LIVING THE STORY: IMPlicit EPISTEMOLOGY IN PAUL'S LETTERS
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By

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ABSTRACT

Although Paul is sometimes depicted as anti-rational, he actually assumes in his letters that human reason, with the aid of the Spirit, can achieve genuine religious knowledge. The specific kind of reason which Paul assumes will be fruitful has a distinctly narrative shape. Paul's theological knowledge is structured as a story within which he and his converts interpret their own lives. Ethical reasoning is a matter of "emplotting" oneself within this theological narrative and asking what fate lies ahead in the story for one who acts in certain ways. When we look more closely at the letter to the Galatians we find that Paul is primarily arguing there for a re-configuration of Israel's theological narrative. The Apostle understands new events as further episodes in the one over-arching story. This means that, just as later chapters in a book can surprise readers and force them to reconsider what they read early on, so new experiences can open up interpretive "gaps" in Israel's theological story and force its adherents to construe the traditional narrative in new ways. Paul argues that both the cross of Christ and the Galatians' experience of the Spirit force just this kind of re-interpretation of the story, and his central argument in Galatians is an attempt to show that his own construal of the narrative is more coherent than those of his competitors. This kind of narrative, hermeneutical logic in Paul's argument not only explains some of the Apostle's notoriously difficult exegesis of Israel's scriptures, but it may also offer a useful epistemological model for contemporary Christian theology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First I must thank my supervisor, Prof. Stephen Westerholm. Though I have, at times, winced at his trenchant criticisms, his relentless attention to detail has saved me from writing a much poorer piece of work. I cannot now talk about Paul, or any other writer for that matter, without hearing Dr. Westerholm's refrain in my ears: "Where is it in the text?" Perhaps even more importantly, he has taught me to be rigorously honest about the object of my study, and to recognize the subtle indicators when I am beginning to let my own ideas run roughshod over what Paul has written. Beyond all of this, however, I am grateful for his friendship and his encouragement when the road was difficult.

I must also thank my other professors at McMaster University, in particular Professors Eileen Schuller, Adele Reinhartz, Alan Mendelson, and Graeme MacQueene. I am deeply grateful both for the chance to learn from their rich understanding of the first-century world and for the way they have treated me from the beginning as a colleague and friend. I regret not having had the time to take seminars with Prof. Peter Widdicombe and Prof. Travis Kroeker, but their friendship, advice, and conversation also helped to make my years at McMaster, and my work on this thesis, both richer and easier to bear. One's intellectual life does not begin, of course, at the start of Ph.D. studies, and I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the role of my earlier teachers. In particular, Prof. Iain Provan and Prof. Rikki Watts both helped to ignite my fascination with early Christianity and Judaism, and both have continued to offer welcome encouragement and advice.

Thanks are also due to my fellow graduate students at McMaster. I now realize that the community we enjoyed in the basement of University Hall was a rare thing. I am especially grateful for the friendship of David Vuyadinov, Ken Penner, David Miller, Derek Melanson, and Scott Dunham, all of whom helped in different ways to spur this work on. Nor can I forget the communities at Church of the Resurrection, Anglican and St. John the Evangelist Anglican Church in Hamilton, who provided my spiritual nourishment.

I was foolish enough to ignore the gentle advice of my professors and to take up a full-time teaching position before this thesis was finished. I only wish, however, that all of my poor decisions would turn out as well as this one has. My completing of the thesis is due in large part to the patient support and warm encouragement of my colleagues at King's University College at the University of Western Ontario.

Finally, I must thank my wife Susan and my children Emmett and Elizabeth. Without their loving support the long evenings and weekends in the library and the office would have been impossible. It is the time spent with them which has helped me to remember that I am a human being first and a scholar second. I only hope that I can offer as much in return.

London, Ontario

August, 2004
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## ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>The Anchor Bible</td>
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<tr>
<td>AThANT</td>
<td>Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Athen.</td>
<td>Athenaeus</td>
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<tr>
<td>BECNT</td>
<td>Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>BET</td>
<td>Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGU</td>
<td>Ägyptische Urkunden aus den königlichen (later Staatlichen) Museen zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden. 1895-.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNTC</td>
<td>Black's New Testament Commentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBQ</td>
<td>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Corpus Hermeticum</td>
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<td>Diod. Sic.</td>
<td>Diodorus Siculus</td>
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<td>DSD</td>
<td>Dead Sea Discoveries</td>
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<td>ExpTim</td>
<td>Expository Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>EKK</td>
<td>Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament</td>
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<td>Epict.</td>
<td>Epictetus</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evangelical Quarterly</td>
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<td>EstBib</td>
<td>Estudios Biblicos</td>
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<td>ETL</td>
<td>Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTK</td>
<td>Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTR</td>
<td>Harvard Theological Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>The International Critical Commentary</td>
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<td>Int</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
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<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature</td>
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<td>JETS</td>
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<td>KEK</td>
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<td>NCBC</td>
<td>The New Century Bible Commentary</td>
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NIBC  New International Biblical Commentary
NICNT The New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIDNTT The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology
NIGTC New International Greek Testament Commentary
NovT Novum Testamentum
NTS New Testament Studies
Odes Sol. The Odes of Solomon
OTL The Old Testament Library
P. Tebt. The Tebtunis Papyri. Edited by B. Grenfell, A. Hunt, and J. Gilbart Smyly. London: Frowde, 1902-
RTR Reformed Theological Review
SP Sacra Pagina
SBLDS Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SNTSMS Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SEA Svensk Exegetisk Årbok
SJT Scottish Journal of Theology
SPhA The Studia Philonica Annual
T. Levi The Testament of Levi
TS Theological Studies
TSS Theologische Studien und Kritiken
VC Vigiliae christianae
VT Vetus Testamentum
WBC Word Biblical Commentary
WTJ Westminster Theological Journal
ZNW Zeitschrift für die neuntestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZST Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie
INTRODUCTION: A DILEMMA, A QUESTION, 
AND A SKETCH OF THE ANSWER

1. The Dilemma

If anything is clear about the early Christian movement it is that the first believers in Christ were not technical philosophers. In *The Passing of Peregrinus* the second century satirist Lucian of Samosata (b. ca. 120 CE) unleashes his wit on the gullible Christians who were so easily duped by the charlatan Peregrinus Proteus. One can detect behind Lucian's sarcasm a genuine amazement that anyone would reject the Greek pantheon of gods, only to worship a crucified Jew from the backwater province of Palestine. What seems to stir up Lucian's derision even more than the content of these beliefs, however, is the lack of critical thought which the Christians apply to their doctrines. "All this," he explains, "they take quite on trust" with the effect that the Christians are perfect targets for a con-artist like Peregrinus: "Now an adroit, unscrupulous fellow, who has seen the world, has only to get among these simple souls, and his fortune is pretty soon made; he plays with them."¹ Not only does Lucian's attitude betray the wide intellectual gulf which lay between the Roman elites and most early Christians, but it also echoes a criticism which has been repeated innumerable times in the centuries since the dawning of the "Age of Reason." Despite occasional attempts to dress itself up in the trappings of philosophical respectability, Christianity has never been able to escape its reputation for encouraging a less-than-rational belief in traditional doctrines. Somewhere at its roots the Christian movement seems to have been shaped by

¹Lucian, *Peregrinus*, 11-13 (quotation from 13).
a kind of thinking very unlike the foundationalist rationalisms which characterized
Lucian's Roman philosophy and modern European thought after Descartes.

Before we add our assent to Lucian's judgement on the early Christians, however,
we must observe that the past century witnessed a disturbing erosion of our confidence in
the powers of human reason. This post-modern insecurity is captured by Umberto Eco in
his novel *Foucault's Pendulum* when the enigmatic Belbo describes to Casaubon the
epiphany which he experienced as he gazed at the enormous pendulum which hangs in
the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers in Paris:

'... then last year, when I saw the Pendulum, I understood everything.'
'Everything?'
'Almost everything. You see, Casaubon, even the Pendulum is a
false prophet. You look at it, you think it's the only fixed point in the
universe, but if you detach it from the ceiling of the Conservatoire and hang
it in a brothel, it works just the same. And there are other pendulums:
there's one in New York, in the UN building, there's one in the science
museum in San Francisco, and God knows how many others. Wherever
you put it, Foucault's Pendulum swings from a motionless point while the
earth rotates beneath it. Every point of the universe is a fixed point: all you
have to do is hang the Pendulum from it.'
'God is everywhere?'
'In a sense, yes. That's why the Pendulum disturbs me. It promises
the infinite, but where to put the infinite is left to me.'

What makes Belbo's anxiety so poignant for many contemporary readers is that we share
his sense of loss. We too have become aware that the cherished beliefs, the unquestioned
assumptions which once formed the bedrock of reality, seem now to float rootless. There
seems no way to find the absolute centre of things, and so every circle we inscribe at the
boundary of our world appears arbitrary. Yet, like Belbo, most of us cannot celebrate this

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2Eco, *Foucault's Pendulum*, 201.
sense of epistemic dislocation. Rather it overwhelms us like seasickness, a pervasive nau"ee which we learn to tolerate but for which we cannot help wishing we could find a cure. Our minds recoil at the thought that we are as absurd as Beckett's characters as they wait for Godot, their world constricted to the ugly banalities of boots, sore feet, and cruelty. We crave a myth to live by as we need air, but even more we have a need to believe the myth. We want its world to be real. We want the anchor point of that pendulum to really be the centre of the world, a fixed point from which we can measure our place. Hence the search for a centre has not died. Richard Rorty's pragmatic relativism, the communitarianism of Habermas, Wittgenstein's rooting of language games in a "form of life," Quine's redefinition of philosophy as the servant of science, Levinas' absolute ethical responsibility in the gaze of the "other," each represents in its own way a rebellion against Beckett's vision of absurdity. Even Derrida, whose flag has often been waved on this side of the Atlantic as the champion who would put an end to all settled meaningfulness, has begun to talk of real ethical meaning in concepts like "hospitality." It is still unclear, however, just how that meaningful centre for thought and life can be trusted, how we can really come to believe a myth again. Lucian's smug confidence in the power of reason has given way in many of us to Belbo's tragic uncertainty.

In this context we see more and more thinkers looking back in order to look forward. In Continental philosophy we can perceive a "religious turn" which seems to involve the conviction that there are important sources for meaning which were excluded, fatally, by the secularism of the Enlightenment. In theology too we see a shift away from the classical liberal project of re-constructing religion on the grounds of secular reason,
away from Bultmann's de-mythologization, and toward a more humble engagement with the pre-modern past. In the post-liberalism of Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and Thomas Oden or in the work of the "Radical Orthodoxy" group centred at Cambridge we see a hope that Aquinas, Augustine, Athanasius, and Paul may not have been so naive in their belief. Suddenly the early Christians do not look quite as foolish for their refusal to play Lucian's rationalist game. Could it be, we wonder, that they stood in living contact with ways of grounding belief and meaning which we have forgotten, approaches which are vitally important now if we are to escape the death-throes of modernity?

2. The Question and a Sketch

Enter Paul. The present project is conceived as another contribution to this exploration of the epistemological resources of our Western past and, for theology, of our Christian past. The question which we will pursue is how Paul, as the most influential Christian thinker in the first century, assumed he could know about God. It is clear that the Apostle did not ask how knowledge was possible in the sense that we do now after Descartes and Kant. Nor was he concerned with the self-conscious logic of the Stoics or with the arguments of the Skeptics. In part this is because, whatever exposure he may have had to the philosophical street-preachers in his native Tarsus, Paul did not belong to the social elite to which the details of Hellenistic philosophy were for the most part restricted. In part Paul was not overtly concerned about epistemology because he was a Jew, and prior to his experience on the Damascus road a fairly traditional one. Yet it is this very lack of interest in theorizing about knowledge which makes him so valuable as
the object of our study. For in reading the letters of this Apostle to the Gentiles we step outside of the tradition stretching from Plato, through Descartes and Kant, to the philosophy departments of our universities. In Paul we have the opportunity to see how someone approached religious knowledge who was at one and the same time foundational in the development of Western culture, and yet relatively untouched by the philosophical movements which so many now suspect are bankrupt. What assumptions did such a thinker make about human knowledge of God?

More specifically, this study is geared to uncover the kind of logic which Paul thought could successfully lead human beings from comparative ignorance into greater knowledge. In the first chapter I will explore Paul's attitude toward reason and rationality. I will begin by examining the two passages where Paul seems to address most directly the human epistemic situation: Rom 1:18-32 and 1 Cor 1:17-2:16. I will then turn to survey the trend in contemporary Pauline studies which recognizes the importance of interpretive rationality in Paul's thought and argument. We will see that the Apostle seems to have a much more positive attitude toward reason than many might assume. The Spirit is, for Paul, an indispensable factor in this acquisition of knowledge, but that Spirit's role is one of facilitating proper reasoning rather than displacing human intellectual activity. Even in the believer's initial conversion to faith in Christ, I will argue, the Apostle does not understand God's sovereignty totally to eclipse human reasoning. We will also see how Paul treats the Christ event and certain other experiences as an interpretive key which, in the context of a Jewish framework of thought, will allow human beings to properly interpret themselves and their world.
In the second chapter we will examine Paul's claims to knowledge and ask what kind of logical structure his knowledge exhibits when it is taken as a whole. This will involve collecting all of the passages in Paul's undisputed letters in which the Apostle describes human beings (himself or someone else) as knowing something. My focus will fall on the kinds of object which this knowledge grasps, so I will look at all those passages in which 1) verbs of knowing occur with an identifiable object; or 2) nouns denoting knowledge are employed and the content of that knowledge is identifiable from context. It will soon become clear that there is a narrative structure to the Apostle's knowledge. Moreover, we will see here further evidence of Paul's emphasis on hermeneutical reasoning, for the Apostle's ethical knowledge seems to arise out of this narrative as individual people are "emplotted" within the story. Finally, we will observe that this narrative knowledge is not, for Paul, an end in itself. Rather, all of the Apostle's knowing is geared to bring believers to that "knowledge of God" which includes a committed relational connection with God and Christ, a knowledge which itself constitutes salvation.

The third and largest chapter of this study aims to provide a clearer picture of the narrative, hermeneutical logic which Paul seems to assume is a reliable path to religious knowledge. Taking the letter to the Galatians as a sample of Paul's argumentation, I will

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1 I will restrict my analysis to those letters for which there is a fair consensus that Paul is the author. This group includes not only Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon, but also Colossians and 2 Thessalonians. There continues to be debate about the authorship of these latter two letters, but there remains a significant portion of the scholarly community which regards them as genuinely Pauline. Those who do not regard them as genuine may be consoled by the fact that neither letter offers decisive or distinctive evidence for this study. Their inclusion should thus not skew the outcome even if they are pseudonymous.
try to uncover the logic by which that argument proceeds. My approach in this section will be similar in some ways to rhetorical analyses of Galatians. My focus, however, remains essentially different. Most rhetorical readings are concerned with identifying recognized features of ancient rhetoric in Paul's writing. While this is an important question to ask, I am not interested here in isolating parallels with the surface structures of the Apostle's speech. Rather, I want to uncover the argumentative logic which lies implicit beneath that surface.¹

Why choose Galatians as a test-site? Unlike Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, and the Pastoral Letters, the Pauline authorship of Galatians has not seriously been challenged. Likewise, unlike 2 Corinthians and Philippians (and in some circles 1 Thessalonians), there has never been serious debate about the integrity of the letter. This is important for our purposes, because we will be tracing the logic of Paul's argument from beginning to end. In order to do so, we need to be confident that what we are reading was, in fact, written as a single sustained argument. This leaves us with Romans, 1 Corinthians, Galatians, and perhaps 1 Thessalonians. The ongoing debate over the nature of the Corinthian situation makes 1 Corinthians a difficult letter to use as a test-

¹The difference is clearly illustrated by a glance at Siegert's work on *Argumentation bei Paulus*. The observation that Paul often uses syllogistic or enthymematic argument (*Argumentation*, 191-95) does not tell us why the Apostle selects the premises which he does or the nature of the logic by which he moves from premise to conclusion. The observation that Paul sometimes employs familiar *topoi* (*Argumentation*, 199-202) does not tell us why he selects those and not others, what he is going to say about them, or why he thinks his audience should believe him. Siegert also focusses on the symbolic and typological connections which Paul often draws, but without providing insight into the logic by which these connections (and not others) are justified (*Argumentation*, 209-224). In contrast, Siegert begins to describe the underlying logic of Paul's argumentation when he observes that Paul often focusses not only on prior causes, but also (in typical Aristotelian and Stoic fashion) on the ends of things as causes (*Argumentation*, 207; see Rom 4:16, 18; 5:20f.; 7:13; 8:15, 17; 1 Cor 1:27-31; 11:19; 2 Cor 7:9; 12:7-9; Gal 3:14, 19, 22; 4:5; Phil 1:25f.). Siegert adds: "Meist ist vom Heilsplan Gottes die Rede, auch vom Zweck der Tora und vom Zweck des Todes Jesu" (*Argumentation*, 207). See also Siegert's observation that Paul often evaluates things based on their consequences (*Argumentation*, 207).
site. Its loose structure, in which Paul deals with a series of apparently distinct issues, also means that 1 Corinthians lacks good examples of an extended argument. Likewise, the ongoing controversy over the argument of Romans would make any reconstruction of the logic in Romans as a whole very controversial. To what extent was Romans an occasional letter? If it was, what kind of situation does Paul address? How does his discussion of the Jews in chapters 9-11 fit into this argumentative setting? At present there is little consensus over any of these questions. This is not to say that the interpretation of Galatians is a simple task, and some readers will doubtless find reason to challenge my own interpretation of the letter. There is, however, broader agreement about the setting and purpose of Galatians. Moreover the sheer length of Romans makes it less manageable as the focus of a detailed analysis. On the other hand, the very brief note from Paul to Philemon is simply not substantial enough for our purposes. Left with a choice between 1 Thessalonians and Galatians, the latter emerges as the obvious choice. On the one hand, Galatians is a much more focussed letter than is 1 Thessalonians. Throughout Paul directs his attention to one basic issue, allowing us to see a sustained example of his reasoning. On the other hand, although Paul’s intention in 1 Thessalonians does include some (new?) instruction (see, e.g., 4:13-5:11), the bulk of the letter either rehearses Paul’s history with the community in order to strengthen their bond

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5Some attempts have been made, of course, to outline an underlying argumentative unity which holds Paul’s treatment of these diverse issues together (see, e.g., Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation). There is, however, little consensus as yet about the success of such attempts.

6Paul’s rhetoric in Philemon is also highly allusive and depends heavily on non-discursive modes of persuasion.

7Betz (Galatians, 30) does not overstate the case when he writes that the body of the letter "contains nothing but one strictly rational argument."
with him (1:2-3:13), or repeats ethical injunctions which are already familiar to the audience (4:1-12; 5:12-22). This means that most of the letter is either not argumentative or simply alludes to arguments which have been presented before. In Galatians, however, we have Paul addressing a new problem with a community, and so we have an opportunity to examine his argument without having to reconstruct his teaching on prior occasions. It is thus to Galatians that we can most profitably look to explore the epistemological assumptions which drive his argumentation.

This analysis will begin with the assumption that Paul intends, by means of his Galatian letter, to influence his audience. This influence is in large part aimed at their behaviour; he wants to move them to act differently. At the same time, however, the primary way in which he can influence this behaviour is via their thoughts. If he can convince them that a certain way of thinking is true, then this way of thinking will (as all preachers and politicians hope) lead them to a new way of acting. To the extent that Paul himself believes in the ideas which he wants to inculcate in Galatia, Paul's purpose in the letter is largely to bring his audience from relative ignorance (belief in false ideas) to a new knowledge (belief in certain true ideas).

The method of analysis will be relatively simple. I will move sequentially through the letter, asking at each stage of Paul's argument how the Apostle is trying to influence his audience.
his audience's thinking. Not all of his strategies will be rational, but our focus will be on those parts and aspects of the argument which do appeal to the audience as rational, thinking persons.\footnote{As Thrén points out, while studies of the context in which Paul's thoughts arise may help us to understand why the Apostle chooses one idea over another, such studies "are of little help for understanding the thoughts of the apostle" (Derhetorizing, 13; italics original). If we are to understand Paul's ideas we must still grapple with that level of his discourse as an autonomous system.} I will concentrate on the ways in which the Apostle invites his audience to follow him through a series of inferences. This does not mean simply describing what Paul actually says. It means, rather, isolating Paul's assertions in the argument and describing the logical relationships between those assertions. In this way my method will be not unlike the approach of transformational-generative (T-G) grammar. Paul's specific word choice, word order, phrasing, etc. is the "surface structure" of his argument, corresponding to the "surface structure" or "performance" of a sentence. Beneath the specific wording of a sentence, however, T-G grammar identifies a "deep structure" of semantic relationships between ideas. On the one hand, a given deep structure can be expressed by means of several different surface structures. On the other hand, the deep structure of the sentence can be inferred from its surface structure. In a similar way, we will be looking to infer from the "surface structure" of Paul's discourse the "deep structure" of logical relationships which it expresses. To the extent that the Apostle's argument appeals to the reason of his audience, it is this "deep structure" which is the real instrument of communication and of influencing their thought.\footnote{There is at least a superficial similarity here between D. Patte's structuralist distinction between Paul's "convictional logic" and his "argumentative logic," between "faith" and "theology" (see Patte, Paul's Faith). After all, T-G grammar is itself a kind of linguistic structuralism. The problem with Patte's approach for our purposes, however, is his insistence that the "convictional logic" of Paul's basic symbols and concepts is distinct from (even detachable from) the logic apparent in his actual speech. This ends up locating the "real" meaning of Paul's speech very far from the ideas as the Apostle presents them, re-formulating them in a form which Paul himself would be hard-pressed to recognize. The relative autonomy
In places the surface structure of Paul's argument is highly enthymematic, leaving unstated one or more premises or (particularly in his ethical instruction) even whole steps which belong to the deep structure of the argument. At these points the only option will be to try to reconstruct the missing links in Paul's inferential chain, and my analysis will become correspondingly more speculative. The criterion with which we will control this reconstruction, however, will be the same one with which we decipher such enthymematic performances in ordinary speech: the ability of the reconstructed deep structure to account for the elements of the argument which are explicit in the performance of the letter. Coherence will be our watch-word.

Once we have outlined the deep structure of Paul's argument in Galatians, we can proceed to ask what kind of logical relationships it involves. In other words, we will be asking what kind of reasoning Paul employs when he tries to lead his audience through a process of rational inference which leads to knowledge. It is at this point that we can glimpse the epistemological assumptions which underlie Paul's argument. For the Apostle will likely lead his audience through rational processes which he himself thinks are reliable ones. In other words, the kind of reasoning which Paul encourages in the members of his communities is likely the kind of reasoning which Paul believes will actually lead reliably to knowledge.\footnote{Of Patte's "convictional logic" also raises questions about what controls are operative on his reconstruction of that deeper meaning. On the other hand, the point of T-G grammar is that there is a direct link between surface structure of speech and the "deep structure" which it is geared to communicate. One discerns the syntax (or logic) of the "deep structure" precisely by studying the syntax (or logic) of the "surface structure." So too in this study we will explore the underlying logic of Paul's reasoning by taking seriously the surface-level of his argument and asking about the logic by which it progresses.}

\footnote{I assume here that, as a general rule, Paul's arguments are composed in good faith and are not deliberately manipulative. There remains, of course, the possibility that Paul is deliberately deceptive or employs rhetorical arguments whose logic he himself does not believe is valid. This possibility has been}
This examination of Galatians will confirm the tentative conclusions reached in chapter 2 about the nature of Paul's ethical knowledge. We will see that it does in fact arise, for the Apostle, from the emplotment of one's life in the theological narrative. I will also show, however, that Paul's narrative is not simply imposed on the world. Rather, it remains open to new events which can drastically change the story's shape, and as one's construal of the narrative changes so too Paul insists that the ethical conclusions which flow from that story will also change.

In all of this Paul is simply assuming the truth of the traditional Jewish narrative which forms his overall hermeneutical framework. His argumentation tells us much about how the Apostle believes he can proceed from this starting-point, but it reveals little about Paul's reasons for choosing (or retaining) this particular story. I will pause for a moment, however, in the conclusion to this study and ask whether the narrative logic which Paul assumes in his argumentation might allow us to extrapolate a way in which the story as a whole could be grounded or justified. These parting suggestions will also afford us the opportunity to ask again how Paul's use of reason in leading his audience to knowledge might be reconciled with his insistence that knowledge of God is the work of God's own Spirit.13

Before we begin, two caveats are necessary. This study is not intended to uncover

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highlighted recently by, e.g., Thuren, Derhetorizing and Given, True Rhetoric. Unless we are going to accept a global hermeneutic of suspicion in relation to Paul, however, we can only evaluate this possibility on a case by case basis.

13The relationship between our reconstruction and Paul's own thought must, of course, remain tentative. We are inferring Paul's thoughts from his words, and this is always an uncertain business. As Leander Keck has pointed out, "[t]o touch [Paul's thinking] we must rely on inference" ("Paul as Thinker," 28).
Paul's conscious thinking, but rather the assumptions and logical structures (often unarticulated in Paul's own mind) which guide his attempts to persuade. The difference here is similar to the difference between description of a speaker's linguistic competence – the rules and patterns which govern that speaker's crafting of a sentence – and someone's conscious thoughts while they are speaking. Most Greek speakers never thought consciously about making their adjectives agree in gender with the nouns which they modify. Even if they did, they might have expressed that pattern in their language in different ways. Yet we can still observe patterns in their speech and infer from them certain grammatical and semantic relationships which (unconsciously) governed the speaker's formulation of sentences. In the same way, we can infer from Paul's argument assumptions about what for him constituted valid reasons for belief, about how someone could rationally move from ignorance to knowledge, assumptions which the Apostle himself may never have brought to full consciousness.

Secondly, we must realize that we are not reconstructing Paul's own process of discovery. Keck rightly points out that arguments adduced to persuade others are not to be confused with the persuader's own thinking about the subject matter the arguments reflect. To recognize this distinction is not to accuse Paul of thinking one thing and saying another but rather to acknowledge the difference between cognition and persuasion. The track along which Paul sought to move his readers' thinking is not necessarily the same track along which his own thinking had already moved.  

My goal in the study which follows is thus not to uncover the path by which Paul came to his own understanding of the Gospel. The aim is, rather, to bring to the surface his tacit
assumptions about how people in general can come to knowledge. Paul may in fact have followed a different "track" in his own discovery. Our purpose, however, is not to reconstruct that historical process, but to reconstruct Paul's assumptions about the kind of rational process which should take place in his audience's minds. With this caution in mind, we turn now to our survey of Paul's attitude toward rational inquiry.
CHAPTER I: PAUL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HUMAN REASON

1. Paul's Explicit Statements About Human Reasoning: The Two Primary Texts

a. Romans 1:18-32

Although he did not pose the question in terms of formal philosophy, the question of human knowledge of God was not entirely foreign to Paul. Two passages in particular have been recognized for centuries as having strong epistemological implications, Romans 1:18-32 and 1 Corinthians 1:17-2:16. The first passage, Romans 1:18-32, is Paul's description of the descent of humanity from an original knowledge of God to blind ignorance and immorality. The Apostle describes how "what may be known about God" has been revealed to human beings "through the things he has made" (1:19, 20). Despite this knowledge of God, however, Paul says that human beings "did not honor him as God or give thanks to him," and as a result their intellectual powers were corrupted, "they became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened" (1:21). This refusal to worship God, and the ensuing ignorance, is most evident in the pervasive idolatry through which humanity confuses the created order with the creator (1:23), and it triggers a moral decline which in turn is the basis for the divine judgement which hangs over the human race (1:24-32).

Aquinas famously took this passage as the primary justification for natural theology. Paul's description of human beings knowing God through the created order was interpreted by the theologian as teaching that the existence of God as "the first cause of

all things" was knowable by "both good and bad" through the operations of unaided
reason. Since, in 1:32, the Apostle describes human beings as knowing that the vices of
vv. 29-31 deserve judgment, Aquinas also held that Paul's vision of unaided natural
knowledge included an awareness of God's eternal law. Apart from the authors of
Thomistic text-books, however, the vast majority of interpreters have understood that
Paul's point in 1:18-32 is not to affirm humanity's intellectual powers, but to emphasize
how much humanity has lost. So Barrett understands Paul to say that "[o]nce man had
fallen from his true relation with God, he was no longer capable of truly rational thought
about him." Barrett is, moreover, representative of most commentators when he
suggests that for the Apostle this is now "the universal state of mankind." Likewise,
Käsemann sees in this passage a vision of a present humanity whose whole existence is
characterized by the "vanity" which the Old Testament associates with idols; human
beings have become "incapable of discriminating perception" and have lost "any grasp of

16 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 12, A. 12 (Dominican Fathers, p. 1.58-9). Hence the
existence of God and other such natural truths "are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles" (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 2, A. 2 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.12]). Aquinas also points out that this passage gives the created order a positive role in leading human beings to God. The material world does not of itself exert a corrupting effect on the intellect (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 65, A. 1 [Dominican Fathers, p. 325]). Yet we must not caricature Aquinas' reading of Paul on this point. The theologian always insisted that sacred theology, based on revelation, could attain a kind of knowledge of God which is impossible for the unaided reason. Hence Aquinas understood Rom 1:19 as describing a knowledge of God which extends only "so far as He can be known through creatures" (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 1, A. 6 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.4]). This natural knowledge, leading us only as far as the senses can lead, does not include "the essence of God," for "the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause" and so his "whole power" is not knowable by rational inference (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 12, A. 12 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.58]). In light of the revealed knowledge which is only accessible through faith, natural reason itself can in turn be "strengthened" supernaturally and in this case "so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures" (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 111, A. 1 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.543]).

18 So, e.g., Dupont, Gnosis, 24; Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 21-26.
19 Barrett, Romans, 37.
20 Barrett, Romans, 36. So, emphatically, Calvin, Romans, on 1:22.
reality. Even worse, Käsemann understands Paul to say that, having once descended into this folly, humanity "can no longer diagnose its own situation" and continues to "boast about itself" despite its hopeless ignorance of God. In the present reality, then, "only the mighty revelation of righteousness, which establishes God's just claim, can reverse the spell."

There continue, of course, to be significant debates about the interpretation of Romans 1:18-32. When Paul talks about God revealing himself through τοῖς ποιήμασιν (1:20), is he thinking merely of the created order as the vehicle of revelation, or also of the Creator's acts in history? Did God's revelation offer to human beings a real possibility of knowledge, or did the Creator reveal himself simply in order to (εἰς τὸ εἶναι, 1:21) render human beings "without excuse" in the face of divine judgment? Nor is there agreement about whether the knowledge of God is envisioned in 1:19-21 as arising from simple rational inference, from an existential confrontation and recognition, or from a more active kind of divine revelation. Some understand Paul to be depicting a primordial state of innocence in which natural knowledge of God was a

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21Käsemann, Romans, 44. 22Käsemann, Romans, 44. See Rom 1:22: φύσκοιτες εἶναι σοφοί εὐκράτησαν. 23Käsemann, Romans, 42. See also Cranfield, Romans, 1.117, 118, 128; Byrne, Romans, 68, 71; Moo, Romans, 107, 118. 24Barrett, Romans, 35; Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 675; Dodd, Romans, 24; Dupont, Gnosis, 23-24; Schreiner, Romans, 86. 25So Michel, Römer, 54 and, tentatively, Moo, Romans, 105. 26So Cranfield, Romans, 1.116; Dunn, Romans, 1.59. 27So Michel, Römer, 56; Moo, Romans, 106. 28So Achtemeier, Romans, 38; Byrne, Romans, 66-7; Cranfield, Romans, 1.116; Dodd, Romans, 24; Dunn, Romans, 1.58; Dupont, Gnosis, 29. 29For Barth the knowledge of God in 1:19-21 is the existential awareness of our own finiteness and limitation in the face of an Other who is neither finite nor limited and who appears as the boundary of our own existence (Barth, Romans, 45-6). See also Baillie, Knowledge, 126; Dupont, Gnosis, 30; Käsemann, Romans, 42-3; Michel, Römer, 54; Schreiner, Romans, 86. 30So Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 675-76, 680; Moo, Romans, 104.
real human experience, while others insist that in Paul's mind it was only ever potential. Some understand this knowledge as a mere theoretical recognition of God's existence and attributes, while others insist that for Paul it included a fuller recognition and worship of the Creator. Likewise, there is little consensus about whether this knowledge is merely knowledge of God's existence and properties, or whether it includes an awareness of God's moral demand and perhaps even a relational knowledge of him as a Person. Finally, there continues to be debate about the precise nature of humanity's intellectual failure. Do human beings fail to respond properly to God because of an intellectual arrogance which attempts to reach God through a reason which is only fit for humbler tasks? Does this hubris reflect a desire to control God by means of reason, and an unwillingness to relate to him as a mystery? Was the problem simply that human beings could not be bothered to pursue the implications of the created order? Or was the failure rooted in the idolatry which Paul mentions in 1:23, an idolatry which is

31Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 675-6, 678. Several commentators see a connection between this intellectual "fall" and Genesis 3. See Achtemeier, Romans, 39; Bell, No-one Seeks, 90-102; Dunn, Romans, 1.57, 60-61; Hooker, "Adam."
32So Barth, Romans, 45-6; Cranfield, Romans, 1.114, 117; Dupont, Gnosis, 30-31; Michel, Römer, 56, 60; Moo, Romans, 109-10; Schreiner, Romans, 86.
33Moo, Romans, 117; Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 675.
34So Byrne, Romans, 71 and, implicitly, Michel, Römer, 60. Cranfield is unusual in distinguishing between the (purely theoretical) knowledge which human beings possessed in 1:20ff. and the knowledge refused by humanity in 1:28 which he sees as involving worship, thanks, and acknowledgment of God in one's life (Romans, 1.128).
35So Calvin, Romans, on 1:20; Cranfield, Romans, 1.113, 117; Moo, Romans, 107.
36Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 681; Dunn, Romans, 1.69; Käsemann, Romans, 41.
37So Bell, No-one Seeks, 90-102; Dupont, Gnosis, 30; Käsemann, Romans, 41; contra Schreiner, Romans, 85-86.
38Chrysostom refers specifically to Greek philosophy as a prime example of this corrupt intellectual activity in which human beings will not "bear with the limits given them" (Romans, "Homily III," on 1:23). Cf. Idem, First Corinthians, "Homily V," on 1:29; Barth, Romans, 46.
39So Barth, Romans, 44; Käsemann, Romans, 42.
40So Calvin, Romans, on 1:28.
41Byrne, Romans, 68-9.
perhaps symptomatic of the creature's refusal to accept its status beneath its Creator?  

What has emerged clearly, however, from the exegetical tradition is the consensus that (Aquinas notwithstanding) Paul was not in Rom 1:18-32 trying to lay the groundwork for a contemporary natural theology. "[N]or," says Barrett, "does he create one unintentionally." His purpose is not, as in Hellenistic natural theology, "to make man feel at home in a threatening universe," but rather to launch an accusation against humanity for a culpable lack of knowledge. If Paul establishes anything unintentionally it is an epistemic proposal that human reason is, at least in the present state of things, constitutionally unable to reach the truth about God. The Creator has made the thinking of the creatures futile (1:21 – ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν), and has spread the darkness of folly over human thought (ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία). At the same time, Rom 1:18-32 establishes that for Paul the primary concern is

42Achtemeier, Romans, 37-39; Käsemann, Romans, 43.
43Barrett, Romans, 35.
44Barrett, Romans, 35.
45Even the Dogmatic constitution on the catholic faith, issued by the First Vatican Council in 1870, shifted away from Aquinas on this point. The constitution affirms on the basis of Rom 1:20 that "God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason (naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse)" (Constitutio dogmatica de fide catholica, chapter 2 [In Tanner, 2.806]). Yet in the same breath the document adds that "the present state of the human race" in some way hampers the use of reason for attaining knowledge of God, and that this limitation makes supernatural revelation all the more necessary for contemporary people, even if in theory those people could know some of its content through unaided reason (Tanner, Decrees, 2.806). Moreover, when in chapter 3 the subject of faith and its relationship to reason is raised natural knowledge of God is not mentioned at all and the discussion seems to envision only one kind of knowledge of God, a kind in which proper reasoning must be preceded by faith. This seems to confirm that the framers did not see natural knowledge, unaided by revelation (and hence by faith), as a possibility in the present order of things (De fide catholica, chapter 3 [In Tanner, Decrees, 806-7]; cf. Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 683).
46What is less clear is how far-reaching Paul understands this intellectual paralysis to be. Calvin believed Paul to be saying that once God had rendered human thinking "vain," the reason "could understand nothing aright" (Romans, on 1:21; cf. on 1:28). For Barth, on the other hand, it is the meaning of things in the world which we fail to recognize, "for our life in this world has meaning only in its relation to the true God" (Romans, 48). Even when, as a result of this disorientation, "reason itself becomes irrational," the result is a moral chaos (Romans, 53; cf. Dunn, Romans, 1.60; Michel, Römer, 60).
not the intellectual attainment of religious knowledge, but rather the moral struggle to respond to the revelation which God offers.\textsuperscript{47} It is this moral effort which, Paul says, human beings are no longer able to exert, and this moral failure which blinds them to religious truth.

At the same time, there have been consistent reminders that Paul's statements here in Rom 1:18-32 do not necessarily mean the rejection of reason in the attempt to know God. Some have tried to read Paul as targeting a specific group of people, usually philosophers of some variety, so that the futile intellect is not universal to humanity.\textsuperscript{48} This approach has, however, been increasingly rejected as forced. More constructive is Cranfield's suggestion that Paul does not disparage the intellect itself, but simply establishes that the reason is not an "impartial arbiter capable of standing outside the influence of the ego and returning a perfectly objective judgment."\textsuperscript{49} Paul's assumption in this passage is that the moral failures of a human being can decisively affect that person's intellectual activities. This leaves open the possibility, however, that, if one's moral faculties are repaired, one's reason might be free to operate as it was first intended. Hence Paul's call in Rom 12:2 for believers to allow the "renewing of your minds," so that their restored reason can make reliable ethical judgments.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, as Coffey suggests, this innate potential of human reason opens up the possibility that, at least to a "renewed"

\textsuperscript{47}So Dodd, \textit{Romans}, 25; Käsemann, \textit{Romans}, 41. In this sense Byrne can legitimately say that Paul "has no concept of a sincere atheism" (\textit{Romans}, 67).
\textsuperscript{48}Chrysostom already read Rom 1:18-32 as directed specifically toward Greco-Roman philosophy. Dodd, on the other hand, defends "Greek philosophy in its higher forms" with which Paul "had no direct acquaintance." Rather, Dodd suggests that Paul is objecting to the fact that in practice popular philosophy "easily came to terms with the grossest forms of superstition and immorality" (Dodd, \textit{Romans}, 25).
\textsuperscript{49}Cranfield, \textit{Romans}, 1.118.
\textsuperscript{50}So Byrne, \textit{Romans}, 67.
mind, the truths of the Gospel might well be compatible with the fruits of rational inquiry.  

Paul might even allow that a kind of natural theology is possible for one who has been restored to intellectual wholeness by Christ.  

b. 1 Corinthians 1:17-2:16

The second passage which has shaped the understanding of Paul's epistemology is 1 Cor 1:17-2:16. There is broad agreement among exegetes that Paul is, in these verses, defending himself against the criticism of (some of) the Corinthians, while at the same time trying to address the factionalism within the community at Corinth. These two goals Paul hopes to achieve in one blow, by correcting the Corinthians' understanding of "wisdom" (σοφία). For on the one hand it is the Apostle's apparent lack of wisdom which seems to have sparked disapproval from some members of the community, while on the other hand it is this same competitive focus on a certain kind of "wisdom" which seems to have given rise to the divisions at Corinth.  

The Apostle begins by emphasizing that his proclamation in Corinth was not based on "eloquent wisdom (σοφία λόγου)," precisely because, had he relied on such wisdom, his message would have been "emptied of its power (κενωθη)" (1:17). The "message about the cross," Paul explains, appears as foolishness to those who are usually considered wise, but their judgement is faulty and they are actually "perishing." Those "who are being  

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51 Coffey, "Natural Knowledge," 682-83.  
52 So Bell, No-one Seeks, 118, n. 250, though Bell believes that even the renewed mind of Rom 12:1-2 would not uncover much more from the created order than was already grasped in faith.  
53 So, e.g., Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery; 157; Gillespie, "Interpreting," 151-52; Stowers, "Reason," 256. Gooch (Partial Knowledge, 20) is most insistent that, based on the ebb and flow of Paul's emotional pitch and level of specificity in chapters 1-4, the Apostle's primary concern is not factionalism per se but rather boasting about the possession of special wisdom. The critique of the Corinthians in 4:6-21 brings all of chapters 1-4 to their point, Gooch suggests, by using sharp irony to deflate the audience's arrogant claims (Partial Knowledge, 23-28).
saved," on the other hand, recognize that "the wisdom of the world (τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου)" is in fact the real foolishness because it fails to recognize this message which constitutes "the power of God (δύναμις θεοῦ)" (1:18-21). Paul's main tactic here is to draw a sharp opposition between "the wisdom of the world" and the Gospel message. His point seems to be that the kind of wisdom which most people (including at least some of the Corinthians) value so highly is actually of no use in the quest for salvation. That salvation is only effected by the Gospel message of Christ's cross – the very message which ordinary wisdom dismisses as "foolishness." In the words of Robertson and Plummer, Paul here declares "the failure of worldly cleverness in dealing with the things of God." Ordinary thought and discourse cannot recognize in the Gospel its own salvation because, as Fee writes, "the cross stands in absolute, uncompromising contradiction to human wisdom."

This failure of ordinary wisdom means that the tables are turned, and that such wisdom can be seen for the folly which in reality it has become, while the Gospel (for all its apparent foolishness) is revealed as God's wisdom. The message which "the world holds to be folly" is the very message which saves, so that the world's wisdom is by this very fact "refuted." Its "self-stultification" is brought to light. As Barrett puts it, "What God has done in Christ crucified is a direct contradiction of human ideas of wisdom and power, yet it achieved what human wisdom and power fail to achieve." The world's wisdom may remain quite competent in the sphere of ordinary affairs, but God has so

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54 Robertson and Plummer, *1 Corinthians*, 18.
55 Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 66.
arranged things that such wisdom cannot discern what is true of humanity's relationship with the Creator. The effective, saving power of the (apparently foolish) Gospel forces a reconsideration of all ordinary standards of reasonableness, and in so doing it "incapacitates, reverses, even turns upside down the values of this world." God's way of acting has, Soards says, "dismissed [ordinary human] standards and made their logic irrelevant.

What is more, this situation is precisely what God intended. It is God who makes the wisdom of the world foolish (ἐμώφαψεν ... τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου) (1:20). He has decided (ἐπόδησεν) to save "those who believe" through an apparently foolish proclamation (1:21). God seems intent on demonstrating his own superiority to wise humanity, demonstrating that "God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength" (1:25). In fact, this power is illustrated in the very existence of the Corinthian congregation, for God's determination to humble humanity by using "foolish" instruments is confirmed by their own social makeup (1:26-31). By painting this portrait of worldly wisdom and the powerful Gospel, the Apostle at once deflates the pretensions of those who are making factional claims to some superior "wisdom," and also counters the criticism from those same quarters that he himself is none...
too "wise." \(^{62}\)

Yet why does God need to assert his superiority over such worldly wisdom? What is it that, in Paul's understanding, is faulty about "the wisdom of this world"? A few interpreters have tried to suggest that Paul's focus in 1:18-2:5 is set narrowly on rhetorical skill (i.e. the form of speech) or on prophetic abilities, \(^{63}\) so that the Apostle is not really talking about reason or thought in general. \(^{64}\) The large majority, however, understand Paul's reference to "human wisdom" to be quite broad, for Paul himself makes it encompass both the expectations of the Jewish tradition ("Jews demand signs") and the rational machinations of Greek sophists and philosophers ("Greeks desire wisdom") (1:22). \(^{65}\) So what is it about ordinary human thought and discourse which incapacitates it in the religious sphere? Many exegetes see Paul emphasizing that God's action in Christ assumes a different set of intellectual and moral standards from those which human beings normally employ. \(^{66}\) Gillespie, for example, understands the Apostle to imply that both the "Greek" and "Jew" expect God's action to be characterized by "power," not weakness, so that they find the message of a crucified saviour incredible. \(^{67}\) This might be understood to imply that the weakness of human wisdom is merely situational, that a different society

\(^{62}\) Cf. 2 Cor 1:12, where we again find Paul denying that he and Timothy acted "by earthly wisdom (ἐν σοφίᾳ κατὰ σαρκα)" and opposing this wisdom to "the grace of God."

\(^{63}\) So Hunt (Inspired Body, 76) sees Paul focussing on "spiritual wisdom."

\(^{64}\) Along similar lines, Aquinas (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 12, A. 13 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.59]) understood the passage to be focussed primarily on the philosophers and not ordinary thinking.

\(^{65}\) So, e.g., Wilckens, Weisheit, 27-8. Robertson and Plummer (I Corinthians, 21) are almost certainly correct that the Jew and Greek in 1:22 are meant to encompass all of Paul's contemporary society. Cf. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 32-35.

\(^{66}\) It is, after all, the message of "Christ crucified" (Χριστὸν ἐκτίμασαν) which is "a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles" (1:23). In other words, there is something about this event which does not fit Jewish or Greek expectations about divine action.

\(^{67}\) Gillespie, "Interpreting," 154.
might encourage a more successful kind of wisdom. Yet most interpreters, to a greater or lesser extent, go further to emphasize that for Paul no ordinary wisdom is capable of recognizing religious truth in the Gospel. What most commentators identify as the problem here is the underlying expectation that God will submit his action to human standards of authentication, standards which arise from within human frames of reference. Wilckens sees Paul as attacking in human beings the demand "daß das Kerygma sich der Norm und dem Kriterium dessen, was in ihrem Sinn Weisheit ist, auszuliefern und zu unterwerfen habe." Likewise, for Conzelmann the problem is not merely that some apply certain wrong criteria in evaluating God's actions; rather God's wisdom "does not subject itself to human criteria, but confounds all such criteria." In answer to this demand that truth be authenticated on our own terms, Paul and his companions "present a message of weakness that is offensive... To the longing for reason, they present an outright

68Stowers ("Reason," 258) seems to suggest this when he insists that Paul only critiques "certain traditions of rationality," and Stowers understands the "moral and epistemic vices" which mark "worldly wisdom" to be nothing more than "conceit, arrogance, and bragging" ("Reason," 258). This would imply that the problems with ordinary reason could be solved simply by kindness and humility within the community. Such love and harmony is, in the short term, certainly what Paul wants to see in Corinth, and Stowers is correct that in 3:3-4 Paul identifies the Corinthians' factionalism as the indicator that they are pursuing inappropriate kinds of wisdom ("Reason," 258; cf. 3:18-22; 1:11-13).

Yet we must not fall into the trap of treating Paul's words merely as pragmatic tools used to influence his audience. In the course of influencing them he is also laying out a broad picture of the world in which the Corinthian situation is one example or symptom of a more universal problem. While Stowers takes the reference to Jew and Greek in 1:22 restrictively, to indicate that Paul is only concerned with specific social traditions of reasoning, these terms are much more likely intended by Paul to be comprehensive. "Jew and Greek" represent both basic categories of the humanity which Paul knew. Note too that in 1:21 we are told that "the world" somehow failed to know God "through wisdom," giving rise to God's strategy of revelation through foolishness (cf. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 32-35). Several exegetes see here in seed form the same idea expressed more fully in Rom 1:18-32 (so, e.g., Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 44-45; Dupont, Gnosis, 25; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 72). Even if we do not accept that connection, however, the identification of o κόσμος as the subject involved in 1:21 certainly suggests a universal situation. Likewise, Dupont points out that Paul cites in 1:19-20 and 3:19-20 scriptural claims that human wisdom and reasoning in general are unable to reach true knowledge (Ps 93:11; Job 5:12; Isa 19:11-12; see Dupont, Gnosis, 25).

69Wilckens, Weisheit, 34.
70Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 55 (italics mine). See also Soards, 1 Corinthians, 42.
absurdity.\textsuperscript{71} God chooses to act in ways which will appear absurd, which will frustrate ordinary human expectations about the divine, in order to force human beings to let go of their usual frames of reference and adopt a new vantage point.\textsuperscript{72}

Yet if this is what Paul believes God is doing when he frustrates "the wisdom of this world," the question still remains why God wants to frustrate these ordinary criteria for reasonableness in religious discourse. Some suggest that, for Paul, the core of the problem with human wisdom is the \textit{hubris} involved when it tries to comprehend God.\textsuperscript{73} These exegetes argue that any attempt to understand God's action is irredeemably flawed, so that the Gospel does not constitute a new "wisdom" or "knowledge," but an outside force – Christ – which the believer experiences without grasping it by means of reason.\textsuperscript{74} In commenting on 1:24, Conzelmann insists that believers "do not advance beyond the situation of hearing and believing."\textsuperscript{75} Bultmann, likewise, regards Pauline faith as a radical decision in the face of God's confronting Word, a decision which, if it is to remain authentic, must not devolve into the construction of a new world-view.\textsuperscript{76} There are difficulties with this reading, however, not the least of which is the fact that Paul employs

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71}Soards, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 42.
\item \textsuperscript{72}Thielson \textit{(1 Corinthians, 158-59)} describes the message of the cross here as something which is not laid open for the audience to judge and evaluate, but which rather confronts and judges the audience. Gärner ("Pauline and Johannine," 217-20) understands Paul to teach (like many Hellenistic thinkers) that the heavenly and the earthly are ontologically incompatible, so that human beings cannot understand God's wisdom simply because they are human and not divine. This reading overlooks, however, Paul's emphasis on God deliberately \textit{choosing} to frustrate human wisdom. The epistemic futility of human wisdom is not a necessary situation, but rather is part of God's strategy in the restoration and judgment of the world. Along similar lines see P. Ciholas, "Knowledge and Faith."
\item \textsuperscript{73}Hence Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 42, 47; cf. Robertson and Plummer, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Hence Conzelmann argues that the preaching of the cross is "not the propagating of a \textit{Weltanschauung}, but the destruction of every attempt to regard a \textit{Weltanschauung} as the way of salvation" (\textit{1 Corinthians}, 47). See also Wilckens, \textit{Weisheit}, 39-40.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{76}Bultmann argues that for Paul God's action in the cross "cannot in any way be \textit{comprehended} as a possibility of salvation" ("Karl Barth," 69).
\end{itemize}
reasoned arguments even in 1 Cor 1-2. If Paul appeals here to his audience's reason, if he
tries to help them understand and think through the divine-human relationship, then either
his practice is hopelessly out of touch with his theory or his target in 1 Cor 1:18ff. is not
the attempt to understand per se. Moreover, nowhere in these verses does the Apostle
actually condemn reason or understanding. It is "the wisdom of the world (τῆς σοφίας τοῦ κόσμου)" which he says is made futile, not wisdom in and of itself."77

So what is it about the thinking of "this age" which, in Paul's view, God has
designed the Gospel to frustrate? Many locate the problem not in an attempt to understand
the ineffable, but in the unwillingness to accept the limits of human autonomy. Human
beings want complete control over their own existence, and so resist the inevitable need to
trust God for their security.78 From this perspective, the Gospel need not be inherently
incomprehensible. Instead it is designed obviously to frustrate any attempt at confirmation
from within the realm of human experience and values, so that in order to accept it one is
forced to adopt a whole new frame of reference. Instead of being incomprehensible, the
Gospel is unjustifiable in terms of other human systems of evaluation and plausibility.79
Hence an acceptance of the Gospel would combat the desire for an impossible human

77So Bornkamm, Paul, 119, 132; Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 42; Soards, 1 Corinthians, 40;
Stowers, "Reason," 258.
78For Barrett (1 Corinthians, 70) this "attempt to secure [one's] position over against the Creator"
is inherently idolatrous. See also Fee, 1 Corinthians, 68; Calvin, Corinthians, on 1 Cor 1:17, 1:19-20.
Gooch is thus on the right track when he says that Paul's emphasis falls on "the cognitive modesty
appropriate to all human intellectual activity" (Partial Knowledge, 42; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 167).
We should be clear, however, that Paul is probably not primarily concerned with the limits of human
reason per se, but rather with the corrupt drive for autonomy which prompts human beings to try to
understand God within the terms of ordinary human experience and values.
79So Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 54-5; Calvin, Corinthians, on 1 Cor 1:20; Chrysostom, First
Corinthians, "Homily III," on 1:17; Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 40-41. See also Fee, 1 Corinthians, 68,
though Fee too suggests that in this sense the Gospel is not a new sophia.
autonomy by requiring that believers depend on God for the framework of their intellectual life. At the same time, there are for Paul other moral failures endemic to fallen humanity which, many suggest, inevitably corrupt the values and standards of reasonableness within which human wisdom operates. So, for Barrett, human wisdom is incorrigibly egocentric, so that "there is no manifestation of God that man's essentially self-regarding wisdom does not twist until it has made God in its own image." However we construe the moral failings which corrupt ordinary standards of reasonableness, Stowers is likely right that Paul does not reject wisdom itself, but rather "any wisdom characterized by certain moral and epistemic vices." The message of the cross is thus not anti-rational. It is, rather, calculated to subvert the essentially idolatrous tendencies which pervert all fallen human thought, by forcing the believer to abandon his or her usual standards of evaluation. As Gillespie suggests, the kerygma is thus foolishness to the perishing "not because it is unintelligible, but because it all too intelligibly calls for a reversal of the human standard ... that determines what counts as 'wisdom.'" It is human moral weakness, a weakness of which our standards of evaluation are a symptom, which

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80 Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 52.
81 Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 54. See also Fee, 1 Corinthians, 73-4. Thiselton (1 Corinthians, 166) argues that Paul attacks reason only insofar as it operates outside its proper limits and as an instrument of "manipulation and self-deception." See also Aquinas, who in commenting on 1 Cor 1:20 suggests that the wisdom of the world is foolish "because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God" (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 25, A. 3 (Dominican Fathers, p. 1.139, cf. p. 137)).
82 Stowers, "Reason," 258 (though Stowers himself describes these vices too narrowly; see above, n. 68). See also Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 30; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 166.
83 In somewhat different terms, Thiselton argues that Paul's gospel appears as folly in part because it represents, in M. Mitchell's words, a "paradigm of self-effacement" which runs counter to the concerns for power and control that lie beneath the Corinthian factionalism (1 Corinthians, 174). Thiselton also characterizes human wisdom as "short-term" and "self-absorbed" (1 Corinthians, 169) and the world which is constructed on the basis of such wisdom as shot-through with "structural self-centeredness, status-seeking, and supposed self-sufficiency" (1 Corinthians, 165).
84 Gillespie, "Interpreting," 156. Gillespie identifies this standard as "power."
for Paul is the real problem, not reason itself.  

Paul goes on to underline in 2:1-5 that his simple presentation of the Gospel was in fact a deliberate strategy, geared to ensure that his preaching did not undermine the Gospel's subversion of that corrupt wisdom. Here, as in 1:17, Paul insists that his proclamation came not "with plausible words of wisdom (πεθωγος σοφιας λογου), but with a demonstration of the Spirit and of power (αποδειξει πνευματος και δυναμως), so that your faith might rest not on human wisdom but on the power of God" (2:4-5). The majority of exegetes have understood Paul to be saying that he chose deliberately not to use eloquent rhetoric or sophisticated reasoning, but instead relied on a straightforward proclamation of the Gospel, to be accepted or rejected.  

There has been some suggestion that when Paul confesses to having arrived in Corinth "in weakness and in fear and in much trembling" (2:3) he is referring not simply to a literal illness and anxiety, nor merely to the Apostle's sense of holy fear as he carries out his divine commission, but also to his lack of "pneumatische δυναμις." Few have been convinced, however, that Paul's

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85 See also 1 Cor 3:18-20, where Paul introduces two OT quotations concerning God's opposition to the wise by warning the audience: "Do not deceive yourselves. If you think that you are wise in this age, you should become fools so that you may become wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." Here again, the concern is not with rational thought, but a particular kind of faulty wisdom which characterizes the present order. Moreover, Paul's point in saying this is to prepare for his injunction in 3:21-23 to avoid boasting about human leaders. This may well indicate that part of the problem with this worldly wisdom is its association with boasting.

86 So Calvin, Corinthians, on 1 Cor 1:17; Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 31-2; Soards, 1 Corinthians, 52-3.

87 Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 31.

88 Wicklew, Weisheit, 47 (though Wicklew accepts that the phrase εν φοβω και εν τρομω which follow do refer to a sense of standing under God's judgment). Gillespie argues along similar lines that the issue here cannot simply be rhetorical mastery because of the religious context of the conversation: "It is more appropriate to infer that the power manifested in and through the interaction of wisdom and speech is considered divine in its origin and redemptive in its purpose" ("Interpreting," 155). Hence he argues that the speech και τηρησαι λογου which Paul rejects in 2:1 is speech which exhibits certain enthusiastic
primary focus in 2:1-5 is anything other than the justification of his lack of impressive speech and reasoning when he preached to the Corinthians. Indeed, this pattern of voluntary intellectual weakness is often seen as Paul's imitation of the pattern of God's action in Christ, who conquered by becoming weak in his shameful death. 89

If it was not his own rhetorical force which Paul believes convinced the Corinthians, what was it? Paul explains that instead of "plausible words of wisdom (πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις)" he came with "a demonstration of the Spirit and of power (ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως)" (2:4). Here again commentators generally agree that Paul envisions some direct activity of the Holy Spirit which works directly on the hearer to produce belief in Paul's message. 90 Even Aquinas insists that the human capacity for natural theology is not sufficient to produce faith in Paul's Gospel on the basis of reason. Rather, "the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will," and Aquinas points precisely to 1 Cor 2:4 when he argues that "[i]n this respect faith comes from God alone." 91 The impetus to believe the Apostle's preaching arises from the direct activity of God in the hearer. 92

90 So Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 65-6; Calvin, Corinthians, on 1 Cor 1:20, on 2:5, and on 2:1; Chrysostom, First Corinthians, "Homily VI," on 2:5; Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 33; Gärner, "Pauline and Johannine," 217; Soards, 1 Corinthians, 54. Gillespie identifies the phrase πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως as a hendiadys ("Interpreting," 155). Indeed, Chrysostom argues that the whole problem with ordinary human reasoning is its claim to be autonomous, to function independent of the aid of God's Spirit (First Corinthians, "Homily VII," on 2:6; cf. Wilckens, Weisheit, 51).


92 Note that for Aquinas these truths of faith can be "confirmed" by rational arguments once they are apprehended by faith, though "the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is proper to the Divine power," whether miraculous acts which only God can cause or prophetic predictions of things which only God can know (Summa Theologica, I, 2, Q. 111, A. 4 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1138-9]).
This observation raises questions, however, about the relationship between the Spirit's activity and human reason. Chrysostom took 1 Cor 1:17ff. to teach that rational discussion is of no use in bringing people to knowledge of the Gospel. In discussing the passage he advised his congregation not to combat pagan thought by mounting educated arguments, but rather to fight with the example of a changed way of life.\(^93\) Those who will not believe are compared to the insane, whose minds are perverted by illness. Such people, Chrysostom says,

> you cannot convince by human wisdom. Nay, if you want so to convince them, you do but the contrary. For the things which transcend reasoning require faith alone. Thus, should we set about convincing men by reasonings, how God became man, and entered into the Virgin's womb, and not commit the matter unto faith, they will but deride the more. Therefore they who inquire by reasonings, it is they who perish.\(^94\)

Recognition of the truth is compared by Chrysostom to direct vision, for which one needs not to argue but simply to open one's eyes. Likewise, this faith, not reason, is the proper "organ" for perception of God's truth, just as the eye, and not the ear, is the proper organ for visual perception.\(^95\) Yet Chrysostom's reading of the passage seems to equate the

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\(^{95}\)Chrysostom, *First Corinthians*, "Homily IV," on 1:19. See also on 1:20-21. Cf. Calvin, *Corinthians*, on 1 Cor 1:20-21. Even Aquinas argues in connection with 1 Cor 2:6-7 that revealed truths such as Trinity of God cannot be grounded on rational argument: "Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason .... Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe upon such grounds" (*Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 32, A. 1 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.169]). Unlike the basic awareness of the Creator which may be inferred from the
σοφία λόγου of 1:17, the ὑπεροχήν λόγου of 2:1, and the πειθόι σοφίας λόγου of 2:4 with rational discussion itself. We saw above, however, that the "worldly wisdom" which Paul describes in 1:18-30 as futile need not be reason *per se*, but may well be reason as it is directed by human vices such as the idolatrous desire for complete autonomy. Paul says that he refused to frame his preaching within the values and standards of reasonableness which characterize other systems of thought. His preaching required a leap into a new system of values and a new understanding of what is plausible for God. This does not mean, however, that Paul claims to have abandoned all strategic rhetoric or rational discussion. He simply repudiates the kind of oratory which some of the Corinthians seem to have craved, an oratory which made its case by appeal to ordinary human frameworks of value and reasonableness. To frame this in more modern terms, Paul says that he avoided arguments which build in a foundationalist fashion on commonly accepted premises, but his denial still leaves room for him to have pursued an argument from coherence, in which the Gospel is presented as rationally consistent within its own terms of reference.

What does Paul mean, then, when he says that his preaching relied on "a demonstration of the Spirit and of power" for its persuasive force (2:4)? He probably does not mean, as Chrysostom assumed, that he abandoned any attempt to present the Gospel as created order, the truths revealed by God "are held by means of a Divine light," by faith (*Summa Theologica*, 1.2, Q. 62, A. 3 [Dominican Fathers, p. 1.852]).

96He does not claim (contra Thuren, *Derhetorizing*, 40) "not to be an orator at all."

97So, e.g., Siegert, *Argumentation*, 250; Gooch, *Partial Knowledge*, 47-9; Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 68; Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 96-7; Calvin, *Corinthians*, on 1 Cor 1:17. We see the same distinction in the prologue of Epictetus, *Diss.* where the editor confesses that the recorded lectures which follow are not polished writing, but nevertheless maintains that Epictetus' motive as he spoke was "to incite (κατεργασάμενοι) the minds of his hearers to the best things," to produce an effect (τοιούτῳ γε αὐτῷ διαπράττομαι) on the audience.
a rational system of thought. The Apostle likely did not intend to set up the Spirit's influence as an alternative to rationality, since his concern in these verses is not with rationality per se but with certain corrupt tendencies in the exercise of reason. At the same time, Paul seems to have realized that a rationally coherent presentation of God's action in Christ would not necessarily convince on its own, since it did not satisfy the morally corrupt urges which plague human beings. So the Spirit's influence is necessary, not as a substitute for rationality in the presentation of the Gospel, but as a cure for the moral vices which usually determine what kind of divine action human beings are willing to accept as plausible and persuasive. The Spirit does not override human rationality, in Paul's presentation, producing a belief in a truly irrational message. Rather, that Spirit is primarily involved here in re-orienting the moral life of those who are "chosen" (1:24), so that the message which would normally appear foolish can be seen and understood as wisdom.

Although my reading here pushes beyond most exegetical explorations of 1:17-2:5, it rests on a fair consensus about the outlines of Paul's thought in those verses. In contrast, we find sharp disagreement over the interpretation of the last section of this passage, 2:6-

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98This is most likely Paul's point in 2:5. It is usually assumed that Paul's concern in that verse is that reasoned arguments are not a solid enough ground for faith in the Gospel, so that he looks for a supernaturally produced conviction as an alternative. He explains that his preaching avoided "plausible words of wisdom" in order that "your faith might rest not on human wisdom (ἐν σοφίᾳ ἡμῶν) but on the power of God." Notice, however, that Paul says nothing in these verses about the instability or unreliability of reasoned arguments. Moreover it is human wisdom which Paul does not want to serve as the foundation of his audience's conviction. If this human wisdom is identified with the "wisdom of the world" which was under discussion in 1:18-31, then it would seem that Paul's concern is not with the inherent instability of rational persuasion, but rather with the distorting and corrupting influence of worldly wisdom when it is taken as the framework for persuasion.
16. Already in 1:30 Paul identified Christ as a "wisdom from God" (σοφία...ἀπὸ θεοῦ). Starting in 2:6 Paul turns from his rejection of human wisdom to describe a "wisdom of God" (θεοῦ σοφία) which is the subject of his speech (2:7). This new wisdom is unlike the "wisdom of this age" (οὗ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου) and has remained "secret and hidden" (σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τῆς ἀποκάλυψιμένης) (2:6-7). This wisdom is only revealed to "the mature (τοῖς τέλειοίς)" (2:6) by the Spirit, and here the Apostle compares the privileged access to divine truths which the Spirit has to the privileged access of the individual human spirit to that person's own thoughts (2:10-11). It is because "the mature" possess the Spirit that they too gain access to this secret wisdom of God, and it is because the "unspiritual" (ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄθρωπος) lack this help that such divine wisdom remains "foolishness" and beyond their understanding (2:14-15).99

While there was broad agreement about the nature of the "worldly wisdom" in 1:17-2:5, here there has been fierce debate over the background of Paul's talk about

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99 This summary assumes that all of the "spiritual" are recipients of the Spirit's revelations. Bockmuehl (Revelation and Mystery, 164-65) has argued for identifying the first-person plural subject of 2:1-16, and particularly the ἡμῖν of 2:10, with the Apostles and prophets and not with mature believers in general. This would make the Apostles and prophets the recipients of the Spirit's revelation, while others would be dependent on the preaching of these Apostolic messengers. The Spirit's role for the rest of the "mature" would simply be to prompt the hearer's recognition of this message as truth. The problem with this view, however, is that in 2:10-12 the reception of this revelation is based on the simple possession of the divine Spirit, not endowment with specific charismata. Paul writes: "Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is from God, so that we may understand the gifts bestowed on us by God" (2:12). What is more, Thiselton points out that the most natural referent for ἡμῖν in 2:10 is τοῖς ἑγαμμαλοῦντας αὐτῶν immediately before, at the end of 2:9 (1 Corinthians, 255; so Fee, 1 Corinthians, 109, n. 51; Robertson & Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 43; Soards, 1 Corinthians, 60). The special insight which the Spirit provides is also closely associated with the "mind of Christ" which this same "we" is said to possess in 2:16, but here the "we" is clearly inclusive of all the "mature"/"spiritual." So, while one might plausibly limit the inspired speech of 2:13 to prophets and apostles, it is difficult to equate the inspiration of 2:10-12 with either of those restrictive charismata.

Moreover, the distinction which Bockmuehl draws between the Spirit's revelations in 2:10-12 and the Spirit's aid in understanding in 2:14-15 is highly artificial. On the one hand, it is not at all clear that by the Spirit's revelations Paul means ecstatic or visionary experiences. Such revelations may well be mediated by rational or discursive activity. On the other hand, if one can only grasp this wisdom when the Spirit opens one's eyes, then this grasp would itself constitute a kind of revelation.
"wisdom," "the perfect," and "mystery." Reitzenstein\textsuperscript{100} and Bousset\textsuperscript{101} located the source of this language in the mystery religions, and Bultmann followed their lead in depicting Paul as here addressing the followers of different "mystagogues" who offer knowledge and sacraments which furnish salvation.\textsuperscript{102} In a slightly different sense, Wilckens argued that Paul's talk about "wisdom" and "mystery" in 2:6-16 reflects "gnostic" ideas circulating in Corinth.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, Wilckens argued that in borrowing this gnostic technical language, Paul could not keep it from colouring the thought of these verses. Hence the ideas in 2:6-16 do not reflect Paul's own thought, but rather an (only partially successful) attempt to subvert his opponents' language.\textsuperscript{104} The vast majority of more recent commentators, however, have agreed that Bultmann and Wilckens were led down a blind alley. The evidence on which they based their model of the Corinthian theology was tenuous at best.\textsuperscript{105} The supposed conflicts between this section and the preceding one arise

\textsuperscript{100}Reitzenstein, \textit{Mystery Religions}, 358.
\textsuperscript{101}Bousset, \textit{Erste Korinther}, 84.
\textsuperscript{102}Bultmann, "Karl Barth," 69.
\textsuperscript{103}Wilckens (\textit{Weisheit}, 19-20) argued that behind the factionalism in Corinth stands a controversy over a gnostic Christology controversy in which Christ is identified as the σοφία of God. He suggested that this christology also entailed a soteriology in which one participates (through baptism) with the resurrected Christ, but in which the crucifixion plays no role, either as a saving event or as a pattern for ethics (\textit{Weisheit}, 53-60). Paul sees reflected in 2:8ff. the gnostic "Erlösermythos" in which this secret wisdom, as a \textit{person}, enters the world in a "spiritual" form in order to reveal salvific knowledge to the "mature," so that they too can become "spiritual" and escape this existence (\textit{Weisheit}, 71-73).

Wilckens saw this gnostic christology behind Paul's opposition to "wisdom" in 1:17ff. as well. In fact, it is primarily because in 2:2 σοφία is set over against the Christological title (?) Χριστός ἐστιν ἡμῶν that Wilckens thought σοφία must have been "ein christologischer Titel des erhöhten Christus" in Corinth (\textit{Weisheit}, 68-71). Note, however, that this hypothetical gnostic background to the "wisdom" debate did not substantially affect Wilckens' reading of 1:17-2:5 because he recognized that Paul's polemic there, whatever its immediate target, is deliberately couched in broader terms (\textit{Weisheit}, 268-70).

\textsuperscript{104}See Wilckens, \textit{Weisheit}, 52, 85. So Lührmann, \textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 113. Martin Widmann has even suggested that the passage is an anti-Pauline interpolation ("1 Kor. 2:6-16").

\textsuperscript{105}See, e.g., the discussion in Dupont, \textit{Gnosis}, 151-80. Hunt (\textit{Inspired Body}, 80) rightly emphasizes that the language which is supposed to present parallels to gnostic or mystery teaching is precisely the language which appears in a broad variety of philosophical and religious contexts. For example, Wilckens describes the opposition between the ψυχικός ἄθρωπος and the πνευματικός in 2:14
not from a conflict in Paul's thought, but from an overly rigid reading of 1:18-2:5.\textsuperscript{106} In fact, Conzelmann characterizes 2:6-16 as an example of the kind of very Pauline thinking which gave rise to the Corinthians' enthusiastic excesses.\textsuperscript{107} Hence, in a dramatic about-face, Wilckens himself eventually penned a subsequent article in which he roundly rejected his former gnostic reading of the passage.\textsuperscript{108}

Thus the broad consensus now understands 2:6-16 as a natural extension of Paul's argument in 1:17-2:5. The "wisdom of this world" which is opposed to divine wisdom in

\textsuperscript{106}Bultmann, for example, sees the description of the Gospel as "wisdom" in 2:6-16 as un-Pauline because he has read 1:17-2:5 as a condemnation of any and all comprehensible wisdom about God ("Karl Barth," 71). If we do not follow Bultmann's existentialist reading of the earlier passage, however, the tension disappears.

Similarly, Wilckens argued that in 2:8 Paul understands Christ already to be the "lord of glory" even prior to his crucifixion. Yet elsewhere, he says, Paul only envisions the apocalyptic exaltation of Christ as occurring after the resurrection. This suggests to Wilckens that Paul is here talking in terms of the gnostic redeemer-myth in which a spiritual being, full of the "glory" of the spiritual realm, comes to enlighten others with his glory (\textit{Weisheit}, 74). It is, however, quite possible that Paul refers to Christ as the "lord of glory" simply because that is how the Apostle understands him in the present, not because it was necessarily a fitting title at the time of the events Paul describes. See further Kovacs, "Archons."

\textsuperscript{107}Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 57-60.

\textsuperscript{108}Wilckens, "Zu 1 Kor 2.1-16."
2:6, and whose representatives fail to recognize Christ in 2:8, is the same human wisdom which Paul has just finished rejecting at length. It thus includes both ordinary standards for rational verification and the rhetorical flair which was expected if those arguments were to carry force.\textsuperscript{109} Paul's point in 2:6-16 is, at least in part, the same point he has been making all along: that such ordinary standards for evaluating the truth or falsehood of a message break down and become counter-productive when they encounter the Gospel. This Gospel is a "mystery" (2:7) in the Jewish apocalyptic sense of a salvific act of God which remains hidden, prepared in heaven, until its eschatological revelation, and which is known ahead of time only to God's elect.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, the emphasis on the Spirit as the one mediator of religious knowledge was introduced already in 2:1-5.\textsuperscript{111} Hence, while Paul's focus on "wisdom" and his use of terms like "the mature" may arise in response to emphases in Corinth, we should read this passage primarily as a continuation of the argument outlined in 1:17-2:5.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109}So, e.g., Fee, \textit{I Corinthians}, 65. This position is compatible with Hunt's suggestion that the language in 2:6-16 reflects a broad tradition of Hellenistic talk about "the human search for the divine mind" (using \textit{επερεύθηναι} and \textit{ζητεῖν}). According to Hunt, this tradition emphasizes "the need for divine initiative," which associates the process with the "perfecting" (τέλος and cognates) of the inquirer, and which tends to talk about such knowledge as \textit{sophia} (\textit{Inspired Body}, 10-11, 15-61), although according to Hunt's own survey of the evidence this pattern of usage is not as firmly attested as his summary statements would suggest (see, e.g., \textit{Inspired Body}, 27, 39, 53). The closest parallels are restricted to Philo (\textit{Inspired Body}, 45; cf. 39-50).

\textsuperscript{110}See Gillespie, "Interpreting," 157. Bockmuehl (\textit{Revelation and Mystery}, 161) plausibly compares Paul's Greek phrase \textit{sophia} \textit{έν Μεθοδίᾳ} to the Hebrew \textit{גּוֹזָר לַמִּדָּנָה} which denotes God's "wisdom displayed in His saving design." See the use of this or an equivalent phrase in 1QH 9:23; 12:13; 1QS 4:18; 1QpHab 7:15.

Most put the emphasis on the message having been unknown and being unknowable apart from the Spirit's revelation (so Robertson and Plummer, \textit{I Corinthians}, 37; Gillespie, "Interpreting," 157; Thiselton, \textit{I Corinthians}, 241). Barrett also suggests that the wisdom of the gospel is "hidden" in contrast to the worldly wisdom which "intends to be openly convincing" (\textit{I Corinthians}, 71; so Chrysostom, \textit{First Corinthians}, "Homily VII," on 2:7). Both of these emphases are combined by Soards, \textit{I Corinthians}, 59.

\textsuperscript{111}So Gillespie, "Interpreting," 158.

\textsuperscript{112}Hunt (\textit{Inspired Body}, 80) is most insistent that even the language of the passage is Paul's own, not the Corinthians'. Thiselton (\textit{I Corinthians}, 224-25, 241, 252) is more representative in his suggestion that Paul takes over the vocabulary of his opponents in order to re-shape it – and that he does so.
There remain, however, two inter-related questions which are less easily resolved, both of which will have a significant impact on how we understand Paul's epistemology in 1 Corinthians. The first question concerns the identity of the "mature" in 2:6. Does Paul intend by this term to include all believers? Or is he establishing a more restricted group within the Corinthian community who are more spiritually advanced than the rest? This question is important for our purposes because if it is only a select group who receive this spiritual revelation, then the epistemic situation which Paul describes in 2:6-16 may apply only to the quest for certain esoteric teachings. It may not reflect, for instance, the situation of a person who responds to the Gospel preaching with faith. The majority of commentators, however, opt for a mediating position between these two identifications of the "mature." It is true that Paul seems in 3:1-2 to exclude the Corinthian believers from the circle of the mature. They are mere "infants (νηπίοι)" who are not prepared for this full wisdom, but can only be given "milk." This makes a simple identification of the

successively. There is also nearly universal agreement that Paul's analogy between the human πνεῦμα and the divine πνεῦμα in 2:10-11 does not imply any ontological parallel between the two kinds of "spirit" or any "divinization" of the human spirit (see Robertson and Plummer, I Corinthians, 44; Fee, I Corinthians, 111-12; Soards, I Corinthians, 60-1; Thiselton, I Corinthians, 257-58; Gärtner, "Pauline and Johannine," 220; contra Wilckens, Weisheit, 81 and [less clearly] Conzelmann, I Corinthians, 65). Robertson and Plummer (I Corinthians, 35) point to the contrast between the τέλειον of 2:6 and the νηπίοι of 3:1. Likewise, they equate the ψυχος of 2:14 with the σώματος mentioned later, a group which clearly includes Paul's Corinthian audience (I Corinthians, 36). Wilckens (Weisheit, 53) agrees, but argues that the ημεραί in 2:12 is not (as in 2:7, 10) identified with these τέλειοι. This is, he argues, an example of Paul's own theology protruding through his adopted gnostic schema (Weisheit, 87). Bultmann recognizes that Paul would not usually talk of a smaller group as those who possess the Spirit, but concludes that the "perfect" must possess the Spirit in a way that is different from other believers ("Karl Barth," 72). Bockmuehl (Revelation and Mystery, 160, n. 16) also observes that Paul does not include a recognition of the Corinthians' σοφία in the thanksgiving of 1:1-9 and that only some receive the λόγος σοφίας in 12:8. See also Bockmuehl's references to the הַעָנָן at Qumran (1QS 4:22; 8:10-12, 15-18), full members who were given access to the mysteries of deeper knowledge, and to Philo's references (LA 3.100; Sacr 60) to the τέλειοι, initiates into the divine mysteries (Revelation and Mystery, 159).
mature with all believers difficult. On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that Paul would describe any class of believers in the way he describes the "unspiritual person (ψυχικός . . . ἄθροισμος)" in 2:14, as entirely lacking the Spirit. This means that the Corinthians also cannot be simply equated with those who are not "mature." Hence Conzelmann writes that for Paul "perfection is not only the goal, but also the status of every believer," but that this status is "dialectically understood." The Corinthians cannot be treated as mature because they "do not conform to the true status conferred upon them (3:1ff)." Likewise, Fee suggests that the Corinthians are, in their factional quarrels, acting out of keeping with their real status. Paul locates the Corinthians in an ambiguous position - not really "unspiritual," but also not "mature" - in order to motivate them to overcome their factionalism and play the role of the mature.

The question of the identity of the "mature" cannot, however, be resolved without

115 Fee points out, however, that Paul does not simply call the Corinthians ψυχικός in 3:1, but rather uses the term σάρκιον (1 Corinthians, 116). The Apostle thus seems deliberately to avoid equating the Corinthian audience with those who in 2:6-16 are contrasted with the mature. Less convincing is Hunt's suggestion that since Paul's statement in 3:1 about being unable to give the Corinthians the full teaching (speak to them as "spiritual") is in the aorist, it only describes the situation before their conversion (Inspired Body, 93).

116 Fee points out that the ψυχικός of 2:14 are "people who are not now, nor have they ever been, believers." They are depicted as never having received the Spirit (1 Corinthians, 116). So Hunt, Inspired Body, 82-3. Hunt points to 3:16, where "the corporate Corinthian body is a temple in which God's Spirit dwells," and to 12:13, where all believers have been "made to drink of the one Spirit" (Ibid., 86). Robertson and Plummer (1 Corinthians, 49) try to explain this in terms of the "spiritual" person's being one "in whom πνεύμα has its rightful predominance." Yet this does not explain why the "spiritual" are contrasted with those who lack the Spirit.

117 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 59, though note that Conzelmann himself does identify the ψυχικός ἄθροισμος of 2:14 with the Corinthians and as an inferior class of believers (1 Corinthians, 71).

118 So Fee, 1 Corinthians, 98-9; Hunt, Inspired Body, 94-5.
also asking about the content of the "wisdom of God" which the Spirit imparts to them through the Apostolic speech. If one understands the "mature" as a restricted inner-circle of believers, then this wisdom cannot be the Gospel itself. It must be a set of more esoteric teachings which are not suited for everyone's ears.\textsuperscript{120} There is, moreover, some force to this suggestion, since Paul's talk in 3:1 about withholding the "solid food" from the Corinthians who are mere "infants" does suggest that Paul has not yet shared this wisdom with them.\textsuperscript{121} Yet he clearly has preached the message of Christ to them, and they are treated elsewhere in the letter as full believers.\textsuperscript{122} This would imply, again, that the epistemic situation which Paul outlines here might apply only to the apprehension of such secondary teaching, and not to the salvific reception of the Gospel.\textsuperscript{123} Yet Paul's description of the wisdom's content in 2:12 as an understanding of "the gifts bestowed on us by God (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθείται ἡμῖν)" does not sound particularly esoteric.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{120}Not surprisingly, it is primarily the proponents of the gnostic interpretation of this passage who have identified the σοφία as such esoteric teaching (so Bultmann, "Karl Barth," 71). Note, however, Bockmuehl, \textit{Revelation and Mystery}, 162-64; Gooch, \textit{Partial Knowledge}, 44; Stowers, "Reason," 261. Gärtner is unusual in identifying the mature with all believers, but still regarding this wisdom as deeper esoteric teaching, emphasizing Paul's statement that the Spirit searches "the depths of God" and knows "the things of God" (2:10-11) ("Pauline and Johannine," 219). Yet we must observe that Paul does not say that the "spiritual" person shares in this complete knowledge. He only says that, by virtue of the Spirit's complete knowledge, that Spirit can share with the "spiritual" an understanding of "the gifts bestowed on us by God" (2:12).

\textsuperscript{121}Bultmann, "Karl Barth," 71; Gooch, \textit{Partial Knowledge}, 44.

\textsuperscript{122}So Stowers, "Reason," 262.

\textsuperscript{123}Stowers ("Reason," 261) argues that this revelation "is apparently unessential to their Christian life."

\textsuperscript{124}Hence Bultmann ("Karl Barth," 71) is forced to conclude that the content of this σοφία has changed since 2:6-9, as has its recipients, so that "Paul is no longer thinking of the 'perfect' but of Christians in general." Yet Gillespie ("Interpreting," 160) rightly observes that Paul's grammar strongly implies a continuity of subject through from 2:6 to 2:12. The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθείται ἡμῖν in 2:12 looks back to τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ in 2:11. These "things of God" in turn look back to the α of 2:9 and hence to the "hidden wisdom" of 2:7. It is, again, this same message which the Spirit brings to speech in 2:13 and which in 2:14-15 the ψυχομονοι are unable to grasp.

Conzelmann interprets Paul's description in 2:12 to mean that "the content of knowledge is the spirit--through the spirit," an unmediated "self-knowledge" (1 Corinthians, 60), though he later speculates that its content might be "insight into the cosmic background of the crucifixion" (1 Corinthians, 63).
Moreover, it was the crucified Christ who was identified in 1:30 as "wisdom from God (σοφία ἐκ θεου)" and in 2:1-5 as the sole content of Paul's preaching. So, when Paul says in 2:6-7 that he speaks a "wisdom" which is foreign to this age but which is "of God," the audience would most naturally assume that he is still referring to the message of the redemptive act of God through the cross. Here again, a solution becomes possible when we understand Paul's rhetorical situation. The "wisdom" which the "mature" can grasp is not a further esoteric doctrine, but the Gospel itself. This the Corinthian audience has obviously accepted, since they have become believers in Christ. But their desire for some deeper or more sophisticated wisdom, the root of their factionalism, calls into question whether they have really understood the full implications of that Gospel. The "solid food" which Paul could not give the Corinthians is precisely the radical reorientation of one's former world-view and values which the Gospel requires. This is Bockmuehl suggests that Paul's phrase in 2:12 refers to "a deeper knowledge of the inheritance which is in store for those who love God" (Revelation and Mystery, 164, cf. 162). See, similarly, Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 44.

125 So Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 35; Calvin, Corinthians, on 1 Cor 2:10; Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 69; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 112; Gillespie, "Interpreting," 156. Gillespie also points out that Paul already identified the Gospel as το ἰσχυρόν παλαιον του θεου in 2:1 ("Interpreting," 157).

126 Cf. 1 Cor 4:1, where Paul describes himself and Sosthenes as "stewards of God's mysteries" and where these mysteries seem to be identical with their Gospel preaching. Likewise, in Col 1:26-27 Paul describes how God has revealed "the mystery that has been hidden throughout the ages and generations" to "his saints." The mystery is "Christ in you, the hope of glory," and in 1:25 and 1:28 it seems to be identified with Paul's own proclamation. These passages confirm that Paul at least could speak of his Gospel message in terms similar to those which he employs in 1 Cor 2:7.

127 Fee argues that the "milk" and "solid food" which Paul contrasts in 3:1-4 are not substantially different kinds of teaching. Both are simply "the good news of salvation." What Paul is highlighting, however, is that because the Corinthians regarded his teaching as merely the initial, preparatory material, they were not able to recognize in it the profound content of divine wisdom (Fee, 1 Corinthians, 124-25). Thiselton understands this wisdom from God as the willingness "to reappropriate the message of the cross in your innermost being" (1 Corinthians, 259). It is what the proclamation becomes for one who grasps a more profound consciousness of the way in which that proclamation breaks open the world's structures of thought and value (1 Corinthians, 260, 262). See also Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 39 and Soards, 1 Corinthians, 57, though these commentators miss some of the rhetorical ambiguity which Paul creates here.

If this general understanding of the "wisdom of God" in 2:6-16 is correct, then this would explain
the true "wisdom" which cannot be understood without the Spirit's help within. Hence, as
with his positioning of the Corinthians in the ambiguous space between the "mature" and
the "unspiritual," here too Paul's talk about "wisdom" is designed to push the Corinthians
into the realization that their whole quest for wisdom marks them as fools and casts a
shadow of ambiguity over their status as Spirit-led believers.\footnote{128}

The epistemological model which emerges from this interpretation of 1 Cor 2:6-16
is thus one in which the Spirit plays a central role in the ability of all believers to grasp the
implications of the Gospel for life. Just as one's initial acceptance of the Gospel comes as
a result of the Spirit's moral influence (2:1-5), so one's deepening grasp of the implications
of that message depends on the Spirit's ongoing "revelation" (2:6-16).\footnote{129} Barrett rightly
emphasizes that for Paul those who lack the Spirit simply "cannot apprehend spiritual
truths," no matter how acute their rational powers.\footnote{130} The Gospel and its radical re-
interpretation of the world remain to such people simple folly. The Spirit is thus a key
factor in the successful attainment of knowledge.\footnote{131}

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why 1) Paul here avoids the language of evangelistic preaching, e.g., the verbs κηρύσσω and καταγγέλλω
(so Hunt, \textit{Ibid.}, 90-91); even though 2) the general epistemic situation seems to be the same as that
described in 1:17-2:5, where such evangelistic language was prominent. Similar spiritual aid is needed both
for the initial acceptance of the Gospel and for the ongoing appropriation of its implications.

\footnote{128}{\textit{Fee}, \textit{I Corinthians}, 98-9, 102-3.}
\footnote{129}{So Barrett, \textit{I Corinthians}, 74.}
\footnote{130}{Barrett, \textit{I Corinthians}, 77. So Dupont, \textit{Gnosis}, 152.}
\footnote{131}{Gillespie points to a cluster of terms which 2:6-16 shares with chapters 12-14: ἀποκαλύπτειν
(2:10; 14:30); πνευματικοῖ (2:13; 12:1; cf. 2:15; 14:37); πνεύμα (2:10, 11, 12, 13, 14; 12:3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11);
σοφία (2:6, 7; 12:8); and τέλειοι (2:6; 14:20). Likewise, in both passages inspired speech is denoted by the
verb λαλέω rather than κηρύσσω (as in 1:23). The wisdom of God is hidden ἐν μυστήριοι in 2:7 and
προφητεία allows one to know τὰ μυστήρια πάντα in 13:2 ("Interpreting," 161; cf. Duutzenberg, "Botschaft und Bedeutung," 142-43). While it is unlikely that this indicates a narrow focus on prophecy in
2:6-16, it does suggest that the Spirit is understood as active in the Apostle's preaching much as in
prophetic activity. It is, however, less clear whether this understanding of the Spirit's role in producing faith
necessarily entails divine predestination of those who are to be saved (so Calvin, \textit{Corinthians}, on 1 Cor
2:14; apparently Gartner, "Pauline and Johannine," 217), or whether Paul assumes some room for human}
Does this mean that Paul is a fideist? Does the Spirit *displace* the activity of reason in his thought? Several commentators seem to think it does. Fee writes that salvation is, according to these verses, only for those who "believe," who "will take the risk and put their whole trust in God to save in this way."\(^{132}\) This leaves humanity with an "awful risk: trust God and be saved by his wise folly, or keep up our pretensions and perish."\(^{133}\) Barrett emphasizes that, for Paul, no human being can discover the truth of the Gospel "by any achievement of his own."\(^{134}\) The upshot of the passage for our purposes is thus that "[t]he Spirit and the truths about God are not grasped and possessed by humans, rather, they themselves grasp humanity and direct persons toward others as the agents of God's saving work."\(^{135}\) We have already seen, however, that there is reason to think Paul's target in the preceding sections was not reason in and of itself, but reason which has been hi-jacked by human vices. The Spirit's role in 2:1-5 seems to be a moral restoration of believers which allows them to move into a new system of values within which the Gospel is rational and plausible. Here too there is reason to believe that Paul understood the Spirit to *renew* human reason, rather than to displace it. Barrett points to Paul's statement in 2:15 that the spiritual "discern all things" and suggests that Paul understands the believer to gain a new ability to "consider and appraise" things in the world because the Gospel has provided "a

\(^{132}\) Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 74.

\(^{133}\) Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 77. See also Robertson and Plummer, *1 Corinthians*, 21.

\(^{134}\) Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 74. Hunt suggests that Paul is emphasizing the passivity of human beings in relation to divine wisdom in order to neutralize any individual claims to a superior access to knowledge (*Inspired Body*, 80). See also Chrysostom, *First Corinthians*, "Homily VII," on 2:7; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 65; Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 61; Thiselton, *1 Corinthians*, 263.

\(^{135}\) Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 61.
moral standard by which all things may be measured.\textsuperscript{136} Gillespie goes further and points out the consistent reference to cognitive activities in 2:6-16. The apprehension of divine wisdom does not seem to suppress rational thought, but rather involves "understanding" (\(\varepsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \nu \alpha \iota\)), and enables the mature to "interpret" (\(\sigma \nu \gamma \kappa \rho \iota \nu \epsilon \nu \gamma\)) and "judge" (\(\delta \nu \alpha \kappa \rho \iota \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \)).\textsuperscript{137} At the end of the passage the "spiritual" believer is left with "the mind of Christ (\(\nu \omicron \omicron \upsilon \chi \rho \iota \sigma \tau \omicron \omicron \))," a new way of thinking and reasoning.\textsuperscript{138} This seems to confirm at least that the Gospel is itself comprehensible (even if some cannot accept it),\textsuperscript{139} and that the one who, under the Spirit's impulse, has accepted that message gains a new ability to reason about the world.

This observation, once again, prompts questions about precisely how the Spirit's ongoing revelatory activity is related to human reason in Paul's thought. Is the revelation of the Spirit in 2:10ff. a matter of his supernaturally implanting ideas in the believer's mind, effectively by-passing the rational faculties? This is a tempting interpretation, but the prominence of human rational, interpretive activities in the passage mitigates against it. Such an irrationalist interpretation of the Spirit's revelation also assumes that the Spirit's...
role here is to provide new cognitive content.\textsuperscript{140} The epistemic problem in 2:6-16, however, is not the discovery of truth about God, but the recognition of truth when it is presented. Paul is not assimilating the believer's whole growth in religious understanding to the model of prophetic inspiration, in which the Spirit's role is to convey a message directly.\textsuperscript{141} It is taken for granted that a wisdom has already been made available to the world, a wisdom which is "not of this age" (οὐ τούτων αἰώνας οὗτων) but which is "from God" (θεόν) (2:6-7). Access to a presentation of this wisdom does not require the Spirit's help. When Paul says in 2:14 the "unspiritual person" is not able to "know" this wisdom (οὐ δύναται γνῶναι), he almost certainly means such people fail to recognize it as wisdom, as true. For in the problem facing the "unspiritual" here is not a problem of access to the true wisdom, but a lack of acceptance of the truth when they do hear it (οὐ

\textsuperscript{140}See, e.g., Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 60-61, 74-8 and Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 36 (though Gooch holds that 2:6-16 apply only to a limited, esoteric kind of knowledge).

\textsuperscript{141} Contra Hunt and Gillespie, both of whom point out parallels in language between 1 Cor 2:6-16 and the discussions of charismata in chapters 12 and 14 (see above, n. 131). Gillespie understands Paul to be narrowly focussed on prophecy in 2:6-16 ("Interpreting," 151, 160), though Gillespie argues (based on the discussion of prophecy in 1 Cor 14) that this prophetic speech is inspired interpretation of the basic kerygma ("Interpreting," 165). As Hunt observes, however, the broader context of 1:17-2:5 makes it very difficult to understand 2:6-16 as a highly focussed discussion of prophecy (Inspired Body, 90). Hunt himself holds that Paul is depicting all intra-group teaching and learning as a charismatic activity analogous to prophecy, and emphasizes the community's corporate role in distinguishing between valid and invalid inspiration. See also some similar suggestions in Dupont, Gnosis.

The parallels to which they point are real enough. Hunt observes (Ibid., 128) that it is in emphasizing the importance of charismatic manifestations serving a constructive role in the community (and in relation to visitors) that the Apostle re-introduces language about being τέλειοι rather than υπήρχοντα and ταινία (14:20) (so Hunt, Inspired Body, 121-25). Both writers also point to Paul's use of καλέσμα in 2:6-7, 13 instead of κρισίματα or καταγγέλλων. This may suggest that Paul understands at least some teaching to be inspired by the Spirit—hence his claim in 2:13 that "we" speak God's wisdom in words which are διακότας πνεύματος. This idea is further reinforced by Dupont's observation that prophecy and teaching are closely aligned in 1 Cor 14 (Gnosis, 213). Even if teaching is understood as a prophetic activity, however, this does not necessarily mean that the successful reception of that teaching (Paul's focus in 2:6-16) is likewise analogous to prophetic inspiration. We must admit that γινώσκω is included, alongside prophecy, among the charismata in 1 Cor 12 and 14 (cf. 13:2; see Dupont, Gnosis, 187-8, 201-3, 213; cf. pp. 33, 214, 224-25 re. Col 3:9-10, 16). Most commentators would agree, however, that this charismatic γινώσκω is a distinct phenomenon from the knowledge which Paul usually denotes by the verbs γινώσκω and οἴδα.
The Spirit appears in these verses not as one who uncovers hidden content, but as one who allows believers to recognize the (openly presented) message as true. The Spirit's "revelation," its "uncovering," is thus a matter of opening human eyes to the truth of the message when they encounter it.

How does the Spirit open the eyes of the "mature"? If my reading of 1:17-2:5 is correct, and the epistemic problem which Paul envisions is primarily a moral problem, then here again Paul most likely imagines the Spirit to open human eyes to the truth by healing the believers' moral constitution. Just as the initial acceptance of the Gospel required that endemic human vices be alleviated, so too the ongoing and deepening grasp of the Gospel's implications requires that the Spirit continue his moral restoration of believers. For if the Gospel is deliberately geared to be incompatible with endemic human vices, and the systems of value and plausibility which those vices spawn, then these vices will make human beings resistant not just to the broad outlines of the message but also (and perhaps even more so) to the ongoing re-evaluation of life which that Gospel

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142 See also n. 139 above. The situation is more ambiguous in 2:8, where Paul describes the αρχόντα τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτου as not having "known" (ἐγνώκεν) God's hidden wisdom. Here the Apostle may well mean that these powers were completely unaware of its content, particularly since the situation envisaged precedes the crucifixion and the subsequent proclamation of the Gospel.

143 It is true that in 2:10-11 Paul emphasizes the Spirit's privileged access to heavenly information. Notice, however, that Paul does not say that the "spiritual" are informed of "the depths of God," of all that the Spirit knows. That which the Spirit reveals to believers is more modest (2:12). Moreover, in 2:12 Paul does not say that the mature have received anything directly from the Spirit, but only that they have received the Spirit in order that they might know (recognize?) the truth: ἐλάβομεν ἄλλα τὸ πνεῦμα τῷ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδωμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρακτήτα ἡμῖν. Why, then, does Paul emphasize that the Spirit has privileged access to divine truth? He likely wants to characterize the Spirit as a uniquely reliable epistemic guide, one who is in a position to give human beings right standards of evaluation.

144 This is the same problem of recognition or evaluation (rather than access) which was Paul's focus in 1:17-2:5. The process is also very much like the one which Paul envisions in 2 Cor 3:12-18, where a "veil" lies over the minds of Jews so that they cannot recognize the truth in the Scriptures, but this veil is removed for those in Christ. Note too that in 3:17 this unveiling of the mind is associated with the activity of the Spirit. See also Phil 3:15, where Paul says to the audience, "[I]f you think differently about anything, this too God will reveal to you (ὁμιν ἀποκαλύψει)."
demands. This is precisely why, for Paul, the selfish rivalry and factionalism at Corinth calls into question the Corinthians' status as "spiritual." For although their initial acceptance of his preaching was an indication that the Spirit had begun his restorative work within them, their behaviour displays the fact that they are still operating (at least in part) within the world of corrupt values which the Gospel was designed by God to subvert. The Spirit has, for whatever reason, not continued to bring about the moral restoration of the Corinthian believers which would allow them to recognize and adopt the new world of values within which the Gospel makes sense.

What we must recognize in all of this is that, for Paul, the Spirit's activity does not provide a license for irrationality. The Spirit's revelatory activity does not remove the need for rational consideration of the Gospel and its implications. On the contrary, the Spirit's moral restoration of the "chosen" is intended precisely to facilitate unobstructed rational activity. It is the Spirit's correction of the believers' deep-seated vices which allows them to recognize that the Gospel, despite its difference from "worldly wisdom," presents a rationally coherent way of interpreting the world. It is the moral influence of that same Spirit which allows believers to continue the rational, interpretive task of re-evaluating all of life and reality in light of the new framework provided by the Gospel. Hence Soards argues that

Paul is not decrying the value of sensible reflection; rather, he is insisting that humans cannot discern the reality of God through their reason based only upon their own experience. God's self-revelation in the cross is the key to comprehending God, it is the necessary starting point for valid comprehension of the divine, and without the cross we are bound to
misunderstand God. The Spirit can be understood to restore and empower human reason by allowing human minds to reason within the one framework which allows true interpretations of existence.

2. Paul and Rationality: The Broader Picture

The model of knowing which has emerged from both Romans 1:18-32 and 1 Corinthians 1:17-2:16 cannot be called fideistic if by that term we mean an appeal to a "faith" as an alternative to rational thought. In both passages the Apostle does affirm that, given the present state of humanity, rational inquiry cannot on its own achieve reliable knowledge of God. What is more, God has chosen to act in such a way that ordinary human inquiry will always mistake the truth about God's action for nonsense. Human beings will somehow have to transcend their ordinary framework of values in order to achieve true knowledge about God and his ways. The Gospel will force those who accept it to abandon ordinary human wisdom, as they allow the message of "Christ crucified" to re-define what counts as plausible and valuable. Paul gives no indication that the message is rationally incoherent, or that his presentation avoids rational explanation. His hearers cannot comprehend that rationality, however, unless they first overcome certain moral vices which are endemic to contemporary humanity, since it is those vices which consistently distort human intellectual standards. It is the Spirit which plays the key role in this epistemic process by healing the human moral constitution, so that the internal coherence and rational implications of the Gospel can be recognized. Hence Paul affirms

\[145\text{Soards, 1 Corinthians, 40.}\]
in 1 Cor 12:3 that "no one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit."146

Yet these two passages, Rom 1:18-32 and 1 Cor 1:17-2:16, are not the only places where Paul makes statements with epistemological implications. It is thus necessary to ask whether my reading of these passages is in keeping with the Apostle's statements elsewhere. After all, some scholars have offered very different models of Paul's approach to human reason. Hans Leisegang, for example, in his 1923 monograph Der Apostel Paulus als Denker, painted a portrait of Paul's thought as a kind of irrational vision which "nicht gedacht, sondern auf einer anderen Ebene des Bewusstseins erschaut und erlebt ist."147 The Apostle's mind was, for Leisegang, dominated by polar oppositions which are only dealt with by means of unresolved paradox.148 Hence Leisegang finds in Paul a profound irrationalism in which one simply allows oneself to be overwhelmed by and enveloped in a powerful vision of reality.149 If this is the kind of Paul which we find elsewhere in his letters, then we would have to ask some hard questions about the exegesis

146Given his insistence in the section immediately following (12:4ff.) that only some members of the community are endowed with prophetic gifts, the Apostle's point here is likely not that "all Christians, at least potentially, have the capacity for inspired speech, even if it comes only in the form of a simple confession" (contra Hunt, Inspired Body, 110-11). The Spirit's role in this confession is likely not the role of inspiring an ecstatic utterance, but rather the role which we saw above in our exegesis of 1:17-2:16—the Spirit influences one's fallen moral constitution so as to allow the acceptance of the Gospel. The Apostle's rhetorical point is not that all are (potential) prophets, but rather that all are endowed with the Spirit, whether they prophecy or not.

147Leisegang, Der Apostel, 9. This also means, for Leisegang, that Paul's holistic vision of reality is not subject to doubt but is driven by "einer untrüglichen Gewißheit" (Der Apostel, 9-10).

148Leisegang, Der Apostel, 17. Cf. J. A. Fischer's suggestion that Paul's thinking stands in the "wisdom" tradition which focussed on the observation of the world's realities but tended to understand those realities in terms of paradox and irony ("Literary Forms"). Siegert also observes that Paul's argument often depends on his setting up antitheses and polar opposites, but he rightly argues that these are formal structures which need not reflect the deep structure of Paul's thought (Argumentation, 184).

149Leisegang (Der Apostel, 16) likens Paul's experience to that of Augustine, who is said to have moved from a critical, rational reading of the scriptures to one in which he "mit hingebender Liebe in diese Texte versenkte" and so found in them "die wunderbarsten Aufschlüsse . . . eine sein Denken befriedigende, gewaltige Philosophie."
I have offered above.

Space does not permit a full treatment of the subject of human reason in Paul's letters. A brief survey of other passages, however, reveals that (despite Leisegang) the whole body of the Apostle's writings attests to Paul's view that human reason is central to all religious knowledge. Just as we found in 1 Cor 1:17-2:16 evidence that the Spirit-led believer continues to employ reason in understanding the world, so elsewhere we see the expectation that believers must think rationally. In 1 Corinthians 14, for example, Paul clearly favours prophetic speech over glossolalia precisely because it is rationally comprehensible. It engages the mind (νοῦς), allows the message to be understood. Why is such comprehensible speech better? Because it is such speech which "builds up (οἰκοδομεῖ)" the hearers, while incomprehensible speech remains ineffective (14:3-5, 12, 17). The implication is that the moral edification of the believers takes place through intellectual activity, as they comprehend the truth with their reason.

It is thus no surprise to find that the Apostle often depicts the believer's ethical decisions as flowing from a process of rational judgment. When Paul wants to urge the Philippians to follow the ethical pattern displayed by Christ, he urges them to "[l]et the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus (τὸύτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ)" (2:5). It seems to be presumed that in order for the Philippians to act differently

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150 So Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 36.
151 Paul asks in 14:9 πῶς γρηγορίεται τὸ λαλοῦμεν ἐὰν μὴ έστημον λόγον δότε. In 14:14 Paul worries that when one prays in glossolalia one's mind is "unfruitful" (ὁ δὲ νοῦς μοι ἀκαρπὸς ἐστιν).
152 So Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 37-8. Note, too, how even prayer and worship are only productive activities for Paul when they are engaged in not only "with the spirit (τῷ πνεύματι)" but also "with the mind (τῷ νοίᾳ)" (1 Cor 14:14). Cf. 14:19.
they must think differently. On the other hand, those who "live as enemies of the cross of Christ" think about "earthly things" (τὰ ἐπὶ γεία ἐφοροῦντες) (Phil 3:18-19).153 Moreover, this seems to be a kind of thinking which leads to new, substantive ethical conclusions. For Paul prays that knowledge will increase among the Philippians, a knowledge with which they can "determine (δικαιοδοτείν) what is best, so that in the day of Christ you may be pure and blameless" (Phil 1:9-10).154 Similarly, in Rom 12:1-2 Paul urges the Romans to "present your bodies as a living sacrifice" to God. Yet this offering, which clearly amounts to ethical obedience, seems to be associated with the mind when Paul calls it their "rational worship (λογικὴ λατρεία)." However we read that verse,

153See also Col 3:9-10, where the Colossians' moral renewal is described in terms of their having "stripped off the old self with its practices" and having "clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge (τὸν ἀνακαινίζοντα εἰς ἐπιγνώσιν) according to the image of its creator." It is thus an intellectual renewal which lies at the root of their ethical change.
154So Bultmann, Theology, 1.326. Hence the differences in actual attainments of knowledge evident in 1 Cor 8:7 (cf. 1 Cor 8:1).
155Although the adjective λογική is often translated "reasonable" (so NRSV) or even "spiritual" (so NIV), Danker rightly recognizes that the emphasis of the term is on cognitive activity or ability (BDAG, 598). It should best be rendered as "rational." The word is prominent in philosophical discourse, especially among the Stoics (see, e.g., Epict., Diss. 1.16.20-21; cf. Ap. Const. 7.38.5; 8.9.8; 8.15.7; 8.41.4). The term is often used to denote the opposite of the merely physical, but this always accompanies a dualism in which it is thought which transcends matter (see Philo, Opif. 119; Leg. 1.41, 70-72; 2.22-23; Det. 82-3; Spec. Leg. 1.201, 277; Ap. Const. 7.34.6.). Notice, too, how in Philo, Leg. 1.70 the λογικός part of the human being, the highest element and the seat of reason, is charged with exercising "prudence (φρονήσεων)," that is, "knowledge of the things we ought to do and of the things we ought not." This is precisely the role played by the renewing of the νοῦς in 12:2 (cf. Ap. Const. 8.12.17). Moreover, notice how in Spec. Leg. 1.277 Philo uses the term in a cultic context, explaining that "what is precious in the sight of God is not the number of victims immolated but the true purity of a rational spirit (πνεύμα λογικόν) in him who makes the sacrifice." This comes very close to Paul's metaphorical connection between cult and moral deliberation in Rom 12:1, and Philo certainly has the idea of rational activity prominently in mind (cf. Ap. Const. 7.35.10). Note, too, that just as Paul's use of λογικός in Rom 12:1 is followed in 12:2 by a reference to the activity of the νοῦς, so too the νοῦς is regularly the seat of the λογικός power in philosophical writers (e.g., Philo, Leg., 2.22-23; Spec. Leg. 1.201; Ap. Const. 7.34.6).

Admittedly, in T. Levi 3:6 the angels' heavenly cult involves sacrifices which are "rational," primarily in the sense that they are "bloodless," non-physical, and the author does not seem to dwell otherwise on rationality as a characteristic of God or human beings. Other purported examples of such a non-cognitive sense for λογικός, however, are unconvincing. CH 1.31 may refer to the mystical prayers of the pure soul as λογικός θυσίας, but notice that in the prayer itself which precedes that statement God is said to have "constituted all that is λόγος." This should immediately caution us against the assumption that the λογικός sacrifice is here merely a non-physical offering (see also CH 13.18, 21). In a context like Rom
Paul's following statements are clear. The Romans are to avoid "being conformed to" the ethical pattern of "this world," but are to "be transformed." Here again the transformation is to stem from "the renewing of your minds (τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοῦς)," so that you may discern (δοκιμάζειν) what is the will of God. Changed ethical behaviour arises from changed ways of thinking, and the use of the verb δοκιμάζειν presumes that this new pattern of thought issues in rational judgments about what one ought to do. Hence in

12:1-2 where λογικός is followed so closely by a reference to the activity of the νοῦς such a non-intellectual use of the adjective is highly unlikely. Moreover, Paul cannot mean primarily that the worship is non-physical or inward, since it is manifested in ethical actions of τὰ σωμάτα (12:1a; so Cranfield, Romans, 2.604; contra Barrett, Romans, 213).

Wilckens (Römer, 3.4-6) argues that the adjective here is simply used as a marker differentiating between a genuine cult and other false ones. Yet while this may be a part of its function in other Greek writers, the word always plays this role precisely because it designates what is rational, what is in keeping with the λόγος over against what is irrational and merely animal. Moo suggests that in Philo, Spec. Leg. 1.277 the adjective denotes "the mental and spiritual attitude that was necessary for a sacrifice to have any merit before God" (Romans, 752). Philo's emphasis there, however, is on pure rationality as what is acceptable to the creator.

Dunn suggests that λογική worship is, for Paul, that which is "proper for man the creature," since human beings were often understood as distinguished from the animals by their nature as λογικός (Romans, 2.712; C. F. Evans, "Rom 12:1-2"). Yet this is to confuse the issue, for the word λογικός in such settings does not denote "what is proper for man the creature," but rather the character of some being or activity as rational. It is because human beings are properly rational that such λογικός behaviour is appropriate to them.

Käsemann, among others, finds the closest analogy in 1 Pet 2:2, 5 where new Christians drink τὸ λογικόν ἅδωλον γάλα, and as they progress they become able ἀνθρωπικὰς πνευματικὰς θυσίας εὑρισκόμενοι. Käsemann presents the passage as evidence that "from the time of the mystical variation of the motif λογικός and πνευματικός are interchangeable (Romans, 329). Yet the two adjectives modify referents which are deliberately distinguished by the author of 1 Pet. We cannot be certain that the author did not intend the idea of rationality to be present when he describes the initial preaching as λογικός (so Schreiner, Romans, 645). Cf. Odes Sol. 20.1-3.

Hence in Rom 12:1 Paul most likely intends to depict the believer's moral effort as a sacrifice offered by the reasoning mind. It is a "rational" sacrifice. Cranfield is right that Paul is thinking here not of "the natural rationality of man" but rather of the new rationality of the Gospel (Romans, 2.604-5). It is unlikely, however, that Paul simply means the believer's moral sacrifice is "reasonable," in the sense that such actions are in keeping with reason (contra Schreiner, Romans, 645). Moo is closer to the mark when he suggests that Paul is stressing "the involvement of the mind" in this worship (Romans, 753; so H. D. Betz, "Foundations of Christian Ethics," 63-5). This λογικός worship is that which is driven by the rational human mind.

156 The dative τῇ ἀνακαινώσει almost certainly describes the means by which the transformation (μεταμορφώθη) is effected (so Cranfield, Romans, 2.608).

157 So Bornkamm, Paul, 132; Dodd, Romans, 192. Notice, too, that this intellectual renewal is something which must be exhorted. Hence the imperative verbs μὴ συσχηματίζεσθαι and μεταμορφοθέντες. Believers are not passively to wait for God to renew their faculty of moral judgment. They are to begin thinking differently, so that they can judge properly. We thus cannot agree, with Käsemann, that "the
Romans 14 Paul describes the believers' ethical deliberation about the sanctity of certain days as an activity of judgment (κρίνων) (14:5). Likewise, in 2 Cor 13:5 Paul urges the Corinthians: "Examine yourselves (ἐαυτοὺς πείράζετε) to see whether you are living in the faith." In each case the Apostle seems to presume that the believers' ethical decisions flow from a process of rational deliberation.

In keeping with this focus on rational judgment, several scholars have observed that Paul's ethical teaching is often supported by reasoned argument. Stowers notes how in 1 Corinthians as a whole Paul does not simply issue authoritative commands, but
reasons with the Corinthians as "responsible moral agents" who must employ their own rational powers to decide on the right path of action. Bornkamm had already made a similar point in his article "Faith and Reason in Paul." Paul could, Bornkamm insists, have offered his Gospel in the form of "revelation-speeches" or prophetic words which admitted of no discussion. Such forms of preaching were, after all, not unknown in the Hellenistic world. Nor does he parade charismatic or miraculous feats in order to overawe his hearers and induce them to accept his declarations. Instead, Bornkamm emphasizes,

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160 Stowers, "Reason," 265. Stowers points to 7:37 where Paul says that moral decisions are not to be made under constraint (ἀναγκαίως), but (in Stowers words) "out of his or her own free will and with due deliberation." Indeed, Stowers may well be right that part of what drew the criticism of the "super-apostles" who came to Corinth was Paul's comparatively open approach to what he considered non-essential issues. His lack of dogmatism may have been considered weakness, while his insistence that certain questions must be approached gently and (at times) through indirectness may have been understood as insincerity ("Reason," 271-72). For the opponents' charge, see 2 Cor 1:12-14; 4:2-3.

Note also Siegert's comment to the effect that "die Vernunft der Hörer werde bei Paulus nicht nur zur Vorbereitung auf den Glauben angesprochen, sondern durchgehend gefordert, bis hin zu den ethischen Forderungen.... Daß Paulus zu einer Diskussion innerlich nicht bereit ist und sie als Streiterei abbricht.... ist demgegenüber die Ausnahme" (Argumentation, 246-47).

161 Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 36; Paul, 119. Even in 1 Cor 9:8, where Paul emphasizes that his statement of apostolic rights in 9:1-7 is not based "on human authority (κατὰ διαφοροποιήσεως)," the statement draws its special authority not from Paul's own inspiration or apostolic status, but from the scriptural passage upon which the instruction is based: "Does not the law also say the same?"

Perhaps the most plausible example of Paul's appealing directly to spiritual inspiration as his authority comes in 1 Cor 14:37, where he writes: "Anyone who claims to be a prophet, or to have spiritual powers, must acknowledge that what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord." Barrett suggests that when Paul claims that his teaching constitutes a "command of the Lord" the Apostle is assuming that since he too has "the mind of Christ" (2:16) his reasoned position carries Christ's authority (1 Corinthians, 334). This comment should not, however, be taken as characteristic of Paul's justification of his teaching authority. For it comes on the heels of an extended confrontation with those in Corinth who seem to claim special pneumatic and ecstatic powers. His point is not to emphasize his own special authority. Rather he puts the "spiritual" in Corinth in the position of having to accept his teaching about their use of the charismata, even though this teaching subverts their claims to superior authority. Either they accept the reduction of their pretentious claims or they place their spiritual endowment directly in question by challenging Paul (so Fee, 1 Corinthians, 712; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 674). It is only because they claim special prophetic inspiration that he demands of them the ability to recognize immediately the divine truth of Paul's words. Paul's clear distinction in 7:10, 12 between Paul's own instructions and the Lord's command likely comes closer to his usual approach to his own teaching (so Soards, 1 Corinthians, 310).

162 Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 37. We could also add that Paul does not treat his Damascus road experience as if it lends him special teaching authority (contra Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 207). When he does report that experience it is either in order to ground his claim to have a message independent of the Jerusalem group (as in Gal 1:11-17) or in order to provide further evidence (alongside the other traditions of resurrection appearances) for the reality of Christ's resurrection (as in 1 Cor 15:3-8).
Paul engages in rational argument, trying to convince his hearers at an intellectual level. In 1 Cor 6:12, for example, Paul responds to what seems to be a Corinthian slogan—"All things are lawful for me"—by adding the qualification that "not all things are beneficial." This response, however, seems to presume that the audience can and should derive their ethics by thinking critically about what is beneficial. Indeed, he goes on in 6:13-20 to offer some reasoned grounds for distinguishing the beneficial from the harmful. In 1 Cor 11:13, when Paul's argument for female head-coverings seems to run out of steam, he calls on the audience to "judge for yourselves (ἐν ὑμῖν ἀυτῶις κρίνατε): is it proper for a woman to pray to God with her head unveiled?" What follows, again, is an appeal to the natural order which seems geared to help the audience make the right rational judgment. 163

Even earlier, Bultmann pointed out that when Paul asks, as he often does, whether his audience "does not know" some basic truth of the kerygma, the Apostle is inviting the audience to draw out the rational implications of the kerygma for their immediate situation. 164 So Paul's actual interactions with his communities confirms the impression while the content of that experience does form an authoritative message for Paul, he does not appeal to it in order to bolster his authority in further interpretation and teaching.

163 Bornkamm writes: "Going through the parenetic sections from letter to letter, it is amazing to see the variety of and differences in the apostle's argumentation in each case—absolutely no set form of clichés; in other words, he appeals to his hearers' and readers' understanding and does not simply proclaim and decree. His arguments are in the best sense of the term 'motivations,' reasons for 'moving'" (Paul, 204).

In 1 Cor 7:17-24, for example, the Apostle does not simply issue commands on the subject of marriage and celibacy, slavery and freedom, but calls on believers to re-think their situation, to use their intelligence in order to understand their lives differently on the basis of Christ (Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason, 38). Note that the only place in the ethical teaching of chapter 7 in which the instruction is cast in terms of commanding (παρακατεγέλλω) is in 7:10, where Paul also specifies that the command comes from "the Lord" and not from himself. Even here, however, Paul seems to feel free to make concessions when there seems to be rational justification for them (7:15). Notice too how in 7:40 Paul writes about widows: "in my judgment (κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην) she is more blessed if she remains as she is. And I think that I too have the Spirit of God." 165

164 Bultmann, Theology, 1.326. See, e.g., Rom 6:3.
that he expects believers to reach ethical decisions by way of rational deliberation.\textsuperscript{165}

Nor is Paul's rational argument limited to ethical issues.\textsuperscript{166} Bultmann notes how at times what Paul claims to know is not merely the bare \textit{kerygma}, but further "truths which 'faith'-ful reflection must draw as consequences" from that preached message.\textsuperscript{167} Paul envisions, Bultmann argues, the believers moving into deeper knowledge "of the mysteries of the history of salvation or of the eschatological occurrence."\textsuperscript{168} While Bultmann depends in part here on a questionable reading of 1 Cor 2:6-16, he can also point to passages like Rom 11:25ff. and 1 Cor 15:51ff. in which Paul seeks to expand the audience's understanding of saving events.\textsuperscript{169} Drawing on Bultmann's pioneering work on Paul's use of rhetoric,\textsuperscript{170} Bornkamm goes further to point out that in the "theological" sections of his letters Paul often seems to make use of the "diatribe," a rhetorical form which engages the hearer in rational argument, introducing possible objections in order to refute them.\textsuperscript{171} This is not to deny that Paul's rhetoric sometimes depends as much on \textit{pathos} and \textit{ethos} for its persuasive force as it does on the \textit{logos} of rational thought. Yet even in these cases the non-rational appeals tend to be introduced \textit{in support of a rational

\textsuperscript{165}Something similar is implied in Yu's recognition that "Paul considers the gospel he preached as the criterion to interpret the situation in which his people should live to please God" (Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 169-73 [quotation from p. 169]).

\textsuperscript{166}Contra Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 78-84.

\textsuperscript{167}Bultmann points \textit{(Theology, 1.318)} to Rom 8:28; 13:11; 14:14; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:2f., 9; 15:58.

\textsuperscript{168}Bultmann, \textit{Theology, 1.327}.

\textsuperscript{169}Note too how in 2 Cor 12:12 Paul expects that the Corinthians should have been able to interpret the evidence of his divine calling: "The signs of a true apostle were performed among you with utmost patience, signs and wonders and mighty works" (2 Cor 12:12). This seems to be a response to the Corinthian desire for "proof (δοκίμα)\textsuperscript{2}" of Paul's apostleship to which he alludes in 13:3.

\textsuperscript{170}See Bultmann, \textit{Der Stil} and cf. Malherbe, "\textit{Mē Genoito}," Stowers, \textit{The Diatribe}.

\textsuperscript{171}Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 36. Even Yu, whose unpublished dissertation generally adopts an anti-rationalist reading of Paul, nevertheless agrees that Paul "never explicitly says that the concept of righteousness by faith apart from the law is the content of God's direct revelation through the Spirit," but instead "opens a series of fiery 'human' arguments to settle the issue" in Galatians and Romans ("Pneumatic Epistemology," 220).
argument. The analysis of Galatians which occupies chapter 3 of this study will simply confirm this impression that Paul's theology is very often supported on rational grounds.

Does this mean that Paul regarded conversion itself, one's basic faith in the Gospel, as the product of rational deliberation? Many interpreters follow Bultmann in his emphatic "no" to this possibility.\(^{172}\) Faith is said to spring entirely from a non-rational encounter with God, whether that encounter is understood as the believer's existential moment of decision or as God's sovereign creation of faith in those whom he calls. Indeed, in many passages Paul can talk as if those who come to believe are entirely passive in the face of God's action. In 2 Cor 4:4, for example, we are told that it is "the god of this world" who has "blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ." In the face of this blindness, the God who created light is said to have "shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (4:6). Similarly, in 1 Cor 3:6 Paul responds to factional enthusiasm for various leaders by downplaying their role in the Corinthians' conversion: "I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth."\(^{173}\) The divine agent who produces this faith...

\(^{172}\)Bultmann emphasizes that the believers' initial deposit of knowledge is identical with the content of their "faith," a faith which comes as "a gift of the spirit" (Theology, 1.326). Hence Bultmann argues that Paul often simply appeals to "dogma" which is ungrounded in rational thought (Theology, 1.318; see 1 Thess 5:2; Rom 6:3; 2 Cor 5:1; 8:9). Bornkamm likewise considers it "self-evident" that "Paul does not derive the message of salvation in Jesus Christ from what man already knows by virtue of his reason. Here it can only be the resounding proclamation of what God has done in his grace. This is and remains a miracle for all human understanding" (Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," 35).

\(^{173}\)See also 2 Cor 2:14-16, where the human crowd observing the proclamation of Christ is divided into two groups: those who are being saved and those who are perishing. The message is depicted as an aroma which strikes each group differently. It is "to the one a fragrance from death to death, to the other a fragrance from life to life" (2:16). Similarly, Paul says in Phil 1:28b-29 that the Philippians' perseverance and salvation is "God's doing. For he has graciously granted you the privilege not only of believing in Christ, but of suffering for him as well." In 1 Thess 2:13 the Apostle thanks God that the Thessalonians accepted his Gospel "not as a human word but as what it really is, God's word." Elsewhere Paul gives thanks to God for the faith of his congregations, suggesting that God is responsible for it (e.g., Rom 1:8).
seems, as in 1 Cor 2:1-16, to be the Spirit. So in 2 Cor 3:12-18 Paul describes a metaphorical "veil" which lies over the minds of Jewish people, preventing them from understanding the truth in the Scriptures (3:14-15). "Only in Christ," we are told, "is it set aside" (3:14). It is only "when one turns to the Lord" that "the veil is removed" (3:16), and Paul goes out of his way to say that the God who performs this intellectual renewal is the Spirit (3:17). In these passages the Spirit's role is still not anti-rational. He renews the convert's intellect and facilitates a new kind of reasoning by overcoming the mind's blindness (2 Cor 4:4) and removing the veil which stifles the mind (2 Cor 3:12-18). If the Spirit produces faith it is not by inducing an irrational belief, but rather by allowing the believer to become truly rational. Yet reason does not, in these passages, seem to play any role in the believer's initial acceptance of the Gospel message.

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174So Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 150-53. See also 1 Thess 1:4-5, where Paul writes: "For we know, brothers and sisters beloved by God, that he has chosen you, because our message of the gospel came to you not in word only, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction (ἐν δύναμιν καὶ ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ καὶ ἐν πληροφορίᾳ πολλῇ)." The sense of the δύναμιν at the opening of v. 5 is ambiguous, so that it is not possible to decide conclusively whether the audience's reception of the Gospel is the evidence of God's election or the substance of that election itself. In either case, however, it is the Spirit who appears to be responsible for their "full conviction.

175See also 2 Cor 5:17-18, where Paul follows up his statements about having come to comprehend Christ differently (a new kind of rational activity) with the affirmation that "new creation" is present where this interpretive shift has taken place. He then goes on to affirm that "All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ."

176There are some hints, again, that the Spirit's role is primarily to bring a moral restoration which frees the intellect for healthy thought. Paul says in 2 Thess 2:13-14 that God chose the Thessalonians "through sanctification by the Spirit and through belief in the truth (ἐν ἁγίασμω πνεύματος καὶ πίστει ἀληθείας). For this purpose he called you through our proclamation of the good news (διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἡμῶν), so that you may obtain the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ." The juxtaposition of the Spirit's moral restorative activity (ἐν ἁγίασμω πνεύματος) and the believer's faith is suggestive, though not conclusive.

177It has, in the wake of Barth, been popular in some circles to depict the Gospel preaching itself as an overwhelming power which calls forth faith in those whom God has chosen (see, e.g., Hofius, "Wort Gottes," 170-1; Ridderbos, Theology, 234-35). Yet Paul's actual words seem to locate the faith-producing force in the Spirit rather than the message. The message is, for Paul, "the power of God" (1 Cor 1:18, 24; Rom 1:16). Yet this does not mean that the message itself somehow contains the power to create faith (contra Ridderbos, Theology, 235). Rather, the Gospel is God's "power" in the sense that it is in their believing this message that salvation is made available to human beings. When Paul wants to talk about God's influencing human beings to accept the Gospel, he talks instead about the Spirit's activity. Ridderbos
There are, however, other passages which seem to imply that God's responsibility for the believers' faith does not totally eclipse in Paul's mind the rational thought which contributes to that decision. We must notice, first, that in places the Spirit is depicted as responsible, not just for the believers' initial conversion, but also for their ongoing growth in ethical knowledge. Yet we saw above that, both in theory and in practice, Paul usually treats such ethical knowledge as the product of rational deliberation. This apparent tension suggests that when Paul made statements attributing the responsibility for faith or knowledge to God, he did not necessarily mean to exclude the idea that such faith or knowledge was also the product of the believer's reason. So in 2 Cor 5:11 Paul does cast his ministry as a matter of trying "to persuade others (πειθωμεν)" of the Gospel, implying that their conversion is an intellectual process. Then in 2 Cor 5:14-15 the Apostle seems to have in mind the idea that faith was the result of rational argumentation.

Ridderbos also points out that faith is said to come "from hearing" the message about Christ: ἔχεισιν ἀκοὴν (Rom 10:17). Yet the preposition ἐκ, which designates the relationship between faith and Gospel-hearing, is ambiguous. All Paul's statement need mean is that it is when one hears the message that one has the opportunity to believe it.

Ridderbos then turns to 1 Thess 2:13, where Paul gives thanks that when the Thessalonians received their Gospel preaching, ἐκείνης τῆς λόγου ἀνθρώπων ἄλλη καθὼς ἐστιν ἐλθὼς λόγον θεοῦ. All that Paul affirms here, however, is that God was somehow involved in their acceptance of the Gospel message as truth from God. It does not specify that the message itself exercised some faith-producing power. The same may be said about the other passages in which God is pictured as producing the faith of the believers (see above), or where those who respond to the Gospel are already "called" by God (e.g., Rom 1:6, 7; 4:17; 9:11, 25; 1 Thess 5:24; 1 Cor 1:2, 24). Paul does not specify in any of these cases that the Gospel message carries within itself this divine influence. Ridderbos' appeal to 1 Cor 2:5 is beside the point as well, since (as we saw above), Paul's emphasis is on the power of the Spirit, not the message itself. Ridderbos provides 1 Cor 15:11 as a further example of the power of the Gospel (Paul, 234), but this passage simply affirms that Paul's message is identical to the message which the Corinthians came to believe.

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178 See Col 1:9-10; 2 Thess 1:3; and cf. Rom 12:3. This was also the case in 1 Cor 2:6-16, though here the knowledge is less clearly restricted to the ethical sphere.

179 Thrall (2 Corinthians, 1.402) is right that Paul's description of the objects of his persuasion as "human beings (ἄνθρωπος)" suggests that he is thinking of his apostolic ministry in general and not simply his responses to critics (so Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 322; Martin, 2 Corinthians, 121). Because this is not Paul's usual way of talking about his preaching, Thrall downplays the idea of rational discourse suggested by πείθω and suggests that he is turning the language of his accusers to his own uses (2 Corinthians, 1.402-3; so Bultmann, 2 Corinthians, 147). Even if, however, Paul is taking over the language of his opponents, we still must deal with his willingness to use such a term for his evangelistic activity.
to represent his conviction that the Gospel is true as the fruit of rational judgment: "we have judged this to be true (κρίνωντας τὸῦτο), that one has died for all, so that those who live might live no longer for themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them." Similarly, Paul lays emphasis in Phil 1:7 on the "defense and confirmation (τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ καὶ βεβαιώσει) of the gospel," an activity in which the Philippians share with Paul. Yet "defense" of a message is both a rational activity and one which is directed toward outsiders. On the other hand the Apostle's emphasis here on "confirmation" reminds us that while Paul can sometimes express confidence that God will preserve the audience's faith, he can also express anxiety that rational arguments might lead believers away from the Gospel. Notice too the prominent role of reason in 1 Cor 14:25, where Paul gives us

\[\text{I have here adjusted the NRSV translation which renders κρίνωντας τὸῦτο as "we are convinced." That translation does not, however, capture the idea of active, rational judgment which is conveyed by the adverbial participle κρίνωντας. Thrall describes the activity denoted by κρίνωντας here as "a decision taken in the past ... concerning the significance of Christ's death" (2 Corinthians, 1.409; so Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 310). Martin speaks, more accurately, of "a judgment formed in the past," since the sense of κρίνω here (followed by a ὅτι clause) is less volitional than cognitive, unless what we mean is a decision to accept a certain view of Christ and his crucifixion (so Bultmann, 2 Corinthians, 151). Martin and Thrall separate this judgement from Paul's conversion, making it a subsequent insight. It is, however, hard to see how Paul could have accepted the Christian Gospel without accepting this perception of Christ's death which (for Paul at least) was its substance, and which Furnish rightly points out is presented here as a universal Christian conviction (2 Corinthians, 310; so Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 168).}

\[\text{Paul worries in 2 Cor 11:3-4 that the false teachers are preaching "another Jesus than the one we proclaimed." His fear is that "as the serpent deceived Eve by its cunning (ἐξετάσθης ἐν τῷ πανοργίᾳ αὐτοῦ), your thoughts (τὰ νομίσματα ὑμῶν) will be led astray (φθαρῆ) from a sincere and pure devotion to Christ." Similarly, in 1 Cor 3:17 Paul warns: "If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy that person. For God's temple is holy, and you are that temple." The context suggests that the prospect of this "destruction" emerges from the discourse of those who claim "wisdom" (3:18-19) or from preachers whose role is analogous with Paul's activity (3:10-15).}

\[\text{It is because of this danger that Paul can urge the Colossians in Col 1:23 to "continue (ἐπιμένετε) securely established and steadfast in the faith, without shifting (μηδὲ μετακινοῦμενοι) from the hope promised by the gospel that you heard ..." This is in a context in which Paul has described their state prior to conversion as being "estranged and hostile in mind (τῇ θανατοῖς)" (1:21). Hence their intellectual attitude toward God and the Gospel seems to be depicted here as something which they must actively}

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a rare glimpse of the actual process of conversion as he understands it. Paul describes the reaction of an outsider upon hearing a prophetic word delivered in the context of a Christian gathering: "After the secrets of the unbeliever's heart are disclosed, that person will bow down before God and worship him, declaring, 'God is really among you.'" While we might focus on the fact that the Spirit is the author of the prophetic gift here, notice that the outsider's reaction is actually the result of a rational inference based on the prophetic message, treated as an observable event. It is because the visitor finds a stranger reciting his most intimate secrets that he is forced, by inference, to admit that a divine power is active in the group. So while we cannot deny that the Apostle sometimes depicts conversion as the result of the Spirit's power, we also should not minimize the indications that he sees conversion as resulting from rational thought.

This dynamic tension in Paul's thought between God's sovereignty over the faith of believers and the importance of human reason is captured well in 2 Cor 10:3-5. "Indeed," Paul writes, "we live as human beings, but we do not wage war according to human standards; for the weapons of our warfare are not merely human, but they have divine power (δυνάτα τῷ θεῷ) to destroy strongholds. We destroy arguments (λογισμοὺς) and maintain. See also 2 Thess 2:15, where Paul urges the Thessalonians to "stand firm and hold fast to the traditions that you were taught by us." Here it is less clear that the danger is false teaching, but Paul clearly does not assume God's sovereignty to guarantee that the believers' faith will endure.

Likewise, Paul urges the Colossians in 2:4 to strengthen their knowledge (by means of love), "so that no one may deceive you with plausible arguments (ἵμας παραλογίζῃ ἐν πίθανολογίᾳ)."

182 See also 2 Cor 5:20, where after apparently affirming that conversion comes "from God" (5:18) Paul describes God as "making his appeal (παρακαλοῦντος)" through the Christian preaching. He then personalizes this by addressing the audience directly: "we entreat you (δεῖχομεθα) on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God." This, again, seems to depict God's activity as an invitation to rational response. Since Paul is addressing believers it is unclear whether he regards conversion in the same light, but he does seem here to be recalling the substance of his initial preaching to the Corinthians.

183 Thrall has objected that the reading of τῷ θεῷ represented by the NRSV translation is grammatically impossible. While it might be construed as a dative of agent, she observes that this construction is rare in the NT and in any case requires a passive verb (2 Corinthians, 2.609-10). Barrett (2...
every proud obstacle raised up against the knowledge of God, and we take every thought
(πᾶν νόημα) captive to obey Christ." Here Paul is describing the character of his apostolic
ministry, affirming that he does not act "according to human standards." As Malherbe has
pointed out, the warfare imagery is a common Hellenistic topos for philosophical
debates. 184 Paul depicts himself first as fighting these battles with "divine power," a power
which apparently allows him to "take captive" the thoughts of those whom he wants to
convince of the Gospel and its true application. 185 Yet notice that these weapons with their

Corinthians, 251) suggests that τῷ θεῷ is a dative of advantage, "for God." The weapons are "employed
on God's behalf!" (so, Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 457; and tentatively, Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 2.610). Martin
suggests, however, that a dative of advantage can be construed so as to understand God as the one who acts
through the weapons, i.e. "God can work powerfully through these weapons" (2 Corinthians, 305; so
Bultmann, 2 Corinthians, 185; Malherbe, "Antisthenes," 117; cf. Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 251). I have here
accepted the reading which maximizes the idea of divine involvement in the process of persuasion. If the
expression is understood more as Barrett and Furnish take it, this would simply intensify the impression
here that Paul is talking about rational argument and persuasion.

It has also been suggested that the expression is a Semitic superlative idiom, but Thrall is likely
right that Paul's Corinthian audience could not be expected to understand such a turn of phrase (2
Corinthians, 2.609).

Martin suggests that the image "is calculated to challenge the opponents' use of reason, exactly as the
defensive stance of Attic philosophy sought to ridicule the pretensions of the sophists" (2 Corinthians,
306).

Malherbe points out that Stoics often compared reason to a secure inner fortress, while Cynics
rejected the need for this fortress of "doctrine" and viewed their own simple garb (and the natural life
which it represented) as their personal armament in the war against vice ("Antisthenes," 95-112). Malherbe
thinks that Paul had been accused of "mean, inconsistent, underhanded, conniving conduct," and that in
response he takes up the rhetoric of the Cynic, portraying his humble, adaptable manner of life as his
strength ("Antisthenes," 114, 116). Yet the connection between Paul's self-description and Cynicism is
tenuous. True, Paul mirrors some Cynic ideas in his emphasis on voluntary humiliation ("Antisthenes,
114-17), but this theme in Paul goes far beyond the Corinthian correspondence. There is little evidence that
Paul or anyone else thought of it as Cynic. We must remember, after all, that it was the Cynic's distinctive
dress which they described as their weapon, and this Paul certainly did not adopt. Moreover, Malherbe
provides no evidence that Cynics talked in this way about demolishing the Stoics' inner strongholds. On the
other hand, there is little more evidence that the description of the opponents' "strongholds" is modelled on
Stoic claims specifically. After all, the Stoic fortress was defensive, erected against vice, while the
opponents' fortress in 10:4 is erected in hostility to God. As Malherbe admits, martial imagery was
extremely common in the ancient world, and it was a standard topos in descriptions of debates. While
Malherbe is right that this broad background likely gave rise to Paul's metaphors here, his specific reading
is unconvincing.

185 Barrett suggests that νόημα has a negative connotation here, based on its use in 2:11; 3:14; 4:4
and 11:3 (2 Corinthians, 252). Yet 11:3 does not portray the νόημα as inherently bad. On the contrary
they must be protected from corrupting influences. Likewise, in 3:14 the problem with the Jewish people is
"divine power" accomplish their intellectual conquest by demolishing opposing arguments.\(^{186}\) So it appears that while God (by the Spirit?) is involved in Paul's efforts at persuasion, these efforts still must involve rational argument. Paul launches his own reasoned attempts to show that hostile ways of thinking are wrong.\(^{187}\) There is, of course, not that they have νοηματα but that these thoughts have been "hardened" (so in 4:4). So the "thoughts" are things which, for Paul, should lead to knowledge of God but do not when they are hampered. The νοηματα of Satan in 2:11 are simply evil by definition.

Malherbe suggests that the λογισµοι are the intellectual faculties themselves, but Thrall is right that in this case we would expect a singular noun (\(2\ Corinthians, 2.612\)). Contra Martin and Barrett (\(2\ Corinthians, 252\)), Paul displays no general opposition to the activity of λογιζεσθαι, and so it is unlikely that he is opposing "reasonings" as such (see λογιζοµαι in 10:21). Thrall is likely right that by these λογισµοι Paul intends primarily "the forms of argument used by the rival missionaries and their Corinthian supporters" and perhaps secondarily "intellectual forms of resistance to the apostolic preaching in general" (\(2\ Corinthians, 2.612\)). He is destroying hostile "arguments," not intellectual argument in general.

It is sometimes suggested that the ὑψωµα which Paul intends to tear down, taken to be an "arrogant attitude" toward God, includes here the attempt to assert human independence by means of reason. Hence the λογισµοι which are destroyed in 4b would be identical with the ὑψωµα of 5a. The captivity of the νοηµατα in 5b would thus be the result not of arguments, but of divine demonstrations of power which do away with and overcome all argument (see Barrett, \(2\ Corinthians, 252\)). Yet there is little evidence for a generally negative attitude in Paul toward such λογισµοι. Moreover, when the νοηµατα are depicted elsewhere they are usually active thoughts, even when obedient (see above, n. 185). So the destruction of λογισµοι is unlikely to mean, for Paul, the end of all reasoning. The common element between the λογισµοι in 4b and the ὑψωµα in 5a may not be the arrogance of intellectual activity itself, but rather the fact that both arguments and arrogant attitudes are often erected in opposition to the knowledge of God, i.e. hinder the reception of and allegiance to Paul's Gospel. So what Paul aims to do is remove any attitudes or arguments which would prevent "obedience to Christ" (10:5). That Paul's means for doing this is, in large part, rational discourse can be seen from the content of his Corinthian correspondence.

Malherbe ("Antisthenes," 118) has argued that the "weapons" to which Paul refers in 10:3-5 are nothing more than his humble lifestyle, and so that his "warfare" involves no "intellectual confrontation" (see also Stowers, "Reason," 268-70). Malherbe is right that Paul is probably defending himself against charges that he is weak and squalid, and that in response he is asserting the superior effectiveness of his humble apostolate. Yet there is no evidence that Paul distinguishes between his humble lifestyle and verbal or intellectual arguments. In fact, the accusation in 10:10 (and alluded to in 10:1) implies just the opposite—that a major part of Paul's apparent weakness was his unimpressive oratory. Hence Paul's claim that, because God is active through his ministry, his unimpressive speech succeeds in overcoming the opposition.

Stowers (following Malherbe) sees in Paul's "stronghold" image the Stoic ideal of inner reason as an impregnable fortress of certainty and security. Stowers then depicts Paul (like the Cynics) as rejecting such rationalism as a form of "rebellion against God" and "self-deception" ("Reason," 284). Instead, Stowers suggests, Paul stresses the weakness of reason and its inability to provide certainty in religious and ethical matters ("Reason," 284). Yet Paul's emphasis in the Corinthian debates is hardly on the sufficiency (or lack thereof) of reason. If anything Paul himself appears as the champion of simple reason over against the rhetorical flourish and charismatic force of his opponents. Notice that 1 Cor 13:9-12, one of the two passages to which Stowers points as an example of Paul's model agnosticism, is actually aimed at deflating over-blown charismatic claims of the "pneumatics." In the other passage, 1 Cor 8:2, Paul's point is not that reason cannot lead to the truth about idol-meats, but rather that knowledge must not supersede love.

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some ambiguity as to whether Paul is including his whole apostolic mission (and so the conversion of new believers) under this metaphor of conflict, or whether the image is meant more restrictively to depict his conflict with the Corinthian "false apostles." The tension involved, however, is precisely the one which we have seen seems to be involved in Paul's talk about both epistemic situations. The divine involvement in the confrontation can be depicted as definitive, and yet this involvement does not do away with the rational, argumentative process by which people move from one way of thinking to another.

How can this tension between the Spirit's power and the believer's reason be

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188 Thrall (2 Corinthians, 2.613-14) is representative of those who take Paul to refer narrowly to his conflict with the false apostles and (perhaps) their Corinthian supporters. Bultmann (2 Corinthians, 186) suggests that although Paul's argumentative focus is on the opponents in Corinth, he is offering a general description of his ministry in vv. 4ff. which "naturally applies to his missionary activity as well." Notice that the goal is construed in 10:5 as obedience of thoughts to God (εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ), recalling Paul's description of his missionary aim in Rom 1:5; 15:18; 16:19, 26 (so Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 462-3). Bultmann thinks (2 Corinthians, 186) that the obedience in 2 Cor 10:6 is now obedience to Paul, but this is not explicit in the text. 10:6 does suggest, however, that this process of bringing thoughts into obedience is one which continues after conversion, since Paul waits for the time ἐν τῷ παντοκράτῳ ὅπως ἡ ὑπακοὴ. If what Paul means, in "practical terms," is "submission to Paul's kerygma" (Martin, 2 Corinthians, 306) then the description would apply equally to his missionary preaching and his struggle with opponents who threaten his congregations' right faith.

189 See also Rom 15:18-19, where Paul describes how God is "winning obedience from the Gentiles," and goes on to say that this happens in Paul's ministry "by word and deed, by the power of signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God." Notice that the references to "word and deed" and to "signs and wonders" all presume a process of rational persuasion. The Gentiles are being persuaded by verbal arguments and by miraculous events which form the basis of inferences about the truth of the apostles' message. At the same time, the Gentiles' response is also attributed to "the power of the Spirit of God." It is conceivable that this is another reference to miraculous acts, which are understood to be effected by the Spirit. If, however, Paul means that the Spirit's power is another cause of the Gentile's response, he still gives no indication of how that power relates to the persuasive force of verbal arguments and miraculous signs.

This tension is, of course, closely related to (though not quite identical with) the tension between Paul's pre-deterministic statements and his statements which seem to attribute real effectiveness to human will. It is not my intent here to sort out the way in which divine sovereignty and human will are balanced (or deliberately left in imbalance) in Paul's account of coming to faith. Ridderbos is probably right to affirm that for Paul "[t]here is a deep mystery here which, on account of the heterogeneity of divine and human freedom, does not, however, admit of being reduced causally to one of the two" (Paul, 236). A more straightforwardly "predestinarian" position is represented by Hofius, "Wort Gottes," 172-4. Perhaps the strongest affirmation of the freedom of the human will in relation to God is offered by Bultmann (Theology, 1.329-30).
resolved? Bornkamm pointed toward a useful model when he suggested that human reason makes possible the existential confrontation in which faith arises. Reason, Bornkamm says, first convicts human beings of their helplessness in the face of sin and then grasps the content of the Gospel proclamation which offers a solution. There are weaknesses in this approach. On the one hand, it probably emphasizes too much a personal sense of oppression by sin as the driving force toward Christian faith. On the other hand, Bornkamm says very little about the Spirit's involvement and lays stress instead on a kind of existential decision about which Paul himself says little if anything. Bornkamm encourages us, however, to treat Paul's "rationalist" and "spiritualist" statements about conversion (or subsequent extension of knowledge) as two legitimate but partial perspectives on one event which encompasses them both. A better specific outworking of this general solution might be the one we suggested above: that Paul sees conversion to Christianity as the result of a process of rational inference, but that such an inference is always resisted by human beings because of our moral corruption. The Spirit would thus be responsible for faith in the sense that he restores the human moral constitution, making it possible for human beings to follow the logic which leads to the Gospel. This model would also help to explain the hints we find in Paul's letters of a general relationship between ethical virtue (specifically love) and successful reasoning about the divine-human relationship. These kinds of specifics must, however, remain tentative extrapolations.
from Paul's own words. Our confident statements can lead us no further than the recognition that when he imagines the process of conversion Paul holds the activities of reason and of the Spirit in some sort of dynamic tension.

We must also leave room in our reading of Paul's thought for prophecy and other charismatic gifts which allow for more direct communication between the Spirit and a Christian community. It is, however, highly unlikely that such charismatic vehicles of knowledge by him." The implication seems to be that the humility which accompanies love is necessary if one is to obtain true knowledge.

Likewise, in Col 2:2-3 Paul wants the audience to be "encouraged and united in love, so that they may have all the riches of assured understanding (πάν πλοῦτος τῆς πληροφορίας τῆς συνεσεως) and have the knowledge of God's mystery (ἐπιγινώσκων τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ), that is, Christ himself, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Love is thus the key to achieving right understanding, and not just moral understanding but understanding of Christ.

See also 1 Cor 4:8-13. Here Paul ironically calls the Corinthians "wise" and claims to have become a "fool" in his work for the Gospel. He calls into question this evaluation, however, and renders it ironic by pointing to the history of his own suffering for Christ and contrasting it with the easy life in Corinth. It is thus the moral life of Paul which lends credibility to his claim to have the true wisdom.

This connection between love and right reasoning does not, however, mean that knowledge simply grows organically "en meme temps que se developpe la vie chretienne" (Gnosis, 13; cf. pp. 33, 43, 49-50). There is little indication in the Apostle's letters that this moral requirement for discovery excludes or renders unnecessary the process of rational inquiry. The root of Dupont's mistake is his assimilation of all religious knowledge in Paul's letters to Scriptural talk about a "knowledge of God" (Gnosis, 137) which involved primarily "l'adhésion à la religion mosaïque et avec la pratique de la justice" (Gnosis, 372). Hence Dupont argues that Paul's concept of knowledge "enveloppe toute la vie religieuse et morale" (Gnosis, 530). Knowledge is above all the communion with God which the believer will only fully experience in the eschaton, but of which one can (as in apocalyptic thought) gain a foretaste in the present (Gnosis, 105, 141-46, 199, 531-32; see esp. 1 Cor 13). We will see below that this devotional, relational knowing of God is one kind of knowledge about which the Apostle can talk, but that it is by no means the only kind or even the kind to which he refers most frequently. This emphasis in Dupont likely stems from his primary aim of rejecting the Hellenistic and gnostic parallels suggested by the Religionsgeschichtlicheschule and emphasizing instead Paul's Jewish heritage (see, e.g., Gnosis, 47, 146-48, 230, 262-63, 493, 529, 537-41).

In fact, Paul's discussion of these charismata is limited almost entirely to the Corinthian correspondence. In 1 Cor 12:4-11 Paul refers to "the utterance of wisdom (λόγος σοφίας)," "the utterance of knowledge (λόγος γνώσεως)," "prophecy (προφητεία)," and "the discernment of spirits (κακιστείς πνευμάτων)," and "the interpretation of tongues (ερμηνεία γλωσσών)." Each of these is a "manifestation of the Spirit (η φανέρωσις τού πνεύματος)" (12:6). Likewise, in Rom 12:6-7 Paul includes among the "gifts" given by God "prophecy," "teaching," and "exhortation."

Lührmann argues that in many cases Paul's positive talk about "revelation" from the Spirit does not actually denote an immediate message from the Spirit. In 1 Cor 14:6, 26 Lührmann argues that the charisma of "revelation" (ἀποκάλυψις) cannot be an "ekstatischen Offenbarungsvision" such as we see in 2 Cor 12:1, 7, for in 14:6 it appears among those charismata which take place εν υμιν. In fact, Lührmann points out that the common assumption that this "revelation" is synonymous with a "vision" remains supported only by 2 Cor 12:1, 7 (Offenbarungsverständnis, 40). Instead he argues that such a "revelation" is "eine in der Gemeinde durch Charismatiker vermittelte konkrete Anweisung" (Offenbarungsverständnis,
knowledge were regarded by Paul as the norm for Christian knowing, since they play almost no role at all in grounding the arguments which we find in his letters.\(^{193}\) Moreover, Paul seems to expect that prophetic messages will still be subjected to rational consideration.\(^{194}\) He tells the Thessalonians not to "despise the words of prophets," but still to "test everything (πάντα δὲ δοκιμάσετε)" (1 Thess 5:20-21).\(^{195}\) Hence prophetic messages seem simply to present for Paul simply one more phenomenon which must be evaluated by the rational mind, under the influence of the Spirit.

Paul is also aware, at times, of the fallibility of human reason. Often Paul's comparison of "knowledge" to an enigmatic reflection in 1 Cor 13:8-13 is understood as a deep challenge to any confidence in human reason. It turns out, however, that the "knowledge" to which Paul refers in this passage is almost certainly charismatic

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\(^{42}\) In particular, Lührmann suggests that the "revelation" which led Paul to go up to Jerusalem in Gal 2:2 need not have been a visionary experience. The parallel account in Acts, in which Paul goes up in response to the decision of the Antiochian community, may suggest that Paul is actually thinking of the Spirit's will as expressed in the community (\textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 41-42, 73).

\(^{193}\) We pointed out Paul's reluctance to parade his own visionary experience as authentication of his own authority above, pp. 54-5. When he does refer to a visionary experience in 2 Cor 12:1-6 he casts it rhetorically as someone else's experience, emphasizing that such boasting is not proper for an apostle of Christ. This suggests to Lührmann that "für ihn die Ekstase kein Offenbarungslehnus und daher auch "Grundlage seiner Verkündigung ist" (\textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 58). Perhaps the opponents in Corinth view their mystical experiences as bringing about a spiritual empowerment and transformation, and they view those without such experiences as "weak." Paul, however, emphasizes that his value to the community lies precisely in his "weakness," in his "alltagsähnlich Existenz" (12:9-10; \textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 60). Indeed, in 4:10-11 it is precisely Paul's "body" and "flesh" which is the locus of God's revelation in him, a revelation which does not try to transcend history but takes place within history, a revelation in which Paul's ordinary life mirrors that of Jesus himself (\textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 61). Hence the "sight" which would make "faith" unnecessary is reserved for the eschaton, when all are brought before the judgement-seat of Christ (5:7, 10; \textit{Offenbarungsverständnis}, 65).

\(^{194}\) Even the outsider's reaction to the prophetic message described in 1 Cor 14:25 is the result of a rational inference based on the content of the message.

\(^{195}\) Note too that Paul most likely has charismatic knowledge in view in 13:2-3, where he insists that (as with other kinds of knowledge) it must be subordinated to love. Then in 13:8-13 such prophetic knowledge is downplayed as only a partial and enigmatic vision, a vision which will "come to an end (κατάργησεται)" in the eschatological fulfilment.
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revelation, not the fruit of ordinary rational thought. Still, in 1 Cor 4:3-5 Paul urges that people not judge one another because their judgment is not sufficiently reliable. "I do not even judge myself," he says. "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted" (4:3-4). Rather, God is the only accurate judge. Here again, however, Paul's concerns with human reason are not as severe as they might at first appear. For on closer inspection the issue seems to be less the inherent fallibility of reason than the human being's lack of access to complete information. God is the one "who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart" (4:5). It is only in light of that complete picture that accurate judgments can be made, and so human judgments must remain tentative. It is perhaps because the problem lies at this level for Paul, at the level of access to information, that he generally shows little concern about the competence of human reason per se to comprehend and acknowledge the truth about our relationship with God, provided that the moral corruption which hampers the mind is removed by the Spirit. Paul may introduce here a certain tentativeness about human knowledge, a recognition that it must be open to revision. This tentativeness does

196So Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 305; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 225-26; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 643-44; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 620. This distinction between the charismatic gift of γνῶσις and ordinary knowledge is missed by Gooch (Partial Knowledge, 142-61). Thiselton, on the other hand, seems to recognize Paul's initial focus on the charismata, but also treats Paul's discussion of γνῶσις here as if it broadens to include all human knowing. Hence Thiselton suggests that Paul's description of knowledge as "partial" in 13:9 reflects the Apostle's view that, in the absence of a knowledge of the whole, "piece-by-piece knowledge may lead to partial and mistaken judgments which set in motion endless processes of correction and recorrection" (1 Corinthians, 1064; cf. 1067-70; see also Garland, 1 Corinthians, 625; Robertson & Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 297-99). Yet this reading does not take seriously enough Paul's insistence in 13:13 that faith, along with hope and love, will remain in the eschaton when γνῶσις has passed away. Gooch rightly pointed out the problem which this causes, since ordinarily πίστις and γνῶσις have much of the same content in Paul (Partial Knowledge, 142-43). The endurance of faith suggests that Paul is not talking in these verses of ordinary knowing at all, but trying to emphasize for the Corinthian pneumatics that their claims to wondrous insight are overblown. All their Spirit-given insight into eschatological mysteries will be rendered redundant when the eschatological reality dawns.

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not, however, issue for Paul in a fundamental mistrust of the human intellect.

3. The Hermeneutics of the Cross: A Trajectory in Pauline Scholarship

In a sense, however, we have now arrived back at our initial problem. If Paul affirmed such a strong and central role for human reason, then why have his actual arguments seemed so unreasonable to the Apostle's readers, from Lucian's day to our own? In search of an answer to this question, we need to ask not just how Paul viewed reason, but what kind of reason he seems to have regarded as valid. When we ask this second question we soon discover that several scholars have gone ahead of us on this track, and that they have arrived for the most part at strikingly similar conclusions. In particular, they all suggest that Paul's thought and argument tends to be hermeneutical, drawing out the implications of a new fact within the context of a prior framework, rather than foundationalist, working up from unquestionable premises by way of syllogistic logic.

In his monograph on *Das Offenbarungsverständnis bei Paulus*, Dieter Lührmann argues that revelation is conveyed for Paul not in immediate communication from God, but in the human being's reflective interpretation of encounters with the divine. Many interpreters (Bultmann included) have seen such rational interpretation as a secondary activity which only worked to expand a basic deposit of "revelation." So, for instance, when Paul alludes in Gal 1:12 to the "revelation of Jesus Christ" which he received on the Damascus road, many understand this as a visionary experience which furnished Paul with the core of his message prior to any rational reflection. Lührmann argues, however, that
the moment of "revelation" for Paul comes not in the pre-reflective experience, but in the interpretation of that experience, when the meaning of the experience is hermeneutically grasped and appropriated. 197 So the "revelation" of Christ to which the Apostle refers in Gal 1:12 includes, when he refers to it again in 1:16, the interpretation of the risen Christ as "God's Son." 198 Hence, "Offenbarung ist nicht das Christusgeschehen als solches, sondern eine auf den Menschen bezogene Interpretation dieses Geschehens als den Menschen angehend durch ein neu einsetzendes Handeln Gottes." 199 Lührmann then points out that the Scriptures and early Christian traditional formulae become vehicles of revelation for Paul only when he interprets them, in turn, in light of this interpreted Christ event. 200

Paul's hermeneutical understanding of revelation helps to explain, for Lührmann, why the Apostle does not claim for himself some special inspiration from the Spirit which

197Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 161. Lührmann writes that "Offenbarung ist also für Paulus nicht vergangenes Geschehen, das eine Tradition begründen könnte, sondern als den Menschen angehende Auslegung des Heilsgeschehens in der Verkündigung ein neu einsetzendes gegenwärtiges Handeln Gottes" (Ibid., 92).

198Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 77, 160. What is revealed, Lührmann argues, is the understanding (evident in Gal 3:23 and Rom 8:18ff.) that Jesus was "die eschatologische Zeitenwende" (Offenbarungsverständnis, 75). This interpretation is eased by reading the genitive in 1:12 as objective, so that Christ is the substance of the revelation (Offenbarungsverständnis, 76), though Lührmann's view does not stand or fall with such a construal of the grammar.

199Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 79. Lührmann also observes that in Phil 3:4ff. (esp. vv. 7-8) "das visionäre Element völlig fehlt" (Offenbarungsverständnis, 74).

200On Scripture, see Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 82-4. On Paul's use of traditional formulae see Offenbarungsverständnis, 88-90. Paul includes clearly traditional formulae in, e.g., Rom 1:3f., 1 Thess 1:9f. In Rom 1:3f., however, Lührmann thinks it is clear that the Apostle uses the tradition in a new context which lends it new meaning. Moreover, with the exception of 1 Cor 15:11ff. and 1 Cor 11:23b-25, Paul does not identify these passages as traditional, so that he does not seem to depend on their traditional nature as grounding for the authority of his teaching. Even in 1 Cor 15, Lührmann argues that Paul adds significant material (15:6-8) without differentiating between the tradition and his own modifications. This is how Lührmann resolves the tension between such traditional passages and Paul's claim that his Gospel does not depend on Jerusalem tradition (Gal 1:11f.). Paul does not use traditional formulae as independent authorities, but rather they become vehicles of revelation once he has properly interpreted them. Along similar lines, see Yu, "Pneumatic Epistemology," 133-36, 140-41, 168-9, 174-5.
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authorizes his teaching. Paul places little emphasis, Lührmann argues, on the Gospel as something hidden, to which only a few might be given privileged access. Rather, knowledge of this Gospel simply requires proper interpretation of events and statements which are open and public. Lührmann points out, moreover, how others seem to be recipients (through their interpretive activity) of the same kind of "revelation" which Paul claims. In Gal 3:23, for example, the revelation of faith (πίστις ἀποκάλυψις) seems to come equally to Paul and to all believers in general. If we understand "faith" as a new mode of existence made possible by Christ, then the "revelation" of this faith must involve the interpretation of the Christ event as (among other things) the pivotal event in God's salvation of humanity. So, Lührmann suggests, all believers receive revelation from God as they come properly to interpret Jesus' death and resurrection. This makes sense of the fact that Paul does not seem to think in terms of a narrowly or clearly defined group of formal Apostles, so much as he thinks in terms of individuals who are gifted to serve an apostolic function.

201Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 158-59. Lührmann points out that although Paul follows apocalyptic literature in looking for an eschatological "revelation" (emergence in history) of God's plans for the end (e.g., 1 Cor 1:7; Rom 2:5; 8:18f.), he does not emphasize the anticipatory announcement of these plans to seers in dreams and visions. Even Paul's visionary experience on the Damascus road is not interpreted in this sense, since its content is not the eschatological future but the acts of God in the recent past (Offenbarungsverständnis, 98-108). Lührmann recognizes, of course, that the motif of "hiddenness" occurs in Paul's letters, but he argues that such examples either do not concern esoteric revelations to the few (Rom 2:16, 28f.; 1 Cor 14:25; 2 Cor 3:13-16; 2 Cor 4:2), or are citations of the Apostle's opponents (1 Cor 2:6ff.; 2 Cor 4:3) or apocryphal texts (1 Cor 4:5; Offenbarungsverständnis, 156-57). Nor does Paul emphasize metaphors of light and vision (see Offenbarungsverständnis, 159-60).

202Lührmann, Offenbarungsverständnis, 80.

203Lührmann (Offenbarungsverständnis, 94-97) points to, e.g., Andronicus and Junia(s) in Rom 16:7 and Paul's inclusion of "apostles" among the groups of those endowed with different charismata in 1 Cor 12:28f. He also observes that when Paul confronts the challenge to his apostleship in 2 Corinthians he seems not to have a clearly defined concept of apostleship to which he can appeal, but rather focusses more broadly on the legitimacy of his work. In particular, Lührmann here points out that Paul does not use his visionary experience on the Damascus road as evidence of his apostleship, even where one would expect it in 2 Corinthians.
Whether or not Lührmann is right about Paul's use of revelation language, the interpretive activity which he identifies as a part of Paul's appropriation of revelation has been observed by others as well. Some have gone further than Lührmann and have tried to describe the logic by which this interpretation proceeds. Leander E. Keck argues, in his article on "Paul as Thinker," that the Apostle's interpretation followed an \textit{ex post facto} logic. Such thinking, he writes, "occurs not only after an event but because of it, and with continual reference, explicit or implicit, to it. The event's very 'happenedness' requires thinking." In other words a single event, "the resurrection of the crucified Jesus," becomes for Paul the hermeneutical key and point of reference for all of life. Since his prior understanding of the world took no account of this event, his acknowledgment of the resurrection forces a re-interpretation of everything within these new terms of reference. Such \textit{ex post facto} thinking, Keck observes, is different from thinking which is oriented toward internal problems detected in previous systems of thought. It also differs from "telic or utopian thinking" which projects the necessary future based on an established

\textsuperscript{204}Robin Scroggs, for example, has argued, in his article "New Being: Renewed Mind: New Perception," that Paul's gospel of justification by faith amounted to a shift to a new reality which brought with it a new noetic situation of the kind described by Berger and Luckmann in their sociology of knowledge. It was this new situation which was the wellspring for new ethical norms. Scroggs does not elaborate, however, on how exactly this new noetic situation produced a new interpretation of the world. This question is particularly pressing, since Scroggs sees Paul's new ethical norms arising from an inner re-orientation which is \textit{not} substantially influenced by interpretation of the Scriptures or other traditional authorities. Moreover, Scroggs suggests that the rootedness of Paul's ethic in such a fundamental shift of perspective explains why Paul ascribes the new knowledge to the Spirit ("New Being," 5). Scroggs does agree, however, with several emphases we have seen: that Paul locates the epistemic problem chiefly in one's struggle to respond to revelation, not in a struggle to attain knowledge in the first place ("New Being," 7); that Paul believes faith in Christ brings the restoration of the corrupted human noetic state ("New Being," 8-9); that love is somehow fundamental to proper thought; and that the believer's new situation does not bring a spontaneous perception of the good, but rather initiates a struggle to appropriate and use one's new powers in the context of the community.

\textsuperscript{205}Keck, "Paul as Thinker," 29.

\textsuperscript{206}Keck, "Paul as Thinker," 30.
This is not to say that the central event was self-interpreting. Perhaps the most insightful aspect of Keck's article is his observation that Paul's understanding of the resurrection depended on at least three prior beliefs: 1) that resurrection is plausible; 2) that resurrection happens during the eschatological fulfilment; 3) that resurrection is a part of the "new age," within a two-age apocalyptic schema. Keck's observations thus prompt us to ask exactly how Paul's prior beliefs interacted with his conviction that Christ had been raised. Can we be more specific about how such ex post facto logic worked in his case?

Jürgen Becker provides us with further hints as to the nature of this interpretive process in his magisterial work Paul: Apostle to the Gentiles. Becker sees "the gospel" as forcing the same kind of radical re-evaluation which Keck describes. Becker insists that for Paul the gospel does not bring partial knowledge within an otherwise untouched, persistent scheme of reality: it does not sing a variation of an already known song. Conversion to the gospel of Jesus Christ is not only a change of position within the same coordinate system. It is not simply the creation of new and different value judgments about the same things within a fixed whole. No, the gospel has within it the possibility of understanding absolutely everything in a new way. With the gospel nothing remains as it was, for the gospel brings a new content that guides knowledge and necessarily leads to a new view of everything.

For Becker, as for Keck, this gospel, this hermeneutical key, includes primarily the conviction that God has raised Christ. Becker suggests that in fact Christianity in general was born out of the effort to "redescribe" the God of Israel's Exodus as "the God who raised Jesus from the dead." Paul simply continues and extends this process of

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209 Becker, Paul, 377. As examples of this radical re-orientation of perspective, Becker points to Phil 3:7-8; 2 Cor 10:5; Gal. 1:11-12, 15-16.
Christocentric interpretation, convinced that "in the destiny of Christ, God interprets himself to humankind." As with Lührmann, Becker insists that Paul's understanding of God's self-revelation is one in which human beings are not called to transcend "world and history" in an attempt to comprehend God directly, whether in Platonic contemplation or in ecstatic mysticism. It is, rather, in the historical life, death, and resurrection of Christ that we are given the means properly to interpret both the world and the actions of its Creator.

Becker is more specific than either Lührmann or Keck, however, about the effect of this re-interpretation on Paul's world-view. In light of Christ, Becker argues, Paul "infers not only the depth of human lost-ness (in sheer classical form in Gal. 2:17, 21) but also the depth of divine grace and love, which alone are efficacious in achieving the deliverance of humanity." Becker also suggests that Paul's ethics, with its emphasis on "faith, love, and hope," arise from the interpretation of the believer's life as one who should follow Christ's pattern of life. These principles of action "are the living expressions of one who is 'crucified with Christ' (Gal. 2:19; Rom. 6:4-5), who has put on Christ like a piece of clothing (Gal. 3:27)." Love, Becker argues, "has its norm in the model of Christ (Phil. 2:1ff.; Rom. 15:1ff.)." Indeed, the sphere of salvation is "in Christ," the Church is Christ's body, and the believer's hope is to be made like Christ. All of human identity

210 Becker, Paul, 378.
211 Becker, Paul, 378.
213 Becker, Paul, 379.
214 Becker, Paul, 379.
has been re-imagined by Paul in reference to Jesus. Becker even suggests that when Paul calls faith a kind of "obedience," he is talking in large part about the willingness to allow the Christ event to re-interpret one's own identity and obligations.

Becker also goes further than previous authors, however, in pointing out that, beyond the historical occurrence of the resurrection, the believer's own experience of God's activity plays an important hermeneutical role for Paul. Becker describes Paul as speaking "out of the experience of his call," out of his experience on the Damascus road. More broadly, though, Becker points to the influence of the broader experience of the Spirit in the Apostle's communities. Paul often points, Becker observes, to the church's original experience of the gospel as the ground for his argument that the believers need to understand themselves and their actions with reference to that Gospel (1 Thess 1-2; Gal 3:1-5). Hence Becker calls Paul's theology "the theology of experience under the influence of the gospel and of the Spirit connected with it." As with both Lührmann and Keck, however, Becker is simply sketching the outlines of Paul's interpretive logic. The very suggestiveness of his observations prompts us to ask how exactly the Christ event and the experience of believers work in the Apostle's mind to reinterpret the world.

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215 Becker also suggests, however, that "[o]utside of God's relationship with humanity, . . . in his dealings with creation, this christological re-interpretation does not go far" (Paul, 380).

216 For this theme in Paul, see Rom. 1:5; 16:19; cf. Rom. 10:3, 16; 15:18; 2 Cor. 9:13. Becker writes: "This context, then, is also the place to speak of 'obedience to the faith.' It is a variation of the basic idea of 2 Cor. 10:5: that Paul wants to bring all thought under the obedience of Christ. Faith is accordingly obedience in the sense that it acknowledges for itself what Christ is for faith. Faith is obedience in that it corresponds to the appeal, 'Be reconciled to God' (2 Cor. 5:20), and does not reject reconciliation"(Paul, 413).

217 Becker, Paul, 374.

218 Becker, Paul, 374. Becker writes that Paul speaks out of "the experience gained by him and the churches through the effect of the gospel on the worldwide mission field. Thus the apostle expresses himself on the basis of the new being effected by the Spirit, the common experience of all Christians with the gospel that changes people" (Paul, 375).
More than anyone else John D. Moores has taken up the challenge of unpacking this Pauline logic in its details. In his book *Wrestling with Rationality in Paul*, Moores reads Romans 1-8 through the lens of Umberto Eco's theory of semiotics. Paul "recognized" the crucifixion, Moores argues, as a sign that particular eschatological events were taking place, much as one might recognize a footprint on the beach as a sign that some particular human being had walked there recently.\(^{219}\) Paul's preaching is, Moores suggests, primarily a matter of pointing out that event and trying to help others recognize it as a sign which carries a certain significance, an indicator of these eschatological events.\(^ {220}\) Yet the significance of a sign is not always immediately apparent, and this is where Moores sees reasoned argument coming into play for Paul. For the meaning of any sign is constituted largely by the relationship in which it stands to other signs and sign systems. In order to "spell out" the meaning of a sign, one must point out the impact which that sign has on these other signs. Hence, in order to "spell out" the meaning of the sign of the cross (or, Moores suggests, even to understand the event himself), Paul must produce a series of "texts" which describe the relationship of the crucifixion to other ideas and entities, statements such as: "A man is crucified," "That man is the son of God," "God gave him up to be crucified," "It was for us that God gave him up to be crucified," etc.\(^ {221}\) Reason must be employed in order to work out exactly how this new sign will impact Paul's whole world of sign-entities and their relationships to one another. For it is only by describing these relationships verbally that he can help his hearers "recognize" the

There are some problems in Moores' treatment of Paul's thought. Moores spends much of the book dealing not with this logic itself, but with the convoluted "enthymematic" arguments which it spawns in Romans 1-8. "Premises are constantly being taken for granted," Moores observes, "where it is far from easy to identify precisely what they are." This part of Moores' analysis is less useful for our purposes, since in most cases the confusion seems to lie more in Moores' reading than in Paul's argumentation. Moores' attempt to justify the Apostle's complexities by an appeal to theories of "fuzzy" logic also lead more to fuzziness in Moores' own argument than to the clarification of Paul's thought. It is far from clear, in any case, that the semiotic setting

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222Moores follows several of the other authors we have surveyed in suggesting that traditional materials are not understood as independent authorities by Paul. At least, where they appear in the Apostle's letters they do not seem to be "deemed crucial" for a proper understanding of things, and "the tightness of the conceptual whole to which they contribute is unlikely to be anything but his [Paul's]" (Wrestling, 30). The primary authority for Paul is the interpreted sign of the cross.  
223Moores, Wrestling, 28.  
224Moores objects, for example, to the enthymeme which supports the assertion of Rom 5:5. The problem which he sees, however, is that the argument is actually an inductive argument from signs to a probable conclusion, not a deductive argument from premises to a necessary conclusion (Wrestling, 77-81). Yet Paul did not claim to be employing deductive argument. Nor is the certainty of which he speaks necessarily logical certainty. The whole problem seems to arise from Moores' overly narrow definition of "logic" as deductively certain reasoning, while inductive, probabilistic reasoning is dismissed as mere "rhetoric" (Wrestling, 79-80).  
Likewise, when Paul argues for the peace of the justified in 5:1, Moores takes this peace to be one which "has yet to mature," but which is deduced by Paul from the justification by God which is "an accomplished fact." Moores finds it illogical to deduce "what-is-not-yet-accomplished from what-is," and explains on the basis of this illogic Paul's attempt "to draw a conclusion whose ambit is experiential ('peace') from a premise whose ambit is forensic ('acquittal')" (Wrestling, 100; cf. 68-76). Yet the logical problem here eludes me. Even if Moores is correct that the syllogism which lies beneath the verse (as reconstructed in version a on p. 74) would be invalidated by the introduction of a third premise, it seems that an alternate solution is ready to hand – recognize that one of the premises is complex and is itself based on a prior syllogism. This is, in fact, an analytical strategy which Moores himself employs liberally elsewhere.  
225"Fuzzy" concepts, such as "tallness" or "security," are concepts which for some reason defy precise, abstract definition, but which nonetheless prove extremely useful, even in logical deductions. In fact, their clarity in practice depends on their remaining "fuzzy" (see Moores, Wrestling, 145-49).  
In a few instances this notion seems to be useful. Moores argues, for example, that in Rom 1:16-17 the enthymematic nature of the argument allows at least four different syllogisms to be reconstructed
of Paul's communication about the cross prevents logical coherence or requires "fuzziness" in his thinking. Moores' own analysis of Paul's use of logic is thus, in many ways, a false start.

The most useful part of Moores' study is, for our purposes, his basic semiotic description of Paul's interpretive situation. He is able to clarify an idea toward which Lührmann, Keck, and Becker all were groping when he suggests that it is the primary "recognition" of the crucifixion as a sign which drives all of Paul's thought and provides its ultimate justification. The specific role of reason in interpreting such a sign also helps us to understand why Paul could both emphasize the role of rational thought and at the same time depict God's wisdom as unjustifiable in terms of "worldly wisdom," ordinary human experience, or ordinary human standards for plausibility. For in this

from the explicit statements (Wrestling, 37-40). Yet the ambiguities entailed are "attributable, not to indifference to logical rigour or abuse of logic, but to profundities of meaning which human reason and language have extreme difficulty in encompassing" (Wrestling, 45).

In several cases, however, it is unclear in what sense Paul's ideas are fuzzy (e.g., Wrestling, 76 on 5:1). Moreover, it is often unclear how the notion of "fuzzy" concepts contributes to our understanding of Paul's logic. Moores argues (Wrestling, 150-53) that by identifying Paul's concepts as "fuzzy" he can save Paul from the charge that he capitalizes on the polysemy of his terms in order to surreptitiously shift the ground of his argument. Moores never explains, though, how the fuzziness of a concept legitimizes such semantic shifts in the midst of an argument.

Moores argues that the use of reason to explicate the significance of a sign, where the recognition of that sign is based on an immediate experience like Paul's Damascus Road epiphany, will necessarily lead to "inescapable" and "baffling" problems over "the jurisdiction of reason" (Wrestling, 31). It remains unclear, however, just why such a logical impasse is inevitable. On the other hand, it is no more clear why Paul's use of "fuzzy" concepts would necessarily lead the Apostle into such confusing, enthymematic argument. For in other spheres, the whole point of "fuzzy set" theory is that "fuzzy" concepts add clarity to a discussion or analysis.

Nor is it apparent from Moores' discussion why this logical conundrum is resolved by Paul's use of "fuzzy" concepts. When he introduces the model of "fuzzy" concepts, Moores talks not about the logical problems inherent in Paul's semiotic situation, but rather about the particular content with which the Apostle is dealing. He attributes the need for such "fuzziness" alternately to the eschatological context of Paul's thought (Wrestling, 98-99), to the Apostle's concern both to communicate cognitive content and to impact the audience's disposition to act (Wrestling, 138), and even to the metaphoric nature of Paul's terms (see Wrestling, 81-86; 99 on 6:1-11). None of these factors obviously arise, however, from Paul's semiotic situation. Moreover, it is difficult to see why some of these factors actually require "fuzziness" of Paul.  

semiotic situation Paul is not using reason to build a world-view from the ground up, based on unquestionable premises. Rather, he is beginning with a phenomenon such as the crucifixion and his Damascus road experience, applying reason to work out the implications of such a phenomenon when it is taken as a sign. In this process reason can work, not to build on ordinary terms of reference, but to subvert and undermine them in light of the new sign.228

What is more, Moores' analysis of Paul's semiotic situation points to a fascinating interplay between sign and interpretive reason which will bear significant fruit in later chapters of this study. On the one hand, Moores suggests that "[r]ecognition occurs only insofar as what has been recognised can be spelt out," and this spelling out necessarily involves reason."229 On the other hand, "spelling-out is only spelling-out if it remains within the boundaries of what has been recognized." Hence, Moores writes,

although the spelling-out of the content of what has been recognised relies on reason, once the content recognised is spelt out, only such further reasoning as is compatible with the established content of the Recognition can be tolerated. The very object of recognition which it has been instrumental in explicating deprives it of its autonomy.230

Moores is suggesting that in this kind of interpretation neither sign nor code has the upper hand. Each constrains the other, but in asymmetrical ways. Moores' insights here can be clarified if we introduce, in a way which he does not, the idea of the "code" which is

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228Imagine, for example, that an astronaut on a lone mission in space leaves his dinner for a few minutes and comes back to find it half eaten, presumably by someone else. Yet he knows there has been no other space-ship within thousands of miles. Such a phenomenon, taken as a sign, would imply a reality which would subvert the astronaut's deep-seated assumptions about his situation—e.g., that he is alone in the space-ship, that other beings would have to come to him in another space-craft, etc. Such subversive signs are, in fact, the stock and trade of many contemporary films.

229Moores, Wrestling, 29.

230Moores, Wrestling, 29.
necessary in order to understand (or "decode") any sign. It is not simply that Paul must employ reason in interpreting the sign of the cross. That phenomenon must be interpreted by Paul in terms of a prior code. Yet once the sign has been decoded, its exerts a reflexive interpretive force on the code itself. Moores simply mistakes the location of the constraint which the interpreted sign imposes. It does not constrain reason, but the code which gave it its meaning. For that code can now only be applied in other situations in a way which is in keeping with the significance of this new sign. In a real sense, the code has not only given the sign its meaning; its own shape has been changed in the process of interpreting the sign. This is the sense in which Paul's interpretive activity can both be eminently rational and deeply subversive of ordinary frameworks of thought.

Space has only allowed me to survey one thread of scholarship on the nature of Paul's reasoning. It may be due to this analytical mistake that Moores introduces this dynamic as a problem, rather than as the opportunity which I think it represents. Moores is, of course, very much aware of the role of codes in sign functions. His mistake in missing the role of the code here may arise from his mistaken suggestion that Paul's re-interpretation of the crucifixion in the wake of his Damascus Road encounter involved the replacement of one code with another one (Wrestling, 8-9). Yet this idea of an entirely new code being introduced raises the problem of explaining where the new code came from. Moores writes:

> Whether the code which enabled Paul to 'recognise' the meaning of the Crucifixion was a code provided by experience alone, it is effectively impossible for us to say. The Recognition certainly depended on a code which, through the experience of a moment of privileged insight, invalidated at a stroke the code that had served him hitherto.

(Wrestling, 8)

How, though, could a code sophisticated enough to interpret the cross be produced instantaneously, "by experience alone"? Moreover, when we actually look at Paul's understanding of Christ we can see that almost all of his terms of reference are derived from Jewish apocalyptic and sapiential thinking. Hence it is more likely that, rather than prompting him to adopt an entirely new code, the Damascus Road event prompted Paul to re-evaluate the significance of the cross in the context of the same code he had used all along. The change came about not because Paul suddenly adopted a new code, but because he now was convinced that Christ was raised from the dead, and this implied a very different significance for the sign of the crucified messiah.

For another approach see, e.g., T. E. Boomershine, "Epistemology." Boomershine argues that Paul, in 2 Corinthians, shares with Jesus (and the evangelist Mark) a "dialectical" approach to his audience's assumptions. He confronts the Corinthians confidence in their eschatological position and problematizes that position. "Paul . . . was dealing with a group who had chosen . . . to conclude that the
here is one which we will find sets us on the proper footing for our analysis of Galatians in chapter 3. There we will take up again the interpretive dynamic to which Moores (almost) introduced us. In the meantime, however, we must look to the objects or content of Paul's knowing and ask what logical structure we find there. This task will not only confirm the basic insights of this "hermeneutical" trajectory in the study of Paul's thought, but it will also suggest a set of terms within which to frame Paul's thought which will prove more useful, for our purposes, than the often arcane terminology of semiotics.

new age has already come and is now fully and unambiguously present" ("Epistemology," 164). In the face of this comforting confidence, Paul's letter "undermines ... any total confidence in knowing oneself or one's community as a 'helper' of the Kingdom of God while at the same time being known as one who is redeemed by the powers of that same Kingdom. The knowledge that is gained ... is that we know ourselves and our communities at the juncture of the ages as beloved enemies of the Kingdom who are called to be storytellers, parablers and apostles of the signs of the new age hidden in the midst of the old age by the grace of God" ("Epistemology," 165). One wonders, though, whether Paul would be content with this kind of agnosticism about the believer's identity.

There are also countless places in which various other scholars have observed in passing elements of the models which we have examined here. Soards, for example, suggests in his commentary on 1 Cor that, while Paul employs reason throughout his letters, this reason is always operating "in reflection on the significance of God's revelation in and through the cross" (1 Corinthians, 40).
CHAPTER II: A STORY TO LIVE BY:
THE STRUCTURE OF PAUL'S KNOWLEDGE

In order to elaborate further the kind of interpretive logic which Paul assumes will lead to knowledge, it is helpful to begin by looking at the knowledge which he thinks that logic can produce. When we gather together Paul's claims to knowledge, can we detect any logical structure implicit in that knowledge itself? To answer this question I will begin by surveying every instance\(^{233}\) in the main Pauline letters of the standard terms of knowing (γνώσκω, γνώσις, γνώστος, ἀγνοεῖ, ἀγνωσία, ἐπιγνώσκω, ἐπιγνώσις, γνωρίζω, ὀλίγα, and σύνεσις)\(^{234}\) and asking what common patterns we can discern in the kinds of things

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\(^{233}\)Here at the outset I set aside those instances in which it is denied that one may actually know the object of the verb. See γνώσκω in  Rom 11:34 (cf. LXX Isa 40:13) and 1 Cor 2:16 (cf. LXX 40:13), ὀλίγα in  Rom 8:26 and 1 Cor 7:16 (*2). In several cases it is also not clear that Paul had a specific object in mind but was thinking simply of the process of knowing in general. See 1 Cor 8:2, where Paul chastises anyone who δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι; 2 Cor 6:9, where the Corinthians are considered ignorant (ἀγνοούμενοι) though they are knowledgeable (ἐπιγνωστικοί); 1 Cor 8:1, where what is known (ὀλίγα) is simply that they have knowledge, i.e. the object is their own cognitive status; 1 Cor 13:2, where Paul does not know (οὐ γνωρίζω) whether he would choose life or death. It is also sometimes impossible to be certain about the content of Paul's γνώσις. See 1 Cor 1:5 (although there is a strong contextual likelihood that this knowledge is ethical); 12:8; 13:2, 8; 14:6; 2 Cor 6:6 (though here again this is included in a list of ethical virtues); 8:7; 11:6; Col 2:3. Zimmerman thinks that several of these instances should be understood as the experiential and volitional "knowledge of God" which characterizes the OT, but he offers nothing by way of justification for this and his reading is far from self-evident ("Knowledge of God," 476).

\(^{234}\)Bultmann represents the consensus when he says that "ἐπιγνωστικά is often used instead of γνώσεως with no difference in meaning"("γνώσεως," 703; so, essentially, Robinson, Ephesians, 248-54). See, for example, the parallel between ἀγνοόμενοι and ἐπιγνωστικοί in 2 Cor 6:9. Some have suggested that the prefixed preposition intensifies the verb, yielding a meaning like "mature knowledge" or "full knowledge" (see, e.g., Trench, Synonyms, 285-86), but it is important to notice that these writers usually have 2 Peter in view (see esp. J. B. Lightfoot, Colossians and Philemon, 136). Danker does suggest (BDAG, 369) that the preposition makes "its influence felt" in some instances of the verb ἐπιγνώσκω, but recognizes that it can equally well be a simple synonym of γνώσεως. In effect, any difference in meaning is simply inferred from context, prompting us to ask whether the different nuance is actually coming from the preposition or simply from that context (so Picirelli, "Epignosis," 90). This is particularly true given the range of meaning which the simple γνώσκω can carry. If we are to see any particular force in the preposition, J. Armitage Robinson's approach is most plausible, that the preposition "is not intensive, but directive... . It prepares us to expect the limitation of the verb to a particular object"(Ephesians, 249; so M–M, 236; Picirelli, "Epignosis").

Danker (BDAG, 369) does not suggest any fundamental difference in meaning between the nouns ἐπιγνώσις and γνώσις, though the semantic range of ἐπιγνώσις may be narrower since it is not used in our literature to denote mundane knowledge (so Robinson, Ephesians, 248-54). Bultmann suggests that ἐπιγνώσις "has become almost a technical term for the decisive knowledge of God which is implied in
Paul knows.\(^{235}\) In the interest of space we will not be able to pursue a full exegetical treatment of each passage, but will instead highlight the patterns in Paul's use of

conversion to the Christian faith"("γινώσκω," 707). Yet the only reference he makes to those letters which are generally accepted as Pauline is to point out that "there is no technical use" in Rom 1:28. He supports his position primarily from the Pastoral (1 Tim 2:4; Titus 1:1; 2 Tim 2:24; 3:7) and Hebrews (Heb 10:26). See also 1 Clem. 59, 2; Mart. Pol. 14, 1; 2 Pet 1:3, 8; 2:20. For the most part, however, he sees no distinction in meaning between γινώσκω and ἐπιγνωσίς ("γινώσκω," 707; compare Rom 1:21 and 1:28; 7:7 and 3:20; Phil 1:9 and both 1 Cor 1:5 and Rom 15:14; ). J. B. Lightfoot argued in his commentary on Colossians and Philemon that the compound noun denoted "a larger more thorough knowledge" (Colossians and Philemon, 136). Yet the passage to which he points, Phil 1:9, hardly demands this, and he seems to ignore the extent to which the two nouns can be used in parallel by Paul. Cranfield counters that in Rom 1:28 there must be some difference in sense between humanity's initial knowing of God (γινώσκεις τοῦ θεοῦ, 1:19) and the ἐπιγνώσεις which they give up, but this is unnecessary (Romans, 1.128). Picirelli has suggested, alternately, that we should read ἐπιγνώσκαι as aggressive, as marking the initial arrival at knowledge ("Epignosis," 91).

In classical attic use, οἶδα denoted "knowledge of facts absolutely," while γινώσκω was "relative," highlighting either "the attainment or the manifestation of knowledge" (Lightfoot, Galatians, 171; cf. LSJ, 350, 483). In the first century the meanings of γινώσκω and οἶδα have likewise become similar enough to be generally indistinguishable. See the parallels in 1 Cor 14:9, 11, 16. The one difference in Paul's usage of the two verbs suggested by Seesemann is that εἰδέναι does not play a significant role in denoting knowledge of Jesus ("οἶδα," 118). Yet he recognizes that the verb is used in precisely this sense in 1 Cor 2:2 and 2 Cor 5:16. Burdick's careful summary of Paul's use of the two verbs leads him to conclude that "Paul normally followed the classical pattern" in which εἰδεῖν denoted direct or intuitive knowledge, assured knowledge, or common knowledge of facts, while γινώσκειν focuses on the process by which one comes to knowledge ("Οἶδα," 354). Yet Silva's paradigmatic study of Paul's lexical use of γινώσκω and related verbs reveals that in many cases he uses οἶδα in stereotyped constructions (e.g., εἰδέναι ὅτι...), in which cases the choice of οἶδα instead of γινώσκω "should not be pressed" for semantic value ("Pauline Style," 201). Moreover, Silva notes how the peculiar significance attributed to οἶδα "is really provided by the whole context" so that these passages offer "no proof that the verb itself...conveys that nuance" ("Pauline Style," 201, see further n. 38). Along similar lines, see Porter, Verbal Aspect, 281-7. The one semantic difference which Silva's study does support is Paul's preference for γινώσκω when he is talking about coming to or acquiring knowledge. Although οἶδα can be used in these settings (1 Cor 2:12; 11:3; Col 2:1; cf. Eph 1:18; 6:21), Paul stands with his Attic predecessors in showing a marked preference for γινώσκω ("Pauline Style," 202). For our purposes, however, this kind of semantic difference is not significant, since our concern in this chapter is with the nature of Paul's knowledge itself, regardless of whether it is newly discovered or old and familiar.

\(^{235}\) These are most of the words used by Paul which Louw and Nida include in the semantic domains "know" (the process of knowing) and "known" (the content or object of knowing), and "able to be known." See Louw-Nida, 334-338. The only words which they include in these domains but which are omitted from consideration here are σοφία/σοφός, ὁρισμός, σαφέστερος, and ἀφικνέωμαι. The σοφία language plays a specific role in the Corinthian correspondence. The use of ὁρισμός in Rom 15:20 can, as Louw and Nida admit, be read in a "more literal sense" in which it means simply "to be named" (Louw-Nida, 337) and we must resist the temptation to import all of the context of a word into its own "meaning." The noun σαφέστερος, while it can mean a kind of "knowledge" or consciousness (BDAG, 967), is used by Paul in the more specific sense of "conscience" (assuming that σαφέστερος should be read in place of σαφές in 1 Cor 8:7a) and we will again deal with that concept in the next chapter. Finally, ἀφικνέωμαι usually means "to arrive at" or "to reach." The verb is used in Rom 16:19 to say that the (report of) the Romans' obedience has reached everyone, but this does not mean that the verb itself should be considered to carry the idea of knowing.

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knowledge language and deal in more depth with those passages which prove difficult or seem to resist schematization. What we will find is that Paul talks about knowing in four distinct but inter-related senses. Three of these classes of Pauline knowledge are a matter of having three different kinds of belief: beliefs about mundane realities; beliefs about realities which reach beyond the mundane sphere and can only be called "theological"; and "ethical" beliefs which bring the mundane into contact with the theological and issue in beliefs about how one ought to live. The fourth class of Paul's knowledge is quite distinct from these three in that it is not primarily a matter of holding beliefs. Rather, that fourth category includes the contexts in which Paul's "knowledge" is a matter of direct experience of or familiarity with something or someone. This fourth category of Pauline knowledge is, as we will see, the point and goal of his belief-oriented knowing so that we might say that Paul only seeks knowledge so that he may know God and Christ. We are, however, running ahead of ourselves now and must come back to focus in the first place on Paul's knowledge of mundane realities.

1. **Paul's Mundane Knowledge**

A significant amount of Paul's knowledge is knowledge of ordinary, mundane realities. In calling this knowledge "mundane" I mean that it has as its object those ordinary realities which belong to the world of immediate and public observation. As such, these are realities about which people can often agree, even when they are

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236 See: γνῶσις, 1 Cor 14:7, 9; Phil 1:12, 2:19, 4:5; Col 4:8; γνωρίζω, Col 4:7, 9; ἀγνώστως, Rom 1:13; 2 Cor 1:8; οἶκος, Rom 11:2; 1 Cor 1:16; 5:6; 9:13, 24; 14:11, 16; 16:15; 2 Cor 9:11; 12:2b (*2), 3b; Gal 4:13; Phil 1:16; 4:15; Col 2:1; 1 Thess 1:5; 2:1, 2, 5, 11; 3:4; 4:2; Phlm 21.
approaching them from widely different world-views. By definition, then, this mundane knowledge does not involve any distinctively Christian assumptions about the world. A great deal of this knowledge concerns the public actions of Paul or his associates. The Apostle does not want his Corinthian converts to be unaware (ἀγνοεῖν), for example, of what he and his co-workers have suffered in Asia (2 Cor 1:8). Likewise, he reminds the intractable Galatians that they know (ὁδάτε) how he preached to them in spite of physical weakness when he first arrived in their city, and how they showed him so much warmth of compassion (Gal 4:13-14; cf. Phil 4:15; 1 Thess 1:5; 2:1-2). Paul sends Timothy to the Philippians in order to be encouraged, knowing (γνῶσις) about their affairs (Phil 2:19; cf. Col 4:7-9), and the Thessalonians know (ὁδάτε) that Paul gave them certain commands from the Lord Jesus (1 Thess 4:2). While the people involved in these events and interactions are all Paul's fellow Christians, there is nothing here which would prevent Paul and his pagan neighbours from agreeing that he does indeed know that they took place. Even when, in Phil 1:12, Paul wants the Christians in that city to know (γνῶσις ἑαυτῶν) that his imprisonment has led to the advancement of the gospel, he is speaking in terms which are not peculiarly Christian. For when he goes on in verses 13-14 to elaborate on his experiences in Rome he describes this "advancement" in terms of the plainly

237 To be more precise, we might say that mundane knowledge claims are those for which a great variety of hearers would understand both what the speaker was claiming to know and how the truth or falsehood of that claim might be tested.

238 See also 1 Thess 3:4. In 1 Cor 1:16 Paul admits that he does not know (οἶδα) whether he baptized anyone at Corinth other than Crispus, Gaius, and the household of Stephanus. He seems, however, to treat this as something which could easily be known if one could remember. We should likely also include Rom 11:2 in this category, where Paul asks (rhetorically) whether the Romans do not know (ὁδάτε) what Scripture says in Elijah, how he pleaded with God on account of Israel.
observable reactions to his preaching.  

At times Paul's mundane knowledge moves beyond the simple fact that certain observable events happened to claims about patterns which can be observed in those events. Paul wonders whether the Corinthians do not know (οὐκ ὁδειότε) that a little leaven will make the whole lump rise (1 Cor 5:6), and that of the runners in a race only one wins the prize (1 Cor 9:24). Here it is not an isolated event that he knows, but a pattern of similar events which take place under certain circumstances. Yet the events are still mundane, and his claims here would not meet with any resistance from the average Greek or Roman. Anyone who can observe that a small amount of yeast is enough to leaven a whole batch of dough can also learn by experience to expect that the same thing will happen whenever bread is made. In the same way, Paul can talk about people hearing sounds and knowing what is being said, or hearing the strains of a flute and knowing the tune (1 Cor 14:7, 9). This knowledge is simply a question of recognizing a common pattern in different mundane events.

From this recognition of patterns in mundane events it is a short distance to Paul's

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239 Cf. Phil 1:16. Something similar goes on in 1 Cor 16:15, where Paul reminds the Corinthians that they know (οδειότε) that the household of Stephanos were the first Achaians to come to faith. If we understand him to be referring to their public shift from pagan practices to membership in the local Christian community and participation in its practices, then this too is a mundane event about which Paul could expect widespread agreement. Again, in 1 Thess 2:1 Paul appeals to the Thessalonians' own knowledge that his arrival there was not κενόν, in vain. This is, however, simply a question of the observable reality that they have continued to maintain their new Christian community with its distinct practices.

240 Cf. 1 Cor 9:13 re. the priests eating from the temple offerings. One might object that the knowledge to which Paul appeals in these instances is not mundane, but rather a kind of traditional, proverbial knowledge. Yet, while it is true that the knowledge in these cases is contained in proverbs or maxims, we are not at this point concerned with the surface form of Paul's knowledge or with its mode of acquisition. Rather, our focus here is on the content of Paul's knowledge-claims. The knowledge to which Paul appeals in 1 Cor 5:6 and 1 Cor 9:24 does have as its content easily observable patterns in everyday events. Moreover, in both cases this content has not been eclipsed by the proverbial nature of the saying, for Paul makes analogical use in these verses of the yeast's behaviour and the runner's victory.
knowledge about the habits and temperament of the people around him. When he knows (οἶδα), for example, the Corinthians' willingness to take part in the Jerusalem collection (2 Cor 9:2), he is not talking about some mysterious inner quality, but rather observing the fact that just as leaven acts in a certain way so too the Corinthians show a tendency to act generously toward the Jerusalem community. When Paul sends Timothy to find out about (ἐις τὸ γνῶμα) the Thessalonians' faith, this is a matter of Timothy observing their actions to see the pattern they betray, i.e., whether they live and speak according to Paul's teaching or whether they have "been tempted" and begun to act differently (1 Thess 3:5).

It is in this sense that Paul can exhort the Philippians to make their forbearance known (γνῶσθαι) to everyone, whether pagan or Christian. By acting patiently toward the community at large, those people will come to recognize a pattern of consistent patience in them and expect them to act the same way in the future (Phil 4:5). All of this mundane knowledge is a matter of observing ordinary, public events and discerning in them patterns which everyone in Corinth, or Philippi, or Rome would agree were significant.241

Paul also assumes that one can know about one's own internal states. In 2 Cor 12:2-4, e.g., Paul does not know (οἶδα) whether the man who saw the vision (presumably Paul himself) did so in his body or was transported out of it. Yet he does know (οἶδα) that he was carried off to paradise and heard unutterable words. Paul claims to know that he had certain experiences, but explicitly brackets out any claims about how those experiences related to physical reality. Similarly, Paul says in 1 Cor 2:11 that τὰ τοῦ

241See also Phlm 21, where Paul writes that he is "confident of your obedience . . . knowing (εἰδὼς) that you will do even more than I say." The basis for this confident prediction about Philemon's future behaviour would seem to be the Apostle's knowledge of his past patterns of behaviour, although we must also take into account here the rhetorical function of Paul's statement as a spur to action.
are only knowable by one's own spirit (πνεύμα). In other words, one's subjective world is not accessible to anyone else. This kind of inner state might not seem like the content of "mundane" knowledge as I have defined it, since such introspective knowledge is, by definition, not publicly observable. Paul's statement in 1 Cor 2:11, however, plays on the broad agreement that people do have privileged access to their own inner world. Hence, Paul's claims to know his own inner states would not meet many objections from outside the Christian community. In this sense, such introspective observations are also "mundane" knowledge.

Finally, we should notice that much of Paul's "mundane" knowledge is based on testimony. He does not require that someone observe events for themselves, but allows that a report about those events (presumably from a reliable source) constitutes a basis for claiming knowledge about that event. This is equally true for internal states. Not only does Paul's "mundane" knowledge include an awareness of his own inner world, but that knowledge can be shared with others if he describes his inner states to them. In Rom 1:13, for example, Paul wants the Romans to know (οὐ θέλω δὲ ἵματι ἀγνοεῖν) that he wanted to come to visit them, and his words constitute his sharing of that privileged knowledge with the audience.242

Do we learn anything of significance from this mundane knowledge? It demonstrates, at the outset, that Paul is not using knowledge language in the same sense as Plato. Paul is evidently willing to grant the status of knowledge, γνώσις, to the observations about the world which arise from his senses, from introspection, or from

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242See also Col 2:1. See also Phil 4:6, where the believers are told they should make their requests known (γνωρίζοντας τοῖς θεοῖς) to God. While the agent of knowing here is unusual, the kind of knowing is not.
reliable testimony about either one. This confidence is a long way from Plato's apparent skepticism about the fruit of the senses, and Paul's willingness to talk about 'knowing' these mundane matters suggests that the absolute certainty and timelessness which are often said to play such a key role in Plato's understanding of knowledge are not so important for the Apostle. We must resist the tendency to imagine that all Greeks fit the stereotype of the Platonic idealist. Strong is not unusual when he writes that for the Greek "knowledge did not derive from experience with the object as in the Hebrew understanding." Yet to pose this kind of opposition between "Greek" idealism and "Hebrew" empiricism is to forget the amount of energy which the Stoics and Epicureans of Paul's day spent on defending the reliability of the senses. In his willingness to call these mundane observations knowledge Paul is not siding with a putative "Hebrew" mindset over against the "Greeks," but rather siding with the ordinary person's confidence in such mundane knowledge over against the idealism of the Academy. Nevertheless, it is important at the outset to recognize that Paul is willing to be much more pragmatic about what he calls knowledge.

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243 In the famous analogy of the "divided line" (Resp. 6.509d-511e), Plato's Socrates divides the human mental faculties into four categories beginning with a) the perception of images (reflections, etc.), moving up to b) the perception of physical objects, and then on to c) the application of abstract principles in concrete cases, and finally d) the pursuit of totally abstract generalities which leave behind all reference to the physical world. This hierarchy of mental processes is said to reflect a hierarchy in the truth of our thoughts and the degree of reality which they capture (6.509d-510a). Not only, thus, does sense perception (the first two categories of mental activity) occupy the less true, less real end of the spectrum, but it is also the realm of "opinion," δόξα (6.511d). Indeed, the section of the line which corresponds to ordinary perception of objects is said to represent mere "belief," πίστις (6.511e), and in 6.534a it is only the last and highest section of the line which is called "knowledge," ἐπιστήμη. Elsewhere Socrates asks Glaucon "have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge (τάς ἀνεύ ἐπιστήμης δόξας) are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?" (6.506c-d).


245 See Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 21-30 (Epicureans), 123-131 (Stoics).
2. Paul's Theological Knowledge

Yet the knowledge in which Paul is most interested is not this knowledge of mundane matters. The knowledge which he sees himself as set aside by God to declare to the Gentiles is something much less obvious and much more controversial. To understand its shape we must turn to those places in his letters where the Apostle claims to know things which lie beyond the sphere of ordinary human observation, which are not available to the senses. Since this kind of "supra-mundane" knowledge consistently deals with the relationship between God and humanity, we can appropriately refer to it as Paul's "theological" knowledge.246

a. Paul's Theological Knowledge as Story

When we pull together the individual statements which represent Paul's "theological" knowledge, we see that together they form an overarching narrative. I am by no means the first person to suggest that such a narrative is central to Paul's thought.247 The "story" to which I am pointing is the same "narrative sub-structure" which Richard Hays and others have observed at work beneath much of Paul's argument.248

246See: γινώσκω, Rom 6:6; 10:19; 1 Cor 2:8 (*2), 11, 14; 2 Cor 8:9; Gal 3:7; γινώσκω, 1 Cor 8:1 (*2), 7, 10, 11 (the γινώσκω being referred to in ch. 8 is that outlined in 8:4-6); γινώσκω, Rom 9:22, 23; 1 Cor 12:3; 15:1; Col 1:27; γινώσκω, Rom 1:19; ἐπιγινώσκω, Rom 1:32; 2 Cor 13:5; ἐπιγινώσκω, Rom 10:2; Col 2:2 (where the parallel with συνέτις suggests a cognitive apprehension and the object is Christ); ἀγιοσκόμω, Rom 2:4; 6:3; 7:1; 10:3; 11:25; 1 Cor 12:1; 2 Cor 2:11; 1 Thess 4:13; οἶδα, Rom 2:2; 3:19; 6:9, 16; 7:14, 18; 8:22, 28; 13:11; 1 Cor 2:2, 12; 3:16; 6:2, 3, 9, 15, 19; 8:4; 2 Cor 1:7, 4:14; 5:1, 6; Gal 2:16; Col 3:24; 4:1; 1 Thess 5:2; 2 Thess 2:6; οἶδα, 1 Cor 11:3; Γινώσκω in 1 Cor 13:9 and 12 should likely also be considered as directed toward theological knowledge.

247Already in 1936 Gyllenberg drew attention to the narrative dynamic in Paul's thought and contrasted this with the approach of Philo: "Die Philon ist alles statisch aufgebaut, bei Paulus ist alles dramatisches Geschehen" ("Glaube bei Paulus," 624). Even earlier, in 1923, Leisegang noticed how the individual's life is integrated with an overarching cosmic story (Der Apostel, 20, 28).

which follows will contribute some methodological rigour to the discussion about the role of narrative in Paul's thought. Where the argument has been made that there is a pervasive narrative structure underlying Paul's thought as a whole, this idea has tended to be imposed as an heuristic category rather than derived inductively from the texts.\footnote{Ben Witherington, whose book \textit{Paul's Narrative Thought World} represents the most ambitious attempt yet to read Paul in narrative terms, tells us that he has "become convinced that all Paul's ideas, all his arguments, all his practical advice, all his social arrangements are ultimately grounded in a story."\footnote{Yet, as suggestive as his narrative reading of Paul is, he relies on the force of a synthetic reading of Paul's whole "thought world" to convince us as central structural feature, see W. A. Beardslee, "Narrative Form in the NT and Process Theology," \textit{Encounter} 36 (1975) 301-15; S. Fowl, "Some Uses of Story in Moral Discourse," \textit{Modern Theology} 4 (1988) 293-309; idem, \textit{The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul}, JSNTSup 36 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990); Richard B. Hays, \textit{The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11} (SBLDS 56; Chico, Ca.: Scholars Press, 1983); J. A. Sanders, "Torah and Christ," \textit{Int} 29 (1975) 372-386; J. T. Sanders, \textit{The New Testament Christological Hymns} (SNTSMS 15; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) 24-25; Ben Witherington, \textit{Paul's Narrative Thought World}, 5 et passim; N. T. Wright, \textit{The New Testament and The People of God}, especially 403-9.}

Of course, as with any valid insight into a text, there were hints in a narrative direction long before these studies. Hays (\textit{Faith of Jesus Christ}, 37-83) points to what amount to narrative structures in Bousset's talk about myths of the "primal man" and resurrected divinities as structuring Paul's thought (\textit{Kyrios Christos}), and in Schweitzer's emphasis on the role for Paul of a "dramatic world-view characteristic of the late Jewish Eschatology" (\textit{Mysticism, I}). While neither model is workable as it stands, and (for reasons which Hays explores) neither came to give this narrative substructure a central place in his final synthesis of Paul's own thought, each represents a recognition of the same constant allusion to a story which Hays demonstrates in Galatians. In a back-handed manner Bultman's program of de-mythologization is perhaps the strongest recognition that a "myth" was in fact central for Paul (see Hays, \textit{Faith of Jesus Christ}, 51-55). Something closer to an explicit recognition of Paul's dependence on a narrative arises in Oscar Cullman's emphasis on \textit{Heilsgeschichte} (see \textit{Salvation in History; Christ and Time}) and in Küsemann's stress on the narrative character of the apocalyptic thought which he believed was so fundamental for Paul (see "The Beginnings of Christian Theology," and "On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic"). Dodd's reconstruction of the primitive \textit{kerygma} which he believed was presupposed by Paul's letters (see \textit{Apostolic Preaching}) and of the substructure of Paul's thinking and its "plot" (\textit{Scriptures}, 102), and Dan Via's exploration of the "comic structure" of Paul's letters (\textit{Kerygma and Comedy}).\footnote{Much of the work on narrative underpinnings in Paul has been less ambitious. Fowl, for example, has focussed primarily on the function of isolated narratives about Christ as "exemplars" to form the ethical vision of Paul's communities.}

\footnote{Witherington, \textit{Narrative}, 2. There is even less exegetical support in Sanders, "Torah and Christ." Wright, \textit{New Testament}.}
readers that we too should try to understand Paul's thought in terms of a story. This kind of narrative reading has thus been open to the charge that it imposes an artificial structure on the text. In *The Faith of Jesus Christ* Richard Hays grounds his use of narrative categories in more detailed exegesis, but does so only in the isolated case of Galatians 3-4. In order to further strengthen the basis for a narrative reading of Paul's thought, I will sketch out inductively how a narrative structure is apparent in the content of Paul's theological knowledge.

**i. Knowledge of events and actions**

To begin with, we must observe how much of what Paul knows is knowledge of *events*. This is, of course, true of straightforward historical reminiscence as in 1 Cor 15:1-11. Yet it is also true in the midst of his most abstract theological discussions. What does Paul know? In Rom 2:2 Paul's hypothetical dialogue partners claim: "We know that God's judgment on those who do such things is in accordance with truth." This includes at least knowledge that God will judge sinners. In 1 Cor 6:9 he asks the Corinthians: "Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God?" This knowledge includes both the future advent of God's reign and an event in which some enter that reign, while others are refused. Of course, Paul's theological knowledge includes the events of Jesus' crucifixion (1 Cor 2:2) and resurrection, and that Christ "being raised, will never die" (Rom 6:9). Paul reminds the Corinthians of their knowledge that Christ, despite being

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251 For some pointers toward positive evidence of such a narrative structure, see Witherington, *Narrative*, 2. Of course, as Witherington emphasizes, such a narrative is surely no more artificial a framework than the *ordo salutis* (see, e.g., Ridderbos, *Paul*; Whiteley, *Theology*) which still forms the framework for most thinking about Pauline theology—in fact, it is prima facie less likely to be distorting (ibid., 4).

252 Rom 2:3 makes it clear that Paul envisions the future, eschatological judgment.
"rich," "became poor" (2 Cor 8:9). This most likely refers to Christ's incarnation as a human being, though it may also look back to the event of the cross. Whatever the event, it is coupled with another in which the Corinthians "become rich," i.e. gain access to the eschatological blessings (2 Cor 8:9). The Apostle recalls for the Romans their knowledge that "all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death," and points out that this involves being "buried with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead . . . so we too might walk in newness of life" (Rom 6:3). Their knowledge is thus focussed on the event of their baptism and highlights the fact that this event brought about their identification with Christ's death. It also includes the knowledge not only of Jesus' resurrection, but also of a future event in which the Romans too will be raised from the dead. In the knowledge of Rom 13:11-12 "salvation" appears as a future event, and is connected with the image of dawning day. On the other hand, in Rom 11:25 Paul wants the audience to know "this mystery," that "a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles has come in."

This is knowledge of a past event in which part of Israel was "hardened," became unresponsive to God.

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253 The NRSV translators highlight the fact that this "becoming poor" is an event by translating τηρηματικοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν as "the generous act of our Lord."
254 This reading assumes that the "newness of life" which the Romans are to enjoy is the life of the resurrection. See also 1 Cor 15:58, where Paul appeals to the Corinthians' knowledge that "your labor is not in vain." Since Paul is referring to their participation in the coming eschatological fulfilment, their knowledge is primarily a knowledge that they will share in that event. These same events constitute the knowledge of 2 Cor 4:14, where Paul writes: "we know that the one who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus, and will bring us with you into his presence."
255 If the content of this "mystery" extends to v. 26, Paul's knowledge here also includes a future event in which "all Israel will be saved." See also 2 Cor 1:7, where Paul knows that "as you share in our sufferings, so also you share in our consolation." He knows that they are experiencing events much like those he is experiencing, and that they too can look forward to experiencing the events of the eschatological restoration.
Even where Paul's theological knowledge is not a knowledge of specific events, it tends to be knowledge of personal actions. In Rom 8:23 Paul refers to the knowledge that "we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies." Not only does this knowledge include the future event in which the Romans will be "adopted," but it also includes their ongoing activity of "groaning" in anticipation. In 1 Cor 6:2-3 Paul asks, "Do you not know that the saints will judge the world? . . . Do you not know that we are to judge the angels—to say nothing of ordinary matters?" Paul's knowledge thus includes the fact that believers will carry out the activity of judgment. The "kindness" of God about which Paul knows in Rom 2:4 is a matter of his actions, his patient restraint of his judgment.

In each case these are actions pursued by a personal agent. The strength of this tendency to talk in terms of personal actions is evident in the way in which Paul consistently personifies inanimate objects or abstract principles and describes them as taking action. Sin and obedience both act to enslave those who serve them, though with

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256 Notice too that this knowledge implicitly involves knowledge of an event in which they received the "first fruits of the Spirit," and that this deposit of "first fruits" implies a future event of harvest.

257 See also 2 Cor 5:1, where Paul knows "that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." In context, this "building from God" is the resurrected body of the believer. Hence Paul's knowledge here amounts to the knowledge that at death believers will receive a new, better, embodied form. God has acted to make it, and they look forward to the event of receiving it.

Likewise, see Col 1:6, where Paul says that the Gospel has been bearing fruit among the Colossians ever since the day when they heard and truly knew (ἐπέγνωσεν) the grace of God. The NRSV translates ἐπέγνωσεν here as "comprehended," and this is made more plausible by the way in which Paul adds ἐν ὑποθείᾳ (Lightfoot, Colossians, 136; Lohse, Colossians, 21). Given that this "grace of God" seems to be equated here with the Gospel message, knowledge of that grace constitutes a knowledge of the gracious actions which God has performed on behalf of human beings. It is also equivalent to the "hope stored up in heaven" which Paul describes in v. 5, the events which the Colossians can expect to experience in the future.

Likewise, see 2 Cor 2:11 where Paul's knowledge includes the thoughts of Satan. If we consider thoughts to be a kind of inner activity, then even this would constitute knowledge of someone's actions.

258 This was observed several years ago by Stephen Crites ("Angels," 26-7).
quite different results for the slave (6:16). Within believers, the "old man" was crucified and they were freed from the domination of personified sin (Rom 6:6). The law speaks to those who are under its control and seals their mouths (Rom 3:19), it rules a person as long as he lives (Rom 7:1). Good does not dwell within the generic "I" of Romans 7:18. Creation suffers and groans along with the "saints" (Rom 8:22). In the Apostle's theological knowledge these realities are all transformed into actors on the grand stage of cosmic events.

In other passages Paul's theological knowledge is directed toward the relationships between the agents who are involved in those events and actions. Even these relationships, however, turn out to be a matter of patterns in the way the agents act toward one another. In Rom 6:9 the Apostle claims to know that "death no longer has dominion over him [Christ]." Paul's knowledge here involves the nature of the relationship between Christ and the personified death. Notice, however, that in defining this relationship Paul is essentially defining the kinds of actions which death can take in relation to Christ. This relationship means that Christ "will never die again" (Rom 6:9). Death cannot carry out certain actions, and Christ will not undergo certain events. Notice, too, that this relationship between Christ and death has also come about as a result of an event. Death, we are told, "no longer has dominion" over Christ (Rom 6:9). This relationship is inseparable for Paul from an event which brought it about. Similarly, in Rom 11:25 where Paul knows about Israel's "hardening" (πτώσεως), this amounts to knowledge of the way in which they are responding to God. They are not embracing the divine action in Christ, but resisting it. They are not taking the right kind of actions. Moreover, here too we find that this
relationship between God and some of the Jews is the result of an event, for in the preceding verses Paul has made it clear that God made them unresponsive. In Rom 1:32, Paul claims that all human beings "know God's decree, that those who practice such things [the vices he has just listed] deserve to die." Once again, we find Paul claiming knowledge of a relationship between human beings and God. This time the relationship is defined by the kind of actions which God will take toward human beings who pursue certain acts, and again this relationship is established by a unique event: "God's decree."

Another example of this knowledge of relationships appears in 1 Cor 3:16 and 6:19 where Paul asks whether the Corinthians do not know that they are the Temple of God. What does it mean to call them a "temple"? In 3:16 that rhetorical question is set in parallel with another which explains it: "Do you not know that you are God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you?" To know that they are a temple is simply to know that the Spirit is exhibiting a certain pattern of action in relation to them, manifesting his power within them. Moreover, just beneath this claim is the assumption that a remarkable event has taken place: the Holy Spirit has come to dwell in their midst just as he did in the sanctuary in Jerusalem. Even Paul's knowledge in 1 Cor 8:4 that "no idol in the world really exists" and that "there is no God but one" amounts to the traditional Jewish claim that only Israel's God can do certain things. Thus Paul goes on in a traditional vein to

\[259\] See, e.g., Rom 11:7-8 where Paul uses a divine passive to say that some Jews "were hardened" and then elaborates on this by citing what seems to be a variation on Deut 29:3(4) and Isa 29:10: "God gave them a sluggish spirit, eyes that would not see and ears that would not hear."

\[260\] Bauckham (God Crucified, 6-13) argues that Jewish monotheism was in fact understood primarily in functional and not ontological terms. That is, there was only one God, not primarily in the sense that this being was composed of a different kind of substance than everything else, but rather in the sense that YHWH could do things which no-one else could. Most specifically, YHWH alone creates all things and rules all things. On YHWH's creation see Isa 40:26, 28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:12, 18; 48:13; 51:16; Neh 9:6; Hos 13:4 LXX; 2 Mace 1:24; Sir 43:33; Bel 5; Jub. 12:3-5; Sib. Or. 3:20-35; 8:375-6; Frag. 1:5-
affirm that "though there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth...yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things...and one Lord, Jesus Christ, though whom are all things and through whom we exist" (1 Cor 8:5-6, my italics). To know that there is only one God is to know that there is only one being who has acted in the past to create and who acts in the present to hold this creation in being.\footnote{261} In each of these cases, Paul's knowledge is not merely knowledge that a single event or action has taken (or will take) place. Nor, however, is it unrelated to events and actions. It is knowledge of recurrent patterns in action, knowledge of the kind of actions which certain agents pursue, often under specific circumstances.\footnote{262}

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\footnote{6; Frag. 3; Frag. 5; 2 En. 47:3-4; 66:4; Apoc. Ab. 7:10; Pseudo-Sophocles; Jos. Asen. 12:1-12; T. Job 2:4. On YHWH's sole rulership see Dan 4:34-5; Bel 5; Add Esth 13:9-11; 16:18, 21; 3 Macc 2:2-3; 6:2; Wis 12:13; Sir 18:1-3; Sib. Or. 3:10, 19; Frag. 1:7, 15, 17, 35; 1 En. 9:5; 84:3; 2 En. 33:7; 2 Bar. 54:13; Jos. Ant. 1.155-156.}

\footnote{261See also Rom 1:19. Here what human beings can know about God (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ) amounts to an awareness of the kinds of actions God can take in relation to the world. What can be known appears to be God's eternal power and majesty (ἡ τε ἀδιάκοπος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης), terms which sound very much like the abstract "attributes" of God which dominated scholastic and reformed theology. We must notice, however, that humanity comes to know that God is like this through their experience of the created world. In other words, human knowledge of what God is like is actually knowledge that he is the kind of God who does this kind of thing, who makes this kind of world. Likewise, when God wants to make his power and glory known (τὸ γνωστὸν) he does it by bearing patiently with objects of wrath which were made for destruction, that is, by acting toward Pharaoh in a certain way (Rom 9:22-23).}

\footnote{262This same kind of knowledge is evident in other passages as well. See Gal 3:7, where Paul assumes that the Galatians know (γινώσκετε) that those who have faith are sons of Abraham, i.e., they act in the same way that Abraham did and will experience a particular event – the eschatological fruition of God's promises to Abraham. Another example appears in 1 Cor 6:15, where Paul knows that the believers' bodies "are members of Christ." This identification with their Lord means precisely that they somehow participate in the events of his passion so that they can also share in the event of his consolation (cf. 2 Cor 1:5-7). In 2 Cor 5:6 Paul claims to know "that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord." If "being with" someone means the potential for certain kinds of interaction, while "being apart" means that those interactions are impossible, then this too is knowledge of the kind of mutual action possible between the believer and Christ under different circumstances. Likewise, in Rom 7:14 Paul claims to know (οἴδαμεν) that the law is spiritual. When Paul says that the law is "spiritual" (πνευματικός), this is not an abstract ontological pronouncement. Paul is certainly not speaking in general terms about the law having a non-physical mode of existence. Dunn rightly observes that πνευματικός is consistently used by Paul in connection with the activity of God's Spirit (Romans, 387; Jesus, 207-9; cf. Rom 1:11; 1 Cor 2:13; 10:3-4; 12:1; 15:44, 46; Col 1:9; 3:16). Paul's knowledge here is knowledge of the relationship between two active agents: the Spirit and the law.}

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ii. Knowledge of causally related events and actions

This collection of events, actions, and patterns of action which constitutes the object of Paul's theological knowledge is not an assemblage of isolated happenings—the events and actions are causally inter-related. Such causal connections are visible already within the individual passages in which Paul refers to his theological knowledge. For example, if one obeys sin this causes death, while obedience to God brings about righteousness (Rom 6:16). Similarly, the law's speech causes every mouth to be sealed (Rom 3:19). Again, if one participates in Christ's suffering, this means that one will also share in both his consolation (2 Cor 1:7) and his resurrection (4:14). That participation...

In calling the law "spiritual" Paul is saying, rather, that this law is to be associated somehow with the activity of the Spirit of God. Exactly how the law is related to the Spirit's action is unclear. Several commentators see here at least the idea that the law was brought into being by the Spirit (So Barrett, Romans, 137; Cranfield, Romans, 355; Dunn, Romans, 1.387). Cranfield points to the idea of the Holy Spirit being involved in the production of the law in Matt 22:43; Mark 12:36; Acts 1:6; 4:25; 28:25; 2 Pet 1:21. Cf. M. Sanh. 10:1, which does not speak specifically about the Spirit but does indicate that one could not be a Jew without acknowledging the divine origin of the law.

Exactly what more the association between the law's action and the Spirit's action implies about the human relationship with the law is not clear, but commentators usually suggest that Paul is thinking of the aid of the Spirit as necessary for properly understanding the law (Barrett, Romans, 137; Cranfield, Romans, 356) or for carrying out its commands (Cranfield, Romans, 356; and perhaps Dunn, Romans, 387). On any of these readings what Paul is trying to convey is that the Spirit acts in crucial ways through the law. Lest this seem forced, we should notice how Paul goes on to contrast the "spiritual" (πνευματικός) law with the "fleshy" (σαρκικός) way in which one acts when one is "under sin." When the personified power Sin rules a person, that person's actions are motivated by the unchecked desires of his sensual body, whereas the lifestyle of the law is one which must be driven by God's Spirit. Paul's point is thus that where we see the activity of the law we are also seeing the activity of the Spirit which is its originating and motivating force.

Even 1 Cor 11:3 may well fit this category of a knowledge of relationships. Here Paul wants the Corinthians to know "that Christ is the head of every man, and the husband is the head of his wife, and God is the head of Christ." The difficulty in this passage is discerning what Paul intended by the image of "headship." If, as is probable, he was thinking in terms of authority, then this relationship would be a matter of one partner issuing instructions, while the other partner acts in accordance with those instructions—again, we would have a pattern of action. The notion of authority, however, carries added ethical connotations. To know that someone has authority is often to know that it is right to act in accordance with that person's instructions. To this extent Paul's knowledge in 1 Cor 11:3 might better be understood as ethical knowledge (see below, pp. 110-136). If, on the other hand, we understand "headship" to mean that one partner is the "source" of the other, then we can see Paul as pointing to the specific roles each partner played in a specific event—the emergence of one partner from the other. For an exhaustive summary of the evidence and a third, more complex interpretation, see Thiselton, I Corinthians, 811-23.
even causes the domination of sin to be broken for the believer (Rom 6:6). Likewise, since all and only those who have faith like Abrahams are his sons, the believers' faith is clearly the cause of their justification and their inheritance of Abraham's promise (Gal 2:16; 3:7), much as possession of the Spirit is a sufficient cause of one's declaration that Jesus is Lord (1 Cor 12:3).

Perhaps more important than this, however, is the way in which the theological events about which Paul knows in one passage are clearly causally related to events about which he claims knowledge elsewhere. The fact that the law performs this negative function is in turn linked with the reign of Sin in human lives (Rom 6:6) and the fact that no good dwells within them (Rom 7:18). It is also because in serving Sin human beings earn death (Rom 6:16) that they need resurrection (1 Thess 4:13) and to be saved from impending judgement (1 Thess 5:2). In fact, the whole crisis in which humanity now stands, whether imagined as a universal "groaning" (Rom 8:22), as a "night" (Rom 13:11-12), or as "poverty" (2 Cor 8:9) is the result of the human slavery to sin and their inability to free themselves. Finally, it is because sin is rebellion against the one who created the world (1 Cor 8:4) that its consequences have this catastrophic scope. 263

As solution is called forth by plight, the action of God in Christ is prompted by this sin and deals with it definitively (2 Cor 8:9; cf. 1 Cor 15:1-4), bringing about the dawning

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263 Examples dealing with the role of the Law are difficult to deal with in this kind of survey because the role of Torah in Paul's thought is subject to so much debate. On a traditional reading of Paul's view of the law, it is because the law "seals" the mouths of those under its sway (Rom 3:19) that human beings must depend for deliverance on God's action in Christ and not on one's own legal obedience (Rom 10:2-3, 19; Gal 2:16; 3:7). Those who follow the "new perspective" of Sanders, Dunn, and others will construe the causal connections here differently, but these actions and events still remain causally linked.
of the day (Rom 13:11-12) and delivering the cosmos from its groaning (Rom 8:22).\(^{264}\)

Second Corinthians 1:7 (cf. 4:14) makes it clear that the resurrection (1 Thess 4:13) and blessed life after death (1 Cor 6:2-3; 2 Cor 5:1, 6; Col 3:24) which God now offers human beings depend on their being identified with Christ in his passion. It is likewise because they have died with Christ that members of the Christian communities stand in a new relationship to the law, a relationship like that which follows an ordinary death (Rom 7:1-6).\(^{265}\) The believers' identification with Christ (cf. 1 Cor 6:15; 2 Cor 13:5) is, in turn, effected by their participation in baptism (Rom 6:3). Likewise, in 1 Cor 12:3 the believers' identification with Christ and their filling with the Spirit (1 Cor 3:16; 6:19) are causally connected, though it is not clear in which direction the causation runs.\(^{266}\)

This is not the strict causal relation of physics. We are rarely presented with cases of a sufficient cause and its inevitable effect. Rather we find the more ambiguous causality which is more common in narrative, in which one event serves as part of the reason for another.\(^{267}\) Events cause one another in the sense that one contributes to the other, but the relationships are not precise. So, the sinful lives of human beings prompt God's judgment

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\(^{264}\)This central importance is implied, too, by Paul's use of the crucifixion as a cipher for his whole theological message in 1 Cor 2:2.

\(^{265}\)Somewhat more speculatively, we might imagine that it is because God (in the Spirit) was the origin of the law that, despite their freedom, those who flaunt its basic moral vision will lose their place in the kingdom (1 Cor 6:9).

\(^{266}\)The particular relationship between man and woman in 1 Cor 11:3 is, again, an exception here. It is not easily linked in a causal fashion with the relationships between God and Christ and Christ and the man. It is also difficult to integrate the "man of lawlessness" (2 Thess 2:6) and his restraint into this causal network, but in this case the ambiguity is likely due to the fact that we have in Paul's letter to the Thessalonians only a dislocated fragment of what must be a much more involved apocalyptic timetable.

\(^{267}\)See the discussion of different approaches to causality in historical narratives in Dray, "Narrative in History," 28-37. Of particular interest is W. B. Gallie's insistence that there remains in historical events an irreducible contingency which often makes them unpredictable, even in retrospect. This contingency can, however, be handled by a narrative which nonetheless is "followable" when we recount how events actually turned out to be related (See his Philosophy and the Historical Understanding).
Yet the judgment is avoidable because there are other factors at play. God's patience with sinful humanity is intended to bring about repentance (Rom 2:4), though not everyone is so affected. It is in this sense, as a necessary but not sufficient cause, that Christ's voluntary poverty causes the believers' spiritual wealth (2 Cor 8:9), that baptism is a prerequisite of identification with Christ (Rom 6:3), and that the apostasy of Israel contributes to the Gentiles' entry into the God's people (Rom 11:25). Yet the causal relationships here are no less real for their complexity. On the contrary, this very ambiguity reflects the kind of causation which is usually built into narratives, stories which are less concerned about providing universal laws than with giving insight into lived events which are irreducibly complex.

iii. Knowledge of causally and temporally related events and actions

Of course, to point out that Paul's theological knowledge constitutes a chain of causally related events and actions is still not to have demonstrated that it is a story. One further narrative dimension which we find in Paul's theological knowledge is time. These events are related not only in terms of causation, but also in that they precede or follow one another in a particular order. The sinful actions of humanity occupy the past and present and near future, while the judgement is anticipated in a more distant future (Rom 1:32; 2:2). Humanity has been groaning along with the rest of creation for some time and looks forward to a deliverance which is yet to come (Rom 8:22-3), a future resurrection (1 Thess 4:13; 2 Cor 4:14; 5:1; 1 Cor 15:48; Col 3:24). The night in which humanity wanders is soon to give way to the new day (Rom 13:11-12). The passion, resurrection, and resurrection appearances of Christ are all past, and these are all later than the origin of the
problem of sin (though not the ongoing commission of sins) since they were a solution to that problem (1 Cor 15:1-11; 2 Cor 4:14; cf. 1 Cor 2:2). The impoverishment of Christ lies in the past, and though the enrichment of the believers is temporally ambiguous its full fruition likely lies in the future (2 Cor 8:9).

It is already evident that these events are temporally located, not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to Paul's audience. The problem of sin and the frustration of creation began in the audience's past though their lingering effects are still felt. On the other hand, it is in the audience's future that the day of the Lord will suddenly come (1 Thess 5:1), that the saints will judge both human beings and angels (1 Cor 6:2-3), that all of creation will be made new (1 Cor 8:22-23). It is between their present and that future consummation that they can expect the advent of the man of lawlessness (2 Thess 2:6). What this means is that Paul not only knows in what relative order the events of the story take place, but also in what stage of the tale humanity stands as he writes. What is happening at that point in the story? This is the time of creation's agony (Rom 8:22-23), in which human beings are powerless to resist sin (Rom 7:18). Some, however, have already been chosen (1 Thess 1:4). Those with faith are already sons of Abraham (Gal 3:7), are already indwelt by Christ (2 Cor 13:5), are already members of Christ's body (1 Cor 6:15), are already the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:19). These believers participate in Christ's sufferings (2 Cor 1:7) and, having been freed from the domination of sin (Rom 6:6), occupy themselves with works of righteousness (1 Cor 15:48) while they await their salvation.

All of this marks the present of Paul's audience as the crucial time in the story. It is
the time at which human beings are given the choice which will determine what role they
play in the rest of that narrative. For in that narrative future Paul knows that some will be
judged (Rom 1:32; 2:2) and others raised to blessed life (13:11-12, etc.). There will be
nothing to do at that point but bear one's fate. In his present, however, things are different.
While baptism and its accompanying identification with Christ are past for believers, they
are presumably still a present opportunity for others (Rom 6:3). Human beings are still
actively engaged in the choice to whether to serve sin or obedience (Rom 6:16). Gentiles
can still enter God's people, and Jews can still fall away (Rom 10:3; 11:25). The
repentance of Romans 2:4 is a present possibility, but one which will not last forever. The
present of Paul's audience is thus in many ways the fulcrum around which the whole story
moves, the pivotal point at which one's future place in the story is determined.

iv. Dramatic tension in Paul's theological knowledge

If we are looking for further, conclusive evidence that Paul's theological
knowledge is a story and not merely a chronicle, we find it here in the dramatic tension
with which the present of Paul's story is charged. His theological knowledge does not
consist merely of a series of events, some causing others, organized in chronological
order. These events are also imbued with significance because they involve human agents
and a personal God, all of whom have intentions and anticipations, hopes and fears. Not
only is God patient toward the sinner, but he does this with the intention of bringing about
repentance (Rom 2:4). In fact God's whole action in Christ is his attempt to save humanity
(Rom 10:9). Moreover, from the perspective of human beings, judgement is obviously
something to instill terror while salvation in Christ fulfills the human hopes of escape
from the fallen world and of final happiness. Thus Paul can allude to the certainty of the Corinthians' resurrection by simply assuring them that "your labour is not in vain" (1 Cor 15:58), for that resurrection represents their whole hope. Injected with these hopes and fears, what would otherwise be a simple chronology of events becomes a story in the fullest sense of the word. It becomes a cosmic drama in which God acts to save a creation which has gone terribly wrong, while human individuals stand at the climactic point in the plot. This is the moment of decision which will determine whether, for each individual, the story will turn out to be a comedy or a tragedy. For the fatal flaw of sin in some will indeed mark their downfall, while others will end in the final eschatological dawn.

That narrative is never expressed as a whole in Paul's letters. Rather, as Ben Witherington has written, "Paul is always alluding to larger narratives by means of brief phrases or quotations," and it is left to the audience to fill in the gaps. Indeed, some sections of the narrative may remain comparatively undeveloped in Paul's own mind. It was, however, this grand unified story which constituted Paul's theological knowledge.

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268 Witherington, Narrative, 2. Three attempts to sketch out the shape of the whole narrative can be found in Ben Witherington, Narrative, 5 et passim; Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ; Wright, New Testament, especially 403-9.

269 While there may be some intrinsic plausibility in Witherington's approach which sub-divides this grand narrative into four smaller stories, this kind of division is not evident in Paul's theological knowledge. Structurally, this story is a single whole, bearing a single over-arching plot line. Witherington (Narrative, 5) suggests that "Paul refers to four interrelated stories comprising one larger drama: (1) the story of a world gone wrong; (2) the story of Israel in that world; (3) the story of Christ, which arises out of the story of Israel and humankind on the human side of things, but in a larger sense arises out of the very story of God as creator and redeemer; and (4) the story of Christians, including Paul himself, which arises out of all three of these previous stories and is the first full installment of the story of a world set right again." Yet one must wonder whether Paul would have thought of separate "stories" of human fall and of Israel, or whether he would rather have thought of them both first and foremost as elements of the one story he inherited in the Scriptures. Moreover, as Witherington immediately admits, "Christ's story is the hinge, crucial turning point, and climax of the entire larger drama, which more than anything else affects how the Story will ultimately turn out" (ibid., 5). On this basis N. T. Wright's framework seems better, which sees Paul as telling "the whole story of God, Israel, and the world as now compressed into the story of Jesus" (New Testament, 79). It is true, as Witherington points out, that Paul nowhere identifies Christ
an epic story of the relationship between humanity and its creator which stretches from
creation to the final eschatological fulfilment.\textsuperscript{270}

\textbf{b. Narrative Theological Knowledge and Paul's Prose Genre}

To some it may seem strange to say that Paul's knowledge is fundamentally
narrative in shape, when there is so little actual narration in his letters. If what he knows is
basically a story, then why do we not find him telling the story in his letters? One answer
to this question is that in fact Paul is constantly telling parts of the story and in the process
is alluding to the rest of it. Why, though, does he depend on allusion and leave the story
itself in the background? Why not simply tell it over and over again?

In order to answer this question we need to make some general observations about
the relationship between narrative and prose as genres. We are used to the idea that a story
can be used to serve discursive language, to "illustrate" an abstract proposition. So, for
example, when we teach children that "curiosity can be dangerous," we will often
reinforce this idea with a story, perhaps about Pandora and all of the evil which came from
her insatiable curiosity. Yet there has been an increasing recognition that the reverse can
also be true, that at least sometimes discursive speech serves simply to help in the
appreciation of a story. Richard Hays has explained this relationship with the help of
Northrop Frye's typology of literature and in particular his notions of \textit{mythos} and
\textit{dianoia}.\textsuperscript{271} In Aristotelian terms, the \textit{mythos} of a tale is the simple sequence of events as
they are narrated, the story as it is told. Frye complements this with the notion of a story's

\textsuperscript{270}See the similar insights about Paul's thought in general in Witherington, \textit{Narrative}, 2.
\textsuperscript{271}See Hays, \textit{Faith of Jesus Christ}, 21-23.
dianoia, a term which in Frye's hands encompasses what we often mean by the "theme" of a narrative.\textsuperscript{272} Dianoia, for Frye, is "the mythos or plot examined as a simultaneous unity, when the entire shape of it is clear in our minds."\textsuperscript{273} It is expressible in discursive language, but it is no less integral to the story because of that. Hays points out that Paul Ricoeur makes a similar observation about the relationship between "sequence" and "pattern" in stories when he observes how

all narratives combine in various proportions two dimensions, one chronological and the other non-chronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension of a narrative.\ldots But \ldots the activity of telling does not merely consist in piling episodes on top of one another. It also construes significant values out of scattered events. To this aspect of story-telling corresponds on the side of story-following an attempt to 'grasp together' successive events. The art of telling and, accordingly its counterpart, the art of following a story requires that we be able to elicit a configuration from a succession. This 'configurational' operation \ldots constitutes the second dimension of narrative activity.\textsuperscript{274}

These two dimensions of a story cannot be separated. Nor does one have priority over the other. Rather, as Frye explains, mythos and dianoia are "the same in substance," the distinction being merely one of our point of view. While mythos follows the events as they unfold, dianoia approaches the sequence of events "in relation to a unity, not in relation to suspense and linear progression."\textsuperscript{275} But both mythos and dianoia, both sequence and pattern, are inherent in the story itself.

If we return, then, to the cautionary tale and its "moral," we can see better the

\textsuperscript{272}In Aristotle, Dianoia means simply those portions of a dialogue in which arguments are explicitly set forth (Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b).

\textsuperscript{273}Frye, Fables, 24. Elsewhere Frye explains: "The word narrative or mythos conveys the sense of movement caught by the ear and the word meaning or dianoia conveys, or at least preserves, the sense of simultaneity caught by the eye. We listen to the poem as it moves from beginning to end, but as soon as the whole is clear in our minds, we 'see' what it means"(Anatomy, 77).


\textsuperscript{275}Frye, Fables, 24.
relationship between the tale as narrated and the discursive speech which then tries to capture its "point." One of the weaknesses of simple narrative for ethical training is that stories can be so polyvalent. Different hearers can find quite different patterns in the same story, some compatible and some contradictory. A well-written story will often provide cues within the narrative itself as to the pattern which the audience is supposed to find, but sometimes it is necessary to use discursive speech to point it out. Thus the "moral" of our fable points discursively to a pattern inherent in the story itself, directing our focus. How does it do this? By alluding to key elements of the story which we should take as focal if we are to grasp the desired pattern. In this sense, then, Richard Hays observes that "reflective discourse" can sometimes be understood as "growing organically out of the process of narration."276

In individual cases one's interest in the pattern of a story may be more or less attached to the particular story at hand. On the one hand, as with the fable of the tortoise and the hare, we might see the particular story as entirely dispensable. It is only a tool with which we can help someone to see the narrative pattern which it embodies. But any other story which embodied that pattern could serve our purpose just as well. It is in cases like these that we might speak of stories as serving discursive speech.277 In other cases,

276Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 24. Cf. W. B. Gallie's recognition of a similar pattern at work in historiography: "If it is true that in the physical sciences there is always a theory, it is no less true that in historical research there is always a story. In the former case there is always a provisional theory which guides experimental researches, even though these will lead to its replacement; in the later case there is always an initial story that acts as provisional guiding thread to the successive assessments, interpretations and criticisms which lead the historian to his final judgment as to what the story really was, or as to what actually happened"("Historical Understanding," 50).

277It remains true that the pattern to which the discursive speech points is a narrative pattern. It may be embodied in a variety of stories, but it can only be alluded to discursively. This observation may, in fact, have far-reaching implications for the relationship between narrative and non-narrative speech in general, but these lie well beyond the aims of the present study.
however, the pattern in which we are interested cannot be separated from the story. The pattern is for some reason dependent on these particular events and without them it cannot be preserved. Hans Frei has recognized that for the greater part of Christian history, the Gospel story was read in just this way. Its meaning and import were treated as "functions of the depiction or narrative rendering of the events constituting them."²⁷⁸ Thus, even as the Church fathers wrote copious discursive treatments of that story, all of that writing was ultimately in service of the story. The patterns toward which they pointed were patterns which could not survive outside the narrative which included these particular events.

This is why the mythological reading of Strauss or the existential, de-mythologizing interpretation of Bultmann has so often been seen as threatening by traditional Christians. Each in his own way was attempting to find in the Gospel narrative a pattern which could exist without the particular events of the New Testament, eternal truths which could find expression in other particular events.²⁷⁹ Yet the consensus seems

²⁷⁸ Frei, Eclipse, 13.
²⁷⁹ This was, in both cases, bound up explicitly with the interpreter's conviction that the events of the Gospel story could not have happened as they were narrated there. Both thus tackled the task of finding in the Gospel a pattern which could also be embodied in events which did happen, particularly in the events of ordinary life in the interpreter's own world. See Frei, Eclipse, 233-44 on Strauss. While Frei is correct (ibid., 337, n. 10) that Bultmann and Strauss took a different self-conscious stance toward "myth," the outcome of their methods was remarkably similar.

Leisegang also exhibits similar tendencies, for while he emphasizes the narrative shape of Paul's theology, he places all of his emphasis on the synchronic pattern, the "Gebilde" which Paul sees in this "Geschichte" (Der Apostel, 18). Leisegang believed that Paul envisioned the individual as re-living the cosmic story, moving from the role of Adam to the role of Christ. This leads him to suggest that for Paul the shape of the individual's life is secured because Adam/Christ provide a paradigmatic pattern (ibid., 28). It is to this paradigmatic role of Christ that Leisegang attributes Paul's talk about the believer being crucified with Christ, buried with Christ, or raised with Christ (ibid., 28). Leisegang understands Paul as grounding this mapping of his own life onto the cosmic story in his religious experience and particularly his conversion. Yet this requires Leisegang to say that Paul has already been "raised" after his "crucifixion" on the Damascus road—something which the Apostle explicitly denies (see ibid., 29-30).
to be that in order to separate a universal pattern from the Christ story both Strauss and Bultmann were forced to abandon the pattern which Paul himself saw as important. The Apostle clearly did not think that the Gospel story was of any value apart from the particular events which it narrated. Paul told the Corinthian believers, "If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile" (15:17). Why? Because then "you are still in your sins. Then those also who have died in Christ have perished. If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied" (15:17-19). The importance of the story for Paul lay in the hope that he and his churches would actually experience the events which it narrated. If the story were re-interpreted as merely a cipher for a universal pattern of life, it would be of little religious use in Paul's eyes. For as one who had been beaten and hunted for his belief in Christ, that belief had brought him nothing but pain in the present. It is only if Jesus was actually raised, only if Paul is actually to be raised along with him, that such a gruelling life becomes worthwhile. As Paul declares to the Corinthians, "this slight momentary affliction is preparing us for an eternal weight of glory beyond all measure. . . . For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor 4:17). If, however, this resurrection is only metaphorical and one can experience the same dynamic in other contexts, then (Paul implies) there must be easier ways to go about it.

Thus, no matter how abstractly Paul might talk about the story's pattern, this talk is

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Michael Root distinguishes between an "illustrative" interpretation of the story, in which "the story illustrates certain redemptive truths about self, world, and God," and a "storied" relationship between narrative and reader in which "the reader is included in the Christian story. The relation of story to reader becomes internal to the story. . . . The story is good news because redemption follows from the primary form of inclusion in the story" ("Narrative Structure," 147). He also notes that "rightly or wrongly, few theologians have sought to interpret the redemptive relation along strictly illustrative lines" (ibid., 147).
in the end entirely secondary for him to the truth of the story as it is told.\(^{281}\) Here we find powerful confirmation of the intuitions of several theologians that the basic ideas of Christianity, and particularly as they are expressed in the Protestantism which owes so much to Paul, have a fundamentally narrative shape.\(^{282}\) In the theological sphere it is this story which Paul knows, and his discourse with his churches is his attempt to convey the dianoia of this narrative knowledge. Since his churches already know the story he does not need to tell it all over again. In fact, such a complete re-telling might well frustrate his purpose. For what Paul wants the audience of his letters to grasp is the pattern of the story, and as we have seen it is often necessary to point selectively to a few events in a story, to make a few events focal, in order to help someone see the pattern which is implicit there. Thus, the fundamentally narrative character of Paul's knowledge is not undone despite his decision to write discursive letters. Paul does not extract the "real" point of the story, leaving behind the narrative shell. On the contrary, his discursive talk gains its coherence from the story which it is intended to interpret.

3. Paul's Ethical Knowledge

We defined Paul's theological knowledge as the opposite of his mundane knowledge, as that knowledge which extended beyond the mundane sphere and which was

\(^{281}\) As Hays puts it, when Paul calls up the image/event of Christ crucified, "the image receives its particular significance only because allusions to it evoke the structure of the entire story within which its meaning is rooted" (Hays, *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 23).

\(^{282}\) Root ("Narrative Structure," 145) calls soteriology "the moment within theological reflection at which the narrative form of the Christian message cannot be avoided. Soteriology presumes two states of human existence, a state of deprivation (sin, corruption) and a state of release from that deprivation (salvation, liberation), and an event that produces a change from the first state to the second. It presumes then the sufficient conditions of a narrative: two states and an event that transforms the first state into the second."
entirely independent of any information about the specific events and experiences of his present Christian communities. There is, however, another sphere of knowledge which stands between these poles, which does extend beyond the mundane realm but which is also focussed on the contingent realities of life in Paul's churches. This is Paul's ethical knowledge.

**a. Knowledge as Ethical Discernment**

It is common in Paul's letters to find references to knowledge of how one ought to live. In many situations the content of this ethical knowledge is left unspecified. In Rom 2:20 Paul's hypothetical Jewish interlocutor believes that he possesses the form of knowledge and truth (τὴν ὁρφασίαν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας) in the law. What is this "knowledge" of which the law is (as the NRSV translates ὁρφασίαν) an "embodiment"? Paul goes on:

> you, then, that teach others, will you not teach yourself? While you preach against stealing, do you steal? You that forbid adultery, do you commit adultery? You that abhor idols, do you rob temples? You that boast in the law, do you dishonor God by breaking the law? (2:21-3)

Paul does not intend to say merely that his imaginary opponent has knowledge of these few specific ethical rules. The knowledge which (as Paul seems to grant) is embodied in the Torah is a comprehensive knowledge of how one should live. This is what the Jew knows (γνῶσκεις) in 2:18, namely God's will (τὸ θέλημα), a knowledge which enables

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283 See: γνῶσκο, Rom 2:18; 7:1; and perhaps Rom 3:17 (which is complicated by its being an LXX quotation from Isa 59:8) along with Rom 7:15; γνῶσις, Rom 2:20, 15:14; ἐπὶ γνῶσις, Phil 1:9; Col 1:9, 3:10 (where this knowledge is the characteristic of one who has put off the sinful ἀθροποπὸν and is being conformed to the image of the Creator); Phil 6; ὀλοκ, Rom 14:14; Col 4:6, 1 Thess 4:4, 2 Thess 3:7; σώζοντα, 1 Cor 4:4.

Another candidate is 1 Cor 8:2, where the one who claims knowledge οὐπο ἔγνω καθὼς δει γνῶναι. The implication seems to be that he does not yet understand how one out to live, the attitude one ought to foster.
them to "determine what is best" (δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα).\textsuperscript{284}

It is, in fact, surprisingly common to find Paul referring to this kind of generic ethical knowledge, this general knowledge of how one should conduct one's life under God. This seems to be what Paul has in mind in Rom 15:14 when he says that the Roman believers are "full of goodness, filled with all knowledge (γνώσεως), and able to instruct one another (ἀλλήλους νοεῖτε ἑαυτῶν).\textsuperscript{285} Likewise, the Apostle prays that the Colossians will be filled with the knowledge (τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν) of God's will (τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ; Col 1:9), knowledge of how to walk in a manner worthy of the Lord (περιπατήσας ἀξίως τοῦ κυρίου; 1:10).\textsuperscript{286} He writes that they "have clothed" themselves "with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge (εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν) according to the image of its creator" (Col 3:10). What is this knowledge "toward" which they are being renewed? It is that which characterizes the "new self," that self which is defined in opposition to sin (3:1-10). The knowledge toward which the Colossians are moving is ethical knowledge, knowledge of how to live in accordance with the will of God.\textsuperscript{287} Even where Paul does make this

\textsuperscript{284}Zimmerman ("Knowledge of God," 475) thinks that this knowledge of God's will includes an acknowledgement of it, a submission to it. Yet the emphasis is clearly on being able to discern what God wants, not on a commitment to doing it.

More ambiguous is Rom 3:17, where Paul quotes Isa 59:8: "the way of peace they have not known (οὐκ ἔγνωσαν)." This could either mean that they do not practise that "way" (in which case this would be an example of knowledge as direct familiarity below) or Paul could be speaking of the kind of ethical understanding we are discussing here. Romans 7:1 is clearer where Paul speaks to those who know (γνωσκόμενος) the law. It is less likely that this knowledge implies in and of itself the idea of submission to God (so Bultmann, "γνωσκόμενος," 705), though that would be a prerequisite to an experiential knowledge of the way of peace.

\textsuperscript{285}Contra Zimmerman, who understands this as the kind of experiential and volitional "knowledge of God" which we find in the Old Testament ("Knowledge of God," 476). See below, pp. 137-151.

\textsuperscript{286}There is no basis for Piper's assertion that this knowledge is directed not toward "the commanding will of God" but "rather, his redemptive purpose and his goal, which is Jesus"("Knowledge," 44).

\textsuperscript{287}Cf. Phlm 6, where Paul prays that Philemon's faith will become effective in knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of "all the good that we may do for Christ." This is hardly, as Piper contends, "the realization of [Christ's] saving significance"("Knowledge," 45).
ethical knowledge more specific, he very rarely talks about knowing a particular moral rule or commandment. Rather, he tends to talk in terms of people having knowledge about how to negotiate some particular situation in their lives. So, in 1 Cor 8:1, Paul concedes that many among his audience have knowledge (γνῶσις) concerning how to handle food which has been sacrificed to an idol, and this knowledge seems to produce an educated conscience which Paul sets in contrast with the weak conscience of those who have an aversion to any idol meats. In 1 Thess 4:4-5 Paul wants the Thessalonians to "know how (καταδικαίονται) to control your own body in holiness and honor, not with lustful passion, like the Gentiles who do not know God." Paul seems to think of this ethical knowledge less as knowledge of a moral code and more as a skill in identifying God's will in a particular situation.

In keeping with this emphasis on knowing how to act, Paul will often also speak about knowing whether someone's actions are good or evil. He will often remind his audience of their knowledge that when he was among them he acted with pure motives and not out of self-interest (1 Thess 1:5; 2:2, 5, 10, 11; 2 Cor 1:8). In 1 Cor 4:4 the Apostle has the same kind of knowledge about his own ethical state, declaring that he does not know

See also Rom 7:15, where Paul writes: "ο γάρ καταργήσωμεν ου γνωσκω. Barrett is almost surely correct that this is not a matter of the subject literally not knowing what he does, but rather that his actions are "incomprehensible" to him (Romans, 138; so Lagrange, Romans, 175). Dunn wants to read the verb here as the same "experiential knowledge" which he thinks we find in 7:7, so that the sense is that "Paul existentially disowns his action" (Romans, 1.389). This is similar to Cranfield, who reads the passage as saying that Paul does not "approve," or "condone" what he does (Romans, 1.358-9). Yet the emphasis in what follows is on the subject's sense of confused helplessness at the lack of effect his will has on his actions. It is simpler, then, to understand Paul as highlighting the subject's experience of this incongruity as a lack of understanding. In this sense, Cranfield is wrong to say that the subject has "a very clear comprehension of his position" (Romans, 1.358).

288 See also 2 Thess 3:7, where they "know (καταδικαίονται) how you ought to imitate us," that is, by not being slack but working for their own food.
anything for which he would condemn himself. Again, when the Apostle expresses his hope that the Corinthians will come to know (ἐπὶ γνῶσεσθαι) him and his compatriots perfectly (2 Cor 1:13-14), he does not simply hope that the Corinthian believers will produce an accurate record of Paul’s mission. Rather, Paul hopes that he and his company will become their boast, just as the Corinthians are his. He hopes that they will come to understand how well Paul and the others have acted, so that they once more become proud to claim an association with him. The Apostle expects that they will exercise their faculty of ethical discernment and come to "know" the moral quality of their lives. 289

We see the fruit of this ethical discernment when Paul talks about knowledge of someone’s character. The Philippians can know (γινώσκετε) Timothy’s character (δοκιμήν, Phil 2:22; cf. 2 Cor 2:9). 290 Paul likewise expects that the Thessalonians know (οἶδατε) what kind of people Paul and Timothy were (οἶοι ἐγενηθημένοι) while they worked among them (1 Thess 1:6), and he sends Timothy to them with a view to gaining knowledge of their "faith" (ἐξ τοῦ γνῶνα τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν, 1 Thess 3:5). 291 This knowledge is not of some free floating, abstract character traits. Rather, Paul looks to a

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289 The sense here verges on the idea of "recognition" of someone’s authority, and so it is taken by Thrall (2 Corinthians, 1.134-35) and Martin. Yet the emphasis on "partial" versus "complete" knowledge fits better with the idea of proper moral evaluation than with recognition of authority. Moreover, Paul begins this paragraph in 1:12 talking about the purity of his actions toward the Corinthians. Hence Paul is most likely talking about their interpreting his actions properly, i.e., as pure. So Barrett (2 Corinthians, 73) understands ἐπὶ γνῶσθαι to mean "recognizing," so that the Corinthians ought to "recognize" the truth about their relationship. Martin likewise understands Paul to be talking about the Corinthians’ "acceptance of his honesty" (2 Corinthians, 21; cf. Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 131).

290 Cf. 2 Cor 13:6, where Paul hopes that the Corinthians will know (γινώσκεσθε) that his company are not ὁδόκητοι.

291 Cf. 2 Cor 9:2, where Paul knows (οἶδα) the Corinthians’ willingness to support the Jerusalem collection because of their past actions.
person's actions in order to see trends and patterns which reveal something of that person's quality as a moral agent. To know someone's character is, for Paul, to know what kind of actions this person has performed in the past and thus how they will likely handle their relationships in the future. This is why, when Paul wanted to know the character of the believers in Corinth (γνῶ τὴν δοκιμὴν ὑμῶν), he penned his "tearful letter" (2 Cor 2:9). It is in their response to a crisis like this that their character, their inclination to act well or badly, is laid open to view and can be known by others. On the other hand, the letter was also Paul's attempt to reveal his own character to them, to let them know through his action that he was motivated by love (2 Cor 2:4; cf. Rom 1:13).

So if Paul is interested in fostering a knowledge of the theological story, he is also deeply concerned that his audience come to ethical knowledge. This is on the one hand knowledge of God's will for human beings, and on the other hand the ability to discern the moral character of the actions and lives of those around them. Does this mean, however, that Paul's knowledge is split in two by a radical division between the theological and the ethical? Or is there some organic relationship between the two? Before we can answer this question we must take a step back to explore the ways in which Paul brings his theological knowledge into contact with the everyday events around him. The question is how exactly he or a member of one of his communities can discern the moral quality of someone's actions at all. In what does this ethical knowledge consist—this ability to discern God's will and to evaluate whether someone is following it or not?

**b. The Intersection of Paul's Mundane and Theological Knowledge**

**i. Locating the audience in the story**
To understand the process toward which Paul's generic talk about ethical knowing points, we must widen our scope to examine the remaining passages in which what Paul knows has cognitive content, yet that content is neither mundane nor entirely removed from the immediate situation—the balance of what we have labelled his "ethical" knowledge. What we find is that in each case what Paul knows is a particular conjunction of some immediate situation and his theological story. It quickly becomes clear that Paul does not leave that story as a self-contained, distant narrative. Rather, as Hays writes, Paul's "pervasive concern is to draw out the implications of this story for shaping the belief and practice of his infant churches." Paul wants his audience not only to discern the outlines and patterns of the story, but as they do so also to recognize where they are located in the cosmic drama. In Beardslee's terms, the "individual story" of Paul himself and of his communities is interpreted in terms of the "universal story": "the 'little story' of Paul's life finds meaning by being related to the 'big story' of which the

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292 See: γινώσκω, 1 Cor 4:19; 2 Cor 2:4, 9; 3:2, 5:16; 13:6; Gal 2:9; Phil 3:10; 1 Thess 3:5; γινώφειν, 2 Cor 8:1; Gal 1:11; επιγινώσκω, 1 Cor 14:37; 2 Cor 1:13b, 14 (*2); ὁγινώσκω, 1 Cor 10:1; 14:38a; οἴδα, Rom 5:3; 15:29; 1 Cor 12:2; 15:58; 2 Cor 5:16; Phil 1:19, 25; 1 Thess 1:4; 3:3. Bultmann suggested that in 1 Cor 14:37 the emphasis was on "recognizing" Paul's authority in the sense of submitting to it. Yet the authority here is merely implied. What Paul wants them to do is "recognize" ("recognize to be so," so Fee, 1 Corinthians 712 n. 15) how Paul's speech fits into the theological story. One might wonder how Paul can command someone to "understand" in this sense, but he seems to be saying something like the NRSV rendering: "Anyone who claims to be a prophet, or to have spiritual powers, must acknowledge that what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord." They must acknowledge this, must "know" it, in the sense that if they do not they cannot be what they claim.

Given the paraenetic nature of Paul's writing to the Corinthians we should also likely include here 2 Cor 1:13a, where the object of επιγινώσκω is the content of Paul's letter. This assumes, however, that Paul means the Corinthians "already know" what he writes, i.e., this is nothing new (so Moule, Idiom, 89). If, on the other hand, Paul underlines their "being able to understand" what he writes—i.e., there are not hidden meanings—then this might be an instance of mundane knowledge (so Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 73).

We might also include in this category the use of οἴδα in 1 Cor 6:16, although this could also be construed as strictly theological. The dividing line here is not sharp but rather heuristic.

293 Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 5.
organizing center is Christ. Thus as Paul points allusively to his theological story, helping his audience to discern its dianoia, his overriding concern is that his hearers will come to understand what role they play. So, when Paul writes to the Thessalonians he tells them that he knows (ἐἰδοτες), not merely that God chooses some people, but more importantly that God has chosen them (1 Thess 1:4). That is the role which they occupy in the narrative, the role of the elect.

This process of locating people in the theological story is chiefly a process of locating the mundane events of individual human lives within the cosmic events of the larger narrative. Very often Paul claims to know that his own actions must be understood as the actions of God's representative, of Christ's witness. In Rom 15:29, for instance, Paul says that he knows (ὁδικα) that when he comes to Rome it will be in the fulness of Christ's blessing. In other words, when he disembarks at the wharf in Ostia, makes his way up the slope to Rome, and is greeted on their own thresholds he will be doing so (in terms of the story) as one who is endorsed by God, one in whom God's benevolent power is at work, one who is experiencing the dawning of the eschatological fulfilment. Similarly, in 1 Cor 14:37 Paul specifies that anyone who claims to be a prophet or "spiritual", "must acknowledge (ἐπιγινωσκέτω) that what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord." Paul is claiming to know that his very ordinary act of thinking and writing is, when seen in the context of the grand narrative, the action of a spokesperson of God. In Gal 2:9 it is

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295 Beardslee writes: "these stories still serve what I have been calling the function of myth, that is, to provide a paradigmatic or exemplary symbolic complex which is so raised above ordinary experience that it provides a norm and shape for it."("Narrative Form," 305).
296 See also Gal 1:11, where the Apostle claims to know that his Gospel is from God.
Peter and James and John who know (γνωρίσ) "the grace that had been given to me," i.e. the fact that he was divinely appointed to preach to the Gentiles. Once again this is a matter of their understanding his work of travelling and preaching as the work of one who (in terms of the story) is sent by God to invite the Gentiles to accept the salvation being offered to them in Christ. All of this is a matter of knowing that Paul's mundane actions are the actions of someone who occupies a certain role in the theological narrative.

So far we have seen Paul locating specific mundane events in the context of the story, but we also saw above that Paul's mundane knowledge includes a knowledge of observable patterns in ordinary life. It is this kind of mundane reality which Paul sets in the context of the theological story in Rom 5:3-5. There Paul claims to know that "suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us." He begins this chain with an experience with which the Romans are only too familiar, their suffering, and the observable fact that it does often provide the occasion for the exercise of endurance, perseverance. So too, he is likely expecting that they have often observed how people who practise this sort of perseverance through adversity develop a habit of enduring, a predisposition to bear up under any new negative circumstances which come along. This too is a matter of their mundane knowledge. Likewise, he could expect them to notice that people within their community who often respond to suffering this way, who develop such a character, become more and more focussed on the blessed life which God has promised them in the future as a way of coping with the difficulty of the present. Although at this stage the theological story which they have learned is clearly involved, what Paul expects them to
know is still strictly speaking mundane. He simply appeals to their observation that their fellow Christians who develop such a character do in fact also become more and more focussed on the future which Christian preachers promise them. This is something with which any pagan could agree. It is only in the last step of Paul's causal chain that he finally brings this pattern of observable behaviour in contact with the theological story. Not only do people who persevere under suffering become more focussed on the promised future, but this hope "does not disappoint" them (5:5). These who suffer and endure and hope are also the ones who will in fact inherit the blessed life which the story promises for one who lives this way. Their actions, though knowable in mundane terms, can also be known to locate them in a particular role in the grand story—the role of those who are saved, raised, and who inherit the kingdom of God.

ii. Points of contact between mundane events and the story

As Fowl has observed, it quickly becomes clear that for Paul "issues of hermeneutics are at the forefront of moral decision making."297 Paul himself recognizes as much in 2 Cor 5:16 when he writes: "we do not regard [οὐδ’αμεν] anyone from a human point of view [κατὰ σάρκα]; even though we once knew [ἐγνώκαμεν] Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way." "Knowing" here is precisely a matter of interpretation. In this case Paul's point concerns which overarching narrative one will use as the interpretive frame for Christ's life and death. Yet even after Paul and the Corinthians have agreed on the narrative context in which to interpret Christ's life, or their own lives, this is only the beginning of the hermeneutical task. The sheer volume of

297Fowl, "Uses of Story," 295.
argument in Paul's letters makes it plain that the location of mundane events within that story was often far from obvious to his audience. As Hays writes, "Paul's letters may be read as running arguments with opponents who draw different inferences from the same story." Thus, as is often reflected in modern translations, Paul's emphasis when he talks about ethical "knowing" is not simply on holding a particular belief (whether mundane or theological), but also on "recognizing" that an event has a particular significance.

How does Paul help the believers to recognize their place in the narrative? By making what Fowl calls a "critical correlation" between the story and "the specific situation faced by each audience." Paul claims to be able to discern in someone's life an action or event which is characteristic of a particular role in the theological story. This is, in effect, what Paul is doing in 1 Thess 1:4-5: "we know (εἰδέχθη) . . . that he has chosen you, because our message of the gospel came to you not in word only, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction." He is reminding the Thessalonians of their first acceptance of his Gospel and interpreting that event, in the context of the theological narrative, as God's choice of them. The "characters" in the story who accept the Gospel

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298 Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 6.
299 Fowl, Story of Christ, 201.
300 Paul's reference to the Thessalonians' experience of and reaction to Paul's preaching is introduced in 1:5 with ὑπετέλεσα. I have taken this ὑπετέλεσα clause as describing the reason or basis for the knowledge of their election to which Paul refers in 1:4 (so Morris, Thessalonians, 56; Richard, Thessalonians, 64). Lightfoot suggests, alternately, that the phrase εἰδέχθην ὑπετέλεσα ὑπετέλεσα is idiomatic and that in this context the ὑπετέλεσα clause should be taken epexegetically (as an expansion or elaboration on the content of the knowledge) rather than causally (as the basis of the knowledge) (Notes, 12; so Best, Thessalonians, 73). Lightfoot points to parallels in Acts 16:3; Rom 13:11; 1 Cor 16:15; 2 Cor 12:3-4; 1 Thess 2:1 (so Best, Thessalonians, 73). See also 2 Cor 9:2. Yet we have the same construction in Rom 8:27 and 2 Thess 3:7, where most commentators take the ὑπετέλεσα to be causal. Moreover, some of Lightfoot's examples are not really examples of an epexegetical ὑπετέλεσα clause. In 1 Thess 2:1 the ὑπετέλεσα clause introduces, not a restatement of the object of knowledge, but a discussion of the nature and/or effects of that knowledge. Likewise, in 2 Cor 12:3-4 the ὑπετέλεσα clause describes, not the object of the verb itself, but events undergone by that object. Moreover, the case of 2 Cor 12:3-4 is complicated by the presence of an intervening explanatory clause after the verb and direct object, after which Paul uses the ὑπετέλεσα to pick up his main line of thought. In Acts

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and experience this "power" are those whom God has chosen. A similar dynamic is at work in 1 Cor 4:19. Here Paul looks forward to being in Corinth and knowing (γνώσομαι) "not the talk of these arrogant people but their power (τὴν δύναμιν)," i.e. whether they can display the kind of miraculous and charismatic abilities which mark Paul's apostleship. In effect he offers a (thinly) veiled threat that when he arrives the events in the community will immediately make it clear whether these would-be leaders actually occupy the role in the story which they claim for themselves.

Similarly, when Paul discusses the use and abuse of prophecy in the Church he says: "I want you to understand (γνωρίζω) that no one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says 'Let Jesus be cursed!' and no one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor 12:3). Here he identifies two kinds of prophetic action and tells the audience that these correspond with two different roles in the story. Someone who speaks in one way is

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301 It is unclear precisely what kind of "power" and "conviction" Paul means in 1:5. Is the "power" which characterized the Thessalonians' experience of the Gospel message the effective force of the message itself to produce belief, perhaps as an expression of the Spirit's activity (so Bruce, Thessalonians, 14; Morris, Thessalonians, 57; Richard, Thessalonians, 65), or the salvific impact of the message for those who believe (so Best, Thessalonians, 75), or the Spiritual empowerment of the preachers (so Best, Thessalonians, 75)? Or is the Apostle referring to miraculous or ecstatic experiences which accompanied that reception (so Donfried, Thessalonica, 91-2; 239-40; Holtz, 1. Thessaloniker, 46-7; Jewett, Thessalonian Correspondence, 100)? The singular δύναμις may tell against the latter, miraculous interpretation (so Lightfoot, Notes, 13; Best, Thessalonians, 75). Is the "conviction" which accompanied the Gospel preaching in Thessalonica the faith which it produced in the Thessalonian audience, the convincing force of the message (so Bruce, Thessalonians, 14; Holtz, 1. Thessaloniker, 47), or the confidence of the preachers themselves (so Best, Thessalonians, 75-6; Lightfoot, Notes, 13; Morris, Thessalonians, 57-8; Richard, Thessalonians, 64).

302 Fee (1 Corinthians, 191) observes the connection between the "power" here and the "demonstration of the Spirit and of power" which characterized Paul's preaching in Corinth (1 Cor 2:4-5).
one who is aligned with and empowered by the Spirit, while the other is by definition excluded from that role. Paul’s immediate purpose is ethical, to teach the Corinthians what kind of prophetic speech to tolerate and what to reject. He does this, however, not by giving them abstract principles about prophecy, but by explaining the kind of speech which the story tells us to expect from a genuine prophet. More broadly, Paul can interpret the former paganism of the Corinthian believers as having marked them out as those in the story who were deceived, living against God. They know, he claims, that when they were pagans they were "enticed and led astray to idols which could not speak" (1 Cor 12:2).

This is certainly not how they would have understood their sacrifices at the time, but in light of the new narrative with which they interpret their own actions, they realize that those religious rites were the kind of thing that the "deceived" would do. Then, in 2 Cor 8:1, the Apostle lets them know (γνώμης "the grace of God that has been granted to the churches of Macedonia." What is this "grace"? It appears to be the joy and resultant generosity which flowed from them despite their severe hardships. The very fact that they can act this way marks the Macedonian believers as those in whom God is at work. In each case, this knowledge is a matter of being able to identify the crucial point of contact between one's mundane knowledge about someone and one's knowledge of how those who occupy various roles in the theological story behave.

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303 If we recognize that the Old Testament is included in the story which constitutes Paul's theological knowledge, then we should read 1 Cor 6:16 in similar terms. Do the Corinthians not know (οἶκος oīkos) that the one who is joined with a prostitute is one body (with her)? This is clearly a matter of pointing out the point of contact between the Corinthians' sexual activity and the part of the story which concerns human marriage and sexuality drawn from the creation story in Genesis 2.

304 This is also likely how we should read 2 Cor 3:2, where the Corinthians are said to be Paul's letter of recommendation, known (γενεακομισμένη) and read by everyone. The very existence of this community, founded by Paul, marks his mission as the mission of one approved by God.
We argued above that for Paul the theological story is what Hans Frei would call "realistic narrative." It is not simply a story which "illustrates" a pattern of life, but rather a story within which Paul wants to locate the experiences of the Christian communities. This is not to say, however, that individual episodes within that story cannot also illustrate patterns which recur within the larger narrative. Thus, in addition to locating himself and his audience within the story, Paul's ethical knowledge can also consist of drawing "analogies" between his audience's experience and the experiences of other particular actors in the story. The assumption seems to be that if Paul's audience is playing a similar role to some other people, they will be able to predict how God will deal with them by observing how God dealt with their counterparts in the past. This is the essence of Paul's "typological" interpretation of Scripture. His hermeneutical task involves filtering out what was incidental to the narrative role in the experience of the "types" so that he can recognize the pattern of experience which was essential to the role and which his audience can expect to repeat. As Fowl puts it, this "analogical" ethical knowledge involves identifying the relevant "similarity-in-difference" between the life of his audience and the lives of someone else who occupied the same place in the story.\footnote{Fowl, Story of Christ, 202. Fowl compares the function of these narratives to the function of the "exemplar" in Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science (Story of Christ, 203). Fowl's own study involves passages which operate slightly differently because the narratives are those "hymnic" passages in which Paul draws ethical conclusions from discrete narratives about Christ (Phil 2:6-11; Col 1:15-20; 1 Tim 3:16b). It would seem at first glance that the analogy in these cases is drawn between people who occupy somewhat different roles in the narrative: Christ and the believers. We must remember, however, that Paul understands the believers as being identified with Christ so that they too may live out some important aspects of Christ's "role."}

So, in 1 Cor 9:13-14, Paul asks whether the members of the Corinthian community
do not know (οὐκ ἔδατε) that "those who are employed in the temple service get their food from the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in what is sacrificed on the alter." The ethical implication which he wants to draw is that, just as those servants of God gained their living from their work, those who preach the Gospel have a right to do the same. Likewise, in 1 Cor 10:1-5 Paul does not want the Corinthians to be unaware (ἀγνοεῖν) of the episode of the Israelites' desert wanderings. Since Paul clearly assumes that they do already know the biblical account,\(^{306}\) it seems that what Paul wants them to know (recognize) is the significance of that account for their own situation. The biblical tale is understood typologically (Paul says the events have become types, τύποι), that is, as providing a template for understanding the shape of God's present interaction with his people. The point of the episode, for Paul, is that the Israelites allowed themselves to covet wicked things and were judged for it, and he urges the Corinthians to remember that the religious story still runs the same way for God's people when they make those decisions (10:6; cf. 10:11).\(^ {307}\) It is simply understood that one can discern the shape of the present phase of the religious story, and thus flesh out its ethical implications, by looking at its shape in the past.\(^ {308}\)

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\(^{306}\)Wenham (Story, 132) points out that Paul's only mention of the golden calf incident is the allusive reference in 10:7: "Do not become idolaters as some of them did; as it is written, 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" As Wenham observes, such an oblique allusion assumes that "the Corinthian church was well versed in the Old Testament, knew its stories intimately"(Story, 132).\(^ {307}\) As Gordon Wenham observes, Paul "identifies the experiences of the exodus generation of the Israelites with those of the Corinthian church"(Story, 132). See too Witherington, Narrative, 38.

\(^{308}\)This explicit connection with the grand narrative breaks down further in 1 Cor 9:24. There Paul bases a general exhortation on the Corinthians' knowledge, not of Scripture, but of general realities about athletic contests: Do they not know that only one of the runners in a race takes the prize? Then they should run so as to win. It seems, however, that the relevance of this common knowledge about racing depends on their prior understanding of the shape of the religious story. Because of narrative dynamics in the story which are already agonistic Paul can draw on common, mundane knowledge in a typological way in order to highlight ethical implications which already lay, albeit less explicitly, in the story.
When all is said and done, however, Paul's ethical knowledge is usually not this "typological" or "analogical" knowledge, but rather a more direct attempt to interpret the lives of Christians in his own day by placing them within the theological story. It is only, in fact, in the context of this overarching story that Paul's analogical knowledge makes sense. For it is only because he knows that, for example, the Corinthians and the Israelites under Moses are playing similar roles in that narrative that he can assume so confidently that God will deal in the same way with them both.309

iii. Knowing the future of the role

Why is it so important to Paul that his communities know how to locate themselves in the theological story? Because whatever role one plays, that role carries with it very concrete implications for the future. For the story within which they understand their existence extends beyond their present toward the eschatological consummation of God's creation. So if one can identify both where one's present lies in the time-line of the story and the role one is playing, one only needs to see how that role fares further on in the story in order to predict the kind of experiences one can expect to meet. Ultimately, the stakes are high. Depending on what role one plays in the story one will either be sheltered from wrath or left to bear its brunt in the coming judgment. Paul knows (εἰδότης) that the one

309 Fowl recognizes that his "exemplar" model is not the only way in which story functions to shape Paul's ethics (Story of Christ, 207). As an example of a different approach Fowl points to Rom 6:1-11 where, he says, "Paul uses a series of metaphors to narrate how Christians have been transferred from the realm of sin into Christ, and to identify what this new identity entails for their relationship to the realm of sin" (207). Elsewhere Fowl characterises this passage as "a series of metaphors which tell, in abbreviated form, the story of the change in political allegiance that occurs when one enters the Christian community ("Uses of Story," 296-8). Fowl's primary focus has been, however, on Paul's use of particular stories as narrated in isolated passages in his letters. This means that he tends to underestimate the significance of this "metaphorical" story in Romans and miss the way in which it alludes to a larger, overarching story.
who raised Jesus will also raise the faithful Corinthians (2 Cor 4:14), that (εἰδοτες)
because of their faithfulness their "labor is not in vain" (1 Cor 15:58), and that (οἴδαμεν)
if their earthly home is destroyed they have an eternal home in the heavens (2 Cor 5:1).310
On the other hand, he also knows that those who act in certain ways will not inherit God’s
kingdom and that outside of Christ’s intervention sinners will face judgement. Thus, once
Paul knows which of these roles a person is playing out, he can predict the end toward
which they are headed.

But the story also provides more detail about the fate of those who play various
roles in the time leading up to that final consummation. In 1 Thess 3:3 Paul reminds his
audience (οἴδατε) that their role in the narrative involves suffering persecution. They are
appointed to it (εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ καὶ μεθα). That is to say, God has made this part of their role in
the cosmic story. Moreover, Paul points out in v. 4 that he predicted it. He is not simply
interpreting their present suffering in retrospect. Rather, in the early days of the
community he was able to warn the new converts that they would encounter suffering.
Why? Because for the present moment in the story this suffering is a part of the role they
are playing. It is because the story provides such insights about the future of its various
characters that Paul can rejoice in Phil 1:19 and claim to know (οἴδα) that his present
sufferings will eventually result in "salvation" (σωτηρίαν). This is also how Paul knows
with certainty (πεποιθώς οἴδα) that he will remain with the believers in Philippi and spur
on their "progress and joy in faith" (Phil 1:25). He knows both the way in which God will
act toward his people and his own role in those plans, so that he is able to infer his own

310Cf. 2 Cor 5:6 where Paul knows (εἰδοτες) that being at home in the body means being away from the Lord.
fate (cf. Phil 2:24).

This knowledge of the future is by no means a comprehensive map. So, in 1 Thess 5:2 Paul refuses to try to construct a table of eschatological times and dates because "you yourselves know (οἱ δακτε) very well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night." Like every story, this one is selective. Likewise, in 1 Cor 7:16 Paul can say to the wife, "[F]or all you know (τι γὰρ οἱ δακτε), you might save your husband," and to the husband, "[F]or all you know (τι οἱ δακτε), you might save your wife." But once one knows one's place in the narrative, Paul believes that some aspects of the future become clear. Thus, while Paul may not be able to predict everything which will happen to the Romans, he does know (οἱ δακτεν) that everything co-operates for good for those who love God, those who are called and predestined (Rom 8:28). The Apostle can assure these believers that whatever they endure in the present their status in the story means that their future is assured.

c. Knowing How to Navigate the Story

i. Living a good role

So far what we have been calling "ethical" knowledge may not have seemed very

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311 Cf. Phil 1:22, where Paul does not know (οὐ γινώσκεις) whether he prefers to live or die.
312 In addition to knowing one's own future, Paul can infer things about the present state of other people based on their "character" in the narrative. In 2 Cor 1:7 he knows (οἰδας τε) that since the Corinthians share in the sufferings of Christ (cf. 1:5), so the members of that church must also share in the comfort which Christ brings.
313 It is clear that he wants the Romans to understand themselves as being among those who are called. This statement in 8:28 stands as the culmination of Paul’s talk in 26-27 about the way in which the Spirit helps us in our weakness and intercedes for us when we don’t know what to pray. The assumption seems to be that the Romans are included in Paul’s ‘we’ in these verses, and it may well be that Paul understands the co-operation of the cosmos for their good as the direct consequence of the Spirit’s intercession. Read this way, the verse serves both as the culmination of Paul’s reassurance that the Spirit is looking out for them and the introduction of his next thought—that God’s purpose in this is to bring them into conformity with Christ (vv. 29-30).
ethical. It is one thing to talk about knowing what role one is playing in the story and knowing what the future holds for that role, but in what sense is this knowledge "ethical"? It is ethical because the Apostle does not regard a person's role in the story as set and unchangeable. His passionate aim is to help his audience see how their narrative location is intimately connected with what they do in the present. If one can come to know one's role in the story by looking at the way one lives, then one can also change that role by changing one's lifestyle. This is a possibility for Paul and his audience because, as we have already observed, their present marks the pivotal moment in the theological story. It is the moment of decision at which one is able to shift one's allegiances before the consummation begins and the fate of human beings is sealed. This, then, is where we see how Paul's ethical knowledge grows organically out of his theological narrative when he brings it into contact with his knowledge of mundane realities. His primary concern is to show his communities how they must live now if they want to place themselves in a good role in the story.314 Paul's exasperated question in 1 Cor 6:9 reminds us again just how high are the stakes in this struggle to make the audience see the ethical implications of the narrative: "Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God?" Paul likewise reminds the Romans that they know how "God's judgment on those who do such things (i.e., the very things that his imaginary opponent does) is in accordance with truth" (2:2). Far more important, therefore, than their merely learning the story is that they learn to navigate their way well through the narrative which is pregnant with both promise and

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314 This is where we must raise questions about Richard Hays' suggestion that some ethical materials, such as are found in 1 Corinthians 7, "are not in any discernible way related to a narrative substructure" (Faith of Jesus Christ, 8).
So, in Rom 2:4 the Apostle argues that the one who judges sinners on the presumption of their own superiority must not "fail to realize (ἀγνοοῦν) that God's kindness is meant to lead you to repentance." Such people's self-congratulatory attitude proves that they do not understand the religious narrative, or else they would know that this posture casts them in a dangerous role. Similarly, in Rom 6:3 Paul wonders whether the Romans are unaware (ἀγνοεῖτε) that "all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death." Why does he think they might lack this knowledge of their place in the religious story? Because of the _ethical_ conclusion his imaginary interlocutor has just reached. Paul is replying to the suggestion that the Christian should "continue to sin in order that grace may abound" (6:1). His response is to point out the connection between the narrative and their lives: "How can we who died to sin go on living in it?" (6:2). The story, with its dramatic identification of the believer with Christ, implies an ethic. In Rom 10:2-3 Paul laments that Israel's zeal for God is not guided by this kind of ethical knowledge, is not _κατ' ἐπὶ γνῶσιν_. They are unaware (ἀγνοοῦντες)
of the righteousness of God— that is, the kind of relationship with God which is portrayed in the theological story—and seek to establish their own righteousness, so that (and this is the point) they do not submit themselves to the righteousness of God. Without this knowledge of the story they unwittingly place themselves by their actions in a perilous role. Indeed, Paul is convinced that if the powers of this age had known (γνωσταν) the proclamation of Christ, if they had known the story, their actions would have been radically different. They would not have crucified the lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8). It is the same narrative, interpretive logic which drives Paul's tendency to ask the Corinthians, perhaps with a note of rhetorical exasperation, whether they do not know some aspect of the theological story. His point is not that they are uneducated, that they actually lack knowledge of the narrative, but rather that they are living in a way that would cast them in a bad role in that story. Do they not know (οὐκ οἴδατε) that they are the temple of God in which God's spirit dwells (1 Cor 3:16)? Then they defile that temple at their own peril (3:17; cf. 6:19). Do they not know that the saints will judge the world? If so, then why are they submitting their complaints to public courts (1 Cor 6:2)? Do they not know that their bodies are members of Christ? Then how can they join this body with a prostitute (1 Cor 6:15-16)? Contrary to Bultmann, knowledge in Paul very rarely...

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318 See also Gal 2:16 where the Jews εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οὐ δικαιούται ἀνθρώπους ξέρουν νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.
319 Notice, then, how in 1 Corinthians 8:4, further on in his discussion of idol meats, Paul seems to provide the basis for the Corinthians' ethical knowledge in their knowledge that the idols are not really gods at all, that there is only one God. Their knowledge about how to act is based on their knowledge of the story within which they are acting.
320 See also Rom 6:16, where Paul asks whether the Romans know (οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι) that whatever one obeys, one becomes a slave to that entity. Notice here the dramatization of what would otherwise be abstractions. Paul envisions the Romans in a cosmic drama, dwarfed on all sides by much greater powers which will either help them to salvation or drag them off to become part of the doomed. See also Rom 7:1. The knowledge in 1 Cor 5:6 is not so clearly related to the religious narrative. Paul asks if they do...
It carries with it the idea of obedience.\textsuperscript{321} It is precisely because the members of Paul's churches often live in dangerous ways, play hazardous roles in spite of their knowledge, that he has to remind them again and again how the story goes and what its future holds for such people.

These consequences are illustrated graphically in the first chapter of Paul's letter to the Romans when the Apostle describes humanity's slide into sin and idolatry. Although humanity begins in harmony with God, the problem begins in 1:21 when Paul tells us that "though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him." Rather they "exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles"(1:23). This was their folly (1:22), that though they knew God's role as Creator (1:20) they did not act in ways that were compatible with that knowledge. In Rom 1:28 Paul explains that because human beings did not "acknowledge God (τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει)," God "gave them up" to their "debased mind (ἀδόκιμον νοῦν)." He allowed their idolatry, which did not accord with God's true role, to distort their understanding of divinity and the world even further. The result of this further distortion of their knowledge was even further ethical folly as they do not know that a little leaven will affect the whole lump of dough. On a superficial level Paul is simply drawing implications from a truism of household life. Yet this observation about the behaviour of yeast has no evident ethical implications unless one already understands oneself in terms of paschal ideas, and one could easily connect that imagery with Paul's overarching narrative.

Bultmann suggested that often in the NT knowledge language was used primarily in the sense of "acknowledgment, and obedient or grateful submission to what is known" ("γνῶσις," 704-6). Yet several of his examples can just as easily be read in the sense of simple familiarity or of intellectual appropriation of an idea ("γνῶσις," 706; see Rom 2:20; 3:17; 1 Cor 8:4-6; 2 Cor 4:6; Gal 2:9). Another of his examples which does talk about obedience does not mention knowledge ("γνῶσις," 705; 1 Thess 1:9), while some clearly indicate that one can have knowledge without any acknowledgement of God or obedience (Rom 2:18, 21; 10:19; 1 Cor 15:34; 2 Cor 8:9). 1 Cor 14:37-38 might demand such a reading (though see above, n. 292), and 1 Cor 16:18 probably does (see also, perhaps, 2 Cor 10:5; Col 1:6).
"things that should not be done (πολείν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα)." In this primeval setting it is not clear how much of the theological story Paul thinks human beings would have known, but they do know at least that God created the world and that he has decreed that those who live improperly "deserve to die" (1:32). And it is humanity's gradual abandonment of this rudimentary story which speeds them on their downward spiral toward their own destruction.

Nor does Paul only focus on this kind of ethical knowledge when he is talking with a community that is in danger of going astray. There is little indication that the Thessalonians are morally corrupt, but when Paul teaches them about the parousia it does not take him long to come around to the point that they must act in certain ways if they want to be in good standing on that day of reckoning (1 Thess 5:3-11).\textsuperscript{322} Similarly, in Phil 1:9-11 Paul prays that the love of the Philippians might abound more and more in "knowledge (ἐπιγνώσει) and full insight (πάσῃ αἰσθήσει)." This knowledge guides love by enabling the Philippians to discern what is really important (εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τὰ διαφέρειν), and the ultimate purpose of this knowledge-guided love is to purify them, morally and spiritually, in preparation for the "Day of Christ."\textsuperscript{323} In other words, this ethical knowledge is a matter of knowing how to negotiate one's way through the religious story well, knowing which actions place one in a role which receives blessing and which

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\item[322]The only case in which Paul's ethical knowledge appears to be unmotivated by his religious narrative is Phil 4:11-12, where he claims to know how to be αὐτάρκης. This characteristic appears to be valuable, not because it helps one to salvation, but simply for its own sake. Yet notice that this claim does not actually ground any ethical injunctions. It seems that Paul is simply appealing to what he knew was a primary value of his Greco-Roman hearers in order to bolster his own authority and the attractiveness of his example.
\item[323]Contra Zimmerman, who reads this as the experiential and volitional "knowledge of God" typical of the OT ("Knowledge of God," 476).
\end{footnotes}
lead to destruction. 324

It is this skill in navigating the theological story which constitutes the generic ethical discernment to which Paul so often refers. So when Paul talks generally about knowing (εἰδέναι) "how you ought to answer everyone" (Col 4:6) he is talking about knowing what kind of speech-acts one should perform if one wants to live out a good role in the story. Likewise, when Paul claims that he knows (οἴδα) that "nothing is unclean in itself" (Romans 14:14), he is making explicit for his audience the kind of pattern of behaviour which marks those who are destined for resurrection with Christ.

ii. Paul's ethical knowledge and the (re)discovery of narrative ethics

As we come to the end of our treatment of Paul's ethical knowledge, however, it would be good to pause and address what might be a suspicion in the reader's mind: Is this emphasis on a narrative structure in Paul's thought not just another scholarly fad? The question is justified. For, although their insights have been fruitful, some scholars have tended to write as if contemporary theories about narrative and knowledge should simply be assumed as the basis for our reading of Paul. The reader may be justifiably sceptical when Fowl writes, without further ado, that "Paul's ethics necessarily draw their force and coherence from a common narrative tradition which he shares with his audience," adding

324See also 1 Cor 1:5-7. When Paul congratulates the Corinthians on their wealth ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ πάσῃ γνώσει he goes on to remind them that this has been granted to them ὡστε ἢμας μὴ ἵστερεσθαι ἐν μηδείς χαρίσματι ἀπεκδεχομένως τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ κυρίου... (1 Cor 1:5-7). Although it is unclear exactly what this knowledge consists of, the point of it in Paul's mind is that it will equip them to be in proper standing at the parousia.

In fact, this seems to be the context for all Pauline ethics. See, e.g., Gal 5:21, where Paul sums up his survey of the works of the flesh by warning (again) that οἱ τὰ τοιαύτα πράσοντες βασιλείαν θεῶν οὐ κηρυσσομένους. Contra Zimmerman, there is no indication that Paul intends in 1 Cor 1:5 the experiential and volitional "knowledge of God" which is representative of the OT ("Knowledge of God," 476).
in a footnote that "any particular formulation of a tradition need not be cast as a narrative, but it must be sustained by a narrative as the ground of the tradition."\textsuperscript{325} We have now seen that, in fact, Paul's theological knowledge is a story and his ethical knowledge is a matter of interpreting the immediate events of life in terms of that story, learning to manoeuver skilfully to a good end. Simply because so many writers have not given their narrative approach this kind of inductive, exegetical foundation, however, we should take a moment to ask just how applicable recent theories of narrative ethics are to Paul's thought.

By far the most influential theorist in this area is Alisdair MacIntyre, whose book \textit{After Virtue} set in motion the current wave of studies on "narrative ethics" almost single-handedly.\textsuperscript{326} What many outside this field do not realize is that MacIntyre's book was primarily an historical and sociological study. While many of his disciples have simply taken his models and applied them wholesale to contemporary issues, MacIntyre himself began with an attempt to find the roots of our ethical vocabulary in pre-Homeric Greek civilization and to trace the shifts in their use over the centuries. In response to the contention that moral language is meaningless, MacIntyre sets out in \textit{After Virtue} to re-

\textsuperscript{325}Fowl, \textit{Story of Christ}, 208, 208 n. 3. My italics. To do justice to Fowl, we must draw attention to the fact that he is well aware of the danger of anachronism. Concerning his use of Thomas Kuhn's theory of "exemplars" Fowl writes: "It may seem that linking Paul and T. Kuhn is a gross anachronism. We would answer this charge on two levels, historical and methodological. As a matter of historical fact the type of practical reasoning outlined above goes back to Aristotle and his concept of \textit{phronesis}. . . . Even if this were not the case, we would argue there is no a priori reason why Kuhn's notion of exemplars should not be seen as heuristically useful for understanding a particular aspect of the Pauline corpus, as long as certain qualifications are recognized. We are not claiming that language about exemplars and analogy would have been intelligible to Paul and his audience. Rather, this is a description we have imposed from our own contemporary perspective on our exegetical findings. Our exegetical work in section II is an attempt to understand Paul on his own terms. Our concluding comments here are attempts to understand Paul on our terms" (ibid., 205-6).

\textsuperscript{326}See, e.g., Hauerwas, "Reforming"; \textit{idem}, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}; Goldberg, \textit{Theology and Narrative}. 

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discover the social and intellectual context in which that language once made sense. He argues that in pre-Homeric Greece language of "good" and "bad" was intimately tied to common stories, stories about what it meant to live and die well. Virtue, ὀρέτη, was not some free-floating moral quality which was simply intuited. Rather, the Greeks had a very concrete sense of their obligations and duties within the πόλεις and of what the ideal life looked like. This basic story of a life lived well was embodied over and over again in concrete tales which were not only entertainment, but were also the chief form of moral education. To have virtue, then, meant quite simply to have the qualities of the hero who succeeded in living that ideal life, to do what contributed to one's εὐδαιμονία. MacIntyre writes:

If a human life is understood as a progress though harms and dangers, moral and physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways and with a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as those qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities which likewise tend to failure. Each human life will then embody a story whose shape and form will depend upon what is counted as a harm and danger and upon how success and failure, progress and its opposite, are understood and evaluated. To answer these questions will also explicitly and implicitly be to answer the question as to what the virtues and vices are. 327

MacIntyre goes on to argue that in fact there must be a narrative structure to any coherent ethical discourse,328 and that the apparent bankruptcy of ethical categories in the modern West is a symptom of our peculiar modern loss of the narrative understanding of life and

327MacIntyre writes that "the difference between the heroic account of the virtues and the Sophoclean amounts precisely to a difference over what narrative form captures best the central characteristics of human life and agency. And this suggests an hypothesis that generally to adopt a stance on the virtues will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life. Why this might be so is easy to understand" (After Virtue, 143-4).
328For a similar approach see Hauerwas, "Vision;" "Character, Narrative, and Growth."
identity in which the notions of good and evil developed.329

Whether or not that further step in his argument works is, for our purposes, neither here nor there. For it is in the midst of that Greek culture, with its virtues and vices grounded as they were in stories about a good life, that Paul wrote his letters. Of course, MacIntyre does not say very much about the Jewish society which nurtured Paul, even in a centre of Hellenistic culture like Tarsus. One might argue that these concepts of virtue and vice are essentially foreign to that Jewish tradition and thus that Paul's ethics need not be tied to a particular narrative. Still, the Jews were also a story-telling people, and it is not by accident that the Hebrew Bible is full of stories, stories which (as Gordon Wenham has recently reminded us) were considered Torah, instruction.330 Surely, then, if MacIntyre's analysis of Greek ethical thinking is even broadly accurate, we should not be surprised to find a similar dependence on narrative in Israelite ethics as well.331

This short engagement with MacIntyre is not enough on its own to justify a narrative reading of Paul, but that is not its purpose. For we have already seen on exegetical grounds that Paul's knowledge, whether theological or ethical, is in fact entirely bound up with a story. What this glance at MacIntyre reminds us is that, in depending on a story as the basis of his ethical thought, the Apostle was following the same kind of moral reasoning which dominated the world around him. Whatever distinctiveness we find in the content of his ethics arises simply from the distinctiveness of his theological narrative.

329See After Virtue, 204ff.
330See G. J. Wenham, Story As Torah.
331MacIntyre himself suggested at least that the centrality of story-telling in moral education was common to ancient Mediterranean and Middle-eastern cultures generally (After Virtue, 121).
4. Beyond Conceptual Knowledge

a. Non-cognitive Modes of Knowledge in Paul

i. Knowledge as experience

In all of the varieties of knowledge which we have examined so far Paul's knowing has been a matter of his having a certain kind of conception of some object. In traditional philosophical language, Paul's knowledge has been a matter of his claiming to have various true beliefs. Yet in some of the passages where Paul talks about knowing things, he does not seem to be talking about having a belief at all. In many of these passages Paul talks about knowing an object in the sense of having an experience of it.

Take, for example, Phil 4:12, where Paul reminds the Philippians, "I know what it is (οἶδα) to have little, and I know what it is (οἶδα) to have plenty." He is not claiming to have the right kind of beliefs here, but rather reminding them that he has had both of these kinds of experience. Similarly in 2 Cor 5:21 the Apostle declares that "he [God] made him to be sin who knew no sin (τὸν μὴ γνώντα ἁμαρτίαν)." Surely this is not supposed to mean that Jesus had no conception of sin, but rather that he had no first-hand experience

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332 See: γινώσκω, Rom 1:21; 7:7; and possibly Rom 3:17 (which is complicated by its being a quotation from the LXX of Isa 59:8); 1 Cor 1:21; 2 Cor 2:21; Gal 4:9; γνῶσις, 2 Cor 2:14; 4:6; 10:5; Phil 3:8; γνωρίζω, Rom 16:26; ἐπὶ γνώσεως, 1 Cor 13:12; 16:18; Col 1:6; ἔπι γνώσεως, Rom 3:20; ἀγνωσία, 1 Cor 14:38b; Gal 1:22; ἀγνωσία, 1 Cor 15:34; οἶδα, Rom 7:7; 2 Cor 5:11; 12:2a, 3a; Gal 4:8; Phil 4:12 (*2); 1 Thess 4:5; 5:12; 2 Thess 1:8.

Also probably ἐπὶ γνώσεως in Rom 1:28, where retaining such knowledge of God is a matter of worshipping him. This is essentially the position of Cranfield (Romans 1.128). See also ἐπὶ γνώσεως in Col 1:10. Bultman thinks that ἐπὶ γνώσεως Rom 10:2 implies the "obedient recognition" of God's will and not simply awareness or understanding of it (Bultmann, "γινώσκω," 1.707). True Paul does say in 10:3 not only that Israel lacks knowledge of the righteousness of God, but that their crucial failure is a failure to submit themselves to that righteousness. Yet is their failure to submit themselves to God's righteousness a sign of their ignorance because knowledge includes such submission to God, or is it simply that they could not submit themselves because they did not come to the intellectual recognition that this message about God's righteousness was true? Likewise, Bultmann's reading of Rom 2:18; 7:1; and 2 Cor 5:16 in terms of "aquaintance" is unconvincing (Bultmann, "γινώσκω," 1.703-4).

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of sinning.\textsuperscript{333} In 2 Cor 5:11 Paul describes himself as "knowing (εἰδοτες) the fear of the Lord" and therefore trying to persuade others. This again means not simply that the Apostle has an idea of what such fear is like, but that he actually lives in the fear of the Lord. This fear of God which he is persuading others to adopt is not merely an idea, but an attitude of submission to and reverence of God, and his point is that his persuasion of others grows out of his own experience of this way of living.

\textit{ii. Knowledge as personal relationship}

A specialized case of Paul's use of knowledge language to denote personal experience of something is his talk about knowing in the sense of having a relationship with someone. When in 2 Cor 12:2 Paul says, "I know (οἶδα) a person in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven," he is not primarily concerned with claiming to have certain beliefs about this person. He is saying that this is a person with whom he has had a relationship, with whom he has some direct familiarity. This is all the more plain when we realize that in this case the person about whom Paul is so delicately talking seems to be himself. He is not saying, "I have good beliefs about this person," but, "[Y]ou can trust me on this because I have intimate familiarity with this person."

Likewise, in Gal 1:22 Paul assures the Galatians that after his conversion he remained

\textsuperscript{333} This is better than Bultmann's suggestion ("γνωσκω," 1.703) that we understand it in the sense of "mastery." The point is not about whether Jesus had mastered sin (whatever that would mean), but whether he had experienced it first-hand.

Likewise, in Romans 7:7 Paul says that he would not have known sin (τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οἴκε ἕγων) apart from the law's influence (cf. the ἐπιγνώσεις ἁμαρτίας in Rom 3:20). One could suggest that this is simply a matter of the law framing certain experiences and actions in terms of a story in which they become understood as sin. Yet Paul seems to envision the law as actually provoking sin: ὁφορημέν ἐξ αἰσχοῦσα ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς κατατρόπωσεν ἐν ἐμοὶ πόσον ἐπιθυμῶς... (7:8). Indeed it brought death to Paul (7:10). Thus, while the knowledge of sin here seems sometimes to be a matter of having an interpretive story which makes it visible (see 7:13), Paul can also understand knowledge of such a cosmic power in terms of direct, experiential familiarity (so Bultmann, "γνωσκω," 1.703).
"unknown by sight" (ἀγνοοἵμενος τῶν προσώπων) to the churches in Judea. There is no question of the Judean believers not knowing about him, for Paul tells us that they were amazed at his conversion: "The one who formerly was persecuting us is now proclaiming the faith he once tried to destroy" (Gal 1:23). What Paul wants to convey is rather that they were not familiar with his appearance.

**iii. Knowledge as personal recognition of authority or merit**

Yet this sort of direct familiarity is not the only non-cognitive mode in which Paul "knows." We also find in Paul what Bultmann somewhat misleadingly called the "OT" view, in which "knowledge is also a movement of the will." We have already glanced at the passage in 1 Cor 14:38 in which Paul insists that if a would-be prophet does not recognize Paul's writing as a command of the Lord, then that person "is not to be recognized (ἀγνοεῖται)." Plainly what Paul means here is that their claim to a prophetic role in the community should not be accepted. This does involve some cognitive content. The community members are not to interpret the pretender's actions in terms of the role of a legitimate prophet in the theological story. Yet there is also, as Bultmann pointed out, a movement of the will involved here which was clearly not involved with Paul's mundane and theological and ethical knowledge. To "know" someone in this sense would be to recognize their legitimate role in the story and then act appropriately toward them.

In the case of the would-be prophets, this element of appropriate response would be a matter of, among other things, granting them a measure of authority. This mode of knowledge need not be, however, a matter of submission. In 1 Cor 16:18 Paul has been

\[334\] Bultmann, "γνωστική," 704.
talking about people like Stephanas and Fortunatus and Achaicus, apparently members of a delegation to Paul from the Corinthian church. Paul is thankful for the way in which "they refreshed my spirit as well as yours," and so he urges the Corinthians to "give recognition to (ἐπιγινώσκετε) such persons." This is not so much a matter of submitting to their authority as it is one of granting them honour in the community. What is common to both of these passages, however, is that Paul's "knowledge" involves not only a recognition of someone's role in the theological narrative, but also one's willingness to treat them accordingly.

b. Paul's Knowledge of God/Christ

i. "Knowledge of God" in the Old Testament

By far the most frequent object of Paul's experiential knowledge is God himself, and here we cannot do justice to Paul's conception without at least a glance back at the way the writers of the Old Testament would speak of the "knowledge of God." As we do so, however, we must avoid the common tendency to say that this idea of knowledge as experience is characteristic of the "Hebrew mind," while the "Greek mind" occupies the

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335 See also 1 Thess 5:12, where Paul wants the Thessalonians "to respect (εἰδοὺ) those who labor among you, and have charge of you in the Lord and admonish you." Clearly Paul expects that this "knowledge" will go along with a submission to their authority, but this is not his primary focus when he pens these words. He goes on in 5:13 to urge the people to "esteem them very highly in love because of their work."

336 See also 2 Cor 1:13a where Paul claims only to write about ἀναγινώσκετε ἢ καί ἐπιγινώσκετε. Thrall suggests that what Paul means by their "knowing" what he writes is actually their "acknowledgment" or active "recognition" of its truth or validity (see 2 Corinthians, 1.133; so Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 128 and perhaps Martin, 2 Corinthians, 19). Other commentators, however, tend to understand ἐπιγινώσκετε in 1:13a as "understand," so that Paul is emphasizing their ability (or the ability which they should possess) to understand his message (so Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 73; Bultmann, 2 Corinthians, 36 and perhaps Martin, 2 Corinthians, 19).
more arid realm of objective, conceptual knowledge. C. H. Dodd, for example, wrote of the Greek knower, "it is the thing in itself, as static, that he seeks to grasp, eliminating in so far as may be its movements and changes, as being derogatory to its real, permanent essence."337 This might be true enough if one were talking about Plato (and even here the issue is controversial), but as we have seen such static idealism certainly does not represent all of Hellenistic philosophy, let alone popular Greek thought.338 So it is important to recognize that the Greeks, too, can talk of knowledge in terms of immediate familiarity. Homer himself, in the Odyssey (21.35), said of Odysseus and his old friend Iphitus that they never shared a meal: οὔδε τραπέζης γνώσεως ἄλληλων.339 A first century decree boasts that a certain citizen of Olbia "had advanced to personal acquaintance with the Augusti (τῆς τῶν Σεβαστῶν γνώσεως)," that is, with Augustus and Tiberius.340 This gives us cause to wonder whether the habit of the LXX translators to render γνώση with γνώσκω where the "knowledge" is direct experience of sin can really be explained away in terms of the translators' wooden adherence to the same term for the Hebrew word.341

337Dodd, Interpretation, 152. Bultmann ("γνώσις," 1.689) writes that "γνώσις . . . denotes in ordinary Greek the intelligent comprehension of an object or matter, whether this comes for the first time, or comes afresh, into the consideration of the one who grasps it . . ."
338E. R. Dodds' classic study The Greeks and the Irrational, while now somewhat dated, is still a very useful antidote to this tendency to view all of Greek civilization through the Platonic dialogues.
340See M-M, 130. Deissmann suggests that this use of γνώσις directly illuminates Paul's use of the noun for "familiarity" with Christ in Phil 3:8 (Light, 383, note 8). Moulton and Milligan also point to an old and not unusual use of γνώσκω as a euphemism for sexual relations, from the time of Menander, just as τίνης is used in the Hebrew Bible (M-M, 127; see the references in B. D. Durham, Vocabulary of Menander [Princeton: University Press, 1913], 51). The verb γνωρίζω is commonly used in the papyri in the sense of "to recognize" another person (M-M, 129; pOxy VIII.1024 18; VI.976; pHib 1.28*), so that the noun γνωρίσμα can mean a "witness" of someone's identity (See pOxy III.496 18). The verb can also be used in a mystical sense, as in Poimandres 10.15. Note, too, how the phrase εἰς γνώσις ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας in pHib 1.92.13 is translated by the editors "until the decision of the suit"(M-M, 129; cf. pHal I.1.25; pLond 234.18).
341Lev 4:14, 23, 28; 5:3, 4, 17.
the other hand, while it is true that יִנְיָן does typically express this kind of knowledge-by-familiarity more often than, say, the Greek noun γνώσις, we must not forget that Hebrew does have a verbal construction (the hiphil of מַכֶּבֶּל) which comes closer to the more "objective" use of γνώσις. 342

With this major caveat in mind, we may ask what the "knowledge of God" means in the Old Testament. More than anything else this knowledge means, in the words of Johannes Botterweck, "a practical and active recognition of God." 343 It is most often a passionate devotion to Yahweh. Mays describes the "knowledge of God" (דעת אל יהוה) which is so prominent in Hosea as "Israel's personal response to the salvation-history of election and obedience to the requirements of the covenant." 344 God's desire, according to the prophet, is for "steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings" (Hos 6:6). Indeed, throughout the Old Testament, those who "know" God are those who "seek" him (Ps 9:11[10]), 345 who "serve" him wholeheartedly (1 Chr 28:9), who "return" to him (Hos 6:3 [cf. 6:1]), who show "steadfast love" (Hos 2:19-20; 6:6). 346 To have the "knowledge of God" is to live in the "fear of the LORD" (Prov 2:5; cf. 9:10). Hence, when the people forget God and worship idols they show that they do not "know

342 See HALOT, 1.700.
344 Mays, Hosea, 63-4.
345 Although Ps 9:11 it is actually God's name which is known (יִנְיָן שָׁמַע), this is clearly a circumlocution for YHWH himself. Isa 58:2 is less clear, where it is God's "ways" which are known by those who seek him. In Hos 10:12, however, the declaration that it is time to seek YHWH (גֹּמַע וַדָּא הַנִּסְרָיִם) is a call to the same repentant obedience which is described as "knowledge of God" in 6:3, 6. The equivalence of the two expressions is underlined by the fact that in both 6:6 and 10:12 this knowledge is set in parallel with מַכֶּבֶּל.
346 Note how in Isa 19:21, where it is predicted that Egyptians will "know YHWH," this means that they will perform acts of cultic worship to him.
YHWH. As Hosea writes: "their deeds do not permit them to return to their God. For the spirit of whoredom is within them, and they do not know the LORD" (Hos 5:4).

Along with this devotion, the knowledge of God entails an ethical way of life. To know God is to live in harmony with the divine will, and only the righteous can enjoy that knowledge. Thus Jeremiah warns Jehoiakim in no uncertain terms:

Are you a king because you compete in cedar? Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? says the LORD. (Jer 22:15-16; cf. Hos 2:19-20)

Likewise, it is when his Torah is inscribed on the hearts of the people that God says they will all "know" him (Jer 31:33f.). Indeed, Isaiah foresees a time when "they will not hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain" because "the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD" (Isa 11:9). On the other hand, when the knowledge of God is missing in Israel this manifests itself in corrupt dealings between human beings (Jer 9:2[3]; Hos 4:1f.), and in Israel's refusal to turn from their wickedness (Hos 5:4). When Israel abandons the knowledge of God the result is, as Walter Harrelson writes, "an age of violence, of breaking all boundaries."

Moreover, those who do not know God, whether Israelite or

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347 Cf. Jer 2:8; 4:22; Hos 4:6, 10. In 1 Sam 2:12 the sons of Eli are described as not "knowing YHWH" (נָאֳשָׁהַיִּשְׁתָּן יְהוֹה), and this manifests itself in their desecration of the cult. In Isa 1:3 Israel's apostasy is described as a lack of knowledge, though here there is no explicit object of the knowing.

1 Sam 3:7 is unusual in that here the knowledge of God seems to be less a matter of proper devotion than of intimate relationship. We are told that "Samuel did not yet know the LORD, and the word of the LORD had not yet been revealed to him." This does not mean that Samuel lacked devotion to YHWH, but simply that he was not yet on speaking terms with the deity. This passage should likely not be understood, however, as exhibiting a completely different idea of "knowing God." Rather, here the idea of relationship (which is always present in talk about knowledge of God) emphasized, while the element of proper devotion recedes into the background.

348 See also Deut 4:39-40, where knowing "that the LORD is God in heaven above and on the earth below" is closely tied to keeping "his statutes and his commandments." Cf. Jer 9:23[24].

not, face not only chaos but also divine judgment. So the Psalmist prays, "Pour out your anger on the nations that do not know you, and on the kingdoms that do not call on your name, for they have devoured Jacob and laid waste his habitation" (78:6-7; cf. Jer 10:25).

350 See also Job 18:5-21 where we read of horrific punishments and are then told: "Surely such are the dwellings of the ungodly, such is the place of those who do not know God."

We should also acknowledge here the similar talk in the OT about knowing that God is YHWH. The refrain "know that I am the LORD" draws many of the oracles of judgement and blessing to a close (e.g., Ezek 6:7, 13; 12:20; 15:7; 25:7, 11, 17; 26:6; 28:22, 23). Zimmerli argues that the formula "know that I am the LORD" originates in "the sphere of legal examination in which a sign of truth was demanded" (Ezekiel, 1.37). Thus to know that God is YHWH is to receive a demonstration proving, and at the same time revealing, God's unique identity. Zimmerli also observes, however, that this knowledge-formula always follows a description of the great acts of God which the people will experience. Thus, this knowledge that God is YHWH is not detached assent to some theoretical affirmations. It is a recognition of God's identity which flows from the experience of YHWH as he destroys the high places, desolates the altars, and lays waste Judah's towns (Ezekiel, 1.38). It is the acknowledgment of YHWH as the one who ends the mourning of Jerusalem, who brings them back into their land, and who establishes an eternal covenant with the people (16:59-63; 20:42, 44; 24:19-27; 28:24, 26; 29:21; 34:27; 36:11, 38; 37:6, 13-14; 39:22, 28). Indeed, in 20:5, 9 the divine voice says that it was in the Exodus, with the establishment of the covenant, that YHWH made himself known to Israel. Hence in 25:14 the prophet can exchange the formula "then they shall know that I am LORD" with the declaration, "they shall know my vengeance" (cf. 17:21). The knowledge is precisely the recognition of God as God which arises from an experience of his deeds. Notice too that in 20:11, 12, 20 the regular practice of the Sabbath seems intended to embed this recognition of YHWH's identity in Israel.

In Ezekiel the formula "know that I am the LORD" seems sometimes to lack the idea of intimacy and ongoing relationship which is present in other Israelite talk of "knowing God." In many places YHWH promises to destroy foreign nations, who will thus "know that I am YHWH" (29:6; 9; 30:8, 19, 25, 26; 32:15; 39:6; see and perhaps 35:15). The foreign nations also receive this knowledge of God when they see Israel restored by God (36:23; 37:28; 39:7; cf. 36:36) or see Gog destroyed at his hand (38:16, 23). Yet language about "knowing" that God "is YHWH" also appears elsewhere in the OT (Exod 6:7; cf. Exod 16:6; 12; 29:46; Deut 4:35; 1 Kgs 20:13, 28; 2 Kgs 5:15), and in these cases outside Ezekiel the construction seems to include that relational idea more prominently. Since this acknowledgement of God as God springs from the experience of his involvement in history, it also entails a recognition of God's reliability. After reminding the people of the exodus experiences, Moses urges them: "Know therefore that the LORD your God is God, the faithful God who maintains covenant loyalty with those who love him and keeps his commandments, to a thousand generations ..." (Deut 7:9). This knowledge that God is YHWH involves a trusting dependence on Israel's God as the one who saves. See, e.g., Ps 100:3, where the psalmist exhorts the congregation to "know that the LORD is God. It is he that made us, and we are his; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."

This means that outside Ezekiel "knowledge of God" and "knowledge that God is YHWH" are not clearly distinguishable. So in Jer 9:23[24] "knowing God" is equated with knowing "that" he "is the LORD." This knowledge involves trusting that he acts "with steadfast love, justice, and righteousness in the earth" and looking forward to his coming judgment and restoration (9:24-25[25-26]). Likewise, when the divine voice in Jeremiah predicts that the people will have knowledge that God is YHWH, it goes on to elaborate on this knowledge in terms of devotion and repentance: "and they shall be my people and I will be their God, for they shall return to me with their whole heart" (Jer 24:7). The experience of being
ii. Paul's knowledge of God

When we turn back to Paul it does not take long to realize that when the object of Paul's knowing is God himself it is this kind of relationship of which he is thinking. In these contexts, at least, Bultmann is right that "[k]nowledge of God is a lie if it is not acknowledgement of him." Knowledge of God is, for the Apostle, a matter of shifting from the hostile opposition which is humanity's default state into a harmonious relationship with the Creator. So, the Gentiles are, by definition, those who do not know (τά μη εἰδότα) God (1 Thess 4:5). Likewise, in Gal 4:8-9 the Galatians were ignorant of God (οὐκ εἰδότες θεόν) prior to their conversion but now know him (γινόμενες θεόν), this passage is particularly instructive when we notice how Paul immediately stops himself and adds, as if by way of an afterthought, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ

brought back from exile (24:6) will produce in the people both a recognition that YHWH is their faithful saviour and the devotion to God from which that recognition is inseparable. On the other hand Pharaoh's lack of "knowledge of God" (with God as direct object) in Exod 5:2 amounts to the same kind of recognition of God's identity which is usually conveyed by "knowledge that" language. Pharaoh asks, "Who is the LORD that I should heed him and let Israel go? I do not know the LORD, and I will not let Israel go." See also Judges 2:10, where the narrator explains that "another generation grew up ... who did not know the LORD or the work that he had done for Israel." So Piper, "Knowledge," 44. Zimmerman ("Knowledge of God," 475) understands the element in Paul's knowledge of God which he owes to the Old Testament as "an expression of genuine religious feeling." This does not do justice to the powerfully ethical and soteriological character of Paul's knowledge of God (both of which Zimmerman acknowledges), but it does highlight the element of devotion. See, e.g., 2 Cor 4:6, where in order to give the believers this "knowledge of the glory of God" he "has shone in our hearts."

351Bultmann, Theology, 1.213.
352So Dupont, Gnosis, 1-2. See also 2 Thess 1:8.
353Strong, following Ridderbos, understands this participial clause to be causal as well as temporal, so that the Galatians' enslavement was the result of their lack of knowledge of God. While Paul might have been happy with such a suggestion, there is little justification for it in the text ("Knowledge of God," 71-2).
354Bultmann finds a subtle difference in the meaning of the two verbs here, arguing that the participle of εἰδίκω was an "instance where in the concept of knowledge of God the element of knowledge emerges alongside and sometimes prior to that of acknowledgement"("γνωσθέντες, 1.705). Γινόμενες, on the other hand, is understood as primarily a matter of acknowledgement and the resulting relationship. Yet the two verbs here seem to be expressing first the lack and then the possession of the same knowledge, and there is not a solid enough basis for distinguishing between εἰδίκω and γινόμενες in this period to argue that the variation in verb necessarily introduces a shift in meaning.
The Galatians' knowledge of God might more accurately be understood as their having been known by God. On the one hand this suggests that Paul's emphasis in his talk about "knowledge" here is not on the cognitive content of the Galatians' beliefs, but rather on their conversion, the shift in their allegiances, and the salvific relationship with God which resulted. Perhaps in order to guard against the impression that the choice and reconciliation was entirely the Galatians' doing, he shifts the agency to God. It was God who brought them near, God who transferred them from a hostile camp to his own. The emphasis falls not on what narrative one has in mind but rather on the end goal of those narratives, allegiance to God and the relationship with him which that allegiance makes possible. Thus, when Paul reminds the Corinthians that the world, through its wisdom, did not know (οὐκ ἔγνω) God, the positive counterpart to this lack of knowledge is God's salvation of those who believe (1 Cor 1:21). As in Jer 10:25 and Ps 78(79):6, those who do not share this knowledge of God face "flaming fire" and "vengeance" when God's judgment is realized, though for Paul this event is located at Christ's parousia (2 Thess 1:7-8).

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356 So Fee, 1 Corinthians, 72. Strong ("Knowledge of God," 61) sees some tension between this denial of gentile knowledge of God and the affirmation of that knowledge in Rom 1:21. He tries to resolve this tension by suggesting that the knowledge which the Gentiles did possess was simply conceptual, knowledge that God exists, while the knowledge which is denied in 1 Cor 1:21 is the more robust knowledge which includes familiarity and response. Yet there are good reasons for regarding the knowledge in Rom 1:21 as more than merely conceptual, and Paul may well not have envisioned that pristine knowledge as anything more than an unrealized potential. For all intents and purposes, human wisdom is unable to bring people into full knowledge of God in Paul's present (see above, pp. 15-21). To push for more precise harmony between the two passages is to expect a kind of exactness with which Paul is not concerned.

Seesemann ("οἶδα," 117) suggests that "knowledge of God" becomes a marker of division between "Gentiles" and the Church when ethnic lines of demarcation have been removed. This is, however, to overlook the way in which "knowledge of God" played the same boundary marking role already in the Hebrew Scriptures.
For one to emerge from spiritual ignorance into the knowledge of God is not, for Paul, simply a matter of adopting new beliefs. It involves devotion and worship. Whether or not Paul believed that the sequence of events narrated in Rom 1:18-32 actually took place in a primordial age, it is instructive to observe the relationship there between knowledge of God and proper worship. In Rom 1:21 Paul describes humanity as having originally known God (γνώσεις τοῦ θεοῦ) through the created order, but not worshipping him as God (οὐχ ὤς θεὸν ἔδοξασαν). It seems that their knowledge of God called for a certain kind of worship, a relational response which fitted God's unique character. 357 Indeed, when they gave up this devotion and set images of creatures in the place of the Creator (1:23), the result was that their knowledge turned to folly (ἐματιαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν). So, in 1:28 Paul says that they did not see fit to retain their knowledge of God (οὐκ ἔδοξασαν τὸν θεὸν ἑχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει). 358 To abandon their proper devotion to God was at the same time to abandon the knowledge of him, the familiar relationship with him, which that worship sustained. 359

357So Strong, "Knowledge," 47. Strong (ibid., 45-6) suggests that this is a "cognitive perception" of God's existence and that humanity's failure was a failure to move from this into a responsive, committed knowledge. Yet it is far from clear that this was Paul's intent. See above, p. 18.

358We should not, with Bultmann, blur the boundaries between the knowledge of God and the proper response. Bultmann writes that "[u]nlike the preaching of the prophets, Christian missionary proclamation is not directed primarily against the practical denial of God is Israel; it is addressed to the heathen who do not honour the one God. Thus in the concept of the knowledge of God the element of knowledge emerges alongside and sometimes prior to that of acknowledgment" ("YLVW<JKW," 705). Yet "the two are obviously linked" in Rom 1:18-23 ("YLVW<JKW," 705). Notice, however, that humanity is able to disobey while they have knowledge of God. The loss of knowledge is a consequence of disobedience, but it is not identified with disobedience. Thus there is no implication that we should identify the knowledge with obedience, either.

359See also Wis 13:1ff., where those who "were ignorant of God" are described as "foolish in nature," and this foolishness issues in idolatry. In 14:8-11 the sage describes a future judgment on this folly, while in 14:12-14 such idolatry is linked to sexual immorality. Hence a lack of knowledge of God issues, as in Rom 1:18-32, in all other sin, and in both passages this lack of knowledge is linked with idolatry, improper worship. The difference, of course, is that for the sage idolatry is the result of ignorance, while for Paul idolatry results in the loss of knowledge.
Even more clear in Paul is the way in which, as in the Old Testament, the knowledge of God involves for Paul a willingness to obey the divine will.\textsuperscript{360} In 1 Thess 4:5 Paul defines the righteousness which he wants to encourage in them by contrasting it with the "lustful passion" of "the Gentiles who do not know (τὰ μὴ εἰδότα) God" (see vv. 3-5).\textsuperscript{361} In 2 Thess 1:8, "those who do not know (μὴ εἰδόσιν) God" are "those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus."\textsuperscript{362} Paul's strategy in 1 Cor 15:34 to shame the Corinthians into abandoning their sin involves pointing out that this is the way of life which characterizes an ignorance of God (ἀγνωσίαν ... θεοῦ). Even in 2 Cor 10:5, where Paul describes his fight against "arguments and every proud obstacle raised up against the knowledge of God," this knowledge involves a particular moral will. The Apostle's description of these "proud obstacles" which are exalted against God evokes images of idolatry and certainly suggests that the knowledge of God which is being attacked involves the opposite, fitting devotion to the Creator.\textsuperscript{363} Yet, in order to keep one's hold on this knowledge Paul says that he must also "take every thought captive to obey Christ." It comes as no surprise then when, in Col 1:10, we find that Paul can talk about walking in a way which pleases God, bearing fruit, and then re-state this way of life in terms of growing in the knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{364} On the other hand, Paul assumes in 1 Thess 4:5 that

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{360} So Dupont, \textit{Gnosis}, 2.
    \item \textsuperscript{361} So Strong, "Knowledge of God," 94.
    \item \textsuperscript{362} So Strong, "Knowledge of God," 100.
    \item \textsuperscript{363} So Strong, "Knowledge of God," 68-9.
    \item \textsuperscript{364} Strong suggests that this εἰπερισκεῖται τοῦ θεοῦ should be understood as equivalent to the εἰπερισκεῖται τοῦ θελητοῦ αὐτοῦ in 1:9 ("Knowledge of God," 85). This parallel does add to the likelihood that the latter phrase carried ethical overtones. We should take seriously, however, the fact that the objects of the knowledge are different: in one case a conceptual grasp of God's ethical will, in the other God himself. Given the way in which knowledge of God's will does not necessarily mean obedience in Paul and the way in which knowledge of God himself usually involves elements of experiential familiarity and relationship, we should be hesitant to jump to the conclusion that the two phrases denote the same
\end{itemize}
the Gentiles "who do not know God" are those whose actions are determined by "lustful passions."

As was evident in the Old Testament, this knowledge is not simply a matter of having experience of something. The knowledge of God does involve, for Paul, some cognitive content. Paul implies as much in 2 Cor 10:4 where his defense of his knowledge (γνώσεως) of God against "every proud obstacle" involves controlling his thoughts. Yet even here, as we have seen, this knowledge cannot be reduced to merely having the right conceptions about the deity. The knowledge of God is, for Paul just as much as for his Hebrew ancestors, a relationship in which one responds with loving obedience to the God who is encountered in history.

iii. Paul's knowledge of Christ

The new note sounded in Paul's talk about the "knowledge of God," however, is the remarkable way in which Christ, a human being, becomes involved as a mediator of that knowledge—and even an object of this devotion in his own right.365 When God gives the believers "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God," they meet this knowledge "in the face of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor 4:6). Indeed, in Col 1:27 what God makes known (γνώσις) is not himself, but "the riches of the glory of this mystery, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory," and in Col 2:2 Paul's desire is that the Laodiceans will have "the knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of God's mystery, that is, Christ himself." In 2 Cor 2:14 he praises the God who "in Christ always leads us in triumphal procession, and through us spreads in

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every place the fragrance of his knowledge (τῆς γνώσεως αὐτοῦ).\footnote{My adaptation of the NRSV translation.} Whose knowledge is this? The pronoun "his" (αὐτοῦ) is ambiguous, but in the following verse the ambiguity is cleared up when Paul writes that "we are the aroma of Christ . . ." (2 Cor 2:15). It is thus the fragrance of the knowledge of Christ which the believers radiate into the world. Christ himself has become an object of the same special knowledge which had before been reserved for God alone.

Lest we imagine that this knowledge of Christ is somehow inferior to the knowledge of God, we must recognize that for Paul this knowledge of the crucified saviour is tantamount to salvation itself. In Phil 3:8, for instance, Paul declares that his knowledge of Christ (γνώσεως Χριστοῦ) is so exceedingly valuable that he considers all else "loss" (ζημία) in comparison.\footnote{It is commonly assumed that Paul is, in these verses, thinking of his experience on the Damascus road (e.g., Dupont, \textit{Gnosis}, 35). We should note, however, that this experience is nowhere mentioned explicitly in Phil 3, and that Paul's focus here seems to lie less on the point in time when knowledge of Christ was gained than on the contrast between the old state and the new one in Christ.} Already the implication is that salvation itself must lie in this knowledge of Christ, and in the following sentence Paul rephrases his declaration of profound devotion by saying that he is willing to consider everything else dung (σκύβαλα) in order to "gain Christ" (Χριστοῦ κερδήσω). Surely to gain Christ (and likewise, then, to know Christ) includes, for Paul, the experience of the salvation which Christ brings. Notice, too, that the things which Paul gives up for the sake of this knowledge are the marks of Jewish piety which he has just mentioned. He was "circumcised on the eighth day, a member of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews; as to the law, a Pharisee; as to zeal a persecutor of the church;
as to righteousness under the law, blameless" (Phil 3:5-6). These are precisely those things which mark a Jew as a faithful member of the covenant. Thus, to know Christ is more important to Paul than to maintain these old marks of his salvation, of his "knowledge of God" in the old sense of that expression. To know Christ is to gain a salvation which cannot be gained anywhere else.

Nor can we overlook the way in which, in Phil 3:9, Paul so closely associates "gaining" Christ (and thus "knowing" him) with being "found in him." Knowledge of Christ is thus inseparable from that very identification of the believer with his Lord which looms so large in his theological story. To know Christ is to somehow share in his cross and in his resurrection. So we read in Phil 3:10 how the Apostle desires

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\text{to know Christ (τὸν γνώσασθαι αὐτὸν) and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his sufferings by becoming like him in his death, if somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead.}
\]

Here is the root of the "peculiarly personal intensity" which G. B. Caird saw in Paul's knowledge of Christ.\(^{368}\) To know Christ is not simply to have the right concepts about him, but nor is it simply to be devoted to him. It is not simply a matter of changing one's life to conform with Christ's will, though this is present in Paul's thought as well.\(^{369}\) Knowledge of Christ includes all of these things, but more than that this knowledge is for Paul a matter of somehow living Christ's life along with him, passing through his passion and

\(^{368}\)Caird, Letters from Prison, 137. So Zimmerman ("Knowledge of God," 476) who sees this knowledge of Christ coming to its typical expression in love, though his observation that to "love God" can be equated with being "known by him" is beside the point (cf. 1 Cor 8:3). Cf. Piper, "Knowledge," 45: "for Paul [knowledge of God] is primarily the experience of the risen Lord's operation in the life of his church. . . . Thereby knowledge assumes a personal character, by means of which it is essentially differentiated from the knowledge of Gnosticism."

\(^{369}\)Notice, too, how in Rom 16:26 the knowledge of Christ which goes out to the Gentiles is εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως.
yearning for the day when he will experience Christ's resurrection. 370

5. Summary: Living the Story

Our goal in this chapter was to see whether we could discern in the objects of Paul's knowing any distinct logical structure. What we have found is that Paul's knowledge falls into four distinct categories. The first three of these categories are different kinds of conceptual knowledge. Paul knows, in the first place, about many ordinary events and observable patterns in everyday life. This is his mundane knowledge, and in this sphere there is little to distinguish Paul from the average inhabitant of the Roman world. More interesting for our purposes is what we have termed Paul's theological knowledge. Here we discovered that Paul's knowledge, when it moved beyond the mundane sphere of ordinary life, consisted of a story. The Apostle's individual claims to theological knowledge turned out to be allusions to a grand narrative of humanity's relationship with its Creator.

We saw that this theological story is not an end in itself for Paul, but led us naturally into his ethical knowledge. This third category of Paul's knowledge consisted of a hermeneutical skill, the skill of setting the mundane events of one's life properly into the context of the theological story. Here again, however, we found that this narrative interpretation of ordinary events served a purpose beyond itself. For the goal of Paul's ethical knowledge is to live out a good role in that theological narrative in the hope that one will live to experience the blessed life which it offers the elect. At this point Paul's

370It is this non-cognitive knowledge to which Pope ("Faith and Knowledge," 424) points, though to call it a "mystic experience" may be misleading.
conceptual knowledge comes to an end and points beyond itself to a knowledge of God and of Christ which is not merely intellectual. This knowledge is a matter of direct familiarity with the divine Person. It involves being related to God in an attitude of humble worship and obedience, and even more comes for Paul to mean that one is identified with the life of Christ himself, lives out his passion, and waits to experience his resurrection.

What conclusions should we draw from this? Among other things, the narrative structure of Paul's theological knowledge helps us to understand why, as exegetes have been realizing for some time now, Paul's "theological" and "ethical" teaching are so intimately intertwined. Paul's ethical knowledge grows out of the conjunction of the theological story with the events of life. The hermeneutical element which enters into Paul's approach to knowledge at this point, as he interprets his "small" story in light of the larger story of God's action in Christ, also confirms the insights of Lührmann, Keck, Becker, and Moores which we surveyed at the end of chapter 1. The logic assumed in Paul's talk about knowledge is an interpretive, hermeneutical logic. It remains to be seen how this interpretive logic actually functions in Paul's arguments. We also must ask whether our description of the Apostle's theological knowledge in narrative terms will carry any explanatory weight. Does it help us to understand Paul's assumptions about

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371 So Victor Furnish: "Because the indicative and imperative aspects of Paul's preaching are so vitally interrelated, it is an exceedingly difficult task to single out and summarize the peculiarly 'ethical' aspects of his gospel. In an important sense the exposition of the themes of Paul's preaching has already, and in the most appropriate way, revealed the character of the Pauline ethic" (Theology & Ethics, 207). Nor is this situation unique to Paul among early Christian writers. In fact, Hauerwas' account of the rise of "Christian ethics" as a discipline, suggests that it was not until the rise of medieval ethical casuistry that ethics was perceived as a distinct enterprise from theology (See his "Christian Ethics").
knowing? With both of these questions in mind, we now turn to the letter to the Galatians.
CHAPTER III: COMING TO KNOWLEDGE IN PAUL'S LETTER TO THE GALATIANS

We are only now coming to the point of my interrogation of Paul. Having uncovered the narrative structure in Paul's knowledge, we are now ready to ask what kind of interpretive reasoning the apostle encourages when he leads his audiences to new knowledge. In this chapter we will focus on Paul's letter to the Galatians, and examine the logical structure of the Apostle's arguments as he tries to offer his audience convincing reasons for placing their confidence in his version of the Gospel. As we uncover the logic of Paul's reasoned arguments we will be able to infer from this logic something about how the Apostle assumes human beings can come to religious knowledge.

1. Reading the World

a. Emplotting Paul and his audience in Galatians 1:1-2:14

Although Paul's epistolary opening in 1:1-5 is not openly argumentative, we find that already the Apostle is preparing for the argument to follow by carefully locating himself and his audience within his theological story. In an unusually long and elaborate self-identification, Paul introduces himself as "an apostle" (one commissioned and sent...
on a mission\(^{375}\) who was "sent neither by human commission nor from human authorities" (1:1). The one who sent him, who authorised his message, is no mere human being, but "Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead" (1:1).\(^{376}\) Paul is claiming at the outset that he is an authorized messenger of the God who in Christ is rescuing humanity. The implicit thrust of this self-identification is that the Galatians cannot play other authorities off against him or decide that someone else knows better.\(^{377}\) If they want to occupy a good role in the story, to play the role of "the saved," they must heed the Apostle's word, for his message is the message of the God who saves. Paul's terse identification of the addressees as "the churches of Galatia," while undoubtedly signalling his unhappiness with their conduct, still locates his audience within his theological narrative as members of "churches," communities of those being saved, communities of

\(^{375}\) Sandnes is right that the unusual expression here, where the title ἀπόστολος is followed by prepositional phrases supplying the agents who sent (or did not send) him, emphasizes the verbal meaning underlying the term, "one being sent" (One of the Prophets, 66; so Martyn, Galatians, 83). As Dunn observes, Christians put an increasing amount of theological weight on this common word, and we should understand its sense in Paul here on the basis of the specification which follows (Galatians, 25; so Martyn, Galatians, 82). On the origins and development of Christian use of ἀπόστολος see Betz, Galatians, 74-5; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 2-4; Rengstorf, "ἀπόστολος"; and P. Barnett, "Apostle" and the literature cited there.

\(^{376}\) Martyn (Galatians, 85) notes that God and Jesus are both identified here primarily by their action in the passion and resurrection (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 5), reinforcing the impression that Paul's theology has a narrative shape. Moreover, Bryant observes that only here and in Romans does Paul refer to the crucifixion or resurrection in the opening of a letter (Crucified Christ, 114), and this suggests that Paul is especially concerned here to bring this basic element of the narrative back to the Galatians' minds, tying the benefit of that Christ event with the message which Paul (as Christ's appointed representative) now brings. Hence Bryant (Crucified Christ, 115) describes Paul as establishing "an apocalyptic framework" for what follows, i.e. a narrative framework of cosmic proportions.

\(^{377}\) Paul clearly wants to emphasize his independence from other authorities here. It is less clear whether Paul faced a prior charge that he was dependent on others, though the emphatic position of this reference to his apostleship, combined with its antithetical form as a denial and refutation, suggests that he is rebutting such a charge (so Betz, Galatians, 39; Bryant, Crucified Christ, 113; Burton, Galatians, 2-3; Dunn, Galatians, 25; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 4).
people aligned with God's act of restoration (1:2b). \(^{378}\)

The customary wish for "grace and peace" which follows the address (1:3-5) is again greatly expanded and provides a dense reminder of the narrative within which this identity makes sense. \(^{379}\) Jesus "gave himself for our sins to set us free from the present evil age," and this happened "according to the will of our God and Father" (1:4). Paul reminds the Galatians right at the outset of the letter that they are claiming to stand among those who benefit from God's act of salvation in Christ. Indeed, he accepts that as "churches" they are at present heading toward a good end. At the same time, however, he reminds them that not everyone is so fortunate. The present age is "evil" and it is out of this whole order that the Galatians have been rescued by God's mercy. As Paul ends his epistolary prescript in verse 5 with a short doxology, \(^{380}\) one cannot help but detect a threat which lies just below the threshold of speech: that if the Galatian believers continue to reject Paul's message, they will be rejecting the God who sent him and this must threaten their identity as "churches," as those who are being rescued from this evil age.

Leaving aside the customary thanksgiving and prayer for the addressees' wellbeing, \(^{381}\) Paul leaps in 1:6-9 directly into a confrontation with the audience: "I am

\(^{378}\) Betz notes the terseness of this identification, which lacks the usual "epithets and polite compliments" (Galatians, 40; cf. Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:2; 2 Cor 1:1; Phil 1:1; 1 Thess 1:1). As Bryant rightly emphasizes, though, this signal of Paul's displeasure does not take away from the implicit affirmation of the "religious value" which (at least at the moment of writing) the Apostle still perceives in the Galatians' assemblies (Crucified Christ, 116-17).

\(^{379}\) Bryant (Crucified Christ, 120-23) further suggests that the unusual or stereotyped vocabulary in vv. 4-5 may indicate that Paul is drawing on confessional material with which the Galatians are familiar.

\(^{380}\) Betz notes that in none of Paul's other letters does he end his prescript with a doxology, suggesting that the reason here might be the absence of the usual thanksgiving for the addressees (Galatians, 43).

\(^{381}\) So Dunn, Galatians, 38-9; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 13; Jegher-Bucher, Galaterbrief, 24. See Rom 1:8ff.; 1 Cor 1:4ff.; Col 1:3ff.; 1 Thess 1:2ff.; 2 Thess 1:3ff.; Phlm 4ff. Bryant (Crucified Christ, 123-26) suggests that vv. 4-5 are actually a replacement for the usual thanksgiving prayer.
astonished that you are so quickly deserting the one who called you in the grace of Christ.

Here, too, the Apostle does not actually argue, but now asserts his own position by elaborating in more detail the "emplotment" of the Galatians which he began in the letter opening. Paul makes explicit the claim which was only hinted at by the silences in his extended address: that their current practice threatens to undermine their identity as "the saved." Their actions are those of apostates, those who have abandoned God. Locating this apostasy in his theological narrative, Paul says that they are abandoning "the one who called you in the grace of Christ" (1:6). They are "turning to a different Gospel" which is in fact not a gospel at all (1:6c-7a), i.e., to a false narrative which does not lead them to salvation. The visiting teachers in Galatia, far from being a positive influence, are "disturbing" the believers there (ταράσσοντες) as one stirs up

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382 There is general agreement that this section presents the reason for writing the letter (Jegher-Bucher, Galaterbrief, 39; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 13; Martyn, Galatians, 109), and my division here follows that of Martyn (Galatians, 106-7). Betz (Galatians, 16) sees 1:6-11 as an "exordium," but his analysis still recognizes a shift from v. 9 to v. 10 since he identifies vv. 1:10-11 as a "transitus" or "transgressio." Several commentators extend this section to 1:10 (so Burton, Galatians, 18; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 12-3), but this blurs the shift in verse 10 from Paul's outrage at the Galatian situation to his defense of his own authority.

383 So Dunn, Galatians, 40; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 14; Martyn, Galatians, 108. Betz also suggests that the verb used here for "deserting," μετατίθημι, finds its background in political desertion and is intended here "to question [the Galatians'] stability and loyalty, and to characterize their plans as typical 'party politics'" (Galatians, 47). BDAG (642 [3]) points out that ὁ μετατίθημενος is sometimes used as an epithet for a certain Dionysius "who left the Stoics and adopted Epicureanism" (see Diog. Laert. 7.166; Athen., Deipnos. 7.281d). This language was also used to describe the apostasy of Jews in 2 Maccabees (so Dunn, Galatians, 39-40; 2 Macc 4.46; 7.24; 11.24).

384 Betz sees conflict between this denial that the opponents' message is a "gospel" and Gal 2:7, where Paul accepts the legitimacy of a Gospel of circumcision (τὸ εὐφύτευμα τῆς περιστομίας) alongside his Gospel of uncircumcision (τὸ εὐφύτευμα τῆς ἀκροβυσσίας). Yet this is only a problem if we assume, with Betz, that the Jerusalem group (including Peter) had always been preaching the message of the opponents (Betz, Galatians, 49). Moreover, Paul does not seem to intend by his language in 2:7 to signify two different messages but two missions (the genitives in each case denoting the object of the mission) which express the same message.
insurrection in a city.\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{385}Betz (Galatians, 49) highlights the strong political connotations of the verb, though Burton points to usage elsewhere in the NT for a mental disturbance "with excitement, perplexity, or fear" (Galatians, 24-5; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 16; see Matt 2:3; John 14:1; Acts 15:24). In any case, as Martyn demonstrates, the verb certainly means more here than simply "to confuse" (Galatians, 111-12).

This is the first mention of the Galatian "opponents," a group which most regard as a band of outsiders who have entered Galatian communities and who are identified as the source of the problematic teaching. Mark Nanos has recently challenged the consensus view that those seeking to "influence" the Galatians were Jewish-Christian missionaries. He suggests, on the contrary, that they were members of the established Jewish communities in Galatia responsible for the supervision of proselytes. Although there is not space here to give an extended response to Nanos, we should point out that Paul's description in 1:7 of the "influencers" as θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι το εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ (while not an objective description of their work) strongly suggests that these people understood themselves as Christian teachers. This same impression is reinforced by Paul's curse on any who preach a Gospel other than Paul's own (cf. τις ημᾶς εὐαγγελίζεται παρ' ὀπαρεκαβετε . . .). Given that Paul's whole reason for this curse seems to be to impugn the activity of those who are "disturbing" the Galatians, it is significant that the curse only covers self-consciously Christian teachers. For Paul never uses εὐαγγελίζομαι except in the technical sense "to proclaim the Christian Gospel." This curse certainly calls into question Nanos' claim that the Apostle does not challenge the status of the "influencers" as righteous members of God's people (so Irony, 84). The opponents' belief in Christ also seems presupposed by Paul's charge in 6:12 that they are motivated by a desire to escape "being persecuted for the cross of Christ" (τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μὴ δεῖκνωσατε). Nanos suggests (Irony, 223) that these "influencers" are Jews who worry about reprisals from civil authorities if some who claim Jewish identity (and the accompanying exclusion from civic cults) are not fully identifiable as Jewish (i.e., are uncircumcized), but in this case it would be strange for Paul to isolate Christ's cross (as opposed to, say, uncircumcision) as the cause of such civil pressure.

Nanos also points out how thin is the evidence that these opponents were actually "outsiders." Sandnes (Among the Prophets, 50) is typical of those who point to the repeated mention of the opponents in the third person, as a group distinct from the Galatian addressess (1:7; 3:1; 4:17; 5:7, 10, 12; 6:12-13). Nanos rightly observes, however, that Paul's division between these "opponents" and the addressees may be an attempt rhetorically to isolate opponents who would otherwise be seen as a part of the Galatian communities (Irony, 159-71; cf. Thurén, Derhetorizing, 66-7 and Munck, Paul and Salvation). At the same time, if the opponents were Christian teachers inculcating a message at variance with that of the Galatians' own ranks at this early stage. Moreover, we must notice that the Galatian letter is written to all the communities of a region and yet seems to assume that the same specific problem exists in all of these places: teachers encouraging circumcision. Nanos suggests that Paul is simply assimilating different local issues to the same pattern, rhetorically claiming that various local phenomena all amount to the same thing (Irony, 183-84). Yet his view would still require that the Galatian churches all experienced remarkably similar shifts in their thinking (i.e. they all came to desire circumcision) at the same time. It is more likely that they all made a (relatively) sudden shift in their thinking because they were all visited by members of the same group of travelling teachers (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 29).

Nanos also criticizes at length the label "opponents" which we have adopted here for those seeking to "influence" the Galatian believers (see Irony, 119-127). The possibility does remain that these individuals did not conceive of themselves as Paul's opponents. Yet Nanos himself admits that this is certainly how Paul understands them (Irony, 120-21). Since the Apostle is opposing them, they are his opponents and the label need mean no more than that. Thurén has suggested that much of the personal polemic against these "opponents" may actually be standard rhetorical vilification whose terms were often "so well-known to both parties in communication, that no-one took them at their face value" (Derhetorizing, 66-67; cf. DuToit, "Vilification"). Moreover, Thurén suggests that the Galatians beliefs, as well, have been deliberately caricatured in an effort to "exaggerate and redefine them, to reveal their true
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They "want to pervert (\( \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \sigma \tau \rho \varepsilon \phi \alpha \)) the gospel of Christ" (1:7). This is hardly the role in which Paul's opponents in Galatia would cast themselves, but that is precisely Paul's point. Their preaching relies, he argues, on a faulty version of the Christian narrative and so leads to a dangerous mis-construal of the kind of behaviour which leads to a good end. Thus, right at the outset, we find Paul situating his Galatian audience within his telling of the theological story in an attempt to convince them that their present actions place them in a perilous role. He has not yet provided any reasons for accepting his own construal of the theological story over that of the opponents. What he has done, however, is to emplot the audience within his version of that narrative, and so to highlight just how much is at stake for the audience.

This polemical emplotment of his audience is not, of course, the only instrument of persuasion which Paul brings to bear in these opening verses. The Apostle is also engaging in a rhetoric of authority designed to win for his message a favourable hearing.

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386 Martyn observes that \( \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \sigma \tau \rho \varepsilon \phi \alpha \) can be used to signify changing something into its opposite (Galatians, 112; see Acts 2:20; LXX Joel 3:4 [2:31]).

387 Bryant (Crucified Christ, 140-42) points to the function of 1:1-10 as establishing the thematic and rhetorical focus of the letter and agrees that the thrust of this opening is the claim that the Galatians "are putting their lives at stake by deserting the true gospel of Jesus Christ."
So the Galatians are being addressed by God's own "apostle," the one chosen directly by divine powers and not through any intermediary (1:1). Wrapped up with this rhetoric of authority is a rhetoric of shaming which appears not only in Paul's refusal in his opening to offer the Galatians any of the usual polite commendations, but also in his expression of amazement at the course of action they are considering (θαυμάζω, 1:6). These non-discursive elements of the letter's persuasive strategy remind us that, as speech-act theorists have observed, communication is always a complex act of which the cognitive, rational component is only one element. The non-rational, non-discursive elements of Paul's speech-act deserve to be taken with full seriousness, and we will note as we go some of the other points in the letter at which they come to dominate Paul's speech to the Galatians.

At the same time, however, we must not fall into the reductionist trap of treating these non-discursive elements of Paul's strategy as the "real" content of the letter, as if his use of discursive reason were mere window-dressing or a rationalization after the fact of convictions established on other grounds. As important as the non-discursive level of

388 Nanos has argued (Irony, 32-56) that Paul's claim to be "astonished" at the Galatians' behaviour (1:6a) is not actually a symptom of genuine surprise and exasperation but rather a standard rhetorical device for rebuking the addressee of a letter. If he is correct, this would make it even clearer that Paul in 1:6ff. is deliberately trying to induce shame in the Galatians for their acceptance of the opponents' message.

389 See Austin, How to Do Things with Words. Austin distinguishes between the locutionary aspect of a speech-act (the conveying of ideas) and the illocutionary aspect (the effect which the act of speaking has on the audience).

390 Austin, the founder of speech-act theory, certainly did not take such a reductionist view. Rather he emphasized that "constative" speech acts, conveying "ideas" by making "statements," are themselves a kind of "performative" speech-act, an act in which the speaker uses words to affect the hearer in some way—in this case affecting the way in which he or she thinks (see Austin, How to Do Things, 132-46). In this sense we need not draw a sharp line between discourse which employs rational argument and discourse which employs non-rational means of persuasion. On the other hand, this is not to deny that in many cases rational argument does function as the primary means of persuasion in a given speech act.
his rhetoric may have been, a brief glance at the whole of Galatians will show that the Apostle did not feel this level sufficient to lead his audience back to knowledge. After all, in the bulk of the letter the predominant element of Paul's speech act is neither a call to accept his authority nor a direct appeal to the Galatians' emotions, but an attempt to persuade by means of discursive arguments. What is more, when these discursive and non-discursive elements in the Apostle's rhetoric converge in the apostolic curse of 1:8-9, Paul deliberately subordinates the non-discursive to the discursive. He declares: "But even if we or an angel from heaven should proclaim to you a gospel contrary to what we proclaimed to you, let that one be accursed!" (1:8). Although Paul, as God's commissioned agent, is able to announce the judgment which lies ahead for those who reject the path of faith in Christ, he does not want his audience to accept that message simply because an authoritative figure is speaking it. 391 The message is here prioritized over the messenger, so that neither Paul nor any other representative of God should be heeded if their message is inconsistent with the authentic Gospel. 392 Certainly, Betz has pointed out that a parallel

391 Martyn is right (contra the implication of Betz, Galatians, 52-53) that both Greek and Jewish readers would understand this as God's curse (Galatians, 114).
392 So Dunn, Galatians, 44-45; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 17. If, as most commentators now agree, the προειρήκαμεν of 1:9 indicates that Paul had announced a similar curse (or teaching to the same effect) in his earlier teaching to the community (so Betz, Galatians, 53-4; Burton, Galatians, 29; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 17; Martyn, Galatians, 115; contra Bruce, Galatians, 84; Schlier, Galater, 40), this would suggest that the priority of the Gospel message over the authority of the messenger was a stable feature of Paul's thought and not simply an ad hoc ploy to undermine the opponents in Galatia. Burton notes that the use of ἄμητον, "now," to mark the temporal distance between this statement and the previous one "excludes the supposition that he is here referring to words just written down" (Galatians, 29).

Dunn (Galatians, 47-8) observes that in v. 9 Paul changes the "what we preached" of v. 8 to "what you received" (ἐὰν παρέλαβετε) and suggests that by the latter verb Paul makes an implicit appeal to the fact that their message "was not theirs alone but already traditional" (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 18). παρέλαβετε is generally used by Paul for the reception of authoritative tradition (see 1 Cor 11:23; 15:3; Gal 1:12; 1 Thess 2:13; 2 Thess 3:6), and the Apostle likely thinks of his teaching as constituting such tradition for his communities (contra Martyn, Galatians, 149-51). Yet it is unlikely that he is thinking here of his teaching as having been traditional when he taught it, given his emphatic insistence in 1:12 that he did not "receive" his gospel as tradition from a human authority.
blessing is pronounced in 6:16 on those who follow Paul's "rule" (τῷ ᾿Οανῶν τὸν ὄντος), so that the whole body of the letter becomes not just an act of communication but an act of confrontation in which the Galatians are forced to decide between reverting to Paul's gospel to receive blessing or following the opponents to receive the curse. The Galatians' response to Paul's words here do become a matter of life or death. Yet the Apostle apparently does not expect their response to hinge primarily on their recognition of his own authority. It is, rather, in the discursive argument which constitutes most of the letter that Paul places most of his hopes to convince the Galatians that they should trust his message, his version of the story, and thus his account of who will reach a good end. It is on this basis that the analysis of Galatians which follows will focus primarily on the discursive level of argument, bracketing out the non-discursive rhetoric of authority and of shaming – again, not because these levels of Paul's rhetoric are unimportant for understanding the letter as a total speech-act, but because the Apostle himself subordinates

393 So Betz, Galatians, 25. It is less certain that we should follow Betz in regarding Galatians as a "magical letter" which, when read, "will automatically produce the judgment" (Galatians, 25; 53). As evidence of this "well-known" genre (for which, nonetheless, 'No satisfactory investigation ... exists') Betz points the reader to the Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri (2 vols; eds. Karl Preisendanz and Albert Heinrichs; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1973-74).

394 Betz (Galatians, 50-51) suggests a parallel between Paul's churches and the various religious societies around the ancient Mediterranean which had their own sacred law, enforced by curse and blessing. We must not overlook, however, the likely background in the deuteronomic cursing and blessing, particularly since Paul will make much of that deuteronomic language in 3:10-14. Hence Betz' strongest parallel to Paul's curse here is found in 1QS 2.5-17, a passage which is certainly influenced by deuteronomic theology. The existence of similar self-cursing formulae in, e.g., the oath of the Hippocratic guild of physicians (see Betz, Galatians, 51) as evidence of a broader tradition of such oaths does not do away with the more specific influence of biblical tradition here.

Dunn suggests that instead of God's active judgment Paul may have been thinking more about a heretical teacher's being "set apart to God," that is, isolated from the community so that no more harm could be done (Galatians, 46-7). It is much more likely, however, that Paul is thinking of the use of ἄνωθεν as the regular translation of לְגֵってしまった, "ban," in the LXX as something devoted to God for destruction (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 17; see Lev 27:28-29; Deut 7:26; 13:17; Jos 6:17-18; 7:11-13, 15 and cf. Rom 9:3; 1 Cor 12:3; 16:22).
them (in theory and practice) to his discursive argument.

One might object to this depiction of Galatians that in fact all of 1:10-2:14 is geared simply to establish Paul's authority and hence the audience's obligation to accept his version of the Gospel. Here already, however, we must notice that the Apostle does not simply assert his authority. Instead he takes the time to make a rational argument, to present evidence on the basis of which he believes the Galatians should rationally be led to accept his claim to be God's apostle. In 1:10-12 Paul answers what seem to be challenges to his credibility which were circulating in Galatia:395 “Am I now seeking human approval or God's approval?” he asks, apparently countering a charge that he panders to his Gentile audience (1:10).396 It is at this stage that Paul first begins, not only

395 Most recognize that these verses contain the "thesis" of the first, defensive section of the letter (so Burton, Galatians, 35; Dunn, Galatians, 52; Jegher-Bucher, Galaterbrief, 39-40; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 20; Martyn, Galatians, 136). We have again followed the division of Martyn here (Galatians, 136-7). Some commentators include v. 10 with the previous section and begin a new section with v. 11 (so Bryant, Crucified Christ, 134-35; Burton, Galatians, 18; Dunn, Galatians, 51; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 18, 20). As Betz recognizes, however, these verses belong together since together they introduce Paul's denial of the opponents' charge (v. 10) and his counter-assertion (v. 11, beginning with γνωσθηθησον...ἐπιθύμητι), the point which he will try to establish in the narratio which follows (ibid., 46; cf. Jegher-Bucher [Galaterbrief, 40-42] who treats it as a transitio). Separated from v. 11, on the other hand, v. 10 is explicable only as an "emotional outburst" without a close connection to the surrounding argument (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 18).

The relationship of vv. 11-12 to the surrounding verses is likewise disputed. Hester argues that vv. 11-12 constitute the stasis of apologetic rhetoric in which the speaker rebuts the basic charge against him (so Sandnes, Among the Prophets, 52; Jegher-Bucher, Galaterbrief, 39-40). Betz assigns v. 11 to the end of the exordium and v. 12 to the beginning of the narratio, but the Apostle does not actually begin narrating his defense until v. 13. Note how in his positive "thesis statement" of v. 12 he alludes to the Damascus road incident but then does not return to that incident in the (strictly chronological) narrative until vv. 15-16. Formally this division at the end of v. 12 is also suggested by the two γνωσθηθησον...ἐπιθύμητι formulae which occur in v. 11 (introducing his positive thesis) and v. 13 (introducing the evidence for it).

396 Here we follow the usual view that the opponents in Galatia had directly criticized Paul's teaching and authority (so Burton, Galatians, 35; Dunn, Galatians, 49; Martyn, Galatians, 142). The rhetorical questions in v. 10 suggest a charge that Paul adjusts his message to please his audience (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 18; Sandnes, One of the Prophets, 56). Sandnes points out that this charge is familiar from biblical disputes about false prophecy (see, e.g., Isa 30:10-11; Jer 6:14; 8:11; 23:16-17, 31-32; Ezek 13:1-3, 10:12, 16; 22:28; Deut 18:19; cf. Mk 11:30-32; Acts 5:38-39; 1 Thess 5:3; Lk 6:26) and thus suggests that the opponents' charge was that Paul was a false prophet (One of the Prophets, 56-7).
to assert his polemical position, but to give some reasons for it. Paul's initial response is simply to ask whether such a charge is really credible: "If I were still pleasing people, I would not be a servant of Christ" (1:10b). It is tempting to hear in these words an allusion to the hostility and violence which Paul's Gospel so often prompted. He then turns to make his own counter-claim to be a messenger sent directly from God. "For I want you to know," Paul says, "that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin (κατά ἀνθρωπίαν)" (1:11). Here Paul explicitly makes the same claim which was implicit in 1:1. His message is authoritative not because of some inherent quality of his...
own, but because the message itself comes directly from God. In verse 12 the Apostle then summarizes the evidence for this claim that his message is God's message: "for I did not receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ" (1:12). His claim to have a message from God is credible because it was taught to him directly by God in "a revelation of Jesus Christ." Paul is probably alluding to his Damascus Road experience here, and we need not decide how explicitly the content of Paul's Gospel was communicated in this vision. What is important to see is that Paul's authority derives not from institutional sanction but from a unique religious experience. It is what Max Weber called "charismatic" authority. Yet this is not simply a matter of basing knowledge on heavenly disclosures. For as Dunn points out, Paul clearly placed (in 1:8) the gospel revealed to him on the Damascus road in a different category from the products of the "ordinary" heavenly visions which seem to have been common in second-temple Judaism and in early Christianity. He situates Christ in a unique

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398 The genitive Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ which modifies διά ἀποκάλυψεως can be taken as subjective, so that the revelation has its origin in Christ (so Oepke, Galatian, 57; Schlier, Galatian, 47; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 24; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 67-68) or objective, so that the revelation has Christ as its content (so Betz, Galations, 63; Bruce, Galatians, 89; Bryant, Crucified Christ, 148; Burton, Galatians, 41-43; Dunn, Galatians, 53; Martyn, Galatians, 143-44). The subjective reading would allow the person "Christ" to play a parallel role to the "human being" in 1:11-12a and would fit well with the sense of διά Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in Gal 1:1. On the other hand, God's "Son" is the object of revelation (ἐποκάλυψα) in 1:16a (cf. 2:20a). In the final analysis we should probably not treat these as mutually exclusive interpretations. As Sandnes points out, "Paul does not make a sharp distinction between Christ as the content of the revelation (as in 1:16), and its originator" (Among the Prophets, 53).

399 We find the same language here as in 1:1, but there it is Paul himself who was commissioned as Apostle διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ while here it is his message which is revealed διὰ ἀποκάλυψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. This probably indicates how closely the validity of Paul's message is associated with the legitimacy of his divine sending (so Sandnes, Among the Prophets, 54).

400 So Dunn, Galatians, 53; Sandnes, Among the Prophets, 53.

401 So Dunn, Galatians, 54.
relationship to God, different from the position enjoyed by the angels. Hence to be addressed directly by the risen Christ was, for Paul, something very much like being addressed face-to-face by the Creator. This is why he can claim that to reject his message is tantamount to rejecting God, why he can warn that a divine curse will fall on those who depart from his gospel.

At this point we should observe that, again, Paul's discursive argument is decisively shaped by his theological narrative. We have seen above how Paul's opening offers a version of the story and then "emplots" the Galatians within it, based on their current behaviour. In much the same way, the Apostle makes his own claim to authority by pointing to his own actions and experiences and arguing that these events locate him in a very specific narrative role—the role of God's messenger. His primary mode of argumentation is a kind of narration in which he alludes to certain aspects of his life-story and suggests, in light of those events, how that individual story should be integrated into the larger universal narrative. Hence it is no surprise that from 1:13 to 2:14, where Paul offers the evidence for his claims to an authoritative role, he proceeds by way of a chronological narration of several key aspects of his life-story. Negatively, Paul's argument proceeds by re-asserting the narrative of his own life as one who was not taught or authorized by Jerusalem. He lays out a narrative of his contacts with Jerusalem authorities (the most likely human basis for any delegated or more indirect authority) to show that, in fact, he had no opportunity either to be catechized by Peter, James, and the

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Positively, Paul's reference to his Damascus Road experience reminds the audience that this event is difficult to construe as anything other than a commission to carry out a specific role in the theological story—that of an apostle of God. Of course, the force of this argument depends on his audience already accepting that the broad Christian narrative is true. But given the context of that story, Paul suggests that the events of his life clearly indicate what role in the narrative he occupies. Thus, even as Paul tries to bolster his own apostolic authority in Galatia, he supports that authority on a narrative argument whose logic resembles the interpretive activity by which Paul’s narrative knowledge gives rise to ethical knowledge. This is a logic in which the events of Paul’s life are taken as clues by means of which one can recognize which role he is playing in the theological narrative, and hence how he should interact with other human beings.

b. Narrative and Experience in Galatians 1:13-2:14

In 1:13-2:14 this narrative mode of argument remains fairly straightforward, describing the role which Paul is playing in the theological narrative and pointing to the specific actions and events which demonstrate that he does indeed play this role. Starting in 2:15 Paul's argumentative logic is marked by a more complex interpretive relationship

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403 There is general agreement that 1:13-2:14 functions as a large unit to substantiate the claims made in 1:11-12 (see Burton, *Galatians*, 43-44; R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 26; Martyn, *Galatians*, 152-53), though there is less agreement about whether (and how far) this unit extends past 2:14 (see Martyn, *Galatians*, 152-53).

This is the section identified by Betz as the *narratio* in which the facts relevant to Paul’s defense are recited. Dunn agrees that this new section begins in 1:13 (*Galatians*, 55). Betz begins the narratio already in v. 12 (*Galatians*, 58), while Hester argues that vvs. 13-14 are transitional and should not be regarded as part of the narratio proper ("Rhetorical Structure," 228-29; so Sandnes, *Among the Prophets*, 52). This disagreement highlights how smoothly Paul shifts into the narratio, lending an element of arbitrariness to any sharp line of division between the two.
between human experiences and the narrative which constitutes their hermeneutical framework. It is important, however, to note the hints in this direction which appear already in Paul's allusions to his experience on the Damascus road in 1:13-2:14. As the Apostle describes the event, it was clearly Israel's theological narrative which provided the interpretive context within which this experience found its meaning. Paul's own theological narrative, as I outlined it in chapter 2 of this study, was based on the elements of Israel's Scriptural story, along with common Second Temple elaborations. It described the relationship between Israel's God and his creation, a creation which was rebellious and suffering, but which God was rescuing. God's restoration would come in a great eschatological transformation, an event which would include the resurrection of the dead, and it would be inaugurated by God's Messiah, emerging from Israel. As the Apostle describes his Damascus road experience in 1:12, 15-16, it occurred at a point in his life when these common Jewish narrative elements would have constituted his entire theological story.\footnote{Paul describes himself in 1:13-14 first as outdoing himself in the destruction of the nascent Church, and then as excelling both in his practice of Judaism and his zeal for Jewish traditions.} It is thus important to observe that when he refers here to that experience, Paul does not offer a neutral phenomenological description. He describes the experience as it would be interpreted in the context of his Jewish narrative. He did not simply encounter a mysterious apparition of an executed man. He met the crucified Messianic pretender from Nazareth after this man had been raised from the dead. He met the Messiah ("Christ" in 1:12) whose claims had been vindicated by God, and who would now bring the eschatological restoration. It is only in the context of Israel's story that Paul could interpret his encounter in this way. It is, moreover, only in that narrative context that
the experience could have the implications for Paul's life that he believes it did: he is to preach the message that God is offering salvation in Christ.⁴⁰⁵ So not only does Paul's theological narrative identify the agent of the vision, but it is also the context within which Paul understands the specific message which the vision conveyed. The narrative of Israel serves as the "code" in light of which the "sign" which he encountered on the Damascus road becomes intelligible.

At the same time, this event itself, once it is interpreted in the context of Israel's story, seems to effect for Paul an irrevocable change in the significance of that narrative. For the Apostle understands that revelation as a commission to preach salvation in Christ "among the Gentiles" (1:16). Whether or not Paul immediately understood his experience in this sense is not, for the moment, our primary concern.⁴⁰⁶ For our interest is not in the

⁴⁰⁵ Notice that in 1:15 the experience is interpreted, using motifs from Israel's prophetic tradition, as the call of Israel's God to one who has been chosen to carry his message. The act of proclaiming that message is denoted with the verb εὐαγγελίζεσαι in 1:16, a term which is likely derived in Christian use from Isaiah and which often denotes the announcement of God's eschatological blessing for Israel (see Isa 42:9; 52:7; 60:6; 61:1 (cf. Joel 3:5; Nah 2:1; Ps 39:10; 67:12; Pss. Sol. 11:1). The identification of the addressees of this message as "Gentiles" (τοῖς ἐξ οὐσίας) in 1:16 also presupposes the Jewish distinction between God's chosen people, Israel, and the rest of the nations. Hence the term presupposes the narrative of Israel's election.

⁴⁰⁶ Up to the middle of the 20th-century (and in some cases later) scholars tended to depict Paul's experience as a crisis brought about by his intense feelings of guilt and oppression by the Law. The resulting conversion naturally involved a sense of liberation from that Law which was formalized in Paul's Gospel of "justification by faith" (see Lüdemann, Paul, 188-191; Theissen, Psychological Aspects, 177-265). More recently it has become popular to understand Paul's experience as a "call" (along the model of prophetic call stories). Hence Paul's initial experience was of the risen Christ commissioning him as Apostle to the Gentiles, and the details of his thinking about the law, etc. were worked out in response to this responsibility (see Dunn, "Light to the Gentiles"; Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind; Stendahl, Paul among Jews and Gentiles). Others, however, continue to argue that Paul's theology was more directly effected by his experience on the Damascus road. Kim, for example, has proposed that both Paul's call as an apostle and his key theological concepts arose from his seeing the glory of God manifested in the face of the risen Christ (Origin of Paul's Gospel). From a different perspective, Segal has described Paul's experience sociologically as a conversion from one community affiliation to another. He suggests that Paul's ideas about personal transformation and a new relationship to law arose from the memory of this radical shift in identity, though the Apostle's specific teaching about the law sprang from his conflicts with Jewish-Christians over his non-observant Gentile communities (Paul the Convert).
process by which Paul actually came to his convictions, but rather his own later account of
that shift. As Paul goes on to describes the Jerusalem meeting in 2:1-10 and his
confrontation with Cephas in 2:11-14, this encounter on the Damascus road, once
interpreted by Israel's narrative, seems to have given rise to a new interpretation of that
very story. His commission seems to have issued in a new "Gospel" (2:2, 5, 14) in which
Jesus is the Christ, the one through whom salvation comes. This is already an expansion or
extension of Israel's story. What is more, when Paul lays out this new Gospel to the
Jerusalem leaders, it appears to be one in which God's eschatological salvation is offered
to non-observant Gentiles like Titus (2:1-3). Paul's experience, once interpreted as a
commission to preach salvation to the Gentiles, seems to have required a re-reading of
Israel's story in which Gentiles as such are fully included in God's people if they place
their faith in the Christ.\footnote{This inclusion of non-observant Gentiles may not have been unknown in Second Temple
Judaism. Both Joseph and Aseneth and Aristeas seem to assume that the adoption of ethical monotheism,
without any observance of the distinctly Jewish aspects of Torah, is sufficient to qualify Gentiles as
righteous. For a many Jews, however, it seems to have been assumed that Gentiles would only be saved
through a mass conversion in the eschaton (see, e.g., Tob 14:6; Sib. Or. 3.616-17; 3.710-23; probably Pss.
Sol. 17:31-2). Some texts envision large scale destruction of Gentiles in the eschaton (see, e.g., Sir 36:1-12;
T. Mos. 10:7; Pss. Sol. 17.24; cf. Judith 16:17; Tob 13:12 where those nations hostile to Israel will be
punished in the eschaton.). In some cases this destruction seems to include all who will not convert (Sib.
Or. 3.670-701), while in other cases all Gentiles are destroyed (1QM; 1 En. 90.19). For an excellent
summary of the variety of opinions about the fate of the Gentiles, see Donaldson, Paul, 51-80. Note that
Paul himself, in 2:15, seems to assume that Gentiles are sinners: ἐμείς φόροι οὐκ οἶκαι ἡθνῶν
ἀμαρτωλοί...}
The Apostle’s experience, as he depicts it, thus seems to have stood in a dialectical relationship to Paul’s earlier understanding of Israel’s theological story. The story provided the framework within which his experience outside Damascus took on meaning, but that "emplotted" experience in turn exercised an interpretive counter-pressure of its own and brought new meaning to the original narrative. This interpretive logic is here only implicit. It must be inferred from the events of Paul’s description of his "call" and the subsequent events, events which the Apostle is narrating to make a more straightforward argumentative point. Yet Paul’s description of later events in 2:1-10 also allows us to infer a similar kind of hermeneutic at work in the minds of Peter and the others at the Jerusalem meeting. In 2:7 the Apostle reported that those leaders "saw (iōnτες) that I had been entrusted with the gospel for the uncircumcised" and that this mission was comparable to Peter’s. The Jerusalem group came to a new understanding which Paul sums up in the following verse: "he who worked (ὁ . . . ἐνεργήσας) through Peter making him an apostle to the circumcised also worked through me (ἐνέργησεν καὶ ἐμοί) in sending me to the Gentiles" (2:8). Dunn is probably right that we should hear in the verb ἐνεργέω some "experiential overtones." That is, "What was evidently decisive in the consideration of the Jerusalem leadership was the recognition, or perhaps inability to deny, that Paul’s missionary work was having precisely the same results among the Gentiles as Peter’s among their fellow Jews." What would be the evidence of such divine activity? Dunn suggests that Paul could probably point to "observable signs of the Spirit’s presence

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408 Bryant sees this "interpretive importance" of Christ’s resurrection as provisioned already in 1:1 where the Apostle makes a point of highlighting the event at the very start of his letter (Crucified Christ, 143).

409 Dunn, Galatians, 106.

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among Paul's converts,\textsuperscript{410} charismatic experiences and apparently miraculous events which both Paul and the Jerusalem leaders would interpret (in the context of the theological story) as the activity of God's Spirit. If Dunn is right in this reading of 2:8, then Paul would here be alluding to an interpretive logic very much like that which we see at work in the account of this same meeting in Acts 15. There Peter refers to what appears to be concrete evidence that the Gentiles had received the Spirit through his own preaching (15:8), while Paul and Barnabas are said to have "told of all the signs and wonders that God had done through them among the Gentiles" (15:12). It is this experiential evidence, interpreted in light of the traditional Jewish eschatological narrative and especially with reference to the prediction of Amos 9:11 (see 15:13-19), which convinces Peter, James and the others to accept Paul's law-free mission. The account of Acts 15 cannot, of course, be taken without further discussion as a reliable description of the events in Jerusalem, but neither for that matter can Paul's own account in Gal 2:1-10. What is important is that in Galatians 2 the Apostle seems to assume an interpretive process very much like the one spelled out more clearly in Acts 15.

Yet notice that in the Acts account these reports of religious experiences among Paul's Gentile converts, though interpreted in the context of the traditional Jewish-Christian narrative, still \textit{come as a surprise}. Although they gain their meaning in terms of the traditional story, that story did not on its own allow the Jerusalem leaders to predict them. The experiences of Paul and his converts thus introduce something genuinely novel to the narrative. More than that, once these events have been understood as signs of the

\textsuperscript{410}Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 105. See, e.g., 2:8-9; 3:2, 5.
Spirit, the undeniable reality of uncircumcised Gentiles having received that Spirit forces a re-evaluation of the whole prior story. Just as the story gave meaning to the events, so the events (once interpreted) re-cast the meaning of the pre-existing story.

c. Paul's hermeneutical rhetoric and the experience of narrative

This dialectical interplay of story and experience, evident both in Paul's description of his "call" and in his account of subsequent events in Jerusalem, recalls Moores' description of the Damascus Road event as a "sign" which produced a new "code" for interpretation. I suggested in chapter 1 above that, in fact, this sign must not have produced the new interpretive code ex nihilo. Somehow the interplay between the sign and Paul's prior interpretive code must have led not only to the interpretation of the sign itself, but also to the re-interpretation of the very code which gave it meaning. This is precisely the kind of interpretive situation which we can infer from Paul's account of these two events in Gal 1:10-2:14. Since our discussion of Moores' semiotic approach, however, we have seen that the signs and codes which the Apostle employs have a narrative shape. Moores' semiotic model did not furnish us with the theoretical tools to account for the transformation of Paul's interpretive code. How exactly does a sign, in being interpreted, alter the code which gave it meaning? Could it be that the narrative dimension of Paul's knowing is in fact crucial to any successful account of the logic which governs the interplay of sign and code, of story and experience?

In order to follow up this possibility we must stop for a moment to examine the experience of following any narrative, whether read or heard. For this purpose we will
look to Wolfgang Iser's phenomenology of reading, which has become in many ways the point of departure for other studies of narrative experience. Iser begins by observing that the individual sentences of which a story is composed do not by themselves constitute a coherent narrative. That coherence is, rather, given to the story by the reader or auditor. As one reads a text or hears a story told one is called on to take the sentences, as “component parts,” and bring them together in an act of interpretive synthesis to form a comprehensive “world.” This is not a completely free process. The author of a story places subtle indications in the sentences themselves about how they are to be joined together. Likewise, the sentences themselves or their particular collocation usually provides cues as to the "genre" in terms of which the story should be understood, furnishing the audience with a rough structural sketch of the shape which the completed story will take. Still, in order to be brought to fruition as a story “the literary text needs the reader's imagination, which gives shape to the interaction of correlative foreshadowed in structure by the sequence of the sentences.” Neither completely free nor completely constrained, the activity of reading is an imaginative process in which the audience strives to arrange the ideas conveyed by the sentences in a way which allows them to yield

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Iser writes: “The author of the text may, of course, exert plenty of influence on the reader's imagination—he has a whole panoply of narrative techniques at his disposal . . .” (*Implied Reader*, 282).
Iser continues: “These connections [between sentences] are the product of the reader's mind working on the raw material of the text, though they are not the text itself—for this consists just of sentences, statements, information, etc.” (*Ibid.*, 278). “The product of this creative activity,” he writes, “is what we might call the virtual dimension of the text . . . This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination of the reader: it is the coming together of text and imagination” (*Ibid.*, 279).
Iser writes: “This whole process represents the fulfillment of the potential, unexpressed reality of the text, but it is to be seen only as a framework for a great variety of means by which the virtual dimension may be brought into being” (*Implied Reader*, 279).
a consistent pattern of meaning.\footnote{Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 283. Iser notes how “even in texts that appear to resist the formation of illusion [i.e., a consistent pattern], thus drawing our attention to the cause of this resistance, we still need the abiding illusion that the resistance itself is the consistent pattern underlying the text” (Ibid., 284).}

To the extent that stories require this active synthetic participation on the part of the audience, they are very much like paintings, road signs, or other visual signs which require decoding. The chief difference between stories (which can be reduced to visual signs but can also be communicated through sound) and these visual signs, however, is that the experience of stories is temporal and directional in a way that these other signs are not. Whereas in a painting all of the elements are available simultaneously to the eye, in the experience of a story (whether read or heard) the sentences emerge into consciousness gradually and in a prescribed sequence. Yet, as with a painting, the meaning of each element depends on its place in the whole work, in the overall pattern which in chapter 1 we called (following Aristotle and Frye) the \textit{dianoia} of the story in contrast to the \textit{mythos} or sequence of events. This means that in experiencing a story, as one moves through the \textit{mythos}, the one-after-the-other of its actions, one must constantly project the shape of the sentences which have not yet been encountered so as to imagine the completed \textit{dianoia} or pattern in which each event in the sequence becomes meaningful. The sentences which make up the work are, for Iser, “always indications of something that is to come, the structure of which is foreshadowed by their specific content.”\footnote{Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 277.} Each sentence, as it is encountered, shapes the audience's expectations about the whole which is emerging,\footnote{Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 277-78.} and it is within the context of that whole that the sentences which have been read thus far are
understood.

As we move forward through a story, however, these expectations about what lies ahead are often frustrated and so must constantly be revised.\textsuperscript{419} Iser explains that “each intentional sentence correlative opens up a particular horizon, which is modified, if not completely changed, by succeeding sentences.”\textsuperscript{420} A character whom we thought to be reliable may turn out to be a villain in disguise. Yet as new sentences change our expectations about the shape of the whole story, all that we have already encountered in the narrative may take on a new meaning. For each sentence in the story must now be understood within this newly imagined whole, this new \textit{dianoia}. “While these expectations arouse interest in what is to come,” Iser writes, “the subsequent modification of them will also have a retrospective effect on what has already been read. This may now take on a different significance from that which it had at the moment of reading.”\textsuperscript{421} So, for example, the hero of what we took to be a serious detective novel may in chapter 3 fail to escape the plotting of his murderous opponent and come to a painful end. Suddenly we are forced to abandon our expectation that the hero will solve his case. Even more than this, we are forced to ask whether in fact this is really a detective story or whether it is a specimen of a different genre. Perhaps, we think, it may actually be a tragedy focussed on the futile attempts of society to curb overpowering primary human instincts through law and order. All that we remember in those first three chapters now takes on a new significance. This new context allows us “to develop hitherto unforeseeable connections”

\textsuperscript{419}Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 278.
\textsuperscript{420}Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 278.
\textsuperscript{421}Iser, \textit{Implied Reader}, 278.
between the elements of the story, it "brings to light new aspects of what we had committed to memory." Finally, having elicited this new configuration of what we have already read, the new sentence, scene, event is itself recast in light of this newly enriched "past," "thus arousing more complex anticipations."423

This process of anticipation, frustration, and re-configuration does not unfold uniformly or smoothly as we proceed through the narrative. When we come to a sentence with no clear connection with what has gone before we experience some surprise or even shock.424 At the death of our detective-hero we may experience a momentary interpretive vertigo in which we are no longer sure how to make sense of the story as a whole. Such points of apparent incongruity represent "gaps" in the matrix of the text which the reader must "fill in" by positing a specific connection and thus restoring the unity of the "virtual" world being presented.425 As we encounter such gaps the indeterminacy of the text is heightened, for different members of the audience may make different decisions about how to fill these gaps.426 Still, consistency of pattern is the mark of "better" readings. That interpretation which can best include every element of the story is the one which should be preferred.

The last aspect of this description of the experience of a story which we must borrow from Iser is his observation that progress through the story, as it is told, is not

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422Iser, *Implied Reader*, 278. "Every sentence," Iser adds, "contains a preview of the next and forms a kind of viewfinder for what is to come; and this in turn changes the 'preview' and so becomes a 'viewfinder' for what has been read" (*Ibid.*, 279).
necessarily correlated with progress through the time of the story world. This movement of interpretation and re-interpretation, although it constantly shifts back and forth between the audience's past (the sentences we have already heard) and the audience's future (the sentences we expect to hear), need not be matched by a smooth chronological arrangement of the events in the story. A surprising event, met half-way through the story as it is told, could take the form of a flash-back to an event which actually occurred (in the world of the story) prior to the events which had been narrated up to this point. Yet that flash-back can, in the audience's experience of the story, have the same effect on the audience's experience as a surprising event which was chronologically subsequent. What is important is that it follows next in the audience's experience of reading and thus has the power to force a re-understanding of all that has come before.

With this model of experiencing a story in hand we can see how Paul's new understanding following his experience on the Damascus road and Peter's insight at the Jerusalem meeting both seem, in Paul's portrayal, to arise when they treat their experience of life in the world as new episodes in a traditional narrative. Paul, as he set out for Damascus, seems to have understood himself within the traditional story of Jewish apocalyptic. This is a story which in its early "chapters" (those contained in Israel's scriptures and other oral and written traditions which Paul learned early on in life) already described both the beginning and the end. Since Paul himself lives within this story, however, his subsequent experiences constitute further "chapters" in that same story, the focus of which is not really the eschatological "end," but the struggle of the individual
Israelite in the present and the question of how or whether they will reach that end. When he encounters the risen Christ, it is that story which gives meaning to the experience. Paul meets Christ not as a mysterious manifestation of the "numinous," but as another chapter in this same story, and hence as Israel's Messiah, as one who has experienced the resurrection which traditional apocalyptic predicted, etc. At the same time, however, this event is not like anything which Paul had anticipated in his construal of the story as a whole. Here Paul has an experience which—if he is to integrate it into his traditional narrative—will demand that many of the events of that prior story take on a new meaning. Similarly Peter, when he learned about remarkable events among Paul's gentile converts, seems to have interpreted those experiences as further events within the Christian story. It was this narrative which provided him with the framework within which to understand them as manifestations of God's Spirit. Yet once again these events represented an unexpected "chapter" in the story which forced Peter to rethink the meaning of the previous "chapters" as he had learned and experienced them. The key in both cases is that the scriptural and traditional story does not stand removed from the present time and space of Peter and Paul as in most understandings of myth. On the contrary, all distinctions between the timeline of the traditional story and the timeline of the experienced "now" are removed, so that the present becomes another episode in the same narrative, a narrative which has God as its author and so must be coherent. As we move from Paul's preliminary defense of his apostolic status to his main argument against the Galatians' being circumcized, we will find that it is this narrative, "re-configurational" logic which

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427 Note that Iser himself observed how the reading process, driven by anticipation and retrospection, "is closely akin to the way in which we gather experience in life" (Implied Reader, 281).
becomes dominant.

2. Re-Configuring the Story of Israel 2:15-4:11

a. 2:15-21 Re-configuring the story for Peter

Although we find hints of this re-configurational logic in the narratio of Paul's letter to the Galatians, it is at the end of chapter 2 that we encounter the first explicit example of it in the Apostle's argument. In 2:11-14 Paul ended his narrative argument for his apostleship with an account of his confrontation with the "pillar," Peter, at Antioch. The speech rebuking Peter begins in 2:14 as a way of demonstrating Paul's independence and integrity in carrying out his commission. With 2:15, however, the topic clearly shifts from Peter's inconsistency to a more generalized argument for Paul's own position. This marks the point at which the Apostle turns from his focus on re-establishing his credibility with the audience toward the substantive argument with which, as the "parent" of the Galatian congregations, he wants to convince them to return to his authentic understanding of the Gospel. Yet there is no clear end to Paul's quotation of his words

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428 Most commentators agree that the rebuke at 3:1 which breaks the illusion that Paul is recounting his speech to Peter marks the beginning of a new section (so Burton, Galatians, 142; Martyn, Galatians, 281).

429 Though we are not going to treat in detail Paul's memory of the incident at Antioch, we should notice that the Apostle is criticizing Peter for observing Jewish food laws and hence separating himself at meals from Gentiles who do not. His point is precisely that Peter, a Jew, has been living εθνικος και ουχι 'Ιουδαιος, and he sees this as the right course of action for a Jew in Christ – at least when living in a mixed community (2:14). This seems to contradict Nanos' assertion that Paul encourages full legal observance as proper for Jews and only opposes the gentile Galatians' conviction that proselytism is necessary to become part of God's people (see, e.g., Irony, 91, 100). The Antioch incident seems to demonstrate that Paul had relativized the place of Torah-observance at a much more basic level than Nanos allows.

430 Cosgrove (Cross, 5-38) has argued on the contrary that 2:15-21 should be understood as a part of Paul's defensive narrative and that the section does not establish the argumentative theme of Galatians. Cosgrove finds the real argumentative theme declared, instead, in 3:1-5. There are, however, decisive reasons for rejecting Cosgrove's reading. First, the argumentative focus clearly shifts in 2:15. Where 1:11-
to Peter until 3:1 where the Galatians are explicitly addressed. Why, given the
importance of Paul's point here, does he leave it ambiguous to whom he is speaking?

Because by maintaining this ambiguity he encourages the audience to lay the situation in
Antioch alongside the situation in Galatia, to see the crises as parallel and the true

2:14 was clearly focussed on establishing Paul's independent apostolic status, that point is entirely absent
from 2:15-21. On the other hand, the themes of "justification," "faith," and "works of the law" which appear in 2:15-21 reappear in 5:4-5, where Paul makes his final argumentative appeal to the Galatians before launching into the explicitly hortatory section of the letter. Cosgrove attempts to lump these verses into the whole "paraenetic" section of 3:1-6:10 (Cross, 32-3), but it is clear that Paul here sums up his main argument by exhorting the Galatians against circumcision and that 5:13 marks a shift to more general ethical exhortation (as Cosgrove seems to admit in Cross, 37). If Paul introduces these themes in the conclusion of his main argument, and if he introduces them here as he shifts to begin that main argument, then it is most natural to understand 2:15-21 as introducing the thrust of the argument proper.

Cosgrove is right that the language of justification does not dominate the intervening argument in 3:1-5:1 (Cross, 32). Yet his attempt to portray justification as a merely subsidiary matter here does not work. Cosgrove misses the fact that in 3:6, where Paul introduces the figure of Abraham, his focus is on how Abraham achieved "righteousness" (δικαιοσύνη). Moreover, in 3:8-9 Paul interprets the Gentiles' sharing in Abraham's blessing as their being justified on the same basis as the patriarch, "justified by faith" (ἐκ πίστεως δικαιώθη τὸ ἔθιμον τοῦ θεοῦ). In 3:11 justification once again appears to be understood as equivalent to participation in blessing (and as the opposite of suffering the curse), while in 3:24 Paul can say that Christ came ἐκ πίστεως δικαιώθηκεν. In the latter passage the end of the law's jurisdiction (a matter which is clearly in focus throughout this argument) is understood precisely as a shift in the means of justification (cf. 3:21). Hence justification on the basis of faith not only appears as the theme in the conclusion of Paul's main argument, it also is portrayed in the body of the argument as the substance of the blessing and the salvation which the Galatians have put in jeopardy by their considering circumcision (cf. 1:6-9). True, Paul also identifies the "promise" which Gentiles inherit as "the promise of the spirit" (τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος) in 3:14. Yet this is the only place where that equivalence is established.

There is no basis for allowing it to "trump" the prior identification of Abraham's "blessing" as justification by faith in Christ in 3:8-9 (contra Cosgrove, Cross, 32). In fact, the reception of the Spirit was always understood in Jewish eschatology as a part of the blessing which the righteous would inherit at the end (see below, n. 543). So when Cosgrove argues that Paul's focus in Galatians is on how to experience the Spirit rather than on how to be justified, he is driving a wedge between two realities which Paul held together. Hence in 5:5, in the conclusion of his main argument, Paul says: ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα. The Spirit's activity, as the Galatians have experienced it, is here understood as a part of their justification. Hence the statements of 2:15-21, while they are not a point-by-point summary of Paul's whole argument, do appear to sum up the thrust of Paul's main argument in Galatians.

431 Verses 15 and 16 in particular can easily be read as a continuation of that speech, so that the "we" of 2:15 (whom Paul identifies as Jews) would be Paul and Peter (so Betz, Galatians, 113-14; Burton, Galatians, 117, 125; Dunn, Galatians, 132, 141-42; Martyn, Galatians, 229, 246, 254). Martyn (Galatians, 230) is likely right that the audience would not have realized the shift in addressees until at least v. 17. Yet by v. 21, where this discourse ends, it has become clear that the Apostle is now no longer simply quoting but has begun to address the Galatian believers and the issues raised in their communities. Alternately, Martyn (Galatians, 230, 246-47) suggests that Paul's address to Peter becomes an address to the (Jewish) opponents in Galatia, who could be included in the "we" of 2:15. Our decision on this point does not significantly affect our reading of Paul's argument.
solution as the same in both cases. Since in the one case the demand for legal observance was clearly (in Paul's telling) evidence of the Jerusalem leaders' inconsistency, this suggests at the outset that here too the opponents' law-observant position will turn out to be wrong. This indirect way of introducing Paul's main theological point also allows him to provide the Galatians with an outline or sketch of his position before they are put on their guard by the direct confrontation which comes in 3:1. The end goal of these rhetorical devices, however, is to gain a favourable hearing for the discursive argument which begins in 2:15-21 and will dominate chapters 3 and 4. Our primary interest here is thus to uncover the logic by which that discursive argument moves forward. Before we can face this central task, however, we must sort out the meaning of the controversial verse 16.

i. Debated issues in the interpretation of Gal 2:16

Paul opens with a concise statement which has become a lightning-rod for debates about the Apostle's thought. He and Peter both "know that a person is justified not by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ" (2:16). Almost every word in this clause is the subject of some scholarly dispute, not only between adherents of the so-called "new perspective" on Paul and their opponents, but also within both of those camps. What is more, these questions cannot be avoided, since they determine how we will read much of Paul's argument in Galatians. Space does not permit me to give a full treatment of each issue here, but I will flag my own position on each issue and offer a brief explanation of my reasoning.

432So Martyn, Galatians, 229-30. For our purposes we need not decide to what extent the situations actually were parallel.
We can sidestep the endless discussion about the meaning of "being justified" (δικαιοφθαι) for Paul by taking this language in the general sense of "being accepted" by God. This acceptance carries with it, of course, inclusion in the eschatological restoration which marks the denouement of Paul's theological story. 433 Our second problem,

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433 Some treat δικαιοφθαι in Paul's use as judicial terminology, so that when one is "justified" one is awarded a legal status, is pardoned by God for one's sin (so Bruce, Galatians, 138; Oepke, Galater, 60). Hence Dunn (Galatians, 134) understands Paul's use of δικαιοφθαι here against the background of Jewish beliefs about God's eschatological judgment. Alternately, Sanders has argued that the verb is "transfer terminology" (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 470-72, 501, 518 n. 5, 544; Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 5-10). It denotes, not that one has been awarded a certain legal status, but simply that an outsider to God's people has been moved (by God) from that outsider existence to to a new kind of existence as an insider, "from the state of sin and condemnation to the state which is the pre-condition of end-time salvation" (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 45; cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 544-45). Hence Sanders observes (Ibid., 10) that δικαιοφθαι language can appear along with talk about "faith" and "dying with Christ," and often seems to mean simply "salvation." This view relies, however, on the assumption that for Paul specific "metaphors" for salvation have lost their concrete meaning and become interchangeable. To the extent that Paul can be seen to use δικαιοφθαι meaningfully in other contexts, Sanders' interpretation of the language as interchangeable with talk of "salvation" will remain problematic (see Westerholm, Perspectives, 293-96).

Most agree, however, that at least the cognate noun δικαιοφθαντία and adjective δικαιοφθαντός often have an ethical content in Paul. They denote the quality of acting as one should. Hence δικαιοφθαντία can be contrasted with sin (e.g., Rom 3:9; 5:7-8; see Burton, Galatians, 468-73; Westerholm, Perspectives, 263-73; so Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 10; though see Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 491-95, 501, 544-45). The question then arises whether the verb too carries the idea, not only of acceptance or transfer, but also of a recognition that one's actions are ethically good. Ziesler separates these senses, suggesting that the verb carries the forensic, relational idea, while the idea of a certain pattern of behaviour is restricted to the noun and adjective (The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul). Westerholm observes, however, how in 1 Cor 4:4 Paul refuses to allow that he is "justified" on the basis of his own moral self-examination (οὖς ἐν τούτῳ δεδικαιωθήναι). In a situation like this, the verb seems to denote the recognition of good ethical conduct (so Westerholm, Perspectives, 264-66). Hence in Rom 2:13 it is those who do the law who will be justified (δικαιοφθαντοντα) by God. As Westerholm observes, this cannot mean "that God constitutes one as [δίκαιος]"; rather, "divine recognition of human [δικαιοφθαντία] is meant" (Perspectives, 267). Hence in ordinary use δικαιοφθαι means the recognition that one has fulfilled God's ethical demand on humanity (Westerholm, Perspectives, 272-73). In the end, however, Ziesler and Westerholm are not far apart, since Westerholm emphasizes that where Paul talks about the justification of sinners (e.g., Rom 5:8-9) he envisions an unusual situation in which (based on Christ's actions) God can grant sinful human beings the status usually reserved for the righteous (Perspectives, 273-84).

Others, however, argue that δικαιοφθαι always denotes a recognition that one has met God's expectations, but that the expectations of God shift with the Christ event from legal obedience to faith in Christ (so Burton, Galatians, 473-74). Dunn moves in this kind of direction when he takes δικαιοφθαι to denote a recognition of one's faithfulness to the covenant (Galatians, 134-35; Theology, 341-42). Hence, since those with faith in Christ have satisfied the requirements of covenant membership in the new era, they can legitimately be recognized as "righteous" (for critique of this covenant association, see Westerholm, Perspectives, 286-93 and cf. Seifrid, "Righteousness Language").

Martyn (Galatians, 250) departs from most other scholars when he takes δικαιοφθαι to mean "making right what has gone wrong."
however, cannot be so easily avoided. Paul's assertion here is that "no one will be justified by works of the law (εἴῃ ἐργανῇ νόμῳ)" (2:16). But what exactly are the "works of the law"? Dunn has been hailed as champion of the view that Paul's phrase primarily refers to the ethnic "boundary markers" which in practice often defined Jewish identity: circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath observance. Dunn has been hailed as champion of the view that Paul's phrase primarily refers to the ethnic "boundary markers" which in practice often defined Jewish identity: circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath observance.434 The "works of the law" of which Paul speaks are, he argues, not merely a matter of Torah-obedience, but rather of the distortion of Torah which arises when it is used as an ethnic boundary marker to maintain Israel's distinctiveness as an end in itself.435 Yet the Qumran sect (which furnishes our only contemporary parallel to the phrase) seems to have meant by "works of the law" any

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434 So Bonneau, "Curse of the Law," 66-7 and Bryant, Crucified Christ, 176, both of whom assume the position with which they credit Dunn. For Dunn's own exploration of the issue, see "4QMMT" and Theology, 354-59. Dunn himself emphasizes in recent writings that "'works of the law' characterize . . . the conviction that status within the covenant (= righteousness) is maintained by doing what the law requires (works of the law)" ("Yet Once More," 100 [emphasis mine]; cf. Theology, 357-8). Indeed, Dunn complains of "repeated misunderstanding" of his initial writing on the subject and insists "that I do not (and never did!) claim that 'works of the law' denote only circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath," arguing rather that the expression is part and parcel of "a generally nomistic attitude" (Theology, 358, n. 97). Yet these affirmations of the expression's broad meaning seem to be eclipsed in Dunn's actual exegesis by the idea that Paul is talking only of a particular misuse of Torah, not of Torah-observance in general (so Westerholm, Perspectives, 314; Matlock, "Sins," 78).

435 See Dunn, Theology, 355, 366.
act of Torah-observance. What is more, Paul seems in Galatians 2 to treat "works of the law" as interchangeable with "the law" in a way which would make little sense if he had in mind only some of its commands or its misuse as an ethnic marker. Paul is thus saying that no-one will be accepted by God (justified) because they have observed Torah. If, however, Paul means by "works of the law" any acts of Torah-observance, |Ph.D. Thesis – Ian W. Scott
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436 So C. R. de Roo, "Concept": Mijoga, Pauline Notion, 113; contra Dunn, "4QMMT" and Abegg, "Works Righteousness." The author of 4QMMT, a sectarian document from Qumran, refer to their collection of legal rulings as "some of the works of Torah" (נְבֹא הַיָּדוֹת) (4QMMT 227). Noting that 4QMMT is a tractate giving the basis for one group's separation from the main temple administration, Dunn has argued that the expression "works of Torah" there is used to define "a boundary which marks out those of faith/faithfulness from others" ("4QMMT", 151). Yet in context, the phrase in 4QMMT designates a wide variety of legal observances, many of which are quite technical interpretations of purity law. Moreover, these are described as "some" of the "works of Torah," that is, this document simply highlights those works of Torah which are at issue in the dispute. The implication is thus that the term "works of Torah" on its own applies to legal observance more broadly. Note too that 4QMMT associates these practices with the proper, complete fulfilment of Torah which is required in order to experience the Deuteronomic blessings (see 4QMMT C20-22). So, far from restricting the sense of the expression, the example from 4QMMT helps to demonstrate that Paul's expression probably refers to legal observance generally and not simply to a few "boundary markers" (cf. the phrase מִלֶּשׁ בְּלֹא מִלֶּשׁ in 1QS 5:21).

Eckstein (Verheißung, 25) points, similarly, to 4QFlor 17, but here the reading is most likely מִלֶּשׁ rather than מִלֶּשׁ בְּלֹא מִלֶּשׁ. On the other hand, the passage to which he points in 4QFlor II 2 does speak of "doing the whole law" ( Dt. 18:5; 4QMMT) in language reminiscent of the formula in 4QMMT. Whether this implies that the formula denotes "umfassende Toraobservanz" rather than "einzeln, konkrete Gebotserfüllungen" is less clear (Ibid., 25).

See also Schlier, Galater, 55-56 for partial parallels in the pseudepigrapha and Rabbinic literature.


Barclay (Obeying, 78-9) has also pointed out that since Paul's statement here is made in the context of his confrontation with Peter in Antioch, Paul likely means by "works of the law" those acts which are foisted on Gentiles when Peter pressures them to "live like a Jew" (iouc\i\v, 2:14). Yet this latter verb refers not merely to keeping kosher but, more broadly, to the adoption of Jewish practices generally. On the meaning of iouc\i\v see BDAG, 478. It might be argued that in talking about "living like a Jew" what was primarily in view was boundary-marking practices. Yet notice how, in Jos., War 2.454 the Roman Metilius is said to have promised καὶ μὲν Χριστόν πεπράτου ἑαυτὸν Ιουδαίον. Here the verb seems to denote the adoption of Jewish practice in general, of which the most extreme form is circumcision. The verb can thus mean "to convert to Judaism" (see, e.g., Esth 8:17 LXX). Yet the very specification that Metilius was willing to be circumcized indicates that iouc\i\v does not by itself denote the adoption of the typical boundary-marking practices in particular. Indeed, at times those who are said to have "Judaized" seem to be deliberately distinguished from full Jews (see Jos., War 2.463; Plut., Cic. 864 [7.5]). Hence the verb can apply to those who adopt some Jewish observances, even though they shy away from full conversion and some of the specific "boundary-marking" practices which go along with it.

438 So Betz, Galatians, 116; Burton, Galatians, 124; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 86; Lührmann, Galatians, 46; Martyn, Galatians, 198, 261-63; Oepke, Galater, 59; Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 46; Schlier, Galater, 55-56; Stanton, "Law of Moses," 103; Westerholm, Perspectives, 313-15.
then the Apostle is not here opposing "legalism." He is not opposing supposedly Jewish attempts to earn salvation, and he betrays here no conviction that human efforts to be righteous are in and of themselves sinful.\(^{439}\) His point is, rather, to emphasize that one's acceptance before God simply cannot be gained through Torah-obedience, try as one might.

Instead (εἰς τὴν μὴν) Paul says that "justification" will come through πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (2:16).\(^{440}\) Here we meet our third dispute about this knotty verse. Until the last couple of decades it was commonly agreed that this phrase was an objective genitive and should be translated "faith in Jesus Christ."\(^{441}\) More recently, Richard Hays has led the

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Note too that Lloyd Gaston has argued for taking νόμος in this phrase as a subjective genitive, so that Paul would be denying that any justification flows from the "works which the law does" (\textit{Paul}, 100-106). These would be effects which the law brings, such as knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20), deception (7:11), death (7:10-11), wrath (4:15), etc. Yet Gaston's reading does not explain the use of the similar Hebrew expression at Qumran. Nor does his view explain Paul's contrast in Gal 3:2, 5 between ἐργαῖοι νόμοι and ἀκός πίστεως, a contrast between two different courses of action which the Galatians might have been taking when they received the Spirit.

\(^{439}\)Contra Opke, \textit{Galater}, 58-60; Schlier, \textit{Galater}, 56. It likely does not mean legalistic observance of Torah, the attempt to justify oneself by means of the law (contra Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 120; Bruce, \textit{Galatians}, 137; Cranfield, "St. Paul and the Law"). For arguments in favor of taking νόμος here to mean the law itself, rather than an improper attitude toward it, see Beker, \textit{Paul}, 235-54 (esp. 246); R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 85-6; Moule, "Fulfilment-Words"; Räisänen, \textit{Paul and the Law}, 162-77 (esp. 176-77); Westerholm, \textit{Perspectives}, 319-20. Schlier (\textit{Galater}, 55) already pointed out that Paul seems to use ἐργατεύομαι νόμου and the simple νόμος interchangeably to denote that which cannot justify. Hence the emphasis seems to fall not on the fact that these are works (i.e., the aspect of human effort or striving), but rather that the works are oriented toward the fulfillment of the law.


\(^{441}\)In Gal 2:16 this affirmation that justification comes διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ is accompanied by the statement that ἠμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν. Similarly, in 3:22 the promise comes εἰς πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and is given τοῖς πιστεύωσιν (cf. Rom 3:22). Traditionally, the verb which accompanies the genitive expression in both cases was understood to control the sense of the genitive. Since the verb had the believer as subject and Christ as object, πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ was understood simply as a short-hand expression for the same faith in Christ. More recently it has been argued that in fact the juxtaposition of the genitive phrase with the verbal expression is redundant unless the two formulations mean different things (so, e.g., Hebert, "Faithfulness," 373). Yet in each case it can be shown that there is reason for the apparent redundancy. In 2:16 Paul begins and ends the verse with a deliberative opposition between justification εἰς ἐργατεύομαι νόμου and justification διὰ/εκ
way in a renewal of the reading which takes the phrase as an objective genitive, "the faith/faithfulness of Jesus Christ." Despite the attractiveness of this reading, however, it does not succeed in making sense of Paul's use of the expression here. For in 3:6-9 Paul sets up Abraham as the paradigm example of justification on the basis of (the human being's) faith. Just as Abraham was justified on the basis of his faith in God, so "blessing" comes to Gentiles like the Galatians who believe (i.e., believe in Christ). In this context

πίστεως Χριστοῦ. He is thus speaking in a rhetorical mode which capitalizes on repetition of key words and phrases to emphasize his point. Between these two statements of this opposition, he personalizes the issue by emphasizing the choice which Paul and Peter made: they believed in Christ (ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦν εἰσπέμψαν). This is hardly redundant repetition. Something similar may be said of both Gal 3:22 and Rom 3:22 (see Betz, Galatians, 117; Burton, Galatians, 121-22; Dunn, Romans, 1.166; Idem, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 739-41; Moo, Romans, 225-26; Murray, Romans, 371; Westerholm, Perspectives, 305-6, n. 18).


It is sometimes observed that when Paul qualifies πίστει with a genitive referring to something or someone other than Christ, the genitive is usually subjective (as with πίστει θεοῦ in Rom 3:3; πίστει Ἀβρααμ in Rom 4:12, 16). Hence, it is suggested, the subjective reading should be our default assumption (so Howard, "Faith of Christ," 459-60). It is, however, well established that πίστει can often take an objective genitive in the NT, and that Paul himself uses the construction more than once (so Burton, Galatians, 121; Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 731-32; Moo, Romans, 225, n. 26; Moule, "Biblical Conception," 157; Westerholm, Perspectives, 305, n. 18; see Mk 11:22; Acts 3:16; Phil 1:27; Col 2:12; 2 Thess 2:13; cf. Phil 3:8-9; Rom 10:2). Moreover, Paul's use of the verb πίστεω also demonstrates that he does regard Christ as a proper object of faith (e.g., Gal 2:16; contra Williams, "Again," 434 and despite his objections on pp. 442-445). Hence, as Westerholm suggests, "grammar cannot resolve the debate" (Perspectives, 305, n. 18).

443For arguments in support of the objective genitive reading, see Barclay, Obeying, 78, n. 8; Barr, Semantics, 161-205; Betz, Galatians, 117-18; Bruce, Galatians, 138-39; Burton, Galatians, 121; Cranfield, Romans, 203, n. 2; Cosgrove, Cross, 55-56; Dodd, Bible and Greeks, 65-70; Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ;" Grundmann, T&NT 9.552; Hansen, Abraham; Harris, NIDNTT 3.1213; Hultgren, "Pistis Christou;" W. Johnson, "Paradigm;" Moo, Romans, 224-25; Moule, "Biblical Conception;" Idem, "untitled;" Murray, Romans, 1.363-74; Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 83-4; Westerholm, Israel's Law, 111-12, n. 12; Idem, Perspectives, 305-6, n. 18.)
the focus is clearly not on Christ's obedient faithfulness, but on the believers' faith in their saviour. Notice too that Abraham is said to be justified εκ πίστεως, and that those with faith like his are called in 3:9 ὀφελομένοι εκ πίστεως. Yet these prepositional phrases are almost identical to Paul's statement in 2:16 that justification comes εκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ. Since in both cases essentially the same prepositional phrase is presented as the basis for the believer's justification, it is most natural to assume that the meaning of the phrase is also the same each time Paul uses it. Those who are justified εκ πίστεως (Χριστοῦ) are those who have faith (like Abraham's) in God's agent, Christ.

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444 So Barclay, *Obeying,* 78, n. 8. It remains unclear what Paul would mean by Christ's faith, particularly since nowhere else does he speak of Christ believing. Hence most who advocate a subjective reading of πίστεως understand the noun to mean "faithfulness." It is important to note, however, that in the vast majority of clear cases Paul uses πίστεως to denote human faith, believing, in a divine object (so Moo, *Romans,* 225; Murray, *Romans,* 365). Thus we would need strong contextual indicators (as in Rom 3:3) to understand πίστεως in the sense "faithfulness." Yet in none of these passages is there an unambiguous reference to Christ's faithfulness (so Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 736). Even in Phil 2 Christ is not called πιστὸς but rather ὑπερήφανος (2:8). In Rom 5 he is not said to exercise πίστεως, but rather acts out δικαιομα (5:18) and ἐπακοῆ (5:19) (so Barclay, *Obeying,* 78, n. 8; Cosgrove, *Cross,* 56; Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 742-43; Westerholm, *Perspectives,* 305-6, n. 18; contra Hays, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ," 723). In Gal 3 Christ facilitates salvation not by providing a model of πίστεως but by becoming a curse (contra Hooker, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 236-331). It remains Abraham who is the model of πίστεως and contra Hays ("ΠΙΣΤΙΣ," 722-23) it is telling that Jesus is never explicitly introduced in that role (so Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 737-38; cf. Heb 12:2). Hence all of the contextual indicators point to what would be our default assumption in any case: that πιστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is an objective genitive signifying human faith in Christ.

This difficulty cannot be sidestepped by reading πιστεως as both faith and faithfulness simultaneously (as, e.g., Hays, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ," 718; Jingman, *Pistis,* 38-40, 47; Torrance, "One Aspect"; Williams, "Again," 437, 443-6) since "faith" and "faithfulness" are (even in Jewish use) two distinct senses of the noun (so Murray, *Romans,* 373-4).

445 In 3:7, 8 Abraham is justified εκ πίστεως, and in 3:9 those who practice the same faith (now obviously in Christ) are ὀφελομένοι εκ πίστεως (see also 3:11, 12, 24). Paul seems simply to have dropped the Χριστοῦ which specified the object of the believing in 2:16 in order to ease the comparison between OT models of faith and the faith of believers in Christ. Likewise, the preposition phrase διὰ τῆς πίστεως in 2:16 closely resembles the phrase διὰ τέκνων in 3:14, 26 where, again, the πίστεως is clearly the believer's faith in Christ (so Hultgren, *Pistis Christou,* 255-56; Murray, *Romans,* 1.366-67). Moreover, in each of these passages, with and without the genitive (Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, "faith" is being contrasted with ἀνθισμένων ἐν Χριστῷ (2:16, 21; 3:10, 21; so Dunn, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 736). This evidence may be weakened slightly by Paul's εκ πίστεως Ἀβραὰμ in Rom 4:12, 16 (so R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians,* 87), but in both cases this πίστεως is still human faith in God by which (ἐκ) one receives righteousness (so Hultgren, "Pistis Christou," 256).

446 Dunn points out that Paul introduces the ambiguous phrase πίστεως Χριστοῦ in Gal 2:16 with no explication of it in terms of Christ's being faithful, but he does go on to elaborate the idea of human believing in Christ. Hence the audience would naturally understand the phrase in terms of human
We can now summarize what Paul means to say at the outset of his argument:

Human beings cannot gain acceptance with God (and the eschatological blessing which goes along with it) by keeping Torah; they can only gain that divine acceptance by placing their faith in Christ. It is in the wake of this realization, Paul says in 2:16, that he and Peter alike "placed [our] faith in Christ Jesus."447 As soon as we begin to ask about the flow of Paul's argument, however, we run into one final question about 2:16. Does this verse state a premise of Paul's argument, or its conclusion? Is this a point of view which Paul shares with his opponents in Galatia, and so can take as a starting point, or is it a point of view for which he is now beginning to argue? One's answer to this question depends in large part on how one understands the "we" introduced in 2:15. For it is this "we" who shares the conviction which Paul outlines in 2:16. We have already seen that 2:15-16 continue the Apostle's speech to Peter in the context of the Antioch crisis. In this context, the "we" primarily includes Paul and Peter.448 The Apostle expands on the identity of this "we," specifying that they are "Jews by birth and not Gentile sinners" (2:15). If we understand 2:15 as a verbless clause, then we arrive at a translation like that of the NRSV: "We ourselves are Jews by birth and not Gentile sinners."449 Paul is thus

believing. The only factor which might change this situation would be if the faithful obedience of Christ were a set emphasis for which πίστις Χριστοῦ was a technical formula, familiar to the Galatians. There is, however, no indication, in Paul's letters or in any other early Christian literature, that this is the case ("ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 324-6). Hence, if Paul did intend the phrase to be a subjective genitive he was communicating very poorly.

447 The NRSV here translates εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν in 2:16 as "we have come to believe in Christ Jesus." This rendering, however, does not do justice either to the aorist tense of the verb (it treats the verb more like a perfect) or to the logical connection between 2:16a and this clause. What precedes this main clause in 2:16b is a participial clause (εἰδοτές) which describes attendant events. In a case like this, where it is a state of knowledge which accompanies an action, Paul most likely means that the knowledge was the motivating factor for the action.

448 So Burton, Galatians, 117-18; Dunn, Galatians, 132.

449 The Greek reads ημεῖς φοιτεὶ ουδεὶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοῖ.
drawing attention to the fact that he and Peter are Jews, likely in order to emphasize the reality that even they (as Jews) have realized that Torah-obedience does not justify. Nothing is implied here, however, about the extent of agreement about the content of 2:16. It remains very possible that while Paul presents this declaration as a point of agreement between himself and Peter it is a point which deeply divides him from his Galatian opponents.

There has, however, been a tendency among exegetes to argue that Paul's "we" here includes not just himself and Peter but all Jewish believers. Those who read 2:15 this way seem to take the verse, not as a verbless clause, but as a pronoun followed by two phrases in apposition to that pronoun which further define it. This yields a translation like that of R. N. Longenecker: "We who are Jews by birth and not 'sinners of the Gentiles' . . ." The opening participle of 2:16 then simply continues this description of the "we" who, as Jewish Christians, know that justification does not come on the basis of Torah-observance, etc. In other words, according to this reading of 2:15 Paul and Peter share the convictions outlined in 2:16 because they are Jewish Christians. The implication, then, is that the Galatian opponents too, as Jewish believers, also share these convictions. As the Galatian audience listens in on Paul's speech to Peter, 2:16

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450 So Betz, Galatians, 114, 115 n. 20; Donaldson, Paul, 181, 352, n. 65; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 82, 84; Martyn, Galatians, 263-64; Oepke, Galater, 58.
451 Many commentators seem to assume this construal of the grammar but, strangely, do not justify the reading in grammatical terms. One exception is Schlier, Galater, 52.
452 R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 81.
453 Martyn is explicit (Galatians, 248) that Paul's "we" includes the Galatian "Teachers." In describing 2:15-21 as the rhetorical proposicio of Galatians, Betz says that this rhetorical section was generally used first to sum up the points of agreement between speaker and audience and then to state the points which are contested (Galatians, 114; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 82). Yet we must be careful not to let our exegesis be governed by the dictates of the rhetorical manuals, since the proposicio is supposed to sum up "the narratio's material contents," but (contra Betz, Galatians, 114) 2:15-21 manifestly
functions to remind them of the basic points on which the Apostle agrees with their more recent teachers. This interpretation is particularly appealing now when scholars are eager to show that Paul did not misconstrue Judaism as a legalistic religion of "works righteousness." On this reading, 2:16 does not contain a (hopelessly inaccurate) rejection of Jewish attitudes, but rather a restatement of the attitudes which all Jewish Christians share, precisely because Jews do not understand their legal works to earn their salvation.

One cannot help but applaud the recent moves toward correcting our understanding of Second-Temple Judaism. In this case, however, the reading of 2:16 which appears to help that cause simply does not work. On closer examination it becomes clear that the statements of 2:16 cannot reflect convictions which Paul shares with his Galatian opponents. When, in 2:21, Paul winds up this section of his argument, his concluding statement seems to be a re-statement of 2:16: "if justification comes through the law (εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνην), then Christ died for nothing" (2:21). As a parting shot, this denial of justification through the law presumes that the opponents do in fact hold such a view, or at least that their teaching implies it. It would make no sense, however, for Paul to insist in this way that justification is not "through the law" if the opponents agreed from the outset that "a person is justified not by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ" (2:16). Thus, the "we" in 2:15-16 does not include

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454 Nor can we differentiate between Paul's statement in 2:16a, which employs the preposition εκ and the statement in 2:21, which uses διὰ. For in 2:16 justification εξ έργων νόμου is set in opposition to justification διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ. On the other hand, in 3:6 and elsewhere justification is said to
Jewish believers generally, but refers only to Paul and Peter. On the level of Paul's summary of the Antioch incident, 2:16 constitutes a summary of the basic convictions shared by Peter and Paul, convictions which had likely been crystalized for Peter earlier at the Jerusalem meeting. On the level of Paul's discourse with his Galatian audience, however, this same verse constitutes a statement of the thesis which will be argued through the theoretical portion of the letter.

Does this mean that Paul thinks his opponents in Galatia actually taught that one was justified on the basis of legal obedience and not on the basis of one's faith? Does it mean that the Apostle considered "justification by the works of the law" to reflect the self-understanding of his Jewish contemporaries more broadly? The answer is probably "no" on both counts. For in 2:16 Paul does not simply deny that justification can come on

**come ἐκ πίστεως.** The prepositions thus seem to be used interchangeably to denote the ground or basis for justification.

Note too how, in 5:4-5, Paul emphasizes that οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοσύνης have cut themselves off from Christ, while "we" are receiving ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης and this ἐκ πίστεως. These statements stand at the conclusion of Paul's "theological" argument, where he begins to draw the implications for the Galatians' consideration of circumcision. Hence, not only does the issue of justification through law/faith seem to sum up Paul's theoretical point, but he employs these terms precisely where he addresses the practical issue which motivated the letter.

This concluding statement in 2:21 also renders implausible the attempt to differentiate between justification (which all agree the law cannot bring) and son-ship of Abraham (for which the opponents think Torah-obedience is required). There may have been some Jews in Paul's day who imagined righteous Gentiles who remained outside the law (see Donaldson, Paul, 60-68). In Paul's argument, however, being a son of Abraham seems to be inseparable from righteousness. Note that it is in a discussion of Abraham's justification ἐκ πίστεως that other believers are said to be τοῖοι Ἄβραχοι (3:7). It is because they follow the same path to justification (see 3:8) that Gentile believers are sons of Abraham. Likewise, while the conclusions in 3:14 and 3:18 are phrased in terms of inheriting the promises to Abraham, it is clear in 3:8 that being "blessed" with Abraham (ἐνύπολητοι ἐν σοι τὰ πάντα τὰ ἔθη) is equivalent for Paul to being justified by God (ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῖ τὰ ἔθη ὁ Θεός).

Hence 2:15 is best construed as a separate verbless clause.

456So Burton, Galatians, 118; Bruce, Galatians, 135; Lührmann, Galatians, 47. It is generally understood that the section in 2:15-21 establishes the primary thesis of the letter (so Dunn, Galatians, 131-32; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 80, 83; Martyn, Galatians, 246). Hence, if 2:16 is stating at the outset the conclusion which Paul will reach in 2:21, then 2:16 plays the role of the opening thesis statement for Paul's theoretical argument in the letter body.
the basis of Torah-obedience. He also sets up such justification-through-Torah as an alternative to justification by faith in Christ. In doing so Paul is likely driving a wedge between two realities, legal observance and faith in God's action, which in traditional Judaism (including Jewish Christianity) had been considered inseparable. He is framing his position in such a way that, instead of legal obedience being the supreme expression of faith in God, that faith in his salvific action can come to full expression without any adherence to the Sinaiitic legislation. It is likely because the opponents do not separate these facets of Israel's devotion to God that they encourage the Galatian believers to adopt circumcision and complete their adherence to Torah. As E. P. Sanders argues, Paul is not attacking "works righteousness," but rather the "standard Jewish view that accepting and living by the law is a sign and condition of favored status." Rather, that status can (and for Gentiles must) be attained outside of devotion to Torah. What remains to be seen, however, is just how Paul is going to argue in 2:15-21 in order to support this model of

457 So Lührmann, *Galatians*, 47. See the connection between faith and works in 4Esar 9:7; 13:23. In 4 Macc. 15.24-28 the mother's steadfast actions in defense of Torah arise from her "faith." Some depict this faith/works dichotomy as a departure from Jewish thought which, nonetheless, Jewish Christians would uniformly support (so Oepke, *Galater*, 58-9; Schlier, *Galater*, 54). James 2:14-17 suggests, however, that in fact Jewish Christians sometimes found Paul's dichotomy nonsensical.

458 Even those who treat 2:16 as common ground often recognize that Paul's dichotomy would have been foreign to many Jewish believers. Martyn (*Galatians*, 267-68) writes: "There is, therefore, no thought [in the Jewish-Christian tradition] that God's rectification removes one from the realm of God's Law." Rather, the law's validity is "taken for granted." Martyn goes so far as to argue that the "Teachers" in Galatia themselves emphasized the need for full Torah-observance, precisely because in this Gentile environment they could not assume what Jewish-Christians normally did about the law's continuing necessity (*Galatians*, 268-69).

459 Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People*, 46.

460 Barclay (Obeying, 78) makes essentially the same point when he writes that "[t]he repeated statements of the contrast between 'faith in Christ' and 'works of the law' in 2.16 emphasize the way that justification by faith in Christ modifies the standard Jewish distinction between 'Jews' and 'Gentile sinners.'" So Dunn (*Galatians*, 132-33), who points to Ps 9.17; Tob 13:6; Jub. 23.23-4; Pss. Sol. 2:1-2; Matt 5:47/Luke 6:33. Dunn also notes that Jews of one group would sometimes call Jews of another group "Gentiles" when they wanted to question the latter's righteousness (*Galatians*, 133; see, e.g., 1 Macc 1:34; 2:44, 48; 1 En. 5.4-7; 82.4-5; I QpHab 5.4-8; Pss. Sol. 4.8; 13.6-12).
the situation. It is to this analysis of the Apostle's argument that we now turn.

**ii. The logic of Paul's argument in 2:15-21**

Paul's thesis in 2:16 is a statement, in general terms, of some implications which flow from his configuration of Israel's story. He agrees with most Jews that people must be "justified," accepted by God, in order to play a good role in the narrative, one which ends up in the eschatological restoration of the world. Paul insists, however, that one does not come to play this role by keeping Torah. Rather, human beings can only play this role in the story if they place their faith in Christ. In other words, those who believe in Christ will enjoy the eschatological restoration regardless of whether or not they keep the details of the Sinaitic law. These ethical dynamics are very different from those which most Jews (including many Jewish believers in Christ) traced out in Israel's story. The ordinary Jewish reading of Israel's history, and especially of Deuteronomy, depicted the observance of Torah as fundamental to maintaining a good relationship with God and hence reaping the blessings promised in Israel's covenant. It is most likely this kind of reading of Israel's story which prompted the opponents to press circumcision on the Galatians. The radical divergence between Paul's thesis here and the position of the opponents thus suggests, again, that the theological story which forms Paul's hermeneutical framework is different in important ways from the story which his Galatian opponents assume. Something has prompted Paul to re-configure Israel's story in such a way that its ethical implications are now the reverse of what they are on his opponents' reading of the narrative. Indeed, we will see that the argumentative thrust of this section is to show that Paul's re-configuration is both coherent and necessary.
Following his thesis statement in 2:16, Paul turns to meet objections which the Galatian opponents seem to have levelled against this position. Echoing the opponents' objection in a rhetorical question, the Apostle asks: “But if, in our effort to be justified in Christ, we ourselves have been found to be sinners, is Christ then a servant of sin?” (2:17). We should understand by the term "sinners" here not simply the charge that the Galatians have been left without resources to curb their transgressions. Rather, just as in 2:15 Paul and "Peter" agreed that neither of them was a "Gentile sinner" (ἐγνώκατε ἀμαρτωλοί), so here too the "sinners" are primarily those who live like Gentiles, those who live outside the covenant law. It thus seems that the opponents have charged Paul with encouraging Gentiles to remain ἀμαρτωλοί, "sinners," and even descending to that level

461So R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 89; see also Lambrecht, "Paul's Reasoning," 72-3. Thus far in the letter nothing has been said about the danger of ethical chaos in the wake of Paul's Gospel. Rather, the focus rests squarely on the question of whether Torah-observance is necessary.

462As Dunn observes, Paul is thinking primarily about the kind of behaviour which the "men from James" condemned at Antioch (Galatians, 141; so Burton, Galatians, 125; Martyn, Galatians, 255). Of course, he is also thinking about the non-observant lifestyle which the opponents condemn in Galatia (so Burton, Galatians, 125; Martyn, Galatians, 255). On the standard Jewish identification of Gentiles as "sinners," see LXX I Sam 15:18; Ps 9:18; Pss. Sol. 2.1-2; 17.25; Jub. 23.23-4; 24.28; 4 Ezra 3.28-36; Matt 5:47; 26:45 (and parallels in Luke).

Alternately, we could understand Paul to be admitting that he is a sinner in the more radical sense that he is "in need of justification through Christ" (so Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 218; idem, "Paul's Reasoning," 72; Eckstein, Verheißung, 35-6). Yet if we understand Paul to be responding here to a charge that "Christ is a servant of sin" (2:17b), it is difficult to see how anyone could draw that conclusion from the fact that prior to their coming to faith believers were radically in need of redemption. Christ, far from serving sin, would be its obvious antidote. Bruce suggests that Christ would be seen as increasing the number of sinners by revealing Torah-observance as inadequate (Galatians, 141), but this would be a thin charge easily refuted by pointing out that Christ is simply revealing people for what they were all along (a response which Paul does not take up). On the other hand, the charge that Christ is being implicated in sin follows quite naturally if it is a response to Paul's encouragement of a law-free lifestyle. Of course, as Eckstein suggests, Paul could be thinking of believers remaining "sinners" before God even as they live out their faith in Christ (Verheißung, 41), but since Paul does not actually deny here the initial charge that he and those around him are "sinners," this reading would require Paul to concede that believers are still ἀμαρτωλοί in the substantive sense that they are characterized by or dominated by sin, something which he seems deliberately to avoid saying in his letters.
lawless way of life himself. Yet the hypothetical objection raised here does not simply attack Paul's ethical conduct. It pushes further, and attempts to show that Paul's reading of the story issues in intolerable internal conflicts. Does Paul not depict Christ as a "servant of sin"? If seeking justification in Christ were really to involve abandoning Torah and living like a Gentile, then would this not mean that the advent and activity of Christ would all be aimed at promoting apostasy in Israel? Would it not mean that the God who had acted in Christ was tearing down the covenant which he himself had established? The charge is, in other words, that Paul's re-configuration of Israel's narrative cannot produce a coherent reading of its "chapters."

Paul's reply is an emphatic "Certainly not! (μη γενομένου)" (2:17). The Apostle does not refute the charge that he (like Peter before the arrival of the "men from James") does in fact live as a "sinner." What Paul objects to is the suggestion that Christ's

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463 It is, of course, difficult to sort out here how much the question in 2:17 is to be taken as an objection in the Galatian situation, and how much it is to be taken as a response to objections in the original Antioch conflict. Whatever the background of this conflict in Antioch, however, it is at least aimed at countering concerns which are also live in Galatia.

464 In this sense the Galatian opponents would have agreed with Marcion's logic that Paul's God must not be the God of the Hebrew Bible, though they would have sided with the Hebrew God rather than Marcion.

465 The form of the conditional in 2:17, beginning with ει in the protasis and making use of ordinary indicative verbs, may indicate that the condition indicated in the protasis is in fact true (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 32-33; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 89; Martyn, Galatians, 253; contra Bultmann, "Auslegung," ??). Yet, as Lambrecht has emphasized, the simple conditional form does not amount to a positive affirmation that the protasis is fulfilled in reality ("Unreal Conditions"). Betz argues (Galatians, 120) that the second part of the condition (that the believers are found to be "sinners") must be false because they are identified as being "in Christ," while the status of "sinner" means that one is "living outside of the realm of God's salvation." Betz' point is an important counter-balance to B. W. Longenecker's suggestion that Paul in 2:17 accepts the identification of believers as "sinners" because "all people find themselves to be outsiders to the covenant" as defined by Christ ("Defining," 85). For both Paul and Peter (presumably the "we" in 2:17), as those making an "effort to be justified in Christ," stand within that newly defined boundary. Surely they, if anyone, must by virtue of their identification with Christ escape the verdict against covenant violators. At the same time, Betz misses the ambiguity about the Jewish use of the term upon which Paul plays here. In Jewish circles the term "sinner" denoted one who had stubbornly and grossly breached Torah or, as in 2:15, was outside the circle of Torah altogether as a Gentile. At the same time it meant one who had rebelled against God's will, for that will was identified.
promotion of this law-free lifestyle must make him a "servant of sin," i.e. that God's agent would have to be understood as God's opponent. The Apostle defends his thesis by showing how the re-configuration of Israel's story upon which it depends is in fact coherent. The key factor in maintaining this coherence is, of course, Paul's particular understanding of Christ's actions. In 2:19-20 Paul lays out in schematic form his construal of the implications of the Christ event in the larger narrative: "For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Paul's telling of the story here is necessarily dense and allusive, but we can make out the broad outlines.

The event of Christ's death is understood here as some sort of punishment for transgression. By placing his faith in Christ, the Apostle is identified with his Lord in that death, so that he has vicariously suffered the judgment marked out for the covenant violator. Since, however, Christ rose from the grave, Paul too is now enlivened with Torah. This ambiguity allows Paul here to affirm for rhetorical effect that the believer is a "sinner" in the first sense—he or she does abandon Torah—while going on to deny that this makes him or her a sinner in the second sense (so Burton, Galatians, 125, 127-130; Martyn, Galatians, 255). Hence, as Räisänen suggests: "those who, according to the norms laid down in the law, are 'sinners' nevertheless do not necessarily live in sin. That is, the law does not provide reliable criteria of sin" (Paul, 76, n. 173).

This reading fits well with Burton's observation that the emphatic denial μην γινομαι is consistently used (in Paul and elsewhere) following a question in order to deny that "the alleged conclusion follows from the premise," rather than to deny the truth of one of the premises (Galatians, 128; so Eckstein, Verheißung, 34). Moreover, Eckstein points out that, in keeping with diatribal rhetorical practice, Paul always uses μην γινομαι to negate a question (as in 2:17b) and never a statement (as in 2:17a; Verheißung, 34).

466 In this sense Paul's death to the law came "through the law," διὰ νόμου (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 66; Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 229; Martyn, Galatians, 257; contra Burton, Galatians, 134). Lambrecht is almost certainly right to see here an allusion to the same idea expressed in 3:13 ("Paul's Reasoning," 63). B. W. Longenecker objects ("Defining," 87) to the use of Gal 3:10-13 to unpack Paul's dense formulations here, but despite the fact that the first audience came to 2:19-20 unequipped with a knowledge of 3:10-13 those later, more explicit verses can surely be used to elucidate what Paul intended by this more opaque formulation in the same letter. Longenecker ("Defining," 87) understands the "death
Christ. Yet once the believer has suffered (through identification with Christ) God's judgment on law-breakers, the law no longer carries any threat: "For through the law I died to the law" (2:19).\footnote{Dunn, Galatians, 144; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 91-92; contra Burton, Galatians, 134, 136. Betz notes (Galatians, 120) that Paul seems to presume the idea which he makes explicit in Rom 4:15, that "where there is no law, neither is there violation."}\footnote{So Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 224-25; "Paul's Reasoning," 61.} Coming to a good end no longer depends, for the believer, on keeping Torah, for he or she has already vicariously suffered its curse and (as one infused with Christ's resurrected life) has been reborn outside of the deuteronomic system.\footnote{We should probably not be over-precise about determining the referent of \(\xi\) and \(\tau\)\(\upsilon\)\(\nu\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)\(\iota\) in 2:18, the things which one might hypothetically "rebuild." Clearly they have to do with the observance of Torah, with the treatment of Torah observance as a condition of one's being righteous before God. Whether Paul is thus primarily thinking of one re-erecting Torah itself as a code to be observed (so Betz, Galatians, 121), the conviction that its observance leads to righteousness (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 49), the observance of certain commands (i.e. food laws; so Burton, Galatians, 130; Rütsäine, Paul, 47), or the legal barrier between Jew and Gentile, the thrust of his thought is the same. Indeed, the fact that Paul uses a plural...} It is this construal of the Christ event, as part of Israel's larger story, which allows Paul to say that obeying Torah will now not bring any benefit to someone who has been included in Christ. On the contrary, if Paul were to "build up again" that way of relating to God, his own (and his converts') law-free behaviour would again come under judgment.\footnote{So Burton, Galatians, 130; Rütsäine, Paul, 47, or the legal barrier between Jew and Gentile, the thrust of his thought is the same. Indeed, the fact that Paul uses a plural...} They

through the law" simply as the verdict pronounced on "all flesh" as "covenant outsiders." This does not account, however, for the close connection between this "death through the law" and the following reference to being "crucified with Christ." It seems clear that Paul is thinking in vv. 19-20 in terms of what happens when one participates in Christ's passion and resurrection, is judged by the law together with Christ (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 58-9). This death is also a death \(\nu\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\upsilon\)\(\upsilon\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\mic...} It is this construal of the Christ event, as part of Israel's larger story, which allows Paul to say that obeying Torah will now not bring any benefit to someone who has been included in Christ. On the contrary, if Paul were to "build up again" that way of relating to God, his own (and his converts') law-free behaviour would again come under judgment.\footnote{So Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 224-25; "Paul's Reasoning," 61.} They

would again be judged as "transgressors" (2:18). Hence it is not Paul but the opponents who by their actions are putting themselves in a dangerous role in the story. As long as one's role in the story is determined by one's participation in Christ, legal observance is irrelevant. The believer has moved beyond the reach of Torah. Hence to return to a system of legal observance would be to "nullify the grace of God" (2:21).

Thus far Paul has responded to the opponents' challenge by demonstrating how his ethical position can arise from a coherent telling of the theological narrative. It is not until 2:21, however, that the Apostle tries to show why this re-configuration of Israel's story was necessary. Here Paul offers his own, positive justification for the way in which he

pronoun should warn us against thinking that his meaning was finely restricted.

460 Lambrecht ("Transgressor," 231) rightly emphasizes that the term παραβάτης implies, particularly in Paul's usage, transgression of some law (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 52). Hence Lambrecht's own interpretation of this "transgression" as the violation of God's act of salvation in Christ ("Transgressor") is much less plausible than a reading which retains the connection between the παραβάτης and Torah (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 55). Certainly, Paul is not simply affirming that, having adopted Torah-observance once more, he would recognize his past actions as sin. The verb συνιστάω does not bear this meaning for Paul (so Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 232). Paul's point is slightly different—that he would actually become, constitute himself, a transgressor if he were to place himself again within the de utero nomic system. Whether on the basis of his past law-free life or of his present inability to keep Torah, he says that his life would be judged as transgressive if he made himself vulnerable again to the judgment of that law.

461 Paul's immediate point is thus that his own particular law-free actions would come to qualify him as a transgressor if he were to return to a Torah-observant system (so Dunn, Galatians, 143). In light of what follows in chapter 3, however, Martyn is likely right that Paul also thinks that anyone who places themselves under that system will simply be dooming themselves to be defined as a transgressor (so Martyn, Galatians, 256), though why this is so he does not yet make clear. Both of these readings are preferable to interpretations in which Paul would pit a believer's return to law-observance against the "true intent" of Torah (as in Burton, Galatians, 131; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 91). Still less is the Apostle saying that his re-adoption of Torah would make him a "transgressor" of the new principle of life in Christ (as Lambrecht, "Transgressor," 234-35; B. W. Longenecker, "Defining," 84), for παραβάτης is never used by Paul of one who rejects salvation in Christ.

462 Notice that Paul does not deny that his gospel involves "tearing down" Torah. What he denies is simply that this opposition to Torah makes him a "transgressor," an apostate Israelite, and thus a "sinner" in the sense of one acting in opposition to God. Here we must qualify Dunn's statement that "Paul's object here is not the law per se, but the law understood as preventing Gentiles' full and free participation in the grace of God as Gentiles" (Galatians, 149). For Paul too, as an ethnic Jew, is asserting that after his identification with Christ he need no longer keep Torah. It is thus more accurate to say that Paul is opposing any use of the law as the criterion for salvation, for inclusion in God's people (so Burton, Galatians, 132).
has re-construed Israel's story: "for (γὰρ) if justification comes through the law, then
Christ died for nothing (Χριστός δοθεν ἀπεθανεν)."\textsuperscript{473} Here is revealed the "gap" in the
story which forced the Apostle's reinterpretation.\textsuperscript{474} Christ's death was a shameful one
which by its very form suggested divine judgment. On the usual understanding of Israel's
story, and the role of legal observance within it, Christ would simply be shown as a
transgressor who has suffered God's curse. Yet by his resurrection Christ has been
vindicated by God and shown to have been God's agent after all. This is the aporia which
Paul could not resolve without re-thinking the whole of the prior story, and at the end of
that process of reinterpretation he was left with a reading which was radically novel but
which (he believed) could encompass this new and radically novel event. Of course, the
question which both the opponents and the Galatian believers will ask is how Paul can
reconcile this construal of the Christ event with the story of Israel in which Torah played

\textsuperscript{473}While εἰ is used in v. 21 rather than εὖ, and while ἄν does not appear in the apodosis, Betz
opts to understand the clause as a (defective) second-class conditional, apparently based on the aorist verb
in the apodosis (Galatians, 126). Betz is motivated in this by the impossibility, in the context, of reading
Paul as affirming that the law really does bring righteousness and Christ's death really is meaningless (so
R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 95; Martyn, Galatians, 260). Lambrecht likewise points out that Paul
has denied precisely this possibility three times in 2:16 ("Transgressor," 229). Even if the grammatical form is
construed as a first-class conditional, however, Lambrecht has pointed out that such first-class conditions
do not necessarily imply the truth of the protasis ("Transgressor," 229; "Unreal Conditions")

\textsuperscript{474}So Bryant, Crucified Christ, 166: "Christ's death has proven the law's inability to put a person in
a right relationship with God (vv. 15-16)" (cf. Ibid., 169-70). Hence Eckstein's general observation that the
thesis of 2:16 is not an objectively accessible "knowledge," but (following G. Klein) an "im
Christusgeschene allererst eröffnetes Wissen" (Verheißung, 13; quoting Klein, "Individualgeschichte," 184).
Dunn turns this backwards when he suggests that Paul's primary concern was to maintain the
implication of Christ's death, that it had "abolished the law in its boundary-defining role," and that "to fail
to recognize that significance of the cross was to lose all" (Galatians, 149). While both of these things
were doubtless true for Paul, Dunn's reading implies that the Apostle could have seen (at least in theory)
some salvific function for Christ's death if the law were still functioning as a route to salvation. What Paul
says, however, is that Christ's death would play no function whatsoever if the law were still to work as a
path to righteousness (so Burton, Galatians, 141; Martyn, Galatians, 260).
so great a part. This demonstration of the coherence of Paul's re-configured story will have to wait, however, for there is another more immediate "gap" to which Paul wants to draw the Galatians' attention.

b. 3:1-5 Encountering another "gap" in the story

When Paul turns back to the Galatians in 3:1 he bursts out: "You foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you? Here, as in 1:6, Paul's discursive argument is momentarily suspended in favour of a rhetoric designed to shame the audience and encourage their sympathetic attention. He wants their attention, however, in order to

Note:

475 The nearest Paul comes to a demonstration of this coherence with the earlier parts of the narrative is his quotation of Ps 143:2 in 2:16. In the LXX (142:2) the verse reads: ὁ δὲ ταχεύσεσται ἐν ἑαυτῷ σου τὰς ζωὰς (MT [143:2]: יִנְשָׁבִּים תַּחְתָּךְ אֲדֹנָי). Paul's most significant interpretive move here is to add that no "flesh" will be justified on the basis of successfully keeping Torah. As Dunn observes, "this was not a merely arbitrary move" (Galatians, 140), but was an extension of a traditional principle which took on new significance in the post-Easter context. Since, however, the original Psalm originates from a context in which Torah-observance was the unquestioned norm for those seeking peace with God, Paul's use of the verse would still seem tortured were it not that the Christ event had forced a radical re-evaluation of the prior tradition.

476 Dunn (Galatians, 151) identifies the rebuke ὃ ἀνόητοι Γαλάται as typical of the diatribe style which seems to be continued through v. 5 in the series of questions (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 99; Martyn, Galatians, 281), and Betz cautions that the apparent insult "should not be taken too seriously" (Galatians, 130). Dunn is also right, however, that Paul's shock does not seem wholly feigned (Ibid., 151; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 99). In his rhetorical assumption that the Galatians must be "bewitched" Paul may reflect a genuine conviction that some demonic power must be at work, for "only that would have been sufficient to explain how those whose experience of the Spirit had been so rich (iii.2-5) could have left it behind" (Dunn, Galatians, 151). Paul does not likely think, however, that someone has actually cast a spell on the Galatians (contra Schlier, Galatier, 119). As Dunn observes, this reference to the "evil eye" not only reinforces his sense of amazement at their behaviour, but also imputes questionable intentions and methods to the opponents (Galatians, 152; so Burton, Galatians, 144 and see Betz, Galatians, 131 for examples of such a figurative use). Their "seductive wiles" are like black magic (Martyn, Galatians, 282).

Paul is further amazed that the Galatians have gone astray this way, for "it was before your eyes that Jesus Christ was publicly exhibited as crucified!" (3:1). This most likely refers to the vividness of Paul's preaching which allowed the audience to picture the event as if seeing it for themselves (so Betz, Galatians, 131-32; Dunn, Galatians, 152; Martyn, Galatians, 283), or to the open and clear way in which the gospel was proclaimed (so Burton, Galatians, 143; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 100-101). As elsewhere (cf. 1 Cor 1:13, 23; 2:2, 8; 2 Cor 13:4) Paul probably means by this reference to Christ as "crucified" to refer the whole message which the Apostle preaches (so Betz, Galatians, 131-32; Burton, Galatians, 143), and not that he only described this one event (contra Martyn, Galatians, 283). Yet this way of summarizing it suggests that it was precisely this unexpected aspect of the Messiah's work which pushed Paul (and should have pushed the Galatians) to a new understanding of Israel's story (so Dunn, Galatians, 152).
reason with them, to show them why the opponents' version of the Gospel is a dangerous perversion of the message. Hence, as suddenly as he broke off, the Apostle rejoins his discursive argument in 3:2, now speaking directly to his Galatian audience and presenting them with reasons why the substance of his own position is true.\footnote{Cosgrove argues at length that 3:1-5 should be understood, not as Paul's opening argument for the position stated in 2:15-21, but rather as a statement of the main argumentative point which Paul wants to make. The Galatians, under the influence of the opponents, "came to understand life in the Spirit as dependent somehow on lawkeeping, despite the fact that they were not under the Torah when they first received the Spirit (Cross, 45; cf. 39-52). Yet, not only does this reading depend on a faulty approach to 2:15-21 (see above), but it also gives insufficient weight to the fact that Paul seems to presume in 3:1-5 that the Galatians will simply acknowledge the conditions under which they received the Spirit. This is a matter for simple observation and recollection, and so he elicits the point from the Galatians themselves: τοῦτο μόνον θέλω μαθεῖν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, . . . (3:2). If his argumentative point were so patently obvious Paul would hardly need to continue arguing, as he does, until chapter the close of chapter 4. Cosgrove objects that the Apostle cannot be appealing to the experience of the Spirit as evidence of the Galatians' justification without law, because if such law-free justification were the issue in Galatia the opponents would certainly have contested the Galatians' experiences of the Spirit (Cross, 43-4). Yet this same objection can be brought against Cosgrove's own reading of the situation. If the issue under dispute were the relationship of Spirit-experiences to law-keeping, then the opponents would just as likely have contested the Galatians' experiences. Cosgrove simply does not allow either for the possibility that these experiences were powerful enough to stand as evidence in the face of the opponents' challenges, or for the likelihood that the opponents were not as rigorously consistent in their theology as Cosgrove implies. In fact their insistence on circumcision in Galatia may even have been prompted by their realization that the Spirit was being manifested there and their concern to bring the Galatian believers within traditionally comprehensible categories of righteous people. In the end we should give decisive weight to the fact that both the introduction (2:15-21) and conclusion (5:1-12) of Paul's main argument focus on the question of how one is justified before God. This is the issue which Paul sees as primary, and the issue in service of which he introduces their experiences of the Spirit. Coponation identifies 3:1-18 as the primary argumentative section of the letter (probatio) (Galatians, 98-99), while Betz (correctly) envisions the probatio as stretching from 3:1 all the way to 4:31 (so Dunn, Galatians, 159). We will treat 4:12-20 and 21-31 under a separate heading simply because the mode of argumentation changes in those sections, but the basic task is still that of the probatio: to present the "proofs" of one's argument (so Betz, Galatians, 128), and it is this task which the Apostle begins in earnest at 3:1.}\footnote{Betz, Galatians, 30. Barclay (Obeying, 83) rightly points out that Paul introduces the fact of their reception of the Spirit as "a knock-down proof for his case: τοῦτο μόνον θέλω μαθεῖν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, . . . (3:2) (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 84).}

It is here that the narrative dynamics in Paul's reasoning become most clear. As Betz observes, Paul begins his main argument\footnote{R. N. Longenecker identifies 3:1-18 as the primary argumentative section of the letter (probatio) (Galatians, 98-99), while Betz (correctly) envisions the probatio as stretching from 3:1 all the way to 4:31 (so Dunn, Galatians, 159). We will treat 4:12-20 and 21-31 under a separate heading simply because the mode of argumentation changes in those sections, but the basic task is still that of the probatio: to present the "proofs" of one's argument (so Betz, Galatians, 128), and it is this task which the Apostle begins in earnest at 3:1.} by eliciting from his audience the chief point of evidence to which he will appeal:\footnote{Betz, Galatians, 30. Barclay (Obeying, 83) rightly points out that Paul introduces the fact of their reception of the Spirit as "a knock-down proof for his case: τοῦτο μόνον θέλω μαθεῖν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, . . . (3:2) (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 84).} "Did you receive the Spirit by doing the works of the law or by believing what you heard (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκοῆς)
It is generally agreed that here Paul is referring to some ecstatic or miraculous experience which the Galatians had at their conversion, and he may also be thinking of the fact that such experiences have continued since then. By referring to this experience as their reception of "the Spirit," Paul makes it clear that he is understanding this event as a part of his theological story. This experience represents the general out-pouring of God's Spirit on his people which was predicted in scripture as a part of the eschatological consummation of history, and to that extent it constitutes a further chapter in the story which many Jews had anticipated.

Whether we understand the phrase δόξα πίστεως to denote "believing what you heard" (so Bryant, Crucified Christ, 172, n. 19; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 103; cf. Martyn, Galatians, 287-88) or "hearing with faith" (so Burton, Galatians, 147; Dunn, Galatians, 154; Lightfoot, Galatians, 135; Williams, "Hearing of Faith") Paul's point is the same. Much less likely is the sense "a message (proclamation) which elicited (only) faith" (so BDAG, 36 [4.b]) or "the proclamation that has the power to elicit faith" (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 86-8; Martyn, Galatians, 284, 287-89; cf. Betz, Galatians, 133; Schlier, Galater, 122), since the focus here is on the response which was required from the Galatians (so Dunn, Galatians, 154). Contra Martyn (Galatians, 283-84) Paul's introduction of the subject of the Spirit here does not require much explanation. There are certainly no sure grounds for thinking that the Spirit was an emphasis of the opponents, particularly since Paul himself speaks so freely and often of the Spirit at work in the believer's life. As we saw above, Paul was likely thinking of the activity of the Spirit in his mission in 2:8 as evidence of its legitimacy, and he would not have thought he was shifting subjects when he moved from talking about his proclamation of "Christ crucified" in 3:1 to the believer's reception of the Spirit when they responded to that proclamation in 3:2. Here, then, we need not see Paul as purely reactive in his emphases, but rather as proactively highlighting what has always been a key piece of evidence for his divine commission—its experiential fruit.

So Betz, Galatians, 29, 132; Burton, Galatians, 151; Dunn, Galatians, 153; Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 74; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 102. Lull (Spirit, 69-71) points to 3:5 where being "outfitted" with the Spirit (ο οἷς ἐπιμορφωθήκατε ἕμνι τῷ πνεύμα ... ) is set in parallel with God's "working" of "miracles" among the Galatians ( ... καὶ ἑνεργὴν διανοίας ἐν ἕμνι; cf. Acts 2:4, 33; 8:17-18; 10:45-6). Note too the association of the Spirit with deeply emotional experiences in 4:6 and in Rom 5:5; 1 Thess 1:6, and the association of the Spirit with moral transformation (Rom 8:4ff.; Gal 5:16ff.). While it is true that early Christian writers often spoke of conversion in terms of "receiving the Spirit" (e.g., Acts 2:38; John 20:22) those very references suggest not that "reception of the Spirit" was merely a metonymic reference to a theological idea or to the baptismal ritual, but that the remarkable experiences which believers often had at conversion were attributed to the Spirit. Nor is there any basis for Eckstein's sharp distinction between one's initial reception of the Spirit and those "offensichtlichen Kraftverweise" which characterize its ongoing presence in the community (Verheißung, 85). It is less clear whether, as it is often assumed, these experiences began at an individual's baptism or whether, as Lull argues, they preceded baptism and were associated with the reception in faith of Paul's teaching (Spirit, 53-66; cf. Eckstein, Verheißung, 86).

So Dunn, Galatians, 153. See Isa 32:15; Ezek 37:4-14; Joel 2:28-29.
Thus far the opponents would likely agree. Paul's point in recalling this event, however, is to point out that it also opens up an interpretive "gap" for anyone who is trying to understand it as part of that traditional story. For in that narrative the Spirit is not poured out on just anyone. This eschatological event is to be enjoyed by the members of God's people, as part of the final covenant blessing. Yet here the Galatians have received the eschatological Spirit without taking on any of the observance of Torah which was usually understood to define the boundary between God's people and the rest of humanity. Here is the "gap," the totally unexpected aspect of the event, the aporia which demands some kind of resolution if the story is to be understood as a coherent whole.

The opponents seem to have resolved the incongruity between their prior understanding of the story and this new event by trying to eliminate it. If non-observant Gentiles are not supposed to receive the Spirit, then the solution to the problem is to make these Gentiles observe Torah. The Apostle argues, however, that this solution is no solution at all for instead of integrating the aporetic event into the story it simply denies it. In contrast, Paul insists that the event must be taken seriously in its novelty and does so by heightening the aporetic character of the event. "Are you so foolish?" he asks. "Having started with the Spirit are you now ending with the flesh? Did you experience so much for nothing?--if it really was for nothing" (3:3-4). The Galatians began their life in Christ

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483 Eckert concurs that Paul's argument in all of Galatians rests "zunächst an die Heilserfahrung der Galater," on the "unten ihnen geschehenen sichtbaren Wirkungen des Geistes" (urchristliche Verkündigung, 108).
484 This kind of approach might be suggested by Paul's allusion in 3:3 to attempts to "become perfect" or "complete" (ἐπιτελέοιθε) by means of Torah obedience (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 106).
485 Note Paul's continued use of shaming rhetoric (οὐτῶς ἀνέπαιτο ἔστε) in order to influence the Galatians to accept his position. Dunn is likely right that with the language of "beginning" (ἐναρξάμενον) and "ending" (ἐπιτελέοιθε) Paul is not thinking of cultic or ritual associations in particular (Galatians, 205).
"with the Spirit" (having received and been empowered by God's Spirit) but not "with the flesh" (without observing the outward acts of obedience to Torah which the opponents are now urging upon them). This means that they had already reached the goal toward which (on a traditional understanding of Israel's story) "the flesh," Torah observance, was intended to lead. They had already become part of God's eschatological people and begun to take part in the blessed restoration of creation. Why would they want to go back to "the flesh," to a system of practices which had no part in bringing them to this point?

Why not take seriously the meaning which the story gives to their experience— that they are already part of God's eschatological people and need nothing else?

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155; contra Betz, Galatians, 133). Both words are very common outside of cultic contexts, and elsewhere when Paul uses them for such an antithesis they mean simply "beginning"/"end," "complete" (see 2 Cor 8:6; Phil 1:6; so Dunn, Galatians, 155). The reference to beginning must refer to the Galatians' initial acceptance of the Gospel (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 103). By ἐπιτελέω Paul may be referring to the Galatians' attempt to "attain perfection" (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 103), perhaps that moral perfection which the author of James sees as the perfection of πίστις (Jas 2:22; so Betz, Galatians, 134).

The talk of what the Galatians "experienced" (ἐπέθετε) reinforces our understanding of the reception of the Spirit as an experiential matter. On πάσχω in this neutral sense for "experience" instead of "suffer" see LSJ, 1347 (II, IV); BDAG, 785 (1); so Betz, Galatians, 134; Dunn, Galatians, 156; Eckstein, Verkehrung, 90-91; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 104; Martyn, Galatians, 285. Although the verb much more commonly carries the idea of "suffering," here the references to miraculous experiences of the Spirit which stand both prior and following should push us toward the less common neutral sense.

486It is not clear whether Paul means here to characterize "the Spirit" and "the flesh" (both in the dative case) as "means that enable the human being to accomplish something" (so Martyn, Galatians, 285) or more generally as two contradictory foci or orientations. We do not know (contra Martyn, Galatians, 291, 294) whether Paul picked up his emphasis on the "flesh" from the opponents, whether it was already a part of his own teaching, or whether he coined the usage for this occasion. In any case, his use in 6:12-13 makes it clear that by σάρξ Paul is thinking primarily of the medium in which the opponents want to see Torah observed, i.e., the body which must be circumcised, etc. (so Martyn, Galatians, 290-91; cf. LXX Gen 17:10-13). On the other hand, in 5:16 σάρξ is used to denote the mode of human existence which is characterized by vulnerability to sin (so Martyn, Galatians, 292). Here in chapter 3, the parallelism between vv. 2 and 3 associates the Spirit with faith and the "flesh" with "works of the law," so that σάρξ means primarily the body as a medium of Torah-observance (so Burton, Galatians, 148; Dunn, Galatians, 156). Yet it is also possible that the Apostle has the other sense of σάρξ in mind as well, heightening the irony that the Galatians would try to reach eschatological fulfillment while operating in the mode of existence which dooms them to failure (see Dunn, Galatians, 155-56). It is less certain that the opponents were urging such a "perfection" of the Galatians' "flesh" in response to immorality in the community (so Martyn, Galatians, 293). The possibility that Abraham was introduced by the opponents as a model of one who had overcome the σάρξ is intriguing but highly speculative (see Martyn, Galatians, 293-94).

487So Dunn, Galatians, 153-54.
Even more, Paul seems to imply that by going back to "the flesh" they would put their participation in the "Spirit" in jeopardy. That experience could end up being "for nothing" (3:4). To the opponents this would have sounded like nonsense. Torah is precisely the path toward eschatological blessing. How could observing it mean that one loses out on that reward? Paul implies, however, that in light of this novel event that whole understanding of the prior story needs to be re-thought. If these Galatians were not justified while doing Torah, then perhaps the story has been misunderstood all along. Perhaps doing Torah was not necessary for justification after all, and by continuing to act as if it is one may miss what God is really looking for from human beings.

All of these implications are thick in the air in 3:5 when the Apostle repeats his question: "Well then, does God supply you with the Spirit and work miracles (ἐνεργείαν δουλεύεις) among you by your doing works of the law, or by your believing what you heard?" (3:5). The shift to the present tense here, and thus to the ongoing experience of the Spirit in the community, brings Paul's questions to their implicit conclusion. If it was not by Torah-observance that the Galatians initially received the Spirit (i.e., became part of God's eschatological people), then why would their ongoing life with God (which continues to be marked by experiences of that Spirit) depend on such observance?

Indeed, if they are to "finish," to reach "completion," it will not be by means of Torah-
obedience but by means of the faith through which they received the Spirit and continue to experience its power. Paul calls the Galatians "foolish" in 3:1 and 3:3 because they have not exercised the interpretive insight to see what are to Paul the obvious implications of their own experience. The "reading" of Israel's story which the opponents are presenting cannot make sense of their reception of the Spirit, and so the whole story must be re-configured in a way which can bridge the interpretive "gap" opened up by this unexpected chapter.

c. 3:6-9 Re-configuring the episode of Abraham

What Paul proceeds to do in 3:6-9 is to trace the outlines of a new "reading" of the prior story. This is, he claims, an interpretation which takes seriously both Christ's death (2:15-21) and the Galatians' experience (3:1-5) and can integrate these novel events into the narrative as a whole. He begins where Israel began, with Abraham: 'Just as Abraham 'believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness,' so, you see, those who believe (οἱ ἐκ πίστεως) are the descendants of Abraham' (3:6-7). Paul may well have chosen Abraham as the focus of his re-interpretation of the story precisely because it is Abraham whom the opponents held up as a paradigm of those who will be considered

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490 Martyn (Galatians, 282) suggests that "Paul sees only one true antidote to foolishness: the proclamation of the crucified Christ." Yet he does not call them "foolish" because they have abandoned the proclamation. Rather he calls them foolish because they have not recognized the implications of the proclamation (3:1) and of their own experience (3:3). He expects them to be able to interpret both.

491 Most commentators take 3:6-9 as a unit dealing with Abraham as a precursor of the Galatians (so Burton, Galatians, 153; Dunn, Galatians, 159). Betz (Galatians, 142) divides these arguments differently, construing 3:6-7 as a kind of "thesis" with its proof-text and vv. 8-13 as a series of scriptural "proofs" for that thesis and the applicability of the proof-text. This reading seems, however, to contribute to his perplexity over Paul's logic.
righteous. Yet the Patriarch also offers Paul important parallels to the Galatians' experience. Like them, Abraham began as a Gentile and then came out of idolatry in response to God's call. Like them, Abraham was granted "righteousness" before he had obeyed any law, before even the first commandment of Torah was written. Like the Galatians who received the Spirit when they "believed" (οι ἐκ πίστεως) that God had acted in Christ, Abraham was granted this "righteousness" when he "believed" (ἐπίστευεν) that God would act on his behalf to create a nation and bless the world.

Here, Paul claims, Abraham represents the paradigm of exactly the same path taken by those in the Apostle's present who "believe," a path which calls not for obedience to Torah but for "faith" in God's action. In this sense, the Galatians are already "descendants of Abraham," those who live according to his paradigm. At the same time, Paul's use of

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492 So Burton, Galatians, 153; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 110; Lührmann, Galatians, 56; Martyn, Galatians, 297 (though Martyn thinks that Gal 15:6 is Paul's own selection). Martyn rightly points out that the expression "descendants of Abraham" appears nowhere else in Paul's letters, and this does suggest that the expression might have been a part of the opponents' program (so Martyn, Ibid., 299). As Eckstein observes, however, the connection between Abraham and the opponents' preaching is still far from certain (Verheißung, 94-5).

493 The preposition ἐκ here can indicate that the πίστις is the source of or the basis for something. In Abraham's case πίστις brought "righteousness" while in the Galatians' case Paul has so far only talked in terms of πίστις bringing a reception of the Spirit, but given Paul's talk in 2:16 about believers being justified ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ the Apostle is probably assuming that reception of the Spirit is itself an indication that one is righteous in God's sight. Given that God is consistently seen as the source of this justification (see 3:6, 8), this πίστις is not the source of that benefit but the proximate basis on which it is received. Paul's use of the phrase οι ἐκ πίστεως to designate believers as a group, however, suggests that the focus of the expression here is less on the goal which is achieved on the basis of faith (righteousness) and more on the faith itself as the attitude from out of which the Galatians live, the immediate source of their "character and standing" (Burton, Galatians, 155). Those "of faith" are those "of whose life faith is the determinative factor" (Burton, Ibid., 155). Longenecker's suggestion that ἐκ means to "rely on" faith (Galatians, 114) stretches the sense of the preposition and blurs Paul's emphasis that πίστις itself is a "relying on" God's action in Christ. Martyn's paraphrase "those whose identity is derived from faith" is better (Galatians, 299), but still obscures the fact that the faith is not simply determinative of their identity, but the sine qua non of their justification.

494 Dunn (Galatians, 163) points out that the semitic idiom 'son of X' to denote a person with the quality X "would make the transition in thought from 'like Abraham' to 'sons of Abraham' all the easier for Paul," and he observes that a similar idiom seems to have been common in Greek (see further BDAG, 1024 [2.e.α]).
that expression is pregnant with excess meaning here, for the Apostle is quite aware that
the title "descendants of Abraham" was also very often used by Jews to define themselves
as members of God's people.\textsuperscript{495} It may even have been a key phrase in the opponents'
rhetoric encouraging circumcision.\textsuperscript{496} By calling those who (like the Galatians) believe
"the seed of Abraham," Paul is thus restating his interpretation of the Galatians'
experience—that they are already accepted as part of God's people—and at
the same time showing how, in the context of Israel's story, this is possible.\textsuperscript{497} Abraham
too gained "righteousness" with God simply by believing.\textsuperscript{498}

Moreover, the Apostle claims that the scriptures, read in this light, can be seen to
have predicted that other Gentiles would follow Abraham's example and find
righteousness through faith. For this, Paul suggests, is what God meant when he declared
to Abraham that "All the Gentiles shall be blessed in you" (3:8).\textsuperscript{499} Certainly this was not
the way the Abraham episode had traditionally been read, but Paul's implicit claim is that

\textsuperscript{495}See the expression "seed of Abraham" in Ps 105:6; Isa 41:8 and the connection between one's
descent from Abraham and covenant status in Pss. Sol. 9.17; 3 Macc. 6.3. As Dunn (Galatians, 160) points
out, Philo devotes a whole work to the question of who is the heir of Abraham (Heres). Abraham was often
portrayed as a model of the pious Jew (e.g., Jub. 23.10; CD 3.2) and the prototype of the genuine convert
to Judaism (Jub. 12; Apoc. Ab. 1-8; Philo, Atr. 60-88; Jos., Ant. 1.155), so that being a descendant of
Abraham would mean precisely to be a faithful Jew.

\textsuperscript{496}So Martyn, Galatians, 299.

\textsuperscript{497}Betz (Galatians, 141) misses this when he suggests that the claim "is the result of the following
argument here anticipated." Rather, it is the (apparently impossible) implication of the Galatians'
experience, which has already been made more intelligible by Paul's highlighting of Gen 15.6.

\textsuperscript{498}Dunn observes that the more developed interpretation of Gen 15:6 which we find in Romans 4,
where Abraham's faith is explicitly distinguished from his later obedience, seems to be presumed here
(Galatians, 163).

\textsuperscript{499}Paul's citation is a mixture of Gen 12:3 and Gen 18:18, but as Dunn observed "the promise was
repeated several times within the patriarchal narratives (also Gen. xxii.17-18; xxvi.4; xxviii.14), and such
variation of detail was inconsequential" (Galatians, 164; so also Burton, Galatians, 160). At the same time,
while most Jews in Paul's day (and certainly the opponents) took as their starting point the later
formulations of the promise which mention Abraham's faithfulness, Paul begins from the first two
formulations in Genesis where that emphasis is missing (so Dunn, Galatians, 164-65). This contrast in
interpretation is even more telling if, as Martyn argues, this portion of the Abrahamic promise played a
prominent role in the opponents' teaching (Galatians, 301).
this re-configuration of the episode allows the Galatians' experience to be taken seriously and so represents a better "reading" of the narrative as a whole, the narrative which continues to unfold in the present. Confronted with that experience, Paul can now understand that "the scripture" (here personified) gave Abraham this promise, "foreseeing (προϊδούσα) that God would justify the Gentiles by faith (ἐκ πίστεως)" (3:8). Once it has been thus re-cast, however, the story suggests a new way of understanding how the role of a member of God's people is defined. It is not those who obey Torah who will be "rescued" (1:4), but rather "those who believe (οί ἐκ πίστεως) are blessed with Abraham who believed (ὁ πιστός)" (3:9).

Betz is not alone when he complains that Paul's interpretation of the Abraham passage, and indeed his scriptural interpretation throughout chapter 3, "appears arbitrary

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500 So Martyn, Galatians, 301.
501 Dunn (Galatians, 166-67) suggests that the present tense of "are blessed" (εὐλογοῦνται) points to the reality of the Galatians' experience as the fulfillment of this promised blessing.

The emphasis throughout this section on Abraham having been justified on the basis of believing and not (as in traditional Judaism) on the basis of his faithful obedience suggests that the adjective πιστός should be taken in the sense "believing," "having faith," rather than the more usual "faithful" (so Burton, Galatians, 162; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 116). The degree to which Paul's reading of the story here departs from its traditional configuration can be seen in the new sense which Paul gives this traditional epithet of Abraham, ὁ πιστός. In Jewish literature it consistently seems to refer to Abraham's righteous obedience which is indistinguishable from his "trust" in God (see, e.g., Sir 44:20; 1 Macc 2:52; 2 Macc 1:2; Philo, Post. 173). Dunn (Galatians, 161) points out how passages like 1 Macc 2:52 and Jas 2:23 testify to a common tendency to interpret Abraham's faith in Gen 15:6 in terms of the "faithfulness" which is emphasized in other promise passages (esp. Genesis 22; see Sir 44:19-21; 1 Macc 2:52; Jub. 17.15-18; m. Abot 5.3; Philo, Abr. 262-74; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 110-11, 113-14). Indeed, as Lührmann observes, Philo makes Abraham the model proselyte (Galatians, 58; see Philo, Abr., 60-88). In Paul's new reading of the story Abraham is πιστός before he receives any commands, simply by virtue of his trust in God's promise to bless him (cf. the treatment in IQGenApoc which does not seem to emphasize Abraham's virtue so strongly, so Fitzmyer, Genesis Apocryphon, 182).

Betz (Galatians, 30-31) also notes that in retrospect this argument lends a new force to the narrated history of 1:13-2:14, which becomes an argument that although the Galatians' "experience of salvation has happened outside of normal expectation, . . . this role of the outsider has always been the trademark of Christianity." The church has been the product of a series of events which "should" not have occurred, but must be recognized once they have.
in the highest degree. As we uncover the hermeneutical logic which drives the Apostle's argument, however, we begin to see that this appearance of arbitrariness stems to a large extent from a misunderstanding of what Paul is trying to do. His references to scripture in chapter 3 are not to be taken as "proof texts," nor are they meant to be free-standing "arguments from scripture" which have argumentative weight independent of the "argument from experience" in 2:15-21 and 3:1-5. Rather, Paul is demonstrating the re-configuration of Israel's story which allows one to take seriously the surprising new events which the Galatians have experienced and ultimately of the Messiah's shameful death. Paul does not expect his reading of the Abraham story to seem natural. On the contrary, it is only in light of these new events that the Abraham episode comes to take on this new meaning. What Paul insists, however, is that once one recognizes the significance (in the context of Israel's story) of the Galatians' experiences, one can go back and re-read the Abraham episode in a way which is very much in keeping with these new events.

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502 Betz, Galatians, 137. Betz also quotes Loisy to the effect that Paul's interpretation here is "une fantaisie ingénieuse" (in Betz, Galatians, 137).
503 Contra Betz, Galatians, 138.
504 Contra Burton, Galatians, 153; Dunn, Galatians, 159; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 109; Martyn, Galatians, 294-95. This division is made even more sharply by Schlier, Galater, 126; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 211.
505 Note that 3:6 begins with the comparative adverb καθώς. The NRSV (cited above) treats this as if the "just as" of 3:6 sets up a "so . . ." in 3:7, but grammatically this completion of the comparison is not present in 3:7. It is much easier to read the καθώς at the beginning of 3:6 as pointing back to the experience of the Galatians in 3:1-5, so that Paul is emphasizing that Abraham's experience flowed "in the same way" as did the Galatians' own (so Burton, Galatians, 153; Martyn, Galatians, 296). This implies a much closer connection between 3:1-5 and what follows than most commentators have allowed. Even Martyn (Galatians, 297), who sees this grammatical link, still treats it as co-ordinating two independent arguments (one experiential and the other exegetical) instead of recognizing that the connection it sets up between the Galatians' experience and scripture is itself the fulcrum of a single argument.
d. 3:10-14 Re-configuring the broader story

The obvious objection to Paul's re-configuration of the Abraham episode is that his re-reading cannot account for Abraham's circumcision and the covenant which it constitutes in Gen 17:4-14. There God declares: "Any uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken my covenant" (Gen 17:14). Instead of addressing this difficult passage head on, however, Paul chooses to widen his re-configuration of the traditional story in order to establish a reading of the narrative as a whole which coheres with his re-configuration of the Abraham episode.

Paul begins this broader re-configuration of the traditional story with a statement which would have been shocking to most first-century Jews: "For all who rely on the works of the law (ὅσος γὰρ ἐξ ἐργασίας νόμου) are under a curse" (3:10). On what basis

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506 While Betz (Galatians, 142) takes vv. 10-14 as further "proofs" for Paul's basic position in 3:6-7, it is much easier to understand 3:10-14 as a distinct section (so Burton, Galatians, 163; Dunn, Galatians, 159) in which Paul opens up the angle of his vision to include more than just the Galatians at one end and Abraham at the other. Here he re-configures elements of the broader story so as to demonstrate how the experience of life under Torah and the work of Christ can be understood.

507 Precisely why Paul avoids dealing with Gen 17:14 is not clear (though see Rom 4:9-12). The omission is noted by R. N. Longenecker, but not explained (Galatians, 113). Burton suggests that Paul may have felt that "the argument of his opponents on this point could not be directly answered," and so instead sought to establish on broader grounds that the opponents' understanding could not be correct (Galatians, 159). In any case, Burton is right in speculating that Paul "may have reasoned that the oracle [of Gen 17:14] ought to be interpreted in view of the fact, to him well established by his own observation, that God was accepting Gentiles on the basis of faith without works of law in general or circumcision in particular" (Galatians, 162).

508 Davis has presented forceful evidence that the expression ἱνδον κατάφειε πρὸς probably does not mean "subject to the power or authority of a curse," but rather "cursed" (Christ as Devotio, 51; see Jos. Ant. 18.287; Chrysostom, Commentary on Galatians, PG 61.652). Dunn recognizes the shocking nature of Paul's statement (Galatians, 170), but tries to soften it by understanding those who are ἐκ ἐργασίας νόμου as "those who . . . were putting too much weight on the distinctiveness of Jews from Gentiles, and on the special laws which formed the boundary markers between them, those who rested their confidence in Israel's 'favoured nation' status" (Galatians, 172). Yet the citation of Deut 27:26 which follows and elaborates on the position of those who are ἐκ ἐργασίας νόμου does not concern special "boundary markers" or ethnic pride but observance of Torah generally. Finally, in 3:11 Paul can state plainly that "no one is justified before God by the law," and there is no justification for importing here the phrase "works of the
can Paul make such an outrageous claim? Most interpreters have assumed that what follows in 3:10b-12 is a sort of deductive argument intended to prove, on the basis of scripture, that those who take the opponents' approach to law are cursed by God. On such a reading the Apostle introduces his quotation of Deut 27:26 as a premise in a syllogism intended to prove his shocking thesis that the law-observant are cursed. The difficulty is, however, that the verse which he cites seems to say the opposite of Paul's claim. At the renewal of Israel's covenant Moses declares: "Cursed is everyone who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law" (3:10). Yet Paul is trying to argue that it is those who do try to keep Torah who are cursed. Most

law" and thus reducing "the law" to a technical term for boundary markers (as in Dunn, Galatians, 174). Those who are εκ εργων νόμου are, as R. N. Longenecker puts it, simply those who view "observance of Torah as obligatory for God's people" (Galatians, 166).

There is good linguistic ground for taking 3:10bff. as an argument of some kind. Paul is not (contra Betz, Galatians, 144) simply setting up "those of the law" as the opposite of "those of faith" in 3:9 and then inferring that if the latter are blessed then the former must be cursed. He actually thinks he can demonstrate that on his new reading of the story they are in fact cursed, just as he has demonstrated that the Galatians must be understood to be blessed with Abraham. Hence (as Betz himself recognizes) the γὰρ which introduces the following citation from Deut 27:26 introduces it as "the reason for the preceding statement" (Galatians, 144, n. 58; so Dunn, Galatians, 170; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 118). Hence John Chrysostom describes 3:10a as the διὰ τῶν ἀντικροτήσεων ("statement") and the citation in 3:10b as the ἀντικροτήσεις ("proof"); Commentary on Galatians, PG 61.652; cf. Davis, Christ, 24).

Actually Paul mixes the substance of Deut 27:26 with elements found in Deut 28:58 and 30:10. He has, however, clearly preserved the intent of these passages (so Burton, Galatians, 164; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 117). Moreover, Betz observes that Paul's citation comes close to the LXX text of A and Ambrosius, so that he may have actually been working with a different LXX text than our critical edition (Galatians, 145).

The phrase αὐτοὶ ... εἰς τῆν νόμου εἰσίν is also sometimes understood to denote those who are subject to Torah, whether they try to keep its demands or not. This is also a possible reading and would not significantly affect our reading of the Apostle's argument. On balance, however, it seems that the parallelism between αὐτοὶ εἰς πίστεως in 3:9 and αὐτοὶ ... εἰς τῆν νόμου εἰσίν in 3:10 favors taking εἰς τῆν νόμου to express the attempt to gain righteousness on the basis of legal obedience (so Betz, Galatians, 144; Bruce, Galatians, 157-58; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 116; Oepke, Galater, 72). For the parallel phrase εκ πίστεως clearly signifies that believers are attempting to gain that righteousness on the basis of faith in Christ. Likewise, in 2:16 the phrases εκ νόμου and εκ πίστεως were set up as hypothetical, alternate routes to justification. Hence Dunn renders the phrase "all who rely on works of the law" (Galatians, 170, 172; though his reading is coloured by his tendency to read "works of the law" as ethnocentric boundary-markers). Similarly, Schlier takes the phrase to mean "die Menschen, die die Quelle ihrer Existenz in den Gebotserfüllung haben" (Galater, 89-90).

Martyn (Galatians, 308) renders the phrase "those whose identity is derived from observance of
commentators thus suggest Paul must have another unspoken premise in mind, for

example that no-one is actually able to do what the law requires.\textsuperscript{512} The result would then

the Law" (cf. Lightfoot, \textit{Galatians}, 138), but this imports a concern with how one establishes one's "identity" into a discussion which is primarily concerned with how one can become righteous. Still less plausible is Davis' suggestion that \textit{ὅτα ἀπέκτεινε} \textit{τὸ νόμον} \textit{τῆς ζωῆς} are those who are subjected to the \textit{effects of Torah}, conceived as an active and hostile agent (\textit{Christ as Devotio}, 72). Davis is concerned that if those who are cursed in 3:10 are restricted to those who attempt to observe Torah it becomes inexplicable why Christ's liberation from that curse in 3:13 would have any impact on Gentiles (3:14), since those Gentiles would not have been cursed in the first place (\textit{Christ as Devotio}, 52). It is much easier, however, to recognize that (as becomes clear in 3:19-29) Paul believes that between Sinai and Christ's advent there was no route to justification other than the route of Torah-obedience. Hence, although his focus in 3:10-12 is on those who attempt to take that route, he seems to be assuming that non-observant Gentiles are, if anything, in an even worse position. Hence, when Christ's action frees Jews from the curse to which nomism doomed them, this entails new possibilities for all of those who do not satisfy the law's demands, Gentiles included.


There are three other standard suggestions as to the unstated element in Paul's reasoning here, but none is as plausible as the one we work with here. First, it has often been suggested (though less often in current literature) that it is the very attempt to keep Torah, \textit{i.e.}, to establish one's own righteousness, which Paul considers sinful (so Schlier, \textit{Galater}, 132f., 134f.). This idea is, however, nowhere actually stated in Paul (so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 171, 176). While Paul evidently sees his past efforts at law-observance as inadequate in the light of Christ, he never gives the impression that those efforts themselves were wrong (see, e.g., \textit{Gal} 1:14; \textit{Phil} 3:4). Moreover, the question which Paul raises by quoting Deut 27:26 (with apparent approval) concerns not the legitimacy of attempts at \textit{self-righteousness}, but one's success or failure at law-keeping.

The second alternative approach is to distinguish between the \textit{"works of the law"} (\textit{ἐργα υἱοῦ}) in 3:10a and the \textit{"law"} (\textit{νόμος}) in the quotation of 3:10b. In this case, \textit{"works of the law"} would be nomistic observances which are not, in Paul's view, what the \textit{"Law"} actually demands. Paul's understanding of the Law's \textit{real} requirements is then usually explicated in terms of the call for faith, the love command, and the expression \textit{"the law of Christ"} in 6:2 (so Lull, \textit{Spirit}, 124-25). A variation on this approach is the suggestion that Paul opposes the misuse of Torah \textit{"as the boundary to distinguish the faithful of God from the unfaithful"} (Bryant, \textit{Crucified Christ}, 176; so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 172-73). It is difficult to see, however, the distinction between saying that only those who keep Torah are among the faithful community and saying that one must keep Torah in order to be righteous (i.e. be part of the faithful community).

The third common approach is to say that Paul is simply assuming a law/faith dichotomy in which law is associated with curse and faith with blessing and life (so Betz, \textit{Galatians}, 146; Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 311). On such a reading, Paul does not actually believe that anyone would be justified even if they kept Torah perfectly (so Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 164-65). Yet this seems to require that Paul be reading against Deut 27:26 when he cites it here, for its clear implication is that if one successfully keeps the law one avoids being cursed \textit{(ergo} one is blessed). Paul's citation of Lev 18:5 in 3:12 (again with apparent approval) seems to affirm explicitly what is implicit here, that the law gives life if one does it (see also Rom 2:6-12). Even
be a syllogism which runs like this:

Premise A (stated): Those who disobey Torah are cursed (3:10b).
Corollary of Premise A (unstated): Those who obey Torah are not cursed.
Premise B (unstated): No one successfully obeys Torah.

Conclusion: No one successfully avoids being cursed by obeying Torah (3:10a).

This reading allows Paul to be presenting a logically valid argument in 3:10. The difficulty with such an interpretation, however, is that it requires that Paul be assuming what would have been a highly contentious idea: that the law could not be kept. After less convincing is Martyn's suggestion that in drawing this conclusion from Deut 27:26 Paul simply "removes the distinction" between the observant and non-observant and applies the curse to both groups (Galatians, 311). Even if Paul was rather dull (which is not likely) he would have seen that such exegesis by fiat would not get him far with the Galatians.

Other suggestions have been even less successful. Lührmann tries to interpret Paul's argument without assuming any unstated premises. He argues that Paul actually interprets the grammar of the LXX of Deut 27:26 as saying that "No one who adheres to all that is written in the book of the law stands under the blessing" (Galatians, 61). It is difficult, however, to imagine him so badly misconstruing (even for polemical purposes) the point of such a well-known part of scripture. Similarly, Sanders understands Paul to be using "proof-texts" here and so treats Paul's explicit statement in 3:10a as a paraphrase of Deut 27:26, while 3:12a is understood as a paraphrase of Lev 18:5 (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 22, 54 n. 30). This does eliminate the need to assume any unstated premises, but it assumes an over-simplified idea of how proof-texts work. For Paul need not think his conclusion is stated explicitly by the proof-text. Rather, it is more likely that he sees the text as implying the conclusion which he states explicitly himself. Such implication, however, always assumes an unstated premise. Young suggests that the unstated element in Paul's syllogism here is the conditional "if those εἰς ἐπάγωσαν νόμον do not do all the requirements of the law," so that in 3:10-14 the Apostle would simply be discussing the threat of cursing which hangs over those who try to keep Torah ("Who's Cursed," 86-88). Yet Christ's "rescue" of believers from the curse of the law in 3:13 is difficult to construe merely as rescue from the threat of a curse. Finally, Wright (Climax, 146-47) argues that 3:10 should be read as a discussion of Israel's national fate, and reflects a common Jewish belief that Judea's subjugation to Rome represented the deuteronomic curse. Yet there is nothing explicit in the letter to require such a nationalistic reading. Moreover, since 3:13-14 seems to require that Gentiles be somehow threatened with or subject to this curse, it is difficult to see how Paul could be thinking of something which only affected national Israel. In fact, as Dunn has observed, there is little evidence in first century Judaism for this sense of languishing under the curse (Galatians, 171-72).
all, the very verse which he cites seems to presuppose that it can be, and this was the standard view among first-century Jews. Is it realistic to think that Paul would leave such an obvious hole in his argument undefended, an opening for easy refutation by his opponents in Galatia? Thus we seem to be left with Paul making an argument which is either extraordinarily weak or obviously incoherent.

The Apostle re-phrases his claim in 3:11, shifting from talk about curse and blessing to talk about justification: "It is evident that no one is justified before God by the law." Here Paul seems to offer two explicit premises on the basis of which one may draw this conclusion: 1) the first is another quotation, this time from Hab 2:4: "The one

Paul claims to have been "blameless" in his "righteousness under the law." As we will see, however, passages like this point not to a conviction the Torah could be satisfied, but rather to the fact that Paul only came to believe it was impossible to satisfy in retrospect, in light of his encounter with Christ on the Damascus road.

514 Dunn, Galatians, 171.
515 Dunn (Galatians, 171) emphasizes that the law itself made provisions for sin and one was generally not expected to observe Torah perfectly. All of this is admitted by R. N. Longenecker (Galatians, 118), though he cites exceptions (see Schoeps, Paul, 177; R. N. Longenecker, Paul, Apostle of Liberty, 40-43). We must admit that 4 Ezra seems to espouse a pessimism almost as deep as that attributed to Paul (see esp. 4 Ezra 4:20-22), but this document comes from the other side of the great divide in Jewish thought and experience constituted by the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE. If B. W. Longenecker is correct, it was that event which prompted the author of 4 Ezra to re-thinking his Jewish beliefs, much as Paul's Damascus road experience was the catalyst for the Apostle's re-configuration of Israel's story (Eschatology, 268 and passim).

516 Here it does not make a substantive difference in Paul's logic if we take the εκ which joins 3:11a to 3:10b as a very weak connective (Martyn, Galatians, 312; Betz, Galatians, 146) or as more strongly adversative (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 118). In either case, the explanatory ἀλλά which follows in 3:11b suggests that 3:11a is again a thesis which Paul then goes on to demonstrate (contra Wright, Climax, 137-56 who reverses the logic and Zahn, Galater, 152-57 who separates the two halves of the verse).

Nor is Paul setting up in v. 11a "the actual attitude of God" (Burton, Galatians, 165; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 118; Martyn, Galatians, 326) in order to pit it against the (false?) judgement of Deut 27:26. As we saw above, Paul nowhere shows this kind of hostile approach to scriptural quotations and can be seen elsewhere to affirm explicitly what Deut 27:26 says (e.g., Rom 2:6-12).

517 The ἀλλά which introduces the citation of Hab 2:4 in 3:11b marks what follows as the reason for the preceding statement of 3:11a. The εκ at the beginning of 3:12a is most likely disjunctive, expressing the contrast between the faith described in 3:11b and the law described in 3:12a (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 119; contra Betz, Galatians, 147).
who is righteous will live by faith" (3:11b); the second premise is again stated in Paul's own words: "But the law does not rest on faith" (3:12a). The resulting syllogism runs like this:

Premise A: Faith is the means by which one becomes righteous (3:11b)
Premise B: Keeping Torah is not an expression of faith (3:12a)

Conclusion: Keeping Torah is not the means by which one becomes righteous (3:11a)

This time the syllogism appears to be valid as stated. The problem in this second stage of Paul's argument, however, is again that the Galatian opponents would certainly have disagreed with both of his premises. They could easily have criticized his exegesis of Hab 2:4 as faulty. The full text of Habakkuk's words reads: "Look at the proud! Their spirit is not right (δικαιότης) in them, but the righteous (δικαιοσύνη) live by their faith (πίστις)."

The noun πίστις, which is here translated "faith," is the same word which we saw in chapter 2 in our examination of Paul's conception of πίστις. As we observed there it can mean either "trust" or "faithfulness." Paul's Galatian opponents would simply have to argue, as have several modern commentators, that Habakkuk is actually extolling the

518 As Martyn observes, the question is moot whether Paul understands Hab 2:4 to say that the righteous one "will live by faith" or that "the one who is righteous by faith" will live. For as Gal 3:21 makes clear Paul equates being made righteous with being given life (Galatians, 314).

519 The affirmation that νόμος is not εκ πίστεως is somewhat ambiguous. The εκ suggests some idea of faith as the origin or source of law (Galatians, 315). This could be taken (as Martyn seems to do) to mean that Torah itself represents a message which originates from somewhere other than the divine source of the Gospel. Given Paul's positive use of quotations from those scriptures, however, this is an unlikely reading. It is more plausible to see in the term νόμος here Torah as an instrument used to achieve righteousness (not law legally misconstrued, but law put into practice as it was intended), since this is Paul's emphasis in his talk about law in 3:11. By εκ πίστεως we should understand the same idea which that phrase expressed in 3:9 where of εκ πίστεως were said to achieve blessing. It means to "rely on" faith, to make faith the basis of one's interaction with God. Hence Paul is saying here in 3:12a that the traditional practice of Torah, taken as an instrument for achieving righteousness, is a practice which cannot be an expression of a basic attitude of faith in God's salvific action.
"righteous," i.e., those who live "by their [own] faithfulness" to God by which they distinguish themselves from the "proud" who are not "right."^520 Hence, the opponents might have argued, the verse can hardly be used to justify a distinction between "faith" and "obedience." In fact, those opponents would probably point out that for Habakkuk the law-keeping of the righteous likely is an expression of their "faith(fulness)," so that the very passage which Paul cites demonstrates how the law does "rest on faith."^521 This is not to say that either Paul or his opponents would have been concerned to isolate the "original" sense of Habakkuk's prophecy, but Paul's reading of Hab 2:4 depends on the very distinction between faith and legal obedience which it is supposed to demonstrate. Unless all parties were willing to grant that distinction his argument in 3:11 would lack any force, but if they had been willing to grant that distinction in the first place then the argument would have been unnecessary.^522

The Apostle does offer one more scriptural quotation, apparently as justification for his disjunction between law and faith, citing Lev 18:5 to the effect that "Whoever does the works of the law will live by them" (3:12).^523 Evidently Paul is thinking of this

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^520 This is not to say that Hab 2:4 was always interpreted in this way. Notice that in 1QpHab 7.14-8.3 the הָבָלֵנָה of 2:4 is interpreted as the people's trust in or loyalty to the Teacher of Righteousness (מַלְאך הַצְיָרֻי). This trust or loyalty (מַלְאך הַצְיָרֻי) is certainly not understood as separate from legal observance, but neither is it simply a matter of "faithfulness" in keeping Torah. It is a matter of "trusting in the guidance of their founding teacher" (R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 119).

^521 This makes it doubtful that Paul would be picking up Hab 2:4 from his opponents and simply applying it "in ad hominem fashion" (R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 119), for if so his ad hominem use would be self-defeating.

^522 Alternatively, 3:11 may be tied more closely to 3:10 so that, having established that legal observance does not justify, the Apostle draws on Hab 2:4 as evidence that God has provided an alternative path to "life." In this case the distinction between faith and law-observance would be explicable, but the validity of the argument would again depend on the claim that no-one can in fact keep Torah.

^523 As R. N. Longenecker observes (Galatians, 120), this citation of Lev 18:5 is introduced with the strong adversative אַלָּא, suggesting that Paul viewed the verse as a strong counter-indication against the compatibility of faith and law which he had just entertained (and denied).

Dunn suggests that Paul understood Lev 18:5 to define Torah as only "the means of regulating life
verse as illustrating the way in which law is based on the fundamental requirement to "do" (ὅ ποιήσας αὐτά) certain actions, while "believing" is based on a denial that our actions are the crucial factor in the divine-human relationship. Yet unless one has already accepted that faith does not involve "doing," this quotation need not be read as evidence of that disjunction. Paul's argument in 3:10-12 appears to be a complete within the covenant, not the basis of the covenant itself" (Galatians, 175). Hence Paul is drawing a contrast between faith which, in Hab 2:4 is the basis for one's whole existence before God and Torah which, in Lev 18:5, is only an administrative code. Yet it is doubtful that Jews would have interpreted Lev 18:5 in such a restrictive sense, and after his citation of Deut 27:26 his quotation of Lev 18:5 here certainly seems to continue the same emphasis—on the deuteronomistic requirement of obedience as the basis for blessing.

524 So Berger, "Abraham," 52; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 120; Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 22. There has, of course, been strong opposition to the notion of a "believing"/"doing" contrast here, but it seem difficult to avoid. The Apostle introduces this quotation in order to illustrate his last assertion that law is incompatible with faith as a way of maintaining one's "life" (3:12a). The thrust of the quotation is that life comes through law if one does it. The quotation certainly suggests, then, that this demand for doing is what the Apostle sees as incompatible with πίστις (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 148-49). This is, moreover, what Paul says explicitly in Rom 4:4-5 in his discussion of Abraham's πίστις: "Now to one who works (ποιησας και ἐργαζόμενος), wages are not reckoned as a gift (κατὰ τὴν χάριν) but as something due. But to one who without works (ποιησας μην ἐργαζόμενος) trusts (πιστεύειν) him who justifies the ungodly, such faith (ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ) is reckoned as righteousness." Although it is often suggested that this idea that life is a reward for activity is an inaccurate portrait of Second Temple Jewish piety, Gathercole's recent work offers compelling evidence to the contrary, showing that Second Temple writers very often predicate entrance into eschatological life (or this-worldly blessing and longevity) on one's obedience to Torah (Where Is Boasting, 37-111; see also Bauckham, "Apocalypses"; Falk, "Psalms and Prayers"; Evans, "Scripture-based Stories"; Alexander, "Tannaitic Literature"). What Paul is doing is emphasizing (in a way which most Jews did not) the real emphasis of Torah-piety on the basic requirement of "doing" God's will, a requirement which only now looks so starkly opposed to faith because of the law-free form in which that faith has manifested itself among the Gentiles.

525 Betz (Galatians, 147) suggests that Paul does simply presuppose the opposition between faith and doing Torah (cf. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 22). Along similar lines, Bryant suggests that Paul here presents law and faith as "mutually exclusive paths... unrelated spheres of existence," and that the blessing of Abraham comes only through the path of faith (Crucified Christ, 177). Hence the law would not lead to the Abrahamic blessing even if it is entirely possible to fulfill its requirements. Yet Bryant does not ask why Paul sees law and faith as incompatible. Moreover, this distinction is precisely what Paul introduces the quotation from Lev 18:5 to prove.

From a different angle, Martyn argues that Paul wants to show, before the opponents appeal to it, that "the promise of Lev 18:5 is a falsification of the gospel" (Galatians, 315). In effect, Paul would be saying that this scriptural promise is false, that the content of the verse is not ἐκ πίστεως and hence not God's word (cf. Martyn, Galatians, 328-34). If a reading is available, however, on which Paul would be maintaining the truth of the scripture he cites, this is surely to be preferred. Lührmann (Galatians, 61) argues that Paul interprets "live" in Lev 18:5 and in Hab 2:4 in a mundane sense, so that his point is that since the righteous person conducts himself ("lives") according to faith, while the one who does law conducts himself ("lives") according to the law (i.e., not according to faith), the one who conducts himself according to law must not be righteous. This reading ignores, however, that Paul cited Lev 18:5 not as evidence that those who rely on the law are not justified, but as
failure, a skein of superficial verbal parallels which do nothing more than create a first impression of coherence.\textsuperscript{526}

Indeed, this is precisely the verdict which several commentators have passed on Paul's thinking in these verses.\textsuperscript{527} Even those sympathetically disposed to the Apostle have often felt the need to apologize for his faulty logic here by explaining that it is "Rabbinic" or "Jewish," but one suspects that the Jewish opponents of Paul would not have found it very convincing as a display of syllogistic reasoning.\textsuperscript{528} This raises the question, however, whether by reading 3:10-12 as a syllogistic argument we have not mis-construed what Paul is doing.

Let us try, then, to read 3:10-12 not as a progressive argument which moves from unimpeachable premises to a logically necessary conclusion, but as a paradigmatic re-imagining of Israel's relationship with God which refutes the opponents' version of that story by being more coherent.\textsuperscript{529} It is a crucial element of such a reading that we not, as is evidence that law and faith are incompatible. Yet this incompatibility is (once again) precisely what Paul, on Lührmann's reading, must assume to make the argument work.

\textsuperscript{526}Longenecker suggests that Paul's scriptural citations are aimed to highlight passages which associate "curse with law and righteousness with faith" (\textit{Galatians}, 118). Sanders, similarly, treats Paul as simply asserting his own position and bolstering it with any scriptural proof-texts which combine the right terms (curse and law, faith and righteousness), regardless of the original sense of the texts (\textit{Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People}, 21-22).

\textsuperscript{527}Lührmann, for example, writes that Paul "seems indiscriminately to take Old Testament passages out of their context and apply them just as it suits him" (\textit{Galatians}, 58).

\textsuperscript{528}On attempts to see specific rabbinic exegetical methods at work here, see Davis, \textit{Christ as Devotio}, 32-44. Lührmann (\textit{Galatians}, 59) rightly points out that Paul's "argumentation would have been quickly dismissed even then in Galatia; it would not have had to wait for the presuppositions of today's exegesis." It may well be that Paul has drawn some or all of these scriptural texts from the arsenal of the opponents (see Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 309), but this still does not change the fact that his use of them appears muddled.

\textsuperscript{529}This is, in essence, what Eckert saw when he described this section of Galatians as a revisionist reading of Israel's "Heilsgeschichte" (\textit{urchristliche Verkündigung}, 102-6). This reading does not violate the sense of Paul's use of connectives in 3:10-12, though it does require that we read them less rigidly. The ýüp
usually done, separate out these verses as an isolated unit which is supposed on its own to be logically valid and rhetorically forceful. Rather we must begin with the awareness that Paul has already played his "trump cards" in 2:15-21 and 3:1-5; he has already demonstrated on the basis of the Galatians' religious experience and Christ's death that the opponents' version of Israel's story must be wrong. Dunn is right that in Paul's mind the Galatians' "own experience of receiving the Spirit through faith should have been sufficient to confirm [Paul's] basic position." In order to refute the opponents, then, what remains is to complete the task which he took up in 3:6-9 of demonstrating a reconfiguration of Israel's story which is internally coherent and at the same time allows the surprising events in Galatia to be taken seriously.

What kind of pattern does Paul find in Israel's story? It is emphatically not the straightforward deuteronomistic pattern in which those who faithfully keep Torah are the ones who are rewarded. This is clear from his initial statements in 3:10 and 3:11a: "no one is justified before God by the law." That this kind of deuteronomistic idea can be found in Israel's scriptures Paul does not deny. In fact, when he quotes Deut 27:26 he seems to at the opening of 3:10a is certainly not to be taken as introducing the strict logical basis for 3:9, but rather as a "marker of clarification" (BDAG, 189 [2]) which introduces the next step or phase in a narrative or discussion without specifying a tight causal connection. The v which then introduces 3:10b can then easily be understood in a similar sense, so that the quotation of Deut 27:26 is not the strict cause of the statement in 3:10a but (in combination with 3:11a to which it joined by a δέ) a further elaboration of that shocking idea. The δέ which introduces v. 11b should be understood as causal, introducing the reason not just for 3:11a but for all of 3:10-3:11a, for this whole portrait of the fate of the law-observant. This δέ introduces not just 3:11b, but all of 3:11b-12 (3:11b is co-ordinated with 3:12a by a δέ and 3:11b-12a and 3:12b are then contrasted sharply by the strong διάλλα) as the basic paradigm which makes sense of the previous statements. The explanatory δέ still does not require, however, that 3:11b-12 be understood as the ultimate justification for this whole paradigm. That comes, as we will see below, in 3:13 which is emphasized by the sudden, asyndetic nature of the transition there.

Eckert, "Die christliche Verkündigung," 152-53. Lührmann has this precisely backward when he suggests that the point of 3:6-14 "is to answer the question in v. 5: the Spirit comes indeed from faith and not from the law (v. 14b)" (Galatians, 55).

Dunn, Galatians, 174.
be deliberately drawing on the central text of that deuteronomistic theology (Deut 27-28) in order to bring to mind the whole pattern of blessing and judgment which Israel experienced.\textsuperscript{532} This same experience is picked up again in verse 12 where Paul characterizes the operation of the law by appeal to Lev 18:5. Paul thus deliberately heightens the emphasis on the necessity of "doing" the Law (\(\pi\nu\kappa\iota\sigma\varsigma\\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\)), on the retribution which follows on failure, which he finds present in the scriptures.

Over against this approach to God through obedience and law, Paul sets "faith," \(\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma\). Paul has already shown in 3:1-5 that in the Galatians' experience this "faith" constitutes an approach to God which does not require the observance of Torah. He has already found a similar law-free path illustrated by the experience of Abraham (3:6-9). Here he follows through on this new way of reading Israel's story by looking for evidence elsewhere of that different approach to God, and he finds it in Hab 2:4. Whether or not Paul's reading of Habakkuk is consonant with other Jewish readings in his day, and whether his understanding of \(\tau\tau\nu\lambda\iota\nu\sigma\nu\) in 2:4 is in line with the prophet's original conception, do not matter. He is probably well aware that he is, from a traditional perspective, doing violence to the story. Yet he finds here an affirmation of faith, \(\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma\) in the LXX, as the basis of life in which he now hears an echo of the experience of Abraham and the Galatians.\textsuperscript{533}

\textsuperscript{532} Dunn suggests that Paul's mixture in this citation of elements from several verses in Deut 27-28 "underlines the extent to which Paul was recalling the whole of that concluding section of Deuteronomy, indeed 'the book of the law' itself and the whole mind-set of nomistic covenantalism which Deuteronomy established for Jewish thought" (Galatians, 170).

\textsuperscript{533} Vos ("Hermeneutische Antinomie," 267) writes: "Für den jüdischen Leser bilden Lev 18.5 und Hab 2.4 ein harmonisches Ganzes. Nur aufgrund der Vorentscheidung, daß die Heiden christen sich nicht an bestimmte Gesetzesbestimmungen zu halten brauchen, kommt es bei Paulus zu einer Dissoziation beider Stellen."
Still, even if Paul can find in Israel's story the material with which to re-read it as a story of two different ways of relating to God (law and faith), why does this require that those who take the path of law always suffer the law's curse? Why could law and faith not remain two parallel ways of approach, one for Jews and the other for Gentiles? Paul cannot expect his audience to follow his argument if it depends on a simple assumption that all fail in their observance of Torah. Such a position is so atypical of Second Temple Jewish thought that it would need some sort of justification. We must remember, however, that Paul has already established in 2:21 that righteousness cannot come on the basis of legal observance, and the key phenomenon there which ruled out any such construal of Israel's story was the crucifixion of Christ.\footnote{So, contra Sanders (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 26), Paul does present Christ's death as the grounding for his argument against righteousness coming by the law. The only way in which we can miss that is by reading his letter in isolated chunks and forgetting that 2:21 stands less than a chapter away.} In 3:10-14, then, Paul need not start from scratch with an argument against justification by Torah. The likelihood that the Messiah's death is still in Paul's mind (and, he hopes, in the audience's awareness) as motivation for this whole re-configuration is confirmed near the end of this phase in Paul's argument, in 3:13. For there Paul returns to remind the audience of this "gap" which has made this whole re-interpretation necessary. "Christ," Paul says, "redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—" for it is written, 'Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree'" (3:13).\footnote{Longenecker observes (Galatians, 121) that the absence of a connecting particle between vv. 12 and 13 breaks the flow of Paul's language slightly, thus adding rhetorical emphasis to his introduction of Christ as saviour. The citation in the second half of 3:13 is from Deut 21:22-23. For "cursed" Paul has the adjective ἐπικατάρατος, while our LXX has the passive participle κεκατάρατος. Dunn suggests, plausibly, that Paul adjusted this word in order to echo more closely his citation of Deut 27:26 (Galatians, 177-78; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 122; Martyn, Galatians, 321). Whatever the source of this discrepancy, there is no substantial difference in sense between the two words. Likewise, while Paul omits the words ὅπως.} It is this shocking event, and not any scriptural passage,
which serves as the initial impetus and final justification for Paul's narrative re-configuration in which faith and legal obedience are decisively separated.

Because the Apostle has already argued that the cross rules out a righteousness coming from Torah-obedience, he does not explicitly repeat that argument here. It is nevertheless tempting, despite my insistence that I am examining Paul's argument and not his own process of discovery, to transgress that boundary for a moment and trace beneath Paul's explicit argument in 3:13 a narrative hermeneutic in the Apostle's own thought which is reminiscent of 2:15-21 and in 3:1-5. Paul alludes in 3:13 to the way in which Christ's crucifixion constituted an interpretive "gap" for anyone who believed that he had also been raised again. For in the context of Israel's story Jesus' glorious resurrection could only mean that he had been vindicated by God. Yet, as Paul points out with his quotation from Deut 21:23, that same traditional story also forces one to interpret crucifixion as a sign of God's curse, of divine judgment on law-breakers. How could

So Berger, "Abraham," 52; Bryant, Crucified Christ, 178. Dunn (Galatians, 178) points out that Deut 21:23 was already being applied to those who were crucified in the first century (see 4QpNah 1.7-8; 11QTemple 64.6-13; cf. Acts 5:30, 10:39). See further J. A. Fitzmyer, "Crucifixion in Ancient Palestine, Qumran Literature and the New Testament," CBQ 40 (1978): 493-513. Evidence of the sense of scandal attaching to Christian acceptance of a crucified Messiah can be seen in 1 Cor 1:23; Gal 5:11. Bruce calls it a "blasphemous contradiction in terms" (Galatians, 166). Dunn (Galatians, 178) seems to miss the interpretive dilemma which the crucifixion would have caused for the early Christians, however, when he portrays Paul as simply using an early Jewish slander against Christ (based on Deut 21:23) in order to establish a connection between Jesus (the outcast) and Gentiles (also "outside the camp"). It is doubtful that Paul regarded the resurrection as an indication of "God's acceptance of the 'outsider', the cursed law-breaker, the Gentile sinner" in any general way (contra Dunn, Galatians, 178). For Jesus was not actually a law-breaker or sinner, and Paul does not imagine that other "outcasts" can find salvation outside of identification with Christ in his death and resurrection.

Burton seems to think it impossible that Paul would think Christ had actually come under God's curse, but this is after he has already ruled out the interpretation of this judgment as a vicarious suffering of others' sentence. It is, however, far more difficult to take Paul to mean that the law is condemned by its pronouncing a negative verdict on Christ (so Burton, Galatians, 173-75). Still less convincing is Betz's suggestion that in 3:13 Paul is trying to prove "that Christ's death on the cross fulfilled Scripture" (Galatians, 152). It seems much more likely that in citing Deut 21:23 the Apostle was not appealing to a
Jesus have both been God's righteous agent and yet have suffered God's curse on unrighteousness? Paul follows the solution offered in early Christian thought generally and interpreted Christ's shameful death, his suffering of the deuteronomic curse, as being somehow "for us." It was not really a punishment for his own violation of the covenant, but rather a God-ordained event which makes possible the vicarious escape of God's people from the judgment which they actually face. If this is, however, the significance of Christ's passion, then that new and unforeseen chapter again forces a re-consideration

messianic prophecy but rather appealing to a commonly-known legal and theological principle in order to interpret the crucifixion.

Burton further argues that the phrase ἵνα ἔλθην must mean "on our behalf" and "can not be pressed to mean 'in our place'" (Galatians, 172; so BDAG, 1030 [A.1.c]). It remains likely, however, that the way in which Paul imagined Christ accomplishing this "on our behalf" was by undergoing vicariously what other human beings would normally have to suffer in order that, identified with him, they could avoid enduring it themselves (so Bryant, Crucified Christ, 178). This "for us" seems to be equivalent to Paul's "for our sins" in 1 Cor 15:3 and Rom 4:25. Schlier (Galater, 138) points to 2 Cor 5:21 where Paul likewise talks about Christ as becoming "sin" and seems to use the term as a metonym for his suffering the penalty which would normally fall on other human beings. Martyn further points out that both in 2 Cor 5:21 and here in Gal 3:13 the metonymic use of "curse" or "sin" for the one who suffers the curse or is punished for the sin recalls the metonymic use of the Hebrew מִשְׁעָל, "sin" for the sacrificial animal which vicariously bore the people's sin (Galatians, 318; cf. Lev 4). See also the use of מִשָּׁעַל, "curse," in Jer 24:9; Zech 8:13. Klaus Berger has called this "ein Tauschgeschäft" ("Abraham," 52) or as R. N. Longenecker puts it "an exchange curse" (Galatians, 121; cf. Hooker, "Interchange in Christ").

Dunn suggests that in Christ's death "the force of the curse was exhausted" (Galatians, 177), though this model again does not explain either Paul's emphasis on identification with Christ's passion or the continuing danger of the curse for those outside Christ (3:10). Similarly, Betz suggests that Paul may think of Christ's death as a "curse offering," an extension of the Jewish idea that the suffering of the righteous was meritorious (Galatians, 150-51), but this simple sacrificial view does not understand why participation in Christ's cross would be important to Paul. Martyn suggests that for Paul Christ did not simply bear the punishment of the curse but actually became a curse on the cross (whatever this means) and was somehow victorious over it by at the same time embodying the faith to which God calls human beings (Galatians, 318). While Paul would doubtless have agreed with this, it probably pays too little attention to the clearly metonymic character of his language here. In 2 Cor 5:21 Paul hardly means that Christ actually became sin on the cross.

Here again it does not work, following Burton, to understand this "curse" as spoken merely by the law and not as "an expression of God's attitude towards men," so that release from the curse is not "a judicial act in the sense of release from penalty, but a release from a false conception of God's attitude" (Galatians, 168-69).
of what had gone before. For if God had to resort to such measures in order to deliver
his people from the deuteronomistic curse, then they must have been falling far short of the
covenant-obedience which would have brought them life. Indeed, if (as the early
Christians agreed) Jesus was God's Messiah, the one come to deliver Israel, and if this
was the unexpected mode of his deliverance, then that curse must have been a general
problem for Israel. It was not simply a few "sinners," but all of God's people who needed
to be rescued from that judgment.

539 Barclay (Obeying, 103) observes this force which the crucifixion of God's Messiah exercises to
push Paul and the Galatians toward a new understanding of their situation. He quotes Meeks' statement
approvingly to the effect that "The novelty of the proclamation, violating or at least transcending
expectations based either on reason or on Jewish traditions (1 Cor 1.18-25), permits it to serve as a warrant

540 So Räisänen (Paul, 108), who points to Gal 2:21 as evidence of the driving force behind Paul's
view that the law could not be fulfilled. This is why, as Sanders emphasizes so emphatically, Paul does not
seem to be motivated by a prior conviction that the law is an impossible demand. Paul's view of the human
failure to fulfill the law properly was not based on observations about law observance itself, but rather was
implied by his understanding of the crucifixion (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 23). Nevertheless,
Räisänen has rightly pointed out how Paul does elsewhere speak of humanity as universally sinful (Paul,
95-101, 109-113; see Rom 1:18-3:20; 3:23f; 5:12; 7:14-25), and while Paul does hold out the possibility of
people attaining righteousness "by the law" in Rom 1:18-3:20 (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 23-
24), this possibility remains hypothetical (contra Räisänen, Paul, 103-6). No-one seems actually to achieve
that righteousness. The one passage in which Paul seems to affirm that someone has actually fulfilled the
law successfully and gained righteousness through it is Phil 3:6 (so Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish
People, 23), but this verse stands alone. Those passages in which Paul calls believers to be "blameless" or
"guiltless" (1 Thess 3:13; 5:23; 1 Cor 1:8) cannot be adduced as evidence that the law could be fulfilled
satisfactorily (contra Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 23), since they do not deal with
blamelessness vis- à- vis Torah and they assume the Spirit's aid in the believer's ethical life. Sanders
attempts to mediate between Phil 3:6 and Paul's emphasis elsewhere on universal sinfulness by pointing out
that Jewish parallels to both views can be found, and that Paul thus likely "makes use of both sorts of
statement" in contexts where they are useful (Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 24). If, however, we
are going to appeal to inconsistency in thought as an explanation, it would be more accurate to say that Phil
3:6 appears as an odd throw-back to Paul's old view of Torah as a demand which can be fulfilled, while
elsewhere we see consistently his newer view that it is only once one is justified by faith in Christ and
given the aid of the Spirit that God's ethical will can be satisfied and Torah "fulfilled" (see below, pp. 297-
303 and cf. Räisänen, Paul, 106, 109). Note, too, that the Christian Paul would hardly have considered his
persecution of the Church to be "blameless." The fact that the Apostle can use this term in such an
unqualified way in Phil 3:6 of his pre-Damascus life thus suggests that he is recalling his former self-
perception (so Westerholm, Perspectives, 403).

541 Hence Paul would here (as in Rom 2:6-12) not be denying the theoretical possibility of one's
living by means of law-keeping, but rather be saying that for whatever reason it has not actually worked for
Israel (contra Martyn, Galatians, 316; Sanders, Law, 54, n. 30). In Rom 5:18-19 we see the Apostle
continuing his re-construal of Israel's story in order to make sense of this general inability to escape sin.
We do not know with any certainty that Paul's own thought actually traversed these particular lines. Yet the lingering presence of 2:21 behind Paul's argument in chapter 3, a presence which makes itself felt in the allusion to Christ's death in 3:13, must be taken into account in our reconstruction of his logic. The Apostle did not want his audience to forget that the death of Christ, as an interpretive "gap," justified his re-configuration of Israel's story. Paul's re-casting of the narrative in 3:10-13 thus turns out to be justified by the need to incorporate two unexpected chapters into the overall narrative pattern: the Galatians' reception of the Spirit and the passion and resurrection of Christ. It is the presence of these two "gaps" in the story which, he argues, requires this re-thinking of the whole. The former event requires that one re-construe the story so that it can now be seen to offer a second way of approach to God, the way of faith, distinct from the way of law. The latter event pushes one to re-configure that story in such a way that the way of law could now be recognized as a dead-end, from which Christ had had to deliver Israel. The only way in which Paul felt he could still read Israel's story as a coherent narrative, while also taking these new events seriously, was to find at its heart a hidden wedge which separated faith in Christ and legal observance. Paul's thinking does indeed seem to move, in E. P. Sanders' words, "from solution to plight," but not in an arbitrary way.\textsuperscript{542} The Apostle is simply following through on the implications of his belief

\textsuperscript{542} Paul was not the only one who found motivation for this kind of \textit{ex post facto} thinking, leading to a similarly pessimistic conclusion. The author of 4 Ezra comes to a similar understanding of Israel's story, but in this case the motivation for re-configuring Israel's story in this way is the experience of Jerusalem's destruction in 70 C.E. Lührmann describes an historical disappointment which may have set the stage for such pessimistic interpretations, for after exile and a strenuous reform effort "What did not occur . . . was an actual realization of the promised blessings" \textit{(Galatians, 64)}. As Martyn puts it, "It is indeed typical of Paul's theology that the true nature of things emerges only in the light of God's act in Christ" \textit{(Galatians, 327; cf. Lührmann, Galatians, 65).
that his present experience, and that of all the people around him, constituted the further unfolding of Israel's story. His logic is simply the logic which we engage whenever we experience a story for the first time. His task in 3:10-14 is not to prove that faith in Christ and obedience to Torah are opposed by means of a series of isolated proof-texts, but to illustrate how the broad themes of the biblical story can be read along lines which are consistent with his re-configuration of the Abraham narrative, and that indeed the death of Christ itself forces us toward a similar re-reading.

Having thus re-configured the story, however, Paul can read it in such a way that, as he concludes in 3:14, the passion took place "in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." This is not so much the conclusion of a linear argument as it is

Several authors have pointed out that in 3:14 Paul for the first time conflates the promised blessing through Abraham with the promise of the Spirit. Betz is likely right that this conflation is in part based on the experience of the Galatians, which combines faith and the Spirit (Galatians, 152-53). Yet nor should we overlook the novelty involved here. Paul already presumed in 3:6-9 that the reception of the Spirit was an indication that one was an heir of Abraham (so Eckstein, Verheißung, 168). Moreover, the out-pouring of the Spirit was widely assumed to be a sign of the more general eschatological blessing, and that blessing as a whole was generally understood as the inheritance of righteous Israel, i.e., Abraham's heirs. Berger points to the close association between eschatology and the "promises" to the patriarchs in apocalyptic texts like 4 Ezra and 2 Bar. ("Abraham," 53). Dunn (Galatians, 179) echoes Williams' comment ("Justification," 97) that "the experience of the Spirit and the status of justification are, for the apostle, inseparable apart from each other." On the eschatological hope of the coming of the Spirit see Isa 32:15; 44:3; 59:21; Ezek 11:19; 36:26-7; 37:1-14; 39:29 and of course Joel 2:28-9. Indeed, Eckstein points out that in Isa 44:1-5 the "promises" which will finally come to the "seed" of Jacob (certainly understood as the same promises given to Jacob's grandfather) include the outpouring of God's spirit (Verheißung, 169-70).

Positively, however, this explicit reference to the reception of the Spirit picks up again Paul's initial argument in 3:1-5, forming a kind of inclusio surrounding this core argumentative section from 3:1-14 and suggesting that indeed the Galatians' reception of the Spirit has been the driving force behind his thinking all through these verses.

The "us" for whom Christ became a curse in 3:13 and who receive the promise of the Spirit in 3:14 are most likely Jews and Gentiles (so Bruce, Galatians, 166-67; Dunn, Galatians, 176-77; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 121; Martyn, Galatians, 317; Oepke, Galater, 74; Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 26; Schlier, Galater, 93). Many commentators have read the "us" who are rescued in 3:13 as referring strictly to Jews (so Betz, Galatians, 148; Burton, Galatians, 169; Lightfoot, Galatians, 139), so that the connection between the liberation of Jews from Torah and the coming of the promise to the Gentiles in 3:14 becomes obscure. For, the argument runs, it is only the Jews (and Gentiles who

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the final tying together of the narrative strands into the new configuration which Paul has given them. The Apostle does want to draw a conclusion from this re-construed story, but that conclusion does not concern the status of law or faith. It concerns the concrete ethical question which the Galatians face: should they submit to circumcision?

*e. 3:15-18 Analogical help toward re-configuration*

Before the Apostle can address that ethical problem directly, however, he needs first to reinforce the re-configuration of Israel's story in the context of which his ethical

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convert) who stand under the law's curse in 3:10, and so it must only be they who are liberated from that curse in 3:13. Yet it is highly forced to read the "us" of 3:13 as exclusively Jewish, since the "us" who receives the promise of the Spirit in 3:14b is almost certainly meant to include those like the Galatians who have experienced the Spirit outside legal observance (so Westerholm, *Perspectives*, 302 n 13). It has been suggested that the explicit mention of the promise reaching ἄνυμην in 3:14a implies that this is a different (Gentile) group than the (Jewish) "us" who are redeemed from the curse in 3:13 and receive the Spirit in 3:14 (so Burton, *Galatians*, 169; Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 139). Yet it is very unlike Paul to distinguish between Jews and Gentiles in this way when he talks about salvation and the reception of the Spirit (so Martyn, *Galatians*, 317). Moreover, if we were to distinguish between the Gentiles in 3:14a and the "us" in 3:14b, this would imply that Gentile conversion is somehow crucial to the Jews' reception of the promised Spirit—an idea of which we find no hint elsewhere in the Apostle's writings. Hence Paul's explicit identification of the Gentiles as recipients of the blessing is probably intended simply to highlight his main argumentative point: that the benefits of the Christ event are extended to the Gentiles as well and not simply to the Jewish community (so Eckstein, *Verheißung*, 152; cf. 164). Even more important is Martyn's observation that this deliverance from the curse is said in 3:13b to have taken place when Christ became a curse "for us" (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν). Martyn rightly points out that when Paul talks about Christ's action being "for us," he is always referring to an action on behalf of all humanity (*Galatians*, 317; e.g., Gal 1:4; Rom 8:32).

Is it plausible, then, to read 3:13 as including Gentiles among those who must be liberated from the law's curse? Notice that the Apostle says essentially the same thing explicitly in 3:22-23, where the "imprisoning" effect of Torah is extended to τὰ τάλατα and not merely to the Jews. In what sense can Gentiles be "imprisoned" under the law? Westerholm is probably right (*Perspectives*, 302 n 13) that Paul simply sees the Gentiles as trapped in essentially the same situation as the Jews. Both are faced with judgment if they do not fulfill God's will, although this judgment comes to Gentiles "apart from the law" (Rom 2:12; see also Rom 1:18, 5:9; 1 Thess 1:10; so Bruce, *Galatians*, 166-67; cf. Eckstein, *Verheißung*, 152-53). Hence Paul can speak "somewhat loosely" of Gentiles being delivered from the law's curse, since they too had faced the same condemnation if their lives were not righteous (Westerholm, *Perspectives*, 302 n 13). Paul's turn of phrase here thus anticipates his argument in 4:8-11 in which the Jewish life under Torah is treated as analogous to the Galatians' life ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου (so Martyn, *Galatians*, 317; Schlier, *Galater*, 93).

544 Contra, e.g., Lührmann, *Galatians*, 61.

545 Most commentators recognize 3:15-18 as a distinct sub-section of Paul's main argument in 3:1-4:31 (so Betz, *Galatians*, 154; Burton, *Galatians*, 177; Dunn, *Galatians*, 159, 180; R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 125-6). Martyn treats it as a sub-section of 3:6-18 (so *Galatians*, 295), but as we have observed this separates it artificially from 3:1-5, which is the heart of Paul's argument.
instructions will make sense. Paul's own efforts to re-configure Israel's story show that he is aware of the indeterminacy involved in the reading of any narrative, a story's capacity to be construed in various ways by different audiences. As we have already suggested, the Apostle is for that reason very concerned to show that his is a better telling of the story than is the opponents'. Yet he knows that from the opponents' point of view (and perhaps from the point of view of their Galatian pupils) the greatest challenge to that claim is that the traditional story is so overwhelmingly dominated by the Mosaic covenant. How can the Torah which encoded Israel's obligations under that covenant possibly be understood as a secondary institution, even as counter-productive in Israel's relationship with God? The hardest part of Paul's task will thus be to assign a meaningful role to that covenant within the context of his re-configured narrative. For all of these reasons Paul wants to prepare for that interpretive task by establishing a basic narrative framework within which to understand the relationship between promise and law. That framework is given in 3:17, where Paul explains simply that the promise to Abraham came first and so must not have been supplanted by the later legal institution under Moses: "My point is this (τούτο δὲ λέγω): the law, which came four hundred thirty years later, does not annul a covenant (διαθήκης) previously ratified by God, so as to nullify the promise" (3:17).546

This re-configured relationship between law and promise is, however, so radically

546 Cosgrove ("Arguing," 536-38) suggests that Paul adopts, for the sake of argument, the premise that in fact the Mosaic law is in contradiction to the promise, and that here he highlights the legal contradiction to which this situation would lead. Yet nowhere in 3:15-18 does the Apostle actually say that Torah is in conflict with the promise. He is not, for the moment, concerned with how exactly the two relate. His concern is, rather, to establish that however one understands that relationship the priority of the Abrahamic promise cannot be compromised. The relationship cannot be construed as one in which the law changes the conditions of the earlier promise.
different from the roles assigned to those institutions in the traditional reading of Israel's story that Paul knows he must somehow fix this new pattern in the audience's mind and demonstrate that such a reading carries at least some \textit{a priori} credibility. The means upon which Paul seizes for this end is a simple analogy from the Galatians' common experience: "Brothers and sisters, I give an example from daily life (\textit{katà áνθρωπον λέγω})\textsuperscript{547}: once a person's will (διαθήκην) has been ratified, no one adds to it or annuls it" (3:15). Here Paul holds up a common situation for the Galatians' inspection.\textsuperscript{548} It is not a

\textsuperscript{547}Burton observes (\textit{Galatians}, 178) that the standard sense of \textit{katà áνθρωπον} in Greek literature is "as men [i.e., human beings] do." The specific expression "to speak in a human way" (λέγω/λαλῶ \textit{katà áνθρωπον/άνθρωποι}) appears in Rom 3:5; 6:19; and 1 Cor 9:8, but does not appear to be attested anywhere else in Greek literature. Nor is there a clear Aramaic or Hebrew equivalent. In Rom 3:5 this speech \textit{katà áνθρωπον} is speech which arises from a "merely" human point of view and does not reflect the truth. For Paul to speak \textit{katà áνθρωπον} could thus mean that he is speaking in a \textit{merely} human way, and hence that this is an \textit{ad hominem} argument which he may not think carries much real validity (so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 181; Cosgrove, "Arguing," 543-5; Siegert, \textit{Argumentation}, 228; cf. R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 125). Yet this emphasis on the limitations of a human perspective are not carried on into the other two instances of the expression. In Rom 6:19 it is Paul who speaks \textit{άνθρωπον} in order to address the "weakness" of the audience's "flesh." Such "human" speech is here true speech, but draws (as in Gal 3:15) on an analogy from common experience – this time the treatment of slaves. In 1 Cor 9:8, again, Paul raises the question of whether he is speaking \textit{katà áνθρωπον} after he has just adduced a series of analogies between daily life and his own situation, and he draws a contrast between that which simply rests on such observations \textit{katà áνθρωπον} and that which is revealed in scripture (6 1'0110';). Yet this is not intended to detract from the truth or validity of the speech \textit{katà áνθρωπον}. Paul is simply distinguishing between ordinary human thought and speech and that which is revealed by God, and the note of condescension which R. N. Longenecker sees in these passages is far from evident (\textit{Galatians}, 127). Since in Gal 3:15 too Paul is drawing on an analogy from common experience, the expression \textit{katà áνθρωπον λέγω} here most likely means something similar: that the Apostle is leaving off his discussions of inspired Scripture and speaking "as men do about their affairs," i.e., drawing on common human experience (Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 178; so Betz, \textit{Galatians}, 154; Lightfoot, \textit{Galatians}, 140-41).

Cosgrove ("Arguing," 543) argues that the prepositional phrase \textit{katà áνθρωπον} seems to denote what is "merely' human' in Gal 1:11; 1 Cor 3:3; 15:32. This is true as far as it goes, provided we understand that Paul does not consistently \textit{denigrate} that which is \textit{katà áνθρωπον} or imply that it is false. In Greek literature more broadly, Cosgrove argues for a distinction between the phrase \textit{katà áνθρωπους}, a neutral phrase denoting what is typical of human life and experience, and \textit{katà áνθρωπον}, which he suggests carries a consistently negative evaluation ("Arguing," 544). This distinction holds true in Philo (compare \textit{Virt.} 217; \textit{Spec.} 1.116; \textit{Legat.} 76 with \textit{Post.} 37; \textit{Conf.} 121; \textit{Mut.} 205; \textit{Decal.} 111). Elsewhere, however, the contrast between that which is \textit{katà áνθρωπον} and that which goes beyond it is intended not to deprecate what is \textit{katà áνθρωπον} but rather to emphasize the extraordinary nature of that which exceeds or excels ordinary human experience (see Plato, \textit{Phileb.} 12c; Athen., \textit{Deipnos.} 10.444b; Diod. Sic. 16.11.2; Xenoph., \textit{Cyri.} 8.7.2; \textit{Mem.} 4.4.24). In fact, in some cases that which goes beyond \textit{katà áνθρωπον} is exceedingly bad or dangerous (Aesch., \textit{Sept.} 425; Soph., \textit{Ajax} 761, 777; OC 598).

\textsuperscript{548}Betz (\textit{Galatians}, 154) calls it an exemplum.
complete story, but a familiar narrative pattern with generic actors (the deceased, those who might try to alter the will) and generic kinds of action (ratifying a will, adding to a will, annulling a will) which are causally inter-related (if someone ratifies the will, then the other kinds of action cannot take place). By the time we reach vv. 17-18 it is clear how the Apostle wants to see this same narrative pattern reflected in Israel's story. God's promise to Abraham's descendants is a kind of "covenant" or "will" (both ideas are expressed by διαθήκη that will be inherited by his "seed," and no additional legal stipulations can exclude his offspring from that inheritance.

By first presenting the analogous situation in everyday life, however, Paul accomplishes two things. First, he ensures that the Galatians will perceive the pattern

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549 The διαθήκη in 3:15 is almost certainly a personal "will" or "testament" (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 128; Martyn, Galatians, 338; contra Burton, Galatians, 179). Not only is this the ordinary sense of the Greek term (see, e.g., Jos. War 1.451, 573, 588, 600, passim; Antiq. 13.349; 17.53, 78, 146, passim), but such a sense is also suggested by the way in which the διαθήκη is characterized as διαθέτω and hence seems to be put in place unilaterally by an individual. Terms such as ἐπιδιορθάσεως, ἀκεφαλής, κυρώσει, and ἀκυρότης are frequently used in technical discussions of such testaments (so Bammel, "Gottes ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ," 313). We might not see a direct parallel between a "will" which one draws up to deal with one's effects after death and a "covenant" between two living partners, but the LXX uses the term διαθήκη consistently for the Hebrew נָקָד (in 270 of 286 occurrences of the Hebrew term), including the passages in the Pentateuch which discuss God's נָקָד with Abraham and his descendants (see, e.g., Exod 19:5; 24:7-8; Deut 4:13; 29:1, 21). Likewise, the Greek term seems to have early on become a standard element of the eucharistic traditions (see 1 Cor 11:25; Lk 22:20). Moreover, Paul's talk about ἐπικοροιδία, "the inheritance," in v. 18 highlights the real similarity between the two διαθήκαι: in both cases there is a unilateral decision which establishes that some person's descendants will receive certain benefits (cf. a similar shift from διαθήκη as covenant to διαθήκη as testament in Heb 9:15-17).

550 Paul is clearly thinking of Gen 15:18 and especially 17:2-8 where the blessings which God has spoken over Abraham are called in the LXX a διαθήκη and are directed not only to Abraham himself but also to his σπέρμα. Paul seems to read a great deal into what is primarily a promise of land, but in this he was following a common Jewish tendency to see possession of the land as wrapped up with blessing in general and to represent for his present the eschatological blessing which the prophets attached to a restored life in the land (see Pss. Sol. 7:2; 9:2; 14:3, 10; 17:26; 1 En. 40:9; Sib. Or. 3:47; Test. Job 18:6-7; cf. Heb 3:5; 6:12; 11:8-16; Acts 2:32; Eph 5:5; 1 Cor 6:9-10; Col 3:24). As Dunn observes (Galatians, 183), the text of Genesis does not actually use the term "promise," but that word "could quite properly summarize the various passages where God says 'I will give', that is, both the land... and a son."

551 That Paul wants the common situation in v. 15 to serve as analogous to his statement in v. 17 is clear from his use of ὁμολογεῖν. Although the adverb is commonly adversative, meaning "nevertheless" or "yet," BDAG is correct that given Paul's use of ὁμολογεῖν to introduce comparisons (cf. 1 Cor 14:7) he is likely using the adverb as equivalent to the older ὁμολογεῖ meaning "equally, likewise" (BDAG, 710; so Betz,
which he wants them to see by isolating a simple situation which they are accustomed to viewing according to an analogous pattern. With this strong and clear image in mind, the Galatians are much more likely to be able to perceive that same pattern in the more complex story which Paul is re-configuring. This analogical help is particularly important now because the Galatians' sense of the overall shape of Israel's story will be very shaky. Paul has just challenged the configuration to which they had been accustomed, and an analogy like this can serve as an important guide in helping them to resolve the elements of the story which have become momentarily disconnected in the audience's minds. Nor is this simply a rhetorical device which can be neatly distinguished from epistemology. For, as Bernard Lonergan has emphasized, knowing the world is in large part a matter of being able to perform acts of "insight" in which we construe a group of particulars according to a certain pattern. That is to say, the world in general is characterized by the kind of interpretive indeterminacy which Iser perceives in the story. One cannot know

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Galatians, 156; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 127; contra Burton, Galatians, 178; Lightfoot, Galatians, 141; cf. 1 Cor 14:7). "In the same way" that human "testaments" are irrevocable once made, so too is the divine ἐπαθήματι with Abraham's "seed." The intervening statements in 3:16 are parenthetical, setting up the conditions under which the two situations may be seen as analogous (so Burton, Galatians, 181). Hence Paul's introduction of 3:17 with τὸ ὅτι δὲ λέγομαι, a phrase which the Apostle uses to resume a previous thought (so Burton, Galatians, 182; cf. 1 Cor 1:12 and the similar phrases in 1 Cor 7:29; 10:29; 16:50) or draw the conclusion of his argument (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 143; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 132) -- two ways of construing the flow of thought which in an argument from analogy need not be seen as mutually exclusive. This analogy is then highlighted by Paul's use of the same language (ἀνοδήμος, καὶ ἐκπορευόμενος) or synonymous terms (ἀνακρίνω and ἀκυρῶν) in both cases.  

Lonergan characterizes insight as, among other things, sudden and unexpected precisely because it cannot be produced by a method: "Were there rules for discovery, then discoveries would be mere conclusions." "Indeed," he says, "what is true of discovery also holds for the transmission of discoveries by teaching. For a teacher cannot undertake to make a pupil understand. All he can do is present the sensible elements in the issue in a suggestive order and with a proper distribution of emphasis. It is up to the pupils themselves to reach understanding, and they do so in varying measures of ease and rapidity" (Insight, 4-5). Thomas Kuhn perceives the intense struggle which can be involved in abandoning one construal of the world in favour of a new one in his discussion of "paradigm shifts" (see The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 77-91).
the truth about something if one cannot perceive there the pattern which is "true." A crucial part of our capacity to know the truth thus consists of our familiarity with the patterns which can prepare us by way of analogy to "understand" or interpret our object in a true way, in a way such that the resulting picture is fitting to the world. To put this in terms of Paul's activity here in Gal 3:15-18, the Galatians must be prepared with the analogical tools to perceive the new pattern in Israel's story if they are ever to come to re-configure it as Paul has and thus come to know the "truth of the Gospel."

The second epistemic task which this analogy performs, however, is to point to an *a priori* plausibility in this re-configured pattern. It is no accident that the analogy which Paul chooses is a common scenario, drawn from the ordinary experience of many of the Galatian believers. For the plausibility of any narrative we tell depends on its being structured, to a large extent, around the kind of narrative patterns which we are accustomed to seeing in daily life. An occasional startling event which breaks through these usual patterns adds interest to a story, but taken too far such anomalies will stretch the credulity of the listeners to the breaking point. Since a striking novelty is already injected into Paul's narrative with the anomalous events of Christ's death and the Galatians' reception of the Spirit, it is imperative that as he fills out his re-configuration of the story he draw on patterns which will carry an inherent plausibility by virtue of their familiarity in common life. This, again, should not be thought of simply as a rhetorical trick aimed at making the Galatians accept Paul's story regardless of its truth. This demand for familiar narrative patterns is, after all, essentially what the historian means by the canon of causal uniformity. Just as physical objects are thought to behave in the same
ways whether they exist in the first-century or the twenty-first, so too human beings are thought (allowing for a certain degree of cultural and individual variation) to behave and interact according to familiar patterns. If an historical reconstruction involves some action on the part of an individual which does not seem to fit any of these familiar patterns we either call that individual insane (thus showing that we can subsume the behaviour under a familiar pattern after all) or we look for a better construal of that part of the past. In the case of Israel's story, both Paul and his opponents would accept that this basic uniformity of human action and interaction can be extended, at least tentatively, to God himself. The human-divine relationship is understood to be an *interpersonal* relationship and one in which God's actions and reactions are at least analogous to those of a human being.

Israel's narrative revolves, in fact, around God's making promises and covenants, suggesting that at least in a broad sense the divine activity will be understandable in terms of the normal human conduct of those institutions. Hence the narrative pattern which Paul offers up for the Galatians' view, the pattern in which a will is established and attempts to alter it fail, not only helps them to perceive a new configuration in the familiar story but also reinforces the Apostle's contention that this construal is eminently

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553 There is, of course, a tension here. Paul, along with many of the biblical writers, is probably aware that God's action is only analogically comparable to human action and that at some points (as in, e.g., the book of Job) one must abandon the attempt to understand it in terms of those familiar analogies. Note, however, that there is a comparable tension in historiography, since the presupposition of analogy between human thought and action in the past and our own must always be tempered by the realization that in certain ways the world-view and experience of people in the past are radically different from our own, giving rise to some kinds of behaviour and thought which are inexplicable in terms of current comparisons. It is not uncommon to see disagreement among historians over just how close the overlap is between past human awareness and our own, with the result that different scholars will disagree over what constitutes a plausible explanation of some past action. So, for example, it is debated whether we must look for a causally familiar model by which to "explain" Paul's sudden shift toward Christianity (such as psychological pressure prompting a psychic break; see, e.g., Lüdemann, *Paul*, 187-91) or whether we can accept that Paul's experience on the Damascus road was radically different from what we normally experience and the "explanation" of his unusual behaviour lies in that difference.
plausible. Paul wants to emphasize that God acts, on such a reading, just the way one would expect any person to act.\footnote{We are here not concerned with the accuracy of Paul's analogy but rather with the manner of his reasoning. It has, of course, been pointed out on many occasions that in both Greek and Roman law a testator could replace a will with a later one or could add codicils with further specifications (so Betz, \textit{Galatians}, 155; Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 182; R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 128-30; see Jos., \textit{War} 2.20-1, 35; \textit{P. Oxy.} 106, 107, 601; Raphael Taubenschlag, \textit{The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in Light of the Papyri}, 332 B.C.–640 A.D. 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. [Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955], 109-207; H. Kreller, \textit{Erbrechtliche Untersuchungen auf Grund der gräco-ägyptischen Papyruskunden} [Aalen: Scientia, 1919]). This would seem to take the force out of Paul's analogical argument, since Torah could be likened to such an added codicil. Bammel ("Gottes \ldots") has argued that Paul is thinking of the Jewish institution of the \textit{\textit{v6lloS}} in which property could be transferred irrevocably to an heir prior to the testator's death (cf. \textit{Sir} 33:19-23; \textit{m. B. Bat.} 8:7; \textit{t. B. Bat.} 8:9-9:1), and Yaron has pointed in the greco-roman world to the similar institution of the \textit{donatio mortis causa} (R. Yaron, \textit{Gifts in Contemplation of Death in Jewish and Roman Law} [Oxford: Clarendon, 1960]; cf. Taubenschlag, \textit{Law}, 204-7; BGU 993). As R. N. Longenecker emphasizes, none of these latter institutions seem to have been called a \textit{διαθήκη} (\textit{Galatians}, 130), but it is difficult to be sure whether Paul might have known a linguistic usage (in Galatia?) with which we are unfamiliar. Dunn (\textit{Galatians}, 182) also suggests that the inclusion of circumcision (Gen 17:9-14) as a part of the \textit{διαθήκη} with Abraham renders the parallel which Paul is trying to establish null, though to be fair the Apostle is concerned for the moment not about circumcision but about law more generally. In any case, Bammel is right ("Gottes \ldots," 317) that we cannot solve the problem by taking Paul as implying that the \textit{νόμος} was not instituted by God at all but by the \textit{άγγελοι} of v. 19. In 3:21ff. the discussion concerns precisely how law and promise can co-exist harmoniously as two products of the one divine will (so Cosgrove, "Arguing," 537, 539-41).}

Finally, in order for this analogy to convince his audience Paul must show that this common situation is actually analogous to Israel's story in the way he claims. He does this, however, not by adducing proofs but by elaborating on his analogy, showing that the reading of the story which results is coherent. The first and by far the more provocative elaboration is his identification in v. 16 of Abraham's heir, the "seed" who was to inherit the promise, as Christ himself. Not a few commentators have seen here Paul taking extreme liberties with the text of Gen 17:1-11,\footnote{Martyn, for example, writes that Paul "ignores . . . the plain meaning of the word 'seed' in Genesis 17," even though he himself has shown awareness of its collective sense in 3:7 and will again in 3:29 (\textit{Galatians}, 340). Likewise, Dunn (\textit{Galatians}, 183) thinks that Paul's reworking of this reading in Rom 4:9-12 "suggests that he recognized the unsatisfactory character of the Galatians' version."} and suggested that Paul's logic must simply be put down to "Pharisaic" ways of thought which are inaccessible to (and invalid
for) the contemporary mind.\textsuperscript{556} Note again, however, that the Apostle's point is not that an ordinary Jewish reading of the Abraham story would lead them to take the singular "seed" as a reference to some future individual. Paul knows very well that most of his contemporaries have taken it as a collective entity, referring to Israel.\textsuperscript{557} He has already shown, however, that in light of recent events that construal of the story, in which only faithful Jews are Abraham's heirs, cannot be maintained.\textsuperscript{558} This opens the door to suggest that the identification of Abraham's heir as a singular "seed" actually coheres very well with his reading of the story, a reading in which an individual (Christ) mediates the promise to everyone else who will enjoy it, whether Jew or Gentile.\textsuperscript{559} Moreover, as Dunn writes, Paul's point is not actually "to deny that Abraham's seed is multitudinous in number, but to affirm that Christ's pre-eminence as that 'seed' carries with it the implication that all 'in Christ' are equally Abraham's seed (iii.26-9)."\textsuperscript{560} So while Paul's

\textsuperscript{556}So, e.g., Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 184. Eckert (\textit{urchristliche Verkündigung}, 80) sees Paul working "den Auslegungsmethoden seiner Zeit entsprechend."

\textsuperscript{557}The context in Genesis implies that this "seed" is to be identified with the descendants of Abraham who will be as numerous as the sand on the seashore or the stars in the sky (Gen 13:16; 15:5; 16:10; 22:17; so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 184), and Betz points to this assumption behind the identification of Jews (and proselytes) as Abraham's heirs in second temple literature (\textit{Galatians}, 157; see Pss. Sol. 12:6; T. Jos. 20; Wis 12:21). Betz further observes that this interpretation is already present in Ps 105:8ff. and is represented among Christian writers in Eph 3:6; Heb 4:1ff.; 11:9, 11; Acts 13:22; 26:6ff. (\textit{Galatians}, 157). Indeed, as Burton points out Paul himself assumes that collective sense in 3:29 and Rom 4:13-18 (\textit{Galatians}, 182; so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 183-4).

\textsuperscript{558}Burton writes: "He doubtless arrived at his thought, not by exegesis of scripture, but from an interpretation of history, and then availed himself of the singular noun to express his thought briefly" (\textit{Galatians}, 182). This is contra Siegert (\textit{Argumentation}, 161) who suggests that Paul, like a hellenistic rhetorician, is assuming an absolute relationship between grammatical form and ontology. The singular which, Siegert admits, Paul would have recognized as "zwangsläufig," serves as "ein Indiz ... für eine singularische Erfüllung" only in the sense that in retrospect it is suggestive of the singular mediating role of Christ.

\textsuperscript{559}Hence Cosgrove is likely right that Paul's point in emphasizing the singularity of the "seed" is to emphasize that the promise "was not made to law-keepers (or anyone else, for that matter), and therefore that the law has absolutely no legal voice in the terms of the inheritance" ("Arguing," 548 [italics original]).

\textsuperscript{560}Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 185; so Brawley, "Contextuality," 102; R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 132; cf. Eckstein, \textit{Verheißung}, 183-84. In \textit{4QFlor} 11 10-12 the Qumran covenanters seem to have understood the מ"ת of David in 2 Sam 7:12-14 as reference to the Messiah, underlining the essential plausibility of
identification of Christ with the "seed" of Abraham must have seemed arbitrary to the opponents in Galatia, it is simply another way of stating the claim which the Apostle has already made in 3:6-9 and will make again in 3:29: that in order to inherit Abraham's promise one must be identified with Christ. He is not doing exegesis, in the sense of drawing out the human author's "original intent," but fleshing out his re-configuration of the narrative and showing how that re-configuration reflects by analogy the situation of a will whose heir cannot be disinherited by some alteration of the original testament.

We see here the same element of circularity in Paul's thought which has surfaced before. The identification of Christ as the "seed" already depends on the overall construal of the story which Paul seeks to reinforce by means of his analogy. Likewise, when Paul elaborates in 3:18 on exactly how the law would be effectively changing the terms of the ἐνδοθήκη established with Abraham's "seed," he emphasizes that the right of inheritance taking such a noun as a singular descendant. Yet Paul shows clearly that he understands the collective sense of the "seed" in Genesis 17:10 and that he must still have it in mind here in Gal 3:16 (see Gal 3:6-9, 29; Rom 4:13, 16, 18). Indeed, Lightfoot points out that the plural σπέρματα would be as unthinkable in Greek as a designation for descendants as would the Hebrew שּׁם, so that Paul cannot seriously mean that such an expression would have been used had the sacred author intended a plurality of descendants (Galatians, 142). Lightfoot thus suggests that Paul does not mean that σπέρμα here is a straightforward singular, but rather "that a singular noun of some kind, a collective term, is employed, where τὰ τέκνα or οἱ γνώγοι for instance might have been substituted" (Galatians, 142). In this way the story makes room for the mediatorial role of the individual Christ. Paul is re-reading the numerical ambiguity of the "seed" as indicative of the fact that it is Christ and those associated with him by faith who will inherit the promise, not Abraham's physical descendants.

Indeed, Dunn suggests that the Genesis text already invites such interpretive play on the numerical ambiguity of the seed, for that σπέρμα is identified both with Isaac and with Abraham's larger offspring (Galatians, 184). Dunn points to a similar logic in Jub. 16:17-18 where Levi is singled out in the expansion of Gen 20-21 (Galatians, 184; cf. Jub. 30-32). Likewise, Dunn observes that the distinction between Abraham's physical offspring (Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau) and the "seed" which would inherit the promise (Isaac and his descendants through Jacob) was axiomatic in first-century Judaism (Galatians, 185). R. N. Longenecker points to awareness of this selectivity in b. Sabb. 146a; b. Pesah 56a, 119b; b. Ned. 31a; Gen. Rab. 4:5, and he observes that the Rabbis sometimes seem to have excluded apostates and extreme sinners from Abraham's "seed" (Galatians, 131; cf. m. Sanh. 10:1; b. Erub. 19a; Lev. Rab. 9:1; Exod. Rab. 19:14).

was originally \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \lambda \iota \nu \), determined solely by the unilateral promise of God, the testator. If that right now becomes \( \varepsilon \kappa \nu \omicron \mu \omicron \omicron \), dependent on one’s keeping law, then there has been a radical change in the basis upon which one can claim to be an heir of the Abrahamic promise.562 Yet Paul assumes here the distinction between promise and law, the basic incompatibility between the two, which is in large part what he is trying to establish.563 This simply reminds us, however, that the Apostle's argument is not a linear chain forged of syllogistic reasoning and leading from premise to conclusion. It is an effort to demonstrate that his reading of the story is coherent, can account best for all of the features of the "text" which consists of Israel's scriptural story and the subsequent experiences of the believers in Christ. He has already shown that his basic reconfiguration can account for recent events, recent "chapters," which other construals find difficult or impossible to encompass. Paul's goal in 3:15-18 is then to set up, by means of a simple analogy, a narrative pattern which will provide the framework for his re-

562 That Paul is thinking here in terms of \( \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and \( \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \lambda \iota \nu \) as generally incompatible forms of relationship is made clear by his use here of the anarthrous form of both nouns (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 144; cf. Rom 4:13ff. where the point is made even more sharply). Still, his point is not (contra Dunn, Galatians, 185-6) that the promise has priority over the law simply because of its nature as promise, but rather that because promise and law are so different that the introduction of law would constitute a major alteration to the \( \delta \iota \alpha \theta \eta \kappa \eta \). Hence Paul's final point here is that God did in fact grant the blessing of progeny and land to Abraham "through the promise (\( \delta \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \lambda \iota \nu \))." Once again, this sharp distinction between law and promise was not familiar in second temple Judaism, where the terms tended to be treated as compatible (e.g., 2 Macc 2:17-18; Pss. Sol. 12:6; Sib. Or. 3.768-9; 2 Bar. 14.12-13; 57:2). Paul, however, sees it as unavoidable in light of the cross and the Galatians' experience of the Spirit (see 3:1-9).

Of course, Jewish thought tended to see the Mosaic code not as a later addition, but as present germinally in Abraham's obedience toward God, or even as revealed already in full-blown form to the first patriarch (see Sir 44:20; Philo, Abr. 275ff.; Jub. 21:10; Gen. Rab. 44 [27d]; 61 [38b]; Mek. Exod. 20, 18 [78b]). Indeed, the text of Gen 26:5 can easily be understood in these terms. As Betz observes, it is Paul who makes a point of Abraham's not having known Torah (Galatians, 159).

563 Something similar might be said of Paul's emphasis in 3:17 on the length of time which passed between the promise to Abraham (the \( \delta \iota \alpha \theta \eta \kappa \eta \)) and the giving of the law at Sinai. The Apostle wants to say that the law would not represent a simple afterthought, but a change added long, long after the original "will" had been set up (for the figure of 430 years see Exod 12:40 and cf. Gen 15:13). This whole way of portraying the situation, however, assumes that Torah introduces a radical change in the conditions of the \( \delta \iota \alpha \theta \eta \kappa \eta \), precisely the point which traditional Jewish thinking would deny.

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imagining of Torah’s place in Israel’s story, and to show that this pattern has at least some
\textit{a priori} plausibility as a way of reading that narrative.

\textit{f. 3:19-24 Demonstrating the coherence of the re-configuration}\textsuperscript{564}

Having set up by way of analogy this basic pattern in which the promise is pre-
eminent and the later Torah cannot interfere with its terms, Paul is ready to approach his
most difficult task in convincing the Galatians: showing that his re-configuration of the
story can integrate God’s giving of Torah to Moses as well as it can integrate the more
recent divine actions in Galatia. Paul asks "Why then the law?" (3:19). Given this re-
configuration of the story, what role would Torah play? His answer is that it was "added
because of transgressions (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη)" and that this institution
was temporally limited, only intended to be in force "until (ἀχρισ) the offspring would
come to whom the promise had been made" (3:19). Exactly what role Paul imagines the
law playing in relation to "transgressions" will continue to be debated.\textsuperscript{565} What is clear is

\textsuperscript{564}Most commentators extend this section further, either to 3:25 (so Betz, \textit{Galatians}, 161; R. N.
Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 137; Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 295, 352-53) or to 3:29, often with a minor division
between vv. 22 and 23 (so Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 187; Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 159; Lightfoot, \textit{Galatians}, 151;
Lührmann, \textit{Galatians}, 71, 74). It is clear that a transition takes place somewhere between 3:24 and 4:1
from a focus on the role of the law in general to a focus on the implications of that role for the Galatians.
The smooth nature of that transition is evidenced by the variety of dividing points suggested by scholars,
but as we will see below it is in 3:25 that the ethical implications of the story for the Galatians are first
introduced explicitly. Thus for our purposes 3:25 marks a shift to a new argumentative mode.

\textsuperscript{565}Is Paul thinking here already of the law as effectively "multiplying sin" (Rom 5:20), and as
making sin visible by converting it into explicit transgression (Rom 4:15) (so Barrett, \textit{Freedom}, 33; Betz,
\textit{Galatians}, 165; Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 188; Lightfoot, \textit{Galatians}, 144-45; R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 138-
39; Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 354)? In this case the law’s role would naturally come to an end when Christ came
to provide a solution for sin. Dunn is rightly cautious about reading Romans into Galatians at this point and
suggests that Paul is thinking of the law as God’s interim means of restraining transgression (\textit{Galatians},
189; cf. Eckstein, \textit{Verheißung}, 193-96). Two difficulties with such a positive reading of 3:19 are a) that the
role assigned to the law in the law in 3:21-23 is indeed one of "imprisoning" humanity under sin not of protecting
humanity from it; b) that unlike sin (ἀμαρτία), Paul does not seem to imagine "transgression" (παραβάσις)
as existing in the absence of a law to be transgressed (see Rom 4:15; 5:13; so Burton, \textit{Galatians}, 188;
that in the Apostle's radical re-imagining of Torah that law plays a role which not only does not interfere with the promise but is *temporary* in a way which the promise is not. 566

Paul adduces no general principles with which to demonstrate a-historically that "promise" in general is superior to and outlasts the "law." Rather his argument moves on three levels, each of which is dependant in a circular fashion on the very theological narrative which he is trying to establish. On the one hand, the Apostle reinforces the impression created in 3:15-18 that the circumstances of the institution of Torah are different in kind from the circumstances under which the promise was given to Abraham. He alludes to the indirectness of the law's advent, coming as it did through angelic messengers and Moses' mediation. 567 Hence the qualitative distinction between law and

566 This is in stark contrast to much of Jewish thinking in which Torah was regarded as eternal (see, e.g., Wis 18:4; Jos., C. Ap. 2.277; Philo, Mos. 2.14; Jub. 1.27; 3.31; 6.17).

567 It is not immediately apparent in 3:19b whether the statement that the law was given ἐν ἁγγελείᾳ is meant to suggest that angels were the divine intermediaries who administered Torah on God's behalf (so Dunn, Galatians, 191; Eckstein, Verheißung, 200-202) or that the law actually originated among the angels and not with God (so Drane, Paul, 34, 113; Lührmann, Galatians, 71; Martyn, Galatians, 357). The language of "being ordained through" (διὰ τοῖς ἰδιατάξεωσι βι') in 3:19 is, however, most naturally read as a "divine passive," the implied subject being God (so Thuren, Derhetorizing, 82). Even Räisänen (Paul, 130) agrees that this is initially the natural sense, and his subsequent objections are not persuasive (see the rebuttal in Thuren, Derhetorizing, 82-3). Moreover, Torah is clearly depicted in 3:21-22 as co-operating with God's purpose (so Thuren, Derhetorizing, 82; Westerholm, Israel's Law, 178). Even if one opts for the latter position, however, Paul clearly does not understand by ἐν ἁγγελείᾳ evil angels, as if the law were attributable to demonic influence (contra Hübner, Law, 24-36). In second-temple Jewish thinking the cosmic phenomena which accompanied the institution of Torah are often attributed to angels (LXX Ps 102:20; 103:4; Jub. 2:2ff.; 1 En. 60:1ff.), and in Antiq. 15.136 Josephus has Herod say that the Jews have learned the law "through angels sent by God" (though some suggest that ἐν ἁγγελείᾳ here should be "messengers": see Davies, "Note on Josephus" and the translation of Marcus in the LCL). See further Betz, Galatians, 169; Cullan, "Midrash," 550-54; Deut 33:2 LXX; Jub. 1.27-2.1; Philo, Somn. 1.143; Apoc. Mos., preface; Acts 7:38, 53; Heb 2:2. Paul's point is thus probably not to distance God from Torah altogether but to emphasize the indirectness of the Torah's revelation and draw an implicit contrast with the direct giving of the promise (so Burton, Galatians, 189; Eckstein, Verheißung, 200; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 140).

The second element of 3:19b is the reminder that Torah was given ἐν χειρὶ μεσιτοῦ. This "mediator" is almost certainly to be understood as Moses (so Betz, Galatians, 170; Burton, Galatians, 189; Dunn, Galatians, 190; Eckstein, Verheißung, 203; Lightfoot, Galatians, 146; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 140-43; Lührmann, Galatians, 72; Martyn, Galatians, 357). The phrase ἐν χειρὶ μεσιτοῦ is a very common way of expressing Moses' role in the LXX (see Lev 26:46; Num 4:37; 41, 45, 49; 9:23; 10:13; 15:23; 17:5; 33:1; 36:13; Jos 21:2, 22:9; Judg 3:4; 1 Chr 16:40; 2 Chr 33:8; Ps 76:21; Bar 2:28).
promise which runs through the Apostle's re-configuration of Israel's story is made to appear even more plausible. At the same time, Paul spells out in more detail the role which is left to the law and does this in such a way that its role now seems naturally temporary. It was given to deal with a specific problem (transgressions) for a specific period in time (until the advent of the "seed"). Its function is not in conflict with the Abrahamic promise (3:21a). On the contrary, Torah co-operates with the promise by "imprisoning" humanity "under sin" (συνέκλεισεν ἦ γραφή τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἀμαρτίαν) (3:22), acting as a "custodian" (παραγωγός), and hence producing the negative circumstances under which the realization of that promise in Christ is possible (3:22-24).

For our purposes what is important is that Paul pursues both of these

The significance of Moses' mediation is explicated in 3:20, but there is much debate over Paul's meaning there. It may be that the Apostle is still thinking of the angelic mediation of the law and pointing out that mediators act on behalf of groups (i.e., the angels and Israel), not on behalf of individuals (so Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 83; Eckstein, Verheißung, 204-5; Lambrecht, "Abraham," 533; Lührmann, Galatians, 71; Stanton, "Law of Moses," 113). Alternately, the Apostle may want to contrast the mediator's role arbitrating between two parties with God's nature as one (see Burton, Galatians, 191). The precise thrust of the contrast, however, would remain unclear. Is Paul's point simply that the plurality involved in mediation is inferior to divine singularity and so cannot be part of God's redeeming activity (so Betz, Galatians, 171-3; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 142)? The general goal, in any case, is to contrast this law characterized by mediation with the Abrahamic promise which was given directly (3:17-18; so Burton, Galatians, 190; Callan, "Midrash," 554-64; Dunn, Galatians, 191; Lightfoot, Galatians, 146-47; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 141-2). It is very unlikely that Paul is saying, even for rhetorical effect, that God was not behind the law which Moses delivers (so Thuren, Derhetorizing, 83; contra Martyn, Galatians, 358). Nor is it likely that Paul is, in 3:20, repeating his diatribal interlocutor's false assumption which leads to the false conclusion in 3:21 (contra Brawley, "Contextuality," 103-4).

568 In 3:22 the "imprisonment" is said to have taken place "so that (ἵνα) what was promised through faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe." Exactly how this "imprisonment" accomplishes this task is less clear, and our answer here will inevitably be tied to our reading of 3:19. The verb φυλάσσω can have the sense either of negative subjection (see Polyb., 18.4.6; LSI, 1957-58 [II.b]) or a protective guarding (2 Cor 11:32; Phil 4:7; 1 Pet 1:5; LSI, 1957-58 [I, II.a]), though στέφω is more consistently used in the sense of confinement (LSI, 1665 [I]; cf. Wis 17:16 where the two verbs appear together). It may well be that both the protective and confining ideas are intended and complement one another (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 147; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 145). The thought, though expressed in a tightly compressed form, seems to be much like that of Rom 3:9; 11:32 (so Dunn, Galatians, 194), and it is tempting to follow Martyn (Galatians, 360-61) and understand here scripture/law as having "shut every door that might seem to lead from the human orb to the possession of God's promise, and in that way it played its part in God's plan to make his own entry into the human orb" (so Barrett, Freedom, 34-5). On the metaphor of the παραγωγός in 3:24 see the next section below.
argumentative directions in 3:19-24 simply by *narrating more of the story* as he has re-imagined it. This is not to say that the telling of the story is very detailed, complete, or ordered by strict chronology, but none of these qualities is basic to narration *per se*. The sentences describe causally interrelated events, actions (giving law, mediating, imprisoning) pursued by personal or personified agents (God, angels, Moses, Scripture/Law) and suffered by other personal agents (the human race). What is crucial to notice is thus that the Apostle argues here by simply relating what, in his configuration of the story, took place. Narration itself constitutes a kind of argument for the coherence of the story being told.

The third line of argument in this section appears in 3:21 as the direct answer to the hypothetical objection that Paul has made the law appear hostile to the promise. Paul replies: "Certainly not! For if a law had been given that could make alive, then righteousness would indeed come through the law" (3:21). Here the Apostle's argument...
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does not consist of simple narration, but rather forms a brief (and enthymematic) syllogism. Paul offers a hypothetical event and then suggests the implications of that event. If a life-giving law had been given (by God), then those who kept that law would be righteous. The assumed premise is that God would not give a law, intended to give life, which did not accomplish its task.\textsuperscript{569} The syllogism is valid, but Paul presumes that its conclusion is false. Righteousness has not actually come by means of law-observance (cf. 2:16; 3:10-14). Hence one of the premises must also be false, and God must not have given a law which was intended to bring life.\textsuperscript{570} Even here, however, where Paul's logic is syllogistic, there are three ways in which Paul's argument is integrally related to his reconfigured narrative. First, the conclusion toward which Paul's syllogism pushes is still an assertion about Israel's story: that the law was not intended by God to give life and so must have had some other purpose.\textsuperscript{571} This is not a general statement about "law" or even a timeless truth about Torah. It is a claim about the intentions of a certain agent (God) in

\textsuperscript{569} This reading assumes that Jews would commonly think of the Law as a (proximate) source of life. See, e.g., Lev 18:5; Deut 6:24; Prov 3:1-2; 6:23; Sir 17:11; Bar 3:9; 4:1; Pss. Sol. 14:2. The verb \( \zeta \lambda \omega \tau \iota \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) (or equivalents in other languages) is not typically used with Torah as its subject. Rather, God is the one who makes people to live (see 2 Kgs 5:7; Neh 9:6; Job 36:6; Ps 71:20; Jos. Asen. 8:3, 9; 12:1; 20:7; Arist. 16; John 5:21; Rom 4:17; 1 Cor 15:22). Paul thus plays on the nuances of this word to emphasize that, despite traditional Jewish associations between law and life, it is God and not Torah which gives that life (so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 193). One could also understand Paul to be claiming, implicitly, that people are "dead" and so the law would have to make them live if it were to bring them salvation. Given the common Jewish association between life and Torah, however, it seems that most Jews would agree they needed in some sense to be granted life. The polemical point is probably not that the people need life, but that the Torah cannot grant it.

\textsuperscript{570} It would be conceivable to argue that it was the second, implied premise which is false: God did give a life-giving law, but no-one succeeded in keeping it. For both Paul and his opponents, however, this would demand an inconceivable frustration of the divine will.

\textsuperscript{571} Once again this stands in direct conflict with second-temple and Tannaitic Jewish thought. See, e.g., Sir 17:11; Bar 3:9; 4:1; Pss. Sol. 14:2; m. \textit{Abot} 2:8; 6:1ff. The idea of Torah giving life is already expressed in Lev 18:5; Deut 6:24; 30:15-20; 32:47; Prov 3:1-2; 6:23. In the New Testament see Mk 10:17-20; Matt 5:17-20; 7:13f. As Betz emphasizes, however, it is for Paul the Spirit who gives life (\textit{Galatians}, 174; see 2 Cor 3:6), though the Apostle nuances this position in Romans where he allows that the law was in fact originally given \( \epsilon \iota \sigma \zeta \omega \omicron \omicron \omicron \) (Rom 7:10).
pursuing a certain action in history (giving the law to Israel). Second, while the Apostle's argument here is more than just narration, its premises consist of narrative statements and it is the causal patterns through which those statements are related in the story which allow them together to establish Paul's point. He points to the absence of a particular event in the narrative, i.e. the human achievement of righteousness through law (premise 1). Then, based on the fact that an agent in the story (God) was capable of bringing that event about had he wanted to (premise 2 [implicit]), the Apostle concludes that the agent in question must not have wanted it to happen. In other words, the actual events of the story are not explicable if the character (God) was acting with the motivation in question (to provide a way of achieving righteousness). Yet this syllogism is only valid because the two premises are describing an event and an agent which are causally related in the story. Thus, while the Apostle's logic here is syllogistic, the move from premises to conclusion is only possible because of the narrative relationship between the premises.

Third, we must point out that Paul's point here hinges on his assumption that the conclusion of the syllogism is in fact false, that Israel had not achieved righteousness by law-keeping. Yet this assumption can only be made within the context of the Apostle's overall re-configuration of the story. His opponents would likely have objected that in fact the events of the story were different than Paul described—Israel (following Abraham) had achieved righteousness by her keeping of Torah. Hence a life-giving law had been established. The Apostle's syllogism thus only makes the point which he wants it to if one already grants his re-configuration of the story in 3:1-18. This highlights the fact that Paul is not pursuing an argument from first-principles or on the basis of common assumptions.
Rather, he has offered an entirely different construal of Israel's story as a whole, and here in 3:19-24 he is simply showing that this re-ordering of the narrative can assign a coherent role to the Torah given at Mt. Sinai. Where this argumentative task cannot be accomplished simply by telling the story, the syllogism which Paul employs is entirely dependent for its validity on that story. The Apostle's argument appears as a kind of narrative criticism which highlights the pattern, the \textit{dianoia} into which the experiences of Israel can be resolved most coherently.

3. Re-emplotting the audience

\textit{a. 3:25-4:11 Emplotting the audience}^{572}

In 3:25, beginning with the image of the παιδαγωγός, Paul sets up a series of analogous\textsuperscript{572} metaphors in order to help the Galatians to see not only the role of Torah in Israel's story, but the implications of that role on their own place in that narrative. When the παιδαγωγός metaphor is introduced in 3:24 it serves primarily to reinforce and crystallize the narrative pattern which is already established - law as a temporary and

\textsuperscript{572}I am running against the trend of scholarship in holding together 3:25-29 and 4:1ff. On the rationale for this move, see above, n. 564 and the analysis below. Martyn (Galatians, 295) at least treats 4:1-7 as the conclusion of an argument which began in 3:6, suggesting a close connection between 3:25-29 and 4:1ff. Similarly, Eckstein treats 3:19-4:7 as a unified phase of Paul's argument (Verheißung, 190). Yet their common decision to place a division between 4:7 and 4:8 obscures the extent to which 4:8-11 sums up and draws the conclusion to 4:1-7 (see the same problem in Betz, Galatians, 213; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 178-79; Lührmann, Galatians, 82-83; Martyn, Galatians, 409).

\textsuperscript{573}The παιδαγωγός of 3:24-26 is not quite the same figure as the ἐπίτροπος of 4:2 (contra R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 162), still less the ὀικονόμος in the same verse. The situation imagined in the first case is that of a young child living under a slave's discipline. The situation imagined in the second case is more wide-ranging, in which a child is under others' supervision until he (the scenario assumes a male heir) reaches the age of majority and can direct his own affairs. Then, as Martyn points out, the motif of adoption which Paul introduces in 4:5 is not really related to either of these other metaphors (Galatians, 386). The shift from one metaphor to another, however, simply underlines the fact that these analogies are being used primarily as heuristic guides to help the Galatians to grasp the underlying shape of Paul's re-configured narrative.
preparatory institution. The law, as παιδαγωγός, facilitates salvation in Christ by restricting Israel for a period of time, but just as the παιδαγωγός leaves his charge when the child arrives at the classroom so too Paul imagines Torah having exhausted its role now that Christ has come. The implicit analogy plays the same epistemic role as did the comparison with the institution of the διαθήκη in 3:15-18: it helps the audience to perceive the pattern which Paul is trying to establish and at the same time reinforces the essential plausibility of that pattern. Already in 3:24, however, Paul is shifting into a new mode of argumentation in which he is not only elaborating the story of Israel as an object "out there," but beginning to show how the players in the Galatian conflict fit into that story, are "emplotted" within it. For the law is now said to have been not just a custodian, but "our" custodian (παιδαγωγός ἡμῶν). Paul has already made clear that the jurisdiction

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574 On the παιδαγωγός in antiquity see Betz, Galatians, 177; Martin P. Nilsson, Die hellenistische Schule (Munich: Beck, 1955); H.-I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York: Mentor, 1964), 201-2; Plato, Resp., 467d; Lys., 208c; Leg.7.808d-e. It is not clear how such "supervisors" were usually regarded and so whether (as Betz assumes, Galatians, 177) Paul intends by this analogy any denigration of Torah. Dunn rightly questions this strongly negative impression of the figure of the παιδαγωγός, stressing the function of the slave in protecting and training youths in good manners (Dunn, Galatians, 199; cf. P. Oxy. 6.930; Brawley, "Contextuality," 107-8). Nor is it entirely clear whether Paul is thinking primarily of the original function of the παιδαγωγός as a supervisor on the way to and from primary school, or whether he is thinking of the broader role such slaves sometimes took on as a guide in manners and morals. If it is the more restricted role which is in the Apostle's mind, the question still remains whether he is focussed on the slave as protector of the pupil en route, as a disciplinarian who constrains the child's conduct, or as a guide who ensures that the child reaches the classroom. Coming as it does after talk of the law as "imprisoning" humanity it is tempting to see in the παιδαγωγός analogy too a primary emphasis on constraint (so Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 85-6; Eckstein, Verheißung, 216; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 148; Martyn, Galatians, 363). The same thing is implied by Paul's equation of life "under the law" with slavery (so Betz, Galatians, 178; Gal 2:4; 3:23: 4:1-10: 5:1). Whether, however, this constraining role excludes any idea of νομός contributing to the realization of the blessing (e.g., by making human beings aware of their need for grace, closing off any way of approach to God but faith in Christ) is less clear (contra Betz, Galatians, 178; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 148). Plutarch uses the παιδαγωγός in just such a metaphor of restriction which effects a positive training in Num. 15 (cf. Epict., Diss. 3.19.5), and the Apostle comes close to saying as much in 3:22. In any case, when Paul says in 3:24 that the law, as παιδαγωγός, leads εἰς Ἡμετέρων, the sense of εἰς is primarily temporal and not spatial (so Dunn, Galatians, 199; Lightfoot, Galatians, 149; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 148-49; Martyn, Galatians, 363). Torah plays its part by restricting Israel for a certain period of time, a period of time which ends with Christ's advent.
of the law would come to an end with the advent of Christ and the new possibility which he brings. In 3:25, however, this turn in the narrative is personalized: "But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to a disciplinarian (ουκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγῶν ἐσμεν)." Having elaborated the place of law in his re-configured story, the Apostle is locating "us" in that story and making clear how "we" now stand in relation to law, given "our" place in the narrative. Who is included with Paul in this "us"? Initially it seems that the pronoun refers to Paul and his Jewish compatriots (including the Galatian opponents). In 3:26, however, it becomes clear that Paul has intentionally left the identity of the "us" vague, for though the Gentile Galatians did not live "under the law" they too now share in the liberated state which Christ has made possible: "for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith." This is their present location in Israel's story.

Through to 3:29 two things are happening simultaneously. On the one hand, Paul comes back to the basic re-configuration of the story which he laid out in 3:1-14 under the dual pressure of the Christ event and the Galatians' experience of the Spirit. It is those who are identified with Christ in baptism, those who are "in Christ," who are "Abraham's seed" and thus "heirs according to the promise (κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν καλλωπίδον)" (3:29).

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575 It is not immediately clear whether Paul means here that the law's dominion ends for the individual when he or she comes to experience faith in Christ or that the law's rule has ended in principle with the coming of Christ (so, e.g., Burton, Galatians, 202). We probably need not separate these senses entirely. The necessity of being ruled by law has come to an end, for Paul, with Christ's death and resurrection. He would, however, recognize that individuals (e.g., the opponents) may remain under that legal domination, just as the Galatians are considering putting themselves under it (4:9). Betz' distinction (Galatians, 179) between the law ending in a "cosmic" sense and the law ending for Jews is probably over-fine. For prior to Christ's coming Paul would probably have agreed that all Gentiles ought to keep Torah, if only in the sense of the Torah inscribed on their hearts (Rom 2:12-16). On the child's emancipation from the παιδαγωγός see, e.g., Xenoph., Laced. 3.1.

576 Eckstein (Verheißung, 217) recognizes that it is here that Paul begins explicitly to draw "die für die galatische Situation entscheidende Konsequenz aus der Darstellung" which has gone before.
This, again, is not a conclusion to the Apostle's discussion of law in the sense of a conclusion to a syllogistic argument. Rather, Paul is bringing his re-configuration of the story full circle. He has shown that this new construal of the narrative can even integrate Torah and give it a meaningful (albeit totally re-imagined) role. Now he can return more confidently to his initial claims about who gets to play the role of "Abraham's seed," about who in the story receives God's eschatological blessing. At the same time, however, by locating the audience in his narrative Paul is beginning to make an ethical argument. He is emplotting the Galatians in the story and placing them in the role of the blessed "seed" who have become heirs of God's blessing because of their connection with Christ (3:29). Yet his whole re-configuration of the role of law in 3:19-24 has portrayed the legal institution as coming to an end once this existence by faith in Christ became a possibility. By means of his ambiguous "us" in 3:24-25 Paul has thus highlighted the implication of the Galatians' location in the story. For if the Galatians stand with Paul in a new chapter, a chapter in which blessing comes simply by one's connection with Christ, they certainly stand among those who are "no longer subject to a disciplinarian" (3:25), even if they were not actually among those who historically stood under that law (3:24).

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577 Nor is it, as Betz suggests (Galatians, 185; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 159) an independent argument based on appeal to a baptismal confession. That some or all of 3:27-28 may be such a confessional formula is clear enough (see Betz' discussion in Galatians, 181-84; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 154-55; D. R. MacDonald, There is No Male and Female: The Fate of a Dominical Saying in Paul and Gnosticism [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987], 4-9; Martyn, Galatians, 378-83; though cf. cautions in Dunn, Galatians, 201). This does not mean, however, that Paul meant his allusion to it to carry the primary argumentative weight in 3:26-29. Paul certainly does not lay heavy emphasis on its traditional nature (vs. 1 Cor 15:1ff.). Moreover, if the material is traditional it would not be accepted by the opponents as Paul interprets it, so that its usefulness to Paul as a traditional authority has probably already been undermined in the Galatian community by the arguments of the opponents.

578 Dunn rightly observes that the post-positive yap which begins v. 26 "indicates that the following assertion is as much the basis of the argument just completed (iii.23-5) as its conclusion" (Galatians, 201; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 151).
Their membership in Paul's liberated "us" implies that a return to the previous mode of life of that "us" is impossible. That chapter in the story is ended.

Here we see in action the ethical "judgment" which we observed already in chapter 2 above, the way in which ethics arise from the story itself as one is "emplotted" within it and perceives how one must act at this stage in the narrative if one wants to play a good role. From 4:1-11 these implications become explicit as Paul seeks to help the Galatians to perform the act of "judgment" which will bring them to a proper understanding of their lack of obligation to keep Torah.579 In 4:1-2 Paul again sets up an analogy from daily life in order to help the Galatians to grasp the narrative pattern which he is suggesting and to reinforce the plausibility of that pattern.580 "Heirs," Paul observes, "as long as they are minors, are no better than slaves, though they are the owners of the property; but they remain under guardians and trustees until the date set by the father" (4:1-2). Given Paul's re-construal of the story, including his re-configuration of Torah's role, the aptness of this analogy seems clear. Life "under the law" was a kind of enslavement (cf. 3:22-24) but was a temporary state which would come to an end once Christ came, once the "heirs" of God's promise were able to inherit their estate.581 Hence the Galatians should not make themselves "minors" again, place themselves back under

579Hence, although the analogy being used in 4:1-7 is closely parallel to that in 3:24-26 and points to the same underlying narrative pattern, it is not the case that 4:1-7 are meant simply "to illustrate what he said in 3:23-25 about living 'under the law' and in 3:26-29 about new relationships 'in Christ'" (R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 162). This is not simply illustration but ethical argument.

580On the historical background of Paul's analogy see Nicholas and Treggiari, "patria potestas."

581Some have been concerned by the fact that in Greek and Roman inheritance law the death of the father was assumed before such a scenario could take effect (see, e.g., R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 163). Paul is not, however, drawing a perfect correlation between the situation of the heir and the situation of human beings in the theological story. The metaphor serves a primarily heuristic purpose and neither Paul nor the Galatians would likely have been too concerned by the fact that, like all analogies, this one cannot be pushed too far (cf. Martyn, Galatians, 386; Burton, Galatians, 211-12).
slavery, by taking on an obligation to observe Torah.

Thus far, however, there has been some obscurity surrounding the Galatians' location in this reconfigured narrative. For they did not keep Torah in the past. They were not under its slavery and did not experience Christ as emancipation from it directly. Hence one might still argue that they need to take on Torah in order to reproduce the Jewish experience of Christ. It is in order to clear up this ambiguity that the Apostle carefully emplots not only the Galatians' Christian present, but also their past outside of Christ. Again this is done by means of analogy—this time an analogy between the Galatians' past existence and an established element of the narrative. Notice how Paul compares the quasi-enslavement of the heir under guardians to "our" experience being "enslaved ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου" (4:3). In what follows, the identity of these στοιχεῖα is slippery. On the one hand, Paul continues (4:4-5) to describe the deliverance of Christ as a deliverance from the law, as if these στοιχεῖα were identical to Torah. On the other hand, Paul describes in 4:8-9 the Galatians' former life as pagans in terms of enslavement "to beings that by nature are not gods," and speaks of their returning to "the weak and beggarly στοιχεῖα." What is going on here? It seems that the Apostle is drawing a second analogy between the existence of Jews under Torah and the existence of the Galatians in their pagan practices. He capitalizes on the ambiguity of the term στοιχεῖα in order to suggest that in certain ways the pre-Christian life of Jews and that of

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582 Contra Barrett, Freedom, 39.
583 Eckstein (Verheißung, 228) recognizes that this requires the Gentiles to be part of the "we" who are set free in some sense from the restrictions of Torah.
Gentiles is the same. Both Jew and pagan experience in coming to Christ a deliverance

584 The noun στοιχεῖον can mean "letter" of the alphabet or syllable (LSJ, 1647 [II.1]; Delling, "στοιχεῖον," 671-72; see Plato, Crat. 426d; Aen. Tact. 31.21; BGU 959.2 (ii C.E.); Apollonius Dyscolus, de Adverbis 165.17; Dionysius Thrax 630.32.), "elements" or basic constituents of the physical world (LSJ, 1647 [II.2]; Delling, "στοιχεῖον," 672-78; see Plato, Theaeet. 201e; Pol. 278d; Tim. 48b; Aristot., Gen. corr. 314a.29; Metaph. 998a.28; Diog. Laert. 3.24, etc.), "elementary principle" or basic issue (LSJ, 1647 [II.4]; Delling, "στοιχεῖον," 678-79; see Xen. Mem. 2.1.1; Isoc. 2.16; Aristot., Pol. 1309b.16, etc.), or "heavenly body," "sign of the zodiac" (LSJ, 1647 [II.5]; Delling, "στοιχεῖον," 679-83; see Manetho 4.624; 2 Pet 3:10; P. Lond. 1.130.60 (vii C.E.); D. L. 6.102; P. Mag. Par. 1.1303). In his survey of the specific phrase στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in extra-biblical Greek, Blizner ("Lexicalisches") argued that in each case the expression refers to "die vier (oder fünf) Grundstoffe" (441; see Philo, Aet. 109; Her. 134, 140; Galen, Nat. Fac. 1.39; Ps.-Lucian, Amores 19; Orphic Hymns 5.4; Irenaeus, Adv. Her. 1.5.4). Rusam ("Neue Belege") pointed to additional instances of the phrase which, he argued, confirm Blizner's conclusion that the expression στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου must refer to the four or five physical elements ("Neue Belege," 124; e.g., Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates, Elem. 1.455-56, 472; Nat.Hom. 15.58; Marcus Aur., Sol. I.18.1; 2.17.2). Note, however, that most of this evidence post-dates Paul's letters, often by a century or more. Moreover, the passages from Sib. Or. cited by Blizner (2.206f.; 3.79-82; 8.337f.) seem to refer not to the four/five elements specifically, but to the basic components of the universe more generally (including stars, earth, sky, sea, night, day, etc.). This would suggest that the modification of στοιχεῖα by τοῦ κόσμου need not necessarily rule out a reference to, e.g., heavenly bodies. On the other hand, Rusam cites Sext. Emp., Pyr. 3.152 where the Pythagoreans are said to have regarded numbers as the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου. Here the expression is equivalent to ἡ ἄρχη πάντων, the origin or first principle of the world (so Rusam, "Belege," 122). Hence, even if the later sources cited by Blizner and Rusam are representative of usage in Paul's day, they testify to a range of usage in which the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου could be the four elements, the constituents of the world more generally, or the basic structuring principles of the cosmos (so Delling, "στοιχεῖον," 683).

What this evidence does suggest, however, is that Paul is thinking of something associated with the physical world, and not primarily of "basic principles" (contra Burton, Galatians, 231; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 165-66; though see Heb 5:12). Some suggest that Paul is referring to deified natural elements, the deities which the Galatians worshipped prior to their conversion (so Betz, Galatians, 204-5; Burton, Galatians, 215-16; Martyn, Galatians, 396-97; see Wis 13:1-2; Philo, Decal. 52-6). In support of this, it is sometimes pointed out that the στοιχεῖα seem to be identical with the "beings" of 4:8 (so Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 69). This observation must be balanced, however, with the observation that the στοιχεῖα seem to be equated with the law in 4:3-5, and that in 4:3 Paul seems to include himself in the "we" who served the στοιχεῖα. It is true that in 3:13 the experiences of Jew and Gentile seem to blur together, as Gentiles are included among those under the law's curse (so Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 151), but this does not mean that Paul would blur the boundaries in the other direction and say that he had worshipped false gods. While we have some indications elsewhere of Paul's assimilating Gentile experience to the pattern of Israel's experience (e.g., Rom 2:12-16), we have no precedent in Paul for such a strong equation of Jewish worship with pagan falsehood.

More persuasive is the suggestion of Delling ("στοιχεῖον," 684-85) and Eckstein (Verheißung, 230) that Paul is referring to the basic physical constituents or structuring principles of the physical world as a metaphor for the "present evil age." To serve the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου is to fail to rise above the constraints and possibilities offered by ordinary human life after Adam. It is to remain outside God's eschatological act of restoration and renewal. Inasmuch as both the Galatians' pagan past and Jewish life before Christ involved a life directed toward something other than the new possibilities which Christ has opened up, both states can be called for Paul a subjection to the στοιχεῖα. The point of Paul's use of the noun is, as Dunn perceives, to encompass both religious states and highlight their similarity when viewed from a specific angle (Galatians, 213; so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 180-81).

Paul might have thought of this language because the opponents used it in speculative teaching (so
from a confining, "enslaving" power. Paul likely did not intend to say that life as a
pagan Gentile was no worse than life under Torah, or that pagan religion and traditional
Judaism were basically equivalent. But in comparison to life in Christ, both previous
states were oppressive, and both come to an end once one is identified with the crucified
and risen one.

With this emplotment of the Galatians' past, the opponents' ethical rhetoric
appears clearly wrong. The observance of Torah is neither an advance on Paul's initial,
rudimentary Gospel nor the key with which they can unlock the full benefit of their faith
in Christ. It is, rather, a return to a pre-Christian state, a state which in crucial ways would
be no different from their pagan existence prior to meeting Paul. With the Galatians'
baptism, they experienced the shift from life under the στοιχεῖα to life in the new
possibility created by Christ, and this is the same shift experienced by Jews who place
their faith in Christ. In baptism the Galatians "clothed themselves with Christ (Χριστὸν
ἐνέκοσμον οὐκ οὖσαντο)" (3:27) and took on a new role in Israel's story, the role of Abraham's heirs,
of those who enjoy the eschatological blessing. This baptism, this clothing with Christ,

Lührmann, Galatians, 84 and differently Martyn, Galatians, 399-406), but this cannot be the only association
on which Paul is drawing since in 4:8-9 these στοιχεῖα are said to have been the object of the Galatians'
devotion prior to their Christian conversion. Any such suggestion is, moreover, very speculative and is not
necessary in order to make good sense of the Apostle's discussion.

Eckstein agrees that the point of Paul's parallel between pagan worship and service of Torah is
"die Tatsache, daß sie die Existenz der von Sünde gezeichneten Schöpfung vor dem Kommen des
Glaubens geprägt haben und daß sie die Instanzen sind, bei denen die Menschen -- auf unterschiedliche
Weise -- vergeblich ihr Heil suchen, von denen sie Freiheit erwarten und Knechtschaft erlangen" (Verheißung, 231). Dunn again points out that the common language of "redeeming" (ἐξωριζόμενον) in 3:13-
14 and 4:4-6 (Paul uses the verb nowhere else in his letters) suggests that he is alluding in both passages to
the same scenario of Christ's representative suffering of judgment (Galatians, 216-17; so Hays, Faith, 118-
21; contra Betz, Galatians, 207, n. 51).

Contra Burton, Galatians, 231; Lightfoot, Galatians, 172-73.

Some have suggested that the "clothing" metaphor is drawn from the new white garment which
the newly initiated would put on after baptism (so, e.g., Martyn, Galatians, 375-76). There is, however, no
evidence from the first century that such a garment was part of the baptism ceremony, and as Lightfoot
was the crucial moment of entry into the best role one can play in the narrative. There is no further shift to make. On the contrary, any further shift toward existence under Torah will, Paul urges, be a retreat from this blessed existence which will leave the Galatians in the same kind of dangerous role which they occupied as devotees of the σταυρος. A move toward Jewish practice does not place them in a better role in the story, but rather places their status as heirs of God's promise in jeopardy. This is why when Paul hears that the Galatians are "observing special days, and months, and seasons, and years," i.e. taking on Jewish observances, he is afraid "that my work for you may have been wasted" (4:10-11). Here the audience stands at the crisis point of the theological story, the point at which their choice can have wonderful or disastrous consequences. The key is that they choose to play the role of God's heirs and that they discern the outlines of that role, not on the basis of the opponents' version of Israel's story but on the basis of Paul's re-configured narrative.

What is it that justifies and grounds Paul's ethical conclusions here? In other

points out it is "scarcely probable" that baptismal ritual "had become so definitely fixed at this early date, that such an allusion would speak for itself" (Galatians, 150). The metaphor of "clothing" is, in fact, common in the LXX (e.g., Job 8:22; 29:14; 39:19; Ps 34:26; 92:1; 103:1). It is unlikely that the metaphor of being "clothed" with Christ simply means to take on Christ's character (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 156), since it is here tied so closely with being "in Christ." The expression can mean "to become" someone else (see, e.g., Col 3:10 and cf. the discussion in Burton, Galatians, 204).

588 It is not clear whether the reference to ημέρας ... και μήνας και καιροὺς καὶ έπαυτοὺς is meant to be a specific description of Jewish sabbath and festival observance (so Burton, Galatians, 232-33; Dunn, Galatians, 227-28) or as Betz says "the typical behavior of religiously scrupulous people" (Galatians, 217 [italics original]). The reference may be kept generic in order to highlight the parallel in practice between the Galatians' pagan past and the Jewish practices which they are now contemplating (so Betz, Galatians, 218). Some have seen here an allusion to astrological ideas in the opponents' teaching (so Lührmann, Galatians, 85; Martyn, Galatians, 414-18), but this relies on an interpretation of the σταυρος as stemming from the opponents' "other Gospel," an interpretation which we have suggested above is speculative and cannot be corroborated. As Dunn observes, we need not mitigate the ordinary force of the present tense "you are observing ... (παρατηρεῖτε)," since circumcision was usually subsequent to such "God-fearing" observance of Jewish customs (Galatians, 229; cf. Jos., Ant. 20.41-6; Juvenal, Satires 14.96-9).
words, why would the Galatian audience accept the Apostle's claim that it is his construal of the story which is the true one? Here again, the basic grounding for Paul's claim is simply the coherence of the narrative as he has re-configured it. His argument still depends in large part on the observation (in 2:21 and in 3:1-5) that there are new chapters in the story which make no sense on the opponents' construal of its plot. Hence, if Paul can offer a re-reading which can encompass both those new events and all of the previous chapters of Israel's story, he will have demonstrated that his own telling is more trustworthy than that of the Galatian opponents. His assumption is that, by 3:25, this task has been accomplished. He may continue to allude in places (particularly in 4:6-7) to the Galatians' experiences of the Spirit as a way of reinforcing the ability of his version of the narrative to encompass these new events. The Apostle does not, however, feel the need at this point to offer substantial new arguments in favor of his construal of the story. He has shown that his re-reading, if disturbingly novel, is eminently coherent, and it is on this basis that he shifts in 3:26-4:11 to begin pointing out the ethical implications which his re-configured story carries for the Galatian believers.

589 So Burton, *Galatians*, 221. Paul says that "God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!' So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also and heir, through God" (4:6b-7). Several scholars see here a reference to a charismatic experience in the Galatians' worship (e.g., Betz, *Galatians*, 210-11; Dunn, *Galatians*, 220-21; Eckert, *urchristliche Verkündigung*, 91; Lull, *Spirit*, 66-9; contra Eckstein, *Verheißung*, 243). Alternately, R. N. Longenecker has suggested that Paul is alluding here to the general experience of "a more intimate and truly filial relationship with God the Father" (*Galatians*, 175). On either reading, it is as a consequence of such experiences of the Spirit (συναιτε) that Paul can affirm the Galatians are "no longer a slave but a child" (4:7). Dunn further suggests that the Christ-like character of these charismatic experiences, and particularly the spontaneous approach to God as Father, was taken to indicate that the experience was indeed a manifestation of the Spirit of Jesus, God's Son (*Galatians*, 221-22). Lull sees confirmation of the "ecstatic" nature of these experiences in the reference to the "heart" (καρδια) as the locus of the Spirit's presence and the way in which Paul makes the Spirit the subject of the believer's "cry" (*Spirit*, 66-67). Moreover, as Lull observes, Paul seems to regard the particular content of these charismatic experiences, which included cries to God as the believer's "Abba" or father, as evidence of the state into which they have come—they are "sons" of God (*Spirit*, 108-9).
b. 4:21-5:12, Analogies within the story

We pass over 4:12-20 where Paul suspends, for a moment, his narrative argument in order to make an essentially non-rational appeal to the Galatians' loyalty and past affection for him. In 4:21, however, Paul returns to his main argument and offers what commentators usually call an "allegorical" reading of the relationships between Abraham's wives and children. Paul recalls the events surrounding Hagar and Sarah in Genesis and says that "these things are read figuratively (τὰ ταύτα ἑστὶν ἁλληγοροῦμενα)." When we render Paul's words in this way and avoid the term...
"allegory" we are reminded that in Paul's time the verb ἀλληγορέω was not yet a technical term for a clearly-defined hermeneutical approach. The verb, along with the cognate noun ἀλληγορία, are actually attested little if at all prior to the first century B.C.E. The term is usually understood to denote a standardized method of interpretation which finds behind the surface of the text a detailed and coded reference to "deeper" meanings, and so Paul is often accused here of "strange and even arbitrary exegesis." Yet both the verb and noun can denote not only a kind of interpretation, but also figurative expression, any metaphorical or analogical speech. Hence when Dionysius of Halicarnassus bemoans the inappropriateness of Pindar's anthropomorphic imagery in his hymn to the sun, he refers to such "imagery" as ἡ ἀλληγορία (Dem. 7.64). Josephus can refer derisively to the Greek artists' fanciful depictions of the gods as τῶν ἀλληγοριῶν, meaning not "allegories," but something like "imaginative representations" (C. Ap. 2.255). By extension, the active sense of the verb initially denoted simply the

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592 The word-group seems to be attested first in Tryphon and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (not in Philo and Cicero, as per Büchler, "ἀλληγορείων," 260).
593 This is assumed by, e.g., Lührmann, Galatians, 89.
594 Barclay, Obeying, 91. Barclay is in good company when he attempts to excuse this exegetical abuse as Paul's rhetorical attempt to re-use his opponents' proof-texts (see R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 199; Martyn, Galatians, 434). In either case, the whole allegory can then be justified as an ad hominem rhetorical move (so Barrett, "Allegory," 13; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 200, 210). Yet Barrett, who has produced the most formidable case for seeing the story of Sarah and Hagar as one of the opponents' favourite texts, has by no means proven his case ("Allegory," 9-10). Nor need we (with Martyn, Galatians, 434) see the ἄλλα in v. 23 as intended to "correct the Teachers' reading of the patriarchal stories." It could simply be setting the fact that the two sons had the same father (4:22) over against the very different manners in which the two were conceived (4:23). McCane goes further to argue that Paul's exegetical technique is itself borrowed from the opponents ("Hellenistic Background," 132), but this does not account sufficiently for the Apostle's use of a similar approach in, e.g., 1 Cor 10:11.
595 So Trapp, "Allegory." The verb can refer to figurative interpretation of a text (so LSI, 69 [1]; e.g., Philo, Contempl. 28; Plut., Is. Os. 362b; Heraclitus the Stoic, Allegoriae [=Quaestiones Homericae] 1), while both verb and noun can denote figurative expression (so LSI, 69[2]; BDAG, 46; e.g., Jos., Ant. 1.24; C. Ap. 2.255; Plut., Is. Os. 363d; De esu 996b; Adol. poet. aud. 19f; Pyth. orac. 409d; Strabo, Geogr. 1.2.7.5; Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata 81.7; Dion. Hal., Dem. 5.31).
596 Likewise, Plutarch can group together τὰ αἰνίγματα καὶ τὰς ἀλληγορίας καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς as a general reference to the enigmatic expression of the pythian oracle (Pyth. orac. 409d).
recognition that words were being used figuratively, interpretation which recognized that analogies or metaphors were being used. Certainly there was a very old tradition of interpreting Homeric myth as a kind of symbolic code. Yet for several centuries up to the first century B.C.E. this hermeneutical approach was not associated with the word ἀλληγορέω at all. So when writers around the turn of the era such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo refer to that familiar approach to Homer as ἀλληγορία it is not because the word group was an hermeneutical terminus technicus, but rather because such Homeric interpretation was recognized as one species of figurative reading, one kind of ἀλληγορία. This is why these same writers feel free to use ἀλληγορέω language for other kinds of speech and reading which have little in common with, say, Philo’s reading of Scripture except that they too employ language metaphorically. It may well be that Philo himself, and the Alexandrian tradition of which he was a part, was responsible for the development of ἀλληγορέω into a specialized term for a distinct hermeneutical approach. All of this means that when Paul announces his intention to read the story of Hagar and Sarah as ἀλληγορία he most likely means nothing more than that he is taking the events described in Genesis as figurative of some broader ideas.

597See Dion. Hal., Anti. 2.20.1; Strabo, Geogr. 1.2.7.5.
598In any case Plutarch, in Adol. poet. aud. 19f, bears witness to the fact that the use of the noun ἀλληγορία for such Homeric myths is still a relatively new thing in the late first century. The older term, he says, is ἰστοποίοια.
599So Jobes: “When Paul calls this trope ἀλληγορομένα, he is not using the verb in the sense of the English literary term allegory. He is simply preparing his readers to understand that his exposition of Sarah and Hagar goes beyond the traditional historical understanding of these women” (Jobes, “Jerusalem,” 317-18; contra Betz, Galatians, 243; Büchler, “Ἀλληγορέω,” 260; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 209-10). Hence Theodore of Mopsuestia says that Paul “terms ‘allegory’ the comparison, by juxtaposition, of events which have already occurred with present events” (quoted in Löfstedt, “Allegory,” 490; cf. Calvin, Galatians, on 4:22). Paul is likely thinking of the same approach to the biblical text which he employs in 1 Cor 10:11 where the account of Israel’s complaint at Meribah is said to have happened τοπικός, in a way which represents a larger idea (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 180).
Essentially, the Apostle is using the story of Hagar and Sarah as part of another analogy, just as he used analogies from daily life earlier in the letter. There is a narrative pattern in the Genesis account which Paul sees also in the Galatians' present situation. Hence, just as before, Paul sets the two situations side by side in order to highlight the similar patterns. In this case the analogy draws a parallel between Isaac's relationship precursors) is distinct from other kinds of figurative reading has often proven difficult. As Büchler has observed, the difference does not lie primarily in whether or not the exegete maintains the historical truth of the events related in the text ("\textit{άλληλο\gammaο\rhoεω}," 262). Even Philo can insist that the biblical narratives are historically accurate. In all cases, moreover, the interpretation is a matter of finding in the text some analogy to an idea or entity which that text does not explicitly address. Rather, the distinction lies in the degree to which the analogy is based on 1) themes and ideas which are native to the text and 2) on prominent features of the story. Hence, while we may call some readings of Song of Songs "allegorical" (so Büchler, "\textit{άλληλο\gammaο\rhoεω}," 262), the comparison being made between the lover's relationship and that between Israel and God rests on a dynamic which is central to the text. This is very different from the way in which the Letter of Aristeas takes the Levitical food laws as symbolic of greco-roman ethical standards (\textit{Let. Aris.} 148-171). Josephus' symbolic interpretation of the tabernacle's design and furnishings (\textit{Ant.}, 3.179-187) stays close to the central themes of the Exodus account, for the text itself seems to suggest that the construction was intended to represent the cosmos (see R. E. Averbeck, "\textit{Tabernacle}," 816-18; J. Levenson, \textit{Creation and the Persistence of Evil}, 53-127). Where Josephus' reading begins to resemble "Alexandrian" exegesis is in the significance which he extends even to trivial details of the text. In contrast, Aristobolus' figurative explanation of the Bible's anthropomorphic language about God not only highlights ideas native to the texts involved, but also focusses on prominent and recurrent forms of expression associated with those themes (see Frag. 2 [Euseb., \textit{Praep. ev.} 8.9.38-8.10-17]; Frag. 4.3 [Euseb., \textit{Ibid.} 13.11.3]; Frag. 5.9-13 [Euseb., \textit{Ibid.} 13.12.9-11]). It is because the analogies drawn in much Jewish "allegory" tended to stay closer to the text's central themes and features that this interpretive tradition seems to Büchler "less arbitrary" than the variety pursued by Philo and Pseudo-Aristeas (Büchler, "\textit{άλληλο\gammaο\rhoεω}," 262; see, e.g., ).

Paul's "allegory" of Hagar and Sarah differs from that of Philo in both of these respects (contra Büchler, "\textit{άλληλο\gammaο\rhoεω}," 263). The Alexandrian understands Abraham to represent the human soul, Sarah divine Wisdom, Hagar a merely preparatory education, and the narratives are then read as the saga of the soul's quest for mystical wisdom (see Philo, \textit{Congr.} 1-23, 63-69, 71-88, 118-22, 139-62; \textit{QG} 3.18-38; \textit{Leg.} 3.244; \textit{Cher.} 3-10; \textit{Somn.} 1.240; \textit{Poster.} 130-31; \textit{Mutat.} 261; \textit{Fug.} 209-13; \textit{Sacrif.} 43-44). Yet none of these ideas are even within the horizon of the text, taken on its own terms. Paul, on the other hand, focusses on the question of how one is included in the heritage of Abraham, slavery and freedom, and the difference between the trust in God involved in Isaac's birth and the human effort involved in the birth of Ishmael—all central motifs in the Genesis account (so Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 248). As Lightfoot writes, for Paul "The symbol and the thing symbolized are the same in kind. The simple passage of patriarchal life represents in miniature the workings of God's providence hereafter to be exhibited in grander proportions in the history of the Christian Church" (\textit{Galatians}, 199; so R. N. Longenecker, \textit{Galatians}, 209). Hence Paul's analogy maintains the integrity of the interpreted text in a way which Philo's does not. For similar reasons it distorts Paul's method to call it "typology" if by that term one means a reading of Scripture which takes the text as providing a hidden "code" depicting future events (as Betz, \textit{Galatians}, 239).

The verb \textit{συγκετοχω} in 4.26 may simply mean that Hagar "corresponds to," is to be compared analogically to, the present Jerusalem. We need not see Paul as setting up two formal columns of opposite concepts (so BDAG, 979; contra Dunn, \textit{Galatians}, 252; Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 438).
with Ishmael and the relationship between those "of faith" and those "of the works of the law."\textsuperscript{601} The Apostle's point is to help the audience to see that, just as Isaac inherited the promise while his brother was excluded, so too those "of faith" are inheriting the promise while those "of the works of the law" are excluded.

The Apostle opens the analogy by reminding the Galatians that "Abraham had two sons." He seems to presume that the audience will know immediately who these two sons were and will, at the same time, grasp the unspoken point that only one of these sons became heir to the Abrahamic promises. What was the basis for God's inclusion of one and exclusion of the other? Paul emphasizes that "one, the child of the slave, was born according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)" while "the other, the child of the free woman, was born through the promise (διὰ ἔπαγγελματος)" (4:23). Thus far the Apostle is offering a straightforward reading of the Genesis story. Ishmael was not allowed to inherit the promises to Abraham because he represented the patriarch's attempt to fulfill those promises through ordinary human means.\textsuperscript{602} Isaac, on the other hand, was made

\textsuperscript{601}That the two groups which Paul has in view are those "of faith" and those "of the law" becomes clear in 5:1-12, where the explicit exhortations which are based on this analogy revolve entirely around the question of whether one should try to "be justified by the law (ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοσύνη)" (5:4) or whether one should place faith in Christ, without obeying Torah (5:2-6).

Exegetes often treat the passage as if Hagar and Sarah were themselves the focus, but notice that Paul begins by saying: γεγονόταται γάρ ὅτι Ἀβραάμ διὸ υἱὸς ἐσχεν (4:22). It is the distinction between these children in which the Apostle is primarily interested. Their mothers are introduced by way of explaining the basis for that distinction.

\textsuperscript{602}Ishmael is born κατὰ σάρκα (4:23), i.e. in accordance with ordinary human experience and ways of acting (so Dunn, Galatians, 246; Lightfoot, Galatians, 180), while Isaac is born διὰ ἔπαγγελματος. There is no need here to see the "flesh" as a "power" which produces the one child and the "promise" as another opposing power (contra Martyn, Galatians, 435). We must allow for flexibility in Paul's usage of terms like σάρξ, and the opposition with ἔπαγγελμα (not yet with πνεῦμα) suggests that the Apostle is still thinking of the fact that Ishmael represents Sarah's own effort to produce a child, while Isaac was conceived as a miraculous fulfillment of God's oath. Such a reading allows us to take the preposition κατὰ in the common sense of "in accordance with" or "according to" (BDAG, 512 [B.5]), marking the conformity of Ishmael's conception to a particular principle of action. While Martyn is right that κατὰ can verge on "as a result of," this is usually only in the sense that the norm according to which an action is
Abraham's heir because his conception was a miracle, itself a fulfilment of the promise which (in turn) the child would inherit.

The surprise, of course, comes in the way in which Paul lines these two sons up as analogous to contemporary groups. For instead of making Isaac analogous to those who faithfully keep Torah, Paul claims that this first "child of the promise" was in a position analogous to the one enjoyed by those "of faith," by Paul himself and his Galatian (Gentile) converts. Paul writes, "Now you, my friends, are children of the promise, like Isaac" (4:28), and he emphasizes that "we are children, not of the slave but of the free woman" (4:31). If it is these covenant outsiders who are, like Isaac, in a position to inherit Abraham's promises, it is those who continue to rely on law-keeping as the basis of their position vis-à-vis God who Paul claims are like Ishmael. They will not inherit the Abrahamic promises. Paul writes: "But what does the scripture say? 'Drive out the slave and her child; for the child of the slave will not share the inheritance with the child of the free woman'" (4:30). Just as Ishmael was forced out of the camp and denied any inheritance, so too those "of the law" will be denied any share in the final fulfillment of those promises.  

pursued "is at the same time the reason" for its performance, or at least that the action is pursued "according to" a particular intention or purpose (see BDAG, 512 [B.5.a.δ]). It does not usually mark a material cause or source of an event. Note too that in 4:28, where the believers are κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα, this means that they are "begotten," become heirs of Abraham, in a manner analogous to (following the same pattern as) that of Isaac.  

603 It is not at all clear that Paul's citation of the biblical instruction to expel the slave-woman is intended as a call to expel the opponents (so Löfstedt, "Allegory," 488-89; Martyn, Galatians, 446; contra Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 98). The Apostle is probably just driving home the fate of "Hagar," who along with her offspring (those who do not accept Christ's salvation in faith) is excluded from the covenant people (so Barrett, "Allegory," 13; Dunn, Galatians, 258). 

Paul's reference to Ishmael's oppression of Isaac (4:29) may also point to the Galatians' experience of some sort of pressure, either from the opponents themselves or (perhaps vicariously through the reports of the opponents) from non-Christian Jews who regard uncircumcized Christians as highly dangerous (so Betz, Galatians, 249; Dunn, Galatians, 256-57; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 216). The analogy helps
How can Paul justify such a radical break with traditional Jewish readings of the Abraham story? The key to understanding the Apostle's argument here is to realize, again, that he is not doing exegesis, if by that term we mean reading the biblical text without any reference to the events involving Christ and the church. He is not suggesting that the Genesis text alone justifies the way in which he has applied it to the present situation.

Rather, Paul has on other grounds (see 3:1-14) re-configured Israel's story and he finds in the relationships within Abraham's household a pattern which is analogous to the pattern of his re-configured narrative. It is that prior re-reading of the over-arching story which justifies the use to which the Apostle puts the Genesis story here. On one level, then, this

604 Many commentators try to find justification for this identification in some association (verbal or geographical) between Hagar and Arabia (so Betz, Galatians, 244-45; Lührmann, Galatians, 90; and tentatively Berger, "Abrahamic," 60; Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 96) or between Ishmael and the Arab people. Dunn thinks such connections would be "too remote from the movement of thought here" (Galatians, 251), but this is not so if the link is intended to justify Paul's allegorical identification. The reference to Arabia may, however, simply be intended to locate Mt. Sinai or (with an adversative *Ó* in v. 25) highlight Paul's awareness that his allegorical connection between Hagar-Sinai and Jerusalem does some violence to geography (so Dunn, Galatians, 251; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 322-24). It is also questionable whether Paul could have expected his Galatian audience to pick up on an allusion which depended on a detailed knowledge of the geography of Arabia (so Lightfoot, Galatians, 197-98). Löfstedt ("Allegory," 480) likewise wonders about the likelihood that the Galatians would be familiar enough with Targumic traditions in order to pick up an allusion in that direction, and observes that the link which Steinhauser has proposed would in any case simply establish that Hagar is a slave -- something which needs no establishing. If Paul had intended such a connection to justify his identification of Hagar with Mt. Sinai then we would expect the Apostle to lay more stress upon it. We must also remember that the text of 4:25a is far from certain (Metzger et al. give it only a "C" rating in his Textual Commentary). Löfstedt ("Allegory," 481) suggests instead that the connection between Hagar/Sinai and Arabia is intended to further marginalize Torah, setting it outside the land of promise and associating it with Arabs (cf. Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 96; Martyn, Galatians, 438, n. 136).

Even if Paul were using a linguistic link to connect Hagar with the siniatic covenant, Martyn is right to point out that the notion that this siniatic covenant can be opposed to a separate dispensation (the Abrahamic promise) must still be supplied by the interpreter (Galatians, 436).
analogy between the Galatians' situation and the story in Genesis is being used, like Paul's previous analogies, as a heuristic device which helps the audience to grasp the pattern of the story. It is precisely because the Apostle is using this incident from the Abraham story in order to illustrate (by way of analogy) a conclusion reached on other grounds, that Paul places such a heavy emphasis on the status of the two mothers (slave or free). For the slavery of Hagar offers a convenient point of contact with his earlier argument that life "under the law" constitutes a form of imprisonment, confinement, even slavery. It is also because his analogy is justified on grounds outside the text that Paul can equate the mothers of the two children with two "covenants" (4:24). For if he has already established that those "of the law" will, like Ishmael, be excluded from the Abrahamic promises, and if they are excluded precisely because of their adherence to a legal covenant which was never intended to bring "life," then Ishmael's mother offers a convenient metaphor for the Sinaitic covenant which holds those "of the law" in "slavery" (4:24-25).

It is, likewise, Paul's prior re-configuration of Israel's story which justifies his peculiar use of Isaiah 54:1 in the context of this analogy. Isaiah's call to the "barren woman" to rejoice aids in the Apostle's creative re-use of the Isaac and Ishmael traditions because it provides a precedent for an analogical equation between the stories involving Sarah and the conception of Isaac on the one hand and the later Jewish community on the other. For the Isaianic author seems clearly to be drawing an analogy between Sarah's

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605 So Lightfoot suggests that Paul employs this allegory "rather as an illustration than an argument, as a means of representing in a lively form the lessons before enforced on other grounds" (Galatians, 200; so Dunn, Galatians, 243).
barrenness and the devastation suffered by exilic Jerusalem.\footnote{Given the encouragement in Isa 51:2 to view Abraham and Sarah as typological precursors of second Isaiah's audience, Paul's identification of the "barren woman" (i.e. Jerusalem, see 54:11-12) as "Sarah," the mother of Israel, is probably already intended by the author (so Lightfoot, \textit{Galatians}, 182; cf. the development in 4 Ezra 10). Jobes ("Jerusalem," 302) argues that an identification of Sarah with the barren woman of Isa 54:1 "does not seem completely apt," since the barren woman seems to be without a husband, while Abraham was Sarah's husband. Yet we need not push the details of the connection this far in order to recognize that the Isaianic author intended the barrenness of the city and the hope for miraculous children to recall Sarah's plight. The barren woman's lack of a husband is likely due to the effect of other imagery with which Isaiah is working, imagery which depicts a devastated city as divorced by its "husband," its patron god (cf. Jobes, "Jerusalem," 308). This need not detract from the way in which Isaiah associates Sarah's barrenness and expectation with Jerusalem (cf. Jobes, "Jerusalem," 308-9). It is likely this traditional, metaphoric association between Israel's eschatological glory and Sarah's long awaited progeny which prompts Paul to associate Isa 54 with Genesis (contra Martyn, \textit{Galatians}, 442). We need not follow Barrett ("Allegory," 12) in his suggestion that Paul draws on Isa 54:1 on the basis of the Rabbinic hermeneutical principle of gezera sawa—simply because the word "barren" occurs in both passages.} What is more, Isaiah 54:1 furnishes Paul with a clear precedent for his association between the Abrahamic promises and Israel's eschatological hope, for the Isaianic prophet seems to be using his Sarah imagery here to cast the exiles of his day as Abraham's (and Sarah's) children and the final restoration of Jerusalem as the fulfillment of the Abrahamic promise of many progeny. So by citing Isaiah 54:1 the Apostle highlights the fact that at least some elements of his own analogy are already conventional. The fate of the later Jewish community has long been associated, by way of analogy, with the story of Sarah's struggles and the eventual birth of Isaac. Yet the pivot of Paul's analogy, his equation of Torah-observant Jews with \textit{Ishmael}, still finds no basis in the Isaianic text.\footnote{Jobes ("Jerusalem," 311-12) points to the promise in Isa 59:21 that God's Spirit will be placed upon the "seed" of Jerusalem's deliverer, suggesting that on this basis Paul identifies the law-free Galatians (who have received the Spirit) with the citizens of the eschatological city, the eschatological "children" of Jerusalem in 54:1. While the logic which this would involve fits closely with our reading of Paul's thought in Galatians, there is little evidence to suggest that in citing Isa 54:1 Paul is thinking specifically of 59:21. Moreover, notice that it is the seed of Jerusalem's deliverer who will receive the Spirit in chapter 59, not the seed of Abraham or Sarah.} The Isaianic author does envision two cities (devastated Jerusalem and the eschatological Jerusalem) and two women (barren Sarah and fruitful Hagar), but for him the two cities are
distinguished chronologically. They are two stages in the ongoing fate of the one Jewish people. Both cities are identified with Sarah, while Hagar is present only as a foil for her vindication. It is Paul's own move which separates these two chronological phases of Jerusalem's experience and constitutes them as ontologically distinct economies or institutions, one which continues indefinitely to languish in "slavery" and the other (the "Jerusalem above" of 4:26) which enjoys the eschatological blessing. It is only Paul's move which distinguishes between law and promise in such a way that the second city is entirely divorced from the Sinaitic institution. It is likewise Paul's own move which identifies the languishing city, the Sinaitic institution, with Hagar, and only the

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608 So Martyn, Galatians, 442. Jobes ("Jerusalem," 310) argues that even this move finds some precedent in Isaiah, however, since the people of Jerusalem are repeatedly condemned as an "evil seed" (σπέρμα τονηρόν, Isa 1:4), while the faithful population of the city remains an eschatological promise (e.g., Isa 1:26). Nor are these two groups identical, for even in the context of Isa 40-55 the exiled populace of Jerusalem is still accused of being blind and stubborn, while the call to participate in the restoration of Jerusalem in ch. 55 implies that a moral return is also necessary for those who will become part of righteous Zion (this note of choice becomes even stronger in 56-66). At most, however, we can say that this distinction between two "cities" was latent in the logic of Isaiah. There is certainly no indication that both cities would co-exist at the same time, as Paul envisions them.

609 In saying that Hagar corresponds to the "present Jerusalem" (4:26) Paul is probably referring to that city as the centre of Judaism in general, not specifically to the Jerusalem church (contra Martyn, Galatians, 439). It is because he takes the present Jerusalem as a narrow reference to the law-observant mission, whose "children" are "judaizing" Christian converts, that Martyn's reading runs into inconsistencies (such as the fact that while the "heavenly" Jerusalem is supposed to be "barren," it is Paul's mission which is comparatively fruitful; see Martyn, Galatians, 443). It is true (Martyn, Galatians, 451-52) that the language of "begetting" in this passage is reminiscent of Paul's use of τικτω and γεννάω for the conversion of new believers in his mission (Phlm 10; 1 Cor 4:14-15), but this need not mean that the "woman" which "gives birth" to slaves is specifically the law-observant Christian mission. It may more broadly be that whole stream of Judaism (whether self-proclaimed followers of Jesus or opponents of the Jesus movement) which denies the sufficiency of faith in Christ. Martyn is correct (Galatians, 457-58) that the Apostle never uses the term "Jerusalem" as a label for "Judaism" as such. Rather he uses it in most cases as a simple geographical designation (1 Cor 16:3-4; Rom 15:19, 24-26; Gal 1:17, 18; 2:1-2). Yet few commentators would suggest that Paul here uses "Jerusalem" as a simple name for "Judaism." Rather, he uses it analogically as a representative of a particular way of approaching God (so Dunn, Galatians, 250). On the other hand, there is only one passage (Rom 15:30-31) in which Paul appears to use "Jerusalem" to denote the church in that city, so that it is far from clear that "when he uses the word 'Jerusalem,' Paul thinks in the first instance of the Jerusalem church, not of the city as such" (Galatians, 458).

On a different note, this identification of Hagar with the "present Jerusalem" raises problems for Nanos' thesis that Paul's argument in Galatians implies nothing about the status of law-observant Jews (see, e.g., Irony, 91). For in the wake of the Christ-event Paul identifies the main-stream Jewish community as
eschatological city with Sarah. What is the basis for these analogical manoeuvres?

Again, it can only be the Apostle's prior re-reading of Israel's story, a re-reading which is in turn necessitated by the interpretive "gaps" constituted by the Galatians' experience of the spirit and the common Christian experience of the Christ event.

Yet if the basic justification for the analogy which Paul draws here arises from outside the Genesis story, then in what sense can Paul claim that this is what "the law," i.e. the text of Torah, says to those who will listen? We must not forget that Paul introduced this whole analogy with a challenge to his audience: "Tell me, you who desire following a religious path which excludes them from covenant inheritance. Whether Paul follows this equation through in Romans is another question.

The idea of an ideal heavenly city which provides the pattern for the earthly city in the eschatological restoration goes back at least to Ezek 40-48; Ps 87:3; and Isa 54. In the Second Temple period such expectations become more and more elaborate (cf. 1 En. 43.6; 90.28-29; 2 En. 55.2; Pss. Sol. 17.33; 4 Ezra 7:26; 8:52; 10:25-28; 2 Bar. 4.2-6; 32.2; 59.4; Heb 11:10, 14-16; 12:22; 13:14; Rev 3:12; 21:2). There is no reason to identify the church with the heavenly city (contra Martyn, Galatians, 440), particularly since by the "present Jerusalem" Paul is referring to an actual city which people inhabit. Paul is pointing toward the Church not as the realization of Israel's hopes, but as the recipients of those hopes which to a large extent still remain future (so Dunn, Galatians, 254). Hence, as Martyn himself observes, Paul can talk in Phil 3:20 in terms of the believers' "citizenship" (πολίτης) in a heavenly πόλις.

Jobes argues that Paul leaves the Sarah imagery unelaborated in comparison with the Hagar imagery, suggesting that while Hagar is identified with Sinai "no corresponding parallel place is given for Sarah" (Jerusalem," 316). Yet Hagar's primary identification is not with Sinai but with the present Jerusalem, and Paul does identify Sarah with an equivalent "place," the heavenly Jerusalem. Again, Jobes argues that while Hagar is identified with the old covenant, slavery, and the present Jerusalem, Paul "does not explicitly identify Sarah in the same way with the new covenant, freedom, and the heavenly Jerusalem" (Ibid., 317). Yet Paul does explicitly identify Sarah with a covenant other than that from Sinai (4:24) and connect Sarah's free state with the freedom of the Galatian believers (4:22-23; 4:30-5:1). Likewise, the believers, who are children of Sarah (4:28, 31) are said to stand in the same relationship to the heavenly Jerusalem as that in which the others stand to the present Jerusalem. This strongly suggests that Paul was completing the Sarah side of the analogy and identifying the matriarch (figuratively) with the heavenly Jerusalem.

It is the text of the Pentateuch which Paul has in mind by τὸν νόμον here. It is less clear how this is related to the νόμος to which Paul points in saying that the Galatians want to be ὑπὸ νόμου. It is doubtful that Paul means here "law" as a general principle, only exemplified by Torah (contra Lightfoot, Galatians, 179). After all, Paul is able to talk positively about fulfilling τοῦ νόμου τοῦ Χριστοῦ in 6:2, and in a stereotyped phrase like ὑπὸ νόμου we should be careful about reading too much into the anarthrous state of the noun.
to be subject to the law, will you not listen to the law?" (4:21). This should remind us that 
even Paul's previous analogies were not solely heuristic constructs. They were more than 
mere "illustrations." The familiarity and plausibility of the situation held up in the 
analogy contributes to the inherent plausibility of the pattern which Paul wants the 
audience to find in Israel's story. The narrative pattern is shown to be "realistic" and 
hence believable. If this was true of analogies with daily life, however, it is all the more 
true in Paul's communities (and for the opponents) of analogies to other episodes in the 
canonical chapters of the story. For we must remember that Paul understands the present 
as an extension of the scriptural narrative. Hence to show that there is an analogical 
similarity between God's actions in the past and a particular interpretation of his action in 
the present provides a powerful argument for that interpretation of the present.613

The particular analogy which Paul draws here is especially effective in making his 
reading of Israel's story more plausible, because he finds in Abraham's household 
analogies to precisely those elements of the Galatians' present situation which had before 
appeared as "gaps." Paul has already drawn attention to the fact that not all of Abraham's 
physical descendants constitute the "seed" which will inherit. In Genesis we see God 
passing over Ishmael, despite his having been born first, because he represents Abraham 
and Sarah's attempt to by-pass faith in God, to make the promise of progeny happen 
through ordinary means instead of relying on God's miraculous intervention. Isaac, 
though he was born later, inherits the promises to his father because he is the child who 
was conceived beyond human expectation, at God's intervention, in the fulfilment of that

613 We see a similar logic at work in second Isa's imagining of God's activity in terms of a "new 
Exodus" — it is inherently plausible that God will act toward his people in the same way that he always has.
promise. Here the Apostle finds precedent for the unexpected pattern of inheritance which has emerged after the Christ event: beyond all ordinary expectations God has produced new children for Abraham among the Gentile Galatians. They have become "children of the promise, like Isaac" (4:28). He also finds a precedent for the slavery/freedom opposition which he developed in describing the role of Torah in Israel's narrative. For here Hagar (and by implication Ishmael) are slaves, while Sarah and her son enjoy freedom (4:23). This resonates very strongly with Paul's configuration of the broader story in which those who inherit Abraham's promise (and their eschatological fulfillment in the "Jerusalem above") are set free from slavery to Torah/the στοιχεία (4:26), while those who insist on the need to keep Torah (quintessentially those in Paul's present, earthly Jerusalem) remain in bondage (4:25). Hence there is real force to Paul's claim that this is what one hears if one "listens to the law" (4:21). It is not that one would arrive at Paul's reading of the Isaac and Ishmael episode on a conventional Jewish reading of the story. Rather, once one has been pushed toward Paul's new re-configuration of Israel's narrative by the "gaps" which have arisen in his own experience and that of the Galatians themselves, one finds in the story of Isaac and Ishmael unexpected parallels to the kind of divine action which is suggested by the Apostle's re-reading of the narrative. In this way an analogy which finds its justification in Paul's re-visioning of the whole story can come,

614 Paul's comment here confirms that he is using the Abraham cycle analogically and not simply treating it as a coded reference to his present. The Galatians are "like Isaac," following in the pattern of Isaac (κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ). It is for this reason that they can be identified with that patriarch by analogy. Yet the assertion that they are "like Isaac" depends on the fact that for Paul Isaac retains an historical/textual identity independent of and prior to the Galatians. Hence Paul the analogical comparison in 4:29 is structured around the words ὥστε ὅτε . . . ὁτιως καὶ νῦν, "just as was the case then . . . so too now . . .". This comparison assumes the independence and distinctness of two events at two times which nevertheless bear a structural similarity.
in turn, to reinforce the essential plausibility of that new understanding of the story itself.

The logic is one which moves, not in a linear chain from certainty to dependent certainty, but in a circular effort to establish a coherent reading of the world.

This analogy between the Galatians and Isaac does not simply recapitulate what has already been said. It also helps Paul to express explicitly something which has, until this point, remained implicit in his argument. Where previous analogies helped the audience to see the relationship between the promise and Torah (3:15-18), or between themselves and Torah (3:24-4:7), here Paul is using the story of Isaac and Ishmael to suggest the shape of the relationship between the Galatians and the opponents. The implication of Paul's re-configured narrative is, as he has already suggested, that no-one will be justified, will inherit the Abrahamic promises, by relying on their legal observances. It is not Torah-observance which marks one as occupying the role of an "heir of Abraham," but rather it is faith in Christ, a faith which does not require observance of the law. Hence, the opponents (and those who follow them into circumcision) will be excluded from the eschatological fulfilment of the Abrahamic promises, a fulfilment which will be enjoyed only by those who hold to Paul's Gospel. Paul introduces this direct polemic against the opponents by means of this analogy, precisely in order to emphasize that his point is not as foreign to Israel's story as it might seem at first blush. If Ishmael was cast out and disinherited, despite being Abraham's physical descendant, so too can those who seem to be his heirs in the Galatian situation. The crucial question, in Galatia as in Abraham's first family circle, is whether one's status
as heir is based on familiar ways of thinking and acting or on a reliance on and
responsiveness to God's miraculous intervention.

Hence, even more clearly than before, Paul's emplotment of the audience and the
opponents constitutes an ethical argument, an argument which draws implications from
Israel's narrative about the specific actions which the Galatians must take. As the
audience stands poised to choose between two different ways of living, Paul uses this
analogy to highlight the fates which await people who play two roles. The one leads to
blessing, while the other (as appealing as it may seem) ends in rejection. In 4:31 Paul
prepares to leave behind the analogy and make this ethical point (now perhaps more
plausible to the audience) in direct terms. The Galatians are, he points out, "children,
not of the slave but of the free woman" (4:31). This freedom is, Paul adds, precisely the
point of their status as heirs of Abraham, and so he urges them to "stand firm" and not to
submit themselves again "to a yoke of slavery" (5:1). Concretely, this means that they
must not allow themselves to be circumcised, and that if they do "Christ will be of no

615 Notice the διό which opens 4:31 and which usually introduces the conclusion to an argument. Betz (Galatians, 251) understands this διό as introducing just the statement in 4:31 that the Galatians and Paul are the "children of the free woman." It seems more likely, however, that the particle introduces Paul's whole ethical conclusion in 4:31-5:1 which is then elaborated and reinforced in 5:2-12. For the statement "For freedom Christ has set us free" is read most naturally as a restatement (in explicitly Christian terms) of the claim to be children of the free woman in 4:31 (this is essentially admitted by Betz, Galatians, 255). The injunction to "stand firm" is then the logical conclusion to be drawn (οὖν) from this state of freedom in which the Galatians exist. This reading has the advantage of doing away with what seems to many commentators like an abrupt and awkward new beginning in 5:1 (so Betz, Galatians, 255).

616 The οὖν which connects the injunction of 5:1b with the previous material indicates that Paul is drawing the natural conclusion of his whole analogical presentation in 4:21-5:1a. It is not enough to say that 5:1b is the conclusion to be drawn from 5:1a, for 4:31-5:1a simply sum up the allegory in 4:21-30. 5:1b then states explicitly the ethical implications which have become clear from Paul's allegorical interpretation. Note that while the position of οὖν is somewhat uncertain in the textual tradition, none of the major options would significantly change this logical connection between 5:1b and 4:21ff.

It is also problematic (contra Betz, Galatians, 253-56) to see this as the beginning of a new section with a new, paraenetic focus. For the point here is still not the conduct of the Christian life in general, but simply Paul's call for the Galatians to avoid submitting to circumcision.
benefit to [them]" (5:2). For in Paul's newly re-configured story it is those who are identified with Christ by faith who experience eschatological blessing. Legal observances are unimportant ("For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything," 5:6), and those who try to supplement Christ with such requirements have placed themselves back under the law-based covenant with its curse. Hence, to those who take on legal observances again, Paul says, "You . . . have cut yourselves off from Christ; you have fallen away from grace" (5:4). Christ will thus "be of no benefit" to the one who takes on circumcision and with that act deliberately returns to the old subjection to law (5:2-3). The question here concerns how one must live in order to play a good role in the story, a role which ends in blessing. On the opponents' construal of that narrative, it is only those who remain faithful to Torah who will come to that good end. The thrust of Paul's argument, however, has been to show that such a reading of Israel's story cannot integrate recent events and that a re-configured story which can do justice to the whole yields a very different picture of what it means to play a good role. Thus, just as Paul's

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617Paul's assertion that one who is circumcised must then keep the whole of Torah (5:3) fits with the common biblical emphasis on keeping all of the commandments (see, e.g., Deut 27:1; 28:1, 15, 58; cf. 4 Macc. 5.20-21; IQS 1.16-17; m. ‘Avot 2:1; 4:2; Jas 2:10). The only way of avoiding this demand, Paul says, is to place one's faith in Christ as providing an alternative to that whole legal system. It is not clear whether this implies that the opponents were not requiring such complete obedience (so Lagrange, Galates, 136; Martyn, Galatians, 470; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 347-8), that the demand to keep the whole law implied a false dependence on it (so Hübner, Law, 18-19, 36-9), or that this demand implied a false requirement that Gentiles become Jews (so Dunn, Galatians, 266). It is perhaps most likely that here, as in 3:10, the Apostle is assuming the inability of human beings to satisfy that whole law.

Thuren (Derhetorizing, 71-2) finds "enormous inconsistency" between Paul's statements here and his slogan in 6:15: "... neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation is everything!" Hence he suggests that in chapter 5 Paul is deliberately over-drawing the significance of circumcision for rhetorical effect. Yet if 6:15 represents Paul's admission "that he has overreacted to the question about circumcision" it would have to represent a retraction of the whole letter which preceded. Moreover, Thuren overstates the inconsistency. Paul can affirm that circumcision, in and of itself, has no significance, but also affirm that it will be disastrous if the Galatians undergo the operation in an attempt thereby to establish a better role in the story. For what is crucial, in Paul's eyes, is that one rely entirely on God's act in Christ.

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theological argument consisted of a kind of narrative criticism in which the story was read afresh in light of newly emerging "gaps," his ethical argument is a matter of tracing out who comes to a good end in the narrative and how one must act in order to play that role.

c. 5:13-6:10, The Positive Ethical Implications of the Galatians' Role

In many ways 5:1-6 constitute the climax of Paul's argument. As in 4:12-20, verses 7-12 of chapter 5 consist primarily of emotionally charged exhortations with little substantial, rational argument. In 5:13, however, the Apostle takes one final argumentative turn. Exactly how one understands the relationship of these verses to the rest of the letter will depend to a large degree on how one reconstructs the situation in Galatia. What is clear, however, is that here Paul is concerned to flesh out an ethic

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618 Commentators universally recognize at 5:13 a shift in Paul's focus which extends to the end of the letter proper at 6:10 (so Betz, Galatians, 271; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 235; Lüthmann, Galatians, 98). As R. N. Longenecker perceives, however, the shift is not a matter of beginning to exhort the audience, but of changing the focus of the exhortation which has been Paul's concern for some time (Galatians, 236).

619 Betz (Galatians, 264) notices the contrast between the "highly condensed" expression of 5:1-5 and the "freer," "rambling" style of vv. 7-12. Moreover, Paul's statement in 5:13 (νομισμεν είρητε εξετάζετε τον αὐτόν) echoes 5:1 (τὴν ἐξετάζετε θυσίας κριτικόν θείον), suggesting that Paul here returns to the main thread of his argument. At first glance the post-positive γάρ which introduces v. 13 seems to suggest a closer logical relationship between this verse and what is immediately preceding. Yet, as Betz observes, Paul sometimes uses γάρ to signal the start of a new step in his argument (Galatians, 272), and it is difficult to see in what way 5:13 would provide the basis for Paul's outburst in v. 12.

This is not to say that the narrative ground of Paul's exhortation disappears entirely. This is the basis on which Paul can interpret the opponents as preventing the Galatians from "obeying the truth" (5:7). It is also the context within which the Apostle can predict that these opponents "will pay the penalty," i.e. will face bad consequences which follow from playing an unwise role in the story (5:10). The image of yeast spreading through a lump of dough (5:9) also functions in a way similar to those analogies from everyday life which we observed above. There are, however, no new elements of the narrative introduced here and no new implications drawn out. Rather, the section is thick with expressions of praise and blame which aim to engage the audience on a level other than that of cognitive discourse and gain their acceptance for the conclusion of his argument.

620 Many commentators understand Paul as here answering the question "How are we to regulate our common life if we do not have to follow Torah?" (So Lüthermann, Galatians, 100; cf. Dunn, Galatians, 284-85). Some suggest that the Galatians were experiencing ethical confusion in the wake of Paul's first preaching (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 238) and felt the need of more concrete ethical direction than Paul had given (so Barclay, Obeying, 70-72, 218), a need which the opponents might have exploited in
based on his re-configured narrative. It should be evident from the preceding analysis why it is not satisfactory to say that 5:13 marks a shift to an "ethical" section of the letter, as if what came before had no ethical thrust.\footnote{Contra the tradition stemming from Dibelius which drew a sharp distinction between the "theological" and "paraenetic" sections of Paul's letters (see, e.g., Lüthmann, Galatians, 95). Lüthmann himself (ibid., 100) observes that Paul does not mark the shift in 5:13 with the usual formula such as παρακαλῶ·παρακαλοῦμεν, "I/we exhort" (cf. Rom 12:1; 1 Cor 1:10; 2 Cor 10:1; Phil 4:2; 1 Thess 4:1; Philm 9). Martyn's description of this section as "pastoral" (Galatians, 481-82) is better, but still suffers from the implication that Paul's concern about the Galatians' attitude toward circumcision is somehow not pastoral.} It is right, however, to recognize that the ethical focus from 5:13 on is different. It is not enough, for the Apostle's purposes, simply to show what the Galatians need not do. He is also concerned to show, positively, that his re-configured narrative has positive implications about how they must live as believers in Christ.

\textit{i. Flesh and Spirit}

Already in 5:6 it became clear that Paul had some such positive ethic in mind, for the faith which thus far had been the sole condition of blessing is now described as "faith working through love" (πίστις δι' ἁγάπης ἐνεργουμένη). There is broad scholarly order to offer Torah as a solution (so Betz, Galatians, 273). In this case, Paul may be offering in chapters 5-6 a more complete ethic as an alternative to the opponents' offer of Torah (so Barclay, Obeying, 216-220). On such a reading, these chapters can be understood as a continuation of the Apostle's argument against the need for law-observance, suggesting that in the absence of Torah the Gospel still has a capacity to produce right behaviour (Thürén, Derhetorizing, 90). Others, however, think that this ethical discussion may be pre-emptive; Paul wants to ensure against libertine excesses in the wake of the success of his letter and the rejection of nomism (so Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 134; Lightfoot, Galatians, 208).

There are, of course, several other models which have gained less enthusiastic support in recent decades. Could Paul be fighting a battle on two fronts, against a group of libertines as well as the Judaizing group, in which case chapters 5-6 are primarily aimed at countering Galatian libertinism (so Lütgert, Gesetz und Geist; Ropes, Singular Problem)? Or is he combattting a single Gentile group who is adopting circumcision but remains lax in other ethical matters (so Munck, Paul)? Schmithals has even suggested that the Judaizers were Jewish gnostics who themselves embodied this mixture of legal observance and laxity (Paul and the Gnostics). Dunn's caution against such models is representative of a broad majority, however, when he suggests that if "a condition of enthusiastic lawlessness" were already a reality in Galatia "Paul would have attached more rebukes to his exhortations and warnings" (Galatians, 286). For an excellent survey of these various positions, see Barclay, Obeying, 9-23.

\footnote{Contra the tradition stemming from Dibelius which drew a sharp distinction between the "theological" and "paraenetic" sections of Paul's letters (see, e.g., Lüthmann, Galatians, 95). Lüthmann himself (ibid., 100) observes that Paul does not mark the shift in 5:13 with the usual formula such as παρακαλῶ·παρακαλοῦμεν, "I/we exhort" (cf. Rom 12:1; 1 Cor 1:10; 2 Cor 10:1; Phil 4:2; 1 Thess 4:1; Philm 9). Martyn's description of this section as "pastoral" (Galatians, 481-82) is better, but still suffers from the implication that Paul's concern about the Galatians' attitude toward circumcision is somehow not pastoral.}
agreement that when the Apostle turns, in 5:13, to exhort his audience to follow this new ethic, his offer of a new motivation and empowerment for moral living flow directly from his theology. It is thus no surprise that these aspects of the Apostle's teaching appear to be direct corollaries of his emplotment of the Galatians within his theological narrative. To act in an ethical way is, for Paul, to "live by the Spirit (πνεύματι)" and not "gratify the desires of the flesh (ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκός)" (5:16).\textsuperscript{622} The immediate presence of God's Spirit within the believer now furnishes, not only the motivation for right living, but also specific direction for ethical decisions.\textsuperscript{623} The believer is "led by the Spirit" rather than by the explicit statements of Torah (5:18).\textsuperscript{624} The community is no longer subject to the ethical authority of the law precisely because its members are guided directly by the divine Spirit. One need no longer be subject to the unreliable urges and drives which are ours simply as human beings, drives which we must counter with formal ethical

\textsuperscript{622}The sharp opposition between these two sources of ethical motivation is highlighted in 5:16 by Paul's emphatic negative οὐ μὴ τελέσῃτε. The one who is motivated by the Spirit will emphatically not act on "fleshly" desires.

Here we take σαρκός in ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκός as an adjectival genitive ("desire associated with/motivated by the flesh"), rather than a subjective genitive ("the desire felt by the flesh"). Martyn treats ἔχει τῆς σαρκός in 5:19 as a subjective genitive, "the effects of the flesh" (Galatians, 496). Yet this interpretation depends on a highly reified understanding of Paul's σάρξ language which was not likely the Apostle's intention (see below, pp. 278-282).

\textsuperscript{623}If the dative πνεύματι in 5:16 is understood in a purely instrumental sense, or as a dative of origin (so Betz, Galatians, 278), then to "walk" πνεύματι might be construed to mean simply to walk "with the help of the Spirit." Or, if the dative denotes the quality of one's "walking" (so Betz, Galatians, 278), one might think here of a life which reflects the character of the Spirit. Yet Paul goes on in 5:18 to speak in terms of "being led by the Spirit" (πνεύματι ᾠδασθήκε), implying that the Spirit provides positive guidance. Indeed, Dunn observes that in the same verse this Spirit-guided life is contrasted with life lived "under the law" (ἐπὶ νόμον), suggesting (among other things) that the inner direction of the Spirit replaces the external standard of legal pronouncements (Galatians, 296). This suggests, moreover, that the dative πνεύματι in 5:16 is likewise a dative "of the rule or direction" (Lightfoot, Galatians, 14; cf. Bruce, Galatians, 243; Burton, Galatians, 298; Martyn, Galatians, 492; Schlier, Galater, 179-80).

\textsuperscript{624}R. N. Longenecker reads πνεύματι in 5:16 both as a dative of origin and instrumental dative (Galatians, 244).
declarations. Rather, one who is indwelt by God's Spirit has direct access to a different set of "drives" which are absolutely reliable. To this extent, the lists of works of the "flesh" in 5:19-21 and the "fruit" of the Spirit in 5:22-23 are probably intended not as a new set of rules, but as a guide to help the Galatians learn to recognize which of their urges originate in the Spirit's proddings and which are the product of their "flesh." It is likely in the wake of this process of learning to distinguish the internal guidance of the Spirit from that of their own "flesh" that the Apostle believes the acts encouraged by the latter will become "obvious" to the Galatians as they are to him (5:19). The Sinaitic legal code, however, must now give way to the inner direction of the Spirit, the divine presence whose influence bears "fruit" in the growth of new kinds of behaviour (5:22).

625 That this σάρξ is conceived by Paul primarily in terms of such urges is reinforced in 5:24 where the believers' σάρξ is said to have been crucified "with its passions and desires" (σὺν τῶν παθήμασιν καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμίαις). On the meaning of Paul's σάρξ language in chapters 5 and 6 see below, pp. 278-282.

626 After all, some of these moral judgments would not be obvious to many of Paul's pagan hearers (see below, p. 301). On the other hand, if they were absolutely transparent then the Apostle would have no need to list these examples. Paul makes clear that his list of vices in 5:19-21 is not exhaustive by adding at the end καὶ τὰ δύο οὖν τῶν τῶν τῶν. It is not only those who act in these particular ways, but all who practice "things like these," τὰ τοιαῦτα, who will be excluded from God's kingdom (5:21). So Furnish, *Theology and Ethics*, 76.

627 Lührmann suggests that Paul's avoidance of the term "works" to designate these Spirit-motivated acts is significant and indicates the negative cast which that noun has taken on because of its use in the expression "works of the law" (Galatians, 107; so Barrett, *Freedom*, 77; Betz, *Galatians*, 286). Yet we must be cautious here, since Paul has no trouble in 5:6 talking about faith "working (ἔργον ἐργάζεται) through love" (so R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 259; cf. 6:4, 10; 2 Cor 9:8; Phil 2:12; 1 Thess 1:3). Likewise, R. N. Longenecker observes that metaphors of "sowing" and "reaping" and of "fruit" can be used of the activity of the "flesh" as well (see Gal 6:7-8; Rom 6:21-22; 7:4-5), and he points out that the imperatives here in chapter 5 suggest that Paul did not mean this talk about "fruit" to imply that good works would simply emerge spontaneously (Ibid. 259; so Barclay, *Obeying*, 120). Betz points out, too, that the Stoics could describe ethics as the "fruit of a garden" (*SVF* 2.38). Epictetus calls the knowledge of how to live well διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ αὐτοῦ (Hist. 1.4.32; cf. 1.15.7-8; 2.1.21; Philo, *Plant.* 138; Somn. 2.272; Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.119) while Philo can describe the virtues as the "fruit(s) of the soul" (cf. Leg. 1.22f., 3.93; *Migr*. 140, 202, 205; Deus 166; *Mut.* 74, 98, 192; Post. 171; Det. 111; Agr. 9; Mos. 2.66; *Cher.* 84). For biblical precedents of the metaphor, see Prov 1:21; 31:31; Isa 5:1-7; Jer 17:10; Amos 6:12 and cf. *Arist*. 233. Paul's own exhortations in this section make it clear that the "fruit" metaphor does not exclude the need to work at ethics, any more than it does in these other texts (so Barclay, *Obeying*, 120).

The metaphor may also echo the prophetic demand that Israel "bear fruit" of righteous behaviour, and the prophetic promise that such fruitfulness will be a reality in Israel's eschatological restoration. So Barclay, *Obeying*, 121. On the demand that Israel "bear fruit," see Isa 5:1-7; Jer 2:21; 8:13; 24:8-10; Mic
What is crucial to recognize here is that only those who are filled with that divine Spirit can enjoy such inward motivation and guidance. Hence Paul can offer the Galatians the direct help of the Spirit only because of their peculiar place in his re-configuration of Israel's story. They have, by their faith in Christ, taken on the role of those who are beginning to receive the eschatological blessing which fulfills the Abrahamic promise, and that blessing involves their being indwelt by the Spirit. Their recent experiences are, Paul says, properly interpreted as the outward manifestations of that Spirit's presence among them. The idea that those who received the eschatological gift of the Spirit would be guided directly by God is itself an old part of Israel's story, and so Paul can assure the Galatians that the Spirit's presence among them brings with it motivation for ethical living. To this extent, at least, Paul's ethical teaching here in chapters 5-6 arises naturally from his re-configuration of Israel's story and his emplotment of the Galatians within that narrative.

Yet Paul's ethical theory does not just involve the motivation of the Spirit. It involves an opposition between the Spirit and the negative source of motivation which he labels "the flesh" (ἡ σὰρξ). Where in Israel's story does Paul find this concept of a drive

7:1ff. On the expectation that she will (both literally and metaphorically) in the restoration, see Isa 27:2-6; 37:30-32; Jer 31:27-8; 32:41; Ezek 17:22-4; Hos 14:5-8; Joel 2:18ff.; Amos 9:13-15. See further the development of this imagery in Jewish tradition: Jub 16.26; IQS 8:20; 1 En. 93:2-10; 4 Ezra 5:23-4; 9:31-2; 2 Bar. 32:1; Gen Rabba 30.6; B. Sotah 46a.

628 Jeremiah's new covenant involves the inscribing of God's Torah on the people's hearts so that they no longer need to be taught. They will all "know" him spontaneously (Jer 31:31-34). On the other hand, there is a common expectation that God's Spirit will be poured out on his people in the eschaton (Isa 44:3). These motifs of "spirit" and ethical renewal are connected in Ezek 36:26-27. There God promises to put a "new spirit" (πνεῦμα καινόν) within them (cf. Ezek 11:9; 37:6) and then explains that he will place his own Spirit within them, and so make them "follow my statutes" (cf. Ezek 37:14). A more general connection between God's Spirit and ethical guidance is evident in passages like Isa 63:10, where the people's rebelliousness is described in terms of "grieving" God's Spirit. Of course none of these writers imagined that the inner guidance of the Spirit would replace the written Torah. That aspect of the story arises, for Paul, only in light of the Christ event.

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toward wickedness within human beings, and why does he call it "the flesh"? Although all agree that the Apostle is not working with a simple Hellenistic dualism of body (evil) and soul (good), our analysis at this point is frustrated by the protracted debate about exactly what Paul's "flesh" language means. The foundational positions in this discussion were established early in the last century by Bultmann and Käsemann. Käsemann understood σάρξ in apocalyptic terms as a cosmic power enslaving humanity. The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that there are several indications in these chapters that the "flesh" is not something external to the individual.

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629 Paul's high regard for physicality is evident in, e.g., 1 Corinthians 15, where he emphasizes that the physical body is renewed along with the whole person and participates in the final resurrection. Likewise, immorality can defile body and soul together (2 Cor 7:1), suggesting that for moral purposes Paul knows little real anthropological dualism (so Erickson, "Flesh," 305).

630 See the convenient summary in Barclay, Obeying, 192-202.

631 So Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 157; Lührmann, Galatians, 106-7; Martyn, Galatians, 485, 528.

632 Dunn (Galatians, 287) points to 2:20 and 4:14. The parallelism in expression between σάρξ and πνεῦμα should not mislead us into assuming that the two terms denote comparable ideas. As Barclay points out, the σάρξ is not personified to anything like the same extent as is the Spirit (Obeying, 213). Moreover, Schweizer observes that while God's πνεῦμα or ἐπαγγελία are often introduced in the instrumental dative or with an instrumental διά, the σάρξ which appears in the same contexts is never introduced with this instrumental sense ("σάρξ," 132; see Gal 4:23; 5:18; cf. Phil 3:3; Rom 8:13f.). Similarly, while πνεῦμα often appears as a verbal subject, σάρξ never does except in passages where it is set in contrast with πνεῦμα (so Schweizer, "σάρξ," 132). This difference in usage implies Paul's recognition that σάρξ and πνεῦμα are not completely parallel as effective powers. It implies, in fact, that whatever moves Paul might make toward the personification of σάρξ are purely figurative, intended to heighten the contrast between ordinary human possibilities and the possibilities opened up by the activity of the Spirit.

The most common evidence presented in favour of interpreting the σάρξ as an external power is 5:17, where we read: ἡ γὰρ σάρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, ταύτα γὰρ ἄλλακοι ἀντικείμεναι, ίνα μὴ ἄ ἐὰν θέληστε ταύτα ποιήσετε. This is often read (particularly in light of Romans 7) as a description of two external, semi-personal powers fighting for control of the (passive) individual will (so Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 137; Lightfoot, Galatians, 209; Lührmann, Galatians, 109). This would seem to indicate that one's own will might be good and yet be hindered by an outside power. Yet Dunn has argued plausibly that Paul intends to portray the Spirit and one's own human weakness in a struggle to dominate the will, each trying to exclude desires which find their origin in the other source (Galatians, 299). Hence the purposive ἵνα: both God's Spirit and one's own "flesh" want to suppress one's will to the extent that it is an expression of the opposite influence. Alternately, Barclay has argued that even this reading conflicts with Paul's confidence that the one who walks in the Spirit will avoid the deeds of the flesh (5:16; Obeying, 113). Rather, Barclay argues, Paul means to emphasize in 5:17 that Christian freedom, directed by the Spirit, "is not a carte blanche for 'doing whatever you want' (ἀ ἐὰν θέλητε . . . ") Rather, the Spirit which indwells believers "provides a
Neither is it something which is decisively subdued or destroyed in the way that one would expect if it were a demonic power. Bultmann's position has also continued to be influential and does more justice to Paul's actual use of "flesh" language. Bultmann viewed the pauline σάρξ as the "world of created things which is the stage and the life-condition for 'natural' life, the world which is at man's disposal, giving him the possibility to live from it and to be anxious about it." This is the world of ordinary human possibilities and limitations within (ἐν) which one necessarily lives but for (κατά) which,

counteracting force which motivates and directs them to exclude the flesh" (Barclay, Obeying, 115). The warfare imagery highlights the inherent incompatibility between flesh and Spirit as motivating powers, not their even balance of control. Hence, Paul can talk in the next verse about being "led" (ἄγεσθε) by the Spirit with no suggestion that the flesh is a serious hindrance (so Barclay, Obeying, 116).

Such an interpretation of σάρξ as an external power is still less likely if Paul has been at all influenced in this language by the Jewish idea of an "evil inclination," for this is an aspect of each human being (See T. Asher 1.5; IQS 5.5; CD 2.14-16; Jas 1.14-15). Even Martyn thinks this very likely, noting that the expression ἐπιθυμεῖ σαρκός in 5:16 is reminiscent of the Hebrew הַסְּדִּיקָא and that Paul's awkward talk in 5:17 of the flesh "desiring against" (πιθυμεῖ κατά) the Spirit seems to echo the talk in b. Ber. 5a of inciting the good inclination against (יִסְדֵּיקָא) the evil impulse (Galatians, 492-93). Martyn argues that Paul is picking this language up from the opponents and re-casting it in more cosmic and "apocalyptic" terms (Galatians, 485; 526-29). Yet if it is conceded that Paul is drawing on Jewish precedents in which the "flesh" is an aspect of the human being, one wonders what justification there is for the claim that Paul is personifying and externalizing the concept. Moreover, the term may well be Paul's own, since it offers him a convenient verbal link between operating from out of the "insufficient" human sphere and circumcision (which is associated with σάρξ language in the LXX and later; e.g., Gen 34:24; Jer 9:25). Barclay (Obeying, 110) even suggests that the opponents' association of "sin" (ἁμαρτία) with transgression of Torah may have made that term dangerous for Paul, pushing him to find in σάρξ an alternate vocabulary for wrong behaviour.

633For example, the present tense of the verb ἀντίκεισται ("they are in opposition") in 5:17 suggests the ongoing presence and activity of the σάρξ in the life of the believer. Likewise, Paul's positive description of life as lived "in the flesh" in 2:20, i.e. in the sphere of ordinary human limitations (see below), is difficult to explain if he is going to go on and use the same term "flesh" to denote a demonic power.

There are some passages in which Paul seems to say that the believer no longer operates "in the flesh" (Rom 7:5; 8:9). Bultmann's explanation of these passages seems best: here the believer's continued existence within the horizon of ordinary limitations and possibilities is "proleptically denied," looking forward to the resurrection and renewal of the whole κόσμος (Theology, 1.236).

634Bultmann, Theology, 235. In this sense, Bultmann suggests, σάρξ becomes synonymous in Paul's usage with κόσμος.
according to the norms of which and for the sake of which, one must not live. 635

Something like Bultmann's approach is made more plausible when one observes the associations in the LXX between the σάρξ and human weakness, mortality, limitation. 636

This is, after all, the same sense in which "the flesh" has been used earlier in Galatians. 637

Yet several more recent writers have offered important qualifications to Bultmann's view.

Barclay has rightly emphasized that the problem with living κατά σάρκα need not be

635 See Bultmann, Theology, 1.232-245. Bultmann observes how the phrase ἐν σαρκί tends to be used neutrally by Paul. Nor does the fact that one operates "in the flesh" exclude the possibility of simultaneously operating within the higher horizon of possibilities which Christ has opened up. Hence, in Phlm 16 Paul calls Onesimus a brother "both in the flesh and in the Lord" (Theology, 235-36). Where the prepositional phrase κατά σάρκα modifies a substantive, Bultmann observes, it carries a similarly neutral sense. Where it modifies a verb, however, the phrase usually takes on a negative sense, denoting "an existence or an attitude not as natural-human, but as sinful" (Theology, 237; see 2 Cor 1:17; 5:16; 10:2, 3; Rom 8:4, 5). Bultmann notes 4:23, 29 as exceptions to this rule (Theology, 237). In these latter cases Paul is condemning "that conduct or attitude that directs itself according to 'flesh,' taking 'flesh' for its norm" (Theology, 238). One must admit that something like this distinction makes excellent sense of the grammatical pattern. It would be when one acts in a manner entirely determined by the pattern of ordinary human life that this sphere of ordinary life becomes problematic.

636 Schweizer ("σαρκή," 109) observes how the LXX introduces a distinction between the heavenly sphere and the earthly sphere, the latter of which is characterized as "flesh" (see LXX Num 16:22; 27:16). This distinction influences LXX Ezek 10:12 to avoid assigning σαρκή to the cherubim. The "flesh" is the whole person in Sir 25:26, and this usage emphasizes the person's mortality and corruptability in 3:1 (cf. Pss. Sol. 16:14; Judith 10:13).

Barclay points to evidence of influence of this Jewish use in the pauline use of the phrase πᾶσα σάρκα to mean "everyone," "every human being" (2:16) and σάρξ καὶ αἷμα to mean "human being" (1:16) (Obeying, 204; so Bultmann, Theology, 1.233; Erickson, "Flesh," 304). Notice that in 2:16 the phrase πᾶσα σάρκα seems to be Paul's own substitution for πᾶσα ζωή in his citation of Ps 142:2. Hence, already at this point the Apostle may be introducing the implication that human beings, as mere σάρξ, cannot please God. Notice, too, that in 4:23 the expression κατά σάρκα means "in keeping with normal human experience and practices." Erickson further observes that the Apostolic Fathers tend not to pick up Paul's negative use of σάρξ ("Flesh," 305), suggesting that this usage is not a product of the Greek or Roman scruples about physicality which surrounded those later authors.

637 R. N. Longenecker observes that σάρξ has, prior to 5:13, been used in the sense of "that which is merely human (cf. 1:16; 2:16) or purely physical (2:20; 4:13-14, 23, 29)," and it shows up in this latter sense again in 6:12-13 (R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 239). We should, however, probably include 2:20 and 4:23, 29 among the passages in which the term means the "merely human" (so Schweizer, "σαρκή," 126-27). Where the flesh/spirit dualism is introduced in 3:3, the σάρξ denotes that legal observance (esp. circumcision) which Paul seems to understand as an attempt to bring about eschatological blessing using the resources of ordinary human existence (so Bultmann, Theology, 237; Erickson, "Flesh," 306). For in 4:21-31, where we find a dualism between flesh and promise, Ishmael's birth κατά σάρκα (i.e. through natural means, not out of reliance on the promise) is presented as analogous to the opponents' efforts at legal observance (so Barclay, Obeying, 179).
understood in terms of a sinful attitude, a rejection of one's human need for God. Rather, Paul's narrative locates him at a point in history at which life depends on being rescued out of the merely human state by being identified with Christ and empowered with his Spirit. Hence the \( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \) would be, for Paul, all that "is merely human, in contrast to the divine activity displayed on the cross and in the gift of the Spirit." To live a life solely directed toward this \( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \), acting in terms of merely human limitations, would thus be to forfeit God's offer to transform the terms of human existence. On this reading of Paul, actions which are motivated by "the flesh" are actions which spring from our ordinary desires, inclinations and powers which, as the Christ event made clear, were not able to motivate human beings toward a life which satisfied God's pattern in Torah. Indeed, since in Paul's narrative the "present age" is "evil" (1:4), is consistently opposed

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638 Bultmann explains that the question is "whether the sphere of the natural-earthly, which is also that of the transitory and perishable, is the world out of which a man thinks he derives his life and by means of which he thinks he maintains it. This self-delusion is not merely an error, but sin, because it is a turning away from the Creator, the giver of life, and a turning toward the creation—and to do that is to trust in one's self as being able to procure life..." (Theology, 1.239).

639 The same apocalyptic context which makes "the present age" evil in 1:4 highlights the weakness and inadequacy of the present human condition in general, so that the "flesh" is seen as "at best inadequate and at worst thoroughly tainted with sin" (Barclay, Obeying, 205). Several scholars have followed W. D. Davies in pointing to a similar use of "flesh" language at Qumran (Barclay, Obeying, 205; Erickson, "Flesh," 305; Meyer in Schweizer et al., "\( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \)," 112-14). There the \( \pi \nu \) is not so much the particular seat of evil as it is a metonym for humanity which, in general, is viewed as sinful (so "Paul and the DSS," 160-62; Barclay, Obeying, 188-91; Meyer, "\( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \)," 113; Licht, "Thanksgiving Scroll," 1-13; Nötscher, Zur theologischen Terminologie, 85-6). See IQS 11:7, 9, 12; IQM 4:3. Erickson points to further evidence of this kind of association between humanity as "flesh" and sinfulness in other apocalyptic literature ("Flesh," 305; T. Judah 19:4; T. Zeb. 9:7).

640 Barclay, Obeying, 206; and cf. W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, 22. What is not clear on such a reading is how much the bodily associations of the term \( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \) should be carried over into Paul's theological/ethical use. It is clear from 4:13-14 that the Apostle is capable of using the term in Galatians to denote the physical body. Dunn puts much more emphasis on this bodily aspect than does Barclay, defining \( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \) here as "the weakness of the human being in contrast to the power of the divine, the dependency of the creature on the satisfaction of bodily appetites, and the tendency of the physical body to decay and corruption" (Galatians, 287). Paul's concern, Dunn suggests, was "that life would be lived solely on that level, that satisfaction of bodily appetites (self-indulgence in all its forms) would become the chief factor in living" (Galatians, 287).
to God, then the desires and habits of ordinary human existence will tend toward this same evil, will "be opposed to" the Spirit (5:17). If this understanding of "the flesh" in chapters 5-6 is correct, even in its general outlines, then we can see that this concept too arises from elements in Israel's story. "The flesh" is simply thrown into new prominence and given a newly problematic significance because of the particular configuration in which Paul has arranged the elements of that story, and because of the particular narrative moment in which he has emplotted himself and his audience.641

Paul's ethics in Galatians are not deterministic. He does not imagine believers to be subject to powers (whether good or evil) which determine their actions against their will. Hence, beginning in 5:13, the Apostle's exhortations are peppered with imperatives. He urges them: "[D]o not use your freedom as an opportunity for self-indulgence (μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκὶ)" (5:13). He calls them to "live by the Spirit (πνεύματι περπατεῖτε)" (5:16), and to "be guided by the Spirit (πνεύματι καὶ στοιχείωμεν)" (5:25), and makes this general appeal specific in concrete exhortations to avoid conceited rivalry (5:26), to bear one another's burdens (6:2), to test their own actions (6:4), and to persevere in this Spirit-led lifestyle (6:9), always doing good (6:10). Paul thus holds out to the Galatians a choice: they may co-operate with the Spirit's inner direction, or they may resist that inner prompting and continue to live according to their natural drives and tendencies.642 Here again, however, when the Apostle offers reasons why the Galatians should follow his advice, he points to Israel's story and observes how

641 Erickson ("Flesh," 305) observes that the LXX never seems to use σάρξ to denote a negative power or object.
642 So Dunn, Galatians, 308.
that narrative holds two different futures: one for those who respond to the Spirit's prompting, and another for those who resist. In 5:21, after listing specific examples of the kind of behaviour which arises from "the flesh," Paul reminds the audience that "those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." Then again in 6:7-10, where Paul brings his ethical exhortation (and the letter proper) to a close, he writes: "If you sow to your own flesh, you will reap corruption from the flesh." If, however, his hearers "sow to the Spirit," they "will reap eternal life from the Spirit" (6:8). Here the kind of ethical activity which one carries out determines which of two roles one plays in the story – two roles which lead to very different ends in the eschatological denouement. Since these are the only two roles open to human beings, and since it is clear which of the two is more desirable, Paul can finish the body of his letter by drawing a final conclusion from this story: "So (δὲ)⁶⁴⁴ let us not grow weary in doing what is right, for (γὰρ) we will reap

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⁶⁴³ The opening statement in v. 7 ("God is not mocked . . . ") indicates that the context of thought is not simply the common idea of moral retribution, but the specifically Jewish notion of God's eschatological judgment. R. N. Longenecker (Galatians, 280) points out that the verb ἐκτίσῃ (appears nowhere else in the NT, but appears very frequently in the LXX and other Second Temple Jewish writings (3 Kdms 18:27; 4 Kdms 19:21; 2 Chr 36:16; 1 Esd 1:49; Job 22:19; Pss 44:13 [43:14]; 80:6 [79:7]; Prov 1:30; 11:12; 12:8; 15:5; 20; 23:9; Isa 37:22; Jer 20:7; Ezek 8:15; 1 Macc 7:34; Pss. Sol. 4.8; T. Jos. 2.3; Sib. Or. 1.171). Hence, while the idea that one will "reap" what one "sows" is common in greco-roman literature (e.g., Plato, Phaedr. 260c; Aristot., Rhet. 3.3.4 [1406b]; Demosth. Cor. 159; Cicero, Or. 2.65; Plautus, Mer. 71) as well as in Jewish literature (e.g., LXX Job 4:8; Ps 126:5; Prov 22:8; Hos 8:7; 10:12-13; Sir 7:3; T. Lev. 13.6; 4 Ezra 4:28-30; Philo, Conf. 21; Mut. 268-69; Somn. 2.76; Test. Levi 13.6; cf. 1 Cor 9:11; 2 Cor 9:6; Luke 19:21-22; John 4:35-36), Paul is not appealing here simply to the idea that actions have natural consequences. He is pointing, rather, to the prospect of eschatological judgment in the future of his narrative (so Betz, Galatians, 307).

Martyn (Galatians, 553) understands "sowing to the flesh" as a reference to circumcision, looking to one's handling of the flesh of the foreskin (and the nomistic framework which that act represents) as a way of curbing the influence of the Evil Impulse (cf. Dunn, Galatians, 330). Yet this phrase is surrounded by injunctions to act lovingly and avoid sin, the "works of the flesh." It is much more likely that the "sowing" Paul has in mind is one's willingness to have one's will be directed by the σῶμα (so Barclay, Obeying, 164).

⁶⁴⁴ Though "so" is an unusual rendering of δὲ, it is justified here by the fact that the particle is clearly marking a logical connection between v. 8 and v. 9 and the fact that the injunction of v. 9a is clearly dependent on v. 8 for its motivation (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 281).
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at harvest time, if we do not give up. So then (ἁπα οὖν), whenever we have an opportunity, let us work for the good of all, and especially for those of the family of faith" (6:9-10).

Barclay has observed how Paul's interpretation of the Galatians' situation reduces what must have seemed to them like a range of possible options for living to a simple choice between two "ways." What allows Paul to do this, however, is not simply his "apocalyptic" mode of thought, but more specifically the particular story within which he locates the Galatians. Their responsiveness to the Spirit is, in Paul's re-configuration of the theological narrative, implicit already in the mode of their salvation. For the Apostle has argued that what marks the Galatians as "children of Abraham" is their experience of being indwelt by the Spirit (3:1-9). At the same time, this presence of the Spirit within and among them is itself a central aspect of the new eschatological possibility which is

645 R. N. Longenecker suggests that Paul is not necessarily thinking here of an eschatological judgment, but of a more general principle of divine retribution (Galatians, 282). Yet the references in v. 9 to a particular future time for moral "harvest" (καὶ ὁ γὰρ ἑδύψομεν), a time preceded by extended labour which might exhaust the believers (μὴ ἐγκακώμεν ἡμῖν... μὴ ἐκλύσουμεν), clearly suggests an eschatological judgment (so Barclay, Obeying, 166; Betz, Galatians, 309; Dunn, Galatians, 332; Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 148; Martyn, Galatians, 552). Paul consistently talks about receiving "eternal life" in the eschaton, not in the present age. So, e.g., in Rom 2:5-8 it is on the "day of wrath" (ἐν ἡμέρα ὀργής) that all will receive "eternal life (ζωὴν αἰώνιον)" if one has diligently sought "immortality (ἀθανασίαν)." Though Paul can talk about living presently "in newness of life (ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς)" (Rom 6:4), he does not yet call that life "eternal." Indeed, in the same context such "eternal life" is designated as the "end (τέλος)" toward which a moral life leads (Rom 6:22). Such "eternal life" seems to be equivalent for Paul to the "life from the dead" (ζωὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν) which is clearly not a present experience (Rom 11:15). This does not exclude, however, some partial and proleptic experience of that "harvest" in the Galatians' experience of the Spirit (so Martyn, Galatians, 554).

Barclay (Obeying, 166) sees an allusion here to the "patience" (μακροθυμία) which forms part of the fruit of the Spirit in 5:22.

646 Hence Schrage is right that for the Apostle "ethics does not replace eschatology but flows from it," despite the tendency in the last century to depict ethics as emerging in the wake of cooling fervor for the parousia (Ethics, 184). As Schrage insists, "Yearning for communion with the heavenly Lord leads Christians to take their earthly obligations seriously. It is therefore absolutely wrong to say that yearning for the Lord makes life here and now irrelevant. Quite the contrary. . . . Eschatological hope gives a clearer vision and evokes responsibility for earthly existence between the ages" (Ethics, 183).

647 Barclay, Obeying, 104.
now open to these believers in Christ. Yet the Spirit is not an impersonal presence, but a personal one with a specific character and moral will. Indeed, the moral guidance of that Spirit had long been, as we have already noted, a prominent part of the Jewish hope. Hence, Paul seems to be assuming that to resist the Spirit's inner promptings, to reject the new way of life which the Spirit makes possible, is to reject the eschatological blessing itself. "If we live by the Spirit," the Apostle urges, "let us also be guided (στολάμιομεν) by the Spirit." For that moral re-formation is precisely the point of the Spirit's presence.

The only alternative is reject one's inheritance, to reject the "blessing of Abraham."

**ii. Identification with Christ**

If the dependence of Paul's overall ethical theory on his theological story is easy to see, scholars often confess more difficulty in recognizing any connection between the content of the Apostle's specific injunctions in chapters 5 and 6 and his theology. Since Bultmann it has been common to read scholarly claims to the effect that Paul's theology offers new motivation for ethics but that it provides no new ethical content. As Schrage has emphasized, however, Paul's exhortations "not to live in conformity to this eon" (see Rom 12:2; 1 Cor 5:12-13; 1 Thess 4:5 and Phil 2:15) seem to suggest that he does not simply accept the ethical standards of the Greco-Roman world wholesale. This is not to say that non-Christians have no grasp on God's ethical demand, for in some sense that

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648 Notice how in 3:14 the "blessing of Abraham" is equated with the "promise of the Spirit." On the associations which make this equation sensible, see above, n. 543.
649 Eckert, *urchristliche Verkündigung*, 154-55. Furnish (*Theology and Ethics*, 61-2) emphasizes that for Paul "the life in the Spirit which the Galatians themselves claim to experience (cf. 3:2, 5) *in and of itself* lays upon them moral imperatives."
"law" is "written on their hearts." It does prompt us, however, to ask whether the specific demands of Paul's positive ethic here in Galatians 5-6 might also derive from his theological narrative.

The most natural place to begin is the point at which the Apostle's ethic is most distinctive: his ethic of love. In his discussion of the "fruit of the Spirit" in 5:22-23, Betz argues that the terms which describe this "fruit" are all "common in Hellenistic philosophy" except for love, ἀγάπη. This admission is more important than Betz seems to realize, for "love," as the first member of the list of "virtues" in 5:22-23, seems to be the point of reference for the rest of the list. Although "joy" and "peace" may not be closely related to love, the terms which follow ("patience," "kindness," "generosity," "faithfulness," "gentleness," "self-control") bear a strong resemblance to Paul's famous description of love in 1 Cor 13:4-8. This impression that love is the dominant principle in the "fruit of the Spirit" is reinforced when we look back at 5:13. For there Paul summed up the ethical responsibility of the believer with the call to serve one another "through love" (καὶ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις). Indeed, the Apostle claims that the entire Mosaic code is "fulfilled" when the believer lives out the single commandment to "love your neighbor as yourself" (5:14; cf. Lev 19:18).

A strong argument can also be made for the suggestion that 5:25-6:6 are intended

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651 So Schrage (Ethics, 200) points to the emphasis on acting in a way which outsiders will approve of, and observes that Paul's use of the term εὐχαριστώς in this sense (1 Thess 4:12; 1 Cor 10:32; Rom 13:13) is borrowed from the pagan world. 652 Betz, Galatians, 281. 653 See also 5:6 where the one thing which Paul recognizes as significant in determining one's ultimate role in the narrative is "faith working through love" (πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργοῦμένη).
to serve not simply as a chain of common ethical maxims, but as a concrete description of some of the ways in which this ethic of mutual love (as elaborated in the "fruit of the Spirit") should be lived out among the Galatians. After the transitional sentence in 5:25 calls the Galatians to "be guided by the Spirit," verse 26 describes the kind of behaviour which the Spirit will always lead the believers to avoid: "Let us not become conceited, competing against one another, envying one another." As Betz observes, the behaviour here "is the opposite of 'love' and of 'serving one another.'" 656 6:1-5 then provide a concrete example of Spirit-directed behaviour by elaborating on a common situation in which conceit and rivalry could normally run rampant. 658 "If anyone is detected in a transgression," Paul writes, "you who have received the Spirit (υψηλοί) should restore such a one in a spirit of gentleness." 660 This offer of help

654 Betz understands all of 5:25-6:10 as a collection of disparate sententiae (Galatians, 291; cf. Dibelius, James, 6). Schlier does not go this far, but thinks that the separate exhortations "nur lose miteinander zusammenhängen" (Galater, 269). Martyn (Galatians, 543) thinks that Paul here strings together sayings from popular proverbial collections, but he also emphasizes that Paul does so in order to make a specific overall point (Galatians, 544).

655 There is broad agreement that a new section begins in 5:25 (so Barclay, Obeying, 155; Betz, Galatians, 291; Dunn, Galatians, 316; Lührmann, Galatians, 114; Martyn, Galatians, 542; Oepke, Galater, 145; Schlier, Galater, 196-97). Others begin the new section in 5:26 (Mussner, Galaterbrief) or in 6:1 (Bruce, Galatians, 259-60; Burton, Galatians, 325; Lightfoot, Galatians, 214-15; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 268-69). Yet the exhortations of 5:25 and 5:26 seem intended to mirror one another as a pair, the positive and negative depiction of life in the Spirit (so Barclay, Obeying, 156). Moreover, 5:26 is no longer dealing in the highly abstract terms of 5:22-24, but presents a summary of the attitude which will be treated at length in 6:1-5.

656 Betz, Galatians, 295.

657 So Barclay, Obeying, 157, 167. Note that in 6:1 the believers are to act "in a spirit of gentleness" (ἐν πνεύματι προσεύχεσθε), recalling the inclusion of "gentleness" (προσεύχεσθε) in Paul's characterization of the "fruit of the Spirit" (5:23; so Barclay, Obeying, 157; Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 160-61). Barclay observes that Paul has been very selective in his illustrations here, lending weight to the hypothesis that he is responding to a concrete problem with inner-group conflict in Galatia (Obeying, 169).

658 As Betz observes (Galatians, 295), there is nothing here to indicate that Paul is addressing a specific case in Galatia (contra Martyn, Galatians, 544).

659 It is sometimes suggested that the appellation υψηλοί applied to the Galatians is ironic, as probably in 1 Corinthians (so Lietzmann, Galater, 38; Martyn, Galatians, 546; Schlier, Galater, 270). As R. N. Longenecker observes, however, "Paul has repeatedly spoken elsewhere in Galatians of all Christians as being possessed by and in possession of God's Spirit" (Galatians, 273; so Betz, Galatians,
to those who stumble is not to be turned into an excuse for κενοδοξία (5:26), but is to be conducted in humility which recognizes that all are vulnerable (σκοπίων σεαυτοῦ). 661

Why is such mutual help important? Because in "bearing one another's burdens (τὰ βάρη)" the community "will fulfill the law of Christ (ἀναπληρώσετε τῶν νόμων τοῦ Χριστοῦ)" (6:2). 662 By "the Law of Christ" Paul probably means the moral will of God which was at one time most readily accessible in the text of Torah, but which has now gained its highest expression in the life of Christ. 663 The talk here about "fulfilling" and

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661So Barclay, Obeying, 158. Eckert, likewise, sees the connection between this freedom from "Hochmut," this awareness of one's own "Schwäche und Hilfsbedürftigkeit," and one's willingness "die Lasten des anderen wirklich zu tragen" (urchristliche Verkündigung, 145).

662Martyn (Galatians, 547) rightly sees these "burdens" as a reference to the believers' struggle with "transgression" in 6:1. Dunn (Galatians, 322) sees the reference as broader and less determinate (so Pigeon, "La loi," 430-31).

663The only other passage in Paul which echoes this talk of a "law of Christ" is 1 Cor 9:21, where Paul qualifies his statement that he has become like one outside Torah by emphasizing that he is νόμος Χριστοῦ, obedient to Christ's law. Barclay observes (Obeying, 126-27) that this phrase cannot mean, in context, either being ὑπὸ νόμου or being ἄνωθεν θεοῦ (Rom 9:20-21). In Gal 6:2 almost all interpreters agree that the phrase is meant to recall the ethic of love in 5:13-14 (so Barclay, Obeying, 131; Barrett, Freedom, 83; Burton, Galatians, 329; Bullmann, Theology, 1.262, 268; Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 64; Pigeon, "La loi," 435-6; Schrage, Die konkreten Einzelgeboten, 99-100, 250; Schweitzer, Mysticism, 303; Thürn, Derhetorizing, 87). Many suggest that νόμος here is the Sinaitic law, now understood in the light of Christ. As Martyn notes, Paul has consistently used νόμος in Galatians for Torah or at least for the scriptures within which it is codified (Galatians, 555). Moreover, given the connection with 5:13-14, it is particularly important that νόμος there denoted Torah (so Barclay, Obeying, 132; B. W. Longenecker, "Defining," 91-93; Stanton, "Law of Moses," 116.). Hence Schrage suggests that Paul might be referring to Torah interpreted "according to its true intention" (Ethics, 207), the law now understood as pointing toward the
"law" is almost certainly intended to recall 5:13 where the Apostle first stated his ethic as an ethic of love. Hence we find the Apostle presenting this concrete example of Spirit-led living as an example of love in practice. He goes on to emphasize that "all must carry

single demand to love. In this case, the law may be "Christ's" because Paul knows this was Jesus' way of summing up Torah (so Barclay, Obeying, 132-33). It may also be Christ's law in the sense that Jesus supremely embodied it (so Barclay, Obeying, 133-35). Barclay points to the association between love and Christ's death in 2:20 and also highlights the parallel between 6:2 and Rom 15:1-3, where the strong are asked to bear with (βαστάζειν) the weak because of Christ's example of self-giving (καὶ γὰρ ὁ Χριστός ὦριξ ἑαυτῷ ἰκεσθεν [15:3]).

On the other hand, Eckert is not alone when he confesses to finding it "nicht vorstellbar" that Paul could speak of such a "law" in Galatians "ohne antithetische Ausrichtung und polemischen Akzent" (urchristliche Verkündigung, 144). Similarly, Thurén suggests that Paul's rhetorical strategy in the first part of the letter prohibits him from allowing any positive ethical role for Torah (Derhetorizing, 86-7). Hence, several scholars have suggested that by "law" here Paul means simply "principle" (so Räsänen, Paul, 80; Hays, "Christology and Ethics," 268-90; Thurén, Derhetorizing, 79; cf. Rom 3:27; 7:21; 8:2), and that he may be deliberately (and ironically?) playing on the flexibility of the term νόμος (so Hays, "Christology," 275). In this case, the "law" of 6:2 would be "Christ's" primarily in the sense that it represents the principle which Christ embodied in his life and passion.

A mediating position is represented by Burton's suggestion that this "law" is "the law of God as enunciated by the Christ" (Burton, Galatians, 329), a law which is not identical with Torah but which can be said to represent the same basic moral demand of God. Martyn proposes a version of this position in which "the law of Christ" preceded and opposed the Sinaitic Torah (Galatians, 555-58; cf. 510-14), but this conflicts with Paul's conviction that Torah was given by God (see above, n. 567). Martyn is likely right, however, that because of Christ's action the love command is now "the whole of the Law for the daily life of the church" (Galatians, 547).

In any case, there is little evidence in support of the suggestion that the "law of Christ" Paul means the teachings of Jesus, functioning as a new Torah. Davies in particular saw Paul drawing on a Jewish tradition that the Messiah would bring a new Torah (Torah, 92), but the evidence which he has marshalled for such a tradition is both thin and late (see Setting, 172-79 and Davies' admission of its weakness on p. 188). Even apart from such a Jewish tradition, several commentators have seen in the "law of Christ" a reference to Jesus' teaching (see Bruce, Galatians, 261; Davies, Paul and Rabbinic, 144; Setting, 341-66; Dodd, "ΕΝΝΟΜΟΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ"; Dunn, Galatians, 322; R. N. Longenecker, Paul, 181-208; Galatians, 276; Social Ethics, 15; Manson, Ethics and Gospel, 69, 78; and hesitantly Burton, Galatians, 329). Yet, as Barclay observes, "It is notoriously difficult to establish where Paul is alluding to or dependent on the teaching of Jesus," and we would expect more clear references to such teaching if it were a new legal code for the Apostle (Obeying, 129; so Furnish, Theology, 59-66; Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 511-15). There is, in any case, little basis for seeing 6:2a as dependent on a saying of Jesus (so Barclay, Obeying, 129-30).

Some have suggested that Paul borrows this language from his opponents (Betz, Galatians, 300-1; Brinsmead, Galatians, 163-85). As Barclay suggests, however, this hypothesis is conjectural and requires that Paul would have risked serious misunderstanding by using his opponents' legal terminology. Given the similar phrase in 1 Cor 9:21, it seems more likely that the Apostle would have coined the "paradoxical phrase" himself (so Barclay, Obeying, 130). Hays adds that even if the phrase did originate with Paul's opponents "Paul adopts it in a thoroughly positive and nonpolemical way" ("Christology," 274).

66So Barclay (Obeying, 158-59), who also observes that both in 6:2 and in 5:13-41 the Apostle places emphasis on mutuality, using the word ἀλήθειαν.
their own loads (τὸ... φορτίον)" (6:5) in the sense that members of the community must focus on moral self-examination (τὸ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐαυτοῦ δοκιμαζέτω ἐκαστὸς) rather than comparing themselves to one another in a way which would lead to "boasting" (τὸ καυχήμα) about one's superiority or in a competitive way (6:4), a form of the κενοδοξία referred to in 5:26. Hence, 5:25-6:5 are not merely a sampling of generic "paraenesis," but present a coherent picture of humble, mutual service which, Paul makes clear, constitutes the "love" which is the centre of his understanding of the believer's ethical responsibility.

665Barclay, along with most commentators, understands φορτίον as a weight of "responsibility before God" (Obeying, 162). For φορτίον in this sense of ethical duty or responsibility, see Epict., Diss. 2.9.22.

666So Barclay, Obeying, 159-61; Eckert, urchristliche Verkündigung, 145; Martyn, Galatians, 550. It is in this light that we must understand the call in 6:3 not to have an over-blown estimate of oneself. The two verses are not merely juxtaposed on the basis of a catch-word (contra Betz, Galatians, 302). Rather, as Martyn suggests, verse 4 is presented by way of an adversative particle as "the antidote to one's deceiving oneself" (Galatians, 544; so Dunn, Galatians, 324). The precise force of the γὰρ which connects v. 3 with v. 2 is ambiguous. Is the statement about self-deception the basis for the call to carry one another's burdens, a call which only incidentally fulfills the "law of Christ" (so apparently R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 276; Martyn, Galatians, 549)? Is the real fact that no-one has a right to boast the reason why one must carry one another's burdens in order to fulfill the law of Christ, so that in v. 3 Paul is making explicit an unspoken premise from v. 2? In the latter case, the injunction to avoid moral competitiveness in vv. 4-5 becomes a further explication of how one can "fulfill the law of Christ."

Betz suggests that the background to 6:3 is the Hellenistic topos of the difference between appearances and reality (Galatians, 301), but Paul's emphasis seems to fall much more on the problem of pride and competition than on a general concern for penetrating the phenomena. Betz also points to the Greek tradition in which one must recognize that one is really "nothing" (Galatians, 301). There is, however, little justification for his suggestion that the "something" which the Galatians are not is "pneumatic" (Ibid.). Martyn also points to the tradition of self-examination as an antidote to self-deception (Galatians, 549; see, e.g., Diog. L. 8.22).

Again, Betz argues that the γὰρ which connects vv. 4 and 5 is used merely to add another independent saying on the same general topic (Galatians, 303; contra Barclay, Obeying, 161; Martyn, Galatians, 544 who give the particle its explanatory weight). Yet here again, where it is possible to understand a passage as a coherent whole that reading should be preferred. As Betz points out, the image of "bearing a load" can be employed in a wide variety of ways in Hellenistic literature (Galatians, 304), and if it is separated from its context here would seem to represent a contradiction of Paul's exhortation in 6:2. Indeed, coming after that call to bear one another's burdens, it would make little sense for Paul to make an appeal for αὐτόπρεπεια, "self-sufficiency," in a typically Stoic sense (contra Betz, Galatians, 304). More plausible is Dunn's suggestion that Paul is calling for "the recognition that there are responsibilities which cannot be shelved or passed on to others" (Galatians, 326), but this too does not seem to fit the context in which the focus is on mutual care and help.
Barclay has even suggested, quite plausibly, that the instruction to pay teachers for their work in 6:6 continues this illustration of the love which is the fruit of the Spirit. Many commentators have felt that the injunction intrudes awkwardly into the flow of Paul's thought, and some have speculated that the instruction must be connected to events in Galatia to which Paul need make no reference. Barclay has suggested, however, that it should be understood as an instance of the "generosity" (ciyaewauvT) which constitutes part of the fruit of the Spirit (5:22). The financial support of those who serve the community may even be intended as another example of how the Galatians ought to replace competitive rivalry with a willingness to bear one another's burdens (6:2).

If this reading of 5:25-6:6 is broadly correct, then we find that all of Paul's positive ethical teaching, from 5:13 to 6:6, is an extended elaboration of the one principle of mutual love. This love is the one thing which fulfills Torah (5:13), it is the focal element of the "fruit of the Spirit" (5:22), and the demand to love constitutes the "law of Christ" which is fulfilled through humble, mutual service (6:1-6). What is more, although some of the virtues, vices, or maxims which Paul includes in this section finds some parallels in the ethics of the broader Greco-Roman world, we search in vain for a

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667 It is not, of course, a problem so long as 6:1-6 is viewed simply as a collection of independent maxims (so Betz, Galatians, 304-5).
668 For possible scenarios, see Martyn, Galatians, 551-52.
669 So Barclay, Obeying, 163; Martyn, Galatians, 551.
670 So Barclay, Obeying, 163.
671 See, for example, the resemblance between Paul's instruction to pay teachers in 6:6 and the section of the Hippocratic Oath mentioned by Oepke, Galater, 150 and cited by Betz, Galatians, 305; Martyn, Galatians, 551.
parallel to this conception of ethical obligation as a whole outside of early Christian literature. In fact, Hays has pointed out that the way in which Paul introduces this love ethic runs directly counter to what we find in Greco-Roman literature at large. In 5:13 he urges the Galatians, as an expression of the mutual love, to "become slaves to one another" (δουλεύετε ἀλλήλους). Elsewhere in Paul's Mediterranean world, we never find slavery held up as a positive ethical metaphor. While freedom was often vaunted as an ethical ideal (particularly in Stoic circles), slavery was (if anything) identified with vice.672 It is beyond the scope of this study to ask how Paul first developed this radical ethic of self-giving love. What we may ask, however, is what grounding, both explicit and implicit, Paul offers for it as he commends this ethic to the Galatians.

Here we must rely on a frustratingly small number of hints, for, in contrast to his teaching about circumcision and Torah, Paul seems to assume that his audience will need little convincing that this love ethic really describes how a believer should live. The clearest hint we receive, however, comes in 5:24 where Paul reminds the Galatians that "those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires." This is no casual statement. On the one hand, such a positive use of crucifixion imagery, even after long familiarity, retains some of its original shock value.673 More importantly, this reminder of the believers' moral "crucifixion" is the conclusion of Paul's call for the Galatians to choose between the way of the flesh and the way of the Spirit in 5:16-24. In 5:16-17 the Apostle set up the antagonism between these two ways of living. In 5:19-21a

672So Hays, "Christology," 283-86; Carter, Servant Ethic, 6-11. See Epict., Diss. 2.9.4; 3.22.47-49; 4.1.1, 62, 128; Dio Chrys., Or. 14.16-18
673Dunn (Galatians, 314) highlights the fact that the metaphoric use of "crucifixion" in a positive sense was also unheard-of in the Greco-Roman world apart from Christian writings.
and 5:22-23a Paul then sketched out the kind of behaviour which characterizes these two ethical patterns, and emphasized in 5:21b that the Galatians' eschatological future hangs on their decision between them. This description of tension between flesh and Spirit is then bracketed by two statements about the relationship between the law and the way of the Spirit (5:18, 23b). Paul's reminder about the believers' "crucifixion" in 5:24 thus stands at the conclusion of a chiastic structure which began in 5:16. In this position it corresponds with the Apostle's initial call to "live by the Spirit" and his description of the flesh/Spirit antagonism. Here in 5:24 Paul reminds the audience that in fact they have already made their decision. Their reception of the Spirit marks them as those who "belong to Christ," those who are identified with Christ (cf. 3:1-9), and just as this identification involved their reception of the Spirit, so too it already involved the "crucifixion" of their "flesh." This is almost certainly a reference to the believers' baptism and the vicarious participation in Christ's death which Paul described in 2:19-20. In being "crucified" together with Christ the Galatians chose the Spirit over the flesh. Paul's ethics simply amount to a consistent willingness to continue in that life.

So far we see, again, how Paul's ethical theory arises organically from his emplotment of the Galatians within his theological narrative, but what about the substance of this love ethic? Notice that at this crucial juncture in his exhortations Paul is

674The aorist verb ἐσταυρωσαν suggests that Paul is thinking not of ongoing moral decisions, but of the believer's initial participation in Christ's death, probably to be connected with baptism (so Dunn, Galatians, 315). Bryant (Crucified Christ, 188) argues that the active form of the verb, which envisages the believers as the agent of crucifixion, indicates that the believers are responsible on-goingly for making the decision to participate in Christ. Yet where Paul describes the believers' "crucifixion" with an aorist verb he consistently refers to an event at the beginning of their Christian existence. Hence the active verb is more likely meant to emphasize the fact that the crucifixion of the Galatians' "flesh" was the result of their own decision. As Barclay writes, "[T]o return to the flesh would be to renounce what they themselves have just done (not just what has been done to them)" (Obeying, 117).
reminding the Galatians of Christ's crucifixion. Paul has, throughout the letter, emphasized Christ's crucifixion, and in 2:20 this act of self-giving is associated with Christ's love. There Jesus is "the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Against this background, it may well be that here in 5:24 Paul recalls the believers' vicarious "crucifixion," not just to remind them that they have already chosen their ethical path, but also to remind them of the form which that path must take. If their entry into the life of the Spirit was effected by their participation in Christ's act of self-giving love, perhaps the Apostle wants to remind the Galatians that this participation implies a call to live out that same love. This is not just a question of the "imitation" of Christ as an external ethical model. The believers have been "rescued" precisely by becoming, in some sense, a part of Christ. Hence the life they have chosen involves rejecting the self-involved pattern of life which characterizes "the flesh," ordinary human tendencies and drives, and taking on the self-giving love which characterizes Christ.

All of this is, of course, extrapolating from hints which Paul's text does not explicitly tie together. If this kind of ethical teaching was familiar to the Galatians, then Paul may not have needed to make these connections explicit in order for them to ground his call to love, but our reading remains a "reading between the lines." At the same time, the more allusions to Christ's passion which we find in and around Paul's ethical

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67See Bryant, Crucified Christ, 192-94; Hays, "Christology," 277. In 1:4 we are told that Christ "gave himself for our sins." See also 3:1, 13-14; 4:4-7.
68So Betz, Galatians, 263. Cf. Martyn, Galatians, 474, who observes that the love which Paul envisions is "elicited by Christ's love for us (2:20)."
69So Bryant, Crucified Christ, 187.
60Could the genitive τοῦ Χριστοῦ in 5:24 even be construed as a partitive genitive, in the sense "those who are a part of Christ"?
exhortations here, the more likely it becomes that he was assuming his readers would understand their participation in Christ as the basis of their obligation to love. Hence it is important to return to Paul's claim in 6:2 that by bearing one another's burdens the Galatians would fulfill the "law of Christ." Coming so soon after the reference to crucifixion in 5:24, it is striking that Paul associates Christ closely with this kind of loving service. 679 As Hays has suggested, it is difficult not to see here something like the thought behind Rom 15:1-6, where the "strong" are urged to put the needs of the "weak" ahead of their own interests because this was how Christ acted in his passion. 680

Finally, Hays has pointed out that while the call to follow Christ's pattern of life is not stated explicitly in 5:13-6:7, it is discussed explicitly elsewhere in the letter. 681 In 2:19-20, as we have seen above, the Apostle emphasizes his identification with Christ as the basis for his life "in the body," and claims: "It is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me." In 6:17 it becomes clear that for Paul this identification meant enduring the sufferings of Christ, for he boasts: "I carry the marks of Jesus branded on my body." 682 This suggests that Paul is thinking of something more than a mere theological metaphor when he says in 6:14 that "the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world," and, as

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679 Dunn (Galatians, 296) agrees that when Paul calls the Galatians to fulfill the law through love, "the paradigm of Jesus is not far in the background."

680 So Hays, "Christology," 287.

681 Hays, "Christology," 280-83.

682 Similarly, there seems to be more than mere hyperbole at work in 4:14 when Paul says that the Galatians received him "as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus." Hays suggests that the point here is not simply that they gave him a reception fit for Christ himself. Rather, he came to them suffering, and they regarded his suffering not as a sign that he was cursed but as the same kind of affliction which Christ bore in the service of others ("Christology," 280-83; so Lührmann, Galatians, 86; Martyn, Galatians, 421; cf. Dunn, Galatians, 234-35). This interpretation would be made even more plausible if we were to follow Bruce (Galatians, 209) and Zahn in rendering ἀγγέλων in 4:14 as "messenger" instead of "angel," though this would run against the current of scholarly opinion, since elsewhere the Apostle uses the noun consistently for super-human beings (see Betz, Galatians, 226; Burton, Galatians, 242; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 192; Oepke, Galater, 106; Schlier, Galater, 149).
Hays points out, the similarity between 6:14 and 5:24 in turn reinforces the impression that Paul is grounding the pattern of his love ethic in the example of Christ. One might argue that the Apostle sees himself as occupying a different position than the ordinary members of his communities, and that such an active participation in the pattern of Christ’s life was not intended as the norm. Such a suggestion, however, would run up against Paul’s habit of exhorting his audience to imitate his own way of life.683 What is more, Paul makes it clear in 4:19 that he understands the ordinary Galatian believers to be undergoing a moral transformation in which they become more and more like Christ.

There, in the context of a “maternal” concern for the wellbeing of his audience, he says that he will continue to feel “labour pains” for them “until Christ is formed in you (μέχρις ὁ μορφωθὴ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν).”684

This last statement, in 4:19, is enough to show that our extrapolation based on the hints in 5:13-6:7 has, in fact, been moving along the same lines as Paul’s own thought when he penned the letter. The Apostle can expect his ordinarily shocking call for the Galatians to be enslaved to one another, as an expression of love, to gain a sympathetic hearing because he and his audience both hear this exhortation within a very specific narrative context. The Galatians know (and here are reminded) that they have been identified with Christ and that the echatological life which they experience is the life of Christ. They also know that this identification with Christ involves living a life which is

683 Hays points to 1 Cor 11:1, where Paul exhorts his audience: “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (“Christology,” 282). The same assumption that the Galatians should imitate Paul’s example is evident in Gal 4:12, though there the connection with Paul’s own imitation of Christ is less self-evident.

684 Hays is likely right here that εἰς ὑμᾶς does not mean “in you,” in each of the individual believers, but “among you” (“Christology,” 283). The community as a whole is to be re-shaped into Christ’s likeness.
more and more shaped by Christ's pattern of self-giving love. To reject that pattern of life is to reject Christ and to forfeit the good end which can only be reached by one who shares in Christ's own resurrection.

**iii. Israel's Past and Ethics in the Present**

All of this suggests that not only Paul's general ethical theory, but also the specific pattern of behaviour which he views as the ideal is presented to the Galatian audience as the implication of their emplotment within his re-configuration of Israel's story. We must not leave off, however, without acknowledging the indications that the Apostle expects the ethical tradition of Israel to play some role in helping the Galatians to recognize those actions which conform to Christ's pattern, to discern the inner promptings of the Spirit.

We must notice, first of all, that there is in these verses a peculiar relationship between a Spirit lifestyle and Torah. When the Apostle first introduces the positive ethic of love in 5:13 he immediately gives justification for this ethic: "For the whole law (ὁ γὰρ τὸ τὰς νόμοις) is fulfilled (πεντηκοσταται)" in a single commandment, 'You shall love your

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685 So Barrett, *Freedom*, 89-90. Hays ("Christology," 278) also points out that it is, for Paul, Christ's passion which is the distinctive source for this ethical pattern. Hays observes that "nothing is said here about any teachings of Jesus on humility and servanthood, nor is there any reference to historical incidents in Jesus' ministry such as healings or table-fellowship with 'sinners' or washing the feet of the disciples. Paul focuses in a single-minded fashion on the decisive significance of Christ's incarnation and death" (Ibid.). This is, however, not surprising since it is that same part of Christ's life which plays the decisive role in the Apostle's configuration of the theological story.

686 We have altered the NRSV text here, which rendered πεντηκοσταται as "summed up." Paul's idea is clearly not simply that the love-command is a summary of Torah's many requirements (which individually remain in force), but that when one carries out this one command the whole requirement of Torah has been satisfied (so Betz, *Galatians*, 275; Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 208-9; contra Schrage, *Ethics*, 206-7). Hence, as Betz puts it, Paul carefully distinguishes between "doing" the whole law (ὁ γὰρ τὸ τὰς νόμοις) and "fulfilling" it, a distinction which (again) was unknown in Judaism (*Galatians*, 275; so Barclay, *Obeying*, 139; B. W. Longenecker, "Defining," 91-2; Stanton, "Law of Moses," 115; Westerholm, "Fulfilling"). Barclay (Obeying, 135-6, n. 95) points to Mek. Vayassa on Ex 15.26 which reads: "... if one is honest in his business dealings and the spirit of his fellow creatures takes delight in him, it is accounted to him as though he had fulfilled the whole Torah"). Yet even in passages like these, Barclay points out, it was always assumed that one would still try to keep the other parts of Torah as well.
neighbor as yourself" (5:14; cf. Lev 19:18). His supposedly law-free ethic is grounded on the obligation to fulfill what he perceives as the ideal at the heart of Torah. This

(Obeying, 136; see Moore, Judaism, 2.83-88; Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 112-14; "Question of Fulfilling the Law," 112-17). Barclay (ibid., 138) further highlights the fact that the Hebrew נָשָׁבָה and its LXX equivalent παράκολουθος are never used in the Bible or in Greek Jewish literature in relation to νόμος (though it does appear with objects like ἐντολή in Test. Naph. 8.7; 1 Macc 1.55; Philo, Praem. 83; Sib. Or. 3.246). Even the rabbinic passages which might serve as parallels employ הֶעֶלְיוּן, not נָשָׁבָה, and thus do not carry the same implications of "fulness" and "completion" (Barclay, Obeying, 138).

Martyn takes this distinction to suggest that the Apostle must not be thinking of the believers' ethical actions, their efforts, at all. Instead, Martyn argues (Galatians, 487-90; 509-14) that Paul is thinking of Christ's actions as having brought the law to completion, allowed it to be restored to its proper role. Yet it is difficult to see in what sense Christ could be said to have completed the law by means of Lev 19:18. For that scriptural passage is the "single sentence" by/in which the Apostle sees Torah fulfilled. True, Paul uses a perfect verb, but as Martyn himself admits this is easily understood as a gnomic perfect, indicating that the action is proverbial. Note too that there is no explicit mention of Christ in 5:13-14, but that on the contrary (as even Martyn admits, Galatians, 490) it is the Galatians who "fulfill" the "law of Christ" in 6:2. In Rom 13:8-10 where we again have talk of the law having been fulfilled (παράκολουθος), it is clearly the believers who accomplish this "fulfilling" by their mutual love.

Nor is it necessary, following Martyn (Galatians, 503-6), to see Paul isolating in 5:14 a different "voice" of Torah than the one which the opponents seek to obey in 5:3. Although Martyn places great emphasis on the "singularity" of the law in 5:14 (ὁ...πᾶς νόμος), the expression in 5:3 (ὁ λόγος τῶν νόμων) is no less singular (cf. Hübner's emphasis on the attributive position of πᾶς in 5:14. Law, 37). Moreover, the shift from talking about "doing" Torah in 5:3 to "fulfilling" it in 5:14 makes sense if it is the same law which is in view in both cases (so Dunn, Galatians, 290; Stanton, "Law of Moses," 115; see also the response of Barclay, Obeying, 137). If in 5:14 Paul were only concerned with a particular aspect of Torah, he would have no problem affirming that it could be "done" (παράκολουθος). Nor does Paul's reference to a single "word" or "sentence" (λόγος) by which Torah is fulfilled indicate that this law is devoid of commandments, since the word λόγος is used prominently in the LXX for the stipulations of Torah (see Exod 19:7, 8; 20:1, 24, 3, 8; 34:27-28; 35:1; Lev 8:36; Deut 1:18; 9:10; 10:4, 12, 28; 27:3, 26; 28:14, 69; 29:8; 31:12, 24). Indeed, in the one other place where Paul talks about "fulfilling" the law, he speaks explicitly of the "commandments" (i.e. the decalogue) which this law contains (Rom 13:8-10). On the other hand, Martyn is right that in Romans 13, as well, love seems to have "taken the place of the commandments" (Galatians, 522; italics original). The command to love has become the sole commandment of the law. The new path of the Spirit, represented by this love command, satisfies the whole requirement of Torah, even though some of its specific requirements have not been "done" (so Barclay, Obeying, 141; Westerholm, "Fulfilling," 235).

The post-positive γάρ in 5:14 is most naturally understood as introducing the ground or reason for the preceding statement. Cf. the similar summary attributed to Hillel in b. Sabbath 31a (cf. Tg. Ps.-J. Lev 19:18). In Gen Rabba 24.7 R. Akiba calls Lev 19:18 the "great principle" (הכרך בַּלַּיְלָה) in the law (cf. Test. Iss. 5.2; Test. Dan 5.3). As Martyn emphasizes, however, Hillel's summary is intended to indicate the "point of entry" for a Gentile who is going to take on the whole of Torah, Paul, on the other hand, has no intention of his converts adopting the details of Torah as it is written (Galatians, 515).

Lührmann tries to explain the apparent conflict here by positing a distinction between "the doing of the law" and "the working out of faith in love," but this is simply to restate Paul's apparently conflicting statements without showing how they are to be reconciled (Galatians, 104). In isolating the love command as the core principle of Torah Paul is in agreement with much Jewish tradition. Cf. Matt 7:12/Luke 6:31, where Jesus' summary of the law in terms of love of God and neighbour is not to be understood as a radical break with tradition.

What Paul is not doing, even unwittingly, is prioritizing a "moral" element over a "ritual" element
seems shocking coming as it does after an extended argument against the idea that Torah is binding on the believer. After all, Paul has made it clear in 5:18 that "if you are led by the Spirit, you are not subject to the law (οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸν νόμον)." Yet the same idea resurfaces at the end of Paul's list of the "fruit of the Spirit" where he adds "There is no law against such things" (5:23). On the one hand, with this negative turn of phrase the Apostle seems to be guarding against the implication that Torah is still binding. At the same time, however, it seems to be important for him to show that the behaviour produced by the impulse of the Spirit is in harmony with that code as a whole. Some of Torah (contra Raisanen, 25-28), for the Apostle emphasizes that "the whole law" (ὅ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος) is in view. Rather, as Thuren puts it, "[B]ehind many rules, be they cultic or moral, a common basic intention, purpose, or 'demand' was envisaged. The addressees are free from the law, but not from the principle, of which its exhortations were but an expression" (Derhetorizing, 75).

In context νόμος in 5:23 should almost certainly be understood as Torah and not simply as law in general. Nowhere in Galatians has the Apostle discussed a νόμος which was not contained in the Pentateuch, and 5:14 shows that he is thinking in terms of the relation of Spirit-ethics to that scriptural code. Although νόμος is here anarthrous, this is not determinative in Paul's usage (contra R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 263). In Rom 2:17-27, for instance, the articular and anarthrous forms of νόμος are used interchangeably and the referent is clearly the Jewish Torah (see also Rom 3:21, 31; 4:13-16; 5:13, 20; 7:1 [vs. 7:2]; etc.). Indeed, in Rom 7:3 the articular form seems to refer not to Torah but to civil law in Rome. Moreover, the set phrases ἐὰν ἐργαστά νόμον (2:16; 3:2, 5, 10) ἐκ νόμου (3:18) and ἐπί νόμου (3:23; 4:4, 5, 21; 5:18) which in Galatians clearly denote the Jewish law are all anarthrous (cf. the anarthrous use in 2:19, 21; 3:11, 17; 5:4, 14, 6:13).

Campbell ("Against such things," 272) argues that τὸν τοῦτον should be read as a masculine plural, not a neuter plural, so that Paul's point would be that the law does not condemn "such people," i.e., those who do such things." Yet the parallel statement in 3:21 – which sums up the list of "works of the flesh" just as the statement in 3:23 sums up the "fruit of the Spirit" – uses the expression τὰ τοῦτα, a clear neuter.

Dunn takes the point here to be that "no law is required in order to produce such virtue" (Galatians, 313; so Betz, Galatians, 288-89), but this is a forced reading of Paul's words. What he says is that the law does not forbid these acts, i.e. that the lifestyle of the Spirit is in harmony with the essence of Torah (so Barclay, Obeying, 123-25).

This demonstrates that Paul does not, as Sanders suggests, maintain the necessity of Torah as a means of "staying in" the Christian covenant (Paul, the Law, 6). As Westerholm observes Paul nowhere talks about believers "doing" or "keeping" the law, and he does not present precepts from Torah as the basis of his ethical exhortation (Israel's Law, 233-237). The turn of phrase also excludes the idea that these virtues themselves constitute a new νόμος (so Betz, Galatians, 288).

Some, like Heikki Räisänen, simply accuse Paul of incoherence, of making contradictory statements about the law (Paul, 199).

This is, as Lightfoot suggests (Galatians, 209), also a polemic against Torah itself, pointing out that by the Spirit one can fulfill the behavioural goal toward which the law pointed but was never able to bring its devotees.

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might suggest that this is only a rhetorical need, that Paul simply wants to say that Spirit ethics are in no way inferior to a Torah-based ethic.\textsuperscript{692} It is doubtful, however, that the Apostle would introduce the positive support of Torah for his own ethics, thus introducing the danger that this law be understood as still carrying binding force, unless he himself felt that this harmony between Spirit-ethics and Torah-ethics was important. It seems, rather, that Paul still believes that the history of God's dealings with Israel did point the people toward the lifestyle which God desires for humanity. In this sense the ethical goal of God's interaction with humanity has not changed with the coming of Christ. The believers still "eagerly wait for the hope of righteousness" (5:5). The internal guidance of the Spirit still leads toward that righteousness which God had been encouraging through Torah.\textsuperscript{693} What has changed, on Paul's re-configuration of Israel's story, is a) that it is no longer necessary to become a Jew in order to achieve that righteousness; and b) the scriptural expression of that righteousness in Torah is relativized accordingly, since in that written code the temporary markers of Jewishness and the eternal pattern of righteousness are not distinguished. It requires the guidance of the Spirit to see in the scriptural record the pattern of righteousness toward which God has been leading humanity, the pattern which is re-established in God's "new creation"

\textsuperscript{692}So Barrett (Freedom, 77) takes it as an "ad hominem dig."

\textsuperscript{693}The idea that when guided by the Spirit the law's demand has been fully met is understood here by Burton, Galatians, 318-19; Schlier, Galater, 262; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 389; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 263.

This δικαιοσύνη is probably not to be understood merely as God's future judicial declaration of a person as acceptable, a declaration which somehow brings along with it participation in "the life, the holiness and happiness of the age to come" (Barrett, Freedom, 66; cf. 64-5).
In this light even Torah, as a part of Israel's story, can be seen to undergird the substance of some of Paul's specific ethical instructions. For although Paul believes, on the basis of the narrative, that the Spirit will now lead the Galatians, he also seems to recognize that they must learn to discern the voice of that Spirit. Otherwise his specific ethical instructions here would be redundant. He claims that the difference between the deeds of the Spirit and those of the "flesh" is "obvious" (5:19), but he still must list them in order to train the Galatians' moral sensitivity. What is crucial to notice is that in this process of moral education the history of God's interaction with Israel is presupposed.

For in what context is "idolatry" an obvious sin, obviously contrary to the direction of God (5:20)? Only in the context of Israel's story, in which those who serve idols are excluded from God's blessing, while those who hold fast to the one God find life.

Similarly, "fornication" (πορνεία) plays no role in Greco-Roman ethics, but is common in

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694 Hence, as Westerholm observes, Paul does not exhort his audience to "fulfill" the law, but rather describes their behaviour as resulting in the law's fulfillment (Israel's Law, 235-7). For one cannot know, from the written code itself, how one is to "fulfill" its intent now that one is "in Christ."


696 Some commentators suggest that when Paul calls the "works of the flesh" φανερῶν, "obvious," he is suggesting that one does not need Torah in order to see their sinfulness (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 252).

697 The term εἰδωλολατρία appears first in Paul, though it expresses an idea with deep roots in Judaism and Büchel speculates that it was likely coined within pre-Christian Judaism (Büchel, "εἰδωλολατρία," 388; so Dunn, Galatians, 304). Hence we cannot agree with Furnish when he writes that the "works of the flesh" are "obvious" in the sense that the Galatians will have always considered them wicked, and "the vices he then lists are typical of those condemned by secular writers (5:19-21)" (Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 71-2). Still less is Betz correct when he says that the concepts in 5:19-21 "represent the conventional morality of the time" (Betz, Galatians, 282). Furnish is, however, right to set aside Kamlah's suggestion that φανερῶν here refers to the "eschatological exposure" of evil (Theology and Ethics, 72, n. 6; see Kamlah, Form der katalogischen Paräne, 19-20, n. 5).
Jewish ethical literature which is dependent on the LXX, and the same may be said for sexual "impurity" and "licentiousness." Thus it seems that as Paul offers the Galatians examples of behaviour to be avoided, helping them to learn to recognize the inner promptings of the Spirit, he assumes that there is continued validity in several of the ethical emphases which characterized God's past demand in Torah. This does not mean

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698 The word πορνεία is common in Jewish literature (see, e.g., LXX Prov 6.16; Wis 2.16; Sir. 23:23; Arist. 166; Test. Jos. 3:8; Test. Rub. 5:5; Philo, Spec. Leg. 1.282; Mos. 1.300). In Greek literature it is very rare (see P. Tell. 2.276.15f. [1/2 cent. BCE]; Athen., Deipn. 13.595a; Demosth., Or. 19.200; M–M, 529; Hauck and Schulz, "πορνη", 581). In contrast to earlier, more tolerant attitudes, Stoics seem to have strongly opposed adultery and prostitution, but the term πορνεία does not seem to have played a role in this polemic (see Hauck and Schulz, "πορνη", 581-84). The adulterer, a common target of Stoic ethicists, is instead a μοιχος (Epict., Diss., 2.4.2, 11; cf. Zeno, Fr., 244).

699 Following πορνεία here, these two terms likely also refer to sexual immorality (so R. N. Longenecker, Galatians, 254; Lührmann, Galatians, 109). The term ἄκαθαρσία is not common in non-Jewish literature, though it does occur with a moral sense in Demosth., Or. 21.119; Epict., Diss. 4.11.5ff. See also the use of ἄκαθαρτος in Demosth., Or. 25.63; 37.48; Plato, Leg. 716e; Tim. 92b; Ps-Plut., Lib. Ed. 17. Yet in each case the term seems to refer to moral corruption in general and does not denote sexual vice specifically. In Jewish circles ἄκαθαρσία is much more common, first and foremost for ritual impurity (e.g., LXX Lev 5:3; 7:20-21; 15:3, 24-31; Num 19:13; Jdg 13:7; 2 Kgs 11:4; Pss. Sol. 8:12). This sense is also extended to "moral" impurity, so that we commonly find ἄκαθαρσία used in Jewish texts for immorality in general (e.g., LXX Prov 6:16; Mic 2:10; Ezek 22:15; cf. the adjective in LXX Is 6:5; Prov 3:32; 16:5, 20:10[13]; Spec. Leg. 3.209; for the connection between ritual and moral impurity see LXX Ezek 4:14; 36:17) and particularly for idolatry and pagan practices (e.g., LXX Hos 2:12[10]; Jer 19:13; 39:34; Ezek 36:25; 1 Esdr. 1:40, 47; 8:66, 80, 84; 2 Esdr. 6:21; 9:11; 1 Macc 13:48; 14:7; 3 Macc 2:17; Wis 2:16; Pss. Sol. 8:22; 17:45). In Spec. Leg. 1.150 ἐπιθυμία is called ἄκαθαρτος, bringing to mind Paul's juxtaposition of the two terms in 5:16-19. There is also a pattern of connection between this moral ἄκαθαρσία and sexual immorality (see LXX Nah 3:6; Test. Jos. 4:6; Test. Jud. 14:5). The closest one comes to this in extra-Jewish literature is Plutarch's comment in Oth. 2.2 that the prostitutes among whom Tigellinus revelled were ἄκαθαρτος. Yet this sexual association is predominant in Paul (see Rom 1:24; 6:19; 2 Cor 12:21; Col 3:5) and seems to be the sense here (so BDAG, 34 [2]).

The word ἄσελγεια is again not especially frequent in Greek literature and is often used in the sense of "wanton license," "lawlessness," "brutality" (Plato, Resp. 424e; Aeschines, Or. 3.170; Demosth. Or. 4.9; 21:1, 88; Jos., Ant. 4.151; Plut., Alc. 8.1), or even "insolence" (Aristot., Pol. 1304b [22]). The term is, however, used by Greek writers to refer to sexual "licentiousness" (Polyb. 36.15.4; 8.10.3; 25.3.7), and the pattern of use in a Jewish writer like Josephus closely resembles the pattern in pagan writers (see War 4.562: Ant. 8.318; 16.184; 20.112). In this case, the distinctively Jewish element in Paul's use is simply the fact that he would think to count such "licentiousness" as a primary vice (so Dunn, Galatians, 303).

Dunn also points out that it was characteristic of Jewish polemics against idolatry to link such religious practices to sexual immorality (Galatians, 304; cf. Wis 14.12-27; Rom 1:23-27). Dunn suggests that at least the first four items in Paul's list here "would evoke warm assent in any Jewish or God-fearing audience" (Galatians, 304).

Note too that among the aspects of the "fruit of the Spirit" listed by Paul, Betz admits that ἄγαθος/κωτός "represents a late development in the Greek language" and occurs first in the LXX (Galatians, 288).
that the Apostle envisions a "third use" for the law, in which portions of it serve as an authoritative ethical code for believers.\textsuperscript{700} Rather, Torah remains important for Paul as part of the Scriptural codification of the early chapters in Israel's story, and as part of that story even legal commandments can help the believer to gain a sense of the ethical ideal toward which God wants human beings to move. Remembering how God taught his people to live in other parts of the narrative can suggest how he might want his people to live in the present chapter. Paul always insists, however, that such past legal pronouncements be understood in terms of their purpose and function in his own re-configuration of Israel's narrative. The source of the Apostle's ethics remains his own re-construal of the theological story, within which he teaches his communities to locate themselves. It is on the basis of this narrative emplotment that he encourages his audience to discern how they must live if they are to come to a good end when the story draws to its close. To the extent, however, that Torah remains a part of his re-configured narrative, it too can play a role in helping the believers to learn to "walk in the Spirit."

\textsuperscript{700}Contra Schrage: ". . . the Old Testament and its law are presupposed and enforced as the criterion of Christian conduct" (Ethics, 205).
CONCLUSIONS: LIVING THE STORY

1. Paul's Narrative Logic

What assumptions did Paul make about how human beings can come to religious knowledge? This is the question which has driven the present study. In chapter 1 we found that Paul's attitude toward human reason is much more positive than one might assume. Rom 1:18-32 may not license a straightforward "natural theology," but neither does the passage teach that human reason is inherently problematic. The root of the epistemic paralysis which Paul describes here is moral; it is the idolatrous refusal to acknowledge God. Hence, the Apostle leaves room for human reason to become fruitful again when the human moral constitution has been restored by the Spirit. Likewise, although Paul has often been understood to teach in 1 Cor 1:17-2:16 that religious knowledge comes only through the irrational inspiration of the Spirit, we discovered that in fact the Apostle presumes that the reasoning faculties are engaged during the Spirit's revelation. Again, what Paul opposes in this passage is not reason per se, but that "worldly wisdom" in which reason is hi-jacked by idolatrous vices of control and self-interest. In fact, as we surveyed Paul's statements elsewhere in his letters, we found that he constantly assumed the involvement of the believer's reason in the acquisition of knowledge, not only in the ethical sphere but in the realm of "theological" knowledge as well. I even suggested that Paul seems at times to treat the believer's basic belief in the Gospel as the fruit of rational deliberation.

This surprising openness to human reason in Paul prompted us, then, to ask what kind of reasoning the Apostle presumes can lead to religious knowledge. So, in chapter 2,
we looked at the logical structure which is inherent in the content of Paul's knowledge.

We found that this content falls naturally into four categories: mundane knowledge, theological knowledge, ethical knowledge, and the intimate knowledge of personal familiarity and devotion. What is more, I argued there that the Apostle's theological knowledge is structured as a narrative, a temporal series of causally related events and personal actions which is shot through with dramatic tension. It is from this theological story, I suggested, that Paul's ethical knowledge arises. Ethical reasoning is, for Paul, a matter of "emplotting" himself or other human beings within this over-arching narrative by correlating the events of the story with his mundane knowledge about himself and others. Ultimately, this theological knowledge (and the ethics which are derived from it) are aimed at bringing human beings into that intimate devotion to God and Christ which constitutes their salvation.

Finally, in chapter 3, we turned to Paul's letter to the Galatians and asked what kind of logical structure could be discerned in the Apostle's reasoning with his audience. I showed how in Galatians Paul's argument is, from the very beginning, a matter of emplotting his audience within his theological story and pointing out the implications, in that narrative context, of their ethical behaviour. If they adopt circumcision and other legal observances, they will not be playing a good role in the story. Quite the opposite; they will be abandoning their role as God's elect, as heirs of Abraham, and taking on a role which ends in destruction. Likewise, Paul's positive ethical teaching in chapters 5 and 6 arises directly from his theological narrative. It is as believers in Christ that the Galatians can expect the Spirit to give them new ethical impulses, and it is the model of
Christ's life and self-sacrificial death which offers the ethical paradigm of love for those who would live "in" Christ and so find resurrection and life in the story's denouement.

Yet all of this ethical argumentation is only valid to the extent that the theological narrative which drives it is a true narrative. Paul's argument with the Galatians cannot be a matter merely of emplotting them within his story; he must also show that his own version of the narrative is true and that his opponents' construal of that story is false. For while both Paul and the teachers in Galatia are guided by Israel's story, they each construe its shape very differently. It is in 2:15-3:5 that the Apostle presents the basic justification for his re-configuration of Israel's narrative, and it is here that we uncovered the most intriguing logical dynamics in the argument of Galatians. In order to demonstrate that his construal of Israel's story is more reliable than his opponents', Paul points to two recent events which those opponents must agree took place: the crucifixion of Christ and the Galatians' reception of the Spirit prior to any Torah-observance. These two events, Paul insists, were not foreseen in Israel's story. When one tries to understand them as part of a traditional reading of that narrative, they cause irreconcilable contradictions. How can God's agent for the redemption of Israel die as a covenant traitor? How can those outside the covenant of Israel gain the eschatological blessing promised to those who faithfully keep Torah? These events emerge as interpretive "gaps" which resist integration into the ordered pattern of the story's plot. Yet, if that Israelite story is to be understood as the universal narrative, these events must be comprehended within it. Hence, Paul argues that in the wake of these novel experiences a re-configuration of Israel's narrative is necessary. What is more, he insists that it is his own re-configuration of that story which
can succeed in integrating these events, resolving these interpretive "gaps," where the version told by his Galatian opponents must fail. The balance of Paul's theological argument in 3:6-4:11 is then a matter of laying out the re-configured narrative in enough detail to show that it can indeed remain coherent while integrating both the chapters which have gone before and these new, unforseen episodes.

The core of Paul's argument in Galatians thus turns out to be an argument from coherence. Paul focusses on a collection of "set pieces" of knowledge upon which he and his opponents agree: the episodes in Israel's story, along with the cross and the Galatians' experience of the Spirit. He then tries to show that it is only his overall paradigm which can make sense of all these pieces together. Yet Paul does not understand himself to be replacing a traditional paradigm with a new one, and here a grasp of the narrative shape of Paul's knowledge is necessary to understand his logic. For if the "set pieces" of knowledge which the Apostle is rearranging were an a-temporal cluster of "facts" or "phenomena," there would be no organic relationship between the old paradigm and Paul's new paradigm, beyond the fact that some of the same individual items were interpreted by both. It is only when these "set pieces" are understood as events and actions in a coherent story that we can discern, not only their essential unity, but also their inherent and irrevocable connection with surprising and novel events like the crucifixion and the Spirit's advent. For just as the later chapters in a novel belong to the earlier chapters by virtue of being bound together as a single book, so in a universal narrative any new event belongs inherently to the story. Hence, Paul's re-configuration of Israel's traditional theology was not simply a rejection of that theology. It was the organic
and necessary development in understanding which takes place as one follows an unfolding story, a story whose sentences are not yet all spoken.

2. Filling the Gaps in Paul's Talk about Knowledge

If this narrative logic is the kind of reason which Paul assumes can lead one to religious knowledge, then we have in hand a hint toward solutions for some of the aporias which emerged early in this study. We can begin, for instance, to understand how Paul could treat human reason so positively, and yet could imply that in giving up "worldly wisdom" one must also sacrifice ordinary standards of plausibility. For Paul's narrative logic tends to be coherentist, rather than foundationalist. In an argument from coherence, however, even one's most fundamental values and assumptions may be challenged if one meets a sufficiently coherent view of the world which is structured in different terms.701

As he argued against his Galatian opponents, the Apostle did not accept many of their assumptions about the shape which a plausible telling of Israel's story must take. The permanent validity of Torah, for instance, an idea which for the Galatian opponents (as for most Jews) seems to have been axiomatic, was deliberately challenged by Paul. Yet he could still argue rationally for his position by pointing out that it was internally coherent. In the same way, we can imagine how believers could be impelled to abandon their "worldly" assumptions about what constitutes a plausible view of the world by the sheer coherence of the Christian message. Paul's message of Christ crucified may be foolishness to Greeks and a stumbling block to Jews because of its violation of ordinary assumptions and values, yet the vision of the world which it presents might still possess

701 See W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas."
an internal coherence which rational minds can recognize and find compelling.

What is the measure of coherence for Paul? At times we see the Apostle emphasizing repeated patterns in the narrative. In 4:21-31, for example, Paul points out that while God's acceptance of uncircumcized Galatian Gentiles may defy ordinary human expectations, so too did the miraculous birth of Isaac. Elsewhere we find Paul pointing out how the patterns of action within the narrative are analogous to patterns of action in the world of everyday life. Hence the Apostle's understanding of God's promise to Abraham appears more plausible when he points out its affinities with human customs surrounding wills and inheritance (3:15-18). Yet both of these approaches appear in Galatians as secondary modes of argument. They bolster Paul's claim that his re-configuration of Israel's narrative is coherent, but the Apostle does not depend on them to do much of the work of convincing his audience. Rather, Paul's central argument is a matter of showing that his construal of the story yields a satisfying plot. The coherence which he tries to demonstrate (and which he claims his opponents' telling of the story lacks) is the narrative coherence of a plot in which the events can all be seen to have causal connections, and in which the characters involved can be imbued with comprehensible motives for acting. How, for example, can Christ's death be God's condemnation of his own agent as a lawbreaker if God then vindicates him by raising him from the dead? What coherent motives can make sense of these apparently contradictory actions? Paul argues that the story can only be read coherently if the Messiah's death is instead understood as (among other things) a vicarious one in which believers can participate. For in this case God's apparent judgment of the Messiah can be understood as
the pivotal moment in a larger divine plan.

At first glance we might assume that this narrative logic could only operate in conversations among those who share a common story. It is possible to imagine, however, how such a narrative logic could also lead Paul's Gentile hearers to the conviction that the Christian narrative is superior to entirely different universal stories. This is because coming to faith involves, for Paul's converts, a shift from one way of configuring the phenomena of the world to another, and such a shift could well follow the kind of coherentist logic which Paul uses in Galatians. Even Paul's Gentile hearers may well have been impressed with the internal consistency of the Christian story and so adopted it as a new framework for understanding the world. Of course, such arguments from coherence still always assume some common ground between the rival positions. In Galatians, Paul shared with his opponents a conviction that the episodes of Israel's narrative were true. This broad area of agreement gave the Apostle a fund of basic "realities" to configure in a more coherent manner than his opposition. When Paul approached pagan listeners in Lystra or in Corinth he would not be able to work with such a broad base of common convictions. This does not mean, however, that an argument from coherence could not make use of a common basic store of data. For, as we saw above, Paul's theological narrative encompasses "mundane" knowledge, knowledge about ordinary and immediate matters with which any inhabitant of Paul's Mediterranean world could agree. To the extent, then, that Paul's narrative furnished a pagan audience with a more coherent account of their everyday experiences, they would have rational grounds to adopt that Gospel.

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Moreover, we also saw above that the Galatians' experience of the Spirit constituted a part of the common fund of phenomena which Paul and his opponents were competing to configure. While pagan listeners might not have these specific experiences, Paul seems to have presumed at times that miraculous phenomena did play a part in the conversion of new believers. Here we should call to mind again the role which prophetic speech plays in conversion in 1 Cor 14:24-25. The point here is that if an outsider arrives in a Christian meeting and is told his innermost secrets, he will have a hard time integrating that experience into his prior account of the world. He will at least be pushed to acknowledge that "God is really among" the believers. What is more, this initial re-construal of the world will simply heighten the cognitive tension for the outsider. For if God is among the Christians, then presumably their message is true, a message which proclaims such follies as a crucified redeemer. Moreover, if the tradition of the resurrection appearances which Paul repeats in 1 Cor 15:1-8 was a prominent part of his early preaching, one can imagine that eyewitness testimony to the resurrection of this crucified criminal would serve as a powerful support for the plausibility of the Gospel. Not only would such an event tend, when integrated into a hearer's world-view, to lend Paul credibility as the (self-proclaimed) messenger of the Risen One, but his message would make much better sense of the cross and resurrection than would the usual Greco-Roman notions of divinized humans.702 Even Gentile citizens of the Roman world could

702 Such a shameful death would have been difficult for Greco-Roman audiences to reconcile with the divinity which they would associate with resurrection. While the divine Aesclepius was thought to have been slain by Zeus as punishment for his audacious healings (see Diod. Sic. 4.71.2-3; Ovid, *Metam.* 642-49; Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.55-58), even this judgment (being struck by lightning) would not have approached in the ancient mind the horror of crucifixion. See further Scott, "Philo's Moses," 93-4.

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thus be pushed, quite rationally, to adopt the (apparently foolish) new Christian message if they found that it accounted more coherently for their experience of the world, both mundane and miraculous.

The point here is not that this is actually how all early Christians came to faith (though it is a plausible scenario), but rather that the kind of logic evident in Paul's argumentation allows us to understand how one could move from unbelief to faith through a rational process. In other words, Paul's assumptions about the basic viability of human reason make sense if we assume that the reasoning involved is the kind which Paul himself employs with the Galatians. This insight leads, in turn, to a suggestion about how Paul might understand the Spirit and human reason to work together in the believer's conversion. The rational process involved in conversion would, assuming Paul's style of reasoning, be very much like the kind of "paradigm shift" which Thomas Kuhn observed in the physical sciences. Yet, as Kuhn pointed out, there is an intangible element to such shifts. One can become frustrated by inconsistencies within one's own paradigm, and can recognize that there seem to be fewer such inconsistencies within another. There is, however, no precise way of determining when this cognitive pressure has built up to the extent that a change of paradigms is rationally justified. In this moment of decision a plethora of non-rational factors may play a role in nudging one toward the new or back

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703 Kuhn, Structure. Note the similarity between Paul's constant reference to his own theological story in his argument and Kuhn's account of the use of paradigms in debates where the choice of paradigm is at issue (see Kuhn, Structure, 94).

704 Kuhn (Structure, 94) writes: "Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue."
into the familiar embrace of the old. If Paul were right that something in the human moral makeup resists any recognition of the Gospel, is offended by its "folly," then Paul might also be right that all the reasoning in the world would still not on its own bring about a single conversion. While the journey toward faith in Christ would be an essentially rational journey, there would still remain the need for the Spirit to re-make the human moral constitution and so make possible the decision to adopt the Gospel paradigm.

3. Dilemmas Old and New

This study of Paul's epistemological assumptions was begun in the hope that the Apostle might help us in the present to find our way back to more workable ways of approaching religious knowledge. Now, at its end, has the search borne fruit? At the very least we can begin to understand why Lucian would be so dumbfounded by the early Christians' apparently groundless beliefs. Doubtless many ordinary believers did not follow the eminently rational process of conversion which has been extrapolated here from Paul's argumentative logic. Yet even if he had met Paul himself and heard his arguments Lucian may still have remained unimpressed. On the logical plane, Paul does not argue in foundationalist terms, following syllogisms from unquestionable premises up to unassailable conclusions, but tends rather to follow a coherentist logic. This means, however, that the Apostle does not try to justify his system in terms of the dominant Greco-Roman intellectual traditions, but rather proclaims a narrative which comes from outside those traditions and seeks to demonstrate its coherence. Hence, one who judged reasonableness in terms of elite Greco-Roman thought would likely miss the coherence in Paul's story and see only that it lacked the "proper" sort of justification. At the same time,
If we asked Paul to explain Lucian's response, he would probably say that without the Spirit's aid the Gospel would always remain a stench in the satirist's nostrils. For this is how fallen humanity will, in Paul's view, always react to God's confrontation of our corrupt illusions. While Lucian would hardly accept this explanation of his sentiment, the Apostle does remind us that one's evaluation of a world view always involves a non-rational element, and that criticism of the Christian Gospel as "irrational" may sometimes arise from a pre-intellectual rejection of its values and its implications.

Yet, beyond explaining this old conflict between elite philosophy and Christian belief, does Paul's way of knowing offer a viable way forward for contemporary Christian theology? I would suggest that it does. On the one hand, the Apostle's implicit epistemology is one which avoids the pitfalls of foundationalism. There is no search here for a neutral vantage point, unsullied by prior beliefs and commitments. The prior story is simply assumed as a way of interpreting the world. On the other hand, Paul's narrative logic does not allow for the kind of gap between religious dogma and lived experience which sometimes plagues confessional movements. For his narrative approach to knowing implies a perennial openness to experience and novelty through which the story remains responsive to the world. What is more, Paul's balancing of a confidence in the usefulness of reason with a caution about the moral corruption which can paralyze that reason offers a nuanced solution to the apparent conflict between faith and the intellect in Christian belief. Coming to faith can be driven by rational thought from beginning to end. At the same time, "paradigm shifts" of this magnitude also involve a decision to leave one way of living and embrace a new one, a decision in which non-rational factors always
intrude. Since the Christian story, in particular, may challenge basic human tendencies toward idolatry and control the rational decision to embrace this narrative may only be possible where the believer exerts a moral effort to overcome these corrupt tendencies. One could thus argue that the moral effort involved in conversion is only possible with the aid of the Spirit, while at the same time insisting that such conversion is a fully rational process.

To say that Paul's epistemological assumptions offer theology a useful way forward, however, is not to deny that they raise new problems of their own. How, for example, would the Spirit's aid and the human will work together in the moral effort which faith requires? If Lucian's derision of the Gospel is due to his human moral corruption, is his failure to embrace the story a failure of his own will? Or does Lucian lack the Spirit's aid, perhaps because God has simply excluded him from the "elect?" We are led inevitably back to the question of "predestination" in Paul's thought and the place of human choice in salvation, a question upon which this study sheds no new light.

Another problem, and perhaps a more fruitful one, arises from the specifically narrative shape of the Apostle's argumentative logic. Does the Christian narrative need to be re-configured yet again in light of the experience of the Church? We have no reason to think that Paul held his own convictions tentatively. His experience on the Damascus Road and the resultant conviction that Christ was risen may have pushed him to re-configure Israel's story, but he believed that he stood at the dawn of the new age. No further re-construals of the narrative would be necessary before human beings could follow that story into eschatological communion with Christ and God. Yet by taking
theological knowledge to be an unfolding cosmic story, a story of which we are all a part, Paul modelled a kind of reasoning which demands, in principle, that theology remain an open-ended exercise. After all, more than nineteen centuries after the Apostle's death new chapters of that story continue to unfold in our own experience. Those who would follow Paul's narrative logic are thus left with the perpetual question whether some new experience might force believers in Christ to re-configure the Christian narrative once again. Moreover, since Paul understands all of human life as taking place within this story, any human experience (or cumulative set of experiences) could in principle force a re-configuration of the narrative. If the Galatians' experience of the Spirit could constitute an interpretive "gap" in the story, so could the experiences of geologists examining rock strata or the experiences of a soldier amid the horrors of war. Hence, Paul's theological reasoning tends to undo the usual distinction between theology "from above" and theology "from below." For neither the prior narrative nor the new event is given priority. Both must be respected and integrated into the whole.

Still, if the Apostle's logic tends to open theology up to the constant possibility of change, its distinctly narrative shape also offers a model in which tradition and the past are given great authority. The new event gains its interpretive significance from its status as another sentence in the unfolding narrative, but by the same token that new event in turn must be configured together with all of the earlier chapters. Paul's strenuous efforts in Gal 3-4 to show how the scriptural episodes can be read coherently in his re-construal of the story demonstrate his conviction that, no matter how the significance of an episode might change, none can be left behind. Finally, when we consider Paul's narrative logic in
light of Iser's phenomenology of reading, it becomes evident that re-configuration of the theological narrative is a process which is endemic to its nature as narrative. So, while in Kuhn's model the emergence of a new paradigm involves the "destruction" of the old, new readings of the story do not involve the rejection of the old narrative but rather its natural extension. Re-configuration of a narrative is a part of faithfulness to that story, and while old readings may die this is a death brought about in some sense by the narrative itself. There is, of course, no sure way, according to this Pauline logic, to know for certain when the theological story needs to be reconfigured or, when it does, which new reading of the narrative is best. In Paul's own case we can see that the debate over his re-construal of Israel's story raged long beyond his death. For those who embrace Paul's kind of theological thinking there will be no rest from this kind of debate while creation still groans awaiting its redemption. In the meantime, however, what remains for "Pauline" theologians is the ongoing process of competitive narration, telling the story over and over again in the attempt to read it well, to read it coherently.

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705 See Kuhn, Structure, 97-8.
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