵ At the same time, I am aware that Nordstrom has not been fully successful in avoiding the taming of violence—indeed, I think she has a very sophisticated theory of violence, the effect of which is to lull one into a safe feeling of “understanding” the violence in Mozambique—nor do I believe that we can avoid the theoretical taming of violence to some degree. What her position does, and what I would hope to emulate, is to keep the arrow of inquiry pointed at people and to foster an attitude of questioning assumptions about violence and its portrayal.

What I want the reader to come away with by the end of this chapter is a clear sense of how I am using ideas that bear some allegiance to the work of several scholars already discussed—including Johan Galtung, Charles Tilly, Pierre Bourdieu, David Riches, and others—to help grind a lens to see dimensions of war with Iraq that have
hitherto been masked; to point in the direction of a reality, in other words, where violence remains unchecked. My purpose in developing this lens has been to get behind the surface representations of the US/UK – IRAQ War found in popular culture to find a more authentic story-line that represents a broader realm of experience than what the conventional view—a view that purports to be about “Iraq”, but which is actually about taming violence to make it palatable to a majority in the US—would have us believe.

CONFLICT, VIOLENCE, AND WAR

The first part of this analysis necessitates exploring the relationships between three key terms: conflict, violence, and war. In the field of anthropology (and perhaps in other fields of inquiry) these three terms are often conflated, or, more often, used with little attention to the relationship that exists between them. In many cases I believe significant assumptions make for a lot of confusion in the field, especially when building models and theory.

In an article by Jeffrey Sluka called, “The Anthropology of Conflict,” (an article that I think is otherwise quite helpful) the habit of assuming the relationships between these terms is quite pronounced and provides an example of what I am talking about. The title would indicate that the main focus of the article will be the concept of conflict. As we begin to read the article, however, we are immediately disconcerted because the author spends the first 750 words of the article—a full page of close text—laying out a litany of major wars and minor wars since about 3600 BCE which have produced “approximately one billion direct battle deaths.” The distinct impression is left that war equals conflict and conflict equals war in a symmetrical fashion. He goes on to document the extraordinary amount of money that has been spent on arms, and the now dated fact that according to UNESCO “one day’s global military spending could save the lives of all of the fifteen million children who die each year from starvation and disease.” All of this information is valuable; however, he then ends this long paragraph—a dramatic paragraph that sets the tone for the article—by saying “the point is that ‘for a decade or two, conflicts have clearly been more frequent, more serious, and more radicalized’ and the fact that today the study of social conflict has become a dominant anthropological interest is a reflection of this world historical trend.” This statement is then followed by a discussion of how important social conflict is for anthropologists. Shortly thereafter Sluka helpfully defines social conflict, but at no time does he clarify what he means by either “war” or “violence”. Throughout the article examples of war and violence are frequently cited, yet the reader is left to assume a “common sense” understanding of these loaded terms. Indeed, in the social sciences there are few terms as contested as the term
violence, yet here the term is only implicitly understood to be related to social conflict. Later in the article, Sluka writes that “one of the most important points anthropologists have made about conflict refers to its sources, particularly the sources of violence.”¹³ We are left with the implied suggestion that somehow the sources of violence are the same as or related to the question of conflict, which I think is not a valid assumption. Like violence, the impression is also left that “war” and its relationship to conflict is a given. In my analysis, it too is not.

Conflict can be as nonviolent as it can be violent, and the relationship between these two types of conflict is important, because conflating (or blending) the terms could among other things mean that violence, like conflict, is “value neutral”. To my mind, conflict (like culture) is value neutral—it is ever present in human society and cannot be avoided. We cannot opt out of conflict any more than we can opt out of culture. The choice to use violence, however, is a different matter. Is violence value neutral? Meaning, does it comprise a conceptual domain like culture and conflict, a domain about which we have no choice? It may be such a category. Indeed, the question of its “neutrality” is the crux of much of the debate about violence. We have already seen that many social scientists lean in the direction of saying that violence is not a choice; it is part of “human nature” or the inevitable product of specific material conditions like scarce resources. In this thesis I have not agreed. Given the importance of the concept and this debate, the author of an article that purports to focus on “conflict” must make the implicit explicit. Too much hangs on the word to leave it unspoken.

For that reason, in the following section I will look at conflict as an umbrella concept, and then focus on its relationship to violence. I will follow this with a discussion of war’s relationship to violence, both of which I understand to be theoretically subordinate to conflict. Once I have explained the relationship between these three concepts I will be better prepared to present a model of violence that I believe makes it possible to see war where it has been hidden from view. One fact of war that cannot be contested is that it is comprised in large part of violence; but it is equally true that not all violence is war. So how then are they related?

Simon Harrison

My effort to address war in the context of violence is informed by an observation made by anthropologist Simon Harrison. In the last paragraph of a concise overview of the anthropological analyses of war, he clearly indicates the problem of trying to address war without addressing violence. He asserts that creating any theory of war in anthropology runs into significant problems because virtually any factor which can be identified as a cause of war can also be understood as an effect of it. He concludes that
these sorts of circularities seem to arise from trying to understand war without first having grounded it in its proper context: namely, in the deeper and more general phenomenon of violence, of which war is an aspect. An adequate theory of war must await the solution of the larger problem of the theoretical understanding of violence, which is poorly developed in anthropology.  

I take his conclusion as forecasting the direction of future work by anthropologists on war as well as an indication that the current implicit division of labour into an anthropology of war and an ethnography of violence needs to be rethought to enable a new generation of work on the subject.

CONFLICT AS THE BROADER CONTEXT

My situating of violence and war in the broader context of conflict is derived in the first instance from the work of Georg Simmel. By doing this I am asserting that there is something important to the simple observation that all violence is conflict, but not all conflict is violent (Figure 1). Moving from a discussion of Simmel's spectrum that has as its endpoints the concepts of conflict and unity, I shall move to a closer examination of the conflict end of his spectrum. From that discussion I will then look at the concept of conflict as an overarching umbrella for contextualizing the notion of violence. Having subordinated violence to conflict, I shall then engage in a conversation about three realms of violence. The next step will then be to explicate the relationship of war and violence through a processual lens. The implications of linking war closely to violence will be central to unmasking not only the harmful impact of war on human well-being, but also showing how it has been masked from popular view over many years. First I want to emphasize "what has now become an axiom in the anthropology of conflict" — the crucial point made by Simmel that there is an oscillating relationship between conflict and unity.
The Paradox of Conflict and Unity

One of the remarkable features of Simmel’s work is the way it has been used by conflict theorists across a broad spectrum of disciplines and theoretical approaches. The most well-known translations of his work came from Marxist sociologists who drew heavily on his seminal ideas. At the same time proponents of a structural-functionalist school of thought also drew heavily on his essays. Those who took up the subject of social integration were especially drawn to his ideas about conflict, leading to a well established school of social process theory in the interdisciplinary field of Conflict Resolution Studies.

The understanding of conflict first developed by Simmel in 1908 (translated in 1955) remains a seminal contribution to the intellectual history of the idea. For Simmel, conflict is “designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties.” This phenomenon means much more than the trivial “si vis pacem para bellum” [if you want peace, prepare for war]; it is something quite general, of which this maxim only describes a special case. Conflict itself resolves the tension between contrasts. The fact that it aims at peace is only one, an especially obvious, expression of its nature: the synthesis of elements that work both against and for one another. This nature appears more clearly when it is realized that both forms of relation—the antithetical and the convergent—are fundamentally distinguished from the mere indifference of two or more individuals or groups. Whether it implies the rejection or the termination of sociation, indifference is purely negative. In contrast to such pure negativity, conflict contains something positive. Its positive and negative aspects, however, are integrated; they can be separated conceptually, but not empirically.

Unity, explains Simmel, has a twofold meaning. His definition of it—a definition that encompasses both its meanings—also helps to clarify the nature of conflict.

We designate as “unity” the consensus and concord of interacting individuals, as against their discords, separations, and disharmonies. But we also call “unity” the total group-synthesis of persons, energies, and forms, that is, the ultimate wholeness of that group, a wholeness which covers both strictly-speaking unitary relations and dualistic relations.
Although both conflict and unity can connote an "event" or "episode," "it is more useful to think about a process, involving the [actors'] sequence of responses to each other." Conflict and unity, then, are more than just two ends of a spectrum; as Simmel describes them, they are an evolving set of relationships emphasizing both discord and harmony between humans (Figure 2).

This view of conflict meshes well with the social constructivist framework pioneered by Alfred Schutz, Herbert Blumer, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman. And more recently, it undergirds the influential work of John Paul Lederach in the field of peace and conflict studies. "At essence," says Lederach, the social constructivist framework suggests that "the construction of social meaning, as an intersubjective process, lies at the heart of how human conflict is created." He summarizes the understanding of conflict that arises from this discussion when he suggests that social conflict "is a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships. It is a phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs, and indeed its very creators. It is a necessary element in transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organization and realities."

What I take from this discussion, and what is especially germane to my analysis, is the idea that conflict is the largest conceptual category under which we can situate the idea of both violence and war. But that concept itself is a paradox. This approach requires at a conceptual level the division of human behaviour into two domains called "conflict" and "unity" which describe an oscillating process of developing relationships. However, at the empirical level of human life—men, women and children getting on, as Edward Sapir says, with their quotidian lives—this human behaviour is not divisible. Because conflict represents a key process that guides human development, any analysis of it must recognize the paradoxical oscillation between its duality and singularity. As a broad framework for understanding the push and pull of daily life, Simmel's paradox serves to ground my understanding of violence and war. Looking at the conflict "end" of Simmel's duality helps to show how conflict itself acts as an umbrella for the concept of violence.

**Conflict as an Umbrella Concept**

Simmel tells us that conflict and unity are complementary aspects of experience, and his holistic perspective allows us to focus on conflict without losing sight of the essential connectedness of conflict to the rest of experience. Rather than treating conflict as a special case, separate from the rest of experience, and especially separate from unity,
we will pursue our consideration of conflict while being mindful of that larger whole within which conflict operates.\textsuperscript{27}

As I understand conflict there are two ends of an oscillating spectrum of human behaviour best characterized by the adjectives violent and nonviolent. Hence, these are two poles between which conflict moves to and fro in either more violent or less violent ways. This is not unlike Morton Deutsch's suggestion that there are constructive and destructive forms of conflict.\textsuperscript{28} However, I wish to emphasize that destructive forms of conflict are actually best understood in terms of violence—too often diminished in functionalist discourse—and constructive forms of conflict processes are best characterized in terms of nonviolence. To consistently apply the idea of Simmel's spectrum to the violent-nonviolent spectrum suggests that there is no pure form of violent conflict, just as there is no pure form of nonviolent conflict. Following Simmel's approach, for analytical purposes we must distinguish between the two at a conceptual level, although in the empirical world they are not always amenable to separation. This framework thus puts in place the foundation for understanding war in terms of violence as suggested by Harrison (Figure 3).

Towards the violent end of the conflict spectrum is included, for example, war, homicide, terrorism, rape, guerrilla warfare, genocide, gang violence, suicide bombing, armed revolution, and ethnic cleansing. In each of these cases there is a clear application of physical force that does harm resulting in injury, death and physical destruction. Towards the nonviolent end of the conflict spectrum are all those processes that do not use the application of physical force to coerce the resolution or transformation of conflict in the move towards unity. Clearly I see that physical force is an often necessary, though never a sufficient aspect of violent behaviour. These nonviolent processes range from formal mechanisms such as mediation, negotiation and arbitration through to large scale informal nonviolent protest movements and third party efforts at multi-track diplomacy. Since conflict is a constant and normal feature of the push and pull of daily life, clearly a significant part of the conflict process is not violent. Indeed, for the most part humans get along fairly well, even when working their way towards unity through difficult times.
There is a dynamic relationship—a never ending oscillation—between violent and nonviolent processes. To illustrate the push and pull of this relationship consider the nonviolent campaign orchestrated by Mohandas Gandhi in pre-independence India. Although it was in most respects a nonviolent conflict process, it cannot be denied that violence and the threat of it played a part in the process that eventually resulted in a successful anti-colonial movement. Clearly it was not a purely nonviolent movement, nor was it as violent as the armed revolution of Algeria, for example. Or to use another example from the other end of the spectrum, World War I was clearly a violent form of conflict resolution, although in the midst of the war there were surely many efforts and dimensions that could be seen as nonviolent—especially various forms of third party diplomacy that were engaged during the war.

It is crucial to see that here we are describing an oscillating process, not a continuous reified canopy that does not allow movement to happen within the spectrum. This model gives us a language to talk about large scale historical conflict phenomena without the discussion becoming an unproductive debate about whether a particular historical event was violent or not. Rather the focus can turn to the dynamics of the situation to reveal when nonviolence was effective and where it was augmented or thwarted by the use or threat of violent coercion, as in the case of Gandhi’s movement. It also turns us toward a more nuanced reflection on the dynamics of war and efforts toward peace, as in the case of World War I.

VIOLENCE AND WAR AS PROCESS

Just as I have turned the focus towards the conflict end of Simmel’s oscillating conflict - unity spectrum (while bearing the unity end of the spectrum in mind), now I want to focus still more explicitly on the violence end of the violence - nonviolence spectrum (while bearing in mind the nonviolent end of the spectrum).

Of all the sections of this dissertation, this one has been the most difficult to write. The process of thinking through the ideas that I shall try to capture in the next few pages has mimicked the very subject under discussion, for I have vacillated to and fro with a range of ideas that have at one time or another captured my attention, proving yet again just how difficult it is to write about violence, an insight that recurs several times throughout this dissertation. Indeed,

Writing about violence is not a simple matter. The subject is fraught with assumptions, presuppositions, and contradictions. Like power, violence is essentially contested: everyone knows it exists, but no one agrees on what actually constitutes the phenomenon. Vested interests, personal history,
ideological loyalties, propaganda, and a dearth of first-hand experience or information ensure that many published definitions of frontline violence are powerful fictions and negotiated half-truths.\textsuperscript{30}

In the end I became clear that I cannot accept the severe limitations imposed by the idea of structural violence, as useful as it once was to break open the subject of violence. The general idea of thinking in terms of three broad realms, however, does trace back at least in part to Galtung and Bourdieu, who both have tripartite models. Equally so, I find efforts to use a very narrow and conservative definition of violence to have somehow missed the mark. While perhaps theoretically sound, this approach nevertheless leaves out far too much in the effort to understand the complex dynamics of violence exhibited in the world today. However, I am influenced by this approach’s concern to put some constraints on the subject. In the end I have come to accept that I will not be able to present a model with all the pieces worked out to the degree I would have wished, but I have come to some peace and clarity about central aspects of the problem about which I can write with confidence. The central organizing concepts for the present model are “realms” and “processes”. In the field of anthropology it is no longer avant-garde to talk about culture in terms of process; I intend to talk about both violence and war in terms of processes situated in particular conceptual realms.

Nordstrom has helped me to see that defining violence is a highly political act. Those who would advance a wide definition are as politically interested in the power of definition as are those who insist on a narrow definition. If we cannot avoid this quest for power, what recourse do we then have? To study violence, Nordstrom suggests, “even to talk about it, is to make a determination as to what constitutes violence where and among whom. Before we can study it, before we can even ask about it, we must situate what we deem to be violence.”\textsuperscript{31} There are any number of places where violence might be situated. For example, it might be found in the actions of soldiers on the ground in a war zone, in leaders who make decisions about where armies will deploy, in cities amongst civilian populations, or in the actions of private security firms. The researcher determines where to look for violence. Following this line of thinking, based on my experience of Iraq I have identified three realms where I see violence deployed.

**THREE REALMS OF VIOLENCE**

Although I resist the idea of defining violence as a “thing”, I am clearly not against the idea of theorizing violence. Nordstrom has been criticized for her refusal to sufficiently theorize violence (see Chapter 3), however, I think that particular criticism of her work is misplaced. Upon close reading Nordstrom does have a clear theoretical
perspective on violence—one that insists on grounding theory in the lived realities of people experiencing violence, not in the abstract concepts that we would lay onto those experiences from afar. It is her form of “grounded” theory. What is a problem for Nordstrom—and what her critics find discomforting because of their collusion with it—is the essentializing and reifying of violence by definitions that are used to manipulate the perception of violent phenomena to prevent people from seeing the realities of actual violence.

Just as conflict is in constant flux, generating more or less unity amongst people, so too is violence in constant flux. Violence is culturally constituted by and constitutive of actions that impact on each other in an ever fluctuating dynamic process that shapes how human history writ both large (in terms of whole societies) and small (in terms of personal lives) unfolds in particular situations. Recall that violence is part of the conflict dimension of Simmel’s conflict - unity oscillating spectrum, which is in direct opposition to the idea that conflict has a linear trajectory with clearly defined boundaries. Violence, then

is not something simply formulated in terms of historical conditions of conflict played out along a conflict trajectory to affect the present. Violence is culturally constitutive. Its enactment forges, in fact forces, new constructs of identity, new socio-cultural relationships, new threats and injustices that reconfigure people’s life-worlds, new patterns of survival and resistance. These emerge in interaction as the idiosyncratic (the personal) and the immediate (the contextual) both shape and are shaped by historical knowledge and forces... Violence is not a static ‘thing’ or a passing ‘event,’ unchanging and monolithic, that is variously employed to achieve certain ends. It is a transformative cultural dynamic expressed and resisted within a changing and often contradictory social universe.32

To get a handle on this culturally constitutive process I have found it necessary to think through how to name the transformative dynamic of violence as it is located in the case of Iraq. At various points in previous work I referred to three “kinds” of violence, but my close examination of the problems associated with defining violence led me away from that approach. To put it directly, although I am sympathetic with the worldview that is often associated with it, I no longer think there is a thing called structural or cultural violence. At another point I tried using a very narrow definition of violence, suggesting that it was enough to capture what has happened in and to Iraq, but in the end I came away from that effort unsatisfied by the definitional approach. I was particularly discomfited by the realization that narrow definitions are often used by those who reinforce through their intellectual work the conventional view; hence, they are not
true to the experience I garnered while living in Iraq and interacting with others from the region and those in North America writing against the grain of the political powers intent on shaping our understanding of these events as they would like them to be known. To address these issues I have developed a model that deliberately de-emphasizes the need to define violence, while still placing some conceptual constraints on the subject at hand. Thus I come to the idea of three realms of violence.

The use of the word realm in this model is deliberate. As I use the term it refers to both a “field of activity” and a conceptual domain. I take this “activity” to be synonymous with process, by which I mean that the word realm is meant to locate specific processes that are related to violence. There are three realms in this model: a symbolic realm of activity, a network realm of activity, and a physical realm of activity.

The Physical Realm

This realm is concerned with conveying the idea of violent processes that are mediated directly through force that is applied to persons in the singular or collective. This realm of violence is in many ways the most narrow in scope but immediate in effect. The effects of such violent processes on persons are both physical and psychosomatic; the word psychosomatic augments the use of the word physical to emphasize the connection between body and mind. As we saw in the previous chapter, most efforts to understand violence at a minimum include various attacks on the mind as part of the outcomes resulting from violent processes aimed at the human body. This realm is overt: there is nothing hidden about it. And it is somatic in the sense that it impacts directly (and sometimes via the destruction of property) on corporeal bodies. This is true whether it is actualized through a knife blade entering a rib cage or a stealth bomber dropping a cluster bomb on a village. In either case the harm that is done to persons is immediate and visible. When it is the mind that is attacked, whether through torture or abuse or deprivation, the effects are sometimes more difficult to see but they are there nevertheless—as has been shown, for example, by studies demonstrating that Iraqi children have been more psychologically traumatized than virtually any other group of children in war zones. The imaginaries of war, to borrow Schröder and Schmidt’s word, most readily bring this realm of violence to mind. Its effects are generally seen and felt for decades in both scarred bodies and scorched earth. When we see violence enacted in the physical realm, we see what we do not want to experience ourselves. There is nothing euphemistic about it. And soldiers, who in war are responsible for deploying this form of violence, must go through extensive training to perpetrate it and many pay dearly for it both during and after the fact. In the end, then, the physical realm of violence is that realm in which violence is inscribed on the body and mind.
The Network Realm

While violent processes are commonly thought to occur only in the physical realm, in my analysis violent processes that cause harm also operate at arms length in a "network realm." As global processes have come to the fore, violence is often mediated by institutional, bureaucratic and economic mechanisms like trade agreements, UN and government policies and a variety of more specific sanctions mechanisms, promoting forceful, often unwanted, change in communities around the world. The violence of these networked processes is often resisted and even transformed, but still, those who experience the consequences of these processes—most often in the developing world—recognize them as being violent. Social processes (e.g., changing family relations prompted by financial insecurity tied to prolonged severe unemployment) are intertwined with these political, bureaucratic and economic processes, wreaking additional havoc on civilian life-worlds in war-zones.

The idea of a "network" realm came to me while reading Manuel Castells’ trilogy of books published under the general title, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. In the first volume of his trilogy, Castells discusses the inter-linkages between global information systems, social institutions, government bodies and a host of other agents in the re-structured "age of information." While reading Castells’ suggestive and provocative ideas I began to see that it is no longer—if it ever was—adequate to talk about a "structural violence" as if it is a thing to put in a box and analyze; it is now necessary to talk about vast networks of activity housed in a myriad of different vehicles in which the workings of violence get played out. By using the idea of networks I wish to emphasize dynamic processes over static things.

Although it is not possible to explicate in great detail Castells’ long and complex work, he proposes two key ideas that support and clarify my use of the word network in connection with a model to understand violence. Networks are comprised of "interconnected nodes":

What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of concrete networks of which we speak. They are stock exchanges markets, and their ancillary advanced services centers, in the network of global financial flows. They are national councils of ministers and European Commissioners in the political network that governs the European Union. They are coca fields and poppy fields, clandestine laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs, and money-laundering financial institutions, in the network of drug traffic that penetrates economies, societies, and states throughout the world. They are television systems,
entertainment studios, computer graphics milieux, news teams and mobile
devices generating, transmitting, and receiving signals, in the global
network of the new media at the roots of cultural expression and public
opinion in the information age.\textsuperscript{40}

For Castells these nodes are what gives networks fluid substance. "The
inclusion/exclusion in networks, and the architecture of relationships between networks" configure "dominant processes and functions in our societies."\textsuperscript{41} These networks can expand virtually without limit as new nodes and existing nodes communicate with each other; they are the basis of a social structure that is "a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance."\textsuperscript{42}

The upshot is a re-ordered society in which power is relocated into what Castells
calls switches—the nodes where different networks intersect. It is precisely in these
"switches" that power is concentrated in a network society; hence it is also in these places
that great harm may be orchestrated.

Yet the network morphology is also a source of dramatic reorganization of
power relationships. Switches connecting the networks (for example, 
financial flows taking control of media empires that influence political
processes) are the privileged instruments of power. Thus, the switchers are
the power holders. Since networks are multiple, the interoperating codes
and switches between networks become the fundamental sources in
shaping, guiding, and misguiding societies.\textsuperscript{43}

There is clear evidence that the network of financial flow is especially central in
the global system of exchange with reference to violence and war, whether it is financing
material production (e.g., to purchase parts for weapon systems) or financing a system of
information (e.g., to exchange torture techniques) or financing new infrastructure (e.g.,
to house the manufacturing of missiles).\textsuperscript{44} By highlighting the economic dimension in
this realm, therefore, I want to highlight the role these processes play in contemporary
warfare in a global environment. The interconnections of these networks of economic,
political and information nodes has become a central feature of the war-making
enterprise, as captured by Nordstrom in this passage:

Massive interlinked and very international war-related industries make war
possible in any location in the world. I have seen the same weapons
vendors, mercenaries, military advisors, supplies, and military training
manuals—both illicit and formal—circle the globe, moving from one war
to the next. Politicians, military and paramilitary troops and diplomats
meet and talk across virtually all boundaries of nation and state. Business
salespeople and blackmarketeers sell the items necessary to outfit troops and launch a battle. Media specialists create a cultural diaspora of every war-related ethos from the Rambo figure to BBC broadcasts reaching the farthest regions of the globe. Propagandists the world over exchange information on how to make casualties palatable to noncombatants and human rights organizations. Everything from development dollars to human rights organization, from covert operations specialists to illegal industries that gain from conflict, builds on the linkages of these networks that shape war and peace as we know it today.  

In the case of Iraq the combination of institution-based administrative structures, global economic processes, information vendors (tied to the symbolic realm as well) led to very tangible impacts on the civilian population. In the end, then, by a network realm I mean a network of social and bureaucratic institutions and processes that mediate violent acts.

The Symbolic Realm

The idea of symbolization is central to cultural anthropology and narrows the focus of this realm to the idea of symbol systems and the processes that are used to create meaning and life-worlds. My understanding of symbol does not depart from common understandings of symbol in anthropological literature. A concise understanding of symbols is found in Sherry Ortner's classic article "On Key Symbols." Her summary provides the general orientation to symbol that I adopt. For Ortner there are two broad types of symbols: summarizing and elaborating.

Summarizing symbols are primarily objects of attention and cultural respect; they synthesize or "collapse" complex experience, and relate the respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole. They include most importantly sacred symbols in the traditional sense. Elaborating symbols, on the other hand, are symbols valued for their contribution to the ordering or "sorting out" of experience. Within this are symbols valued primarily for the ordering of conceptual experience, i.e., for providing cultural "orientations," and those valued primarily for the ordering of action, i.e., for providing cultural "strategies." The former includes what Pepper calls "root metaphors," the latter includes key scenarios, or elements of scenarios which are crucial to the means-end relationship postulated in the complete scenario.

These two broad types of symbol Ortner then further explains in terms of three key forms of action. The first type of symbol, the summarizing symbol, "suggests a range of
questions pertaining to the cultural conversion of complex ideas into various kinds of relatively undifferentiated commitment—patriotism, for example, or faith.” She then suggests that “root metaphors” (the first form of elaborating symbol) suggest “questions applicable to the analysis of metaphor in the broadest sense—questions of how thought proceeds and organizes itself through analogies, models, images, and so forth.” And finally, “key scenarios” (the second form of an elaborating symbol) suggest “dramatistic modes of analysis, in which one raises questions concerning the restructuring of attitudes and relationships as a result of enacting particular culturally provided sequences of stylized actions.” Most symbols that I will analyze in the next chapter fall into these latter two forms. Saddam Hussein, for example, acts as a root metaphor in that his name and image organizes how thought patterns are organized to enable violent actions.

A core cultural process is the making, unmaking and sustaining of symbols, metaphors and symbol systems, all of which inform how we understand the world, giving it meaning and providing a template for action. Keeping the focus on these symbols and symbol systems helps to avoid making vast generalizations about culture that are unwarranted. This understanding of symbols is the basis for saying that efforts to talk about cultural violence writ large, as we saw in the previous chapter while reviewing Galtung’s work, are off the mark. Culture, simply put, cannot be violent; people are violent. Humans do have the capacity, however, to create symbols and metaphors that call into being a sense of a person or people to whom some other person or persons want to do harm. In order to facilitate that harm a negative construction of the “Other” is necessary. The negative construction of the Other is a dynamic process that goes much deeper than an us/them dichotomy and strikes at the core of another person’s “humanness” in a process of dehumanization.

Pierre Bourdieu’s comments on “symbolic violence”, a concept that I am here modifying to accommodate my concern to focus more explicitly on processes of symbol creation and manipulation, reveal other facets of this realm. He writes,

Symbolic violence ... is a violence exercised, so to speak, in formal terms, and paying due respect to forms. Paying due respect to forms means giving an action or a discourse the form which is recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved, that is, a form of a kind that allows the open production, in public view, of a wish or a practice that, if presented in any other way, would be unacceptable (this is the function of the euphemism). The force of the form ... is that properly symbolic force which allows force to be fully exercised while disguising its true nature as force and gaining recognition, approval and acceptance by dint of the fact that it can present itself under the appearances of universality—that of reason or morality.
A significant effect of the violent processes in this realm of activity, then, is the masking of harm that would otherwise be viewed as unacceptable.

The symbolic realm enables violent processes carried out in the physical and network realms. At the same time, the disruptions resulting from processes in the physical and network realms upset the symbolic realm within which people create meaning in their lives. Nordstrom, again, helps to clarify this violent process. "If we accept the premise that reality is socially constructed," drawing on Schutz, Berger and Luckman,50 "then the disruption of the basis of social relations and the shared epistemological truths on which it rests necessarily imperils people's ability to continue to construct a significant reality."

Since culture and epistemology are ... naturally regenerating phenomena, the disabling of cultural knowledge per se does not represent irreconcilable devastation. There is a danger in this process, however.

Schutz and Luckman (1973) have postulated that life-worlds—socially constructed knowledge systems so essential to cultural viability they are taken to represent reality in its most fundamental sense—ground human endeavor, conceptual and actual. While knowledge systems are not inherently consummate, the reality of the life-world(s) resting on them depends on the illusion that their integrity remains unchallenged. When the viability of the life-world is challenged, the sense of reality itself is simultaneously challenged....

But during a war—when families are scattered, communities destroyed, and valued life-world traditions have been bankrupt by difficulty, terror, and need—epistemological systems that would normally provide the raw material for repairing impoverished frameworks of knowledge and meaning are being seriously undermined by the viciousness of the widespread violence.51

In the end, then, violent processes in the symbolic realm have the capacity to do great harm. These processes are constantly creating, modifying, manipulating, and maintaining symbol systems that foster an ethos to do harm. In addition, violent processes in all three realms harm the ability of people to create meaning and therefore challenge a people's cultural viability, which grounds human life conceptually and actually.

WAR AS VIOLENT PROCESS

When Simon Harrison suggests that war has to be theoretically subordinated to violence I think he is onto something very important. In the previous few pages I have
suggested that violence is a process located in particular realms. In similar fashion I now want to suggest that war, too, is a process that arises out of large scale social interaction. Although I do not suggest that the three realms of violence I have identified define war (they might well be applied fruitfully to many different situations of violence), they can serve as a lens through which we can see war that has been masked by the focus on offices and institutions of war, rather than the actualities of war on the ground. What I am suggesting goes against the grain of most studies of war. Of the hundreds of books on Iraq that I have examined, fully 95 percent focus almost exclusively on the institutions of war-making and the leaders who guide them. This is not surprising. To return to a passage from Nordstrom used earlier:

Traditional political science would have it that going to the offices and institutions of (elite) political and military actors constitutes a reasonable place to study (the phenomenon of) war. But both the people who populate the institutions and the structures and ideologies that shape their expression exist across war and peace. How, then, can they be said to be indicative of war if they exist and operate equally in peace?... The institutions that are defined as carrying out the enterprise of war—political and military—are fundamentally concerned with controlling the definitions of what war is, not with making the definitions responsible to the realities of war. In fact, one can argue, these institutions have a vested interest in defining war in precisely nonrealistic terms.... Therefore, studying the nature and culture of war from a purely institutional vantage is less about the actuality of war than about the politics of power.52

This is not to say that common definitions of war are all wrong. Indeed, the case of Iraq fits into these definitions quite easily. The problem is that none of them address the core problem of framing that I have identified. Von Clausewitz’s classic definition of war, for example, is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”53 Some anthropologists have said that war is “defined as socially organized armed combat between members of different territorial units.”54 Institutes of peace and conflict studies engaged in tabulating the occurrence of war on a yearly basis have developed definitions that include threshold numbers of combat deaths (generally 1000 per year) and other related categories. Other elements of these definitions include the observation that all wars ebb and flow in intensity (they do not require that a bomb is dropped every day, for example), and the reality that wars often result in numbers of civilian and combat deaths that are far greater than numbers used as baselines.55 These definitions do not contradict my conclusions about the Iraq case as one war, but they also do not provide the tools for an analysis that can reveal the war.
What is needed is to refocus the analysis of war on the central defining characteristic of war-making, which is violence. The recognition that war itself only “comes into existence when violence is employed” opens the possibility of seeing the actualities of war in ways that are hidden by merely looking at numbers of battle deaths, institutions and political structures that embody it. That is not to say that looking at those aspects is wrong, only that it falls far short of representing war as it is experienced by people—mostly civilians—who live with and bear the brunt of its violence. The upshot is that political aggressions “may become flamed, threats may be flung back and forth, military exercises may take place, but it is only when bullets are fired and people are maimed and killed, when bombs destroy strategic targets, that war is said to exist.”

Because we are talking about a process, not a static definition, this violence—whether through knives and guns, cluster bombs and High-speed Antiradiation Missiles (HARM) missiles, psychological torture, the destruction of social networks and livelihoods, or through bureaucratic processes that facilitate these harmful psychosomatic realities—can be seen as the constitutive element of the war process. It is surprisingly easy to forget in the fog of misinformation that militaries are primarily institutional means for violent acts. Yet that is exactly what they are, which leads to the realization that it is “in the act of violence ... that the definition of war is found. Militaries operate on one single truth: the strategic employment of violence. Politics is rooted in one paramount definition of security: military might that is ultimately predicated on the ability to employ (and deploy) violence effectively.” Violence is not only mediated by militaries, however. Political, economic, and cultural mechanisms are equally important means of creating, maintaining, and supporting violent processes. But getting at these mechanisms is not an easy task, for it is notoriously difficult to study the actual sites of violence. In fact, it is as hard to study the actuality of war as it is easy to study its institutions. This fact, perhaps more than any other, explains why so many studies of war have focused on political and military leaders and their institutional bases—as unrepresentative of actual war as this may be—rather than following the actual deployment of violence in situ.

The main point of this is to say that it is very difficult to get at violent processes as employed in war. Every situation requires a different method of getting at the subject; nevertheless I am drawn to the idea of “studying a process ... rather than a study based in a circumscribed locale.” Hence my concern in the first chapters to explain that this is not a study of Iraq as a locale, but rather a study of the processes of war that have had a direct impact on the lives of people in Iraq with whom I have briefly lived. To study these processes from a North American vantage point is not the same as “studying war ... in a
particular place among a set community.” To return to my earlier position, this study is “grounded in a topic and a process rather than a place. War is about flux, and this approach works to report on that flux as realistically as possible.” The point is that the conventional view of Iraq distorts the reality of the US/UK – IRAQ War to such a degree that we cannot even see it. For that reason I have focussed my attention on developing a set of lenses that allow us to get rid of at least some of the distortion in order to see where further work needs to be done to understand this particular war. It would be easy to imagine, using the framing that I have advanced here, that an anthropologist in Iraq might well be able to do a study of this thirteen year long war using the very techniques that Nordstrom, for example, has used to great effect.

**Violence as a Lens to See War**

The three realms of violence that I have identified are not exclusive to war, but rather are lenses to help us focus on the core activity that is constitutive of war; namely, violence. It is quite possible that these could be applied to other situations that go by a variety of names, all of which have violence as a core component (examples that come readily to mind include states of occupation and genocide). The point of using these three lenses is not to define war, then, but rather to help clarify its parameters; the aim is to bring to the fore what has been hidden.

Although for analytical purposes we can isolate the three realms of violence and identify specific processes in them that are related to violence, it is also the case that these three realms overlap each other at a number of points (Figure 4). To identify those points of contact between the three realms—to identify a violence node in other words—is in large part to demarcate war. The symbolic realm interacts with and is reinforced through the network realm; the network realm often provides the immediate context within which physical harm is inflicted; and the physical realm is the site of processes that inflict physical and psychosomatic harm which are the result of, and also have the capacity to fuel, processes in both the network realm and symbolic realm that create the environment for continued harm. In other words, these three realms mutually reinforce each other. Just as
with the subject of conflict, however, at the empirical level of day-to-day life these different conceptual realms are often indivisible.
ENDNOTES

2 Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story*, 16.

6 Although causality—discussed in the overview of anthropological literature in Chapter 3—is not the main focus of this paper, I want to clarify here that at the level of theory about causality, I am convinced that a unified theory of violence is not possible at this time, although I think eventually we will get a better grasp of why violence occurs. Perhaps, as Charles Tilly suggests, we “await the social scientific Newton who will detect underlying regularities in all the diverse phenomena people call violent.” More likely, he suggests, “the notion of violence resembles such other widespread but diffuse terms as disorder and goodness: Morally powerful categories that do not refer to any causally coherent domain.” Until such time as we are witness to that “social scientific Newton” we need to put some order to our thoughts, at least in the immediate sphere of case by case analyses. As a part of the community of scholars working on this difficult problem I want to try and pull together some of the strengths of the different responses to the subject with special reference to the matter of violence and war as process. See Tilly, “Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories,” 17.

7 The need to distinguish between these three concepts has been raised briefly and helpfully in Louis Kriesberg, “Sociological Statement on War and Violence,” in *Rethinking Peace*, ed. Robert Elias, and Jennifer Turpin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).


19 An English translation of a much earlier draft of the 1908 essay was published in 1904. See the introduction to Kurt H. Wolff, ed. Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of Essays, With Translations and a Bibliography (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1959).

20 Simmel, Conflict, 13.

21 Simmel, Conflict, 13-14.

22 Simmel, Conflict, 17.


26 Lederach, Preparing for Peace, 17.

27 Although it is not a primary focus of this dissertation, I think it would be possible to focus on the unity of Simmel's spectrum in the same way that I am now wanting to focus on the conflict end of his spectrum. A tentative thought would be to think of a conformist - consensual spectrum under the umbrella of unity in parallel to the violent - nonviolent spectrum under the umbrella of conflict.


29 See, for example, Richard McCutcheon, "Sanctions Against Iraq: War By Other Means?,” Ploughshares Monitor (1992): 13; The Iraq War as Globalized War, Ploughshares Working Paper Series (Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, 2002);

30 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 6.

31 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 117.

32 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 141-42.


35 For a remarkable account of the aftermath of war, see Donovan Webster, Aftermath: The Remnants of War (New York: Random House, 1996).


39 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); The Power of Identity, vol. 2, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); End of Millennium, vol. 3, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). During the oral defence of this thesis Dr. Mark Vorobej observed that in a recent book Zygmunt Bauman has weighed in on the idea of networks. Bauman suggests, for example, that the “ever more frequent substitution of the metaphor of ‘network’ for the terms most commonly used in narrating social interactions of the past (terms like systems, structures, societies, or communities) reflects the gathering realization that social totalities are hazy at the fringes, remain in a state of constant flux, are always becoming rather than being, and are seldom meant to last for the duration. It suggests, in other words, that the totalities struggling today for recognition are more fluid than they used to be or were believed to be when the terms we now yearn to replace were designed and adopted.” Zygmunt Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 12-13.


52 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 114.


56 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 115.

57 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 115.

58 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 115.

59 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 115.

60 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, 10.

The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the US/UK – IRAQ War between 1991 and 2003 by drawing on examples from the three realms of violence I outlined in the previous chapter and showing how they are connected. Over the past eighteen years I have collected a great deal of historical data and grey literature that spans these years, which is augmented by my own experience of travelling in the country of Iraq on two occasions in the early 1990s, and living there as a non-governmental aid worker for most of a year in 2000/2001. My goal in writing this chapter has been to describe a sufficient number of examples to illustrate my thesis that there was one war, not to write a complete history of it.

This chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part I illustrate the processes of violence in three realms using a variety of examples from the case of Iraq. In the second, I demonstrate the links between these three realms by focussing on two examples. The metaphor that helps to clarify what I want to accomplish in this second part is that of an optometrist conducting an eye examination. Imagine that each of the conceptual realms (what I have also called a lens or filter in this dissertation) is similar to the correction lenses that optometrists use to bring your vision into focus. The first lens, in this case the physical realm, helps to sharpen the image considerably. A second lens, the network realm, is added to bring still more definition to our vision. And then a third lens, the symbolic realm, is put in place that results in an overall clarity of sight that represents more clearly the processes of war. To illustrate how this analysis illuminates the US/UK – IRAQ War, 1991-2003, I present in part three a brief heterodox narrative of the war to show how the deep framing of the subject has an impact on the language we use to describe the case of Iraq, and to point in the direction of a full length alternative historical narrative that is yet to be written. This dissertation provides the theoretical justification for such a project.

THREE REALMS OF VIOLENCE ILLUSTRATED

In this section I provide a series of examples from each of the three realms to demonstrate that in all three realms violent processes were employed to enable war. I begin with the physical realm because it is the most concrete and it is where the impact of violent processes is most readily seen and felt as harm; from it I then move to the more abstract realms.
Physical Realm

Violence in the physical realm was evident throughout the war against Iraq. While many will recall the technologically advanced displays of so-called “shock and awe” at the beginning and end of the war in 1991 and 2003, what was masked for the duration of the war was the constant nature of violence in the physical realm. Although the focus of the military exchange for many years was on the air war, ground forces were obviously heavily involved at the beginning and end of the war and are a part of the analysis. A constant bombing campaign and an equally consistent effort by the Iraqi army to target the airplanes doing the bombing were an ongoing feature of the war for its duration.

While living in Iraq I experienced this bombing campaign in the field. On an excursion to the city of Nasariyah, a small city to the south of Baghdad, I visited a famous archaeological site (Ur) about eight kilometres from the city. Viewing the site from the top of the famous Ziggurat, I was told by the guides not to look in certain directions; however I did manage to look around a bit and could see that there was a military installation in the near distance. While walking through the site later I was brought up short by the unmistakable sound of a rocket igniting not too far away and the sound of it winging its way skyward. I was quick enough to turn and see the briefest glint of sunlight on its metal casing as it disappeared into the sky. This was followed by the sound of air raid sirens in Nasariyah coming across the desert, a tragic counterpoint to the beautiful sounds that come from the minarets each day. About five minutes later the “ka-thump, ka-thump” of bombs could be heard falling in the near distance. The sound waves rolled over the desert.

This direct experience of bombing in Iraq was not unusual. Confidential internal United Nations documents produced by the Baghdad Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq clearly show that intrusive sorties and bombing runs were made over Iraq on a regular basis—at times daily—at different periods of the war. One report that I had access to analyzed 46 of 143 bombing runs conducted during 1999. It records 110 civilian casualties, 350 serious injuries, over 60 houses destroyed, and over 400 livestock killed. Livestock, of course, are a significant source of food and income. There was some acknowledgement of these facts in North America, for example, in both the New York Times and the Washington Post.

The exchanges of bombs and missiles ebbed and flowed over the years, as is true in all wars. In his well-researched book Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm, Dilip Hiro records high-times in 1991, 1993 (twice), 1996, 1998 and 2000 when the armies of Iraq and the armies of the United States and Britain exchanged bombs and missiles, the intensity of which could not be hidden. In between these high tides of violence in the physical
realm, there was a constant engagement of military force. In an essay called, “Paying the Price,” John Pilger documents one period of the military activity, which gives some indication of its extent:

During the eighteen months to January 14, 1999, American air force and navy aircraft flew 36,000 sorties over Iraq, including 24,000 combat missions. During 1999, American and British aircraft dropped more than 1,800 bombs and hit 450 targets. The cost to British tax-payers is more than £800 million. There is bombing almost every day: it is the largest Anglo-American aerial campaign since the Second World War; yet it is mostly ignored by the American and British media.4

Aid workers have recounted personal stories about the direct engagement of physical force. Carmen Pauls, who worked and lived in Baghdad for a non-governmental organization at the time, recorded one such incident: “At 6pm, Sunday, July 18th, 1999, a plane dropped a bomb on the main road between Najaf, a city 170 kilometers south of Baghdad, and Monathera city. This highway is lined with homes and mechanics’ shops. A second bomb fell near a grain storage silo. Fourteen civilians were killed and eighteen wounded, including women and children and laborers on their way home from work.”5 Later in her biweekly report she noted that since her earlier report, “an additional 18 persons have been killed and 54 wounded in similar attacks.”6 In one incident, on May 12th, air strikes hit shepherds in their pastures near Mosul, leaving 14 persons dead and 22 wounded.7 Hans von Sponeck, a former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, witnessed the aftermath of a similar airstrike on 30 April 1999:

I should have told [UK Ambassador] Eldon of the attack in the spring of 1999 by US/UK planes on a shepherd’s family—the Jarjees family near Quban village, 30 km from Mosul. The shepherd, six members of his family and 101 sheep were killed, and a water bowser and a vehicle destroyed. I will never forget the stench that hung over the wide, open plain in April temperatures of 40 [degrees Celsius] at the time of my visit there. Nor will I forget the immense sadness on the faces of those who showed us around. The human bodies had been removed. The mangled carcasses of sheep lay where they had been struck.8

This is one of the few places in the literature where a direct comparison of language used to describe the harm done in the physical realm is explicitly made. Von Sponeck was able to find the same incident described in US military sources.

The US/UK military described this incident quite differently: ‘30th April 1999 ... Operation Northern Watch aircraft were fired upon by Iraqi
anti-aircraft artillery. Responding in self defence, US air force F-15E strike
eagles and F-16C falcons dropped GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on Iraqi
radar and anti-aircraft artillery sites south and northeast of Mosul. In
addition, US air force F-16CJ falcons launched AGM-88 high-speed
antiradiation missiles (HARM) at Iraqi radar and anti-aircraft artillery sites
south and northeast of Mosul.' Referring to this incident, Robin Cook,
British Foreign Secretary at the time, said to me five years later: 'I cannot
understand how the US air force could not distinguish between an
anti-aircraft facility and a shepherd's grazing ground. Yes, the US
committed a lot of blunders' in the no-fly zones.9

In the many times that I travelled to the north or south of Iraq between June
There is no shortage of direct empirical evidence that the bombing was happening and
that the Iraqi army was attempting to reply. UN officials consistently filed reports about
their experience of being in the vicinity of bombing. US military sources corroborate my
experience and the findings documented in UN and non-governmental organization
reports.

Although on paper a ceasefire agreement was negotiated between 1-3 March
1991, it is significant that there was no actual stoppage of an ongoing military exchange.
According to the United States European Command (USEUCOM)—"the focal point
for controlling, coordinating, and facilitating American support to NATO"10—on
March 3rd, the day military officials were meeting in Safwan, Iraq to negotiate and
finalize ceasefire terms, two Iraqi SU-22s flying over northern Iraq were shot down by
US F-15Cs. This pattern of military exchange was repeated continually throughout the
following years. Much of this activity was facilitated by a unilateral decision by Allied
forces to set up "no-fly zones," areas to the north of the 36th parallel and south of the
33rd parallel from which all fixed-wing Iraqi aircraft were banned. These later included
no-drive zones. These zones never received UN approval, and are frequently cited as one
of the most contentious aspects of the war.

The following list of significant events, compiled from a variety of Allied military
sources, gives some indication of the extent of the military exchange between 1991 and
2003.11 Although not complete, because much of the information that would be needed
to make it complete is not publicly available, this list does serve to show in a condensed
fashion that in the physical realm, violent processes—involving physical force applied to
destroy property and life—never ceased for the duration of the thirteen year war.
Chronology of US/UK – IRAQ Military Engagements

MAR 91: two Iraqi SU-22s flying over northern Iraq were shot down by US F-15Cs.

DEC 92: an Iraqi MiG was shot down for violating the southern no-fly zone.

JAN 93: Allies struck thirty-two Iraqi missile sites and air defense command centers.

JAN 93: three incidents of Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery firing on Allied planes in the northern zone. Planes were not hit and did not return fire. However, after these attacks, on Jan 17 Allied planes attacked an air defense site that was targeting French reconnaissance planes and also shot down an Iraqi MiG over northern Iraq. In the south, US warships fired forty-five cruise missiles against the Zarfaraniyah nuclear facility outside Baghdad.

JAN 93: Allied planes attacked multiple surface-to-air missiles sites in northern Iraq after being fired on. Cluster bombs were dropped on Bashiqah airfield. In the south, seventy-five planes were sent out to destroy Iraqi missile sites.

APR 93: An Iraqi radar site illuminated two Provide Comfort Wild Weasels flying north of the 36th parallel. One of the Weasels, an F-4G, fired an AGM-88 at the tracking radar and destroyed it.

JUN 93: US warships fired twenty-four cruise missiles at intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for what the United States called a plot to assassinate President George H. W. Bush.

AUG 93: Allied planes dropped cluster bombs and later four laser-guided bombs on a site, west of Mosul, of possible SA-3 launches.

APR 94: Allied planes enforcing “no-fly” zone shot down two US helicopters carrying a UN relief mission, mistaking them for Iraqi helicopters. Twenty-six people were killed, including fifteen Americans.

OCT 94: Iraqi troops moved toward the Kuwaiti border. US deployed warships, warplanes, and 54,000 troops to the region. Iraq moved its troops back.

APR 95: US alleged “at least 17 attacks against UN and international relief personnel” and alleged over 100 such attacks in the previous four years as part of Iraq’s “terrorist war of attrition.”

MAR 95-6: US accelerated CIA collaboration with Iraqi opposition in planning two attempted coups (March 1995 and June 1996) to overthrow the Iraqi government of President Hussein.

SEP 96: US ships and airplanes fired fourteen Tomahawk missiles and thirteen conventionally armed cruise missiles at southern Iraqi anti-missile sites to
punish the Iraqi military for venturing into the Kurdish “safe haven” in northern Iraq.

SEP 96: Seventeen cruise missiles launched against sites in southern Iraq.

SEP 96: Responding to Iraqi missile fire at two F-16s in the northern “no-fly” zone, the US sent more bombers, stealth fighters and another aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf region. Iraq accused Kuwait of an “act of war” for allowing US jets into Kuwait.

NOV 96: Two US F-16 pilots fired missiles at Iraqi radar sites near the 32nd parallel in the southern no-fly zone.

NOV 97: US sent another “carrier battle group” to the Gulf after Iraq expelled all weapons inspectors working with the UN Special Commission.

JUN 98: A US F-16 fighter fired a missile at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile battery in southern Iraq after Iraqi radar locked on four British patrol planes.

DEC 98: Weapons inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. Hours later, four days of US-British air and missile strikes began, pounding Baghdad.

DEC 98: Iraqis fired three surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at Allied planes in the northern no-fly zone (all missed); the same fired back three HARMs.

DEC 98: An Iraqi SAM site fired six to eight missiles at an Allied plane in the southern no-fly zone, which retaliated with six GBU-12 laser-guided bombs and two HARMs on the site.

FEB 99: US and British warplanes fired at two air defense sites in Iraq after three waves of Iraqi fighter jets violated southern no-fly zone.

FEB 99: Air Force and Navy aircraft attacked two Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites near Al Iskandariyah, about thirty miles south of Baghdad, in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire and an Iraqi aircraft violation of southern no-fly zone.

APR 00: Allied aircraft targeted four Iraqi military sites, including one at Nasiriyah, in southern Iraq.

FEB 01: After President George W. Bush’s first military order, US and British warplanes bombed surveillance radars and sites linking command and control to Iraqi surface-to-air missile batteries around Baghdad. It was the largest strike—and the first outside the no-fly zone in southern Iraq—in more than two years.

MAY 01: Allied forces targeted a surface-to-air missile complex, including radars and launchers, near Al-Amarah, about 180 miles southeast of Baghdad.

JUL 01: An Iraqi anti-aircraft missile narrowly missed an Air Force U-2 spy plane.

AUG 01: Air defense sites in northern Iraq were struck by the US Air Force after surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery were fired by Iraq. Just days
before, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Iraq had rebuilt air defenses near Baghdad which had been targeted in heavy Allied attacks in February.

AUG 01: Dozens of Allied aircraft bombed a military communications centre, a surface-to-air missile launching site and long-range radar in southern Iraq.

AUG 01: One day after an unmanned Air Force reconnaissance aircraft was inexplicably lost in southern Iraq, Allied forces hit two targets which provided support for Iraqi air defense fighter aircraft.

AUG 01: US fighter jets attacked an Iraqi radar site at Basra airport.

OCT 01: Allied warplanes attacked military installations in southern Iraq.

JUN 02 - MAR 03: Allied air forces dropped 606 bombs.

The pattern of military exchanges is undeniable, although it is often difficult to wade through the language used to describe it. Records of these exchanges are ritualistic from all quarters of the war-making parties. The US/UK perspective almost always includes the statement that any ordnance dropped by the Allies was done in self-defence against Iraqi aircraft, Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire, or an Iraqi threat posed by Iraqi radar tracking allied planes. From the Iraqi perspective available through print and internet based information sources, US/UK attacks are almost always identified as provocations and intrusions into Iraq's sovereign territory. The brief chronology above indicates that in each year between 1991 and 2003 it is possible to find evidence of a military exchange that involved the physical exchange of lethal ordnance. There are of course periods of more or less intensity in this realm of activity, but the continuity is clear.

Discussions of this period within US sources often betray the reality of the ongoing war, although the evidence comes slant, by which I mean we can read into statements the information that is not explicitly mentioned. In an article entitled "General Admits to Secret Air War," Lieutenant-General Michael Moseley, "the American general who commanded allied air forces during the Iraq war appears to have admitted in a briefing to American and British officers that coalition aircraft waged a secret air war against Iraq from the middle of 2002, nine months before the invasion began." Moseley confirmed that "in 2002 and early 2003 allied aircraft flew 21,736 sorties, dropping more than 600 bombs on 391 'carefully selected targets' before the war officially started." During this same period "Iraqi attacks peaked with more than a dozen missiles and rockets per day being fired at coalition forces. On one day, Iraqi air-defense forces fired 15 surface-to-air missiles." These comments show the continuity of the military exchange with the previous years, and demonstrate that it was understood by those involved in it to be warfare. Other comments demonstrate that the US military
sources viewed the air war to be beneficial to the eventual invasion and occupation of Iraq. Major Michael Norton, a South Carolina Air National Guard F-16 pilot who flew Northern and Southern Watch missions (US Airforce designation for operations over the north and south no-fly zones in Iraq), said that “air strikes conducted over the years by Northern and Southern Watch pilots had helped to render Iraqi air defenses less effective as OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] neared.”

It is perhaps worth noting, to conclude this sub-section, that the weapons being used were not always so-called precision guided munitions. In February 2001, well before the invasion of Iraq began, they were regularly cluster bombs. As William Arkin notes, commenting on the February 16th attack, these are weapons “that have no real aimpoint and that kill and wound innocent civilians for years to come.” One of the most frequently stated reasons for this intensive military engagement, mostly through air strikes and bombing, was “to protect vulnerable groups from a ruthless regime;” however, as von Sponeck has pointed out, “to establish two rigid exclusion zones and make these increasingly the practice ground for waging a war ... was not the way of achieving this goal.”

Network Realm

The deployment of violence in the network realm during times of war happens through numerous channels. Violence in this realm is a constitutive part of the cumulative process of war-making. In the US/UK – IRAQ War, conducted in a globalized environment, it is possible to show that this realm of violence now plays a key role in war-making. The process of applying economic sanctions is the clearest example of violence in this realm. Because this is the most visible aspect of violence in the network realm I want to note how the institutional process used to administer economic sanctions contributed to the overall effect of doing harm inside Iraq. I will highlight some of the impacts of these economic mechanisms on local populations.

Already in the first chapter I outlined how the economic sanctions regime was put in place, and its general contours. After the initial bombardment of the country in 1991, many people following the war from its beginning believed the economic sanctions would be lifted. Quite the opposite happened: UN Resolution 687, which continued the sanctions regime, was passed.

The embargo was now intended to enforce Iraq’s compliance with a long list of requirements under Resolution 687. If Resolution 661 had been a coercive measure, the new post-war resolution could also be regarded as punitive. Furthermore, as one commentator noted, measures which
affected the well-being of the civilian population were combined with those which resemble ‘the process of disarming a conquered country generally imposed by contemporary peace treaties’. This was also the first time such a draconian UN embargo had been imposed on a state which had just suffered severe infrastructural damage in the course of a war. 19

Sarah Graham-Brown, one of the most authoritative sources on the subject of sanctions and Iraq, goes on to show how extensive were the practical bureaucratic processes that were required by the sanctions regime. As an NGO worker trying to get water filtration systems passed through the committee that oversaw the process of applying sanctions, I was able first-hand to see the exceptionally obstructive nature of these processes. The Sanctions Committee, as it was called, played the key role in deciding what import items would be allowed into the country. The key debate in the deliberations of this committee revolved around the definition of essential civilian needs. As I have thought about this, I have also been working through the question of defining violence, and the parallel is startling—for the way these import items were defined ultimately had the potential to cause harm and even take away human life in Iraq. In the case of the water filtration units, they were held back for a long time because they were not considered acceptable items for import, even though their sole purpose was to chlorinate water to make it potable. The key issue was the chlorination for the units—since chlorine was considered to have possible military uses, the units fell into the suspect “dual use” category. The process of how decisions like this were made was secret. “The work of the Committee takes place behind closed doors. Until 1995, no record of its discussions or decisions was made public or even circulated to interested parties such as UN humanitarian organizations, Security Council members, or the sanctioned state, Iraq. Only the state which made the application for a waiver was informed of the Committee’s decision.” 20 Although the decision making process was secret it is now known that decisions over essential civilian goods were hotly contested by the members of the sanctions committee. The US and UK (and to some extent France in early parts of the war) were consistently resistant to allowing many items into the country that would have mitigated the violence of the process. Moreover

Most public attention has focused on contentions by the Government of Iraq and others that patently ‘civilian goods’, such as pencils and paper, have been stopped or delayed by the Committee. But perhaps a more crucial and less recognised problem is that the Committee has in practice refused to give waivers for any goods which could be construed as industrial inputs. Only finished products are permitted. ‘Products which are inputs
to Iraqi industry, rather than finished products for domestic consumption, are generally declined, as are "dual use" items."

This policy was evolved within the Committee, mainly at the behest of the US, UK and France. It is not anywhere embodied in Security Council resolutions. Finished goods may be easier to monitor, with less chance of dual use, but such a policy clearly has a major impact on the production of goods which are purely for civilian needs. Some observers have argued that this constitutes an "economic warfare" strategy towards Iraq, not envisaged under the UN Charter, and designed to weaken the country's economic structure in the long term.21

The Government of Iraq, as might be expected in a time of war, resisted this process of violence in whatever ways were open to it and "did not intend to acquiesce in its terms any further than it perceived to be necessary." As one UN researcher with access to relevant resources suggested in 1992, more accurately than perhaps he realized, "One has the impression that in its leaders' minds, the war is not over and that it is being continued through political means."22 With time it became clear that the Iraqi Government was able to resist violence in this realm on many levels.

A number of methods were used to 'test the boundaries' of the Security Council's tolerance. The Iraqi Government frequently challenged UNSCOM inspectors' access to facilities or curtailed their freedom of movement, and occasionally created incidents on the disputed Iraq-Kuwait boundary. This strategy of brinkmanship led to confrontations, in response to which the US, Britain and, for a time, France threatened, and sometimes used, force. Usually the response was a rapid climbdown followed by acceptance of previously rejected Security Council demands. The Government also demonstrated a tendency to 'bargain', to try to trade off acceptance of parts of Resolution 687 for the easing of the sanctions regime.23

As the war wore on the Government of Iraq attempted to use more aggressive measures of its own to negatively harm those whom it regarded as the enemy. One of the more striking examples of this tit-for-tat of violent process in the network realm was the Government of Iraq's efforts to subvert the US dollar as a medium of exchange for oil. Tara Moayad, an Iraqi commentator, described this effort.

One of the most influential and effective means of US hegemony for its so-called super power role is the US dollar.
It has been used wickedly and inhumanly to control the potentials
of economy and capital in a way that serves the interests of the US and all
the rapaciously ambitious allies for so long....

No one dared to go against the torrential power of the dollar
except Iraq and its wise leadership led by President Saddam Hussein. On
the 14th of August 2000 the Iraqi Ministerial Council issued a statement
which calls for serious research in what concerns exchanging the Dollar
with the Euro or any other currency for foreign trade.

This Iraqi decision clearly reflects the desire to struggle in any
possible way against the stinging winds of Americanization and Zionism.

Going Euro means world policy and economy will no longer
remain so surely secured under the US thumb.24

While the newspaper account uses inflammatory language, the point is that economic
processes aimed at doing harm were engaged by all sides in this war.

That the economy of Iraq was severely affected by these network processes was
demonstrated by the severely depressed and very unstable currency exchange rates. While
I was in Iraq in 2000/2001 the value of the Iraqi dinar fluctuated dramatically. At its
lowest point 2020 dinars equalled one US dollar, and at its high point 1500, for a few
days only. Prior to 1990 one Iraqi dinar was equal to between three and four US dollars.
For the last several months of my stay the exchange stabilized at about 1725 dinars to the
US dollar. To give a reference point, a jar of jam cost about 7000 dinars, which was well
beyond most Iraqis' standard of living. Unemployment rates remained at about 65
percent while I was there; a family regularly earning twenty US dollars a month would
have been considered a fortunate family.

The negative impact of economic sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq was
carefully documented over the course of the thirteen year long war. A constant stream of
reports from the United Nations, NGOs and independent study teams were published at
the beginning, during the middle, and towards the end of the US/UK – IRAQ War.
They sounded a consistent, and virtually unanimous, tone marked by urgency.

Based on infant mortality rates, the United Nation's Food and Agricultural
(FAO) study team members produced a controversial report in December 1995 that
concluded that 567,000 Iraqi children had died in the first five years of the war.25 Their
study did not include vulnerable groups like the elderly and homeless. Richard Garfield
later produced a study that significantly lowered this figure to about 250,00026 also
controversially. In either case, the impact of economic sanctions on Iraqi families was
significant. Nuha al-Radi records in her diary this report from a woman friend in 1994:
Her daughter said that a lot of kids have stopped going to school, the parents can’t afford to buy exercise books and pencils. A friend of hers who lives in Mansur told her that her thirteen-year-old daughter had locked herself in her room crying because she wanted to walk down the main shopping street and her mother said no. ‘I can’t afford to let her,’ she said. ‘Everything costs in the thousands. I can barely afford to give them a sandwich to take to school.’ This is a middle class family living in a good neighbourhood, and reasonably well off.27

The impact of economic sanctions extended from school age children up to university professors. An Iraqi university student wrote of this in December 2002. “I appreciate the role these sanctions had in making a country full of riches so poor. I appreciate watching my professors having to sell their whole personal libraries to survive, and seeing their books being bought by UN staff who take them home as souvenirs. I have so much appreciation it is flowing out of my ears” he said.28 Few people in North America have an appreciation for the large quantity of personal possessions that were sold to make ends meet. The extent of it will likely never be known.

These accounts of personal experiences are supported by official reports produced along the way. Beginning in 1990, a series of reports consistently described the devastating effects of economic sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq: these included the March Special Report to the UN by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the Harvard Study Team’s careful analysis in May, two months later the Special Report to the UN by Sadruddin Aga Khan, and then the comprehensive study completed by the International Study Team in October 1991. There were also reports by UNICEF, the WHO and numerous first-hand accounts by those who visited the region. Ahtisaari, a Special Rapporteur to the Secretary-General of the UN at the time and a recent recipient of the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize, invoked in his first post-war report the now familiar metaphor of the apocalypse:

The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.29

The Harvard and International Study Teams gave clear warning of the impending disastrous situation for children of Iraq.30 All indicated a four-fold rise in infant mortality rates and suggested that it would remain stable at that high rate, while health conditions
in general would deteriorate further. As noted above, the destruction of the infrastructure had incapacitated water and sewage treatment, resulting in widespread water-borne diseases. Diarrhoea, for example, became a major cause of death. The Center for Economic and Social Rights, UNICEF and the World Health Organization produced similar reports. The WHO closed its 1996 report with this warning:

The vast majority of the country’s population has been on a semi-starvation diet for years. This tragic situation has tremendous implications on the health status of the population and on their quality of life, not only for the present generation, but for the future generation as well. The world community should seriously consider the implications of an entire generation of children growing up with such traumatized mental handicaps, if they survive at all.

Throughout the years of the war well-researched, credible reports were tabled. In 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2000 UNICEF presented findings that echoed earlier reports. In his October 1996 press release, Philippe Heffinck, then UNICEF representative for Iraq, said: “The situation is disastrous for children. Many are living on the very margin of survival.” He added that “around 4,500 children under the age of five are dying here every month from hunger and disease.” As documented in its November 1997 report, UNICEF continued to see an alarming situation in Iraq “with 32 percent of children under the age of five, some 960,000 children, chronically malnourished.” UNICEF observed that “....chronic malnutrition has long term implications on a child’s physical and mental development. After a child reaches two or three, chronic malnutrition is difficult to reverse and damage on the child’s development is likely to be permanent.” The 2000 UNICEF report which I received from the Baghdad office in September continued to indicate high levels of infant mortality rates and malnutrition. The report asserted that, Iraq begins the new millennium with high child mortality rates (131 per 1000 live births in the south and centre of Iraq) and more than 20% of Iraq’s 3.5 million children are suffering from various degrees of malnutrition. The situation is made worse by the lack of progress in arresting the rapid decline in essential social infrastructure. The limitations of the SCR 986 programme prior to SCR 1330 did not allow the Government to plan for the comprehensive rehabilitation of the primary health care system, primary education system, or the water and sanitation systems. These essential public services have continued to suffer from a lack of maintenance and therefore decreasing capacity, a lack of electricity which further cuts capacity and efficiency, particularly in the water and
Sanitation sector and rapidly increasing demand through population growth.

The report went on to say that "child malnutrition has remained entrenched" and "diarrhoea leading to death from dehydration, and acute respiratory infections (ARI) together account for 70% of child deaths." 34

Electrical grid systems were targeted early in the war. During my first visit to Iraq in March of 1991 I travelled inside Baghdad and Karbala, both of which had been without electricity for many weeks. I recorded in a report from that trip that all means of communication were destroyed, water purification and sewage systems were not functioning, and public transportation was at a standstill. The entire city of Baghdad was silent. 35 Daniel Kuehl, a military strategist, published an article analyzing "Electrical Power as a Target For Strategic Air Operations" in which he documents that "The first week's attacks cut Iraq's generating capacity by approximately 75 per cent, and follow-on attacks extended that even further so that by war's end the system had been reduced to only about 15 per cent of its prewar capacity." 36 The destruction of this vital power grid inevitably led to the breakdown of the water and sewage treatment facilities. In an important piece of research, Thomas Nagy uncovered US government reports done in 1991 that predicted widespread disease in the civilian population as a result of this breakdown. 37

My brief overview of violence in the network realm demonstrates that between 1991 and 2003 there was significant harm done to the population of Iraq by policies enacted through several large administrative bodies including national governments and the United Nations. There were also attempts by the Government of Iraq to reciprocate the violent processes in this realm. Although it would be difficult to hold any one person responsible for this violence, it cannot be denied that people in Iraq experienced it as a part of the US/UK - IRAQ War.

**Symbolic Realm**

Giambatista Vico, whose 18th century treatise on a new science ushered in a modern historical understanding, was "really the first to discover that culture and history were man-made; and he understood that all science properly centers on man's creation of symbolic meanings." 38 Indeed, as I have pursued my study, the role of symbols in shaping human behaviour has become increasingly clear. Symbols themselves cannot be violent, but they certainly shape an ethos to encourage or sustain violent acts. A discourse on symbol systems is not my intent in this section, but I do want to present a number of examples that clearly show how symbol systems were created and sustained for the
duration of the US/UK – IRAQ War. The key element of this process is the persistent effort to create a negative construction of the Other at the level of symbol. I contend that it is only when this process of symbol creation is in place that violence in other realms is made possible.

Perhaps the clearest example of the process of negatively constructing the Other was the early identification of Saddam Hussein with Hitler, a powerful symbol of “evil” (a symbol I shall return to below). This image of Saddam Hussein was laid out in prominent media sources under the banner of “this generation’s Hitler.” He certainly was never granted the status of being a country’s President. By reducing and reifying the person called Saddam to an “evil madman” the work of culturally constructing the enemy was well under way. This same process was engaged in Iraq. I recall distinctly stepping around the inlaid mosaic representation of George H. Bush’s face on the floor at the entrance of the famous Al-Rachid Hotel.

A key to accomplishing the negative construction of “Iraq” was to tell a story that placed the blame for the deaths of innocent victims squarely on the soon-to-be enemy. Chris Hedges retells the story of how this process was started in the case of the war against Iraq. The story bears repeating in full:

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was widely disseminated that Iraqi soldiers removed hundreds of Kuwaiti babies from incubators and left them to die on hospital floors. The story, when we arrived in Kuwait and were able to check with doctors at the hospitals, turned out to be false. But by then the tale had served its purpose. The story came from a fifteen-year-old Kuwaiti who identified herself only as ‘Nayirah’ when she tearfully testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, 1990. She said she had watched fifteen infants being taken from incubators in the Al-Adan Hospital in Kuwait city by Iraqi soldiers who ‘left the babies on the cold floor to die.’ Nayirah turned out later to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir al-Sabah. She did not grant interviews after the war and it was never established whether she was actually in the country when the invasion took place.40

In public speaking engagements between 1991 and 2003, I was continually asked about the veracity of this story, even though it had been widely reported and shown to be false for over a decade. This gives some indication of the resilience of symbols brought to life in stories that create the context within which more overt forms of violence in the physical realm are then enacted. Those hearing “the baby story” in 1991, as Hedges indicates, became “enmeshed in the imposed language.”41 Meanwhile, any subtlety in this
constructed falsehood, a subtlety that may have been felt by those listening to the story when it was first told in 1991, evaporated in the context of 2003 when the story was told in an obvious attempt to manipulate the US and UK citizenry in preparation for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

To reinforce the idea that Iraqi soldiers and their Commander-in-Chief were a dangerous threat to those who would war with them, it was important that they be able to physically “reach” North America and Europe, for only with the threat of reciprocal violence would the symbols take on sufficiently deep meaning to bear the weight of ongoing war. To that end, as is now quite clear, a careful argument was made (Colin Powell’s 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council was the most public enactment of this false information) over the course of the entire war beginning in 1991, that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were virtually “in the hands” of the Iraqi government. “With remarkable unanimity,” says one commentator who has reviewed the documents related to this case, “former Iraqi scientists interviewed since... [2003] about the status of the weapons programs ... have all maintained that the regime did, in fact, destroy those stockpiles in the early 1990s, as it claimed.”42 The discourse that reinforced the social construction of “weapons of mass destruction” as a symbol system is a part of the larger process of war-making. Both Bill Clinton and the later George W. Bush reinforced this fear of WMD on a continual basis. They often did this with threats of further military actions, including possibly invading the country, which was clearly on the US administration’s agenda for a long time, as seen in Bill Clinton’s 1998 statement that addressed both WMD and the possible need for a new Iraqi government.

The hard fact is that for so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with the new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people....

Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors; he will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them. Because we are acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.43

One of the more striking aspects of this symbol system that was played on constantly over the years is that it eventually became absolutely clear that it was only that—a symbol
system that enabled violence in other realms, although what the symbol purported to represent was in fact not in existence.

Another striking example of violent processes in the symbolic realm arises in an 1990 article by Fouad Ajami, published in the widely read journal *Foreign Affairs*. Ajami wrote:

No sooner had the Arab/Muslim world said farewell to the wrath and passion of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s crusade than another contender rose in Baghdad. The new claimant was made of material different from the turbaned saviour from Qum: Saddam Hussein was not a writer of treatises in Islamic government nor a product of high learning in religious seminaries. Not for him were the drawn-out ideological struggles for the hearts and minds of the faithful. He came from a brittle land, a frontier country between Persia and Arabia, with little claim to culture and books and grand ideas. The new contender was a despot, a ruthless and skilled warden who had tamed his domain and turned it into a large prison.  

What Ajami does in this passage is to put the symbol/name “Saddam” in direct association with a negative assessment of cultural achievement, for example, a “brittle land” with “little claim to culture and books and grand ideas.” This example exemplifies the negative construction of the Other. In other words, Ajami is effectively disabling cultural knowledge in order to create a sense of “the Iraqi people”, a highly abstracted symbol launched through time and space, that helps to create the cultural conditions whereby violence in the network and physical realms can be enacted.

The trajectory of this process is clear: when “Saddam” is heard or read in this context, a host of symbolic associations are made—the creation of negative knowledge—which mask the epistemic processes of violence that go into the creation of an enemy. Based on my own experience, many people in North America either thought of “evil mad man,” “possessor of weapons of mass destruction,” or “someone who is capable of attacking ‘my country’,” when this symbol/name was seen or heard; or they were willing to turn a blind eye to these blatant reifications and distortions in the name of patriotism and loyalty to “the troops,” also potent symbol systems. Note that when the “real” Saddam Hussein was captured, he was quickly removed from the scene, for to allow him to be seen as a bedraggled soldier for too long could have re-awakened the awareness that he is as human as he is symbol. The perpetuation of the symbol/image required that his presentation to the public be well prepared, and his demise carefully orchestrated.

It is instructive to compare how the political leadership of those at war used similar language to describe each other. A key element of the following excerpts from a speech by Saddam Hussein and one by George W. Bush is the use of the term evil. In
both contexts this word is a powerful symbol of that which is morally wrong. There are few words that convey such strong stigma as does the word evil in both a North American context and an Iraqi context. That each leader called on it to label the other side, so to speak, speaks volumes about the desire to produce at the level of symbolic language the strongest possible moral condemnation of the Other. Here is an excerpt from the well-known 2002 speech by President Bush that refers to an “Axis of Evil.” Note both the invocation of evil, and its link to terrorism. The quote goes so far as to claim that “Iraq” is not a part of the civilized world, a patently obvious effort to justify and turn eyes away from the negative impact of violent processes like economic sanctions and misguided missiles.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.45

The factual content of the speech has been shown to be suspect, but when dealing with the process of constructing symbol systems to support warfare, facts often fall by the wayside. Of course, then President Saddam Hussein was keen to do the same in the context of the ongoing war. In his speech of 1994 he emphasized “evil” as well. However his emphasis was not on terrorism, but rather on the role of the US government as the aggressor; Hussein implied, given the ancient history of Iraq that he was so fond of recounting, that the US was in fact the uncivilized one.

God wanted to relieve us from our sufferings. He bestowed on us more patience, power protected by the greatness of His power and wisdom which place the people of Iraq on His right path. But let it be known to all the evil that the people of Iraq and their leadership, from a position of responsibility and patience shall not convert wisdom into weakness and despair. If we have endured the continuation of the blockade which was
imposed by the will of the malicious, in addition to all that has been done by the conspirators and the wicked, if we have endured the continuation of the flights of enemy aircraft on the southern part of our dear Iraq thus violating our airspace and preventing our aircraft from flying south [of] parallel 32 for a long time with the help of the wicked from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; if we have endured the continuation of infringement in the northern part of our dear land and dear people north [of] parallel 36, despite the uncovering of the true intentions and the collapse of pretexts, we shall not forsake our people in the north nor shall we stand idle towards the continuation of blockade and the violation of our airspace in the south.

To all the wicked, masters and subordinates; we reiterate it here again: you must not delude yourselves again and miscalculate. Try to learn from the lessons of the near past and comprehend their meanings on bases other than those of the malice you harbour.  

It goes almost without saying that the US won the war. But that it was a war fought on several fronts, including in the symbolic realm, is clear.

An interesting and enlightening window into the way official Iraqi news sources helped to develop a symbolic construction of the US/UK as enemies is found in the weekly English language newspaper, *The Baghdad Observer*. Clearly a government voice, the paper consistently reinforced the language we have already seen in Hussein’s speech. Here, for example, we find reference to both aggressors and evil forces: “The US-led aggression targeted many Iraqi bridges in all Iraqi provinces, among them the suspension bridge in Baghdad. Owing to the brutal attacks launched daily in 1991 during Um al Ma’rk battle, the evil forces bombed the Suspension Bridge twice on February 9, 1991.”

The symbolic nature of this statement is particularly apparent when you consider that the event being described occurred in 1991, but this description is found in a paper published in 2001—exactly ten years later. A pattern of invoking similar negative constructions of the US and UK is found throughout this paper. An incident that happened while I was in the region was captured in this manner:

On February 16th of this year, and in a calm night in Baghdad, the brutal aggressors’ warplanes, represented by the US and the UK, exceeded every limits and entered Baghdad’s airspace, bombing whatever before them; people, houses and other civilian targets.

This act of terrorism is the start of the new American policy against Iraq. It is the policy, which the new American President George W. Bush, inherited from his father who had been conquered by Iraq’s
steadfastness and faith under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein during Um Al-Ma’arik war in 1991 and the aftermath.
That aggression resulted in killing an innocent young woman and injured many victims, mostly children. What kind of revenge does Bush Junior want to take from a leader and people whose faith and power defeated the arrogance of his father and Israel who support him.48

According to this symbol construction, there was more than one government involved in terrorism.... Clearly in the symbolic realm an ethos for violence was being cultivated on both sides throughout the war. A valid question that merits further study revolves around how long these symbol systems endure as current events unfold.

What the processes of telling false stories about the killing of innocent babies, repeating false claims about weapons of mass destruction, and constructing false academic knowledge have done is to mask the reality that between 1991 and 2003 millions of people in Iraq continued to try to go about their daily lives, in the same manner that people in Canada try to go about their daily lives. The negative construction of the Other, operationalized in the symbolic realm to enable warfare, was highly effective in the case of the US/UK – IRAQ War.

Linking the Three Realms

The best way that I have found to explain the relationship of these three realms of violence to war is through examples. Consider an airplane pilot flying over Baghdad in 2001 in the process of dropping a bomb. A symbol system justifies this action as legitimate violence—patriotism, democracy vs. dictatorship—indeed, it justifies the existence of war in the first place. The “work” of the pilot is legitimized by these symbol systems. The network realm is all the components and processes that had to come together to manufacture and sustain the airplane, the bomb, the global positioning system, the economic institutions, the social support network for the pilot (internet email connection to family, for example) and the political machinery allowing information to be shared between the US and the UK militaries through global satellite systems. The act of dropping the bomb occurs in the physical realm of violence, where the physical and psychosomatic damage caused by its impact is experienced by individuals, families and communities in the village where it lands, and by wider communities connected to the people of the village.

The carefully constructed symbol system is required to legitimize the negative construction of the Other both at the level of the individual pilot and at the broader cultural level. It serves simultaneously to empower the pilot to act without guilt (although
it doesn’t always work) while also creating the conditions for society at large to accept it as a part of patriotic duty. We might frame this acceptance as a constructed form of indifference, which, if we recall Simmel’s ideas, is wholly negative as opposed to being a part of conflict that has both positive and negative dimensions. Elie Wiesel’s suggestion that “the opposite of love is not hate, it’s indifference” captures the essence of this process. 49 So we have a broad cultural construction based in the negative construction of the Other that simultaneously oscillates between empowering individuals and discouraging criticism. This is different than the actual processual mechanics necessary to sustain/provide the support network to carry out violence—we can distinguish for analytical purposes between the two. The network becomes the mediator/enabler between the symbol system and the physical act of violence that does immediate harm at a physical and psychosomatic level. The network enables and mediates acts of physical violence. The violent processes that take place in the physical realm are in large part the local consequence of these large scale socio-politico-economic networks and cultural symbol systems.

Consider the case of child mortality in Iraq as a second example. Here the three realms come together in a particularly potent way. In the physical realm one of the most common causes of childhood mortality in Iraq during the war was diarrhoea, a common ailment provoked by lack of access to clean water that often turned deadly when basic treatment was not available due to severe shortages of medical supplies. 50 As part of my work for aid agencies I was required to go to hospitals to assess possible reconstruction projects. Inevitably I faced parents whose children were dying from preventable causes, often diarrhoea. In one Basra hospital, while being led through the wards, an elderly woman confronted me and my wife with a simple question: “Why can’t I get medicine to stop my child from dying? Can you get us some? You are from the US, right?” The MD explained that we were not from the US and that we were writing reports to help him get medicine for the hospital (not entirely accurate, but under the circumstances understandable). She was not easily placated and her anger at the situation of her dying child laying on the bed beside her was palpable.

Linking a “simple” case of diarrhoea to the broader social orbit of the network realm begins to show how these realms interact with one another. Indeed, the interconnections within this realm can be both subtle and devastating. 51 For example, if an adult experiences malnutrition there are direct impacts on the family and the nation, according to biologist, George Sorger. Drawing on his research in El Salvador, he explains that “if you’re malnourished and you’re sick a lot of the time your potential is low and you will not be able to earn enough wages to feed your family. You will not be competitive with other people who are well-nourished and, therefore, your children will also be malnourished, and you will perpetuate a cycle of malnutrition. That’s not only
true of families, however, it is also true of whole societies and nations."

For the men, women and children of Iraq, who experienced deprivation at all levels over a period of thirteen years, the full impact of violent processes enacted in all three realms may not be visible for decades to come. But the voice of an Iraqi nurse with whom I was sitting in a small office in 1991 remains clear. She asked, “Why does your country support policies that are killing our children?”

While the violent processes of the physical realm are most clearly visible, and the violent processes in the network realm becomes clear as we put together the pieces of the larger process called war, violence enabled in the symbolic realm is more elusive. But in the case of children, one startling example does present itself to show how in the realm of symbol systems are found the roots of violent acts. For there are few more potent generators of symbols than the highest political offices of the US government. In what became an infamous statement, Madeleine Albright, then the US Ambassador and official Representative to the United Nations, revealed the carefully orchestrated nature of a negative construction of the Other that has the capacity to justify and support harm. This incident of symbol production links directly to the case of childhood mortality in Iraq. What follows is the transcript of an interview with Albright conducted by Leslie Stahl for the prominent investigative news show 60 Minutes.

Leslie Stahl: “We have heard that a half a million children have died. I mean, that’s more children than died in Hiroshima. And is the price worth it?”

Ambassador Madeleine Albright (US Representative to the United Nations): “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think the price is worth it ... It is a moral question, but the moral question is even a larger one. Don’t we owe to the American people and to the American military and to the other countries in the region that this man not be a threat?”

Stahl: “Even with the starvation and the lack ...”

Albright: “I think, Leslie—it is hard for me to say this because I am a humane person, but my first responsibility is to make sure that United States forces do not have to go and refight the Gulf War.”

The final clause of this statement bears careful scrutiny given the current situation in 2008 Iraq. The rest of the statement, I believe, speaks for itself at this point in the narrative.

In the physical realm harm is brutally inscribed on young bodies; in the network realm a bureaucratic process prevents medicines from reaching the sick, also enabling...
potent harm; and in the symbol realm a people is negatively represented as Other—a representation that creates an ethos in which violence is justified and necessary.

TOWARDS A HETERO DOX NARRATIVE

The argument of this dissertation imposes a different structure on how the course of events now unfolding in the geographical region of Southwest Asia is understood. Although this dissertation is not the place to write the full narrative that would more accurately represent the US/UK–IRAQ War, in this final section of Chapter 6 I would like to point in the direction that such a history needs to take.

In contrast to the orthodox narrative recounted in Chapter 1, my heterodox narrative describes a series of escalating stages. A long-standing conflict between the governments of Iraq and Kuwait was escalated when the Government of Iraq occupied the country of Kuwait in 1990. When a cohort of countries led by the US government intervened in the occupation of Kuwait, the conflict escalated into a state of war which lasted until 2003. That war was not named as "war", because doing so would have been detrimental to its conduct. By examining war through the lens of violence as it is enabled in three different realms, we begin to see the full extent of the war and can consequently
name it as such. It is very clear that throughout this war violent interactions were taking place in the physical realm, in which militaries dropped bombs, soldiers marched across deserts and shepherds died. As has been true of war through the millennia, violence was enacted in what I have called the network realm, in which economic, political and bureaucratic mechanisms combined as a significant part of the war machine. None of this would be possible, in my view, if it were not for the absolutely central role of negatively constructing the Other in the symbolic realm. I have become convinced through my study that if we are to make any progress in reducing incidents of warfare, then it is to this realm—in which we engage the heart and mind—that we must turn our attention.

Eventually the US/UK–IRAQ War was ended by yet another occupation; this time, however, it was the country of Iraq that was occupied. When this happened the President of Iraq was captured and summarily executed in a trial that left a great many questions. Although there should be no doubt about the brutal nature of the government led by Saddam Hussein, a significant opportunity to explore alternative forms of justice was missed in this case.

In conceiving of a heterodox narrative, my central task is to consistently reject the unquestioned assumptions used by the orthodox narrative. The effort required to produce a heterodox narrative is significant, but in the interests of producing a more authentic record of such an event, it is energy well spent. It is even possible that by the time a new narrative is ready to be published, the contours of the current US occupation of Iraq—and the internal resistance to it—will be more fully revealed.
ENDNOTES

1 I was able to see a copy of this report while being briefed for my term as the MCC/AFSC Field Representative in Iraq in 2000. The central facts of that report have since been published in 2006 by its primary author, along with a description of the political controversy over producing the reports. See Hans C. Von Sponeck, *A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 210-11.


7 This information is archived at Mennonite Central Committee headquarters in Akron, Pennsylvania.

8 Von Sponeck, *A Different Kind of War*, 213.

9 Von Sponeck, *A Different Kind of War*, 213. Von Sponeck is citing here the USEUCOM website found in the following footnotes.


13 One of my main Iraqi sources for examples of the language used to talk about Allied attacks is the Baghdad Observer, a publicly accessible weekly English language newspaper that I collected for seven months in 2000/2001. There are internet sources which discuss an Iraqi viewpoint as well.


18 Von Sponeck, A Different Kind of War, 219.


20 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 70-71.
25 Clark and The UN Food and Agriculture Organization, *The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq*.
33 Copy on file with the author. These press releases are available from UNICEF.


41 Hedges, *War is a Force*, 145.


44 Faoud Ajami, "The Summer of Arab Discontent," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990), 1.


49 Reflecting on the constructed form of indifference, one of my advisors raises the interesting idea that when indifference is constructed it may be "more powerful than hate, or more politically and strategically effective." Personal correspondence, Dr. Wayne Warry, September 2008. Copy on file with the author.

50 It is not my intent to go into the medical details of diarrhea. A good source that gives an overview written in the middle years of the war is Hoskins, "Public Health and the Persian Gulf War."

51 I have been aided in seeing the extent of this by Mona Macksoud, *Helping Children Cope With the Stresses of War* (New York: UNICEF, 2000).

53 CBS 60 Minutes, “Punishing Saddam,” May 12, 1996. This exchange can be found in numerous sources, and is well enough known to be considered a public document.
LOOKING FORWARD TO A CONCLUSION

History is almost always written by the victors and conquerors and gives their view. Or, at any rate, the victors' version is given prominence and holds the field.¹

There is very little left to say at this point in my dissertation. I will take the advice of mentors who say that I should not introduce a raft of new ideas into the manuscript in the conclusion, although I am not quite clear that this is a conclusion. In many ways it simply marks the beginning of the next phase of work.

THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THIS STUDY

Over the past many years I have presented the ideas found here in numerous forums, some academic and others public. Parts of the argument, and in some cases different formulations of it, have been published in a variety of informal and formal essays and articles.² My experience over these years has been that people respond to the ideas and the material in one of three ways.

First, there are those who hold to such a different world view that they cannot accept the idea at its core. For these people the thought that there was but one war, and that now there is an occupation, is just too divergent from their own perspective to gain any traction. Dismissing the argument is the only recourse, although when pushed to prove the opposite, namely, that there were two wars, I have noted that these people have a hard time articulating a rationale for the two war argument. Generally the discussion has to move to questions of how we define war, but then, as the evidence of military engagement in all respects is presented, the two war argument flounders on its own definition. This sometimes, though not always, then moves people to the second position, the one that I have seen most often in academic settings.

The second response to the argument of this thesis is that the ideas are basically sound, but that it is—to use words overheard at one academic gathering—not the right direction to go. I have not entirely understood the reasoning behind this attitude, for I think it is merely an attitude, but it is a common response. At one level this response admits that the argument itself is sound. The evidence is present to substantiate the conclusion that there was but one war. However, these people conclude that somehow—even if the argument is sound—this is not a fruitful direction of inquiry. The implication here is one of relevance, and generally comes from those most concerned with political
studies. It suggests that the pace of events has basically moved beyond these questions, and there is no relevance to knowing that there was really only one war between the United States and Iraq. Relevance here is determined by a political worldview called realism. In this perspective, current dynamics of power relationships between national states are of primary importance. An analysis that challenges the fundamental idea that there is something more to the story than the realist position is not welcome, for it challenges the fundamental assumptions that undergird that position. Those who hold to this position are effectively turning their eyes away from the real situation on the ground. This position is in my eyes dishonest, and therefore academically seriously unsound, perhaps even deceptive and flawed. Those who hold to this position are in fact supporting the status quo because it is in their interest to do so. The interests at work in this case are (a) not to be shown to have been wrong, and (b) not to have to say that all those professional publications that the academic industry produced far too hastily are flawed. Indeed, what I am saying is threatening, for it calls into question the very intellectual paradigm that has held sway for the past decade-and-a-half in ways that are very uncomfortable, implying the collusion of academic knowledge creation with the very real harm that has been done in Iraq. Whereas in the past anthropologists have been correctly accused of helping to subjugate colonial subjects—a sorry history that all anthropologists have now had to face and address as a body—now the focus of attention may need to shift away from anthropology, which now helps to provide the theoretical basis for challenging the orthodox view, toward those who work most directly with political studies, which is now frequently and centrally helping to create the very ideas that sustain war. This is not really a new development, when seen in the light of how many intellectuals supported the Vietnam war, but the situation has changed in that anthropologists in general have been less willing to be a part of war-making. The recent brouhaha over the use of anthropology in places of war points to this growing awareness.

The third response is demonstrated by people who accept the argument, but then do not know what to do with it because the implications are so overwhelming. There have been countless times when, after a public talk, I have been approached by someone who says that I have "opened their eyes" not only to a whole new way of looking at what has happened, but to a new sense of history. They have then gone on to say that they do not know what to do with it. This is a more difficult question for me to address, because it is a valid question. What do we do with this new way of looking at the subject? It takes a great deal of internal fortitude to hold to a heterodox position that flies so much in the face of received "wisdom", which I am sure many heretics in history have discovered. At bottom it requires that no inch be given in the mind at any time. When a newscast comes on the television, it means not accepting the words offered; when a politician speaks, it means maintaining our own integrity and not giving into the temptations of
power. These are not easy things to do in the seemingly overwhelming amount of false and misleading information that bombards us on a daily basis, but that is what I am proposing. To make even a small dent in this juggernaut is to my mind a success; indeed, I have often joked that if my work can become nothing more than a dissenting footnote to some work that continues to project an orthodox view, then I will have been successful. What is important to me is that a nascent movement already exists that sees the problem that I have elaborated at length in this paper. And that movement is worthy of still greater support.

REFRAMING THE OCCUPATION

The scope of my paper has not allowed me to take the logical next step, which is to reframe the occupation of Iraq (2003-?), which is now incorrectly being called a war. Fortunately, that work has already been started by others; here I would like briefly to comment on it because it complements my own so well.

Over the past several years, George Lakoff and his colleagues at the Rockridge Institute have been committed to raising issues about the politics of naming and framing in a consistent effort to challenge contemporary political discourse in the US. Their analysis often goes beyond the borders of the US to address issues relevant to a global audience. Their main goal is to help fellow academics and citizens to see with greater clarity the assumptions that dominate political agendas. In a series of articles publicly available on the Internet they have challenged, for example, the prevailing attitudes about terrorism, immigration and foreigners.

Although he has not addressed the question of one war with Iraq, Lakoff has correctly seen the fallacy of saying that there is continued war in post-2003 invasion Iraq. In “Occupation: The Inconvenient Truth About Iraq,” he outlines the beginning point of an analysis that runs parallel to the one I have put forward in this paper. He correctly (in my view) asserts that the “war was over when Bush said ‘Mission Accomplished.’” Quite clearly US forces “defeated Saddam’s military machine” in 2003. This assertion, of course, does not go over well with either end of the political spectrum, because it implies that even the opposition to the so-called war in Iraq has bought into the framing of the event as war. This “buy in” has serious political implications.

He summarizes the importance of this position for citizens in the US when he says the “Occupation Frame fits a politically inconvenient truth. Most people don’t want to think of our army as an occupation force, but it is. An occupying army can’t win anything.” The War Frame, as he calls it, served the interests of the Bush administration, who have drawn heavily on the phrase “cut and run” to vilify all those who disagree with
the occupation of Iraq. That frame draws on powerful symbols and imagery of its own, here summarized by Lakoff:

There is a war against evil that must be fought. Fighting requires courage and bravery. Those fully committed to the cause are brave. Those who 'cut and run' are motivated by self-interest; they are only interested in saving their own skins, not in the moral cause. They are cowards. And since those fighting for the cause need all the support they can get, anyone who decides to 'cut and run' endangers both the moral cause and the lives of those brave people who are fighting for it. Those who have courage and conviction should stand and fight.

Once this powerful frame is set, Lakoff shows how difficult it is to use any frame that does not address the cause of “fighting evil.” This “war-against-evil” frame is the same frame that was used to invade Iraq in the first place, and remains the key organizing principle that supports the current occupation. While the Cut-and-Run frame “fits a gallant war” it does not fit “a failed occupation.” A closer proximity to truth says that all occupations “end with withdrawal. The issue is not bravery versus cowardice in a good cause.” When viewed in this way, the Cut and Run Frame simply “does not apply.”

As soon as we begin to see more clearly that the occupation of Iraq is exactly that and not a war—a war that ended after it had been waged for some thirteen years in my analysis—then significant questions can be raised with political implications. Once it is acknowledged that what we are dealing with is an occupation then we have to ask not whether there will be a withdrawal, but when and how. There cannot be agreement on an answer to those questions, until they are acknowledged as the questions, because they reflect the politically real situation, not an illusion of ongoing war. More pragmatically, we then need to ask whether a president should still have war powers when the situation is one of occupation? And in what way does the reality of an occupation change the military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, all of which are premised on war? To challenge the way the events of Iraq are framed is itself one of the most political acts that any academic can do and requires considerable courage.

When Lakoff’s analysis is piggy-backed onto my own, it becomes clearer that we are dealing with a sequence of historical events that has transpired over almost twenty years—all under false pretenses, hidden by carefully constructed frames of reference that mask the day-to-day life in Iraq dominated by suffering and military occupation. That there was one war with Iraq is no longer in doubt. It started in 1991 and ended in 2003. That the country of Iraq is now occupied is also no longer in doubt. The occupation began in 2003. When will it end?
I want now to consolidate the heterodox view that I have been advocating throughout this paper by returning to a conversation that I began in the first chapter about Bourdieu's concepts of doxa, orthodox, and heterodox. While in the first chapter I explained the basic architecture of Bourdieu's three part understanding of doxa and the realm of opinion, here I want to push that analysis further to indicate the deeper framing to which the case of Iraq points. Here the main focus of attention will be doxa, what Bourdieu defines as the "field of taken-for-granted knowledge." 7

"The importance of this taken-for-grantedness is," as paraphrased by anthropologist John Gledhill, "that there are some subjects which are never discussed, and certain questions which are never raised, in social discourses relevant to power and domination." 8 This, according to Gledhill, "is one of Bourdieu's most important ideas" and it is directly related to my study of Iraq. My primary focus has been wrestling with the conventional, or orthodox, view of Iraq. Sometimes I feel like this has been the story of my life for the past two decades—a constant uphill grind against overwhelming opposition. But as I have struggled with the orthodox view, I have become very aware that there is a difference of opinion. I have already pointed to other scholars and activists who have raised the concerns that I have raised, albeit not in the systematic form that I have; the work of Joy Gordon, Hans von Sponeck, George Lakoff and many others are examples of a growing awareness that something is amiss.

Furthermore, however—and this is the main point I now want to make—to argue against the orthodoxy I have not yet been able to address the realm of taken-for-grantedness, the doxa. At an important level my analysis is still structured by the need to engage with the orthodox view. Following Bourdieu, however, this should not be a surprise. In the final analysis, my argument is not the radical critique that some would make it out to be, for I am still arguing within the realm of opinion. Gledhill explains Bourdieu's position like this:

Political or economic crisis can provoke confrontations between groups, but this may go no further than opening up what Bourdieu terms the 'field of opinion' (that which is talked about) to a heterodox discourse, which is distinguished from, but still structured by, an 'orthodoxy' defined in terms of the positively expressed aspects of dominant class ideology. Radical critique and fundamental change demand a questioning of what is not normally questioned. To secure emancipation from existing modes of domination, the dominated classes have to go beyond offering a competing heterodox discourse in the 'field of opinion' to question the wider field of
doxa, the 'taken-for-granted' domain of social thought on which orthodox and heterodox discourses are equally silent.\(^9\)

Here is how I read the preceding paragraph: the ongoing severe strain caused by war with Iraq and the subsequent occupation of Iraq has provoked a confrontation over ideas, opening up—bit-by-bit—to a heterodox discourse. That strain is embodied in the dead bodies of American soldiers, in an economic recession fueled by increasing gas prices (when the idea had been instilled that this “war” was to ensure cheap gas), and by a growing public awareness that political leaders have used powerful symbols and metaphors to promote half-truths that play on significant fears, most importantly the fear of weapons of mass destruction that were never found. My work is in fact the flowering of that heterodox discourse, an effort to patiently wedge it into the orthodox’s space. What would need to take place to make it into a truly radical critique—one, to use the term literally, that would go to the root problem—would be to ask questions about the deeper frame that supports both the orthodox and heterodox views. At this point I can only point in the direction of that inquiry.

Based on my study of Iraq to this moment in time, I believe that questioning the doxa would mean investigating the role of militarism as a prime directive for foreign policy, and even deeper than that, the meaning of democracy in North America. As I have thought about what my study reveals, these concerns keep coming up. My study shows that militarism is the foundation stone of foreign policy.

Let me first explain my thoughts about democracy and its taken-for-grantedness. Earlier in this paper I discussed Henry Giroux’s concern about the possibility of having true citizen input into decisions made by democratically elected governments in Europe and North America. At least one dimension of democracy is the idea that citizens have freedom to choose their representatives, and these representatives then express the will of those who have elected them. One of the fundamental requirements, then, of a well functioning democracy is the element of choice. If choice is taken away from a population, then they no longer are free to express the direction they want representatives to go on their behalf. Working backwards from this observation, consider this: if a war is hidden from view, so that citizens cannot know that it is taking place; if an occupation is being conducted in their name, but it is not called an occupation; then to what degree are these people free to choose their own direction? I am not saying here that given the choice, citizens would not have chosen the war with Iraq; I am saying that my argument proves they were not given the choice, and that reality is sufficiently disturbing to raise questions about the democratic process in the US (we could extend this easily to Canada if we were to engage with the question of Canadian participation in the Afghanistan war). My suggestion, in line with Giroux’s, is that citizens in the US have not been truly
free to make the choice. The radical critique called for by Bourdieu’s analysis suggests that Western democracies are no longer healthy (if they ever were). But that is not yet in the realm of opinion—about it we have neither orthodox or heterodox views in the North American public sphere. Rather, what we see is an unquestioned assumption that democracy as a value simply is not something that we can collectively question. In terms of power and the construction of knowledge, and notwithstanding the few fringe groups that raise an occasional objection to democracy, it is doxa.

Next, consider the question of militarism. I suggest that it would be a worthy follow-up study to look at the degree to which militarism is the foundation stone of democracy. Foreign policy is based on militarism—the case of Iraq is but one of a litany of cases in which the use of the military to resolve matters of foreign policy is de rigueur. While there are cases in which diplomacy is used in place of actual military intervention, I think it would be worth asking the question about how necessary is the threat of military force to non-military forms of intervention. There is some important work already being done in this area. Cynthia Enloe, for example, has begun to probe American family life to get at the depth to which militarism has penetrated everyday life. Although individual citizens may question the wisdom of the Canadian government’s decision to use active military forces in Afghanistan, and individual citizens in the US might question the ongoing use of the military in Iraq, by and large, very few people can consider questioning the value of the military itself.

But these are speculative issues that go beyond what I have attempted to do in this study. They are reflections of possible topics for further study, and I think valid hypotheses which could be further explored using my case study as starting point.

**IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH**

The scope of my study has been quite limited: to argue that there was one war with Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Even so, its implications are far reaching and have the potential to spawn a great deal of further research. A conversation about the difference between journalism and academic writing with a former adviser has stayed with me and contextualizes how I understand the implications of my work. He commented that one of the distinguishing features of good academic writing is its longevity and potential for generating further research. In many cases the ramifications of what we discover may not be known to us immediately, and sometimes not even in our lifetime. We write with the confidence of not knowing how, when, or where our findings and our ideas might be of use to other intellectuals. If we are constantly and only writing to the present moment, then we are doing journalism, which is itself a necessary and noble endeavour. But as academics our work is situated in a much longer view. The long view is what I have been
after in this paper—certainly I have no illusions about a sudden rewriting of history along
the lines I have argued in my thesis. I am convinced, however, that we need more of this
kind of work, for "to avoid misunderstanding the world’s contemporary ills, we must take
a longer view." 10

By far the most significant implication of my study is that it calls for a wholesale
change of language when referring to the events of Iraq. What I have done is provide the
beginning point for that narrative. This new narrative implies that a great deal of the
work that has been previously done in this area was hasty in its historical judgment.
Although I would not go so far as to say that previous work is simply wrong, I do think
that it is incumbent upon the intellectual community to go back and reassess its rush to
publication based on assumptions that were given to us by political entities. Why were we
so quick to jump to the politico-military agendas? Surely one of the hallmarks of
intellectual inquiry is its effort to maintain a critical distance and to open up questions
about assumptions, yet in this case, the fog of war seems to have clouded the thinking of
even well-respected academics who apparently wanted to be the first to publish "the"
history of "the Gulf War," for example. To this day, I cannot help but wonder about the
wisdom of those who had books published within weeks of the initial bombing of Iraq.
Having just spent a great many years thinking through my own study, and being very
aware of the significant amount of time involved in simply producing roughly 300 pages
of text, I look at the books that were published within weeks of the end of that initial
phase declaring definitive analyses of "the Gulf War" and wonder how the authors could
have had any perspective whatsoever, because their assumptions about the so-called end of
the war must have been in place in early 1991 or even before the war began. The kind of
intellectual honesty that would be required to look at this question is considerable, but I
think the question is valid.

My study calls for a new comprehensive history to be written about the thirteen-
year-long US/UK – IRAQ War. What I have done is provided a theoretical model to
pursue that task, or perhaps inspired others who disagree with my approach to develop
another one that is better. I have started to outline a comprehensive history along these
lines, but I think it is the kind of work that would benefit from many studies that could
explore the question from a variety of perspectives and viewpoints. I do not think that my
study suggests that any one political ideology has a firmer hold on the truth of this war,
for any can use the paradigm that I have presented in this study. Here I simply encourage
rethinking how the war with Iraq has been framed.

In a pragmatic way, my study reveals the need for a thoroughgoing analysis of the
role of the United Nations in international incidents that involve Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. In my analysis of the US/UK – IRAQ War it becomes very clear that the
United Nations was used as a tool of particular governments. It is not only the US that is
implicated in this use of the UN; I think the global community of nations needs to be called to task in this area. In what way can we re-conceive the United Nations so that it is more clearly an independent and leading player on the world stage? A fruitful place to start, where others have already begun the work, is to call for a re-imagining of the UN Security Council's composition. The idea of permanent member states with veto power is extremely problematic. My study suggests that a great deal of harm can be done by the unwitting actions of member states in the UN. Yet I am idealist enough to believe that change is possible.

In a very particular way, my work seriously interrogates the role of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. Sanctions are clearly a part of the modern war-making machine. The idea that sanctions are nonviolent is nonsensical to me; that sanctions constitute a violent process is a finding supported by my study. My singular concern is that we not dupe ourselves into thinking sanctions are a nonviolent alternative to war—use them we might, but in all cases they are premised on violence. When we advocate their use we must be clear that we are advocating for the use of violent measures. Further research is needed to clarify how sanctions are violent not only at the proximate level of analysis, but also at the deeper level of symbol and ritual.

Anthropologists, as seen in numerous articles, face an incredibly complex reality in any cross-cultural situation, and that complexity is enhanced when traveling in war zones. In addition, researchers must deal with still more challenges when working in security states where life and death issues can hang on simply talking to someone, or the wrong person, in an unguarded fashion. While in Iraq I had to work within the confines of accessible information in keeping with my role as an NGO worker that did not endanger myself or anyone else in the process of collecting it. Although I was often very frustrated by these constraints, I nevertheless feel that focussing on easily accessible material augmented even minimally by my experience has been the correct approach. My experience has certainly raised for me the question of how to conduct ethically and theoretically sound research in security states. Although anthropologists have been aware of this problem, I think it bears further study. (I am not sure whether recent AAA or CASCA meetings have called together anthropologists who have worked and traveled in security states to work through their experiences. If not, this would be a worthy idea that I would like to be a part of.)

With specific reference to the military engagement between the US and Iraqi militaries, my study suggests that much more research is needed to uncover the full extent of the physical exchange of bombs and missiles. Perhaps as documents become more available in the public sphere we will have access to it. In the absence of official documents and figures, it might be possible to coordinate research using a methodology like that used by the Iraq Body Count, which involves correlating numerous public
documents from the media and a variety of other sources to cross-check specific incidents of military exchanges. I have begun to do some of this, and have indicated in chapter six where others have done some of this work, but I still believe more needs to be done in this area. It would be a necessary part of the longer historical study that I have suggested earlier in this section.

At one level, there have already been a number of studies of the media with relation to various parts of this war. A comprehensive study of the media, using the paradigm presented in this study, remains to be written. My study points to the need to integrate a study of the media into a framework like that offered by Lakoff in the idea of “framing”. Frequently the media are blamed for the war. I have never believed that blame rests with the media. There are of course many different theoretical positions on the media—those like Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman argue that the media is controlled from above, while those like Stewart Hall argue that the media is a reflection of society (a position closer to my own). The US/UK – IRAQ War would be an excellent case study to pursue that debate.

In two of my earlier papers I put a great deal of effort into trying to understand how the contemporary concern to understand globalization, especially in the formulations of anthropologists, links to my concern to understand war. Although I elected not to make the question of global processes a central feature of this study I nevertheless continue to believe that it would be a rich area to investigate, as demonstrated by Nordstrom’s recent work on the shadow economy of war and violence. 13

As I have pursued my study one dimension of the war that was constantly present was the anti-war movement. I have myself, of course, been a part of that movement over the years, and I have collected an enormous number of documents about it. This study has not looked at that movement at all. One of the areas that I think would be worth pursuing would be to write a history of the anti-US/UK – IRAQ War movement using my paradigm as its cornerstone. Such a history would chart the ebb and flow of the protest movement in North America and possibly Europe between 1991 and 2003, with a view to seeing how it interacted with the prevailing discourse of power that I have revealed. To what degree did that movement have its own agenda, and to what degree was it constantly reacting to the agenda as set out by more powerful political actors? That history would help a great deal to understand how war is sustained in the face of opposition from a significant part of the civilian population.

An area of study that I have not pursued in this paper, but which has been on my mind a lot has been the question of memory, especially as it applies to large groups of people. At one point I had done a great deal of reading on the subject, but came to see that it was not central to the argument that I have made in this thesis. 14 It is however a
significant parallel inquiry that continues to intrigue me. If the US/UK – IRAQ War was one war waged over thirteen years, how does this change the way we commemorate it? How does this reworking of history play into the memories of those who have participated directly in the war? A researcher might do well to take my ideas as a framework for talking to soldiers and investigating how their memory of events has been shaped by the conventional view. Further, one could ask questions about how their perception of involvement would change when viewed through a heterodox lens.

In the realm of anthropological theory on violence and war, a great deal of work remains to be done to fulfill the mandate laid out by Simon Harrison. I continue to believe that his observation forecasts the direction that any study of war in anthropology must take. Efforts to understand the linkages between violence and war at a theoretical level are still in their infancy. Several dimensions need to be looked at more closely—it would be worth continuing to investigate, for example, how war mobilizes a constellation of symbols. Comparative studies of occupation, war, genocide and other such phenomena using a model like the one I have presented in this paper might bear fruit. Indeed, a thorough-going comparison of occupation and war is a natural follow up to this study.

An ongoing conversation must be had within the discipline of anthropology about the idea of violence in the network realm, which has been central to this paper. Although I have charted a compromise position on the question, I think a great deal more work needs to be done on this idea. So far, most anthropologists have been cool to the idea of any form of “structural violence”. Perhaps it has not yet been put to the discipline in a modified way that would encourage scholars to integrate it into broader theoretical fields of inquiry. A part of my ongoing effort will be to try to suggest ways we might be able to use the idea without doing harm to our core concerns for culture and agency.

Finally, my study has explicitly and narrowly focused on punctuating the US/UK – IRAQ War. My goal has been to argue the “what” question: in other words, to blow away the haze of confusion and emotion to reveal the parameters of this thirteen year long war. Having accomplished this, I am left now wondering how this clarification changes the study of the war’s causes. For example, a frequent causal factor, according to many analyses across the political spectrum, has been the US government’s drive for direct access to oil. Along with others, I’ve questioned this as a causal factor, because access to Iraq’s oil was never really an issue. It involved a constant negotiation with the Iraqi government, but there were no indications that Saddam Hussein had any intentions of stopping the flow of oil; indeed, oil is the lifeblood of Iraq’s economy, and it would make no sense whatsoever to impede that flow. Certainly it was a major bargaining chip in negotiations with OPEC and Western nations. But there was never a question that Iraq’s oil would be taken offline.
By revealing the thirteen-year US/UK – IRAQ War, I believe more significant causal factors come to the fore. As a general category I think these factors fall in the area of neo-colonialism and modern imperialism. For this reason, I think a next step in my analysis will be to pursue this avenue using some of the initial works that already exist.15

A SENSE OF HISTORY

Not far from the Iraqi Red Crescent headquarters in Baghdad there is a small coffee shop. On the outside wall it has a large chess board painted, and inside it is not very large—a few small tables and chairs. Most striking are the faded pictures and a few paintings that cover the inner walls depicting the past hundred years of Iraq history—pictures and sketches of British administrators, former Iraqi leaders, and famous scenes of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. On shelves lining various walls are books, lots of books. And as always there is the obligatory picture of the president, framed on the wall behind the rather small and informal looking till. The bodily memory that I have of the place is of a small cave, where intellectual discourse is actually possible. This is Ghassan’s coffee-shop.

Ghassan was an exceptionally articulate conversation partner. A former civil servant and very well educated, he had been an Iraqi diplomat in several European countries, his favorite posting apparently being to Austria. Cultured in an old-fashioned sense of that phrase, when my wife Tamara would come into the shop he would show real courtesy, not some fake pretense of courtesy, but rather one that spoke of honesty and integrity to an old custom learned from years of diplomatic work. Here one didn’t kiss a woman on the cheek—especially when she was not known to you—but a kiss on the back of the hand genuinely offered came across as the real thing.

Our conversations were animated and traveled over a great deal of territory. Certainly Iraqi politics was discussed, carefully of course. But the main interest of this inquisitive older gentleman was Canada. He wanted to know about our forms of democratic process, a subject I tried to articulate and that required my reaching into high school social studies memories. He was also curious about how we treated the aboriginal population. When I could, I was able to ask him questions about what he thought his country needed, because that was ostensibly why I was there—to offer aid wherever it would be of use. One afternoon over a cup of very strong coffee I broached this subject yet again, because I truly wanted to know what our small organization could do that would not end up doing more harm than good. His answer, which I can only paraphrase here, has stayed with me over the years. Sitting across a small round table, he paused and got a small gentle smile on his face. He then said very quietly,
We truly and sincerely appreciate the help that organizations like yours are bringing to us in these times of need. But I must say to you with honesty that we really don’t need you. Ours is a rich country. We have resources to easily feed all our people. Indeed, we have had educational and medical care facilities that are the envy of most countries in the region. It’s true—and here he pointed with his eyes to the picture on the wall—that we have some political difficulties. But that too will come to an end in its own time.

Then he said what I have taken deeply to heart.

In this land which has gone by many names we trace long histories. We Iraqi people have known foreign invaders before and we have had long wars. But we have a sense of history that goes back far longer than these invaders. One day they too will be gone, and we will still be here, for we are survivors. Our country will still be here, as it has been for centuries before the British came, before the Ottomans came, and back into ancient times. The United States will be gone one day, not in my lifetime, but it will be gone for all empires fall, and all bad rulers come to their end. We will feed our people once again. And we will write our history anew, after the current battles are fought. That we can know for sure. So thank you for the help you have been giving to us, even though it is not needed. Tell people in your country that we appreciate it and will remember those of you who tried to help, especially those who saw through this charade. Some day we look forward to welcoming you back to a country that is truly ours.

Listening to this white-haired gentle man speak with such confidence about his country, I realized how little confidence I had in the political leadership of my own country. He gave me a sense of history unlike any that I had before living in Iraq. If I have been able in any sense to instill a bit of that alternative sense of history through my argument and efforts to properly name the US/UK – IRAQ War, 1991-2003, then I will feel that I have been true to those in Iraq who have known the truth of one long war by living through it.
ENDNOTES


3 There are occasional exceptions. See, for example, Glenn D. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2007).


5 Sadly the Institute was closed in April 2008, although the research articles and public opinion pieces will be archived on the Institute’s website for the foreseeable future.


8 Gledhill, Power and Its Disguises, 136.

9 Gledhill, Power and Its Disguises, 136.

10 Gledhill, Power and Its Disguises, 151.


12 Nordstrom, Scheper-Hughes, and others have all raised this question, which is summarized recently in Kevin Avruch, “Notes Toward Ethnographies of Conflict and Violence,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30, no. 5 (2001): 637-48.


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