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CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING DURING THE TRUDEAU YEARS

CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING DURING THE TRUDEAU YEARS:
A CONTINUATION OF THE "HELPFUL FIXER" TRADITION

By

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Abstract

By actively seeking to act as a peacekeeper, mediator, or any other function necessary to either preserve peace or remove contentious problems between states, Canadian governments in the years since World War II have created the perception that Canada is a helpful fixer in international affairs. Used here as a codeword to describe a state that is actively prepared to find a means of containing or solving international crises, the term helpful fixer best describes the international policies of successive Canadian governments. The crucial role performed by Lester Pearson in ending the Suez Crisis in 1956, following upon numerous other helpful fixer roles, was very important in firmly establishing the perception amongst both Canadian and foreign observers, that the Canadian government actively sought ways of reducing international tensions. The image thus created has served to influence the value judgements of succeeding Canadian governments.

The government of P.E. Trudeau has been unwilling to abandon the helpful fixer traditions established by its predecessors. In Foreign Policy for Canadians the Trudeau government attempted to warn Canadians that there would probably be few opportunities for peacekeeping in the 1970's, and that Canadians might not always be acceptable in such roles. However, as the 1970's unfolded it became obvious that the Canadian government not only supported the principle of peacekeeping, but was also

concerned about protecting its image as an international helpful fixer. Indeed the positions adopted by the Trudeau government towards peace-keeping operations in Cyprus, Vietnam, the Middle East, and southern Africa support this contention. The image created by Pearson has persisted, and appears to have shaped the Canadian government's value judgement in the 1970's.

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Introduction

Since World War II, Canadian foreign policy behaviour has been characterized by a strong and active commitment to reducing international tensions. Inspired by Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, the Canadian government has aspired to have an active and influential position in international affairs from which it has sought to make a constructive contribution to the cause of peace. By such activities as serving as a mediator to solve crisis, carrying messages between belligerents, and trying to moderate the more extreme policies of its allies, Canadian governments have done what they could to prevent the spread of conflict. Indeed, Canada has participated in two international truce supervisory commissions in Indo-China that were created outside the auspices of the United Nations, as well as every UN peacekeeping operation. It has also assumed a most active role in the United Nations, and has been a leader in efforts to expand the power and influence of that organization. Aptly called helpful fixing* by the Trudeau government in the foreign policy review published in 1970, this type of international behaviour has in fact become associated with Canada's international image. The Economist was inspired to comment

the community of nations has learned that it needs an active Canada: as an intermediary in Commonwealth disputes, and in wider ones that range ex-imperial powers against former dependencies; as a factor that moderates the disproportion between American and European strengths in the Atlantic world; as a dispassionate but not apathetic participant in projects that are based on a tenuous international consensus.¹

*The term helpful fixer is used in this thesis as a codeword to describe a state that is willing to act, usually as a third party, to find means of containing or solving international crisis. For an expanded definition see Chapter 1, pp. 15 & 16.

While Canadian helpful fixing activities in the 1950's and 1960's have been well documented, little has been written about Canadian peacekeeping experiences in the 1970's, and even less about what motivated the Trudeau government to continue Canada's role as an international peacekeeper. The purpose of this thesis is first to describe the development of the helpful fixing tradition and second, demonstrate how Canada's image as a helpful fixer became a major influence on the Trudeau government's peacekeeping policies. While Canadian helpful fixing roles in general will be discussed, the focus of this study will be on peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has been the most active and prominent of Canada's helpful fixing roles, prompting John Holmes to say that "peacekeeping has in fact, been incorporated into our image of our role in the world."² Indeed, Canadian politicians like to emphasize Canada's peacekeeping tradition, and during international crisis invariably Canadian officials are questioned about the possibility of Canada intervening as a peacekeeper. It has become a role Canadians expect their government to assume.

The genesis of the helpful fixer tradition was in the period immediately after World War II. The architects of Canada's post-war foreign policy, Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, were profoundly affected by the war and the development of the nuclear age. They realized that Canada could no longer hope to hide behind the wide expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans hoping international conflicts would not affect Canada as it did during the pre-war period under the non-interventionist and isolationist policies of Mackenzie King. Therefore, St. Laurent and Pearson forged an internationalist foreign policy for Canada. They played a leading role in the creation of the United Nations

and when that organization demonstrated that it would not be a completely effective instrument for preserving peace, Canada was one of the initiators of the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which would also serve as a means of collective security. However, Canada's position within the alliance has been rather unique. It is not directly threatened like the European members, and unlike the United States Canada is not a contributor of major military forces to the alliance. Therefore, Canada's military contribution to the alliance is somewhat of a symbolic nature, demonstrating its adherence to the principal of collective security, but at the same time the lack of a crucial military role provides Canada with the ability to pursue its helpful fixing policies.

Canada's membership in the NATO alliance was not an indication that the Canadian government was about to lose all faith in the United Nations. Indeed, when announcing in the House of Commons that Canada was making forces available to the UN for use in Korea, Pearson emphasized that the Canadian government strongly supported the creation of an international police force which would consist of national contingents put at the disposal of the UN and controlled by it.³ Pearson was to remain committed to the principle of a UN police force, and as prime minister in 1964 he was still promoting the concept.⁴ But while Pearson's dream of an international police force controlled by the United Nations has yet to be realized, Pearson did perform a crucial role in expanding the concept of UN peacekeeping. The initial UN peacekeeping operations consisted of small groups of observers to supervise cease-fire agreements. However, the 1956 Suez Crisis became a watershed not only in UN peacekeeping but also in Canada's role as a helpful fixer.

The Canadian government served as a bridge between the United States and its two major European allies, Britain and France, when diplomatic communications broke off when the latter two countries invaded Egypt. Ottawa's actions assisted in repairing the political rift that developed in NATO. Pearson also proposed and, after much diplomatic negotiating spearheaded by himself and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, acquired broad support in the UN for the creation and deployment of a UN peace-keeping force containing large military units from various countries, including Canada, which was interposed between the belligerents. Pearson's role in ending the Suez Crisis was to earn him a Nobel Peace Prize, but more importantly, it established a precedent for using UN peacekeeping forces to end international crisis that was to be copied on many occasions in the following years. As well, the Canadian government found an effective and popular role for itself in attempting to limit international conflict.

This single event made peacekeeping a most popular role in Canada. After Suez, Canadians expected their governments to willingly support and contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. The Diefenbaker government quickly found this out in 1960 when it hesitated to accept a role in a UN force being sent to the Congo. Immediately, sufficient pressure was placed on the government in both Parliament and the press to have Canada contribute to the force sent to the Congo that Diefenbaker's government consented to send a Canadian contingent. In 1962 and 1963 the Canadian government also sent men to West Irian and Yemen as part of UN peace-keeping operations. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Pearson's government, hoped to follow Pearson's path to the

prime minister's office by copying his success as a helpful fixer. Martin's fulsome rhetoric in support of peacekeeping was matched by his vitally important role in creating a peacekeeping force for Cyprus in 1964 which prevented war between Greece and Turkey. The expulsion of the Suez peacekeeping force in 1967 temporarily dampened Canadian support for peacekeeping but by 1970 it was a popular role for Canada once more. The Trudeau government's foreign policy review concluded that there would be fewer opportunities in the 1970's for peacekeeping, and that Canadian foreign policy should not be based on helpful fixing. Though the government reaffirmed its support for peacekeeping it was critically attacked in both Parliament and the press for what was assumed, inaccurately as it turned out, to be a negative attitude toward helpful fixing, and peacekeeping in particular. But from 1969 to 1980 the Trudeau government was advocating the use of peacekeeping forces, and successive Secretaries of State for External Affairs were fond of pointing out Canada's record as a helpful fixer, especially as a peacekeeper. Apparently wanting to preserve Canada's peacekeeping tradition, Trudeau's government anxiously made every effort to secure Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping forces on two separate occasions (the Middle East in 1973 and Namibia in 1978-79) when it appeared Canada would be excluded. The Trudeau government was simply unable and unwilling "to escape the habits of a generation or the expectations of the international system."⁵ The helpful fixer tradition was firmly entrenched in both external and internal perceptions of Canada's role in the world.

It is this author's contention that the creation of a national image, once accepted, tends to influence succeeding foreign policy decision

makers. It is not the author's intention to claim that the helpful fixer image was the sole motivating force, but that it was an important influence on the Trudeau government's foreign policy decisions during the 1970's. Studies have shown that images held by foreign policy decision makers do indeed influence the attitudes, and hence the policies, of governments. Kenneth Boulding, in his important study demonstrated the importance of images in influencing one's personal behaviour and interactions with others.⁶ Robert Jervis determined that a foreign policy decision maker was influenced by the images he possessed of the domestic political situation, of international history, and his previous experiences. Jervis also found that people tend to maintain their images and beliefs despite contradictory information.⁷ Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merriam also found that it was almost impossible to change the images held by a population over a twenty-year period,⁸ so the image Pearson created for Canada as a helpful fixer during the Suez crisis would likely have persisted until Trudeau became prime minister. In fact, numerous opinion polls since 1956 have confirmed that Canadians generally supported Canada's participation as a peacekeeper. These opinions have likely been reinforced by the rhetoric of successive prime ministers and cabinet ministers extending into the 1980's who have emphasized Canada's role as a peacekeeper.

In order to set the stage for examination of the Trudeau government's peacekeeping policies, chapters one and two will examine the activities that provided the basis for the development of the helpful fixer image. Chapter one will provide a working definition of the term helpful fixing, which was apparently used by the Trudeau government

to provide a codeword to describe the various Canadian foreign policy activities designed to reduce international tensions. It will also examine the various factors which contributed to Canada's willingness to be a problem solver in the Commonwealth, the United Nations, to prevent exacerbation of tensions in East-West relations and between the developed and developing nations. The chapter will describe Canada's helpful fixing activities in these forums which led to Canada being described by foreign observers as a country characterized "by its eagerness to promote compromise" and "the most non-aligned of the western powers."⁹ This image in turn allowed Canada, a NATO member, to act as a peacekeeper in many volatile regions sensitive to western imperialism.

It is the purpose of chapter two to describe the early peacekeeping efforts of Canada, and Trudeau's reaction to Canada's image as a helpful fixer. Between 1948 and 1968 Canada served on all nine United Nations peacekeeping operations plus a truce observation commission in Indo-china which was not sponsored by the UN. The most important event discussed in this chapter is Pearson's critical role in creating a United Nations peacekeeping force to end the Suez crisis. Also examined is Diefenbaker's abrupt discovery of the expectations Pearson had created amongst the Canadian public when he was initially reluctant to send Canadians to the Congo as part of a UN force. Paul Martin, in turn, hoped to exploit this feeling to enhance his aspirations to become prime minister but his efforts as a helpful fixer had only mixed results. This author does not accept the standard interpretation of Foreign Policy for Canadians that this publication indicated the Trudeau government was about to abandon helpful fixing.¹⁰ Instead, in chapter two it is argued that Trudeau, believing

opportunities for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations would be fewer in the 1970's, attempted to dampen public expectations but did not intend to abandon the role. Numerous speeches by government members as well as government publications substantiate the argument that the Trudeau government was prepared to accept viable roles to keep the peace.

Chapter three will discuss Canadian peacekeeping operations and related helpful fixing activities in the 1970's. As early as 1969 Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp was suggesting that a new peacekeeping force be sent to the Middle East and that Canada would be prepared to participate. Then, as will be shown, in 1973 the evidence began to mount that the Trudeau government was indeed influenced by Canada's helpful fixer image. When it appeared that Canada would not be included in the new peacekeeping force sent to the Middle East, Sharp initiated frantic diplomatic negotiations to ensure Canadian participation. The government also enthusiastically joined the remaining UN peacekeeping forces created in the 1970's and then in 1978 Trudeau's administration again began a public campaign to be included in a UN force proposed for Namibia when it once again appeared Canada was not needed. The only reluctance displayed towards peacekeeping was displayed when Canada was requested to join a truce supervisory force in Vietnam created outside the auspices of the United Nations, with what government analysts believed was an unworkable mandate.

The concluding chapter attempts to demonstrate this author's contention that once the helpful fixer image was created, it influenced succeeding foreign policy decision makers. It is argued that the Trudeau administration's statements and behaviour during the 1970's were calculated

to preserve and enhance Canada's helpful fixer tradition. It demonstrates that Canada was still perceived as a helpful fixer by foreign observers and the Canadian public during the 1970's. Finally, alternative explanations suggested as motivations for Canadian helpful fixing policies during the 1950's and 1960's are shown to be no longer entirely applicable and that Canada was no longer as essential for peacekeeping as it had been in Pearson's era, placing the Trudeau government in the predicament that it had to actively campaign for positions on two UN peacekeeping forces. That Trudeau's government did obviously want to be included in all United Nations peacekeeping forces indicates the image Pearson created was still influencing Canadian foreign policy in the 1970's.

Notes

1. The Economist, July 1, 1967 quoted in Peter C. Dobell Canada's Search for New Roles, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 2.
2. John Holmes, "Foreward" in Alastair Taylor et al Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. VII.
3. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, September 7, 1950, p. 405.
4. Ottawa Journal, May 8, 1964.
5. John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle Aged Power, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), p. 35.
6. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961).
7. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
8. Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images" in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.) International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
9. Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1979), p. 84 and Toronto Star, July 5, 1981.
10. For example see R.B. Byers, "Defence and foreign policy in the 1970's: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine" in International Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, (Spring 1978) or Akira Ichikawa, "The 'Helpful Fixer': Canada's Persistent International Image", Behind the Headlines, Vol. 37, No. 3.

Chapter I

Canada - Is it a Helpful Fixer?

Introduction

In the three and a half decades following World War II Canada has been an activist in international affairs, and in the process, has acquired a reputation for being a helpful fixer. Indeed, it has shouldered many international responsibilities, amongst which a continuing theme has been the maintenance of world order and stability. Ottawa has taken a leading role in attempting to make the United Nations an effective organization for solving international crisis. It has also desired to control the super powers through the United Nations by attempting to limit their veto powers, and to subject them to the influence of the smaller powers. In effect this would give Canada more influence, and better opportunities to act as a helpful fixer. Using what influence they possessed Canadian officials became the driving force behind the creation of peacekeeping forces, and have encouraged the United Nations to serve as a mediator.

However, Canada has not limited its helpful fixing to the United Nations. It has been active in many fields where it felt threats to peace and stability existed. In north-south issues, east-west issues, at the disarmament conferences, in NATO, Canada is repeatedly avoiding polemics and striving to find compromise positions. Canada has also repeatedly taken upon itself the responsibility of holding the Commonwealth together. Its helpful fixing activities have forced Canada to maintain a precarious balance. It has to remain a loyal western ally and must not jeopardize NATO security

interests, yet it must create a perception of moderation and pragmatism if it is to have credibility as a helpful fixer. But by accepting the dictum that politics is the art of the possible, Canada has had numerous occasions when it has been able to achieve compromise agreements or reduce tensions, thus contributing to its image as a helpful fixer.

Canadian Foreign Policy in the post-World War II Era -
The Genesis of the Helpful Fixer Tradition

Before World War II Canadian statesmen did not believe their country was a power capable of exerting influence on the international system, nor did they desire to try to do so. Canadian military forces were very small and the economy was weak, entrapped as it was in the throws of a terrible depression. However, Canada emerged from World War II profoundly changed. By the end of the war Canada was a powerful country. It had the fourth largest air force, the fifth largest navy, and a powerful, well trained and equipped army of nearly five hundred thousand men and women.¹ A large industrial structure had been created to support not only the Canadian armed forces, but also to supply large amounts of material to its allies as well. It was said of Canada in 1945 that it had risen to where it

is effective in influence as well as in power and production. Canada has come to a place where she ranks nearest of the small powers to the Big Four and even in some ways to the Big Three.²

Prime Minister Mackenzie King called Canada the strongest of the Middle Powers,³ while Senator Winhart Robinson stated in 1944 that he thought Canada would go to the peace conference "virtually as leader of the smaller countries among the United Nations."⁴

After the war, and indeed even during it, Canada's leaders sought to have influence in the international system commensurate with its new-

found power and prestige. During the war Ottawa had fought long and hard to have some input into allied war decisions. While unable to participate in the major strategic decisions taken by the allies, the Canadian government was granted places on several boards dealing with war production and supplies.

Mackenzie King was not completely satisfied with Canada's representation in the decision-making processes of the allied war effort, so in 1943 he enunciated the "functional principle". King proposed that effective international authority in given subject areas be vested in organizations whose membership consisted of those nations, regardless of size, who had an interest in the subject area.⁵ Even though cognizant that Canada was not a great power, he was asking that his country and others like it have input into international issues, and that decisions not be left totally in the hands of the great powers. However, the great powers continued to leave Canada out of major decisions during the war. Nevertheless, the Canadian battle for recognition continued after the war in the United Nations. The Canadian government endeavoured at the United Nations to lessen the power and authority of the permanent members of the security council, in order to provide a meaningful role for the lesser powers such as Canada.⁶ The Canadian effort failed, but regardless, Ottawa's faith in the United Nations persisted.

Canadian statesmen felt the most effective method for placing restraints on a state's activities was in international organizations. It was hoped, particularly in the immediate post-war period, that through international organizations an international structure could be created to maintain world peace. Ottawa also realized that non-aligned states would

have little influence as individuals, so working in international organizations would provide Canada access to other small powers with whom it could cooperate.⁷ Consequently, post-war Canadian internationalism was a means by which Canadian statesmen would be able to influence international events, and fulfill the idealistic notion that world peace could be maintained.

Lester B. Pearson was one of the primary architects of post-war Canadian foreign policy. Pearson was strongly committed to internationalism, and indeed he felt Canadians would be making a serious mistake if they thought they could ignore the rest of the world. "If we are to be of service in the world and to ourselves and our destiny, if we are to find our right place in the sun we must look beyond our own national or local limits."⁸

Pearson believed that Canada's first foreign policy goal should be to attain world peace, and that could only be accomplished if Canada as well as other countries ignored their own narrow self-interest. Pearson believed that "without peace and security, it would be impossible to accomplish other objectives,"⁹ therefore, Canada would co-operate with other like-minded countries to try to achieve this goal.

Pearson was realistic enough to realize that conflict is inevitable, but he felt that the United Nations could be used to control conflicts before they endangered the whole world. He thought it was the nature of great powers to exercise their power to achieve national goals. In the past this had inevitably led to military conflict with other states. Pearson hoped that if the great powers could be induced to participate in a multi-national organization such as the United Nations, their activities could be constrained much easier. Within the United Nations they would be subject to pressure

from the smaller states, and if the smaller states could be mobilized to act together, the great powers would find it much harder to ignore their demands. Nevertheless, Pearson realized that the great powers would only accept small power demands and pressure if they felt important interests were not being threatened. If so, the great powers would simply ignore the lesser powers. Consequently, Pearson believed that small powers like Canada should avoid striving for goals beyond their capabilities because it would only be counterproductive. Instead, they should limit their efforts to trying to achieve "reasonable" compromises when conflicts needed to be resolved.¹⁰

Pearson thought that only by taking reasonable and moderate positions would small powers like Canada be able to earn the trust of other nations needed to provide Canada the opportunity to encourage negotiations and act as a mediator or go-between. Pearson realized that only once other nations were willing to negotiate, would the rigid positions often responsible for exacerbating international tensions nearly to the point of armed conflict, be broken down.¹¹

The major policy goals shaped by Pearson and his colleagues in Ottawa during the post-war period included: helping to establish peace; build an effective United Nations in order to preserve peace; provide economic support for the reconstruction of those countries ravaged in the war and also for the former colonies gaining their independence; and to make arrangements for western regional security.¹² These goals, by their very nature, were directing Canada into the role of "helpful fixer". The actual term "helpful fixer" appears to have been first used as a codeword in the foreign policy review done by the Trudeau government in 1969-70 to describe

a range of activities in international affairs. The term was not defined but it appears to have a meaning similar to, but more encompassing than earlier terms used by scholars and media commentators who described Canada variously as an "honest broker", "bridge builder", "peacekeeper" or "mediator". The term helpful fixer can be used to describe a state that is willing to act as a go-between, a mediator, a peacekeeper, will initiate crisis solving, and will strive to find common ground during negotiations. A helpful fixer may or may not be a direct party to the crisis or problem, but its activities are designed to reduce or remove contentious issues so as to terminate the crisis or problem. In order to do this it may attempt to ameliorate a crisis by suggesting procedural points that would remove contentious issues or facilitate developing approaches to resolve problem areas. If possible a helpful fixer may actually deal explicitly with the actual substance of a crisis by attempting to find specific solutions acceptable to the antagonists or persuade them to accept compromises. Helpful fixers sometimes act as middlemen by transmitting information between contending states when mistrust, emotional commitment, or political necessity prevents antagonists from communicating directly. Acting as peacekeepers, helpful fixers will provide soldiers to supervise truces or patrol buffer zones between belligerents in order to reduce tensions that lead to conflict.¹³

A helpful fixer can be a non-aligned or aligned state. However, if it is a member of an alliance, it would be most likely not a leading member of the alliance, for it would have less responsibility for defending alliance interests and could therefore be more flexible. The basic quality of a helpful fixer is that it is trusted to act in a relatively impartial manner and

its major concern is perceived to be only finding a solution to the problem.

Trudeau's foreign policy review was accurate when it described Canada's international behaviour as that of a helpful fixer. Indeed, it has been observed that Canada's actions are often predicated on a belief that communications between the great powers should always remain open in order that potential confrontations can be resolved by discussion rather than open warfare.¹⁴ Despite Canada's military alliance commitments, it has generally refrained from taking polemical or rigid ideological stands. Canadian diplomats have continually searched for compromise positions. They have sought to gain the confidence of diplomats from other countries by not publicizing differences and by stressing similarities.

This approach to international relations gave Canada a reputation for acting like a helpful fixer. This reputation had been earned through a wide range of roles in Cold War crisis, problems within NATO and the Commonwealth, general north-south issues, and especially acting as a peace-keeper. Canada is perceived by Europeans, as one European commentator put it, as being "a somewhat more distant Switzerland" which fosters humanitarian ideals and world peace.¹⁵ In the third world the perception of Canada is somewhat similar. In 1960 Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo, told Diefenbaker that "Canada...[possessed] a reputation of coming to the assistance of other nations".¹⁶ During the Parliamentary debate on defence in 1963, Howard Green defended Canada's mediating role by claiming that third world countries have greater confidence in Canada than in any other NATO or Warsaw Pact country.¹⁷ By the time Pearson finally left Canadian politics in 1968, the helpful fixing tradition was firmly established in Canada. His successor as Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau accepted his pre-

decessor's belief that Canada has the right and responsibility to reduce tensions throughout the world, and that it is through international organizations and relationships that this can best be done.¹⁸ But a major difference is Trudeau's perception of Canada's relative strength and influence in the world by the 1970's, when compared with the post-war period. While Mackenzie King had referred to Canada as the strongest of the middle powers, Trudeau states his belief that Canada is "probably the largest of the small powers."¹⁹ Consequently, he feels Canada should not try to intervene in every international crisis. Nevertheless, while Trudeau downplayed the helpful fixer role for Canada, he is certainly not willing to abandon it. In the House of Commons during 1969 when Trudeau was supporting his proposal to reduce the Canadian contribution to NATO, he stated there were only three options which in the long term offered the only hope for lasting security. They were:

participation in international peacekeeping forces, and in non-military initiatives which will foster trust and strength in international conflict - resolution procedures and in an effective system of world order; dedication of adequate resources to the study and negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and; contribution of an increasing per centage of natural resources to activities which are designed to relieve or remove such causes of unrest as economic insecurity.²⁰

At the same time, he also advanced the notion that "co-operation in preventing, or in properly settling conflicts of a nature that might, by their location escalate into nuclear war" would help preserve national security. Pearson could not have put it any better. Trudeau hardly sounded like a politician preparing to disavow helpful fixing.

Indeed, the Trudeau government was to be an active helpful fixer in the 1970's. It continued to believe just as Pearson had that the United Nations must work to remove the causes of the "major tensions" that threatened the world with impending disaster.²¹ The government would "determine where we can be effective" but, it would not be "involved in all issues, to seek to do something in all of them, and in a real sense spread ourselves so thin that we would not be effective anywhere."²² But the prevailing image of Canada as a helpful fixer tended to dissipate the government's early caution, and it repeatedly acted as an international helpful fixer. Consequently, in style and substance there has been little variation from the internationalist tradition that has existed since 1945. Helpful fixing is still alive and well as a Canadian foreign policy role.

Preserving the Commonwealth

The Canadian government has long felt there was a great deal of utility in belonging to the Commonwealth for the Association has provided Canada a forum for contact with many diverse nations in Asia and Africa. Here Canadians have learned about the problems and aspirations of the Third World in free and open discussions between the heads of government, while demonstrating to these countries that Canada is willing and able to challenge British authority. The Commonwealth has also been looked upon as an outlet free from American influence. Paradoxically, the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth have felt the association is useful because it provides them a channel of influence with the United States via Canada.²³ Since a succession of Canadian Prime Ministers have felt the Commonwealth is a worthwhile association to preserve, they have

often played important roles in solving the numerous crisis that have faced the association. Indeed, the Canadian concept of a loose, decentralized commonwealth has prevailed, enabling it to survive despite its multi-racial character and diverse systems of governments.²⁴

Canada's role as a helpful fixer in the Commonwealth began in 1949. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon had just acquired their independence from British rule and wished to join the Commonwealth, but on becoming independent nations these states had become republics. Prior to this date membership in the Commonwealth was predicated on having the British Monarchy as head of state. Consequently, a method had to be devised to accomodate these new nations in the Commonwealth. At a conference held in London during April 1949 to deal with this question, the issue was resolved through a proposal presented by Canada's Minister of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson. His initiative allowed the republics to remain in the Commonwealth by making it a free association of independent member nations. Henceforth, the British Commonwealth would be known simply as the Commonwealth of Nations.²⁵

The Commonwealth has been pulled back from the brink of disintegration on a number of occasions by Canadian efforts. The Suez crisis of 1956 nearly destroyed the Commonwealth. An Anglo-French invasion force occupied the Suez Canal Zone following Egypt's nationalization of the canal. The Afro-Asian bloc of the Commonwealth were united in their opposition to the British action, while Australia and New Zealand supported Great Britain. Canada was indignant about the invasion but nevertheless, Pearson successfully found a formula which led to a ceasefire and the creation of United Nations peacekeeping force to supervise it. Pearson's solution allowed Britain and France to withdraw without further embarrassment while at the same time making

it possible to act to save the Commonwealth. India was seriously considering leaving the Commonwealth, but Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, who already possessed a good personal relationship with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, convinced the Indian government that the British actions were not sufficient cause to break up the Commonwealth. He argued that the British actions were an aberration, though a very regrettable one.²⁶ Pearson meanwhile used Commonwealth contacts to persuade the reluctant Arabs and India that the peacekeeping force would not harm Arab interests.²⁷

At the 1961 Commonwealth Conference it was South Africa's apartheid policies which precipitated a crisis. Apartheid was heartily disliked by the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth, and also, two months prior to the meeting, South African police killed sixty-seven blacks while suppressing riots. These events only reinforced the Afro-Asian states' determination to expel South Africa from the association. Just prior to the meeting South Africa announced it was becoming a republic but would apply to remain in the Commonwealth. However, the non-white members would not allow it to remain.

The British, supported by Australia and New Zealand, attempted to preserve South Africa's membership in the Association by trying to separate the issue of apartheid from its readmission to the Commonwealth. However, the African and Asian states refused to accept this tactic and threatened to leave the Commonwealth themselves if South Africa remained. To preserve the association's multi-racial character, Canada's Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, devised a compromise solution. He sided with the Asian and African members by proposing that while South Africa not be expelled, the conference's final communique should state that social equality in member nations was an essential principle of the Commonwealth. Great Britian

and New Zealand objected to the proposal but the non-white states agreed to it. South Africa refused to contenance any changes in its apartheid policies and as a result, subsequently withdrew from the Commonwealth.²⁸

Canada had once again performed the 'helpful fixer' role. Acceptance of Diefenbaker's initiative had preserved the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth. The London Observer stated

Mr. Diefenbaker's role was of decisive importance. Not only did he provide a bridge between the old white dominions and the new non-white members; he also demonstrated the importance of somebody giving a lead.²⁹

Solving the South African issue did not remove racial problems from the Commonwealth however. In the mid-sixties Rhodesia's racial policies resulted in a series of tense conferences that nearly resulted in the Commonwealth's dissolution. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had separated into three separate countries in 1963. Two of the new countries produced from the federation, Zambia and Malawi, which were ruled by governments elected by their black majorities, were admitted to the Commonwealth. However, the third country produced by the breakup of the federation, Rhodesia, was still ruled by a government representing the white minority. The question of Rhodesia acquiring independence was initially dealt with at the Commonwealth Conference held in London during July, 1964. Diefenbaker's successor as Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, also succeeded him as a helpful fixer in the Commonwealth. Pearson was instrumental in easing tension in the Association created by the Rhodesia situation by drafting the Declaration of Racial Equality.³⁰ The Declaration stated that majority rule would have to be instituted before Rhodesia could become independent. Commonwealth members were also forbidden by the Declaration from extending diplomatic recognition to Rhodesia if the white regime

unilaterally declared independence. Canada had openly sided with the African and Asian nations with its proposal, but all members accepted it.

Ian Smith's white minority government did unilaterally declare independence in 1965. A special Commonwealth meeting was held in Nigeria in January 1965 to deal with the Rhodesia problem. African Commonwealth leaders demanded that Britain take military action to stop Smith, but London refused. Non-mandatory economic sanctions were imposed but the meeting ended with no conclusive decisions being taken and with a growing split between England and the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth.

In September another meeting was held. The economic sanctions were having little effect and the rift in the association was wider than ever. Prime Minister Kaunda of Zambia boycotted the conference while most of the remaining leaders re-expressed their firm conviction that only military intervention would suffice to remove Smith's government. Only Australia, New Zealand and Malawi supported Britain's preference for negotiations over uses of armed force.

Canada and Malaysia tried to mediate in order to draw the two factions closer together. Pearson cautioned against the use of force and supported the British desire to continue strengthened economic sanctions. He warned that bringing down the Smith regime

at any price might result in the use of force in a way which could destroy those that we are trying to help, and have far-reaching consequences never intended or desired...I presume that our consideration would be initially directed to the feasibility of mandatory economic sanctions, it would seem premature to discuss military sanctions before the possibility of economic sanctions had been exhausted.³¹

Pearson concluded that Smith's regime was "abhorrent and intolerable to the great majority of people and must be changed." At Wilson's request,

Pearson shouldered the responsibility of working out an acceptable compromise. Pearson's plan required Britain to take a tougher stand with Rhodesia, and if an agreement was not worked out within three months the issue would be taken to the United Nations. Britain would then ask the Security Council to impose selective, but mandatory, economic sanctions on Rhodesia. This solution was acceptable to all participants at the meeting.³² Once again, Canada had played a mediatory or helpful fixer role, and had developed an acceptable compromise for the opposing factions. Canada tried to play the same type of role during the India-Pakistan war in 1965. However, the offer was not accepted.³³

South Africa once again became a divisive issue at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore. Great Britain intended to sell arms to South Africa and this infuriated the African Commonwealth members. Prime Minister Trudeau, who despite initial reservations, had found the Commonwealth to be an invaluable forum for discussing problems of government in the 1970's with other heads of government, worked vigorously to save the association. A private protest was made to London opposing the proposed arms sales. He also dispatched his personal foreign affairs advisor, Ivan Head, to persuade African leaders who were considering not even attending the Conference in protest, that they should come. Head's mission proved successful and there was full attendance at the meeting in Singapore. Once there, Trudeau successfully strove to find a solution to the crisis. He argued strenuously that no simple issue was important enough to destroy the Commonwealth. He then proposed and won approval for an amendment to President Kaunda's Declaration of Principles that originally would have forced Britain to cancel its sales. As amended, Kaunda's Declaration of Principles preserved Britain's right to sell arms to South Africa.³⁴

Trudeau had performed admirably as a Commonwealth helpful fixer. He and his predecessors had reacted quickly whenever a crisis threatened to end the association. Typically, the Canadians did not take polemical stands but instead devoted their efforts to working quietly behind the scenes with individual delegations to find common ground, and then advocating compromise positions that could be accepted by all or most participants. Repeatedly, the only Canadian objective seemed to be ensuring survival of the association. Canada never received direct benefits but since the Commonwealth was deemed to be useful to Canada, strenuous efforts were made to preserve it.

Helpful Fixing at the United Nations

The United Nations has been strongly supported by Canada since its inception. It has even been claimed that it has provided "the idealistic basis for post-war Canadian foreign policy."³⁵ After World War II, Canadian officials wanted to continue to exercise what influence they had been able to during the war, and if possible, increase it. The new United Nations then became a major forum for Canadian activity directed to preserving its influence on world affairs. Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent sought ways in which Canada would be able to present initiatives. When the United Nations was organized Canada tried to limit the power of the great powers as much as possible by trying to maximize international democracy. It tried to ensure that small and middle powers would have seats on the Security Council, and it tried to place limits on the veto powers of the great powers. Efforts to control the veto had to be abandoned because the Soviet Union objected very strongly, but, what became known as the "Canadian Formula" was incorporated into Article 23 of the United Nations

Charter.³⁶ This formula asserted that the General Assembly would have to elect six members of the United Nations to sit on the Security Council with the permanent members. Ottawa reluctantly abandoned its efforts to limit the veto, even though it felt that greater international democracy would greatly enhance the chances of preventing a major international war between the great powers because, it felt that as many nations as possible should be included in the new world body, where they could be subject to international pressure whenever possible. Consequently, to ensure Soviet participation in the United Nations Canada abandoned efforts to control the veto. Despite its failure to weaken the power of the superpowers in the security council, Canadian statesmen recognized that in the General Assembly a formal equality of states existed regardless of size, and this would allow smaller powers to exercise some influence and pressure.³⁷

Canada served as a helpful fixer in the first major international issue to face the United Nations. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson played an important role in getting the Palestine partition plan accepted by the United Nations by serving as a mediator. A dispute arose between the United States and the Soviet Union over the timing of the termination of Britain's mandate in Palestine. Canada adopted the role of mediator, keeping in touch with the British to see that their views were represented, while trying to reconcile the American and Soviet positions. Pearson's energetic intervention was decisive in successfully producing a compromise acceptable to the United Nations. However, it proved to be simply an agreement for agreements sake and, it ignored Pearson's own dictum that middle powers should only attempt the practicable. The Canadian delegation itself could not really find anything positive to say about its own compromise and as the British had warned, the Arabs would never accept

partition.³⁸

Following Great Britain's withdrawal of its garrison from Palestine a conflict broke out between the new Jewish state of Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, Canada participated in the effort to achieve a ceasefire and to reconcile the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom. It urged the United Nations to abandon the partition plan and accept the "power realities of the situation."³⁹ The Canadian position was that only minor border changes should take place from those established at the ceasefire, a conciliation commission should be established, and Jerusalem should be placed under international control. Canada's proposals were accepted and incorporated in a General Assembly resolution. Canada acted once more as a mediator in 1952 when the Canadian United Nations delegation negotiated changes to a draft resolution that was to continue the existence of the Conciliation Commission. By making the resolution less critical of Israel, the Canadian delegation was able to secure not only its passage, but also to prevent an open breach between Israel and the United Nations.⁴⁰

Canada has continually striven to push the United Nations into taking an active role in solving the Middle East problem created by Israel's existence. In 1976 Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, was telling the General Assembly that

it is my view that negotiations with regard to a permanent settlement in the Middle East should begin at the earliest possible moment, that the situation that exists at present is one that could erupt once again into a very serious danger, not only to the peace of the area but to the peace of the world.⁴¹

Realizing its own inability to influence the Middle East situation, Canada has been participating as a peacekeeper "consistent with an objective and

balanced approach towards the various issues arising out of the Middle East dispute."⁴²

Canada also performed its typical helpful fixing role when the United Nations became deadlocked over an American proposal to dispatch observers to Greece in 1947 during a bloody civil war. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was created to investigate foreign support for the Greek communist guerrillas. When the Soviet Union and Poland refused to sit on the committee, it appeared the committee would not be formed. Canada reacted by suggesting that the committee be formed, but that two seats be left vacant for the reluctant Soviets and Poles. The Canadian suggestion was adopted, the committee was formed and observers were dispatched to the Balkans.⁴³

In 1947, Canada was appointed to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) which was charged with supervising elections in Korea. It was nominated by the United States without the prior knowledge or approval of Ottawa. King was furious and considered rejecting the appointment, but St. Laurent and a number of other cabinet members convinced King to accept in order not to embarrass the United States, and because Canada was one of the few countries acceptable to everyone.⁴⁴

Once on UNTCOK, Canada along with Australia, strongly opposed American suggestions made in the United Nations' Interim Committee,⁴⁵ that the commission consider holding elections in only south Korea after UNTCOK met with little co-operation from communist officials in the north. Canada and Australia opposed this proposal because they felt the communists would respond by holding separate elections in the north, and thus de facto create two separate countries. But when the commission accepted the Interim

Committee's suggestion to hold elections only in the south, Canada accepted the situation and extended diplomatic recognition to the new country.⁴⁶

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 started by North Korea's attempt to forcibly reunite the nation, led to a much greater involvement for Canada on the peninsula. Initially, Ottawa made no effort to serve as a mediator in this crisis. It simply felt that the communist invasion of South Korea was similar to the Fascist aggression of the 1930's, preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Canada, along with many other western nations, felt that force would have to be met with force. They would not repeat the mistakes of the western leaders during the 1930's, and try to appease the enemy. Negotiation without complete withdrawal by North Korea was considered appeasement. Consequently, Canada fully supported American moves to counter the invasion.⁴⁷ Pearson announced in the House of Commons that he felt the dispatching of US troops to Korea to repel the invasion was in accordance with the UN charter, which called for collective defence against aggression. He claimed as well, that American actions also met the requirements of a Security Council Resolution adopted on June 25, 1950 calling for the UN to aid South Korea in repealing the invasion.⁴⁸

However, not until seven weeks after the outbreak of the Korean conflict did Ottawa decide to send troops itself. Both St. Laurent and Pearson justified the move by claiming that Canada was obligated to do so under the United Nations' charter. But Pearson also explained it by placing the situation in cold war terms. He told the House of Commons that this country should determine a role for itself, in consultation with its allies, to assist "the collective effort of the free countries to prevent aggression."⁴⁹ Canada, along with its allies, would demonstrate to the communist powers that force would be met by force. Nevertheless, Canada did want the war fought

under UN auspices because Ottawa felt it would be easier to influence Washington's policy in concert with other nations at the United Nations, than if the war effort was directly under U.S. control. Ottawa also felt that it would set a valuable precedent for UN activity.⁵⁰

Although an active participant in the conflict, Canada did oppose all attempts to expand the war. It repeatedly tried to moderate American policy and strongly opposed all efforts to turn the war into an attempt to unify Korea, to attack China, or to involve Taiwan in the war. After American General MacArthur, then UN commander in Korea, successfully counter-attacked against the North Koreans, Pearson tried to prevent the Americans from invading North Korea. In Pearson's own words, he presented "the inevitable Canadian compromise" and he even worked out arrangements for the UN command to contact the North Koreans.⁵¹ To his chagrin, the Americans brushed off his efforts and pushed deep into North Korea.

Pearson warned the United States that if they moved their forces too close to China, the Chinese would intervene. Unfortunately, his sage advice was ignored and as predicted, Peking attacked the American troops with substantial forces. After the Chinese intervention in the war, the Canadian and Indian delegations to the United Nations co-operated extensively with each other. "From this point on Ottawa's major objective was to find a way to end the hostilities."⁵² Because of his extensive efforts to serve as mediator, Pearson was appointed along with an Indian diplomat to a three-man committee charged with the responsibility of finding a way to achieve a ceasefire in Korea.⁵³

The committee met with little success, but Canada used its good relationship with India, which maintained diplomatic relations with China, to exchange proposals and suggestions for a ceasefire with China. Since

these efforts also failed, Ottawa focused its efforts on ensuring that American policies were acceptable to those Asian states sympathetic to the West.⁵⁴ Canada did not even let its co-sponsorship of American resolutions in the General Assembly prevent it from mediating between the U.S. and India and its allies, if the Asian countries found the resolution unacceptable.⁵⁵ Canadian diplomats also attempted to preserve unity amongst the nations fighting in Korea under UN command, particularly between Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain's attitude to the war was similar to Canada's, because they did not want to see it expanded into a war to unify Korea, or, to attack China. Consequently, there was some tension in British-American relations.

By contributing army forces to Korea, Ottawa, or at least some elements in the government, were hoping to gain some goodwill from Washington.⁵⁶ But Canada did not let this prevent it from being critical of the United States. Indeed, Ottawa used its close relationship with Washington to counsel moderation and restraint. It also used its intimacy with Washington, and its knowledge of American intentions, to enhance its mediation efforts. Canadian efforts to limit the Korean war resulted from purely pragmatic reasons. Ottawa felt the United States should give priority to defending western Europe and believed that fighting China would only damage western relations with the countries of Asia. Therefore, the war should be limited strictly to defending South Korea.⁵⁷ Generally, Canada's position was espoused, and the war did not turn into a wider conflagration. This was in no small part due to Canadian mediating efforts, and this in turn enhanced Canada's image as a helpful fixer in the third world.⁵⁸

Canada's role as helpful fixer in the United Nations has not only been limited to major international crisis. It has also worked to solve problems within the UN. One of its most successful efforts was in 1955 when it broke the deadlock over admitting new nations to the United Nations. Since 1950 no new nations had been allowed to join the organization because the USSR and the United States vetoed acceptance of the other's allies. By 1955 twenty countries were waiting for admission. Canada felt that it was imperative that these nations be admitted whatever their political ideology. The Canadian delegation argued that the new members are "likely to become more acceptable members of the world community as part of this organization, when they are committed to its purposes and subject to its rules."⁵⁹ To break the deadlock, Canada proposed that all nations, with the exception of those nations where unification was an unsolved issue, should be admitted en mass.⁶⁰ To override the objections of the great powers, the Canadian delegation lobbied other General Assembly members in order to muster support for their proposal. They successfully gained the support of twenty-four other nations but Taiwan vetoed the inclusion of Outer Mongolia. In a compromise, the Soviet Union agreed to admit every nation with the exception of Japan, which it refused to admit as long as Outer Mongolia was excluded. As a result of the Canadian package plan, and its extensive lobbying to gain wide small power support, the deadlock over admitting new members was broken despite the continuing reluctance of the great powers.⁶¹

Canadian activity at the UN has contributed substantially to Canada's ability to act as a helpful fixer. Ottawa's early efforts at the creation of the United Nations to increase the influence of smaller powers established a reputation for Canada as a spokesman of the smaller powers. Canadian diplomats feel that some goodwill has accrued to Canada because of previous

helpful and mediatory stances it has taken, and this has assisted Canada when undertaking negotiations.⁶² Indeed, Pearson would agree with this assessment.

We have also acquired diplomatic power from a demonstrated desire and willingness to discharge our responsibilities as a member of the UN; and even more, I believe, from a desire to broaden and deepen that responsibility of the United Nations. I think of our efforts for instance to build up peacekeeping machinery in the UN.⁶³

The absence of an imperialistic past and its own colonial history has made third world countries receptive on occasion to Canadian ideas and suggestions; thus allowing Canada to act as a helpful fixer. Ottawa has also refrained from trying to coerce nations into taking sides over cold war issues, and this willingness to accept non-alignment amongst third world nations has been appreciated. This combined with Canadian membership in the Commonwealth and, more recently, expanded contacts with francophone nations, has provided Canada with good access to the governments of third world nations which now constitute a majority in the General Assembly.⁶⁴ These factors have contributed to Canada's ability to act as a helpful fixer in the United Nations when Canadian leaders felt it was appropriate.

Reducing International Tensions

Even outside of the Commonwealth and the United Nations, Canadian officials have on occasion attempted to smooth negotiations they have participated in, and have tried to mediate crisis situations. Generally, working quietly and unobtrusively, Canadian officials have sought to protect what they thought important and avoided polemics whenever possible. By operating quietly as a helpful fixer, Canada was able to have some

influence on world events and to work for the cause of peace.

Canada acquired a seat at the nuclear disarmament conference where it has attempted to serve as a helpful fixer. Its efforts have been concentrated on working quietly in private meetings where Western representatives gather to discuss proposals prior to presenting them to the Soviets. There, Canadians will often attempt to influence their allies to make proposals that are not just designed for propaganda purposes in order to create pro-western support amongst non-participating nations. Instead, they try to create proposals that will lead to serious discussions with the Soviets. However, in actual negotiations with the Soviets, Canada has little influence because the USSR tends to ignore Canada's proposals because it is very weak militarily.⁶⁵

When the Disarmament Commission was expanded in 1961, difficulties arose over appointment of a chairman for the new eighteen member body. The Americans did not want a pro-Soviet nation chairing the commission and the Soviets were no more agreeable to a pro-American nation on the chair. The Soviets also rejected a proposal calling for a neutral chairman, so deadlock was close to occurring before the committee even started substantive meetings. Canada broke the deadlock by proposing a joint-chairmanship held by the Soviets and Americans. The Canadian delegation felt there was an additional advantage in this proposal because a major problem in the previous disarmament negotiations had been getting the Soviets and Americans to talk frankly with each other. The two superpowers would be forced to consult frequently if they were to chair the commission, and they would also be responsible for its success or failure.⁶⁶ This proposal was accepted by the member nations, although with a minor change. It was decided that chairmanship of the actual meetings would be rotated amongst all participants.

In addition, Canadian amendments to test ban resolutions proposed by non-aligned states, making the resolution more acceptable to the western nations, played a large part in creating the first major success in arms limitation talks - the Moscow Test Ban Treaty.⁶⁷ But Canada also worked diligently to protect NATO interests, consulting frequently with its allies over policy, and working to amend resolutions so that they would be more acceptable to the United Kingdom and the United States. The head of the Canadian delegation, E.L.M. Burns, even noted that "our representatives can do better in a kind of brokerage job than if we try to take a lead ourselves."⁶⁸

At the disarmament conferences Canada's usual approach "was less to invent new ideas, or to engage in polemics, than to seek out patiently the common ground between the contending parties."⁶⁹ Even at the NATO meetings in May 1962 Green cajoled his allies into issuing a communique stressing NATO's support for disarmament (with effective verification measures), and which emphasized the need to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ At the 1965 Disarmament Conference Canada followed its traditional approach. Progress had been achieved in previous sessions towards achieving a nuclear non-proliferation treaty and Canada felt that if a draft treaty could be presented when the conference reconvened, a final treaty could be drafted faster. Canada and Great Britain's objective was to make the treaty more acceptable to those states not possessing nuclear arms. Britain separately set out to draft a new treaty. In the succeeding conference Canada was successful in getting its provisions accepted and the final treaty appeared in a form very close to Canada's conception.⁷¹

Canada has consistently endeavoured to serve as a helpful fixer in the Cold War. The Canadian attitude has generally been that which was

expressed by Mitchell Sharp in 1971 when defending the use of a Canadian diplomat to carry a message from Washington to the North Vietnamese government in 1964. On this occasion Sharp stated that "Canada should endeavour to promote a dialogue between the main parties to the conflict."⁷² As has been seen, the Canadian government similarly attempted to promote dialogue between China and the United States during the Korean War.

This was also precisely the Canadian policy during the off-shore Islands crisis in 1954-55. The Peoples Republic of China was threatening to invade a number of Nationalist Chinese held islands just off the coast of the Chinese mainland. The United States government had publicly stated that it would support Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government if the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu were invaded. Washington had accepted Taipei's argument that the off-shore islands were an integral part of Formosa and were vital for its defence. Ottawa completely disagreed with the United States over this issue. It did not feel that the off-shore islands were an integral part of Formosa or were a vital part of the Nationalist defence perimeter. Indeed, it felt Chiang Kai-shek wanted to hold on to the off-shore islands because they made good bases from which to attack the mainland, and this, Ottawa felt, the Nationalists should not be allowed to do.⁷³ To defuse the crisis, in 1954 Ottawa worked out a detailed plan that called for the withdrawal of the United States Seventh Fleet which was patrolling the Straits separating Taiwan from the mainland, and replacing it with an international fleet which would prevent either a communist attack on Taiwan, or a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. This proposal was presented in private to Washington, but was rejected. Consequently, Ottawa dropped the idea and at this time no mention of the proposal or Washington's response was made public.⁷⁴

With the failure of this effort, Canada was not ready to abandon its efforts to end the continuing crisis. In February 1955 American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met Pearson in New York City. Pearson was returning home from a Commonwealth Conference where the crisis had been discussed. Pearson told Dulles that the Commonwealth was concerned about American commitments to the Nationalist Chinese, upon which Dulles informed Pearson that he hoped to convince Chiang that his only future would be on Taiwan. Dulles hoped that if Chiang was convinced of this he would voluntarily withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. The Secretary of State told Pearson this would not happen quickly, and would be impossible if the Chinese Communists were to invade the Nationalist held islands. Dulles stated that if the communists refrained from aggressive actions a de facto ceasefire would in all likelihood occur. Pearson responded by inquiring if this information could be given to others. Dulles agreed, and shortly after, Pearson informed the Indian government about the contents of his conversation with Dulles. India, which maintained diplomatic relations with China, duly informed Peking and within a short period of time the fighting between the two Chinese factions slackened. By using Canada as a conduit, the United States could disavow its new stand if the information became public.⁷⁵

In early 1979, when tensions between Vietnam, Cambodia and China exploded into open warfare, the Trudeau government attempted to find a way to halt the fighting. It "made high level demarches in the capitals concerned", and it also actively supported efforts in the United Nations Security Council and elsewhere to achieve a political solution to the problems.⁷⁶ But, having little influence with the belligerents, the Canadian

government's efforts were doomed to failure.

Within the NATO alliance Canada has occasionally served as a helpful fixer by attempting to moderate alliance policies dealing with the Warsaw Pact forces, and thus preventing an exacerbation of east-west tensions. Since Canadian actions are rarely decisive in terms of survival of the alliance, Canadian officials have tried to make NATO's position less stridently anti-Soviet and more flexible in dealing with the Warsaw Pact.

Canadian diplomats are generally more adventurous in the consideration of new proposals and in trying to envisage western policies as they might appear to the uncommitted and communist powers.⁷⁷

Because its importance as a NATO member lies more in symbolic terms than in military terms, and because it is perceived to be a loyal western ally committed to preserving NATO, Canada's actions have been acceptable to its allies.⁷⁸

An example of Canada's role occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1958. The Canadian Minister of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith succeeded in moderating the tone of NATO's communique issued to the Soviets. Smith also pushed for a full discussion of Soviet proposals. In order to ease the increasing tensions between the two military alliances, Smith attempted to involve the United Nations in the talks. However, this proposal was unfavourably received by Canada's alliance partners, and Smith's subsequent death resulted in the idea being dropped by the Canadian government.⁷⁹

Canada's function as bridge between the United States and Great Britain is no longer necessary because with Britain withdrawing from its colonies and its relative decline in power, there are no longer occasions when tensions between the two have required a mediator. But when the "cod

war" broke out in 1975 between Britain and Iceland, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen served as the intermediary. And, as will be shown in detail in the following chapter, the Canadian government has played an important role in the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus which has helped prevent open warfare between ostensible NATO allies Greece and Turkey. Ottawa has also tried, unsuccessfully, to find a diplomatic solution to the Cyprus problem.

While the Canadian government would like to ease North-South tensions, it has often voted with the developed nations in opposing proposals presented in the United Nations by underdeveloped countries that would increase the United Nations role in distributing foreign aid and development funds. This has prevented the removal of foreign aid from the control of the aid distributors, and placing distribution under the control of the third world dominated General Assembly. Ottawa has also consistently put greater emphasis on bilateral programs in which recipients are often required to purchase goods in Canada with the financial aid distributed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In the past, Canada has been criticized for this policy by aid recipients. Compounding the problem is the fact that Canadian aid levels are also lower than many other western nations, which has prompted Trudeau to state that "we can and perhaps should be more generous" in distributing foreign aid.⁸⁰

But despite weaknesses in Canada's foreign aid programs, Trudeau and his recent predecessors have felt that Canada could serve as a bridge between the developed and developing countries because it has much in common with both types. While Canada is an industrialized country its economy, like many Third World countries, is still heavily dependent on natural resource extraction. Another common problem is the high per centage of

foreign ownership in many sectors of the economy. The developing countries are willing to use Canada as a middleman in its dialogue with the developed countries. They regard Canada as being sympathetic to their views, despite Canada's mixed record as a helpful fixer in north-south relations, and they feel it is influential in Washington, which gives Ottawa added importance.⁸¹ Ottawa's willingness to participate in third world affairs has also contributed to the third world's use of Ottawa as a middleman. In the Commonwealth and United Nations Canada has often acted as a sympathetic helpful fixer in dealing with third world issues, and in 1965 and 1971 it offered to mediate between India and Pakistan during their periodic wars.

At the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas Venezuela, the Canadian delegation acted as the honest broker by trying to reconcile the differences between the developing and developed countries. The head of the Canadian delegation, Alan Beesley was criticized by some for being too much the conciliator, and by others for acting too much as the Canadian spokesman.⁸² While Canada has achieved most of its objectives for control of the sea bed in subsequent conferences, often at the expense of the developing nations, the Canadian government has not abandoned its efforts to act as a bridge builder between the developed and developing countries of the world. In his June 1980 meetings with European leaders, Trudeau repeatedly broached the subject of the increasing poverty of the developing nations, and sought support for re-opening the stalled North-South talks.⁸³ He expressed his concern to the European leaders he visited about the deteriorating relations between the developed and developing nations, and sought to win support for a mini-summit between European leaders and influential

leaders of the developing nations. Trudeau has also offered to host this mini-summit.⁸⁴

Conclusion

It seems clear that Canada has been an active helpful fixer in international affairs. While it unquestionably has remained a loyal western ally, and has avoided jeopardizing western security interests, successive Canadian leaders have believed Canada should avoid polemics and instead, should strive to reduce international tensions. It is careful not to embarrass the United States and in fact, tries to get American acceptance of proposals in private before presenting them publicly. If Washington rejects Ottawa's suggested compromises, Canada will not generally try to force the issue. This is an obvious result of the Canadian government's realization that it is heavily dependent on the United States, and that its interests are similar to those of the Americans. However, international recognition that Canada has been an objective and trustworthy helpful fixer has enabled the Canadian government to continue this role.

As a result of its many interventions, it has become a tradition for the Canadian government to be willing to assist in solving international problems. Aptly called helpful fixing by the Trudeau government, this tradition was developed in the post-World War II period by Lester Pearson and his colleagues. The helpful fixing tradition has persisted into the 1970's and indeed, it seems this tradition has influenced government activity in international politics. Trudeau quickly showed his ability as a helpful fixer by preventing the disintegration of the Commonwealth at the 1971 Singapore Conference, and Mitchell Sharp suggested Canada remained neutral in the 1971 India-Pakistan war because it may have been asked to serve as

a mediator or peacekeeper.⁸⁵ With the easing of cold war tensions as a result of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Trudeau government has tried to thrust itself into the role of mediator between the developed and developing countries. But the helpful fixer tradition in Canadian foreign policy has been most associated with peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, often intertwined with mediating or other helpful fixing activities, has been perhaps Canada's single most prominent international role, and where the helpful fixer tradition has most obviously influenced government decisions.

Notes

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Chapter 2

Canadian Peacekeeping Operations in the Pre-Trudeau Years and the Trudeau Government's Foreign Policy Review

Introduction

Since World War II, Canada has participated in more peacekeeping operations than any other nation, and has played important roles in most of those operations. David Cox has said that

in terms of the general objectives and motivations of its foreign policy, the Canadian government perhaps more than any other, has been a persistently enthusiastic supporter of peacekeeping activities.¹

Under the guidance of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, post-war Canadian governments adopted the view that Canada's interests could best be served in collective alliances or the United Nations. The reason for this policy seemed obvious to Pearson. He stated

We...know, or should know, that there can be no political security except on the widest possible basis of co-operation. If that basis can be a universal one - so much the better - If it cannot, then on the broadest possible basis and inside the United Nations.²

Consequently, Canada's active participation in peacekeeping ventures has, with two exceptions, taken place under the auspices of the United Nations.

International peacekeeping has been an important segment of Canada's efforts as a helpful fixer. Indeed, peacekeeping has become one of Canada's most prominent international roles. A contributing factor to the prominence of this role is that peacekeeping operations, by their very nature, are

public exercises. In contrast, other helpful fixing activities such as mediation or acting as a go-between, often take place out of the public eye.

Peacekeeping is also important for Canada's international image because it has led to mediation and intermediary roles for Canada. Participation in the International Control Commissions in Indo-China was at least partially responsible for the decision to have Canadian diplomats act as messengers during negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States, though knowledge of these missions did not become public until some years after their completion. Membership in the peacekeeping forces on Cyprus has also allowed Ottawa to attempt to negotiate settlements to the problems dividing that country. Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations, with or without related mediation efforts, has played an important role in creating Canada's helpful fixer image. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the pre-1968 peacekeeping efforts of Canada, and Pierre Trudeau's reaction to Canada's growing image as an international helpful fixer.

Peacekeeping can be classified as helpful fixing, since the objective of peacekeeping operations is to allow third parties to prevent, or stop, armed conflict. By placing neutral international military forces between belligerents, a conflict can be stabilized and contained before it threatens to destabilize the international system. It enables the "parties in a dispute to draw back from conflict when they recognize that this is in their best interests and to help create circumstances in which their differences can be settled by negotiation."³ Peacekeeping operations are not intended to impose a political settlement on the conflicting parties,

though such operations may be used to supervise a peace settlement. There are two categories of peacekeeping operations: observer groups and peacekeeping forces. Observer groups involve small numbers of officers and men equipped only with sidearms. They do not become involved in a dispute, but rather just observe ceasefires and report on military incidents or infractions of the ceasefire agreement. In theory, they will prevent violations of the ceasefire accords because the observers will either see or hear any such activities and will report them to the United Nations. Observers "symbolize the authority and concern of the international community."⁴

Peacekeeping forces have been used in two different types of operations: interstate and intrastate. In interstate operations, peacekeeping forces interpose themselves between the armies of the two opposing nations, separating them and then watching to ensure violations of the truce agreement do not occur, while allowing time for political solutions to be found. Both Sinai operations are examples of this type of force. During intrastate operations, peacekeeping forces

may have broad responsibilities for internal security, involving both purely military operations and actions in support of the civil power.⁵

The peacekeeping force in the Congo from 1960-1964 is representative of an intrastate operation.

United Nations Resolution 998 states the principles of peacekeeping as established by the United Nations. Initially it was just intended for the 1956 Sinai force (UNEF I), but now all United Nations peacekeeping operations are formed and operated under its basic guidelines. The essential points are: great powers cannot participate, nations that do participate

must do so voluntarily, and nations where forces are to be placed must consent to having them on their territory. Peacekeeping forces are intended to play only a passive role which entails them supervising, rather than enforcing, ceasefires. Indeed, their combat capability is only for self-defence.⁶

After the initial impetus given to Canada's assumption of the role of helpful fixer by the strong personal beliefs of men like Lester Pearson, international helpful fixing has become part of Canada's national image. Its popularity with Canadians has exerted some influence on Canadian politicians. Strong public pressure was placed on John Diefenbaker to include Canada in the Congo peacekeeping force. Paul Martin, convinced Canadians strongly supported helpful fixing, searched for ways to serve as a mediator in Vietnam, and frantically attempted to prevent the demise of UNEF I in 1967. The Trudeau government, unsure of the future of peacekeeping, and anxious to lower public expectations created by its predecessor's successes and rhetoric supporting Canada's role as a helpful fixer, suggested in a foreign policy review that peacekeeping may no longer be a viable role for Canada in the 1970's. Even though the review also suggested Canada would act as a peacekeeper when practicable, it created a critical outcry from Canadians who feared Trudeau would abandon the helpful fixing role initiated by Pearson in the early post-World War II period.

The Initial Peacekeeping Role, Kashmir, 1949

Canada's first peacekeeping role occurred on the India-Pakistan border in 1949 when eight Canadian officers were dispatched to Kashmir as part of a United Nations observer group which served on the India-

Pakistan border. Ottawa had been reluctant to accede to the UN request for observers but the request was strongly supported by the new Minister of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson. He induced the government to accept the request and consequently, the observers were duly dispatched. Pearson felt the observers' presence helped contain and ease the crisis in Kashmir,⁷ though in 1965 and 1974 the tension between India and Pakistan escalated into open warfare which the observers were powerless to prevent. Nevertheless, because of the extended scope of tension created during the 1965 war, another observer group was created to supervise the withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistani armies along the whole India-Pakistan border.

Indo-China Truce Supervision and Related Helpful Fixing Roles

The participants of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which led to the French withdrawal from Indo-China, requested that Canada become a member of a three-nation commission to supervise the withdrawal of troops and the movement of refugees in Indo-China. Canada was not a participant in the Geneva Conference but was suggested for the truce supervisory commission by India. Ottawa had some doubts about the Geneva agreement and was especially worried because Washington refused to support the treaty. However, the United States did say that if there was going to be a commission to supervise the peace accords, it preferred to have Canada on it.⁸ Despite its doubts, Ottawa consented to serve on the commission, partly because it was afraid that if it turned down the request, the agreement would collapse. As it was, the agreement had restored peace to the region and prevented another Korea, which had come dangerously close to escalating into a major war.⁹

The membership of the commission quite clearly was designed to represent the communist bloc, the capitalist bloc, and the neutrals. Canada's activities during the Korean war had demonstrated that it was one of the more objective and moderate NATO countries, so it was a logical western representative. Along with communist Poland and non-aligned India, Canada dispatched officers to constitute the observer teams of the International Control Commission (ICC) stationed in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. They successfully supervised the withdrawal of military forces and the movement of refugees. However, complaints of communist obstructionism prompted some Canadians to suggest that Canada should end its participation. But Pearson rose in the House of Commons to announce that the Canadians would remain because withdrawal might still jeopardize the peace settlement.¹⁰

However, Canadian officials soon became increasingly frustrated with the operations of the commission. They accused the Poles of favouring the communists, and the Indians of trying to avoid offending the communists. Consequently, the Canadians themselves did not act impartially. Rather, they accepted American violations of the ceasefire accords and favoured the non-communists in their reporting.¹¹ But the quarrels on the ICC effectively damaged the close Canadian-Indian relationship that had developed in Korea and the Commonwealth. Ottawa had argued that it had influence in third world countries like India because Canada was a close ally of the United States, and was also willing to act independently in foreign affairs. However, to Indians on the ICC, it appeared that Canada was more concerned with being a loyal ally than with independent action.¹² Despite these problems, the commission continued to exist until the early 1970's, ostensibly supervising a non-existent truce, but in reality it

helplessly watched an intensifying war. The ICC demonstrated beyond a doubt that observer commissions are unable to prevent war if the belligerents are determined to fight.

While the ICC was becoming increasingly ineffective, Ottawa nevertheless did try to convince the other governments on the commission to use it as a means for "bringing the parties [at war] closer together"¹³ Poland and India responded unfavourably but Canada decided to go ahead alone. In 1964, the United States approached the Canadian government to see if it would be willing to carry communications from Washington to Hanoi. Ottawa agreed after Pearson was fully briefed on Washington's policies. Pearson was informed that the United States intended to follow a "carrot-and-stick" policy, and needed a confidential and responsible intermediary to carry information to North Vietnam. The chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, Blair Seaborn, was appointed to be the emissary at the American's request.

Washington was not prepared to allow Canada to influence its negotiating position. Canada was to serve only as a go-between and not as a mediator. Indeed, Henry Cabot Lodge seems to indicate the general American attitude towards Canada's role when he stated

It is...not at all necessary that the Canadians either agree or disagree with the content of the messages to Hanoi. What is important is that the Canadians transmit the message and be willing to do that and report back accurately what is said.¹⁴

The Americans also hoped that Seaborn would provide them with political intelligence regarding the state of morale in Hanoi, the economic situation, and the relative influence of the Chinese and Soviets.

Seaborn was instructed to tell Hanoi that the American ambitions in South East Asia were limited essentially to preserving the territorial integrity of South Vietnam. But if Hanoi did not stop the fighting in South Vietnam "the greatest devastation would of course result for North Vietnam itself."¹⁵ However, if the fighting were to stop Hanoi would receive economic aid from the United States as well as diplomatic recognition. North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong listened to Seaborn's message but did not have a specific reply for Seaborn to carry back to Washington.

On his return from Hanoi, Seaborn reported to the Americans that a combination of threats and promises would not work. Regardless, Washington sent him back shortly after with essentially the same message. Phan Van Dong was angry at the continued threats and the American bombing of North Vietnam that followed the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Nevertheless, he

was unhesitating in his statement that a channel of communications to the U.S. should stay open and that Seaborn should continue to bear U.S. messages, no...matter how unpleasant they may be.¹⁶

For his third mission, Seaborn requested that Washington provide new proposals because Hanoi was not responding to the earlier approach, which amounted to Hanoi's negotiated surrender. But in his remaining four missions, Seaborn simply carried American threats and ultimatums to a government which had indicated it would not negotiate under such terms. Consequently, Hanoi quickly lost interest in Seaborn's mission and in using Canada as a go-between. As a result, Seaborn no longer saw Phan Van Dong, but had to be content with lower ranked officials.¹⁷

Initially, Seaborn had performed a useful function because both sides were using him to communicate their intentions to the other. But with neither side prepared to compromise Seaborn's efforts were doomed to failure, and therefore his missions as a go-between were terminated. However, Canada did not abandon its efforts to be a helpful fixer in Vietnam with the rather ignominious failure of the Seaborn mission. By 1966 both Pearson and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, had concluded that the American bombing of North Vietnam would not force Hanoi to negotiate. A short American bombing pause had just ended without any sort of diplomatic negotiations taking place, so Pearson and Martin concluded Washington would not launch a peace initiative in the near future. It was time for Canada to take the initiative once again. The initial conception was to work out a common approach with Canada's colleagues on the ICC, but this effort was abandoned when the Poles objected.¹⁸

Martin then conceived the idea of sending to Hanoi a retired Canadian diplomat, Chester Ronning, who was well respected by the North Vietnamese. The Americans were not enthusiastic about the project, but agreed to it in order not to appear to be obstructing the search for peace. Hanoi also readily agreed to see the Canadian envoy. After four days of fruitless meetings in Hanoi, Ronning finally met Prime Minister Dong, who agreed to start negotiating with Washington if only it would stop bombing North Vietnam.

Washington however, was not very impressed by this proposal. Only after Ronning had been back in Canada for six weeks did Washington finally reply. Even then it took a phone call from Martin insisting on a reply. Martin threatened to send Ronning back to Hanoi with the message

that Washington refused to reply. Martin felt some sort of reply was necessary, even if it was that Washington had nothing to say, in order to demonstrate to North Vietnam that Canada was sincere in its efforts for peace.¹⁹ Washington's response, when it finally did come, was that it would not stop bombing North Vietnam without a reciprocal measure.

Upon being informed by Ronning of Washington's conditions, Hanoi rejected them and accused Washington of escalating the conflict since Ronning's first visit. However, Hanoi's Foreign Minister did add that his government did not require the United States to stop the fighting in South Vietnam or, to accept Hanoi's Four Point peace plan as pre-conditions for negotiations.²⁰ Ronning felt these were important concessions and emphasized their importance to Washington. But regardless, the United States refused to act and stated it would not open negotiations until it had stabilized the situation in South Vietnam. As if to emphasize the point, the Americans bombed Hanoi for the first time shortly after Ronning left it. In effect, Washington was using the failure of Ronning's mission as a pretext for increasing the scope of its bombing campaign. To underscore this reasoning, American Undersecretary of State George Ball stated in a television interview that "there was nothing in what Ambassador Ronning brought back which gave any encouragement that Hanoi was prepared to come to the conference table."²¹

Ball's statement was completely false, but it had the effect of destroying Canadian credibility in Hanoi, and consequently removed the possibility that Canada could again serve as an intermediary.²² It appears that Washington was not yet ready to negotiate in Vietnam and did not want the ever ready helpful fixer - Canada - to place it in a compromising

position. Already, domestic opinion in the United States was divided over the war and the administration probably felt it could not risk alienating more public opinion by rejecting opportunities to negotiate. Despite the failure of both Seaborn's and Ronning's efforts, Ottawa had attempted to use its position in a peacekeeping operation to start a dialogue between Washington and Hanoi. That these efforts failed was no fault of Ottawa's.

The Suez Crisis, 1956

While Ottawa met little success in Vietnam serving as a helpful fixer, it was more successful in the Middle East and especially in the area of peacekeeping. The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) was created to supervise the armistice signed in 1948 by Israel and its Arab neighbours. UNTSO's duties involved investigating violations of the armistice accords but unfortunately, it had little effect in reducing tensions and the number of violations increased during the early 1950's. Canada first participated in the Supervisory Organization in 1954 when four army officers were dispatched to serve with it.

In 1953, Pearson had proposed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, that the UN observers be replaced "with a police force which would have greater powers and greater authority, and would be able to do things which the truce organization could not." But the Secretary-General replied "that in his opinion it would not be a desirable move at this time."²³ In February 1956, Pearson again proposed creation of a peacekeeping force to help defuse the mounting tensions in the Middle East. This time he directly approached Israel and her Arab neighbours but both sides turned down the proposals.

Fighting broke out in October of 1956 between Israel and Egypt, and shortly thereafter Britain and France invaded Egypt. The United Nations quickly became involved in trying to settle this major international crisis, with Canada, seemingly always the helpful fixer, playing a major role in the UN efforts.

There was a variety of reasons for Canada to get deeply involved in solving the crisis. Canada certainly lacked direct interests in the region for it was not a major user of the canal. Ottawa had accepted the British and American position that if Egypt possessed sole control of the canal, it would threaten NATO and Israeli security.²⁴ But, it seems that Canada's major concern was repairing the damage to NATO and the Commonwealth. Pearson openly stated in the House of Commons that "our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could."²⁵ A great strain was being placed on the Commonwealth because the Asian members were not terribly pleased with the British actions in Egypt. NATO was suffering because the United States so strongly opposed the Anglo-French moves that communications between Washington and its two major European allies had nearly ceased.

Pearson was also inspired to act quickly because the communists were "gleefully" and destructively working to exploit the crisis by trying to exacerbate tensions between England, France and the third world countries.²⁶ There was also the fear that the Suez crisis could eventually lead to direct Soviet intervention. They were threatening to send "volunteers" to Egypt if the Anglo-French forces did not quickly withdraw.

Pearson thought that if Canada supported the Anglo-French actions in the Middle East without reservation "we would not have been of any help to our friends subsequently" because the Third World would mistrust Canada's

motives.²⁷ With this in mind, Canada expressed "regret" at the action taken by Israel, Britain, and France. Nevertheless, Pearson did not assign blame for the crisis. By doing so he would have taken a stand, and consequently, probably would have alienated at least one of the participants, which would have made Canada's subsequent role of helpful fixing more difficult or even impossible. As well, strongly condemning Britain and France would have had serious domestic political ramifications for the Liberal government. As it was, taking an essentially neutral role in the crisis aroused Nasser's suspicions and also brought Pearson under heavy attack in the House of Commons. Nasser interpreted Canadian neutrality as support for Britain, while in Canada the Progressive Conservative opposition interpreted neutrality as condemnation of Great Britain.²⁸

The stated Canadian objective was to work towards achieving a final peace treaty based on the premise that Israel had the right to exist, but that it did not have the right to expand at the expense of the neighbouring Arab states.²⁹ To defuse the situation, Canada began to act on its own initiative. Pearson felt the best way to accomplish Canada's goals would be to involve the United Nations in solving the crisis as quickly as possible, and to seek a "solution which would be satisfactory to all sides."³⁰ After abandoning as unworkable his original plan of placing the Anglo-French forces in Suez under United Nations command, Pearson began to work behind the scenes to convince Secretary-General Hammarskjold of the advantages of a United Nations force. At first, Hammarskjold was not convinced such a force was practical and felt it would not work, but Pearson finally convinced him it would.³¹

The United States supported the Canadian efforts to defuse the crisis, but allowed Canada to take the lead because it realized that a middle power would be able to rally support from more third world countries than would the United States itself.³² Indeed, Canada had established many such contacts through the Commonwealth and during its efforts in the preceeding year to break the deadlock over admitting new members. Its image of being a helpful fixer improved Ottawa's ability to continue to act as one. Consequently, it was able to muster sufficient support to enable its resolutions during the crisis to pass with large majorities, thus giving them greater impact.³³

Pearson had also explained to United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the Canadian objective was to present a resolution that would prevent a return to the status quo, but would establish a real peace. It would have to be done in such a way so as to allow Britain and France to withdraw with as little embarrassment as possible, and therefore, allow the rift between the U.S. and its two major European allies to be repaired. Dulles accepted this reasoning and allowed Canada a free hand to draft its own resolution. Washington even assisted by providing intelligence on the developing situation in the Middle East.³⁴

On November 3, 1956 Pearson introduced a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the establishment of a United Nations force to supervise the disengagement of the Israeli, British, and French forces. The Secretary-General was to submit within forty-eight hours a plan for setting up such a force. There were no votes against the resolution, but a number of states abstained. An informal planning group was also set up to advise the Secretary-General and Canada was appointed to it. The Secretary-General submitted his report to the General Assembly within the allotted time.

It was adopted by the Assembly after it was presented as a resolution co-sponsored by Canada. During these deliberations, the United Kingdom and France indicated they would withdraw their forces when the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) called for in the Secretary-General's report was established. This is what Pearson hoped and expected they would do.

Pearson assisted Hammarskjold in drafting the Secretary-General's second report in which the principles and procedures under which the emergency force would operate were delineated. Among the principles set forth was the exclusion of permanent members of the Security Council from the force. This was important because it prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from getting involved. The report also gave political control of the force solely to the Secretary-General. An advisory committee was created to assist him. The military commander of the force was given full authority to direct the operations of the force, but he was to act in consultation with the Secretary-General.

The force itself was to be stronger than an observer corps, but was to have only a passive role. It was not intended to influence the military or political outcome of the dispute but was to remain completely neutral. It was not even to attempt to impose the will of the United Nations on the belligerents. The peacekeeper's combat capability was only for use in self-defense. Pearson himself had never intended UNEF to be "a United Nations fighting force in the sense that the force in Korea was."³⁵

The Emergency Force was to be only of a temporary nature. The length of the assignment was to be determined by the needs of the area and only the General Assembly was to be able to say when its task was accomplished. Nations that contributed to the force were to do so voluntarily,

and nations where peacekeeping forces were to be sent had to consent to their presence. Only the Secretary-General was to have the power to determine which nations would participate in the force. Pearson felt that if the host state was not given the power to decide whether or not to accept the force, the resolution calling for the creation of UNEF might very well have been rejected.³⁶ With that clause in the resolution, no members of the General Assembly voted against the resolution.

It was Pearson's opinion that the creation of UNEF made it easier for Britain and France to accept a ceasefire. It enabled those two states to salvage a little honour by letting them withdraw gracefully from the Suez and be replaced by a United Nations force. The United Nations force was to act as a police force and protect the Suez Canal just as they were ostensibly doing.

With Britain accepting the ceasefire and preparing to withdraw, Pearson had accomplished his goal of preventing the rift in the Commonwealth from growing more divisive, and possibly destroying the association. He also reduced the strain on American relations with Britain and France. Possibly an even more important result was that the Anglo-French acceptance of the ceasefire averted the danger of Soviet intervention in the conflict and the serious escalation of tensions that would have entailed.³⁷ Pearson had accomplished precisely what he had set out to do when he arrived in New York for the emergency debates on the crisis.

But with the creation of UNEF, Pearson's efforts on behalf of creating stability in the Middle East did not cease. The original mandate would be extended. He later proposed that UNEF patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border after Israel had pulled back its forces to it. Pearson felt it would help prevent raids across the border and generally maintain

peaceful conditions. He also thought it would be a good idea for a detachment of United Nations troops to occupy Sharm el Sheikh in order to prevent Egypt from closing the Straights of Tiran.³⁸

Another trouble spot had been the Gaza strip and it was also the only heavily populated region occupied by the Israelis. To prevent trouble, Pearson proposed that United Nations forces occupy the strip, and set up a United Nations administration during the transitional period between the time of the Israelis withdrawal, and the time when Egypt moved back in. Once Egypt had taken over, a United Nations commissioner could supervise all UN activities in the strip. This commissioner would be subordinated to the UNEF commander. Pearson believed that if his proposals were put into practice they would greatly reduce tensions between Israel and Egypt. That in turn would make a final peace agreement easier to work out.³⁹

Canada was the first nation to offer a contingent to serve in UNEF, and its offer was accepted by the Secretary-General. He felt Canada was acceptable, despite its strong ties with the United States, England, and NATO, because it "had played the leading role in the establishment of the force and had to turn away from her historic links with Britain to do so."⁴⁰ But Egypt initially rejected Canada, because of its close relationship with Britain and France, and because Ottawa had abstained on the initial UN resolution dealing with the crisis. This resolution introduced by the United States despite Pearson's efforts to discourage Dulles from doing so, called for an immediate ceasefire; withdrawal of forces behind the 1948 Armistice lines; an arms embargo; and the re-opening of the Suez Canal. Ottawa favoured some parts of the resolution so they could not vote against it. However, always trying to be helpful fixer, Canada could not support this resolution because it did not offer any solutions, or method of

obtaining a solution, to the problems that spawned the crisis.⁴¹

Within two days Pearson introduced his own resolution which led to a ceasefire and creation of a peacekeeping force, but by abstaining on the first resolution in Nasser's eyes at least, Canada had adopted an equivocal position on the issue. Nasser eventually relented, under pressure from the Secretary-General and India, and agreed to accept a Canadian logistics contingent.

Lebanon, 1958

With UNEF patrolling the border between Israel and Egypt, peace was temporarily restored in the Middle East. But the relatively peaceful atmosphere was shortlived. In 1958 a political crisis in Lebanon led to that country's president, Camille Chamoun, requesting that UN peacekeepers be stationed there. Chamoun claimed that the United Arab Republic (a new country resulting from a political union of Egypt and Syria) was smuggling arms into Lebanon and promoting revolt. The Secretary-General responded by transferring ten men from UNTSO (including a Canadian). By June 1958 the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, (UNOGIL) was operating.

Shortly after, Canada was appointed to the forces Advisory Board, and was also requested to provide ten more men for the force. Ottawa responded positively to the request and dispatched the requisite number.⁴²

By July, Chamoun felt even more threatened after a coup overthrew the Iraqi government, and requested American aid. In response to Chamoun's call for assistance, U.S. marines were landed in Lebanon and shortly afterward British troops arrived in Jordan to support its pro-western government. While Ottawa was sympathetic to its allies objective of restoring stability in the Middle East, it believed sending in troops was unwise. Ottawa

thought the American and British moves only served to heighten tensions in the Middle East and increased anti-western feelings amongst the Arabs. The government believed the American objectives could have been much better achieved by strengthening UNOGIL. Consequently, it announced that it had a brigade ready if the United Nations chose to strengthen its presence in Lebanon.⁴³ Within days of the landing of the western troops, Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith was asked to go to Washington to discuss the crisis with his British and American counterparts. Smith was invited because Canada's role as a peacemaker and mediator had gained respect for it in the Middle East, and the British and Americans hoped Canada would support their actions.⁴⁴ This looked for support was not forthcoming. While in Washington, Smith warned the British government that a contemplated British invasion of Iraq might destroy the Commonwealth and shortly after the Washington meeting ended, Diefenbaker announced Canada supported a Soviet plan for an immediate summit conference on the Middle East situation, and repeated the government's offer to send Canadian troops to Lebanon as part of a UN force. The United States opposed the proposed conference because it had not yet stabilized the situation in Lebanon and had not yet strengthened the pro-Western forces. In a further divergence from American policy, Smith stated "that the key to the problems of the region rests largely in the hands of the states of the area themselves."⁴⁵

At the United Nations, in a repeat of 1956, Canada actively sought to find a compromise solution incorporating an increased UN presence in Lebanon and Jordan, which would allow the United States and Great Britain to withdraw their troops without losing prestige. Canada, along with other American allies,⁴⁶ submitted a draft resolution to the General

Assembly giving the Secretary-General the authority to maintain peace, and to investigate the creation of a standby peacekeeping force. The resolution was not accepted, but subsequently UNOGIL was strengthened in order to facilitate the American withdrawal and lessen its embarrassment.⁴⁷ Ottawa was requested to provide fifty more observers which it quickly did. By December 1958, UNOGIL had completed its assigned task and was withdrawn, long preceded by the marines. Canada had once again provided the largest contingent for the UN force and had acted as one of the more moderate members of the Western Alliance in order to aid in defusing a serious international crisis.

The Congo, 1960-1964

After the feverish activity of the 1950's, there was a short lull before a need for a peacekeeping force arose again. But in 1960, the government of the newly independent Congo requested that a United Nations force be dispatched to assist it because of Belgian aggression. The United Nations, through the Secretary-General, asked for Canadian assistance. Initially, the Diefenbaker government was reluctant to take part. The army was involved in a large scale training program, most units were already occupied with other commitments, and the government was trying to cut back expenses. Ottawa also felt that forces from African nations should constitute the peacekeeping forces in Africa, because of anti-western feelings present during that period of decolonization. However, domestic public pressure for Canadian participation in the Congo peacekeeping force, as well as the United Nations' need for radio operators bilingual in French and English, resulted in Diefenbaker's government deciding to participate.⁴⁸ The Soviet Union strongly protested Canadian involvement in the Congo peace-

keeping force, and accused Ottawa of partiality because of its membership in NATO and the Commonwealth. However, the Soviet protests received little support at the United Nations.⁴⁹

Cyprus

In the 1963 general election, Pearson was elected as Prime Minister in a minority Liberal government. Early in 1964 his government was faced with a request to participate in a peacekeeping force in Cyprus, after the island was torn by fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities. Britain, which had troops on the island under a treaty with Cyprus, tried to quell the fighting. When the fighting showed no signs of dying down, London tried to get its forces replaced, first by a NATO force and then by a Commonwealth force, but met with little success. Canada was asked to serve on both forces but turned down the requests, insisting instead on the creation of a UN force.⁵⁰ Finally, on February 15, 1964 Britain abandoned its efforts to create a peacekeeping force outside the auspices of the UN, and requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Here the British proposed that a United Nations peacekeeping force be established. After a month of debate the Security Council decided on terms for the force. Canada was one of five countries asked to supply troops.

Pearson's government was very wary about getting involved in another peacekeeping operation. Pearson had been disappointed that the use of Emergency Force in the Middle East had not led to a peace settlement. He had also not expected the force to be of an indefinite nature. In addition, there was a great deal of difficulty in trying to get the United Nations to finance the force properly. The Canadian contribution to UNEF was costing Canada a great deal of money and it was not leading to a final

solution. In the Congo, Canada again had to shoulder much of the financial costs of its contribution.⁵¹ A number of Canadian soldiers were also physically abused because they had no means of defending themselves.

As a result of these past experiences the Canadian government pressed vigorously for clarification of the mandate given the force. The Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin felt this was required

of a country with long experience of peacekeeping operations of this kind...To provide a reasonable opportunity for the success of the operation and to encourage other governments to support it actively, we believed it necessary and desirable to reach a satisfactory understanding with the Secretary-General and with the parties directly involved in the Cyprus question on the role which the United Nations would be assuming.⁵²

As early as February 19, Pearson spelled out the requirements that would have to be met first before Canada would send soldiers to Cyprus. He wanted to be sure that the peacekeeping force would have enough power and authority to enable it to perform the role it was sent to perform. The Prime Minister also wanted to be sure that the force would have the authority to protect itself. Pearson stressed that a mediator must be appointed as quickly as possible, in order to bring about a quick solution before the situation was stabilized, and the crisis atmosphere had passed. This is what he thought had failed to happen in the Middle East, and was the major reason a peace settlement had not been negotiated.⁵³ Pearson did not want the Cyprus force to be of an indefinite nature as it then appeared that UNEF was.

It was not until March 12 that the government decided to participate. Even at this late date Canada was still the first country to agree to participate. Pearson ultimately accepted the United Nations request for Canadian troops because, he was convinced that Cyprus was the type of peace-

keeping activity that the UN should be involved in.⁵⁴ He believed that the Cyprus problem could only be "solved only in a climate of moderation and compromise" which can only be created by peace.⁵⁵ An important consideration that affected Pearson's decision was that two NATO allies were badly split over the Cyprus crisis. Turkey and Greece were on the verge of war and that would seriously weaken NATO's eastern flank. In addition, Cyprus was a member of the Commonwealth, and Britain had important military bases on the island. Strategic military and political motivations were as important as the moral considerations of helping to establish peace.

President Johnson of the United States shared Pearson's concerns. He even phoned the Prime Minister on March 12, before Ottawa's decision was announced, to see if Pearson could get Canadian troops onto Cyprus before the situation deteriorated further. Pearson informed him of his government's decision to act as soon as other nations agreed to send troops.⁵⁶

When Canada committed itself to sending forces, no other nation had as yet agreed. Ottawa wanted the Canadian troops to be part of an international force. So Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin took it upon himself to phone the governments of Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Britain. He convinced the Swedish and Irish governments to each send a contingent. Britain consented to put some of her Cyprus garrison under UN command. The Finns hesitated for a week before they decided to join the effort. Once the others agreed to participate, Canadian troops were on Cyprus in less than twenty-four hours.

Martin's efforts had been crucial. "It is generally conceded that...it was...Martin who saved the peace."⁵⁷ Dr. Jack Granatstein cites a Department of External Affairs official as stating that "the fact is that without Canada, and without Mr. Martin's nerve, there would have been

no United Nations force" on Cyprus.⁵⁸ President Johnson was very pleased with Canada's role. He phoned Pearson again to say "You'll never know what this has meant, having those Canadians off to Cyprus and being there tomorrow." Johnson then asked Pearson "Now, what can I do for you?" While Pearson did not have any immediate requests, he "had some credit in the bank." As a result of Canada's important role in the creation of the Cyprus peacekeeping force, Johnson was later sensitive to Canadian interests in other areas. For example, he warned Ottawa in advance about legislation that would affect Canada, and tried to moderate its impact on Canada.⁵⁹

In July 1964, the fighting had still not stopped on Cyprus. In the House of Commons, Martin was questioned regarding a possible withdrawal. However, Martin stated that the government had no intention of ordering the Canadian forces home. He felt the force was playing a valuable role and that, if UNFICYP was a failure, it would make it more difficult in the future to create a new peacekeeping force.⁶⁰

During the remainder of the 1960's UNFYCP succeeded in maintaining a relative degree of peace in Cyprus. However, crisis did periodically occur. During a rather serious crisis in 1967 an English observer stated that "Canada fulfilled her accustomed role by putting forward a set of peace proposals, which, characteristically, relied to a large extent on the involvement of the UN."⁶¹ This statement describes Canada's involvement in the Cyprus problem. In 1964, Ottawa had once again played a crucial role in creating a peacekeeping force. Also, by insisting that the operation be under UN command, and operating with an assortment of countries, some from NATO, others unquestionably non-aligned, it protected Canada's image from being too closely identified with NATO while acting as a helpful fixer.

The 1964 Defence White Paper

The reorganization of the Armed Forces carried out in 1964 by the Pearson government tended to reinforce the belief, at least domestically, that Canada was committed to being an international helpful fixer. No other country had allowed the desire to be an international helpful fixer to so strongly affect national policy. The primary objective of the white paper was to increase the mobility and flexibility of the armed forces by integrating the three services, in order to improve its peacekeeping capabilities. "Canadian forces will be trained and equipped in a way which will permit immediate and effective response to United Nations requirements."⁶² The army was to become airmobile and the airforce and navy were to be re-equipped so as to have the capability to deploy the army in an emergency.

Alliance commitments were not to be ignored, but they would no longer determine the structure of the armed forces. It was felt that those troops trained and equipped as peacekeepers could also be used to fulfill other commitments of the armed forces.

It is essential that a nation's diplomacy be backed up by adequate and flexible military forces to permit participation in collective security and peacekeeping and, to be ready for crisis should they arise.⁶³

If there was any doubt left after the white paper about the importance given to peacekeeping by the Pearson government, it should have been dispelled by Paul Martin. His speeches confirmed that peacekeeping was the most important priority of the government, and that he felt peacekeeping could lead to durable peace settlements.⁶⁴

The Withdrawal of UNEF I

The failure to arrive at a final political settlement in the Middle East led to the rather ignominious end of UNEF in 1967. In the early part of 1967 tensions began to increase once again between Israel and her Arab neighbours. In April a serious armed clash occurred between Syria and Israel in which six Syrian planes were shot down. A report on the incident was circulated to the Security Council members by Secretary-General U Thant. Unfortunately, the Security Council President for April George Ignatieff, who was head of the Canadian UN delegation, failed to call a Security Council meeting. This was a "regrettable and to some degree inexplicable" error, for in May the Syrian-Israeli clashes were cited as a reason for Egypt's request that UNEF be withdrawn, and the subsequent entrenchment of Egyptian forces on the Israeli border.⁶⁵

Ignatieff later admitted his failure when he stated to the Security Council he

was only too keenly aware of this [the signs of the increasingly dangerous deterioration of the situation]. ...Steady reports of deterioration along the frontier lines between Syria and Israel were reported in correspondence which I received and forwarded to my colleagues as President... Tension also grew as a result of sabotage and terroristic activities on the border of Syria and Israel.⁶⁶

Arthur Lall, former Indian delegate to the UN, thought that the fact that so

dedicated and concerned a representative as the Ambassador of Canada should not have thought it feasible to press for a Security Council meeting in April when, on his own admission, reports of increasingly dangerous deterioration were coming in is an indication of how strong have become the inhibitory factors...such as national interest [which prevent the UN from acting].⁶⁷

While the United Nations failed to act, tension escalated dramatically when Nasser ordered UNEF to withdraw on May 16. Two days later U Thant agreed to Nasser's request, and ordered UNEF to leave Egypt. It was only then that Canada reacted to the crisis. The United States, Great Britain, and Canada strongly protested against U Thant's decision, even though most other United Nations members agreed with the Secretary General. It was Pearson's view that Nasser did not have the right to order UNEF out, even though in 1956 he had stated that UNEF would not infringe on Egyptian sovereignty.

With U Thant's agreement to withdraw UNEF, Martin frantically searched for ways to maintain peace, and keep UNEF separating the Egyptian and Israeli armies. He suggested to the Israeli Ambassador in Ottawa that Israel request UNEF to take up positions on the Israeli side of the frontier. Israel refused so Martin flew down to New York in order to try to persuade the Security Council to keep UNEF in place. Again he failed. A Canadian request on May 24 to convene the Security Council met with little success. A split between Britain, the United States and Canada with the rest of the Council over how to handle the crisis was growing.

Nasser was furious with Canada's attitude. He felt it was trying to infringe on Egypt's sovereignty and that it had aligned itself completely with the United States and Great Britain. Nasser's anger and distrust was exacerbated when President Johnson arrived in Ottawa to confer with Pearson, whom the President described as "one of the leading experts" on the Middle East.⁶⁸ After his conference with Johnson, Pearson announced he and the President agreed that the Gulf of Aquaba should be kept open to all nations. Pearson was accused by Nasser of being totally biased in favour of Israel and "condemned the attitude of Canada as an act of total hostility."⁶⁹ Canada was also accused, along with Britain and the United

States, of attempting to turn UNEF into a force "serving neo-imperialism."⁷⁰ As a result, Canadian troops serving with UNEF were ordered by Nasser on May 27 to be out of Egypt within forty-eight hours.

Since Canada was perceived by the Arabs to be so closely aligned with Britain and the United States on Middle East policy, it was unable to mediate prior to the Six Day War or immediately after. Nevertheless, Ottawa gamely attempted to maintain its role. On May 30 Pearson suggested a compromise requiring concessions from both sides. The Israeli Ambassador to Ottawa indicated it would accept a compromise if it was quickly initiated, but the Egyptians were not so agreeable. Even on June 5, the first days of the war, Pearson endorsed De Gaulle's suggestion for a summit meeting of the leaders of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, with the purpose of finding a way to end the war.

On June 8 Pearson once more tried to play helpful fixer by presenting in Parliament proposals for a settlement. On June 23, accepting its own lack of influence, Canada stated in the General Assembly that the Security Council should take the lead in finding a peace agreement, and that Canada was consulting other countries in order to draw up an acceptable draft resolution to guide implementation of the ceasefire. So, unable to have any direct impact, Canada limited itself to encouraging the search for a political settlement, while seeking to prevent the censure or condemnation of any of the belligerents, in the belief that would only make it harder to find a political solution.⁷¹

The lesson that can be drawn from this fiasco was that Canada could easily lose its helpful fixer image by taking a stand on an issue. By taking a stand it disqualified itself as a mediator in the eyes of

those most directly concerned. Once it was categorized in one camp it was unable to regain its image as a disinterested helpful fixer, even though it persistently suggested compromises. If it seeks a role as helpful fixer, Ottawa must avoid publicly stressing its agreement with its NATO allies on issues pertaining to a crisis.

Initial Reaction of Trudeau's Government to the Helpful Fixing Image

When Pierre Elliott Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, he initiated policy reviews for most areas of government activity. One area that came under very intense scrutiny was foreign policy. The whole question of helpful fixing and peacekeeping was examined in the foreign policy review. By the late 1960's peacekeeping was being seriously questioned in Canada. The expulsion of UNEF I by Egypt, the ineffectiveness of the ICC in Indo-China, along with the failure to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the Cyprus problem contributed to a growing disillusionment with peacekeeping. The disillusionment was especially severe after the near euphoria in Canada because of its leading role in the creation of UNEF I in 1956. The inability of the United Nations to follow up the positioning of peacekeeping forces with successful peace negotiations, and the inability of the UN to intervene in the Nigerian civil war contributed to the unfavourable attitude towards peacekeeping.⁷²

As reflected in Foreign Policy for Canadians, the government arrived at the conclusion that the greatest source of public unhappiness with Canadian foreign policy was the "over emphasis on role and influence obscuring policy objectives and actual interests."⁷³ The rhetoric of previous ministers constantly stressed a role as mediator for Canada, and emphasized that she should work through the UN to reduce tensions. The

unsatisfactory results of peacekeeping, as well as public disenchantment with it, led the government to state that it is risky and "...certainly misleading - to base policy on an assumption that Canada can be cast as the 'helpful fixer' in international affairs."⁷⁴ As a result, a greater emphasis would be placed on achieving pre-conceived aims and objectives.

The review enunciated six primary themes: economic growth, sovereignty, and independence; peace and security; social justice; quality of life; and a harmonious natural environment. Peace and security would no longer be the primary goal of Canadian foreign policy as it was under Pearson. However, it still remained as one of the six priorities listed in the review. Consequently, internationalism and support for peacekeeping was not about to be abandoned by Trudeau.

For a number of reasons, the government did clearly feel that the opportunities for peacekeeping would in all probability decline in the 1970's. It concluded that there would be a great deal of conflict in many parts of the world, but these would consist of internal conflicts such as

civil war, racial or other forms of dissention
within an independent state, indirect aggression
and guerilla warfare fomented by liberation
movements.⁷⁵

Ottawa anticipated that outside interference would be most unwelcome in such conflicts, and the United Nations would be unable or unwilling to intervene. The situation, the government felt, was unlike the 1950's and 1960's when the conflicts which led to UN intervention, were a result of decolonization in which either the colonizing nation, or the newly independent state, asked for UN assistance. As well, the longer these new states existed, the greater their own self identity and means to defend themselves. Consequently, the government believed they would be less

willing to allow the United Nations to meddle in their internal affairs.⁷⁶

From Ottawa's point of view, the United Nations was becoming increasingly ineffective in controlling conflicts, and more serious, was increasingly unable to act. It had over extended itself in the Congo by using force to crush the Katanga rebels. This had led to a serious crisis in the UN over financing the force, which the Soviet Union and France felt had gone beyond its mandate. These two nations refused to contribute funds to pay for the force and consequently, nearly left the UN over the issue. In the India-Pakistan war of 1965, it was the Soviet Union, actively encouraged by the United States, which negotiated a peace settlement, though the Security Council did pass a ceasefire resolution. Peace negotiations to end the Vietnam conflict, when they took place, were done outside the auspices of the United Nations. The UN had also been totally unable to take effective action after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia or to intervene in the Nigerian civil war. All this pointed to fewer opportunities in the future for UN peacekeeping, so Ottawa thought.

To make the UN more effective, Ottawa concluded it should not act without superpower concurrence but

unfortunately, because of the stubborn opposition of some important members of the UN, the prospects for permanent peacekeeping arrangements or further UN ad hoc peacekeeping forces are not good.⁷⁷

Increasing these doubts about the United Nations viability as a peacekeeper, was the belief that the General Assembly was becoming dominated by the third world nations of Africa and Asia who were not willing to accept American leadership. Consequently, the United States would be less likely to be able to override Soviet opposition to peacekeeping forces by appealing to the General Assembly.⁷⁸

Even if the United Nations did successfully create a peacekeeping force, Ottawa believed conflicts for which such forces would be needed, would most often take place in third world countries. It was concluded that while troops would not be welcome in these regions, with the experiences of Canadian troops in the Congo an example of what could happen. In any case, Canadian officials believed that contributing to peacekeeping forces sent to third world countries would not enhance Canada's image, and in fact could lead to alienation amongst third world countries sensitive to western imperialism.⁷⁹

Canada also did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It had just gone through its own internal crisis with the October crisis, and did not want to set a precedent for international interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Trudeau felt Canada would have fewer opportunities to serve as a helpful fixer of any sort in the 1970's, because he felt Canada's power compared to other states in the world was declining. He suggested

we're perhaps more the largest of the small powers than the smallest of the large powers ...now we have to realize that Europe has developed itself; it is a great continent, its strong, its currency is strong. And Canada, on the other hand, has fallen onto a more modest role, and it should reassess its foreign policy rather than trying to peacekeep everywhere, which in a sense, means that we're trying to determine international situations.⁸⁰

But while Trudeau felt that Canada should pursue a more modest role he did not advocate dropping peacekeeping or helpful fixing entirely. He wanted to tone down the rhetoric and lower popular expectations because he simply did not feel Canada would be able to perform as a helpful fixer that often. It appears he did not want to be trapped by Canada's image of

being a helpful fixer. It was good politics to lower public expectations when he did not feel he would be able to meet them.

Sharp contributed to the effort to lower expectations in a speech to the Winnipeg branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in December 1969. He stated that Canada's ability to contribute as a peacemaker was limited by its acceptability to the countries concerned, and the belligerents' willingness for peace.

An experienced nation does not get involved
in peacekeeping unless there is reasonable
evidence of a will to agree on both sides.⁸¹

He stated in the same speech that Canada had contacted both sides in the Nigerian civil war but that they had rejected his overtures. Sharp concluded that

it is only on the rarest of occasions that
Canada or any other nation can make a dramatic
intervention and bring conflict to an end.

Nevertheless, Trudeau and Sharp made repeated references to their willingness to work towards peace or a reduction of tensions whenever possible. They had no intention of totally abandoning the helpful fixer role established by Pearson.

Trudeau's major concern in politics was national unity, but helpful fixing did little to harm it since a majority of Canadians in all regions usually supported Canadian efforts in this direction. Indeed, one of his major preoccupations in international affairs has been to find a way to end the political bifurcation between the developed and underdeveloped nations.⁸² Trudeau's greatest complaint about helpful fixing was with the rhetoric of the past, not the substance. In fact, Canada's post-war record in international affairs was described as "brilliant" in many respects under Pearson's leadership.⁸³

Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of State for External Affairs tried to express to the public their desire that peacekeeping operations had to have a reasonable chance of success and that they should not be of an indefinite nature. They also did not want a peacekeeping operation to damage Canada's reputation in the same way it was thought the ICC may be doing, where the Canadians felt obliged to act in a pro-American manner in order to counteract the pro-communist partiality demonstrated by the Poles. As well, Canada's early expulsion by UNEF I by Nasser was accompanied by rhetoric accusing Canada of a strong pro-American and Israeli bias. As Pearson had done, Trudeau's government was attempting to learn from past problems, as well as protect Canada's image of impartiality and independence.

While the general booklet of the foreign policy review downplayed "helpful fixing", the UN booklet stated

Canada's exceptional knowledge and experience will be of value irrespective of the form of future peacekeeping operations, and consistent with our basic interest in maintaining peace and security, Canada should continue to take an active part based on that experience, in negotiations at the UN on the peacekeeping role of the organization.⁸⁴

The European booklet claimed that "the requirement for peacekeeping would partially determine Canada's military role,"⁸⁵ indicating that helpful fixing would continue to be a Canadian role during Trudeau's administration.

In a speech at the University of Toronto in September 1970, Sharp defended Foreign Policy for Canadians and rebutted its critics. In explaining the reviews stated desire to have foreign policy meet national goals, he emphasized that while the review was based on the premise that foreign policy should be directed towards achieving and protecting national

goals, it does not preclude support of international activity, and co-operation with other countries. He stressed that the section of the review dealing with helpful fixing had been misquoted and misinterpreted, resulting in it being

taken to mean that Canada is trying to dodge international responsibility and to repudiate the invaluable work it has done in the mediation of disputes and in peacekeeping operations - in which we are still involved in Cyprus, the Middle East and Kashmir. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Canada is as ready as ever to act as a mediator or to provide peacekeeping forces when called upon to do so, but there must be some real hope that the operation will be effective.⁸⁶

Sharp was quite clearly stating that as far as he was concerned, as long as the government felt it could play an effective role as a helpful fixer, it was quite willing to do so.

In an earlier speech, Sharp even indicated Ottawa was prepared to try to facilitate the creation of peacekeeping forces and therefore, increase its opportunities to act as a helpful fixer. He stated that

I see no reason, however, not to go on patiently trying to find a way around the roadblocks that have been thrown up in the UN. There are a good many other middlepowers in the UN that share our views, and that are willing to join with us in maintaining pressure for the development of the peacekeeping conception.⁸⁷

The Prime Minister himself denied his government was going to repudiate internationalism and involvement in peacekeeping, claiming that Canada under his administration would continue to be a responsible member of the international community. Consequently, it would maintain forces that were not only capable of functioning as peacekeepers, but would be made available for such duties when called upon by the international community.⁸⁸ True to his word, the Defence White Paper unveiled in 1971

did not change the functional capabilities of the armed forces. While it certainly re-ordered the policy priorities of the armed forces, by focusing on making the armed forces lighter equipped, more mobile, and training them to aid the civil powers, it if anything improved their peacekeeping capabilities.⁸⁹

In order to respond quickly to UN requests, the government decided to maintain a battalion group on standby for peacekeeping, and to train them specifically for such duties. The NATO reserves in Canada would also be deployed on peacekeeping missions if needed. The Defence white paper, in a departure from the foreign policy review was optimistic that peacekeeping forces could be deployed. It was even suggested in the white paper, correctly as it turned out, that the Middle East or Indo-China were likely locations for the deployment of a peacekeeping or truce supervisory force if political settlements were negotiated.⁹⁰ In general, Defence in the 70's quite clearly supported the principle of peacekeeping, and did not attempt to alter the structure of the armed forces created by the 1964 Defence white paper, which reshaped the armed forces in order to allow them to meet the demands of peacekeeping.

The government also made no effort to withdraw the troops already committed to peacekeeping. The Canadian contingents were left in Indo-China, on Cyprus and on the India-Pakistan border. As Sharp indicated it would, the government did try to improve the problems associated with peacekeeping exposed by previous operations through its vigorous work on the United Nations Committee of Thirty-Three. Canada was "urging forward" peacekeeping studies carried out by the Committee, and was trying to direct its attention to developing plans that would solve the political, legal,

and financial problems with peacekeeping, before a new crisis developed that resulted in the dispatch of new peacekeeping forces.⁹¹

In 1968, Canada was appointed to a working group established by the UN to speed up the examination of peacekeeping and the problems associated with it. The Canadian delegation worked vigorously to make the working group a success. It was one of four countries that submitted draft agendas for the committee. The Canadian agenda was deemed most useful, and consequently it was adopted by the Committee. In 1970 a Parliamentary subcommittee examining peacekeeping praised the government "for vigorous efforts in the Committee of 33 to establish more effective peacekeeping procedures."⁹²

By October 1972, the committee was once again making little headway. The diligent Canadian delegation presented proposals that

offer a practical solution to the problems of command, control and operation of peacekeeping forces, and a viable bridge between previously established positions on these complex and difficult issues.⁹³

While the committee has made little progress, it has been through no fault of Canada's. Canada's role was helpful fixing at its altruistic best. Canada had few practical rewards to gain by attempting to develop workable compromises, other than to hope to ensure that the next peacekeeping mission it participated in was successful. Its work on the committee seems to indicate a strong commitment to the UN, and its role of maintaining peace.

Though helpful fixing was still in vogue, Ottawa was attempting to learn from previous operations. Trudeau's government stressed that it would not automatically accept invitations to participate in peacekeeping

forces. In November 1968 Trudeau indicated his government's thinking when he told the House of Commons that before his government accepted a request to participate in a peacekeeping force it would ascertain the conditions under which it would operate, and ensure they were satisfactory.⁹⁴

The Prime Minister further expanded on his thoughts regarding peacekeeping at a press conference in Australia in 1970. There he repeated his assertion that he would not automatically commit Canada to peacekeeping activities. One of his primary concerns expressed at the press conference was that the contending parties wanted peace, and were willing to accept the intervention of third parties to assist in the peace process.⁹⁵

The general booklet of Foreign Policy for Canadians, stated quite flatly that "the government is determined that this special brand of Canadian expertise peacekeeping will not be dispersed or wasted on ill-conceived operations."⁹⁶ Canada would only participate if it felt that by doing so it would improve the chances for reaching a lasting political settlement. The government was determined to avoid another Cyprus or Sinia type operation of an indefinite life span. It was also determined not to get trapped in another ineffective force like the ICC which compromised Canada's position as a mediatory power.

In the early 1970's the government continued to enunciate its criteria for accepting a peacekeeping role. In Canada and the United Nations, Sharp set out eight criteria that he and his colleagues felt were required before Canada would accept an invitation to join a peacekeeping operation. Once it had been established that a threat to international peace and security existed, Ottawa would consider participating in a peacekeeping force if its creation was linked to attempts to achieve

a political settlement; a political authority, ideally the UN, should be appointed to receive reports, and the responsible authority should have the power to supervise the mandate of the force; the mandate must be clear, provide provision for the forces freedom of movement, and an agreement for equitable financing of the force. Finally, participants in the force, including Canada, must be acceptable to "all concerned".⁹⁷

The Trudeau government's stated concern about helpful fixing and peacekeeping in the foreign policy review and elsewhere came under heavy attack by both politicians and academics. They seemed to have the impression that the government would abandon or severely curtail its mediatory and peacekeeping activities. The critics did not want the government to de-emphasize policies that were designed to promote peace and security. There was even concern expressed that Canada would pursue isolationist policies.⁹⁸

In July 1971, the Progressive Conservative party responded to Foreign Policy for Canadians by bringing out their own external affairs policy paper. It quite clearly disliked what it felt was the Trudeau government's pursuit of the nation's narrow self-interest. The Conservative position paper stressed that Canada should be both willing and able to play an important part in such operations. Consequently, they felt that planned reductions in the strength of the armed forces would leave Canada with insufficient "specialized military units to fulfill additional peace-keeping commitments."⁹⁹

The government was even criticized by a Liberal dominated subcommittee of the House of Commons Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence, for what the subcommittee perceived to be a negative attitude towards peacekeeping. The subcommittee strongly supported peace-

keeping and Canadian participation in it.

The subcommittee cannot assert too strongly its conviction that strong and tenacious advocacy of improved United Nations peacekeeping should remain a foremost priority in Canada's foreign policy.¹⁰⁰

It felt that if Canada were to reduce its interests in peacekeeping, that would be a disastrous abdication of responsibility. The subcommittee totally rejected the government's contention that there would be a declining role for peacekeeping. It was sure that the UN would be called upon to provide a peacekeeping force or observer missions. When that situation arose, the subcommittee thought Canada, because of its soldiers' skills in communication, air transportation and administration, as well as its past experience as peacekeepers, would be requested to participate. Consequently, the subcommittee strongly recommended that the government should maintain troops on standby for peacekeeping. These troops' training should emphasize the development of "transportation, communications, and military movement expertise" because the subcommittee concluded that these roles were more probable than an infantry role.¹⁰¹

Trudeau's predecessor as prime minister, and one of the major architects of the policies being reviewed, Lester Pearson, was himself initially upset. Pearson recognized that on occasion Canadians exaggerated their influence in international affairs, but nonetheless felt that should not result in depreciating Canada's international responsibilities.¹⁰² In addition, he felt it was foolish to establish anything but peace and security as Canada's most important foreign policy objective. Pearson stated his reasoning rather succinctly when he said "Economic growth will be our last words when the first atomic bombs fall."¹⁰³

Pearson also argued that Canada was not a professional "busybody", but rather that Canada had only undertaken mediatory or peacekeeping roles when urgently requested by other countries. Canada was one of the few countries qualified to be a peacekeeper, so it had the moral responsibility to act when the opportunity arose. However, he soon realized that Trudeau's foreign policy would not differ greatly from his own, when his successor acted as helpful fixer at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference, and prevented that organization from disintegrating.¹⁰⁴

Pearson's conclusion was accurate. As Trudeau and Sharp tried to indicate, they did not make a radical departure from the helpful fixing tradition. Canada's commitment to peacekeeping and the United Nations has been indicated by the 1,500 men maintained overseas in 1975 by Ottawa in peacekeeping assignments.¹⁰⁵ This was the largest contribution by any nation to UN peacekeeping, and does not include the men contributed to the ICCS in Vietnam in 1973. Sharp and MacEachen had by this time also emphasized the continuity that existed between Pearson's and Trudeau's foreign policies.¹⁰⁶ In 1976, Don Jamieson concluded that while "the concepts of UN peacekeeping have been the subject of strong disagreement ...the practice has been modestly successful."¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

The objective of peacekeeping is to prevent bloodshed, and create an atmosphere of calm and stability that allows political negotiations between belligerents to take place. The presence of peacekeeping has often led to a reduction of tension, and this has provided opportunities for political settlements to be constructed which eliminate the causes of conflict. However, Canadian politicians, among others, have learned through

experience that this is an ideal that only too rarely occurs. Political settlements have rarely followed the deployment of UN forces. The expulsion of UNEF I also demonstrates very clearly that a peacekeeping force can only exist, and be effective, as long as the countries whom it separates are willing to accept its presence, and to avoid hostilities. Ineffective mandates, such as the one that plagued the ICC, could completely cripple a peacekeeping operation.

Nevertheless, peacekeeping was an effective method of helpful fixing in the 1950's and early 1960's for Canada. Along with defusing international tensions, almost without exception, western interests were protected by the deployment of peacekeeping forces. These early peacekeeping forces also created a strong and positive image in Canada. It has been claimed that

Canada's most distinctive contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security has been through its leadership in peacekeeping and peace observation activities.¹⁰⁸

After Pearson's tremendous success in 1956 with the creation of UNEF I, Diefenbaker found himself pressured to include Canada in the peacekeeping force sent to the Congo. Paul Martin also seemed compelled to duplicate Pearson's feat, which he succeeded in doing by playing a decisive role in the birth of UNFICYP. Domestic support remained relatively strong for peacekeeping, despite a temporary decline after the withdrawal of UNEF I. As a result of peacekeeping's favourable image, when Trudeau's government felt compelled to warn that it believed there would be few opportunities for Canada to participate in peacekeeping forces in the 1970's, it was strongly criticized for appearing willing to abandon its activist helpful fixing role. The critics overreacted because Trudeau and fellow cabinet

ministers frequently stated that if suitable opportunities arose, Canada would be willing to act again as helpful fixer. Events in the 1970's were to prove these statements were sincere. Indeed, maintaining Canada's image as a helpful fixer seemed to become a motivating force.

Notes

1. David Cox, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy" in Stephen Clarkson (ed.) An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), p. 188.
2. Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 69.
3. Allan MacEachen, "Peacekeeping and Cyprus: The Canadian Experience," Statements and Speeches, 75/20.
4. Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., Ltd., 1972), p. 108.
5. David Cox, "Canada's Interest in Peacekeeping" in A. Taylor et al, Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, (The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 42.
6. Cox, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy", p. 190. Peacekeeping operations do not always function as intended. A persistent problem is that once peacekeeping forces are deployed, because they reduce tensions, they tend to reduce the urgency to find political settlements. There has also been complaints that peacekeeping forces are used only when it will be advantageous to the great powers, and especially the West. For discussion of the criticisms levelled at peacekeeping operations see Alex J. Inglis, "Peacekeeping and peacemaking should be reviewed together" in International Perspectives, (Jan./Feb.) 1975, David Cox, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy", pp. 192-3, Donald Gordon "Canada as Peacekeeper" in J. King Gordon (ed.) Canada's Role as a Middle Power, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 57 and Stanley Hoffman, "Erewhom or Lilliput? a critical View of the Problem": International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 411.
7. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, November 16, 1949, p. 1842.
8. John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 220.
9. Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States, and Vietnam, (Toronto: Anansi, 1974), p. 5.
10. Debates, May 3, 1955, p. 3389.

11. Holmes, Op. Cit., p. 219.
12. Taylor, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20.
13. See Paul Bridle "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954-72" in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne (ed.) Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia, (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 432, and Charlotte Girard, Canada in World Affairs, 1963-1965, Vol. 13, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1980), p. 339.
14. Cited in Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 55.
15. The Pentagon Papers, as published by The New York Times (Toronto: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), p. 256. This volume contains the complete American message that Seaborn was instructed to convey.
16. "Canada in the Pentagon Papers", Canadian Forum, Vol. 53 (September, 1973), p. 16. This volume carries a selection from the Pentagon papers dealing with the Seaborn mission which an American court ordered deleted from The Pentagon Papers.
17. See Taylor, Op. Cit., pp. 70-80 as well as "Canada in the Pentagon Papers" Op. Cit., for further elaboration.
18. Taylor, Op. Cit., pp. 93-94.
19. Ibid., p. 106.
20. Hanoi's Four Point peace plan was released in April 1965, and was immediately rejected by Washington as being tantamount to a communist takeover of South Vietnam. The four points consisted of: (1) The United States must withdraw its troops, weapons, and bases from South Vietnam and cease its "acts of war" against North Vietnam; (2) pending reunification both North and South Vietnam must agree that no foreign bases or troops will be allowed on their soil and that they will join no military alliances; (3) The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front; (4) The reunification of Vietnam must be settled by the Vietnamese themselves without outside interference. Until Ronning's mission Hanoi had insisted that the four points be accepted by the United States as the basis of any peace settlement.
21. Cited in Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 115.
22. Ibid., p. 116.
23. Debates, November 29, 1956, p. 166.
24. James Eayres, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 252-3.

25. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 55.
26. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 54.
27. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 55.
28. See Pearson, Mike, Vol. 2, pp. 261-274 and Debates, November 26, 1956, especially pp. 12-14 and 40-42. The attacks on the government continued on November 27. See Debates, November 27, 1956, pp. 70-72.
29. See Louis St. Laurent, "On the International Situation", Statements and Speeches, 56/24, p. 1.
30. Debates, November 27, 1956, pp. 53-54.
31. J.L. Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeping" in Taylor et al, Op. Cit., pp. 121-123.
32. Holmes, Op. Cit., p. 151.
33. Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964), p. 218.
34. Ibid., pp. 187-8 and pp. 191-2.
35. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 61.
36. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 58.
37. Debates, November 27, 1956, p. 60.
38. Lester B. Pearson, "The Middle East", Statements and Speeches 57/17, pp. 7-8.
39. Ibid.
40. Granatstein, Op. Cit., p. 128.
41. Lester B. Pearson, The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December 1956, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), p. 8.
42. See Granatstein, Op. Cit., pp. 143-145.
43. Globe and Mail, July 18, 1958.
44. Globe and Mail, July 28, 1958.
45. Quoted in Globe and Mail, August 11, 1958.
46. Columbia, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, Panama, and Paraguay.

47. Granatstein, Op. Cit., p. 146 and D. Colwyn Williams, "International Peacekeeping: Canada's Role" in R. MacDonald et al, (ed.) Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 659.
48. See J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping is our Profession?" International Journal, Vol. 25, p. 416 and Robert W. Reford, Canada and Three Crisis, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 150.
49. Henry Wiseman, Theoretical Approaches and Policy Examination of Canada's Role in Peacekeeping (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University, 1971), p. 188.
50. Globe and Mail, August 11, 1964.
51. Financing of peacekeeping forces has long irritated Canadian officials. For UNEF I in 1956 the salaries and equipment of the individual soldiers was to be paid for by their national governments. UNEF I itself was responsible for providing a certain amount of food and equipment. To pay for this and other costs, a special account was created by the United Nations. Members of the UN were to pay amounts assessed in proportion to their national G.N.R. The Soviet bloc nations immediately protested against collective sharing of UNEF I expenses. They felt that only those nations which had caused the crisis should pay. Consequently, the Soviet bloc nations refused to pay. By 1959 over \$19 million of assessed money had not been paid.

Since Canada was a peacekeeper it took a strong stand on compulsory payments. Ottawa took the position that peace and security are a collective responsibility and the costs of such activities should be borne collectively. Canada even supported a General Assembly resolution which placed the issue before the International Court of Justice in 1962. The Court's decision supported Canada's stand and stated that peacekeeping expenses should be subjected to collective and compulsory payment. (see Peter V. Bishop, "Canada's Policy on the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations", International Journal, XX, 1965, pp. 475-77).

The Soviets still refused to pay for UNEF I and France refused to pay for the Congo peacekeeping operation. They both threatened to leave the UN before they would pay. As a result, in 1965 Paul Martin announced that Canada would no longer insist that all United Nations members pay their full share of the assessed costs for peacekeeping. Moreover, Ottawa would donate \$4 million to help liquidate the United Nations' deficits. But Martin stressed that Canada had not abandoned the principle itself. (Debates, June 21, 1965, p. 2659)

Pearson was displeased with the financing of UNFICYP. He felt that UNFICYP should also have been financed collectively. But because of the financial crisis the UN was then facing, Pearson

accepted the Secretary-General's request that Canada assume all the costs for its contingent. The other contributing nations also accepted this request from the Secretary-General. (External Affairs, XVII, "Cyprus", 1965, p. 165) Voluntary cash payments were requested to help pay for the force, but by 1977 the operation was over \$50 million in debt. (Don Jamieson, "Speech to the United Nations General Assembly", Statements and Speeches, 1977, No. 17, p. 1). Since the crisis over financing in the early 1960's Canada has avoided creating a new one over the financial arrangements for peacekeeping forces. It has unhappily limited itself to numerous complaints about the situation.

52. Martin, Op. Cit., p. 1.
53. Debates, March 13, 1964, pp. 913-914.
54. Bruce Thordarson, Lester Pearson, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 157. It is interesting to note that the Cyprus crisis was one of the few occasions Pearson became directly involved in foreign policy matters while he was prime minister.
55. Debates, March 13, 1964, p. 913.
56. Pearson, Mike, Vol. 3, p. 134.
57. J. King Gordon, "The United Nations in Cyprus", International Journal, Vol. 19 (Summer, 1964), p. 340.
58. Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeping" in Taylor et al, Op. Cit., p. 173.
59. Pearson, Mike, Vol. 3, pp. 134-135. Nevertheless, it had taken over three weeks once the Security Council had decided to send a force before it became operational. The delay in establishing UNFICYP could have been avoided if Pearson's repeated pleas for the creation of a standby force, or at least a plan, had been heeded. Instead, everything had to be done on an ad hoc basis.
60. Globe and Mail, July 22, 1964.
61. Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping, (London: Chatto and Windus, Ltd., 1969), p. 265.
62. Canada, White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 24.
63. Ibid., p. 11.
64. Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: a study in decision making, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 18.
65. Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 6-7.

66. Ibid., p. 8.
67. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
68. T. Hockin, "External Affairs and Defence" in John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review for 1967, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 223.
69. Cited in Ibid., p. 244.
70. See U Thant, View from the UN, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 234-245.
71. Tareq Y. Ismael, "Canada and the Middle East" in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (ed.) Canada and the Third World, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1976), p. 256. It is curious that Pearson practically ignored the whole crisis in his memoirs, and thus shed little light on Canadian activities.
72. R.B. Byers, "Defence and foreign policy in the 1970's: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine", International Journal, V. 33, No. 2, pp. 322-323.
73. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 8.
74. Ibid.
75. Foreign Policy for Canadians (United Nations), p. 16.
76. Ibid.
77. Mitchell Sharp, "The Role of Middle Powers in a Changing World", Statements and Speeches 69/3, p. 5 see as well Foreign Policy for Canadians (United Nations), p. 16.
78. Alastair Buchan, "Concepts of Peacekeeping" in M.G. Fry (ed.) Freedom and Change, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), p. 18.
79. D.C. Thomson, R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: options and perspectives, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1971), p. 89.
80. Toronto Star, April 27, 1968.
81. Winnipeg Free Press, December 13, 1969.
82. See George Radwanski, Trudeau, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978), pp. 177-187 and Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980) for further elaboration on Trudeau's major goals in politics.

83. Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, pp. 106 and 205. Thordarson states that Trudeau did not want to downgrade peacekeeping but only wanted to ensure that future peacekeeping would be "successful" and, would not be of an indefinite nature. This was similar to Pearson and Martin's attitude when deciding upon the question of Canadian participation in the Cyprus force. However, Thomson and Swanson, Op. Cit., p. 89 seem to have felt that Trudeau wanted to drastically downgrade peacekeeping as a Canadian policy. Akira Ichikawa in "The Helpful Fixer: Canada's Persistent International Image", Behind the Headlines, Vol. 37, No. 3 similarly concludes that Trudeau wanted to minimize Canada's helpful fixing activities.
84. Foreign Policy for Canadians (United Nations), p. 17.
85. Foreign Policy for Canadians (Europe), p. 24.
86. International Canada, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs), September 1970, pp. 176-177.
87. Mitchell Sharp, "The Role of Middle Powers in a Changing World", Statements and Speeches, 69/3, p. 5.
88. See Mitchell Sharp "Canada - a Middle Power in a Changing World", Statements and Speeches, 69/16.
89. Wiseman, "Peacekeeping : Début or Dénouement", p. 11.
90. See Department of National Defence, Defence in the Seventies, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 40.
91. Mitchell Sharp, "Canadian Statement in the General Debate of the United Nations", Statements and Speeches, 69/14, p. 6.
92. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Eighth Report (May-June 1970), p. 27.
93. Saul F. Rae, "Special Political Committee of the UN", Statements and Speeches, 73/24.
94. Debates, November 1, 1968, p. 2293.
95. International Canada, May 1970, p. 106.
96. Foreign Policy for Canadians, p. 23.
97. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1945-1975, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977), p. 61.

98. See Andrew Brewin, E.L.M. Burns, Maxwell Cohen et al, "Foreign Policy for Canadians: Comments on the White Paper", Behind the Headlines, Vol. 29, No. 7-8 for comments on the review. See as well Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, pp. 184 and 194-195.
99. International Canada, July and August 1971, p. 168.
100. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Eighth Report, p. 29.
101. Ibid., pp. 5 and 28.
102. Pearson, Mike, Vol. 2, p. 25.
103. Quoted in Peyton V. Lyon and Bruce Thordarson, "Professor Pearson: A Sketch" in Fry (ed.) Op. Cit., p. 7.
104. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
105. Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Scenes, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson), p. 113).
106. See Mitchell Sharp, "Canadian Participation in the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East", Statements and Speeches 73/23 and Allan MacEachen "Peacekeeping and Cyprus: The Canadian Experience" in Statements and Speeches 75/20.
107. Don Jamieson, "Canada Pledges Continued Support for the World Organization", Statements and Speeches 76/24, p. 4.
108. Gray, Op. Cit., p. 106.

Chapter 3

Canadian Peacekeeping in the Trudeau Era

Introduction

The Trudeau government's commitment to peacekeeping was not tested until 1973. Ottawa had continued the commitment first made by Pearson in 1964 to maintain a contingent of soldiers in the United Nations peacekeeping force on Cyprus, but no new international peacekeeping forces were created in the first couple of years of the 1970's. In 1971 Trudeau had acted as helpful fixer at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference, but it was not until early 1973, when a truce was signed in Vietnam, that Ottawa was formally requested to once again participate in an international peacekeeping operation. Since then, Ottawa has committed Canadian forces to every peacekeeping operation it was asked to join in the 1970's. And, it was also prepared to participate in a peacekeeping force proposed for Rhodesia and Namibia.

The Trudeau government's commitment to peacekeeping was also demonstrated by the development of peacekeeping as the greatest drain on the manpower of the Canadian Armed Forces Mobile Command. In 1977, 1,100 soldiers were serving as peacekeepers in the Middle East and another 500 were performing a similar function in Cyprus.¹ The figure has since declined with the disbandment of the second United Nations Emergency Force, but Canadian troops still remain in Cyprus and Syria. In addition, a battalion stationed in Canada has been kept on standby for use whenever

necessary in a peacekeeping operation.

In 1978, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson described the positive image peacekeeping had in Canada.

It is something that not only fits our capabilities as Canadians, but it is something that also fits our character as Canadians. I think it is the sort of thing that gives satisfaction to the people of this country to know that we can reinforce our commitments to peace and security in the world by making our troops,...available - not for aggressive purposes but to preserve stability in troubled regions.²

Jamieson also described the positive international image peacekeeping gave Canada when he claimed that Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper is well known, and because of its role as a peacekeeper Canada has become a "highly respected" nation in the Middle East and other regions where it served on such operations. During the 1970's this reputation became self-fulfilling. Its existence seemed to encourage the government to ensure it had a place in all UN peacekeeping forces. Consequently the Trudeau government was as enthusiastic an international peacekeeper as the father of Canadian peacekeeping, Lester Pearson, and jealously protected its reputation as an impartial and willing helpful fixer.

Peacekeeping on Cyprus - The Never Ending Commitment?

Despite Trudeau's statements that Canada would not get involved in any more open-ended peacekeeping missions, his government made no efforts to end its role in the peacekeeping operation it inherited on Cyprus. This force, United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), had been in place since 1964, and there was little indication its role would soon end.

In September 1968, following a request by UN Secretary-General U Thant to reduce Canada's contribution, Canadian Minister of National

Defence Leo Cadieux announced that Canada would reduce the number of Canadian troops on Cyprus from 872 men to 587. He also indicated that this would probably be the beginning of the end for this force. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker called for a total withdrawal of the force but Trudeau was unwilling to countenance such a drastic step.³

The Canadian troops on Cyprus were to remain there throughout the 1970's despite Cadieux's announcement, even though the government was not entirely happy with the situation on the island. In 1973 Minister of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp defended keeping troops on the island, even though the government's much vaunted requirements for a peacekeeping force were not met by UNFICYP's mandate. Sharp stated that UNFICYP had been dispatched under the pressure of time in 1964 with the threat of a serious crises developing, and these circumstances prevented Canada from requiring vigorous conditions before acting. Even so, he believed that in contrast to the ineffective ICCS, UNFICYP had been successful in preventing clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots for nine years. But Sharp did qualify his support for UNFICYP by expressing concern about the lack of movement toward a peace settlement, resulting in "the seemingly indefinite requirements for maintaining the Force on the Island."⁴ Curiously, the United States, which was also concerned about the stalemate in Cyprus, was more prepared to act than Canada. Washington was concerned about the mounting deficit for UNFICYP, and the diplomatic stalemate which contributed to poor relations between Americas' Greek and Turkish NATO allies. Consequently, it pressured the Secretary-General to reduce further UNFICYP's strength. By 1974 the force contained only 2,341 men compared to its original strength of 6,500, and the force's commander was expressing concern that any further reductions would undermine the

forces' credibility.⁵

These events indicate not only the superpowers influence on peace-keeping forces, but that UNFICYP was an important factor in American policy regarding Cyprus. Canada therefore had a number of reasons for leaving its troops on Cyprus besides the simple altruistic desire to maintain the peace. Ottawa was aware of the Americans' concern and interest about developments on the island; indeed, that had been one of the motivating factors for Canada's original involvement. There was also Ottawa's oft expressed reluctance for being blamed for the collapse of international helpful fixing activities.

Events in 1974 demonstrated the correctness of the Canadian and American fears that UNFICYP was only preserving a fragile truce that perpetuated the bifurcation of the Cypriot community. In early 1974 the uneasy status quo was upset by the overthrow of the Greek-Cypriot government by extremists. This resulted in a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community. The UN force was powerless to prevent the invasion, though the Canadian battalion prevented the Turks or Greek-Cypriots from capturing strategically important Nicosia airport.

The invasion served to re-trigger Canadian helpful fixing efforts. First, Sharp tried to arrange a meeting between the Greeks, Turks, and British in order to solve the crisis. He also fruitlessly urged all parties not to take further actions which would aggravate the situation. Failing in his first initiative, Sharp then tried to "rally international support" for a United Nations Security Council resolution asking for a ceasefire.⁶ Once a tenuous ceasefire was finally established, Ottawa quickly agreed to a UN request to double the size of its troop contribution in order to reinforce UNFICYP.

In November 1974, Defence Minister James Richardson visited Cyprus in order to investigate the situation. At a press conference in Nicosia, Richardson complained that Turkey was restricting the movement of the UN troops in its sectors, and bluntly stated that "if we are not able to perform our duty we will not continue." However, he continued by announcing that he thought UNFICYP would be useful in creating conditions that would allow negotiations to take place. As long as they were useful, Canadian troops would remain, but taking what has become a rhetorical position for Ottawa, Richardson warned that if there was no real effort to find a settlement Canada would not stay indefinitely.⁷ That threat has often been repeated when UNFICYP's mandate has come up for renewal before the UN General Assembly, usually at six month intervals.

Canada was also concerned over the poor financial support for UNFICYP. It was being financed by the government of Cyprus, the countries providing contingents, and by voluntary contributions of UN members. However, by 1975 the voluntary contributions had fallen short by \$44 million. Canada had spent \$25 million itself on the force between 1964 and 1975.⁸ The large deficit once again resulted in reduction in the force's strength and by 1975 United Nations officials were seriously worried that the decline in strength would destroy the force's effectiveness.⁹ Despite the pleas of Canadians and others, the deficits continued to mount. In 1977, Finland withdrew its troops from UNFICYP, apparently because the UN failed to pay the full cost of the Finnish contingent.¹⁰ Canada contented itself with expressing concern over the Finnish withdrawal and the mounting deficits, and appealing for increased voluntary contributions. Ottawa would not withdraw its own troops because, as William Barton argued in 1977 when speaking in favour of extending UNFICYP's mandate, the force played an

important role in maintaining peace on the island and, if it were to be further reduced in strength or completely withdrawn, the consequences could be devastating. Barton stated that

Canada's involvement on Cyprus stems primarily from our membership in the UN and our readiness to assist the organization to maintain peace and security. It also stems from concern for the national integrity of a fellow Commonwealth member and for the harsh fate that has befallen countless individual Cypriots.¹¹

The fact that Turkey and Greece were Canada's NATO allies and would in all probability become involved in open conflict if the force withdrew probably was also an important consideration. The Foreign Minister of Greece stated that UNFICYP was "extremely necessary" and that "he placed great value on Canada's contribution to the force."¹²

Canada has not simply been a passive helpful fixer, content with the important role its soldiers have played in UNFICYP. Ottawa has also been active in negotiating a permanent political solution. While visiting Cyprus, Don Jamieson claimed that Canada "had earned the right to speak out on Cyprus because it had now had a peacekeeping presence there for fourteen years."¹³ In November 1978 Canada, jointly with the United States and Great Britain, put forward a new twelve point plan for resolving the disputes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.¹⁴ Unfortunately, this plan was unacceptable to the belligerents. Jamieson did not give up but persisted in trying to achieve peace by talking with representatives from both sides in hopes of re-starting negotiations.¹⁵ However, negotiations have not succeeded and UNFICYP remains in place.

With the inability to negotiate a political settlement, Canada is left in the position of periodically calling for increased financial contribution and movement towards a diplomatic settlement, while threatening

to review its role as a troop contributor. But these threats have probably lost their credibility because of their numerous repetition and the Trudeau government's failure to act on them. Significantly, when Finland, which has also been a consistent contributor to peacekeeping operations, finally withdrew its troops because of financial considerations, the Trudeau government made no such move. Two factors probably have influenced Ottawa's thinking. First, UNFICYP has helped prevent two of Canada's NATO allies from becoming involved in open warfare and second, Canada's prestige as a peacekeeper would inevitably be damaged. Canada's peacekeeping reputation seemed important as latter events were to indicate, and as Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson indicated in 1978. While discussing in general Canada's peacekeeping role, Jamieson stated "we are highly respected...where our reputation as peacekeepers is very well known. It is my view that we should continue with this emphasis."¹⁶ He also noted that peacekeeping was a very popular role with Canadians. Consequently, the Trudeau government is unlikely to withdraw the Canadian troops from Cyprus until they are no longer needed.

The ICCS - Canada's Reluctant Return to Vietnam

When Trudeau became prime minister in 1968, he inherited Canada's role on the International Control Commission (ICC) in Indochina. The ignominious failure of the Ronning mission destroyed whatever possibility there existed of Canada acting as a mediator and, by the time Trudeau became prime minister, the ICC had become totally ineffective. Majority consent was needed on the ICC before investigations could be carried out, and this was no longer obtainable on most occasions. India and Poland constantly opposed Canada, and consequently, the commission teams rarely left their

camps to investigate incidents.¹⁷ As a result, Ottawa announced in late 1969 that it was withdrawing its ICC delegations from both Laos and Cambodia. Although it was announced as a money-saving move, the government was clearly tiring of participating in a farce.¹⁸ The Premier of Laos requested that Canada maintain a "moral presence" in Laos which Ottawa consented to do by leaving two Canadians in Vientiane. The last Canadian elements of the Laotian ICC were finally withdrawn in 1974, at which time, Sharp announced the Canadian delegation would return if needed to supervise a new ceasefire. The Canadians never did return.

In Cambodia, Phnom Penh openly accused the Canadians of favouring their American allies and in late 1969, expelled the ICC shortly before Ottawa's own announcement that it was withdrawing. In 1970, when it was suggested the ICC return to Cambodia, Sharp stated

Canada would return...only when the ICC's terms would be clearly defined, only when unanimity would not be necessary for action, only when freedom of access could be guaranteed and only when the full support of all parties concerned would be offered.¹⁹

Though the ICC in Vietnam remained until 1972, while doing little but sitting in their camps, Canada was beginning to learn from its experiences. Ottawa realized that if the peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam were successful, in all probability Canadians, because of "Canada's record and experience in ceasefire supervision in the area", would once again be asked to participate in a new international commission to supervise a ceasefire.²⁰

While as early as 1968 Trudeau had announced "we would be prepared to contribute anything that would be possible and desirable" to help bring peace to Vietnam,²¹ Mitchell Sharp at a later date succinctly stated the government's attitude, saying "we are never again to do what we did in the

old international commission [ICC] , and that is remain to watch the war."²² To avoid that possibility, in 1970 Ottawa initiated a study of its previous experiences in Indochina in order to prepare a list of essential conditions for an effective supervisory commission. At a 1970 teach-in at the University of Malaysia, Trudeau stated Canada would participate in a ceasefire commission, but only if it was clear that the belligerents really wanted peace.²³ Foreign Policy for Canadians reflected Trudeau's thinking when it stated that Canada would not participate in a ceasefire commission unless certain essential conditions were met, including a clear mandate, adequate resources and the full co-operation of the parties could be assured.²⁴

While the government was prepared to accept a role in Vietnam once more, though with reservations, within Parliament there was a more positive attitude. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) report on peacekeeping in 1970 had advocated that Canada accept a new peacekeeping role in the region if the government felt it would serve the cause of peace, while a 1972 report by the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded that it was important for Canada to indicate that it was willing to participate again as a truce supervisor in Vietnam in order to assist bringing the Vietnam war to a close, even though the committee understood the reason why the government had reservations.²⁵ Support for helpful fixing was very much alive in Parliament despite the disappointments of the past.

Though Ottawa had expected as early as 1970 that it would be asked to send observers to Vietnam once again, it was not until October 25, 1972 that it was officially notified by Washington that at the Paris peace talks Canada was being considered for a new truce observer commission. The follow-

ing day Ottawa was informed that all parties involved in the peace talks had agreed that a commission comprising Canada, Indonesia, Poland and Hungary would be deployed to supervise the ceasefire when it was signed. At this time Kissinger also announced that "peace was at hand", thereby placing extra pressure on Ottawa to consent quickly to the plan. The government's cautious reaction was that it would agree to participate if it could play an effective role. However, the Department of National Defence began drawing up contingency plans for sending troops to Vietnam.

On November 2, three days after a general election placed the Liberal government in a minority situation, Sharp issued a statement outlining the government's position on the Vietnam truce supervisory proposals. He stated it

would consider favourably any request by all the parties for Canadian participation in such arrangements if, in the light of Canada's experience in this area the proposed operation held the promise of success and it seemed likely that Canada could play a useful and effective role in it.²⁶

Sharp also offered the Canadian delegation to the ICC for a temporary period. But the government adhered to its previously announced condition that it would not join a new commission unless there was an effective truce to supervise, provision was made for an international body for the commission to report to, that the mandate of the force allow it to properly perform its duties, including freedom of movement, and that it would not be of an indefinite duration.

The United States seemed to place great importance on Canadian participation in the supervisory commission and placed intense pressure on Ottawa to join. Washington informed Ottawa, inaccurately as it turned out, that a peace agreement was imminent and also claimed that Indonesia,

Poland, and Hungary had already agreed to serve on the commission, leaving Canada as the "missing piece in the puzzle" of peace. It also publicly announced that all four countries had agreed to serve on the commission; Ottawa bluntly informed Washington it had made no such commitment. Ottawa also checked with the other three countries and found Washington's claims about their agreement was also inaccurate. The United States would not give up easily however. Ottawa was told by Washington that it had tried to find a substitute for Canada, but North Vietnam would not accept any other western or pro-western country. But after persistent questioning from Ottawa, Washington admitted that Japan was the only alternative considered.²⁷

However, the Americans need not have been so concerned. Ottawa had already decided it would make a limited commitment before the United States started applying pressure. Sharp had indicated as much in his November 2 statement when he offered the ICC delegation for a temporary period until the new commission was operational. Ivan Head, Trudeau's personal foreign affairs advisor, had also assured presidential advisor Henry Kissinger that Canada would provide some form of assistance but refused to be specific.²⁸ Ottawa was being so cautious because its previous experience as a helpful fixer in Indochina had demonstrated quite clearly the perils an unwary helpful fixer could run into. The government would say yes, but it was most concerned that it would be placed in an unworkable situation that would harm its reputation. Sharp was to say "we are deeply conscious that Canada has a history of concern for, and participation in international peacekeeping and is very jealous of its reputation in this area."²⁹ Therefore, the government was hesitant, no doubt hoping the supervisory commission's mandate would

meet Canadian standards, and by delaying accepting a role it would also avoid any responsibility for the final peace treaty which it had little chance of influencing anyway. The government also refused an invitation to attend the Paris talks, probably for the same reason.

In mid-November, Sharp held discussions with American Secretary of State William Rogers about the proposed supervisory commission but Sharp still did not commit Canada to the commission. Shortly thereafter, on November 23, the Globe and Mail reported that Kissinger and other American officials were irritated by Ottawa's continued insistence on having specific conditions met before it would commit itself, and by what they considered to be Canada's "backing away from its agreement in principle" to serve on the supervisory commission. A CBS correspondent reported that Sharp had told Rogers that Trudeau, now leading a minority government, "was having second thoughts" about getting re-involved in Vietnam.³⁰

The Paris peace talks faltered in mid-December but re-started in late December. At this time Ottawa sought clarification from Hanoi and Washington about the structure, size, terms of reference, and expected roles of the new commission. Sharp also reiterated Canada's belief that a peace supervisory commission would be unsuccessful, unless the requirements previously enunciated by Ottawa were fulfilled. He recognized that fighting would not stop completely as soon as a peace agreement was signed, but Canada would seriously consider joining the commission if

there was a chance that a mutually representative group of observers might reduce the scale of violence significantly and permit some sort of political settlement.³¹

With the coming of a new year, Canada had still not committed itself to sending troops to Vietnam, and was still insisting on its previous conditions. During an interview with Radio-Canada International released

in early January, Sharp indicated that Ottawa's stubbornness was at least partly due to concern that another ill-conceived Vietnamese supervisory role could damage Canada's image, especially if expectations were high. He stressed that Canada had not taken the initiative and it was "significant" that Ottawa had publicly stated its conditions for participation.

Otherwise people might have quite unrealistic ideas of what can be done and the conditions under which it can be done. Too often in the past there has been a tendency to believe that you throw in a supervisory commission or you throw in a peacekeeping force without having definite terms of reference, without too clear an idea of what it might do. This has been embarrassing not only to the members of the supervisory commission but frustrating to all concerned. So on this occasion when we did get a little bit of notice that our name was being used, we decided to make clear what experience had taught us, not only in our own interest, so that we did not get involved in an operation that would be futile, but also for the guidance of other countries that might be thinking of participating or might be asked to participate.³²

On January 23, 1973, Ottawa could vacillate no longer, because the parties to the Paris peace talks announced that the talks had reached a successful conclusion and Canada was named, without its prior consent, to serve on the truce commission. Canada was placed in a difficult position. The peace treaty was to be signed on January 27 and on that date the truce commission was to be in place. The government did not know the full conditions under which the commission would operate, but if it refused to accept its allotted role, Canada could very well be responsible for delaying a cessation of hostilities. Ottawa was unwilling to place itself in such an odious position so Sharp announced in the House of Commons that once the four belligerents signed the Paris accords, and had "clearly" extended an invitation to Canada to serve on the commission, Canada would accept for

an initial sixty-day period.³³ The "clear" invitation from all four belligerents did not come however, and to preserve the facade that Canada was not just the American appointee, but the choice of all four parties, Canadian officials in Paris had to track down the foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, Nguyen Thi Binh, and get a formal invitation to join the ICCS.³⁴ With that accomplished, the Canadian contingent was dispatched to Vietnam.

Even though Canada was once again directly involved in Vietnam, Ottawa did not abandon its efforts to have the commission's mandate satisfy its own criteria, which the government believed were necessary if the commission were to succeed. Sharp repeatedly threatened that if Canadian demands were not "adequately" met, and if the force was proving to be ineffective, the government would have no qualms about withdrawing. While Canada would do what it could to make the commission a success, Sharp was also preparing the Canadian public for a possible breakdown in the truce and absolving the Canadian government of responsibility. Indeed, he warned the Commons that "no one should assume as a matter of course that continued Canadian participation will be forthcoming" when the initial sixty-day term expired.³⁵

Ottawa was not very optimistic about the possibilities for success of the ICCS, for after analysis of the failure of the ICC, the government believed there were serious deficiencies and inadequacies in the new commission's mandate. Sharp pointed out five areas of concern: the absence of a continuing political authority for the commission to make its reports to; the requirement for the commission to always act as a single body, which meant national delegations could not act independently and that all commission

decisions and reports had to be unanimous, leading Sharp to conclude that the combination of these factors could quickly paralyse the commission the way the ICC had been; the provision making commission members pay a fixed percentage of the commission budget over and above the normal salaries and allowances of their personnel; and the commission's responsibility for controlling and supervising entry of all military personnel and equipment into South Vietnam, which was an impossible task in Sharp's view.³⁶ Unless these problems with the mandate were cleared up the government believed the ICCS would be no more effective than the ICC.

Despite its pessimism, two major considerations overcame Ottawa's reluctance to become reinolved in a Vietnamese truce supervisory commission. One of these considerations was the government's conclusion that it would be unwise to risk alienating the United States by refusing to serve on the commission. President Nixon had pledged to the American people to withdraw American troops from Vietnam and to obtain "peace with honour". The Paris agreement was to be Nixon's cherished "peace with honour" which would allow him to withdraw the American soldiers. Ottawa was cognizant of the fact that if Canada refused to serve on the supervisory commission because it believed the peace agreement would not work, it would be a damaging blow to the "peace with honour" claims being made in Washington. With a number of important bilateral issues on the agenda to be discussed in the near future between Ottawa and Washington, Canadian officials were unwilling to further aggravate an already unsympathetic administration in Washington.³⁷

Washington had already demonstrated that it was determined to get Canadian acceptance of a new role in Vietnam, and was showing little concern for how its tactics to achieve this end were received in Ottawa, as long as Canada joined the commission. Realizing the United States' attitude,

and unwilling to unnecessarily complicate Canadian-American relations, Ottawa was prepared, albeit reluctantly, to take its allotted place in the ICCS at least long enough to allow the Americans to pull their troops out of South Vietnam. Indeed, it has been claimed that Canada's only reason for participating in the ICCS was to allow the Americans a dignified withdrawal from Indochina, and that the Canadian role had nothing to do with attempting to create a real peace in Vietnam.³⁸ As well, Canada's initial commitment expired at the same time the Paris accords required the American troops to be withdrawn. Sharp himself accurately depicted the American withdrawal from Vietnam to be one of the ICCS's most important accomplishments.³⁹ It may not have been altruism, but Ottawa's allowing itself to be used for the truce commission did facilitate American efforts to extract themselves from a situation that was causing them both domestic and international problems.

Besides the desire to help the United States pull out of Vietnam, and in the process avoid alienating Washington, was Canada's penchant for doing what it could to bring peace to world trouble spots, and reluctance to be responsible for continued bloodshed. Ottawa could have unequivocally refused in October 1972 to serve on the proposed ICCS, when it first learned it was being considered for a role on the supervisory commission. But it never did so. Instead, Ottawa's statements to Washington always left open the possibility it would serve on the commission. Indeed, in November Sharp emphasized that Canada was willing to make sacrifices to serve on the commission, if it stopped or led to a "significant" decrease in the fighting and thus contributed to world peace.⁴⁰

American Secretary of State William Rogers warned Sharp that if Canada refused to accept a position on the supervisory commission, there was a real chance there would not be a peace agreement. This warning seems to have had some impact on Sharp. When announcing that Canada would agree to serve on the proposed commission for at least sixty days, Sharp cited as a reason "it would risk delaying an end to hostilities" if it refused.⁴¹ Sounding very much like Lester Pearson, Sharp also told the House of Commons that

Canada recognizes it has a responsibility to contribute to peace in the world if it can do so effectively. I know of no better way of contributing to Canada's national interest than to end the war in Vietnam, or to help end the war in Vietnam.⁴²

Amongst the people who would actually have to serve on the ICCS there were mixed opinions. Sharp's feelings were not universally shared in his department. Many of his subordinates had served on the old ICC and through dangerous and frustrating experience had learned how futile truce supervision could be with an unsatisfactory mandate. Many External Affairs officers were also convinced the truce would break down, and were worried that Canada, as a truce supervisor, would be blamed for the failure.⁴³ While there was strong opposition within External Affairs to joining the ICCS under the mandate provided by the Paris agreement, within the armed forces there was actually enthusiasm for participating in this, or any other peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping provided operational experience for the troops, as well as a prestigious and respectable role which helped justify the existence of the armed forces.⁴⁴

Though Ottawa accepted a position on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, it was still most unhappy with the commission's mandate, especially the lack of a continuing political authority for the commission to report to. But Canada, in Sharp's words, was determined "to make this commission work, if it can be made to work."⁴⁵ In order to compensate for the lack of a continuing political authority, Sharp announced that Canada would unilaterally make the commission activities and proceedings public through the press or any other forum available" to ensure that our view of events and, if necessary, the difference between our view and that of others were publicly available."⁴⁶ It was hoped this would break any deadlocks that developed on the commission, as well as prevent Canada from being blamed for commission failures.

Canada's open mouth policy was not appreciated by Poland and Hungary. It seemed quite obvious to them that they were the North Vietnamese representatives on the commission and as such, would be Hanoi's advocate on the commission. Consequently, they expected Washington's nominees, Canada and Indonesia, to be Saigon's advocates. Therefore, the communists felt Canada's attempts to have the commission impartially investigate violations to be, at best, foolish. Instead, the Poles and Hungarians would have preferred that the commission members act as mediators between the belligerents. Ottawa showed little interest in this role, believing this was not the commission's function and would involve them in Vietnamese politics, so it refused to abandon the "open mouth" policy. The Canadians criticized the South Vietnamese on occasion, but mostly the North Vietnamese and the communist members of the commission bore the brunt of Canadian criticisms.⁴⁷

While Sharp argued that Canada was not a spokesman for any one party, the Canadian delegation did provide intelligence to the Americans

which they had gathered while performing their duties.⁴⁸ However, mostly because of Canadian initiatives, the ICCS had its regional teams established quickly, and overcame its early administrative and procedural difficulties.⁴⁹ However, as Ottawa had feared, by March the commission was virtually deadlocked and the truce was constantly being violated.

In late February 1973 at a twelve nation conference held to ratify the Paris accords, Sharp attempted to rectify what in Canada's view were the problems with commission. He argued that the reports he received indicated quite clearly that the commission was not working very well, and that the ceasefire was not holding. Sharp's suggestion that the commission report to the United Nations Security Council was rejected and only a drastically modified Canadian proposal allowing for dissenting viewpoints to be attached to commission reports was accepted. Sharp signed the accords but bluntly told the conference that his government was most unhappy with the arrangements, but did not want to jeopardize the peace treaty. He also stated that developments in Vietnam were already causing Ottawa to question the usefulness of the ICCS, and the Canadian delegation could be withdrawn if the situation did not improve. Ottawa refused to supervise a non-existent ceasefire, and would not place itself in a situation where it could be held responsible for a breakdown in the ceasefire.⁵⁰

Heavy international pressure was exerted on Canada to remain on the ICCS after the expiration of its initial sixty-day term. The United States put intense pressure on Ottawa because the withdrawal of American forces would be completed just as Canada's commitment elapsed. Washington claimed that the ICCS was an integral part of the peace agreement, and it feared that a Canadian withdrawal might possibly lead to a new crisis in Vietnam

and a collapse of the ceasefire. If heavy fighting commenced immediately after the American withdrawal, Nixon's cherished "peace with honour" would have been a failure. This would likely lead to both international and domestic claims that the United States had simply abandoned its South Vietnamese ally, and that the war had been fought in vain. Nixon had prolonged the war in order to avoid this possibility so he was not willing to risk endangering the Paris accords at that point.⁵¹

The United States was not alone in entreating Canada to remain on the ICCS. Great Britain, China, and Japan among others argued that it was irrelevant if the ICCS functioned as envisaged in the Paris agreement, because the commission's real value was that it was a symbol of world concern over developments in Vietnam. Even Saigon and Hanoi requested Canada to extend its stay, believing that its "early departure would have far reaching consequences."⁵²

Ottawa eventually decided it would remain on the ICCS for a further sixty days and on March 27, 1973 Sharp informed the House of Commons of this decision. He stated the government's belief that more time should be provided to the belligerents to work out a political settlement. He expressed the belief that while the ICCS was not strictly necessary for achieving peace, if the commission ceased to exist, this "would be taken as an indication that the agreement lacked world support and consequently our withdrawal could become a further destabilizing psychological factor in a situation already very unstable."⁵³

Sharp declared that the government was caught in a dilemma. As long as there was the slightest chance that a real peace treaty could be achieved Canada was willing to stay, but it did not want to be caught in a charade of supervising a non-existent ceasefire. Sharp was worried that "Canada's

reputation is closely associated with our contribution to international efforts to make peacekeeping a reality."⁵⁴ Therefore, unless there was a marked decrease in the level of violence, and the ICCS functioned more effectively, Canada would withdraw. But as always, Ottawa tried to be helpful, and in this case Sharp stated the Canadians would remain an extra thirty days if it decided to withdraw, in order to allow a successor to be chosen.

While pessimistic about the chances of making the peace agreement work, Ottawa finally concluded that it should remain in Vietnam. First, the government was concerned about its reputation for helpful fixing. This would be damaged if open warfare broke out immediately after a Canadian withdrawal after only sixty days of giving peace a chance. Second, the expiration of the sixty-day period Canada had agreed to serve on the ICCS was exactly the same as the deadline given for the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Leaving with the Americans could create perceptions that Canada had acted only to assist the Americans, which would also reflect poorly on Canada's helpful fixer image.⁵⁵ Third, public opinion in Canada still favoured Canadian participation in the ICCS, with 53 per cent approving, 39 per cent disapproving, and 8 per cent who were undecided or held qualified opinions.⁵⁶

With popular support for Canada's role in Vietnam, there were few costs entailed in Ottawa's decision to stay in Vietnam. But one extension would serve the government's purpose; Canada would demonstrate to the world that it had given the belligerents every chance to make the Paris accords work, and the American soldiers would be long gone. Consequently, one extension was enough for Ottawa. Sharp was finally reflecting the opinions of his subordinates in the Department of External Affairs, who had not

wanted to get involved in the ICCS from the beginning. Trudeau, in line with his long stated opposition to ineffective peacekeeping operations also believed Canada should now end its role in the ICCS. Minister of National Defence James Richardson, reflecting the armed forces' support for peacekeeping was in favour of remaining. He was supported by Energy Minister Donald MacDonald and Industry Minister Alastair Gillepsie, reportedly because they were both about to engage in delicate negotiations with the United States on economic matters and wanted to avoid actions which would raise Washington's ire. But Washington no longer seemed to have a strong aversion to Canada leaving Vietnam and eased off on its strenuous efforts to keep the Canadians in the ICCS.⁵⁷

Under the circumstances, Trudeau's and Sharp's position was adopted by the government, and on May 29, 1973 the Secretary of State for External Affairs rose in the House of Commons to announce that Canada would withdraw from Vietnam. But always helpful, at the request of the White House, the government agreed to extend its stay by one month until July 31, 1973 because it did not want to jeopardize the talks Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would be holding in an attempt to preserve the crumbling ceasefire. Another crucial consideration Sharp stated, was that it would take time to find an acceptable country to replace Canada on the ICCS. In citing the government's reason for pulling out, Sharp merely reiterated complaints already made by himself and the Canadian ICCS delegation. Consequently, the "open mouth policy" adopted by Canada was beneficial because the reasons for Canada's dissatisfaction became well known, and "it prepared the way psychologically for the Canadian withdrawal", even though it annoyed the Poles and Hungarians and failed to improve the commission's effectiveness.⁵⁸

In early June, Sharp tried to put Canada's role in the ICCS in the best light possible, and even tried to make the decision to withdraw sound like helpful fixing. He stated that by withdrawing Canada might goad the Poles and Hungarians into taking a more objective role. Sharp hoped Canada's replacement would be able to advantageously use Canada's withdrawal. He also stated that in "looking back I can confirm without hesitation that our initial decision to participate was the right decision."⁵⁹ In concluding, Sharp felt it necessary to emphasize that withdrawing from the ICCS did not indicate that Canada was abandoning its "international responsibilities", as many critics of its foreign policy review three years previously had suspected. Indeed, Sharp announced in the House of Commons that Canada was still willing, if asked, "to participate in the international supervision of an election [in Vietnam] clearly held under the terms of the Paris agreement."⁶⁰

While still an unrepentant helpful fixer, Canada for the second time had been unable to assist in bringing a final political settlement to war-torn Vietnam. Extremely reluctant to participate in the ICCS, the Canadians had nevertheless for six months tried to make what they considered an unworkable mandate workable. While the "open mouth" policy may have been partially designed to broadcast Canada's views on the reasons for the ICCS's ineffectiveness, and thus prepare the way for its withdrawal, Sharp did try repeatedly to rectify the problems with the commission's mandate. The government had even consented to an additional three months on the commission, partially in the hopes this would allow progress towards a political settlement. Only when it was obvious a political settlement could not be achieved and that the ceasefire was being increasingly ignored, did Ottawa serve notice it was through as a member of the ICCS.

As Sharp had often indicated, Canada had learned from past experience that only if the belligerents were willing could a helpful fixer be of any use in resolving a conflict - and - that helpful fixing could best take place under the umbrella of the United Nations. In September 1973, Sharp told the UN General Assembly that Canada had tried, but failed to have the ICCS report to the United Nations. He reiterated that Canada was still prepared to participate in peacekeeping, but through frustrating experience Canada had learned that such operations "stand the best chance of success if they are conducted under the authority of the UN Security Council".⁶¹ In the very near future the Canadian government was to have an opportunity to test Sharp's hypothesis.

Return to the Middle East - UNEF and Others

In 1956 Canada had initiated the deployment of the first UN force designed to separate belligerents during a UN sponsored ceasefire. This force, UNEF I, was the prototype for UN peacekeeping forces that have been deployed since then. Even though UNEF I was rather ignominiously expelled in 1967, resulting in many Canadians questioning the whole concept of Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping ventures, it was not long before Canadian officials were once again showing a willingness to help achieve peace in the Middle East.

During a visit to Cairo in 1969, Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp stated that Canada was prepared to participate once again in a Middle Eastern peacekeeping force.⁶² While nothing immediately came of this offer, Sharp reiterated it twice while on official visits to Yugoslavia and Romania in 1970, shortly after Soviet troops had been deployed in Egypt to help fend off Israeli air raids. On these occasions, Sharp

suggested that a UN peacekeeping force be re-established in the Middle East, with the purpose of separating the Israeli and Egyptian forces so as to reduce tensions. He stated that Canada's main interest was in preventing the USSR and the United States from becoming involved in a confrontation "because Canada would be the first country destroyed." Consequently, Canada was willing to partake in a new Middle Eastern peacekeeping force, and indeed, he felt that was the best role Canada could play in the crisis. Consistent with the government's position in Foreign Policy for Canadians, Sharp did add however, that a new forces' mandate would have to be much clearer than UNEF I's mandate.⁶³ Meanwhile, in Ottawa Defence Minister Leo Cadieux stated that any decision to assume a new Middle East peacekeeping role would have to be taken by the Cabinet after a formal request was received from the UN. Cadieux did note though, that "providing peacekeeping forces is one of the priorities of our defence review of a year ago", and that one battalion of troops was earmarked for peacekeeping service.⁶⁴

Sharp was well aware that if a peace settlement was going to be achieved in the Middle East the United Nations would have to be involved in some way. It was his opinion that "in the tragic Middle East conflict ...the only generally acceptable machinery for peacekeeping and peace-making endeavours has been UN machinery."⁶⁵ Canada, though prepared to help bring peace to the Middle East, could only wait for the call to come from the UN.

When the October 1973 Yom Kippur War escalated tensions between the two superpowers, it was to the United Nations that the United States turned to head off the threat of superpower confrontation. Israeli military victories over Soviet supplied Arab forces resulted in the Soviet

Union preparing airborne forces for deployment in Egypt. The United States countered by placing its own forces on alert. The White House rejected a Soviet proposal for a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping to end the crisis. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Security Council that

the United States does not favour and will not approve the sending of a joint Soviet-U.S. force in the Middle East...When you have a situation in which several of the permanent members may themselves contribute to tension in the area it seems to us that the only possible course is to exclude the forces of all permanent members. It seemed to us that the political purposes would be best served if any international forces that were introduced were composed of countries that have no possibility of themselves being drawn into rivalry as a result of being there.⁶⁶

After an initial Security Council ceasefire resolution was ignored, on October 25, 1973 a second one calling for the creation of a six thousand man peacekeeping force which excluded forces of the permanent members of Security Council was accepted by the belligerents. This force was of approximately the same size as UNEF I, but on this occasion the Soviet Union, the United States, Israel, and Egypt all supported its creation. The first elements of United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), drawn from the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish contingents in UNFICYP, were in Egypt thirty-six hours after the ceasefire resolution was passed.

Initially, it seemed that Canada might not be requested to take part in UNEF II. In the House of Commons on October 22, Sharp and spokesmen for all three opposition parties expressed support for the initial Security Council ceasefire resolution, and all stated they favoured Canada joining a peacekeeping force if one was formed.⁶⁷ Ottawa even offered the paratroop regiment to the United Nations, but the offer was not accepted. However, after the second Security Council ceasefire resolution was accepted

on October 25, Sharp informed reporters that Canada had not taken part in informal discussions leading to the Security Council resolution, nor had Canada been asked to participate in the peacekeeping force created by the resolution.⁶⁸ Since Canada did not have a seat on the Security Council at the time, it had little opportunity to influence events.

Canadian officials were disturbed because the United Nations ignored Canada during the initial phases of the creation of UNEF II. Concern was expressed in Ottawa that Canada was now no longer acceptable as a peacekeeper.⁶⁹ Opposition members questioned Sharp in the House of Commons about reports that Egypt had objected to Canadian participation in UNEF II. Sharp denied he had received such information,⁷⁰ but despite his denials the reports were true. Secretary-General Waldhjem was under pressure to follow "the accepted principle of equitable geographic distribution", in order to meet the demands of communist and third world countries for greater numbers of non-western troops in peacekeeping forces. The Soviet Union objected strongly when Canada was originally chosen, and only accepted a Canadian role when it was agreed Canada and Poland would be asked to jointly provide the logistical units for the force, a role originally allotted solely to Canada.⁷¹

Waldhjem had already requested Canada to provide the logistics component of the force, and Ottawa had accepted, when the Soviets raised their objections. When this problem developed, Sharp hurriedly flew down to New York in order to clarify Canada's position. Sharp had no objections to sharing the logistics role with Poland. Egypt however, also questioned Canadian participation, where upon Sharp met the Egyptian ambassador in Washington to resolve Egypt's objectives. Though Sharp claimed Canada did not consider itself a NATO representative, other countries inevitably

viewed Canada as such.

Canada had found itself in such a potentially embarrassing position because, as Conservative foreign policy critic Claude Wagner put it, the government could not "bear" to be excluded from UNEF II. Wagner believed that Sharp went to New York in order to ensure that Canada had a role in the force. Even though the Conservatives agreed Canada should serve on UNEF II because it would help achieve peace, Wagner was angered that Sharp "stooped to generating an invitation" for a role which left Canada as the NATO counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact's representative, Poland. Wagner among others, believed this would add nothing to Canada's international reputation and could only harm it. Further, to secure this role the government had allowed Canada to be "dragged...through a process of inspection and approval on the part of the Soviets and Egyptians." Wagner felt that the government's approach had only served to demean Canada's image as a helpful fixer and the "international currency of goodwill" which had previously been developed.⁷² Nevertheless, the government was obviously very pleased that it had secured a place on UNEF II, "as the air of relief displayed by Canadian diplomats" demonstrated. The armed forces, always ready to join peacekeeping forces, were also enthusiastic about their new job.⁷³

The government's satisfaction was heightened because UNEF II's mandate met its basic conditions for peacekeeping, and it was not above a little self-congratulation. Indeed, it claimed that

Canada had succeeded in winning acceptance of the principle of equal financial treatment of all troop-contributing countries; the Secretariat in consultation with countries contributing troops to UNEF II, has for the first time worked standard across-the-board financial arrangement for payments for personnel.⁷⁴

Sharp also stated that Canada's past experiences as a peacekeeper, especially its previous experience in the Middle East, led to Canada's inclusion in UNEF.

The new Middle Eastern peacekeeping force, operating under its Canadian influenced mandate, was able to fulfill its task of providing a buffer between the belligerents. In this atmosphere of reduced tensions, political negotiations took place which resulted in an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, and negotiated Israeli withdrawals from occupied Egyptian territory.

In 1976 Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen emphasized that Canada was playing a role in the peace process. He declared that "Canada's participation [in UNEF II] was of tangible assistance in maintaining the possibility of a final negotiated settlement."⁷⁵ While he was claiming a virtuous helpful fixer role for Canada, MacEachen also emphasized that Ottawa was unwilling to take a stand on the Middle East negotiations, because articulating a position on the political situation would serve no purpose, and would only jeopardize Canada's peacekeeping role. However, Canada would follow a policy of "balance and objectivity", and hoped a settlement could be reached on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. Ottawa realized it had no real ability to influence negotiations in the Middle East, and that its only role as helpful fixer in the region would be as a peacekeeper. This was a lesson rather embarrassingly learned in 1967 while Canada was a member of UNEF I. Ottawa had taken a position that was interpreted by the Egyptians as being anti-Arab, and this resulted in the Canadian contingent being expelled on forty-eight hours notice. MacEachen's statements clearly indicate that Canadian policy was to

avoid taking a controversial stand in order to preserve Canada's role as a peacekeeper. Consequently, Canada quietly remained in UNEF II until the force was disbanded in July 1979 after successfully supervising the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

The Emergency Force was only placed between the Israelis and Egyptians. But when it was announced that a disengagement agreement had been reached between the Syrians and Israelis in May 1974, and an observer force was required for their mutual border, Ottawa promptly volunteered to have Canadian troops serve in it. As a result, the UN Security Council transferred elements of the Canadian contingent, along with troops from other national contingents in UNEF II, to the Syrian-Israeli border in order to create the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Every six months, when UNDOF's mandate has come up for renewal, Canada has agreed to keep its troops in the force despite the fact that a Canadian Armed Forces transport plane attached to UNDOF was shot down by Syrian forces in August 1974, killing the nine Canadians aboard. The government has looked on UNDOF favourably "since we believe in the peacekeeping operations" and because Ottawa "believed that the force had contributed 'measurably' to the relative lack of tension" on the Israeli-Syrian border.⁷⁶

When fighting between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) resulted in an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council. The American resolution was accepted by the Security Council as Resolution 425, and it called upon Israel to immediately withdraw its forces from Lebanon. The Resolution also called for the creation of a UN force to supervise the Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of peace in southern Lebanon. Canada was once again called upon to provide the logistics elements of the United

Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL). Ottawa was initially reluctant to participate because its contributions to UNFICYP, UNEF II, and UNDOF were already putting a great strain on the resources of the Canadian armed forces.⁷⁷ However, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson praised the UN for acting wisely in sending troops to Lebanon, and Trudeau flew down to New York to discuss the matter with Secretary-General Waldhien. The outcome was that Trudeau agreed in New York to provide a Canadian communications detachment for six months. At the end of the six months, the Canadian transferred their communications duties to other UN troops and ended their role in UNFIL. This was the first occasion in which Canada had adhered to a self-imposed deadline for participation in a peacekeeping venture. However, this deadline was set not because Ottawa questioned the utility of its role, but rather simply because it lacked the resources to continue its commitment. Consequently, Canada's commitment to helpful fixing, or to peacekeeping in particular, was not being challenged by the government. The commitment remained, only the wherewithal was missing.

Indeed, this episode inspired Ottawa to once more beseech other nations to earmark forces for peacekeeping duties.⁷⁸ Jamieson reiterated to the General Assembly that "my country is unusually sensitive to the need for the UN to improve its advance planning arrangements for peacekeeping...I urge all member states to consider again the earmarking of personnel, services, and equipment for this kind of contingency."⁷⁹ Canada itself was still viewed as a potential peacekeeper and it was still willing to fulfill such a role in the Middle East. In March 1979 the participants in the Camp David peace talks had sounded out Ottawa to see if it would serve on a new Middle Eastern peacekeeping force. Jamieson had replied that Canada was prepared to accept. However, that force never got past the talking stage

at Camp David.⁸⁰

Canada's record in the Middle East during the 1970's demonstrates that it was still a very willing participant in peacekeeping. It had accepted peacekeeping roles offered to it with very little hesitation. While Canada did not initiate any peacekeeping activities as it had done in the 1950's, this was due to changed circumstances rather than a lack of desire, as events in Namibia were to demonstrate. Unlike 1956, when Lester Pearson had played such an important role in the creation of UNEF I, Canada did not have a seat on the Security Council when circumstances provided a situation where a peacekeeping force could be useful. A seat on the Security Council is important because it provides a forum for a smaller power to initiate activities in the UN. Previous important Canadian helpful fixing activities, such as the compromise agreement to break the deadlock on new memberships in the United Nations, and the creation of UNEF I, took place when Canada possessed a seat on the Security Council.

As well, by the 1970's the superpowers had developed very close ties with the local Middle Eastern powers. The United States and the Soviet Union almost exclusively provided political support and military equipment for the opposing parties. During the 1950's this military and political support had been fragmented amongst the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France. As a result, none of the local powers were dependent solely on one great power for support. The nearly exclusive role of the Soviets and Americans as patrons of the contending states in the Middle East meant that superpower agreement was essential before the United Nations could intervene. Consequently, it was the United States and Soviet Union which jointly sponsored the Security Council ceasefire to end the Yom Kippur War, and who then applied pressure on the belligerents to accept it.

There was little opportunity for smaller powers like Canada to exploit rifts amongst the patrons in order to take the initiative for peace-making, as Pearson had done in 1956.⁸¹

During the 1970's, Canada could only respond to UN requests for peacekeeping contingents in the Middle East, and could do little else. Ottawa's efforts on the Committee of Thirty-Three in the late 1960's and early 1970's were partially responsible for the mandates of the Middle Eastern peacekeeping forces substantially meeting the requirements Ottawa believed were necessary for success. The mandates for UNEF II and UNDOF did indeed allow them to efficiently and effectively perform their responsibilities. Consequently, Ottawa's efforts to create effective peacekeeping standards proved to be justified, especially if one contrasts the ICCS fiasco, which did not meet the government's requirements, to the relative success of the Middle Eastern operations. The Middle Eastern peacekeeping forces demonstrated that peacekeeping was still useful in the control of international conflict, and that Canada could still play a useful and effective role as a peacekeeper.

Helpful Fixing and Peacemaking in Southern Africa

Since 1960, Canada has generally supported decolonization in Africa. It supported resolutions in the UN condemning Portugal's efforts to maintain control of its African colonies, and stopped all trade to Portugal that assisted these efforts. But Canada's membership in the Commonwealth, and its reputation as a helpful fixer, has meant that Ottawa has had to consider taking a more active role in the long struggle for black rule in Rhodesia (after 1979 known as Zimbabwe), and independence for Namibia. As events developed, Canada eventually became little more than a bystander

in the Rhodesia situation, but in the Namibian case it has played a leading role.

The attempt by the white minority in Rhodesia to preserve its dominant social, political, and economic position first made its impact on the Commonwealth at the 1964 Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers. The Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth attempted to pressure Great Britain into forcefully removing Ian Smith's white minority government, and placing political power into the hands of Rhodesia's black majority. It was Prime Minister Pearson who found himself with the responsibility of finding a compromise between the British and Afro-Asian positions. Pearson was able to successfully accomplish that task, and preserve the unity of the Commonwealth, but unfortunately finding an acceptable method of imposing black rule on Rhodesia was to take many more years to solve.⁸²

Canada's constant position on the Rhodesian issue was that it favoured a constitution for Rhodesia that provided equality and political responsibility for all Rhodesians. However, when political negotiations during 1976 resulted in a proposal for a Commonwealth peacekeeping force for Rhodesia, Ottawa was unenthusiastic about accepting a position in such a venture. Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson reiterated that the principle of peacekeeping was acceptable, but the government was concerned about the role that might be assigned to such a force during a transition period between white minority and black majority rule. He stated emphatically that Canada did not wish to see Canadian troops "used as a buffer between blacks and whites, or to see us once again thrust into a peacekeeping role between people who are genuinely, indeed, anxious to be literally at each others throats."⁸³ Jamieson did add however that

if it appeared there would be a "useful" role for a peacekeeping force, Ottawa would examine the proposal carefully before making a decision on participation.

Jamieson's statement indicates the government's position on peacekeeping was still consistent with the position adopted in 1968. The government supported the principle of peacekeeping, but an actual proposal would have to provide indications that it was workable and useful. The spectre of being sent into another war of liberation situation, first experienced by Canada in Indochina, did not enthuse Ottawa. It was wary of being caught in a position that would alienate the Third World. Indeed, one nationalist leader, Joseph Nkomo, on a visit to Canada stated that the nationalist movements did not want an international peacekeeping force deployed in Rhodesia. But, while the government was wary of a peacekeeping commitment, it was willing to contribute to a proposed transition fund that would compensate white Rhodesians for turning assets and land over to blacks.⁸⁴

When the 1976 negotiations broke down, the proposal for a peacekeeping force were temporarily dropped. However, in August 1977 new British-American proposals called for a UN force to keep order during the period of transition from minority to majority rule. At a press conference Jamieson made it known that Canada was still reluctant to join a peacekeeping force in Rhodesia, though if no other suitable troops could be found, Canada would participate.⁸⁵ But by October, Ottawa seemed to be overcoming some of its reluctance. A special study group was created to analyse Canada's ability to respond to a request to send troops to Rhodesia.⁸⁶ Jamieson, in the true spirit of a helpful fixer, even stated

"we should not be the party that would stand in the way of bringing about [a settlement]" when discussing Canada's willingness to join a peacekeeping force for Rhodesia.⁸⁷

During the final negotiations in late 1979 to end the national liberation war in Rhodesia, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda proposed that a Commonwealth peacekeeping force be created and suggested Canada be one of the participants.^{87a} This proposal was accepted, though Canada was not included in the Commonwealth peacekeeping force. Instead, the Canadian Armed Forces assisted in transporting observers and officials during the elections held under the British transition plan. A Canadian, R. Gordon Fairweather, was also chosen to be part of an eleven member Commonwealth Observer Group to observe the electoral campaign and election. Thus ended the Rhodesia issue and Canada's role, which involved much speculation about potential roles, and little substance. Possibly as a legacy from the ICC fiasco in Indochina, the government was again cautious about becoming involved in a non-United Nations peacekeeping force deployed to end a war of liberation. But as it became more likely a peacekeeping force would be created, the government's interest was also heightened, even to the extent of creating a special study group.

In contrast to the Rhodesian situation, Canada has played a leading role in trying to negotiate Namibian independence from South Africa. Canada has long supported the notion that South Africa grant Namibia (until 1968 known as South-West Africa) its independence. Namibia had been a former German colony which South Africa had governed since 1920 under a mandate originally granted by the League of Nations. The United Nations terminated the mandate in 1966 but South Africa still refused to grant Namibia independence. Eventually, in 1973 the South-West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO),

a Namibian nationalist organization founded in 1960, was recognized by the UN General Assembly as the legal representative of the Namibian people. Unfortunately, this did not end South African rule of Namibia, and the political situation remained essentially static, though SWAPO carried out a slowly intensifying guerrilla war against the South Africans.

Concerned about the situation, Canada joined with the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany in 1977 to form a "contact group" to negotiate between South Africa and SWAPO. Canada was included in the contact group because at that time it possessed a seat on the Security Council and, very importantly, it possessed relatively close relations with the three Commonwealth nations bordering Namibia and thus frontline states in the growing crises.⁸⁸ After a series of meetings with South Africa and SWAPO, the contact group developed a plan for Namibian independence. Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson speaking on behalf of the contact group, informed the UN of their proposals. Included in the proposals was a demand for free and fair elections. In order to ensure that these took place, the contact group sought the creation of a civilian and military UN force, to be called the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which would be responsible for supervising and controlling the elections. The military force would also replace the South African garrison, most of which was to be withdrawn, and maintain peace and order.

The South Africans and SWAPO promptly agreed to the plan. UN Secretary-General Waldheim, acting on the contact group's proposals, dispatched a representative to Namibia to study implementation of the independence plan. Then, using the representative's report, Waldheim asked for authorization to create a 7,500 man force to police Namibia during the

period of transition to independence. The Security Council endorsed the proposals in Security Council Resolution 435. Unfortunately, South Africa rejected Waldheim's report, claiming it was not similar to the agreement negotiated with the contact group.⁸⁹

Jamieson was surprised at Pretoria's rejection of Waldheim's report because, as he publicly stated, he felt the report was in complete accordance with the contact group's proposals. Despite the situation Jamieson offered a Canadian contingent for service in Namibia. He informed the Security Council that Canada had a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping activities, and as a full participant in the Namibian negotiations, it was "prepared to consider carefully" how it might be of assistance to the Secretary-General in bringing peace and independence to Namibia.⁹⁰

At a press conference the following day, Jamieson was more specific, stating that Ottawa would dispatch six hundred soldiers to Namibia if they were needed. Jamieson also indicated that if a replacement could be found, Canada might withdraw six hundred men from Cyprus. However, a Department of External Affairs spokesman clarified Jamieson's remark by stating that Ottawa did not rule out participating in the Namibian and Cyprus operations concurrently. A UN spokesman, replying to Jamieson's offer, indicated that in light of Pretoria's rejection of Waldheim's report, a peacekeeping force "was no longer in the cards for the time being." He went on to say that Canadian forces were always appreciated, but even if the Namibian force was created, Canadian troops were not essential since many other countries had offered to participate.⁹¹

Despite these remarks, Jamieson seemed to be making a concerted effort to inform the world that Canada was a most willing helpful fixer.

After the contact group's initial efforts had collapsed in September the group re-opened negotiations with South Africa. While these discussions were still taking place, Jamieson reiterated that if they were successful, Canada was prepared to serve "in whatever way seems to be most beneficial." He also rather proudly added "that all parties in the territory had praised Canada's impartially and practical experience in peacekeeping."⁹² In December, reports from England once again had Jamieson offering a battalion for peacekeeping service in Namibia, and stating that Canadian "observers had scouted the territory."⁹³ Ottawa did not just limit itself to talk. The Department of Defence accepted the burden of doing the detailed planning for UNTAG since the UN lacked the staff to cope with such a complex operation.⁹⁴

The negotiations (in which Jamieson claimed Canada played a most important role)⁹⁵ between the contact group and South Africa that would allow UNTAG to be operationalized, met with some success. South Africa agreed to accept Security Council Resolution 435, although Pretoria insisted on holding unilateral elections in Namibia which excluded SWAPO. Only after these elections were held would South Africa agree to UN supervised elections. The contact group accepted this condition, but when South Africa proceeded with its unilateral elections, the Security Council passed a motion condemning the election. The contact group abstained on this motion. Canada, once again acting as spokesman for the contact group, criticized the Security Council motion condemning South Africa. Canada's representative, William Barton, stated that Pretoria's actions were not necessarily detrimental to implementing the UN plan and therefore, Pretoria should not be prejudged, for that did nothing to improve the situation. Barton emphasized that Canada and the contact group were making every effort

to have the UN plan implemented.⁹⁶

Despite Canada's history of helpful fixing, including its important role in the Namibian negotiations, it could not escape the impact NATO membership had on international perceptions of Canada. Not only did the United Nations politely state that the proposed Namibian peacekeeping force could operate quite all right without Canadian participation, but in early 1979 SWAPO announced it was opposed to Canadian participation in UNTAG because of Canada's membership in NATO. However, even this did not phase Ottawa. A battalion was still kept on standby in case it was needed in Namibia, and Jamieson was once again reiterating that Canada was ready to take part. Jamieson felt the Secretary-General would not allow SWAPO to dictate which nations would serve in UNTAG. Even though Waldheim's initial list of participants in UNTAG did not include Canada, if the force had to be reinforced, Canada was likely to be one of the countries called upon. Indicating Canada's desire to be helpful, in March 1979 it was reported that two Canadian officers were assisting the United Nations' UNTAG planning team.⁹⁷

In 1973, the government was accused in Parliament of "begging" for a role on UNEF II. Nevertheless, once again in 1978-1979 Jamieson repeatedly let it be known that Canada was willing to contribute to peacekeeping in Namibia or Rhodesia. Indeed, Conservative M.P. Allan McKinnon was concerned that Jamieson, by so "freely offering" Canadian forces for services in UNTAG, was placing Canada in an embarrassing position if SWAPO insisted that Canada did not participate.⁹⁸ As well, Jamieson demonstrated little reluctance in letting it be known that "Canada had taken a leading role in concert with other Western countries in pursuing peaceful solutions to the racial and decolonization problems of Southern Africa."⁹⁹

Canada had indeed played an important role, participating fully in the negotiations conducted by the contact group between South Africa and SWAPO. These negotiations eventually resulted in the proposals adopted by the Security Council as the method by which Namibia should become independent. On two occasions Canada had also delivered the contact group's position to the United Nations, and Canada had participated in drawing up the plans for UNTAG. Canada's active role in the decolonization of southern Africa indicates that the spirit of helpful fixing still existed in Ottawa, and that peacekeeping was looked upon very favourably.

Conclusion

Despite fears to the contrary, the Trudeau government has kept alive the Canadian tradition of peacekeeping. While Foreign Policy for Canadians reiterated support for peacekeeping, the Trudeau government, learning from past Canadian experiences, established guidelines which it believed were necessary to provide peacekeeping operations with a reasonable opportunity for success. When these conditions were met, it threw itself wholeheartedly into the traditional Canadian role of peacekeeper. In March 1979, Don Jamieson reiterated this support:

as a matter of general policy the government continues to believe that peacekeeping is a useful and effective role for Canada, that it is one of the areas in which we can make a contribution to the strengthening of world peace and to the settlement of disputes amicably, or if not amicably then with the least tension possible. So the basic principle of peacekeeping remains a valid one, perhaps in some respects even more valid today than when it was originally conceived by Mr. Pearson.¹⁰⁰

But while Pearson was instrumental in conceiving peacekeeping forces, he also created an image for Canada as a helpful fixer. The Trudeau government not only believed that peacekeeping was a useful role for Canada, but

maintaining and protecting the helpful fixing image itself became an important motivation of the government during the 1970's. Indeed, it appeared that it did not want Canada left out of any United Nations peacekeeping forces. After Sharp suggested as early as 1969 that the Trudeau government would be willing to place Canadians in a new Middle Eastern peacekeeping force, when the force was finally created in 1973 the government conducted a flurry of diplomatic negotiations to ensure Canadian participation in the force. Once again, in 1978-79 the government, on this occasion represented by Don Jamieson, was unabashed in its efforts to publicize its willingness to serve as a peacekeeper in Namibia. And also, despite repeated expression of dissatisfaction at the long diplomatic stalemate on Cyprus necessitating the retention of peacekeeping forces there, Ottawa has continued its participation in UNFICYP.

The government's reluctance to return to Vietnam, and its initial reluctance to join a Rhodesian peacekeeping force, demonstrates its concern that supervising an ineffective ceasefire, not only would weaken the credibility of peacekeeping, but as had happened on the ICC, might lead or force Canadians to take sides, and thus damage Canada's reputation for impartiality while peacekeeping. In conclusion, the events of the 1970's indicate that the government was most anxious to retain its role and image as a helpful fixer. Indeed, the image itself had become a motivation.

Notes

1. Gerald Porter, In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years, (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg Publishers Ltd., 1978), pp. 127-128.
2. Don Jamieson, "Canadian Foreign Policy: A 1978 Perspective", Statements and Speeches, 78/2, p. 7.
3. Globe and Mail, September 18, 1968.
4. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, November 14, 1973, pp. 7798-7799, and International Canada, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, June 1973, p. 196.
5. Van Coufoudaki, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1976), p. 468.
6. See Mitchell Sharp, "Cyprus - Current Situation", Statements and Speeches, 74/25 and Sharp, "Cyprus", Statements and Speeches, 74/26.
7. International Canada, November 1974, p. 217.
8. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1945-1975, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977), p. 56.
9. The Economist, Vol. 256, August 2, 1975, "Men Between", p. 46.
10. Ltd. Col. James H. Allan, "The Future of Peacekeeping for Canada" in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1978), p. 33.
11. William H. Barton, "The Question of Cyprus", Statements and Speeches, 77/20, p. 2.
12. International Canada, October 1976, p. 258.
13. International Canada, June 1978, p. 153.
14. International Canada, November 1978, p. 259.
15. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 12.

16. Jamieson, Op. Cit., p. 7.
17. It should be noted that India also opposed Polish initiatives, thereby trying to preserve its image of neutrality and not seemingly favouring either side. See Paul Briddle "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954-72" in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne (eds.), Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia, (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 445.
18. David Van Praagh, "Canada and Southeast Asia" in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.), Canada and the Third World, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p. 314.
19. Cited in J.L. Granatstein "External Affairs and Defence" in John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review for 1970, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 326.
20. Mitchell Sharp, Vietnam: Canada's Approach to Participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision, October 25, 1972 - March 27, 1973, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), p. 2.
21. Debates, November 1, 1968, p. 2294.
22. R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence" in John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 1973, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 287.
23. International Canada, May 1970, p. 107.
24. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Pacific), (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 24.
25. See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Eighth Report (May-June 1970), p. 16, and Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canadian Relations with the countries of the Pacific Region, (March, 1972), p. 43.
26. International Canada, November 1972, p. 203.
27. Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam, (Toronto: Anansi, 1974), p. 148. Japan was not a good candidate for the supervisory commission because memories of the Japanese invasion and occupation of Indo-China during the World War II were still strong in Hanoi.
28. See Ibid., p. 157.

29. Mitchell Sharp, "Conditions for Canadian Participation in Vietnam Truce Supervision", Statements and Speeches, 73/5.
30. International Canada, November 1972, p. 204.
31. "Weighing a new peacekeeping role" in International Perspectives (Jan./Feb. 1973), p. 17.
32. International Canada, January 1973, p. 25.
33. Sharp, Vietnam, pp. 10-12.
34. Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 152.
35. Debates, February 1, 1973, p. 865.
36. Ibid., pp. 864-865.
37. Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 156. Nixon had already shown himself to be most unsympathetic to Canada. Unlike previous American presidents, he was unwilling to provide an exemption for Canada when his policies harmed it. In 1971, Nixon refused an exemption for Canadian manufactured goods when his administration imposed a ten per cent surcharge on imported manufactured goods, even though two-thirds of Canadian exports in manufactured goods went to the United States.
38. A number of writers make reference to Canada's desire to help the United States withdraw, For example see Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1979), p. 17; Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 179 and Alex J. Inglis, "Peacekeeping and peacemaking should be reviewed together" in International Perspective (Jan./Feb. 1975), p. 31. This viewpoint was even held abroad, for Ramesh C. Thakur "Change and Continuity in Canadian Foreign Policy" in India Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 412, suggests that Canada returned to Vietnam in order to assist the United States.
39. Mitchell Sharp, "From Indochina to the Middle east - An Account of Canadian involvement", Statements and Speeches, 74/4.
40. "Weighing a new peacekeeping role", in International Perspectives (Jan./Feb. 1973), p. 17.
41. Sharp, Vietnam, p. 12.
42. Debates, February 1, 1973, p. 865.
43. See Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 144 and Jack Cahill, If You Don't Like The War, Switch the damn Thing Off!, (Don Mills, Ontario: Musson Book Co., 1980), pp. 61-63.

44. Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 149 and was referred to during an interview at the United Nations, May 13, 1980. Peacekeeping provides Canadian soldiers an opportunity to put their training into practice in field conditions. Indeed, on Cyprus in 1974 the Canadian battalion serving there gained actual combat experience while defending Nicosia Airport. As well, peacekeeping provides a publicly acceptable, even popular role, for the armed forces and in an era of peace for Canada, provides a justification for its existence. For these reasons the armed forces support peacekeeping.
45. Debates, February 1, 1973, p. 864.
46. Byers, Op. Cit., p. 288.
47. Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 171.
48. Ibid., p. 160.
49. Byers, Op. Cit., p. 287.
50. See Murray Goldblatt, "Canada's Role in Vietnam" in International Perspectives (March/April 1973), p. 50.
51. Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 167.
52. Sharp, Vietnam, p. 24.
53. Debates, March 27, 1973, p. 2630.
54. Ibid., p. 2629.
55. Byers, Op. Cit., p. 288 and Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 188.
56. International Canada, April 1973, p. 117.
57. See Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 175.
58. Byers, Op. Cit., p. 288. For an example of the "open mouth" policy followed by the Canadian ICCS delegation see Michel Gauvin "Ambassador's view of the ICCS limits" in International Perspectives (May/June, 1973), pp. 16-17.
59. International Canada, June 1973, p. 196.
60. Debates, May 29, 1973, p. 4195.
61. International Canada, September 1973, p. 234.
62. Globe and Mail, November 24, 1969.

63. Globe and Mail, June 2 and 5, 1970. One would think that Sharp had, or believed he had, cabinet support when twice in a period of four days during an official visit he stated Canada was willing to serve as a Middle East peacekeeper again.
64. Globe and Mail, June 6, 1970.
65. Mitchell Sharp, "World Order and World Security", Statements and Speeches, 70/11, p. 4.
66. Quoted in Alastair Buchan, "Concepts of Peacekeeping" in M.G. Fry (ed.) Freedom and Change, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), p. 21.
67. Debates, October 22, 1973, pp. 7074-7075.
68. Globe and Mail, October 26, 1973.
69. R.B. Byers, "Defence and Foreign Policy in the 1970's: The Demise of the Trudeau Doctrine" in International Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 323.
70. Debates, October 26, 1973, p. 7258.
71. N.A. Pelcovits, "UN Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict" in Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 162.
72. See Debates, November 14, 1973, pp. 7801-7803.
73. Globe and Mail, November 9, 1973, Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 180, also claims that Ottawa "desperately" sought a role on UNEF II.
74. Canada Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1945-1975, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977), p. 57. Ottawa was pleased with the force's mandate because: the UN would serve as the continuing political authority to which the force would report; the Secretary-General would make his report public; the force would have the full backing of the Security Council; have full co-operation from the belligerents; function as an integrated and efficient military unit; would be allowed freedom of movement, communications and, "other facilities" necessary to perform its duties; and force personnel would be granted immunity as provided for by the UN convention on privileges and immunities. Debates, October 30, 1973, p. 7343.
75. International Canada, January 1976, p. 6.
76. Ibid., November 1974, p. 108 and Ibid., May 1977, p. 130.

77. See comments made by General Dextraze, Chief of Defence Staff, regarding the overextension of the Armed Forces caused by peacekeeping in "A New Era for Canada's Armed Forces", Statements and Speeches, 76/3.
78. Lester Pearson was the first Canadian External Affairs Minister to make this request, which was to be repeated many times by his successors in External Affairs. Pearson also sought to create a permanent UN police force. However, this dream was never realized.
79. Don Jamieson, "The UN attests the Common Accountability of its Members", Statements and Speeches, 78/5, p. 8.
80. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 11.
81. Buchan, Op. Cit., p. 20. See William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 1967-1976, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 176-206, for an excellent account of American mediation efforts during the Yon Kippur War.
82. See Chapter one for further details of the 1964 Commonwealth Conference. Robert C. Good, U.D.I. The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) is an excellent study of the early international efforts to cope with the Rhodesian issue, R.O. Mathews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Lyon and Ismael (eds.), Op. Cit., provides a good overview of Canadian policy towards Africa.
83. Don Jamieson, "Canada's International Responsibilities", Statements and Speeches, 76/32, p. 4.
84. David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence" in John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 1976, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 329, and International Canada, October 1977.
85. International Canada, September 1977, p. 217.
86. Globe and Mail, October 26, 1977.
87. See Don Jamieson, "Current Issues of Concern to Canada and the International Community", Statements and Speeches, 77/24, p. 15 and Don Jamieson, "Canadian Foreign Policy: A 1978 Perspective", Statements and Speeches, 78/2, p. 7 for similar sentiments.
- 87a. Globe and Mail, November 10, 1979.

88. Clarence G. Redekop, "The limits of diplomacy: the case of Namibia" in International Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 79.
89. For further elaboration of the contact group's proposals see Don Jamieson "Canada Supports a New Proposal for Namibian Independence", Statements and Speeches, 78/6. Security Council Resolution 435 is published in United Nations, Security Council, Document S/12636 (September 29, 1978). By comparing these two sources one can conclude that South Africa was unjustified in rejecting the Security Council resolution. It seems obvious Pretoria was stalling for time in order to carry out its own plans.
90. International Canada, September 1978, p. 192, and Don Jamieson, "The UN Attests the Common Accountability of its Members", Statements and Speeches, 78/5.
91. Globe and Mail, September 28, 1978, and International Canada, September, 1978, p. 192.
92. International Canada, October 1978, p. 215.
93. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 18.
94. Sunday Observer, January 14, 1979, as quoted in Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 17.
95. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 17. Jamieson informed the committee that during in camera negotiations Canada had played a very important role in the negotiations; however, he did not elaborate.
96. See International Canada, November 1978, p. 240 and David Leyton-Brown, "External Affairs and Defence" in R.B. Byers and John Saywell (eds.) Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 1978, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 278-279.
97. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 8, March 22, 1979, p. 27.
98. Ibid., Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 18.
99. Don Jamieson, "Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy, Statements and Speeches, 79/5, p. 1.
100. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 9.

Chapter 4

Conclusion: The Role of Image as an Influence on the Helpful Fixing Policies of Trudeau's Government

Introduction

Peacekeeping, and indeed helpful fixing, have become a permanent part of Canadian foreign and defence policies. Canada's role as an international helpful fixer was pioneered under the stewardship of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson during the 1950's. They fostered the development of Canada's active involvement in reducing international tensions and crisis whenever possible. The underlying motivation for assuming this role was the strong belief that World War II and the birth of the nuclear age had demonstrated beyond a doubt that Canada, or any other nation, was no longer invulnerable to the effects of war.

Canada, while certainly not unique in this venture, has found itself to be a suitable helpful fixer in the post-World War II era. It was not a colonial power, and has few direct interests to protect where it has intervened. Consequently, while it was recognized that Canada was aligned with NATO, Canada has been generally perceived to be sufficiently disinterested in most situations to be an objective mediator.¹ Therefore, under the guidance of St. Laurent, Pearson and their successors, Canada has been an active helpful fixer. Canadians often served as mediators in international disputes and from 1948 until the present, Canada served in every UN peacekeeping force and twice served on international commissions in Indochina.

Canada's vigorous activity as a mediator and peacekeeper, as well as its evident willingness to assume such roles, has created an international image for Canada as a helpful fixer. It was described by one European commentator as a "somewhat more distant Switzerland".² One of the arguments of this thesis is that the creation of a national image, once accepted, tends to influence those who later come into power. Helpful fixing was popular with the Canadian public and it was an expected international role for Canada, both domestically and internationally. The Trudeau government's foreign policy review, published as Foreign Policy for Canadians, reflected these expectations by reiterating support for peacekeeping, though it attempted to lower expectations about Canada's continued ability to act as a helpful fixer. During the 1970's, Mitchell Sharp and Don Jamieson constantly signalled that Canada was willing to act as a helpful fixer, and seldom rejected opportunities to act as such. The Trudeau government even sought to be included in United Nations peacekeeping forces earmarked for the Middle East and Namibia after Canada was initially ignored. Maintaining Canada's image as an international helpful fixer had become an important motivation for Canadian helpful fixing policies.

Image - A Definition

The importance of image is demonstrated by the Trudeau government's conclusion that "foreign policy can be shaped, and is shaped, mainly by the value judgements of the government at any given time".³ Value judgements are in part determined by one's conception of the surrounding milieu. Consequently, foreign policy decision makers' behaviour will depend upon their image of their own country, and of the world at large. An image consists of an organized mental picture of an object. This mental picture

is one's perception of the true character of the object as perceived through specific memories and expectations, in addition to sundry generalized beliefs.⁴ Images are shaped not only by current trends or opinions, but also by past experiences and perceptions.⁵ Past experiences are important because they will influence the selection of information which will become part of one's image of an object.⁶

Once an image has been adopted by an individual, it tends to remain simply because new information is usually accepted only if it corresponds with the already present image. This often holds true even if the image does not fit reality.⁷ Indeed, Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt found that it was almost impossible to change the images held by forty per cent of the population in "most" countries even over a twenty-year period. Only very rare combinations of events could change the images possessed by the other sixty per cent of the population. It required the "mutual reinforcement of cumulative events with spectacular events and substantial government efforts as well as the absence of sizable cross-pressures."⁸ Individual events could produce sharp fluctuations in image but often one's image quickly reverted to the previously held image. These changes in perception are more important for their long term, cumulative effect on the gradual change of an image over a long period of time.⁹

While the concept of images normally refers to individuals, it is also applicable to international affairs. Foreign policy makers hold images of their own and other states in the international system which influence their perceptions in any given situation. These images will thus help determine what decisions are made.¹⁰ Foreign policy decision makers in states will try to influence the image foreign policy elites in other

states possess of their state, because an image provides the general context in which a state is perceived. By controlling its projected image, a state's decision makers will influence how external actors respond to it, as well as how the domestic audience will view government activities. To influence its image, a state's government will issue signals in the form of statements or activities which it believes will encourage acceptance of its desired image by external or domestic audiences."¹¹

Perceptions of Canada's International Image

Canada's dominant international image is that of an international helpful fixer. It is an image that is generally perceived similarly both domestically and internationally. It is an image that has persisted since the early 1950's despite Canada having five different Prime Ministers. Indeed, Canadian governments are generally expected by their domestic audiences to act in a manner befitting Canada's helpful fixing image.

Both foreign and Canadian foreign policy elites most often equate Canadian international behaviour with that of the Scandinavian countries.¹² After interviewing foreign policy elites in numerous countries, Peyton V. Lyon and Brian Tomlin reported that ninety per cent believed that "Canada's activity in world affairs is distinguished by its efforts to sustain international organizations" while four-fifths also believed that it was characterized "by its eagerness to promote compromise."¹³ In fact, they found that foreigners even more so than Canadians perceived Canada's role in the United Nations to be that of a peacekeeper. Canada's role as a mediator and peacekeeper was also "generally appreciated" by the foreign policy elites interviewed.¹⁴

Lyon and Tomlin's results are supported by observing the types of questions faced by Trudeau or his Secretaries of State for External Affairs during international excursions, when they are often questioned about possible peacekeeping roles for Canada. This especially holds true when there are crisis that could potentially be defused by the use of peacekeeping forces. During international excursions to Asia in 1970 and 1971, Trudeau was repeatedly questioned at press conferences and university teach-ins about the possibility of using an international peacekeeping force, and Canada's role in such a force, to end the Vietnam war.¹⁵ This type of questioning demonstrates an awareness of Canada's history as a peacekeeper.

The Trudeau government itself recognized in the foreign policy review that "the United Nations will expect Canada to continue to provide advice and assistance in the peacekeeping of the future."¹⁶ Thus the government publicly acknowledged its image as an international peacekeeper and that this would in future lead to requests for further participation in UN peacekeeping activities. But the government believed that Canada, as a developed Western country and a firm NATO ally, would have its opportunities to act as a peacekeeper reduced in peacekeeping forces sent to the Third World. Nevertheless, it recognized that its record at the United Nations had resulted in African countries concluding that Canada was amongst the most "sympathetic" developed Western countries to the aspirations of the developing countries.¹⁷ However, a series of interviews in 1969 carried out by David Wiseman at the United Nations with Afro-Asian delegations indicated that being a white and developed nation would not bar Canada from future peacekeeping operations in the Third World.¹⁸ Canada possessed a

positive image with these countries, just as Ottawa itself claimed.

The evidence would seem to strongly support the contention that Canada's dominant international image is that of an international helpful fixer. It is perceived as such by both foreign and Canadian foreign policy elites. The image existed in 1969 at the beginning of Trudeau's period as prime minister and has persisted into the 1980's. This would indicate that Ottawa did little to harm Canada's reputation as a helpful fixer. Indeed, it was claimed in 1975 that "Canadian judgement has perhaps been coloured in the past by a feeling of being the world's peacekeeper par excellence."¹⁹ During the 1970's the government, well aware of its image as an international helpful fixer, acted to ensure that it was included in the peacekeeping forces created by the United Nations. Trudeau's government was criticized twice for trying too hard to secure roles in peacekeeping forces. It was criticized in 1973 for 'stooping to generate' a role in UNEF II, and in 1979 for its blatant signaling of Canada's availability for a role in a UN peacekeeping force proposed for Namibia.²⁰ As Lyon's and Tomlin's study indicated, Canada's image amongst foreign policy elites as a helpful fixer did remain strong during the 1970's.

Domestic Attitudes to Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has been popular with the Canadian public since 1956. The success of UNEF I and Canada's role in its creation resulted in a groundswell of support for peacekeeping in Canada. This support, either for Canadian contributions to specific forces for peacekeeping in general, has fluctuated but has not fallen below 53 per cent since the initial success in UNEF I. As Deutsch and Merritt found, it is almost impossible to change significantly images held by the public over a twenty-year period.

In 1956, public opinion was initially sharply divided over Canada's role in the Suez crisis. Indeed, it was the most heated foreign affairs debate in Canada since the conscription crisis of World War II. Many people were angered at Ottawa's condemnation of Britain's actions, and the major part it played in creating the Emergency Force. The opposition was centered in those areas that traditionally favoured Great Britain, notably Toronto, southwestern Ontario, and the Maritimes. However, in other parts of the country, the creation of UNEF I was generally well supported.²¹ A 1956 public opinion poll showed that 79 per cent of respondents supported peacekeeping. This was an increase from the 45 per cent level of support recorded the previous year.²² Suez had a profound effect on Canadians and since that time they have seen "themselves in the chosen role of peacekeepers."²³

In 1962, 78 per cent of Canadians thought peacekeeping was a suitable role for Canada. But in 1964, after several Canadian soldiers serving with the UN in the Congo had been physically beaten, only 54.6 per cent of Canadians supported dispatching Canadian troops to Cyprus as United Nations peacekeepers, while 31.6 per cent opposed such a venture. Even after UNEF I was forced to withdraw in 1967, 31.6 per cent of Canadians felt the demise of the force should not affect peacekeeping, while 30.4 per cent actually felt that the need for Canadian peacekeeping forces had increased. However, 24.1 per cent believed it had reduced the need for Canadian peacekeeping. Nevertheless, a majority of Canadians still felt Canada had a role to play and supported continued participation in peacekeeping operations.²⁴

During the 1970's support for peacekeeping has remained strong. A Toronto Star poll in 1971 discovered that 64 per cent of its respondents favoured the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping army.²⁵ Even

in 1974, shortly after Canadian troops belonging to the Cyprus peacekeeping force were engaged in fighting and a plane carrying some Canadian troops on peacekeeping duty was shot down in Syria, a majority of Canadians still supported peacekeeping. 40.3 per cent stated unequivocally that Canada should participate in peacekeeping, while 16.5 per cent agreed that on a "selected" basis peacekeeping should be continued.²⁶ In 1979, 89 per cent of Canadians felt that peacekeeping should be one of the primary concerns of the government.²⁷

The public's generally strong support for peacekeeping has been reflected in Parliament. All three major federal parties have consistently committed themselves to peacekeeping. The Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence in 1970 strongly endorsed a continued peacekeeping role for Canada, and urged the government to maintain its role. In 1972, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs also urged the Trudeau government to accept any requests to act as a peacekeeper in Indo-china.²⁸ The opposition parties have repeatedly criticized the government when they believed it was weakening its commitment to peacekeeping. The heavy criticism Trudeau's government received after Foreign Policy for Canadians suggested Canada would probably not be wanted too often as a peacekeeper during the 1970's, and should only join forces that had a reasonable chance of success, is indicative of the pressure placed on the government to act as a helpful fixer. Pierre Trudeau strongly criticized the shortlived Clark government for endorsing too strongly American condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, because it prevented Canada from adopting its usual mediation role.

The public's endorsement of Canada's helpful fixing role has served to buttress the government's support of helpful fixing. As well, because

Canada's image as a helpful fixer has persisted for so long, and has been endorsed by the major political parties, successive policy makers have not been free of the helpful fixing image. Trudeau's first Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, was a former member of Lester Pearson's cabinet. It was Sharp who as early as 1969 offered Canadian troops for service in a peacekeeping force for the Middle East and who, in Claude Wagner's words, "stooped to generate" a role on the peacekeeping force sent to the Middle East in 1973. Sharp's successors in External Affairs were also most willing to involve Canada in helpful fixing activities. Helpful fixing has been and continues to be an international role which is broadly supported in Canada. It has become a Canadian tradition in international affairs which has meant the government is expected by Canadians to act in a certain manner during international crisis.

Development and Preservation of the Helpful Fixer Image

What makes Canada unique in international affairs when compared to other countries of similar size, such as Australia, were those who directed Canadian foreign policy in the years immediately following the Second World War. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson initiated Canada's international activities as a peacekeeper and mediator, and it was their activities which gave Canada an image as an international helpful fixer. This image, popular in Canada, guided and motivated subsequent Canadian foreign policy decision makers.

St. Laurent and Pearson strongly believed that the Second World War had demonstrated beyond a doubt that no nation was immune from involvement in international conflict. Pearson was to write that

Everything I learned during the war confirmed and strengthened my view as a Canadian that our foreign policy must not be timid or fearful of commitments

but activist in accepting international responsibilities...International co-operation for peace is the most important aspect of national policy.²⁹

St. Laurent's and Pearson's strong personal beliefs that the prevention of war was essential for the survival of not only Canada, but the whole world, became a primary motivation of Canadian diplomacy during the 1950's. Consequently, Canada adopted its role as a helpful fixer, mediating in crisis whenever possible, and looking for ways to strengthen the United Nations. Peacekeeping became a cornerstone of Canada's helpful fixing activities so Ottawa constantly attempted to improve the ability of the United Nations to create peacekeeping forces. It made proposals for the creation of stand-by forces, attempted to create effective procedures, and, to ensure adequate financing of peacekeeping forces. Pearson argued that

only by collective international action and by a consequent limitation of national sovereignty through the acceptance of international commitments, can peace and security be established and maintained, and human survival ensured.³⁰

Pearson strongly believed that acting through the United Nations was the best way to preserve peace, and curb the larger powers actions against smaller powers.³¹ In order to maintain the credibility of the UN, Ottawa consistently tried to ensure that all peacekeeping activities took place under the auspices of the United Nations, and it always responded positively when called upon by the world organization. Ottawa refused to abandon its commitment to the UN even when UN activities, especially as the General Assembly became increasingly dominated by the countries of the Third World, did not please Ottawa.

By the time St. Laurent's government was defeated in 1957 by Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservative party, Canada's helpful fixer

image was firmly ensconced. Diefenbaker followed in his predecessor's footsteps by preventing the disintegration of the Commonwealth because of tensions created by South Africa's apartheid policies. The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, often spoke of Canada as a world peacekeeper, and in 1962 public pressure induced the Diefenbaker government to send Canadian troops to the Congo as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Upon election of the Liberals in 1963 Paul Martin was assigned to the External Affairs portfolio as he wished. Pearson had used the public popularity he had gained because of his successful helpful fixing policies, notably the creation of UNEF I in 1956 while Secretary of State for External Affairs to catapult himself into the Prime Minister's office. Martin, while no doubt believing that Canada could and should make a contribution to world peace, hoped to duplicate Pearson's accession to the prime ministership.³² Stating "I am convinced that Canadians want us to go on making a contribution to UN peacekeeping" Martin tried to "out-Pearson Pearson"³³ with his repeated public statements in favour of peacekeeping. And, as we have already noted above, Martin played a crucial role in the creation of the UN force sent to Cyprus. He also made desperate, but unsuccessful efforts to prevent the withdrawal of UNEF I in 1967.

Pearson's eventual successor, Pierre Trudeau, attempted to deflate public expectations about Canada's ability to be a helpful fixer. Canadians were warned that his government believed that there would be fewer opportunities for peacekeeping in the 1970's, and that Canadians might not always be acceptable in such roles. Foreign Policy for Canadians reflected this belief but also stated that it is a "basic premise" that Canada should continue its policy of attempting to improve the UN's capability to fulfill

its charter responsibilities, of which the UN's first purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, the government stated, Canada would accept peacekeeping duties if it felt the United Nations could "play a useful role". It was also determined to take an active part in improving the guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations and for resolving disputes. As well, Canada would maintain its standby peacekeeping forces.³⁴

The image that Canada was an international helpful fixer simply would not dissipate. Indeed Peyton V. Lyon and Brian Tomlin found in 1979 that 94 per cent of the Canadian foreign policy elite supported Canada's role as a peacekeeper, though only 14 per cent believed Canada should "automatically" support UN peacekeeping.³⁵ The government contributed to Canada's helpful fixer image by both words and deeds. In 1969 and 1970 Mitchell Sharp made unsolicited offers of Canadian troops for peacekeeping duty in the Middle East and refuted accusations that Foreign Policy for Canadians indicated the government wanted to downgrade its peacekeeping efforts. During the 1970's government rhetoric repeatedly emphasized Canada's contribution to international peace through such statements as MacEachen's 1976 pronouncement that Canada's contribution to the Middle Eastern peacekeeping forces "is larger than that provided by any other country [and]...Canada fully intends to maintain its contribution", as well as Jamieson's terse assertion in 1979 that peacekeeping was "a useful and effective role for Canada."³⁶

The Trudeau government also actively participated in international affairs as a helpful fixer. Trudeau played a crucial role in preventing the Commonwealth from disintegrating at the 1970 Singapore Commonwealth

Conference, Sharp successfully pressured the UN to include Canada in UNEF II, MacEachen served as mediator during the British-Icelandic "Cod War", and Jamieson played a leading role in negotiations to end South African rule in Namibia. Canadians participated in all UN peacekeeping forces created during the 1970's as well as the ICCS in Vietnam. Strenuous efforts were also made by Ottawa to have Canadian troops included in the peacekeeping force proposed for Namibia.

Robert Jervis asserts that a state will issue signals to protect its desired image.³⁷ The repeated statements by the government supporting peacekeeping can be interpreted as attempts to protect Canada's helpful fixer image, as can the diplomatic efforts to ensure Canadian participation in the Middle Eastern and Namibian peacekeeping forces. The government has also tried to prevent injury to its apparently desired image. Mitchell Sharp refused to intervene in the Nigerian Civil War despite strong public pressure because he argued, the civil war was a domestic concern of the Nigerian government. Meddling in the domestic concerns of another government without invitation would only damage Canada's international reputation with a consequent reduction in Canada's future effectiveness as a helpful fixer.³⁸

In addition to avoid unsolicited activity in Nigeria the government was also reluctant to become involved in the 1973 truce supervisory force in Vietnam. It was concerned that participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision, which was not created by the United Nations, could leave Canada appearing as an American representative.³⁹ The government was also very concerned that if the truce collapsed, which to it appeared likely, as one of the truce supervisors

Canada could be blamed for the breakdown.⁴⁰ There is little honour for serving in an unsuccessful peacekeeping force so the "open mouth policy" adopted by Ottawa prepared the way for the Canadians early departure once it was evident the force would be no more effective than Ottawa had believed.⁴¹ Thus Canada escaped the ignomy of watching the truce collapse completely. Sharp's assurances following the Canadian pullout that Canada would return to Vietnam if there was an effective mandate for a peacekeeping force seems calculated to be a reassurance that Canada was not leaving the helpful fixing business. In addition, it was only three months later when Sharp made a special flight to New York to ensure Canadian participation in the new Middle Eastern peacekeeping force. Behavior depends on images and the helpful fixer image appears to have remained firmly ensconced in Ottawa. Indeed, the Trudeau government's statements and behaviour during the 1970's seem calculated to preserve and enhance Canada's helpful fixer image.

Alternative Explanations for Canada's Helpful Fixing Policies.

A number of reasons have been attributed for Canada's helpful fixer policies. While these motivations may have been valid at one time, it seems that due to changed circumstances they were no longer as valid during the 1970's.

When addressing the question of what has motivated Canada to act as a helpful fixer one of the most persistently ascribed reasons has been the desire to maintain Canada's peace and security. The quest for peace and the desire to strengthen Canada's security through the use of international organizations provided the basic motivation for Pearson's and St. Laurent's helpful fixing policies. Pearson believed that "international

co-operation for peace is the most important aspect of national policy."⁴² However, while the desire for peace and security was still strong in Ottawa during the 1970's, Canada was, as Trudeau had observed, of decreasing importance in international affairs.⁴³ Canada was generally not in a position to play leading roles in peacekeeping operations as it once was. Rather, during the 1970's Canada's helpful fixing policies were devoted to doing whatever possible to ease international tensions, and ensuring that Canada participated in all United Nations' peacekeeping operations. Essentially, the 1970's saw Canada maintaining a high profile as a peacekeeper but actually performing a less crucial role as a peacekeeper than previously.

Perhaps the most important reason for this change of affairs was that Canada did not have a seat on the United Nations Security Council between 1967 and 1978. Canada had been most effective as a helpful fixer when it possessed a seat on the Security Council. Indeed, Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize for resolving the Suez crisis in 1956 by creating UNEF I, when Canada had a seat on the Security Council. However, the Trudeau government did not even play as significant a role as Paul Martin in 1964 during the creation of the peacekeeping force for Cyprus.

During the 1970's many more countries have also become willing to participate in peacekeeping forces as former colonies have adjusted to independence, and have become able to take part in international affairs. Such countries as Senegal, Indonesia, and even little Fiji have contributed to recent peacekeeping forces. Indeed, it is now United Nations' policy to ensure regional balance in the selection of forces in order to satisfy criticism from Communist and Third World countries that membership on UN peacekeeping forces had previously been too heavily weighted in favour of

western nations.⁴⁴ Consequently, Canada is no longer as necessary for peacekeeping as she once was in the 1950's, when Canada was one of the relatively few countries able and willing to partake in international peacekeeping. Therefore, Canada has recently found it more difficult to find itself a role on peacekeeping forces.

Canada's difficulties in obtaining positions in peacekeeping forces are well illustrated by the difficulties encountered when it tried to secure roles in the second United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group proposed for Namibia. Canada was only accepted as a contributor to UNEF II after a great deal of diplomatic bargaining. That Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp felt obliged to make a hurried visit to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in New York, and that Department of External Affairs officials were greatly perturbed until Canada was assigned a place on the UN force, indicates both that the government was concerned lest it not have a role, and that Canada was not really a necessary participant in the force. Indeed, in 1973 Canada was required to share the logistics role with Poland, unlike 1956 when Canadians performed the role alone. Therefore, in 1973 Canadian participation was not essential for the peacekeeping forces operation as it was claimed to be in 1956 when the force commander, General E.L.M. Burns of Canada, stated that "the administrative and support troops Canada provided...were absolutely essential, and the force could not have operated without them."⁴⁵ In 1956 Pearson was responsible for initiating and preparing the plans for UNEF I in order to end a serious international crisis, unlike 1973 when Ottawa was a helpless bystander reduced to sending Sharp to New York to ensure Canada had a role, after the force was already created. Unlike 1956, when Canadian officials played a crucial role in

ending a major international crisis, in 1973 Canadians performed no such function.

Only since 1978 has Ottawa, in league with the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, played an important role in attempting to diffuse a potentially explosive situation, when it has participated in negotiations to end South African rule in Namibia. However, Canada has found itself unwanted as a peacekeeper in the territory. After Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson publicly offered Canadian troops for the peacekeeping force proposed to be sent to Namibia, a United Nations spokesman publicly stated Canadians were not essential for the force as many other countries had volunteered troops.⁴⁶ As events unfolded, the Secretary General did not include Canada amongst the list of countries designated to contribute troops to the Namibian peacekeeping force if it was activated. However, Jamieson persisted in reiterating Canada's willingness to send troops to the proposed force, indicating that it was not so much peace and security but rather preservation of Canada's helpful fixer image that was at issue.

Another argument used to justify or explain Canada's willingness to act as a peacekeeper during the years following World War II was that the United Nations needed Canada's military capability. It has been claimed that the Canadian Armed Forces were much better equipped than other small powers acceptable for peacekeeping.⁴⁷ It had the ability to provide efficient transportation and supply organizations in addition to effective communications systems. Canada did indeed provide the logistics for UNEF I and the Congo peacekeeping force. However, during the 1970's the United Nations had a wider choice when selecting the countries which

would provide the logistics element. Canada shared the logistics role for UNEF II with Poland, and provided a communications team for the United Nations force sent to Lebanon during its initial six months, but, since that period other nations have fulfilled the logistics duties for that force, Canada was not included in any capacity in the plans for the proposed peacekeeping force in Namibia.

James Eayrs has argued that "the main and overriding motive" for maintaining the Canadian Armed Forces has had little to do with national defence. He argued that the United States must protect Canada in order to protect itself in this nuclear age. Eayrs claims that the armed forces are maintained in order to support Canadian diplomacy.⁴⁸ In support of this contention, it has been suggested that once the Canadian Armed Forces had developed military capabilities for peacekeeping purposes, it would be "politically embarrassing" for Ottawa to decline peacekeeping roles.⁴⁹ Indeed, since the 1964 Defence White paper the Armed Forces have been trained and equipped for peacekeeping duty, and, unification of the three services was carried out in order to provide the flexibility needed for peacekeeping. Consequently, what has evolved since 1964 is a peacekeeping army which is lightly equipped and highly mobile, and which has units on standby for immediate peacekeeping duty. The military, which initially was reluctant to be involved in peacekeeping, also began to enjoy its new role because it was popular with the public and provided operational experience for the troops.

The Trudeau government wanted to retain a peacekeeping role for Canada, so the 1971 defence white paper reiterated support for peacekeeping. Significantly, the white paper did not alter the peacekeeping capabilities of the armed forces while it proposed reducing and restructuring the Armed

Forces NATO commitment.⁵⁰ Therefore, the government protected its helpful fixer image by not reducing the Armed Forces' ability to act as peacekeepers. It is well it did for Ottawa used the Forces peacekeeping capabilities to the fullest thereby causing the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Dextraze, to complain in 1976 that the heavy peacekeeping commitments were overextending the military's strength.⁵¹

It has been suggested that helpful fixing provides Canada with an independent foreign policy. David Cox has said that "peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy [is a] search for areas of flexibility."⁵² If Canada wants to continue as a helpful fixer it must demonstrate some independence from the United States and NATO in order to be accepted in such a role.⁵³ However, this is a questionable hypothesis. A major premise in Canadian foreign policy is that Canada will not jeopardize NATO interests. The United States also has tremendous economic power over Canada, and Canadian security depends on its southern neighbour. Therefore, Canadian foreign policy decision makers will criticize and try to change American foreign policy when they believe it is necessary, but they will not do anything that would adversely affect American power or prestige.⁵⁴ The United States will not normally try to prescribe Canadian foreign policy decisions, but it is still most influential because of "the restraints Canadians place upon themselves out of consideration for American attitudes or possible American attitudes which are the determining factor" in Canadian foreign policy decision making.⁵⁵

Knowing that Canada is loyal to Western values and is committed to NATO, Canada's allies do not object to it seeking compromise positions. Peyton V. Lyon and Brian Tomlin have also found that Communist and non-aligned countries accept Canadian participation in peacekeeping forces

because they believe that Canada is a relatively objective country which has "exceptionally easy access to Washington and NATO."⁵⁶ Canada was indeed selected to be the NATO representative on both the ICCS and UNEF II, though the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) objected to a possible Canadian presence on the proposed Namibian peacekeeping force because it was a NATO member. Despite SWAPO's stand, Canada's helpful fixer image makes Canada the most acceptable NATO country for peacekeeping roles.

Instead of giving Canada an independent foreign policy, Canada's helpful fixer image has bestowed more opportunities for Canada to use its influence. This is not to say that Canada is extremely influential, but that the helpful fixer image has allowed Canada to be more active in international affairs. Mitchell Sharp recognized this in 1969 when he stated that his predecessors, notably Lester Pearson, had greatly enhanced Canada's reputation and gave it "a considerable capacity for political and diplomatic influence."⁵⁷

Canada's mediation efforts in the Commonwealth were in large part responsible for close Canadian relations with its Afro-Asian members, which resulted in Canada's inclusion amongst the five western nations which have been attempting to end South African rule in Namibia. Once it was included in the group, Canada played a leading role in the negotiations.⁵⁸ Canada's reputation as a helpful fixer had also meant that on numerous occasions, especially at Commonwealth conferences, other nations turn to Canada for compromise solutions.⁵⁹ On account of Canada's acceptability as a peacekeeper, Canada often finds itself on peacekeeping forces which has then provided opportunities for Canadian opinions to be expressed. Don Jamieson

expressed the government's belief in this contention in 1978 when he stated that Canada "had earned the right to speak out on Cyprus because it had...a peacekeeping presence there"⁶⁰, and he followed up by joining the United States and Great Britain to present a new peace plan for Cyprus.

Due to changing circumstances, especially the increasing ability and willingness of Third World countries to involve themselves in international affairs, Canada has found during the 1970's that it was no longer essential for peacekeeping. Other countries could provide the logistics for peacekeeping forces, so such forces could function quite well without Canada. Nevertheless, having enunciated Canada's continued commitment to peacekeeping in Defence in the 70's and elsewhere, and with peacekeeping still popular with Canadians, government officials attempted to generate peacekeeping roles. Peace and security was no longer what was motivating Canadian peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

Since Lester Pearson won accolades and a Nobel Peace Prize for ending the Suez crisis in 1956, domestically and internationally Canada has been perceived as an international helpful fixer. It is a universally popular role as Lyon and Tomlin's studies demonstrated and public opinion polls have shown. As the image has persisted, the government is expected and indeed seems to feel obliged to acquire roles in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

As the 1960's drew to a close the government concluded that Canada would have fewer opportunities for helpful fixing in the 1970's. It believed that Canada would be needed less as an East-West middleman as Cold War tensions declined. Trudeau's government also concluded that the

ending of the period of decolonization would increase stability in the Third World, thereby reducing the need for peacekeeping forces. If peacekeeping forces were needed, it believed that Canada, as a developed country with a predominantly white population, would not be wanted to contribute forces. Therefore, Canadian foreign policy in the 1970's would not be based on the assumption Canada would be a helpful fixer. But while attempting to lower public expectations, the government did reiterate its support for helpful fixing and stated that if opportunities arose Canada would be prepared to act. The subsequent defence white paper confirmed the government's commitment and preserved intact the Armed Forces peacekeeping capabilities.

If there was any question that Trudeau's government had not accepted Canada's helpful fixer image, they should have been dispelled by Trudeau's role at the 1971 Singapore Commonwealth Conference, and the frantic diplomatic activity to secure a role on UNEF II in 1973. The government's reluctance to join the ICCS in Vietnam partly because it feared being blamed for collapse of the truce, remaining on the Cyprus peacekeeping force despite long-standing dissatisfaction over its financing and the lack of progress in peace negotiations also confirmed the government's desire to protect Canada's helpful fixer image. Canadian politicians made constant and repetitious references to Canada's peacekeeping record which culminated in Jamieson's public offers in 1978-1979 to contribute Canadian troops to the United Nations peacekeeping forces to be sent to Namibia, despite public rejection by a UN spokesman. No longer needed by the United Nations for peacekeeping, Trudeau's government nevertheless persisted in its efforts to be perceived as a helpful fixer. The image created by Pearson has persisted and appears to have shaped the government's value judgements in the 1970's.

Notes

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3. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy For Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 19.
4. Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations" in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 24.
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29. Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 1 edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 283.
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31. See Lester Pearson, Words and Occasions, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 69.
32. Peter C. Dobell, Canada's search for new roles, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 144.
33. Paul Martin, "Contributions to International Peace and Development", Statements and Speeches 67/27, p. 4 and Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 25.
34. Foreign Policy for Canadians, (United Nations), p. 17.
35. Lyon and Tomlin, Op. Cit., p. 17, footnote no. 5.
36. Allan J. MacEachen, "Balance and Objectivity - The Aims of Canada's Middle East Policy, Statements and Speeches 76/6 and Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 17.
37. Jervis, Op. Cit., p. 66.
38. See Canada, House of Commons, Debates, November 26, 1968, p. 3239.
39. Sharp felt obliged to state that Canada was not a spokesman for any one party.
40. Murray Goldblatt, "Canada's role in Vietnam", International Perspectives, (March/April, 1973), p. 50.
41. R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and National Defence" in John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 1973, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 288.
42. Cited in John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), p. 67.
43. Trudeau stated that "Canada's position in the world is now very different from that of the post-war years. Then we were probably the largest of the small powers. Our currency was one of the strongest. We were the fourth or fifth trading nation and our economy was much stronger than the European economies. We had one of the very strongest navy and air forces. But now, Europe has regained its strength. The Third World has emerged." Office of the Prime Minister, press release, May 29, 1968. quoted in Dobell, Op. Cit., p. 3.
44. N.A. Pelcovits, "United Nations Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict", Orbis, Vol. 19, no. 1 (1975), p. 162.

45. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, (Toronto: Clarke Irwin and Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 215.
46. International Canada, September, 1978, p. 192.
47. See John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 24 or J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping is our Profession?", in International Journal, Vol. 25, p. 415.
48. James Eayres, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience" in Gordon, Op. Cit., p. 70.
49. David Cox, "Issues and Opinions: A Report on the Queen's/CIIA Conference on Peacekeeping" in Taylor et al, Op. Cit., p. 89.
50. See Canada, Department of National Defense. Defense in the 70's, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
51. General A.J. Dextraze, "A New Era for Canada's Armed Forces", Statements and Speeches 76/3.
52. David Cox, "Canada's Interest in Peacekeeping: Some Political and Military Considerations" in Taylor et al, Op. Cit., p. 62.
53. David Cox, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy" in Stephen E. Clarkson (ed.) An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 195.
54. Holmes, Better Part of Valour, p. 23.
55. John W. Holmes, "Focus on the constant dilemma of U.S.-Canadian relationships" in International Perspectives (May/June 1972), p. 10.
56. Lyon and Tomlin, Op. Cit., p. 16.
57. Mitchell Sharp, "The Role of Middle Powers in a Changing World", Statements and Speeches 69/3, pp. 3-4.
58. Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes and Proceedings, Issue No. 5, March 8, 1979, p. 17.
59. See Chapter 1. This happened at the 1966 and 1971 Commonwealth Conferences, and at the Disarmament negotiations among other occasions.
60. International Canada, June 1978, p. 153.

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