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POLITICAL PARTIES AND MILITARY INTERVENTION:
THE CASE OF GREECE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY SYSTEM AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF POST WAR GREECE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY SYSTEM AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF POST WAR GREECE

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work is to attempt to demonstrate that the displacement of the civilian political authority in April 1967 by a segment of the Greek Military establishment was the result of the lack of legitimacy of the country's liberal bourgeois political institutions--in particular the party system. Contemporary Greece is a product of the French Revolution, the Enlightenment and foreign intervention. The small segment of the Greek middle classes that spearheaded the Greek Revolution of 1821 against the Ottoman Turks lacked both ideological cohesion and socio-political legitimacy. The result was that the superimposition of liberal democratic institutions upon the newly "liberated" nation-state whose economic base was in constant fluctuation had adverse affects. Secondly, the inability of the middle classes to destroy or even subordinate the country's quasi-feudal relations, i.e., patronage system, prevented the entrenchment and legitimization of these institutions within the Greek polity. Throughout the country's history military revolts and foreign intervention further contributed to the loss of legitimacy of these institutions, in particular that of the party system. Thus their performance and functions in the political system were impaired. To put it in another way, no political parties were developing along corporate and associational ties capable of becoming the mechanism for the channelling or accommodating the various social groups that were coming into being due to changes in the economic base, i.e., industrialization and urbanization.

As these developments were coming into focus following World War II, the country's military apparatus was experiencing drastic and dramatic

change--that is, it was being professionalized, as well as becoming more independent from the political authority. In other words the process of professionalism and the increased autonomy of the military structure contributed to the development of a structural disequilibrium within the Greek political system, hence the military structure acquired unprecedented dominance within Greek society. Furthermore, as this process took place, changes in the economic base allowed the development of new heterogeneous social groups, especially during the early sixties, whose demands could not be marshalled by the existing political parties in view of their patron-client nature. Therefore, the pressures and demands of these social groups led to the disintegration of the party system which in turn created a power vacuum within the political arena, thus facilitating the condition for a component of the Greek Officer Corps to displace the existing civilian political authority and take over the management of the state's affairs on April 21, 1967.

In conclusion, then, this work argues that the Greek political elite should have made some efforts to create viable and legitimate political institutions, i.e., political parties, capable of accommodating new social groups without breaking up and causing political instability for the political system. It is the opinion of this author, that a viable party system is, at this juncture, a suitable and effective means of developing the Greek political system, as well as preventing future military intrusions.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The study of civil military relations has been of considerable importance to social scientists, particularly since there has been a vast proliferation of military intervention into the political affairs of nation-state following World War II. The primary targets have been the new and developing countries.[1] The rate of these intrusions has reached alarming proportions. Outside North America and Western Europe, the armed forces have become the most important power contenders in any political system. For example, on the night of April 21, 1967, the tanks rumbled into the streets of Athens and in a few hours the people of Greece[2] unexpectedly discovered that a group of officers of the Greek Armed Forces, in a swift and well-planned coup, had overthrown the conservative government of Panagiotes Kanellopoulos, replacing it with a military regime. Thus, as a political scientist remarked, "Greece overnight acquired the dubious distinction of being the first West European [sic] country to fall under dictatorial rule since the troubled thirties."[3] A recent study[4] has concluded that military regimes outnumber "democratic" and "communist" political systems. The same study notes that on the African continent alone twenty out of forty-one, or just under fifty percent, of the post-war newly emergent nation-states are under the rule of military or civil military cliques.

Military dictatorships do not just come "out of the blue." They are the result of the kind of civil-military relations that exist or prevail in a given historical epoch, or a given geographical region

(e.g., Latin America, Africa), or a given country (e.g., Ghana, Greece). The pattern of civil-military relations, in turn, is the result of both historical experiences and of the economic base which is the focal point in shaping a historical period, a geographical region or a nation-state. As Karl Marx, in one of his writings, remarked:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.[5]

Approaches Toward Explaining the Reasons that Underlie Military Intervention

A The Aristocratic Model*

The quotation from Karl Marx above is very apt in considering the basic approaches of models of civil military relations. The first model to be considered is applicable to, or descriptive of, the pre-industrial feudal states, what some writers have called the "aristocratic model."[6] In this model relations between the political arm and the military arm of the feudal or aristocratic state were passive and cordial. This particular type of civil military relations was a product of the social conditions and the social relationships that prevailed in pre-industrial states, such as England and France. Two elements dominated this mode of civil military relations: (a) in the feudal aristocratic state there existed a clear cut hierarchical system which in turn clearly "delineated" both the "source of authority" and the "prestige" of any member of both the political and military elites; and (b) the base of recruitment in both military and civil structures was very small and narrow. For example,

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*The term model is used throughout this work to mean an analytical construct.

in 1789 the officer corps of the French Army was composed of 9,578 men, of which 6,333 were of aristocratic background, the rest being "commoners" and "soldiers of fortune." Similarly in Prussia, the ratio between the nobles and the non-nobles was greatly in favour of the former. For example, in 1806 in an officer corps of 7,100 men, only 700 were of non-noble background.[7]

The aristocratic model of civil military relations was possible because of the narrow base of recruitment in both the military and political elite. Therefore, such a mode of civil-military relations led to what Samuel P. Huntington calls "subjective control"[8] over the military arm of the nation-state by the civil authorities. This form of control was possible due to the ability of the aristocratic family to dominate the politico-military and economic affairs of the feudal political system. That is, the aristocratic family supplied "one son to politics and one to the military. Birth, family connections and common ideology insure that the military will embody the ideology of the dominant groups in society." Thus, in the feudal aristocratic state of affairs "political control is civilian control" only insofar as there exists and prevails an "identity of interest between aristocratic and military groups." To put it in another way, the presence of common interests provided the linkage between the military elite and the political elite, which in turn led to civil control and the neutralization of the military. As Janowitz put it: "The military is responsible because it is a part of the government."[9]

B Liberal Democratic Model

This mode of civil military relations lasted only as long as the feudal aristocratic system remained intact. With the advent of industrialization the feudal aristocratic state changed drastically. Not only was the material basis of the feudal political system altered, but more significantly, its socio-economic and political structures. The emerging new forces or classes, e.g., the bourgeoisie, demanded new governmental structures, e.g., parliament, whereby they would be in a position to influence and control the nation-state in every aspect, and particularly its military establishment. Thus, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, struggles between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were aimed at increasing their respective power vis-à-vis that of the Crown and the landed elite, or class which it represented. The bourgeoisie wanted to "maximize parliamentary control" over the military as a means of curtailing the powers of the Crown and in doing so increasing its own. Secondly, one of the issues at stake in these struggles was whether the aristocratic or liberal bourgeois interests "were to prevail in the armed forces."[10]

In the struggle between the emerging bourgeoisie and the old aristocratic elite the former emerged victorious, and thus a new form of civil military relations came into being: what some writers have labelled as the "liberal democratic" model.[11] Whereas in the aristocratic "model" the military arm of the state was controlled by "subjective" means, in the liberal democratic model political control over the military establishment is exercised through "objective" means; that is, through a formal set of rules in which the functions of the military are clearly specified as well as the conditions or circumstances in which the military may

exercise its power. This mode of control of the military is based on the assumption that the officer corps of the military establishment are merely "professionals in the employ of the state."[12]

The classic exponent of the liberal democratic model of civil military relations is Samuel P. Huntington.[13] The primary focus of his work has been the investigation of the interacting processes between the "professional" officer corps and the civilian components of the political system. His primary concern is: How to prevent the military elite from intervening in the political affairs of the nation-state. By the term military intervention we mean the displacement of the prevailing political and/or governmental authority by another authority, or the supplementing of the civil governmental authority either by direct rule (in which the military interventionist forces take over the management of the political and economic affairs of the state themselves) or through an alliance with a segment of the country's political elite.

According to John L. Johnson, in Latin America "the influence of military officers has played a part in virtually all individual and social relationships, and civilians have been unable to devise workable systems for permanently keeping in check and military machines subordinate to policy objectives."[14] The ingredient which Huntington offers as a means of preventing the military from intruding in the political sphere of the state is that of "civil supremacy." This has a particular meaning for him, namely, that control over the military can best be maintained not merely through the maximization of military professionalism. Thus, the key element in the liberal democratic model of civil military relations, at least in Huntington's view, is the concept of "professionalism."

According to Huntington, this concept is composed of three very important, distinct characteristics: (a) military expertise, (b) responsibility and (c) corporateness.[15] Military expertise is the result of training and prolonged education and experience. Through these processes the military man acquires the "knowledge and skill" which in turn enables the "professional officer" to apply it irrespective of time and place. Secondly, responsibility is acquired through one's experience, that is, through his relationship with the client--the political elite of the state. Finally, corporate loyalty is the result of the recognition of a set of operating standards held by a particular occupational group--a sense of esprit de corp--which allows that group: (a) to share a sense of organic unity and consciousness and (b) to occupy a distinct sphere of competence, share common bond of work, and most important, assume a unique social responsibility.

This kind of "professionalism," Huntington believes, would render the military "politically sterile and neutral." In his own words:

> . . . [professionalism] produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time it preserves the essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military profession. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within a state.[16]

Like its predecessor, the liberal democratic state of civil military relations is a manifestation of both historical experiences and the kind of economic and political structures that are prevalent in Western European and North American societies. In view of the nature of this mode of civil military relations, we find it to be inadequate for explaining civil military relations, and more specifically, military

intervention, in new and developing or "transitional" political systems. (By the term "transitional" we mean those political systems which are both economically and politically in a state of constant fluctuation; that is, such societies do not have any dominant mode of production and their political structures are alien, "fragile, unstable and porous."[17]) For example, the Turkish army of 1960 fits well into Huntington's conceptualization of professionalism, yet on May 27 of the same year it overthrew the "legitimate" government of Premier Menderes.[18]

A similar example, the case of Greece in 1967, demonstrates that even the professionalization of the officer corps does not necessarily guarantee that a military establishment will be politically sterile and neutral, especially in "transitional" political systems, e.g., Greece. This is so due to the fact that such a model of civil military relations requires two very important ingredients: In countries where the liberal democratic model of civil military relations prevails, there exists a dominant (capitalist) mode of production, e.g., the United States. The presence of such mode of production necessitates the conditions for relative stability in the political system's base, and thus prevents the emergence of strong counter elites that might be in a position to displace the present ruling classes. Secondly, there exists viable liberal democratic governmental structures with a broad social base and consensus.[19] For example, the parliamentary institutions and the congressional system of government in the United Kingdom and the United States respectively are deeply-rooted and accepted by the elites and the populace at large. Therefore, the presence of these two conditions prevents the military elites from intervening in the political affairs

of these political systems. On the other hand, these two ingredients are absent in "transitional" societies; hence such a model of civil military relations could not function, nor could it be used as a tool of analysis to explain military intervention in new and developing societies.

In summary, neither the aristocratic model nor the liberal democratic model can adequately explain military intervention in transitional societies like Greece. With respect to the former model we find that in Greece there is an absence of feudal-aristocratic relations which are a precondition for a non-interventionist officer corps. Greece had been under Ottoman rule for almost four hundred years. She was unable to develop a landed aristocracy of the kind that existed in Great Britain, which could dominate both the political arena and the military establishment, because both of these areas were in the hands of the colonial power. With respect to the latter model, like the former, it cannot be of any use in countries like Greece, primarily due to the absence of deeply rooted and viable liberal democratic institutions. Unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, the emergence of the liberal democratic institutions in Greece were not due to any "natural" development or a historical process, but due to foreign pressures and influences.[20]

C The Developmental Model

In response to the shortcomings of the feudal aristocratic model and particularly of the liberal democratic model, some social scientists, in their quest to explain why the military intervenes in transitional political systems, have put forth what Jose Nun calls the "developmental model."[21] Unlike the liberal democratic model, this model of civil military relations is a product of experiences derived from the newly emergent

nation-states of Southeast Asia and Africa. The basic premise that underlies this model is as follows: The army is recruited primarily from the lower and middle classes of society; secondly, the army's level of organization is high in contrast to the level of organization of other segments or components of society; finally, the lack or inability of the traditional elites to foster socio-economic developments impels the armed forces to enter into the political sphere of the transitional nation-state.

A proponent of this model is Lucian Pye. In one of his numerous works he has argued that the more recent military interventions were of a "dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies that have been subverted by the 'corrupt practices' of politicians."[22] Another expert in the field put it as follows:

> As a revolutionary force they [the military] have contributed to the disintegration of the traditional political order. . . as a modernizing force they have been champions of the middle class aspirations or of popular demands for social change and have provided administrative and technological skills to the civilian sector of countries in which such skills are scarce.[23]

It is quite obvious that the military elite is viewed by these two proponents of the developmental model primarily as an agent of modernization. The implicit assumption is that since the military elite has undergone modernization, it feels obligated to assist the society and/or community at large in modernization when the political elite is unable or unwilling to do so. For example, the "Young Turk" movement succeeded in breaking up the "hide-bound social and political" structures of Turkey and embarked upon the development of the necessary institutional arrangements for social and economic progress--e.g., political parties,

bureaucracy and state-sponsored industrialization.[24] Similarly, Nasser, upon acquiring power in Egypt in the fifties, embarked upon the modernization of Egyptian society through the technical and the organizational abilities of the country's military elite. In summary, the military man in this model is perceived as a "champion of progress and development."[25]

Although the developmental model may be adequate in understanding why the military intervened in countries such as Burma and Egypt, it is inadequate for explaining the intervention of the Greek military. This is so because the political elite was both willing and prepared to modernize the country. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that the Greek military, in its seven year rule, made any effort to modernize the country through its technical and organizational abilities. Nor did it attempt to introduce such structural or institutional changes as those that occurred in countries like Turkey and Egypt.

D Psychological and Ideological Model

In contrast to the aforementioned models of civil military factors as causes of military intervention or non-intervention, other writers, such as Samuel E. Finer and M.D. Feld, have focussed their analysis of military intervention upon cultural and social factors. For M.D. Feld, military intervention depends upon the level of "secularization" of society and not upon the level of military professionalism. According to Feld, efforts at economic and political modernization of society, such as the actions of the political elite in improving the standard of living of the people, and increasing the level of participation of the masses in the affairs of the state, are in direct contradiction with the values of the military officer corps. As he put it: "According to secular

ideology, public servants are participants in a commonly-shared enterprise."[26] In view of the nature and function of the professional soldier, when the "secular ideology" is introduced the military man finds himself in an anomalous position. That is, the military officer corps is the only "prominent group excluded both by tradition and by design from a positive welfare contribution . . . . By tradition the officer corps is anti-commercial, non-entrepreneurial. In function it is non-productive."[27] Therefore, the secular policies of the political elite have a tendency to alienate groups within the officer corps. This kind of alienation, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, would lead:

> . . . the soldier [to feel] that he occupies an inferior position, and his wounded pride either stimulates his desire for hostilities that would render his services necessary or give him a desire for revolution, during which he may hope to win by force of arms the political influence and personal importance now denied him.[28]

Also, such alienation has a tendency to develop into a form of "militant nationalism;" that is, "a vision of a modern society in which secular welfare and sovereign authority would be reconciled. The consciousness of a unique national mission would promote internal harmony, eliminate social conflict and promote economic efficiency."[29] It is on this basis that Feld puts forth the following hypothesis:

> Since the [governmental] military policy of secular society has as its objective the creation of an <u>apolitical armed forces</u> and the social policy of the professional soldier has as its objective the creation of an <u>apolitical society</u>, sustained and equal partnership between the two is impossible.[30]

In comparing Feld's hypothesis to the argument advanced by the exponents of the developmental model we find that the latter perceives the military man as a progressive force, whereas Feld sees him as a reactionary

one. To some extent Feld's hypothesis is valid with respect to the Greek case, but such a hypothesis does not take into consideration the structural weaknesses of the Greek political system, namely, the fragility of the country's liberal democratic institutions, such as the party system.

E Cultural Model

In contrast to Feld another writer, Samuel E. Finer, focusses on cultural factors as a means of explaining military intervention. Finer seriously questions the basic assumption that underlies the liberal democratic model--namely, that there exists a "natural" tendency of the military establishment, through professionalization, to subordinate itself to the civilian authorities. He contends that military professionalism, as defined by Huntington, does not adequately safeguard against military intrusions in the political sphere of the nation-state. On the contrary, Finer notes, military professionalism has a tendency to thrust the military into a "collision course with the civilian authorities."[31] He maintains that in order to prevent such a tendency from manifesting itself, it is necessary that the military elite absorb the "principles of the supremacy of the civil power."[32] In other words, the military mind must unconditionally accept the major policies and programs formulated by the nation's politically responsible leaders and the country's norms, mores and values--its political culture.

For Finer, the level of political culture is the key determinant in explaining military intervention in any society. In his own words: "The levels to which the military press their intervention are related to the level of political culture of their society." For him the

> level of political culture is high, when (1) the 'political formula', i.e., the belief or emotion by virtue of which the rulers claim the moral right to govern and to be obeyed, is generally accepted. Or, (2) the complex of civil procedures and organs which jointly constitute the political system are recognized as authoritative, i.e., as duty-worth, by a wide consensus. Or, again in other words, where (3) public involvement in and attachment to these civil institutions is strong and widespread.[33]

From this explanation Finer proceeds to establish a set of criteria whereby one can assess the level of public attachment and involvement in a given society's civil institutions. His criteria are as follows: (1) the existence of wide public approval for legal transfer of political power from one political group to another; (2) acceptance and recognition of what constitutes the "sovereign authority;" and (3) what proportion of the public at large is mobilized and organized into "private associations"--e.g., political parties and labour unions.[34] Therefore, according to Finer, when a nation-state meets all these conditions it is said that it has a "high" level of political culture; when it does not, it has a "low" level of political culture. For instance Britain and the United States fall into the first category whereas countries such as Ghana and Greece fall into the second category. By definition, then, the latter countries are subject to military intervention.

In Finer's formulation the high level of political culture in any society may be a remedy against military interventions. However, for such a state of political culture to prevail, there must also exist a high degree of socio-economic, political and cultural continuity. Transitional societies such as Greece do not have such continuity. For example, since Greece gained independence and nation-state status, she has had a number of military interventions. Given the absence of continuity with

respect to economic, social, political and cultural factors, is military intervention the result of a "low" level of political culture or of structural weaknesses such as an unstable party system?

According to Finer, indeed, the "low" level of political culture leads to military intervention. If we accept this proposition, we are accepting a tool of analysis that is alien to the conditions of our phenomenon. That is, Finer's typology is primarily based upon the experiences and traditions of those nation-states which historically have developed the liberal democratic institutions and traditions which are central to his explanation of military intervention. Third world countries have gone through different historical experiences and their material basis, that is, the level of development of the productive forces, is far different from that of those industrialized nation-states which have a "high" level of political culture. Secondly, transitional societies are highly dependent upon industrialized states not only for economic assistance, but also for military aid. Given the dependence by transitional societies upon industrialized countries for the training of their officer corps, some writers have assumed that military-related training programs conducted by a foreign power have a substantial impact upon the military mind.[35] That is, there is a tendency to instigate a military coup d'etat by foreign-trained officers.

F Foreign Assistance and Training Syndrome

None of the writings which we have examined concerning military intervention take into consideration the impact or influence which military aid and military training abroad could have upon the country's

officer corps. For instance, if country "A" sends a relatively small segment of its officer corps to country "B" for military training purposes, what effect would such a group have upon the remaining officer corps? Is it possible that the environment in which the visiting officers were placed could have any effect upon country "A's" civil military relations?

Military intervention is not merely a product of lack of professionalization of the officer corps, structural and societal weaknesses, and low levels of political culture. It is also, in some cases, due to the impact of foreign military aid and military training--which we shall call the external structure of transitional political system. The role of foreign influences, such as military aid and training, are of considerable importance to a recipient country's civil military relations. As one writer has noted:

> [The] intended political consequences that derive from military assistance are probably harder to achieve than expected . . . . On the other hand, if military trainees are subjected to systematic political propaganda and organization, and return home with explicit theories as to how their countries' political structure should be changed. It is quite conceivable that such politically oriented training would improve the chances that the donor country would retain influence over their trainees.[36]

Another prominent analyst, Paul Hammond, testifying before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in 1970, stated the following with respect to the role of U.S. military assistance:

> Long-term professional identification, the first function, bolsters the most widely acknowledged utility of MAAG's [Military Assistance Advisory Group], their potential for influencing the host government through a trustful relationship. The U.S. Army has probably been the most successful service in developing [the] long-term professional [military man in the new states] . . . .[37]

It is quite obvious from the testimony of these two analysts that in the foreign aid programs of the United States, as well as of other powers, the emphasis has been placed upon "professionalizing" the officer corps of the developing countries through the Military Assistance Programs. Another researcher, H. Bienen, clearly notes that the primary purpose of military assistance, at least from the American point of view, is to stabilize a given area or country "through balance-of-power politics and through creating strong political units which will not be targets for aggression and subversion."[38] What is implicit in such a policy is that the power's (in this case the United States) economic and strategic interests are protected.

In the period between 1961 and 1966, for example, there were 31 military coup d'etats in the world, of which eleven were in one area--Latin America. What is striking in these military intrusions is that twelve, or thirty-nine percent, were in countries where the United States had military assistance programs. Moreover, "only one or two" of the coups in Latin America were to the "left," the majority of them were to the "right."[39]

From the evidence presented here it seems that foreign military assistance programs contribute to military intervention. However, we must caution against drawing any conclusion that military intervention arises solely from a systematic conspiracy by an outside "power" to purposely

undermine a nation's democratic process without properly and carefully taking into consideration other elements which, when they reach a critical state, would lead to military intervention.

The Nature of a Transitional Political System

Writers examining military intervention have a tendency to see it as resulting from "structural weakness." Hence they put forth the proposition that "societal and structural weaknessess" as well as the "low levels of political culture" (and, one may add, the absence of "professionalism"), tend to create a magnetic force which pulls "the armed forces into the power and legitimacy vacuum."[40] Such a proposition presupposes that the legitimate governing body, being unable to "rule", loses "legitimacy" and in doing so it "invites" the military to intervene. The problem with such a proposition is that it does not correctly identify the causal factors that lead to military intervention.

Let us grant that the notion of "professionalism," on which the liberal democratic model places great emphasis, is not applicable insofar as transitional countries are concerned. If professionalism is not the causal factor that leads to military intervention in transitional societies, what factors are? One expert in the field of civil military relations, in such countries, gives a partial answer--namely, that military intervention is caused primarily by the "political and institutional structure of society."[41] But what do we mean by the term "structure"? How did a transitional society acquire such structures? More importantly, under what circumstances and/or historical conditions did a transitional society come into being?

These questions are not taken into consideration when attempting to explain military intervention in transitional societies by the concepts of "level of political culture" (Finer) or "professionalization" (Huntington). The level of political culture or the degree of professionalism in a given society depends primarily upon the historical and socio-economic development of a country. For instance, countries with "high" levels of political culture (in Finer's terms), such as the United States and Great Britain, have such characteristics as high levels of industrialization and political and institutional structures which are historically rooted and developed (for example, political parties). Transitional states, however, have passed through completely different historical experiences such as as colonialism, whereby their process of historical development was sharply ruptured.[42] Moreover, their socio-economic base was completely altered to meet the requirements and interests of the colonial power. As Paul Baran put it:

> [The Western Capitalist states introduced in their colonies], with amazing rapidity, all the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist order. It effectively disrupted whatever was left of the 'feudal' coherence of the backward societies. It substituted market contracts for such paternalistic relationships as still survived from century to century. It reoriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economies of agricultural countries toward the production of marketable commodities. It linked their economic fate with the vagaries of the world market and connected it with the fever curve of international movements.[43]

Secondly, each colonial power, by abrogating the traditional political power structures, "implanted" its own governmental structures or institutions upon the fragile and unstable economic base. Moreover, such structures or institutions, in order to function effectively, required a sizeable middle class. However, due to the nature of the

colonial states, such class was very inept. Again, to quote Baran:

> The establishment of such institutions was, however, beyond the reach of the tiny middle class of most backward areas. The inherited backwardness and poverty of their countries never gave them an opportunity to gather the economic strength, the insight, and the self-confidence needed for the assumption of a leading role in society.[44]

Therefore, when the colonial powers withdrew and granted independence to their colonies, they adopted their former masters' liberal democratic system of government without having a stable economic base nor an effective political elite. For example, Nigeria, following independence, adopted the English parliamentary system, whereas Cameroun adopted the French one. The fragility of the economic base, the low level of development of the productive forces, the adoption of the liberal democratic institutions by such emerging political systems which were alien to their socio-economic structures, and the inability to build the necessary political structures such as political parties made the entire political system highly unstable, which tended to result in a military dictatorship.

We stress the importance of political parties, in attempting to explain military intervention because as Professor Sartori put it, they are central "parts of the whole."[45] They play a very specific significant role in any political system, since they are both aggregators and articulators of interests; agents of change and of maintenance of the political system; provide the linkage between leaders and the masses; and as a distinguished Canadian Marxist scholar, C.B. Macpherson, put it: ". . . the chief function [of] the party system . . . in Western [Capitalist] democracies . . . [is] to moderate and smooth over a conflict of class interests so as to save the existing property institutions and the market system from effective attack."[46]

As Huntington informs us, the inability of the political parties to perform these tasks, as well as their inability to cope with social mobilization, demands and capabilities of the system, leads to serious structural weaknesses within the political arena which, in turn, leads to military intervention. In other words there is a causal relationship between the inability of the political parties (party system) to perform their functions and military intervention. For example, a recent study has demonstrated that ineffective political parties have led to military intervention. The researcher found that thirty-three new and developing nation-states, with either a two-party or a multi-party system, twenty of those were susceptible to military intrusions.[47]

A Definition of the Concept of Structure

Prior to examining the nature of political parties and their relationship to military intervention, we shall first define what we mean by the term "structure." For our definition of the term "structure" we shall borrow that of the late Polish sociologist, Stanislaw Ossowski:

> By 'structure' in its literal meaning we understand a spatial arrangement of elements, in which we regard spatial relations as being correlated with some system of relationships between these elements or between particular parts and the whole. The structure of a building is described in terms of the arrangement of elements fulfilling specific functions in relation to the building's purpose: e.g., the pillars and the arches support the vault while the roof shields the interior from rain. The structure of a living organism is the arrangement of tissues and organs which fulfill specific functions in the life process.[48]

From this metaphoric construct we can conceive of a political system in terms of structures with specific functions necessary for (a) the maintenance and (b) the development of a particular system or society. The "pillars" of any political system may be identified as

follows: (a) the military structure, through which a "military elite" emerges, organizes and develops, and stands ready to defend the "whole"--the nation-state--against adversaries; (b) the party system, through which "political elites" compete for political power, and whereby they can alter the political system according to their own perceptions and/or programs; (c) the governmental structure--the executive and the legislature--in which the victorious "political elite or elites" assume the management of the affairs of the political system and/or nation-state and thus become the "political managers" of the "whole;" (d) the economic structure, whereby the "economic elite" either independently or in collaboration with the other parts or components of the system assists in the maintenance and development of the political system; and (e) the external structure, through which the "foreign elite," in collaboration with one or more other elites of the whole, contributes to its economic development, as well as to other forms of development.[49]

These "structures" which we have described very briefly, compose a "typical" framework of the "modern" developed political system, with the exception of the external structure, which seems to be a "feature" of transitional political systems. Transitional societies in which the military has intervened have one common characteristic: they are products of colonialism. Their nation-state status was either granted by the colonial power, or was gained through guerrilla warfare, or the result of major international wars. These kinds of relationships exist throughout Southeast Asia and the African continent. As each of the European colonial powers withdrew, the "struggling" elites in those countries acquired state power, but they also maintained and in some cases devised

political and governmental structures similar to those of their colonial power, at least in appearance.

B Role of Political Parties in Society

As we noted earlier, the political elites of the newly emergent nation-states generally accepted their respective colonial power's system of government. In doing so the new states found themselves facing more problems than they could manage. The system of government which their respective elites adopted requires certain structures--e.g., a party system--in order to be able to function. Political parties are an integral part of the liberal democratic governmental system as well as of any other political system. Every political system today, irrespective of ideological beliefs, has some form of a party system, with the exception of those political systems whereby the military has intruded and has suspended the functioning of political parties. For example, one group of political scientists views the American political parties "as aggregating interests, setting goals and formalizing conflict. Thus, they are essential to the continued functioning of societies by resolving strains on social organization and by legitimizing governments".[50] Elsewhere, political parties are engaged in mobilizing the population (e.g., China), are involved in "political recruitment," that is, the "selection of the political leadership in whose hands power and decisions will in large measure reside" (e.g., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.).[51]

In the eyes of the aforementioned American political scientists, the maintenance of the American political system depends, to some degree, upon the ability of the country's political parties to perform certain necessary functions. In other words American political parties, through

a competitive realm, facilitate the conditions for political stability in the country and thus prevent any structural weaknesses which may pull the military into the political arena of America. The question which comes to mind, then, is what brings this system into being? To put it in another way, what explains the origins of political parties?; and what leads to party system instability, so that it is unable to perform its functions?

Political scientist, Maurice Duverger, associates the genesis of political parties with the development of parliamentary institutions, as well as the growth of the size of the electorate. He postulates three stages in the development of political parties: first, the creation of parliamentary groups; secondly, the development of electoral committees because of the necessity to organize the electorate; and finally, the "establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements"[52] which in turn leads to the formation of liberal bourgeois political parties.

Given the absence of "natural" parliamentary institutions in transitional societies, political parties in such societies developed at what Duverger calls the "extra parliamentary" level.[53] In many post-colonial countries, for example, nationalist movements not only formed the government, but they also in some cases formed the only political party (e.g., the Nationalist Union Party of Sudan).

A "modern political party" has certain specific features which enable it to perform its role within a political system. According to LaPalombara and Weiner, a modern political party does not have those features that characterize the antecendents of the modern political party in most Western countries (e.g., England and France), such as "cliques,

clubs and small notables." For these two writers the modern political party is defined in the following terms:

> (1) continuity in organization--that is, an organization whose expected life span is not dependent on the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and other relations between local and national units; (3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power; and (4) a concern on the part of the organization for seeking followers at polls or in some manner striving for popular support.[54]

Only a few Western and industrialized countries have political parties which meet the requirements of this definition--e.g., the United States, Great Britain and Canada. In transitional societies, characteristics reminiscent of the antecendents of the modern liberal bourgeois political party prevail. Greek political parties, for example, have not by-passed the "clique" and "notable" stage.[55] The reason for such state of affairs concerning Greek political parties, or those of similar nature in any transitional society, is that unlike classical capitalism whereby all forms of "feudal, patriarchal, [and] idyllic relations" were put to an end by the revolutionary class--the bourgeoisie.[56] In colonial and/or neo-colonial situations, and particularly in the latter, the old kinship and/or clientele relationships become the mechanisms or means whereby the neo-colonial power penetrates the political system and thus such relationships are further perpetuated.[57] In view of the clique and notable characteristics of political parties, there exist, in transitional countries like Greece, what James Jupp calls an "indistinct bi-partisan system"; that is, in such a party system the "party structure is loosely associational or 'notable-led' and where programmatic differences are vague and the social composition of party leaderships is similar."[58]

Without the presence of a competitive party system the liberal democratic form of government could not be sustained. Not only does the party system within the "whole" function to organize support for the policies of the different competing political elites, but, most importantly, it also acts as a vehicle of change and as a constraint on change. The Swedish socialists, for example, by organizing and developing a political party, and most importantly in participating in the country's competitive party system, were able to secure enough electorate support which in turn placed them at the helm of the Swedish state's decision-making apparatus. As political managers they were able to manage the affairs of the state and in the process improve the standard of living and the working conditions to a considerable extent. In the United States the most "heated" debates concerning the country's involvement in the Vietnam war took place within a political party--the Democratic Party--in the late sixties. The ability of a component of the American party system to "moderate and smooth" as well as control such conflict inhibited the expansion of roles of other structures within the political affairs of the system.

C Patron-Client System and Its Impact Upon Political Parties

In the development of Western liberal democracies, the capitalistic mode of production eliminated or subordinated to a considerable extent the existing archaic mode of social relations, i.e., patron-client relationships.[59] In contrast, in transitional societies, on the other hand, we find that under neocolonial conditions, as noted above, the aforementioned quasi-feudal relations were allowed to persist. The persistence and maintenance of the clientage system under neocolonial conditions, and the absence of a dominant mode of production facilitated the conditions under

which a patron-client system emerged as the predominant mode of social relations within the transitional society. In view of the hegemonic position of the patronage system, the nation-state's political parties, as well as civil-military relations were fundamentally shaped by the norms and values of this ancient mode of socio-economic and political relations.[60] Hence, the party system in such societies is characterized by the leadership of cliques and notables. As a result, its structure is very fragile and porous.

Given the nature of the political parties there exists no continuity in organization and no cohesiveness among the various notables that comprise the political party. For instance in the mid-sixties, in Greece, the Center Union Party was unable to control the group which was led by Andreas Papandreou. The very nature and composition of the party system in transitional societies, such as Greece in the period 1965 and 1967, tended to lead to factionalism. The various notables which comprised the Center Union, because of their diverse and often contradictory interests, were unable to work as a "unit." This led to disunity and instability within the party. As factionalism increased, the structure of the party system as a whole began to deteriorate and lose legitimacy. A power vacuum was created which in turn pulled the military elite or a segment thereof into the political arena.

Secondly, given the fragile structure of the party system of a transitional state, when there is rapid "mobilization" and great socio-economic changes, it cannot accommodate the new and demanding elites (e.g., the intellectuals and the technocrats), and cannot endure the drastic shocks produced by these changes. As a result, the party structure breaks down.

It is at this point that the elite of the military structure, or a segment thereof, either independently or in coalition with other elites (e.g., the economic elite) tend to displace or supplement the political managers.

There is a greater tendency for the military elite to intervene, either independently or in coalition, in this state of affairs, than any of the other elites, because of its cohesiveness and organizational ability. Moreover, unlike the other elites of the political system the military elite is the only elite with the capabilities of effectively displacing the political managers because of its monopoly over the means of violence. As one researcher aptly put it:

> The capacity of the military establishments in new nations to intervene in domestic politics derives from its distinctive military format, namely, its control of the instruments of violence.[61]

Summary and Purpose

We can summarize the arguments as follows: As factionalism increases within the various political parties, it tends to produce disintegration and loss of legitimacy for the party system as a whole, which in turn leads to military intervention into the political sphere of the nation-state, because of its social and ideological cohesiveness, organizational abilities and its monopoly over the instruments of violence. These two aspects enable the military elite to impose order in a situation of social and political chaos, something which the other elites in the system (e.g., the bureaucratic elite) are less equipped to do.

In the following pages we shall attempt to illustrate this proposition with respect to post-war Greece. We shall examine the following questions: (a) Why did the indistinct bi-partisan party system seem to work and then fall apart in the mid-sixties; (b) Why did the military

structure intervene in the political affairs of the Greek state; and (c) Has the pattern of emergence of the Greek nation-state had any impact or influence on Greece's contemporary problems, and if so what kind of "remedies" could be put forth as a means of preventing the military from displacing the "political managers"?

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. The works cited below are merely examples and by no means exhaust the literature on this subject: H. Daalder, The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries (The Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1969); S. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1976, 2nd Edition); M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

2. In spite of the fact that Greece is geographically situated on the European continent, her mores, values and culture are quite un-European. It is for these grounds that we do not consider her a "European" country. Thus when we look for an understanding of her politics it would be useful to place her in the category of the "transitional" states of the Middle East and African countries.

3. G. Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece" in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (ed.), Greece Under Military Rule (London: Secker and Warburg Ltd., 1972), p. 17.

4. Decalo, op. cit., p. 6.

5. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 10.

6. Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 2 & 111.

7. S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 22.

8. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 80-82; Janowitz, op. cit., p. 111.

9. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 111; J. Nun, Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup (Berkeley: University of California, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 7, 1969), pp. 4-8.

10. Huntington, op. cit., p. 81.

11. Janowtiz, ibid.; Nun, ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 112; Huntington, op. cit., pp. 80-85.

13. Huntington, ibid.

14. J.L. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 3.

15. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 8-11.

16. Ibid., p. 84.

17. H. Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. xiv.

18. E. Ozbudun, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 14, November 1966), pp. 1-22.

19. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 112.

20. As will be demonstrated in Chapter II, there is no relationship between contemporary Greek political institutions and those of the ancients.

21. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 28; Nun, op. cit., p. 5.

22. L. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 70; cited in H. Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization" in H. Bienen (ed.), The Military and Modernization (Aldine: Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 7-8.

23. J.J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. v.

24. P.A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backwardness" in A.N. Agarwala & S.P. Singh (eds.), The Economics of Underdevelopment (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 78; D.A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey" in J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 120-124.

25. L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 173; Nun, op. cit., p. 8.

26. M.D. Feld, "Professionalism, Nationalism and the Alienation of the Military" in J. Van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society (The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1968), p. 64.

27. Feld, op. cit., p. 64.

28. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Langley, 1840), Vol, II, Book III, pp. 266-267; cited in C.L. Cochran (ed.), Civil Military Relations (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1974), p. 3.

29. Feld, op. cit., p. 66.

30. Ibid., p. 68.

31. Finer, op. cit., p. 22.

32. Ibid., pp. 25-26 & 28.

33. Ibid., p. 78.

34. Ibid., p. 78.

35. For example, M.D. Wolpin, Military Aid and Counterrevolution in Third World (London: D.C. Heath & Co., 1972).

36. Cited in Wolpin, op. cit., p. 95.

37. Loc. cit.

38. Bienen (1968), op. cit., p. xvii.

39. Wolpin, op. cit., p. 130.

40. Decalo, op. cit., p. 7.

41. Loc. cit.

42. G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1975), pp. 98-99.

43. Baran, op. cit., p. 76.

44. Loc. cit.

45. G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976, Vol. 1), pp. 24-25.

46. C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 64-65; M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 283.

47. S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 404-409.

48. S. Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1963, trans. by S. Patterson), p. 7.

49. For example, the Marshall Plan assisted post-war European states, both in economic and military aid.

50. J. Jupp, Political Parties (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 22.

51. LaPalombara & Weiner, op. cit., p. 3.

52. M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967, trans. by B. & R. North), p. xxiv; Ibid., p. 8.

53. Duverger, op. cit., p. xxvi.

54. LaPalombara & Weiner, op. cit., p. 6.

55. K. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 16-18.

56. H.J. Laski, Communist Manifesto: Socialist Landmark (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 122.

57. For details on this matter see Chapters II and III.

58. Jupp, op. cit., p. 111.

59. The term patron-client has been defined elsewhere in this work. See infra, pp. 46-49.

60. For a detailed discussion of the role and function of the patron-client system as it shapes political parties and civil-military relations, see infra, pp. 32ff.

61. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 6, emphasis added.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF POST WORLD WAR II GREEK POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Pre-Independence: The Ottoman Rule and the Rising Greek Merchant Elite

The fall of Constantinople in 1453, although wrongly believed to be the date in which the Greeks were conquered by the Ottoman Turks, nevertheless marks the end of the Byzantine Empire. With the centre of the Empire subjugated by the "Asiatic barbarians," it was only a matter of time before the Empire's "European" possessions would be taken over by the conqueror. By 1460 the Ottoman Turks had overrun the peoples of the Balkan peninsula, destroying in the process the archaic form of feudal relations that prevailed under Byzantine, Latin, Serbian and Bulgarian rulers of the area, the exception being a number of Aegean Islands and some parts of Peloponesse and Central Greece which were under Venetian rule until 1779.[1]

The Ottoman Turks, unlike the Venetians who attempted to assimilate the Greeks and to reunify the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, granted to the subjugated peoples of the Balkans "extraterritorial" rights and privileges. According to a Greek-American historian of international repute, L.S. Stavrianos, Islamic law permitted the "non-Moslem subjects to organize into communities with their own ecclessiastical leaders."[2] The Ottoman rulers also granted a measure of political freedom, that is to say, they permitted the establishment of local self-government[3] which enabled the Turks to rule the Balkan peoples with the assistance of indigenous leaders. Under this scheme a great deal of local administration lay in the hands of the Greek "archontes" (Kodsabasis) or notables as they were known who were, for example, responsible for tax

collecting and policing within their respective districts.[4] The granting of the extraterritorial rights and privileges not only permitted the non-Moslem nationalities to administer their own local affairs, but more importantly, it allowed the continuous maintenance of individual culture, language and religion. In another important respect it permitted religious institutions to increase their power and influence in their respective religious groups. For example, the leader of the Orthodox peoples, the Patriarch of Constantinople, ironically, "enjoyed greater ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction under the Ottoman sultan than under the Byzantine."[5] Moreover, the Empire permitted considerable social and political mobility, in the administrative sense, for the non-Moslems. Both Greeks and Jews acquired tremendous economic and politico-administrative power within the Ottoman Empire. With respect to the latter's power and influence, the following extract from a letter written by Lady Mary Wortley Montague, wife of the British ambassador in Constantinople, to her sister in May 17, 1717, illustrates the point:

> I observed most of the rich tradesmen were Jews. That people are on an incredible power in this country. They have many privileges above all the natural Turks themselves, and have formed a very considerable commonwealth here, being judged by their own laws, and have drawn the whole trade of the empire into their hands, ... Every Pasha has his Jew, who is his homme d'affairs; he is let into all his secrets, and does all his business. No bargain is made, no bribe received, no merchandise disposed of, but what passes through their hands. They are the physicians, the stewards, and interpreters of the great men.[6]

Similarly, the Greeks after 1670, and in particular, the Phanariotes,[7] acquired tremendous power within the Empire in such areas as diplomacy, religion and commerce. This group from 1711 onward not only served as governors of the Moldavian and Wallachian Principalities

with the title of hospodars or princes, but they also occupied the more important and lucrative positions in the vast Turkish Empire, namely, that of the Grand Dragoman of the Porte, or undersecretary of the grand vizier, and that of the Grand Dragoman of the Fleet, or undersecretary of the Navy and Charge of Aegean Affairs. These positions guarantee the Phanariotes virtual monopoly of power in these civil service positions, government contracts and other privileges.[8] Having acquired bureaucratic power, this social group was able to extend its influence over the Greek people through the infiltration of the Constantinople Patriarchate which it eventually dominated and controlled to a large degree. By becoming the hegemonic group within the Patriarchate, this rising bourgeoisie was able to exert tremendous pressure in the "election of bishops, archbishops and even patriarchs." And by the end of the seventeenth century the phanariotes took over the control and direct management of the Church's properties, revenues and even the administration of monasteries. Furthermore, this bourgeoisie, by exerting tremendous pressure upon the Sultan, forced the abolition of an independent and autonomous Serbian Patriarchate in 1766 and the Archbishopric of Ochrida in 1767, and placed their respective diocese "under the direct control of the patriarchate of Constantinople,"[9] which in essence meant control by the Phanariotes.

The changing international order increased the Greek bourgeoisie's power, and in particular that of the economic faction. This faction or elite acquired considerable economic power both within the Empire and outside it for two reasons: first, the economic expansion in Central Europe had created a demand for Turkish goods such as grain, leather and cotton. Secondly, such a demand occurred at a time when the Ottoman wars

with Persia had led to a general disorganization in the Syrian and Egyptian ports and markets. These events shifted the centre of the Ottoman commercial life northward to cities like Salonika and Smyrna, which had a considerable number of Greek inhabitants. As Campbell and Sherrard note, the local "Greek merchants with commendable opportunism and energy" were able to capture "the greater part of the Empire's internal trade." By the middle of the 18th century the merchant faction of the Greek bourgeoisie either as "agents" for the "European merchant houses, or on their account they were steadily extending their influence in external trade." The extent to which this elite was influencing and controlling external trade is illustrated by a report of the French Consul in Salonika who in 1776 reported that the "Austrian houses could no longer face their competition in the market for cotton and woollen thread." By the same date it is reported that the Greek merchant elite had infiltrated and had become a considerable force in the domestic markets of even the Austrian capital.[10]

The rising Greek merchant elite was further assisted in its expansion and development by international events such as the two Russo-Turkish Wars: the first in 1768 over the question of Poland which ended with the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774); and the second in 1787 over the Crimea which ended with the Treaty of Jassey (1792). These two events granted the Greek merchants new economic opportunities by providing new markets. The treaties opened the Dardanelles to Tsarist Russia and Austrian commerce and most significantly permitted the Greek merchants under the Sultan to fly the Russian flag. As a result of this permissive policy this elite expanded tremendously.

Other international events such as the destruction of the French commerce at Levant due to the continental blockade during the Napoleonic wars gave considerable impetus to the advancement of the Greek commercial elite during this period. For example, by 1771 the French merchants "controlled half the external trade of Salonika," but following the Anglo-French wars three quarters of the total eastern Mediterranean trade had fallen into the hands of the Greek merchants. However, and more important and crucial aspect of such expansion was the development of a "crescent of Greek merchant colonies;" which stretched from the north of Africa to the south of France to central Europe and ended in southern Tsarist Russia. The Black Sea colonies, such as Odessa, Chersones and Tagonrog, enabled this elite to control the region's trade relations. This crescent of Greek merchant colonies not only provided the link between Greece and the rest of Europe, but more importantly became the fertile ground for the development of the Greek revolutionary movement.[11] It was in these communities that the Greek diaspora was exposed to the emerging liberal bourgeois democracy and its values. Having developed a very close relationship with the Western European Civilization, the Greek merchant diaspora experienced a national awakening which in turn led to their conception of a national liberation of their compatriots from the alien's rule.

The Process of National Awakening: Rhigas Pheraios and Adamantios Korais

The French Revolution and the Enlightenment had a profound impact upon the Greek emigres. These two great historical events became the driving force behind the movement for a Greek national liberation. Although the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars did not directly

affect the Greek populace, they provided the stimulus for the rising of Greek national consciousness on the part of the various segments of the Greek bourgeoisie (e.g., the Merchant elite). As intermediateries, this elite was able to contrast the security and enlightenment which it witnessed abroad with the deplorable conditions at home. It very naturally concluded "that their own future, and that of their fellow countrymen, depended upon the earliest possible removal of the Turkish incubus."[12] Aside from the merchants, elements of the Greek intelligentsia were also stimulated by the emerging liberal bourgeois democratic norms and values. Two outstanding examples in this tradition were Rhigas Pheraios and Adamantios Korais. The former was a disciple of the ideas expressed by the French Revolution. He was so absorbed in the period's revolutionary nationalist theories, that being a man of action he organized a society, Hetairia (Society), for the purpose of promoting the Greek patriotic sentiment and to provide the Greeks with arms for the coming liberation struggle. He also wrote and distributed various revolutionary pamphlets. Unfortunately, his revolutionary career was brief and tragic. He was arrested by the Austrian government and turned over to the Turks, and was executed in Belgrade in June 1789.[13] His outstanding work was his famous "Thourios" (War Humn), which is still one of the most celebrated works of modern Greek literature. The opening lines of this famous piece of work clearly echo its revolutionary message. It is worth quoting:

> How long, my heroes, shall we live in bondage,
> alone like lions on ridges, on peaks?
> Living in caves, seeing our children
> turned from the land to bitter enslavement?
> Losing our land, brothers and parents,
> our friends, our children and all our relatives?
> Better an hour of life that is free
> than forty years in slavery![14]

Unlike the revolutionary activist Pheraios, Korais' contribution to the Greek national awakening was mainly through literature. He translated many of the ancients' works. He formulated an artificial languaged called Katharevousa (meaning "pure"), which was based upon the syntax and vocabulary of the ancient language and was spoken by the members of the educated middle classes, and later was to become the new nation's official language, as well as a point of contention among the political parties with respect to educating the masses, since they were only able to speak the demotike or common language. His works had considerable influence in promoting the "growth of the Greek national spirit during the last years of Ottoman control and early of independent Greece."[15] Like Pheraios, Korais was inspired by the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, and thus he envisaged the emancipation of Greece clearly in liberal bourgeois terms; namely, "secular liberalism" and "humanist enlightenment" as was found in contemporary Western Europe.[16]

The Social Composition of the Revolutionaries

The immediate impetus to the Greek national liberation was Filiki Hetairia (Friendly Society), which was found in 1814 in the Greek merchant colony of Odessa by three middle class Greek merchants of no "no particular repute."[17] According to a recent study the society was a secret organization which consisted of 911 men and cut across class lines of Greek society. The majority of its members (53.7 percent) were merchants. Professionals such as lawyers, physicians, teachers and students constituted the second largest group of the organization (13.1 percent); local notables constituted 11.7 percent of the total, mostly from the Peloponnese. Clergymen represented 9.5 percent, the majority being priests. Of the total of 911,

8.7 percent or 78 individuals could be classified as "military" men or mercenaries, that is, former "armatoloi-klepts" who had been or still were in the service of foreign armies--i.e., British and French, at the time of joining the Society. Although the peasants constituted the bulk of the Greek population, it was the only group that was under-represented in the Society (0.6 percent). The remaining members of the organization were artisans and sailors: 0.7 percent and 3.1 percent respectively.[18]

Given the composition of the society and the dominance in it of middle class elements of the merchant faction of the Greek bourgeoisie, the Society's objectives were defined in bourgeois class terms as the overthrow of the Turkish rulers and the Greek bureaucratic elite, as well as those notables who had acquired large land holdings and regional political power, and the creation of a liberal democratic state on the ideas and values of Western Europe. In view of the ideological aims of the movement it was natural that elements of the wealthiest and powerful factions of the Greek bourgeoisie both within the Empire and in the Greek emigre communities, did not join it, at least until the revolution flared in 1821. Moreover, unlike the Italian revolutionary secret societies, the Friendly Society was unable to develop a strong "bond" between the various elements of the organization so as to keep them united, and thus when the revolution broke out the Society simultaneously disappeared, and its members returned to promoting their respective class interests.

As was mentioned, the Society had failed to attract any elements of the Greek upper classes, so that on the eve of the revolt, a considerable number of the local notables and some members of the Phanariotes group were very reluctant to assist or side with the revolutionaries

primarily because, aside from the Turks, their wealth and political power were to be placed in jeopardy. For example, the Phanariote group, as was noted, had acquired considerable socio-economic and political power within the decision-making structures of the Empire. Similarly, the Kodsabasis in their respective districts had acquired large tracts of land and politico-administrative power. With respect to the landowning notables, according to a Greek scholar, during the peak of the Ottoman Empire, this group owned 30 percent of all lands in the Peloponnese, 20 percent of the lands in Roumeli (Central Greece), and 10 percent of the lands in Thessalia and Macedonia.[19] In view of such power and wealth, when on 25 March 1821, the Bishop of Patras, Germanos, a member of the Hetairia, raised the dtandard of the Cross to signal the revolt, members of the Kodsabasis elite and the wealthiest merchants in the island of Hydra refused to support the insurrection. However, as the "insurrection gathered impetus"[20] and more importantly, as the lower classes, i.e., the peasants, joined the ranks of the revolutionaries, it became very difficult for the "reluctant" notables and merchants to remain "neutral." And in doing so they took credit for the revolution.

The Clientage System and the Struggle for the Formation of a Greek Nation-State

Although the joining of the upper class elements with the revolutionaries contributed considerably to the struggle against the foreign overlords, it also exacerbated regional or sectional interests, since this elite joined the revolutionary struggle so as to secure its interests and a share of the spoils. As noted the Friendly Society was instrumental in arousing the masses against the Turkish overlords, but it did not have a

strong force of nationalism which would have developed into a national esprit d'corps, and thus would have been able to transcend the traditional sectionalism or factionalism of Greek society. In other words, the Society was unable to create a sufficiently strong ideological basis whereby the "national interest" could override the regional and even sectional interest of the various factions of the Greek bourgeoisie. Secondly, since it was unable to remain united and to provide the necessary leadership for building a liberal bourgeois state, it had deleterious consequences for the emerging nation-state.

The "extraterritorial" rights and privileges, granted by the Ottoman overlords, had allowed the development over the centuries of a patron-client relationship between the masses and the kodsabasis in the various districts or regions which they administered on behalf of the Sultan. (By the term "patron client relationship" we mean

> . . . a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic [and political] status (patron) uses his influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.)[21]

Therefore, the absence of a strong "central authority" facilitated the development of mini-states within the Empire based upon the system of clientage, which later provided the ground for the emergence of political parties, as well as conflict. The following passage written by a contemporary of the times, is worth quoting at length for it provides us with a clear understanding of the nature that governed the political culture of the Greek society. The observer wrote:

> To understand the nature of this clientage and the obligations which it imposed on the patrons, one must understand the state in which centuries, perhaps thousands of years, had left society in Greece. As there was no central authority, capable of controlling and defending the inhabitants, each was forced to look elsewhere for support and protection. The most natural and surest support was found in the family, whose members and even relatives to the second degree were nowhere so closely connected and ready to aid each other as they were in Greece. In the second place, the isolated man had to take his position in the midst of others. According as he felt himself weak or strong, he made himself the partisan of some influential man or collected partisans about himself. In this manner each distinguished man has a more or less considerable number of subordinate persons who associate with him, listen to him, ask his advice, execute his wishes, and defend his interests, always careful to merit his respect and win his confidence. This is the origin and nature of the innumerable coteries with which Greece is covered. The chiefs, when they do not feel powerful enough to be self-sufficient by themselves and their followers, range themselves with the latter under a stronger chief and augment by this accession his power and influence. They therefore combine the role of patron toward their clients with that of client toward the patron placed on a higher level. It is by this grouping of coteries that the parties are formed . . . .[22]

In view of the patron-client pattern of relationships that prevailed in pre-revolutionary, as well as in post-revolutionary, Greece, it was quite easy for the various components or factions of the Greek bourgeoisie whose power and loyalty was drawn from the town, village or the district to be able to manipulate and utilize the revolutionary masses for their own interests. Thus, within six months of the insurrection three different regional political authorities emerged in the mainland Greece: the Peloponnessian Gerousia (Senate) which was dominated by the landowning Kodsabasis declared that it was the only supreme authority in the Peninsula; likewise, in Central Greece two political authorities came into being: a Senate for the Western section and an Areopagus for the

Eastern section of the region. Also, the Aegean islands set up their own respective governments. Hence, when on January 27, 1822 the first national assembly met at the ancient seaport of Epidaurus near Argos, to discuss the future of the "liberated" lands, the members of these regional political authorities arrived not as representatives of the various constituent parts of a liberated and unified Greek nation-state, but rather as delegates of their respective regional governments. However, in spite of the factional interests involved the "assembly" did proclaim in the liberal bourgeois nationalist tradition, "before God and man, the political existence and independence of the Greek nation." The members of the assembly then proceeded to adopt an elaborate liberal constitution and they elected a member of the Phanariote faction, Alexandros Mavrokordatos, as the Hellenic Republic's first President. Although the Constitution of Epidaurus laid down the principles and the functions of a central national government for the newly declared Republic, the Mavrokordatos regime was "too weak to exercise any real control" since the powers of the regional tycoons remained unchallenged.[23]

The notable faction of the Greek upper classes, as mentioned earlier, enjoyed considerable economic and political power under the Sultan. It was, therefore, not prepared to relinquish it to the newly formed central government. One reason for this, according to some writers, is that they were suspicious of centralized power, a trait inherent from the Ottoman period. However, that was not the crucial factor for such unpreparedness. The real element was that they feared that some surrender of regional power would enable the central government to become an active agent in what had been their exclusive regional domains. The regime of Mavrokordatos

could not effectively bring the various powerful notables and merchants, who at this point in time constituted the upper classes of the Republic, under effective state control; this led to the exacerbation of inter- and intra-factional jealousies and suspicions, which in turn divided the various factions and culminated into two civil wars within a year after the proclamation of the Greek Republic. The civil wars, moreover, brought into play a new elite: namely, the rise of the military-notable such as Theodore Kolokotrones. By 1823 this man had become the "virtual master of the country" and the undisputed military authority in the Peloponnesse region after a successful military campaign against the other politico-notables. He had become so powerful that his power was viewed as a threat by the old and established classes in the country and in particular in the Peloponnesse area. Because of the growing power of the military-notables throughout the liberated country, in Western Greece it was personified first in Georgios Varnakistis and later in the Souliot Markos Botsaris; and in Eastern Greece in Odysseas Androutsos,[24] the traditional classes attempted to check their power, and especially that of Kolokotrones. Consequently, the most powerful elements of the Peloponnessian faction (the lesser notables of the region had joined Kolokotrones), allied temporarily with the merchants and established in collaboration with the President of the Republic a "new" government in the Aegean Islands under the leadership of a wealthy shipowner named George Koundouriotes.

The action of the Peloponnessian notables led to a split in the Greek bourgeoisie which in turn led to the creation of two political authorities, both claiming to represent the Republic: one in the island of Hydra, headed and dominated by the merchants and the other on the

mainland controlled by Kolokotrones; thus civil war was inevitable. The renegade mainland notables were forced to grant recognition to this government in early 1824. The truce did not last long; the Peloponnessian-based wealthy notables, realizing that they were "unduly dominated by the islanders," soon joined forces with the renegade notables against the islanders. The attempt to combat the islanders, however, was futile, since the islanders in contact with the English, were able to acquire a "loan" which was used to attract the military-notables of Western Central Greece to their camp and led to the defeat of the rebelling Peloponnessians.[25] With this victory, the islanders were able to consolidate their position in the new state, temporarily, until the Egyptian invasion in late 1825.

While the various factions of the Greek bourgeoisie were violently struggling among themselves for control of the Greek state, the Turkish Empire was unable to exploit the menace that had fallen upon its former subjects due to its "corruption and inefficiency." In view of the inability of the Turkish Armies to move against the revolting Greeks, a stalemate emerged between the Greeks and the Turks: the Greeks of the "liberated" Peloponnessus and the Islands were unable to carry any further the "national war, holy war, a war the object of which is to reconquer the rights of individual liberty, of property and honor . . ." as they had proclaimed in Epidaurus, to the rest of the Greek nationals under Turkish rule; similarly, the Turks were unable to reconquer the "liberated" areas.[26]

The Greek-Turkish stalemate was broken by the Great Powers and the Egyptian intervention in 1825. An Egyptian force under Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet Ali, the Sultan of Egypt, with its European organized navy and veteran army, landed in southern Peloponnessus and immediately commenced

a "harrying, devastating and slaughtering in all directions."[27] Even though Koundouriotes, in the early part of the invasion, was head of the provisional government, there was no attempt on the part of this central authority to provide funds and coordination to the Greek forces. Resistance to the adversary was put forth by individual notables and merchants. For example, merchants such as Miaoulis, the Tombasis brothers, and Kanaris made regular "raids" against the invaders at their own initiative.[28] Lacking military and political coordination, the Greek forces were no match for the well organized and disciplined invading forces. Despite the absence of an effective central authority, the mainland forces reorganized under the leadership of the military-notable, Kolokotrones, and inflicted considerable casualties upon the Egyptians, but such wounds were not strong enough to repel the menacing adversary and guarantee the survival of a free and autonomous Greek nation-state. However, the continuation of raids, by the merchants, against the Turkish-Egyptian naval forces which provided supplies to Imbrahim's forces in the mainland, seriously threatened to disrupt the commercial routes used by the European powers: namely, Great Britain and France. Therefore, in 1827 in concert with Tsarist Russia, the naval fleets of these Great Powers put an end to the "menace" by destroying the Turkish-Egyptian naval forces at Navarino, and thus emerged as the country's guardians.

The Greek Revolution of 1821 was not a welcome event in the higher councils of the European powers; if it were to continue to succeed it would facilitate a change in the existing balance of power of the geographical region between the various European powers. The Great Powers, in particular Great Britain, were greatly concerned with the effect on European

security of the carving up of the Turkish Empire. The British, from the beginning, saw an independent Greece as upsetting the region's status quo. They feared that such a state of affairs might bring the Russian factor into play in the area, which they did not want. Therefore, as the Egyptian forces were devastating the liberated lands, the representatives of Great Britain and Russia met in Petersburg to discuss the fate of the Greeks. The outcome of the Petersburg meeting was the Protocol of April 4, 1826. This agreement called upon the two powers to "mediate between the Turks and the Greeks on the basis of complete autonomy for Greece under Turkish suzerainty."[29] In effect this agreement attempted to maintain the region's status quo, and the signatories, by granting limited political autonomy to the Greeks under Turkish tutelage, were hoping the Greek revolutionary forces would be content with their prize and thus give up the "national" and "holy" war against the remaining Turkish Empire.

While the powers were busy attempting to resolve the situation, the Greek notables and merchants from both the defeated and victorious regions, met at Epidaurus in 1826 to elect a new government. The National Assembly appointed a governmental committee of eleven members and a legislative body of thirteen. Like its predecessors this Assembly was doomed to failure: regional and sectional interests were left untouched, and its efforts to coordinate the war effort met with very little success. Within a year inter- and intra-sectional rivalries led to a split in the national government. A number of notables broke away and established their own.[30] Despite their differences, however, the various factions at an "eleventh hour" decision realized that the future of the Greek nation-state depended upon the actions of European powers, and that political

stability was a must if the nation was to survive. Furthermore, the various factions had heard of the Petersburg agreement, indicating both Russia and Great Britain were prepared to support their revolutionary claims. They also realized that a settlement could only come through a concert of Europe. Accordingly, on May 1827, the various elites reached a compromise whereby the former foreign minister of the Tsar, John Kapodistrias, a Greek emigre from the Ionian Islands, was elected President of the Hellenic Republic. At the same time the Assembly published the "extremely democratic 'Constitution of Troizen'," which was to be the guiding document behind the governing of the new state.[31]

The new constitution provided the political leadership with liberal bourgeois guidelines for the operation and the functioning of the Republic, as did the previous one. Although the "liberal and democratic spirit" may have been at home in countries such as France and England, it was totally alien to the socio-economic and political relations of liberated Greece. The constitution by strengthening the "legislative body" of the state made the "executive" incapable of resolving the country's problems.[32] Secondly, like its predecessor, the Constitution of Troizen failed to check the power of the factional interests, and thus posed a further dilemma for the Kapodistrias regime. Realizing that the liberal bourgeois Constitution of Troizen was unworkable under the prevailing conditions, Kapodistrias attempted to create an absolutist regime, or as Kaltchas calls it, a "dictatorship,"[33] whereby he could build a strong and centralized state. By subordinating or completely destroying the political power of the merchants and notables who, in his view, were anathema to the new state, in addition to the Turkish-Egyptian forces. He wanted to create a "state"

that was above factionalism and regional interests, and strong enough to meet its national tasks. To put in another way, he wished to shape a "power" which could stand on its own "above society" and which could subordinate or deter both internal and external conflicts.[34] His attempts to encroach upon sectional interests led to his assassination on October 1831 by two members of the powerful landowning notable family of Mavromichailis.

In spite of his tragic death, much was accomplished during his three years of tenure. The Turkish-Egyptian threat was eliminated due to the intervention of the Great Powers at Navarino (1827). The February 3, 1830 Protocol in London, which was signed by the representatives of France, great Britain and Russia declared Greece to be an independent nation, and it "arbitrarily fixed Greece's northern boundaries." It also provided that the new state should be governed by a "hereditary monarchy based on primogeniture."[35] Finally, the Kapodistrias years may be said to be the only period in modern Greek history wherein a genuine attempt was made to lay the foundation for the modern Greek nation-state.

The Reign of the Bavarian Prince: Political Parties, Foreign Influence and Coups

In accordance with the London Protocol, the Great Powers undertook to find a King for Greece. Just prior to Kapodistrias' death, the Great Powers had offered the "Greek Crown" to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who accepted only to reject it later. The primary factor that underlay Leopold's rejection of the Greek Crown was his inability to guarantee to the Greeks, as he put it: the "security of their territories, and the establishment of their independence on a permanent and honorable basis."

As we have noted above, the Great Powers and especially Great Britain, wanted to limit Greek expansion and thus maintain the balance of power in the area between them and Russia. Hence, Great Britain was unwilling to extend Greece's northern frontiers, and to add the islands of Samos and Crete to the new nation. In effect Great Britain only wanted to establish a Greek quasi-state with no real power that would enable it to continue the national war which would further upset the status quo. Acceptance of the Greek Crown under the conditions laid down by the Allied Courts meant, in essence, that Leopold was to act not as the sovereign of a sovereign people, but as a "delegate of the Allied Courts," whose chief function would have been to "hold in subjection [the Greek people] by force of their arms."[36]

With Leopold's rejection, the question of the Greek Throne was to remain unresolved beyond the death of Kapodistrias which was followed by another period of civil war and anarchy between the various factions, resulting in direct foreign intervention. Without consulting the Greek people the Great Powers on February 13, 1832, after considerable negotiations among themselves agreed to offer the Greek Crown to Otho, the second son of the King of Bavaria. On May 7, 1832 the Great Powers and the King of Bavaria signed a convention which made Greece an independent and monarchical state of Europe under the sovereignty of the Prince of Bavaria, and under a "vaguely-defined guarantee" of the Great Powers--France, Great Britain and Russia. In addition the three Protecting Powers agreed to provide the new Kingdom with a loan of 60,000 francs under conditions laid down in paragraph 6 of Article XII of the agreement, which stipulated:

> The Sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be found to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, of such instalments of the loans as many have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first Revenue of the State, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted first of all to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the three Courts shall have been completely secured for the current year. The diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation.[36]

The conditions which the aforementioned convention laid down and in particular those stipulated in Article XII, made the newly recognized Greek nation-state a "colony" under the guidance of the Great Powers instead of the Ottoman Turks. The Convention gave the Powers either in concert or independently, the "right" to intervene in the financial affairs which in essence meant intervention in the general administration as well as the society at large. Therefore, during the early reign of King Otho, Greece became the battlefield for inter-power rivalry. Unlike his predecessor, Otho made no serious attempt to destroy the power of the notables, instead he manipulated and utilized the existing system of clientage to create and maintain a paternalistic type of government without parliamentary representation. Furthermore, each of the rival international powers, by utilizing this archaic form of social relationships, were able to align with a "faction" of the Greek bourgeoisie, and thus were able to influence its policies and actions. Such alignment meant that the organs of the Greek ruling classes, the political parties, would depend directly upon the country's international patrons; the English, French, and Russian ambassadors "unofficially" presided over the country's political parties led domestically by Mavrokordatos, Kolettis, and Metaxas respectively.[37]

Thus we have the emergence of Anglophile, Francophile, and Russophile parties in the land of the ancients. Moreover, at this juncture of the historical development of the Greek state, access to the higher councils of the state did not depend upon their ability to organize and attract electoral support from the Greek masses but, as a Greek-American political historian, John Petropulos, put it:

> [the party] leaders realized that, given the international status of Greece and its internal constitution (absolutism), they could influence the Crown (King Otho) and mold the future of Greece much more effectively by catering to the powers than by catering to the home public.[38]

Given the patron-clientele relationship or dependency of Greek political leaders upon the Protecting Powers, the Powers were in a position to "cause the fall of Greek Governments, or they could arise public feeling for or against a political leader or even against the throne." For example, on January 1847, British agents organized demonstrations in Western Greece (Roumeli) against the Francophile Government of Kolettis for the purpose of discrediting it, and hence made the way for the Anglophile party of Mavrokordatos-Trikoupis to acquire governmental power.[39]

In spite of foreign interference, Otho's personal rule remained unchallenged until 1843. During the first ten years of his reign the country's political power lay in the hands of his Bavarian advisers, and most of the Greeks held "subordinate positions" within the state's decision-making apparatus. The majority of the Greek irregular military forces were disbanded and were replaced by "Bavarian troops whose excessive rates of pay consumed the greater part of the loan made to Greece by the Protecting Powers." The veterans of the revolution such as Makryannis and a number of disenchanted and discontented politicians joined forces with

the commander of the Athens garrison, Colonel Kallergis, and on September 13, 1843 staged a bloodless coup d'etat against the Monarch. Against his will, the young Monarch gave in to the demands of the revolting military and political leaders: namely, the establishment of a Constitution. Like the previous Greek constitutions, the Constitution of 1844 was modelled along liberal democratic lines. For instance, the Constitution provided for a bicameral Parliament--a House of Commons and a Senate (Article 15). The members of the House of Commons were to be elected on a wide franchise; whereas the members of the Senate were to be appointed for life by the Crown with the proviso that such appointments required the counter-signature of the President of the Ministerial Council (Article 70). With respect to "executive powers" the constitution stipulated that they were to be exercised only through "responsible" Ministers which the King had the right to appoint and dismiss (Article 24). Furthermore, Article 29 gave the Crown veto power over legislation which he disapproved.[40]

Despite its "liberal" format, the King retained considerable powers both in the legislative and executive apparatus of the state. Moreover, through patronage the King was able to make key appointments in the nation's public service and even demarchs (Prefect) and alderman at the town level. By cultivating and utilizing the patron-client system the King achieved two objects: first, he was able to secure his position within Greek society by becoming its chief domestic "patron;" and secondly, he was able to circumscribe the power of the Greek Parliament through the patron-client system, and thus render it inept.

Although Otho originally was installed upon the Greek Crown by the Great Powers for the purpose of maintaining the status quo, he adopted

expansionist policies which cluminated in his downfall in 1862. Supported by the majority of the Greek people, as well as by a number of political leaders, Otho, in the last few years of his reign, began a campaign to eliminate the constant interference of foreign powers, and especially that of the British.[41] Therefore, when the Crimean War broke out, Otho allied with Tsarist Russia. In doing so, however, he placed his Crown in jeopardy. Immediately thereafter, British and French forces occupied the port of Piraeus, thus preventing Otho from declaring war against their ally, Turkey.

By identifying himself with the nationalist aspirations, Otho achieved considerable popularity during the Crimean war. However, six years later he was overthrown by a military coup d'etat inspired by university students and middle class intellectuals. The causes for this were numerous, but two domestic factors specifically contributed to his downfall: the Italian War of 1859 against the Austrians, in which the majority of the Greek population sided with the Italian forces, who were at that time struggling for independence and freedom from the Austrians, whereas Otho, in view of family connections, sided with the Austrians. Secondly, the fact that in this period there was emerging a "new and more democratic generation of political leaders who were the first products of the national university and whose ambitions brought them into conflict with the King and his supporters."[42] Moreover, the British "passively" supported the rebelling forces. Otho's actions were contrary to their interests and rendered him expendable.

The Search for a New Head of State: The Reign of King George

After Otho's deposition the new emerging politico-intellectual elite did not seize control of the State, nor did it forsake the institution of Monarchy; instead, it turned to the European Courts for a new "head of state." The provisional government, together with the Great Powers, began a search for another King who would be acceptable to the parties concerned and in particular to the Great Powers: that is, a King who would not in any way venture into expansionist policies that would affect the status quo. There were a number of possible candidates for the vacant Crown. The Greeks strongly favoured Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, because they "hoped that, if he became their King, Great Britain would be prepared to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece and prevail on the Sultan to transfer Thessaly and Epirus to the Greek Kingdom."[43] On the other hand, the Great Poers, with the exception of Great Britain, "favoured" Prince Nicholas of Leuchtenburg, a nephew of the Tsar. The election of one of these two princes to the Greek throne would have meant that one of the Great Powers would become the country's chief "patron." The British, by invoking the Protocol of 1830 and the Convention of 1832, which stipulated "that no member of the ruling house of the Protecting Power should be elected the King of Greece,"[44] were able to declare both Nicholas and Alfred ineligible for the Greek throne. However, the British hand in the diplomatic game was strengthened tremendously when, on December 8, 1862, the British cabinet "unanimously" decided to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece.

In making such a decision the British gained the upper hand in the negotiations for a suitable head of state for Greece, and more

significantly, were able to exert considerable influence upon the Greeks concerning their future King. After extended diplomatic negotiations, an agreement was reached among all parties, whereby the nineteen-year-old Prince William George, an heir to the Danish throne of the House of Glusksburg, was chosen as having met the conditions required by Britain, France and Russia, and, of course, Greece. In keeping with their December 8th decision, the British Government ceded the Ionian Islands to the Hellenic Kingdom.

In addition to acquiring new territories, under the London Treaty of 1863, and in particular under the stipulation of Article IX of said treaty, it was provided that

> each of the three Powers will give up in favour of Prince William of Denmark L4000 a year out of the sums that Greece has engaged to pay them, according to the arrangement of 1860. These three sums forming a total L12000 yearly, shall be destined to constitute a personal donation of his Majesty the King in addition to the Civil List fixed by the State. The accession of Prince William to the Greek throne shall not involve any change in the financial engagements of Greece as laid down in the Convention of 1832. The three Powers will watch over the execution of the financial arrangements of 1860.[45]

Although the Treaty declared Greece a "monarchical, independent and constitutional state," as in the agreement of 1832, the country's sovereignty was once more placed in the hands of the Protecting Powers. By retaining the right to "watch over the execution of the financial arrangements of 1860," the Powers were licensed "legally" to interfere constantly in the governmental and general affairs of the Kingdom. Thus, in the first decade of the reign of King George, political factionalism and foreign interference prevailed.

Moreover, in spite of the treaty's declaration that Greece was to be a "constitutional state," during the Danish Prince's reign, political parties were based upon notables of similar repute as those of the Otho period. There was no attempt to build deep-rooted liberal bourgeois structures, such as political parties based upon principles rather than personalities, which in turn might have led to the development of viable bourgeois institutions. In the words of one researcher, King George's first ten years of rule were marked by the

> undeterred . . . fate of his predecessor, he attempted to govern through minority or extra-parliamentary ministries on behalf of which he made lavish use of the weapon of dissolution. The consequences of this ill-advised course were ministerial instability, scandalous governmental interference with elections, administrative paralysis and corruption, and an alarming increase of anti-dynastic sentiment due to the fact that the Crown was closely identified with the successive ministries and was therefore held responsible for their lawlessness and incompetence.[46]

A The Rise of Trikoupis and the Rule of Parliament

Although his early years of rule were marked by political and governmental instability, King George I, unlike his predecessor, "learned" in that period "the art of serving as a constitutional monarch."[47] Under the impetus of the 1864 liberal democratic constitution, which came into being following the forced abdication of King Otho by the "liberal middle class" coup d'etat, the King was to guide Greece to the establishment of Parliamentary rule. Prior to the arrival of King George I, Greece had not experienced any form of parliamentary government. It was during his later years of reign that parliamentary government was first established in the country, as stipulated by the 1864 Constitution. The resignation of

Demetrius Voulgaris, 'the worst offender against constitutional government," was the key factor that led to the advent of constitutional government for the first time in the nation's history. With Voulgaris out of office the King turned to the leading critic of his unconstitutional practices, Charilaos Trikoupis, to form the next government. Up to this time, the King's unconstitutional practices had resulted in a form of "monarchical absolutism." With the advent of Trikoupis, the King accepted the principle that no party or group leader would form a government without a majority and the confidence of such a majority in parliament. In accepting such a principle the Crown nullified its right to arbitrarily dissolve a ministry which commanded the confidence of parliament. In spite of the introduction of the principles of parliamentary government, politics continued to be based upon the clientele or patronage system; no effort was made to establish political parties along corporate lines. That is, the development of a party system where the components, the political party, was formed along a common program, with organizational structure links, its various parts through the country. It may be said, however, that during this period the country's electoral politics resembled a two-party system based on the personalities of Voulgaris and of Trikoupis, the former drawing its support and representing the old and traditional factions of the Greek bourgeoisie, i.e., the landowners; whereas the latter drew its support from the urban middle classes and was inspired by liberal principles, although not to the extent of being a party based exclusively of liberal democratic lines resembling a "modern" party.[48]

With Trikoupis at the "apex of power" of the State's higher councils, the country experienced economic growth and there was a genuine

attempt to reorganize the governmental structures so as to base them upon the "values and institutions of Western Democracy," rather than on the archaic form of kinship relations. Prior to Trikoupis the country's industrial development had remained in the "embryonic stage." The small enterprises that existed in the coastal town, such as Patras and Piraeus, were primarily involved in the production of consumer's goods, especially flour, textiles, olive oil, leather goods, glass and soap. In 1877 the country had 136 plants employing 7,342 workers and with the second administration of Trikoupis in 1882, industrial development increased further and in particular, in areas such as the exploitation of natural resources. External trade also flourished, at this time, from 69.94 (golden drachmae per inhabitant) for the years 1861-1870, to 93.37 for 1871-1880, and to 97.89 between 1881-1890. The merchant navy also experiences prosperity: from 37 steamships with a tonnage of 8,241 in 1875 to 107 steamships (144,975) in 1895. The impetus was so great that by the first year of World War I the Greek merchant navy had grown to 475 steamships with a tonnage about seven times that of 1895. Similarly, the financial sector of the Greek state experienced considerable growth. Aside from the National and Ionian Banks in existence, in the period between 1882 and 1907, five other banks were granted charters as well as a number of insurance institutions.[49]

In the field of agriculture, the policies of the "liberal" oriented regimes of Trikoupis had considerable impact. The number of fields cultivated increased from 70,000 hectares in 1860 to more than 111,000 hectares by 1911. The current products dominated the agricultural export market; from 42,800 tons in 1861 to 100,700 tons in 1878. Other agricultural products such as raisins contributed considerably to the growth of external

trade: the volume of exports increased from 195,000 Venetian litres in 1880 to 312,000 ten years later, and by the turn of the century, had risen to 341,000 litres. However, in spite of the increased growth, agriculture and industry still lagged in comparison to that of the rest of Europe. On the other hand, despite its "primitiveness," the growth in industry, agriculture and the merchant fleet contributed tremendously to the growth of urbanization and literacy which would have major consequences for the country's political power structure in the first decade of the twentieth century. According to one authority the country's urban population increased from 8 percent around 1853 to 28 percent (1,679,470) in 1879, and by 1907 it had risen to 33 percent (2,631,952). Similarly, literacy had increased from 19.3 percent in 1879 to 39.5 percent in 1907.[50]

Furthermore, during the same period the country's infrastructure was improved and expanded considerably. In the field of transportation, for instance, between 1880 and 1909 some 2,118 kilometers of road mileage were laid. In the same period, some 1,614 kilometers of rail were laid, thus creating the foundations for the country's modern railroad network. In other areas, such as in the field of administration, the Trikoupis era made considerable inroads. Trikoupis reorganized this field by raising the requirements that shaped patterns of recruitment in the police force, the armed forces, and the public service in general. Moreover, and more significantly, he "instituted a framework for a neutral judiciary,"[51] thus attempting to build another aspect of institutional structures necessary for the functioning of a "modern" liberal bourgeois state.

In spite of this unprecedented growth, the Trikoupis administrations were plagued by considerable financial difficulties. In the period

1879-1890 the Greek State borrowed heavily from the international money markets; some six loans which amounted to the sums of 630 million gold francs. However, in view of the financial constraints imposed by the Protecting Powers in the Treaty of 1863, these sums were issued below par, and hence the country actually received only 458,622,000 gold francs. Of this amount only six percent was invested in the country in "productive works." The rest was used to purchase armaments and to pay off the "rapidly mounting national indebtedness." In addition to this financial burden, the country's value of exports in the 1880s ran "between two-thirds and three-fourths of the value of imports." In view of the trade deficit, the country's primary export commodity, the currants, reached a record low in 1893. Given the fact that the interest on foreign debts consumed about a third of the state's budget, the Trikoupis government was forced to declare a state of bankruptcy. His twenty-year political career, with some minor interruptions, as the country's first minister, ended two years later when he failed to win re-election.[52]

B Megale Idea: A National Obsession

From the time that the Greeks received their "political independence" from the Sultan, the "idea" of unifying all Greek nationals and expanding the country's boundaries had become an obsession. This irredeemable goal, commonly referred to as the "Great Idea" ("Megale Idea"), had deleterious consequences upon the country's political leadership from Otho to the 1920s. Following the fall of Trikoupis, the Greek political leadership embarked upon an ill-fated venture against the country's visible arch enemy--Turkey--in 1897, in the hopes of bringing about the realization of this mania. The leadership's plans, however, were foiled when the better-

organized Turkish army easily defeated the ill-prepared Greek forces. The fear of losing their investment in the country "forced" the Great Powers to intervene in the Greco-Turkish war, so as to prevent the Turkish armies from overrunning their piece of real estate in the Balkans. As a mediating force between the two warring states, the Powers prevented any change in the region's status quo, and their financial interests remained intact. Moreover, in order to keep the balance of power, the representatives of the Great Powers decided that financially burdened Greece pay the sum of 4 million pounds to the Turks as an "indemnity" and placed her financial affairs under an International Financial Commission of Control (I.F.C.C.). By accepting the decision of the powers the country's political leadership forfeited her sovereignty: according to Stavrianos, the I.F.C.C. "was authorized to collect certain specified taxes and to use the revenue to service past debts as well as to service a new 'Indemnity Loan' which Greece was to receive in order to pay the Turks."[53]

The Revolt of 1909: The Advent of Venizelos and his Attempts to Create a Liberal Bourgeois State

The acceptance of foreign financial control by the Greek traditional ruling classes, and the humiliating military defeat had tremendous political and psychological effects upon the country's emerging middle classes, and particularly its bitterly discontented political and military elites. The decline of economic growth, as noted above, further frustrated their aspirations. These prevailing circumstances stimulated once again the conflict between the old oligarchy or traditional ruling classes, and the emerging, as well as discontented middle class forces. The situation was further compounded by two factors: firstly, the Crown's interference in

the promotional affairs of the army's officer corps. That is, the "improper" promotion of officers who were in the favour of the Commander-in-Chief, the Crown Prince Constantine; and secondly, the impact of the Young Turk's revolution upon the middle class elements of the officer corps. Consequently, the situation exploded in the Revolt of 1909 against the established classes and their organs, the political parties. The revolt had very broad ramifications in both the political and military structures of the Greek State. Like the revolt of 1862 which overthrew King Otho, this one had considerable support from the "trade guilds, the more advanced intelligentsia, and the mercantile and professional classes."[54]

The revolt's primary objective was to curtail the power of the Monarchy, to remove the princes from the high ranking military positions, and to increase the military budget. Secondly, the 1909 coup d'etat was an attempt on the part of the military to gain independence from the old, corrupt and inept political elites. This is reflected in their desire to gain complete "control of the military establishment, and especially to appoint military officers to the Ministries of War and Marine, and to manage the promotion policies of the armed forces."[55] According to one authority, the military leadership, as a result of the 1909 coup, shifted from the hands of the old commercial and landowning notables to the middle classes and the peasantry.[56] With the broadening of the class base of military recruitment, its nature and perspective with respect to the role of the military in society changed considerably, particularly in the early twenties and thirties.

In the political sphere, the revolt, displaced the traditional ruling oligarchies by effecting a general reorganization of the state's

apparatus: the public service, the judiciary and education. This was accomplished with the entry into the political arena of the new middle class aspirants under the political leadership of the Cretan liberal bourgeois revolutionary, Eletherios Venizelos, a young and energetic lawyer, who had distinguished himself during Crete's struggle for union with Greece. As Professor Geroge Zacharopoulos so aptly put it:

> The political significance of the 1909 revolution is connected with the career of Eletherios Venizelos, under whose leadership Greece expanded in size after the Balkan wars of 1912-3, and played a prominent role, for a small nation on the periphery of Europe, in the international politics of the period.[57]

Under the leadership of Venizelos the middle classes, members of the intelligentsia formed the Liberal Party as a vehicle of reaching the higher councils of the Greek State, and in the elections of 1910, the Cretan's Liberal Party experienced an overwhelming triumph at the polls by winning 300 seats out of Parliament of 364. Unlike his predecessors, Venizelos, surrounded by entirely "new" men, immediately began to lay the foundations for an "intense reconstruction and radical reform." In other words, to pick up where Trikoupis had left off, and to construct a modern Greek bourgeois state on the Western European model. The first item on the agenda for the Liberals was constitutional reform. The old and outmoded constitution of 1864 was fully revised, and the new document affected every aspect of national life: it guaranteed individual civil liberties in an unprecedented manner (Article 4). It provided that the state was to be responsible for the financial needs for elementary education which was made compulsory (Article 16). Military men, and public servants who wished to contest elections had to resign their position in order to be eligible

as candidates (Article 71). This stipulation clearly attempted to divide the line between the political arena and the state's servants with respect to elections. Some of the formal powers of the Monarchy were curtailed by the new constitution, but a number of the King's "real powers" remained "ambiguous" which later had "explosive consequences" upon the Greek society. In order to modernize the armed forces with outside help, the Liberals included in the constitution Article 99, which stipulated that by "law," foreign army personnel were eligible for state service.

In addition to constitutional reforms the Liberals embarked upon a legislative programme that was designed to change the existing socio-economic relationships in the country. Like their constitutional reforms the legislative ones penetrated every aspect of Greek society, and were met with substantial opposition by the "old" notables. It is worth quoting at some length from Professor Tsoucalas' work concerning the Venizelos radical socio-economic reforms:

> Land reform was the most urgent and difficult problem. A constitutional amendment (1911) was promulgated authorizing expropriation with compensation . . . . The medieval agrarian system of the Ionnian Islands was abolished (1912), and agricultural cooperatives were formed for the first time . . . . Low wages were exempted from confiscation in cases of debt (1909), the trade union federations of Athens and Piraeus were recognized (1910), Sunday was made a compulsory rest day (1910), a new and rapid procedure was introduced for the adjudication of disputes between workers and management (1912), joint unions between workers and employers were forbidden (1914), and the newly established unions of workers were permitted to negotiate and sign collective labour contracts . . . a compulsory general labour insurance was introduced in 1914 . . . . Progressive taxation of income was introduced in 1911 and death duties were reorganized and greatly increased in 1914.[58]

The enactment of this kind of legislation by the Liberals was indeed a "national regeneration" or we might even say, a second foundation for the creation of the bourgeois state. Although the passage of these reforms was easy due to parliamentary majority by the Liberals, their implementation met with considerable resistance. As noted above, the old oligarchy bitterly opposed the land reforms. The inability of the Liberals to implement, through state power, the land reforms had major political consequences, namely, it caused a large percentage of the peasantry, whose expectations were frustrated, to abandon the Liberals, especially during the crucial general election of 1920.[59]

A political manager par excellence, Venizelos, with the help of foreign advisers, British and French, was able to reorganize and strengthen the Greek armed forces. In the pursuance of a realpolitik foreign policy, involving manipulation of and cooperation with the country's northern neighbours, he was able, in a coalition first with Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria to declare war against the European remnants of the Turkish Empire, and secondly, with Serbia, against his "ally" Bulgaria. The Greek forces, under the command of the Crown Prince Constantine emerged victorious during the Balkan Wars. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 brought the wars to an end. Greek boundaries were re-arranged to include new territories, namely, the island of Crete, Epirus and a large part of Macedonia, and the Aegean Islands, with the exception of two islands: Imbros and Tenedos that stand guard at the mouth of the Hellespont Straits. In quantitative terms this meant that the country's territory increased from 25,104 to 41,933 square miles, and her population rose from 2,666,000 to 4,366,000.[60]

A Things Fall Apart: The Constantine-Venizelos Faud

Unfortunately for the land of the ancients, the triumph of victory could not last for long. The accession of Crown Prince Constantine to the Greek Throne, following the tragic death of his father, King George I, created a "schism" between the Crown and the political manager over the country's foreign policy. The King being married to the sister of Kaiser William II of Germany and considerably impressed by the German war machine, wanted the country to join the Central Powers, otherwise remain neutral in the upcoming international conflict--World War I. Venizelos, on the other hand, had different and contradictory views on the matter--Being impressed by British naval power and bitterly opposed to the German war aims, wanted Greece to ally herself with the Entente countries in the hopes of bringing the "national mania," the "Megale Idea," into reality. The Anatolian venture became the crucible with destructive consequences for the emerging bourgeois state.

In view of the two opposing stances over foreign policy, King Constantine, in an unconstitutional and unprecedented manner, dismissed Venizelos from the premiership, despite the fact that the latter commanded a large majority in Parliament, when Venizelos became excessively adamant on his insistence that Greece should "participate in the Gallipoli campaign on the side of the Allies."[61] In spite of Venizelos' dismissal, his foreign policy stance continued to haunt the higher councils of the state, and came to the forefront once again when the electorate returned him to office in the elections that followed on August 23, 1915. The situation reached the crisis point with the landing of Entente troops in Thessaloniki. The

King, determined to keep the country out of the war, dismissed Venizelos for the second time in the same year. Venizelos' dismissal, at this point in time, set the stage for foreign intervention, the establishment of a second government under him in Thessaloniki, the anatolian venture and its aftermath, and finally plunged the country in a constitution crisis concerning the "powers" of the Crown, the non resolution of which had deleterious and lasting effects in Greece's future political life. Furthermore, the Constantine-Venizelos feud and its aftermath faciliated the conditions for undermining the legitimacy of political institutions and public confidence.

B The Constitutional Crisis

Venizelos, following his second dismissal, contended that the King, in doing so under the circumstances, had exceeded his constitutional powers. Article 44 of the revised constitution stipulated that the "King has no other powers than those explicitly conferred upon him by the constitution and the special laws made in persuance thereto." Because of the vagueness of this article and the fact that no laws were explicitly made to define under what circumstances the King could exercise his "undeniable" right to appoint and dismiss his ministers (Article 31),[62] even though they enjoyed the confidence of Parliament, the country was plunged into a constitutional crisis. The ambiguity in Greek constitutional laws regarding the King's power to exercise his "right" to appoint and dismiss his ministers under circumstances which he may deem to be in the "interest" of the State, and the unwillingness of the Crown to accept the precedent set by King George I in 1875 with respect to parliamentary majority rule, continued to haunt the alien and fragile Greek political institutions, and culminated into the tragic events in 1967 which eventually led to the abolition of the

Monarchy. In a somewhat similar situation King Constantine II, in the mid sixties, dismissed prime minister G. Papandreou, in spite of his parliamentary majority. Both of these situations illustrate that constitutional precedent and norms were of no significance to the Greek Kings, and that their personal prerogative was supreme even if it meant pushing the country into disaster. In addition, the Constantine-Venizelos crisis illustrates that the Greek bourgeoisie and its organs, the political parties, were very weak, at this juncture of the country's history, and unsuccessful in curtailing or limiting the Crown's powers, and to set up a genuinely "constitutional monarchy" on the model of the leading liberal bourgeois parliamentary state, Great Britain. To put it in another way, the Greek bourgeoisie, being weak and fragmented, could not effectively reduce the powers of the Monarchy as it looked to it for support and stability in the country.

C Foreign Intervention and Venizelos' Thessaloniki Government

Having lost the constitutional debate to the King, Venizelos temporarily retired to his home island of Crete. However, within a short time, he entered the political arena. With the encouragement and aid of the Entente Powers he established a second government in Thessaloniki and threw "Greece" on the side of the allies and against the Central Powers. As in the "independence" period Venizelos' act led to the creation of two political authorities, one in Athens and the other in Thessaloniki, within a nation, both claiming sovereignty over the "nation" and the "right" to determine its destiny. Like his predecessor, Otho, Constantine had supported the "wrong horse" and in doing so he was expendable in the eyes of

Great Britain and France. Under allied pressure, King Constantine appointed his son Alexander to the throne without "formally" abdicating and left the country on June 12, 1917 for Switzerland.

With King Constantine in forced self-exile, Venizelos immediately thereafter recalled the Parliament of June 1915, became prime minister of a united nation and government, and officially declared war on the Central Powers, thus strengthening his position at the peace table. In order to consolidate his position within the decision-making apparatus of the state, he purged the public service and officer corps from pro-royalist elements. But he left intact the pro-royalist political forces within the political arena, which were to become the driving force behind his defeat in the election of 1920.[63]

The signing of the Treaty of Sevres on August 10, 1920 fulfilled Venizelos' Anatolian ambitions and of that segment of the Greek bourgeoisie that wanted to bring into reality the "idea" of a Greater Greece. Under the agreement Venizelos' Greece was to expand her boundaries tremendously; she was to acquire the city of Adrianople, and all of eastern Thrace to the city of Chatalja, which was within twenty miles of the capital of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople. Also, the city of Gallipoli and the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara were to be under the supervision of the International Commission of the Hellespont Straits. In the Asiatic continent Greece acquired administrative responsibilities for the city of Smyrna and its hinterland, with the provision for a local parliament which might opt for union with Greece, after a five-year period. All the Aegean Islands which Turkey had occupied during the war were ceded to Greece.[64]

Like the triumph of the Balkan Wars, the victory at Serves of Venizelist Greece was to be short-lived. The accidental death of King Alexander on October 25, 1920 (he died of blood poisoning from the bite of a pet monkey) plagued Venizelos' political fortunes. His regime offered the throne to Prince Paul, the third son of King Constantine. The prince rejected the "offer" on the ground that his father and elder brother, Prince George, had not "renounced" their "rights" to the Greek throne. With Paul's rejection of the Crown, Constantine's return was inevitable; hence, as one authority put it: "A monkey's bite had brought the feud once more to a head by pitting the old adversaries against each other--Constantine versus Venizelos."[65] However, the two enemies never fought again. The election of November 14, 1920 put an end to Venizelos' political career, at least for the time being. The people, tired of war and the inability of the Liberals to keep their promises, as noted above, and having been manipulated by Venizelos' opponents, the pro-royalist forces, rejected the Liberal Party and its leader, the old Cretan warrior, suffered a humiliating defeat, losing his own seat. Out of a chamber of 370, the Venizelists received 120 seats. Following the election, the leader and his former ministers boarded a British yacht and left the country. "Exile had become an institution."[66]

The Abolition of the Monarchy and the Rise of the Republic

With Venizelos resorting to self-exile, the royalists, having gained access to the higher councils of the state, were in a position to lay the ground for the return of their patron, King Constantine. Indeed, the war-weary people, on December 5, 1920 voted overwhelmingly for the return of

the self-exiled King. With the royalist forces at the helm, one would expect that Venizelos' Anatolian vision would be discontinued. But that was not the case. Contrary to what they had promised the electorate, they embarked upon achieving the irredeemable goal beyond the parameters granted by the Treaty of Sevres. The Greco-Turkish war of 1921-1923 had catastrophic ramifications for both the Greek society and the country's political life. During the Asia Minor expedition, the Greek armed forces were bitterly defeated and humiliated by the rising Turkish nationalistic forces of Kemal, who, ironically, was supported with arms from Greece's former allies: France and Italy. The disaster was so great that the retreating Greek forces established a "Revolutionary Committee" under the leadership of Colonel Plastiras and a large number of the officers involved in the "adventure," revolted against the monarchist government of Gounaris and demanded the abdication of King Constantine on September 22, 1922. Although the King commanded the "loyalty" of a considerable portion of the armed forces and could have resisted the revolting forces, due to British pressure, he decided to abdicate in favour of his son, Prince George, whom the British did not consider to have any pro-German sympathies. Upon acquiring state power, the revolutionaries arrested and tried eight of the King's former political managers. Of the eight, "six of the most prominent personalities" of the monarchist faction of the Greek political elite, including the former Premier, Gounaris, in spite of international protests, were executed after a summary courtmartial. This action, in effect, sanctioned the "schism" between Venizelos and the Royalists "with blood, thus feeding fanatical controversies for two more decades."[67]

The treaty of Lausanne in 1923 ended the Anatolian expedition, and put a permanent end to the "Megale Idea." The country's final boundaries were settled with the exception of the Dodecanese Islands, which were ceded to Greece by Italy following World War II. Under the Treaty of Lausanne Greece had to give up a number of her possessions gained by the Treaty of Sevres: Eastern Thrace, the two islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and her entire possessions in the Asiatic Continent. Aside from the territorial readjustments, the Treaty stipulated that "there . . . take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox religion in Turkish territory territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory." Under this provision more than a million and a half people were uprooted, 400,000 Turks and 1,300,000 Greeks, and exchanged between the two states. Although such an exchange added to Greece's population, it also irritated the existing socio-economic problems, especially the necessity for land reform. The fear of social revolution forced the revolutionary government in 1923 to "decree the expropriation of practically all large estates (public, private or church-owned)", and have them distributed to the landless peasants. According to one researcher "over 1,200,000 hectares, amounting to 38 percent of the arable land of the country, were . . . distributed."[68]

Following the abdication of King Constantine, as noted above, the reign of his son, King George II was very brief. The government, under the leadership of Plastiras, persuaded the newly crowned King to leave the country so that the Chamber could decide on the question of what kind of government the land was to have. After considerable deliberation the Chamber voted in favour of a Republic. The Assembly's decision was confirmed

by the electorate on April 13, 1924, which voted by a margin of two to one for the establishment of a republican form of government.

If the Greeks expected to have a stable political regime under the Republic, they were mistaken. The Army became very active in the country's political affairs. The politicization of the officer corps due to the Anotolian catastrophe had led to factionalism within this body, which manifested itself in eleven coups or "pronunciamentos" during the first four years of the Republic.[69] However, the officer corps was not the only body which was fragmented: the Greek bourgeoisie was so fragile, porous and unstable that its organs, the political parties, were unable to establish the conditions for the development and maintenance of a stable regime. In a span of four years there were ten Prime Ministers and three general elections. Political stability or regime stability under the Republic was achieved only when the old Cretan, Venizelos, returned to the fragmented political arena. Between 1928 and 1923 this dominant political personality presided, once more, over the Greek people. During his final rule industrial development increased. For example, in 1920 there were 2,905 factories employing some 60,000 workers. In the years 1929-30 the number had increased to 4,000 factories employing some 110,000 workers. In spite of the growth in manufacturing, the gap between the value of imports and the value of exports widened. The world-wide economic depression had affected the country considerably. The Liberal Party who had begun as a reform party and "represented the rising, progressive middle class of merchants, manufacturers, bankers and shipowners. But by the 1930s the ideas of this middle class had changed. It had arrived. It wanted to preserve and retain, rather than change and discard."[70] Any sort of

reforms were an anathema to this faction of the Greek bourgeoisie; consequently, its organ, the Liberal Party, was unable to introduce "radical" reforms which were needed during the world-wide economic crisis so as to minimize its impact upon the Greek society.

The Return of the Traditional Political Forces to Power: The Dictatorship of Metaxas

As a result of the general socio-economic and political climate of the period, the Liberal Party was displaced in the general election of September 25, 1932 by the Populist Party, a coalition of various royalist "parties," under the leadership of Tsaldares. Although the Populists had promised to work under the Republican Constitution, various republican elements within the armed forces were very uncomfortable with the royalists at the apex of power. Between 1933 and 1935, the armed forces attempted two coup d'etats against the government. In view of world-wide economic depression, unemployment and inflation, and the fact that political structures were underdeveloped, fragile and alien, superimposed upon an underdeveloped economy, such structures could not function. Moreover, the republican coups of the early thirties and the loss of legitimacy by the Republican political forces facilitated the return of the Crown in the person of King George II in 1935.

The return of the Monarchy, after more than eleven years of absence, was insufficient to stabilize the fragmented political world, if anything, it exacerbated the polarization of the political arena. The general election of 1936 unequivocally illustrates the situation: the Populists political forces won 143 seats, whereas the Liberals gained 143 seats, and the Communists received 15 seats in parliament. The significance of these

elections was the unexpected gains made by the Communists. After more than a decade of inactivity it managed, during the 1938 election, to gain enough votes as to be able to hold the balance of power between the two major bourgeois political parties. The working class "organ" founded in 1918 as the Greek Socialist Labour Party had become the country's Communist Party six years later in 1924. The latter drew much of its support from among the intellectuals, the tobacco workers, and the Asia Minor refugees, but never really threatened the established Greek ruling classes.[71] However, its 1936 electoral victory constituted a "threat" to some of the conservative forces. Since neither of the two traditional parties could independently form a government, both parties turned to the working class representatives for parliamentary support. To the conservative elements of the armed forces any sort of an alliance with the Communists was anathema. Through their "representative," general Papagos, they made known their views to the King, namely, that if he would accept such a coalition, the "army" would intervene.[72]

The rivalry between the Liberal and the Monarchist political forces, which stemmed from the Venizelos-Constantine feud, prevented the two bourgeois parties from "working" together. In view of the polarization in the political arena, and the world-wide economic crisis, as well as the increasing demands of the Greek working class for radical changes, the only alternative left to the Greek bourgeoisie was to have the Monarchy become the final and arbitrary authority. The Monarchy, seeing that its position and that of the established ruling classes was in jeopardy, decided on August 4, 1936 to suspend the articles of the constitution that guaranteed civil liberties and the activities of parliament. In its place it established

a dictatorial regime in the person of John Metaxas, a former army general and an individual of pro-Monarchist sympathies. As a contemporary Greek politician, Andreas Papandreou, has noted in one of his works, the August 4th dictatorship, as it was known, was in reality nothing more than the "personal" dictatorship of King George II himself[73] since he "controlled" the Royalist elements within the armed forces, and used them to preserve the existing socio-economic and political order.

World War II and its Consequences on the Greek Political System

The advent of Metaxas to the higher councils of the political decision-making apparatus enabled the conservative factions of the Greek bourgeoisie to eliminate the Republic forces within the armed forces and the bureaucracy, and to purge all progressive forces wtihin the Greek society. Such actions had grave consequences for the country. The fall of the dictatorship of Metaxas in the spring of 1941 due to the German invastion facilitated the emergence of new social forces under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Monarchist forces, under the political leadership of Tsouderos* were forced, along with a small contingent of army and naval units, and under the protection of the British fleet, to leave the country and establish a Government-in-Exile in Cairo. Tsouderos had the assurance of the British that his political forces would be returned to power after the war in Greece. With the traditional political forces in exile, the Greek masses were left leaderless. The only party that remained behind and was able to provide the masses with leadership

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*Tsouderos had succeeded Koryzis, who had committed suicide, who in turn had succeeded Metaxas following his death.

and guidance against the occupying Axis forces was none other than the Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.) and a few, unorganized Republican elements.

In cooperation with Socialists and Republicans, the K.K.E.'s central committee organized the National Liberation Front (E.A.M.) immediately following the Axis occupation of the country. A year later, in 1942, E.A.M. created the National Popular Liberation Army (E.L.A.S.), which was to become the most powerful resistance element in the land. As one writer has observed regarding the role of the Greek Communists in the resistance movement, the K.K.E. ". . . was largely responsible for shanking the Greek people out of the lethargy they had sunk into immediately after the occupation settled on Greece."[74]

Within the span of two years the E.A.M./E.L.A.S. forces had created a state within a state. The nature of this "free" state is best described by a contemporary of the times, C.M. Woodhouse, who as a member of the British Military Mission had parachuted into occupied Greece and had lived among the resistance forces. According to him, the E.A.M./E.L.A.S.:

> Having acquired control of almost the whole country, except the principal communication used by the Germans, they had given it things that it had never known before. Communications in the mountains, by wireless courier and telephone, have never been so good before . . . even motor roads were mended and used by E.A.M./E.L.A.S. . . . The Benefits of civilization and culture trickled into the mountains for the first time. Schools, local government, law courts and public utilities, which the war had ended, worked again. Theatres, factories, parliamentary assemblies, began for the first time. Communal life was organized in place of the traditional individualism of the Greek peasant. His child was dragooned into the E.P.O.N. (youth body), his nest-egg levied into E.A. (relief work), his caique commandeered to equip E.L.A.N. (E.A.M.'s naval army). Followed at a distance by minor organizations, the E.A.M./E.L.A.S. set the base in the creation of something that the governments of Greece had neglected: <u>an organized State in the Greek mountains</u>.[75]

It was apparent to the British that the success of these forces threatened the restoration of the Monarchy and the traditional political forces in Greece, following the withdrawal of the Axis forces in 1944. Therefore, with their diplomatic assistance and later with their direct military intervention, the Greek traditional forces prevented the resistance forces from acquiring state power in December of 1944. The defeat of the resistance forces at this point was temporary, because within the span of two years the E.A.M./E.L.A.S. forces regrouped and launched a final and catastrophic assault against the Greek traditional forces and their allies, first the British and later the Americans. The traditional forces with massive Anglo-American military and economic aid were able to defeat the resistance forces once again. One factor that is significant in contributing to this defeat was the emerging of the new international order, namely, the emerging post-war Soviet control of Eastern Europe, which aided the resistance forces until the break-off of Yugoslavia from the said order, following the Tito-Stalin dispute. With military aid to the Greek Communist-led forces cut off, their fate was sealed.

Despite the fact that the Communist-led revolutionary forces were eliminated, the Greek political arena still remained fragmented and unstable as it was in the mid-thirties. For example, between 1946 and 1952 there was a total of seventy political parties or political alliances that contested the elections of 1946, 1950 and 1951.[76] In addition to political instability, the Axis occupation and the civil war that followed had destroyed the country's economic base and infrastructure, thereby resulting in weakening the base of the country's economic elite. According to a number of sources the country suffered tremendously during the Axis

occupation: For instance, 25 percent of the country's timber resources were either destroyed by the occupying forces for military purposes, or they were cut down and transported to Germany or to Italy. The country's rail and road networks were extensively destroyed by the occupying forces: 90 percent of the country's large bridges and 50 percent of the smaller ones, as well as the various tunnels and mountain passes were demolished. Of the country's pre-war 220 locomotives, only 15 were operational after the war, the rest were either destroyed or removed by the Axis Powers. Also, the occupying forces demolished rail installations, marshalling yards and machinery. In addition to the destruction of the land-based infrastructure, the country's sea-going lines were also suffering substantially. Shipping losses amounted to 78 percent of the pre-war tonnage. Finally, over 2,000 villages were burned or destroyed, as well as 25 percent of all the houses were demolished, leaving thousands homeless.[77]

Aside from the physical destruction caused by the war and civil strife that followed, productivity in some agricultural commodities decreased by almost 90 percent of the 1938 production. Production output in commodities such as grapes and raisins had declined by 66 percent in contrast to the pre-war level; for other agricultural products the decline was higher, 89 percent for tobacco and 75 percent for cotton output.[78]

Summary

In this chapter we have traced the factors that led to the formation of the modern Greek state and its institutions. We have seen that the French Revolution and the Enlightenment had substantial impact upon the Greek middle classes. It was this influence that led a segment of these classes to organize a revolt against the Ottoman rule, and with the

aid of the European Powers to secure political independence of the southern part of the Balkan peninsula, as well as to attempt to superimpose the liberal bourgeois values and government. In the early post-independence period Greece was ruled in an authoritarian manner through the utilization of the patron-clientele system. A number of military revolts led to the democratization, and to the development of liberal/bourgeois parliamentary form of government, especially under the Trikoupis and Venizelos administrations. Furthermore, the military revolts, and in particular the 1909 coup had led to the politicization of the officer corps, which in turn led to grave consequences for the Greek political system, especially during the twenties and thirties. In spite of the changes in the Greek political system in the early part of the twentieth century, the patronage system remained a powerful force within Greek society, hence preventing the establishment of an effective and viable liberal bourgeois political structure, i.e., political parties.

The conflict between the traditional and progressive factions of the Greek bourgeoisie personified in King Constantine I and Venizelos drove Greece from a Monarchy to a Republic to a Dictatorship, compounded by foreign intervention. Finally, the destruction of World War II and the civil war that followed reduced the country into merely an administrative unit of the United States and Great Britain, with a fragmented political arena, whose notables were looking for a patron to align with.

In the following chapter we will attempt to show how it was possible for the Greek state to endure, given the fact that the country's post-war emergence led to an increased, as well as a fragmentation of its political forces, and as noted above, the existence of a very weak economic

base. We shall, further, attempt to show how it was possible for the fragmented organs of the Greek bourgeoisie to be able to establish a stable political authority in the decade of the fifties within a framework of alien, fragile and porous political structures. Or, to put it in another way, we will attempt to examine the "factors" that made the country's fragile and fragmented party system function so as to facilitate the conditions for political stability and the maintenance of the Greek political system for about twenty years.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

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2. Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 89.

3. W.P. Kaldis, John Capodistrias and the Modern Greek State (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1963), p. 18; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., p. 79.

4. Kaldis, op. cit., pp. 18-19; Ibid., p. 79; D. Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 14.

5. Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 103.

6. Quoted in ibid., p. 90.

7. The term "phanariote" is derived from the extreme northwestern corner of Constantinople called Phanar or lighthouse, which was a district inhabitated predominantly be Greeks.

8. Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 270-271; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., pp. 81-82; T. Stoinavich, "Conquering the Balkan Orthodox Merchant," Journal of Modern History, 1960, pp. 269-270; C. Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 14; V.I. Philia, Society and Power in Greece (Greece: B. Macrionitis & Co., 1974, in Greek), pp. 30-31.

9. Stavrianos, loc. cit.; Stoianovich, loc. cit.

10. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 50; Stoianovich, op. cit., p. 308.

11. Ibid., p. 50; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., pp. 87-88.

12. Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 274-276.

13. Ibid., pp. 144-145; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., p. 88.

14. Ibid., pp. 278-279; ibid., pp. 88-89; J. Carey and A. Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 45-46.

15. Quoted in Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 279.

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17. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 58-64; S.G. Xydis, "Modern Greek Nationalism" in P.F. Sugar and I.J. Lederer (eds.), Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), p. 232.

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20. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 65.

21. J. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (1), 1972, p. 92.

22. J.A. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 54.

23. Petropulos, op. cit., p. 20; N. Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece (New York: A.M.S. Press, 1970), p. 53; N.G. Svoronos, Introduction to NeoGreek History (Athens: Foundation, 1977, in Greek), p. 68; Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 285; D. Dakin, "The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-1833" in Clogg, op. cit., pp. 165-166; A Svolos, The Constitutional History of Greece (Athens: Stochastis, 1972, in Greek), pp. 79-92.

24. Petropulos, op. cit., p. 21; Dakin, op. cit., p. 166; STavrianos, ibid.

25. Stavrianos, loc. cit., Dakin, op. cit., pp. 167-168; Svoronos, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

26. Ibid., pp. 285-286; H. Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965, revised edition), p. 116.

27. Ibid., p. 286.

28. Dakin, op. cit., p. 169.

29. Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 288.

30. Dakin, op. cit., p. 173.

31. Heurtley, et al., op. cit., pp. 94-95; Dakin (1972), op. cit., pp. 56-57.

32. Kaldis, op. cit., pp. 59ff.

33. Kaltchas, op. cit., pp. 58-79.

34. J. Woddis, Armies and Politics (London: Lawrence & Wishark, 1977), p. 38.

35. W.P. Kaldis, "Leopold and the Greek Crown," Balkan Studies, Vol. 8 (1), 1967, p. 51.

36. Kaldis (1967), op. cit., p. 63; Kaltchas, op. cit., p. 88; J. Kordatos, British Intervention in Greece (Athens, 1964), in Greek), pp. 36-37.

37. D.N. Dontas, Greece and the Great Powers, 1863-1875 (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966), pp. 2-3.

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39. Petropulos, op. cit., p. 503.

40. Dontas, op. cit., p. 4; Kordatos, op. cit., p. 43.

41. Svolos, op. cit., pp. 111-126; Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 86; Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 84-86.

42. In exploiting the Don Pacifico incident, Palmerston, the then British prime minister, ordered the British navy to blockade Greece in 1854; see Kordatos, op. cit., for details.

43. Carey and Carey, op. cit., p. 86; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., p. 100; Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 295.

44. Dontas, op. cit., p. 4.

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53. Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 472-473; Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 100-105; Svoronos, op. cit., p. 104.

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57. G. Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece" in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (eds.), Greece Under Military Rule (London: Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1972), p. 21.

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59. Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Svolos, op. cit., pp. 145-166; Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 476-477; Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 100-112.

60. Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 31 & 34; Stavrianos, loc. cit.

61. Psomiades, op. cit., p. 197.

62. Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 92-93; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., pp. 113-114; M.L. Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-22 (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 53-54; Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

63. Carey and Carey, ibid.; Kaltchas, op. cit., pp. 134-135; Svolos, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

64. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 122-124; Heurtley, et al., op. cit., pp. 117-119.

65. S. Hourmouzios, No Ordinary Crown: A Biography of King Paul of the Hellenes (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), p. 43; Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 586.

66. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 124-125; Hourmouzios, op. cit., p. 44; Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 586-587.

67. Inter-power rivalry also contributed to the defeat of the Greek forces in Asia Minor. As early as 1921 the powers were discussing a revision of the Treaty of Sevres so as to limit Greece's gains. See Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 125-126; Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 588-589; Smith, op. cit., pp. 312-336; Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 35.

68. Smith, op. cit., p. 335; Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 590; Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

69. Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

70. Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 666-667; Svoronos, op. cit., p. 130.

71. For details concerning the Greek Communist Party, see G. Tsoucalas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

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73. A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1971), p. 42ff.

74. E. O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949 (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 82; Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

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CHAPTER III

THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM IN OPERATION, 1946-1961

Introduction: The Genesis of Greek Political Parties and the Nature of Social Classes

Political parties, as we have noted previously (Chapter I), perform a multitude of functions in various political systems. The pattern of function and performance of such parties in a given political system, however, depends upon two factors: (a) the conditions that facilitated their genesis, and (b) the degree of homogeneity and cohesiveness of the country's ruling classes or bourgeoisie.

Unlike the emergence of political parties in countries such as Canada and Great Britain, Greek political parties came into existence based not upon corporate and associational ties, but rather upon patron-clientele relationships. This was possible due to the following factors: In classical liberal bourgeois political systems there was a "natural" development of parliamentary institutions which in turn led to a parallel development of political parties. In transitional societies like Greece, however, there existed no "natural" development of liberal bourgeois institutions. Therefore, no political parties could develop along lines similar to those of their continental counterparts. Moreover, the kind of liberal bourgeois institutions which Greece "acquired" and attempted to develop were based on "foreign" ideas and in no way represented the society's norms, values, and culture. Like all alien forms of government they were superimposed upon the country by a faction of Greece's bourgeoisie, i.e., the rising merchant middle classes, which were influenced tremendously by "western" ideas and the Great Powers of the era.

Secondly, unlike classical capitalism, as we have noted above, which, when it emerged in countries such as England, destroyed some forms of kinship ties, neo-colonialism has tended to exploit such archaic forms of socio-economic and political relationships such as patron-client relationships for its own purposes. To put it in another way, the structure of the patron-client system, in neo-colonial situations, served two purposes: first, it provided the neo-colonial elites such as the English and American, with the mechanism whereby, through the collaboration of the political system's ruling classes, they were able economically to exploit the society, and even to dominate it politically through proxy. Secondly, it provided what one writer calls the "ideological structure for the regulation of consensus"[1] among the masses which in turn enabled the indigenous political forces to be able to "legitimize" their policies, control the masses, and thus be able to maintain the status quo within the political system.

In addition to this pattern of the socio-economic and political relationships which predominates in transitional societies, we find that in such societies their upper classes of bourgeoisie are not very cohesive or homogeneous. For instance, Greece's bourgeoisie is unlike that of Great Britain in terms of homogeneity and cohesiveness. The country's upper class is very heterogeneous and fragmented. As one researcher aptly observed:

> The upper class in Greece today [1964] does not consist of a homogeneous group such as aristocrats, businessmen or public officials. It is made up of individuals who have been successful in a variety of fields, and whose success has been translated into wealth or at least high income, as well as of heirs of wealth. They do not have in common particular class orientation, tradition or education. Thus at the top of the social pyramid one

> finds entrepreneurs (captains of industry, ship owners, big merchants and bankers), higher echelon administrators, successful doctors and lawyers, academicians who have been successful elsewhere (in business or politics), artists who have used their talents commercially . . . .[2]

Given the present state of affairs, and in view of the prevalence of the structure of the patron-client system in pre-revolutionary Greece, it is quite natural that, upon gaining "political" independence from the Sultan, and with the superimposition of governmental institutions based upon the western European model in an economically underdeveloped society, the aforementioned social system was further cultivated and exploited by the country's emerging political forces. This system, then, provided the basis for the development of Greek political parties. From the early post-independence period to the present, Greek political parties that represent the various segments or factions of the country's bourgeoisie have been the offspring of the patron-client system. Personalities or notables of the calibre of Kolettis, Venizelos, Papagos, Karamanles, and Papandreou formed or "created" their respective political vehicles or parties either independently or in association or collaboration with other political leaders or notables of the country's political elite. Their base and support rested upon the mores, norms and values that govern the patronage system. This sort of party formation lacked both broad public consensus and overall legitimacy. Being the creature of the patronage system, public consensus was limited and "legitimacy" depended upon the ability or capability of the political notable or group of notables to supply the clientele with adequate goods and services.

In view of the "nature" of the development of Greek political parties, the "life" and "success" of a "party" or a group of parties

depended largely upon the abilities of the "leader" or "leaders" to keep the "party" together so as to be able to attract continuous electorate support. For example, the Liberal Party, from 1910 to 1920, under the leadership of Eleutherios Venizelos, was very successful due to the charismatic abilities of its leader in attracting electorate support, which in turn enabled it to form the government for almost a decade. When Venizelos went into self-exile in the early 1920s, just prior to the Asia Minor adventure, however, the party's electoral fortunes were considerably diminished. The Liberals were able to return to state power only after their leader, Venizelos, returned to the political arena wherein he was able to secure enough electoral support to enable him and his party to govern the country between 1928 and 1933.

Since Greek political parties are the products of the patron-client system, they are inherently unstable and tend to disintegrate when conflicts among the various notables reach a critical state and become unable to perform their functions. Furthermore, when a key notable "fades" away, the "party" has a tendency to follow suit. But that is not all. On numerous occasions such a process or tendency has led the country's political institutions being placed in jeopardy. For example, Kolettis' Liberals, following his death in 1897, dispersed and became politically inept. With the Liberals politically inactive, a power vacuum was created within the political arena, which in turn allowed the more conservative and expansionist forces to acquire state power through elections and thus were able to engage the Greek state in a humiliating and catastrophic war against Turkey. Such an ill-prepared adventure led to direct foreign interference in the country's economic and political affairs, which undermined the Greek state's sovereignty.

The introduction of Western liberal bourgeois institutions (i.e., parliament, an independent judiciary and an "impartial" public service), without making any attempt to eliminate, reduce or contain the influence of the prevailing social structure (i.e., the patronage system), created

> . . . an incompatibility between the values and institutions of traditional Greece, in particular categorical obligations to families and communities, the absence of wider corporate loyalties either in the countryside or the town, and the growth of patronage which protected or promoted these interests in relations with the state, and on the other hand the effort to govern the country through Western institutions of corporate parliamentary parties, and a centralized bureaucracy, elaborate and overstaffed, in theory impartial, in practice too closely allied to the party which had appointed its members.[3]

The country's political managers, for example, Venizelos, on the one hand, introduced and enacted the most radical liberal bourgeois legislation the country had ever known. However, on the other hand, Venizelos' policies perpetuated the existing social structure, and his attempts to organize and create a political party based on corporate loyalties were a failure. According to one source, unlike his predecessors or even the post-war political leaders, Venizelos, at the early period of the development of his Liberal Party, "had founded throughout the country local associations" which were to form the base, for the first in the country's history, of "a mass party whose adherents would admit a permanent and corporate loyalty which [would] depend on their approval of national policies rather than local personalities."[4] Two factors, however, prevented him from extending this aspect of liberal bourgeois democracy to the party system: first, the dominance of the patronage system, and secondly, more significant, the methods of Venizelos. Instead of discontinuing the practice of his predecessors, that is, choosing candidates who did not have any connection

with or relation to the pre-existing social structure, he continued to draw the party's candidates from the society's "pre-existing social, commercial, or professional clientele,"[5] and thus maintained that social structure and its contradictions.

During Venizelos' rule the patronage system not only survived within the political arena but also increased its scope within the state's bureaucratic apparatus. The country's public service became the "institution" wherein a large number of pro-Venizelist individuals acquired employment through the mechanisms of the patronage system. Venizelos thus set the precedent to be followed by future governments. Furthermore, the maintenance of the patron-client system within the political arena maintained the status quo of the country's political elite. That is, kinship ties within the political elite remained prevalent. According to one writer, K. Legg, between 1910 and 1936, of the country's 300 ministers more than a third had a "father" or a "relative" in politics. Similarly, of the 31 "leaders" 35.5 percent of them had family connections within the political world. It is worth noting that family ties within the political arena increased by almost five percentage points following the Second World War. Between 1946 and 1965, out of 230 ministers approximately 38 percent had family ties, whereas out of 35 "leaders" approximately 49 percent had a "father" or a "relative" in politics.[6] Legg's data clearly demonstrate that kinship ties are a predominant factor of the Greek political class. Furthermore, both state power and political power in the country rest in the hands of few notables who through the years and through the patronage system have built a base of relative constant electoral support. Thus they have prevented any new political forces from acquiring access to the upper

councils of the Greek state, unless they are linked with the traditional political notables. Also, the level of turnover among the members of this group is quite low.

Given the nature of the country's politics, political power could only be gained through the utilization of the structure of the patron-client system. Greek political parties, therefore, cannot be considered "modern" as LaPalombara and Weiner define it, nor can such parties be seen as a cohesive and integrative bodies or entities with an ideology that provides the linkage that keeps the parties together and whose primary purpose is to maintain the nation-state by advocating policies which promote the "national" good. The parties of Greece have been and remain nothing more than groups of individuals, each having specific interests, lacking discipline, and loosely aggregated around a particular personality or notable, who is perceived only as a means or vehicle of acquiring access to the higher councils of the Greek state, i.e. Papandreou and the Center Union. Once they have acquired this position, they could provide their clients with "goods" and "services." For instance, members of the Greek parliament, as a recent study notes, are "chiefly concerned with seeking amendments and special favours of access to government resources for individuals or particularistic groups in order to secure their position within the clientele network,"[7] and nothing more. Unlike the functions performed by the legislative bodies of the Western democracies, the Greek parliament is nothing more than a place wherein a politician acquires national fame and personal status and, moreover, it "services as an arena for political debates," and gives the impression that the country has a representative government. As Weintraub and Shapira aptly summarized the functions of the country's party system and legislative body:

> [In Greece] parliamentary representation . . . [is] used mainly to obtain special concessions or considerations by the bureaucrat for his client. The major function of parliamentarism . . . [is] to fulfill the traditional role of mediating--so that in a sort of vicious circle the personal ties connecting voters and deputies affected the nature of the legislative process which in turn perpetuated the very same ties.[8]

In view of the kind of genesis, and the sort of function the Greek liberal bourgeois political parties perform, it seems that the country's party system as a whole is highly fragmented and fragile. To put it another way, it is "natural" that in terms of "organization" and cohesiveness the political parties are very weak. Moreover, there seems to exist a built-in tendency, of the formation of the notable-led parties, which during crisis situations produce catastrophic consequences for the country's political system. For instance, given the party or the system's state of affairs, disagreements among the various notables or personalities that comprise a political party over "policy" or even shadings of personal opinion has a very strong tendency to cause the party to disintegrate. In some cases, for example, during the reign of the Center Union, party disintegration led to political or regime instability. Political or regime instability is only one consequence of the process of party disintegration. The major and most significant consequence of party disintegration is that it has a strong tendency, at least with respect to the Greek party system, to contaminate the party system, to make it less credible, to force it to lose legitimacy, and finally to "paralyze" the party system to the point that it is unable to allow segments of the political elite to form a "regime" that the entire society could accept. Therefore, as the party flounders due to its internal contradictions, it slowly reinforces the "conditions" which make it inept. In turn, party disintegration creates a power vacuum

which attracts segments of the country's military structure into the political affairs of the nation-state.

The Rise of the Foreign Elite and its Impact upon the Party System

As we have mentioned in Chapter II, following the end of World War II the Greek political arena was fragile, unstable and as fragmented as ever. Political managers came and went. From 1944 to 1952 the country was "governed" by a series of coalitions which were comprised of conservative, liberal and left centre elements of the political spectrum. During this period, as well as up to the mid-1950s, members of the Greek political elite that occupied the state's higher councils could be said to "reign" over the country, but not rule or govern it. The governing of the Greek state lay in the hands of the foreign elite. (By the term "foreign elite" we mean a group of individuals who are alien in terms of nationality, but exercise tremendous influence through the institutional structures of the Greek state, as well as outside those structures. This elite is comprised of two segments: (a) there existed a high level of advisers who exerted considerable influence with respect to policy development and programs. An example of such actors would be the members of the British and American Embassies, i.e., ambassadors and heads of economic and military missions; and (b) those actors who are specialized in technical fields such as agronomists and budget control specialists, and who are not directly concerned with the formulation of policy, yet control key sectors within the decision-making apparatus of the State.)

The country's political, economic and military situation following the war facilitated the conditions for the predominance of the foreign

structure. As early as 1946 the Greek military establishment came under the direct control of the foreign elite. The following quotation unequivocally demonstrates the role and influence of foreign elite, in this case the British, upon the decision-making apparatus of the Greek military structure.

> No law or degree shall be signed for military matters, [unless it is considered, first, by the Head of the British Military Mission] . . . . The Head of the British Military Mission will give his advice to the Supreme Military Council, at its meetings. If his advice is not accepted, the matter will be placed in the hands of the president of the Council, in which he will not make a decision which is contrary to the advice of the Head of the British Military Mission without first consulting the British Ambassador.[9]

The foreign elite, as noted by controlling and directing the decision-making structures of the military apparatus, was able to subordinate the military elite to its own wishes, demands and purposes. However, the political system's other structures, such as political parties, remained unstable and fragmented until the early fifties. As with the stabilization and the "functioning" of the country's military structure, the nation-state's party system was able to stabilize and thus facilitate the conditions for a "stable" political authority due to the presence and hegemony of the foreign elite. This elite, i.e., the Americans under Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, was able to subordinate the Greek political forces to their demands and policies by its sheer use of economic power. The war and the civil war that preceded this period had destroyed the country's productive forces.[10] Being the country's chief supplier of both capital and foodstuffs for its population, this elite was able to secure a predominance over the other elites. For example, between 1948 and 1953 the foreign elite (the Americans) gave Greece

financial aid that amounted to $989.5 millions; over a period of approximately two decades American financial aid to Greece amounted to $3,285.5 million. Of this 54.7 percent were economic grants and loans, with the remaining 45.3 percent constituting military grants and procurements.[11]

The tremendous economic power of this elite enabled it to act in such a manner as to impose upon the other elites and in particular upon the political elite conditions that would permit the formation of a viable, durable and stable political authority. As a Greek social scientist, C. Tsoucalas, has aptly observed: The foreign elite, the Americans,

> through bargaining over the amount and the use of the money given, . . . had a stronger hold over Greek governments than Britain had ever managed to get. An implied threat to stop, reduce or even postpone the aid was enough to make Greek ministers fall flat on their faces.[12]

According to this writer, the Americans in the late forties "forced" the resignation of Tsaldaris, even though he commanded a parliamentary majority, by threatening to stop all aid, and thus they made room for the advent of Sophoulis to the premiership. The takeover of Sophoulis at the helm of the state apparatus did not necessarily mean that the country could attain a stable and durable regime. His reign until the end of the civil war[13] was made possible by a series of coalitions with the various non-left elements of the political arena.

The kaleidoscopic nature of Greek politics in the post-war period was due to the fact that the considerable economic aid provided by the foreign elite gave the various political notables the resources which would enable them to maintain their patron-client relationship, and therefore their political power. Thus, these political notables could not afford to keep away from the state's higher councils. Moreover, they

were quite aware that, although the country's political authority was fragile and unstable, the Greek political system could be maintained in view of the fact that the foreign elite participated in the decision-making apparatus as though it was running its own country.

Under the Marshall Plan agreement the foreign elite (the Americans) were able to penetrate the Greek decision-making apparatus; consequently, it was in a position to make decisions that affected the entire functioning of the Greek political system. For example, in every Greek ministry there was an American "adviser" and every decision taken by the Greek bureaucracy had to have his approval in order to be enforceable. But that was not all. The Head of the American Military Mission to Greece, General Van Fleet, the Ambassador Grady, and later Peurifoy, and the Head of the Marshall Plan mission, John Nuveen, constituted the country's "super government" during the immediate post-war period. This politico-military and economic troika had extraordinary powers given to it by the Marshall Plan agreement. For example, the country could not export or import a single item without the permission of this group. Also, this segment of the foreign elite, obviously the most powerful, "set the prices of all major commodities, fixed interest rates, approved bank loans and controlled the issuance of currency."[14]

While the Greek political system was maintained by the direct (and legally sanctioned) intrusion of the foreign elite within the country's decision-making apparatus, the threat of cutting off aid, at this juncture seemed to have been a very poor means for facilitating the conditions for the creation of a viable, durable and stable political authority. As we have noted previously, for instance, between 1946 and 1951 there

were 28 political authorities reigning over the war-torn country, each attempting to get a greater piece of the economic goods provided by the foreign elite. Therefore, some other, more credible and effective means had to be found in order to necessitate the conditions for a viable, durable and stable regime. The mechanism that was to guide Greece to the "state" of political "stability" for almost a decade was found in the changing of the electoral system and the emergence or the consolidation of the right of centre political forces under the leadership of Marshall Papagos.

A The Formation of the Greek Rally and the Rise of Marshall Papagos

The March 5, 1950 elections had unequivocally demonstrated that the country's party system was still weak and fragmented as it was in the forties. This state of affairs could not, therefore, lead to the formation of a fairly stable and durable political authority that would be in a position to govern the country. Under a proportional representation system, approximately 3,000 candidates representing 44 political "parties" contested the 250 seats of Parliament. When the results were in, four of the 44 political parties gained a total of 198 seats. The reamining seats were divided among the country's other contestants. No single party or a coalition of parties could form a "stable" regime. Within a year eight different political authorities came and went, finally resulting in the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of new elections on September 9, 1951.[15] The new elections were to be conducted under a new electoral law, a modified system of proportional representation, whose sole purpose was designed to favour the larger parties at the expense of the smaller parties led by notables such as G. Papandreou and S. Markesinis, and of course the parties of the left.[16]

According to a number of sources, Field Marshall Papagos, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces during the late phase of the country's civil war, resigned his commission in the armed forces and on the day Parliament was dissolved he declared his decision to contest the elections. Although of pro-royalist and conservative sympathies, he was not trusted by the Monarchy. The schism between the Monarchy and Papagos was caused by the latter's strong views that the Palace's interventionist powers in the country's political affairs should be curtailed. According to one researcher, the Monarchy was so afraid of Papagos, and ". . . Queen Frederica was so annoyed and at the same time so determined to stop Papagos [from participating in the elections], that she persuaded King Paul to summon immediately to the Royal Palace General Tsakalotos, then Chief of the Joint Military Staff, and in a quite unconstitutional manner ordered him to place Papagos under arrest. Happily Tsakalotos refused and an open crisis was averted."[17]

As the victorious hero of the Greek civil war, the Field Marshall had acquired considerable charismatic appeal. Although not a politician, he attracted many elements of the right and centre to his new political party--the Greek Rally (Ellenikos Synargemos), which was modelled after General De Gaulle's Rassemblement Français. Having observed the notable-led political parties and their effect on the country's political stability, the Field Marshall "insisted that his movement [Ellenikos Synargemos] was not a party, and that men of all political sympathies would be welcome as individuals on condition that they forsook previous party allegiances."[18] Since the Greek party system was based on the patronage system and since the various political notables or members of parliament had no real

allegiance to their party, the prospect of a national and charismatic personality entering the political arena, such as that of Papagos, had a tendency to attract or to pull like a magnetic force those notables or individuals who desired to get their hands on the state's resources. Looking at Papagos as a vehicle for the purpose of acquiring state power and, therefore, the source to provide their clients with goods and services, a number of Right wing political "parties" such as the Populist-Unionist Party led by Kannelopoulos and Stephanopoulos and the "New Party" led by S. Markesinis, were immediately dissolved and their members joined the Ellenikos Synargemos. In addition to the dissolution of "parties," numerous deputies and individuals from the smaller parties of the Right of Centre spectrum "deserted"[19] their parties and joined the Papagos bandwagon.

Even though right and right-centre elements congregated around the personality of Papagos, thereby forming the country's single largest political party since the days of Venizelos, the results of the 1951 election were not as conclusive as might have been expected. The political arena, however, had become more manageable. Of the 44 political parties contesting the 1950 elections, only 10 political parties or formations participated in the 1951 election. As the final results were tallied up, the Greek Rally gained 36.5 percent of the popular vote and 114 seats in a Chamber of 258; the National Progressive Union of the Centre (E.P.E.K.), headed by another former general, Plastiras, received 23.5 percent of the total vote and 74 seats; the Liberal Party under the leadership of the son of that Great liberal bourgeois revolutionary, Eletherios Venizelos, Sophocles Venizelos, gained about 19 percent of

the vote and 57 seats; the rest of the parliamentary seats were distributed among the United Democratic Left, the Populist Party and the Agrarian Workers Rally, which received 10 and 2 seats respectively.[20]

The electoral results made it quite obvious that none of the victorious parties could muster enough seats to form an independent government. Papagos, knowing the inherent difficulties that usually confront a coalition regime, refused to form the government. With the Marshall's refusal to enter the higher echelons of the Greek state's decision-making apparatus, Plastiras' forces and those of Venizelos were left to put together a shaky coalition. Like most governmental coalitions, this one was not destined to live for long. A general election was imminent. The election results made it clear to the leaders of the political parties and to the country's new international patron--the United States--that the modified proportional system could not produce a stable regime. Aside from the debate of whether or not the country should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.),[21] the most crucial decision that faced the Plastiras-Venizelos coalition was the reformation of the electoral rules for the upcoming election so as to produce a stable regime.

Papagos' party, which represented the Right, was in favour of the "majority" or single-member-district election system. The centre parties, on the other hand, being weak and fragile, were in favour of the "simple proportional" system since it meant that under such a system they could continue to influence the political authority. The prime minister, Plastiras, condemned the method of electoral system voiced by the centre parties, thus adding more weakness to the political centre. In view of the diverse and often contradictory views expressed by the various segments

of the Greek political elite, it was clear that no compromise method could be agreed upon. Hence, it was left to the country's patron to settle the stalemate. At the peak of the controversy over the electoral system, the foreign patron in the person of John F. Peurifoy, the American Ambassador to Greece, issued the following statement:

> The US Government believes that the reestablishment of the simple proportional system, with its unavoidable consequences of the continuation of governmental instability, would have destructive results upon the effective utilization of US aid to Greece. The US Embassy feels obliged to make its support publicly known for the patriotic position of Prime Minister Plastiras on this position.[22]

The ambassador's verbiage was backed up by heavy artillery. According to a former government member, Rentis, Peurifoy had threatened the governmental coalition of Plastiras-Venizelos that he would cause the termination of all financial aid unless parliament abandoned the "proportional" system.[23] With the inability of the Greek economy to meet rising financial demands, the government in the end was forced to give in and to implement the "majority" system which favoured the large and traditional parties and elminated splinter parties that contributed to the establishment of unstable governmental coalitions. In the elections that followed, September 16, 1952, a conservative and "stable" government was formed, with an absolute parliamentary majority. Moreover, of the nine political parties contesting the elections four received no seats in the new parliament; the Union of Independents gained 2 seats; the alliance of Socialists, Liberals and the Progressive Center Unionists received a total of 51 seats; whereas the Greek Rally, under Papagos, won 247 seats (with 49.2 percent of the popular vote) in a parliament of 300,[24] and this result laid the foundations for political "stability" until the early sixties. Papagos'

electoral victory set the stage whereby the political Right gained direct access to the country's decision-making apparatus for the next ten years.

With Papagos' Ellenikos Synargemos at the helm of the state's higher councils, a number of economic reforms and administrative changes were introduced that were to be the basis for Greece's post-war economic recovery. Under the leadership of S. Markesinis, as Minister of Economic Coordination,* and one of Papagos' early supporters and possibly the "man" who brought the Field Marshall into Greek politics,[25] the country began to experience socio-economic changes. As a Greek revisionist writer aptly observed: "The first notable achievement of the Right was to devalue the currency. This was done swiftly to the tune of almost 50 percent and was one of the most successful operations of its kind in post-war European history."[26] Even though this was true, the currency devaluation hurt considerably the country's working classes since most of their savings were in cash. However, such an act "proved [to be] a boom to the commercial classes." In other areas of economic activity, the government abolished the country's import control system which prevented the free importation of foreign goods. This system had been a "source" of corruption within the politico-economic sphere, and an embarrassment to the political managers.[27]

In order to attract foreign capital, the government passed Public Law 2687/1953, whose primary aim was, in the words of the country's finance minister, Kapsalis, to "encourage the investment of foreign capital and to promote the country's productive investment, to raise employment

*By order of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, Industry, Labour, Transport, Public Works, Agriculture, Merchant Marine and the Banks were placed under the direct supervision of the Minister of Economic Coordination.

and generally to accelerate the rate of the country's economic development."[28] Contrary to the arguments put forth by some writers,[29] the PL 2687/1953 seemed also to be a reaction to the "imminent reduction" of American aid under the Marshall Plan, so that, for the country to continue its economic recovery, capital was of essence. However, in spite of the extraordinary guarantees which the law granted to foreign investors and the prevailing political stability, foreign capitalists found the Greek economic climate not to their liking, primarily due to the absence of domestic skilled labour. It is worth mentioning that during the decade of the Right's reign, between the enactment of PL 2687 and the end of 1962, of the total amount of approximately $347 million approved for investment by the Military of Coordination, only about $70 million were actually invested in the country.[30]

With the aid of US financial assistance and the economic reforms instigated by the Greek Rally, the country's economic base began to stabilize. Likewise the hegemonic position of Papagos within the Greek Rally and the state apparatus was secured (he retired some five thousand public servants, thus reducing a considerably expenditure, and made the institution more offective by allowing the rise of younger bureaucrats), strengthening the conditions for political stability. The hegemonic position of Papagos within the Greek Rally and the constant presence of American aid, at this point, seems to have facilitated the conditions for the stability of the Greek political party system. For instance, the resignation of Papagos' most powerful and influential minister, Markesinis, over economic policy, together with the resignation of two other ministers,[31] and the withdrawal of some minor adherents, did not in any way shatter

the party or its parliamentary position, as we will see occurred in the Papandreou years. On the contrary, the country's political authority remained stable until the mid-sixties.

B The Cyprus Issue and its Consequences upon the Party System

According to one authority, Papagos, while he was still an army officer, had expressed a "desire" to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.[32] Cyprus, an island in the Mediterranean Sea, with a predominant Greek-speaking population (80 percent) and a Turkish-speaking population of about 18 percent, its Greek-speaking population had long strived for enosis or union with Greece. The Greek Cypriots' desire to unify with Greece has been one of the most crucial factors affecting, tremendously, the operation and the functioning of a party system based on liberal bourgeois norms and values. Since the end of World War II, the Greek political arena had been especially affected by the Cypriot problem. As early as 1948 the Greek Monarchy, in the person of King Paul, had expressed a desire for enosis of the island with Greece.[33] The Monarchy was by no means alone in encouraging enosis. Elements of the country's political forces constantly raised the issue. For instance, Plastiras, during his brief premiership, raised the question of enosis of Cyprus with Greece with the country's international patron, the British, who were also the colonial administrators of the island since 1878. It seems that Plastiras' action did not impress the British. But with Papagos in office, the desire for unification was more forcefully expressed. It is believed that the Field Marshall, as early as 1951, encouraged and supported a former army officer in the Greek army of conservative and nationalist or enosist views and Cypriot decent, Grivas, as well as

Archbishop Makarios to take measures that would ultimately facilitate the conditions for enosis. The measures that these two men took were in the form of a secret organization known as E.O.K.A. (the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants), whose primary aim was to provide or create through the utilization of guerrilla warfare tactics against the island's colonial masters--the British, the conditions for enosis of Cyprus with Greece.[34]

The encouragement of enosis by the various segments of the Greek political forces sparked off a number of events that would have far-reaching consequences for the country's political situation. First, the E.O.K.A. guerrilla tactics had turned the island into a state of siege. Secondly, Papagos, by raising the Cyprus issue at the United Nations, created an embarrassment for the British, even though the latter did not deal with the issue because it felt that this was a matter between Greece and Britain. The Field Marshall's determination to solve the Cyprus problem led to the deterioration of relations between Greece and Britain, whose influence in Greek political affairs had been slowly diminishing "since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine." However, since Great Britain was the primary force behind the return of the Greek Monarchy, that institution was indebted to her and the representatives of the said institution, as will be discussed below, made every possible effort to remedy the situation. Thirdly, Papagos, by openly supporting the Cypriot cause, increased his personal popularity with the masses, and, consequently, it was feared by the Monarchy that he might use this as a means of curtailing royal prerogative powers over the country's political affairs. Finally, and possibly the most important of all the effects the Cyprus "problem" had upon Greco-British-American realtions was the fact that it had placed N.A.T.O.'s

southeastern flank in jeopardy since Turkey, the other member of the alliance in the region, on the instigation of the British, entered the Cyprus dispute.[35]

So long as Papagos and his Greek Rally maintained their parliamentary strength and the Cyprus issue continued to be the dominant factor within the Greek political arena, the country's party system gained considerable autonomy from the Monarchy, since its power and legitimacy no longer resided or was based upon it, but rather upon the populace. Such a state of affairs, if it were to continue to take its natural course, would inevitably have led to the erosion of the Monarchy's power and privileges within the country's politikos kosmos. It was apparent that if the Monarchy was to continue to be the country's chief local patron in terms of power and legitimacy, the forces unleashed by Papgos had to be stopped. An effective and immediate "ingredient" had to be found so as to cut off this process from reaching its logical conclusion.

C The Rise of Karamales and its Consequences

Like the accidental death of King Alexander in the early twenties, which led to the exacerbation of the Venizelos-Constantine feud and prevented the creation of a "genuine" liberal bourgeois nation-state, the death of Field Marshall Papagos on October 4, 1955 provided the necessary opportunity that enabled the status quo forces to put an end to this process, thus robbing the people, for the second time, of the opportunity to develop the liberal bourgeois institutions or structures.

Prior to his death, Papagos had made it known that his foreign minister, Stephanopoulos, should succeed him. King Paul was aware of this. However, instead of appointing him to the premiership, as would be expected

of a "constitutional" Monarch, he, in unprecedented manner, handed the premiership to Constantine Karamanles, an obscure and relatively unknown member of parliament, who was Papagos' Minister of Public Works.[36] The circumstances under which Karamanles acquired the country's top political administrative job are worth discussing, for they highlight the decisive elements that contributed to the failure of the Greek party system, to transcend its "notable-led" stage, at this juncture, and to operate or function in a manner similar to those party systems found in liberal bourgeois societies.

According to one account, King Paul met Stephanopoulos at Papagos' house where his body still lay. The King requested that Stephanopoulos present him with a new Cabinet. The latter demurred that such action would appear to be "in bad taste . . . before the State funeral of Papgos and before a party vote."[37] The key factor in this exchange, between Stephanopoulos and the King, is that it was assumed that the party's parliamentary wing would be the maker of the new Government and would elect the new prime minister its leader and not the Monarch, or any single notable. Such a process would have led to the democratization of the party structure of the Right[38] and thus would have affected the country's entire party system. The Monarch's intervention deprived the party system of the chance to develop along corporate and associational lines. The motives that prompted the King to act in an unconstitutional manner may be summarized as follows: Stephanopoulos, although he was of pro-royalist sympathies, could not be trusted by the King to lead the country due to two factors: first, it was quite possible that he would continue the Marshall Papagos policy with respect to Cyprus, since he owed his job to him and to the

Greek Rally. Secondly, and more importantly, unlike Karamanles, he was "responsive" to public opinion and even if he went against the wishes of his party, the public would have certainly forced him to side with the nationalist or enosis forces, a position which would have strained further Greek and Anglo-American relations, possibly jeopardized N.A.T.O.'s south-eastern flank. Therefore, Stephanopoulos and his Greek Rally would have become an independent political party with power and legitimacy based upon the electorate. The Monarchy's power and position within the political world would have been affected tremendously. The loss of power or of influence would have meant that this institution could no longer be the link between the Greek political arena and the two dominant foreign powers, Britain and America. Furthermore, since these two powers, and in particular the latter, provided the country's armed forces with all the necessary material, should such support be diminished, the Monarchy could have no pillar or structure to stand on, and thus would become expendable. To put it another way, once the Monarch's influence in the military was diminished it could no longer remain the country's chief local patron, and the outside forces would have to look elsewhere to find a linkage between themselves and the country's political forces. Therefore, in order to maintain power and influence in Greek politics, the Monarchy, it seems, had no other choice but to intervene directly in the affairs of a political party. However, as we noted, by appointing Karamanles to the premiership instead of Stephanopoulos, even though the latter commanded considerable support in the Greek Rally, the King's actions had adverse implications.[39]

As we mentioned, Stephanopoulos commanded the support of almost half of the Rally's deputies.[40] The question which comes to mind, then,

is how was it possible for Karamanles to secure the Rally's support in parliament so as to carry out the King's wishes? Two very crucial elements contributed to Karamanles' success. First, when the King gave him the premiership he also armed him with a "weapon." That is, if he and his Government did not get the necessary parliamentary support he had the "right" and power granted by the King to dissolve the Chamber. As G. Papandreou accurately pointed out during the parliamentary debates: "the fate of this House [1955] depends on whether Mr. Karamanles obtains a vote of confidence."[41] Secondly, the King, in a covert manner, pressured the Greek Rally's deputies to support Karamanles' new Government. Therefore, a combination of these two tactics resulted in securing a vote of confidence, by margin of two hundred to seventy-seven votes, for the Karamanles Government which, incidentally, comprised of thirteen ministers, nine of which had served under Papagos. As would be expected, Stephanopoulos and twenty-nine other deputies resigned from the Greek Rally.[42] Moreover, since Karamanles' power and legitimacy lay in the hands of the Crown, he "reigned as an absolute dictator within his party."[43] Such a state of affairs added to the already fragile and fragmented party structure, which in turn led to further splits.

With Karamanles at the top within the state's higher councils, it seemed that the Monarchy was "safe." The Cyprus problem could now be resolved in a manner which did not damage N.A.T.O.'s interests or that of the foreign powers' position in the area. Furthermore, the country, under his direction, could closely align with the West, and particularly with the United States. He continued to carry on the policies of his predecessor in the fields of economic, social and even foreign policy,[44] in

connection with the western alliance. However, unlike his predecessor, Papagos, Karamanles had considerable difficulty in keeping himself and the Right in power. To put it another way, aside from the Cyprus problem, as well as the socio-economic problems that he had to face and deal with during his tenure, the most difficult problem that faced him from our perspective was how to keep the country's political Right together. The answer to this problem was to be found in the constant changing of the electoral system, the extensive use of the patronage system, as well as the armed forces,[45] without having regard to possible consequences. Unlike his predecessors, Karamanles made no effort to create a viable political party. It seems that he, as will be demonstrated below, was guided by political expediency without considering the long-term effects his methods would have upon the Greek society, and in particular upon the politicos kosmos. It is a tragedy for the Greek people that their political elite failed to learn from their mistakes. As Machiavelli informs us: "Men commit the error of not knowing when to limit their hopes."[46]

As the life of the Chamber elected in 1952 was coming to an end, the country's political manager was preparing to go to the "people" with his "new" party: the National Radical Union (E.R.E.), which he founded after dissolving the Greek Rally and reconstituting its members under his banner. The majority system used in the 1952 election, it seems, did not quite serve Karamanles' purpose. Just prior to the dissolution of Parliament he passed, as one writer informs us, "an exceptionally complicated electoral law which was a combination of proportional representation and simple majorities."[47] It was quite clear that the aim of this law was to further the prospects of E.R.E. Under this "hybrid" electoral system the

opposition had no choice but to form a loose coalition so that they might make some inroads in the elections scheduled for February 19, 1956. As a result of this electoral law, the centre-left political forces joined together to "form" an electoral coalition labelled as the "Democratic Union," whose dominant notables were G. Papandreou and S. Venizelos. Each was represented in the coalition by his own "party:" the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Union respectively. As the electoral results were tabulated, it was of no surprise to the political world that Karamanles was returned to power. However, what was interesting in this election is that Karamanles did not have the absolute control of the electorate, and a viable alternative might have been in a position to displace him. In the 1956 election the political right received 165 seats out of a total of 300, and 47.1 percent of the popular vote, as compared with 247 seats out of a total of 300, and 49.2 percent of the vote in the previous election. At the same time the centre-left forces increased both their popular vote (34.2 percent to 48.1 percent), as well as their seats in parliament, from a mere 51 seats in the 1952 election to 132 seats in the 1956 election.[48] As the electoral results demonstrated, the absolute majority which the political Right enjoyed in the 1952 election in seats as well as in the popular vote dropped considerably, especially in terms of seats. Karamanles' first electoral victory, however, was to be shortlived. The unresolved Cyprus issue, the question of nuclear bases on Greek soil, and open dissension among the ranks of the E.R.E. led Karamanles to call a general election two years later.

By capitalizing on the conditions of economic and political stability which Papagos had set in motion, together with the open support of

the Crown and the Americans, Karamanles was able to maintain "internal stability." However, it was in the foreign field that Karamanles' first Government faced its greatest difficulties. The Cyprus problem continued to haunt the country's political right. The failure of the Greek, Turkish and British representatives to come to an agreement over the issue in question, as well as the appointment of Sir John Harding by the British government to govern Cyprus, further exacerbated the problem. The appointment of Harding, instead of pacifying the guerrilla tactics of E.O.K.A., increased them considerably. The chaotic situation arising from the Cyprus question and "the allegations that he [Karamanles] had agreed, or was about to agree to the establishment of U.S. missile bases in Greece"[49] led to the defection of fifteen deputies and two ministers from the ranks of E.R.E. and forced Karamanles to call a general election. The question of nuclear bases did not only affect the E.R.E., but also prevented the centre-left forces from forming an electoral coalition.[50] Furthermore, it facilitated a temporary truce between the remaining E.R.E. political forces and the Liberals which enabled the caretaker government to pass "a modified system of proportional representation" whose primary purpose was to prevent the smaller centre-left parties, as well as the splinter groups, from forming a coalition "which everybody considered imminent."[51]

The elections were fought on the issue of whether or not Greece should allow the Americans to establish bases in her territory, as was favoured by Karamanles, and on the question of Cyprus. The electorate was disenchanted with the way Karamanles was handling the country's foreign policy.[52] The centre-left, on the other hand, remained fragmented and thus did not represent a viable alternative. The political right, in

order to remain in office, changed the electoral system in its favour. In spite of this the electorate was preparing to teach the political right centre a lesson that would have far-reaching consequences for the political arena.

Although Karamanles' E.R.E. was returned to power with a small increase in parliamentary seats, 171 from 165, the centrist forces' strength was reduced from 132 seats to 50. The winner of this election was the United Democratic Left, which increased its popular vote from 9.6 percent in 1956 to 24.4 percent in 1958, and gained 79 seats in the new parliament "thus becoming His Majesty's Opposition."[53] With the new electoral mandate Karamanles proceeded to resolve the Cyprus problem, at least temporarily, by signing the London Agreement which made Cyprus an "independent" Republic. The Greek Parliament ratified the agreement, and thus recognized the new republic following a "bitter debate" on February 28, 1959 by 170 votes to 118.[54]

With the Cyprus problem "resolved" relations with the British, Americans and even with the Turks improved. In the economic field, Karamanles made considerable inroads. Inflation was brought under control. Greek shipowners began to bring their vast merchant navies under the Greek flag, after having had them registered under foreign flags for many years, in order to avoid heavy Greek taxation. The same tycoons began investing their capital in new industrial enterprises in Greece after having ignored her for many years. A new shipyard at Skaramanga, an oil refinery, the beginning of an iron and steel industry, an aluminium plant, an atomic reactor, just to mention a few, were the results of the first Greek economic reemergence since the pre-war period. Tourism began to become a

major source of revenue. The Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1959, with a capital of 540 million drachmae, whose primary purpose was to "promote the modernization of production and to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital." This corporation was later amalgamated with the Economic Development Finance Corporation, which was created in 1954 to administer loans to Greek enterprises under the Marshall Plan. This amalgamation led, in 1964, to the creation, under the Papandreou Government, of the Hellenic Industrial Bank, a corporation owned by the State. By 1967 this corporation controlled seventeen Greek corporations and had investments in areas ranging from shoe manufacturing to fruit processing, to fertilizers and mines.[55]

D The Formation of the Center Union Party and the Political Right's Struggle to Remain in Office

However, in spite of the economic improvement, the left's victory haunted the traditional forces. To put it another way, the unexpected victory of the United Democratic Left had a chilling effect upon the country's political right, the Monarchy and her international patron--the Americans. Therefore, immediately thereafter, the ruling political elite, in cooperation with the Americans and the Monarchy, encouraged the fragmented centre forces to remedy the situation. After three years of on-and-off negotiations between the various elements of the centre spectrum, the notables Papandreou, Venizelos, Garoufalias, and Tsirimikos, to mention only a few of the Centrist leaders, joined forces to form a new political party--the Center Union. Its purpose was to deter the "left" from ever again gaining second place in the political arena. These people "were part of and represented the ruling bourgeoisie"[56] and the interests which it espoused.

The formation of the Center Union in 1961 led to the development in Greece of what may be termed a three-party system, comprised of the United Democratic Left (E.D.A.), the Center Union (C.U.) and the National Radical Union (E.R.E.)--the C.U. and the E.R.E. being the largest and the dominant political formations within the Greek political arena. Like Karamanles' party, the Center Union was a party of personalities aggregated around a "dominant" personality, that of G. Papandreou. The fact that it was a party did not necessarily mean that the other personalities would be loyal and obedient to Papandreou, as will be shown later,[57] nor that it had any genuine mass support. Any support it may have had depended upon the patron-client relationship of a notable of the party and a particular district or social group. On paper, both parties seemed to be "democratic," but in reality, as Meynaud informs us, they were undemocratic and authoritarian, with considerable power in the hands of the "leader."[58]

The formation of the Center Union was not in any way a means of developing the country's party system, an important aspect of the liberal bourgeois nation-state; it was, rather, an act of political expediency, that is, to create a buffer zone between the "left" and the "right," with the latter, if possible, in power or alternating with the centre. However, two factors wait unnoticed when its creators put the Center Union together. First, given the notable-led nature of its formation, its initiators failed to take into consideration the inherent contradictions this heterogeneous party carried, thus making no attempt to prevent the diverse interests from splitting the "party" by building a mass base and democratizing its power structure. Secondly, given the fact that it was a conglomeration of the right of centre to the left of centre forces, one of the

political system's "traditional" pillars or structures--the army--was not particularly happy to see elements of the "left" compose part of the new party.[59] Furthermore, one of its creators, the ruling political right, was not prepared to relinquish state power in the upcoming elections: October 29, 1961. On the contrary, the ruling political right was prepared to utilize all the available means at its disposal, ranging from the extensive use of the patronage system to the police and the gendarmerie in order to secure an electoral victory. As one source informs us: "E.R.E. was ruthlessly determined to remain in office."[60]

E.R.E. was returned to power with considerable gains: 50.8 percent of the vote as compared with 41.1 percent in the previous election. With respect to seats, it only increased them by five: 176 from 171 seats. The Center Union, in collaboration with S. Markesinis' Progressive Party, made considerable inroads, if it is compared with the gains of the centre forces in the 1958 election. The electoral coalition received approximately 34 percent of the vote and 100 seats in the new parliament, as compared to 50 seats in the previous one. However, the "methods" used to gain such support were immediately questioned by Papandreou, who began his anendotos polemos (relentless struggle), which facilitated the conditions for the dissolution of parliament in 1963. Papandreou had finally succeeded in facilitating the conditions which paved the way for his entry into the higher councils of the state. However, he had failed to realize the menace which he carried on his shoulders and the grave consequences it would have for the country, namely, the fragmented and divergent interests that rested within the Center Union.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. L. Li Causi, "Anthropology and Ideology: The Case of 'Patronage' in Mediterranean Societies," Critique of Anthropology No. 4 & 5, Autumn 1975, pp. 91-92 & 99-100.

2. A. Alexander, Greek Industrialists: An Economic and Social Analysis, Research Monograph Series, 12 (Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1964), p. 79.

3. J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, Modern Greece (London: Ernst Benn Ltd., 1968), pp. 116-117

4. Ibid., p. 115.

5. Ibid., p. 116.

6. K. Legg, "Political Recruitment and Political Crises: The Case of Greece," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. I, January 1969, pp. 542-543.

7. D. Weintraub and M. Shapira, Rural Reconstruction in Greece: Differential Social Prerequisites and Achievements During the Development Process, Sage Research Papers in Social Science, series no. 90-017 (Studies in Comparative Modernization Series) (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975), p. 38.

8. Loc. cit.

9. P. Rodake, Foreign Capital in Greece (Athens: Mekena, 1977, in Greek), p. 152, translation and emphasis mine.
We are of the opinion that such state of affairs within the Greek military structure remained in force until the advent of General Papagos to the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces, January 19, 1949. In a letter to Prime Minister Sophoulis, according to S. Hourmouzios, op. cit., p. 202, the General wrote: "the powers of the Commander-in-Chief should be the same as he had held during the 1940-41 war in the matter of planning and directing military operations, the composition of military units, appointment and transfer of officers, and the recall of officers from the reserve." He went on to add that the role of "the allied military mission should confine their activities to training and supply, and should not intervene in administration, organization or operations." It was on this condition that he accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief. However, this does not mean that the country's military establishment became autonomous from the foreign elite. It still relied tremendously upon the British and

the Americans for military supplies, but at this juncture, it seems that the decision-making apparatus of this structure was in the hands of the Greeks.

10. See infra, pp. 46-47.

11. G. Coutsoumaris, et al., Analysis and Assessment of the Economic Effects of the US PL 480 Program in Greece (Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1965), p. 19.

12. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 106.

13. Loc. cit.

14. J. Nuveen, "Answering the Greek Tragedians," The Christian Century, October 2, 1968, p. 1236; A. Maddison, et al., Foreign Skills and Technical Assistance in Greek Development (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1966), p. 12; W. McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1957), pp. 67-68; Rodakes, op. cit., pp. 153-161.

15. Hourmouzios, op. cit., p. 219; J. Meynaud, et al., Political Forces in Greece (Athens: Baron, 1974, in Greek), pp. 540-542; Nuveen, op. cit.

16. N. Crawshaw, "Political Changes in Greece," The World Today, Vol. 18 (1), 1952, pp. 28-29; B. Markesinis, The Theory and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament: A Comparative Study with Special Reference to the United Kingdom and Greek Experience (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 205.

17. Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 149-150; Markesinis, op. cit.; Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 124.

18. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 28, emphasis mine.

19. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

20. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Nov. 10-17, 1951, p. 11836, hereinafter referred to as Archives; Meynaud, op. cit., p. 543.

21. Greece joined N.A.T.O. on October 17, 1951. See T. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

22. Couloumbis, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Nuveen, op. cit.; Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 125.

23. Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 152-153; Couloumbis, op. cit., p. 57.

24. Ibid., p. 154; Markesinis, op. cit., pp. 207-208; Meynaud, op. cit., p. 544; A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), p. 93.

25. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 208; K. Young, The Greek Passion: A Study in People and Politics (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1969), p. 267.

26. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 130.

27. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 252; Casey and Casey, op. cit., pp. 154-155; Markesinis, Ibid.; Tsoucalas, Ibid.

28. H. Ellis, et al., Industrial Capital in Greek Development, Research Monograph Series 8 (Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1964), p. 275; Rodake, op. cit., p. 223.

29. Rodake, op. cit., pp. 221-222, argues that the PL 2687/1953 was a "payment" by Papagos for American support, which guarantee the protection of (American?) capital in Greece.

30. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 275-276 & 286-288.

31. Archives, Jan. 1-8, 1955, p. 13973; Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 252; Heurtley, op. cit., p. 163; Markesinis, op. cit., p. 208.

32. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 207.

33. C.L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954 (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1969), pp. 404-405.

34. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 254-255; Heurtley, op. cit., pp. 168-169; Young, op. cit., pp. 273-274.

35. Both Greece and Turkey were members of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the Turks did not enter the Cyprus issue until the mid-fifties. According to Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 158-160, in order to countervail Greece's claim on Cyprus, the British encouraged the Turks to take an active role on the matter, so as to allow Britain to become the countervailing power between the disputants, and to be the winner in either way.

36. Constantine Karamanles, a village boy from Serre, Macedonia, had first been elected to Parliament in 1935 under the banner of the Populist Party. Following Metaxas' dictatorship he returned to his village where he remained inactive throughout the occupation period. In 1946 he was re-elected and on many occasions served in the Cabinet. See D. Holden, Greece without Columns: The Making of the Modern Greeks (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), pp. 178-180; Markesinis, op. cit., pp. 208-209; Papandreou, op. cit., p. 94.

37. Young, op. cit., p. 275, emphasis mine.

38. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 149.

39. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 210; Tsoucalas, Ibid.

40. One writer informs us that approximately 100 deputies of the Greek Rally had pledged their support to Mr. Stephanopoulos. See Markesinis, op. cit., p. 209.

41. Parliamentary Debates (extraordinary session), 11 October 1955, I, 14, cited in Markesinis, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

42. Archives, October 15, 19-5, p. 14467; ibid., p. 210; Young, op. cit., p. 276.

43. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 150.

44. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 258.

45. The role of the armed forces in elections will be discussed in Chapter IV.

46. Cited in S. Rousseas and J. Farganis, "American Politics and the End of Ideology" in R. Denisoff (ed.), Sociology: Theories in Conflict (Belmont, California :Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1972), p. 311.

47. Campbell and Sherrard, ibid.; Markesinis, op. cit., p. 211; Papandreou, op. cit., p. 95.

48. It should be noted, however, that in the 1952 election the "centre-left" coalition was composed of three parties: Plastiras' National Progressive Union of Center, Venizelos' Liberals and Svolos' Democratic-Populist Socialist Union. Whereas, in the 1956 election the coalition encompassed seven parties:

    Liberal Democratic Union, headed by S. Venizelos
    Liberal Party, headed by G. Papandreou
    Democratic Party of Working People, headed by A. Svolos-G. Kartalis
    United Democratic Left, headed by J. Pasalides
    National Progressive Union of Center, headed by S. Papapolites
    Agrarian and Labour Party, headed by A. Baltatzes
    Populist Party, headed by K. Tsaldares

    The broadening of the coalition seems to have increased its popular vote, as well as seats, compared to the previous election. Furthermore, it should be noted that Mr. Papandreou participated in the 1952 election as a "personality" with the Greek Rally. The electoral data in this section are drawn primarily from the following sources: Archives, op. cit., 1952 and 1956 years; Carey and Carey, op. cit., pp. 161-162; Meynaud, op. cit., pp. 545-546.

49. Heurtley, op. cit., p. 172; Markesinis, op. cit., p. 212.

50. Markesinis, ibid., attributes the defection of the fifteen deputies and the two ministers to Karamanles' attempts to "introduce a Bill of establishing a system of reinforced proportional representation, which penalized coalitions and at the same time gave him greater control over his party."

51. Loc. cit.

52. Unlike the situation in the 1956 election, in this election, the "centre-left" was represented by two electoral coalitions and a single "party" headed by Venizelos and Papandreou. See Meynaud, op. cit., p. 547.

53. Archives, May 24-31, 1958, p. 16201; Meynaud, ibid., Papandreou, op. cit., p. 96.

54. Heurtley, op. cit., p. 173.

55. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 301-305; A Herrick, et al., Area Handbook of Greece (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 236-240; Heurtley, op. cit., p. 174; Rodake, op. cit., pp. 297-308; Young, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

56. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., pp. 264-265; Meynaud, op. cit., pp. 276-277; Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 167; Young, ibid., pp. 286-287.

57. See Chapters V and VI.

58. Meynaud, op. cit. See Chapters VII and VIII.

59. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 215.

60. Campbell and Sherrard, op. cit., p. 265; Markesinis, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY IN GREEK POLITICAL LIFE PRIOR TO 1967

Introduction

Political systems, as we have noted previously, are comprised of a set of structures which perform a set of functions that sustain and perpetuate them. One such structure is the military. As we know, the military in all political systems provides the mechanism whereby the system's sovereignty is guaranteed against foreign or internal aggression. Furthermore, it may be used to integrate the culturally distinct and different elements or parts of a given society. Through this structure individuals from one part of the country may be transferred to another part of the country which may have different cultural values. Such an individual or groups of individuals are, therefore, exposed to the subculture or tradition that may prevail in that particular region of the land. Thus over time such a process may lead to the development of a unique culture within that structure that would be able to embody and transcend all the societal parts. In other words, such experience has a tendency to break the old regional, cultural, or even political ties, and in the process may allow the development of a national esprit de corps as well as a national identity. For example, one is not merely an Athenian or a Spartan, but most significantly he is a Greek, and his allegiance should be tied to the "nation" and not to his region or district. In addition to the integrative role of the military, in some countries this structure has become a vehicle for educating the populace. A case in point is Iran, whereby the military is actively engaged in the education of the rural population and the modernization of the countryside.

The Nature of the Greek Civil Military Relations

The manner in which the military structure functions or performs its tasks in a particular society is related to the state of the system's civil-military relations, which in turn is linked to an extent to the morphology of the said structure. In the traditional liberal bourgeois societies civil military relations developed along particular lines, namely, from a feudal mode of civil-military relations to a liberal bourgeois mode, in which the military is considered to be nothing more than mere professionals in the service of the state. In transitional societies, however, like Greece, the pattern of development is quite different. In view of the presence of quasi-feudal social relations and the predominance of the patron-client system in post-revolutionary Greece, the nation's military structure evolved around a group of "private military entrepreneurs [who] possessed . . . private armies which they hired out to the state as integral units under their command."[1] State control over these groups was practically non-existent. The major leverage which the Greek had over these military groups rested on its ability to provide them with the necessary funds and its acceptance of their respective regional political authority. In other words, the Greek State gave these groups the appropriate funds required for a particular military mission, and it did not in any way interfere in their affairs. Any attempt to form a regular army along liberal bourgeois pattern was adamantly opposed by the local politico-military notables. For such attempt would have meant the destruction of the regional political authority of these groups and, therefore, reduced them to the status of mere civil servants ". . . of a bureaucratic state military establishment."[2]

Futhermore, the "regular army" which came into being during the post-revolutionary period was composed of various European Philhellenes and of a group of Greeks who were not from the liberated area--i.e., the Peloponnesse and Central Greece. According to one observer, this group of Greeks came primarily from

> areas and cities of Thrace, Macedonia and Asia Minor which the Turks had destroyed, as well as from nearby islands; they were primarily well-bred young men, some of them educated, who had a clear feeling of patriotism . . . and who, lacking relatives and friends, found an honorable refuge in the regular army; by contrast, the Rumeliot and the Peloponnessian had the captain of their village, under whom they served whenever the need arose; otherwise they returned home.[3]

It is quite obvious from this observation that, in view of the social composition of the "regular army," and in view of the cultural differences as well as the differences in perception of the concept of nation which its members reflected, that the politico-military notables of the liberated areas considered the military to be an "alien institution"[4] whose purpose was to displace their power base. Such a state of affairs further exacerbated the politico-military schism, which in turn tended to undermine the intentions of those Greeks who wanted to create a bureaucratic-military establishment during the immediate post-revolutionary period.

A Capodistrias' Military Reforms

Until the arrival and advent of Capodistrias to the presidency in 1829, the Greek liberating army was composed of "regular and irregular forces [who] lacked formal organization and military discipline."[5] Capodistrias knew very well that the survival as well as the maintenance of Greek nation-state rested upon the ability of the central governing authority to create a bureaucratic-military establishment. In spite of the bitter

opposition from the local politico-military notables, he was determined to provide internal stability and to guarantee the security of the newly-founded nation against possible Turkish aggression. He therefore embarked upon military reorganization. Through a series of decrees he placed the irregular army under the authority of Demetrius Ypsilantes, whom he had named Stratarchos or Field Marshal. Furthermore,

> the irregular forces were divided into eight chiliarchies or regiments or approximately 1125 men . . . . Each regiment was commanded by a chiliarchos (a commander of a thousand men) or the rough equivalent of a colonel. There were junior officers, an aide-de-camp, secretary, priest, doctor, paymaster, two standard bearers (color sergeants) and two drummers. The chiliarchos or colonel appointed the two lower grade officers while the government chose the remaining higher ranking officers upon the recommendation of the commander of the campaign. An oath of allegiance to the new [central] government was required of the officers and the men.[6]

The first phase of the military reorganization had not eliminated factional interests nor partisan rivalry. The politico-military notables took advantage of the infant structure. Through embezzlement of funds and jealousy between the regular and irregular forces, the notables weakened the effectiveness of the newly-created military structure. Capodistrias realized that if such state of affairs continued to go unchecked, the nation's existence was in doubt. Therefore, one year after the creation of the chiliarchies, 1829, he officially dissolved them and "reorganized the army into tagmata or battalions."[7] Under the new reorganization plan, and with the assistance of philhellenes, who were appointed to the higher councils of the military establishment,

> the irregular forces were divided into twenty battalions, each consisting of four companies and commanded by a taxiarch. The officers and non-commissioned officers were similar to those of the regular forces. The former chiliarchs or colonels were now ranked as generals, forming a kind of general staff. Paymasters were included and commanding officers deprived of jurisdiction over the military treasury.[8]

The integration of the regular and non-regular officers into a kind of national officer corps whose loyalty lay with the central government, under the second phase of the military reorganization, served a number of purposes for the Capodistrias regime. First, it made the Greek army an effective weapon insofar as internal stability was concerned. For instance, the new military units were able to bring both order and stability to eastern Greece, a trouble spot for the central government.[9] Secondly, it altered somewhat or neutralized the power of the politico-military notables, bringing some of them under the control of the national regime, i.e., Kolokotrones. Finally, it opened the way for the government to lay the foundation of the country's military structure by creating the necessary institutions, such as a Military Academy, for the military's maintenance and continuity.

B The Military Academy and the Emergence of the Officer Corps

Prior to Capodistrias, the country's officer corps was very heterogeneous because it was drawn primarily from a number of European philhellenes, Greek emigrés, and a few local notables who had acquired military training in the service of foreign armies. Capodistrias' military reforms in no way eliminated the military's heterogeneity. On the contrary, he utilized the voluntary services of the philhellenes to create a better and more effective military establishment. In December of 1828, by means of a decree, the President of the Greek State established the Military Academy or Scholi Evelpidon as the country's first legal military institution, from which the nation's professional officer corps could take shape. He placed the new institution under the directorship of the Italian philhellene Salteli, who was later succeeded by another philhellene, the French officer Pauzie.[10]

In the first sixty years of its existence, the Academy provided the country with a small and relatively homogeneous officer corps, trained and educated in Western European military thought and practices. Out of forty-three cadets who entered the Academy in its first year, only eight graduated three years later. The low output of officers was due to a number of factors. The high standards established by the Academy's director caused "the failure of a large percentage" of the cadets during the examination period.[11] Secondly, the country's military force "was basically made up of a small standing infantry and cavalry force that policed the countryside and chased brigands."[12] Thirdly, the high cost of tuition fees allowed only the most wealthy families to send their children to this new institution, hence a low and relatively homogeneous enrollment. It cost, for example, about one thousand two hundred drachmas for one year's tuition fee, which was equivalent to a year's salary for a clerk, while a janitor earned approximately two-thirds less than that. Hence, the Military Academy became an exclusive club for the upper classes. Furthermore, given the narrow base of recruitment, and until the advent of Venizelos, the graduates of the Academy constituted an elite force not only within the army, but also within the society as a whole. A military career had considerable social status, second only to the legal profession. For these individuals of lesser social prominence who wished to enter into the country's military profession, the political managers, in order to accommodate them, founded in 1882 the School of Non-Commissioned Officers. Although they spent the same number of years in formal study as their colleagues in the Academy, their opportunities within the officer corps was limited. The graduates of the Academy predominated in the military

structure. This was possible due to a number of factors. First, the School of Non-Commissioned Officers supplied graduates for the lesser prominent military positions, such as "officers for the infantry, the cavalry and the various corps and services." Secondly, the "seniority criteria favoured [the] graduates of Evelpidon, since officers from the School for NCOs were ranked two months behind their colleagues graduating from the Academy at the same time."[13]

This small group of graduates continued to dominate the military establishment until the turn of the twentieth century, when two events altered their position within the military structure, namely, the 1909 revolution and the mobilization for the Balkan Wars. The latter, which required a larger officer corps to command the mass army, radically affected the social composition of the country's officer corps. The officer corps no longer remained an exclusive preserve of the wealthy. With the abolition of tuition fees in 1917, the Academy's doors were opened to the country's lower social classes.

With the influx of the lower classes, the Academy, in the eyes of the upper classes, lost its "social prestige," and they stopped sending their children there. Furthermore, given the economic crisis in the twenties and thirties, the Academy, with its free tuition, and as the country's only post-secondary institution, recruited widely from those social classes who could not afford to pay for their children's education.[14] In other words, the primary institution of the land's military structure became for the lower classes the channel for social mobility. Since 1916 the country's officer corps has its roots, to a large extent, in the rural areas of the nation. According to data compiled by social scientists

(TABLE 1), the majority of the officer corps' recruits were drawn from areas with a population group of less than 1,000 and not greater than 5,000. About 24 percent originated from areas which had a population of between 5,000 and 50,000, whereas only 4.2 percent were drawn from areas with a population group of over 50,000. In summary, these data illustrate that Greece's officer corps reflects fairly accurately the country's overall state of urbanization and economic development. For instance, more than a third of the country's population between 1916 and 1965 lived in areas under 1,000 and more that half of the population was engaged in agricultural (small or family farming) activity.[15]

Similarly, in terms of social origins by class, social scientists have found that Greece's officer corps in contrast to that of the U.S.A., Great Britain and Sweden, is drawn primarily from the lower or working stratas of Greek society. According to a cross national sociological study[16] (TABLE 2), 49 percent of the country's officer corps is recruited from the lower or working class segments of society, as compared to 5 percent for the U.S.A.; nil for Great Britain, and 13 percent for Sweden. The absence of upper class elements within the Greek officer corps is attributed to the fact that the military profession is not as prestigious as it used to be. Secondly, the country's upper class prefer to send their children to respectable professions, such as medicine and the law. Thirdly, Greece differs from the European pattern due to the fact that it lags behind the rest of the countries, both in economic development and in class formation. That is, only since the mid-sixties has the country experienced industrialization and urbanization as well as the crystallization of middle and upper class in the tradition of Western Europe.

TABLE 1

Demographic Origins of Greek Professional Officer Corps
1916-1965

Population Group	Army %	Total Population %
Less than 1,000	32.1	34.6
1,000-5,000	25.9	20.2
5,000-10,000	6.2	3.2
10,000-50,000	18.0	12.0
50,000 or more	4.2	3.5
Thessaloniki and Athens	13.6	26.5

Source: Brown, op. cit., p. 251.

TABLE 2

Social Origins by Class of the Contemporary Military Officer Corps
in the United States, Great Britain, Greece and Sweden
(in percentages)

			Greek		Swedish	
Class	U.S. Army Elite 1950	British Army Elite 1956-60	Army Officer Sample 1968	Total Army Corps 1968	Officer Sample 1962	Army College 1962
Upper	3	18	-	-	41	34
Upper middle	47	39	34	29		
Other middle	45	43	32	22	46	54
Lower or working	5	-	34	49	13	12
Number	(140)	(100)	(100)		(846)	

Source: Kourvetaris and Dobratz, op. cit., p. 62.

C The Officer Corps and the Patronage System

The political events of the first two decades of the twentieth century not only radically changed the social composition of the Greek officer corps, but more significantly displaced the traditional relationships. As noted previously,[17] the post Capodistria period was marked by a very narrow and rigid patronage system. This was possible due to a very centralized form of government and the importance of the Monarchy, as the latter was the focus of political power, and thus it was the chief source of patronage not only for local political and economic elites, but also for the military establishment. Through the royal princes who controlled and directed the upper councils of the military structure, the Monarchy exercised tremendous power and influence in the selection and appointment process of officers. According to one study, the Monarcy in the person of Prince Constantine, who as commander-in-chief "tended to keep favorites on the General Staff and to promote those close to him more readily. This elect group often avoided the unpleasant task of provincial garrison duty."[18] Therefore, this group of officers tended to be loyal to the Monarchy. Similarly, another researcher reveals that the Prince used his influence to change the criteria of scholarships, so that one of his clients, Ioannis Metaxas, was able to receive one, and thus could continue his education abroad. Therefore, it seems obvious that since Metaxas had been in debt to King Constantine, that he "should share his patron's political views in time of crisis . . . ."[19] The crisis came in 1936, as we have mentioned above,[20] and Metaxas fulfilled his debt to King Constantine's son, King George II, by becoming a puppet dictator controlled directly by the Crown.

Such a system of patronage was closed and only very few and select officers could benefit from it. Furthermore, under such a pattern of patron-client relationships, once a military man became a party to it, his loyalty and allegiance lay not with the nation but with the Monarchy. In other words, the military structure at this juncture was merely an appendage of the Crown, with relatively little control of its own procedures by members of the military apparatus. Such a system of civil military relations inhibited the development of a military structure based on the Western European pattern as envisaged by Capodistrias and others. Therefore, it was clear to the initiators of the 1909 revolution that if the military structure was to acquire relative autonomy within the political system, the royal princes had to be removed from its upper councils.

As we have noted in Chapter II, the 1909 revolution marks the beginning of the creation of a liberal bourgeois Greek state. Not only did the 1909 revolution displace the traditional political forces and open the way for the new aspirants to political power, such as Venizelos, but with respect to the military it overthrew the rigid and narrow system of patronage of the princes and replaced such a patronage system with a more "flexible and open patronage."[21] The concept of flexible and open patronage has been used in this work to mean that associations within the political arena, and in particular within the military structure, were between a dominant political figure (patron) and his supporters (clients). Furthermore, such relationships were based on a common interest and were flexible. That is, such associations were subject to change as the interests of the supporters (clients) changed, and new more dominant patrons came into being. After the 1909 revolution the phenomenon of the flexible

and open patronage came to govern civil military relations. Prior to this date, the patronage system was inflexible and closed, as we have shown above, in that associations were possible only between one predominant patron, the Crown, and very few and select supporters (clients).

The change in the patronage system and in the social composition as well as the politicization of the officer corps brought the military directly into the political affairs of the state. In the pre-1909 period because of the narrow base of recruitment, the inflexible patronage and the lack of strong radicalism within the military, as well as the absence of alternate political centres (patrons), military interventions were very limited, both in activity and in scope, that is, during this period officer groups tended to support politicians rather than actively taking part in the political affairs of the state. According to one researcher, they performed "the function of arbiter rather than ruler."[22] For example, in 1843 the group of officers led by Kallergis merely wanted King Otho to grant a "liberal" constitution whereby segments of the upper and commercial classes gained access to the higher councils of the state.

However, since 1909 the military has played an active role in Greek politics. This was possible partly due to the nature of the military's social composition, and the politicization of the officer corps,[23] and partly because of the introduction of the flexible and open patronage which allowed the military man to constantly fluctuate according to the political climate of the times. The nature of such a system of socio-political relations is best illustrated by the case of General Leonardopoulos and Lieutenant Tsakalotos, wherein the patron clientele system crossed political lines in spite of the national schism (dichasmos), which had

polarized the political arena into Venizelist and Monarchist forces. According to a recent study, Leonardopoulos, although a liberal, at the time of Venizelist supremacy "could not afford to be magnanimous and extend his favour to a repenting member of the Royalist camp"--Tsakalotos. The latter was one of the many Royalists

> who had been accused of sedition and imprisoned by the courts of 1918. Leonardopoulos, who met Tsakalotos while inspecting the latter's prison cell, offered him the option of fighting under his command in a dangerous mission. Tsakalotos accepted the offer with enthusiasm and became Leonardopoulos' devoted client. He followed his patron in the Asia Minor expedition, in Thrace, and finally in launching an abortive coup of 1923 against Plastiras and Gonatas. After the failure of the coup and Leonardopoulos' downfall, Tsakalotos managed to escape arrest and dismissal by attaching himself to another influential Venezilist officer, General Klados. The latter, as Chief of General Staff in 1925, transferred him to an important position in the General Headquarters. The fact that he had fared so well under his Venizelist patrons did not prevent Tsakalotos from applauding the restoration of the monarchy in 1935 and the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936.[24]

Although the preceding case is both unique and atypical in the history of Greek military relations, it is, nevertheless, significant in that it reveals the nature of the flexible and open patronage system. For under such a system of civil military relations, officers subordinated the "national" interests to their own. Furthermore, the aforementioned case clearly illustrates that the actor's ideological position was flexible, thus he could join or support the different political factions. Therefore, the actor's "attachment to the personalities from whom he derived benefits, regardless of what they stood for, epitomizes a client's behaviour in military politics"[25] at this juncture.

This analysis of the change in civil-military relations brought about in 1909 is also reflected in the thesis of Janowitz. According to

him, officers who originated from the upper classes historically tended to make the military profession "conservative and disdainful of active politics."[26] The reason for that was due to the sharing of common interests and family ties between the political and military actors. This is represented by our concept of inflexible patronage system and explains why Greek officers played a very passive role in the first thirty years of the Greek state. Janowitz further contends that with the influx of the middle classes and peasants into the military structure, the common interests between the political and military participants evaporated and consequently, "the military in the West became a middle class profession; one consequence was that the profession was opened to more direct political involvement."[27] This new phenomenon was due to the heterogeneity of interests amidst the middle classes and their diverse social composition. As an example, in Greece between 1916 and 1936, officer groups made six attempts to overthrow the civilian political managers of the Greek state and in three cases were successful in their interference.[28]

The Post War Period and the Military's New Functions

The advent of Metaxas, and the Second World War that followed, eliminated the system of flexible patronage within the military. Through a systematic elimination or purging of the republican forces, brought about primarily by forced retirement, the royalist political forces secured their position within the army, and hence the old rigid system of patronage re-emerged within the military structure. Furthermore, the monarchist political forces encouraged the creation and development of a secret organization known as I.D.E.A., Sacred Union of Greek Officers, within the military structure, whose primary function was to neutralize any republican elements

within the army after the civil war, as well as to given the royalist forces an extraordinary means to control the military apparatus. The I.D.E.A. was composed primarily of officers above the rank of colonel from the within the army,[29] and its main objectives were: (a) adamant opposition to communism; (b) "loyalty to the king"; and (c) "support for conservative 'nationalist' political leaders." According to one expert in the field, "one of those who enjoyed the support of I.D.E.A. was Karamanles."[30]

In the immediate post-World War II period, the Greek military apparatus was accorded with a set of new roles and privileges never envisaged by its founders. Because of the role it played in the defeat of the Communist opposition, this apparatus was viewed by the populace and by its members as a liberating force, a symbol of national unity, and as a saviour of the nation from a Communist takeover. Like the armies of the national liberation mvoements found elsewhere, the Greek military structure had for the first time in its history acquired "a combination of pragmatic and ideological commitment, a cohesion formed by common experience, and a heightened sense of self-esteem."[31]

Moreover, the military apparatus became a vehicle for integrating and educating the masses. It was able to take advantage of the social requirement, that every Greek male is by law required to enter military service, and thereby contributed in a positive manner "toward the virtual elimination of the stigma of illiteracy among men under the age of forty by forcing illiterate recruits to attend special schools where reading, writing and simple mathematics are taught."[32] The educational role of the military served as the "training ground" for developing "technical and administrative skills."[33] Like the armies of many transitional states,

the Greek army actively participated in building and maintaining infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges. Moreoever, the Greek military establishment "trains a large number of young men to operate, maintain, and repair heavy construction equipment, skills that can prove beneficial to them and to society at large upon their return to civilian life."[34]

According to one researcher in the field, the country's political managers, having realized the significance of the military apparatus in the development of civilian sector (i.e., public works and housing), created in 1957 a special unit within the Defense Department--Stratiotiki Yperesia Ergon Anasyngrotiseos or Military Reconstruction Projects Service--whose primary function was to coordinate the non-military activity of this apparatus. Within a span of twelve years, between 1957 and 1969, this special unit was allocated the sum of 1,191,000,000 drachmas for its projects. During this period this unit was engaged in erecting several structures at the newly-created University of Patras, and installing 937 prefabricated housing units in ten different areas of the land, at the cost of 70 million drachmas. These social and economic roles of the Greek military apparatus provided this structure with "a self-perception and a public image as an instrument of progress and modernization," which may have had broader political ramifications. For instance, segments of this apparatus may have "misjudge[d] and overestimate[d] the importance of the army to the nation's development." Thus there was a tendency of such a group of officers to "decide to intervene" in the political affairs of the state on the feeling that the "political" managers did not give proper consideration "in the allocation of resources or sufficient credit [to it] for its development accomplishments."[35]

Furthermore, in an unprecendented manner the Greek military establishment acquired politico-military control of areas or zones in northern Greece. According to Katris, following the Greek Civil War, the country's civilian political managers under the fear of possible aggression from the land's northern Communist countries, created the "Surveillance Zone" under the administration of the military. This zone extends for "650 miles along the northern borders of the country and encompasses over a million people out of a total population of eight million."[36] Within this zone the army's power is absolute. No one may enter it without prior clearance from the military commander. It is significant that the people in this area have always voted for the Right. For instance, in the 1958 election the Right received about 42 percent of the total vote. However, within the Surveillance Zone "the percentage by districts was between 71 percent and 86 percent. In the 1961 election the Right had 50.81 percent [on the whole], but in the zone 91 percent to 100 percent."[37] It is obvious from the data that the military "pressured" the people of this area, who are mostly peasants, to vote for the right-wing candidates.[38]

Finally, again in an unprecendented way the Greek military acquired a supra patron, the United States, which enabled it to increase considerably its autonomy from the Right. The United States not only provided the post-war Greek military apparatus with the equipment and funds, but more significantly, became the military's school for training and educating its officer corps. Between 1950 and 1969, according to official American statistics, under the Military Assistance Programme the total number of Greeks trained in the United Stated amounted to 11,229. This figure is quite significant since the country's Officer Corps numbers approximately

11,000[39] at any one time. In addition, the U.S. has provided the Greek military apparatus with constant financial assistance. For instance, according to one source, the United States, between 1947 and 1964, contributed an average of about $100 million per year for military expenditures. The contribution as it stands is not significant in U.S. terms, but taking into consideration that Greece's total military expenditures at this juncture amounted to $300 million annually, the figure assumes a staggering importance.[40]

Conclusion

In this chapter we have traced the development of the Greek military apparatus. We have seen that like the party system it, too, has been predominated by patronage politics. The broadening of the recruitment base caused a change in the civil military relations of the country, namely, the fact that the military became an active participant in the state's political affairs, especially in the twenties and thirties. Furthermore, we have seen that since the post-war period, the army has taken new roles, namely, not only has it become a pillar of the society, but it has also assumed substantial politico-military power, something which its founders could not have forseen. It would not be exaggerating to note that in view of its increase in power and autonomy, and its independent constant financial assistance from non-Greek sources, it had become a state within a state. In other words, its unprecedented power and autonomy has made it a predominant structure within the political system, and as other structures fail to perform their tasks it stood ready to intervene in the political affairs of the state.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. J.A. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 42; see also P. Diamandouros, Political Modernization, Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), p. 305.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Diamandouros, op. cit., p. 307.

4. Ibid., p. 308.

5. W.R. Kaldis, John Capodistrias and the Modern Greek State (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1963), p. 45.

6. Ibid., p. 46.

7. Ibid., p. 48.

8. Ibid., p. 49.

9. Loc. cit.

10. Ibid., p. 50.

11. Ibid., p. 51.

12. T. Veremis, "The Officer Corps in Greece (1912-1936)" Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 2, 1976, p. 114.

13. Veremis, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

14. Ibid., p. 116.

15. J. Brown, "The Military and Society in Greece," Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1974, p. 251.

16. G. Kourvetaris and B. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political Orientations of Officer Corps in a World Perspective (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1973), p. 62.

17. See Infra, pp. 39-48.

18. Papacosma, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

19. Veremis, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

20. See Infra, pp. 73-75.

21. Veremis, op. cit., p. 128.

22. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 21.

23. See Veremis, op. cit., pp. 118-200.

24. Ibid., p. 131.

25. Loc. cit.

26. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 42; cited in Ibid., p. 21.

27. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 26.

28. Brown (1971), op. cit., p. 49.

29. G. Karagiorges, From IDEA To Junta (Athens: Papazesi, 1976, in Greek), p. 3ff.

30. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 25.

31. Brown (1971), op. cit., p. 89.

32. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 26.

33. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 75; cited in Loc. cit.

34. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 26.

35. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

36. J. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power (St. Louis, Missouri: New Critics Press, Inc., 1971), p. 59.

37. Katris, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

38. For details on this area see Tsoucalas, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

39. The data cited in this paragraph are found in T. Couloumbis, "Post World War II Greece: A Political Review," East European Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1974, p. 115; and in Wolpin, op. cit., p. 97. The two sources cited here give no indication of how many of those Greek individuals were members of the officer corps. Wolpin, however, informs us that of the MAP trainees for the FY 1964-FY 1969, coming from 62 countries, "about 50 percent were commissioned officers. Many of the enlistees were accounted for by intire naval units and air force maintenance personnel. Of army

personnel brought to CONUS installations, approximately two-thirds were officers . . . ." p. 98. With respect to Greece, in view of a lack of evidence as to how many of these trainees were actually army officers, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the coup instigators were merely "agents" of the U.S. For such conclusion tends to subordinate the domestic contradictions of the Greek political system, and distort one's analysis of the problem of military intervention.

40. Katris, op. cit., p. 155.

CHAPTER V

THE PARTY SYSTEM, THE "NEW MILITARY" AND THE NEW SOCIAL FORCES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POWER VACUUM, 1961-1967

Post War Economic Developments

With the economic assistance of the United States[1] the traditional Greek ruling class--the Monarchy and the bourgeoisie--was able to consolidate its position within the Greek political system, as well as to lay the foundations for a remarkable economic recovery, expansion and development. Under the guidance of its political manager, Karamanles, the country's economic base was stabilized and expanded. The output of staple foodstuffs, industrial crops, and mineral production not only recovered their pre-war levels, but in many cases increased substantially. A few specific examples are evidence of this. Wheat production between 1935-38 averaged 767,000 metric tons. By the early sixties it had reached a level of 1,594,000 metric tons. Rice production increased from a pre-war level of 4,000 metric tons to 85,000 metric tons in 1961. In the field of industrial crops the growth was unprecedented. Production of unginned cotton increased by six times its pre-war level: that is, between 1935-38 it averaged 44,000 metric tons, whereas, by the early sixties, it had reached a level of 277,000 metric tons. Also, in the area of mineral production the country experienced substantial success. For instance, the iron ore output in 1951 was 53,000 tons, by 1960 it had reached a level of 277,000 tons. Similarly, the production of manganese ore jumped from a mere 16,000 tons in the same year to a 126,000 ton level nine years later.[2]

As the economic base recovered and expanded it began to change the traditional socio-economic and political relationships. Prior to World War II the agricultural sector was the country's main employer and producer. It employed 60 percent of the working force and produced 50 percent of the

Gross National Product (GNP). By 1962 the number of people working in this sector dropped to approximately 53 percent. As the number of people working in agriculture decreased at this juncture, there was a modest increase in the number of people engaged in the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. Between 1952 and 1962, according to one researcher,[3] the increase in the number of people working in the manufacturing sector amounted to 1 percent, whereas in the service sector it amounted to 2.1 percent. In spite of the increase in the labour force within the service sector, its contribution to the GNP decreased by about two percentage points during this period, as compared with a five percentage point increase with respect to the manufacturing sector.

The shift in the labour force and the increase in productivity led to an increase in the annual per capita income, as well as to changes in the country's demography. In regard to the latter, in 1940 only 33 percent of the population lived in areas of 10,000, by 1960 the number had increased to 44 percent. Similarly, the annual per capita income prior to the war averaged the sum of U.S. $80; within a span of six years the annual per capita income increased from U.S. $112 in 1951 to U.S. $270 in 1956, an increase of 250 percent. By 1964 it had reached the $500 figure.[4] By the early and mid-sixties this economic growth had provided the Greek people with relative stable consumer prices, wages increased on the average by 8.4 percent per annum and the GNP gain averaged about 7.6 percent between 1963 and 1967.[5]

New Social Forces: The New Military

During this period Greece experienced not only an economic "miracle," but, more significantly, the emergence of two diametrically opposed forces. Firstly, the country's armed forces not only were professionalized, in Huntington's terms, but they were also politicized. Also, the post-war officer corps had experienced a psychological trauma, as cadets of the classes of the late thirties and early forties at the Military Academy. These classes of young officers, as Zacharopoulos observes, "experienced the bitter-sweet sensations of mutiny and insubordination as young cadets in April 1941, when they were ordered not only to surrender to the invading Germans but to act as policemen as well--to make certain that the population of Athens did not offend the Germans in the initial stages of occupation."[6] This order, the author informs us, was anathema to the corps of cadets. Therefore, a majority of them decided to disobey their superiors. This they did by commandeering vehicles and small vessels and setting out for Crete in time to take part in the bloody battle for the island. Those who survived at the battle of Crete either joined the Greek forces in the Middle East, or returned to the mainland to join with "nationalist" resistance forces inside Greece. Furthermore, the remnants of these classes went on to fight in the Greek Civil War.[7]

Against this background the country's military structure became the fertile ground for the emergence of a new military class. Within I.D.E.A., the post-war secret military right-wing organization, a new secret society came into being--E.E.N.A. (Union of Young Greek Officers). As we have mentioned in Chapter IV, I.D.E.A. was formed as well as encouraged by the conservative segments of the Greek political forces and especially by the

Monarchy, so as to guarantee political "control" of the Armed Forces through an extraordinary and extra-parliamentary mechanism. As long as the right-wing political forces remained in office, the Monarchy was in no danger. Given the vested interests of the Monarchy and the conservative political forces, the nature of civil-military relations during this period was that of a patron-client relationship. That is to say, the military establishment supported the status quo forces by making sure that in the areas of its control the people voted for the conservative candidates and, in return, the political right provided it with a guarantee of financial support.[8] Moreover, the political right allowed the military structure to gain considerable dominance within the political system, and in fact to become a "state within a state." In other words, it was permitted to run its own secret and intelligence agencies and, more importantly, a nation-wide radio and television network capable of manipulating public opinion,[9] without effective parliamentary scrutiny.

Unlike its mother organization, I.D.E.A., the new entity was autonomous of the political forces and comprised junior officers with similar social and educational backgrounds. Its founder was George Papadopoulos, who had joined I.D.E.A. in 1947 while still in the Artillery School.[10] Of the seventeen men who were instrumental in planning and finally executing the April 1967 coup,[11] according to a number of sources, sixteen were members of E.E.N.A. Moreover, eight of these officers were members of the Military Academy class of 1943, while four graduated with the class of 1940, one in the class of 1939, and one in the class of 1948 (see TABLE 3). What is significant in regard to these officers is the fact that the majority held a field-rank, "perhaps the most frustrating

rank in any military, from which level promotions are more difficult to come by and at which point retirement is usually around the corner."[12]

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there are many striking similarities between those Egyptian Officers who led the coup against Farouk and those Greek Officers who spearheaded the army intervention of 1967. The Egyptian Free Officers, according to one scholar, had similar military experience, as well as a common social background. According to Vatikiotis, most of the Free Officers group "were of humble origin--from all parts of Egypt. Their fathers and grandfathers were peasant farmers, small landowners, or minor officials in the Delta or Upper Egypt provinces."[13] Similarly, the Greek Officers, according to studies and to their own pronouncements, were of humble origin, namely, coming from the peasantry, lower middle class and from small towns. As Table 3 indicates, only three (Balopoulos, Iordanides and Karydas) were born in a large city--Athens. The rest came from small, mountain and remote villages. One of the coup makers, Colonel Ioannis Ladas, reflected this humble origin when he said in April of 1969: "We were all so poor that we called Papadopoulos the rich man because his father was a school teacher."[14]

Given their humble social origin, it is obvious that these men who, in April 1967 altered the country's constitution, had similar childhood and educational experiences. To quote Zacharopoulos,

> Their education in village primary and provincial secondary schools must have been a source of hardship and sacrifice for their families. Their formal education was undoubtedly augmented by first hand experience of the harsh realities of Greek rural life during the economic crisis of the 1930s. One can safely assume that the choice of a military career was not, for many of them, so much a matter of personal preference but of simple family economics--tuition in the Military Academy was free.[15]

TABLE 3

Leaders of the 1967 coup d'etat:
a sociological portrait

NAME	MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS	APRIL, 1967 RANK	BRANCH	FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS	WHERE BORN
Zoitakis, G.	1933	Lt. General	Infantry	Farmer	Nafpactos
Pattakos, S.	1937	Brigadier	Cavalry	Farmer	Aghia Paraskevi, Crete
Hadjipetros, A.	1938	Brigadier	Artillery	Military	Athens
Karydas, K.	1939	Colonel	Armored	Unknown	Patras
Kotselis, P.	1940	Colonel	Infantry	Unknown	Argos
Ladas, I.	1940	Colonel	Infantry	Farmer	Dyrakhion, Megaloupolis
Makarezos, N.	1940	Colonel	Artillery	Farmer	Gravia
Papadopoulos, G.	1940	Colonel	Artillery	Schoolmaster	Eleochorion
Aslanidis, C.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Farmer	Halkidikis
Balopoulos, M.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Artillery	Unknown	Athens
Ioannides, D.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Farmer	Athens
Lekkas, A.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Unknown	Piraeus
Mexis, A.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Unknown	Peros Island
Papadopoulos, K.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Schoolmaster	Eleochorion
Roufogalis, M.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Artillery	Farmer	Akarta
Stamatelopoulos, D.	1943	Lt. Colonel	Infantry	Farmer	Touzkolegs, Tripolis
Konstantopoulos, G.	1948	Major	Infantry	Unknown	Larissa

Source: Brown (1974), op. cit., p. 256.

Finally, it is worth noting that these officers reached the impressionable formative years of their lives and entered the Military Academy during the Metaxas dictatorship. This pre-war authoritarian regime placed heavy emphasis on strict law and order, a very rigid anti-communist position, anti-political bias and slogans. Moreover, the Metaxas regime cherished visions of a "Third Greek Civilization" must have left a deep and strong impression on the young minds of the future leaders of the military intervention.[16]

The humble origin and the common social and military experience combined to develop a cohesive group or class of people, capable of acting independently from the higher traditional military elite represented by the general staff. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that such experiences produced in the members of this "new" class or stratum of military men a psychological condition, which may be labelled a "messiah complex," that is, a perception of the saviour of society. Such a state of mind perhaps in turn may have led to the development of what Feld calls "militant nationalism." This signifies that in view of these ideological determinants, the adherents, the new military class, have a tendency to be "suspicious and disdainful of any elite--whether political economic, intellectual or even military."[17] And when the conditions are ripe, through the utilization of the military structure's capabilities, this new military class enters the political arena so as to save the country from the menace that has tormented her.

The New Middle Classes

In the non-military sector of the Greek political system, the expansion, the change in the labour force and the urbanization combined to produce a new civilian elite. Unlike the nature and composition of the new elite within the military structure, the new civilian elite were by no means homogeneous either in composition, education, or even in ideology. These new elites were comprised of a number of emerging social groups, such as technocrats, industrialists, workers, youth and intellectuals.[18] Like the emerging middle classes of the first decade of the twentieth century, they too wanted to reform and change the political system's structures. Whereas the middle classes of the turn of the century found and developed a mechanism--the Liberal Party under Venizelos--to take them to the higher councils of the Greek state, the newer middle class elites of the 1960s lacked both the vehicle and the leadership to guide them to political success. Nor was there a "revolution" which could displace the traditional power holders, as had occurred in the period from 1900-1910. On the contrary, as noted in Chapter III, the traditional political forces at this juncture were in full command of the country's political apparatus through extra-parliamentary coercive means, and were unprepared to yield power to this socially and ideologically heterogeneous group of post-war modernizers.

The political power of the traditional political forces was neither independent nor absolute. It was based upon a system of patronage using extensively the resources of the state, the military structure, as well as the para-military units, T.E.A. (National Defence Battalions), and the state-controlled, state-run media apparatus. The formation of the Center

Union (EK) in 1961, based on an amalgamation of right-of-centre and left-of-centre political forces, by Papandreou, Venizelos and other disenchanted notables of the Greek political arena, although enjoying the "blessing" of the key notables of the political right, posed two serious problems. First, the formation of the EK helped create a party system which Sartori has termed "polarized pluralism."[19] Under such conditions the country's party system is in constant danger of disintegration and polarization, which tend to lead to adverse consequences. As the author informs us,

> . . . the very existence of a centre (qua party) [and in Greece's case, the EK] discourages and critically impedes centrality, i.e., the "moderating" drive. This is not to say that under certain conditions a centre-based political system does not have its use; it may be, at least at the outset, the only possible working solution. Yet in the long run a centre-based political system gives way to a circularity.[20]

Secondly, an electoral victory by EK in 1961 would have displaced the notables of the political right from the higher councils of the state, and thus would have deprived them of the necessary resources which they commanded in order to maintain their patron-client responsibilities for almost a decade.

The Attempts of E.R.E. to Remain in Power and its Consequences

The fear of losing the 1961 election caused the established political forces to resort to undemocratic means of securing the necessary votes. That is, the political right openly utilized the military apparatus in order to make sure that the electorate voted for its candidates. The electoral results were quite impressive. Karamanles' party, E.R.E., received more than half of the parliamentary seats (176 out of 300), and more importantly E.R.E. increased its popular vote from 41.1 percent in

the previous election to 50.8 percent, a gain of about ten percentage points. The newly formed EK received, in coalition with the Markesinis' Progressives, 33.6 percent of the popular vote and 100 seats in the new Chamber. The losers in this election, however, were the Union of the Democratic Left (E.D.A.)forces, a coalition of Communists, Socialists and non-establishment forces. Both in terms of popular vote and in seats, they experienced a substantial decline. From Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition E.D.A. was reduced to an insignificant third place with a popular vote of 14.6 percent (24 seats), as compared to a popular vote of 24.4 percent (79 seats) in 1958.[21] These elections illustrate that the unification of the right-centre-left political forces (EK) had successfully deprived the more radical left forces (EDA) of electoral support, and thus prepared the ground for the reemergence of two "dominant bourgeois" political parties, namely, EK and ERE.

In spite of the fact that E.R.E. was returned to power with an increased majority, the opposition, and more specifically, George Papandreou, the co-leader of the Center Union, refused to accept the results and embarked upon a "relentless struggle"[22] for the next two years, which prepared the ground for military intervention. It should be noted that an electoral victory by the E.K. forces at this juncture, given their composition, would not have necessarily changed the status quo. It would merely have given the E.K.'s notables the opportunity which they had for so long to further their patron-client relationships, as well as their own political fortunes through the resources of the national treasury. Their leader then, Papandrou, felt that his "party" was cheated of victory. He not only attacked the irregularities surrounding the election, but in an

unprecendented way launched an all-out attack on the whole system. He vehemently criticized the methods of the political right by which it secured its electoral majorities, namely, "the manipulation of the electoral law; the monopoly of the mass media; the restrictive conditions under which the opposition candidates canvassed"[23] within the Surveillance Zone, and the manipulation of the vote of conscripts in the Army. He accused the political right of organizing a systematic campaign of violence and coercion so as to guarantee E.R.E.'s victory. Furthermore, for the first time since the Venizelos-Constantine feud, the old chief notable denounced King Paul who had allowed the caretaker government to be formed from his entourage to conduct the election. Moreover, he went as far as to accuse the "army of direct intervention in the 'electoral coup' and he later produced in parliament their operative plan 'Pericles,' the authenticity of which has never been challenged."[24]

Papandreou's actions during these two years are very contradictory, since it was with the "blessing" of the political right and the Monarchy that he was able to form the Center Union. It is certain that he was aware of these irregularities that were part of the electoral process during the fifties, and that at one time or another he may have taken part in devising some, especially the complex and discriminatory electoral system. Therefore, since he was a member of the traditional political forces, the question we must attempt to answer is why did Papandreou speak openly against his former colleagues, at this juncture, and for what particular gains? We mentioned previously that he felt he was cheated of the premiership; however, it seems that his political fortunes within the E.K. were not secured. As we have noted earlier, the E.K. was comprised of a variety of political notables,

each participating for his own particular interest. As the party's state of affairs stood, no one could claim the leadership of the party, as well as have complete, obedient and monopolistic control of it. It seems that the open utilization of the military by the right and, in particular, its adamant determination to remain in power, provided Papandreou with the opportunity to seize the leadership of E.K. In other words, his "relentless struggle" led him to become the most popular notable among the masses, which in turn led him to become the undisputed leader of the party. Furthermore, his bitter criticisms of the Karamanles regime attracted a large number of supporters from all sectors of Greek society, and, in particular, those emerging new social forces to whom he gave a new sense of confidence.[25]

While the old notable, Papandreou, was gaining political ground, Karamanles, his political adversary, and the country's manager for almost a decade, was losing ground. Not only was Karamanles' political support declining among the populace, but more importantly he was losing control over the activities of the extra-parliamentary forces, i.e., the T.E.A., which were becoming a liability rather than a source of support. The assassination of an E.D.A. deputy, Lambrakis, in May 1963, by the extra-parliamentary police forces, proved fatal to Karamanles' political fortunes. In June 1963 he resigned the premiership and left the country.[26]

The Papandreou Interlude and its Consequences

With the withdrawal of Karamanles from the political arena King Paul dissolved parliament and issued writs for a general election to be held on November 3, 1963, under the caretakership of Stavros Mavromichailis, a highly respected judge. In the elections that followed, a "sharp but

not decisive swing" took place. The Papandreou-Venizelos coalition--E.K.--won 42 percent of the votes cast, whereas the E.R.E. led by Karamanles received only 39 percent (had returned to lead his party, after its loss he left for Paris and Karamanles pledged not to return to active politics). The distribution of seats in parliament was 140 for E.K., 128 for E.R.E., 30 for E.D.A., and 2 for Markezinis' Progressives.[27] As the data indicates, neither party could form an independent government without the support of E.D.A. The situation was similar to that of 1936, wherein the unwillingness of the two bourgeoisie parties to accept the support of the Communist Party, resulted in the installment of Metaxas as dictator under the aegis of King George. History was surely not going to repeat itself.

Technically, Karamanles could have formed the government with the support of Markesinis. However, the old notable, Papandreou, was determined to beat his opponents at their own game, for he lusted for political power. According to one well informed source,[28] the old notable, Papandreou, persuaded King Paul to appoint him to form the government. It seems the palace entourage was in favour of Papandreou's desire for the premiership, hoping that such an appointment would end the severe criticisms on the Monarchy, unleashed by the Center Union. Papandreou's determination to become the country's chief political manager led him to a series of unorthodox and unparliamentary practices. First, he assured King Paul, who was seriously ill at the time, that for the nation's three key ministerial posts, namely, Interior, Defence, and Public Security, he would appoint persons who were enjoying the "absolute confidence of the Crown, in exchange for the Premiership. He also promised not to change the Chief of the Joint Military Staff without the King's permission."[29] Secondly,

he knew that, in order to secure his first objective, Parliament had to elect a member of his own party as the Speaker of the House, since such a move would have been interpreted by the royal entourage as an indication of his enjoyment of the confidence of the House. The result would have secured for Papandreou the position of being His Majesty's first minister, and would have legitimized his party as the governing party. This he accomplished very swiftly by simply arranging with E.D.A. to support his candidate for the chair through a secret ballot, in spite of the fact that he turned down E.D.A.'s open support for a Papandreou Government with no strings attached.[30]

The lack of independent parliamentary support forced Papandreou to cut short his stay at the upper councils of the state. No other alternative existed except to call a general election. On the advice of the Prime Minister, therefore, the King dissolved Parliament and a date for the new elections was set for November 7, 1964. Papandreou's brief tenure as Prime Minister of the Greek state proved to be very significant and fruitful. According to one writer, during the eight years of office Karamanles had produced a "surplus" in the budget. This surplus offered Papandreou "a unique opportunity, which he was quick to realize. By initiating considerable public spending, he was able to sway the electorate in his favour."[31] To put it in other words, given the nature of the Greek party system, this surplus provided Papandreou with two crucial weapons. First, it gave him substantial political bargaining power among the populace. And second, it immensely increased his power of patronage which enabled him to keep the fragile Center Union Coalition together, especially after the death of Venizelos, and to attract votes in the approaching elections.

Papandreou's strategy had worked very well. On November 7, 1964, the electorate returned him to power, this time with a substantial majority of his own. The Center Union received approximately 53 percent of the populace vote and 171 seats in the new Parliament. The political right, on the other hand, represented by E.R.E., under Kanellopoulos, Karamanles' successor, and the Markesinis' Progressives gained about 35 percent of the vote and 107 seats, thus making them His Majesty's Loyal Opposition for the first time since the twenties. The radical left, represented by E.D.A., gained about 12 percent of the vote and 22 seats in the new Chamber.[32] The Center Union's electoral victory brought new faces and new demands within the political arena. One person in particular who became the spokesman for the new social groups was Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister's son, whose actions during the second administration of his father unleashed a series of events that shook the foundations of the Greek political system. Elected to the Greek Parliament in 1964, he quickly came to dominate the managerial affairs of his father's government. Like most intellectuals who have been educated in terms of western values (Andreas was educated in the United States), and who upon arrival in their country of origin, these intellectuals like Andreas seem to disregard the traditional ways and in their place attempted to introduce a rational administration and a codified system of law and order. On many occasions such "modernizing elites" have attempted to create a bourgeois state without taking into consideration the implications of such a process. Moreover, as Shils notes, such intellectuals "are often more concerned about the international status of their country than they are about the people in the village . . ."[33] This generalization unequivocally describes the

behaviour of Andreas Papandreou during the second administration of his father. A few examples will illustrate this point.

Given the different educational process and the different value systems, intellectuals like Andreas tend to come into conflict with the more traditional politicians like his father and the other notables. This conflict began to take shape when Andreas was appointed as Minister to the Prime Minister by his father. As Minister in charge of the prime minister's office he was both his chief assistant and adviser. Furthermore, in a rather contradictory way, in terms of his value system, he resorted to traditional ways of building the fortunes of his father's party. According to Young, while he was Minister to the Prime Minister's Office, Andreas

> . . . took charge of such matters as broadcasting, which he aligned firmly to the Centre Union (Greek broadcasting is controlled by the State). He replaced the press sections of Greek embassies abroad with Center Union . . . supporters. Gradually he tried to subjudgate the working of the Ministry of Coordination to it, coming into conflict with George Mavros, who held the post, with Kostas Mitsotakis, the Finance Minister, and with Stavros Kostopoulos, the Foreign Minister.[34]

Andreas' constant interference in the affairs of other government ministries irritated his colleagues. His open support for President Makarios during the 1964 inter-communal crisis in Cyprus further exacerbated nationalist elements within the political arena and the military hierarchy. It was during the Cyprus crisis that the "Aspida" Affair arose and it was the causal factor that led to a conflict between King Constantine (who had succeeded his father following his death), and Papandreou over the Ministry of Defence. Within the rubric of the "Aspida" case, it was alleged that the prime minister's son was the leader of a secret army organization whose purpose was to instigate an army revolt to displace

the existing political forces and to replace them with a Nasser type regime.[35] The feud came to a head-on collision between the participants, when Papandreou attempted to replace the Minister of Defence, Petros Garoufalias, a King's man. It seems that Papandreou had, in spite of his overwhelming support, kept his promises to the palace when he took office in 1964. The Ministry of Defence was to be in the hands of people who enjoyed the confidence of the Crown. Such unorthodox compromises, however, further facilitated the conditions for the overthrow of the prevailing political forces.

In a genuine liberal democratic system of government the Prime Minister's right to dismiss his Minister is both acceptable and legally unquestionable. Furthermore, if a Minister does not share the opinions of his leader, he has only one alternative, that is, to resign from his portfolio. However, the situation in Greece at this point was quite different. The Minister of Defence argued that the only person who could dismiss him was the King. Papandreou, on the other hand, as Markesinis informs us, remained adamant.[36] He vehemently insisted that the Minister of Defence be dismissed and gave the King the assurance that he would take over this portfolio himself. The absence of liberal democratic traditions, and the absence of a legal-constitutional mechanism to resolve such a conflict brought about the country's greatest constitutional crisis since the twenties.

The constitutional stalemate came to an end when Papandreou resigned in a rather abrupt manner, following an exchange of correspondence with the King, wherein the young Monarch "in a rather rude tone" informed his Prime Minister that he would not concede to his demands until the "Aspida" affair was resolved. As for the "Aspida" affair itself, the younger

Papandreou was never unequivocally linked to the so-called conspirators against the state.[37]

Musical Chairs and the Coming of the New Military Class

The resignation of Papandreou had grave consequences for the Center Union, as well as for the country's party system. Within a period of about two years, the country experienced six different governments.[38] Notables such as Stephanopoulos, Novas, and Tsirimikos, to name only a few, defected from the ranks of the political party which they had helped to create a few years earlier, and aligned with the Crown. As one government came, another went. The musical chairs' syndrome led to the loss of political legitimacy for the entire political party system. No segment of the elected political forces could form a stable government. As the situation deteriorated, the King, on two occasions, requested the formation of a national government under Papandreou, but the old notable refused to accept the offer.[39] Two elements seemed to prevent the old notable from heading a national government. According to Markesinis, the radical elements of the remnants of the Center Union, headed by his son, pressured him not to accept participation in any form of coalition. Another writer, Holden, believes that it was Papandreou's "pride" that prevented him from accepting an eleventh-hour task which may have saved him and his country from the Colonels.[40]

Whatever the reasons may have been for his refusal, the old notable, at the end, realized that political power could be used if one can secure the support of the electorate. Hence, he accepted Kanellopoulos as head of a caretaker government to prepare the country for elections. However,

before this could be realized, another hidden force was at work. The political decay[41] and the loss of legitimacy of the country's institutions that was taking place for almost two years, apparently had irritated the new military class to such an extent that an electoral victory by Papandreou's political forces, as was expected, could not be tolerated. Furthermore, it was apparent to this new military class that even though the King could have requested his Generals to displace the old chief, had he succeeded at the polls, the Generals would have been reluctant to do so since they would have the most to lose. Consequently, there was no force capable of displacing the political forces of the left-centre and to maintain the status quo.

In view of the power vacuum within the political arena, and in view of a second power vacuum created by the inability of the upper echelons of the military structure to act,[42] the new military class, utilizing the obedient aspect of the military structure and its weapons, i.e., tanks and armed cars, in the early hours of April 21, 1967, swiftly moved its lethal weapons into the streets of Athens and put an end to the rule of Parliament and Monarchy. A segment of the Greek military was once again at the helm and destiny of the nation-state.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Between 1946 and 1963 the U.S. provided Greece with a total of $1,799.9 million. See Coutsoumaris, op. cit., p. 42.

2. Svoronos, op. cit., p. 145.

3. In 1952 the manufacturing and service sectors employed 21.1 percent and 22.1 percent of the labour force, and accounted for 21.4 percent and 43.9 percent of the GNP, respectively. Ten years later, the trend reversed itself. The manufacturing sector employed 22.1 percent of the labour force and accounted for 26.6 percent of the GNP, whereas the service sector employed 24.2 percent of the labour force; contributed 42.5 percent to the GNP. See loc. cit.

4. Loc. cit.

5. Brown (1974), op. cit., pp. 314-315.

6. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 32.

7. Loc. cit.; see also Brown (1974), op. cit., p. 255.

8. Greece's defence expenditures during this period averaged 5.5 percent of GNP. See NATO: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1970), pp. 226-227.

9. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 149. See also Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 18.

10. S.G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973 (With Postscript)" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 89(3), Fall 1974, p. 508; Karagiorges, op. cit., p. 12.

11. Brown (1974), op. cit., pp. 255-256; Zacharopoulos, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

12. Ibid., p. 255.

13. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations? (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1961), p. 45; cited in Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 32.

14. Times, April 18, 1969, p. 33; cited in Brown (1974), op. cit., p. 255. This citation should not be taken to indicate the the Egyptian Free Officers given similar socio-economic backgrounds with the Greek Colonels, were of conservative trend; on the contrary, the E.F.O. in part were a very modernizing force. This comparison is noted here merely to illustrate the nature of the social composition of

Officer groups that tend to lead the armed forces in transitional societies into the political affairs of the state, irrespective of their ideological developments or tendencies.

15. Zacharopoulos, op. cit., p. 32.

16. Ibid., pp. 32-33; ibid., pp. 255-256.

17. Loc. cit.

18. Brown (1970), op. cit., p. 103.

19. G. Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism" in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 137-176.

20. Sartori, op. cit., p. 156.

21. Meynaud, op. cit., pp. 552-553.

22. J. Yannopoulos, "Greece: Political and Constitutional Developments, 1924-1974" in J.T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modern Greece (London: Zeno, 1977), p. 84.

23. Yannopoulos, loc. cit.

24. Ibid., pp. 84-85. "Pericles" was the codename for a plan devised by the upper echelon of the Greek army and was used during the 1961 general elections to support the E.R.E. forces through coercive means.

25. Loc. cit.

26. Ibid., p. 84; see also Papandreou, op. cit., p. 116.

27. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 554.

28. The author, B. Markesinis, is the son of Spiros Markesinis, the political notable of the fifties. His work draws extensively from his father's unpublished material, as well as from other key political figures of the Greek Government of the period. Markessinis, op. cit., p. 218.

29. Loc. cit.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 555; Papandreou, op. cit., p. 121.

33. E. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States" in Johnson, op. cit., p. 19.

34. Young, op. cit., p. 304.

35. For a detailed discussion of the "Aspida" Affair, see S. Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968).

36. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 219.

37. Loc. cit.; Pandreou, op. cit., pp. 121-155.

38. The six governments were: George Athanasiades-Novas, July 15, 1965; Elias Tsirimokos, August 24, 1965; Stephanos Stephanopoulos, September 25, 1965 and July 15, 1966; Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, January 14, 1967; Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, March 15, 1967.

39. Markesinis, op. cit., p. 22.

40. Loc. cit. See also D. Holden, Greece without Columns: The Making of the Modern Greeks (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 191.

41. Huntington (1968), op. cit., pp. 1-93.

42. Karagiorges, op. cit., pp. 53-59.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION:
THE THEORY OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF GREEK EXPERIENCE

Conclusion and Alternatives

This study has sought to answer the question of why the Greek military establishment, or a component thereof, was able to displace the civilian political authority in April 1967. With this in mind we proceeded to review two bodies of literature: First, we examined a selection of scholars who have dealt with the topic of civil-military relations in a general or theoretical approach, and secondly, we briefly looked at the general literature, focusing on political parties, their nature, roles and functions in society. We found that the concepts put forth by writers examining civil military relations to be of limited use with respect to Greece. However, it appears that some insight can be derived from both bodies of literature and some relevance to the Greek situation can be found through a synthesis of the concepts found in both bodies of literature. Hence we proceeded to construct an analytical framework whereby we could examine the phenomenon at hand, by focusing on two structures of the Greek political system, that is, the nature, role and function of the country's military apparatus and its party system.

Moreover, in the course of our examination of the historical development of the Greek nation-state, we found that the country continued to be dominated by an archaic mode of socio-economic and political relations, i.e. the patronage system. In Chapter II we showed that it was this mode of relations that prevented the establishment of an institutionalized party system and a military apparatus along Western European lines. Thus, in times of crisis the party system disintegrated, creating a power vacuum which in turn enabled the military to intervene. On this basis, therefore, we found

evidence in the Greek case to support the hypothesis that the failure of the party system to perform its roles and tasks attributed to its patron-client nature, invites military intervention.

In order to illustrate this hypothesis we proceeded to examine the historical factors that led to the formation of the Greek State and its various institutions. We found that the Greek State was a product of the ideas of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, as well as of foreign interventions. The segment of the Greek middle classes who held these views was not strong enough to eliminate the pattern of quasi-feudal relations of authority, namely, the patron-client system, before imposing the liberal bourgeois institutions and values. Furthermore, foreign powers utilized and reinforced this ancient system of authority and power, thus further preventing the development of genuine parliamentary system of government. Both the party system and the military apparatus were infested with this malaise.

In the early post-independence period, civil military relations were patterned upon patronage lines. The Monarchy, being the chief domestic patron controlled the military, as well as the political parties. This pattern of politico-military relations prevented the military from effectively displacing the political authority, in this case the Crown. However, the military revolt of 1909 brought new dimensions to the role of the military in society. Whereas in the past it looked for some support from the political arena, after this event it took charge of the political affairs of the Greek State. Moreover, its actions led to the creation of new centres of power, whereby new patrons could emerge and perpetuate the patronage system, not only within the political arena, but within the military structure as well.

One consequence of this event was the fact that the military was radicalized and became an active participant in the political affairs of the state to the point of discrediting the "progressive" political forces and leading to the rise of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936. Attempts to create viable political parties during this period were met with very little success, primarily due to the inability and perhaps the unwillingness of the political leaders to rise above the patron-client system.

With respect to the political arena, the situation remained relatively unchanged following World War II. However, with respect to the military apparatus, a drastic transformation took place. A segment of the political forces, the Right, took control of the Greek State and instead of attempting to build genuine liberal bourgeois structures, created a quasi-authoritarian state, using repressive means to control the populace. At the same time, the military apparatus was being professionalized, in one sense, but not becoming subservient to civilian authority. Also, the traumatic experience of the war and Civil War that followed had led segments of the country's officer corps to be politicized. Furthermore, in view of the new post-war international order, the Greek military apparatus acquired a new "patron," the United States, which provided it with educational facilities, equipment and financial assistance, thereby enabling it to become a predominant structure within the Greek political system. Simultaneously, the political arena remained fragile and sterile, to use Bienen's words.

The massive economic aid by the United States led to the creation of new social forces, namely, middle class professionals. This new middle class could not be effectively accommodated within the existing party structure. Like all middle classes, they too wanted to change the existing

power relationships. However, this one lacked the means to effectively change the political system. Also, its social composition was quite diverse and it did not have a clear plan of action. Within the military apparatus, the politicization process had taken hold within a very small group of officers, with common educational and social backgrounds. They developed something of what Feld calls "militant nationalism," which was anathema to the new aspirants of political power.

In a situation of this kind, namely, the inability of the existing party system to bring about a viable and "credible" political authority, the politicized segments of the military trend, as shown with respect to Greece, to intervene in the political affairs of the state, when the opportunity arises. A prime causal factor that brought the military into domestic politics seems then to be the failure of the party system to act as an interpretive force, at least with respect to Greece. Therefore, the onus on the Greek contemporary political elite is to create a viable party system, in the hopes of eliminating a key precondition which tends to lead to military dictatorship. Furthermore, the various political, economic and military elites must be willing to lay the foundations of a political system which can provide for an equilibrium among the various structures articulated by a party system that is able to supplant the patron-client system, and become based instead upon corporate ties, and economic or functional interests.

Postscript

After seven years of rule the colonels' regime, due to its internal contradictions and the Cyprus issue, fell in late 1974. Post-dictatorship

Greece has seen the emergence of a multiparty system--with parties representing the entire political spectrum, ranging from left to right. However, recent election results and the disintegration of the centre political party have led to the formation of a polarized pluralism party system dominated by two political entities, namely, Karamanles' New Democracy on the right and Andreas Papandrou's Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) on the centre-left, with numerous small right-wing cliques and small left-wing political parties, of which the two communist parties are of importance.

As of this writing, of the two dominant political parties, only a component of PASOK has made some effort to create a party based on the principle of intra-party democracy, a coherent program, and a relatively autonomous riding associations from which the party is to draw its membership as well as its leaders. However, such efforts have had limited impact upon the party primarily due to the strong opposition by the leadership component. Thus, at this juncture, Greek political parties are still based upon primarily patron-client relations. Greece's political future will depend upon the ability of the centre-left political forces to transcent the patron-client system and lay the foundations for a genuine democratic party system.

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