

LABOUR PARTY AND CCF-NDP: POLICIES
AND POLICY-MAKING

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE CCF-NDP :
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
POLICIES AND POLICY-MAKING, 1945-1968

By

MARTIN JAMES RIDGWAY, B.A. (Econ.)

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

May 1969

MASTER OF ARTS (1969)
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Labour Party and the CCF-NDP: A Comparative Study
of Policies and Policy-making, 1945-1968

AUTHOR: Martin James Ridgway, B.A. (Econ.) (Sheffield University)

SUPERVISOR: Mr. George Breckenridge

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 165

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis is a comparative study of some domestic policies (nationalisation, taxation, health services and housing) of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP between 1945 and 1968. The aims of the study are to assess the extent to which these policies have changed, to examine the reasons why they have changed and why CCF-NDP policies have become less socialist more rapidly than the Labour Party's.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to record my thanks to Professor T.C. Truman and Dr. R. B. Cunningham for their helpful comments and suggestions. Especially, I should like to thank my supervisor, Mr. George Breckenridge, for his guidance in the preparation of this thesis.

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I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION

The parties being studied, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), its successor the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the Labour Party are usually classified as democratic socialist parties¹. Such a classification assumes that they share an ideology that is essentially collectivist and anti-capitalist. Although both the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have modified their policy positions since 1945, they did enter the post-War period with basically similar short-term and long-term aims -- aims which were substantially in accordance with traditional democratic socialist thought.

Democratic socialism may be defined as a doctrine which is primarily concerned with transferring the ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange from a small number of private individuals to the people as a whole, the object being to create the conditions for equality of wealth and opportunity. The aim is to produce a collectivist society based on co-operation and central planning. The means that socialists have proposed to employ to achieve these ends are nationalisation, the provision of a wide range of social services by the State, and a system of taxation designed to transfer wealth from rich to poor. Democratic socialists have proposed to accomplish these fundamental changes in the balance of economic and social power by non-revolutionary

¹For example, by Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (1967), Ch.VI passim.

and constitutional means through the existing political system. Hence their emphasis on short-term measures, such as welfare services, to alleviate the hardship of those worst hit by the capitalist system.

Apart from this shared ideology, the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have other common features that clearly differentiate them, in company with the Labour Parties of Australia and New Zealand, from the general group of democratic socialist parties. The most important, the emigration of supporters and members of the British Labour Party, has been noted by Lipset when writing about the origins of the CCF in Saskatchewan:

In 1929 a small group of trade unionists and teachers under the leadership of M.J.Coldwell, a former member of the English Fabians . . . decided to form the Independent Labor Party of Saskatchewan. Most of the members were Englishmen who had belonged to, or had supported, the labor movement in the United Kingdom².

As might be expected, the political cultures of Britain and Canada have much in common. In both countries there is a high level of consensus on certain political values and attitudes. For example, all but an insignificant minority of their populations support, or at least accept, a democratic, parliamentary system of government based on competing political parties. In some respects, however, there are marked differences between their political cultures --- differences resulting from the contrasting political, economic and social histories of Britain and Canada.

British political culture comprises elements that are both

²Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, (Up-dated ed.,1968), p.110.

traditional and modern. Traditional values and attitudes have their roots in the pre-industrial period and are exemplified by paternalistic Toryism and by deference amongst the lower classes. Such values were challenged, though by no means eliminated, in the nineteenth century as industrialisation progressed and there developed a considerable body of influential opinion proclaiming laissez-faire individualism. By the beginning of the twentieth century, laissez-faire was being effectively challenged by a class-conscious labour movement that became increasingly better organised to press its claims for State action on behalf of the working class. Thus, though seeing economic and social problems from different points of view, the labour movement and the paternalistic Tories both reacted against the values individualism. Samuel Beer has explained this anti-laissez-faire reaction as follows:

British Tories are in some degree Collectivists, not only in certain aims of policy, but in certain methods of political action. In both respects, they often have more in common with Socialists than with their contemporaries in the Liberal party. Old traditions of strong government, paternalism, and the organic society have made easier the massive re-assertion of state power that has taken place in recent decades, often under Conservative auspices.³

Although, as Lipset notes, "Canada has been a much more conservative, traditional and hierarchical-elitist society than the United States"⁴, its society and the nature of its economic development have conformed to the American rather than the British pattern. Explanations of this difference have been put forward by Louis Hartz, Kenneth

³Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, (1965), p.69.

⁴Lipset, Introduction to Agrarian Socialism, p.xvi.

McCrae and Gad Horowitz⁵. In their theory, emphasis is placed on the absence of a European-type class structure in North America. In Canada, as in the United States, there is a broad liberal consensus -- "The English fragment [in Canada] seems firmly and irremovably anchored to its liberal heritage"⁶. And although there have been elements of Toryism, as Lipset suggests, and there still are elements of socialism, the general picture remains of an achievement-orientated, liberal-capitalist, middle-class society.

The absence of a traditional past and the filling up of the North American continent with mainly lower class immigrants from many parts of Europe has produced a society that in many ways contrasts sharply with that of Britain. Such immigrants, pushed from Europe in the nineteenth century by harsh economic and political conditions, or lured by the wealth-potential of the New World, were, or soon became, imbued with the laissez-faire individualist spirit. Hence industrialisation, with its free enterprise philosophy, did not challenge existing values and attitudes, and the absence of an entrenched class structure meant that there were no barriers to the upward mobility of the working class. Unlike in Britain, therefore, industrialisation in North America did not result in any

⁵Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, (1964); Kenneth McCrae, "The Structure of Canadian History", in ibid; Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, (1968); Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science [cited hereafter as CJEPS], XXXII (1966); reprinted in Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, (2nd ed., 1967).

⁶McCrae, in Hartz, p.272.

widespread awakening of class consciousness among the workers. On the contrary, it presented greater opportunities for enterprising workers to advance, while at the same time producing marked improvements in the material standards of the working class. Consequently, "American industrial workers, as an entire class have not been so poor or depressed as to believe that an improved future required a drastic change in the economic system"⁷.

A further factor relegating the importance of class in North American politics has been the existence of many other lines of cleavage. In relatively homogeneous societies, such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand, class is one of the few significant lines of cleavage. But, as Regenstreif has written, in Canada "it is difficult to make a case for the existence of a situation in which active discord exists between classes . . . in any aspect of life, much less the political"⁸. "If history is any guide at all, other things dividing Canadians -- ethnicity, for example -- loom as being far more important than differences in style of life or in the way they earn their daily bread."⁹

The differences between the political cultures of Britain and North America have been reflected in their trade union movements. The British trade union movement is, in origin, a movement of social protest whereas the American tradition is one of market unionism, and, as Porter notes: "It is the social movement concept of unionism that links it with

⁷Epstein, p.143.

⁸Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude, (1965), p.98.

⁹Ibid., p.99.

left wing political groups, while market unionism limits its activities to collective bargaining."¹⁰ By the end of the nineteenth century, British trade unions were becoming more favourably inclined towards direct participation in politics through the formation of their own party. The main reasons for this development were: growing class consciousness and solidarity of the workers due to the economic depression of the last quarter of the century; the efforts of employers to combine and their enlistment of government help in defeating strikes; the reaction of the courts in the 1890s against the expanding and broad-based movement; the inability of Liberal MPs representing the working class to get any ameliorative measures through the House of Commons; and, finally, the growing popularity of socialist ideas, especially amongst the leaders of the new unskilled workers' unions.¹¹ The formation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 came at a time when the British working class was becoming more class conscious because of these factors and because they saw no prospects of improving their conditions. Hence, the trade union movement's political arm arrived on the scene just as the tide was coming in.

The membership figures for the British and Canadian trade union movements show no great differences apart from the very important fact that British unionism reached a high level of development about a quarter of a century earlier than its Canadian counterpart. By 1901, total union membership in Britain was over two million, or 12.8 per cent.

¹⁰ John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, (1965), p.314.

¹¹ Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, (1963), Ch. VI, passim.

of the labour force. The figure rose to 37.6 per cent. in 1921, fell during the inter-war depression so that it was only 29.9 per cent. in 1948, but soon recovered to reach its high point of 44.8 per cent. in 1950. The Canadian figures show a much later development. In 1940, total union membership was 326,000, or less than 20 per cent. of the labour force. In 1945, it amounted to 25 per cent. and by 1950 had reached only 33 per cent.¹² The rise and fall in the fortunes of the Labour Party corresponds roughly to the changes in the fortunes of the British trade union movement. The CCF-NDP, however, has not achieved a rate of growth in support to parallel the increase in the membership of Canadian unions. In view of what has been said about British political culture and the character of the trade-union movement, it is probably legitimate to infer that there is a positive relationship between union membership and support for the Labour Party in general elections. But in Canada, no such relationship seems to exist. The explanation for this appears to lie in the character of the Canadian trade union movement.

As Porter has noted, "More than any other society the United States has influenced the development of Canadian labour organization."¹³ American unionism exists almost solely for the purpose of collective bargaining. As the prevailing values, upholding individualism and private property, were also shared by the working class, socialist remedies for economic problems were rejected in favour of Samuel Gompers' laissez-faire approach

¹²The figures for British unions are from the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, (1967), Research Paper 6, p.14; those for Canada from Porter, p.309.

¹³Porter, p.318.

to the question of worker-employer relations. Unions stayed clear of involvement in political activity because they were not alienated from the existing capitalist system, which the political system upheld. V.O.

Key explained this outlook as follows:

Neither CIO nor AFL questioned, as Selig Perlman put it, 'the basic management mandate independent of government or labor'. That is, the owner remains the boss, no matter how much he may be hedged about by agreements through bargaining. 'It is this', continues Perlman, 'which marks off the American labor movement from most other national movements; it is a labor movement upholding capitalism, not only in practice, but in principle as well'.¹⁴

The market unionism that dominated the American labour movement also dominated the Canadian movement. This was because most Canadian unionists belonged to international unions, i.e. branches of American unions. In fact, in the mid-1950s, over 75 per cent. of the unions in Canada with over 10,000 members were internationals. Hence, any tendency there might have been amongst Canadian trade unionists to direct involvement in politics on the lines of the British movement was thwarted by the market union philosophy of the American leaders.¹⁵

Although there were attempts to form a Canadian Labour Party, the most notable being by the Trades and Labor Congress in 1917,¹⁶ it has only been since the formation of the NDP in 1961 that a relationship similar to that between the British Labour Party and the unions has existed in Canada. The CCF was formed in Saskatchewan in 1932 as a party of agrarian protest, and many of its members were at least as

¹⁴V.O.Key, Jr. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, (4th ed., 1958), pp. 68-69.

¹⁵Porter, p.319.

¹⁶Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, p.60.

hostile to formal links with trade unions as were the unions themselves. Only since 1956, when the CCF toned down its socialism by adopting the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles to supersede the 1933 Regina Manifesto, have links between the party and the trade union movement been significantly strengthened. The formation of the NDP, in which the unions played an important part, was a departure from the North American trade union tradition only insofar as the unions abandoned their principle of formal non-alignment. They did not, however, depart from the basically pro-capitalism position of American market unionism because by this time the CCF-NDP had become a Keynesian reformist party.

This discussion of various aspects of the political cultures of Britain and Canada, especially the character of their trade union movement, can be related to their party systems by adopting Robert Alford's notion of the "centre of gravity" of political systems.¹⁷ Alford maintains that Britain's political centre of gravity is to the left of Canada's, but neglects to define his left-right continuum. If "left" is equated with the acceptance of collectivism and "right" with individualism, the use of Alford's idea gives a clear illustration of the difference between the two party systems. The idea of the political centre of gravity also possibly provides the basis for an explanation of the differences between the policies of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP because, by placing these parties in relation to their opponents on the individualism-collectivism continuum, it brings out a problem of vital importance to democratic socialist parties: whether to remain "fundamentalist", i.e. committed to the traditional doctrine, or whether to become "revisionist", i.e.

¹⁷Robert R. Alford, Party and Society, (1963), p.15.

compromise socialist principles to try to gain the support of the marginal or floating voters.

The extent to which the various parties in both countries have leaned towards collectivism or individualism at different times may be roughly estimated from the following table, which indicates a party's position on some major attitudes in the culture.

Table I: PARTY ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOME MAJOR CULTURAL VALUES
IN BRITAIN AND CANADA, 1945 AND 1965¹⁸

	BRITAIN				CANADA			
	1945		1965		1945		1965	
	Con.	Lab.	Con.	Lab.	PC & Lib.	CCF	PC & Lib.	NDP
Equality	-	+	- /	+	+	+	+	+
"Big Govt."	+ /	+	+ /	+	-	+	-	+ /
Welfare	- /	+	/ +	+	-	+	- /	+
Socialism	-	+	-	+ /	-	+	-	/ -

+ : supports / : partially supports - : rejects

two signs indicates sharp intra-party divisions

The major differences between the collectivism of the British Tories, on the one side, and that of Labour and the CCF-NDP on the other are clearly shown in this table; the points on which they differ sharply are equality and socialism. This brings out the distinction between collectivism and socialism, which Arthur Marwick explains as follows:


There can be no precise definition of socialism, a word which is highly emotionally charged, and which is used by the body of its adherents

¹⁸Based on a diagram by Richard Rose, Politics in England, (1964), p. 56.

rather as the adolescent girl uses the word 'nice', but, as distinguished from collectivism, it connotes a more positive egalitarianism; being the philosophy of the have-nots, it is associated with the conscious working-class movement, and it implies that in the desired reorganization of industry and society the worker will have managerial and political power, whereas collectivism alone could result in former employers continuing in exactly the same jobs, only as high-salaried employees of the State. All socialists, then, are collectivists (though some, for example, the guild socialists, would desire the collectivist unit to be very small); but not all collectivists are socialists.¹⁹

Table I may be put in the form of the following diagram:

DIAGRAM I: THE CENTRES OF GRAVITY OF THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO COLLECTIVISM AND INDIVIDUALISM



The extent of the movement of the Labour Party's and the CCF-NDP's policies towards those of their opponents depends largely on the active members of each party. Some members may be fundamentalists, others revisionists, while there will probably be a large uncommitted centre group. What will determine the policies of the parties will be the balance of power between the fundamentalists and the revisionists, and the success

¹⁹Arthur Marwick, The Deluge, (1967 ed.) pp. 164-165.

of each of these groups in enlisting the support of the centre for their point of view. In Britain, the more widespread acceptance of collectivist policies might be expected to produce a strong left wing in the Labour Party, including some trade unionists, that resists attempts to dilute socialist doctrine in the interest of capturing marginal voters. In Canada, the virtual absence of collectivism from the political culture means that fundamentalism is a weaker force and that revisionist policies will be widely acceptable within the CCF-NDP. This is especially likely for two reasons: firstly, the CCF-NDP has never been one of the two main parties in the federal Parliament; and, secondly, the tradition of market unionism means that there is no sentimental attachment, as there is in the British trade union movement, to the ideology of the "years of struggle".

The above explanations provide the general setting in which to consider the policies and policy-making processes of these two democratic socialist parties.

The CCF-NDP and the Labour Party are both organised on the basis of membership participation in policy-making. In Duverger's terminology, they are success-orientated mass parties with strong systems of articulation, based on constituent units, such as branches, and are formally committed to intra-party democracy.²⁰ Their policies have to be produced within the constraint of an ideology upheld, to a greater or lesser extent, by the party members. Yet they are not exclusive sects: on the one hand,

²⁰ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (1963 ed.), pp. 41-47.

their ideology is essentially gradualist and worldly in that it is first and foremost concerned with improving the material condition of the working classes; and, on the other hand, their membership is large and fairly diverse in character, partly because of their proselytising mission, and partly because of their links with the trade unions -- the trade union connexion does not mean, of course, that all trade union members who do not contract-out of the political levy vote for the party of which they are affiliated members. The aim of these two parties is to secure control over the machinery of government in order to implement their programmes. Their method of obtaining this control is basically by putting forward their programmes to the electorate in order to attract its support.

The Problem and the Proposed Approach to it

The aim of this study is to analyse and compare certain domestic policies and the policy-making procedures of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP between 1945 and 1968, so as to assess the extent of, and reasons for, any changes in these policies -- policies which started from a very similar socialist base. It is not intended to delve into the complex economic and social changes that have occurred in this period, and which have obviously had an effect on these election-orientated parties. Though external factors such as these are important in a complete examination of policies and policy-making, it is nevertheless possible to obtain a fairly clear picture by focussing on intra-party factors. This is because the range of policies available to democratic socialist parties is limited by their ideology and membership to a much greater extent than the range of policies available to less ideological parties. In

addition, they have usually been in the vanguard of the movement towards economic and social reform and so have not had to try to outbid their opponents.

To a great extent, then, the policies of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP may be regarded as the outcome of factors internal to both parties. Yet it would be a mistake to regard them, in their policy-making capacities, as operating in isolation. In two important and related respects their policies are influenced by the external political environment: firstly, the parliamentary wing of each party is daily coming into contact with its political opponents and has to expound policies and make ad hoc policy decisions in the light of changing circumstances; secondly, the party membership, from the leaders down to the rank-and-file, are continuously affected by external factors which, in turn, might reasonably be expected to affect their own attitudes towards policies and also their perceptions of the electorate's attitudes.

In this study, parties are viewed primarily as organisations; specifically, they are viewed as organisations for policy-making purposes. Leiserson notes that in an analysis of parties as organisations, the internal process of policy-making may be visualised not as dominated by closed, self-contained elite groups, but as the result of "complex patterns of leader-follower relationships (exhibiting varying degrees of interpersonal control, rivalry, submission) with other political entities", e.g. interest groups, with which the parties

intersect and overlap.²¹

The consequence of viewing parties as policy-making organisations is a concern with the centre, or centres, of policy formulation and decision. The fact that the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP are mass parties with extra-parliamentary origins, formally committed to membership participation in policy-making, and having fairly strong ideological elements within them, means that the problems of oligarchy associated with large-scale organisations have a special significance. And this significance is increased due to their intersecting and overlapping with interest groups, especially trade unions.

Their extra-parliamentary origins raise the problem of maintaining links with the rank-and-file once they achieve some measure of success in elections, and especially when they are in a position to form a government. It also raises a problem for the parliamentary wing of the party because clashes between it and the mass organisation can be damaging to its electoral image. This dilemma, however, can become less acute as the tendency towards oligarchy increases. The problem often begins to boil down to whether agreement can be reached between the parliamentary leadership, on the one hand, and the party activists and leaders of affiliated organisations, on the other. "When the 'iron law of oligarchy' operates in its most efficient form intra-party 'democracy' may involve no damaging splits between the mass and parliamentary parties even

²¹ Avery Lieserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics", American Political Science Review [cited hereafter as APSR], LI (1957), 950; reprinted in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Political Parties, (1967), pp. 25-39.

though the views of the grass roots differ from those of the parliamentary leadership, provided there is sufficient accord between the leaders of the mass party and the parliamentary leadership."²²

The fact that both the Labour Party and the CCF-MDP are democratic socialist parties raises another problem: the relation of ideology to party policy. The members of both parties are not all equally committed to an identical ideology.²³ This problem is posed in its extreme form by Weber who refers to the conflict between the "ethic of ultimate ends" and the "ethic of responsibility". "The believer in the ethic of ultimate ends feels 'responsible' only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not quenched: for example, the flame of protesting against the injustices of social order." On the other hand, "a man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies of people."²⁴

The conflict between party members who tend towards these two positions may be accentuated in the following ways: firstly, as mentioned above, by a gulf developing between leaders and rank-and-file, the former believing in an ethic of responsibility, the latter in an ethic of ultimate ends; or, secondly, by a split among the leaders -- Michel's struggle among the leaders themselves -- some taking one position, some

²²D.Hoffman, "Intra-Party Democracy: A Case Study", CJEPS, XXVII (1961), 234-235.

²³Ideology in the sense used here, is what Christoph calls an "organized bundle of views"; see J.B.Christoph, "Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology", APSR, LIX (1965), 629-642; reprinted in Macridis, pp.75-101.

²⁴Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and eds., From Max Weber, (1958), p. 121.

the other, and each side mobilising support among the rank-and-file.

Though these are extreme positions, there does seem to be a prima facie case for expecting tendencies in these directions to be evident at some periods in the histories of both the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP. Thus, a theory or model of intra-party policy-making must include provision for the interplay of these patterns of relationships. Such a model may be briefly described as follows: policies are the outcome of the interaction between ideology and political reality -- the need to attract votes -- and this interaction takes place within the formal and informal processes of the party's policy-making organisation.

Democratic socialist ideology is held with varying degrees of emphasis by all members of the party.²⁵ These varying degrees of emphasis on ideology provide the basis for factions within the party.²⁶ Ideology, in a democratic socialist party, then, is not a matter of interpreting sacred texts; rather, it is an approach to political action in the light of certain principles or attitudes which are held more strongly or with different emphases by some members than others. Ideological factions within a party consist of groups of members with similar attitudes. Hence, ideology may be referred to as member's attitudes.

²⁵In what follows, "members" refers to all active members of a party, including leaders as well as rank-and-file. For what constitutes "active membership" see, for example, Frank Bealey, Jean Blondel and W.P. McCann, Constituency Politics, (1965).

²⁶See, for example, Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain", Political Studies, XII (1964), 33-46; reprinted in Macridis, pp. 102-117; and S.E.Finer, H.B.Berrington and D.J. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955-59, (1961).

Most of the active members, rank-and-file as well as leaders, of democratic socialist parties are probably aware of most of the facts of political life. They see the party not only as a policy-making body but also as, amongst other things, a vote-getting organisation. One of the factors influencing policy decision is the desire on the part of party members to make policies as acceptable to as large a number of voters as possible. Thus, there can develop a conflict between ideology and members' perceptions of policies acceptable to a sufficient number of voters. The conflict, it should be noted, is not between members' attitudes and voters' attitudes, for the latter factor is external to the policy-making process; rather, it is between members' attitudes and those same members' perceptions of voters' attitudes.

Translated into the language of the current North American Political Science orthodoxy, the model may be stated as follows: policy is the dependent variable; the policy-making organisation is the intervening variable; members' attitudes and members' perceptions of voters' attitudes are the two independent variables.

Such a model raises a number of questions. The primary one is, who are the policy-makers?; can they be identified as one group of members, or is policy the product of inter-group bargaining and compromise, or is it the outcome of true intra-party democracy? Following on from this is the question of the strength of ideology in the party; are some members more likely to compromise ideology to match their perceptions of voters' attitudes than others and, if so, do they dominate the policy-making process? The policy-making process may be regarded as the means of resolving any conflicts there may be between members who hold different

ideological positions: does this machinery put one group in an advantageous position in the policy-making process?; does it accentuate or conceal divisions between groups of members? And, finally, there arises the question of the effect on policy-making of a party's becoming the government. The answers to these questions will provide the evidence for answering the three basic questions posed by this study. These are: firstly, to what extent have the policies of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP changed during this period?; secondly, why have they changed?; and, thirdly, why have the policies of one party changed more (or less) than those of the other? It is hoped that tentative answers to these questions can be presented in the concluding chapter.

The form of this study will be as follows: Chapter II will comprise a description of the origin, development and organisation of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP, and an analysis of their policy-making procedures; Chapters III and IV will be concerned with certain domestic policies of the parties between 1945 and 1968 --- they will be both descriptive and analytical and will attempt to bring out any significant points that might indicate which groups of members are dominant in policy making; Chapter V will present any conclusions as may be warranted.

The policies to be studied are nationalisation, taxation, socialised medicine and housing. They have been selected because they are not only traditionally the main items in the domestic programmes of democratic socialist parties, but also because they have either remained significant in these programmes or have become bones of contention. In addition, most of these items are significant not only in the eyes of the party members, but also in the eyes of the electorate, thus providing a means by which members' perceptions of voters' attitudes can be assessed.

Sources used in this Study

The policies on which election campaigns are based are generally drawn up by the parties in the months, or even years, preceding general elections. They are usually published in the form in which they are presented to party members meeting in Conference or Convention, and later a final approved form is published. The main sources of information, therefore, are the Reports of Labour Party Annual Conferences and of CCF National, and NDP Federal, Conventions. Further information has been obtained from Labour Party and CCF-NDP election manifestos. In addition to these primary sources, information has been obtained from general writings on the parties and from biographies and autobiographies of participants in the policy-making processes.

II

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE CCF-NDP AS POLICY-MAKING ORGANISATIONS

Being democratic socialist parties, the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP are both attached to an ideology that delineates their objectives. In the long-run, they are formally committed to the establishment of a socialist society; in the short-run, their policies must be more or less consistent with this goal.

Both parties are associated with mass-membership organisations; in fact, the term "party" or "movement" embraces both their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings. The relationship between the party's ideology and its mass-membership is a reciprocal one: the ideology attracts the members, or at least the activists; they in turn exert pressure "to maintain or even extend the program that attracted the members . . . in the first place".¹ The party membership may therefore limit flexibility in election campaign tactics because they are not solely interested in winning elections. Hence there is a possibility of conflict between activists and party leaders.

In these parties the activists have a constitutionally defined role in the policy-making procedures. They tend to see an election not

¹Epstein, p. 261

merely as a means of attaining power, but as a means of implementing an ideologically derived programme. Thus the programme presented to the electorate must be consistent with the party's basic objective, the eventual establishment of a socialist society.

The machinery adopted by both the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP to enable the views of the rank-and-file to be communicated to the leadership are very similar. According to their constitutions, delegates from constituencies and affiliated organisations, meeting in Convention or Conference, are the parties' supreme authority. This supremacy is regarded by the rank-and-file as being particularly important in the field of policy-making, and intra-party democracy is a much-vaunted feature of both the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP. Although there is little doubt that the formal situation is substantially different from the actual one, the wishes of the organised membership are far from insignificant in the policy-making process, if only because it is necessary to maintain their enthusiasm as unpaid workers in the constituencies. Whether or not intra-party democracy is a sham, the formal machinery for membership participation is of great importance in both parties because it provides channels of communication between different sections of their respective movements: horizontally between the various membership groups; vertically between the mass membership and leadership. Hence a description of that machinery and an evaluation of the roles of various groups in the parties is a necessary prelude to a consideration of the actual policies produced.

Labour Party

Origin and History

Although the Labour Party was originally, and to a great extent still is, the representative of organised labour on the political scene, it was nevertheless much more than this. It was, and has remained, a coalition of trade unions, co-operative societies, doctrinaire socialists and pragmatic reformers.

The initial impetus for the formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) came towards the end of the nineteenth century when the courts began to attack the unions. "It was in this situation that the 1899 Trade Union Congress (TUC), meeting as usual in September, had to consider a resolution from the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants to summon a special conference of trade unions, co-operative societies, and socialist bodies in order to make plans for labour representation in Parliament".² The Conference met in February 1900 and set up a committee to co-ordinate labour representation, but on other things, such as a programme, it could not agree.

The first member unions were those of the unskilled workers, the main reason being that their officials tended to be socialists. The other group of makers was the socialist societies: Independent Labour Party, the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and the Fabian Society. After the 1901 conference the SDF withdrew because the LRC would not accept the "class war" concept.

²Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, (1962), pp. 6-7.

Affiliated membership increased after the 1901 Taff Vale judgement and the party's organisation improved so that in the 1906 election there were 50 LRC candidates, of whom 29 were returned to Parliament.

"As soon as the 1906 Parliament assembled, the LRC assumed the name of 'Labour Party' ".³ After the second election of 1910 there were 42 Labour MPs, the increase being due to the affiliation of the Miners' Federation and their MPs dropping the "Lib" from their "Lib-Lab" label.

During the First World War the Labour Party was split; the majority supported the war and a number of its members were given positions in the Lloyd George coalition -- Arthur Henderson was even in the War Cabinet; the ILP, however, was in opposition to the war. Henderson's departure from the Cabinet marked the turning point in the history of the party in its early years because he then turned his attention solely to its affairs. With Sidney Webb, he prepared a new draft constitution. "His object was to weld the socialist and trade union elements firmly together and to provide for the admission to full membership of people who were not trade unionists: middle-class people, for instance, and also women, who were shortly to get the vote."⁴ The 1918 constitution not only laid down the organisational structure of the party but also committed it, by clause IV, to socialism: Clause IV states that one of the party objects is, "To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution

³Ibid., p.18.

⁴Ibid., p.43.

and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service."⁵ Later in 1918, the party adopted Sidney Webb's Labour and the New Social Order which formed the basis of its policy for over thirty years.

The Labour Party formed minority governments for a few months in 1924 and from 1929 to 1931. Only being in power through Liberal support, they were unable, even if they had wanted to, to introduce any socialist legislation. The 1931 Government's collapse as a result of the international financial crisis, which caused a Cabinet split over proposed retrenchment measures, was a traumatic experience for Labour because it was followed by Ramsay MacDonald's "betrayal" and subsequent expulsion from the party. The locus of power in the party then shifted from the PLP to extra-parliamentary bodies, especially the TUC. In its period of convalescence during the 1930s, it became, in Henry Pelling's words, "The General Council's Party". "The records show that the National Council of Labour⁶(NCL) was constantly assuming statements on policy, and Bevin himself, who served on it from 1931 to 1937, regarded these decisions as binding even upon the parliamentary leaders."⁷

After about 1935 the National Executive Committee (NEC) became more important and there developed a rough division of policy-making

⁵Constitution and Standing Orders of the Labour Party, reprinted in the Annual Report of the Labour Party for 1966, pp. 332-340 [Cited hereafter as LPCR].

⁶The NCL comprises members of the General Council of the TUC, the PLP and the NEC, and was remodelled in the 1930s so that the General Council had a majority.

⁷Pelling, p.77.

functions between it and the NCL. The latter, dominated by the trade unionists, especially Bevin and Citrine, determined the outlines of policy, while the NEC, dominated by moderate politicians, began to draw up detailed policy proposals. "The National Executive had a powerful policy sub-committee, consisting of Attlee and Cripps . . . and the other leading younger contenders for parliamentary honours, several of them still being outside parliament: Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton, Arthur Greenwood. The sub-committee was very active in drawing up detailed legislative and administrative programmes for a Labour Government, within the general policies laid down by the Council of Labour. The concept of 'planning' was only now being evolved, and the Labour Party's economic experts were just awakening to the need to prepare every step of their proposed transition to socialism, in such a way that the economy would continue to function satisfactorily throughout."⁸

The Labour Party's new parliamentary leaders got an opportunity to learn the art of government when, after the resignation of Chamberlain in 1940, Churchill invited them to join his Coalition. When Churchill was absent, Attlee, his deputy, presided over Cabinets which "disposed rapidly of the business that faced them: decisions were reached quickly instead of being postponed . . . this not only widened Attlee's experience; it heightened his stature with his own colleagues, especially with Bevin."⁹ The Labour Ministers were also able to get a certain amount of social legislation through and to initiate enquiries, such as the

⁸Ibid., p.79.

⁹Ibid., pp.91-92.

Beveridge Committee which looked into Social Insurance.

With the election victory of July 1945, Attlee and his now experienced team were able to proceed quickly to implement Labour's long-prepared programme. By 1950 it had largely completed this but had drawn up no similar programme to present to the electorate in that year. It stood on its record of achievement, but also had to bear the responsibility for the austerity of the preceding five years. With its majority down to six after the 1950 election and having decided to embark on a rearmament programme, the period of grave dissention within the party began. Rearmament was responsible for cutbacks in domestic programmes, the imposition of National Service charges, and the consequent resignation of Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman.

The party was torn by internal conflicts from then until the election of Wilson as leader in 1963. The main reason for the troubles was ideology -- the battle between the fundamentalists and the revisionists. Linked to it was the struggle for the succession to the party leadership between Gaitskell and Bevan, but even when this was resolved factional disputes continued within the PLP and in the movement as a whole, both in the constituencies and in the trade unions.


Organisation of the Labour Party

Crossman, in his introduction to Bagehot's The English Constitution, gives a succinct description of the three conditions which determined the structure of the Labour Party:

First it must have very large funds at its disposal; hence the reliance on trade union financing which led to the sponsoring of Trade Union candidates by particular unions. Secondly, since it could not afford, like its opponents, to maintain a large army of paid party

Diagram II

ORGANISATION OF THE LABOUR PARTY
(based on McKenzie, p.487.)



- delegates
- > elected
- - - -> ex officio -- cannot vote at Conference, but many are T.U. or C.L.P. delegates
- =====> appoints and/or directs

the Deputy-Leader of the PLP has been an ex officio member of the NEC since 1953

workers, the Labour Party required militants -- politically conscious socialists to do the work of organising the constituencies. But since these militants tended to be 'extremists', a constitution was needed which maintained their enthusiasm by apparently creating a full party democracy while excluding them from effective power. Hence the concession in principle of sovereign powers to the delegates at the Annual Conference, and the removal in practice of most of this sovereignty through the trade union block vote on the one hand and the complete independence of the Parliamentary Labour Party on the other. Thirdly, since its avowed aim was social revolution, the Labour Party from the first accepted the semi-military discipline of democratic centralism, based on the enforcement of majority decision. Hence its intolerance of minority opinion.

In any modern mass party, power tends to be concentrated in the hands of the parliamentarians, and the professional machine politicians. In working class parties, the spirit of trade unionism intensifies this process.¹⁰

The majority of the party's members belong to affiliated organisations, mainly trade unions, and so their connexion with it is tenuous. The only efforts that most members make on its behalf are not contracting-out of the political levy and perhaps voting for Labour candidates at parliamentary elections. Although they usually take little or no part in the party's activities, or even in union activities, their leaders cast block votes at Annual Conferences. Representation of affiliated organisations is on the basis of one delegate for every 5,000 members on whom affiliation fees were paid. In fact, however, the unions usually only send about half the delegates they are entitled to, but this in no way affects their voting strength.¹¹

A much smaller, but more active group of members is those who have joined constituency parties. These include individuals who are not

¹⁰R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction to Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (1963 ed.) pp. 41-42.

¹¹R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, (2nd ed., 1964) pp. 488-489.

Table II

MEMBERSHIP OF THE LABOUR PARTY

Year	Constituency and Central Labour		Trade Unions		Socialist and Co-operative Socs		Total Membership
	No.	Parties Individual Membership	No.	Membership	No.	Membership	
1945	649	487,047	69	2,510,369 [※]	6	41,281	3,038,697
1950	661	908,161	83	4,971,911	5	40,100	5,920,172
1955	667	843,356	87	5,605,988	5	34,650	6,483,994
1960	667	790,392	86	5,512,688	5	25,450	6,328,330
1965	659	816,765	79	5,601,982	6	21,146	6,439,893

※ the 1927 Trades Disputes Act was in operation until 1946

Source: 1966 LPCR, p.45.

eligible to be members of affiliated organisations, and members of affiliated organisations who wish to take a more active part in constituency affairs. The individual members are often referred to as "activists" or "militants", although only a small percentage of them really deserve such labels. Nevertheless, their distinguishing characteristic is interest in the party, and it is reflected in the zealous manner in which they fill the Conference places allotted to them. They are entitled to one delegate per 5,000 members, with an additional delegate if their women's membership exceeds 2,500. They take up almost all the Conference places to which they are entitled and generally outnumber trade union delegates.¹²

The affiliated organisations were responsible for the formation of the party; individual membership came later. Hence, the federal structure adopted at the beginning has been retained, and is evident not only in the system of voting at Conference but also in the composition of the National Executive. As Richard Rose says, "The Labour Party is federal in theory and federal in practice."¹³

Parliamentary Labour Party Since 1922 the Labour Party has been one of the two major parties in the House of Commons. It formed minority Governments in 1924 and 1929-1931, and majority Governments in 1945-1950, 1950-1951, 1964-1966 and from 1966 onwards. Labour Party activity has therefore been centred on Parliament, as was intended by its founders, and the role of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) has consequently

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Rose, Politics in England, p.144.

Table III

THE LABOUR PARTY'S GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1935-1966

Election	Labour's % of votes cast	Seats	Majority if forming Govt.	Seats in the Commons.
1935	37.9	154	-	615
1945	48.3	393	146	640
1950	46.1	315	5	625
1951	48.8	295	-	625
1955	46.4	277	-	630
1959	43.8	258	-	630
1964	44.1	317	4	630
1966	47.9	363	97	630

Sources: D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966, pp. 296-297; The Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1966, p.244; Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party, pp. 185-186; D. E. Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts, 1900-1967, pp. 143-144.

acquired great importance in the party organisation as a whole -- probably greater than the founders envisaged or intended.

The Labour Party has always been a party of factions, and this has been especially noticeable in the PLP. Any important splits in the party have always been on left-right lines and have involved both the PLP and the extra-parliamentary party; there has never been an example of a monolithic parliamentary party opposing or being opposed by a monolithic extra-parliamentary party. The question of unilateral nuclear disarmament, for example, when Hugh Gaitskell, the Party Leader, refused to be bound by a conference decision, revealed a deep split in the PLP as well as in the trade unions and constituency parties.

The issue of unilateralism is a good example of the influence of the leaders of the PLP, who form either the Cabinet or the Shadow Cabinet, on party policy. Gaitskell never accepted the decision of the 1960 Conference and promised to "fight and fight and fight again" to get it reversed. The policy was duly reversed at the 1961 Conference and the principle then seemed to have been established that the PLP, even when in opposition, was not bound by Conference decisions. "And . . . when Harold Wilson succeeded Gaitskell as leader he made it clear that he stood with the PLP in refusing to be bound by the conference decision on [the American Polaris submarine base]."¹⁴

Such confrontations between the majority of the PLP and the majority of Conference have, however, been uncommon because of the support for the Leader usually found among leading trade unionists and because of the care

¹⁴ McKenzie, pp. 624-625.

he usually takes to prepare his victories. Therefore party policies, throughout the period under consideration have generally resulted from decisions made in both the PLP and the extra-parliamentary party. This process enables minority views to be taken into account and hence adds legitimacy to such policy in the eyes of the rank-and-file. But, as will be mentioned below, the leaders of the PLP usually also occupy important positions in the extra-parliamentary organs of the party and thus their influence on policy-making is further enhanced.

Annual Conference "The work of the Party shall be under the direction and control of the Party Conference."¹⁵ Apart from this general supremacy, the constitution also gives Conference an important role in the formulation of the party programme: "The Party Conference shall from time to time decide what specific proposals of legislative, financial or administrative reform shall be included in the Party Programme."¹⁶ Conference also elects most of the members of the NEC, which, in the words of Clause VIII of the Constitution, is "the Administrative Authority of the Party."

National Executive Committee The federal nature of the party is clearly revealed in the composition of the NEC. It has a total of 28 members, 26 of whom are elected (the other two, the Leader and, since 1953, the Deputy Leader of the PLP being ex-officio members). Of these 26 members, only the Treasurer and Division IV, the women members, are elected by the Conference voting as a whole. The remainder are voted for separately, as follows: Division I consists of 12 members elected from and by the trade

¹⁵Constitution of the Labour Party, Clause VI.

¹⁶Ibid., Clause V.

union delegates; Division II consists of one member elected from and by the co-operative, socialist and professional societies; Division III consists of 7 members elected by the constituency delegates.¹⁷

The duties of the NEC include submitting to the Annual Conference "such resolutions and declarations affecting the programme, principles, and policy of the party as in its view may be necessitated by political circumstances," and to decide in consultation with the Parliamentary Committee of the PLP "which items from the Party Programme shall be included in the Manifesto."¹⁸

The NEC seems to be, on the face of it, controlled by the constituency parties and trade unions, with only two prominent members of the PLP represented on it. In fact, however, Division III has had, since 1940, an average of 6 MPs out of its 7 members. And in the 1950s the other member was often Tom Driberg or Ian Mikardo, formerly and subsequently MPs. The reason for the predominance of MPs in this section is simply that they are well known; only occasionally is a non-MP sufficiently well known to be elected, e.g., Harold Laski.¹⁹ During the periods 1945-52 and 1964-66, Ministers and ex-Ministers have been well represented in Division III. In the 1950s, however, when Bevanism was rampant, the only ex-Minister to remain as the NEC's Division III was Harold Wilson, and he was identified with the left-wing.

"The trade union members of the NEC are almost always their

¹⁷Constitution and Standing Orders of the Labour Party, Standing Order 4.

¹⁸Constitution of the Labour Party, Clauses VIII and V.

¹⁹Jean Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders, (1963), pp.123-124.

second string.²⁰ They are not necessarily second rate. Many later become General Secretaries [of their unions]. But the abler men do not often serve long enough to make either a reputation or a significant contribution to the work of the NEC. In general, though, the standard of the trade union representatives is not high."²¹

Since 1945 there has been an average of about 17 MPs on the NEC in all four divisions as well as ex-officio. This does not mean that the leaders of the PLP have had it all their own way on the NEC because of the backing of MPs. The constituency section of the NEC, especially in the 1950s, tended to elect members who were not in sympathy with the party leadership; support for the leadership therefore came mainly from trade unionists. But even amongst the trade unionists unity cannot always be counted on for, as Harrison notes, "almost every issue which troubles the party divides the trade union group" on the NEC.²² The division among the trade unions has become more marked since Frank Cousins was elected General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union (T & GWU).

McKenzie implies that the NEC is the creature of the Leader of the Party. The Leader's control, he maintains, may be exercised in two ways: through MPs on the NEC; or, if they disagree, through the loyal trade unionists. Saul Rose,²³ in his criticism of McKenzie, notes that six of the 17 MPs on the NEC in 1952-53 were Bevanites and so constantly in

²⁰This is because Labour's Standing Order 4 bars members of the General Council of the TUC from NEC membership.

²¹Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party, (1960), p.321.

²²Ibid.

²³Saul Rose, "Policy Decision in Opposition", Political Studies IV (1956) 128-138.

opposition to the Leader. Rose admits that trade union support is more likely, but since his article was written some unions, especially the largest, the T & GWU, have moved leftwards.

An additional complicating factor is the possibility of disagreement between the Leader and Deputy Leader of the party. Michels noted this in his chapter entitled "The Struggle among the Leaders Themselves." "The thesis of the unlimited power of the leaders in democratic parties requires a certain limitation",²⁴ due to two causes of dispute. "Above all there are objective differences and differences of principle in general philosophical views . . . In the second place, we have the struggles that depend on personal reasons. In most cases the two series of motives are somewhat confounded in practice."²⁵ This was the case for a long period in the post-war history of the Labour Party, when the NEC became "a cockpit of conflict."²⁶

Sub-Committees of the NEC The Policy Sub-committee is among the five major sub-committees of the NEC. In the years 1940-66 between one-half and two-thirds of its members have been MPs. The total membership²⁷ has increased from eight in 1940 to an average of 17-20 in the 1950s and 1960s. Ministers and ex-Ministers were well represented between 1945 and 1954, having around eight of the places on the committee (about 40 per cent. of the total). McKenzie's view was that the sub-committees of the NEC

²⁴Robert Michels, Political Parties, (1966), p.172.

²⁵Ibid., p.175.

²⁶Pelling, p.105.

²⁷In addition, there are five ex-officio members; the Leader, Deputy Leader, Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Treasurer.

"might almost be described as committees of the PLP to which have been added a minority of Trade Union leaders"²⁸ is justified. But it should also be noted that the left and centre-left of the party has been well represented on the Policy Sub-committee since 1954. Thus, like the NEC, it cannot be regarded as the creature of the Party Leader.

The Policy Sub-committee sets up its own specialist sub-committees and study groups to which are co-opted ex-Ministers, MPs, trade unionists and academics, all of whom have a particular interest in, or knowledge of, the subject being investigated. "The sub-committees work closely with the principal departments of the party head office."²⁹ In the case of the policy sub-committee the corresponding department is the Research Department.

Unlike the CCF-NDP, the Labour Party's bureaucracy has had only limited influence: "Transport House has never dominated the Labour Party, despite the fact that Transport House could claim that it has the knowledge of the skill of organization."³⁰ The probable reason for this is the Labour Party's electoral success; a parliamentary career is much easier to come by in the Labour Party than in the CCF-NDP and so young party bureaucrats seem, after a few years, to get elected to parliament, e.g., Wilfrid Fienburgh and Peter Shore who both held the office of Secretary of the Research Department.

²⁸ McKenzie, p.128.

²⁹ Ibid., p.527.

³⁰ Blondel, p.128.

Policy-Making Procedure

Throughout most of its history the Labour Party has been in opposition. The leaders of the PLP have therefore been deprived of the power and prestige that normally attend Cabinet Ministers. The policies of the period under consideration, 1945-1966, are largely those of an opposition party seeking power. The key periods for policy-making are therefore the three years or so of preparation and discussion preceding general elections. Four of these periods, those before the 1945, 1955, 1959 and 1964 elections, have seen the party in opposition.

"In opposition there are three different but overlapping centres of policy-making, each with a different balance of power."³¹ These are the PLP, the NEC and the Annual Conference. Policy results, therefore, from the interplay of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces. Long-term programmes are normally the product of the NEC, approved by the Annual Conference. As has been seen, the PLP is well represented on the NEC, but its group is by no means monolithic. Day-to-day policies are mostly enunciated by the Parliamentary Party, e.g., in speeches by its leaders in parliamentary debates, but there are occasions when the NEC makes a policy pronouncement. Manifestos, on which election campaigns are based are, according to Clause V of the Party Constitution, the product of consultation between the NEC and the Parliamentary Committee of the PLP. The large degree of overlapping membership of these bodies means that consultations are almost continuous and that an unresolvable clash between the two is unlikely -- but not impossible. The trade union and

³¹Richard Rose, p.132.

constituency representation on the NEC also makes it likely that policies agreed upon by that body will be generally acceptable to the whole party. This likelihood is further strengthened by the presence, since 1943, of two TUC representatives on the Policy Sub-committee -- mostly senior men in the trade union movement such as Vincent Tewson, George Woodcock, Harry Douglass --- and by a variety of formal and informal consultations between the unions and the NEC. "To attribute NEC majorities at Conference to the consistent backing of the big trade unions is a superficial and partial analysis. It omits the important point that the object of the NEC is precisely to secure majority support at Conference, and that support is normally obtained, both from trade unions and the constituency parties, in the policy-making process."³²

Policy-making or, more strictly, policy-formulation by the NEC follows the basic pattern described in the NEC Report to the 1949 Annual Conference.³³ The Research Department, it said, was involved in the preparation of a new statement of policy in conjunction with seven sub-committees of the Policy Sub-committee. It continued:

These Sub-Committees, consisting of members of the NEC and co-opted members of the Party, expert on particular subjects, met frequently . . . and presented their Reports by December 31, 1948. The Statement on Policy was subsequently drafted and considered at a number of meetings of the Policy and Publicity Committee and NEC. The TUC convened several meetings at which representatives of trade unions were consulted on various aspects of policy. There were also consultations with representatives of the Co-operative Union. Finally, the statement was published in April for consideration at Annual Conference.

The Report goes on to say that research papers on various aspects

³²Saul Rose, 132.

³³1949 LPCR, p.27.

of policy were submitted by the Research Department, the Fabian Society and other organisations.

Annual Conference and Policy-Making As Alan Watkins has noted:

When one says that it is not the business of conference to lay down party policy it is very easy to be misunderstood. It does not mean that conference is unimportant or that a leader can for a long period defy conference and survive or that the real sovereign of the party is the National Executive of the PLP. It means what it says: that a body of several thousand people meeting once a year cannot by its nature create policy. In private the most rebellious constituency left-winger is prepared to concede this; in public the pretence is still kept up.³⁴

Yet even though it is generally recognised that the rank-and-file do not make policy, their views do have some influence on it. They influence policy in two ways: first, they may be mobilised in support of one or other of the leaders when a struggle among the leaders occurs; second, they act as a channel of communication between MPs and party leaders and the electorate at large.³⁵ Their influence on policy is not wholly in the direction of left-wing extremism. Rose concludes from his analysis of Conference resolutions that opposition comes only from a small section of the rank-and-file. "Another portion is likely to support the leadership and a significant group may have no clear views, or even interest, in questions of party policy. In such circumstances support of the rank-and-file assembly may be gained simply by giving a clear policy lead."³⁶

It still remains true, though, that the rank-and-file in the constituencies are more militant than most of the trade union leaders. Three

³⁴Alan Watkins, "The Future of the Party Conference", New Statesman, (19 April, 1968), p.502.

³⁵Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party Activists", APSR, LVI (1962), 361.

³⁶Ibid., 370.

out of every four resolutions submitted to Conference come from constituency parties, while only one out of four come from the unions. Amongst the unions the most assiduous contributors are the dissident left-wing unions such as the ETU, the Draughtsmen, Foundry workers, Fire Brigades. "Their resolutions tend to increase the impression of solid left-wing feeling that is left by the constituencies."³⁷

Although the unions have the reputation of being almost solidly behind the NEC and the constituencies solidly opposed, the actual situation, as shown by analyses of resolutions and of votes, is rather different. "The unions have never been as thoroughly unprogressive -- nor the local parties as fanatically left-wing -- as popular legend decreed. Obviously the constituencies are on balance to the left of the unions, but the overlap is considerable."³⁸ This conclusion is borne out by an analysis of voting on Labour's defence policy at the 1960 and 1961 Conferences: 55 per cent. of the trade union vote was cast against the NEC in 1960, in contrast to only 33 per cent. of the constituency vote: by 1961 several unions had swung round to supporting official policy so that only 26 per cent. of the union vote was cast against it, whereas 37 per cent. of the constituency vote was against.³⁹

The way the unions cast their votes depends largely on the views of their leaders, although delegations are sometimes bound by resolutions of their union conferences. The influence of union leaders over the

³⁷Harrison, p.204.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 238-239.

³⁹K. Hindell and P. Williams "Scarborough and Blackpool", Political Quarterly, XXXIII (1962), 306-320.

policies of their unions is best illustrated by the example of the T & GWU. Up to 1955 it was a strong supporter of the NEC, due to the influence of Bevin and Deakin, its former and current General Secretaries. Bevin died in 1951 and Deakin in 1955. Deakin's replacement lived for only a short-time and was succeeded in 1956 by Frank Cousins, who was markedly to the left. In several important instances in the early 1960s Cousins led the T & GWU in opposition to the NEC's policy.

Unions are also in a position to wring concessions from the NEC before Conference begins. An example of this was at the 1957 Conference when the NEC proposed a policy for a future Labour Government of buying shares in private industry. William Carron of the AEU had obviously put pressure on the Executive to give a public assurance that such a policy did not mean that traditional nationalisation had been abandoned. He said: "we regard the acquisition of shares, not as an alternative to nationalisation -- that point has already been made by Harold Wilson, and I am sure we will have that assurance again."⁴⁰

NEC and Conference When the Labour Party is the Government its leaders assume great prestige by virtue of their official positions. Even during periods of opposition, however, the Leader of the PLP is a highly respected figure at Conference and his views carry a great deal of weight with the majority of delegates. Some of the other Parliamentary leaders are also influential with delegates and so the choice of NEC speakers on controversial policies is important, e.g., Bevan was able to sway Conference. In addition, the factor of "instinctive solidarity", Labour's

⁴⁰1957 LPCR, p.137.

equivalent of the "deference" of the Conservative rank-and-file, often swings votes behind the official line; this is especially so in respect of the trade union vote.

Apart from these there are a number of technical factors which the NEC can manipulate in order to control Conference decisions. The 400 or so resolutions submitted by local parties and other bodies, plus amendments, are composited to produce motions which sink themselves. "Repeatedly, moderate left-wing unions and constituencies have chosen to support the NEC rather than vote for motions which are mischievous, meaningless, impossibly extreme or utterly incapable of realization."⁴¹ Another possible result was noted by Alan Watkins: "On economic policy there may, in a self-denying year, be four resolutions. When a vote is taken on each resolution, quite contradictory results may be obtained. One resolution may be carried; another, asserting much the same thing, defeated. This has happened several times. It has the convenient consequence that the platform and the newspapers can interpret the debate in any way they choose."⁴²

Other methods of control by the NEC are by allowing a great deal of time to be spent lambasting the Tories and on other irrelevancies, and so cutting down the time available for what might prove to be awkward debates for the NEC; by the practice of allowing much more time to the NEC speakers than to ordinary delegates; and by the discretionary powers of the Chairman, an NEC member.

⁴¹Harrison, p.241.

⁴²Watkins, p.502.

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation

Origin and History

In origin the CCF was a coalition of farmer, socialist and labour organisations. The United Farmers' Organisations of the prairie provinces, especially of Saskatchewan, had turned to socialism in the depths of the Great Depression and were ready to participate in the formation of a new radical political party. Various socialist organisations, such as the Socialist Party of British Columbia, the Independent Labour Party of Saskatchewan and the Canadian Labour Party were also interested in participating in a nation-wide people's movement. Encouraging signs also came from the politically-orientated All Canadian Congress of Labour, which mainly comprised the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE).⁴³ In addition, there already existed an active group of MPs known as the "Ginger Group".⁴⁴ Led by J. S. Woodsworth and William Irvine, both elected in 1921 as Labour Members, the group worked throughout the 1920s with extra-parliamentary protest movements, trying to co-ordinate the activities of various farmer and labour organisations. The other important group in the formation of the CCF was the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR), which was founded in 1932 and was the Canadian equivalent of the Fabian Society.

⁴³Porter, p.316.

⁴⁴Frederick C. Engelmann, "The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation of Canada", [cited hereafter as "The CCF"] (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954), p.33; Elmer Roper, "They did the spadework", 'CCF 25th Anniversary Souvenir' (1957), pp.43-44.

Table IV

THE CCF-NDP'S FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1935-1968

	1935		1940		1945		1949		1953	
	seats	vote %								
Nova Scotia			1	6	1	17	1	10	11	7
Ontario					0	14	1	15	1	11
Manitoba	2	19	1	19	5	32	3	26	3	24
Saskatchewan	2	21	5	29	18	44	5	41	11	44
British Columbia	3	34	1	28	4	29	3	31	7	27
Alberta	0	13	0	13	0	18	0	9	0	7
Canada total	7	9	8	8	28	16	13	13	23	11

	1957		1958		1962		1963		1965		1968	
N.S.	0	5	0	5	1	10	0	6	0	9	0	7
Ont.	3	12	3	11	6	17	6	16	9	22	6	21
Man.	5	24	0	20	2	20	2	17	3	24	3	25
Sask.	10	36	1	28	0	22	0	18	0	26	6	36
B.C.	7	22	4	25	10	31	9	30	9	33	7	34
Alta.	0	6	0	4	0	9	0	7	0	8	0	10
Total	25	11	8	9	19	14	17	13	21	18	22	17

Sources: Hugh Thorburn ed., Party Politics in Canada, (2nd ed.1967) pp. 214-215.; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Aug.3-10,1968, pp. 22841-2.

The crucial meeting of these groups was the Western Labour Conference at Calgary in July and August 1932. "On August 1, a number of farmer representatives joined the labour delegates and the meeting became a conference to form a nation-wide people's political movement. More than a hundred delegates were in attendance, representing all the farmer, labour, and democratic socialist political organisations of the four western provinces."⁴⁵ The delegates, "Marxian socialists from British Columbia, men raised in the traditions of the British labor movement, and the agrarian radicals . . . decided to form a new political party to be known as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation."⁴⁶ This was followed, in July 1933, by the party's first National Convention which adopted the Regina Manifesto, a statement of principles and programme of action.

The CCF's centre of gravity was originally Saskatchewan, the province that provided the bulk of its membership and, in 1945, eighteen out of a national total of 28 CCF MPs in the Federal House of Commons. Its national leadership, however, was not drawn from its agrarian base; Woodsworth had long been active in the labour movement and represented Winnipeg North Centre in Parliament from 1921 to 1942; M. J. Coldwell, a teacher, was a member of the urban labour group in Saskatchewan, F. R. Scott and F. H. Underhill of the LSR were academics; T. C. Douglas was a Baptist minister. By the mid 1950s the party's centre of gravity had shifted to the urban areas of Ontario and British Columbia, reflecting the

⁴⁵Stanley Knowles, The New Party (1961), p.27.

⁴⁶Lipset, p.114.

waning of agrarian support and the growing importance of the connexion with organised labour.⁴⁷

Agrarian Movements and Membership Participation The tradition of membership participation in policy-making preceded the formation of the CCF. Lipset's explanation of this is that rural Saskatchewan was a one-class community, without great disparities of wealth, and that townspeople were often legally barred from taking part in rural affairs.

"Under these conditions, any farmer who has executive ability is forced to accept community responsibility. A large proportion of the population has become accustomed to playing an active role in different organisations."⁴⁸

"Long before the CCF was formed, the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association met in annual district and provincial conventions to adopt policies to be urged on government. The annual meeting of the S.G.G.A. was known as the 'Farmers' Parliament' and was well attended."⁴⁹

Engelmann, writing in 1956, noted that the CCF's emphasis on membership participation had continued, "both in pamphlets issued by the party and in speeches made at Conventions."⁵⁰

Intellectual Base of the CCF The intellectual base and a measure of respectability were provided by the League for Social Reconstruction and

⁴⁷See Table IV .

⁴⁸Lipset, p.247.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 259.

⁵⁰Frederick C. Engelmann, "Membership Participation in Policy-Making in the CCF", [cited hereafter as "Membership Participation"/] CJEPS, XXII (1956), 162.

some protestant churches. The LSR, founded early in 1932, was centred on McGill and Toronto Universities and naturally undertook educational and research work. Apart from giving intellectual prestige to the party, LSR members contributed significantly to its policy-making. In 1933 for example, Underhill drew up the first draft of the Regina Manifesto,⁵¹ while in 1935 the research committee of the League published the book Social Planning For Canada in which democratic socialist principles were applied to Canadian social and economic development.⁵²

Support for the CCF also came from some Protestant churches hostile to existing economic arrangements. Lipset quotes a statement in support of socialism by the Toronto Conference of the United Church: "First of all, it is our belief that the application of the principles of Jesus Christ to economic conditions would mean the end of capitalism."⁵³

"Thus the heritage of the Social Gospel, of the British Fabianism and, in some cases, of European radicalism blended in the university atmosphere to become the most formative influence on the future leaders of the CCF."⁵⁴

Organised Labour Right from the beginning the CCF was determined not to allow trade unions to take on a role similar to the one they held in the

⁵¹Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, (1959), p.258.

⁵²Knowles, p.27.

⁵³Lipset, p.113.

⁵⁴Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, (1964), p.36.

Labour Party. Canadian labour was, however, associated with the party from its inception : A. R. Mosher, President of the CBRE, attended the Calgary Conference in 1932, but his union, unexpectedly, was not allowed to affiliate nationally. Between 1933 and 1937, CCF policy was that unions should affiliate with provincial parties. In 1937, however, in response to demands from trade unionists for political action, the policy was changed. Accordingly, in August 1938, District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America (the coal miners of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) affiliated with the national party. "The first fruit of the affiliation was the election of Clarie Gillis to the House of Commons at the federal election in 1940."⁵⁵

The next step was in 1943 when the Canadian Labour Congress endorsed the CCF as labour's "political arm" in the following resolution: "Whereas, in the opinion of this Congress the policy and programme of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation more adequately expresses the viewpoint of organised labour than any other party: Be it therefore resolved, That this Convention of the Canadian Congress of Labour endorse the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation as the political arm of labour in Canada, and recommend to all affiliated and chartered unions that they affiliate with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation."⁵⁶

By 1952, 44 unions were affiliated (37 CCL and 7 Trades and Labour Congress), accounting for over 50 per cent. of the individual

⁵⁵Angus MacInnis, "First Union Affiliation", CCF 25th Anniversary Souvenir, p.29.

⁵⁶Quoted in Zakuta, p.67.

membership of the CCF.⁵⁷ By the late 1950s, after the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress, "not only did nearly all of the leaders of unions formerly with the CCL declare themselves to be CCF supporters, but also nearly one-half of the leaders of unions formerly with the TLC."⁵⁸

Increasing trade union affiliation brought with it the spectre of labour domination of the party. Before 1943, there had been a web of connexions between the CCF and the trade unions. The formal endorsement of the CCF as labour's political arm and the party's acceptance of a comprehensive programme written by the CCL in 1945 affected its structure significantly. These closer ties "established an additional centre of gravity in CCF affairs, one that grew steadily in influence, culminating in the formation of the New Democratic Party."⁵⁹ Yet these ties remained largely informal, through personal contacts and consultation committees, and "there were never more than two members of the CCF National Executive who owed their designation primarily to their prominence within the labour movement."⁶⁰

Organisation of the CCF

The original CCF constitution was adopted at the First National

⁵⁷Engelmann, "Membership Participation", 169.

⁵⁸F. C. Engelmann and H. A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, (1967), p.139.

⁵⁹Zakuta, p.67.

⁶⁰Engelmann and Schwartz, p.137.

Convention in Regina. It was, in McHenry's words,⁶¹ a "simple document", but it provided the broad outline around which the new party could be built. At subsequent National Conventions it was frequently amended so as to meet changed conditions. In 1946, a new constitution was drawn up because by this time the party seemed to have reached maturity, having grown larger and more professional, and because also it was necessary to clarify its relationship with affiliated trade unions, especially in so far as their representation at Conventions was concerned.

The early CCF, having a mostly agrarian membership was a loose federation of provincial parties whose aims and form was outlined as follows in the 1933 constitution : "The object of the Federation shall be to co-ordinate the activities of member organisations in order to promote through political action and other appropriate means the establishment in Canada of a Co-operative Commonwealth.

Membership in the federation shall consist of approved provincial organisations which accept the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation program."⁶²

Membership of both groups and individuals was therefore primarily the responsibility of provincial councils, so ruling out the national affiliation of the CBRE.⁶³

Thus there were two dimensions to the federal structure of the CCF: first, the party was a federation based on the geographical political

⁶¹D. E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, (1950), p.29.

⁶²Quoted in Zakuta, p.42.

⁶³McNaught, p.261.

divisions of Canada; second, it was a federation of member organisations. In the latter respect it resembled the Labour Party, but differed from it in that groups of member organisations did not retain their separate identities up through the party's organisational hierarchy.

The basic unit of organisation was the constituency association, the total membership of which determined how many delegates it could send to the National Convention : roughly one delegate for every 500 members. Affiliated groups could also send delegates : they were entitled to one for every 500 members up to a maximum of ten from the locals of any one organisation in each province.

The National Convention was theoretically the supreme governing and policy-making body in the party. A CCF publication said: "Conventions have supreme authority. They . . . meet regularly and frequently to hammer out party policy and are composed of democratically elected delegates from the local associations. Officers do not make policy. They carry out the program laid down by the Conventions. Further, they are always answerable to the movement and come up for election or re-election at every Convention."⁶⁴

The official governing body between Conventions was the National Council. It comprised three main groups: representatives of the provincial parties; the elected officers and top permanent officials of the federal party; and representatives elected by the National Convention. It only met, on average, three times a year and so the day-to-day

⁶⁴From They'll Ask You [a leaflet published by the CCF National Office], (May 1948); quoted in Zakuta, p.13.

administration of CCF affairs was in the hands of the National Executive, consisting of six members elected from and by the Council, plus the elected officers and top permanent officials. According to McHenry, "a distinct effort is made to achieve a geographic balance in the executive and also to secure personnel that is about one-half MPs and one-half geographically accessible (Ontario and Quebec) non-MPs."⁶⁵

The CCF National Office, played an important part in the party's development. The appointment of David Lewis as Secretary in 1936 marked the beginning of a period of rapid expansion of the functions of the bureaucracy, despite the obvious limits imposed by the CCF's financial position. By 1950, the party had an Education and Research Secretary (Donald MacDonald), a Research Secretary (Lorne Ingle), a Parliamentary Secretary and a Librarian. Although much of the time of the office was taken up assisting the federal MPs it did do some research work of the movement generally. According to Engelmann,⁶⁶ however, research activities did not influence policy-making very much.

The party's federal leadership consisted of members of the National Council and Executive, the senior permanent officials and federal MPs. The top officers were almost invariably re-elected as competition for leadership posts was not very keen; between 1946 and 1952 there were only 22 persons who served in the National Executive, a body of twelve members with two year terms.⁶⁷

⁶⁵McHenry, p.40.

⁶⁶Engelmann, "The CCF", p.102.

⁶⁷Engelmann, "Membership Participation", p. 168.

Policy-Making Procedure

Party programmes were worked out by committees of the National Executive and National Council, often circulated to local groups throughout Canada, discussed and amended by the full Executive and Council, and finally submitted to the National Convention which had the power to accept, amend or reject them. Conventions have usually accepted the proposed programmes, making only minor changes, but there have been occasions on which the delegates have been less passive. "In the 1948 National Convention the delegates overturned a prior decision of the National Council to delete from the program draft the nationalization of the banks. This basic decision was taken in spite of the fact that most of the national leaders warned the delegates that it would be unwise to saddle a CCF government with the responsibilities of nationalizing the banks."⁶⁸

Although the election manifesto was always drawn up by the party leadership it could not be too far removed from the policies approved by the Convention because the leaders always emphasized that they were answerable to the rank-and-file. "The manifesto with which the CCF faces the electorate is usually an abbreviated form of the program and therefore to a large extent a product of membership policy-making"⁶⁹ and there has been an occasion, in 1949, when the election manifesto had an extra section added to it containing supplementary resolutions passed by

⁶⁸Ibid., 167. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

⁶⁹Engelmann, "The CCF", p.96.

the previous Convention.

Role of the Rank-and-file and Leaders in Policy-making Lipset describes fully the participation of members of the CCF's Saskatchewan section in policy-making.⁷⁰ According to Engelmann, the emphasis on membership participation in policy-making extended to the national party and was reflected in party pamphlets, speeches at Convention and in the large number of policy resolutions submitted.⁷¹

An analysis of the resolutions submitted to National Conventions from 1946 to 1952 showed that of the 390 that came from constituencies, only 24 per cent. were adopted, whereas of the 174 from National and Provincial Councils and Executives 90 per cent. were adopted.⁷² It seems, therefore, that the rank-and-file were not so influential as the party myth made them out to be. Early in the CCF's history, leadership in policy-making was exercised by members of the LSR and between 1933 and 1939 very few meetings of the National Council were not attended by one or more of its members.⁷³ By the 1940s the party had a number of experienced leaders both inside and outside Parliament and they began to put forward ideas about future policies. "Beginning in 1944, the Ontario CCF presented a series of lectures on party policies and program; the addresses of the first series, given by such men as Frank Scott, T. C. Douglas, M. J. Coldwell, and David Lewis, were of such quality that in

⁷⁰Lipset, Chapter X., passim.

⁷¹Engelmann, "Membership Participation", 162.

⁷²Engelmann and Schwartz, pp. 191-192.

⁷³Kenneth McNaught, "CCF Town and Country", Queen's Quarterly, LXI (1954), 214.

printed form they are regarded as an authoritative statement of party policy."⁷⁴ They were published as Planning for Freedom in 1944.

According to Engelmann, the initiation of policy by leaders is as old as the CCF itself.⁷⁵ He notes that the Regina Manifesto was adopted by the Convention with very few changes. "Ever since then, CCF council, have considered themselves charged with the initiation of party policy especially at the national level. Here, the National Executive has taken much of the initiative from the less wieldy [sic] National Council."⁷⁶

The most influential group of leaders was an "inner circle [that] had neither an official existence nor a formal structure."⁷⁷ "Several of these interlocked groups of friends formed the core of the CCF's leadership in Ontario from the mid-1930s and later in the national organization. They had many things in common, of which perhaps the most important for the party were a right-wing orientation and close connections with the trade unions."⁷⁸ Through their positions in the federal caucus, National Councils and Executive, and in the party bureaucracy these leaders were able to control the proceedings and to a large extent the decisions of Conventions.

⁷⁴McHenry, p.96.

⁷⁵Engelmann, "The CCF", p.113.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Zakuta, p.26.

⁷⁸Ibid., p.25.

One method of control was by preparing a body of resolutions for submission to the National Convention. The time spent discussing these would mean less for resolutions from the rank-and-file. The leaders were careful, however, not to make it look as if they were dominating the Convention; the Minutes of the National Executive, 1946, stated: "if satisfactory resolutions covering the above topics should be received from other bodies in the movement, the Executive resolutions will not be placed on the agenda."⁷⁹

Another powerful instrument of leadership domination of policy-making at the National Convention was the Resolutions Committee. This was largely a result of the increasing size of the Convention and the quantity of resolutions submitted. The Committee had, through its function of classifying, ordering, and compositing resolutions, the opportunity of preventing awkward resolutions reaching the floor during the short period of time available or of producing composite resolutions which few delegates could support. With reference to the Ontario CCF's Resolutions Committee which, he remarks, performed a similar function to that of the National Convention, Zakuta writes: "probably its greatest influence stemmed from its authority, which it exercised constantly . . . to move the acceptance or rejection of resolutions upon their introduction. In doing so the Resolutions Committee generally expressed the administration's opinion before the debate began."⁸⁰ Lipset found that the views of

⁷⁹Quoted in Engelmann, "The CCF", p.114.

⁸⁰Zakuta, p.27.

the Saskatchewan CCF leaders carried similar weight: "When the leaders oppose a resolution they are able to control the overwhelming majority of delegates."⁸¹

Several other examples of ways in which leaders are pre-eminent in policy-making can be noted briefly. The discussion of a new domestic policy, which culminated in the adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration, was initiated by the national leaders and submitted in broad outline to the 1950 Convention by F. R. Scott and M. J. Colwell. Outside Conventions, the leaders also had opportunities for defining policy not adequately covered by past declarations, e.g., in the sphere of international affairs. The National Secretary was also important, as Engelmann notes: "The National Executive may not meet for a period of two or three months, and the National Chairman does not have a permanent office establishment. This means that the National Secretary may be called upon to make virtual policy pronouncements. He is further entrusted with the day-to-day coordination of the various sections of the movement, a task that may very well require the exercise of some discretion."⁸² As Secretary, Lewis was influential not only as long-term employee and organiser but also as one of the chief theorists of the party and so he often initiated policy proposals and piloted them through the national executive bodies.⁸³

Trade Unions and CCF Policies Ever since the affiliation, in 1938, of

⁸¹ Lipset, p.258.

⁸² Engelmann, "The CCF", p.119.

⁸³ Engelmann, "Membership Participation", 169.

the United Mine Workers to the national CCF, the trade union connexion steadily grew in strength culminating in the formation of the New Democratic Party in 1961. The attitude of the party to this trend has been somewhat ambivalent. In 1956, Engelmann wrote: "All the farm and co-operative groups that helped to form the CCF either never became part of the movement or have since disaffiliated. The socialist groups . . . have virtually disappeared. But the party's interaction with labour groups has posed interesting problems for the mode of policy-making it has adopted."⁸⁴

The main problem was that the leaders of the CCF in the 1930s and 1940s did not want it to become a Canadian Labour Party. They therefore made provisions to forestall this possibility; e.g., by limiting the number of delegates at Conventions and by allowing each delegate only one vote. This is not to imply that all the Canadian unions were clamouring to jump on the CCF bandwagon; there was a strong tradition in the TIC unions of Comperian non-alignment. The implication of the CCF's affiliation provisions was that it was torn between the desire to reap the financial benefits of trade union affiliation and the fear that its policy-making procedure might be threatened by trade union oligarchs armed with thousands of block votes.

As things turned out, the trade union leaders became important in the policy-making process anyway. It occurred because the unions that affiliated in the 1940s were often led by CCF leaders or sympathisers such as C. H. Millard, the Canadian director of the United

⁸⁴Ibid.

Steelworkers of America and later a CCF member of the Ontario Legislature. This system of interlocking directorates first showed itself to be of great importance when, in 1944, the CCF accepted and endorsed a twenty-nine point programme, Political Action by Canadian Labour, which the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) had drawn up.⁸⁵

The increasing support of the CCF amongst leading trade unionists was evident in the 1950s, especially when the CCL and Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). A survey of the political views of union leaders in 1958 showed that not only did almost all leaders of unions formerly with the CCL support the CCF, but also that about half of those formerly with the TLC did too.⁸⁶ The CLC's call for a new political party was a natural continuation of this trend. The resolution passed by the 1958 CLC Convention called for "a fundamental re-alignment of political forces in Canada," and for "a broadly based people's political movement, which embraces the CCF, the Labour movement, farm organisations, professional people and other liberally-minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through our parliamentary system of government."⁸⁷ It was followed, three months later, by a resolution at the CCF National Convention welcoming the proposals and authorising the start of discussions with the CLC.

⁸⁵Engelmann, "The CCF", pp.140-141.

⁸⁶Porter, p.350.

⁸⁷Reprinted in Knowles, pp.127-128.

Table V

TRADE UNION AFFILIATION WITH THE CCF AND NDP

	No. of affiliated trade union locals	Total affiliated membership
1944	100	50,000(approx)
1952	44	16,397 [⊛]
Dec.1961	278	71,010
Sept.1961	612	186,295
Aug.1966	679	242,000

⊛ District 26 of the United Mineworkers of America accounted for 10,117 of this total.

Sources: W.Baker & T.Price, "The New Democratic Party and Canadian Politics", in Thorburn ed., Party Politics of Canada, (2nd ed.), p.172; Engelmann, "The CCF", p.133; G.Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, pp.80-81.

New Democratic Party

In contrast to the grass-roots origin of the CCF, the NDP was a product of the co-ordinated efforts of the CIC and party leaders especially Stanley Knowles and David Lewis.⁸⁸ The New Party differs from the CCF in only minor respects, although two of these minor differences, the attempt to involve French Canada in the party and the closer links with trade unions, have a major objective: that of restructuring the Canadian party system on left-right lines. As yet the attempt to make a break-through in Quebec has not been successful, but there has been a substantial growth in trade union affiliation, as shown in Table V.

Organisation of the NDP


The organisational structure of Convention, Council, Executive and Party Office is the same as the CCF's. Despite its efforts to become more of a labour party, the NDP has maintained the CCF principle that individual membership should have greater weight in the party's affairs than affiliated membership. The representation of the party membership at Federal Conventions is therefore approximately as follows: federal constituencies have one delegate for every 50 members up to 200, and one for every 100 members over that figure; affiliated organisations have one delegate for every 1,000 dues-paying members. As with the CCF, delegates have only one vote each,⁸⁹ thus preventing trade union domination. The Convention elects officers, has final authority over

⁸⁸William E. Lyons, "The New Democratic Party in the Canadian Political System", (Ph.D. thesis Pennsylvania State University, 1965), p.65.

⁸⁹Federal Constitution of the NDP, Article V.

Diagram IV

FEDERAL ORGANISATION OF THE NDP
(based on the 1961 Constitution)



* Officers: Leader
President
Associate-Pres.
5 Vice-Presidents
Treasurer

** Fed. Council, by a 2/3 vote,
may co-opt five members

- delegates
- > elected
- - - -> ex officio
- =====> appoints and/or directs

federal policy, programme and constitution, but, as under the CCF constitution, the provincial parties retain considerable local autonomy.

Since the early 1950s, CCF-NDP organisation, at all levels, has become increasingly professional. Two related causes of this are probably the decline of ideology and the growth in the size and complexity of the party. Activists, disillusioned by the watering down of doctrine, have increasingly been replaced by professional organisers who have made the NDP highly regarded for its efficiency. Party leaders, however, recognising the need to maintain rank-and-file activism, have tried to maintain their morale and have used professionals to co-ordinate their efforts rather than to supersede them.⁹⁰ An example of NDP organisation in action was given in a report about the 1968 election campaign: the NDP candidate's "machine encompasses 500 people, with six full time workers. He has \$7,000, has erected 6,000 of his 10,000 lawn signs, and has completed two of his planned four canvasses of every house Four of the full time workers are on loan from the UAW."⁹¹

The Federal Office has also grown in step with the NDP's organisation and finances. "The permanent staff of the party, while small, is influential. The Federal Secretary and the various provincial secretaries are particularly important. In the Federal Office there is a permanent Director of Organisation, a Director of Research and a Director of Publicity."⁹²

⁹⁰W.Baker and T.Price, "The New Democratic Party and Canadian Politics", in Thorburn,ed., p.174.

⁹¹John Kelsey, "Oshawa - Whitby : 3 want to drive", Globe and Mail, Toronto (15 June, 1968), p.7.

⁹²Baker and Price in Thorburn,ed., p.176.

Conclusions

In many respects the histories and organisations of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP are similar. But the differences between them are even more important than the similarities. Perhaps the most striking difference is the Labour Party's successful growth to become one of the two main parties, and the CCF-NDP's struggle even to retain the status of a significant third party at the national level. The reason for this lies in the completely different bases of support for the two parties which, in turn, is a result of the different political environments in which they operate.

The Labour Party, like the CCF, began as a coalition of groups already in existence. But the main group forming the Labour Party was the trade unions; and the unions were entering a phase of rapid growth. The identification of Labour as the party of the working class meant that within a quarter of a century of its formation it was in a position to form a government. The main group forming the CCF, however, was the farmers of Saskatchewan and, as prosperity returned to the prairies in the post-war period, this group became a wasting asset so far as the national CCF was concerned. Without substantial support outside Saskatchewan, the CCF was doomed to remain either a provincial party with an uncertain future or to change its support base and try to become a force at the federal level. Hence, the CCF transformed itself into a party aiming at the vote of the urban industrial worker; a transformation that was completed by the founding of the NDP.

In the CCF-NDP the falling away of agrarian support has been compensated for by stronger links with the trade unions -- a development

that has been especially important in bringing it financial stability. But the early CCF's fear of union domination has remained, with the result that union representation in the party organisation is still strictly limited. No such limitation exists in the Labour Party, yet the unions do not dominate it. There are several reasons for this: firstly, the unions are a semi-external pressure group that has to deal with Conservative as well as Labour Governments and so want to retain some independence; secondly, the Leader and the PLP are independent of Conference if they want to be, and Conference is where one of the unions' two main sources of influence, votes and money, could make itself felt if they acted in concert; and thirdly, the unions hardly ever act in concert anyway because they tend to be divided on issues just as deeply as the PLP and constituency parties.

The consequences of these factors for the policy-making processes of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP are of great importance. Though the unions do not dominate the Labour Party, they still play a vital part in policy-making through their historical role and actual position in the party's structure; both at Conference and on the NEC. Hence, there is no one locus of policy-making in the Labour Party. In the CCF-NDP, on the other hand, policy-making was originally in the hands of the mass-membership, which was largest in Saskatchewan. As the Saskatchewan farmers became more prosperous after the end of the war, policy-making increasingly fell into the hands of the CCF parliamentarians and bureaucrats, a process that was aided by the fall-off in trade union affiliation. The main cause of the domination of the party by parliamentarians was not just that trade unions' support declined, but that

the absence of the block vote meant the unions were powerless to prevent it even if they had wanted to. In other words, since the departure of the active policy-making membership, there has been no effective countervailing power in the CCF-MDP. And the influence of the leaders has become more and more important as the party has become more "professional" in an effort to make a major breakthrough. In the Labour Party, the parliamentary leadership is also very important, but this is because of its position as either Government or potential Government.

III

LABOUR PARTY POLICIES, 1945-1966

Samuel Beer has described the years 1918-1948 for the Labour Party as those of the "Socialist Generation". "In 1918 the party made the formal decision that committed it to Socialism and a Socialist program. Thenceforth it was accepted and official usage to say that its ultimate aim was a new social order, 'the Socialist Commonwealth'."¹ The economic crisis of the inter-war years confirmed the party in its commitment that capitalism was the enemy; socialism was the only possible remedy for the evils that it had produced. By 1950, this commitment to socialism was showing signs of weakening. It was a result of two factors: control over the economy through physical controls and nationalisation, and specific nationalised industries themselves, had not been so successful as expected; and, more important, the "New Economics" had provided an alternative means of taming the old enemy. The consequence for the Labour Party was a period rethinking and intense ideological dispute which lasted throughout the 1950 s and into the 1960 s.

The Commitment to Socialism

In 1918 the Labour Party adopted a socialist constitution drafted by Sidney Webb. Clause IV of the Constitution stated the "Party Objects" as follows: "To secure for the producers by hand and brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof

¹ Beer, p.126.

that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service"². A few months later the Party Conference endorsed Labour and the New Social Order and adopted a series of resolutions based on it³. This step "was of great importance because it formed the basis of Labour Party Policy for over thirty years --- in fact, until the general election of 1950"⁴. The main points relevant in this statement, to the present study were: first, an emphasis on the need for nationalisation, especially of the basic industries; and second, " 'The Revolution in National Finance', which meant in practice the subsidisation of social services by heavy taxation of large incomes"⁵. "The Socialism proclaimed in Labour and the New Social Order was of a moderate, evolutionary kind, and no suggestion was made that a Labour Government on coming to power would promptly introduce more than a very small instalment of Socialism. Nevertheless, in the new programme Socialism, as the ultimate objective, was definitely adopted as the programme of the party"⁶.

The year 1918 is the most significant in the history of the Labour Party because it became then more than a party of the trade unions.

² 1918 LPCR, p.140. The clause was altered to read "the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange" in 1929; see McKenzie, p.408.

³ McKenzie, p.480.

⁴ Pelling, p.44.

⁵ Ibid., pp.44-45.

⁶ G.D.H.Cole, British Working Class Politics, 1832-1914, (1941), p.244.

While remaining a union-based party, it also attracted the support of socialists and others who wanted to see widespread social reforms. Its ultimate aim, the establishment of a socialist society, and its immediate objectives, the implementation of essentially practical ameliorative measures, united progressive forces in the country. "All this enabled the party to make its bid to rank as an alternative government of the country"⁷.

In the 1920 s, under the influence of Ramsay MacDonald and a year in office, Labour swung slightly away from socialism: "Labour and the Nation, the official statement of Party aims adopted at the Party Conference in 1928, was an able, intelligent but acceptably amorphous expression of Socialist ideals"⁸. Later policy documents, For Socialism and Peace (1934), Labour's Immediate Programme (1937), and The Old world and the New Society (1942), were stronger statements of socialist intentions. For example, the 1934 document declared: "There is no halfway house between a society based on private ownership of the means of production with the profit of the few as the measure of success, and a society where public ownership of those means enables the resources of the nation to be deliberately planned for attaining the maximum of general well being"⁹.

This series of policy statements, from 1918 onwards, culminated in the 1945 election manifesto, on which the legislative

⁷ Ibid., p.45

⁸ M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan, I, 100.

⁹ Quoted in Beer, p. 136.

programme of the first majority Labour Government was closely based:

Although shorter and aimed specifically at the election campaign of 1945, Let Us Face the Future revealed its descent from this body of sentiments in the general views in which its numerous and specific pledges were embedded. Denouncing 'the chaos of economic do-as-they-please anarchy', as responsible for war, exploitation, and depression, it proclaimed: 'The Labour Party is a Socialist Party, and proud of it. Its ultimate purpose at home is the establishment of the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain' ¹⁰.

It even came near to satisfying Aneurin Bevan, who wrote: "At last we are facing the right direction even if the pace of advance is not so quick as some of us would like"¹¹.

In the remainder of this chapter, the policies of the Labour Party will be traced from this high point of socialism through the compromises of the 1950 s to the pragmatism of the 1960 s. Nationalisation, generally recognised as the policy par excellence of democratic socialist parties, will, for that reason, be considered in much greater detail than other policies.

Nationalisation

The debates on nationalisation in democratic socialist parties reveal a number of different approaches¹²: for some members, nationalisation is mainly a means of controlling monopolies and ensuring full employment; for the out-and-out planners in a party, it is a means of remedying the inefficiency that is a feature of private industry; for idealistic socialists, it is a means towards achieving the "Socialist Commonwealth", with the equality and workers' control of industry that

¹⁰ Beer, pp. 136-137.

¹¹ Quoted in Foot, I, 501.

¹² This is based on Andrew Hacker, "Why Nationalize? -- British Labour's Unasked Question", Social Research, XXII (1955), 1-24.

this implies; and finally, for the Marxian socialists, it is a means of transforming society through a transfer of economic and social power. In the CCF-NDP and the Labour Party, the first two of these approaches have been dominant, but the other two points of view have also been present and so have, at times, added a certain distinctiveness to their policies.

For both parties, but especially for Labour, the important result of these different approaches has been the utter confusion of the electorate. In her contribution to Labour's 1959 election inquest, Rita Hinden wrote: "Everything that socialists have thought desirable, they have believed would materialize if only more and more industries were nationalized. All these arguments have been heard at different -- or the same -- times; no wonder the electorate has been confused. Indeed, socialists themselves have been confused and angrily divided in debating the confusion"¹³.

In the inter-war years Labour Party policy documents listed a number of industries as being ripe for nationalisation. In 1934, for example, For Socialism and Peace named textiles, shipping, ship-building engineering and the banking system as well as other previously accepted

¹³ Rita Hinden, "The Lessons for Labour" in M. Abrams, R. Rose and R. Hinden, Must Labour Lose?, (1960), p. 110. In a speech at the 1957 Conference, Harold Wilson said that the members of the study group that drew up Industry and Society had asked themselves why they believed in nationalisation. Their answers, all different, followed closely Hacker's classification.

candidates such as coal and the railways. It was recognised, however, that such a programme could not be enacted in one parliamentary term.¹⁴ After the 1935 general election, the Parliamentary Party began to regain its prestige and leading role in the party, and policy statements, though still deeply committed to socialist goals, became less sweeping and more practical.

The serious planning for a post-war Labour Government began early in the war as leading members of the party were getting Ministerial experience in the Coalition Government. Labour stated its position as follows: "While planning for war, the Government must plan for Peace and a New Society. Instead of regarding each item of State Control as a temporary infringement of the normal, the occasion should be seized to lay the foundations of an efficient economic system"¹⁵. At the 1941 Conference, Hugh Dalton, for the NEC, proposed the setting-up of policy - formulating machinery "to work out blue-prints for the new Britain of tomorrow"¹⁶. The NEC reported to the 1942 Conference that a Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction Problems had been formed under the Chairmanship of Emmanuel Shinwell, who was Minister of Fuel and Power in the 1945 Government. It had thirteen sub-committees to deal with

¹⁴ Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Party, (1964), pp. 170-171.

¹⁵ Labour's Home Policy, reprinted in 1940 LPCR, Appendix III, p. 192.

¹⁶ 1941 LPCR, p. 158. At the same conference Sydney Silverman M.P. quoted Roosevelt as saying that the U.S. would be fighting for "God and private enterprise", and asked the rhetorical question, "Are we fighting for God and private enterprise?"

At the 1944 Conference, during the debate on Full Employment and Financial Policy, there came a significant policy-making move by the delegates. Ian Mikardo moved a composite resolution calling for the "public ownership of land, large-scale building, heavy industry, all forms of banking, transport and fuel and power"¹⁹. "Although the executive asked Mikardo not to press his amendment to a vote, he persisted and the conference, its Socialist nerve touched as in 1931, supported him so overwhelmingly that there was no call for a card vote"²⁰.

The small Campaign Committee of the NEC engaged in drawing up Let Us Face the Future passed over most of the items in Mikardo's resolution that were not already recognised party policy. There was, however, one important exception: "heavy industry", which meant, in effect, iron and steel. The Conference resolution gave Dalton, who was a member of this committee, the extra support he needed in order to have his way. He explained his method of persuading his apprehensive colleagues as follows: "I said that, if iron and steel was dropped, I should refuse to speak in support of the Policy Declaration at Conference, and then Morrison, (who was chairman of the Committee) and Greenwood could explain to the delegates why this item, which had been enthusiastically adopted by Conference only last December had now vanished"²¹.

¹⁹ 1944 IPCR, p. 163.

²⁰ Beer, p. 174.

²¹ Dalton, The Fateful Years, pp. 432-433.

The 1945 manifesto therefore included the following statement: "Public ownership of iron and steel— private monopoly has maintained high prices and kept inefficient high-cost plants in existence. Only if public ownership replaces private monopoly can the industry become efficient"²².

As Beer points out, if it had not been for Dalton's insistence that iron and steel be included in Let Us Face the Future, the Mikardo resolution would have had no effect. But equally, important member of the PLP and NEC though he was, Dalton probably would not have been able to change Morrison's mind on this question had it not been for the rank - and - file support he could count on. So, as Michael Foot notes, the manifesto "was in effect a compromise between the statement presented by the Executive to the 1944 Conference and the amendment moved by Ian Mikardo"²³.

When introducing Let Us Face the Future at the 1945 Conference, Morrison, addressing himself particularly to Labour candidates, said that they should not only give "negative" reasons for nationalisation, but they should also argue "the case for socialisation of these industries on the merits of their specific cases - - prove the case each time to the electorate"²⁴. Morrison was, in effect, on the defensive right from the beginning. He was not asking the candidates to go out and proclaim the nationalisation proposals as the first steps towards a socialist

²² Quoted in Dalton, Memoirs, 1945-1960: High Tide and After, (1962), p. 135.

²³ Foot, I, 501.

²⁴ 1945, LPCR, p. 89.

society; rather, he was asking them to justify the proposals on the grounds that they would result in greater efficiency and social responsibility. Only incidentally might they represent a move towards socialism. "Efficiency was the objective most emphasized; nationalisation was stressed as a practical remedy rather than as a political end"²⁵. Much more scathingly, D.N.Pritt has described the programme as one of "nationalising the cripples"²⁶

Let Us Face the Future Enacted

Despite the differences of opinion within the party, there was in 1945 perhaps a higher degree of consensus on both principles and policies than either before or since. The leaders and the rank-and-file were committed to the proposals in the election programme and the Government's legislative programme followed it closely. Only on iron and steel nationalisation was the Government divided.

First on the nationalisation list was the Bank of England. Dalton moved the Second Reading of the Bill as follows: "I hold in my hand a document entitled Let Us Face the Future, a Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation. The nation considered it, and having done so, elected this House of Commons. We have an unchallengeable popular mandate to carry out all that is contained in this document."²⁷ The fiction of the mandate provided parliamentary justification for the

²⁵ Brand, p. 232.

²⁶ D.N.Pritt, The Labour Government, 1945-51, (1963), p. 44.

²⁷ Dalton, High Tide and After, p. 40.

Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, the Civil Aviation Act, 1946, The Electricity Act, 1947, the Transport Act, 1947, The Gas Act, 1948, and the Iron and Steel Act, 1949. The nationalisation of the iron and steel industry was deliberately left till last because it aroused the greatest controversy and opposition inside and outside of the Government. Morrison, as mentioned above, was only lukewarm on this proposal and tried to persuade the Cabinet to accept a compromise form of Government control without nationalisation. Cabinet opposition to his proposal was formidable: Bevin, Dalton, Bevan, Cripps.²⁸ Morrison had to back down.

Dalton, and many others in the Labour Party, regarded the nationalisation of the public utilities as merely belatedly catching up with other capitalist countries: "Practical Socialism in Britain . . . only really began with coal and iron and steel, two cases where there was a specially strong political argument for breaking the power of a most reactionary body of capitalists"²⁹. Very few people, including Conservatives, disagreed with the nationalisation of coal and it is difficult to see this as a particularly revolutionary measure.

The General Elections of 1950 and 1951

At the 1948 Conference, when the Labour Party was beginning to think about the next general election, Morrison made it clear that the Government was rapidly backpedalling on nationalisation. It was proposed that delegates should approve a general statement of principles on further public ownership but leave it to the NEC to decide what specific

²⁸ Ibid., p. 136.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 138.

industries should be included. The reasons given by Morrison for the NEC's non-committal attitude were that a period of consolidation was necessary to allow recently nationalised industries to improve their efficiency and create a favourable public image; that the industries listed in Let Us Face the Future were "acceptable to public opinion as well as being consistent with the principles of the Labour Party"; and that the party must win the next election. For Morrison the election was obviously the primary factor --- "We must make the programme as attractive as we can to ourselves, but we must make it attractive also to public opinion"³⁰.

Despite tight control over the debate by the Chairman, Morrison's position was strongly attacked by delegates, one of whom said: "I want to see in the forefront of our General Election Programme a declaration of faith in Socialism --- not the approach of the Liberal to nationalisation"³¹.

The first draft of the election programme, called Labour Believes in Britain, was presented to the 1949 Conference by Morrison who continued his theme of the previous Conference in saying that the proposals did not only have to satisfy the party, but also inspire "confidence and faith among the level-headed, sensible people of the country"³². He also talked about Labour's policy for private industry, "for we shall be living in a mixed economy for a good long time to come."³³ The constituency delegates launched a vigorous attack, which can be summed up in the words of a delegate from Hackney, S.E.: "Labour Believes

³⁰ 1948 LPCR., pp.121-122.

³¹ Ibid., p.122.

³² 1949, LPCR, p.153.

³³, Ibid., p.155.

in Britain reads more like a White Paper It is certainly not a Red Paper"³⁴. A number of trade union leaders also expressed dissatisfaction; Ted Hill of the Boilermakers for example, pretty well asked outright for the nationalisation of the ship-building industry³⁵. But despite this unenthusiastic reception the policy statement was accepted.

The 1950 manifesto, Let Us Win Through Together, was based on the policy statement, Labour Believes in Britain. It was a compromise between Morrison's views and those of the more doctrinaire members of the party and consequently included "a strange medley of nationalization proposals"³⁶. The only concerns definitely marked down for nationalisation were sugar, cement and water; all three on the grounds that they were monopolies. There was also a promise to "mutualise" industrial insurance, i.e., ownership by the policy holders; "mutualisation" had been substituted for "nationalisation" as a result of pressure from the Co-operative Movement.

There was also, in Dalton's words, a "dog's dinner of new nationalisation proposals"³⁷, and, as it was the last time the Labour Party went in for anything so sweeping, it may be quoted fairly fully:

Where private enterprise fails to meet the public interest the government will be empowered to start new competitive public enterprise in such circumstances. Monopoly concerns which cannot be dealt with in other ways will be socialized

One industry which will be carefully examined is the chemical industry. If necessary to assure vital national interests, Labour

³⁴ Ibid., p. 156.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 162.

³⁶ Beer, p. 220.

³⁷ Dalton, High Tide and After, p. 340.

will transfer to public ownership any appropriate part of this vital industry

Where the job is too big for individual farmers to tackle, public ownership will be used as a means of bringing into sound cultivation good food-producing land not fully used

All suitable minerals will be placed in public ownership

Water supply should become a wholly public responsibility

There must be more wholesale and retail markets for fruit and vegetables under municipal or other public ownership

The development of cold storage will be effected through public ownership

The present system of distribution of meat should become a permanent public service³⁸.

Nationalisation, however, was not particularly popular with the electorate as surveys by Research Services indicate:

July 1949, 19 per cent of the public thought that Labour's chief failure was in the nationalised industries. Only five per cent. of the Labour voters in the sample thought nationalisation was the chief accomplishment of the labour government When a sample was asked in April 1949: 'Are you in favour of Labour's proposals for the nationalization of further industries such as sugar, cement, and so on?', 55 per cent of those polled were opposed, and only 27 per cent in favour of further nationalization then"³⁹.

This evidence, combined with the Labour Party's poor showing in the 1950 election, strengthened Morrison's hand in the drawing up of the 1951 manifesto, Labour and the New Society. No industries were specifically mentioned; there was merely the statement that a Labour Government would "take over concerns that fail the nation and start new public enterprises wherever this will serve the national interest"⁴⁰.

Conclusions in the period up to 1951

The 1945 manifesto was essentially practical; it contained

³⁸ Let Us Win Through Together, quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 338-339.

³⁹ Mark Abrams, "The Socialist Commentary Survey", in Abrams, Rose and Hinde, p. 37.

⁴⁰ Labour and the New Society, "substantially reproduced" in *The Times Guide to the House of Commons*, 1951., pp. 228-230.

just enough nationalisation proposals to be put through in one term of office. In contrast to some of the policy statements of the 1930s it bears the mark of the politicians in the party who had regained control, gradually first of all after the 1935 election, and then fully as they participated in the Churchill Coalition Government. As Dalton suggested most of the measures passed by the 1945--1950 Government cannot really be regarded as socialist. Only the nationalisation of steel and road haulage, both profitable as well as vital industries, were really socialist measures⁴¹.

The nationalisation proposals of 1945 were a great part of Labour's promise of economic planning, the object of which was primarily to avoid mass unemployment. Although the electorate probably voted more on the record of the pre-war Conservative Government than on a positive response to Labour's programme, the nationalisation proposals at least did not evoke a negative electoral response because they were skilfully interwoven with the generally more positive appeal of "planning". It so happened, then, that nationalisation was an integral part of a policy of planning which was favourably received by the electorate. It also united for several different reasons, the various groups of opinion in the Labour Party. The coincidence of these two factors was aided by the party's policy-makers, mainly future Ministers, who moderated rank-and-file demands. The outcome was Labour's unexpectedly large majority.

⁴¹ The Conservatives recognised this, too, for these were the only industries denationalised after 1951.

Towards the end of the 1940 s, nationalisation was becoming unpopular with the electorate⁴² and a number of party members, some of whom had never been more than lukewarm on nationalising "non-cripples", were becoming disillusioned. This disillusionment was also shared by the more doctrinaire members of the party on the grounds that the Government had not been sufficiently bold, e.g., over management policy and compensation terms.

Having held office for a few years, some members of the Parliamentary Party, led by Morrison who was in the advantageous position of Chairman of the Policy Committee, tried to get the party to attune its policies to what they perceived to be the more conservative mood of the electorate⁴³. Others, especially the constituency delegates and left-wing MPs, argued for a bolder approach -- for Labour to educate the electorate and to provide a firm lead towards a socialist society. In the Cabinet, the PLP and the NEC, Morrison's views tended to prevail. And at Conference the big trade unions were also faithful. The economic problems that had beset Britain, and the consequent period of austerity, combined with the lack of any startling success in the newly nationalised industries to create a climate of opinion⁴⁴ in which such views were not strongly challenged in the higher echelons of the party's policy-making

⁴² See, for example, Mark Abrams, "Public Opinion Polls and Political Parties", Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (1963), 9-18.

⁴³ Evidence for this came in the local government elections of April and May 1949 when Labour had net losses of over 950 seats.

⁴⁴ Fostered, of course, by the Conservatives and their wealthy allies, e.g., the "Mr. Cube" campaign conducted by Tate & Lyle, the sugar monopolists, against the nationalisation of their industry.

machinery. Morrison's views were regarded as the safest, especially after the near-defeat of 1950. In addition, the party had made no real plans for the next Government, Ministers being wholly absorbed in the problems of their departments, and had not whipped up any enthusiasm among either members or voters for the hotch-potch of proposals it eventually produced. Dalton later described this lack of planning as "almost incredible propagandist ineptitude and electoral levity"⁴⁵. The manifestos were designed to please everyone, especially the middle-classes. In fact they pleased no one, least of all the ideologues⁴⁶.

1951 - 1966

For almost the whole of this period there was a series of conflicts, mostly over nationalisation and defence and foreign policy, between what Beer calls the "fundamentalists" and the "revisionists". "The main phases in the conflict were marked by the general elections of 1951, 1955 and 1959. As an election approached, the party would paper over the cracks with a compromise program and close ranks against the common enemy. Defeat, however, would open the way for a new onslaught by one faction, or by both"⁴⁷.

The fundamentalists, always a force in the Labour Party, had a powerful leader until 1957 in Aneurin Bevan; their revisionist opponents were led first by Morrison and then by Hugh Gaitskell. A factor making

⁴⁵ Dalton, High Tide and After, p. 340.

⁴⁶ Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, (1961), p. 300.

⁴⁷ Beer, p. 219.

the conflict even more ferocious was the rivalry, especially between Bevan and Gaitskell, for the position of Party Leader.

The great nationalisation rethinking period got under way in earnest after the 1951 election defeat. Basically, the revisionists' position was that the Labour Party's major goals had been attained with the coming of the welfare state and the managed economy; only relatively minor adjustments were now necessary⁴⁸. The fundamentalists, however, remained committed to the ultimate goal of the Socialist Commonwealth; for them, more nationalisation was necessary because it was the primary means of achieving that goal. In other words, the former groups were more concerned with winning elections in order to give the people what they wanted; the latter wanted to maintain doctrinal purity even if it meant a long wait until the people realised what was good for them.

The conflict split the party; but not into leaders versus followers. The split was vertical: "At every level there was conflict -- from Shadow Cabinet through NEC and conference to individual constituency parties and trade unions"⁴⁹. It became especially clear after the death of Arthur Deakin that the trade unions were by no means united⁵⁰.

Labour Party policy in this period reflected this conflict over principles. Attlee, the great compromiser, introduced a home policy statement, Facing the Facts, at the 1952 Conference. One comment on it was:

⁴⁸ The most comprehensive statement of this position is in C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (1956).

⁴⁹ Beer, p. 231.

⁵⁰ See Chapter II.

"It contains practically everything except the date of the next General Election"⁵¹. It did nothing to narrow the gap between the two sides, as a few quotations from the debate show:

Michael Stewart, MP, : among Socialists surely if a man advocates a scheme of private ownership the burden of proof is on him. We take the view that public ownership must be the rule and private ownership in certain circumstances the exception.

J. Stanley (Constructional Engineering Union): I always understood that the socialist movement was out to remove and entirely eliminate private enterprise.

George Brown, MP, : It seems to me this conference is rapidly going mad. There are some things happening here which should be looked at in the light of their electoral possibilities I do beg of comrades not to be carried away by emotional sentimental stuff, simply because somebody says 'The pioneers said it 50 years ago'⁵².

At the 1953 Conference the debate continued. Crosland stressed the importance of appeasing the floating voter; others, including MPs, attacked him. The fundamentalists got the better of the argument because of substantial trade union backing, and the NEC agreed to examine a number of nationalisation proposals. Included in the 1955 election manifesto, Forward with Labour⁵³, was the following statement: "Public ownership of the steel and road haulage industries is essential to the nation's needs and we shall renationalise them. We shall bring sections of the chemical and machine tools industries into public ownership. Where necessary we shall start new public enterprises Water supplies . . . will be greatly extended and brought under public ownership".

Labour's defeat in the 1955 election marked the beginning of the

⁵¹ 1952 LPCR, p. 87.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 93-94.

⁵³ "Substantially reproduced" in The Times Guide, 1955, pp.260-264.

Gaitskellite period of rethinking that culminated in the fundamentalists' victory in the Clause IV issue. Most of the well known figures of the Attlee Government left the centre of the stage, partly as a result of Dalton's "Operation Avalanche"⁵⁴. In December 1955, Attlee resigned and the PLP elected Gaitskell to succeed him.

In 1957, a policy document, Industry and Society, drawn up by an NEC study group, was presented to Conference. The left-wing of the party was well represented on the group and the speech introducing the document was made by Harold Wilson, long regarded as a fellow-traveller with the Bevanites. The only definite nationalisation proposals were for steel and road haulage, but there was a statement promising that industries considered by a Labour Government to be "failing the nation", would also be nationalised. Wilson defended the lack of specific proposals as follows: "The reason for this is not so much electoral considerations, or fears that the more profitable sectors of firms will be hived off before the election to avoid nationalisation. The reason is a purely practical one. We cannot judge which industries will be most relevant to the problems we are facing until we take over the responsibility of government and know what the circumstances are at the time"⁵⁵. Also in Industry and Society was the dual object of controlling firms that were "failing the nation" and enabling the community, rather than only private shareholders, to profit from growth industries—Wilson described this as a measure which would help "to secure for the workers by hand or by brain, the full fruits of their industry".

⁵⁴ Dalton, High Tide and After, Chapter XLIV, passim.

⁵⁵ 1957 LPCR, p. 129.

Many of the delegates who spoke were not impressed by Industry and Society though it got a comfortable majority when voted on. Apart from the NUR's deploring "the present tendency to deviate from . . . accepted socialist principles"⁵⁶, there was even sharp criticism from Morrison and his ally Shinwell, with whom a surprised Jennie Lee found herself in agreement. The supporters of the document, Bessie Braddock, Gaitskell and Roy Jenkins, for example, all mentioned election prospects. Frank Cousins, with a million votes at his disposal, criticised it but voted for it unenthusiastically.

These proposals formed the basis of the 1959 manifesto, Britain Belongs to You. It differed from the three previous manifestos in its emphasis on planning for economic efficiency and expansion, and used the sort of phrases on which Harold Wilson later rode to power. The manifesto stated:

As part of our planned expansion, it will be necessary to extend the area of public ownership. The private steel monopoly will be restored to public ownership, in order to ensure its expansion and give the taxpayer value for the large sums of public money still invested in it. Commercial long distance road haulage will be renationalised and built into an integrated transport system We have no other plans for further nationalisation. But where an industry is shown, after thorough enquiry, to be failing the nation we reserve the right to take all or any part of it into public ownership if this is necessary⁵⁷.

At the inquest Conference of 1959, the fundamentalists got off to a flying start with the opening address of that year's chairman Barbara Castle. She attacked the revisionist argument that Labour had

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 131.

⁵⁷ Reprinted in The Times Guide, 1959, pp. 247-255.

succeeded so well in reforming capitalism that it had become not only civilised, but indestructable. The fundamentalists saw the abandonment of wholesale nationalisation and the proposal to buy shares "merely to ensure that the community gets a cut at the capitalist cake" not only as a betrayal of socialist principles but also as bad election tactics.⁵⁸

Gaitskell then stated the revisionist case: "There seems no doubt that, if we are to accept the majority view of those who fought this election, nationalisation—on balance—lost us votes"⁵⁹. He then went on to ask for the revision of Clause IV of the Party Constitution, its statement of socialist principles, on the grounds that it laid the party open to continual misrepresentation.

Most speakers agreed that some rethinking on nationalisation was necessary; but most agreed with Barbara Castle on the lines this rethinking should follow. Lena Jeger, a defeated MP, said: "It is not the job of the Labour Party to try to give all things to all voters"⁶⁰. And Aneurin Bevan's view was that the problem was one of education of the voters, "not of surrender"⁶¹.

The question of the revision of Clause IV was obviously a non-starter after Frank Cousins's speech, in which he also expressed the opinion that it was rather odd that Gaitskell had not previously consulted with the NEC on the matter:

⁵⁸ 1959 TPCR, pp. 84-86.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 110.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 149.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 153.

I think I am a fairly powerful man in my own organisation, but if I were going to give a public airing to a change in the Constitution of my Union I should wait until I had talked to the Executive before doing it. If all the idea is that all we need to do is to add something to our Constitution there could be something to be said in favour of that. But if, as I gather, Rule 4 is likely to be revised to make a different reference to our attitude towards public ownership, I would suggest, with the greatest respect to our Leader, that no way -- Douglas Jay's way or any other way -- is going to change that one⁶².

Clause IV was not changed, but a supplementary statement "reaffirming and clarifying" Party Objects" in the light of post-war developments and the historic achievements of the first majority Labour Government" was presented to the 1960 Conference⁶³. Though passed by the Conference, it had over two million votes cast against it. Part of the explanation for this was supplied by Ray Gunter when he said, "this movement was not created to be a university debating club"⁶⁴. But the main reason for their indignation was the outright questioning of the party's central myth -- for some members it was almost like the Pope questioning the existence of God at High Mass on Christmas Day.

Though in a sense formally defeated, many of Gaitskell's views on nationalisation policy were incorporated in Sign Posts from the Sixties, a statement adopted by the 1961 Conference. Its emphasis was on planning for economic growth, and to this end steel and road haulage would be renationalised. Other proposals were concerned with ensuring that the public got value for its money; for example, statutory limitations on public bodies, preventing them from competing with private industry, would be removed and industries dependent on Government loans and

⁶² Ibid., p. 131.

⁶³ 1960 LPCR., pp. 12-13.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 135.

contracts, mainly the aircraft and pharmaceutical industries, would be more strictly controlled - "where state money goes, so does control"⁶⁵.

The death of Gaitskell in January 1963 and the election of Wilson as Leader might have been expected to herald a leftward shift in party policy. But Wilson had been one of the principal architects of Sign Posts for the Sixties, being the NEC's main speaker at the 1961 Conference, and his domestic policy continued in that vein. The 1964 manifesto, The New Britain⁶⁶, emphasised the modernisation of Britain through planning. "If production falls short of the plan in key sections of industry, as it has done recently in bricks and in construction generally, then it is up to the Government and the industry to take whatever measures are required". It was not all veiled threats, however:

The public sector will make a vital contribution to the national plan. We will have a co-ordinated policy for the major fuel industries. Major expansion programmes will be needed in the existing nationalised industries, and they will be encouraged . . . to diversify and move into new fields Private monopoly in steel will be replaced by public ownership and control⁶⁷. The water supply industry, most of which is already owned by the community, will be re-organised under full public ownership.

⁶⁵ 1961 LPCR., p. 104. Much of this was obviously at Wilson's instigation; he had been chairman of the Commons' Public Accounts Committee which had discovered a number of cases of private industry making excessive profits from Government contracts.

⁶⁶ Reprinted in The Times Guide, 1964, pp. 267-282.

⁶⁷ The Bill to nationalise the steel industry had its Second Reading in The Commons in July 1966, and later became law.

The 1966 manifesto, Time for Decision⁶⁸, differed little from that of 1964. It was ironic, however, that under the leadership of a "left-winger", the manifesto put forward as accepted party policy the revisionist point of view: "Britain has a mixed economy — and both sectors must play their part in carrying out the national plan. Both sectors, however, must be encouraged to become more enterprising".

Conclusions on the Period 1951-1966

The period of rethinking on nationalisation that every social democratic party has had to face since the war was particularly painful for Labour because it was complicated by a number of other issues. First of all, there was the leadership struggle between Bevan and Morrison, and later the more important one between Bevan and Gaitskell, and this added a measure of personal animosity to an ideological dispute. There was also a sharp difference of opinion within the party on defence and foreign policy. Finally, there was the ambiguous position of the trade unions on the question of nationalisation, for though they were still committed to wholesale nationalisation they had rejected the methods of physical planning that a full socialist programme implied. And in all these problems the party was haunted by what Beer calls "the ghost of the Socialist generation" — the strong commitment to fundamentalist ideals that all members of the party nominally subscribed to.

The split between the fundamentalists and revisionists, between Bevanites and Gaitskellites, was the main feature of intra-party politics

⁶⁸ Reprinted in The Times Guide 1966, pp., 268-284.

in the 1950 s. The battles were fought mainly among members of the PLP, but the battleground was not only the Parliamentary Party; it was fought out also in the NEC, Conference, and even in the constituency parties and trade unions. The leaders mobilised support throughout the party; there was even groups formed for the purpose, such as Victory for Socialism and the opposing Campaign for Democratic Socialism.

The effect of the dispute is most clearly seen in the party's nationalisation policy. Between 1951 and 1959, every election manifesto and policy statement bears the mark of compromise on nationalisation. The Party Leader and his supporters were not able completely to have their way because of the strength of fundamentalists in the Shadow Cabinet, Parliamentary Party and NEC. From about 1960 onwards, when fundamentalism seemed formally to have triumphed, nationalisation policy entered a new phase. Wilson, as chairman of the Policy Committee (1961-1963) and Leader (1963 onwards) was able to produce a much more subtle compromise policy -- revisionism couched in the language of fundamentalism. And for the voters, the policy was suitably embellished by talk of "planning" and "efficiency".

Taxation, Health Services and Housing

One of the main guidelines of Labour's economic and social policies has been the quest for equality --- equality in the treatment of citizens and equality of opportunity for them. In many respects its policies in the spheres of taxation and the provision of social services are extensions of the ideas of the progressive section of the pre-1914 Liberals, and today many of the same views of these policies are held, though with different emphases, by a number of members of the Conservative Party. Yet, through taxation, health and other welfare services, the

provision of rented houses, and other means, notably education, the Labour Party has sought to realise its aims of a classless society⁶⁹, and it is this goal, and the overall plan of which the policies are a part, that gives these policies their distinctive flavour. But Labour, as a non-revolutionary socialist party, has had to pursue its ideals within definite limits, mainly financial, which have resulted from the policies of past governments, external events that have affected Britain through her military alliances, and her vulnerable economic position as a trading nation. A further factor limiting some of the more grandiose schemes has been administrative feasibility.

Of the policies discussed below, the provision of health services and houses by public authorities is only viable if there is a sound financial base. Hence, taxation, the key to government spending, is considered first.

Taxation

The Labour Party has seen the taxation system as a means of fulfilling two complementary objectives: raising revenue to finance government services and reducing inequalities of wealth. "The Revolution in National Finance" proposed in Labour and the New Social Order is the basis of party thinking. It placed a heavily graduated income tax at the centre of the system and insisted that indirect taxation should only be applied to luxury goods. It proposed, in addition, the taxation

⁶⁹ This aim was reaffirmed in the statement, Labour's Aims, presented to the 1960 conference; see 1960 LPCR, p. 13.

of profits and capital -- proposals that left wingers continually revive.

Labour's Home Policy (1940)⁷⁰ proposed that the war should be used as an opportunity to bring about a fairer distribution of wealth in Britain, and at the 1941 Conference Dalton was able to report that, as a result of implementation of some of Labour's suggestions, there would be no great war fortunes this time⁷¹.

In the 1945 election the emphasis was on the provision of services by the government. "Reduction of taxation is, or was, as easy form of appeal, yet it is scarcely mentioned by Labour candidates This is one of a number of indications that in the election more attention was paid to benefits than to burdens"⁷².

In office, Labour's taxation policy was, within the limits imposed by the post-war economic situation, true to its principles. Dalton reduced taxes on the poorer sections of the community and increased them on the rich, mainly by increasing exemptions and allowances at the lower levels, by steepening the slope of graduation of income tax and by making surtax even more progressive⁷³. His retention of purchase tax caused some dissention within the party's ranks but his gleeful taxing of distributed profits and inherited estates did much to calm his critics. Cripps continued Dalton's policy, but by 1951 some of the party militants were becoming restless because of the government's failure to limit dividends

⁷⁰ Reprinted in 1940 LPCR, Appendix III, pp. 192-194.

⁷¹ 1941 LPCR, p. 158.

⁷² R. McCallum and A. Readman, The British General Election of 1945, (1947), p. 103.

⁷³ Dalton, High Tide and After, Chapter IV, passim.

and capital gains. One delegate to the 1951 Conference appealed to the next Chancellor of the Exchequer "to introduce a Socialist budget".

The 1951 manifesto mentioned progress towards a fairer distribution of income and property, but noted that 50 per cent. of the country's wealth was still owned by one per cent. of the population. Despite the prevailing mood of reaction against austerity, the Labour Party did not succumb to the temptation to try to outbid the Conservative promise of tax cuts but stuck to its policy of working for a more equitable distribution of wealth:

As soon as tax reductions become possible we shall still further reduce taxation of wages, salaries, moderate incomes and moderate inheritances On the other hand we shall limit dividends by law, increase taxation on the small minority who own great fortunes and large unearned incomes, and take measures to prevent large capital gains.

The Tories are against a more equal society In Parliament they proposed cuts in taxation on large incomes and fought the profits tax. They oppose the dividend freeze.

In order to reduce the taxes of the well-to-do they would cut down the social services and penalise the great mass of people⁷⁴.

The 1955 election manifesto contained a told-you-so section and then reiterated Labour's traditional position on the use of taxation as an instrument of social justice. It promised to deal with tax evasion, excessive profits, capital gains and the inheritance of large fortunes. A new development, however, was its proposals to use taxes as a means of increasing industrial efficiency. It marked Labour's complete acceptance of the managed economy and its acknowledgement of the failure of physical planning.

⁷³ Dalton, High Tide and After, Chapter IV, passim.

⁷⁴ Labour and the New Society; in The Times Guide, 1951, pp. 228-230.

As the Gaitskellite phase of rethinking got under way after the 1955 election, the Labour Party began to show much more interest in taxation. At the 1956 Conference there was a debate on the policy document, Towards Equality. The NEC's spokesman, Wilson, cited as the major cause of inequality in Britain the growth of a system of fiscal privilege. "Under Mr. Butler and Mr. MacMillan the taxation system of this country is rapidly becoming a public assistance committee for the people who need assistance least"⁷⁵. His attack focussed on the legal loopholes for payers of surtax and death duties, the abuses associated with business expenses and the Government's failure to tax capital gains. The theme was continued in Industry and Society and Plan for Progress, which noted that shareholders merely had to sit back and wait for the dividends and capital gains to roll in.

The 1959 manifesto emphasised the consequent mal-distribution of "Tory prosperity" and the fact that there were now greater extremes of wealth than in 1951. It promised to change the tax system to deal with this and the various abuses associated with it. But it denied that Labour's plans for the social services would mean increases in taxes generally; these developments would be financed by "planned expansion" of production. Gaitskell even went so far as to promise that a Labour Government would not increase income tax -- and laid himself wide open to Conservative charges of "electioneering"⁷⁶.

⁷⁵ 1956 LPCR, p. 119.

⁷⁶ See D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959, (1960), pp. 59-60.

The concluding section of Sign posts for the Sixties laid down the principles on which a Labour Government's taxation policy would be based in much greater detail than any previous statement. According to Wilson, speaking on the document at the 1961 Conference, a system of fair taxation was the primary feature of Labour policy that differentiated them from the Conservatives:

We shall redress the balance between earned and unearned taxation, between taxation of individuals and taxation of company profits, between profits ploughed back into industrial expansion and modernisation, and those dissipated as dividends, between enterprising, go-ahead firms serving the nation and the slothful, lazy and out-of-date. We shall redress the evil development of the past ten years, under which more and more direct taxation is taken regardless of means and regardless of family needs, by insurance and national health plans, and see that the whole Budget is inspired by the principle, our Socialist principle, 'From each according to his means, to each according to his needs'⁷⁷.

Detailed studies of tax problems were undertaken after this conference by an NEC sub-committee with a high-powered membership, including Nicholas Kaldor, the Cambridge economist. The results of the committee's work were embodied in the 1964 manifesto, The New Britain. Tax policies for industry were to be used specifically to encourage exports, and generally to contribute to the aims of the national plan. "They will be used to encourage the right type of modern industry. Above all, the general effect of our tax changes will be to stimulate enterprise, not to penalise it". There was also the usual promise of tax reform as regards the individual, plus a proposal to lighten the burden of rates⁷⁸.

⁷⁷ 1961 LPCR, p. 106.

⁷⁸ The New Britain; in The Times Guide, 1964, pp.270-271.

The 1965 Budget started to put these proposals into effect. The exemption of business entertainments expenses from taxation was abolished; a capital gains tax was announced; and a corporation tax which would make tax avoidance more difficult and make investment overseas more selective was also introduced⁷⁹.

The 1966 manifesto proposed two new measures: a general tax on betting and gaming and a land levy. The land levy was the nearest Labour has come to its long standing promise to nationalise the land.

A further development came in the 1966 Budget. "The fertile mind of Dr. Kaldor", as one newspaper put it, came up with the Selective Employment Tax which was designed to be a close fiscal substitute for physical planning⁸⁰.

Conclusions

The Labour Party's personal taxation policies have been guided by two complementary principles: equity and the pursuit of equality. Equity can probably be regarded as a generally acceptable principle on which party members attitudes correspond closely to those of the voters. Economic equality, however, is an expression of socialist ideology and is probably less broad in its appeal. Nevertheless, the Labour Party has continued to expound the cause of greater economic equality.

Taxation policy has never been a burning issue in the Labour Party. Any new policies have come either from Leaders of the PLP or from committee of the NEC on which they and academic economists have been

⁷⁹ 1965 LPCR, p.71.

⁸⁰ The Selective Employment Tax was designed to channel labour into Manufacturing industry by putting a charge on employment in service industries and providing a premium for employment in manufacturing.

represented. Many of the recent innovations, though probably having the effect of producing a more equitable tax system and also reducing inequality, are largely technical in character and have been permitted by improvements in the machinery of government.

The National Health Service

The National Health Service (NHS) was the most striking and probably the most popular feature of the comprehensive system of social security that has come to be known as the Welfare State. The service was a socialist concept in that the criterion for the receipt of medical services was need, not ability to pay.

Labour Party policy on a national health scheme antedated the Beveridge proposals by several years. For example, the 1940 policy statement, Labour's Home Policy, said: "Full medical care will be made available for everyone who needs it, whether in the home, in hospital or at the clinic. Lack of means must not be a barrier to the best prevention and relief, including specialist care, that medical science can provide. Ill health is a loss to the nation against which the nation owes its citizens the best possible safeguards"⁸¹.

In June 1941, Arthur Greenwood⁸², using Labour's newly acquired leverage power through membership of the Coalition, appointed William Beveridge to produce a report on Social Insurance and Allied Services. Beveridge's comprehensive social security plan was published in December

⁸¹ 1940 LPCR, Appendix III, pp. 192-194.

⁸² Greenwood was in charge of reconstruction problems as a member of Churchill's Cabinet, 1940-1942.

1942 and had an immediate impact. A Gallup poll showed that nine out of ten people agreed with the proposals, but the Conservative Party was none too keen⁸³. Churchill was allergic to post-war policy and Bevan, with characteristic exaggeration, wrote: "The Beveridge Report which was one egg laid for post-war planning, the Tories are now doing their best to addle"⁸⁴.

Meanwhile a sub-committee of the NEC had been looking into the same problems and had reached similar conclusions to those of Beveridge. The Labour Party as a whole therefore welcomed Beveridge's proposals but criticised, both in Parliament and outside, the Coalition Government's 1944 White Paper on the grounds that it did not go quite far enough⁸⁵.

At the 1945 Conference, that year's chairman, Ellen Wilkinson, MP, outlined the future Welfare State: "The Labour Party's policy is straight-forward. We want not only millions of houses, jobs for all and social security, but also educational opportunity for all, and a real State Health Service"⁸⁶. The National Health Service came into operation in July 1948 after a long campaign against parts of it by the Conservative Party and the British Medical Association.

The social services, of which the NHS was a part, were partly

⁸³ Cited in Foot, I, 407-408.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Ibid., 408-409.

⁸⁵ An amendment expressing disappointment was put down by Labour MP's and it obtained ninety-seven votes -- one of the few occasions when Labour MPs in any number opposed the coalition; see McKenzie, p.327.

⁸⁶ 1945 LPCR, p. 80.

insurance schemes, financed by flat rate contributions as well as out of taxation. Bevan did not regard them as "the last word in social wisdom. Like many other socialists, he had always been reluctant to agree to basing social services on insurance schemes, holding that the non-contributory principle could have the double advantage of avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy and a poll tax which masqueraded as an insurance premium"⁸⁷.

The rearmament programme of 1950 resulted in the imposition of certain Health Service charges by Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and caused the resignation of Bevan, Wilson and John Freeman in 1951. It is likely that some of the members of the Labour Government who were more sensitive to public opinion, especially Morrison, were influenced at this time by charges of extravagance in the NHS⁸⁸.

Labour Party policy statements from 1950 onwards have praised the achievement of a National Health Service and promised to abolish all charges. By 1959 the party was also promising a hospital building programme and efforts to increase the number of doctors. At Party Conferences, the NHS has received only minor attention; the few resolutions there have been have expressed concern at the steady reduction of NHS facilities by the Conservatives and have invariably been moved by members of the Socialist Medical Association. Labour fulfilled its promise to abolish prescription charges in 1965, but reimposed them in 1968 as part of the post-devaluation economies in Government expenditure.

⁸⁷ Foot, I, 408.

⁸⁸ Dalton, High Tide and After, p. 364, notes that these charges of extravagance were refuted by a committee set up by the Conservatives in 1953.

Conclusions

Apart from prescription charges, the National Health Service has aroused no controversy within the party; attacks have usually been on the Conservatives for failing to develop the service. The NHS has always been the Labour Party's big selling point. Hence, there seems to have been no conflict between members' ideological positions on the service and their perceptions of voters' attitudes.

Housing

As the party of the working class, the Labour Party has always shown a keen interest in the provision of houses by public authorities -- the main domestic achievement of the 1924 Labour Government was Wheatley's Housing Act. In 1945, the housing problem was even more acutely than before the war, and was seen by the public as the most important problem, apart from employment, to be dealt with by the next government⁸⁹. Let Us Face the Future stated that the Labour Government would "proceed with a housing programme with the maximum practical speed till every family has a good standard of accommodation" but there would have to be a "due balance between housing, school building and factory modernisation and construction"⁹⁰.

The wartime controls retained by the Labour Government were essential if its policy was to be carried out. The housing programme was related to a system of controlled land use. Private building was strictly controlled through a system of building licences, so that resources could be channelled into the public sector. And finally, rents were subject to

⁸⁹ F.V.Cantwell, "The Meaning of the British Election", Public Opinion Quarterly, IX (1945), 154-155.

⁹⁰ Quoted in Pritt, p. 21.

control. By 1947, Bevan, who as Minister of Health was at that time also responsible for housing, was able to say: "The Government's policy of concentrating its programme on the local authorities -- to build houses to let to those families in greatest need, not houses for sale to those with the money to buy -- had been completely justified"⁹¹.

Bevan's "houses before mansions" policy was generally approved by the party, as was his rents policy. A delegate to the 1951 Conference said: "For five years Nye Bevan resisted in the Commons demand after demand by the Tories for the end of the Rent Restrictions Acts or their alteration, not because the rents were too high and the cost of living too much, but because the rents were too low and the poor landlord was not getting enough in return to pay for his property. The first item cut of every worker's pay packet is the rent unless he owns his own house"⁹².

The 1951 and 1955 manifestos maintained Labour's policy of building most houses for rent and not for sale. The latter stated: "Labour believes that housing is a social service and will therefore go on subsidising the building of houses to let by local authorities". By this time there was also the problem of old privately-owned, rent-restricted houses that need modernising. Labour proposed that local authorities should compulsorily purchase them and modernise them. This was the basis of the proposals of a party study group which in 1956 published the study group which in 1956 published the statement, Homes of the Future.

⁹¹ 1947 LPCR, p. 4.

⁹² 1951 LPCR, p. 116.

Anthony Greenwood, MP, introduced it as: "a full-blooded Socialist policy statement which will involve what is probably the biggest socialisation project that has yet been attempted in the democratic world. It takes the profit out of private landlordism; it makes housing a social service; and when it is implemented it will take us a long stride along the road to Socialism in this country". He then named the two major housing problems: the need for two million new houses; the overhaul of millions of others. The answer to the problems, he said, was "social ownership", which in effect meant ownership by local authorities. This was Labour's answer to the problem of improving old houses, which the Conservatives were proposing to deal with by ending the Rent Restriction Acts. This policy, he asserted, would leave people open to the tender mercies of the big landlords --- "the big boys who regard housing not as a social service but purely as a source of personal profit for themselves"⁹³.

Homes of the Future formed the basis of the housing section of the 1959 manifesto, by which time the Conservatives had implemented their policy of rent control. "As a first step we shall repeal the Rent Act, restore security of tenure to decontrolled houses, stop further decontrol, and ensure fair rents by giving a right of appeal to rent tribunals"⁹⁴.

Rent decontrol and speculation in building land acquired greater significance in the early 1960 s. At the 1960 Conference Alice Bacon, for the NEC, moved an emergency resolution on the subject of rents and at the 1962 and 1963 Conferences housing dominated the discussion. In the

⁹³ 1956 LPCR, p. 98-100.

⁹⁴ The Times Guide, 1959, p.249.

meantime two study groups under a Fabian MP, Arthur Skeffington, were working on new housing policies --- one group was dealing with the cost of land, the other with the efficiency of the building industry. With public opinion now running strongly in favour of Labour's policies, the 1964 manifesto made a number of points. It condemned "the relentless pressure of decontrolled rents, Rachmanism,⁹⁵, high interest rates and soaring land prices" which, under the Tories, "have condemned yet another generation to squalid and over-crowded housing". It therefore promised to set up a Land Commission to prevent speculation in building land and to buy land at just above its existing use value --- a step in the direction of Labour's old commitment to nationalise the land. It also promised lower interest rates, 100 per cent. mortgages, machinery for fixing fair rents, leasehold reform, and an increase in the rate of house building, especially by local authorities.

Conclusions

Like Labour's health service policy, housing has not caused any major controversies within the party. Policies have generally been put forward by Parliamentary leaders and have been welcomed by the rank-and-file. Throughout the period under consideration, the Labour Party has continued to stress the building of houses for rent by public authorities. It adapted its policies to the affluence of the 1950 s and 1960 s, however, as evidenced by its promised to home buyers in the 1964 and 1966 manifestos. In this respect, policy has been influenced by social changes in Britain.

⁹⁵ Peter Rachman was one of the most brutal of the slum landlords.

The Labour Party's aversion to the free market has remained a central feature of its policy on rented houses, and its attitude to the exorbitant rents being charged after the 1957 Rent Act cannot be regarded as political opportunism.

IV

CCF - NDP POLICIES, 1945 - 1968

The CCF was a product of the inter-war depression. Capitalism was its enemy; but for most of the party members, Saskatchewan farmers -- erstwhile capitalists themselves -- it was a newly-found enemy. It took a decade, and a watering down of socialism to convince the voters of Saskatchewan that the CCF could solve their problems. In the 1930 s, the CCF had failed to make the election gains that some members expected; in 1934 it had five seats in the Saskatchewan legislature and only doubled this figure in the 1938 election¹. In federal elections its performance was equally unimpressive.

During the war, however, the CCF gained in popularity. Zakuta explained it as follows: "Towards the end of 1941, the CCF ceased to be a lost cause. The dark period of the war was turning men's thoughts to a bright new social order Although the depression was over, its memory was still fresh, and people everywhere agreed, in language surprisingly like the CCF's that the world must never return to its pre-war state!"² But the language of the CCF had also changed. The word "socialism" became a rarity in CCF publications in the 1940 s and it adopted a less dogmatic approach to politics than it had in the 1930 s.

¹H. A. Scarrow, Canada Votes, (1962), p. 218.

²Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 58.

Industries and other enterprises marked down for nationalisation were carefully chosen and the reasons for the proposed actions carefully argued. Wholesale nationalisation was a thing of the past.

In August 1943, the CCF just failed by four seats to gain power in Ontario. In September 1943, a Gallup poll showed the CCF marginally ahead of the Liberals and Conservatives at the national level³, and in June 1944 it swept to power in Saskatchewan. But in the federal general election of 1945, the CCF only obtained 28 seats and, though its popular vote was more than double what it obtained in 1940, the result was regarded in the party as a major defeat⁴. The expected post-war economic crisis did not appear, the socialist experiments in Saskatchewan did not produce a prairie utopia, and the managed economy brought increasing prosperity to the whole of Canada. The CCF, the product of the depression, therefore had to adapt itself rapidly to these new conditions. It did it in three ways: firstly, by strengthening its ties with the trade unions; secondly, by further de-emphasizing its socialist ideology; and thirdly, by eventually making formal its changed character in adopting a new name. Being a minor party, the CCF's internal politics in relation to its adaptation to post-war conditions have not been so noticeably turbulent as they were in the Labour Party's period of re-thinking. Nevertheless, there have been significant intra-party disputes, and occasionally ideology has been in the forefront of these disputes.

³ See McHenry, Table II, p. 136.

⁴ Ibid., p. 135.

At the 1932 Convention, the CCF adopted an eight point programme which called for the public ownership of natural resources and for the implementing of various social services. It was "brief and moderate . . . by general socialist standards. It presented no grand design. It contained no analysis of the evils of capitalism nor did it explicate the reasons why the 'old' parties could not be relied upon to effect reforms"⁵. Many members of the party, especially those belonging to the LSR, wanted a more doctrinaire statement of principles and so a committee was set up to draft one. At the First National Convention in Regina in July 1933, the CCF adopted the socialist programme produced by this committee -- the Regina Manifesto. It remained the basic statement of party policy until 1956.

The Regina Manifesto⁶ began as follows:

The CCF is a federation of organizations whose purpose is the establishment in Canada of a Co-operative Commonwealth in which the principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits.

We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based on economic equality will be possible. Power has become more and more concentrated into the hands of a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists and to their predatory interests the majority are habitually sacrificed We believe that these evils can be removed only in a planned and socialized economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are owned, controlled and operated by the people.

⁵ Lyons, pp. 29-30.

⁶ Re-printed in Zakuta, pp. 160-169.

It ended: "No CCF Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth".

The 1935 federal election manifesto followed the Regina Manifesto very closely, noting that the latter programme was "the only one offered to the Canadian electorate which deals adequately with the present economic crisis"⁷. In the 1940 s and 1950 s, however, CCF policy statements and writings of leaders became steadily more reformist, while few issues aroused much controversy in the party. Factionalism in the party declined and the temperature of meetings and Conventions fell⁸. The CCF had failed to reach the point of take-off into sustained growth in the mid-1940 s, so party leaders began to search for new ways of creating interest in their party of the left. At the 1950 National Convention, the retiring National Chairman, F.R.Scott, who had helped to draft the Regina Manifesto, made a speech in which he told the party that it should take stock of its position "in the light of post-war circumstances". The results of the 1949 election were obviously a major factor influencing his call for a restatement of CCF policy, for he said:

the absence of serious economic hardship has slackened the interest of the ordinary Canadian in politics, and we have felt this inside our movement Indeed, we face the likelihood that liberal capitalism has learned enough from Mr. Keynes and from war planning to be able to avoid any

⁷ A New Social Order [The National Election Declaration of the CCF] [1935].

⁸ Zakuta, p. 100.

economical [sic] crisis so severe as that which gave birth to the CCF The socialist must be aware of world trends, and must realize that he is no more free than anyone else from the danger of becoming old-fashioned⁹.

M. J. Coldwell, the National Leader, took up this theme, referring to losses in the 1949 election and suggesting the establishment of a "competent drafting committee similar to that which worked on the draft of the Regina Manifesto" to draw up a new statement of the CCF's principles and programme¹⁰. According to Engelmann, a "rather excited debate followed. The defenders of the status quo claimed angrily that the leaders had decided to betray socialism. The proponents of a new statement emphasized their loyalty to the Regina Manifesto, but insisted that it be brought up to date in several respects"¹¹.

As this period of re-thinking got under way, CCF and trade union leaders were preparing the ground for closer links between the party and organised labour. The relation between the reformulation of party policy and the CCF's proposed new base of support was stated by T.C. Douglas at the National Council meeting in 1956:

We . . . like socialist parties all over the Western world, are on the defensive [The] indictment of capitalism [in the Regina Manifesto] is still basically true, but it is not as apparent as it was in 1933 and it is harder to sell.

Our movement must be deepened and broadened No one knows better than I that you just can't elect a CCF government with only the people who are avowed socialists. You have to have the support of the hundreds of thousands of people who will accept the objectives that we have without necessarily understanding the political philosophy or ideology. And that of course is where we must then use this hard dynamic core [or convinced socialists] as the yeast that will . . . work as the

⁹ Report of the CCF National Convention (Cited hereafter as NCR), 1950, pp.6-7.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.9.

¹¹ Engelmann, "The CCF", p. 149.

leaven in other organizations to get us the mass support which we need. We have to get those people to , . . exercise their influence . . . in the labour congresses, the farmers unions¹².

The main point of Douglas' speech, however, was that the CCF's commitment to socialism should be played down in order to increase its electoral effectiveness: "Unless we can restate our position and . . . unless we . . . adopt better techniques and adopt them fast . . . we will continue to be a diminishing group, a small well-respected, highly-thought-of minority, with increasingly less influence"¹³. Ontario delegates to this meeting reported back to their Provincial Council that the aim of the restatement of party principles was as follows: "While retaining its basic goals, the CCF should endeavour to make its appeal more pragmatic, more empirical, more geared to the issues of the day"¹⁴.

The Winnipeg Declaration of 1956¹⁵ marked the formal acceptance by the CCF of this movement to the right -- towards the pragmatic centre of the political spectrum. In this respect, the most significant section of the Declaration was that dealing with nationalisation. It stated that the CCF accepted the mixed economy and would only extend public ownership to monopolies and to facilitate "the social planning necessary for economic security and advance".

Votes were foremost in the minds of the CCF leaders who drew up the Winnipeg Declaration. Only at the end of the document was socialism

¹² Quoted in Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, pp. 172-173.

¹³ Quoted in ibid., p. 173.

¹⁴ Quoted ibid.

¹⁵ Reprinted in Zakuta, pp. 169-173.

mentioned, and only then to remind people that democratic socialist governments had been formed in other countries and that they had extended, not restricted, democratic freedoms. The Declaration was designed to appeal to both middle class reformers and to trade unionists. The labour movement was especially important at that time because the CLC had just been formed and had outlined a legislative programme which had much in common with CCF programmes. Horowitz notes the approval given to the CCF's new-look by the union journal, United Auto Worker: "Many in organized labour will welcome the Winnipeg Declaration With the tag 'Socialism-will-cure-everything' off its back, the CCF should be . . . much more acceptable to union voters"¹⁶.

Not all members of the CCF welcomed the change in doctrine. Left wingers regarded it as a betrayal, rather than a restatement of socialist philosophy the sole object of which was to win trade union votes. Ernest Winch, a member of the British Columbia legislature, who had opposed the revisionist move made at the 1950 Convention, said that by adopting the Winnipeg Declaration the CCF had "surrendered the stand which distinguished it from all other political parties and sounded its death knell as a vital and revolutionary force"¹⁷. Robert Kenzie, a left winger from Ontario, had called it, "the same old poker game . . . its philosophy of equality of opportunity is not socialist philosophy . . . it makes us all contestants in a race for personal gain. Competition is the rule, not co-operation"¹⁸. Criticism also came from some trade unionists :

¹⁶ Quoted in Horowitz, pp. 174-175.

¹⁷ Quoted in Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁸ Quoted in Zakuta, p.95.

"Larry Bennett of the Steelworkers Union asked if the CCF is providing a program that differentiates it sufficiently from the old-line parties. 'There has been a loss of integrity', he declared"¹⁹. The left however, was not very powerful and was unable to change the course that the party leaders were steering. As Zakuta notes, "The feeble opposition at the 1956 National Convention to the adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration effectively demonstrated the final balance of power in the CCF"²⁰.

With the merger of the CCL and TLC, to form the CIC, and the CCF's adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration, the stage was set for the establishment of stronger and more formalised links with the trade unions. Both party and unions were anxious for the move to be made: the party needed union money, union organisers for election campaigns and union members' votes; the unions were concerned over government and public hostility to them and hoped to safeguard their interests through full political involvement. Hence "in 1957 the CCF and CIC began a series of secret formal and informal discussions on the future relationship of the CCF to the labour movement"²¹. "Top level discussions within and between the national CCF and CIC continued from January 1957 to February 1958 The discussions were restricted to a few key figures in both organizations; outside of those directly involved, no one in the CCF or the CIC knew exactly what was going on"²². The leaders of the two groups

¹⁹ Quoted in Ibid., p. 96.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

²¹ Horowitz, p. 191.

²² Ibid., p. 191.

decided that the CCF should be transformed into a party similar to the Labour Party, and a resolution²³ was put forward at the CLC convention, in April 1958, calling for "a fundamental realignment of political forces in Canada". It continued: "There is a need for a broadly-based people's political movement, which embraces the CCF, the Labour movement, farm organizations, professional people and other liberally minded persons interested in basic social reform". According to Lyons, this resolution was "either authored or co-authored by David Lewis, CCF National Chairman, despite the fact that he had no formal connection with the unions"²⁴.

Three months later, the CCF held its Convention which passed a resolution welcoming the CLC's proposal and authorising the National Executive and Council to enter discussions. The resolution also stated: As democratic socialists we believe that such a [broadly based people's political] movement must continue to be dedicated to the principles of democratic socialist planning and to the widest forms of social security and individual liberty. It must remain steadfast in its determination to introduce, where appropriate, public control and public ownership in place of the present monopolistic domination of our economy and, indeed, our whole society by large private corporations²⁵.

This was obviously an attempt by the CCF leaders to allay the fears of left wingers that the formation of a new party would result in a further shift to the right. Nevertheless, at the 1960 Convention, Coldwell, still National Leader even though defeated in the 1958 parliamentary election, prepared the ground for an even more pragmatic approach to politics: "The CCF has never been a doctrinaire party,

²³ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 192.

²⁴ Lyons, p. 66.

²⁵ 1958 *NCR*, p. 34.

clinging to slogans of the past, but, on the contrary, a living, evolving political organization constantly bringing its policies into conformity with the needs of the people it sought to serve"²⁶.

Among those the New Party was seeking to serve were "liberally-minded persons" and so the party leaders encouraged the establishment of New Party Clubs to build up their enthusiasm. Lyons explained it thus: "Given the apparent elite origins of the new party concept, it was necessary that 'grass-roots' support be created. This task, in addition to that of developing a draft program and constitution for the new party, fell to the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee, later renamed the National Committee for the New Party"²⁷. (NCNP)

The rightward trend established at the 1956 Convention in Winnipeg was not reversed as the New Party idea was being worked out. The Draft Program²⁸, published by the NCNP in May 1961 and presented to the Founding Convention held in July-August 1961, was similarly a reformist document. W.D.G. Hunter wrote of it: "Pragmatism is the key-note of the NDP program adopted at the party's founding convention Instead of boldly proclaiming its faith in socialism and pledging itself to fight for it, the party offers a collection of ad hoc Keynesian remedies"²⁹.

Some delegates to the 1961 Convention launched equally vigorous attacks. Left-wing delegates, especially those from British Columbia,

²⁶ 1958 NCR, p. 7.

²⁷ 1960 NCR, pp. 66-67.

²⁸ Reprinted in Knowles, The New Party.

²⁹ W.D.G. Hunter, "The NDP: Antecedents, Policies, Prospects", Queen's Quarterly, LXIX (1962), 367.

while not opposed to the proposals in the programme, wanted a far less moderate statement. They did not want to see the party "wallowing in the swamps of neo-liberalism"³⁰. Colin Cameron of BC, led the attack by saying that the new party would fail if it developed as a "mildly leftist liberalism rather than as a new political force", and told the Convention that it was "succumbing to the North American fairy tale . . . that one can compromise with capitalism and the affluent society"³¹. Another BC left-winger, J.M. Thomas, called the preamble to the programme a "bunch of pious expressions that could just as easily have been promulgated by a bunch of Liberals"³².

The right-wing position was defended strongly by members of the New Party Clubs. Leo McIssac was concerned about "independent voters" and did not want a party programme "that clung to socialism, a position that could only threaten the establishment of a broader electoral base for the party"³³. Another delegate said he wanted the New Party to become heir to "a truly liberal position". He even went so far as to say the word "liberal was a good word", and "it is more respected than socialism" and "the delegates could have all the socialism they wanted, but it would not put any new party members into the Commons"³⁴.

What the leaders of the New Party wanted to create was a new image for the party. They wanted to get away from the terminology of socialism

³⁰ Lyons, p. 26.

³¹ Ibid., p. 127.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 128.

and to include within the party people of progressive, but not necessarily socialist views. The whole object of the operation was to get votes, as can be illustrated by a quote from a report of the NCNP's Sub-committee on Promotion and Public Relations:

We will not convince many people that the party is really new if we continue to use the old . . . jargon which is meaningful to us but means very little to their minds A few examples: 'people's movement or people's party . . . 'socialism'. People who use this word freely are by no means agreed as to its meaning and most others have been conditioned to respond unfavourably. The ideas we espouse are far more important than the word used to describe them, so why not concentrate on the ideas?³⁵.

Though the left-wingers succeeded in modifying the wording of the preamble to the Draft Program, the changes did not significantly alter its orientation; it remained a reformist, rather than a socialist, statement. The party leaders also had their way on the contents of the Draft Program, as they had had in 1956 and for much of the time before that. Now, however, they were in an even more dominant position because of the large trade union delegation at the Convention. In the 1940 s and 1950 s there had always been less than twenty trade union delegates at CCF Conventions, and for several years there were none³⁶. At the first day of the New Party Convention there were 630 trade union delegates, out of a total of 1,579. There were also 661 CCF delegates and 186 from the New Party Clubs³⁷. According to Lyons, "The union forces . . . approximated a single voice in support of the new party leadership on both programmatic and constitutional issues With a few votes drawn from the CCF or the

³⁵ Quoted in Horowitz, p. 206.

³⁶ See ibid., p. 81.

³⁷ Lyons, pp. 170-171.

New Party Clubs, the unions could control the convention"³⁸.

The opposition to the leadership was a heterogeneous bunch, consisting of left-wingers who objected to the "watering-down of socialism", and some CCFers from the prairies who objected to the link with the unions. But they were unable to achieve many changes in the party programme because their tactics of prolonging debate meant there was only time to consider half of the Draft Program. The remainder was referred to the NDP Federal Council, on which the left-wingers and CCF dissidents were hardly represented.

The Federal Program, as the Draft Program became, contained no reference to socialism, being designed "to unite for democratic political action all Canadians who put human rights and human dignity above the mere pursuit of wealth, and public welfare before corporate power It adopts and will carry forward to new levels of achievement the best objectives of the farmer and labour, co-operative and social democratic movements for which so many progressive Canadians have striven in the past"³⁹.

At the 1963 Federal Convention, the NDP appeared to move slightly to the left. It adopted a policy statement⁴⁰ that included the pledge "to bring about in Canada a new society . . . [in which] the principles of democratic socialism [are] applied to our time and situation". It even used the phrase of the Regina Manifesto, "That production be for use, not for profit". But the words were deceptive; the NDP did not move

³⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

³⁹ Federal Program of the New Democratic Party, (3rd ed; March 1967), p.1.

leftwards. As an article about the 1967 Convention in the Globe and Mail put it:

policies pose problems. Few New Democrats want to return to the dogmatic socialism of the Nineteen Thirties but they also do not want the party to drift too far to the right. Highly placed New Democrats concede privately that their party is already moving gradually right toward a position to the left of centre --- but hopefully far enough left of the Liberals that voters will be able to distinguish differences.

Many NDP members feel the movement to the right is inevitable if the party is to achieve power. The bulk of Canadian votes, they believe, is tied to the centre of the political spectrum⁴¹.

The remainder of this chapter will trace the changes in CCF-NDP policy in relation to nationalisation, taxation, health services and housing.

Nationalisation

The nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange was the primary means proposed in the Regina Manifesto for bringing in the socialist millennium. It was regarded as the only way to effect policies of economic planning. A number of concerns ripe for immediate nationalisation were listed. At the top of the list was the "socialization of all financial machinery --- banking, currency, credit and insurance". The prominence given to financial institutions reflects the prairie origins of the CCF and the influence there of the Social credit doctrine against which it had to compete⁴².

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

⁴¹ Geoffrey Stevens, "Will the NDP break the vote barrier?" Toronto Globe and Mail (30 June, 1967), p.7.

⁴² See Lipset p. 183. The Labour Party adopted a policy of nationalising the joint stock banks at its 1932 conference, against the advice of the NEC. It was dropped in 1938. See Dalton, The Fateful Years, pp. 30-31, 124.

The 1935 election manifesto went even further towards the Social Credit position, but it also contained a substantial list of other nationalisation proposals, mainly public utilities and natural resources: "Transportation, communication and electric power must come first in the list of industries to be socialized. Others, such as mining, pulp and paper and the distribution of milk and bread, coal and gasoline, in which exploitation, waste or financial malpractices are particularly prominent must next be brought under social ownership and operation."

In the early 1940 s, the CCF started to plan its post-war programme. While Woodsworth was leader, the party based its federal programme on the Regina Manifesto, but when he virtually withdrew from politics because of his pacifist views the CCF fell more under the influence of Coldwell who was in favour of updating the programme. "Woodsworth, who had spent a large part of his life in political isolation trying to build a socialist party, resisted all efforts to achieve rapid party growth through ideological compromise. The newer and younger socialist who joined a going movement wanted power and proceeded to try to gain it"⁴³.

At the 1942 Convention, the National Council called for a "comprehensive restatement of our fundamental policies for victory in this war and for building the peace afterwards"⁴⁴, and presented some ideas on the subject. The outcome was the policy statement, Security with Victory (1945), which was revisionist in its nationalisation policies.

⁴³ Lipset, pp. 188-189.

⁴⁴ 1942 NCR, p. 8.

It proposed the nationalisation of financial institutions, monopolistic industries and other "key industries", but seemed well aware of Canadian public opinion: "The socialisation of large-scale enterprise, however does not mean taking over every private business. Where private business shows no sign of becoming a monopoly, operates efficiently under decent working conditions and does not operate to the detriment of the Canadian people, it will be given every opportunity to function, to earn a fair rate of return and to make its contribution to the national wealth"⁴⁵. It also contained a reassurance for farmers: "The CCF has always stood for the private ownership of the family farm family home, and other personal property. In fact, the CCF will make it possible for the people to acquire all the personal property necessary for a high standard of living"⁴⁶.

Commenting on the 1945 election, McHenry wrote that the CCF regarding it as "a defeat of major proportions"⁴⁷. The defeat initiated a major policy making effort which produced the CCF First Term Program in time for the 1949 election. While introducing it to the delegates at the 1948 Convention, M. J. Coldwell made a practical politician's speech urging them to avoid making promises that might be difficult to fulfil when the CCF gained power. "What we adopt", he said, "should be regarded as a minimum we intend to carry out as time and circumstances permit"⁴⁸.

⁴⁵ Security with Victory [1945], p. 14.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ McHenry, p. 135.

⁴⁸ 1948 NCR, p. 32.

He also made it clear that a CCF Government would not be dictated to by the extra parliamentary organisation because "the Parlimantary group . . . will be assessed by the Canadian electorate to whom in the final analysis under our democratic and parliamentary system they must always be responsible"⁴⁹. The First Term Program was adopted at the 1948 Convention after some amendments had been made to it.

The most significant amendment was to the bank nationalisation policy.⁵⁰ The National Council had drawn up the proposed programme, as requested by the 1946 Convention, and had circulated it to the Provincial Councils and party branches for their criticisms and suggestions. A final draft was drawn up by the National Council when it met for a few days just before the 1948 Convention. During this meeting the Council, by a vote of seventeen to twelve, decided to omit the nationalisation of the banks and to substitute for it the "regulation of banking". It submitted an amendment to this effect to the Convention:

It soon became evident that the more doctrinaire socialists in the movement were for public ownership of the banks, and that they would not be swayed by arguments that it would be unkind to saddle the young CCF government with the banking business. In spite of the advocacy of the council's stand by the CCF's most popular orator, Premier Douglas, and by F. R. Scott, the National Chairman, the majority of the delegates seemed to side with the public ownership faction, which was headed by British Columbia leaders Dorothy Steeves and Colin Cameron. David Lewis, realizing the serious ideological issues involved, sided with the minority of the council and came out for public ownership. When the vote was taken, the council's amendment was rejected, 94 to 56, and public ownership of banks was restored to the First Term Program⁵¹.

There was no dispute over the remainder of the nationalisation

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ This is based on Engelmann, "The CCF", pp. 98-100.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 100.

proposals and they all duly appeared in the 1949 manifesto, which declared itself to be a "program of the common people". It tried to inspire confidence by stating that it had been thoroughly costed and methods of carrying it out had been studied from the experience of other democratic socialist governments, including that of "our own province of Saskatchewan". In order to "break monopoly's grip", it proposed to nationalise the C.P.R., fuel and power, the chartered banks, the manufacture of steel, farm machinery and fertilisers, and meat packing.⁵² The proposals in relation to agriculture came from a statement, A National Farm Policy, presented to the 1946 Convention, but the First Term Program omitted its proposal for the co-operative or public ownership of dairies⁵³. The programme promised that a CCF government would encourage and assist co-operatives and it also contained a section on the role of private enterprise, similar to that in the 1945 manifesto.

F. R. Scott's speech at the 1950 Convention began a much more rapid retreat from wide nationalisation proposals and marked the CCF's move towards complete acceptance of the mixed economy. He said:

We do not oppose the making of profit in all its forms; on the contrary, the profit motive, under proper control, is now and will be for a long

⁵² First Term Program, pp. 29-38.

⁵³ 1946 NCR, Appendix II, p. 57.

time a most valuable stimulus to production. Not a single democratic socialist party anywhere plans to nationalise all forms of production, and in the privately owned sector the profit motive must continue.

Nationalization is only one tool, and we must learn to use all the tools I suggest that for any socialist today to look upon every proposal for nationalization as the acid test of true socialism, an act of faith rather than of reason, is to be a little foolish.⁵⁴

The other means of economic control he mentioned as being substitutes for nationalisation in the sense that they could achieve the same ends, were the control of credit, the allocation of raw materials, an equitable tax system, and competition from public and co-operative enterprise.

Adding weight to Scott's proposal to backpedal on nationalisation was the experience of the CCF Government in Saskatchewan. Writing about it in 1957, T. C. Douglas said, "Our main effort . . . has been concentrated in the field of basic utility services such as electric power, natural gas, telephone and transportation, all of which lend themselves to natural monopolies. Here the great advantages of public ownership have been comprehensive planning, the 'service at cost' principle, and the social values achieved by extending service to marginal areas"⁵⁵. The Saskatchewan Government had also introduced a provincial compulsory automobile insurance scheme which even a critical account of the CCF in power admitted was a success⁵⁶. Other experiments in public ownership,

⁵⁴ 1950 NCR, p. 7.

⁵⁵ T. C. Douglas, "Saskatchewan Springboard", in CCF 25th Anniversary Souvenir, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Robert Tyre, Douglas in Saskatchewan, (1962), p.36.

such as a tannery, a shoe factory, a woollen mill and a brick factory were judged to be a failure after only a few years in operation.

The national CCF leaders were cautious in their movement towards a new position on nationalisation, and a resolution at the 1950 convention calling for the deletion of bank nationalisation from the party programme was referred to the National Council, which tabled it "as contrary to CCF policy established at the 1948 National Convention"⁵⁷. For the rank-and-file of the party, nationalisation remained a subject of some importance and there were always several resolutions on it at Convention. But the revisionist trend continued, reaching a climax in 1955 - 1956.

The 1956 Convention in Winnipeg had as its main task the detailed consideration of the new Declaration of Principles which had been under consideration ever since Scott's speech at the 1950 Convention. In 1955, David Lewis delivered a speech obviously designed to test opinion in the party over the issue of the role of public ownership, in the CCF's future policies. He emphasized that he was speaking as an individual, not as a member of the National Executive and Council, although he did say: "most of the opinions I shall express are shared by a majority of our members and by a majority of the National Executive Council"⁵⁸.

Lewis' argument ran as follows:

Until fairly recently it had been accepted by most socialists as axiomatic that nationalization of industry would automatically bring with it greater social and political freedom and a release from the obstacles to the widest liberty which private economic power produces.

⁵⁷ 1950 NCR, p. 25.

⁵⁸ His speech was published as A Socialist Takes Stock; quoted in Zakuta, p. 90.

[But] the comfortable generalizations of the early socialists have been proven by history to be false, or only partially valid, although they were genuinely well meant. Socialists can, therefore, no longer regard nationalization as an automatic panacea for all ills, but must regard it merely as one tool that is available in appropriate circumstances for the furtherance of socialist ends.

It follows from what has been said that the democratic socialist today should continue to reject any suggestion of total nationalization. In fact, of course, he has always rejected it and has always emphasized that he is concerned with public ownership only of the key economic levers of society.

Lewis went on to hint at the electoral liability that the formal commitment to wholesale nationalisation was for the CCF:

The idea is still abroad that socialists intend eventually, if not now, to socialize everything. I, as one socialist, have no such intention, and it is my firm belief that neither the CCF in Canada, nor its sister parties in Great Britain and all other free countries, has such an intention or ever had. Public ownership in a democratic society and under a democratic socialist government will never cover more than a part of the economy and only that part the public ownership of which is essential for the welfare of the people. The time is long overdue when this should be frankly stated without qualification and without apology⁵⁹.

Commenting on Lewis speech, W. E. Lyons suggested it may have been a "trial balloon". "If it was, the feedback apparently indicated that important segments of the party were ready to formalize the moderating trends that had characterized the behaviour of the party for almost a decade"⁶⁰.

The Winnipeg Declaration contained the basic logic of Lewis' position, though it was framed in such language as might accommodate the fundamentalists as well as the revisionists. It remained formally

⁵⁹ David Lewis, A Socialist Takes Stock, pp. 3-9; quoted in Zakuta, pp. 91-92.

⁶⁰ Lyons, p. 37.

committed to the "Co-operative Commonwealth", but it was a different type from that envisaged in the Regina Manifesto. In 1933 the aim was to replace the capitalist system; in 1956 it was to subordinate private profit and corporate power to social planning in order to "achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living standards for all Canadians"⁶¹. Though it regarded a "society motivated by the drive for private gain and special privilege" as "basically immoral", it accepted the fact that in "the co-operative commonwealth there will be an important role for public, private and co-operative enterprise working together in the people's interest". Public enterprise would be extended to deal with private monopolies and to facilitate economic and social planning, but "the CCF also recognizes that in many fields there will be a need for private enterprise which can make a useful contribution to the development of our economy. The co-operative commonwealth will, therefore, provide appropriate opportunities for private business as well as publicly-owned industry".

The National CCF Program, Let's Go Forward, published in January 1958, reflected the new line of thinking initiated by the Winnipeg Declaration. Though it still included many of the nationalisation proposals that were in the 1949 manifesto, its emphasis was on planned investment, Canadian ownership and exploitation of Canadian resources, and measures to increase economic efficiency. It therefore proposed a National Investment Board to control investment, and "a publicly-owned

⁶¹ Winnipeg Declaration of Principles; reprinted in Zakuta, pp. 169-173.

National Investment and Development Bank to provide capital for Canadian Industry", i.e., to buy shares in private industry. Gas and other interprovincial pipelines were marked down for public ownership, and the CCF proposed that public enterprise should participate in "the processing of natural resources in Canada". For purposes of economic efficiency it proposed the nationalisation of transport and communications and basic iron and steel, while the farm implements and agricultural chemicals industries should be publicly owned because they were private monopolies. But, following its usual post-war line, the CCF also saw an important role for private industry, which should be allowed to earn "a fair rate of return".

At the 1958 Convention, Hazen Argue, the Parliamentary Leader in Coldwell's absence from the House of Commons, expressed the opinion that, as a result of the Trans-Canada Pipeline controversy, more and more Canadians were coming round to the view that oil and gas pipelines and similar utilities should be nationalised⁶². By 1960, Argue had narrowed the nationalisation field to new projects rather than taking over old ones⁶³.

The NDP Federal Program of 1961 did not go so far to the right as Argue had: "The New Democratic government will expand public and co-operative ownership for such purposes as the operation of utilities, the development of resources, the elimination of monopoly concentrations of power, and the operation of major enterprises immediately and

⁶² 1958 NCR, p. 13.

⁶³ 1960 NCR, p. 9.

directly affecting the entire nation". This statement was exactly the same as the one in the Draft Program presented to the Convention.

The section of the Draft Program entitled "Control by Canadians" did, however, have a paragraph added to it by the Convention. It included the statement: "The federal New Democratic Government, and where possible the provincial governments, will negotiate over a period of years the selective repatriation of Canada's resources and industries"⁶⁴. According to Lyons, the press "quickly dubbed the new paragraph a program for 'selective nationalisation of natural resources and industries controlled by foreign companies'"⁶⁵.

The policy statement adopted at the 1963 Federal Convention, though phrased in somewhat less right-wing terms, was similarly unspecific about nationalisation: "It is the aim of the New Democratic party to modify and control the operations of great productive organizations and where necessary to develop new institutions: public, joint public and private, and co-operative organisations which will . . . be part of an overall pattern of economic planning"⁶⁶. A resolution saying much the same sort of thing was passed by the 1965 Convention, and two years later the theme was continued. The Globe and Mail, reporting the 1967 Convention, said:

It won't be the same for the old line Socialists in the party and if they want to catch a whiff of the old days, they will have to dig through the book of resolutions submitted by constituency and other groups. There

⁶⁴ Federal Program, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Lyons, p. 130.

⁶⁶ Federal Program, p. 29.

they will find a variety of militant resolutions, including demands for the nationalization of the Canadian Pacific Railway, base metals, forests and water.

But the convention is not likely to endorse nationalization of the CPR or anything else. Times have changed, party fortunes are soaring, a breakthrough may be just around the corner and it would not do to look too radical⁶⁷.

The NDP's present position on nationalisation was put by T.C.

Douglas in an interview just before the 1968 election:

Socialist thinking now doesn't rule out nationalization -- I still think that public ownership is an effective economic tool, but it is a tool, not an objective -- (but) I'm not in favor of public ownership for the sake of public ownership. If the Post Office were run better as a private enterprise system than I'd make it a private enterprise system

I think there is still a field for public ownership. I think, for instance, in Canada (that) communication and transportation ought to be publicly owned.

We'd hold on to the publicly owned central bank, and maybe even to one publicly owned chartered bank, to act as a criterion, a measuring stick, for the other chartered banks, as they've done in Australia.

But (current thinking) seems to indicate that by fiscal policy, monetary policy and investment policy, you can control and direct the economy⁶⁸.

Conclusions

The CCF has almost reversed its stand on nationalisation. In the early 1930s it wanted to nationalise almost everything; in the 1960s it wants to nationalise hardly anything. The attitudes of party members, especially the leaders, have clearly changed in response to changed economic circumstances and, perhaps more importantly, because nationalisation seems to be an electoral liability. The party leaders have implied in their speeches that the Canadian electorate is firmly

⁶⁷ Stevens, Toronto Globe and Mail (30 June, 1967), p. 7.

⁶⁸ George Bain, "Away from nationalization", Toronto Globe and Mail, (21 June, 1968), p. 6.

wedded to private enterprise and, following successive failures in federal elections, they have led the party to a less and less doctrinaire position.

In this respect they have resembled the revisionist leaders of the Labour Party. In other ways, however, the CCF-NDP has differed markedly from the Labour Party over nationalisation policy. The balance of power in the CCF-NDP has increasingly tipped towards revisionism. Only occasionally, such as in 1948 over bank nationalisation, have the majority of party members disagreed with their leaders and forced them to modify proposed programmes. In the 1950 s, the party leaders had their way on nationalisation policy, and this was especially so after the formation of the NDP when a number of non-socialist reformers joined the party.

In the Labour Party, fundamentalism has remained a much more powerful force, and the central position of nationalisation in this doctrine has had support not only from the left-wing of the party, but also from the trade unions, most of which have been faithful to the leadership on other matters. Hence the battles in the Labour Party have been not only more ferocious but also drawn out over a much longer period of time.

Taxation

The section of the Regina Manifesto dealing with taxation contained perhaps the most utopian statement of the whole document: "In the type of economy that we envisage, the need for taxation, as we now understand it, will have largely disappeared". It quickly passed on to more down-to-earth fiscal proposals: "At present capitalist governments

in Canada raise a large proportion of their revenue from such levies as customs duties and sales taxes, the main burden of which falls on the masses. In place of such taxes upon articles of general consumption, we propose a drastic extension of income, corporation and inheritance, steeply graduated according to ability to pay". The object of the CCF's taxation policy was stated as being "not only to raise public revenues but also to lessen the glaring inequalities of income and provide funds for social services and the socialization of industry".

Security with Victory, the 1945 manifesto, proposed a complete revision of the taxation system in order to redistribute the burden equitably. It would entail a shift away from indirect taxation; sales taxes and excise duties would be reduced, except on luxury goods⁶⁹.

In his address to the 1946 Convention, the National President and Leader, M. J. Coldwell, made it clear that the CCF was the spokesman in Parliament for the farmers and their co-operatives. His party had opposed an item in the Budget which treated co-operatives in the same way as private enterprise: "Tax legislation which can properly apply to profit-making business is quite inapplicable to non-profit-making co-operatives"⁷⁰. The CCF had also proposed that farmers earnings should be treated, for the purposes of taxation, not as those of a single individual but of the entire family. Apart from pressing these sectional interests, the CCF had reiterated its policy that there should

⁶⁹ Security with Victory, p. 27.

⁷⁰ 1946 NCR, p. 45.

be larger tax reliefs for those with low incomes.

The First Term Program when presented to the 1948 Convention contained no reference to taxation. Consequently, two resolutions were moved; one called for for removal of the sales tax from all but luxury goods, the other for the raising of income tax exemptions. Both were referred to the Executive for consideration and both duly appeared in an addendum to the 1949 manifesto.

The increasing prosperity of the post war years was reflected in the type of resolutions submitted to CCF Conventions. In 1950 for example, a resolution proposed a "capital gains tax on all transactions involving the purchase and sale of houses"⁷¹, and at several Conventions there were resolutions demanding the re-imposition of the Excess Profits Tax and the abolition of special deductions allowed to the recipients of dividend income. Such resolutions show party members concern that the return of economic prosperity might result in greater disparities of wealth.

A concern with great inequalities of wealth was one of the main features of the Winnipeg Declaration. It said, "The gap between those at the bottom and those at the top of the economic scale has widened". It put the blame for this state of affairs on the "growing concentration of corporate wealth" and said that Canada was faced with the challenge of deciding "whether future developments will continue to perpetuate the inequalities of the past or whether it will be based on principles of

⁷¹ 1950 NCR, p. 21.

social justice".

Let's Go Forward (1958) proposed increases in taxes on large corporations and "reductions in the present excessive depreciation and depletion allowances"⁷². It also called for a "complete revision of the present system of taxation to eliminate inequalities in the application of income tax, to abolish the special privileges and exemptions now enjoyed by corporations and the recipients of corporation dividends, to increase tax rates on the higher income groups and corporations, and to remove the sales and special excise tax from the necessities of life"⁷³.

In 1961, the section of the New Party Draft Program dealing with taxation was passed unaltered and it appeared in the Federal Program of NDP. In addition to the 1958 proposals the NDP said it would redistribute income through a capital gains tax, increased succession duties and the elimination of tax evasion. The principle behind the party's proposed taxation system was stated in the 1963 policy statement: the NDP would establish "a tax structure which neither inhibits economic growth nor presses unduly on any economic class but is solidly based on the principle of ability to pay"⁷⁴.

The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (The Carter Report), published in 1967, provided the NDP with ammunition for the

⁷² Let's Go Forward, p. 2.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁷⁴ Federal Program, p. 32.

1968 election campaign because its recommendations were broadly similar to existing NDP policy. A resolution, proposed by the Federal Executive and submitted to the 1967 Convention, included the statement: "The New Democratic Party endorses the main principles recommended by the Royal Commission on Taxation and in particular those proposals designed to make the tax system more egalitarian and just"⁷⁵.

Conclusions

The CCF-NDP's taxation policies have remained much the same throughout the period 1945-1968. The party's basic concern has been to secure an equitable tax system -- to ensure that the heaviest burden of taxes does not fall on those least able to bear that burden. Though it is unlikely that its proposals have been put forward solely to attract votes, its aims can reasonably be expected to secure public support. As part of its plan to obtain an equitable system, the CCF-NDP has proposed new taxes, such as the capital gains tax, but has not mentioned, since the 1930 s, inheritance or wealth taxes, which are the usual mark of socialist taxation policy.

Though the CCF-NDP's taxation policies have, like those of the Labour Party, never been a burning issue, they differ from those of the Labour Party in their lack of emphasis on the socialist objective of reducing inequalities of wealth. In this the CCF-NDP has come to terms with North American cultural values -- the acceptance of the desirability of an equitable tax system, but the rejection of a tax system that goes

⁷⁵ Resolutions submitted to the NDP Fourth Federal Convention, 1967, p. 14.

beyond the need to provide the conditions of equal opportunity to be unequal.

Health Services

A proposal for "socialized health services" was contained in the Regina Manifesto, which also stated that the CCF regarded publicly-organised health, hospital, medical and dental services as normal responsibilities for the government of "every civilized community".

The CCF's policies put forward in the 1945 election manifesto were more specific: "The CCF will establish a socialized health service, aimed at providing a national standard of health care in every part of Canada. It will provide all citizens with complete preventive and remedial services. Its major aim will be the achievement of positive health and not only the curing of obvious disease"⁷⁶. It proposed to administer the scheme through provincial commissions and local boards working in co-operation with a Federal Health Commission and to embark on a programme of building hospitals and health centres. The party insisted that the question of finance should "never again be permitted to block the road to progress. If we succeed in maintaining full employment and a high national income . . . then the financial means will be readily available for a comprehensive system of social security, and for health, housing, education and other services."⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Security with Victory, p. 22.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 21-24.

At the 1946 Convention, party members continued their attack on the North American myth that public expenditure on social services means economic disaster. The National Executive's Report to this Convention noted that the CCF Government in Saskatchewan had introduced some of the most advanced social welfare legislation on the North American continent and that those "socialist policies" had not jeopardised the financial security of the province but, on the contrary, had increased it⁷⁸. The National Executive also moved a resolution calling for "a comprehensive and integrated social security system, the benefits of which shall be extended to all citizens as a fundamental human right and free from humiliating means tests". With regard to the financing of the scheme, it proposed a "single social security contribution for which the people receive extensive benefits, far in excess of the payment they have to make, the balance being covered out of general revenue"⁷⁹.

Canada's federal system posed problems for the CCF in relation to a National Health Service. Centralised administration to ensure uniformity in the provision of services is favoured by socialist parties, but the CCF tried to avoid any clash with provincial "rights". The 1949 manifesto, for example, said: "The provinces have not the financial resources for a comprehensive health plan, although they are best suited

⁷⁸ 1946 NCR, p. 8.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

to administer such a plan. The federal government, however, can find the necessary additional funds through a social security contribution and from its general revenue. It should also give the necessary leadership and set the pattern and standards. A federal CCF government will accept and carry out these responsibilities"⁸⁰.

The CCF was also cautious over the speed at which a National Health Service could be introduced: "No such comprehensive health system can be established overnight. A CCF government will, however, start on this program immediately and carry it forward as rapidly as possible"⁸¹.

In Saskatchewan, the CCF Government was also cautious. Though the party had promised in the 1944 election campaign to "provide a complete system of socialized health services so that all will receive adequate medical, surgical, dental, nursing and hospital care without charge"⁸² it did not try to introduce a full service immediately. In 1946 the Hospitalization Act was passed, but the Douglas Government did not proceed with the full medical care plan until it had tried it out in one region of the province first. Only in the late 1950 s did the Government start preparations for a full health service, and in doing so aroused the anger of the doctors. The issue dominated the provincial election of 1960. T. C. Douglas "saw Saskatchewan as the 'beachhead' where the battle for socialized medicine would be fought and won. The doctors felt that they were fighting the first frontal attack against

⁸⁰ First Term Program, pp. 13-14.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸² 1944 Saskatchewan election manifesto; quoted in Lipset p. 179.

the freedom of the medical profession elsewhere in Canada"⁸³.

M. J. Coldwell, speaking at the 1960 National Convention in Regina, said, "I have no doubt that within a few years every Canadian citizen will, as a result of the pioneering here [by the Saskatchewan government], enjoy the benefits of the best health care, regardless of economic circumstances. The promotion of such a plan must be the principal activity of the CCF throughout Canada, and, indeed, must form a basic policy of the new party"⁸⁴. The universal, compulsory plan was introduced in Saskatchewan in 1962.

At the national level, a National Health Service had remained one of the main items in CCF programmes, and this emphasis was continued after the formation of the NDP. The 1963 policy statement, for example, said: "The NDP is proud of the pioneer role played by the CCF in establishing hospitalization and also later establishing medicare in Saskatchewan. The New Democratic party will not rest until the full resources of medical science are available to all Canadians"⁸⁵. And, once again, a Royal Commission Report (the Hall Commission, 1965) provided support for the NDP point of view. Hence, in its 1965 election manifesto, the NDP described Medicare a comprehensive health insurance plan, as a "top priority goal"⁸⁶.

⁸³ J. Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1960, (1961), p. 26.

⁸⁴ 1960 NCR., p. 7.

⁸⁵ Federal Program, p. 42.

⁸⁶ The Way Ahead for Canada (the NDP federal election manifesto, 1965); reprinted in Paul Fox, ed., Politics: Canada, (2nd ed, 1966), pp. 360-367.

Conclusion

Though Medicare has been one of the CCF-NDP's main selling points, it has taken a long time to create sufficient demand for it to persuade a Canadian federal government to act. It certainly has not created sufficient demand for the Canadian voters to desert the two old parties. Undoubtedly, the carefully nurtured North American fear of "socialized medicine" has been mainly responsible for this. Thus, it would seem that, unlike in England, there had been a conflict between CCF-NDP members' ideological positions and their perceptions of voters' attitudes, and this has shown itself in the concessions the party has made as a result of its Saskatchewan experience. As Bennett and Krueger have written:

Although this plan has been described as socialized medicine and hence as a product of socialist doctrine, the consistent argument of the government on its behalf was rational self-interest. Medicare was presented as financially advantageous to the average Saskatchewan citizen, as productive of better care than private medicine in no sense could this campaign be viewed as a significant deviation from standard trends in liberal state ideology in Canada and the United States. The Medicare bill was presented as a progressive piece of legislation, comparable to that favored by the Democrats in the United States, that would further Saskatchewan's reputation as a North American leader in health programs⁸⁷.

The CCF's experience as the Government of Saskatchewan has not changed its policy to any great extent, though it has had to expand certain aspects of its policy, for example, over patients' freedom of choice of doctors, to guard against the scurrilous attacks of the North American medical "profession".

⁸⁷ John W. Bennett and Cynthia Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and Politics", in Lipset, p. 357.

Housing

Housing did not figure prominently in the Regina Manifesto, appearing only as part of a public works programme. The 1935 election manifesto repeated the public works argument but then went on to state a distinctly socialist housing policy: "Housing should be regarded as a public utility and the responsibility for it no longer left to private speculative builders and landlords. And the clearing of rural slums as well as those of the big cities must be a part of this responsibility".

In Security with Victory (1945) a programme of public investment with the federal government co-operating with the provinces and municipalities, was proposed. "Housing, slum clearance, community and regional planning for town and country" were referred to as social projects which it was thought would be necessary to help in maintaining full employment. A permanent Dominion Housing Authority would be set up to prepare and launch the CCF's "comprehensive program of housing and community planning" and the federal government would provide sufficient funds "to finance the construction of one million dwelling units within ten years". Essential elements in the plan were subsidies for house building authorities, and large-scale construction, "under public or co-operative auspices, of low rental housing in town and country, with consequent reduction of construction costs." The North American environment, however, once again made its mark on CCF policy, for the party also promised low-interest loans "to encourage home ownership".

88 1946 NCR, pp. 21-22.

The chronic shortage of houses in Canada in the immediate post-war years made it the most important topic on the agenda at the 1946 Convention. One resolution condemned the Liberal Government for its "stubborn determination to depend upon private enterprise and for its unwillingness to establish a Dominion Housing Authority", proposed that a CCF Government should deal with these omissions, and suggested controls over the price of building materials and the establishment of government plants to alleviate the shortage of building supplied⁸⁸.

The 1946 Convention Report also contained a National Council sub-committee report on immediate measures to deal with the housing crisis. It did not recommend the construction of temporary buildings but thought that existing government-owned buildings could be used as temporary accomodation. It cited as an example the CCF Government's taking over a former military base for this purpose in Saskatchewan. But the "only satisfactory way to attack the present housing crisis is for public authorities to take immediate action on a large scale programme of subsidized low-rental public housing", and control over rents and the cost of building materials were essential concomitants of such a programme. Towards the end of the report however, the committee made a concession to the property-owning urge by expressing the wish to make home ownership possible for more people.

All these proposals were embodied in the National Council's First Term Program resolutions presented to the 1948 Convention, and they subsequently appeared in the 1949 election manifesto. The election resulted in an increased majority for the Liberals, who then proceeded

to reduce rent controls, thus arousing the anger of CCF leaders in Parliament, and rank-and-file outside, as evidenced by their resolutions to the 1950 and 1952 Conventions.

Housing continued to be a major topic of discussion at CCF Conventions in the 1950 s. The Winnipeg Declaration mentioned slums and inadequate housing in its section on inequalities, and it also assured Canadians that the CCF would make home ownership more widespread. The 1958 policy statement proposed a "comprehensive national housing program to provide subsidized low rent housing units for families on low incomes and mortgage money of not more than 2 per cent for families building or purchasing low cost houses". The NDP Federal Program (1961) repeated this but also proposed to undertake a much more extensive programme of urban re-development and town and country planning, and to "eliminate land speculation and profiteering".

Conclusions

CCF-NDP housing policy has followed closely the attitudes of rank-and-file members, as shown by Convention resolutions. The party has responded to increasing affluence by tending to move away from emphasizing house building by public authorities and government control over rents, to methods of making house purchase cheaper through lowering interest rates and controlling land speculation. It has therefore moved much further away from a socialist housing policy than the Labour Party has. This is no doubt due to the realisation that the CCF-NDP must come to terms with prevailing North American values which are, in general, hostile to the provision of subsidised houses by public authorities and to controls over the free market determination of rents.

V

CONCLUSION

In this Chapter it is proposed to do two things: first, to assess the extent of the changes in the policies of the two parties; and, second, to try to reach some conclusions on the causes of these changes and to note the main differences between the parties which appear to affect the policies. Although intra-party factors have received most attention in all but the first chapter, the conclusions here will draw not only on them but also on factors related to the political cultures of Britain and Canada which directly affect the two parties.

The policy that reveals the greatest change in both parties is nationalisation. An examination of the proposals of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP reveals two things: first, both parties have moved a long way from their 1945 positions; and, second, the CCF-NDP has moved away from this position much faster, much less reluctantly and with less intra-party strife than the Labour Party. In 1945, the policies of both parties were certainly collectivist: they wanted to use the power of the State to take over, almost immediately, a number of important industries and services, to run them in the interests of the people as a whole and of the workers in those concerns. Nationalisation was seen as a panacea for almost all the ills of the economy and without it there would be, it was thought, an inevitable return to the slump conditions of the inter-

war years. But both parties were still thinking in terms of pre-Keynesian methods of economic management: control over the economy by a socialist government was only thought possible if there was State ownership of at least the major industries. Keynes provided the means of saving capitalism by making nationalisation superfluous so far as economic management was concerned. Demand could be regulated, in the post-war period, by fiscal and monetary policies, but socialists had placed all their bets on the direct control of demand through public ownership of industry. Hence, nationalisation rapidly lost its central place in the Labour Party's and the CCF-NDP's plans for full employment and soon became a target for opposing parties' jibes about their hide-bound ideology.

In addition to the irrelevance of nationalisation for maintaining full employment, many members of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have their faith in it shaken. The party members who have judged publicly owned industries according to the conventional criterion, profit, have seen the dismal failure of the two largest nationalised undertakings in Britain, coal and the railways, and, on a much smaller scale, the brick, paint, shoe and other factories in Saskatchewan. For left-wingers in Britain the disillusionment has been even greater: compensation terms for run-down industries have been generous, many of the former owners were appointed to high positions in the newly nationalised industries, and there have been no serious attempts to get any worker-participation in the running of the industries.

Despite these factors, however, the Labour Party has not gone so far along the revisionist road as the CCF-NDP. In the 1968 election campaign, the NDP had no definite nationalisation proposals. But the

Labour Party has gone ahead with steel nationalisation since it came to power in 1964 and has also intimated that it will nationalise the ports. Thus the Labour Party has retained some at least of its collectivist policies -- the commitments to the nationalisation of what Aneurin Bevan called the "commanding heights of the economy". The CCF-NDP, on the other hand, has succumbed almost completely to the North American individualist ethos.

The other policies that have been examined, taxation, health services and housing, show much less marked changes. But the changes that have occurred in the policies of both the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have resulted in a movement to the right.

In its taxation policy, the Labour Party can hardly be accused of making, or even proposing, any radical measures. It has generally been content to manipulate the existing tax system to try to reduce inequalities of wealth, but only in 1968 has it seriously proposed to introduce a wealth tax, and this proposal is probably part of a package deal which would entail a reduction in taxes on incomes, the latter representing a movement towards the individualist end of the continuum. The CCF-NDP'S policies, not even containing a proposal for a wealth tax, are still further to the right. The equity principle has generally been at the centre of its policies, while a tax system designed to produce equality has not been pressed for. The Labour party, then, has remained slightly to the left of the CCF-NDP, but both have abandoned their original principles, e.g., to almost eliminate indirect taxation, and have therefore moved to the right. The Labour Party in office has not done a great deal to reduce inequality, and has, in recent years, followed its

revisionist leaders towards the individualist values associated with the currently fashionable worship of economic growth.

In the immediate post-war period, the Labour Party's and the CCF's proposals for a National Health Service were very similar. Although left-wingers in both parties would have preferred the service to be completely "free", i.e., paid for solely out of taxation and without any insurance contributions, they accepted the fact that this was impracticable. They, and other sections of the party, have, however, strongly attacked increases in insurance contributions and prescription charges, both of which are regressive in their incidence. Though policy has nominally remained the same, such charges by Labour Governments run directly contrary to the party's principles and are a clear indication of a movement to the right. The CCF-NDP has also compromised its 1945 principles: first, over "provincial rights"; and, second, over the speed at which a Medicare scheme should be introduced. In Saskatchewan, it was eighteen years after the CCF Government took office that it introduced a comprehensive health service. Thus, both parties' policies have moved rightwards: Labour has compromised on the "free" aspects of the NHS; the CCF-NDP has also compromised on this, on the national uniformity of a scheme, and, in Saskatchewan, on the speed at which it could be introduced.

The housing policies of the two parties show a greater distance between them than either taxation or health services. Labour's answer to the housing problem has been to subsidise the building of houses by local authorities to be let at subsidised rents and by statutory controls over the rents of privately-owned houses. The CCF-NDP has seen the

answer in government control over speculation in building land and in lowering interest rates, thus reducing costs, thus reducing rents; it has not advocated housing by public authorities on anything like the scale that even Conservative Governments in Britain have gone in for. This policy shows clearly the results of the pressure of the North American individualist values, especially the idea of the free market, on the CCF-NDP, and of Britain's collectivism on the labour and Conservative parties. Nevertheless, the Labour Party has also moved towards individualism to some extent with its promises in the 1964 election campaign of help for house-purchasers.

Taking these four policies together, it is clear that the Labour Party has been more reluctant, especially when in opposition, to give up its socialism. But it has moved away from its socialist position of 1945 by adopting more individualist policies in the more prosperous years of the 1950 s and 1960 s. When trying to determine the causes of these changes in policy it is difficult to separate intra-party factors from factors associated with the political cultures of Britain and Canada. The two sets of factors are closely interconnected. For example, the strength of the Labour Party's left wing and its success in maintaining the party's commitment to nationalisation is no doubt ultimately due to the fact that it upholds certain important values and attitudes in the political culture, such as a dislike of companies making vast profits. Another example of this overlap between intra-party factors and cultural factors is the different roles played by trade unions in the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP. In the former, they are a powerful

force because of their historical links with the party, because of its financial dependence on them, and because of the party's structure. British unions are conservative in the sense that they adhere tenaciously to their attitudes of the first half of the twentieth century; their influence on party policy is therefore also conservative, as was shown during the Clause IV controversy when they combined with the left-wing to defeat the revisionists. Canadian unions, on the other hand, are not conservative in this sense: they accept capitalism and try to get as much from it as possible for their members. The fact that they have not been formally part of the CCF-structure has meant that the party, wanting to get their support, has had to woo them; it has had to make concessions to get this support, the main one being its abandonment of socialism.

Revisionist leaders of the Labour Party have therefore had a much harder job to convince the remainder of the party that their policies should be followed than have their counterparts in the CCF-NDP. Hence Christoph has been able to write:

The controversy over Clause IV showed convincingly that the ideological reflexes of the party are not atrophied, and that electoral calculation has not completely replaced them as the mainspring of Labour's program¹.

But a completely different judgement has been made of the CCF-NDP:

The success of the Saskatchewan CCF's pragmatic approach to politics, and its effect on the historical development of the party, led the party away from its allegiance to socialism. In the process of 'interplay

¹ Christoph, in Macridis ed. p. 94.

between current contingencies and historical legacies', the original socialist ideology was dropped to be replaced by liberal democratic politics linked to practical expediences.²

Zakuta has also stressed the CCF's experience in Saskatchewan as being an important factor in the rightward movement: Because the Saskatchewan Government was the pride of the whole party, its peaceful and, indeed, apparently cordial coexistence with 'private enterprise' has inevitably made an impression on the CCF's outlook"³

The differences in the attitudes of policy-makers and between the actual policy-making processes of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have also been important. At the national level, CCF-NDP policy has been proposed by the leaders of the parliamentary caucus and those closely associated with them, and their proposals have usually been accepted without a great deal of hostility by the rank-and-file. CCF policy making was dominated by the Coldwell-Douglas-Lewis-Knowles axis; all of them being revisionist in outlook. In his book Turn Left Canada, published in 1945, Coldwell wrote that had the CCF retained its 1932 programme instead of adopting the Regina Manifesto, it might have made more rapid progress.⁴ Douglas regarded the Regina Manifesto as an electoral liability and was pleased when the party adopted the Winnipeg Declaration. In an interview in 1956, he asserted "that the CCF had been dominated too long by a depression psychology. Although the CCF

² John W. Bennett and Cynthia Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and Radical Politics", in Lipset, p. 357.

³ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 90.

⁴ Cited in Lyons, p. 20.

had come to terms with the affluent post-war world in 1956, Douglas had always felt that it should have done so in 1945⁵. Lewis was one of the prime movers in the adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration and, with Knowles, was one of the chief architects of the NDP. All these CCF-NDP leaders, then, have had similar outlooks and no significant leadership quarrels have occurred to split the party from top to bottom. The nearest the party has come to a split of this sort was over the question of who should be Leader of the NDP in 1961. But the split here was on left-right lines only to the extent that the left-wingers would not support the establishment candidate, T.C. Douglas. Instead, they joined with the anti-trade union group in the party to support the right wing Hazen Argue — who was so far to the right that after his defeat he defected to the Liberals. But the left-wing of the party has had no leader of its own of sufficient stature to challenge the ruling clique, or "inner circle" as they have often been called.

The Labour Party has never been ruled by a monolithic inner circle like the one that controls the CCF-NDP. Since 1945, the left-wing of the party has had recognised leaders, the most notable being Aneurin Bevan. Having been the Minister in charge of implementing Labour's most popular measure, the National Health Service, Bevan was a power in his own right. The strong left-wing faction in the Labour Party reinforced Bevan's position, and Bevan provided additional stature for

⁵ Michael Best, "Bad Times in Program Blamed for CCF Drop", Toronto Daily Star, (6 August, 1960); quoted in Lyons, p. 39.

the left-wing. Hence, Labour's policies have been influenced much more by left-wing attitudes than the policies of the CCF-NDP.

But the most important factor affecting the different rates at which the policies of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have drifted to the right has been the role played by trade unions in each party. The first point to note in this connexion is the contrasting trade union traditions in the two countries; traditions that are closely bound up with their political cultures. Canadian unions, in the American tradition, have accepted the capitalist system; many British unions regard capitalism as inherently evil. A result of this difference has been noted by Anthony Sampson:

Many British unions still dislike being mixed up with 'tar' --- the goings-on of capitalists The American mineworkers think nothing of buying up large shares in coalfields, but British unions are only now beginning to make tentative investments, usually in unit trusts which avoids the embarrassment of having holdings in a particular industry. Several unions still have rules forbidding investment in equities.⁶

This attitude of British trade unions has made it difficult for leaders of the PLP, such as Gaitskell, to throw overboard what they consider to be the electorally damaging trappings of socialism, such as Clause IV of the Party Constitution. The conservatism of the unions has meant that they have been the Labour Party's anchor. Generally faithful to the Party Leader, they have thwarted the attempts of the left-wing to stampede the party into accepting extremist policy positions. But they have also prevented, again by their block vote, a complete takeover by the revisionists. And, whatever criticism might be levelled at trade

⁶ Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, (1962), pp. 562-563.

union leaders such as Arthur Deakin by left-wingers, the fact remains that Deakin, and others like him, would never have defected to any other party. It was Deakin who, at the 1952 Conference, moved a resolution condemning the Conservatives for denationalising steel and road haulage, and calling on the next Labour Government to renationalise them "on such terms as will prevent private owners profiting at the expense of the nation"⁷. The Clause IV issue also revealed the basic socialist commitment of the trade union movement in Britain. As Beer puts it, such challenges to the party's central myth touch the "Socialist nerve" of trade unionists as well of those normally associated with the left-wing.

In the CCF-NDP, on the other hand, trade union involvement was for a long time only marginal, and was in any case severely restricted by the Party Constitution. It was during the period when the CCF was still mainly a party based on individual membership that it remained committed to socialism, e.g. the 1948 controversy over the nationalisation of the banks. At the same time as the unions began to take part more and more in the activities of the CCF, and as it showed no signs of making any headway in elections, the party swung to the right. The tightly-knit leadership of the party, some of whom had close connexions with trade union leaders with similar attitudes, reinforced this rightward trend. The negotiations leading up to the formation of the NDP showed the strength of these connexions. And the socialists in the party, leaderless and few in number, were swamped by the influx of non-reformers and American-style trade unionists. Hence, the left-wing was unable to

⁷1952, LPCR, p. 70.

check, let alone reverse, the trend to "neo-liberalism".

Taken together, all these factors provide much of the explanation for the different rates at which the policies of the Labour Party and the CCF-NDP have moved rightwards. The Labour Party has a fairly strong left-wing consisting of MPs, trade unionists and constituency members. It also has a large centre group, which is similarly a cross-section of the party but is dominated by the trade unions and is generally hostile to radical departures from accepted policy. The pull from the revisionists, more concerned with attracting votes than with maintaining the ideological content of policy, and comprising many leading MPs and some constituency workers, especially agents, has been resisted not only by the left-wing which would prefer to see policy move in the opposite direction, but also by the large centre group. This alliance of fundamentalists left and conservative centre in a holding action against the revisionists has been facilitated by the Labour Party's policy making machinery when in opposition. When Labour has been in office, however, the holding action has failed. There are a number of possible reasons for this: in office the leadership, in effect the Cabinet, must, according to constitutional convention, present a united front; of course, there are likely to be struggles in the Cabinet but it is difficult to find out about them, and there are obvious deterrents to resignations; trade union influence declines when Labour forms a Government and they tend to revert to their role as an external pressure group; and, finally, the Government is able to keep the left in line by Machiavellian means, such as by throwing them scraps of socialism like steel nationalisation and by holding out

carrots, such as the possibility of nationalising the docks.

In the CCF-NDP, the first step in the rightward movement was the destruction of prairie radicalism by post-war prosperity. This meant that the left-wing was weakened in the party's main area of support, Saskatchewan, and only remained a force in British Columbia. With the waning of CCF support in Saskatchewan, it began to turn its attention more and more to the urban workers, most of whom were in Ontario. But these workers were organised in America-style trade unions and had no socialist, or even radical, tradition. Throughout the period when this transformation was taking place a small group of leaders remained in power, and their attitudes became increasingly revisionist. In the absence of a countervailing power, such as the trade unions were in the Labour Party, the leaders were easily able to persuade most of the rank-and-file of their often defeated party that the only possible way of gaining power federally was to discard socialism and to become moderately reformist. This trend was strengthened by the influx of outspoken non-socialists at the time when preparations for the New Party were being made. Hence the disappearance of socialism and the formation of the radical-liberal NDP.

Though intra-party factors do provide some of the reasons why the rightward trend in CCF-NDP policies has been more rapid than in the Labour Party, external or semi-external factors also come into the full explanation. The basic reason, as indicated in Chapter I, lies in the differences between the political cultures of Britain and Canada. In

Britain, socialism is not anathema to perhaps at least fifty per cent. of the electorate, and many of the remainder accept the collectivism of both the Labour and Conservative Parties. Within the Labour Party itself and within the trade unions, left-wing dissent is regarded as respectable while right-wing dissent is heresy. Both party and unions operate within a socialist tradition which, if taken to its logical conclusion (which it is not), dictates that capitalism must ultimately be eradicated. Labour's position as one of the two main parties has meant that it has not been forced to abandon this commitment. Indeed, if it did it might well lose many of its most active supporters. But in Canada, socialism is almost as alien an ideology as it is in the United States, and a left-of-centre party such as the CCF-NDP must, in an affluent society, be no more than reformist if it is to survive.

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