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The Role of Tanzanian Socialist Doctrine

THE ROLE OF TANZANIAN
SOCIALIST DOCTRINE

By

SEAN JONES, B.A.

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AUTHOR: Sean Jones, B.A. (Macquarie University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Gordon Means

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ABSTRACT

The Thesis examines the role of the ideology of socialism, as defined by Julius Nyerere, in the post independent years of Tanzania. Theoretical works will be cited. They list the possible roles an ideology can play. In addition, 'factors' that effect the role of an ideology at a specific time will be considered. The thesis will relate these possible roles to the Tanzanian experience.

In our investigation the concepts of Tanzanian socialism will be articulated. The relationship between social pressures and the formulation of the ideology, and the influence of that ideology on Tanzanian development will also be observed. Drawing from the Tanzanian experience, some broad conclusions will be made concerning the power of an ideology to aid modernization programmes in under-developed nations.

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CHAPTER I

The Role of Ideology

Why Ideology?

The day after the British colony Tanganyika won its independence, the leader of the new nation, Julius Nyerere, made the following statement to John Hatch:

Now that we won independence I do not know what to do with this country. 1

A year later Nyerere began to formulate ideological principles. He labelled them socialist, and they subsequently became the official policy guideline for the Tanzanian government.

What benefit does a leader see in promoting an ideology? It would appear that one motive a leader may have for drafting an ideology is simply that he believes it will strengthen his government's ability to rule. A common explanation for the supposed effectiveness of an ideology is that it will create an association between the government and the people. John Plamenatz makes the point that the power of an ideology is that it is "primarily 'persuasive' and is only, if I may so put it, secondarily 'prescriptive'." ² A similar view is expressed by L. Garstin who states that an ideology is "a conceptual scheme according to which the individual may govern his actions." ³ However, it would be naive to suggest that an ideology expounded by the ruling elite would, in the short term, be whole heartedly endorsed

¹ John Hatch, Two African Statesmen, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976), p. 179.

² John Plamenatz, Ideology, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 75.

³ L.H. Garstin, Each Age is a Dream. A Study in Ideology, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1953), p. 3.

by the public, so that the mass of the population would adopt new social ethics, as a practical guide for its own activities.

In view of the uncertainty regarding the political consequences of an ideology promoted by a government, it becomes appropriate to ask three questions, that serve as a focus for our thesis, using the Tanzanian experience as a case study. 1) What are the possible roles of an ideology, and, more particularly, what role does socialism play in Tanzania? 2) Does the role of an ideology change over a period of time, and what various roles has Tanzanian socialism played since the country's independence? 3) What are the reasons for the changing role of an ideology, and more specifically what was the particular configuration of forces that determined the role of socialism in Tanzania?

Some Views on the Role of Ideology

An ideology is commonly regarded as being a system of ideas belonging to a party, class or culture that manifests itself in a political arena. As a distinctive term, ideology was a product of post enlightenment theorists, who regarded it quite simply as a "science of ideas". Its meaning, however, has changed because of the influence of Karl Marx who challenged the belief that an ideology was concerned with the pursuit of 'scientific' facts. Marx instead argued that an ideology designates the quality of thought, part of which, by nature,

is illusory and distorted.⁴ He argued that an ideology is formed in relation to the existence of a ruling class who, over a period of time, formulates rules and laws based on their vested interests and is devoted to defending the structure of society. These rules and laws fall within the boundaries of the dominant ideology.⁵

The Marxist assumption that an ideology is a doctrine to justify the existence of the ruling class has been stated by many contemporary writers. For example, Robert Dahl argues that:

Leaders in a political system usually espouse a set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify their leadership in the system. A set of doctrines of this kind is an ideology. One reason why leaders develop an ideology is obvious: to endow their leadership with legitimacy - to convert their political influence into authority and it is far more economical to rule by means of authority than by means of coercion. 6

The reason why leaders of many developing nations feel the need to create ideological political doctrines is apparently because many of these countries have a weak 'national' structure. It is easy to comprehend the reasons

⁴W.A. Mullins, "On the Concepts of Ideology in Political Science", American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI No. 2, (June, 1972), p. 499.

⁵See T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, (ed.), Karl Marx, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 221-223.

⁶Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1965), p.42.

for a government wanting to suppress "antipathetic cultural strains"⁷ which might weaken the base of its support. Promoting an ideology is one possible means of overcoming the social influences which hinder the formation of a national state. David Apter explains:

Ideology, often consciously manipulated for the purpose of building authority, helps to minimize the consequences of such strain. That is how the ideology performs its solidarity function. Similarly in the case of identity, competing socialization processes new and traditional, make the identity problem a complex one; ideology is employed to introduce greater coherence.⁸

A number of scholars have concluded that political mobilization is a primary function of ideology particularly in developing countries. For example John Nellis observed that "it is absolutely clear that African leaders regarded their ideologies as capable of directing citizenry behaviour."⁹ To Nellis, an ideology is one of the few weapons that a government, of low administrative experience possesses to peacefully influence social behaviour.¹⁰ The ideology becomes an even more important strategy for the control of social behaviour when the political apparatus is the sole institution over which many African leaders have some control. Nellis explains;

⁷D.E. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent", in D.E. Apter, (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p.22.

⁸Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁹John Nellis, A Theory of Ideology, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 29.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 29-33.

the economic system is frequently, in African states, subject to the control of expatriate extractors or foreign markets, while the varied cultural systems in African states still contain authorities distinct and frequently antagonistic to the central government. 11

Apter cites a major reason for an ideology being an important tool for a government, in its efforts to develop the economy. An ideology has the potential to create comparatively homogeneous expectations and behaviour within a society, the government and its bureaucracy. This homogeneity provides the possibility to counterbalance the instability of a modernization programme, where past traditions are challenged and reformed so as to create the framework for a new social change.¹²

Apter also argues that an ideology is a link between action and fundamental belief. Because it is a link, ideology "helps make more explicit the moral basis of action."¹³ Mullins has also expanded on this theme by stating that an ideology can be utilized as a yardstick for government action. He states that an ideology, unlike a myth, results from the study of certain characteristics of a state, and because of this it is "cast in the form of logic."¹⁴ He continues:

Ideology...informs political action...it is inclined to simplify alternatives, to reduce complex situations to understandable

¹¹ Ibid., p. 33.

¹² D.E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 323.

¹³ D.E. Apter, op. cit., 1965, p. 314.

¹⁴ W.A. Mullins, op. cit., p. 506.

proportions so action is possible. Whereas utopia expands the detail, ideology appraises them, selecting some as especially relevant, and relegating the rest to background. 15

The creation of an ideology as the ruling doctrine of a state allows the government to define the political roles of other sectors in the community. By making an ideology the ruling doctrine, a government is stating that the concepts of the ideology are right and proper. In so doing, the government is in a position to discredit sectors of the population that would disagree over the validity or ideology can also be used as a test for access to the arenas of power, thereby becoming an important factor in recruitment, and also a means of promoting or punishing various sectors of the population.

If the broad framework of an officially proclaimed ideology is accepted by the population, then that ideology may give the state the potential to siphon and process information from within.¹⁶ For this cybernetic effect to occur, however, the ideology has to gain mass acceptance. When a ruling elite attempts to propagate an official ideology, as is typical of many underdeveloped countries, the government

¹⁵W.A. Mullins, ibid., p. 507.

¹⁶R.N. Bellah, "Epilogue: Religion and Progress in Modern Asia", in R.N. Bellah, (ed.), Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 169-170.

usually develops a strategy by which it attempts to obtain mass acceptance and support for the ideology.

Strategies to Obtain Acceptance for an Ideology

The obvious problem that governments face in underdeveloped countries is to obtain mass acceptance of its 'modernization' programme. If the ruling elite want to create a structure for modernization, this means that it will have to alter the traditional structure that had not created an environment for economic growth. In wishing to change the social structure, the ruling elite will face degrees of resistance from the populace, who are hesitant to deviate from traditional ideas and behaviour. The government can attempt to avoid these conflicts in values by either cloaking its ideas in a traditional idiom, or creating a group identity, such as a nationalistic spirit.

To elaborate on the first strategy: A government could promote an ideology by relating the social needs of the future, as embodied in the ideology, to a terminology linked with past social traditions. That is, future needs could be masked in traditional terms, and perhaps even 'sold' as a contemporary extension of the past, despite the contradictions and inconsistencies in such a theme.

A second strategy employed by governments in developing countries, designed to create public support and consensus, has been to place emphasis on nationhood, based on the argument that the good of all who live in the state, will be best

served by strong leadership from indigenous leaders. Nationalism is an ideology that has historically been used by elites as a device to legitimize their rule. If successful, this strategy may create social stability and strengthen the elite's powers. Since nationalism stresses the good of the nation, it implies that the elites' programmes are "somehow part of an even, natural evolution of social events",¹⁷ whereby all the population take an equal part. If the state has an unequal distribution of income and wealth, nationalism can be a stabilizing force, for it downplays the position and condition of the individual, while emphasising the collective good of the nation.¹⁸

While most European nations had a national heritage even before acquiring independence, many developing nations were the product of colonial rule, with boundaries being drawn up by colonial offices on the basis of geographic and political considerations, rather than a cultural or linguistic division.¹⁹ The lack of national heritage among many ex-colonial countries, places added strain on government resources to generate a popular sense of national identity, and a consensus

¹⁷ T. Narin, "The Modern Janus" The New Left Review, (November-December, 1975), No. 94, p. 9.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁹ Antony Rweyamanu, "An Overview of National Building: Problems and Issues", in A. Rweyamanu, (ed.), Nation Building in Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 2.

on national objectives. The government's legal authority, however, is based on the nation, therefore, the government has little choice but to strengthen links with its broad 'national' constituency.

A popular strategy employed to strengthen a nationalistic feeling is for the government to relate the freedom of being a non-colonial power to that of having the status of a nation. The nationalization of foreign enterprises in the post-independent period can also be a means of strengthening this nationalistic momentum. For a government of a newly-formed state, previously colonized by an external power, the act of nationalization can be regarded as a direct attack on the past, and a dramatic symbolic assertion of equal status for the new state.²⁰ However, it should be noted that in a post-independent period, the return to pre-independent sentiments (i.e. anti-colonial feelings) could, in itself, be restrictive in creating social consensus needed for the successful development of a state in its post independent period.

A Schema for Analysis

Many authors have suggested that governments, in developing areas, frequently promote an ideology in the expectation that ruling a country will be enhanced. Leaders of such governments often believe that the new political system can

²⁰ John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization, (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p. 109.

be legitimized by promoting an ideology. The role of an ideology will play in a political system may or may not approximate the expectations of those leaders who employ it as a public policy strategy. For analytical purposes it is important to try to identify some of the likely functions of ideology. Later in the examination of our case study, we can focus on various alternative functions, to explore whether, and to what extent, such functions are performed in Tanzania.

1) Ideology can create identity for government. By associating itself with the concepts of the ideology, a government may be providing its citizens with common goals.

2) An ideology can limit public demand. By generating popular support for an ideology, the government may be able to control demand, and create greater unity, within the political arena. Stability can be achieved in the political system, by the government referring to the concepts of the ideology, as an explanation to the populace of the necessity for sacrifices, to allow the fulfilment of the ideological goals.

3) An ideology can be a means of politically mobilizing the population for common goals that are defined by the state. If the government can successfully legitimate a single ideological framework, this ideology can, in turn, serve to justify future government-initiated actions. If the concepts of an ideology receive paramount attention by the government, then the elaboration of a particular ideology can become a

precondition in justifying aggressive and coercive forms of intervention by the state, in its attempt to implement the government's ideological goals.

- 4) An ideology, in a gatekeeping role, allows the government to promote allies and punish its foes. The government can do this by promoting the concepts of the ideology as being a reference point for 'correct' political activity, therefore allowing the government to publicly define the 'loyalty' of other political parties, or public groups within the country.
- 5) An ideology can also be used as a yardstick for government bureaucracy, in co-ordinating social and economic policies. The concepts of the ideology can be a reference point for government agencies, in setting-out what priorities should be given to competing economic or political interests within a society.

Factors Influencing the Role of Ideology

The government may alter its views on the role of an ideology in response to changing social conditions, caused by the influences of various social factors. Factors that may alter the role of an ideology include: 1) public acceptance or opposition to the ideology, 2) the enthusiasm for, and support of the ideology by the internal political elites, 3) feasibility, in the short or long term, of the economic programme that the ideology inspires, 4) the success of the government in strengthening the institutional apparatus of the state, and 5) the response of the international community

to the policy implications of an ideology.

The interacting of these factors creates an environment within which an ideology can either flourish or wither. A government will have to come to terms with them - and its reaction to new problems, could possibly, in time, alter the role of the ideology. For example, a government may have initially promoted an ideology because it gave priority to it being used as a yardstick for government policies, and as a technique for bureaucratic co-ordination. Later, other objectives or functions for an ideology may become paramount, depending on the elite's perceived requirements of the political system. Of course, a number of functions can be performed simultaneously by an ideology, but the relative emphasis could shift, depending upon environmental and circumstantial conditions. Thus, the different roles of an ideology are not fixed, but most likely shift and evolve. The matter of the circumstances and conditions that generate such a shift in the role of ideology, is one of the ancillary questions this thesis will explore, based on the content of the Tanzanian experience.

CHAPTER II

The Formulation and Content of the Tanzanian Socialist Doctrine

Tanzania's ideology of Socialism was not a statement of popular belief, nor a product of a broad national consensus among Tanzanians. Rather, it was almost exclusively one man's initiative -- Julius Nyerere. In 1962, Nyerere published a pamphlet entitled "Ujamaa -- The Basis of African Socialism."¹ In that pamphlet he outlined a few broad themes and goals for Tanganyika, but avoided a more specific elaboration of ideological objectives and strategies. By 1967, Nyerere was more detailed in his proposals for the creation of a socialist Tanzania. His more clarified thoughts on the meaning of socialism were published in the "Arusha Declaration",² and a number of auxiliary documents. The Arusha Declaration was endorsed by Tanzania's ruling party -- Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) -- as the ruling ideology. These documents contain the essence of Tanzanian socialism.

'Ujamaa'

In the earlier document, published in 1962 when Nyerere temporarily relinquished the office of Prime Minister, he enumerated some of the broad objectives he envisioned for his party, and his government. Nyerere argued that socialism

¹ Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa -- The Basis of African Socialism" in Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa -- Essays on Socialism, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-12.

² "Arusha Declaration", ibid., 13-37.

³ TANU is the official author of the Arusha Declaration. Nyerere's authorship, however, was both apparent and tacitly acknowledged. See John Hatch, Two African Statesmen, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976), pp. 192-193.

was "not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern",⁴ but was instead a social acceptance for co-operative enterprises. Referring to his ideology as 'Ujamaa' (familyhood⁵), Nyerere called for the revitalization of a sense of community, and a popular concern for the community, to allow for the creation of a socialist society.⁶

In his preliminary 'Ujamaa' statement, Nyerere addressed himself to a wide range of topics. He attacked colonialism because Africans were never granted the same rights as their colonial masters. He claimed that material equality is morally correct and a viable social goal in Africa. It is a plausible goal, argued Nyerere, because it is labour that creates wealth, and in Tanganyika everyone was a worker. Because everyone was a worker, socialism could be created in Tanganyika without an internal class struggle. The pamphlet, of only 6000 words was understandably, brief and general. Social equality, however and the rejection of class conflict as a means of building a socialist state, were the basic themes elaborated upon in the paper. A further theme involved Nyerere's call for a return to the traditional African tribal attitude towards the community, and the co-operative use of

⁴ Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa -- The Basis of African Socialism", op. cit., 1968, p. 1.

⁵ Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 162.

⁶ Ibid., p. 1.

property. According to Nyerere, the traditional tribal attitude exists when there is social co-operation.

This is exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing. Both the 'rich' and the 'poor' individual were completely secure in African society....Nobody starved, either of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. 7

He argued that the social features of traditional African society were synonymous with his vision of a modern socialist African life.

Nyerere advocated the establishment of communal and co-operative enterprises, in contrast to individual ownership of property. Such economic and social arrangements would, it was believed, facilitate the revitalization of traditional tribal attitudes toward community and the common good. For Nyerere, one of the main advantages of a society based on the village community and on co-operative enterprise, was that such institutions would create social conditions for greater equality. It was assumed that:

In a tribal society, the individual or families within the tribe were 'rich' or 'poor' according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor. 8

For Nyerere, the revitalization of a similar social attitude would allow for the creation of a socialist society in East

⁷Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁸Ibid., p. 9.

Africa.

Socialism, according to Nyerere, "is essentially distributive."⁹ Nyerere argued that inequality was morally wrong,¹⁰ and "must be interpreted as a vote of 'no confidence' in the social system."¹¹ In the 'Ujamaa' pamphlet, he further asserted that competition is socially self-destructive, - it pitted the individual against his fellow man, in a struggle for material gain. Derived from the premise that competition is not good, Nyerere proceeded to reject both colonialism and the "capitalist methods that go with it."¹²

Nyerere's abhorrence of competition and conflict, was extended from the individual to broader social strata, forcing him to reject the ideas of inherent class conflicts. He disputed the view that socialism must be born out of a class struggle. In doing so, he stated his opposition "to doctrinaire socialism [within the European tradition] which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man"¹³ in the transition from capitalism to socialism, as envisaged by most Marxist interpretations of the historical stages of development.

⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰ Nyerere writes: "There must be something wrong in a society where one man, however hard working or clever he may be, can acquire as great a 'reward' as a thousand of his fellows can acquire between them." Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹² Ibid., p. 7.

¹³ Ibid., p. 12.

Rediscovered tribal traditions, according to Nyerere would provide the foundation on which socialism would be built in Tanzania. He argued that Africans did not need to be converted to a new ideology, since the one he articulated was already rooted in the ideals and practices of traditional African society.¹⁴ For Nyerere, this traditional past was not just a Tanganyikan phenomenon, but also Pan-African. On the basis of this assumption, and the principles enunciated in his vision of socialism, he makes a plea for the creation of Pan-African unity.¹⁵

The Arusha Declaration

In the 'Ujamaa' pamphlet Nyerere stated that it was not his intention, in 1962, to "define the institutions which may be required to embody the socialist attitude in a modern society".¹⁶ In the Arusha Declaration, and also in a number of 'post Arusha' policy directives, he attempted to overcome this acknowledged deficiency. The Arusha Declaration was published in February 1967. It was approximately 24 pages in length, and is divided into five sections.

Part one of the declaration was an explanation of the broad principles of the TANU creed. The party declared that it was committed to building a socialist state, one in which there was social and material equality for the people in the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 12

¹⁵Ibid., p. 12

¹⁶Ibid., p. 1.

country.¹⁷ TANU also made clear in the document that it saw its responsibility "to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation"¹⁸, so as to build a socialist state. In accordance with this proposal TANU states that it was the government's function to actively assist "in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations".¹⁹ TANU also asserted that the government should "exercise effective control over the principal means of production, and pursue policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources"²⁰ in Tanzania.

In part two, the party defined its interpretations of socialism. The section commenced with a tautological definition:

A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and which neither capitalism and feudalism exists. 21

Section two does, however, illustrate the programmatic quality of the declaration, by committing the government to controlling the means of production.²² In part two, there was a list of "the means of production and exchange" which the government was compelled to nationalize, and this included land, oil, electricity, forests, minerals, water, news media, communications, banks, insurance, import and export trade, wholesale

¹⁷"Arusha Declaration", op. cit., pp. 13-14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 14.

²⁰Ibid., p. 15.

²¹Ibid., p. 15.

²²Ibid., p. 16.

fertilizers.²³

Section three, the longest in the declaration, was concerned with outlining the policy of self-reliance. The declaration attacked the allegedly held belief that development could occur simply "--WITH MONEY".²⁴ Such an attitude, claimed the party, was a mistake because:

we shall not be able to get sufficient money for our economic development; and secondly because even if we could get all that we need, such dependence on others would endanger our independence and our ability to choose our own political policies. 25

Section three, as indicated, outlined the proposed new direction for Tanzania's proposed new direction in development strategy. TANU stated that it would no longer give its highest priority to the development of the manufacturing sector, but would instead stress the development of the agrarian sector.²⁶ TANU reasoned that by previously having given high priority to industry, the government would in effect be causing the economy to go into debt, increasing Tanzania's dependence upon international finance. This would create greater inequality between the urban and rural sectors.²⁷ TANU proposed that more emphasis be placed upon the development of the agrarian sector, and only when this sector was developed,

²³ Ibid., p. 16.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 25-29.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 27-29.

should Tanzania then concentrate its efforts on the creation of a strong industrial base.²⁸ TANU advocated that rural growth should occur within a co-operative communal framework.²⁹ The Declaration also stated that the base of economic growth should be labour power, to lessen the government's need for obtaining capital.³⁰

Part four states that TANU should not be closed to the people. The masses should be allowed to exert their influence in determining national policy. This section also had a qualifying statement which stipulated that every party member must adhere to the socialist principles outlined in the Arusha Declaration.³¹

In section five, TANU stated that the government should implement policies "which will raise the standard of living of the peasants and the rural community",³² to ensure that workers in the private sector received incomes which were not "very different" from those received by workers in the public sector. It also pledged to develop a plan that would make Tanzania self reliant.³³

In the last section, the party drew up guidelines for

²⁸ Ibid., p. 33.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 33-35.

³¹ Ibid., p. 35.

³² Ibid., pp. 36-37.

³³ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

the conduct of party leaders in creating a socialist state. Section five stated that a TANU leader must be either a 'peasant' or a 'worker', "and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism."³⁴ In addition, a TANU leader is prohibited from owning shares in a company, be a director of a private firm, receive two salaries, or to be a landlord.³⁵

In the 'post Arusha' policy directives, four of the Declaration's points were stressed. Firstly, Nyerere emphasised the need for self reliance. Secondly, he underlined the need for rural development and 'hard work', as a means of achieving this goal. Thirdly, he stressed the importance of 'equality'. Forthly, Nyerere emphasised the point that the Arusha Declaration was an "act of intent"³⁶ to change -- not just reform -- Tanzanian society and thus create a socialist society.

In October 1967 Nyerere reiterated the 'self reliance' initially cited in the Arusha Declaration. To him it did not mean self sufficiency. In the post-Arusha period, the receiving of aid and loans from foreign sources did not break the principles of the 1967 declaration.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

³⁶ Julius Nyerere, "After the Arusha Declaration" in Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 385.

Nyerere stated, however, that assistance of this sort was to be directed towards the best utilization of Tanzanian skills and resources. Nyerere explains:

We may decide to spend some of our resources we have, or the product of those resources, on buying imports of skills or machines from abroad. But our real emphasis will be on using the skills that we already have and on developing the natural resources that we now possess. 37

Nyerere claimed that such a guideline, would allow Tanzanians, and not a financial donor, to determine the country's development strategy.³⁸

For Nyerere, the desire to make Tanzania self-reliant meant that in its development strategy the highest priority would be the domestic rural sector. Nyerere explains:

What we do have is land in abundance and people who are willing to work hard for their own improvement....And as it is in the rural areas that people live and work, so it is in the rural areas that life must be improved. 39

This was another reiteration of a point made in the Arusha Declaration. Nyerere did not, however, outline precisely what he meant by a rural communal structure. In September 1967 he began to outline the elementary unit for a socialist rural sector which was envisioned as the Ujamaa village.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 389.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 388.

³⁹ Julius Nyerere, "Education for Self Reliance", ibid., pp. 272-273.

The village would have a 'manager', 'treasurer', and a 'government committee' capable of making executive decisions outside general meetings. Initially, external administrators could substitute for officers if there was a lack of necessary expertise within the village. In the long term, however, these positions were to be filled by people within the village "if it is to be a real socialist unit."⁴⁰ Land would be communally owned and worked on. That is, Nyerere stressed the need for a non individualistic attitude towards property and labour. The produce created by the village, and the services that exist in the village would be regarded as 'ours'; it would not be related to individuals.⁴¹

To Nyerere, a nation of such villages would constitute a socialist society.⁴² Within an Ujamaa village it can be assumed that distribution of material goods would be moving towards equality, for Nyerere also stressed that within a socialist society there must be equality. He further claimed that to have 'complete equality' was unfeasible, but that Tanzanians should establish a movement towards the equalization of incomes as the country's total wealth grew.⁴³ This lends further reason to Nyerere's seeing the need for stressing the development of self governed communal villages.

⁴⁰ Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", ibid., p. 351.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 352.

⁴² Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", ibid., p.351.

⁴³ Julius Nyerere, "After the Arusha Declaration", ibid., p. 403.

An increase in production in such a development strategy would rapidly bring benefits to the poor. Nyerere's desire for a movement towards equality concurred with his denunciation of an elite he saw emerging in Tanzania during the 1960s. He intended to challenge this social development, the corresponding higher incomes, and the political power that the elite commanded.

Nyerere saw elitism emerging because of Tanzania's economic and political character up to 1967. He claimed that the existence of an individualistic attitude towards land and labour resulted in the division of labour ("for the employees are the servants of the man who employs them")⁴⁴, and material inequality. "Thus", Nyerere claimed with animosity, "we have the beginnings of a class system in the rural areas."⁴⁵ As stated, the Ujamaa village was a means of checking this social trend. Nyerere was also concerned with the behaviour of members of the political apparatus and the educational sector. In 1963,⁴⁶ Nyerere made a notable speech in which he expressed concern over abuse of power by public officials. By 1967 however, Nyerere was not only attempting to rectify the elitist trend by drawing-up rules of behaviour, (as printed in section five

⁴⁴ Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", ibid., p. 343.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 343.

⁴⁶ Julius Nyerere, "Pompositivity", in Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.223-226.

of the declaration) but he was also advocating a structural change in the education system,⁴⁷ and stressing the need for community autonomy.⁴⁸

The Arusha Declaration, to him, initiated an integrated and coherent policy for educating Tanzanian society in socialist principles.⁴⁹ The declaration was not a number of separate plans in the areas of economic policy and political reforms. Instead, to Nyerere, the economic and political policies propounded in the Arusha Declaration were integrated, but also symbiotic. The establishment of the Ujamaa village, for example, was mutually advantageous to the aims of improving the living standards of the poor, of making Tanzania self reliant, enhancing equality, checking elitist behaviour, and in increasing the autonomy of the individual who would be living in a socialist setting.

As a consequence, the Declaration was more programmatic than the 'Ujamaa' pamphlet. Arusha's greater detail should not come as a great surprise. By 1967, Nyerere could call upon six years of administrative experience to set out a strategy for Tanzania's development. By contrast, 'Ujamaa' was in response to a new

⁴⁷ Julius Nyerere, "Education and Self Reliance", p. 273.

⁴⁸ Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", ibid., p. 347.

⁴⁹ Julius Nyerere, "Education and Self Reliance", ibid., pp. 269-270.

development that Nyerere and TANU faced in 1962, when they had to orient themselves to govern a newly formed state, instead of merely fighting for its existence.

Background to 'Ujamaa'

During the fight for independence, TANU's primary concern was to obtain black majority rule. The TANU leaders, in the pre-independence years were mild and vague in the economic reforms they sought. Perhaps the most explicit economic reform that Nyerere expounded in the pre-independence years had been formulated in 1958. In that year, he had stated that land should be owned by the public, to prevent the wealthier members of the community from monopolising the ownership of property.⁵⁰ At the same time, however, Nyerere believed that there should be individual reward for labour on land that was rented out by the government.⁵¹ By the early 1960s, Nyerere and TANU had not proposed any 'radical' or 'socialist' economic policies, and continued to encourage private investment even into the early years of independence.⁵²

The moderate economic programme espoused by TANU, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was consistent with TANU's overall moderate strategy for obtaining independence. TANU called for independence based on non-violence, and respect

⁵⁰ Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-65. (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 55-56.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 53-54.

⁵² Julius Nyerere, "Relations with Private Capital Investment", ibid., pp. 209-211.

for colonial law.⁵³ On the basis of these principles TANU solicited mass support so as to force the British to bargain for Tanganyika's independence. TANU's moderate economic policy could only have helped to improve relations between the party and the colonial administrators by making a comparatively smooth transition to independence.

Party Problem and Nation Building

In February 1962 Nyerere resigned from his office of Prime Minister, and travelled widely throughout the country. These travels initiated Nyerere's attempt to reorganize the party's structure, and so allow it to encompass greater participation by the population. Prior to 1961 TANU only concerned itself with the question of independence. The party, therefore, did not have to concern itself with gaining a public consensus on other issues. In the days of colonial rule, the party merely had to obtain support from the people, (which is a relatively more passive phenomenon than urging the people to help formulate specific policies) so as to allow TANU to be in a stronger position when it negotiated with the colonial administrators.

Nyerere believed that if the party structure remained unchecked, as it had been before independence, then the party could

⁵³ See Julius Nyerere, "Non-violent Methods", op. cit., 1966, pp. 59-60. Also see William E. Smith, Nyerere of Tanzania (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973), pp. 70-71.

become authoritarian. Nyerere wanted to democratize the party so as to allow the masses the chance to voice their opinion in creating party policy. In his 1962 travels throughout Tanganyika, Nyerere removed party officials whom he believed to be unresponsive to the community's wishes.⁵⁴ Nyerere claimed to be checking the authoritarian potential that he believed was being fostered by the party when it was only concerned with one issue, as it had been in the pre-independent years. The tactic he used to counter attack the authoritarian trait within the party, was to commit the party apparatus to the principle that the population should have access to the political structure. Nyerere, in 'Ujamaa', did not respond to the question of how the party should go about fulfilling this objective. He, was able, however, to force the party to commit itself to solving the problem.

Nyerere was also eager for the party to direct itself to the question of developing Tanganyika.⁵⁵ Presumably, he saw the question of nation-building as important in itself. Yet, in raising this particular question, he also siphoned party discussion away from pre-independent concerns such as the racial question. Therefore, Nyerere, in initiating a discussion on the need for socialism, was

⁵⁴Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965), p. 411

⁵⁵Julius Nyerere, "Presidential Inaugural Address", in Julius Nyerere, op. cit., 1966, p. 178.

attempting to revitalize the party, by urging a new structure that would concern itself with the issue of development.

'Ujamaa' was an expression of this desire to have the party focus on post independent issues. Nyerere was not guaranteed that all his suggestions would receive automatic approval from party members; however, Nyerere was able to impose his concepts as reference points for party debate. In the years just after independence, Nyerere actively promoted the issues of the creation of a democratic society, and the mobilization for national economic development. The 'Ujamaa' paper did not specify just how TANU was going to work on these two major issues (e.g. 'Ujamaa' was not directly concerned with economic issues). Nevertheless, the publication of 'Ujamaa' was a step by which Nyerere attempted to get the party to redirect itself to post-independent issues, within a political apparatus that mirrored the general consensus of the population.

Background to the Arusha Declaration

In 1964, Nyerere was successful in having the party endorse his proposal that the constitution of the nation should commit the Tanganyikan government to building a democratic and socialist state.⁵⁶ To implement this ideological commitment to socialism, TANU established a committee whose purpose was to identify the sort of political structure

⁵⁶ Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 173.

necessary for achieving this goal. The committee's recommendations were that there should be one party, and that this party would be open to the people, who should have control over planning and the implementation of national policy.⁵⁷

TANU, dominating Tanganyika's political apparatus by 1964, accepted all the committee's recommendations.⁵⁸ By undertaking these responsibilities, the party saw as one of its duties the planning of a national economy. By 1964, the party's major concern was the development of a strong manufacturing sector. This would free the former colony from the instability caused by an economy based solely on the exports of primary products. The party attempted to attain its goals by giving the manufacturing sector highest priority in the party's First Five Year Plan. The introduction of the First Five Year Plan, however, created an administrative problem for the government, and its solution to it influenced the resultant content of Tanzanian Socialism.

The First Five Year Plan called upon the government to depend upon foreign finances to pay 78 per cent of the investment bill.⁵⁹ Because of this dependency, the government

⁵⁷ Julius Nyerere, op. cit., 1966, p. 195.

⁵⁸ C. Pratt, op. cit., pp. 203-207.

⁵⁹ Peter Meyns, "Some Aspects of Planning and Socialism in Tanzania" in L. Cliffe and John Saul, (ed.), Socialism in Tanzania. Vol. 2. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), p. 63.

was faced with a contradiction; the Tanzanian government wanted to direct economic strategy, but because the government was dependent upon foreign sources it was hindered in its ability to control its own strategy. Cranford Pratt argues, that it quickly became apparent

that donors wished to play a more active role in the selection of projects in the plan which they might finance, and more than that, they advocated other projects not included in the plan....in the pursuit of these new projects resources were allocated and foreign exchange used up which were not therefore available for alternative projects which had been judged important enough to be included in the plan. 60

The Tanzanian government believed that its emphasising the creation of a manufacturing base had made Tanzania dependent upon foreign finance. This, in turn, restricted the government's ability to control the Tanzanian economy. Nyerere believed that a solution to this problem was to place less emphasis on the development of the manufacturing sector, thus reversing Tanzania's need to rely on outside sources. It was this potential solution to an economic and administrative problem that became a determining force in shaping the specific economic strategy that was outlined in section three of the Arusha Declaration.

It is alleged by John Hatch and John Grimond, that Nyerere's views on economic development were influenced by

⁶⁰ Cranford Pratt, "The Administration of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: The Tanzania Experience 1963-1966" ibid., p. 13.

the writings of the French agronomist, René Dumont.⁶¹ Dumont advocated that under-developed countries should stress the growth of domestic agricultural production in order to allow, (in the long term), a country to develop a balanced industrial sector. Dumont states that the primary aim of development, is industrialization. "Without factories", he writes, "an economy cannot get off the ground and effect rapid growth in labour productivity, nor can it produce for the massive demands of modern agriculture. Giving priority to agriculture alone is "a typically reactionary position."⁶² Yet Dumont argued that it is wrong to conclude from this sentiment that one should initially stress industrialization. Such a programme would have detrimental economic effects on a developing country.

Dumont proposed that the surest path towards industrialization is for a country to increase its national demand. Dumont stated that an increase in national demand can occur if there is an increase in income in the domestic agrarian sector. By increasing the potential demand of the agrarian sector one can usefully employ a large percentage of the population who would otherwise experience difficulty in finding employment in the more capital intensive, labour-saving manufacturing sector. Dumont also argued that by

⁶¹ John Hatch, op. cit., 1976, p. 192. Also see John Grimond, "Back to Back. A Survey of Kenya and Tanzania", The Economist, (March 11, 1978), p. 8.

increasing agricultural productivity one is increasing rural buying power, which can thereby offer new industries (subsidiary to agricultural production) sufficient outlets.⁶³

Dumont further claimed that this agrarian strategy would make the national economy more responsive to the needs of the poor. The greater "the value of the goods that the peasant contributes to the wealth of the community, the more he can trade his goods, and so participate in the general economic growth and improve his standard of living."⁶⁴

The Arusha Declaration encompassed these beliefs. Like Dumont, Nyerere argued that the economic advantages in stressing the domestic agrarian structure, also encouraged the creation of a democratic and decentralized political structure. Because this is, theoretically, a symbiotic relationship between the economic strategy and political principles of the Arusha Declaration, it is uncertain whether the strategy or the principle formed its basis.

There is thus much evidence to suggest that economic factors primarily influenced the character of the Declaration. Samuel Mushi, however, made an important observation when he stated that "the timing [Mushi's emphasis] of the Arusha Declaration was, in large part, a result of economic necessity."⁶⁵

⁶³ René Dumont, ibid., p. 105. Also see René Dumont, Types of Rural Economy, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1975), p. 5.

⁶⁴ René Dumont, Hungry Future, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 39.

⁶⁵ Samuel Mushi, Revolution by Evolution: The Tanzanian Road to Socialism. (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1974) p.63.

Mushi's statement questions the belief that economic factors were primarily responsible for the content of the Arusha Declaration. Cranford Pratt raises similar doubts. As shown above, Pratt illustrates the influence that economic factors had in formulating Nyerere's political principles. Pratt, however, lays heavy emphasis on other factors having a primary influence in determining the publication of the Arusha Declaration. These factors being a wish for the creation of a decentralized, democratic socialist society free from class divisions.⁶⁶

To verify his point, Pratt could cite the public statements made by Nyerere, and the actions that Nyerere took to make TANU and the general Tanzanian political structure less autocratic. One could also state that Nyerere drew up the economic strategy outlined in the Arusha Declaration to foster his political beliefs.

A possible solution to the riddle of whether it was economic pressure, or political sentiment that primarily influenced the content of the Arusha Declaration, is the following: Nyerere's long-held beliefs of political liberty within a co-operative society kindled the possibility of a declaration of intent. The intention being to create a society whose principles concurred with those of the Arusha Declaration. The specific content of the declaration was a response to the national problems confronted by Nyerere. The significant factors

⁶⁶ Cranford Pratt, op. cit., 1976, pp. 233-235.

in determining the problems that Nyerere had to respond to were the economic and administrative difficulties that the government faced between 1961 to 1967. Thus, although the economic strategy was purposely located within a definite set of political principles, the declaration's specific character was a response to the economic and administrative problems that the government faced in 1967.

Summary

Since 1961 Nyerere's political concerns have shifted. The change in his priorities was mirrored in the formulation of Tanzanian socialist doctrine during the 1960s. The fragmentary evidence available suggests that the concepts of the ideology initially evolved as a counter response to, what Nyerere viewed as, the authoritarian tendencies in TANU. Underlying the ideological pronouncements for political democracy and racial equality, by Nyerere, in 1962, was a vague pronouncement for the economic development of Tanganyika. By 1967, the issue of economic development was given high priority by Nyerere. This change in emphasis was expressed in the Arusha Declaration where TANU outlined, in comparatively specific terms, a development strategy in harmony with the political principles that Nyerere had earlier stated, then labelled as socialist. Thus, in approximately a five-year period, the concepts of Tanzanian socialism moved from a position where there had been a general plea for political and economic equality

within an East African traditional society, to a position where TANU presented a guideline on the form to be adopted by the political and economic structure of Tanzania.

The political pursuits of freedom and equality expressed in the Arusha Declaration, are similar to those expressed by Nyerere in 'Ujamaa'. It was Nyerere's stressing of economic issues, during the middle and the latter half of the 1960s, that gave Tanzanian socialist doctrine its special identity. The ideology became more precise in its aims when Nyerere began to question liberal economic views. This public questioning of liberal economic views, admittedly, first occurred in the late 1950s when Nyerere suggested that there should not be private ownership of land, but private reward for labour on rented land owned by the community. An argument similar to the one proposed by Henry George in the nineteenth century.⁶⁷ However, within a ten-year period, Nyerere's views became more radical when he subsequently advocated that the rural population should live in communal villages, and that the product of their co-operative work should be shared in an equitable manner.

Much of the clarification of this definitive ideology was in part a response to the economic and administrative problems, resulting from Tanzania's dependence upon foreign loans for the finance of the First Five Year Plan. The

⁶⁷ See Julius Nyerere, op. cit., 1966, p. 53. Also see Henry George, Progress and Poverty, (New York: Appleton and Company, 1881), pp. 303-304.

attempt to overcome this dependency resulted in the ideology having two components by 1967; the first being its expressions in support of democracy, and the second its pronouncements on the economic base that was to exist in Tanzania. It was assumed that both components were juxtaposed.

Conclusion

The primary role of Tanzanian socialism in the latter half of the 1960s, was to be a yardstick for government policy. TANU's commitment to a new economic strategy, which was expressed in the Arusha Declaration, challenged John Saul's remark that Tanzanian Socialist doctrine was nothing more than a rationalization of the existence of a liberal economic structure. Saul admits that Nyerere and his colleagues made "some real effort" to break out of the "neo-colonial" framework that goes hand in hand with "conventional nationalism".⁶⁸ It should be noted that such a break was first articulated in the Arusha Declaration, which had set forth the objectives of Tanzanian socialism.

The government's placing a high priority on the development of the Tanzanian economy, meant it obviously wished to mobilize the masses to participate in the economic programmes. The government attempted to gain a consensus from the population for its scheme. This would aid the progress of the government's strategy. To obtain a popular consensus the government promoted

⁶⁸ John Saul, "Neo-Colonialism Vs Liberation Struggle", in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, (ed.), The Socialist Register 1973, (London: The Merlin Press, 1974), p. 304.

the homogenous goals of Tanzanian socialism as being noble and proper; concepts that were in accordance with the East African tradition.⁶⁹ By thus portraying the socialist objectives, the government was asking the people to join the programmes which it would formulate and control. Consequently, in the late 1960s, it appeared that the roles of the ideology were to be a yardstick for government policy; an attempt to create a consensus amongst the population, and to mobilize the people so as to create a new economic and social base. The response of the public, especially the rural peasantry, to the new economic strategy that was outlined in the Arusha Declaration, would influence the role of the ideology in Tanzania in the 1970s.

⁶⁹ See Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", op.cit. 1968, pp. 337-338. Also see Julius Nyerere, "After the Arusha Declaration", op. cit., 1968, p. 405.

CHAPTER III

Tanzanian Socialist Doctrine and Social Change

The concepts of Tanzanian socialism imply that a socialist society could be created in Tanzania without coercion or violence. It was with this in mind, that Nyerere opposed the idea that a class struggle was necessary for the creation of a socialist society. The possibility of a non-violent path towards socialism appealed to Nyerere, not because he rejected force, but because he believed African Society could accept and easily adapt to a socialist system. His conclusions were based on three broad assumptions of social change strategies that can be identified within the concepts of the Tanzanian socialist doctrine. These assumptions were: 1) That East African traditional society and socialism were essentially congruous 2) That colonialism destroyed East Africa's traditional co-operative and communal character 3) That the people's regaining of traditional attitudes would create the necessary pre-requisite for the peaceful transition to a socialist state.

The chapter's purpose is to evaluate these assumptions, and concomitantly, to analyse some of the problems faced by the Tanzanian government in its attempt to introduce socialist policies. It thus becomes appropriate to study the social characteristics of traditional life by focusing our attention on land distribution, and whether it was organized in a communal manner, as claimed by Nyerere. It will also be important to gauge the influence of colonial rule on East African society, and to analyse what effect the colonial

period had in preventing the government from successfully implementing their socialist policies. Finally, it is appropriate to observe how the ideology of Tanzanian socialism was translated into specific policies, and how these policies were received by the populace.

In the pamphlet 'Ujamaa', Nyerere put forward the proposition that traditional East African society was socialist because it had a communal social structure based on the extended family.¹ This sentiment was publicly repeated in 1967.² If we observe that communal attitudes towards property were not strongly established in the traditional East African society, we can conclude that Tanzanians would have to be introduced, not re-educated, to communal social structures and values. Under such circumstances the government would be required to induce changes in popular attitudes towards property rights, if the government policies incorporating the concepts of Tanzanian socialist doctrine were to be successfully implemented.

Characteristics of Traditional Society

A social characteristic which reveals the nature of an agrarian society is a community's land holding patterns.

¹Nyerere writes: "The formation, and objectives, of African Socialism is the extended family." Quoted in Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa--The Basis of African Socialism" in Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa--Essays on Socialism, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 11.

²See Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", Socialism and Freedom, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.337-338.

Admittedly, our evaluation of the traditional structure and pattern of land use must be regarded as inconclusive since no anthropological study took place in pre-colonial time of East Africa. Due to this lack of information, we must study the social structure that existed in Tanzania in the recent past, and then make an educated guess in reconstructing the basic characteristics of the traditional social system.

Jannik Boesen studied the Nygara district, located in the extreme South west corner of the West Lake area. The district has three major regions; the Nygara, Mukididili, and the Murgwara regions. The Nygara region had a comparatively high population in proportion to the available land. This high density contrasted with the Mukididili and Murgwara regions. In all three regions, land had been in the hands of the tribal authority; however, the pattern of ownership of the land was related to the nuclear family.³

A similar study by R.G. Abrahams made in Kahama District found that the family was the major social economic institution.

Most homesteads contained a man, his wife or wives, and their children plus an occasional and varied sprinkling of kin of the head, such as a divorced or widowed mother or sister, an unmarried younger brother, and perhaps some sister's children. 4

³Jannik Boesen, "Development and Class structure in the Small holder society and the potential of Ujamaa.", Institute for Development Research, Vol. 4 No. 2 (May, 1972, pp. 18-22.

⁴R.G. Abrahams, "Time and Village Structure in Northern Unyamwezi", Africa Journal of the International African Institute 47, (No. 4, 1977), p. 373.

It was the family that cleared the land, worked it, and consumed its produce. Abrahams claimed that the main forces influencing villagers to clear new land were fear of witchcraft, a relative land shortage, and a decline in soil fertility.⁵

Similarly, in the Bena tribe, the family was the predominant social unit. The prevailing family structure can be described as independent, polygamous, and often with dependent relatives.⁶ The independent nuclear family was not ubiquitous. For example, the main social unit of the Samgu tribe was the patrilocal extended family.⁷ In the Karewe, Kara and Pogoro tribes, the independent polygamous family was the basic working unit within the society; a pattern similar to that of the Bena.⁸ Inheritance, within the polygamous or nuclear family, was a common phenomenon within the Sagara, Ngonda, Shambala, Tatoga, Zaramo, Kindiga and Shashi tribes. The tradition of a son inheriting his father's land strengthened individualistic attitudes towards property rights in these traditional tribal societies.⁹

It was a common practice for the father to own and control his family's land. Typically, the following pattern

⁵ Ibid., p. 375.

⁶ George P. Murdock, African Cultural Summaries, (New York: Human relations Area Files Inc., 1958), p. 1199.

⁷ Ibid., p. 1202.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 1205-1210.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 1235-1305

emerged: When a son reached adulthood he would receive a proportion of his father's land. The son worked the allotted acreage for subsistence, and would subsequently attempt to create surplus. This enabled him to purchase a bride. The son's wife would then in turn work on her husband's land. In return she would obtain some control over distribution of produce amongst the family. The husband, however, retained control over any surplus the family might produce, making it possible for him to cultivate a new plot, and, if feasible, to marry a second wife, who would also work on her husband's land.¹⁰

This arrangement of property allocation to the son tended to significantly reduce the husband's land. It was often the eldest and youngest sons who received the greatest proportion of their father's land. The eldest son received a larger proportion because he was the first to become independent at a time when the family ownership of land was of its maximum. The youngest would receive a high proportion of land when his father died, in recognition of looking after his parents in their old age. The other sons who inherited a comparatively smaller area of land, were urged to establish new plots so that a wife and family could accumulate their own wealth. It was a common practice for sons to have resided in different villages or even chiefdoms. They also tended to

¹⁰Jannik Boesen, loc. cit.

take their spouses from outside the village.¹¹

From this brief survey of traditional land and property rights we can conclude that there was a significant individualistic character to matters of land ownership. The family was based on a limited kinship relation. It was not essentially the center of a community structure established on voluntary association and co-operation.

The Influence of Colonial Rule on East African Society
Land and Property Laws

The establishment of colonial rule encouraged a further individualistic component in traditional life. The creation of a primary export crop economy undermined the traditional social structure. With respect to traditional land and property customs, the establishment of a commercial agrarian economy overwhelmed the "customary rights of the natives."¹² These rights were theoretically protected by British Colonial law in Tanganyika. In 1923 the Land Tenure Ordinance (Cap. 68 of the laws) was enacted to protect the "existing customary rights of the natives to use and enjoy the land and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for their subsistence...as far as possible."¹³ C.K. Meek

¹¹R.G. Abrahams, "The Peoples of Greater Unyamwezi, Tanzania" East Central Africa 17 (Part XVII, 1976), p. 43.

¹²C.K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, (London: Frank Crass & Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 102.

¹³Ibid., p. 102.

argues that the preservation of these customary rights was significantly limited because of the development of plantation crops, a situation which resulted in a "wide extension of the conception of private property rights."¹⁴

The Germans and the British, by colonizing Tanganyika, introduced an economic system that had an individualistic approach to property rights. The overall result of this imposition of German and British law was that it defined a person's social function more specifically. Subsistence was obtained, and the individuals social worth was gauged in relation to his land, capital or labour work. Common law recognized an individual in place of social aggregates. It made property disposable. With the introduction of commercial activity, land began to acquire intrinsic commercial value.¹⁵

Monetization and Traditional Authority

Colonial rule resulted in various changes in the character of the East African hierarchical structure. Colonial rule in Tanganyika brought with it, the monetization of the economy, based on a more individualistic approach. It also altered the function of the traditional tribal hierarchies. Traditional tribal societies had to relate not only to new economic masters but also to an economy re-defined first by Germans, and later by the British. For example, in North West

¹⁴Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁵R.W. James, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 63.

Tanzania, in Buhaya, there existed a dominant clan (the Nyarubaja) which was accorded land ownership rights by the Germans. The land which the Nyarubaja controlled was small, but they had the right to force other members of the clan (the baito) to become labourers.¹⁶ In other places, however, the introduction of commercial cropping destroyed the traditional hierarchy. In the southwest region of Tanzania, for example, there existed a society based on the leadership of the chiefs, superimposed on a social and economical pattern based on age groups. With reference to the work of van Hekken and van Velzen on this region, Lionel Cliffe states:

The effect of the promotion of cash crops... was to promote individualization of land rights, and when all the productive land was taken up [by about 1950] by the new crops there was a process of rapid destruction of the age villages and the social relationship on which they were based. 17

Thus we can cite two broad effects of colonial rule on East African society in its organization of economic activities for a market economy. They were: 1) A breakdown of traditional authority 2) The stressing of individual property rights.

Whether or not traditional life was communal is overshadowed by the existence of colonial rule which established, to an ever-increasing extent, a more individualistic attitude

¹⁶ Lionel Cliffe, "Rural Class Formation in East Africa", The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 4 No. 2, January 1977, p. 214.

¹⁷ L. Cliffe, ibid., p. 214.

to property. As a result of colonial rule there was a five to six generation gap between contemporary Tanzanians and the varied social formations of traditional life. In the colonial period, East Africans were adapting their social patterns in response to the more blatant individualistic, economic, and legal system that was imposed under colonial rule. Even though popular resentment of colonial masters grew with the nationalistic movement, the cry for independence was never expressed in terms of constructing a communal rural sector. As the government advocated such a social structure within the framework of Tanzanian socialism, it was faced with the task of inducing fundamental changes in popular attitudes in order to gain broad approval and support for the social patterns and institutions advocated by the ruling ideology. The government's task, in reality, was more problematical because the communal attitude that the government espoused was not strongly embedded in East African traditions as claimed by Nyerere.

There are two possible reasons for Nyerere's exaggerating the communal component of Tanzanian society. Firstly, he may simply have been naive in holding such a romantic view of pre-colonial East African society. Secondly, he may have viewed traditional life in such glowing terms as an attempt to promote the government's socialist policies. By relating the proposed village programmes to the potent emotional symbols of tradition, Nyerere may have felt that his development strategy would receive public approval. He exaggerated the

existence of those traditional characteristics which were in line with his envisaged future for East Africa. At the same time Nyerere minimized other traditional social characteristics which conflicted with his aims.

In 1963, the government began to implement a pilot rural project programme known as the Village Settlement Scheme. This scheme was eventually replaced by the more ambitious Ujamaa village plan that the government implemented in 1967. The government never claimed that its first rural projects were patterned after its concepts of socialism. Rather the government, in 1967, noted that the Village Settlement Scheme violated many of the ideological concepts that the government wished to promote. Yet, the Village Settlement Scheme was viewed as a small scale experiment in the reconstruction of rural society. It is therefore pertinent to examine the Village Settlement Scheme, to identify the problems in getting people to leave their home, and partake in a rural scheme sponsored by the government.

The Village Settlement Scheme

The Village Settlement Scheme was an agrarian development project involving less than one hundred villages. The scheme was devised by the government as a means of modernizing the rural sector. The project villages were to be centres where the government attempted to introduce new methods of rural production. The villages were to be built on newly acquired land, specifically cleared for the project.

To be admitted into a government-sponsored village, a man had to have a family, and be between the age of twenty-five and forty. He also had to have previous "monetary experience". Other requirements were more vague. The individual was selected for his capacity for hard work and his willingness to live in a community, his receptivity to new ideas and methods, and his commitment to farming as a profession. TANU officials in old villages, and government officials in the new one would screen the candidates. Each village was designed for approximately 250 families.¹⁸

In the new villages, the government provided schools, medical facilities and other services. The government owned all village land, as well as the machinery to be used for cultivation of plots. Each family or individual was given a plot of land with a title in the individual's name.¹⁹

Each villager was required to work on the communal plots for five and a half hours a day, five days a week. Farm planning, mechanized cultivation and general services were organized in a co-operative manner with each member of the community being allotted a specific job. In his free time the villager could choose to work the land allotted to him for private cultivation. The villager was not paid for his communal work. However, he was able to use the services that

¹⁸ J.R. Nellis, A Theory of Ideology, The Tanzanian Example, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 123.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 121-123.

were provided by the village. It is interesting to note, that there was high absenteeism and a concomitantly low rate of production on the communal plots.²⁰

The project village was run by a government administrator who answered to the Village Settlement Agency, which was a government body. The government did not place a high priority on establishing an internal political structure for these villages. A possible explanation for the government's low priority on creating such a political structure, was that it never anticipated the establishment of these settlements throughout the countryside.²¹

Responses to the Village Settlement Scheme

Government policies in the Village Settlement Scheme were both inconsistent and contradictory, causing confusion and disillusionment in many villagers. The government had attempted to entice villagers into the scheme by promising access to the social services and by offering plots of land. In its provision of individual plots, the government had appealed to the individualistic motives of villagers. Yet, at the same time, each villager was obliged to work on communal plots for which he received no direct payment. Such communal work was designed to be in lieu of taxes, for the support of various services available to the villagers. Against this

²⁰Ibid., pp. 124-125.

²¹Ibid., pp. 116-117.

background, it is not difficult to understand why communal work could be viewed negatively by the villager, as a veiled form of labour.

Nellis states that the work done on the individual plots was intensive, while on the communal plots it was not.²² Very likely the individual villager sought to increase the product of his own land, while giving minimal attention to his obligations to communal work. As individual pursuits received highest priority, the villager may have wished to forego communal work, and instead, attempt to concentrate on his private wealth. The desire to work alone would have been further encouraged if the services that the government offered were not available. This was often the case because of management inefficiencies.²³

Government Reaction of the Village Settlement Scheme

It is difficult to obtain precise information on government expenditures for the Village Settlement Scheme. However, Nellis reports that the programme was promoted "at a comparatively enormous cost".²⁴ Although there were only approximately seventy of these villages established, the government spent Tshs 10,690,000 in 1965/66. This sum constituted 10.4 percent of the total external funds for

²² J.R. Nellis, op. cit., p. 124.

²³ Ibid., pp. 120-121.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 199.

development in that year.²⁵

The government also acknowledged that the Village Settlement Scheme was incompatible with its ideological principles because the scheme encouraged individualism, and its application was selective and discriminatory. The government maintained that these characteristics were contrary to the communal concepts of Tanzanian socialism. Thus, by 1967 the government felt that it had to rectify three problems that existed with its rural strategy. They were: 1) Low public support for communal work obligation 2) Poor production performances 3) The high cost of the scheme in relation to the small number of people associated with the scheme.

Re-evaluation of Economic Strategy

In April 1967, the government had announced a shift in its economic strategy, claiming that the change was in keeping with the concepts laid down by the Arusha Declaration which had been publicly released earlier that year.

The Arusha Declaration has shifted the emphasis from heavy reliance on foreign assistance as a major source of the plan's financial resources to heavy reliance on domestic effort as the basis for the future development. 26

²⁵ Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 168.

²⁶ Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, A Mid-Term Appraisal of the Achievements Under the First Five Year Plan. July, 1964-June 1969. (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), p. 39.

The government believed that if it was able to locate the rural population in self-sufficient co-operative rural units, its investment bill would decrease and so lessen Tanzania's dependency on foreign finance. Nyerere admitted that a capital-intensive state, or project farms could run on a co-operative basis; yet for Tanzania, such farms were not applicable as a means of nurturing a socialist society. This was because they demanded "considerable capital investment, a high degree of managerial skill, and a highly disciplined wage labour force. Resources, claimed Nyerere, were "in short supply in Tanzania."²⁷ The government's new strategy in attacking rural poverty, in 1967, was to have all Tanzanians participate in a development programme based on labour-intensive communal villages. Thus, if the new development strategy resulted in growth, the population would reap the benefit. The government further postulated that if the majority of Tanzanians were living in communal villages, there would be a movement towards material equality.²⁸ Thus, in search of these goals the government, in 1967, called for a new rural development programme entitled the Ujamaa Village Scheme.

The Ujamaa Village

For Nyerere, the political advantage of the 'frontal'

²⁷ Julius Nyerere, "Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969" in Lionel Cliffe, (ed.) Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), p. 28.

²⁸ The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania's Second Five Year Plan. 1st July, 1969 - 30th June 1974, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), pp. 1-5.

economic strategy based on the Ujamaa village was that the people would be partaking in an immediate attempt to develop a socialist state. For Nyerere a "nation of such village communities would be a socialist nation."²⁹ As a consequence of the government's desire that all Tanzanians in the agrarian sector live voluntarily in Ujamaa villages,³⁰ it set no admission requirements for entry into the scheme.

While the government did not own Ujamaa villages, it exercised control through government-appointed administrators. Theoretically, ultimate authority rested on decisions made at the village meetings where all members enjoyed equal voting rights. The meetings elected village representatives (manager and secretary), who were to convey the village's position to the government administrator.³¹ In practice, however, it was common for the villager to be passive, and the government, active, in setting out administrative orders. The government's active condition was a predictable phenomenon given the high priority placed on Ujamaa by various party members, including Nyerere. The following quote clearly illustrates this:

it is to the building of Ujamaa villages that government must now turn its attention. We have to organize our government and party machinery to assist their establishment....³²

²⁹ Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development", op. cit., 1968, p. 353.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 355-356.

³¹ Roger Lewin, "Matetereka" in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, (ed.) Socialism in Tanzania Vol. 2. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), p. 190.

³² Julius Nyerere, "Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969" in L. Cliffe, (ed.) op. cit., 1975, p. 28.

Nyerere advocated the strengthening of the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development. The ministry was to draw up broad outlines for development activity. A 'Planning Research and Training Unit' would have general responsibility for co-ordination of ministry plans. A member of the training unit - a 'Maendeleo' with assistance from a TANU party member, would provide linkage between the villager and government.³³

In practice, the villager little objected to the plans' production goal. Goran Hyden suggests the villagers' silence was the fear that to object might reduce the chances of gaining social amenities from the government.³⁴ Although Hyden only averts us of the generalization, he does make the following conclusion.

Thus, whether the production targets are realistic or not, the villagers have unanimously adopted them in the presence of higher officials. Rarely, however, are the planned targets reached. The result is a vicious circle breeding passivity in the villagers and frustration among party and government officials. 35

The purpose of Ujamaa was to encourage and develop a communal attitude towards work and ownership of property. Thus, the long term goal of the government was the creation of autonomous communes in which the reward for labour was to

³³ Ibid., pp. 31-33.

³⁴ Goran Hyden, "Ujamaa, Villagisation and Rural Development in Tanzania" ODI Review, (January 1975), p. 59.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 60.

be organized on a co-operative basis.

The villagers were to be organized in work teams to cultivate the land. Hyden argued that the system of regulating and assessing work was rudimentary with emphasis only on attendance, "and quality and attitude to work or fellow workers generally ignored."³⁶ Roger Lewin states that in the Ujamaa villages, he witnessed comparatively extensive private ownership of land.³⁷ Antony Ellman observed a similar phenomenon. In the Handeni district, the government allowed a proportion of land, cleared collectively for a Ujamaa village, to be divided and used for private farming. The villagers wanted these private plots, and the government complied with their wishes to avoid initial antagonism to its scheme from the villagers.³⁸

Thus, if the post 1967 rural strategy was to bring different results from its predecessor, firstly it had to attain the support of the majority of the rural population. These people were to partake in mainly co-operative work on communally-owned land. Secondly, due to Tanzania's poverty and the scope of the programme, the amount of government investment in each village would be comparatively small. To capture

³⁶Goren Hyden, op. cit., p. 60.

³⁷Roger Lewin, "Matetereka" in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, (ed.), Socialism in Tanzania Vol. 2. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), p. 194.

³⁸Antony Ellman, "Development of Ujamaa Policy in Tanzania" in L. Cliffe, op. cit., 1975, p. 329.

Nyerere's cherished socialist spirit, the government could not be selective in its investment allocation as it had been with the Village Settlement Scheme.

The Problems of Ujamaa

The scheme faced many problems. Public response to the scheme was, overall, minimal. It lacked full support from the political apparatus. It was inflicted by bad management, and it received uneven investment expenditure from the government.

Five years after the commencement of the Ujamaa scheme, the government published an annual plan. In this document, published in 1971, the government stated that there were "about 2668 Ujamaa villages in varying stages of development and about 6.3 per cent of the total population of Tanzania at that time lived in these villages."³⁹ The government figures also illustrated a wide regional disparity in the percentage of people who were members of Ujamaa villages. In the Mtwara region, for example, 44.1 per cent of the population were listed as living in an Ujamaa village, while in Arusha, ironically, only 1.3 per cent of the population belonged to an Ujamaa village.⁴⁰ The proportionally high membership in

³⁹United Republic of Tanzania, Annual Plan 1971-72, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 57.

⁴⁰Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "Peasant Participation in Communal Farming: The Tanzanian Experience", African Studies Review, Vol. XX No. 3 (December 1977), pp. 45-47.

Mtwara can be explained by the fact that the government grouped farmers into Ujamaa villagers for security reasons, as in the Mtwara region, which is located near the Mozambique border.⁴¹ If we exclude Mtwara we see that 4.4 per cent of Tanzanians lived in Ujamaa villages.

A closer look at the nature of the villages illustrates the fact that their communal character was far less than that envisioned by Nyerere. A survey, conducted by McHenry Jr., shows that co-operative work was low in the villages he observed. His survey covered 66 villages in the Dodoma, Irinqa, Kiquoma and Kilimanjaro regions of Tanzania. The study showed that the average time spent at communal work "during the 1973/74 crop year", by adult workers, was 23 days.⁴²

By noting the circumstances surrounding the formation of Ujamaa villages, Hyden has given us an understanding of the low co-operative work level in these communities. Hyden accepts that some Ujamaa villages operated under Nyerere's communal spirit. Yet, he also supplies reasons for the relative unwillingness of villagers, in the short term at least, to work in a socialist spirit. Kilimangaro, Bukoba, Arusha and Lushoto, for example 'progressive farmers' appropriated the name 'Ujamaa', in order to obtain more labour for private cultivation.

⁴¹Goran Hyden, op. cit., 1975, p. 56.

⁴²Dean E. McHenry, Jr., op. cit., p. 47.

Hyden also states that the government had simply attached the Ujamaa label to an existing village or settlement. The government also attempted to attract people into Ujamaa not by promoting the community life they could lead, but by offering the villagers increased social services.⁴³

Another membership incentive the government provided for Ujamaa villages, was permission for members to have private plots. This provision, in turn, dampened the communal spirit of the village. The villager put a higher priority on the work that he performed on his private plot than he did on his work on the communal plots. A villager saw his private plots as being the means for his, and his family's subsistence. Thus, in time of bad weather, the communal plots would be abandoned while villagers tended crops on their own plot of land. Additionally, if the output of an individual plot was high, the farmer had little incentive to do communal work as his subsistence was temporarily secured.⁴⁴ In short, to give up work on individual plots and work on the communal land, was seen as a gamble, and to many it was an unnecessary risk.⁴⁵

Indications also exist of uncertainty within government ranks on the correctness of constructing

⁴³Goren Hyden, op. cit., 1975, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁴Goren Hyden, ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁵Dean E. McHenry, op. cit., pp. 51-56.

the Ujamaa Village Scheme. Barker illustrates the possibility of this uncertainty, by pointing out that the enormous emphasis on Ujamaa was written into the Second Five Year Plan after the document had been prepared.⁴⁶ It should be noted that the scheme did receive support from powerful members of the government, including Nyerere. Uncertainty within government ranks was possibly a response to the broad hesitancy showed by the population towards the original concept of the scheme. This had helped contribute to low production from the communal plots.⁴⁷ The poor performance was a challenge to the government on the feasibility of the scheme in that period of Tanzania's development.

The government's rural strategy returned to be selective during the Second Five Year Plan. As stated, if the government wanted to achieve the goals that it set for itself in the Arusha Declaration, and in the Second Five Year Plan, it would have had to channel investment into labour-intensive, small-scale local projects.⁴⁸ This would be achieved at the expense of diverting capital into only a selective number of village schemes, as it had done with the Village Settlement Scheme. After 1966, W.E. Clark states that

⁴⁶ Jonathan Barker, "The Debate on Rural Socialism" in B. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, (ed.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 98.

⁴⁷ W. Edmund Clark, Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania 1964-73, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 78, footnote 7.

⁴⁸ D.B. Jones, "Rural and Regional Planning in Tanzania", in A.H. Rweyemamu and B.U. Mwansasu, Planning in Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing Literature Bureau, 1974), pp. 61-62.

even though capital expenditure on the settlement scheme continued, it no longer dominated total ministerial expenditure, and such expenditure actually came to a halt in 1971/72.⁴⁹ After 1966, however, the government did not re-direct its expenditure into the labour intensive villages, but instead, it continued to divert money into a few capital-intensive projects which, it was hoped, would "provide a quick answer to the low level of agricultural productivity."⁵⁰ Thus in reality, concludes Clark, the rural strategy of the Second Five Year Plan was not markedly different from what it had been in the First Five Year Plan.

Due to the government's selective policy, and its bad management, (by its own admission the government claims it did not know the "size of the financial effort devoted to Ujamaa villages"),⁵¹ it is evident that the people thought it not to their advantage to change their lifestyle and join a Ujamaa village. In response to public hesitancy, the government in 1971, began to spend more money for social services, in the hope of creating an incentive for people to join the communal villages.⁵² Such capitalization efforts into Ujamaa resulted in the erosion of the scheme's original purpose in

⁴⁹W. Edmund Clark, op. cit., p. 78.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 80.

⁵¹United Republic of Tanzania, Guideline to Annual Development Plan, 1971, 72, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p.6.

⁵²United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1971-72, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 57.

the rural area. The failures and problems that had arisen with the Ujamaa Scheme promoted a new review of government rural policies. The government had two broad alternatives. They were: 1) Abandon Ujamaa and reformulate another rural strategy 2) Force people into the scheme and hope that the increased number would result in production gains, thereby allowing greater efficiency, in relation to investment expenditure, thus diminishing the cost of the scheme.

Operation Tanzania

The government chose to take the second option. In late 1973, the government began a "national recruitment drive" which was labelled, 'Operation Tanzania'. The 'operation' was implemented in response to TANU's decision, made in November 1973, which stated that it was compulsory for all Tanzanians to obtain membership in villages within three years.⁵³ Prior to 1973, the only recruitment drives that the government initiated were in the three regions of the Dodoma, Kogoma and Pwani, between the years 1971-73.⁵⁴

The reported consequences of 'Operation Tanzania' were varied and confused. However, the simple point remains, that the spirit of Ujamaa--the communal village voluntarily entered into by the citizen--was not realized. Africa magazine wrote

⁵³ P.M. Desai, "Ujamaa Villages: A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development", African Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1976, p. 43.

⁵⁴ H. Kjekshus, op. cit., p. 279.

that "millions of peasants, up to 45% of the population approximately eight million people were moved into selected areas..".⁵⁵ Time magazine puts the figure at 14 million people, relocated by the government's decision. The same article revealed that before 1974, only two million Tanzanians had been living in Ujamaa villages, so that 'Operation Tanzania', as reported in Time, was instrumental in the relocation of an estimated 12 million peasants into Ujamaa Villages.⁵⁶

Jean-Francois Revel, in a passing comment in his book, related the 1973 Tanzanian decision to the horrors of the collectivization programme in the Soviet Union in the late twenties and early thirties.⁵⁷ The Time article reported that 'Operation Tanzania' resulted in the death of scores, "perhaps hundreds" of Tanzanians. There has been one "documented" observation of the use of force in the Inchugu district of Tanzania. An eyewitness stated that the militia men were destroying peasants' houses, thereby forcing them to move into Ujamaa villages.⁵⁸ Nyerere claimed that the use of coercion, as reported by some segments of the international press, was false. Nyerere argued that the Tanzanian government

⁵⁵ Africa, (August, 1975), p. 25.

⁵⁶ Time, (March 13, 1978), p. 30.

⁵⁷ Jean-Francois Revel, The Totalitarian Temptation, (New York: Doubleday, 1977), p. 129.

⁵⁸ P.M. Desai, op. cit., pp. 279-280.

did not have at its disposal the forces to keep significant numbers of people in villages, nor to collect them into the villages in the first place.⁵⁹

It is difficult to reconcile these different accounts. However, it is clear that the government did impose its policies on a large number of Tanzanians, through the use of force, or threats of force. As the government operated a national programme to induce people into villages, it appears that the use of coercion must have been extensive. By using force the government seriously deviated from its idealistic intentions with respect to the Ujamaa Village.⁶⁰

Conclusion

Nyerere was naive to have believed that social change could occur in Tanzania without the use of coercion. Nyerere himself assumed that colonial rule brought a greater individualistic component to East African society. Thus, it would have taken considerable effort, by the government, to change people's attitudes and so establish popular acceptance of the government's communal rural policies. The government's task was, of course, made more difficult by the fact that

⁵⁹ John Grimond, "Back to Back: Survey of Kenya and Tanzania" The Economist, 267 (March 11, 1978), p. 8.

⁶⁰ In fact the government has conceded the point that it deviated from the concepts of the ideology of Tanzanian socialist doctrine, because by 1976, the communities were no longer referred to as Ujamaa villages. The term has been dropped in favour of the term "planned development village". See H. Kjeckhus, op. cit., p. 277.

Nyerere's assumption that traditional life concurred with socialist principles, was not fully correct. As a result, the policies that the government presented to the people, had social consequences which were alien to them. So it can be readily understood that people were hesitant to change a social pattern with which they were familiar. In response to this apathy, the government used coercion, which was contrary to the strategy of social change, expressed in Tanzanian socialist doctrine.

By 1974, it also became apparent that Tanzanian socialist doctrine had two components. The first component consisted of its principles on democracy, and the second included its principles on socialist economic policies. By 1974, it was also clear that these two components were not complementary, as demonstrated by the government's reliance upon 'Operation Tanzania'.

This 'operation' also revealed that the government was not successful in attempting to create a consensus between itself and the people. Yet, the use of force gives ample proof to the fact that the ideology was used as a yardstick for economic policy; to the extent that the government used coercion in an attempt to mobilize the people to participate in its economic plan, even though, in so doing, the government was compromising the political principles of Tanzanian socialist doctrine.

CHAPTER IV

Tanzanian Socialist Doctrine and its Political Structure

In publicizing its socialist doctrine, TANU stated that it was committed to creating a socialist-based economy and a democratic political apparatus within a one party state. Therefore, the ideology had two main components: its economic and its political aspirations. The events of 1974 indicate that the government was not able to achieve both goals simultaneously. Thus, the government was put in the position of having to decide which aspect it thought important. It is the purpose of this chapter to detail more specifically how the political apparatus was changed in response to the government's attempt to implement its national economic strategy while still utilizing its ideology as a broad framework for national policies.

Theory of the One Party State

In 1961, the formal structure of the political apparatus in Tanganyika was based on the Westminster parliamentary model. However, because TANU had dominated all elections up to 1961, it held all the seats in the legislature. In the early 1960's, TANU took advantage of its monopolistic position by legally establishing

¹G.A. Maguire, Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania. The Politics of Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 261. Also see Raymond F. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State. Tanzania's First Decade, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 2.

a one party state whose provisions were permanently incorporated into the Second Constitution of 1965.² The ideology claimed that Tanzanians were united and homogenous, and thus a multi-party political system, representing varied community interests, was not necessary.

TANU also justified its existence as the only political party, by arguing that a poor and newly independent Tanzania could not afford the presence of a rival political faction. This faction could siphon resources away from the major political projects, and challenge strategies badly needed for the country's development.³ The unique position in which TANU found itself, gave the party the potential to insulate itself from the masses. If the party chose to remain aloof from the people, restrict debate, or limit access to the formulation of policy, it could still employ the whole state apparatus to secure compliance from the population.

Nyerere's solution to the problem of promoting democracy and preventing authoritarian tendencies from emerging in the political apparatus, was to have party branches located at the local level. Such a structure, argued Nyerere, would allow the party to advise the government on proposed action. On this issue Nyerere states:

²See Henry Bienen, Tanzania. Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 81-84.

³Julius Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System", in Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 196.

...only a Party which is rooted in the hearts of the people, which has its devoted workers in the village and the towns throughout the country - only such a Party can tell the government what are the people's purpose, and whether these [sic] are being carried out effectively. 4

The electoral success of TANU in the late 1950's and early 1960's occurred at a time when independence was the only predominant question. TANU supporters could claim that this electoral success lent credence to the party's having won "the hearts of the people". Yet, it should be noted that the formulation of socialism occurred after TANU had become the only legal party within the state. On the issue of socialism it was not clear that the party had the active support of the populace. Nevertheless, TANU saw the adoption of socialism as synonymous with fulfilling the needs of the people. TANU identified the ideology with the objectives of the nation as a whole. Such an attitude could, in the government's eyes, justify its belief that it had the right to lead people into a socialist state: Significantly we learn that:

We have to lead the people in the constructive work of development, we have to listen to them, co-operate with them, and work with them with our instrument - the government. 5

If the population did not support its programmes, the

⁴ Julius Nyerere, "The Party Must Speak for the People", in Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Development, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973) p. 33.

⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

government faced a dilemma. It could not simultaneously fulfill the two purposes of African Socialism that Nyerere had articulated - popular representation through democratic institutions, and the construction of a socialist economy.

Nyerere clearly recognized a potential dilemma between the role of government, giving dynamic leadership, while also being accountable to public opinion. He admitted that if the government acquired power to lead the people, it could create a powerful bureaucracy which might easily lose touch with the masses.⁶ In the same speech, however, where the above warning was sounded, Nyerere expressed his fervent desire for government to work for economic development. He was also willing to accept the political consequences of a larger bureaucratic network designed to achieve this goal.

On the other hand, there is a danger that in an effort to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucracy, skilled jobs will be undertaken without the necessary knowledge or preparation, or that skilled workers will be frustrated by limitations of their own power to make necessary decisions. 7

To overcome this 'pitfall' Nyerere opted for an administration run by "committed experts",⁸ while also providing for a political structure which purported to place power in

⁶ Julius Nyerere, "The Supremacy of the People" in Julius Nyerere, ibid., p. 36.

⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

the hands of the people. This solution, however, did not solve the dilemma when the 'committed expert' and the general population disagreed on basic public policies. An examination of the institutions of the party and the government will illustrate the choices made by TANU, as to whether it was actively to lead the people, or merely represent their wishes.

The Connection Between the Party and the Government

The political structure is legally split into two sectors; the government, and the party. As Tanzania is a one party state, there has always been a great degree of interaction between the party and the government. Their relationship is more complicated than Nyerere pictured it to be in 1968, when he argued that the government's primary purpose was to formulate policies that would be harmonious with the guidelines set by the party.⁹ Since the formation of the third constitution in 1977, the party has legally been the supreme body in Tanzania; nevertheless, some government agencies are in a position to formulate policy guidelines. For example, because the cabinet is bestowed with the responsibility of implementing public policy, it can always draw upon information from the party and government apparatus. Armed with such information, the cabinet could persuasively argue for the need to alter public policy. The cabinet suggestions carry much

⁹ Julius Nyerere, "The Party Must Speak for the People", in Julius Nyerere, ibid., p.33.

weight not only because it has influence in government circles, but because government members still often hold equivalent positions in the party. For example, the president of the party has been president of the state, while members of the cabinet are also members of the National Executive Committee of TANU.¹⁰

The Party Structure


As can be seen in Graph 1, TANU has had a hierarchical structure with a well-developed central network. The two predominant arenas, at the core of the party, have been the National Conference, and the Central Executive branches; the National Executive Committee, the Central Committee and the National Headquarters. The graph also illustrates the fact that the party structure has its branches at the local level, and that the local branches of the party have been responsible to the central bodies.

The National Conference

The largest organ of the party has been the National Conference. Its members included two elected representatives from each party branch, plus all TANU Regional and District chairmen, all members of Parliament, and all members of the

¹⁰The third constitution sanctioned the emergence of TANU and Zanzibar Shirazi Party. The new ruling party in Tanzania since 1977 has been called Chama Cha Mapinduzi. See Africa, (February, 1978), p. 31.

TANU PARTY STRUCTURE



Source: Tanzania U.S. Handbook, (Washington: US. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 208.

National Executive Committee. The National Conference elects the president of the party, and has the power to remove him, if two thirds of its members vote to do so. Theoretically, the National Conference is the supreme body in Tanzania. It is not, however, a very influential central organ.¹¹

The National Conference has met less frequently since the early 1960's. Prior to 1965, the conference gathered annually. Between 1965 and 1977, it met every two years, but no party rules provide for its meeting once every five years.¹² Due to its infrequent meetings, the National Conference is in a position to ratify national policy, rather than initiate it.

The Cell

After the party re-organization in 1965, the cell was made the most basic unit in the party. TANU members of the local area, such as the neighbourhood of a town or a village, were organized into cells. A cell consisted of approximately twenty members who, in turn, elected their local leader. The cell structure was justified as a method by which the party members could influence government policy. From the perspective of national elites, however, it was also a means by which the central apparatus could strengthen its link with the local

¹¹ K.W. Sperber, Public Administration in Tanzania (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1970), p. 64.

¹² Africa (February, 1978), p. 31.

population.¹³ The establishment of the cell system allowed the government to usurp the authority of the traditional local leaders. Prior to independence, traditional local leaders had helped the colonial regime to govern. The extent to which TANU saw the chiefs and elders as a potential threat to their power, can be demonstrated by the fact that within the first year of Tanzania's independence, their traditional legal power was formally withdrawn.¹⁴

The cell system did not function well for the party, cell members, or the local population. In practice, the cell leader became merely an agent of government administration, whose main preoccupation was keeping the peace, or attempting to obtain settlements of private feuds and conflicts. The cell leader's political function was further undermined by the fact that there existed poor communications between the government and himself. Kawogo argues that it was common for cell leaders in the Iringa district to be ignorant of party policy.¹⁵ Quorro observed that cell leaders in the Mbulumbula district resented having to perform administrative duties for the party and the government, without remuneration for their work. He also reported that, the public usually

¹³ Peter Rigby, "Local Participation in National Politics: Ugogo District Tanzania", Africa. Journal of the International African Institute, 47 (No. 1, 1977), p. 94.

¹⁴ See C. Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 108, 194-195.

¹⁵ K.S. Kawago, "The Operation of TANU Cells in Iringa", in J.H. Proctor, ed., The Cell System of Tanganyika African National Union, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1971), p. 64.

reacted indifferently when party leaders attempted to explain, or win support for party policy. The popularity of the cell leader was not improved when government policies met with indifference on the part of village peasants. That the cell leader had to collect party dues and government taxes further strained his relationship with the local constituency. Understandably, the cell leaders retreated from some of their assigned tasks. Finally, in 1969 the government terminated the practice of cell leaders having to collect party dues and government taxes. In the 1970's, the cell leaders' sole duties have been the settling of local disputes and attempting to explain party policy to the villagers.¹⁶

When the population enthusiastically supported some government policies, the cell structure functioned well. For example, a number of Mbulumbula farmers wanted to create their own co-operative in 1966. By 1968 the co-operative was completed.¹⁷ When the cell leaders asked for government contribution, its wishes were considered, and in this case, granted by the government. Demands were articulated at the local level, and help was forthcoming from the higher echelons of the party.

By contrast, when the people were disinterested in a government project, the scheme did not operate well. In the Ugogo and Iringa districts there was passive opposition

¹⁶ J.S. Quorro, "Cell Leaders in Mbulumbula and Problems of Effectiveness", in J.H. Proctor, *ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

to the government villagization policy. The cell leaders had no success in convincing higher levels of government that their local inhabitants had little wish to live in the new villages.¹⁸ In face of local opposition, the government enacted policies, and attempted to impose them on the community. This defeated the purpose of the cell, as being a means of representation of popular views and demands.

The Executive Branch of TANU

The Executive organs of the party have been established at the central, regional, and district levels. The central units of the party have been dominated by the offices of the President, the National Executive Committee, and the Central Committee. These in turn exercise effective control over the Regional and District Executive Committees, who play a supervisory role to insure that party policy, initiated by the central executive branches, is carried out at the local level.

It is difficult to gauge the power of the President as Nyerere has always been TANU leader. As Nyerere is the "father of the party and the nation", the power that he possesses, as the President of TANU, is not solely due to the formal position that he holds. The President formally ratifies party initiatives carried out by the executive. A more positive aspect of the power of the office is the

¹⁸Peter Rigby, op. cit., pp. 93-96.

President's ability to influence the composition of the central apparatus. The president appoints the Vice President and members of the Central Committee, who in turn sit on the National Executive Committee.

The National Executive Committee of TANU has had the power to initiate national policy. It is composed of the President, Vice President, the Secretary General, the Treasurer of the party, the members of the Central Committee, top regional officials, and also members of regional affiliate organizations, and the TANU Youth League who were co-opted by the National Executive Committee.¹⁹

The Central Committee is concerned with the day to day administration of party affairs. Its duty is to see that the decisions of the National Executive Committee concerned with party matters are implemented. The Central Committee calls upon the National Headquarters to aid it in fulfilling its task. Therefore, both of these bodies have had some leeway in shaping national party policy and are able to advise the National Executive Committee on appropriate strategies for the implementing of national goals.²⁰

The Regional and District Branches

District and Regional Branches of the party were

¹⁹ William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 79.

²⁰ H. Bienen, Tanzania. Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 189.


originally established as a communications link between the party's local and central bodies - a vehicle for expressing local grievances to the central body. Each lower branch of the party was made responsible for selecting a proportion of higher executive party committee's membership. In turn, the lower branches of the party were made responsible to a higher level of the party organization. For example, the District Executive Branch elected some members of the Regional Executive Committee. Yet, the District Executive Committee was also responsible to the Regional Executive Committee for its actions.²¹

Structure of the Government

Graph II shows that in 1968 government structure was similar to that of the party, a strong central domain with branches that percolated down to the local area. Yet Graph III clearly illustrates that, by 1972, the structure of the party had become even more centralized with the abolition of the regional and area commissioners, and the district and local councils. The common characteristic of both periods was that the government structure was split into two areas; the executive branch and the representative branch. The two major bodies of the executive branch were the office of the President, who was elected by popular vote, and the Cabinet, whose members were appointed by the President. The executive

²¹H. Bienen, op. cit., pp. 106-107. Also see graph in R. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State. Tanzania's First Decade (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 12.


GRAPH II
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 1968



Source: Ibid., p. 208. Also see R. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 12.

GRAPH III

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 1972



Source: Cranford Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 199 and passim.

Also see Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique (4th Quarter 1979), p. 5.

branch initiated government policy and with the assistance of the national bureaucracy, attempted to implement these policies. Since the scrapping of local government in 1971, the National Assembly (the Bunge) became the only representative branch of government.

The National Assembly

Just over half of the seats in the National Assembly have been filled through elections. The rest of the personnel in the National Assembly obtained their positions by being appointed by the President of the state, or by being ex officio; for example, the Regional Commissioners, or members of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, sat in the National Assembly, by virtue of their former office.²²

The party's influence has been crucial in the selection of personnel of the National Assembly. To be a member of the assembly, one first had to be a member of TANU. Secondly, one had to obtain written support of twenty-five registered voters. Thirdly, it was necessary to receive the approval of TANU's District Executive and National Executive Committee. TANU allowed each seat to be contested by two candidates that it had approved.²³

²²R. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 12.

²³The United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1964), p. 20.

National Assembly Elections

Since independence, Tanzania has held National Assembly elections at five-year intervals, the first being held in 1965. The country has not experienced any social unrest associated with national elections. Turn out for elections has been high, and in each election, a significant number of MPs have lost their seats. For example in 1975, 5, 367, 769 Tanzanians voted. In these elections approximately 40 per cent of MPs were defeated by their opponents.²⁴

Raymond Hopkins suggests that the National Assembly has played a passive role in the political apparatus. Prior to the one party constitution, speeches critical of government projects were 30 per cent of all speeches made in the assembly in 1961-62. In 1963-64, the level dropped to 10 per cent. In the first year after the 1965 elections, 20 per cent of speeches were critical of the government. Not surprisingly, speeches supporting government policies followed the reverse of this trend. However, it is too simplistic, and potentially misleading to suggest that the National Assembly has played a passive role in the political system by just looking at the number of critical speeches made in the assembly. What is perhaps a more precise

²⁴At these elections Tanzanians also voted for their President. In all three presidential elections Nyerere has run unopposed. In a 'Yes' or 'No' vote he has obtained approximately 90 per cent approval in all three elections. See African Diary, (November 26-December 2, 1975), p. 7697, Africa, (November, 1975), p. 67, and Africa, (December, 1975), p. 24.

indicator of the passive nature of the National Assembly is its lack of a systematic organization for reviewing national policy. Hopkins observes:

Although criticism of the government has increased following the 1965 elections, it tends not to be directed towards critical or sensitive matters, and those members who have been noticeably or consistently critical tend to have their political career shortened.... Among those MP's who were most critical according to the analysis of speeches in 1965/66 period, nine had lost their Assembly seats for political reasons by December 1968, either by virtue of having been expelled from the party or due to political detention or exile. 25

Surveys taken in 1968, showed that both MPs, and the population (in the Dar es Salaam area), believed that the party was more powerful than the National Assembly. Because of this widely held belief, the majority of the population sampled, said that they would turn to the local TANU officials before consulting their local MP.²⁶ The comparative ineffectiveness of the National Assembly, as critic of the executive branch of government, is a common theme in the writings of foreign scholars studying Tanzania.²⁷

At the local level, the government's administrative

²⁵ Raymond Hopkins, "The Role of MP in Tanzania", American Political Science Review LXIX (September, 1970), p. 785. Two of the nine MPs, Oscar Kambona and E. Anangisye, were expelled not solely for the criticisms that they made in the assembly. See C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 209.

²⁶ Raymond Hopkins, Political Roles in the New State: Tanzania First Decade, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 192-193.

²⁷ See William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), pp. 13-15. Also see C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 287.

bodies are the Regional Development Councils.²⁸ These two bodies co-ordinate all local services. The central government, however, created the policy which the Planning and Development Committees²⁹ implemented in their local area. The central government's power was further enhanced by the abolition of District and Municipal councils in 1971. The government believed that the power of local government had to be undermined because their existence was a hindrance to the development of a congruent national plan.³⁰ In theory, local government was to be one organ which was to provide a channel of communication between the government centers and the villages, a means by which local projects could be integrated into an overall plan. However, because of the number of villages, the lack of uniformity in village demands, and poor communications with the villages, the central government began to impose its plan and subsequently established the Planning and Development Committees.

Local government was replaced in 1971 by administrators assigned to the local level. Initially, this political change did not result in greater administrative efficiency. G. Hyden

²⁸ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (4th Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

²⁹ H. Bienen, op. cit., p. 321-323.

³⁰ C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 199.

reports that at the time the government attempted to accelerate its villagization programme, local bureaucrats used government capital and finance as a means of enticing the people into government-sponsored villages. A patron/client relationship was often formed at what is reported to be an "incredible cost".³¹ However, the government opted to seek reform in this administrative structure, but did not alter its bureaucratic nature. In October 1977, the government announced the transfer of a further 8000 officials to the villages. They were to work as managers, administrating village affairs.³² The move was prompted by the government's desire to strengthen its control of village councils, and in particular, to control fiscal matters and the implementing of government policy at village level.

The comparative power of the central apparatus can be illustrated by the relative ease with which the decentralized units of the political structure have been abolished, or simply relegated to a subservient role. The increased power of the bureaucrat was the direct consequence of the decline of power by the local political bodies. The extended power that the bureaucrat enjoyed decreased the participatory influence of

³¹H. Kjekshus, "The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementation Lessons and Ecological Dimensions", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, 1977, p. 279.

³²Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (1st Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

the local populace in the formation of political decisions. The enhanced power of the bureaucrat had also served to increase the power of the central apparatus, because he was accountable, not to the local population, but rather to a more highly placed administrator in the hierarchical apparatus.

The Prerogative of Power Vs. Representative Accountability

By the early 1970's, the central apparatus accused local branches of the party and local government of being ineffective. As a consequence, the central apparatus asserted its dominance in structuring national policy, and had altered the structure of the local political branches, in an effort to obtain greater efficiency in implementing policy. Nyerere encouraged this centralized trend because he placed higher emphasis on leading the people to a new order rather than on being subservient to their wishes. Earlier, in the late sixties, when Nyerere fostered popular participation through local party organs, Cranford Pratt claims that Nyerere was acting very much in the manner of a democratic leader.

He [Nyerere] was in harmony with the popular will. He was defining it more sharply, prescribing what institutions it would require and then acting astutely to secure their the commissions recommendations introduction. This representative quality of their leadership helps to explain why he was effective in winning TANU support for a one party system which was very significantly different from the initial authoritarian ideas of many in leadership positions in the TANU at that time. 33.

³³C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 205.

However, when Nyerere's established structure did not function according to his wishes, he did not hesitate to initiate change, and so assert strong central leadership.

He [Nyerere] sees himself as the leader of a people who are groping their way forward towards a better future. He is not just the servant of his people....He has not needed to confine himself to teaching by example and by precept. He has been able to manipulate the circumstances of politics, in order to lead his people to moral preceptions which as yet they only imperfectly comprehend. 34

The danger of Nyerere's latter attitude was that the State could justify its action in utilizing authoritarian repression of those who voice 'disagreement' in what form the "better future" should take. The government, backed by the power of the State, was influential in silencing open discussion of such disagreement. Political suppression has occurred in Tanzania to a significant degree. Under the 1962 Preventive Detention Act, the government acquired the authority to jail a person without trial. Exactly how many people have been jailed under the detention act, is unclear. It is not surprising that the government has avoided revealing such information. The Economist Intelligence Unit claims that by the end of 1977, 5000 Tanzanians were held without trial for political reasons.³⁵ The Economist cites an Amnesty International estimate which states that approximately 1000

³⁴ Ibid., p. 256.

³⁵ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Maritius (1st Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

political prisoners were being held without trial in Tanzania at the beginning of 1978.³⁶ To confuse the matter, The Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique states that Nyerere freed 7083 prisoners and 26 political detainees in May 1978.³⁷ The Economist stated that as of May 1978, it is believed that there were "hundreds, of untried detainees in jail (not all there for political reasons)."³⁸

Whatever the precise figure, the point remains that the government has held a significant number of people without trial. Arbitrary and authoritarian rule can be invoked whenever the government feels so inclined. The 1962 Preventative Detention Act remains in force, and whether the people are detained or not, has depended on the arbitrary actions of the government. An illustration of the manner in which the government has exercised power, is revealed in its treatment of university student protestors. In both 1966 and 1978, Nyerere expelled hundreds of students from the university, when students demonstrated, firstly against being conscripted for national service, and secondly, against the government for granting MPs, ministers, and party leaders an increase in pay.³⁹

³⁶The Economist, (May 13, 1978), 2, p. 82.

³⁷Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (2nd. Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

³⁸The Economist, (May 13, 1978), p. 82.

³⁹Africa, (April, 1978), pp. 27-28.

Ideology and the Nature of Political Power

The formulation of an ideology, per se, was not necessarily the sole cause for the trend towards a more centralized political structure in Tanzania. Similarly, the introduction of an ideology was not the primary cause for the authoritarianism that had existed in the Tanzanian political structure. The detention act of 1962 clearly illustrates that the government was willing to take a tough stance, even though, at the time, Nyerere was just beginning to articulate the concepts that were later to become the ruling principles for his country.

In some respects, the creation of a socialist doctrine may have directly assisted in making the political structure less autocratic. It would only be fair to assume that Nyerere was sincere in his beliefs, in having the party and government become more responsive to the wishes of the people. Spurred by this conviction, Nyerere fought to make the political structure more 'democratic', and promoted the ideology to assist his objective.

The government's nationwide promotion of socialism emphasized its concern in attempting to create a unified social structure throughout Tanzania. While the government placed a high priority on establishing a unified democratic political structure, it also was dedicated to the creation of a new national economic base. Both of these political and economic goals were embodied in the concepts of the ideology. In the

early 1970's, it became apparent that government was not able to fulfil both of its wishes simultaneously; therefore, the government was forced to relinquish one in favour of the other. Indeed, in the 1970's, the government chose to place more emphasis on economic matters, rather than on its political principles.

Ironically, it was Nyerere's sincerity towards the economic concepts of the ideology which he viewed as fundamental, that confronted him with a dilemma, and which helps to explain why in the 1970's, the party and the government chose political centralization, over the abandonment of ideologically defined economic goals.

The government could not satisfy both aims of the ideology because of lack of public support for national economic policies. If the government was subservient to the wishes of the people, public indifference and opposition to the government's rural policies, would have prompted a change or the abolition of the rural programme. As the government stressed the establishment of its economic programmes, it therefore had to act more autocratically, in an attempt to induce the population to participate in its scheme.

Conclusion

The ideology of Tanzanian socialism had an expressed aspiration that the will of the people should prevail in Tanzania. The ideology however was also a yardstick for

public policy, and as a result it had a strong programmatic character. Concomitantly, the ideology was a means of mobilizing the population to partake in the national plan that the government had declared it would implement. In this way, the socialist concepts would be institutionalized. Political conflict arose because the populace was not supportive of the new socialist policies. This lack of support created a dilemma for the government, as to whether the government should be a tool for the creation of a new economic order. During the 1970's, the Tanzanian government placed a higher priority on leading the people, than it did on being simply a body which represented their wishes. The writings of Julius Nyerere were not explicit as to what component of the ideology should receive the higher priority. Between 1970 and up to at least 1976, however, the government had a missionary-like zeal in its efforts to fulfil the economic goals laid out in the Arusha Declaration and the Second Five Year Plan, even though it meant ignoring and modifying the general aspirations that it made towards the concepts of participatory democracy.

CHAPTER V

Results of Tanzania's 'Socialist' Policies

Between 1970 and 1975, the Tanzanian government attempted to implement the policies of the Second Five Year Plan. They effected a socialist strategy even though the plan's important rural programme was met with significant public opposition. In implementing the Plan, the government was assessing the development strategy's feasibility which, it claimed, concurred with the concepts of its socialist doctrine. The purpose of this chapter is to judge the feasibility of having continued to implement a strategy similar to the one of the Second Five Year Plan.

The Economic Condition of Tanzania in 1975/76

The 'state' of the economy is a primary concern of all governments. And it is a common practice to evaluate its 'health' by employing macro statistical indicators, such as: balance of payments, balance of trade, gross national income, and gross domestic product. However generalized (and potentially misleading) these indicators may be, they can still identify a financial and economic problem to be faced by a government. These macro figures unequivocally state whether or not a country is in debt. The figures bluntly indicate the feasibility of a strategy. If the statistics reveal poor economic performance, they challenge the government to reassess those policies that may be contributing to the economic difficulties.


The major problem facing Tanzania up to 1975 was its low production and productivity. In the agrarian sector, bad weather and inefficiencies in exploiting usable land

contributed to low productivity levels. The agrarian sector was further weakened by the fact that Tanzania received low prices for its export crops. Poor production in the manufacturing sector was characterized by insufficient usage of plant machinery and equipment. An ancillary problem emerging from this unfavourable position, was that Tanzania lacked capital. The shortage was temporarily offset, by Tanzania's borrowing from overseas sources. This would create an investment pool, for further production in the agrarian and manufacturing sectors. Borrowing of this sort increased Tanzania's long term indebtedness. The financial problems became critical when the production and earning performances, from these two sectors, remained poor, up to 1975. As a consequence, Tanzania became even more dependent upon foreign loans, which were required for fiscal solvency.

The Agrarian Sector

Graph IV illustrates that Tanzania's balance of trade deteriorated considerably between 1971 and 1975. Tanzania's balance of trade debt was just under Tshs 3000 million by 1975. Production results were one of the main causes of this malaise. Deficient productivity, in some cases, undermined the benefits Tanzania stood to gain from the comparatively favourable prices, for certain crops, on the international market. In 1976, for example, the price of cotton rose 70 per cent above the mid-1975 international market price. Reduced supplies of fertilizers, however, and

GRAPH IV
BALANCE OF TRADE



heavy May rains, caused cotton production to fall approximately 60 per cent below the previous year's level.¹

Coffee provides another example of poor production performance. Due to a weather-damaged Brazilian crop, in 1976, the price of coffee rose dramatically. The Tanzanian coffee crop was not large enough to affect the world price of coffee. It would therefore have been to Tanzania's benefit to increase its coffee production, so as to take full advantage of the favourable prices. Yet, Tanzania could not achieve an increase in production. Based on an index unit, the coffee production in 1960, was 27. In 1970 it rose to 64, but in 1974, it fell to 55.² In the period between 1974 to 1978, production of coffee stagnated, or possibly fell, from the 1974 total.³ Bad weather contributed to the poor production output. In 1978, the coffee sector received another setback with the price of the crop falling to US \$3,500 a ton, from US \$6,000 a ton price obtained the year before.⁴

In contrast to most other products, sisal production increased from a low of 4000 tons in the first quarter of 1975, to 13,000 tons in the last quarter of 1975. Tanzania, however, was not able to benefit from an increase in revenue from this

¹ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (1st Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

² The Economist, The World in Figures, (London: The Economist Newspaper Ltd., 1976), p. 100.

³ Alan Rake, "Export Crops Come Back into Fashion", African Development, (November 1976), p. 1209.

⁴ The New York Times. International Economic Survey, (February 4th, 1979), p. 76.

crop because of the falling prices it was offered for sisal in the latter half of 1975.⁵

By and large, Tanzania's agricultural performance has not been good. In the decade between 1960 to 1970, the average gross agricultural production rose only 2.6 per cent per annum. During the years 1970 to 1974, average production fell by 0.5 per cent per annum.⁶ Between 1974 to 1975/76, earnings from agricultural production could only have fallen because of the 1974 drought. This caused a decrease in production, and forced the government to produce crops for domestic consumption, instead of obtaining earnings from export sales.⁷

The Manufacturing Sector

Up to 1975, the manufacturing sector had played a minor role in the economy. Between 1972 and 1975, only 10 per cent of the country's gross domestic product resulted from the manufacturing sector.⁸ Such a small contribution by this sector could be explained by the fact that the Second Five Year Plan purposely stressed the development of the agrarian sector. The Tanzanian authorities, however, must have been

⁵ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (3rd Quarter, 1976), p. 7.

⁶ The Economist, op. cit., p. 100.

⁷ The stress on the production of crops for the sake of internal consumption was incorporated into the government's 1974 campaign, "Food Production is a Matter of Life and Death." See Alan Rake, op. cit., p. 1209.

⁸ See Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Zambia, (Annual Supplement, 1973), p. 10, and Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (Annual Supplement 1976) p. 10.

concerned by the manufacturing sectors' inability to expand from their own reserves. In the years 1970-72, for example, the manufacturing sector obtained healthy profit returns. Yet between 1973-76, it was unable to make a greater contribution to the growth domestic product, even though the agrarian sector performance had been poor in those years.⁹

By the early 1970s, production problems enveloped the manufacturing sector. Members of the government freely admitted that productivity in the manufacturing sector had been disappointing. Nyerere stated:

Almost all our industrial plants are running well below capacity; sometimes less than 50% of what could be produced with existing machinery is actually being manufactured and put on the market. 10

Citing some examples of under-capacity in the manufacturing sector, Nyerere revealed in 1976, that Tanzanian Breweries were running at 68 per cent capacity, Tegeny Plastics at 46 per cent, while Mara Milk Plant was operating at only 30 per cent of capacity.¹¹

Tanzania's Debt and Foreign Loans

During the 1970s, the government invested a substantial amount of capital in the economy. This investment netted poor returns because of the low productivity in industry and agriculture. The difference between the investment and the

⁹ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius (Annual Supplement, 1977), p. 10.

¹⁰ John Grimond, ibid., p. 11.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 11.

return on it had to be covered by international loans. This is illustrated in Graph V, where foreign funds assumed an ever-increasing role in the development budget in comparison to national funds.¹² During the 1970s, Tanzania became even more dependent upon foreign funds because of her increasing debt in the goods and service account which, by 1975, rose from US \$9.7 million, to US \$272.2.¹³ By the mid 1970s, therefore, in both her capital and current accounts, Tanzania was in acute financial straits. In the short term, Tanzania had to depend upon foreign loans to cover her debts; yet, as Graph VI illustrates, by accepting outside loans, the government further increased its long term liability. This emphasised the weak structure of the Tanzanian economy.


Summary of Economic Condition in 1975/76

The Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974) was designed to make Tanzania more independent of foreign aid. Through the first five years of the 1970s, Tanzania had become even more dependent upon foreign assistance. The severe drought

¹²The major source of Tanzania's foreign loans have been China, Sweden, West Germany, Holland, Norway, Denmark and the World Bank. Except for the World Bank it is difficult to obtain information on the amount of money each country has given to Tanzania. The total sum provided by the World Bank and the IDA lending operations between 1970 to 1976 has been US\$ 350.2 million. This amount was given in 31 separate allocations. See International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Annual Report 1976, (Washington: International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1976), p. 153.

¹³International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Yearbook 1977, (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1977), p. 153.

GRAPH VI
LONG TERM LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT



of 1973/74 did not ease this dependency. The long term figures, however, indicate that the deficiency in production was due to more than simply one or two years of bad weather. The jump in the loan figure occurred around 1972. Between that date, and 1976, the average growth rate of the economy was disappointing, even though Tanzania borrowed extensively. In the period between 1964 and 1967, the average increase in gross domestic product was 6.8 per cent per annum. Between 1967 and 1975, increase in gross domestic product fell to 4 per cent.¹⁴ The economy was in even worse shape than the 4 per cent figure indicates. The production of goods (a lucrative source for loan repayment), unfortunately did not form the 4 per cent growth rate. Services that had thrived on loans were the contributing factors. In short then, Tanzania's poor production performance created severe economic problems for the government.

Alterations in Economic Strategy

The government, in 1975/76, began to place a higher priority on the manufacturing sector. In the 1976 budget, the manufacturing sector received 27 per cent of the investment pie, while agriculture was allocated only 12 per cent.¹⁵ These figures only partially demonstrate the shift that the

¹⁴ John Grimond, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁵ David Coetzee, "Industry: Tanzania Economic Survey", African Development, (November, 1976), p. 1207.

government placed on industry, in view of the fact that much of the manufacturing sector had previously operated under-capacity. More specifically, the emphasis on development spending was directed towards productive investment in mining, industry, and natural resources. The government devoted a smaller percentage to social services than before,¹⁶ emphasising the government's reallocation priorities of 1969.

In an attempt to reduce its investment bill, the government encouraged the private sector to contribute to the national investment pool and, correspondingly be rewarded for its risk. Nyerere's plea, to government bureaucrats, made in October 1977, asking that they promote private ventures, reflects fundamental changes in official attitude and policy.¹⁷ Internally, the response was slow, but as the quote below illustrates, there nevertheless was a response to the government's new initiative.

Loans are easier to get from the banks, and many people are now prepared to invest their savings rather than try to smuggle money out of the country, says one Asian businessman. One sign of the greater Asian confidence¹⁸ is the black market exchange rate for Tanzanian currency has dropped significantly in the past year.¹⁹

¹⁶ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (3rd Quarter, 1976), p. 5.

¹⁷ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mauritius, (3rd Quarter, 1978), p. 5.

¹⁸ The business community is dominated by Asians who have Tanzanian citizenship.

¹⁹ The Economist, (August 12, 1978), p. 49. The government also invited foreign investment, yet up to 1978, the response to the invitation by the international community was hesitant. From 1975 to 1978 only US \$ 15 million had been invested by foreign private interests. ibid., p. 49.

By contrast to its more liberal approach to the private sector, the government took a firmer stance against its own public sector. In 1976, the Prime Minister, Mr. Sokine, announced that no public companies (corporations that are known as parastatal organizations) were permitted to be run at a loss.²⁰ Yet, a year later the government announced that by its own estimates, 39 per cent of Tanzania's parastatal industries were not making profits. The government did not close all their non-profit making industries, but it did begin partially to carry out its threat, when in late 1974, its bankrupt national transport company was dissolved, rather than an attempt made to engineer solvency with public money.²¹

The government's concern for greater efficiency in production is also illustrated by the new labour bill, introduced in July 1978. The government called for the country-wide establishment of Disciplinary Committees in industries and factories. It was proposed that these committees consist of party members, managers, and workers' representatives, and that they penalize workers who interfered with efficient production of goods. Offenders faced possible expulsion, premature retirement, and "in the case of gross irresponsibility, detention."²²

²⁰ African Diary, (June 18-24, 1977), p. 8535.

²¹ The Economist, (August 12, 1978), p. 49.

²² New African, (August, 1978), p. 20.

The bill, when made law, was to replace the 1964 Security Employment Act. A declaration in which the government stated its commitment to all Tanzanians having the right to work.

In addition to placing less emphasis on the agrarian sector, the government in its new economic strategy, initiated policy that allowed for a more individualistic approach by the agrarian sector. In chapter III it was stated that the government permitted Ujamaa members to possess private plots. It was a compromise to ideological principles to develop communal production in Ujamaa villages. By 1976, Alan Rake states that the government officially sanctioned this individualistic trend.²³ In an attempt to increase rural production the government, in 1976, began to pay the farmer, on average, 98.5 per cent higher prices for agricultural products than had been paid in 1972/73.²⁴

Effects of the New Strategy

The government has instituted a liberal approach in its Third Five Year Plan.²⁵ It is obviously too early to gauge the impact of the new strategy. The agrarian sector has experienced mixed results. Production of food crops improved in 1978,

²³ Alan Rake, op. cit., p. 1209.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 1209.

²⁵ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (3rd Quarter, 1978), p. 9.

but production of cash crops fell.²⁶ Earnings from cash crops also varied. In 1977, coffee earned 41 per cent more than it did in the previous year, while cotton and sisal earnings decreased from their 1976 level.²⁷ Unfortunately, overall statistics on rural productivity are unavailable.

The industrial sector also recorded varied performance levels after the government adopted its more liberal approach to economic matters. Output of textiles, cement, petroleum, and pyrethrum all fell significantly between January and June 1977 from their level of the same period in 1976. Certain products, however, such as shoes, rolled steel, fishnets, iron sheets, and beer, all recorded improvements over the previous year.²⁸

In the hope of avoiding stagnation, the government has continued to borrow extensively from foreign creditors. In 1977 it borrowed US \$27.5 million from the IDA, US \$12 million from the International Fund for Agriculture Development, US \$20 million from the World Bank, US \$80 million from West Germany, and US \$ 36 million from the Netherlands.²⁹ All these funds were allocated solely for the creation of productive

²⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

²⁸ See Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (2nd Quarter, 1978), p. 11, and Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (3rd Quarter, 1978), p. 1.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

capital, and for the improvement of the transport system.³⁰

The pursuit of the new economic policies deviate significantly from the economic/social goals of the Second Five Year Plan, which the government promoted synonymously with the concepts of Tanzanian socialism. The government had previously claimed that the Second Five Year Plan did not contradict the concepts of the Arusha Declaration because the Plan had stressed the need for the following strategies. 1) That the agrarian sector be given highest priority in the national development plan, 2) that the agrarian sector form itself into co-operative enterprises, 3) that key industries be nationalized, 4) that Tanzania would be in a position where it would be self reliant and 5) that there be a movement towards material equality.

The new economic policies violate all these principles. The government has again placed heavy emphasis on foreign interests to participate in, and help finance the development of the manufacturing sector. It is a similar strategy that existed in the First Five Year Plan. A plan that was later rebuked by TANU because the party claimed it did not make Tanzania self reliant.

³⁰Tanzania has placed a high priority on building a transport infrastructure. A high percentage of Chinese aid went into building the Tazara railway system. The importance of an effective railway system was directly brought to the attention of the Tanzanian government when in October 1978, Zambia re-opened its borders with Rhodesia to allow the export of Zambian copper. Zambia opened its borders because it found the port facilities in Dar es Salaam completely insufficient. Zambia's action cost Tanzania the right to

In the Second Five Year Plan, and in the Arusha Declaration, there existed a number of proclamations stating that the agrarian community would be the keystone of the government's development strategy. In its new economic policies the government has shifted its priorities. The development of the manufacturing sector was greatly stressed in the new economic policies. This will inevitably create greater inequality (on the aggregate level) between the rural and urban areas, as most of the manufacturing sector will be located in the towns or cities. Furthermore, the government is contributing to greater inequality by giving social welfare less consideration. This is a shift that would be further aggravated by the government's willingness to lay off workers whose organizations are running at a loss. Therefore, material benefits to the poorer section of the community have not been increased by the new economic policies.

Conclusion

In the mid 1970s there existed a definite disparity between the development strategy outlined in the Arusha Declaration, and the development strategy of the Third Five Year Plan. This incongruity emerged because the government

transport 200,000 tons of Zambian goods which would have travelled through Tanzania in October 1978. See the London Times, (October 9, 1978), p. 5, and The New York Times (November 26, 1978), p. 5.

changed its priorities at a time when the economy was experiencing significant financial strains. The disparity between ideology and national policy signified a change in the role of socialist doctrine in Tanzania. No longer could it be said that the ideology was a yardstick for national policy. It thus becomes appropriate to study the role of the ideology in the latter half of the 1970s.

CHAPTER VI

Reasons for the Changing Role of Tanzanian Socialist Doctrine

The aims of the Third Five Year Plan seriously deviated from the development strategy of what were publically promoted by TANU as the socialist policies of the Second Five Year Plan. Prior to the introduction of the new economic strategy, a number of people had predicted that, for various reasons, Tanzania would deviate, for some time, from its socialist principles. Thus, it was predicted that the economic policies, outlined in the Arusha Declaration, would not be successfully implemented. An examination of possible explanations will help clarify the reasons for the government's activities in the mid 1970s. Also clarified will be the consequences for the role of ideology in Tanzania, in the latter half of the same decade.

Explanation I - Class Conflict and Economic Dependency

The first explanation for a change of policies away from socialist principles is derived from the assumption that Tanzania is locked in a political class struggle, in which the bourgeoisie could win. Issa Shivji, a major proponent of this view, argues that "on the home front", in Tanzania, there is a class struggle between the bureaucracy, which is "objectively backed by the international bourgeoisie", and the workers and peasants, who are represented "in the most vocal and conscious element" by a group of academics and a few enlightened leaders.¹

¹Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania - The Silent Class Struggle", in Tanzania Studies No. 2, The Silent Class Struggle, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974), p. 22.

On this basis, Shivji argues that TANU must alter its structure from that of a mass party, to an elite socialist party. The enlightened leaders must break away from the bureaucracy. For a socialist state to be successfully established, according to Shivji, it needs to be based on Ujamaa villages, and the working class, guided by those firmly in political power.²

This can be ensured only if the working class is guided by a revolutionary vanguard party of dedicated cadres.³

Shivji's suggestions, if implemented, would result in the greater use of force in Tanzania. He urges that TANU take the lead in developing a Socialist state and place less emphasis on its serving as a representative party. His desire that TANU forgo the role of a mass party, provides a tacit acknowledgement that a significant proportion of the population is inactive in the support of socialist policies. Even if we make the very dubious assumption that workers in the manufacturing sector maintain a 'socialist' attitude, the basis for socialism in Tanzania is still very weak. This is due to urban workers comprising only 16 per cent of the population. The other segment of the "working class", the peasants, have not been enthusiastic in their response to the communal Ujamaa villages. For the government to pursue the objectives defined by Shivji, it would require the vanguard party,

²Ibid., pp. 37-38.

³Ibid., p. 39.

backed by the army, to force the people into Ujamaa villages. As 'Operation Tanzania' illustrates, such use of force does not necessarily ensure the economic viability of the village.

There is some evidence supporting Shivji's claim that members of the "international bourgeoisie" are 'influencing' or 'aiding' the government. In February 1978, consultants from the International Monetary Fund advised the Tanzanian government on appropriate accounting methods, and methods of tightening government control over public expenditure.⁴ Also, recent economic reforms that the Tanzanian government has adopted, were strongly influenced by suggestions from the World Bank.⁵

Too simplistic is the explanation that Tanzania's more conservative economic policies, after 1975, were a result of its dependence upon international capital. Tanzania's past is the reason for her economy's reliance on foreign capital. In fact, foreign capital established Tanganyika's identity. Tanzanian socialism, as defined by the Arusha Declaration, outlined Tanzania's objective - to move away from such financial dependency. The Second Five Year Plan was designed to provide the means by which the government could fulfil this aim. The failure of the plan further necessitated Tanzania's request for outside assistance. The granting of

⁴ Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, (2nd Quarter, 1978), p. 6.

⁵ Time, (March 13, 1978), p. 30.

foreign aid (even though it may have been to the advantage of Western powers) cannot, therefore, be cited as the primary cause for the change in the 1975/76 economic strategy.

Explanation II - Pragmatists Vs Ideologues

A second explanation for the government's policy shift, away from socialist principles, concentrates on the pragmatic and ideological attitudes of various members of the elite. Some sectors of the press have argued or suggested that the liberalization of the economic policy was the result of a victory of pragmatists over ideologues in the party. Keesing Contemporary Archives reported that, in 1977, there were "far reaching changes"⁶ in the composition of the Tanzanian cabinet. In the major cabinet reshuffle of February 13, 1977, Nyerere transferred Prime Minister Kawawa to the defense portfolio, and appointed the Defense Minister, Edward Sokoine, to the position of Prime Minister. Amir Jamal, who previously controlled the important Ministry of Finance and Planning, was demoted to the Ministry of Communication and Transport. Edward Mtei replaced Jamal as the Minister of Finance and Planning.⁷

The Economist concluded from these changes that the power of the ideologues had decreased. The Economist states:

⁶Keesing Contemporary Archives, (April 8, 1977), p. 28288.

⁷African Recorder, (March 26 - April 8, 1977), p. 4497.

Just as pragmatism now flavours commerce, industry and agriculture, so it does politics. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, the man to whom Mr. Nyerere temporarily handed over power in 1962 while he sorted out his ideas, was last year removed from the Prime Ministership to make way for the less dogmatic and uncompromising Mr. Edward Sokoine. With the likes of Mr. Amir Jamal (unravelling Tanzania's web of transport and communications, hopelessly tangled in the break up of the East African Community), and Mr. Edwin Mtei (at finance) there is no shortage of capable men running the ministries. 8

Although there has been some alteration in the make-up of the cabinet in 1977, it would be a mistake to think that such changes were the only explanation for the major shifts in economic policy. The press reports that there was a connection between these two events, primarily sparked by the events surrounding the removal of the previous Minister of Finance and Planning, Mr. Jamal.

In late 1976, Mr. Jamal, who at the time was Minister of Finance and Planning, stated that the government was unable to establish a self-reliant socialist structure. He thus advocated drastic changes in economic policy, to improve Tanzania's poor financial position. Mr. Jamal presented the government with a report written by a panel of local economists. It recommended the abandonment of socialism, and a return to private enterprise. In short, Mr. Jamal argued that Tanzania did not have "the financial or managerial resources to socialize the entire economy."⁹

⁸ The Economist, (March 11, 1978), p. 17.

⁹ Keesing Contemporary Archives, (April 8, 1977), p. 28288.

Jamal was not a long time antagonist to the 'socialist' policies of the Second Five Year Plan. In fact, Jamal was an advisor, in its formation, and during the Second Five Year Plan, and a key administrator in the implementation of economic strategy. As late as 1976, Jamal defended the socialist rural strategy, particularly the need for emphasising rural development around the Ujamaa village.¹⁰ Jamal withdrew support of the socialist strategy in response to the economic unfeasibility of the plan. As Minister of Finance and Planning, Jamal had to face the problem created by the Second Five Year Plan in which the cost of the programme exceeded government resources and capabilities. Continuing such a policy would further weaken Tanzania's crippled economic position.

Tanzania's ideological and pragmatic division has not been developed to the extent where there was a definite line between the two camps. In fact, the ideological camp is a very small one, mostly because the ideology stems from the thinking of Julius Nyerere. Such men as Kawawa and Jamal have been colleagues of Nyerere since 1961. They have therefore, held government posts when Tanzania had encouraged private investment,¹¹ nationalized private investment, and again when Tanzania began to invite private investment to play a greater

¹⁰ David Coetzee, "Interview with Amir Jamal, African Development, (November 1976), p. 1199.

¹¹ In the early 1960s, Nyerere laid down a foundation stone with the inscription: "On the basis of mutual trust benefit we...welcome private investment in this and other fields." The Times Literary Supplement, (March 30, 1967), p. 259.

role in the economy. During all these phases the cabinet has given comparatively faithful service and attempted to implement whatever programme Nyerere espoused.

Explanation III - Elite Values Vs. Mass Beliefs

Another explanation for change in policy, away from socialist principles, emphasises Nyerere's alleged willingness to be flexible on ideological points, in the interests of social stability. To a number of observers, this flexibility indicates Nyerere's pragmatism in seeking a suitable strategy for Tanzania's development.¹² Cranford Pratt suggests that one of the reasons for this was not that Nyerere ostensibly supported the ideology, but because he placed a higher priority on democratic rights.¹³

TANU has never seen itself as a vanguard party, in the Marxist/Leninist sense. TANU has never proclaimed that its duty was to work for the benefit of the productive powers of a specific class within a multi-class society. Nyerere believed that Tanzania was classless. Nyerere also did not see the inevitable path that Tanzanian society had to follow.

¹²See The Times Literary Supplement, (March 30th, 1967), p. 259. Michael Harrington, The Vast Majority: A Journey to the World's Poor, (New York: Simon Schuster, 1976), p. 189.

¹³Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 263.

In fact, he rejected the much-expressed European Marxist belief, that only a developed capitalist country has the potential to transform itself into a socialist state.

Socialism, according to Nyerere, could occur in Tanzania if the political structure is democratic and decentralized. This strong belief in a democratic society, Pratt suggests, would encourage Nyerere to yield to public sentiment, ultimately placing greater store on the people's wishes, than on his ideological concepts. Pratt remarks that:

His, [Nyerere's] belief in democracy has persisted. He has recurringly refused to allow himself or his government to become so certain of their own integrity, of the validity of their vision and the adequacy of means as to feel that extreme coercion is justified. 14

The implementation of 'Operation Tanzania,' however, illustrates that Nyerere's capacity to use force should not be underestimated. His highest priority in the years of the Second Five Year Plan was to encourage people to live in collective villages. He controlled a state apparatus that exercised strong arm tactics. Nyerere also presided over a government apparatus that sacrificed grass-roots participation. This developed greater efficiency in government business administration.

Explanation IV - Economic Necessity

A fourth explanation for the change of policy is based

¹⁴Cranford Pratt, op. cit., p. 263.

upon the assumption that Nyerere and the government initiated a change from the strategy of the Second Five Year Plan because of its unsatisfactory economic results.

The government was forced to compromise its ideological principles, not because of public opinion, but primarily because Tanzania faced bankruptcy, if the plan continued. By 1974/75, Tanzania was in a very weak position. She was dependent, to an ever increasing degree, on foreign finance to cover unprofitable investment commitments. Certain economic problems arising from the First Five Year Plan stimulated government initiative--a new strategy for the mid-1960s. Similarly, new economic problems resulting from the ideologically-inspired policies, prompted the government to again alter, in the mid 1970s, its economic strategy.

The two episodes had significantly different effects on determining the role of Tanzanian socialist doctrine. The party's response to the economic problems of the 1960s was enveloped in the ideological pronouncements of the Arusha Declaration. Concomitantly, the ideology became more precise in its meaning, allowing it the role of yardstick for the formation of the Second Five Year Plan. The government's movement away from these guidelines, in the mid 1970s, again in response to economic problems, allows us to conclude that by 1977, the ideology no longer served to form government policy.

The belief that Tanzania has moved away from socialist principles, is challenged by Reginald Green. "In simplistic

terms", writes Green, "the transition to socialism in Tanzania could be said to be nearly accomplished."¹⁵ Green claims that the Tanzanian government had made significant progress in the areas of public ownership,¹⁶ by creating a public consciousness, for the necessity of Tanzania being self-reliant, and in depressing the power of the bourgeoisie in the rural and urban sector.¹⁷

Cranford Pratt is more cautious in his appraisal of Tanzania's movement towards building a socialist state. He nevertheless claims a significant movement has been made. Pratt cites a movement towards income equality, especially amongst the civil service. He also claims that there has been significant improvement in instilling socialist beliefs in the public, through the education system, and in providing more adequate medical care for the poor.¹⁸ Pratt cites problems that the government will face--managerial inefficiency, the allocation of social surplus to obtain growth, without creating

¹⁵ Reginald Green, "Towards Socialism and Self Reliance", Research Report No. 38, (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), p. 24.

¹⁶ The largeness of the public sector does not refute the claim that Tanzania depends on foreign finance. For example, foreign interests do give 'assistance' to the Tanzanian public sector. See New African (March 1979), pp. 57-58.

¹⁷ Reginald Green, op. cit., pp. 24-28.

¹⁸ Cranford Pratt, "Reflections of a Democratic Socialist" in B. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 216-223.

inequality in the society, lack of technical skill, and the ability to construct a national plan. Pratt,¹⁹ like Samuel Mushi, believes that these problems can be solved in a 'pragmatic' and 'eclectic' manner,²⁰ congruent with the original method applied in formulating Tanzanian socialist doctrine.²¹

However true, this does not deny the fact that the role of socialist doctrine in Tanzania has changed. This thesis has not attempted to define the meaning of socialism. The thesis accepts the fact that socialism can be defined in many ways. The attempt, here, is to illustrate the role of socialist doctrine, as defined in the Arusha Declaration, and how it has changed, in that the government in the Third Five Year Plan had set a strategy that conflicted with the one advocated in Arusha.

Mushi argues that the role of the ideology has not changed, because its political principles (which determine the nature of the economic principles) had remained unchanged.²² The thesis has argued that, theoretically, TANU saw no such split arguing that its economic strategy and political principles enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. In reality, however, there was a

¹⁹C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 264.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 227-231.

²¹Samuel Mushi, Revolution by Evolution: The Tanzanian Road in Socialism, (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1974) pp.447-448.

²²S. Mushi, ibid., p. 451.

definite split between these two components. A split which was only highlighted because the political principles and economic strategy were incompatible. As a result, the government could not fulfil either its political or economic aim as defined by the Arusha Declaration.

Chapter I listed five factors influencing the role of ideology. To summarise, these factors were: 1) Governmental success in improving administrative ability. 2) International response to the ideologically inspired national policy. 3) The political elite's enthusiasm and support for the ideology. 4) The ideology's acceptance by the populace. 5) The short or long-term feasibility of the economic policy, inspired by the ideology.

This thesis has argued that economic factors were primarily responsible for the changing role of Tanzanian socialist doctrine. It would, however, be unfair to overlook other factors contributing to African Socialism's changing role in the mid 1970s.

Lack of public support for the policies of the Second Five Year Plan was a very important cause of change in the role of Tanzanian socialism. As argued in Chapter III, this lack of support for the socialist policies resulted in poor productivity performances, and unprofitable capital investment in the rural sector. Admittedly, it is difficult to calculate the precise effect of public indifference to the performance of the Second Five Year Plan. It was, however, a significant

contributing factor to the economic problems faced by the government in 1975.

Public apathy did not play the primary role in altering the government's use of the ideology. This was due to the fact that the government ignored public sentiment when attempting to implement socialist policies. The government's inability to make these policies economically feasible, caused a change in strategy. One could speculate, however, that earlier public resentment of socialist agrarian policies would cause governmental temerity in re-introducing similar programmes for the future.

The government's inability to efficiently administer specific projects in the Second Five Year Plan was also another factor in determining the role of ideology. The formation of socialism increased demand for governmental administrative reform. The socialist doctrine called for the creation of central plans, and for the government in general, to take an active part in the economy. The government administrators were not able to meet this challenge without creating severe costs.

There is no evidence to suggest that divisions amongst the ruling elite were a major factor in causing change in the role of ideology. It was obviously the ruling elite that brought about the demise of socialism as a yardstick for government policy. It established this by directing national policy away from the framework of the Second Five Year Plan.

This action, however, was undertaken in response to pressure from factors cited above. The party displayed no significant forms of disunity in the years of the Second Five Year Plan. Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that pressure from the international community caused the government to redirect its economic strategy. During the Second Five Year Plan, the government did receive aid and loans from a wide range of countries. Admittedly, the government followed the advice of the World Bank to liberalize its economy in the mid 1970s. The primary cause, however, of the government's acceptance of the advice was a response to the poor condition of the economy in 1975--a matter of internal economic problems rather than external pressure.

The Role of socialism in the Latter half of the 1970s

To summarise, in Chapter I five possible roles of an ideology were cited. They were: 1) As a yardstick for national policy 2) To control public demand 3) To mobilize the population 4) As a reference point for 'correct' political behaviour 5) To create an identity for the government. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ideology played an active role in being a yardstick for government policy. Concomitantly, the promotion of an ideology was a means by which the government attempted to control demands, in order to allocate and co-ordinate resources for the numerous economic projects within the Second Five Year Plan. The active nature of the

role of the ideology was enhanced, because the concepts of Tanzanian socialism were comparatively precise. This gave the government even greater direction in the method of controlling demand, and in the form popular mobilization should take.

By the mid 1970s, the socialist doctrine could no longer be regarded as a yardstick for government policy, when the concepts of the ideology and the aims of the Third Five Year Plan were incongruous. The socialist concepts stressed a need for rural development, self reliance, and material equality. These concepts were obviously not a guideline for the Third Five Year Plan--this advocated the development of the manufacturing sector, which would be considerably financed from foreign loans. It is an economic strategy that would also result in greater inequality, for example, between the rural and agrarian sectors.

Due to the inconsistencies between Tanzanian socialism and the Third Five Year Plan, the ideology could also not be used as a means of controlling demand, or directing the forms of social mobilization. A more passive use of the ideology does not reduce the government's attempts to regulate demand, or mobilize the population in accordance with its new economic strategy. The government, however, can not obtain assistance from its socialist doctrine in regulating demand or social mobilization, because there is a simple conflict between the pursuits outlined in the ideology, and the aims of the Third Five Year Plan.

The role of the ideology has not, per se, had an influence upon determining the government's methods of dealing with political opponents. The government, since independence, has had political prisoners. The political prisoners have been detained, probably because the government feels that these persons posed a threat to its authority, or they hindered the development process of Tanzania. Presumably, political detention will occur if the government feels its programme is hindered by political opponents. These political restrictions have occurred, regardless of the nature of the development strategy it has attempted to implement.

In summary, we can state that in the latter half of the 1970s, the role of Tanzanian socialism has been more passive when compared with the latter 1960s and early 1970s. More passive in the latter half of the 1970s, it was no longer a yardstick for national policy. Concomitantly, it was no longer a means of controlling the government's power to demand and mobilize the population. In the latter half of the 1970s to mobilize the population, to control demand, and to punish and promote various internal political groups, proceeds, primarily, from the power of the state apparatus. This contrasts with the phenomenon of the people ordering their life according to formally promulgated national ideology.

In the latter half of the 1970s, the government still used its socialist doctrine as a means of creating an identity. As late as 1977, the government publicly claimed its commitment to the ideals of socialism. This was at a time when it was,

paradoxically, executing new liberal economic policies. The government apparently felt it would lose credibility if it were to publicly refute principles that, earlier, it had been most active in promoting. The government's anxiety accounts for a redundant lag between revision of ideological concepts, and national plans. This lapse, in turn, will obviously discourage the renewal of active use of the ideology. This would highlight the inconsistencies between the government's theoretical pronouncements, and the policies it actually implemented.

With the socialist doctrine having a more passive role, the government can expect greater public quiescence to its authority. Social stability (and consequently government authority) should be enhanced by the government's refraining from the implementation of socialist policies that proved to be unpopular. It is ironic that the abandonment of active use of an ideology contributes to a more stable political atmosphere. As we observed in Chapter I, it was commonly viewed that the formation of an ideology would enhance social stability.

In conclusion, Tanzania provides us with a good example of the limited influence an ideology has on social change. An ideology is only the expression of concepts and goals. One of the dangers of devoting a research paper to the role of an ideology is that one may see it as being an independent force in itself. What gives an ideology potential

power is not necessarily its intellectual import, but the fact that a government, with all its powers, can justify behaviour in the name of a particular set of concepts. It is the action of the government, not the ideological concepts, that ultimately translate an ideology into working practice. If an ideology is precisely composed it will advocate the implementation of a specific social and economic policy. The role of an ideology will become more passive once the government attempts to fulfill the goals that it has set for itself. If the government is not able to meet all the requirements, compromises and alterations will be made. Ideological principles would thus be broken. This erosion of original ideological principles, promotes government incentive for increased opacity in its interpretation of an ideology--so avoiding the charge of inconsistency or hypocrisy.

Active use of ideology could only return if the government decided that the ideologically inspired policies were once again relevant. Otherwise, the role of the ideology becomes more passive and possibly anticipates the challenge of a competing social view, cloaked in ideological terms.

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