THE SHIFTING PERSONA IN JONATHAN SWIFT'S

A TALE OF A TUB
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A TALE OF A TUB

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis endeavors to investigate the shifting rhetoric of *A Tale of a Tub* with the object of determining the nature of the speaker in both allegory and digressions. It concludes that a single voice, Modern by Swift's standards, speaks throughout. This voice adopts various Modern positions yet is not consistent in being Modern, for it does, on occasion, let through Swift's own point of view.
I wish to thank Dr. Gordon Vichert for his helpful suggestions during the preparation of this thesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE PERSONA TRADITION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE ALLEGORY AND ITS PERSONA</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE PERSONA AND THE REST OF THE TALE</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE HEART OF THE MATTER: &quot;A DIGRESSION ON MADNESS&quot;</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This study began as a close reading of *A Tale of a Tub* with particular focus on its rhetoric. The *Tale* contains peculiar and confusing shifts in style and point of view, and by examining these shifts I have hoped to make my own judgment concerning the voice or voices responsible for them. I have concluded that a single persona, who presents and adopts a number of Modern views, narrates both allegory and digressions. Extremely elusive in nature, this persona changes his vocabulary to match his pose of the moment. Beginning as a Modern writer, he also at times emerges as a critic (both biblical and secular); a Modern projector evincing mystical, Cabbalistic, Rosicrucian, or alchemical tendencies; a Modern scientist of mechanical or experimental leanings; and a materialist philosopher with Hobbesian or Neo-Epicurean vocabulary and beliefs.

Within this chameleon-like shifting between Modern positions, some are obvious and some more concealed but yet important. The Neo-Epicurean positions, for instance, although less immediately apparent than the amusing "dark writer" ones, are more central to the *Tale*. Furthermore, a given attitude, such as that of explainer of the mysteries of the universe, is common to both poses. The rapid change between Modern views and the existence of attitudes common to more than one view make exact enumeration of the persona's changes impractical. However, since certain poses dominate related sections of the *Tale*, a general pattern can be discerned. A Modern writer guise controls the prefatory apparatus and Introduction as well as the Conclusion; a biblical critic most parts of the allegory; and
a Modern critic or enthusiast the early digressions. "Dark writer" characteristics are more prominent in sections V, VIII, and X, while a Hobbesian vocabulary emphasizes the materialism of the tailor cult, the opening of the Aeolist section, and portions of "A Digression on Madness". Underlying Aeolism and controlling Madness is a Neo-Epicurean terminology and philosophy which also appears strategically from title page to Conclusion.

In his wide-ranging Modernism, the persona adopts not only generalized positions, such as those of a Modern writer or critic, but also takes on the style and opinions of known individuals. That the reader might not miss this element of specific parody, comments on it appear in the margin notes of the Tale's first edition and in the Apology and footnotes of the fifth and subsequent editions. Although Swift hardly furnishes a complete guide to the instances in which the persona resembles a given Modern, his notes give sufficient clues for the reader to pursue the matter on his own.

By the frequency with which the persona imitates or mentions them in a manner calculated to do them no honour, certain individuals emerge as principal objects of Swift's satire. Chief among these are Richard Bentley and William Wotton, opponents of Swift's mentor, Sir William Temple, in the Ancients-Moderns controversy. In any part of the Tale directly related to the controversy the persona mimics these two, while at other times he gratuitously pulls them into the narrative, thereby implicating them in a more obviously reprehensible Modernism. Thus, in Section III, "A Digression Concerning Critics", the persona especially mimics Bentleyan historical criticism, while in the next digression, "In the Modern Kind", 
he mainly parodies William Wotton's enthusiasm for Modern endeavors. In that same digression, furthermore, an alchemical recipe for knowledge (an obvious target for satire) immediately precedes a Wotton-type censuring of Homer's deficiencies. Of Modern literary figures those most often implicated by the persona are John Dryden and Roger L'Estrange; of "dark writers", Thomas Vaughan; of philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Lucretius. Although Lucretius was an ancient, his work, *De Rerum Natura*, the Modern's bible of Epicureanism, had only recently been translated into English. The persona's Modernism is broad enough to be both general and very specific.

Structurally, this Modern consciousness serves as the link between sections labelled as allegory and as digression. In all sections the persona focuses on what he finds most interesting at the moment, thereby giving short shrift to consistent exposition. The undue intrusion into his material, often in the form of digressions within a chapter, and a penchant for congratulating himself upon his proficiency as a Modern writer mark the persona's authorship of both allegory and digressions.

As the Modern author he is responsible for the alternation between "tale" sections and digressions and for the relationship between each. As Miriam Starkman and Jay Arnold Levine both point out, a definite connection exists between the installments of the allegory and their accompanying digressions.¹ For example, in the allegory's opening section the persona

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describes Peter's techniques of finding meanings in his father's will solely to prove his own point. Then, in section III, himself indulges in similar tactics to prove the existence in ancient times of the true critic. Again, in the second allegory installment he describes Peter's activities as a projector, only, in the succeeding digression, to become himself a kind of Modern projector. As the Tale progresses this relationship between allegory and digressive sections gradually breaks down, as does the order of even-numbered sections continuing the allegory and odd-numbered ones the digressions. Perhaps this is to be expected after digressions praising digressions and madness. At any rate, the persona's own whim eventually subverts any other ordering principle.

Another kind of connection, a thematic one, further demonstrates that one voice narrates allegory and digressions. This connection by subject appears in the description of the tailor cult in Section II and in the subsequent reference to it in Section III. Furthermore, the tailor cult and Aeolism, although they nominally belong to the allegory, in addition belong to the materialistic system more fully propounded in "A Digression on Madness".

A prominent aspect of the Tale-Teller's Modern mentality is his use of metaphor. Instead of metaphor illustrating his thought, it more often controls it, partly because he persistently confuses the difference between literal meanings and metaphors. For him, metaphor becomes literal meaning, while a literal meaning evolves into metaphor. Thus the metaphorical "deep impressions" which words make upon us (Introduction) become physical impressions and prove one of his theories. St. Paul's statement that "Learning puffeth Men up" (section VIII) in his mind accounts for the
Aeolist practice of applying bellows to their neighbors’ breeches. In addition, his analogy between the face of nature and the mind of man turns into a literal application of natural process, (that is, that vapours rise and produce disturbances) to mental activity. On the other hand, he likes to change literal sense into metaphor. In discovering the antiquity of the "true critic", he finds that the ancients' references to asses, weeds, and serpents are actually metaphors for "true critics".

Throughout the Tale the persona favors certain kinds of metaphors, namely those of an inside-outside as well as those of an up-down nature. Men, for example, become suits of clothes animated by wind. Early in the Tale it becomes established that these outsides rarely contain anything of worth, and are indeed, vehicles of delusion. The Tale itself is a major vehicle of delusion which, like the largest in a series of Chinese boxes, contains others—the allegory, the oratorial machines, and the systems of the tailor cult, Aeolism, and Madness. In its turn, the Tale comes within the Introduction's theory of oratorial machines, specifically the Stage Itinerant. Again, the Puritan pulpit, one of the oratorial machines, is also a tub which reappears in Aeolism as the requisite vessel for containing wind. In one of the Tale’s more famous passages, the Teller, after demonstrating that Modern outsides are often delusory, notes that the "Grubbean Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts and their Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and Fables". The allegory, of course, does just this.

2Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub, ed. Guthkelch-Smith (Oxford, 1958), 66. All subsequent references to the Tale are from this edition and will be referred to within the text.
The whole of the Tale at times seems a crazy mixture of insides and outsides. Even the quotation from Irenaeus on the title page relates to vehicles of delusion. The Guthkelch-Smith edition reproduces this note on it from the Nichols's edition of Swift's works: "The words are taken from the first book of Irenaeus against the Pagans: where he says that the followers of the Heretic Marcus hid their mysteries under these Greek letters, but that the words were Hebrew". (353)

The religions described within the Tale, the tailor cult and Aeolism, are also of an inside-outside nature. The tailor cult postulates that the universe and man within it is a suit of clothes; Aeolism finds the universe and man animated by wind. Furthermore, the definition of happiness in "A Digression on Madness" (which puts forth a materialist philosophy to match these religions) is given in terms of insides and outsides. The Epicurean trust in outsides—the evidence of sense knowledge only—is shown to be delusory. Experimentalist-type knowledge, still restricted to the senses but gained from probing the insides of things, is shown to be little better.

Up-down metaphors also find their place in the Tale, sometimes as part of Modern confusion, sometimes as explanations for the way things are. In the Dedication the Modern worries about Modern Works being sunk into the abyss of things when they were light enough to float on the surface. Later, the horse in control of rider, or imagination in control of the reason, becomes representative of the Modern condition. And finally, the up-down motion of the winds of Aeolism and the vapours of Madness accounts for Modern innovators in empire, religion or philosophy.

A discussion of the Tale's persona would be relatively easy if he
consistently remained Modern, however changeable and given to metaphors he might be. However, the persona has not even the integrity of always being a Modern. On occasion he lets through a Swift-like judgment upon the Modern nonsense he persuasively puts forth. Because these judgments—which are clues to Swift's norm of common forms and common sense—intersperse with the Modern views, a reader might easily overlook them. Instances of these judgments occur at least twice in "A Digression on Madness" (166 and 171) before the more obvious and devastating one that the man who does as the persona recommends is in the "Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves".(174). At another juncture where Swift wishes to make clear his satire against the "true critic", the persona clearly and cogently describes two valid kinds of critic before he both discusses and himself becomes a "true critic".

Given the occasional sane comment which penetrates the plethora of Modernisms it might seem logical to judge that the Modern author is in fact a sane ironist. A number of passages which are ironical from Swift's point of view are perhaps so from the persona's as well. It is often difficult or impossible to determine whether an individual passage proceeds from an ironical or naive persona. My conclusion that the persona is dominantly but not consistently a Modern is supported by reference not merely to individual passages but to the over-all pattern of the Tale. It is a Modern work, unsuccessfully put together in the Modern fashion of numerous prefaxes, digressions, and a lengthy conclusion. The Tale's "author" digresses within chapters, repeatedly congratulates himself upon his abilities, and expresses himself in metaphors which initially bewilder the reader.
Swift perhaps enjoyed making the persona the enigma that most readers find him. In fact, so puzzling is the nature of the speaker in all of Swift's satires that controversy exists even over the use of the term "persona" to describe these speakers. Irvin Ehrenpreis, Swift's twentieth-century biographer, has questioned the validity of "persona" criticism, implying that persona is a twentieth-century concept which imposes the "dogma of impersonal art" upon the eighteenth century. 3 Ehrenpreis's insistence that the voice in the satires of Pope and Swift is that of the real author provoked, in turn, a symposium entitled "The Concept of the Persona in Satire" in which a number of critics disagreed with Ehrenpreis's contention. 4 Since this basic term of my thesis is controverted, my opening chapter discusses the origin and tradition of persona in satire. For support in establishing that such a tradition existed in satire from classical times onward I have drawn upon contributions to the persona symposium as well as upon my own reading. 5 In the subsequent discussion of the persona in various Swift satires, including the persona of the Tale, I have recorded the result of my own analysis.


5In The Masks of Jonathan Swift, William Bragg Ewald gives a helpful definition of persona as "a clear fictitious character who is represented as the supposed author of a work (or a spokesman in a monologue)". William Bragg Ewald, The Masks of Jonathan Swift (Oxford, 1954), p.9. My approach, though not specifically indebted to his discussion of persona and of the Tale's persona in particular, proceeds from a similar viewpoint.
This study's second chapter, "The Allegory and its Persona", discusses the narrator of sections concerning the three brothers and his manner of telling their story. Critical commentary on this narrator involves a situation somewhat analogous to that concerning the term "persona". Philip Harth, who examines the Tale in relation to a background of Anglican rationalism, concludes that in all sections related to the abuses in religion, Swift himself is the speaker. An opposing view which I find more convincing is that one voice narrates both allegory and digressions. Ronald Paulson, Robert C. Elliott, Jay Arnold Levine and Harold Kelling have all published studies which differ in approach but hold this general view.

Jay Arnold Levine's description of the persona as a Bentleyan biblical critic led me into some background reading on the Ancients-Moderons controversy. I doubt that one can pinpoint the persona's identity so exactly as Levine would do, yet, as narrator of the Tale and of the earlier digressions, the persona is dominantly a Bentley-Wotton Modern. An examination of the persona's Modernisms within the allegory occupies the greater part of this second chapter. Its final concern is with the persona's nominal allegiance to the Anglican brother, Martin—an allegiance which I find subverted by the persona's preoccupation with the more interesting Peter and Jack.

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An investigation of the persona and the rest of the Tale, excluding "A Digression on Madness", takes up the third chapter. Examining the prefatory sections and digressions in some detail, the chapter investigates possible sources for the persona's style and point of view in given passages. Aside from Bentley and Wotton, whose views the persona respectively mimics in the digressions "Concerning Critics" and "In the Modern Kind", the persona chiefly echoes such literary figures as Dryden and L'Estrange. The writings of Sir William Temple in the Ancients-Moderns controversy perhaps underlie Swift's own point of view concerning these Modern positions.

Within the digressions the persona frequently expresses himself metaphorically, particularly in what I have termed a series of inside-outside and up-down metaphors. For this habit of mind, Moderns in the fields of literature, philosophy, or science provide him with ample precedent. My analysis of the persona's rhetoric includes quotations by Ronald Paulson and Robert C. Elliott, both of whom are perceptive in exploring subtleties in the persona's language. Studies by Miriam Starkman on the background of Swift's satire on learning and by Edward Rosenheim on the victims of Swift's satire were also pertinent, as I have noted within the chapter.

Because it is complex and elusive, "The Digression on Madness" compels the close attention of anyone who tries to understand the Tale. And because it also plays a major role in the Tale's satiric pattern, an analysis of it forms the subject of my final chapter. In 'Madness' the persona offers a materialistic system which is the philosophical counterpart to the abuses in religion and learning found in the allegory and in
the other digressions. The major tenets of this system unfolded in "Madness" all parody an Epicurean mode of perceiving reality. These tenets include the theory that the angle at which vapours hit the brain determines human activity, that man perceives reality only through the senses, and that happiness consists in delusion. My discussion of the reasons why Swift thought Epicureanism worth parodying as Modern in the seventeenth century makes use of Miriam Starkman's work already cited, Thomas Mayo's Epicurus in England, and Louis Bredvold's article on "Dryden, Hobbes, and the Royal Society".

In this final chapter I also posit that the tailor cult and Aeolism, which respectively define man as a suit of clothes and as animated by wind, are closely linked to Madness. In one sense these two cults fit within the story of the three brothers; yet they are also the materialistic religions of madness. Aeolism, particularly, is directly associated with both a Lucretian theory and with examples of Madness in religion. They also both parody the language and view of Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century philosopher of materialism. (Although Hobbes's materialism was not Epicurean, he was popularly linked with the older materialistic philosophy.)

To any reader the crux of Madness is that the persona advocates being a serene fool as preferable to the discovery that on the inside things are good for nothing. After a careful reading of all that leads up to this statement, I am convinced that the persona relates only two extremes, neither of them acceptable to Swift or necessary for us to choose between. Critical opinion on the matter is divided: Ronald Paulson, Martin Price, Kathleen Williams, and Harold S. Kelling see the persona's choices as false alternatives, while F. R. Leavis, Robert C. Elliot, and Edward
Rosenheim hold that Swift here reveals the devastating reality.

It is somewhat conventional to link the Tale's persona with Erasmus's persona of Folly in *The Praise of Folly*. In this middle section of "Madness" I have gone beyond that to trace a parallel between Folly's advocacy of madness and illusion and that of the Tale-Teller. There is no way of proving whether or not Swift intended this parallel but it would be appropriate to the allusive habit of the age in which Swift lived.
II

PERSONA

The use of the term "persona" for the speaker in Swift's satires is a common but still controversial practice. A discussion of the term itself and of the persona tradition in satire precedes my analysis of the persona of *A Tale of a Tub*. Derived from drama, the term originally was the Latin word for an actor's mask and later broadened to include his role, thus giving the sense of "dramatis personae". Subsequent usage has made it independent of drama and it now signifies any distinctive relation or capacity in which one acts. "Persona's" derivation from "mask" perhaps conveys to us an element of disguise, but that is not its primary meaning. The word very possibly comes from the Latin personando, meaning "sounding through". If this is the case, then even "persona's" etymology involves communication. Certainly in ancient drama the mask itself functioned less to disguise the actor than to communicate a desired pose or attitude.

Its general sense of a performance designed for specific effect has made persona a term usefully applied to characters in satire. Since satire implies a certain attitude on the part of its author towards folly, satire's speakers are always controlled for their satiric effect. Although not confined to distinguishing a first person speaker from the true author of a work, the term "persona" is especially useful in this respect. Otherwise, it is easy to blur the distinction between the author in real life and his voice in an art form. No twentieth-century innovation, this distinction was assumed in classical as well as in eighteenth-century
literary theory. Discussing the speaker in Roman satire, the classicist, J. P. Sullivan, says that at its lowest level the notion of persona "was a matter of projecting a literary personality." He notes that "in ancient literary theory, the important thing was the relationship established between the speaker (sc. writer) and his audience, not the relation between the speaker's words and the facts".\(^1\) To Professor Sullivan "the first person mode is just as much a matter of a satiric persona, dictated by tradition and adopted when suitable, as is the use of other named characters to express more appropriately the sentiments of the poem".\(^2\)

The foregoing statements imply that the rhetorical tradition of satire includes the element of fiction and that the speaker in satire belongs to that fiction. In reference to rhetoric, "fiction" means something slightly different from its ordinary connotation of the non-factual or imaginary. Insofar as satire involves a critical attitude toward something in the real world and often a stated intention of correcting real abuses, satire is not pure fiction in the ordinary sense. But, insofar as satire involves an artistic construct and the most effective arrangement of language to attain a given effect, it contains a degree of fiction.

Satire is not confined to a particular form: a poem, an essay, or a fable may be a satire. It is, rather, a particular attitude which, if in control of what is written, causes the resulting work to be designated as satire. On the other hand, if this attitude controls merely some portion of the writing, the work is considered to have satiric elements but

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\(^2\) Ibid., 141.
to belong to some other category. Since satire is not such a clearly defined genre as epic or lyric poetry, for instance, it embraces a broader range of works. As a result, satire has some odd bedfellows. Within the form of the novel, for instance, a given work may contain enough satiric elements to be commonly considered first as satire, almost secondarily as a novel. *Catch 22* and *Pale Fire* are of this sort. Furthermore, characters who belong to a novel which has satiric elements, may at times be caricatures whose actions or responses to a situation are entirely governed by their author's purpose of satirizing what they represent. Square and Thwackum in *Tom Jones*, or Dr. Slop in *Tristram Shandy* in this sense are personae of satire.

With their affinity to classical literature, Augustan writers were for the most part aware of satire's rhetorical tradition. In an influential essay entitled "The Muse of Satire" Maynard Mack notes that Pope portrays himself as "lofty, good-humored, calm, disinterested" only in certain kinds of poems--his formal satires. Pope does this, says Mack, in accordance with the established principle of classical rhetoric which decrees that the ethos, or character that a speaker establishes for himself, highly influences the reception he receives. Thus each satirist offers an apologia as one of his "stock subjects". To the definitive edition of the *Tale of a Tub* Swift belatedly prefaced the same sort of apology. In the *Tale* itself, his persona follows the same principle but establishes a "reverse" ethos--that of unreliable Modern.

In the same satire symposium to which Professor Sullivan contributed, Professor Howard D. Weinbrot quotes various statements in which Dr. Johnson comments on Pope's use of a mask. In his "Life of Pope" (1781) Dr. Johnson

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refers to Pope's assumed attitudes of contempt of fame, or indifference toward riches or poverty. Johnson notes that when Pope says such things "he certainly does not express his habitual and settled sentiments, but either willfully disguises his own character, or, what is more likely, invests himself with temporary qualities and sallies out in the colors of the present moment". In addition to Dr. Johnson's statements, Professor Weinbrot also quotes an advertisement for the anonymous Tears of the Muses (1783) which comments on the rhetorical function of the persona in satire.

The advertisement includes the following passage:

I am afraid, there is another Particular, that calls aloud for the Regard of the Satirist: and That is a Reflection, how far Decency may make it a Duty, to abandon his personal Self, and Insinuate Opinions, with Modesty. I mean from the Mouth of some figurative Speaker, whom he ought to suppose of more Consequence; and whose Sentiments the Reader will be sure to receive with less Scruple.

Furthermore, a pictorial instance of the age's familiarity with the concept of a persona can be found in Dryden's translation of the satires of Juvenal and Persius (1697). The illustration facing the title page (and reproduced within this thesis) shows Juvenal receiving the satyr's mask from the muse—a mask which represents the conventional attitude of the satirist—one who lashes out at men's follies. In writing satire Juvenal assumes this pose, which, though it may coincide with his own temperament, is also part of an established convention.

The publishing of Maynard Mack's essay (1951-52) marks the beginning of a renewed interest in and appreciation of the persona concept.
THE SATIRES OF
Decimus Junius Juvenalis.
Translated into English VERSE.

By Mr. DRYDEN,
And several Other Eminent Hands.
Together with the
SATIRES OF Aulus Persius Flaccus.
Made English by Mr. DRYDEN.

With Explanatory Notes at the End of each SATIRE,
To which is prefixed,
A Discourse concerning the Original and
Progress of SATIRE,
Dedicated to the Right Honourable
CHARLES Earl of Dorset, &c.
By Mr. DRYDEN.

Quicquid agunt Hominis, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
Gaudia, discursus, nostris est farrago libelli.

Adorn'd with SCULPTURES.

LONDON: Printed for Jacob Tonson; and are to be Sold by Robert
within the tradition of satire. A notable exception to this general
trend may be found in the writings of Swift's twentieth-century bio-
grapher--Irvin Ehrenpreis. In an article written largely in reaction to
persona criticism, Ehrenpreis questions the value of applying the term
"persona" to Swift's speakers. Ehrenpreis stirred up his own reaction,
which includes the persona symposium in *Satire Newsletter*.

To Ehrenpreis, persona means a mask or a "device to screen the
author from his meaning" a particular use of the term which is not
entirely justified. Professor Ehrenpreis does accept the term as "illumin-
ating when the speaker has an ambiguous character" but considers that
even an ironical persona designates "a disguise that is intended to be
seen through, a mask that the reader at first supposes to be genuine but
at last sees removed .... In the reflective or polemical essay, the
author must be regarded as the speaker".

Ehrenpreis correctly implies that to read Swift's work with under-
standing requires some idea of where Swift, the true author, stands in
relation to what his speaker says. Furthermore, Ehrenpreis's approach
receives support from the Apology Swift attached to the fifth edition.
The Apologist points out that "some of those Passages in this Discourse,
which appear most liable to Objection are what they call Parodies, where
the Author personates the Style and Manner of other Writers, whom he has
a mind to expose". He then gives an instance of this practice. In
gravely drawing attention to one example of parody by the "Author", the

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6Irvin Ehrenpreis, "Personae" in *Restoration and Eighteenth-
Century Literature: Essays in Honor of Alan Dugald McKillop* (Chicago, 1963),
p. 29.

7Ibid., p. 37.
Apologist appears to imply that a sound mentality which employs the method of parody, directs the entire Tale. It does, but at one degree more removed. The Apologist ignores a great deal. While he is accurate in the one instance he mentioned, he by-passes the Tale's over-all tone and structure—both produced by a mind recognizably Modern. This Modern voice is not merely a mask in the sense of a mode of concealment for Swift. It provides the form and content of the Tale.

Ehrenpreis's approach to the concept of persona reflects his emphasis on Swift's biography at the expense of the Tale-Teller's rhetoric.

He is author of *The Personality of Jonathan Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*. The biographer naturally comes to the works through the man.

In Vol II Ehrenpreis gives the following explanation of Swift's speakers:

Brought up to consider his essential character as naturally corrupt and to consider the corruption as rooted in his flesh, Swift used the imagery of bodily filth as the hallmark of his most brilliant creations . . . Ultimately, this low opinion of himself (which I assume was implanted in childhood) becomes the source of his love of parody, impersonation, and irony. By assuming a false identity, Swift protects his true, weak self. In imagination, any fault committed by a pseudonym leaves the true author blameless. The impurities of the Tale Swift can unconsciously charge to the invented fools who supposedly tell it, just as the oaths of Peter leave no stain on his creator.

This Freudian view may well be relevant. Yet Ehrenpreis's focus on Swift's impersonation as a means of disguise and protection ignores the equally important aspect of the rhetorical tradition in which Swift wrote.

That tradition applies even in satires where the author himself seems to be speaking. The speakers in the satires of Horace and Juvenal

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may resemble and represent their authors, yet they are part of an art form. As such, each is a literary personality employed for rhetorical purposes. The English tradition had its own version of the speaker who subtly differs from the real author. Although Chaucer's works are not classified as satires, they contain satiric elements. Part of the slyest satire concerns the Chaucer who narrates *The Parliament of the Fowles, The House of Fame, Troilus and Cressida,* and *The Canterbury Tales.* The real Chaucer enjoys manipulating and poking fun at this literary projection of himself.

The element of fiction should also be noticed when the speaker's position differs appreciably, even if not consistently, from that of the real author's. This tradition, in which the speaker is a parody and is himself mocked, is designated Menippean or Varronian. In his "Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire," incorporated into his translation of Juvenal's satires, Dryden traces Menippean dialogues and epistles as the acknowledged source of a tradition in satire. Apparently Menippus was much given to parodies, "that is, he often quoted the verse of Homer and the Tragick Poets, and turn'd their serious meaning into something that was Ridiculous."9 Both Varro and Lucian consciously imitated Menippus in style and manner. Dryden establishes a line from Menippus, Varro and Lucian which includes Petronius Arbiter, the *Encomium Moriae* of Erasmus, *Mother Hubbard's Tale* in Spenser, and his own satires *Absalom and Achitophel* and *Mac Flecknoe.*10 Certain of Swift's works--An


10 Ibid., xlvii.
Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, A Modest Proposal, Gulliver's Travels, and A Tale of a Tub—likewise belong to this tradition.

Northrop Frye, in his Anatomy of Criticism, comments on Menippean satire's focus:

The Menippean satire deals less with people as such than with mental attitudes. Pedants, bigots, cranks, parvenus, virtuosi, enthusiasts, rapacious and incompetent professional men of all kinds, are handled in terms of their occupational approach to life as distinct from their social behaviour. The Menippean satire thus resembles the confession in its ability to handle abstract ideas and theories and differs from the novel in its characterizations, which is stylized rather than naturalistic, and presents people as mouthpieces of the ideas they represent. . . . Squire Western belongs to the novel, but Thwackum and Square have Menippean blood in them. A constant theme in the tradition is the ridicule of the philosophus gloriosus, already discussed. The novelist sees evil and folly as social diseases, but the Menippean satirist sees them as diseases of the intellect, as a kind of maddened pedantry which the philosophus gloriosus at once symbolizes and defines. 11

The persona of Tale of a Tub exemplifies this concentration on mental attitudes and on occupational behaviour. In fact, the Tale's speaker, an example of what Professor Paul Zall calls "mind satire", presents himself only in these aspects. To Professor Zall "Menippean satire mixes anything and everything that comes to mind. It dramatizes thought process rather than thought, and we ought to be looking at those processes rather than at autobiography or persona per se". 12

This satire on mental attitudes and processes exists in Lucian's dialogues, in The Praise of Folly, and in sections of Gargantua and Pantagruel (particularly where Rabelais parodies scholastic thinking). Certainly, it is not confined to works that are pre-eminently satires, but

appears in the novel and various kinds of poetry as well. *Tristram Shandy* is primarily a novel; yet it also parodies the novel. In relating his life and opinions its narrator, who does not get to the circumstances of his birth until half way through the book, is a worthy successor to Swift's Modern Tale-Teller. Tristram digresses as much as does the narrator of the Tale. However, Sterne manipulates his narrator with a gentle affection never found in Swift's treatment of the Tale Teller. In Byron's *Don Juan* the narrator's thought process structures, or refuses to structure, the entire poem. The narrator tells what he wants to when he wants to, and in addition gives his opinion on every subject related or unrelated to Don Juan. The poem is as much about his attitudes as about Juan's adventures. Byron's narrator is a conscious and humorous version of himself. The refusal to worry about form, spelling or "reasonable" rhymes, and the jaded perception through which the poem filters, reflect an aspect of Byron's own non-literary personality projected into a literary one. Both *Tristram Shandy* and *Don Juan*, though not only satires, use the narrator's own consciousness as the distorting medium through which the work is presented. In each case the narrator's mind is an important element of the fiction, and in each case the mind is mocked—affectionately.

The dramatic monologue of the later nineteenth and twentieth-century presents speakers whose attitudes reveal what kind of individuals they are. The speaker's consciousness is the *raison d'être* of the poem. An important difference yet exists between the dramatic monologue and Menippean satire: the monologue focuses on the speaker's social character which he reveals—often unintentionally, while Menippean satire is more interested in the attitudes and positions he assumes.
In the twentieth century the novel becomes a major vehicle for Menippean satire. By definition the novel does not exist only for satire but at times satire emerges as the dominant element. Vladimir Nabokov's satiric novels, Lolita and Pale Fire, provide imaginative examples of "mind satire". Humbert Humbert, the lascivious narrator of Lolita, shocked unwary readers who ignored the rhetoric and saw him simply as a dirty-minded creator. Yet though Humbert is mocked by Nabokov, the American scene is probably mocked even more. The novel's focus is not necessarily on its scandalous narrator. Pale Fire, reversing this emphasis, is a Menippean satire and in some respects is a direct descendant of A Tale of a Tub. Pale Fire ostensibly focuses on a poem of that name much as the Tale purportedly deals with the allegory. In each work the narrator is also a critic who overwhelms and distorts his source. Dr. Charles Kinbote, whose interpretation, annotations, and index of Pale Fire refer almost exclusively to himself, is a persona as mad, elusive, and deceitful to his readers as the voice of the Tale. It is no accident that Pale Fire's mad critic claims to be king of the northern land of Zembla. Nabokov follows the Augustan tradition in regard to false criticism. Readers of Swift will recall that Momus, listed in the Tale as the ancestor of the "true Modern Critick", in The Battle of the Books has recourse to "the malignant Deity, call'd Criticism" who "dwelt on the Top of a snowy Mountain in Nova Zembla" (Battle 240). Like the Tale Teller, Charles Kinbote is a Modern critic who contemplates himself rather than his material and whose criticism reflects this consuming interest.

Though not all of them share the same ancestry as critics, the line
of personae whose mental aberrations provide the content and often the form of satire is a long and unrespectable one. The preceding discussion implies that the personae of satire differ widely in their distance from the authors who create them. In the satires of Horace, Juvenal, and Pope, the "I" of satire is often a literary personality very close to the author's real one. In Gargantua and Pantagruel the narrator is perhaps more developed as part of a fictional plot, but he is still close enough to Rabelais that it doesn't make much difference whether "Alcofribas, Abstractor of Quintessance" or Rabelais is listed as author. The narrator of Don Juan has a digressive, wandering mind which dominates his material, yet he is projection of an aspect of Byron himself. Tristram Shandy is a narrator who appears as a character, or caricature, within the novel quite separate from his creator, Laurence Sterne. Though Tristram's book parodies the novel, Tristram himself is presented with amused detachment. Erasmus allows Folly in her own voice to deliver a formal oration but he does not keep the same degree of distance from her throughout her speech. When Folly recommends delusion as happiness her position presumably is antithetical to Erasmus's; when she recommends Christian folly her position is apparently much closer to her creator's.

Characters in novels, simply by appearing in a form more developed as fiction, possess a certain distance from their authors. Thwackum and Square, whom Northrop Frye mentions for their "Menippean blood", are removed from Fielding; Dr. Charles Kinbote is removed from Nabokov. The novelist who uses autobiographical details in presenting the mind of a less-than-ideal protagonist poses more of a problem to the reader, for the obvious relationship to his own life sometimes obscures his attitude to-
ward his literary creation. In The Rhetoric of Fiction, Wayne C. Booth reports an amusing mistake made in this respect by Edmund Wilson concerning Henry Miller's Tropic books:

Wilson praised Miller for his skillful ironic portrait of a particular kind of "vaporings" poseur, for making his hero really live, "and not merely in his vaporings or his poses. He gives us the genuine American bum come to lead the beautiful life in Paris; and he lays him away forever in his dope of Pernod and dreams." To all of this praise for irony, Miller replied, "The theme is myself, and the narrator or hero, as your critic puts it, is also myself... If he means the narrator, then it is me... I don't use "hero", incidentally, nor do I write novels. I am the hero, and the book is myself".13

A slightly different kind of problem arises in James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. That Stephen Daedalus is a version of Joyce himself as a young man is supported by numerous autobiographical details. Furthermore, Joyce to some degree approves of his younger self. Yet Joyce is also a very careful artist and rhetorician who re-wrote an earlier version of the novel--Stephen Hero--which satirizes Stephen, into the Portrait which uses Stephen's perceptions as the means of telling the story. Joyce's skill in presenting Stephen's expanding consciousness helps to make the Portrait more of an artistic success than Stephen Hero. However, the gain in art involves some loss of clarity, for it is hard to know where Joyce stands in regard to his creation.

Stephen's rhetoric is the best guide to Joyce's distance from him. The final passage, in which Stephen entertains particularly grandiose conceptions, possibly indicates that in Joyce's view the young artist is also the young egotist: "Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth

time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race."\textsuperscript{14}

These examples suggest that the persona's distance from his author depends more upon the author's degree of irony and conscious artistry than on the resemblance between the two in real life. Personae in literature vary from being fictional representatives of the true author to being in almost every respect antithetical to him. Furthermore, in any given work the persona's distance from his creator may vary between these extremes.

As my discussion has perhaps already indicated, the persona can range from a mere voice to a rather fully developed character. As Northrop Frye's comments indicate, the persona of Menippean satire is never allowed to develop into a character with a rich or complicated personality. He is a projection of certain mental or occupational traits. We do not expect him to develop inwardly as a result of his experience nor do we expect any kind of growth from his interaction with his fellow men. Typically, the persona is created to serve the author's satiric purpose and this purpose is the controlling mechanism for the persona's thoughts and actions.

None of the personae thus far considered are completely developed characters, although those in the novels are perhaps more developed than the others. Even Thwackum and Square are quite "flat" as characters. That is, we see them from the outside, acting only in one particular way; their behaviour becomes predictable. The same might be said of Dr. Slop

\textsuperscript{14}James Joyce, \textit{Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man} (N.Y., 1944), p.p. 252-253.
in *Tristram Shandy*. Dr. Slop is presented as a caricature of a bungling doctor and only in these terms. Tristram as narrator may be more complex, but the impression we carry away is one of Tristram with cap and ink horn--making a glorious botch of his tale. From the writings of Lucian to those of Nabokov the speakers or persona in Menippean satire lack a fully human stature. They range from characters with fairly solid existence in particular surroundings among particular people that we believe in, to mere voices with no name, no history, and no firm setting.

Some of the personae of satire present a consistent voice to the reader, and this consistency tends to coincide with an unchanging distance between the persona and his creator. These personae tend to be either truly representative of the author (the voice in the satires of Horace, Juvenal, and Pope), or always satirized by him (Square, Thwackum, or Dr. Slop). Of this consistent type are Swift's personae in *The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man*, *The Drapier's Letters*, and the *Partridge-Bickerstaff Papers*. The Church-of-England man and the drapier represent, in a fictional voice, points of view Swift thoroughly supports. The personae of the Partridge-Bickerstaff dispute are farther removed from Swift and perhaps supported chiefly in their function of "accurately" predicting and confirming the death of John Partridge, "the Almanack-maker". Bickerstaff, for instance, presents himself as a solid and public-spirited citizen, but Swift's real opinion of any astrologer, might put him in a different light.

This type of persona is less relevant to the Tale than another kind in which the true author prefers a more indirect irony. In the latter case the reader must continually be alert, for the persona presents positions
which are not consistently the same as, or different from, the author's, but which range the spectrum in between. The pre-eminent Renaissance example is Erasmus's Folly. Her superficial decorum—a single voice delivering a formal oration— belies the range of positions she professes. Certain other personae in Swift's ironical works are of this more elusive kind—the speakers of *An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity*, *A Modest Proposal*, *Gulliver's Travels*, and *A Tale of a Tub*.

Closest to the Tale in time of publication and in a persona developed only as a bewildering voice is *An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity*. All of Swift's ironical writings are complex, particularly those which are ironical at a persona's expense. But complexity pervades these two works in a manner that almost obscures Swift's satirical intention. The deliberately confusing rhetoric in the *Argument* and the *Tale* suggest that Swift wrote them for reasons other than giving the world one lash the more, or correcting what he considered to be a dangerous or unreasonable situation. The *Drapier's Letters* reveal the forcefulness and clarity that Swift could command, even when using irony, if he wanted to satirize, communicate, or recommend a course of action. In the *Tale* and the *Argument* these purposes exist in subordination to a delight in verbal pyrotechnics. Swift is interested in his fiction as such and in his role as a master riddle maker. In his ironical works the wit-testing impulse, which sparked Swift and his friends to compose riddles for one another, complements Swift's Anglican morality.

The voice in *An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity* is less developed as a fictional personality than the voices in Swift's other ironical works— that is, those discussed in this paper. If Professor
Ehrenpreis's contention that the author is the speaker ever adequately describes Swift's writing, it does so for the Argument. The voice gives no biographical or even occupational information; we must assess it solely by tone and by the argument it offers. The argument is an oblique one, although it is not presented as being so. The speaker claims to argue in favor of a nominal Christianity which is supposedly in danger of being abolished. He takes up a series of reasons for getting rid of nominal Christianity and rebuts them in a manner and tone which Swift, the clergyman, could never publicly use.

The tone and content of the rebuttals often imply an attitude of basic agreement with those who would abolish nominal Christianity—the name and title of Christian—for reasons of their own convenience. The essay seems to be addressed to those who wish an ordered but very comfortable existence. It is possible to read the Argument as an essay by an urbane gentleman with a very similar philosophy and no religious convictions. Or, it can be read as delivered by Swift, speaking ironically. Like Folly's oration, the Argument says things which its true author agrees with and other things he abhors. But the Argument gives no "ethical proof" of identity, as the oration does. The voice of the Argument therefore remains very confusing.

The substance of the Argument is also confusing. In actual fact, "nominal Christianity" is a metaphor for the Test Act, a measure requiring nominal affirmation of the Anglican faith for all holders of governmental office. At the time Swift wrote the Argument Against Abolishing Christianity there was talk of abolishing the Test Act. Swift thought it should remain operative in order to preserve the position of the Anglican
Church. A passage which reads as if spoken by a modern cynic gets at the Argument's true intention: "If the quiet of a State can be bought by flinging Men a few Ceremonies to devour, it is a Purchase no wise Man would refuse. Let the Mastiffs amuse themselves about a Sheep-skin stuffed with Hay, provided it will keep them from worrying the Flock".\(^\text{15}\)

In this section the modern cynic, or Swift speaking ironically, is making of nominal religion (the Sheep-skin) a diversion which will, like the Tale of a Tub, keep critics too busy to trouble the state. The passage is in essence a disreputable argument for a reputable view.

Anglicanism as a living faith which moulds men's lives never comes into question. In the only passage which brings up the matter, the voice confuses the issue. The speaker claims that he would not be so weak as to stand up for real Christianity; such as used in primitive Times... to have an Influence upon Men's Belief and Actions: To offer at the Restorating of that, would indeed be a wild Project; it would be to dig up Foundations; to destroy at one Blow all the Wit, and half the Learning of the Kingdom; to break the entire Frame and Constitution of Things."\(^\text{16}\)

By equating real Christianity with its primitive state, the speaker removes the possibility of a faith which both has meaning and yet also exists as a formal institution. Brother Jack, in the allegory of the Tale, shows that to attempt to restore Christianity in its primitive condition is "to dig up Foundations". In concentrating on extremes and ignoring Anglicanism as a meaningful via media between them, the speaker


\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 438.
of the Argument resembles the persona of the Tale. But the only positive he expounds is the very limited "nominal Christianity", deficient as Christianity but serviceable in its true meaning—the Test Act. In this work a delight in irony and enigma submerge Swift's attempt to influence politics.

Gulliver's Travels and A Modest Proposal, written more than twenty years after the Tale's composition, are important in the canon of Swift's works but less directly relevant to the Tale's persona. Gulliver and the economic projector of A Modest Proposal have more established identities than the persona of the Tale or of An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity. In the numerous details given concerning himself, his family, and his background, Gulliver seems like a character in a novel. Yet Swift contrives this matrix only to make Gulliver believable in his role. Remaining within the conventions of Menippean satire, Swift manipulates Gulliver's perceptions and attitudes in accordance with the satiric aim of the moment. Gulliver himself assumes he has learned through his experience but in reality Swift is in control, shifting his distance from his persona and using Gulliver to report or to exemplify in his own attitudes, the perverseness of mankind.

Thus in Book I, a decent and practical-minded Gulliver reports his adventures among the less decent Lilliputians. In Book II, Gulliver himself becomes a petty character and shows man's capacity for evil, at times by being aware of it, and at other times (as in his proposal to introduce gunpowder to Brobdingnag) by being evil himself. Swift changes focus in Book III, where Gulliver, until the visit to Lugnagg, observes and comments on the follies of others with a mental and moral perception which is like
Swift's own. In Luggnagg, Houyhnhnm-land, and back in England again, Gulliver evinces a moral obtuseness which is probably most ludicrous when he thinks he is most wise. By assuming man must be either Yahoo or Houyhnhnm Gulliver falls as much victim of extremes as do Peter and Jack in the allegory of the Tale. In a sense Gulliver's Travels is a successor to Lucian's True History. Whereas the "cock-and-bull stories" of ancient poets and historians were the objects of Lucian's satire, the object of Swift's satire expands to include earlier travel literature as well as all mankind--Gulliver, who would be a Houyhnhnm, perhaps most of all.

A Modest Proposal offers yet another flexible voice, in turn observant, benevolent, practical-minded, and also evil in its obtuseness. Like the speakers in other ironical works, this voice can shift between rationality and its opposite and frequently seem unaware of the difference. The speaker can enunciate Swift-like sentiments on landlords--"who, as they have already devoured most of the Parents, seem to have the best Title to the Children". He can likewise suggest, by his vocabulary, that he has truly forgotten the difference between children and suckling pigs--"it is true a Child, just dropt from its Dam, may be supported by her Milk." The emphasized words may indicate that Swift is the ironical speaker. In the context of the essay, however, the emphasis probably serves to alert the reader to irony at the speaker's expense.

Like the Tale's persona he lets through a norm but makes it unoperative: "Let no man talk to me of other Expedients: Of taxing our

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18 Swift, ibid.
Absentees at five Shillings a Pound: Of using neither Cloaths, nor Household Furniture except what is of our own Growth and Manufacture: Of utterly rejecting the Materials and Instruments that promote foreign Luxury". The list continues. The typically Swiftian catalogue suggests that little distance exists between Swift and the speaker on this point. However, the speaker continues to prefer his own ambitious project.

The only autobiographical information the voice offers—that his youngest child is past nine years old and his wife past child-bearing" reveals that the speaker has safely removed the possibility of being done to as he would do unto others. He thus confirms his own lack of humanity. The speaker joins Swift's gallery of those who in reporting or satirizing folly become prize examples of it. Within the Menippean tradition they have sufficient company.

The voice of A Tale of a Tub is the most difficult to pinpoint, chiefly because it is a voice which assumes various identities. Also, it is only a voice which we identify by tone and by occupation. There is no name, no believable matrix of "facts" such as Gulliver or M. B. Drapier present. In its range and flexibility the voice encompasses numerous Modern poses—from writer, biblical and secular critic, mechanical or experimental scientist, dark writer or Rosicrucian, to an explicator of materialist systems and an accompanying Epicurean ideal of serenity. In these poses the voice adopts and praises the appropriate attitude. As Modern he is like the protean octopus who takes on all the attributes of

19Swift, ibid., p. 494.

20Swift, ibid., p. 496.
each new position. Furthermore, the voice is unreliable enough to include at various points a rational and penetrating judgment very like that of Swift himself.

This combination of Modern folly and reason provokes the interpretation that indeed Swift is speaking all along, ironically adopting various poses and then, so to speak, lifting the mask to reveal his true opinion. Or, one may legitimately relate the voice to the Lucianic tradition of irony. In the Introduction to his *True History* Lucian refers to the "veiled reference underlying all the details of (his) narrative; they parody the cock-and-bull stories of ancient poets, historians and philosophers". He then makes the only true statement of his narrative—"I am a Liar". In his exaggerated imitation of Modern literary decorum, the Tale Teller has an element of this kind of parody. He does parody such writers as Dryden and L'Estrange, as the Tale's Apologist tells us.(7). Yet, while Lucian parodies chiefly by carrying Odysseus-like adventures to the point of absurdity, the Tale Teller dwells excessively on himself. The emphasis on exterior adventures produces a different kind of work than an emphasis on the act of writing a Modern book. The *True History* is a parody by a sane author; the *Tale* is a work undermined by its narrator's self-consciousness. As it relates to Lucian's works, the *Tale*, with its persona who combines folly and reason, more closely resembles Lucian's dialogues, where the reader must furnish the necessary perception as to which voice is foolish or wise and when. The *Tale's* reader must exercise similar perception on the Teller's voice.


Furthermore, the persona of the Tale bears a relation to the narrator of Gargantua and Pantagruel, who in the first two books is listed as "Alcofribas, Abstractor of Quintessance" and in the last two as Rabelais himself. Like the voice of the Tale, Rabelais makes claims for underlying meaning—the "substantific marrow" of the prologue—, boasts of his book's virtues, twits his readers' possible objections to his wisdom in writing "tomfoolerie" by observing that neither are they wise to read it, and satirizes a range of events and people which includes much that pertains to the sacred. But significant differences exist between the two voices and the irony of each. In Rabelais the satire turns outward to the numerous representatives of folly and unreason unconnected with the narrator. Furthermore, the Rabelaisian narrator has a Renaissance enthusiasm and breadth which is not satirized. Among the errors he presents he includes a "substantific marrow" which is not the meaning of the Pythagorean symbols he mockingly proposes to employ (Prologue) but the way of life represented by the Abbey of Theleme and the education—proposed for Gargantua—proper for the Renaissance man. In contrast, the Tale's persona demonstrates his own affinity with each of Swift's satiric objects. Swift's satire turns inward, for the persona's thought process, his observation of Modern form (the tale layered with prefaces and digressions which add little to his subject) and his Modern civilities become examples of what Swift satirizes. The persona's equivalent of substantific marrow—the secrets of the universe—is projector's nonsense. The Tale's real marrow is the norm of reason and the

common forms which the Modern projector who narrates it overwhelms.

The Tale's persona is more like Erasmus's Folly—the self-confessed fool who praises foolishness. Like the Teller, Folly is ambiguous. In her nonsense there is much that cannot be simply dismissed, and her praise eventually becomes the praise of Christian folly. Erasmus preserves the decorum of a persona and yet he is not always the same distance from his persona. At times she speaks foolishly but at other times she says what he believes in. After a checkered career, Folly finishes her oration by praising something desirable. Swift's persona follows a different pattern. The Tale Teller changes, not at the Tale's conclusion, but within every section. In each installment of the Tale or its accompanying digression he shifts from his dominant Modern voice to one of shrewd judgment. Modern decorum prevails but is periodically undercut by penetrating comments which represent a view very like Swift's. The Modern voice is not a mask which Swift dons for purpose of disguise but an essential part of the fiction. The Tale is a Modern book, for Moderns, and by a representative Modern. But what the Teller says, like what Folly says, must be evaluated from sentence to sentence. For, like Folly, the Tale-Teller, although he keeps the decorum of a persona, is not evenly distanced from his creator. Swift allows him to articulate a norm; however soon he overwhelms it. As is the tradition in satire, Swift manipulates his persona for satiric effect.

The persona's shift between foolishness and wisdom is evident in the metaphors which are his principal mode of communication. The Preface and Introduction establish his fixation on types and vehicles. However, not until the final section of the allegory does he establish his techniques in this respect. He writes for those whose "converting Imaginations
dispose them to reduce all Things into Types; who can make Shadows, no thanks to the Sun, and then mold them into Substances, no thanks to Philosophy; whose peculiar Talent lies in fixing Tropes and Allegories to the Letter, and refining what is Literal into Figure and Mystery" (190). Although he imputes this process to his readers' imaginations, it is, as the analysis in the succeeding chapters will make apparent, the process of his own. When he speaks as a Modern, metaphor does not only illustrate his thinking, it often determines it. It is a case of the tail wagging the dog. Yet at other times, without warning, his voice controls the metaphors and uses them directly to satirize Modern thinking and productions.

Aside from this shift in kinds of sensibility—Modern or truly sane—the persona assumes a number of Modern poses satirized by Swift. In these poses his style and theories often parody specific individuals and their works. The number of clues Swift gives in the text and footnotes of the definitive fifth edition makes clear that he intends the alert reader to be aware of the specific nature of this parody, at least in respect to William Wotton, Richard Bentley, and at times, Dryden and Roger L'Estrange. However, at other times, as when his persona in proclaiming a materialistic philosophy uses the language and style of Hobbes, Swift leaves recognition completely to the reader. The persona quotes Lucretius, whose De Rerum Natura is the great exposition of Epicurean philosophy, with some frequency and at important points. Yet Swift never admits that the central portions of the Tale, Sections VIII and IX, expound Epicurean physics and the Epicurean ideal of serenity.

In addition, a knowledge of Swift's basic position in religion and
learning is necessary in order to separate what is satirized from what is not. As a sincere Anglican his beliefs are those of his church and he holds that knowledge draws upon the senses but not exclusively. As a supporter of Sir William Temple in the Ancient-Modern controversy he favours the Ancients and downgrades Modern learning and criticism which denigrates the Ancients. The allegory has less to do with Temple than do the digressions. Throughout most of the Tale Swift implicitly supports Temple's theories of knowledge and literature, and the persona—sometimes with true wisdom—echoes Temple's later essays. In "A Digression on Madness" this support reverses. Swift disassociates himself from Temple's approval of the Epicurean ethic. It is debatable whether or not in satirizing a position Temple discussed,24 Swift also satirizes Temple. The following paper will look at a persona who embodies Modern positions but obliquely lets through Swift's judgment on them.

III

THE ALLEGORY AND ITS PERSONA

Given the Tale's shifting parodies of various individuals and traditions, it would be foolish to fasten a single, exclusive identity on its persona. Yet it is compatible with Swift's satire to posit a dominant identity more specific than a merely Modern manner of reasoning. Any discussion of such an identity must recognize that Swift very probably wrote the allegory first and then the digressions, shaping the whole into a satiric pattern encompassing a variety of objects. Thus to some extent the persona's identifying diction and enthusiasms shift between allegory and digressions, as well as between one digression and another.

Indeed, surface differences in style and subject matter might cause inclusion under the title, Tale of a Tub, to seem the chief link between allegory and digressive sections. In the digressions the teller is more obviously a Modern who exemplifies various Modern eccentricities. The question arises whether or not he is also such a Modern in the allegory chapters. Is his allegory a straightforward, though ridiculous exposure of abuses in religion? Or does his mad Modernism subvert the entire Tale, digressive sections and allegory alike?

The problem has led critics to opposite views. In his study Swift and Anglican Rationalism Phillip Harth emphasizes Swift's roots in the tradition of Anglican apologetics. According to Professor Harth Swift, consistently preserving the "Character of an Historian", narrates the allegory. In all sections related to the abuses in religion Swift is him-
self the speaker—"sometimes adopting the irony of pretended praise, but
at no time assuming the identity of another persona". 1

Since the allegory's speaker assumes the pose of an historian,
displays an initial bias toward Anglicanism over Roman Catholicism or
Puritanism, and at times speaks with a voice like Swift's, Harth's
interpretation is understandable and no doubt shared by a number of careful
readers. His approach, however, insufficiently considers Swift's elusive,
ironical style. The changing tone and fragmentary structure in sections
purporting to deal with the brothers suggest a speaker other than Swift.
There is textual evidence for a single persona whose shifting enthusiasm
dictates both tone and structure in the entire Tale. Ronald Paulson,
Robert C. Elliott, Jay Arnold Levine, and Harold Kelling, who from varying
approaches analyse structure in the Tale, all agree on this. 2

Paulson and Elliott present cogent arguments for a single narrator
whom they respectively call the "hack" and the "ingenu". To Elliot the

1 Phillip Harth, Swift and Anglican Rationalism: The Religious
Harth does not allow for the following intrusions of the Modern author:
two paragraphs in Section IV (pp. 65-66, 70), one in Section VI (p. 86),
one in Section IX (p. 106), parts of two other paragraphs--Section VI
(p. 84), Section XI (pp. 130-131). These references are to the Herbert
Davis edition.

2 Ronald Paulson, Theme and Structure in Swift's Tale of a Tub
in Problems of Structure", PMLA, LXVI (1951), 441-455. Jay Arnold Levine,
"The Design of a Tale of a Tub (With a Digression on a Mad Modern Critic)",
ELH, XXX (1966), 198-217. Harold D. Kelling, "Reason and Madness in A
ingenu is "man, rationis capax, but corrupted by an easy acceptance of false values". Since the persona espouses a number of false positions, this generalized identity is quite convincing. Yet, it does not invalidate Levine's more specific identification of the persona as a biblical critic in the manner of Dr. Richard Bentley. Levine combines pertinent excerpts from the Ancient-Modern controversy with an analysis of the persona's role in structuring the entire Tale. He presents a plausible argument for an identification which, in view of the persona's other Modern traits, is yet somewhat too specific.

Examination of the Tale reveals that Bentley shares the honor of being the contemporary figure most often imitated (or gratuitously referred to when he is not being imitated) with his friend, William Wotton. In fact Wotton was probably the first to point out the fashion in which Peter's commentary is sometimes modeled on Bentley's. In his Observations, appended to the Guthkelch-Smith edition of the Tale, Wotton notes that Peter's comment—"I have found a certain Author, which shall be nameless, that the same Word, which in the Will is called Fringe, does also signify a Broomstick, and doubtless ought to have the same interpretation in this paragraph" (is) seemingly perhaps to laugh at Dr. Bentley and his Criticism" (319). Other contemporary writers, such as Dryden and L'Estrange, and "modern" philosophers—Epicurus, Lucretius, and Hobbes—are parodied. Yet except in Section VIII and IX, which concern the religion and philosophy of madness, Bentley and Wotton are the most consistent and obvious Moderns in the Tale. Swift no doubt considered that fitting. Bentley and Wotton

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3Elliott, ibid., p. 447.
were the principal refutors of Sir William Temple's not always sage remarks in his Essay on Ancient and Modern Learning (1690). Swift lived with Temple during most of the 1690's, when controversy simmered between these representatives of differing views. Since Swift had a naturally ironical mind, he perhaps found it appropriate to satirize his mentor's opponents, not merely directly, but by making his disreputable persona in their joint image and likeness.

A combined Bentley-Wotton identity very possibly underlies the persona in his critical and projector activities. Such a combination of two figures from real life would not be unique in the canon of Swift's works. As Arthur Case has demonstrated,4 Gulliver in Lilliput combines the careers of Oxford and Bolingbroke. In terms of imaginative structure of a work, this correspondence to actual figures is far more important to the Tale than to Gulliver's Travels.

The case for such a Bentley-Wotton identity is strengthened by the relationship between the first two sections of the allegory (II and IV) and their corresponding digressions (III and V). These initial, and important, sections support Levine's theory that the persona is a critic who composes his own text, and in the accompanying digressions himself engages in comparable critical activity. In the allegory's opening section, brother Peter is a biblical critic who to justify his inclinations finds meaning where none is meant. The following digression "Concerning Criticks" finds the persona, acting as a historical critic on critics, likewise

4 Arthur Case, "Personal and Political Satire in Gulliver's Travels", Discussions of Jonathan Swift, (Boston, 1962), 105-120.
supporting his ideas by finding meaning where no others would find it.\(^5\) In the "Digression Concerning Criticks" the persona is a recognizable parody of Richard Bentley, with a touch of William Wotton. In the second installment of the allegory brother Peter turns projector. The following digression "Of a Modern Kind" finds the persona also a projector, who this time resembles William Wotton spliced with paragraphs of Bentley.

A persona who as critic and projector parodies Bentley and Wotton, accounts both for nonsensical shifts in tone and structure and also for the kind of connection the persona makes between sections. The persona, like Bentley and Wotton, holds allegiance to Anglicanism. That at times within the Tale (in discussing the tailor cult, Aeolism, and Madness) he takes on the enthusiasms of a materialistic "modern" philosopher, is no true obstacle to a persona interpretation. The fact that Bentley had prominently attacked materialism—in the 1692 Boyle Lectures—and that Wotton had applauded this—in his Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694)—might only add zest to the joke. Swift's object in writing the Tale was not complete fairness or exactitude. Rather, he tried to undermine individuals and philosophies he disliked. He did this by making them seem ridiculous and inconsistent as well.

In his Essay on Ancient and Modern Learning, which favored ancient knowledge and literature, Sir William Temple downgraded the discoveries of modern science—even Harvey's investigations concerning the circulation of the blood. Temple also singled out the works of Aesop and Phalaris as among the best and most ancient works extant. Such views, in an essay

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\(^5\)The following chapter, "The Persona and The Rest of the Tale", discusses this question in more detail.
generally moderate, though conservative, provoked public opposition. Partly in reply to Temple's essay, William Wotton wrote his *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning* with the same bias for Modernism that Temple had displayed towards the Ancients. The *Reflections* is in no way extreme; nor does it reject ancient learning. Yet its continuous favoring of Modernism and its somewhat pompous tone makes it a not unlikely subject for parody. The *Reflections* chapter on Modern theological and philosophical learning may have inspired Swift's creation of a Wotton-like persona embodying such knowledge. Levine quotes two passages which put forth the modern critic, textual or sacred, as just the master of invention which the *Tale* parodies:

There are Thousands of Corrections and Censures upon Authors to be found in the Annotations of Modern Critics, which required more Fineness of Thought, and Happiness of Invention, than, perhaps Twenty such Volumes as those were, upon which these very Criticisms were made... which often raise a judicious Critic as much above the Author upon whom he tries his Skill, as he that discerns another Man's Thoughts, is therein greater than he that thinks.

A Perfect Divine ought to understand the text of the Old and New Testament so exactly, as to have a clear Notion of every Book in general, and of the Grammatical Meaning of every Text in particular; that so he may be able to reconcile all Difficulties, and answer all Objections that may arise... we are not now enquiring who were the Holiest Men, but who were the greatest Masters of their Professions, the Ancient Fathers, or the Modern Divines... It has been observed already, that scarce any of the Fathers understood Hebrew beside Origen and St. Hierom...  

Whereas in the first edition of his *Reflections*, Wotton reproached Sir William for his negative attitude toward the Moderns, to the second edition of *Reflections* (1697) he appended his friend Richard Bentley's *Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris*. Bentley's *Dissertation* took

up the cudgel against Temple in regard to the works of Phalaris and Aesop. Temple had mentioned them as praiseworthy examples of the most ancient writing. With much greater scholarship and a certain enjoyment in refuting Sir William Temple, Bentley proved those works to be spurious and relatively modern. But Bentley was more than a learned, astute, and somewhat acrimonious critic. With his knowledge of both scripture and classical language Bentley felt himself well equipped to produce a better version of the Bible which he would translate from the older, Greek text. His formal proposal to do this did not appear until well after the Tale's publication (it may be found in Volume III, Theological Writings, of his Works). Yet, according to J. Arnold Levine, Bentley's interest in such a translation was known even in the 1690's.7

Furthermore, the year after the Dissertation's publication, Charles Boyle, then a Christ Church student who had just assisted in publishing a new edition of Phalaris, in turn attacked Bentley. In the Apology affixed to the Tale's fifth edition Swift refers favorably to Boyle's intentions and completed Remarks on Bentley's Dissertation. Boyle attacked Bentley for applying "philological and historical" criticism to the Bible as well as to the Phalaris text:

Let it have its force to the Confusion of Phalaris, and all his Adherents: but what shall we do for St. Paul? He comes far within this period; so that the Writings that carry his Name must be Four hundred Years Younger than We Christians suppose 'em: and the Epistle to the Romans could not be the Genuine Work of that Apostle, but was penn'd (as Phalaris's Epistles were) by some more Recent Sophist; whom Dr. Bentley

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7Levine, ibid., p. 204.
has detected. ... What shall we say to this? Shall we allow Dr. Bentley to be a Scurvy Critic, or shall we in Tenderness to his Honour, give up our Bibles?

... are not some of these very Idioms frequently to be met with both in the Gospels and Epistles? Should not so profound a Grecian and Divine as He is have look'd a little into the New Testament before he had pronounc'd such rash and groundless Assertions?

Does he know Whose this sort of Proof is, and to what Ill Purpose it has been employ'd? It is famous for being made use of by Spinosa to ruine the authority of Moses' Writings. ... Ought the Dr. in a Doubting Age to have employ'd such an Argument, without the utmost Caution and Guard? ... Is he so eager to prove Phalaris Spurious, that he cares not whether the Authority of the Sacred Writing sink with him?8

Such an approach, combined with Bentley's known interest in Biblical translation, may well have confirmed Swift in his final shaping of the Tale. For the Tale ironically uses Modern criticism in a manner which undermines religion's corruptions, and perhaps, unintentionally religion itself.

My examination of the allegory for evidence of a single persona who controls the entire Tale begins with the Modern's announcement of his ensuing "Performance", intended to divert unquiet wits who might otherwise poke holes in religion and government. Since this performance is admittedly a mere delaying action until a mammoth projectors' academy can be established, the value of the Modern's own project is doubtful. The project's name, A Tale of a Tub, hardly encourages an estimate of worth. It derives from a "mythologized" parable of a seamen's custom to divert whales by flinging them an empty tub. The whale is Hobbes'...

Leviathan (whose reductive, systematizing language and materialist values the persona momentarily adopts in describing the tailor's cult and Aeolism). The endangered ship is the commonwealth. But the tub keeps its literal meaning—hence the persona's tale. The tale, in its meaning of an empty tub, is introduced as a delusive decoy whose outer wrappings conceal nothing but air.

Furthermore the term "tub" has other meanings readily apparent to a seventeenth-century audience. The OED gives as a standard meaning for "tub", a term applied in contempt or joke to a pulpit, especially that of a non-conformist preacher. John Taylor, the water poet and a most prolific writer of anti-Puritan satire, called his reproduction of a Puritan sermon in which the preacher explicates a biblical text "A Tale in a Tub, or a Tub Lecture". The first of the Introduction's oratorial machines is a pulpit, and the design chosen for the accompanying illustration (56) resembles nothing so much as a tub.

Additional meanings of the expression "tale of a tub", listed by the OED before the meaning of a tub to divert danger, are "an apocryphal tale" or a 'cock and bull' story. Given the anti-Puritan satire, the pretensions of a religious allegory, and the actual nonsense of the entire Tale, Swift probably drew upon all the meanings.

Within the Preface the persona plays the role of future tale teller and that of the digressive voice which expands at length on a subject for which he confesses himself to have no talent. In introducing

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his Tale he employs the language of criticism—"mythologized", "Parable", "Antitype", and "literal Meaning". His reference, shortly afterwards, to his course of study in prefaces (43) may refer directly to the manner in which Richard Bentley pursued his critical activities. As a footnote in the Guthkelch-Smith edition notes, Boyle's work attacked Bentley for being learned in prefaces and introductions. The persona also makes a Modern statement, which in de-valuing the literature of the Ancients, also devalues his own:

I cannot imagine why we should be at Expence to furnish Wit for succeeding Ages, when the former have made no sort of Provision for ours; wherein I speak the Sentiment of the very newest and consequently the most Orthodox Refiners, as well as my own. (44)

Although the comment is a generalized, Modern one, the work "Orthodox" with its theological connotations may edge it toward a context of sacred criticism. The persona next ventures into digressive wanderings which will be considered in the following chapter. But, before concluding the Preface, he alludes to a proposed "Second Part entitled A Modest Defense of the Proceedings of the Rabble in All Ages". This allusion to the Wotton-Bentley collaboration in the second edition of the Reflections momentarily establishes the persona as at least of a Bentley-Wotton breed.

The allegory's formal beginning in Section II initially sets a distance between the teller and his tale. Oddly enough for a religious allegory, his tale begins in the "once upon a time" fashion of a fairy tale. The narrator supposedly follows a story—"here the Story says, this good Father died" (74). The tale remains for a time in the fairy-tale genre: "they travelled thro' several Countries, encountered a
reasonable Quantity of Gyants, and slew certain Dragons" (74). Only when the Tale Teller comes to relate the brothers' adventures in the corrupting town does the narration take on the gusto of a Swiftian catalogue. The term "Swiftian catalogue" indicates that Swift himself has a certain zest for satire. Yet this catalogue, like the catalogues which Gulliver repeats, probably rebounds on its narrator as well. Only a portion of the brothers' "interesting" life is here reproduced:

They Writ, and Raillery, and Rhymed and Sung, and Said, and said Nothing; They Drank and Fought, and Whor'd, and Slept, and Swore, and took Snuff: They went to new Plays on the first Night, haunted the Chocolate-Houses, beat the Watch, lay on Bulks, and got Claps: They bilkt Hackney-Coachmen, ran in Debt with Shop-keepers, and lay with their Wives: They kill'd Bayliffs, kick'd Fidlers down Stairs, eat at Locket's, loytered at Will's. (74-75)

The persona departs from this vivid account of the life of Restoration fops to beg the reader's "good Leave" while he "has recourse to some Points of Weight, which the Authors of that Age have not sufficiently illustrated" (75). He poses, at this point, as an historian discreetly but necessarily departing from the facts before him in order to clarify his narrative. In explaining a system of belief wholly materialistic however, his tone changes from objective, third-person reporting to proselytizing. At this juncture if the teller is to retain his historian's role he should remain neutral toward the sect. Furthermore, if he is to defend religion against the unquiet wits who draw their ammunition from Hobbes' Leviathan--the function proposed for his tale--he should be aware of excessive attention to a false system. Instead he becomes fascinated with the clothes metaphor which he stretches to encompass the universe and all nature within it, including the mind of man:
They held the Universe to be a large Suit of Clothes, which invests every Thing: That the Earth is Invested by the Air; The Air is invested by the Stars; and the Stars are invested by the Primum Mobile. [Then comes the shift in tone.] Look on this Globe of Earth, you will find it to be a very compleat and fashionable Dress. What is that which some call Land, but a fine Coat faced with Green? or the Sea, but a Wastcoat of Watter-Tabby? Proceed to the particular Works of the Creation, you will find how curious Journey-man Nature hath been to trim up the vegetable Beaux: Observe how sparkish a Perewig adorns the Head of a Beech, and what a fine Doublet of white Satin is worn by the Birch. To conclude from all, what is Man himself but a Microcoat, or rather a compleat Suit of Cloaths with all its Trimmings? As to his Body, there can be no dispute; but examine even the Acquirements of his Mind, you will find them all contribute in their Order, towards furnishing out an exact Dress: To instance no more; Is not Religion a Cloak, Honesty a Pair of Shoes, worn out in the Dirt, Self-love a Surtout, Vanity a Shirt, and Conscience a Pair of Breeches, which, tho' a Cover for Lewdness as well as Nastiness, is easily slit down for the Service of both. (77-78)

The joke is, of course, that the speaker has become involved in a system as materialistic as that of Hobbes. What could be more materialistic than a tailor cult which envisions the universe and man within it as a suit of clothes? Swift chose his main allegory of the three brothers' coats with care; it lends itself well to the tailor cult digression. The tailor cult itself is yet digressive and intrusive in the history of Christianity which the allegorist presumes to put forth. Swift's footnote to the fifth edition notes that the tailor cult is "an Occasional Satyr upon Dress and Fashion, in order to introduce what follows" (76) -- that is, the brother's changes in their coats. The footnote itself is somewhat of a put-on, for the brothers' pursuit of fashion requires no such justification.

In fact, the long passage just quoted parodies a famous metaphor from the Leviathan. Its reductive rhetorical questions and its movement from a general statement to its particular application, but even
more its reduction of man's mental attributes to material substance satirizes Hobbesian materialism. The Leviathan passage, considerably less inclusive in its scheme of the "artificial man", follows:

For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joyns but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificier? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rational and most excellent work of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in Latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistratess, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joyns; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joyn and member is moved to perform his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; the Wealth and Riches of all particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the people's safety) its Business; Counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know, are suggested unto it the Memory; Equity and Laws, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sickness; and Civill War, Death.

The persona eventually retreats from the direct involvement of "Is not Religion a Cloak" etc. to a descriptive "we". But his words still reduce men and their religion to the material: "if certain Ermins and Furs be placed in a certain Position, we stile them a Judge, and so an apt conjunction of Lawn and black Sattin, we intitle a Bishop" (79). From there the persona backs into a more distant third-person narration before uttering the most blasphemous statement yet. Others of the professors, he tells us, held that the soul was the outward clothing of man: "This last they proved by Scripture, because in Them

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we Live, and Move, and have our Being" (79-80). The Modern writer—if he is a scriptural critic the more perverse he becomes—uses Scripture itself to prove that man's soul is material and ephemeral. Like the Father's Will, Scripture is debased into corroborating whatever the projector wants to find.

Furthermore, the persona's language at this point reflects an uneasy mixture of the language of scriptural criticism and that of the Modern experimenter. He completes his "proof" of tailor philosophy by remarking—"Besides, said they, separate these two, and you will find the Body to be only a senseless unsavory Carcass" (my underlining) (80). The underlined terms suggests the same dissecting approach to human nature that he admits to in "A Digression in the Modern Kind" (123). Yet, when after sliding back into the vocabulary of coat decoration for a paragraph, the speaker concludes his summary of the tailor cult philosophy, he seems to have changed his tone once more.

In commenting on a "body of Philosophy and Divinity, which seems to have been composed by a Vein and Race of Thinking, very different from any other Systems, either Ancient or Modern" (80) the persona resembles Swift being ironical as much as an ingenu who exemplifies Modern folly. Swift appears very close here, ironically pointing out the tailor cult's correlation with ancient and modern materialism by disclaiming any such connection. Throughout the Tale the persona wavers or shifts in this manner. Most of the time he clearly represents a Modern individual or philosophy. But he is not entirely consistent. To find consistency would involve forcing a persona theory on the rhetoric as much as to say that Swift is at all times the speaker. If one considers the tailor cult in
itself and apart from the rest of the Tale, one might well conclude with Professor Harth that in these passages Swift is ironically praising materialism. Only by judging the tenor of the entire Tale and the numerous passages in which the speaker is a recognizable Modern can one justify a persona theory. The alternative, which Professor Harth employs, of finding Swift the speaker except in a few paragraphs, applies a somewhat Procrustean treatment to the Tale's rhetoric and the tradition of irony to which it belongs.

The narrator's language displays this same elusiveness when he tells of the brothers' efforts to make the will correspond with the dictates of fashion. His diction shows irony, or sympathy or perhaps both, since he does not confine himself to any one set of values. Whatever his position the following observations do not come from a careful historian: "What should they do? What temper should they find?.....But their evil Star had so directed the Matter, that the first Syllable was not found in the whole Writing; .. .when that same Planet, Enemy to their Repose, had wonderfully contrived, that a K was not to be found" (83-84). Such interpolations suggest a tendency to adopt the values which momentarily attract him. Thus his subsequent comment on the nature of happiness seems less ironic than an easy acceptance of the tailor cult's values: "but as human Happiness is of very short Duration, so in these Days were human Fashions, upon which it utterly depends" (84). Furthermore, the false ideal of happiness coming from the outside of things links the tailor cult and its exponent to the similarly delusory ideal in "A Digression on Madness" (171). The Tale's narrator is, perhaps, as easily corrupted as the protagonists of his allegory. His pose as objective historian is only
a pose.

In recounting Peter's critical activities the persona makes another intrusive comment which is more applicable to his own type of scriptural commentary:

But about this time it fell out, that the Learned Brother aforesaid, had read Aristotelis Dialectica, and especially that wonderful Piece de Interpretatione, which has the Faculty of teaching its Readers to find out a Meaning in every Thing but itself; like Commentators on the Revelations, who proceed Prophets, without understanding a Syllable of the Text. (85)

Swift may be disparaging Aristotle, but he also disparages his own allegorist to whom the judgment more pertains.

In the following section of the allegory (IV) the persona applies the same zest to recounting Peter's projector activities that earlier marked his story of Peter as interpreter. Again, his pretense of historical correctness is rather thin. He puts together Peter's doings "without considering much the Order they come out in; because I think Authors are not well agreed on that Point" (105). But he soon begins to congratulate himself in a manner similar to his normal pose in the digressions:

I hope, when this Treatise of mine shall be translated into Foreign Languages, (as I may without Vanity affirm, That the Labour of collecting, the Faithfulness in recounting, and the great Usefulness of the Matter to the Publick, will amply deserve that Justice) that the worthy Members of the several Academies abroad, especially those of France and Italy, will favorably accept these humble Offers, for the Advancement of Universal Knowledge. I do also advertise the most Reverend Fathers, the Eastern Missionaries, that I have purely for their Sakes, made use of such Words and Phrases as will best admit an easie Turn into any of the Oriental Languages, especially the Chinese. And so I proceed with great Content of Mind, upon reflecting, how much Emolument this whole Globe of Earth is like to reap by my Labours. (106)
The reference to the Treatise's adaptability into Oriental languages, and the teller's smug contentment with his worthless scholarship probably mock William Wotton's somewhat similar claims for Modern scholarship. In extolling the Moderns' proficiency in eastern languages, Wotton had regretted that the ancient fathers lacked such knowledge: only Origen and St. Hierom at all understood Hebrew, while "the other Oriental languages even the Inquisitive Fathers knew very little of".\(^{11}\) Wotton's commendations of Modern philological learning deserve reproduction:

> Though Philological and Critical Learning has been generally accused of Pedantry, because it has sometimes been pursued by Men who seemed to value themselves upon Abundance of Quotations of Greek and Latin, and a vain Ostentation of diffused Reading, without any Thing else in their Writings to recommend them, --yet, the Difficulty that there is, to do anything considerable in it, joyned with the great Advantages which have thereby accrued to the Commonwealth of Learning, have made this no mean Head whereon to commend the great Sagacity as well as Industry of these later Ages.\(^{12}\)

Although he tries to present a positive case for Modern scholarship, Wotton's objections carry more weight than his own arguments. The persona, whether by ironic intention or by mere obtuseness, also consistently undercuts any flattering judgment of the Moderns. Given the political history of seventeenth-century England, any taint of Jesuit proselytising (the most Reverend Fathers, the Eastern Missionaries), is enough in itself to discredit an author.


Still another digressive passage envisions the treatise in the hands of future commentators: "I desire of those whom the Learned among Posterity will appoint for Commentators upon this elaborate Treatise; that they will proceed with great Caution upon certain dark points" (114). Although an appendix of the Guthkelch-Smith edition relates the necessity for commentators on dark points to the tradition of alchemical learning, this does not deny its further relevance to the tradition of biblical commentary. The various assertions of the Tale's future benefit to mankind may serve a purpose beyond topical humour, and suggest that a scriptural critic is devising and expounding his own Bible for posterity.

In arguing this theory, Levine cites a passage from Section X:

It were much to be wisht, and I do humbly propose for an Experiment, that every Prince in Christendom will take seven of the deepest Scholars in his Dominions, and shut them up close for seven Years, in seven Chambers, with a Command to write seven ample Commentaries on this comprehensive Discourse. (185)

Like much of the Tale this passage is in large part an amusing exaggeration and exposure of the Tale Teller's pretensions. But, as Levine points out, it is also a travesty of the Septuagint legend. Swift may be repaying Wotton's own linkage of modern biblical criticism to that of the seventy interpreters. In his chapter "Of the Theological Learning of the Moderns" Wotton decreed: "the first thing required, is an exact knowledge of the Text of the Old Testament. Herein even the LXX Interpreters themselves have often failed, as has been abundantly proven by Modern Criticks". Both Swift and Wotton perhaps have also in mind Richard Bentley's interest in biblical criticism.

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13 Wotton, ibid., 352.
Throughout his recital of the allegory, the persona renders in lively detail a series of events and conversations of which he nominally disproves. His account of the brothers' life until their rupture—the Reformation—is studded with colloquial invective, and resembles his reporting of the mountebank incident in the Preface. He reproduces Peter's defense of Transubstantiation: "By G____, it is true, good natural Mutton as any in Leaden-Hall Market; and G____ confound you both eternally, if you offer to believe otherwise" (118). His depiction of Peter's salute likewise reveals little of the objective historian: "Peter with much Grace, like a well educated Spaniel, would present them with his Foot, and if they refused his Civility, then he would raise it as high as their Chops, and give them a damn'd Kick on the Mouth, which has ever since been called a Salute", (115). Such phrases as "like a well educated Spaniel", "their Chops", or "a damn'd Kick on the Mouth" all stem from the teller's own point of view, not from the story.

The account of Peter's discovery of the "famous Universal Pickle" makes an amusing satire on Holy Water and its uses. But his proximity to the story and his curious use of language suggest that the persona himself is also an object of Swift's satire. Thus the allegorist speaks of Peter "having remarked how your Common Pickle in use among Huswives, was of no farther Benefit than to preserve dead Flesh" (109). His use of "your" puts him too close to the narration for his own well being. Furthermore, his juxtaposition of "dead" with "Flesh" probably indicates that he is influenced by the Modern experiments of the Royal Society. On one level this results in humour. On another it involves the attempt
to replace conventional meanings by personal ones. In his discussion of the teller's general way of using words, Ronald Paulson notes that the "hack" tries to convey his own ideas of the moment to the exclusion of other meaning gathered about the word, but is unable to sustain an exclusive sense.\(^{14}\) It is the persona's perversion of language here and elsewhere (as the "senseless unsavory Carcass") which Swift satirizes in addition to the evident satire on Roman doctrine.

In each section of the allegory examples of the persona's subtle verbal intrusion abound. In a subsequent installment, Section VI, the narrator gives an amusing account of the progress of Jack's hatred and spite once he breaks with Peter:

However for this Meddly of Humor, he made a Shift to find a very plausible Name, honoring it with the Title of Zeal; which is, perhaps, the most significant Word that hath been ever yet produced in any Language; As, I think, I have fully proved in my excellent Analytical Discourse upon that Subject; wherein I have deduced a Histori-theo-physiological Account of Zeal, shewing how it first proceeded from a Notion into a Word, and from thence in a hot Summer, ripned into a tangible Substance" (137).

The movement from "notion" to a "tangible substance" so enthusiastically "analyzed" by the Tale-Teller sums up not only the history of zeal, but the characteristic reasoning process of the teller himself. His very Tale is created by spinning from nothingness to substance, the same process by which the spider in "Battle of the Books" spins his fragile web. The persona reverses the normal process in which the external object constitutes reality, and the word is midway between man and the object. As Paulson points out in his study of the Tale, the persona's world is an idealist's world in which reality is constituted

\(^{14}\) Paulson, ibid.
by the mind.  

Perhaps this explains why in Section VI, in which the narrator initially proposes to return to the two brothers, he concentrates almost entirely on the whimsies of Jack. He has solemnly promised to "by no means forget my Character of an Historian, to follow the Truth, step by step, whatever happens, or where-ever it may lead me" (135). However, to him, Martin's truth, the sound observation of exterior reality, is worth only momentary lip service. In contrast, Jack's zeal, proceeding from a disordered brain, accounts for adventures "so extraordinary, as to furnish a great Part in the Remainder of this Discourse" (137). In this section it becomes increasingly apparent that for the teller either the "Character of an Historian" signifies something rather different from its conventional meaning, or it is a character as easily put off as a suit of clothes. His tardy attempt to order the material reduces the narrator to a few asides to the reader: "but, here it is good to stop the hasty Reader, ever impatient to see the End of an Adventure, before we Writers can duly prepare him for it" (134).

But here the severe Reader may justly tax me as a Writer of short Memory, a Deficiency to which a true Modern cannot but of Necessity be a little subject: Because, Memory being an Employment of the Mind upon things past, is a Faculty, for which the Learned, in our Illustrious Age, have no manner of Occasion, who deal entirely with Invention, and strike all Things out of themselves, or at least, by Collision, from each other" (134-135).

The persona indicates that he should in Method, (of which he has little) have informed the reader of Peter's fancy, but "this material Circumstance, having been forgot in due Place; as good Fortune hath ordered, comes in very properly here" (135). It seems clear that Swift  

\[15\] Paulson, ibid.
is demonstrating, in the celebrated "ridiculous manner", the utter incompetence of his persona, who may be ironical, who may at times say truth, but who can never be trusted to say it consistently or entirely. Invention, not memory; collision, not ordering, characterize the method of the Tale.

The teller again gives notice of his shifting values when he briefly reports Martin's moderate and charitable remarks to Jack. Curiously enough, he prefices Martin's speech by a statement that Martin "at this Time happened to be extremely flegmatic and sedate" (139). He thereby, I think, manages to suggest that as a moderate Martin has become rather dull to his tastes. The persona enforces this connotation by the paragraph subsequent to Martin's speech:

Martin had still proceeded as gravely as he began; and doubtless, would have delivered an admirable Lecture of Morality, which might have exceedingly contributed to my Reader's Repose, both of Body and Mind: (the true ultimate End of Ethicks;) But Jack was already gone a Flight-shot beyond his Patience. And as in Scholastick Disputes, nothing serves to rouze the Spleen of him that Opposes, so much as a kind of Pedantick affected Calmness in the Respondent; Disputants being for the most part like unequal Scales, where the Gravity of one Side advances the Lightness of the Other, and causes it to fly up and kick the Beam; So it happened here, that the Weight of Martin's Arguments exalted Jack's Levity, and made him fly out and spurn against his Brother's Moderation" (140).

The definition of the "true ultimate end of Ethicks" as "Repose, both of Body and Mind" represents an amusing perversion of values. A body and mind at repose is hardly "prone" to good actions, as he should know. But his own word-spinning cast of mind can conceive of sensible moderation as productive only of sleep. He turns a sober comment into a sea-saw metaphor bearing small resemblance to its "scales of justice" counterpart in Paradise Lost. Now that Martin has become so "weighty", the persona
shuts him from his narrative, and prepares a tenuous connection between Jack and the system he next wants to expound—"the most Illustrious and Epidemik Sect of Aeolists".

By this point in the Tale the reader may not be surprised to discover that Jack's reputed founding of the Aeolist Sect provides sufficient justification for the author to entitle the section on Aeolism "Tale of a Tub". The critic who in Section II so vividly adopted the tailor's cult, will evidently find in the Aeolists' theories another reductive system equally attractive. Aeolism emerges as the complement of the tailor cult—one postulating the universe and man within it as a suit of clothes, the other maintaining the universe and man within it to be animated by wind. The persona exhibits a proximity to his narration similar to that found in the tailor cult description, and his rhetoric once again patterns itself after that passage in the Leviathan. Interestingly enough, Hobbes himself warns his readers of language's inherent dangers:

In reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which beside the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; Such as are the names of Vertues and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another called feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidicy, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratio-cination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.16

This warning is a helpful antidote to the persona's style which at times resembles metaphor-making gone mad, and frequently shifts the meaning of individual words. He indulges in just these practices in the

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passage imitative of the Leviathan:

For, whether you please to call the *Forma informans* of Man, by the Name of *Spiritus, Animus, Afflatus*, or *Anima*; What are all these but several Appellations for *Wind*? which is the ruling *Element* in every Compound, and into which they all resolve upon their Corruption. Farther, what is *Life* itself, but as it is commonly call'd, the *Breath* of our Nostrils. Whence it is very justly observed by Naturalists, that *Wind* still continues of great *Emolument in certain Mysteries* not to be named, giving occasion for those happy Epithets of *Turgidas*, and *Inflatus*, apply'd either to the *Emittent* or *Recipient* Organs. (151)

In her study, *Swift's Satire on Learning in "A Tale of a Tub"*, Mrs. Starkman notes that before modern chemistry, the soul "although primarily considered air, was also called smoke, wind, breath, exhalation, or vapor". She adds that "vapour was described as a kind of or ingredient of air". Swift, however, purposely allows his persona to utilize the confusion of terms as part of his delusory way with words. He then rapidly moves from a false premise to his own version of reality. That metaphors profess their inconstancy bothers him no more than it bothers Hobbes in one of the best-known metaphors extant.

Scripture, used to justify the clothes philosophy of the tailor sect—"in Them we Live, and Move, and have our Being"—(79) is now pressed into similar service for Aeolism: "First, it is generally affirmed, or confess'd that Learning *puffeth Men up*: And Secondly, they proved it by the following syllogism; *Words are but Wind*; and Learning *is nothing but Words*; Ergo, *Learning is nothing but Wind*" (153). In each instance the technique is a literal application of what is intended as figurative. This could be a satirical demonstrating of the Puritan manner of interpreting Scripture, as well as one of the Teller's basic

methods. As Martin Price comments—"for the Puritan, in his fondness for affecting scriptural metaphor, the task was to reduce metaphor to plain doctrine". The Aeolists do so to support their materialistic system.

The persona depends on the reader's curiosity to gain momentary assent for his deception. But in his mind-created world the deception, which has a surface plausibility, changes so rapidly into a system that the reader has difficulty remembering where the reasoning has gone wrong. A passage within the Aeolist section but digressing from it offers a thoughtful commentary which describes the Tale's imaginative process:

And, whereas the mind of Man, when he gives the Spur and Bridle to his Thoughts, doth never stop, but naturally sallies out into bold extremes of High and Low, of Good and Evil; His first Flight of Fancy, commonly transports Him to Ideas of what is most Perfect, finished, and exalted; till having soared out of his own Reach and Sight, not well perceiving how near the Frontiers of Height and Depth, border upon each other; with the same Course and Wing, he falls down plum into the lowest Bottom of Things; like one who travels the East into the West; or like a strait Line drawn by its own Length into a Circle. (158)

The passage is not digressive in the Modern way. It uses the metaphors of the Tale to sensibly speculate on how Modern reasoning goes astray. The fancy-in-control-of-reason motif occurs repeatedly in the Tale, often in the form of the horse in control of rider (particularly in Madness). The confusion between height and depth is one that the persona as Modern early betrays. In the Dedication he worries whether Modern works are "Sunk in the Abyss of Things"; in the Preface he notes that the reader should "descend to the bottom of all the Sublime throughout this Treatise" (44). Without control of reason even extremes resemble each other. Peter and Jack, pursuing opposite courses on their coats, 

eventually become alike—one's tatters resembling the other's finery.

An inconclusive speculation about what in man's nature accounts for this process becomes the link to the Aeolists' imaginations which climb up to a concept of God and down to that of the Devil. As wind is "the Original Cause of all Things" (150), a definition of God, so the chameleon, the air-devourer, and the windmill which wages "Eternal Battle" with it, become Devils.

The Aeolist system is an amusing, but scandalous example of that reason which converts metaphor into the literal, which pursues its point untempered by reason, carried to its "logical" extreme. Aeolist practices clearly satirize Puritans but the Modern critic who devises this windy tale, who has his own compulsion to reduce the figurative to the plain, literal truth, is also Swift's victim. With the Modern decorum which accompanies each digression he has given due honour to this worthy sect "without any Regards of (his) own, beside the Conscience, the Honour, and the Thanks". (161) Aeolism, like the rest of the Tale, sometimes invites a judgment that either a consistent fool, or Swift using irony is in control. In my opinion, however, the diversity in tone suggests a Modern persona who is not bound to that "foolish consistency" of little minds.

In Section X the projected alternation of allegory and digressions gets abandoned in all but the title. Not until Section XI does the narrator return to his renowned Jack whose adventures had been promised to absorb a great part of the Tale. By now all pretense of "following the truth" has been abandoned. The author's subject becomes metaphorically a journey to be held to, "except some beautiful Prospect appears within sight of my way; whereof, tho' at present I have neither Warning nor
Expectation, yet upon such an Accident, come when it will, I shall beg my Reader's Favour and Company, allowing me to conduct him thro' it along with myself" (188). His terminology is polite, his words inviting. In keeping with the Tale's over-all satiric pattern the teller suggests the norm—in writing as it is in traveling "the straitest and the commonest road"—then deprecates it as an unpleasant last resort. Continuing the metaphor, he pictures the digressive route as delightful while the followers submit to the leader's caprices. However, if they refuse "let them jog on by themselves, and be d--n'd". The sudden switch from the leisurely third-person description of the traveler to the personal, vigorous put-down of recalcitrant followers reveals the persona's involvement and his point of view. The controlling metaphor here conveys the persona's habitual shift between poses of exaggerated respect and biting contempt toward his readers.

Fascinated with the journey metaphor, as with so many others in the course of the work, the teller expands it to include classes of writers and critics who are never far from mind. The fate of a nasty critic merits a typically vivid description: "But should some sourer Mungrel dare too near an Approach, he receives a Salute on the Chaps by an accidental Stroak from the Courser's Heels" (189). Thus another critic appears in the low diction of "sourer Mungrel" while the traveler, representing the persona as narrator, rides not a hobby horse but the high diction "Courser".

Even when the author gets down to his subject, Jack's adventures, abandoned fifty pages earlier, he continues to toy with the reader. His tone differs from the polite request for the reader's good leave and Patience which accompanied his first digression within the allegory (Section
II). He now expects readers to be systematizers as undisciplined as he. He writes for those "whose converting Imaginations dispose them to reduce all Things into Types; who can make Shadows, no thanks to the Sun; and then mold them into Substances, no thanks to Philosophy; whose peculiar Talent lies in fixing Tropes and Allegories to the Letter, and refining what is Literal into Figure and Mystery" (190). Such terminology fits Jack's interpretations of his father's will, the reasoning of the tailor and aeolist sects, and the teller's own interpretations of church history. The process described is the technique of Modern composition and criticism which controls the entire Tale.

Professor Harth describes this section as a "topical arrangement" of Jack's activities after he has gone mad. It is certainly that but it is also a final demonstration of the persona's intrusion into his material. Whereas in Section VI he cut off Martin's one speech for fear it would produce "the true end of ethicks"—repose of body and mind, in Section XI, the next to treat of the brothers, he devotes eleven pages to Jack's words and actions before verging off to a discussion of ears. As representatives of Catholicism and Puritanism, objects of Swift's satire, Peter and Jack predictably dominate the allegory as Moderns do the digressions. Yet the persona obviously finds them as fascinating, even when satirizing them, as he does the secular Moderns. While in the digressions he veers between satire and praise of his fellows, in the allegory he normally maintains more distance from the brothers. However, even within this section he is not wholly consistent. His report of Jack's speech as a "Scantling of . . . . great Eloquence and the Force of his Reasoning upon such abstruse Matters" (191) suggests a detached irony. Similarly his
report of Jack's posture when he "had some Roguish Trick to play" (194) indicates his opposition. However, in his discourse on the falling state of ears he momentarily identifies himself with those he satirizes: "Why should we wonder at the greatest Consequences, from so many Loppings and Mutilations, to which the Ears of our Fathers and our own, have been of late so much exposed" (201). His use of "our" associates him with the Puritans; he is as shifting as Proteus whom he factitiously uses to introduce his ears' discourse.

The persona slides from a concluding "experimentalist" description of ears--"some were slit, others cropt, and a great number sliced off to the Stumps"--into a description of his relationship with the reader. Having progressed from long ears, to short ears, to no ears, his mind leaps to other possible handles for catching mankind fast. For his mind this progression through metaphors is standard, be he in control or not. Among the few handles "riveted" to the intellect, curiosity affords the firmest grasp:

Curiosity, that Spur in the side, that Bridle in the Mouth, that Ring in the Nose, of a lazy, an impatient, and a grunting Reader. By this Handle it is, that an Author should seize upon his Readers; which as soon as hath once compast, all Resistance and struggling are in vain; and they become his Prisoners as close as he pleases, till Weariness or Dullness force him to let go his Gripe. (203)

The persona has reached the final stage of his relationship with his reader. His reader is an animal to be manipulated, while he, the one in power, will cease to be so only through "Weariness or Dullness". But, since he has incompetently lost his notes, he must immediately release his "prisoner" who thereupon becomes again the "Courteous Reader". The Modern's true regard for his reader is evident enough.
At this closing point the persona again uses a Bentley word—"Oscitancy"—reminding us once more that he is modelled in a predominantly Bentleyan image. His parting words show the same Modern sensibility that has undermined what might have been a conventional allegory: "I go now to the Ceremonial Part of an accomplish'd Writer, and therefore, by a Courtly Modern, least of all others to be omitted" (205).

A final issue implied in the subject of the allegory and the persona's relation to it concerns the position of Martin, the via media brother. To most careful readers Martin emerges as the only clear positive of the Tale. One may feel with Kathleen Williams that the story of the three brothers shows less than Swift's usual power because the work has been done for us. Her comment is valid for most Tale readers since in the digressions a norm of reason and the common forms enters only fleetingly.

Irvin Ehrenpreis offers a related criticism:

In its literary aspect, the treatment of Martin is weak because it clashes with the programme of the book as a whole. This programme is for the author to imply a virtue which he desires to recommend, but to state it either not at all or else ironically—by pretending to depreciate it.

Ehrenpreis concludes that Swift would have done better to leave Martin out but that since the allegory precluded the possibility, one might as well admit the flaw and go on from there.

In reading the Tale as the product of a persona whom Swift ironically manipulates, Martin's via media does not emerge as this structural

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19 Kathleen Williams, Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise, (Lawrence, Kansas, 1958), p. 133.

weakness. It is merely a more obvious positive than appears elsewhere. In "A Digression on Madness" or "A Digression Concerning Criticks" a norm is given which is not thereafter denied, but is simply submerged. As narrator of the allegory the Teller has nominal allegiance to Martin, the Anglican moderate. But he is also unwilling to adhere to the positive standard he overtly affirms, and even as allegorist expounds Modern systems and style. Once he begins the allegory he finds himself obliged to account for the fate of each brother. Since his emotional commitments are to the more interesting Peter and Jack, whom he resembles, he allows the reformed Martin only one page—from a total of two hundred and ten in the Tale materials. In virtually negating what he set out to defend, he demonstrates the perversity of a Modern historian-critic. To the Teller as a Modern, Martin's right reason applied to the evidence of the senses is merely soporific. If Martin emerges as a positive figure it is despite the persona's efforts to submerge him by Peter and Jack's more fascinating activities. In the allegory as in the digressions the Tale-Teller at some point articulates Swift's judgment. Yet his Modern sensibility leads him to more ample disclosure of folly.
IV

THE PERSONA AND THE REST OF THE TALE

In good Modern fashion, the prefatory and the admittedly digressive sections of the Tale overpower its supposed subject, the allegory of the three brothers. Not only do these digressive materials quantitatively overwhelm the narrative, 106 pages to 73 pages excluding the Apology, but they absorb the primary interest both of the Tale-Teller and of his twentieth-century readers. When the Tale was first published, however, the allegory attracted more attention. Wotton's Observations (1705) cannily passed over the sections obviously referring to him and zealously attacked the allegory as derivative and impious. In turn, the Apology prefixed to the fifth edition focuses on the allegory, presumably the "greatest Part" finished in 1696. A mention of intent to parody the style and manner of such writers as Dryden and L'Estrange offers a clue to the Tale's underlying technique of "mind satire". Yet the "graver character" of the Apologist chooses to emphasize the orthodoxy implied rather than the nonsense delivered.

The Apology, therefore, provides only limited insight into the entire work. Its cogent, impersonal style differs from the self-indulgent Modernism of the Tale, implying a different persona, or at least, a very different pose. Different purposes account for this shift. The Tale exposes Modernism as much by its teller's thought process as by what he says. The Apology defends the Tale from the distance of one who designed its satire to include its intentionally ridiculous "Author". I don't wish to multiply identities to the extent that Ricardo Quintana does in

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Swift: An Introduction, where he discerns six personalities, including "the one who is writing the "Apology", 'the author' referred to therein, 'the bookseller', the modern author, and the latter's alter ego, the historian, plus an elusive satirist. However, there is some confusion about the Apologist's identity. He consistently refers in the third person to "the Author", yet the two are linked by the title page's advertisement of the "Author's Apology". As the Guthkelch-Nichol Smith edition points out, the two are additionally linked by the statement "the Author cannot conclude this Apology, without making this one Reflection; that, as Wit is the noblest and most useful Gift of humane Nature, so Humor is the most agreeable, and where these two enter far into the Composition of any Work, they will render it always acceptable to the World" (18).

Without giving notice, Swift has changed the "Author's" identity to suit a new occasion. The Apologist resembles Swift. Yet often the Apologist pretends to be serious when he is not so, and his statements contribute as much fiction as fact. He says that the bookseller will not permit the author to change any satire "expressed in too free a manner... being apprehensive it might spoil the Sale of the Book" (18). He asserts that he has never seen any of the notes appended to the fifth edition, "nor intends it, till they appear in Print" (20). Benjamin Tooke's letter to Swift confirms that Swift did see the notes before publication. In fact he probably wrote them. The Apologist defends the choice of three oratorical machines by reporting that others blotted out the description of a fourth. Yet he also notes that the "Gentleman", singular this time,

who gave the papers to the bookseller used "no other Liberties besides that of expugning certain Passages where now the Chasms appear under the name of Desiderata" (21). No hiatus corresponds to a fourth machine. Swift probably invented the machine's existence in manuscript as a mock-serious answer to his detractors. Furthermore, the hiatuses themselves are integral to the text, a satire alike on the persona and the uncomprehending reader.

Again, the Apologist reveals that he "most wondered" to see the "Fragment", A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, in print since it was a "most imperfect Sketch with the Addition of a few loose Hints, which he once lent a Gentleman" (17). This contrasts with the bookseller's statement that the Discourse came into his hands perfect and entire (260). Of course the bookseller is no more to be believed absolutely than any other voice in the Tale. He proclaims The Battle of the Books as "unquestionably of the same Author as the Tale" (213) although the Battle is written in a much less personal style. He disclaims any knowledge of the author of the Discourse, thereby ignoring the links of theme and style between it and the Tale. The Apologist, the bookseller, and the persona of the Tale are as adept at manufacturing fiction as at telling the truth.

The "I" of the Apology, the recognizable but ironical author playing a role within his satire, comes within the tradition set by Horace and Juvenal. There is a well-defined convention of the satirist defending his art. Robert C. Elliott notes that Persius, Juvenal, Boileau, Swift and Pope all project a similar image of themselves. They maintain that "the satirist is a public servant fighting the good fight against vice and
folly wherever he meets it; he is honest, brave, protected by the rectitude of his motives; he attacks only the wicked and then seldom by name."² The Apologist does not completely fit Elliott's abstraction because he openly parodies individuals whom he thinks deserve to be satirized. The Tale's persona, in his own ironical way, also maintains that satire to be effective must be particular (51). However, the Apologist's basic defense that "the numerous and gross Corruptions in Religion and Learning might furnish matter for a Satyr, that would be useful and diverting" (4) places him within this convention.

Since the persona of the Tale is a representative of Modern Folly, Swift might well have used the justification that Erasmus put forth in defending The Praise of Folly. Erasmus's apology comes in the form of a public letter in which, after mildly defending his work from future cavillers, he adds the final disarming remark: "And now, if there be any one that is yet dissatisfied, let him at least remember that it is no dishonour to be discommended by Folly; and having brought her in speaking it was but fit that I kept up the character of the person."³ Erasmus, being uninvolved in the personal and occasional controversy that occupied Swift, thus turned the edge of his satire and also hinted at the ambiguous nature of his persona. Swift, who thoroughly enjoyed puzzling his readers, gave one clue to the impersonation technique of his "ridiculous manner". Yet,

rather than pursue this justification he preferred to leave the discernment of what he was about to those "Men of Wit and Tast" for whom he originally wrote.

Therefore the apologist concentrates on defense and attack rather than explication. He contrasts the permanence and wit of his own satire with the ineffectualness of his answerer's (Wotton's) attempts. The apologist's discourse "seems calculated to live at least as long as our language and our Tast admit no great Alterations" (3). His good satire differs from Wotton's "perpetual Itch towards it" which the Tale Teller commends even while saying that "the World is insensible to the Lashes of it" (49). To the Apologist, as to Swift, satire's status depends upon its wielder.

Swift himself was temperamentally attracted to satire in a way which Sir William Temple, the man who most influenced Swift's literary development, was not. While Temple admired Don Quixote, he was aware of a theory which attributed the decline of Spanish romantic honour to the ridicule Don Quixote brought upon it. Temple felt that the justified ridicule of pedantry had rebounded to make all genuine learning also susceptible to mockery and wished that "the vein of ridiculing all that is serious and good, all honour and virtue, as well as learning and piety, may have no worse effects on any other state: 'tis the itch of our age and climate, and has overrun both the court and the stage". Temple thereby implies considerable skepticism concerning the value of satire.

5 Temple, ibid., p. 70.
It is interesting, moreover, that although *A Tale of a Tub*, *Battle of the Books*, and the *Fragment* for the most part support Temple's positions, they were not published until five years after his death. Whether this was because Temple felt their publication might demean him, or because he did not wish to continue the controversy, or because in the *Tale* Swift differs from Temple in one important respect, it is impossible to determine. Perhaps all these reasons are pertinent. At any rate, the delayed appearance of these works suggests that Temple did not approve their publication.

Swift's awareness of Temple's opinion that satire may well harm genuine, as well as sham, learning may have prompted his vigorous defense of the *Tale's* orthodoxy after Wotton's attack. While Wotton was patently eager to take offense at the *Tale*, and chose not to read it on its real author's terms, he might not have been entirely mistaken. Robert C. Elliott, who unlike Wotton, credits Swift with worthy intentions, thinks that the *Tale* in effect ramified into an attack on religion itself.7

Satire can have a corrosive effect even on what it does not intentionally attack. The mock heroic, for instance, presumably mocks the new in reference to the true heroic to which it pays homage. The new—mock heroic—may refer to the old—genuine heroic—by imitating its established conventions (such as the invocation to the muse, the visit to the underworld, or the epic battle) as well as by making specific reference to particular epic events. Thus, Belinda's journey to Hampton Court, in *The Rape of the Lock*, refers back to Aeneas's voyage up the Tiber, and Belinda's petticoat, with its honour guard of fifty sylphs, reminds us of the epic

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6See xlviii Guthkelch-Smith edition.

shield in the *Iliad* or the *Aeneid*. Pope holds up the original as an ideal to which the Modern, trivial version falls amusingly short.

Unfortunately, our associations do not operate on a one-way circuit. T. S. Eliot's point, in *Tradition and the Individual Talent*, that each new work to some extent alters the existing order, is relevant here. Some hint of the triviality of the modern voyage from London to Hampton Court finds its way back to the relevant passage in the *Aeneid*; some ridicule of the arming ritual rebounds from the sylph-protected petticoat to its *Iliad* or *Aeneid* precedent. In similar fashion, a ridiculous allegory can pull down valid Christianity. In each case the ideal standard should be strong enough to withstand the juxtaposition without much loss. However, given Temple's position and Wotton's attack, it is understandable that Swift eventually penned a conventional apology, or justification of his satire, in a somewhat serious, although still fictitious voice.

More irritating than Wotton's charge of profanity, I believe, was his oblique reference to Thomas Swift or Sir William Temple as possible authors of the *Tale* and his charge of plagiarism in it. The Apologist reacts with genuine ire. If Swift does not want anyone to bear criticism for authorship, neither does he want another to receive credit for it. The Apologist devotes two and one-half pages to demolishing the plagiarism charges which Wotton made in a short paragraph. Although in the *Tale* Swift parodies and abstracts from many authors, chiefly his opponents, he rightly felt his work was original. The Apologist reflects Swift's intense concern for his artistic as well as his moral integrity.

Another fictitious voice, that of the bookseller, follows the "Apology". The bookseller plays a role distinct from that of the apologist
or the tale-teller. Like the Apologist he preserves the author's anonymity and non-responsibility for the Tale's publication, but as merely possessor and publisher of the work he is more distanced from it. His delay of six years in publishing the Tale, in part because he had better things to do, suggests judgment as well as detachment. Otherwise, the bookseller's comments disparage Modern publications as a group rather than the Tale he now publishes. Ostensibly, the bookseller is a practical business man with a knowledge of modern publishing decorum. Yet, in a style more subdued than the tale-teller's, he is also an ingenu who exposes his own ignorance as well as the pretensions and ignorance of other Moderns.

The varying uses to which Swift puts him explain the bookseller's capacity for relative astuteness or ignorance. As a successful publisher he knows the practical value of a dedication to the right man—it gets off one edition. By instinctively assuming that Lord Somers is that man, he reflects the prevailing opinion of Somers' virtues and importance. In recording the opinion of various egocentric poets, that after themselves, Lord Somers is surely the worthiest, he emphasizes the unanimity of this opinion. In reporting the solid virtues, such as wit, eloquence, learning, wisdom, justice, politeness, candor, and so forth, which his dedicators have attributed to Somers and which are attributable solely to him, the bookseller assigns to Somers those qualities which Swift most valued. The bookseller's unwillingness to recount this "old beaten story" because everyone already knows it, completes a genuine tribute to Somers as the epitome of permanent virtues.

The bookseller's profession also enables him to reveal matter-of-factly the deficiencies and shoddy practices common to modern writers and
publishers. He is quite aware that Moderns ignore posterity, dedicate for personal gain, compose their dedications as abstracts from a host of other dedications, and switch at will the subject of an otherwise-completed dedication. The bookseller himself accepts these practices as the conventions of his trade. He is somewhat annoyed to find his hacks do not read Latin, although they accept recompense for doing so--because they have thereby deceived him. Furthermore, the common practice of fitting older writers to the fashion of the age bothers him when it affects a work he intends to publish. The bookseller partakes in Modern limitations and expectations. He disclaims knowledge of a dedication's exact form and style, but he does expect the standard list of "accomplishments" totally unrelated to a man's true worth.

As do Gulliver and the Tale Teller, the bookseller shifts between obtuse comments and penetrating ones. He cannot translate Detur Dignissimo; he is duped by translators and dedicators. Yet, he shrewdly observes that dedicators should admire the patience rather than the liberality of their patrons. He also considers it "fairer dealing" to offer the Tale as written, rather than fitted to "the Humor of the Age". His request for a key to explain the more difficult parts of the work, since it directly follows his statement on fairer dealing, is ironical from his point of view as well as from Swift's. Perhaps it amused Swift when Wotton's Observations and Curll's Complete Key duly appeared. Swift's use of Wotton's explanations as signed footnotes to the fifth edition clearly continues the game the bookseller began. The bookseller's elusive shift between dupe and satirist makes it likely that he is, as Robert Elliott suggests, the Tale Teller in another pose.
In the "Epistle Dedicatory to Prince Posterity" the persona first appears as the ingenious Modern and establishes the flexibility of his role. Observing relevant Modern decorum he opens with a barrage of excuses which outdoes even those writers Swift intends to satirize. In a footnote Swift calls attention to his parody of a regrettable Modern practice. Richard Blackmore's prefaces to King Arthur and Prince Arthur (quoted in the Guthkelch-Smith edition on p. 182) illustrate the custom. Its extent might be judged by Roger L'Estrange's reference in his preface to the Fables of Aesop:

"Another Man in my Place now, would perhaps take it for a Notable Stroke of Art, Good Breeding, to Complement the Reader with Twenty Fooleries of Apology, and Excuse for such an Undertaking: As if the Hononest and most Necessary Part of a Man's Life and Business, were a Thing to be Asham'd of."

Dryden, with more grace and perspecuity than L'Estrange, also finds it necessary to defend his abstinence from the custom. After indicating his advanced age and bodily infirmity Dryden notes:

"I will not trouble my reader with the shortness of time in which I writ it, or the several intervals of sickness. They who think too well of their own performances, are apt to boast in their prefaces how little time their works have cost them, and what other business of more importance interfered; but the reader will be as apt to ask the question, why they allowed not a longer time to make their works more perfect?"

Swift, I assume, would object that by their extended references, L'Estrange and Dryden are paying homage to Modern custom.

The persona's addiction to metaphor becomes immediately evident.

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He personalizes time to avoid admitting that the natural fate of contemporary mediocrity is oblivion. Time becomes a Governor, whose determination to keep Modern productions from his ward, Prince Posterity, turns him, in the Teller's estimation, progressively into an "Insolent" (31), a creature with nails and teeth of extraordinary "Length and Strength, Sharpness and Hardness" with a "baneful abominable Breath, Enemy to Life and Matter" (32) and one who "flays alive" and tears infant productions "Limb from Limb" (33).

Through his metaphors, which then tend to take over the narrative, the persona unwittingly discredits himself and the work of other Moderns. He "commits himself to a metaphor which, when its vehicle is carried out consistently, damages the tenor he is trying to convey". 10 One such metaphor concerns the disappearance of Modern books by drowning: "Are they sunk in the Abyss of Things? 'Tis certain, that in their own Nature, they were light enough to swim upon the Surface for all Eternity" (32). As Ronald Paulson notes, in the process of "proving" that the works of themselves would not drown, the persona describes them as "light": "But to keep his metaphor consistent he has admitted the lightness (i. e. superficiality) of his books". 11 Another metaphor used as a ploy for sympathy—Modern works as infants slaughtered by the monster, Time—leads the persona into portraying these works as "barbarously destroyed before they have learnt their Mother-Tongue" (33). Such metaphors, which assert reality despite his efforts to the contrary, suitably lead up to the persona's open


11 Paulson, ibid., p. 32.
contradiction of it: "the never-dying Works of these illustrious Persons, Your Governor, Sir, has devoted to unavoidable Death" (33).

The persona completes the birth-death metaphors which control the dedication by noting that "Books, like Men their Authors, have no more than one way of coming into the World, but there are ten Thousand to go out of it" (36). All the metaphors or examples which he has used to prove the worth and permanence of Modern works, in fact emphasize their worthless and transitory nature. Things-as-they-are have so far upset his pretensions that he is reduced to affirming in the "Integrity of his heart that what he writes is "literally true this Minute" (36).

Having blackened Modern works in general by his praise, the speaker does the same for specific Modern writers. The order of his list suggests the degree of Swift's animus. It begins with Dryden (and I suspect the persona's insistence at this point on his own integrity and sincerity is meant to reflect on Dryden's presumed lack of it), and ends with extensive and pointed praise of Bentley and Wotton for qualities notably absent in their writing. The reference to Wotton being a "worthy Yokemate to his foremention'd Friend" (38) evokes, in less literal form, the skewered brace of woodcocks to which the two are likened at the Battle of the Books' conclusion. Bentley and Wotton, joined by their own choice in the second edition of Wotton's Reflections are the Modern writer-critics most praised and imitated by the persona and most ridiculed by Swift. As in the allegory they probably form the model for the persona as biblical critic, in these prefatory sections and in the majority of the digressions, they form the model for him as Modern writer and literary critic.

In closing his dedication the persona presents it as a "faithful
Abstract drawn from the Universal Body of all Arts and Sciences, intended wholly for . . . Service and Instruction" (38). This stress on the usefulness of their work is common to experimentalists, Puritans, and literary systematizers. 12 An example of the literary systematizing prominent in Swift's mind is found in William Wotton's Preface to his Reflections. Wotton made the ambitious attempt to set out the "Several Boundaries of Ancient and Modern Learning" in order that after he sorted out what was perfect, and what unfinished, men might apply themselves accordingly. 13 This same insistence on range and usefulness is also found in Roger L'Estrange's Preface to his Fables of Aesop. L'Estrange, himself a pointed, if less important victim of Swift's satire, tells the reader that in paraphrasing Aesop he "propounded to digest [him] into a Compendious Abstract of Instructive Precepts and Counsels, to be ready at hand, for the Use and Education of Children, which [he] look'd upon as Work highly Necessary for a Common Good". 14

Even in the Dedication the persona does not remain thoroughly consistent in his role as a Modern. When he comments on his intended character of wits, their persons to be described "particularly and at Length, their Genius and Understanding in Mignature" (38), he demonstrates the momentary shift to valid judgment that occurs at strategic points throughout the Tale. Here the shift establishes a convenient distance between himself and Wits. In the Preface, which this passage looks forward to, the persona

14 L'Estrange, ibid.
recounts his appointment as Tale-Teller to divert the Wits from attacking religion and government (39-41). The succeeding pages of the Preface he devotes to an exposition of false wit. His point of view throughout the Preface thus seems more detached than in the Dedication; it is even on occasion, rational and penetrating. Yet at the same time he and his Tale remain under attack as Moderns. For example, he satirizes the Modern custom of railing against other Modern authors by the parable of the crowd jostling around the mountebank. The point of the parable is that like the spectator who most vociferously complains of others, the Modern writer is himself the greatest offender. But the Mountebank in this parable is very like the Modern of the Introduction who to make himself heard uses one of the three oratorial machines. The third, the stage itinerant, is explicitly the type for all Modern Grub Street works, including that of the Author.

In this section the persona is to some extent himself a satirist. After his speaker disavows any intention of satire, Swift lets him speak well against the famous "Originals" (satirists) of his "Age and Country" (48) whose satire is vainly directed to the "World's Posteriors". The Teller says that "most of our late Satyrists seem to lye under a sort of Mistake, that because Nettles have the Perogative to Sting, therefore all other Weeds must do so too" (48). In this metaphor the persona is not the naive Modern whose metaphors unwittingly get out of control but the true satirist who controls the implications of his language. The persona then begins to praise the same "Satyrical Itch" he has earlier condemned. To the evaluating reader the praise is further condemnation:

May it survive the Neglect and Scorn of the World, with as much
Ease and Contempt as the World is insensible to the Lashes of it. May their own Dullness, or that of their Party, be no Discourage-
ment for the Authors to proceed; but let them remember, it is with Wits as with Razors, which are never so apt to cut those they are employ'd on, as when they have lost their Edge. Besides, those whose Teeth are too Rotten to bite, are best of all others, qualified to revenge that Defect with their Breath. (49)

In the persona's mind, the sense in which wit is sharp, and therefore "cutting" becomes a literal meaning. The curious analogy of wits to razors becomes an encouragement to butchery, hardly the object of either. And, as Robert Elliott points out, there "lurks the implication that just as dull razor may cut a man shaving himself, so a dull wit may injure the man who possesses it".15

The persona praises, and Swift mocks, non-particular satire which all can enjoy and none take to heart. In saying that satire "being levelled at all, is never resented for an offence by any," (51) the persona is not voicing an isolated opinion. Dryden in dedicating his translation of Juvenal to the Earl of Dorset, praised Dorset's "pointedness of thought" for the same reason: "there is more of Salt in all your Verses, than I have seen in any of the Ancients: But you have been sparing of the Gall, by which means you have pleas'd all Readers, and offended none".16 Dryden was a fulsome dedicator, but in his own satires was as personal as Swift could wish. Although Swift often parodies Dryden as dedicator or apologist, he avoids Dryden as satirist.

From satire, the persona moves easily to its opposite, panegyric.

His main purpose in proposing a Panegyric upon the World, with a second part, is to implicate Bentley and Wotton once again. This is consonant with a general satiric scheme of frequently and obviously linking them to the text, even when they are not particularly relevant to Swift's current satiric focus.

Within the Preface, the parable of the mountebank in Leicester Fields established in advance the minimal worth of Modern orators and the machines which guarantee their being heard. The examples in the Introduction confirm this. Before he expounds his scheme of three oratorial machines, for that is currently his favorite number, the persona offers a sane evaluation of what is to follow. He informs us that he has chosen this number of machines in imitation of those who in order to project a mystical number "force common Reason to find room for it in every part of Nature; reducing, including, and adjusting every Genus and Species within that Compass, by some against their Wills, and banishing others at any Rate" (57). The brief opposition of the norm--common reason--to the arbitrary selection of three as the number of oratorial machines, obviously impugns their validity. As his "Analogy to the spacious Commonwealth of Writers and to those Methods by which they must exalt themselves to a certain Eminency above the inferior World," (61) they dominate the Introduction. But the persona's momentary shift to common reason has already established that they attain only a bad eminence. By now, readers should know that the persona is capable of inventing a complete scheme to fit his specifications.

As a justification for his Scheme of Oratorical Receptacles, the persona invokes the physical system put forth by Epicurus. In expounding
this theory, Lucretius (whom the persona quotes) spoke of voice and sound as material with the power to "beat against the senses and cause us pain."

Perhaps from this context the persona makes the impressions of words, physical impressions, which require proper altitude for due effect. Lucretius had added that "what e'er part of voices falleth not/ Straight on the ears, forthwith is onward borne/ And lost, dispersed upon the empty air."

The persona, as a more recent Modern develops a more thorough-going theory of acoustics, seizing upon the theatre to discuss its structure in relation to what kind of sound goes where. Edward Rosenheim plausibly suggests that the analysis derives from a report in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* (1684). The report he quotes was written by Narcissus Marsh, provost of Trinity College, Dublin while Swift was a student there, and (according to Rosenheim) the same man "whose caution, in 1694, delayed Swift's ordination and prompted his famous "penitential" letter to Temple".

Swift links the Epicurean physical system with an approach derived from mechanical philosophy and allows both to be discredited by false wit. He does a similar thing in "A Digression in Madness". There he links the Epicurean ethical ideal of serenity with a persona who momentarily becomes the experimentalist philosopher and who proves his point by dissecting the

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18 Lucretius, IV, 571-573.

19 See page 106.

beau. In an article on "The Rhetoric of Science in England of the Mid-Seventeenth Century", Richard Foster Jones discusses the rhetoric of the atomists, or mechanical philosophers, whom he distinguishes from the experimentalists. Experimental philosophy, he says, might be described "as a method of enquiry, and the mechanical as a method of explanation."\textsuperscript{21} Jones quotes Sir Kenelm Digby and Dr. Walter Charleton, also known for their espousal of Epicureanism, as exemplars of the atomists' style. Both writers, like the Tale Teller, use metaphor in such a way that the metaphor becomes an end in itself—pursued beyond its function of elucidating a point. The atomists' style caused appropriate concern among their Royal Society colleagues. Jones notes that the atomists' spirits "were raised high by the feeling that they were getting on the inside of nature, that they were penetrating its innermost recesses and throwing light upon what had always been dark".\textsuperscript{22} The persona's return to the major allegory of the Introduction, the scheme of oratorial machines, shows a similar delight in explaining the significance of things. He proclaims that the "Physico-logical Scheme of Oratorial Receptacles or Machines, contains a great Mystery, being a Type, a Sign, an Emblem, a Shadow, a Symbol" (61) bearing analogy to writers and their methods. The language can belong to the persona as mechanical philosopher, or as a writer, or as a biblical critic with a text to write and explain.

To retain his mock consistency in explicating this mystery, the


\textsuperscript{22}Jones, \textit{ibid.}, p. 19.
persona applies it to the three devices. He does so in a fashion which accords with Swift's satiric plan in these early sections. The persona succinctly disposes of the pulpit as the symbol of Puritan writings refined from "the Dross and Grossness of Sense and Human Reason" (62). Before he begins to find Jack's doings so interesting, the persona speaks with Swift's trenchant anti-Puritan view. The teller next takes care of the ladder, the second oratorial machine, but in such casual fashion as to suggest that the ladder (to the gallows) is put forth merely to additionally discredit Modern poetry, which is also included under the next heading. The third device, the Stage Itinerant, conceived as encompassing all works by Grub Street writers, is the one which most interests the persona and which proves the principal focus of Swift's satire in this section.

Because the persona now wishes to identify himself with the Modern writers under this type, he reverses his earlier (Dedication) portrayal of time. The teeth, nails, and scythe which were then irresistible destroyers of Modern works now become, respectively "filed", "pared", and "blunted" (63). This complete reversal of what he "proved" before suggests the loyalty to what sounds good at the moment which distinguishes his Modern pose. In this same pose the persona claims for Grub Street, the productions of Will's (the poets) and Gresham (the scientists). He does so in a fashion which indicates this is the last category they would wish for their work, but which yet taints them with a Grub Street label.

Now, having swept a sufficient number of works into the Grub Street "Society", the persona launches into a series of outside-inside metaphors. He purports to complain of the "superficial Vein among man Readers of the
present Age, who will by no means be persuaded to inspect beyond the Surface and the Rind of Things" (66). In fact, the curious progress of the passage indicates that the readers probably miss nothing of value:

Wisdom is a Fox, who after long hunting, will at last cost you the Pains to dig out: 'Tis a Cheese which by how much the richer, has the thicker, the homelier, and the courser Coat; and whereof to a judicious Palate, the Maggots are the best. 'Tis a Sack-Posset, wherein the deeper you go you will find it the sweeter. Wisdom is a Hen, whose Cackling we must value and consider because it is attended with an Egg; But then, lastly, 'tis a Nut, which unless you chuse with Judgment, may cost you a Tooth, and pay you with nothing but a Worm. In consequences of these momentous Truth's, the Grubean Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts and their Arts shut up within the Vehicles of Type and Fables, which having been perhaps more careful and curious in adorning, than was altogether necessary, it has fared with these Vehicles after the usual Fate of Coaches over-finely painted and gilt. (66)

The contrast between the homely examples—fox, cheese, sack-posset, hen, and nut—and the gilt exterior coaches to which Grubean Society vehicles are likened is in itself an amusing example of the persona's pretentious vocabulary to describe his current theory. The term "coaches" is used in part for its punning value. Swift is a punster but for the persona one vehicle calls for another. In somewhat the same fashion the persona links the dishonest hackney coachmen to a "miscarriage" in the "Digression on Madness" (p. 168).

The progression defeats the persona's original implication—that these productions contain something worth uncovering—and instead suggests that they may be quite beside the point or actually harmful. As always, the reader must exercise his own judgment, not accept without due care either outsides or insides. The persona has set up a cabbalistic system in which one vehicle includes another, and each in turn may be delusive. The passage thus reflects upon the ingenious scheme of receptacles as well
as upon the following list of "Society" works with their beautiful externals and dark insides. I think Swift intends to satirize, in particular, Modern writing which pretends to unravel theories or systems not available to common sense. The allegory and the digressions both attempt to do this.

The persona's most comprehensive vehicle of Modern truth is his own Tale of the Tub. We may remember its literal meaning, retained by the persona, to be an empty tub thrown out for amusement (40). In terms of the Tale's structure it is appropriate that this Introduction which bridges to the main body of the work, devotes itself largely to Modern "Vehicles of Types and Fables". These, which include the Tale and other Modern works referred to or parodied, are shown as meriting a qualified skepticism from the reader. Although the Introduction includes their religious and philosophical systems it focuses on Moderns as writers and critics. Most openly ridiculed are Dryden, Bentley and Wotton, but it is worth noting that Swift in a footnote (70) and in the Apology (7) mentions the personation of L'Estrange as well. In fact, a good part of the obvious and ultimately discredited enthusiasm for allegory, riddles or fables comes from L'Estrange; in particular from his preface to an edition of Aesop. In concluding his justification for uncovering in plain English the proper morals for Aesop's fables, L'Estrange affirms that "an Emblem without a Key to 't, is no more than a Tale of a Tub; and that Tale sillily told too, is but One Folly Grafted upon Another"23 Swift's Grub Street Society persona, with an attraction to types remarkably like that of L'Estrange, ensures that for his treatise "the chief Title prefixed to

23 L'Estrange, Aesop's Fables, I.
it is modelled exactly after the Manner peculiar to Our Society" (71). Swift thus uses L'Estrange's term of derision to characterize a work also devoted to expounding allegory and fable, but in the Modern manner of heresy or nonsense.

Indeed, much of L'Estrange's Preface might come directly from the persona's mouth as proper Modern jargon. The following passage suggests that in the Introduction L'Estrange's manner and convictions provided a convenient point of departure for the persona:

For there's nothing makes a Deeper Impression upon the Minds of Men. . . than those Instructive Notices that are convey'd to them by Glances, Insinuations, and Surprize; and under the Cover of some Allegory or Riddle. But, what can be said more to the Honour of this Symbolical Way of Moralizing upon Tales and Fables, than that the Wisdom of the Ancients has been still Wrapt in Veils and Figures; and their Precepts, Counsels and Salutary Monitions for the Ordering of our Lives and Manners, Handed down to us from all Antiquity under Innuendo's and Allusions? For what are the Aegyptian Hierogliphicks, and the whole History of the Pagan Gods; The Hints and Fictions of the Wise Men of Old, but in Effect, a kind of Philosophical Mythology: Which is, in truth, no other, than a more agreeable Vehicle found out for Conveying to us the Truth and Reason of things, through the Medium of Images and Shadows. But what needs any thing more be said for the Reputation and Authority of This Practice and Invention, considering the Frequent and Edifying use of Apologues in Holy Writ.²⁴

L'Estrange writes as if all allegories, those of the Egyptian hieroglyphs and of scripture, were of equal value. The persona, in turn, takes over the Ancient method of "Allegory and Riddle" as the Modern method of writing—the unveiling of them as the Modern method of criticism. By his list of such works (68-69) he makes Modern popular mythology (Tom Thumb, Dr. Faustus, and Dick Whittington and his Cat) vehicles for abstruse philosophies and associated with the other modern vehicles by Dryden,

²⁴L'Estrange, ibid.
Wotton, and Bentley. In effect, Swift takes off from L'Estrange in order to discredit more visible Moderns. Another passage, within the same paragraph as the Tale of a Tub reference, suggests that Swift had L'Estrange specifically in mind in the "Surface and Rind" passage. L'Estrange says that people "Pronounce the Words without so much as getting at the Meaning" (of the fables): Or to take it Another way, the Boys break their Teeth upon the Shells without ever coming near the Kernel. They Learn Fables by Lessons, and the Moral is the least part of our Care in a Child's Institution: so that take Both together, and the One is stark Nonsense, without the Application of the Other. But the persona's examples leave us with either stark nonsense or an inside rarely worth attaining.  

Swift openly points to L'Estrange and Dryden as sources for his Author's apologetics—"the poor Remains of an unfortunate life" etc. (70). Dryden's Virgil also provides a model for his dedicatory practice. He adapts his old metaphor of Modern works as Infants to his current need and refers to Dryden's "Multiplicity of Godfathers". Dryden not only dedicated the three major parts of his Virgil to three separate patrons, but achieved a list of first and second "Subscribers to the Cuts of Virgil, each Subscription being Five Guineas". The expenses involved might well deter the Tale's prospective godfathers. The godfathers and the persona throughout, make their own convenience a "Matter of Conscience".

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25 Rosenheim convincingly and at length discusses L'Estrange in his chapter, "The Satiric Victim". Although I became independently aware of the linking through my own browsing in the Fables of Aesop I am indebted to his analysis.

26 Dryden, "Translations from Virgil" in The Poetical Works of John Dryden. Also quoted in Starkman, Swift's Satire on Learning in "A Tale of a Tub".
L'Estrange was one of perhaps many predecessors in this regard. In addressing the reader before Volume II of the Fables he stresses that "having now spoken more than enough, to the Morality and Usefulness of this Tract, (if I have not spoil'd it in the Making), I am once more to tell the Reader, before we part, that I have now Consulted the Virtue and the Conscience of the Office I have here taken upon me as I ought to do". His virtuous intentions contrast oddly with his confessed original method—the "Jumbling Matters and Thoughts together, and laying One thing by Another". Swift's persona mimics his moral pretensions, his lack of method, and his addiction to types. L'Estrange is his own parody. It was Swift's genius to imply more distinguished objects of satire by a manner, which in its most inane Modernism, is more characteristic of L'Estrange.

After seventy-two pages of the requisite Modern civilities the actual Tale, or allegory, begins. Its initial installment concentrates on Peter's exegesis of the will. Peter's interpretations derive from the brothers' need to be fashionable rather than from an objective evaluation of the text before him. In a cabbalistic operation, the persona begins an allegory in which the three brothers turn critics. Then, in the following digression, he matches their critical activities by his own. Thus, in "A Digression Concerning Criticks" the persona parallels Peter's biblical criticism by himself becoming a secular critic commenting on critics. His overt reason for this is also fashion. That is, he observes Modern decorum, which includes "due Discourses, Expostulatory, Supplicatory, or Deprecatory" toward the critics. Although the major part of the digression

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27 L'Estrange, Aesop's Fables, II.

28 L'Estrange, Aesop's Fables, I.
purports to be expostulatory, it is, even from his point of view, deprecatory. Like Peter, he knows what he wants to find and uses the Modern predilection for mythology or hieroglyphics to prove his point.

In the course of the digression he takes on the manner of Bentley and Wotton. Throughout the Tale, as I noted in discussing the allegory, the persona as a modern writer and critic is primarily, although not exclusively, a parody of these two men. This is particularly apparent in the digressions which alternate with the first two installments of the Tale. The "Digression Concerning Criticks" calls forth the persona's inherent Bentleyism—appropriately so, since Swift satirizes Bentley for his fault-finding criticism in the Phalaris controversy. Bentley's manner and actual words reappear in parody. In marshalling his "facts" to indict critics the persona displays a controlled animus which belongs as much to Bentley as to Swift. One presumes that Swift recognized a worthy adversary.

Even the persona's intention to examine "the Original and Pedigree" of the word, "critic", involves satiric potential. While "pedigree" when applied to a word does mean its etymology, in a broader sense it applies to the descent of men and animals. The lineage of the true Modern critic, described in terms of asses, wolves, rats, wasps, and dogs, suggests that Swift intends to include the latter sense.

In keeping with Swift's general practice of inserting a norm, sometimes obvious, sometimes subtle, always overrun, the persona devotes a long paragraph (92-93) to the original meaning of the term. The passage makes clear the critic's obligation to use judgment and discretion, to be as cognizant of "Beauty of Matter or of Style" as of faults. A secondary meaning, of the critic as restorer, follows Sir William Temple's estimation
of his true function and is also respectful. Both kinds of critics, says the persona, are extinct. In a passage somewhat reminiscent of the "begat" passage in Genesis Five but in the secular, heroic tradition, the persona traces the family tree, which includes Bentley and Wotton, back to Momus and Hybris—an unpromising ancestry for himself as well.

Malice aforethought (as opposed to the bumbling Modernism which unwittingly convicts the object it praises) governs the linking of critics to the heroic tradition. The persona turns heroic lineage against critics by demoting heroes to nuisances greater than those monsters they subdued, who "when all other Vermin were destroy'd, should in Conscience have concluded with the same Justice upon themselves: as Hercules most generously did" (94). The particular analogy to Hercules leads him to suggest ratsbane or hemp for the critics' equivalent end and the pruning of "Monstrous Faults" as the object of critics' Herculean labours. The passages utilize the heroic analogy in the most damaging manner possible to arrive at a concluding definition of a true, Modern critic as a "Discoverer and Collector of Writers Faults" (95). The definition corresponds to Temple's view of bad critics: "there is, I think, no sort of talent so despisable, as that of such common critics, who can at best pretend but to value themselves by discovering the defaults of other men, rather than any worth or merit of their own". Furthermore, since Bentley refuted Sir William Temple's very real mistake of assuming that Aesop's Fables and the Epistles of Phalaris were the most ancient literature extant, it is quite appropriate

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30 Temple, "Some Thoughts upon the Essay", p. 89.
for a Bentleyan voice to define a critic only in terms of one who seeks faults.

The persona, in a momentary shift to a Wotton-like proseletyzing of Modernism, nicely parodies Wotton's somewhat pompous manner and ambitious scope by "reflecting maturely upon all this, and taking in the whole compass of Human Nature" (97). The twenty-four chapters of Wotton's Reflections do attempt not only all of human nature but snatches of the universe too. To justify his subsequent derivation of critics through a technique of mythology and types already affirmed as the Modern way, (Introduction) the persona amusingly reverses the chronological order and states that the ancients must have so written "Satyr or Panegyric upon the True Criticks, in Imitation of their Masters the Moderns" (97). Wotton's compliments to Modern invention become distorted into a claim for being first in all things.

The persona's subsequent proof of Modern critics' ancient lineage again relates to Bentley's part in the Phalaris controversy. In proving that true Modern critics (which includes himself) are asses, the persona assumes Bentley's manner, his use of Herodotus, Pausanias, and Diodorus as authorities, and his interest in "ass" as a term for an opposing critic. Bentley's piling up of sources is integral to his erudite approach, as reading his Dissertation upon the Epistle's of Phalaris will show. Mrs. Starkman points out, and I have verified it myself, that in proving the Phalaris Epistles to be spurious, Bentley cites the given authors in a similar manner. The hieroglyph of "ass" meaning "critick"--in support of which the persona quotes Herodotus, Pausanias, and Diodorus--stems

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from Bentley's exchange with Charles Boyle, editor, (along with a number of other Christ Church wits) of an edition of Phalaris. Bentley quotes the exchange in the preface of his Dissertations:

And by the help, he (Boyle) says, of a Greek proverb I call him a downright ass (p.11). After I had censured a passage of Mr. B's translation that has no affinity with the original, This puts me in mind, said I, of the old Greek proverb, that Leucon carries one thing, and his Ass quite another. Where the Ass is manifestly spoken of the Sophist, whom I had before represented as an Ass under a Lion's skin. And if Mr. B. has such a dearness for his Phalaris, that he'll change places with him there, how can I help it? I can only protest that I put him into Leucon's place; and, if he will needs compliment himself out of it, I must leave the two friends to the pleasure of their mutual civilities.32

Swift, of course, leaves Bentley and his own friend in the ass's place. In refuting Boyle, Bentley again brings up the subject of asses:

He (Boyle) says I compare him with Lucian's Ass; which, were it true, would be no coarse compliment, but a very obliging one. For Lucian's Ass was a very intelligent and ingenious Ass, and had a better talent at kicking and bantering than ever the Examiner will have, though it seems to be his chief one.33

After gravely quoting passages from his reputable sources in which he says that their word "Ass" is hieroglyph for "critic", the persona employs the same technique in showing that "weeds" and "serpents" are also mystical names for them.

The persona switches his focus to the "Institution of the True Criticks" which soon gives him an opportunity to report an analogy between critics and the tailor idol of Section II. By quoting this analogy made by the critics' "detractors", the persona can defend critics with a rebuttal yet more destructive to them. He lets stand most of the "detractors'" account which concludes that "the Valour of both is equal and their Weapons

32Bentley, "Dissertations upon the Epistles of Phalaris", in Works, (London, 1836), I, xlviii.

33Bentley, ibid., liii.
near of a Size" (102), and takes up the earlier, minor point of the expense involved. While the "detractors" merely reported that the "Critick" is a sort of Mechanick, set up with a Stock and Tools for his Trade, at as little Expense as a Taylor", the persona's two-fold rebuttal neatly completes the critic's ruin. The expenses quoted by the persona are overwhelming. From the world's point of view "it requires greater Layings out, to be free of the Critick's Company, than of any other you can name" (102). For the critic himself "as to be a true Beggar, it will cost the richest Candidate every Groat he is worth", it costs "all the good Qualities of his Mind" (102).

The digression moves from point to point in its "expostulatory discourse" through the means of expressed analogies or interpretations of hieroglyphs. In other sections this kind of progression is often contrary to the persona's expressed intent or at least not within his control. In the "Digression Concerning Criticks" the persona controls his metaphors. Since the expressed norm--the extinct ancient critic--so clearly stands behind and opposed to the true Modern critic, the satire, though constructed of metaphors, is yet quite straightforward.

While Wotton's Modernism accounts for only a short section of parody in the section on critics, it is a major satiric object in the "Digression in the Modern Kind". Wotton called his book Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning but made his most favorable reflections on the many aspects of Modern invention. In the Modern digression, the persona, in his fervid observation of Modern forms, noticeably resembles William Wotton. He includes prefatory, self-praising material within his work in order to outwit the reader's boredom with prefaces which, like the pictures hung
out by "Monster-mongers and other Retailers of strange Sights", satiate curiosity before securing a paying customer. He thereby swells his work's bulk—"a Circumstance by no means to be neglected by a skillful Writer" (132). The following passage illustrates his flexible role as the open praiser and demonstrator of Modern customs who also, in his emphasized words, shrewdly construes these same activities from a satiric viewpoint:

Having thus paid my due Deference and Acknowledgment to an establish'd Custom of our newest Authors, by a long Digression unsought for, and an universal Censure unprovok'd; By forcing into the Light, with much Pains and Dexterity, my own Excellencies and other Mens Defaults, with Justice to myself and Candor to them; I now happily resume my Subject to the infinite Satisfaction both of the Reader and of the Author. (132)

The first section of this "digression unsought for" reveals the persona complementing Peter's role, in the preceding section, of critic turned virtuoso and projector. The persona's scale is simply bigger—the universe and all things known. In this pose he incorporates other phases of Modernism satirized in the Tale. As Secretary of the Universe (123) he quotes Lucretius, another such secretary, that he willingly works and watches the night through that he might "shed the light of reason" so his reader may "search the heart of hidden things". In his determination to uncover all knowledge for all people the persona is also an experimentalist who uses phrases from a relevant section of Wotton's Reflections. Having "dissected the Carcass of Human Nature . . . till at last it smelt so strong (he) could preserve it no longer" (123) he is left with a skeleton, which to Swift is of dubious value.

In this same pose he incorporates attitudes of Wotton, Bentley,

34 Lucretius, I, 143-148.
35 See Guthkelch-Smith ed., p. 123.
and probably, L'Estrange. By insisting that mankind "receives much greater Advantage by being Diverted than Instructed" the persona recalls L'Estrange's argument that many people "are not to be dealt withal but by a Train of Mystery and Circumlocution" (Preface to Aesop). For L'Estrange, "neither the Pulpit, the Stage, nor the Press" Dares so much as Touch" directly upon men's failings. They rely upon "Significant Types and Proper Resemblances" originally put forth by the founder of the method, Aesop, who, in the frontispiece of L'Estrange's edition of the Fables, appears surrounded by the animals of his fables, bearing a sign "Utile Dulci". The persona's comment that "in Compliance with a Lesson of Great Age and Authority" he has kneaded up both instruction and diversion with a "Layer of Utile and a Layer of Dulce", probably refers to the Tale's layers of allegory and digression and also to L'Estrange's preface. 36

As a Wotton-like projector, the persona notes that in "the present universal Empire of Wit and Learning, there seems but little Matter left for Instruction" (124). In discussing "The Natural Histories of Elementary Bodies and Minerals" Wotton had reached a similar conclusion on the study of air. After noting that the Ancients had contributed little to our knowledge of air, and the Moderns had contributed a great deal to it, Wotton decided that "there is scarce any one Body, whose theory is now so near being completed, as is that of the Air". 37 The persona's desire for a portable book containing all perhaps reflects Wotton's attempt to cover

36 All L'Estrange quotations in this paragraph come from his Preface to Aesop's Fables, I.

all knowledge and also Bentley's interest in doing a new version of the
Bible from the Greek. The alchemical recipe that the persona gives for
this links Bentley and Wotton to the discredited dark writers who were
also secretaries of the universe (Tale, 356).

During the remainder of the digression (until he switches to the
acknowledgment of modern forms discussed earlier) the persona attacks
the ancients for not being projectors in the same grand style. The persona
shows his Zoilus ancestry (Digression on Criticks) by a Modern attack on
Homer—the "universal censure unprovok'd". Homer was regarded as one who
included in his native genius "all Art and Sciences, all Moral and Natural
Philosophy". The Tale Teller states that Homer intended his work as a
guide to all knowledge, then criticizes him for his omission of such a
useful instrument as a "Save-all" and his "gross ignorance in the Common
Laws of this Realm". Wotton's own words concerning the ancients—"grossly
ignorant"—thus condemn Homer for his lack of things either useless or
impossible for him to have known. Furthermore, in his condescending
attitude to Homer—"a Person not without some Abilities, and for an Ancient,
of a tolerable Genius", (127) the persona catches Wotton's qualified ap-
proval of ancient achievement in the Arts: "So that there is Reason to
think that in those Arts the Ancients may have out-done the Moderns; though
neither have they been neglected in these later ages, in which we have seen
extraordinary Productions, which the Ancients themselves, had they been

38 Dryden, "Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of
Satire", in Juvenal.
39 Wotton, Preface to Reflections.
alive, would not have been ashamed of." Yet the concentration on faults suggests his braying and browsing ancestors.

With the exception of madness, which is important enough to warrant a close scrutiny, the remaining digressions indicate that long before he confesses so (208) the persona writes about nothing. Section VII, nominally in praise of digressions, uses by now familiar techniques to discredit them. The persona reports the anti-digression opinions of "morose, detracting illbred People". These, however, are couched in cogent food and army metaphors whose implications effectively condemn digressions and thereby give Swift's norm (143-144). As a Modern the persona replies to this position with his own continuation of the army metaphor. Seeking to excuse Modern digressions by showing the necessity for them, he further condemns Modern works:

But with Knowledge, it has fared as with a numerous Army, encamped in a fruitful Country; which for a few Days maintains itself by the Product of the Soyl it is on; Till Provisions being spent, they send to forrage many a Mile, among Friends or Enemies it matters not. Meanwhile, the neighboring Fields trampled and beaten down, become barren and dry, affording no Sustenance but Clouds of Dust. (144)

By the analogy, anything to the point is impossible, unless Moderns copy their spider representative of the Battle of the Books and, nourished by dust, draw books out of their own dirt and poison. Understandably then, the persona spends the rest of the digression on Modern abstracts or titles and indexes and their obscene types. Having indicated that Modern works are by necessity digressive, in praising them, he in fact praises digressions.

40 Wotton, Reflections, p. 23.
That Section X, labeled "A Tale of a Tub", is another digression further indicates the breakdown of even Modern "layered" form. The digression merely adds on to materials already presented in the prefatory and other digressive sections. The Modern form observed is that of acknowledgements, once more an activity ordinarily consigned to the preface. The persona outdoes himself in almost universal thanks for universal acceptance but he also lets through Swift's judgment of such applause--"the Lord knows where, or when, or how, or from whom it received" (181). The succeeding dialogue with the bookseller (182) completes the point that the Modern "acknowledgement" is one more game to conceal the public's indifference.

In the "Digression in the Modern Kind" the persona began as a projector, switched to the role of a modern Zoilus, and finished up by exemplifying a particular modern fashion. In slightly different order he repeats the pattern in Section X. After his nod to Modern forms he turns his attention to the Bentleyan critic, and then ends as the projector of the "Modern Kind". He does not become the critic but invokes the help of Bentley in a way that recalls Bentley's controversy with Charles Boyle. He uses the ass metaphor from the "Digression on Critics" and implies that Bentley will quite rightly take the "Furniture of an Ass" to himself. The critic-as-dog, used in the critic's section also reappears here and in Section XI. He keeps his resolution to employ his whole "Stock of Matter""(184) both as writer and critic for this digression is a recapitulation of elements already used.

In announcing himself to be the author of a "miraculous Treatise" (184), and a comprehensive and wonderful discourse (185-186) the Author
calls attention to his projector's role in composing the Tale. He gives directions for it to be interpreted in a manner which matches that in which the Septuagint was allegedly written (185). He also has calculated the proper approach for Rosicrucians and Arian heretics. Swift's footnotes (186-187) explicitly point out the resemblance to the Jewish Cabbalists' interpretations of the Bible, and likewise notes that the Author uses the jargon of heretics and dark writers. The passage does offer the Tale as the persona's Modern Bible. It also is in part foolery, in part an association of the primarily Bentley-Wotton Modern with discredited philosophies, and in part an open demonstration of the subversion of meaning in which they all engage.

Swift's note on the heretics' jargon used here and on the title page, concludes that such cant or jargon is "very properly prefix'd to such a Book as this of our Author" (187). Swift's position on the theological writer and critic is as close to Temple's as it was on critics in general. Temple concluded that "human learning seems to have very little to do with true divinity, but on the contrary, to have turned the Gentiles into false notions of the Deity, and even to have misguided the Jews and the Christians into the first sects and heresies that we find among them". The Tale's allegory, including the tailor and aeolist sect and its Teller, support Temple's contention. In regard to this passage and Swift's notes upon it, Temple's further mention of the rabbinical writing is enlightening: "how little the Jews have gained by all this learning of their Rabbins, how ancient or modern soever, I leave to others to consider and determine, who

41 Temple, "Some Thoughts upon the Essay", p. 90.
have more esteem for it than I". Temple thought that the too-polemical writings of theologians had been chiefly devoted to proving themselves in accord with the ancient fathers. This only proved the Ancients' superiority, and gave Moderns no reason for Wotton's self-gratulatory manner. In respect to critical writing on religion, Swift's persona incarnates the faults Temple attacked.

The leave-taking ceremony of the Tale's conclusion calls forth a flurry of comments on Modern efforts, including again the metaphor which condemns them. The last word on profound writers, a category the persona belongs to particularly through the projector passages recently discussed, is that such writers are like wells: "A Person with good Eyes may see to the Bottom of the deepest, provided any Water be there". If there is only "Dryness and Dirt, tho' it be but a Yard and half under Ground, it shall pass, however, for wondrous Deep, upon no wiser a Reason than because it is wondrous Dark" (207-208). Swift's judgment is not in doubt.

The persona's concluding remarks are appropriately anti-climactic. He has descended from the Lucretian aspirations of the title page—"I long to pluck fresh flowers, and crave to win/A glorious coronal to crown my head". He now reveals that his collection of "Seven Hundred and Thirty Eight Flowers, and shining Hints of the best Modern Authors could in no other way receive proper attention. He is a Modern anthologist, a gatherer of Modern bouquets. Only a touch remains, in his assertion that he will write again when he finds "by feeling the World's Pulse, and my own", of that venter of Madness's vapours who speaks in the most important digression, the subject of my next chapter.

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42 Temple, ibid., 91.
43 Lucretius, I, 932-933.
THE HEART OF THE MATTER: "A DIGRESSION ON MADNESS"

"A Digression on Madness", the Tale's most celebrated tour de force, is also the most perplexing section of the entire work. "Madness" is a dense, complex, and elusive, perhaps indeed a deliberately confusing maze. The digression's careful, somewhat disguised threepart organization into "the Original, the Use and Improvement of Madness in a Commonwealth" will emerge from my detailed reading of it. To understand "A Digression on Madness" one must consider first what Swift is satirizing and why, and second, how this digression relates to the allegory and other digressions.

Madness, as it appears in this section, is a complete, materialistic system. It contains a theory of vapours as the material cause of human behaviour, a theory of Knowledge -- that we know only through sense knowledge, either delusive surfaces or unpleasant insides, and an ethic -- that man seeks happiness, defined as "the perpetual possession of being well deceived". One may well ask what Swift's object is in letting his persona put forth such a system. The answer is that the physical system, the theory of Knowledge, and the ideal of serenity represent and satirize an Epicurean mode of interpreting reality, a mode unacceptable to Swift, the Christian moralist.

Through his university training and his preparation for ordination and also by his familiarity with Sir William Temple's essay Upon the Gardens of Epicurus, Swift probably knew Epicureanism well before he wrote the Tale. By his own account, furthermore, Swift read Lucretius,
the fervid and thorough exponent of Epicureanism, three times in 1697, the time at which the Tale most likely began to take final form.¹

Yet why would a work which parodies various forms of Modernism and specific Moderns of whom Swift disapproved, also parody, in its most important chapter, the ancient materialistic philosophy of Epicureanism? Epicurus, who died in 270 B.C., hardly qualifies as a Modern by his date, and his disciple, Lucretius, died on the day that Virgil reached seventeen, that is in 55 B.C. Even a conservative clergyman would need another reason to find Epicureanism Modern in 1697.

Swift found that reason in the literary and philosophical revival that Epicureanism underwent in England in the late seventeenth century. In his Ode to the Athenian Society, 1692, Swift had already railed against Epicureanism as a contemporary philosophy:

The Wits, I mean the Atheists of the Age,
Who fain would rule the Pulpit as they do the Stage,
Wondrous Refiners of Philosophy,
Of Morals and Divinity,
By the new Modish System of reducing all to sense,
Against all Logic and concluding Laws,
Do own th'Effects of Providence,
And yet deny the Cause. (11. 103-110)

'Tis but to say, that what we daily meet,
And by a fond mistake
Perhaps imagine to be wondrous Wit
And think, alas, to be mortals writ,
Is but a Crowd of Atoms justling in a heap,
Which from Eternal Seeds begun,
Justling some thousand years till ripen'd by the Sun,
They're now, just now, as naturally born,
As from the Womb of Earth a field of Corn. (11. 123-131)²

¹The Guthkelch-Smith edition reproduces Swift's list of his readings for that year. In discussing the dates of the Tale's composition the editors conclude, on the basis of events mentioned in the digressions or prefatory material, that "Swift was engaged on the Tale in the latter part of 1697" and that "the critical digressions belong to the latter half of 1697 at the earliest." p. xlvi.

In this early ode, Swift is not fully in control of his satire, yet he clearly intends to satirize the physical system of Epicureanism currently in vogue.

Until the middle of the century there had been in England, almost a total dearth of works concerning Epicurus and his system, although all other major classical points of view had received publication. Within the period from 1650 to 1700, however, there were published thirteen works dealing with the life or system of Epicurus or with such Epicurean figures as Lucretius or Petronius Arbiter. The impetus for this interest came largely from France. The French priest, Pierre Gassendi, a devout Christian who nonetheless held Epicureanism in high regard, published works on Epicurus and his system in the 1640's. A friend of Gassendi's, Jean Francois Sarasin, published a discourse on Epicurus which eventually was republished in 1683 in the works of St. Evremond. The latter was a prominent French exile, a man notable for his pleasure-loving interpretation of Epicureanism, and a close friend of Sir William Temple, with whom Swift lived most of the time between 1689 and Temple's death in 1699.

Samuel Holt Monk notes that "one of Gassendi's most forceful spokesmen in England was Dr. Walter Charleton (1619-1707), a distinguished physician and a member of the Royal Society." Dr. Charleton's Epicurus's Morals, published in 1656, with a second edition in 1670, was "a representative

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3 Most of my information concerning Epicureanism in England comes from Thomas Franklin Mayo's Epicurus in England (1650-1723) (Dallas, 1934). To avoid excessive footnotes, clearly identified Mayo references are given in the text.

4 In the Battle of the Books, Swift satirizes Gassendi together with Hobbes and Descartes, 235;

5 Samuel Holt Monk, Introduction to Five Miscellaneous Essays.
expression of modern Epicurean ethics". This is the same Dr. Charleton whose ebullient, metaphorical style in writing up his experiments in mechanical philosophy embarrassed his Royal Society colleagues. There was also published in 1656 the second volume of Sir Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy which referred to Gassendi and carried a full account of Epicureanism.

The first English translation of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura by Thomas Creech, appeared only in 1682 but reached a second edition the following year. This edition is quoted twice in the Tale, while the other quotations are from a Latin edition. Not even a Latin edition was published in England until 1675. In the year 1685, when Temple published his essay on The Gardens of Epicurus, Dryden, then Poet Laureate and noted for his knack of writing on fashionable topics, came out with a group of translations from Lucretius. These translations included the openings of Book I and II, and the passage on the nature of love in Book IV. As will become evident later in this chapter, all three passages (although not specifically Dryden's translation of them) underlie "A Digression on Madness". In the same year St. Evremond wrote his letter "To the Modern Leontium" which discussed the Epicurean moral philosophy. Temple's essay itself is perhaps best described by Samuel Holt Monk: "it unites the typical seventeenth-century theme of the pleasures of retirement with a brief exposition of the lofty ethical ideal of Epicurus and a lovingly detailed discussion of the best methods of cultivating fruit trees and grapevines.

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6 Monk, Ibid., xx.

7 Dryden, however, wrote an early poem to Dr. Charleton, congratulating him on his theory on Stonehenge. The poem is perhaps most notable for Dryden's eulogy of experimental scientists, including Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Harvey.
and the sort of soils in which they best flourish". Temple's style and point of view in his later essays obviously influenced Swift's composition of the Tale. This earlier essay of Temple's also affects the Tale, but Swift, rather than supporting Temple's view, as he usually does, sharply differs from it.

The physical theory of Epicureanism could not be ignored by the philosophers and scientists of the time. Dr. Charleton, for instance, was interested in both Epicurean morals and Epicurean atomistic theory. Thomas Mayo suggests the relationship between this theory and seventeenth-century science: "As the traditional vehicle of atomic physics, Epicureanism had affiliations with both Descartes and the Baconians of the Royal Society. But in its essential spirit it was so radically antagonistic to the Christian attitude as to get itself quite consistently deplored and abused by the Church and its philosophical allies" (112).

Those interested in the new science found atomistic theory a useful hypothesis for their experiments. Louis Bredvold, in discussing the seventeenth-century search to explain how bodies actually moved, refers to this link between ancient materialistic philosophy and science:

Thus arose in a new and much more perplexing and dangerous form the ancient problem of materialism. Even Descartes felt constrained to regard living organisms as machines, although he of course admitted that man has also a "rational soul", and thus established the famous Cartesian dualism. But there were many who accepted the mechanical theory without adding to it this idealistic superstructure which contradicted it. Hence the great popularity

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8 Monk, Introduction to Five Miscellaneous Essays, P. xxiii.
in the seventeenth century of the atomistic philosophy of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, who not only affected the general tone of sophisticated society by stimulating 'libertine' thought, but influenced as well the new science.  

Among those who disparaged the "Libertines" (pleasure-loving Epicureans) but welcomed mechanical philosophy was William Wotton. In the Preface to his Reflections he noted that mechanical philosophy revealed "the whole Knowledge of Nature, which in an age wherein Natural Religion is denied by many, and Revealed Religion by very many more", made it possible "that the Invisible Things of the Godhead may be clearly proved by the Things that are seen in the World".

Robert Boyle, perhaps the leading scientist between Bacon and Newton, could accept the Cartesian mechanism and its idealistic superstructure, but write against Epicurean theories of the origin of the world and the material composition of the soul. Furthermore, when Richard Bently came to give the Boyle Lectures (1692) he repeatedly attacked Epicurean moral and physical theory on the origin of things, while upholding the usefulness of atomism to science. He credits Boyle with rescuing the mechanical theory from "oblivion and contempt", with showing its "usefulness in physiology" and its "great serviceableness to religion itself". Even the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, defended "atomic physiology" by tracing it back to a Phoenician name Mochus. By this procedure he

10 W. Wotton, Quoted by Mayo, Epicurus in England, p. 196.  
11 Mayo, ibid., p. 136.  
12 Bentley, Sermon VI in Works, III, p. 74.  
13 Mayo, ibid., p. 140.
separated atomism from an association with Epicurean materialism which scientists found increasingly unwelcome in the final decade of the century.

Advocates of experimental and mechanistic philosophy who were eager to sever any connection with Epicureanism often in turn linked the Epicurean philosophy with that of Thomas Hobbes. In doing this they intended to damage both. Dr. Mayo quotes statements by Thomas Tenison (later to become Archbishop of Canterbury), Robert Boyle, and Ralph Cudworth which pejoratively link Hobbes with the Epicureans (122). Hobbes himself never relates his theories to Epicureanism. Yet Hobbes' system does resemble that of the Epicureans in certain important respects. Both posit a thorough-going materialism: for them all beings are corporeal substance. Hobbes simply ignores the soul, but implies that God is an unknowable and corporeal substance: Lucretius and Epicurus take away all power from the Greek and Roman gods, and (in Book III of De Rerum) explain the soul's corporeal nature.

In ethics, as Dr. Mayo notes, "Epicurus was explicitly egoistic and hedonistic, while Hobbes at least leaned far enough in the same direction to be, with some degree of justice, popularly included in the same category" (116). More than that, both philosophers wrote not merely to put forth what they believed to be true, but to convince other men to act in accordance with the philosophy thus expounded. The Tale's persona unkindly says of Epicurus and Descartes that they wished to "reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, and Height of their own" (166). Hobbes, like Epicurus, wished to influence behaviour as well as belief. They differ in important respects, such as whether the universe
be essentially plenum or void. Yet their philosophies resemble each other enough to cause others to link them.

Those who wished to justify mechanistic philosophy sought to disassociate it from their materialism. Others, like Swift, who had little use either for materialistic philosophies or for the scientific approach, did not always bother to distinguish between them. The philosophies of Epicurus and Hobbes were attacked by many from the moment of their appearance in England. In 1685, however, when Temple, St. Evremond, and Dryden wrote in praise of Epicureanism, its ideal of pleasure, happiness and serenity held great appeal. After 1688, for a number of political and social reasons not relevant here, the vogue of Epicureanism gradually declined.

Swift, who in his second ode mocked Epicureanism as the "new modish system of reducing all to sense", never ceased to regard it as pernicious. In his ironical Abstract of Mr. Collins's Discourse of Freethinking (1713) Swift damnns Collins by having him praise Epicurus. A later sermon, On the Wisdom of the World places Epicurus among those philosophers who "have been grossly defective in their lessons of morality":

Epicurus had no notion of justice but as it was profitable; and his placing happiness in pleasure, with all the advantages he could expound it by, was liable to very great exception; for although he taught that pleasure did consist in virtue, yet he did not any way fix or ascertain the boundaries of virtue, as he ought to have done; by which means he misled his followers into the greatest vices, making their names to become odious and scandalous even in the heathen world.  

At various points throughout the Tale, culminating in "A Digression

on Madness", Swift satirizes the Epicurean ethic and system -- often by letting his persona quote De Rerum Natura. Swift also periodically satirizes Hobbesian materialism which detractors had linked to Epicureanism. He does this by having his persona expound Hobbesian ideas in language and style very close to that of the Leviathan. Furthermore, these passages sometimes coincide. Hobbes becomes associated with the tailor cult, Aeolism, and to a lesser degree, Madness. The tailor cult initially seems remote from any satire on Epicureanism. Yet in following it the three brothers place their happiness in fashion. Its materialism complements Aeolism -- that thoroughly materialistic system which relates very closely to the "Digression on Madness". Together the tailor cult, Aeolism, and Madness form the Modern religions and Modern philosophy of the Tale. All are materialistic and exist solely to gratify the individual. As such they are ingenious and yet in Swift's view quite wrong.

Epicureanism, though pervasive enough in the Tale, is not immediately perceived as being so. Yet, from title page to conclusion the Tale is strategically laced with Lucretian quotations which juxtapose their original context (not simply the line quoted) with a new satirize the persona's Epicureanism. The title page itself, in setting out his ambitions, does so in the words of Lucretius: "I long to pluck fresh flowers, and crave to win/ A glorious coronal to crown my head". Lucretius both concludes Book I and opens Book IV with the bold and glory-seeking passage from which these lines are taken. In Book I Lucretius is striving to be the great illuminator of man kind -- by positing a solely material universe. The passage's repetition in Book IV precedes his case

for total dependence on sense knowledge, a case which the persona also makes. Swift has chosen a proper model for a persons who writes for "the Universal Improvement of Mankind" (title page and elsewhere), who is the "Secretary of Nature", and who in Madness puts forth the same Epicurean theory of sense knowledge. The other quotation of the title page --from the Arian heretics -- fits very well for a book which, in expounding a vast range of topics, also refurbishes religions to its author's own taste. Clearly Swift's satire embraces a number of individuals and ways of perceiving reality, and no study can do justice to each one.

In the Introduction Epicurean materialism once more emerges, this time as the justification for the scheme of Oratorical Machines. The machines fit well with the Epicurean theory that all voice and sound are of corporeal elements (80). Materialistic philosophy justifies even the tailor cult of the allegory's opening section. The professors of this system say that philosophy proves that the soul is man's outward clothing "because they are All in All and All in every Part" (80). Although the philosophy is expressly that of Anaxagoras, Swift certainly knew Lucretius's discussion of it. Although Lucretius disagrees with Anaxagoras, he does so by assuming that the "All in All" refers not to substance but to each, individual object. In refuting the Anaxogorean doctrine that "all things/ Are mingled, though in hiding, in all things;/ But that alone is manifest whereof/ Most parts are mixed therein" (Lucretius, I, 11. 881-883). Lucretius says that if this were so corn and blades of grass when crushed would ooze blood or clots of gore (I, 887-891). Lucretius himself comes to a similar but less rigid conclusion that "common seeds of many things lie hid/Mingled in things in many and various ways" (I, 895-896).

In "A Digression Concerning Criticks" the persona is quite far
from Epicureanism. Yet he does quote Lucretius as an authoritative support for his theory that in ancient times poisonous weeds were hieroglyphs for critics. The opening of "A Digression in the Modern Kind" finds the persona again in the role of a projector. Reaffirming the Modern design of "an everlasting Remembrance, and never-dying Fame" in return for promoting the "general Good of Mankind", the persona quotes Lucretius -- a fellow secretary of the universe. In the quoted passage Lucretius states his resolve to "endure/All toil however great" and to "watch the calm nights through" in the effort to teach his friend "the heart of hidden things". Immediately following the Lucretian lines, the persona explains how he has dissected "the Carcass of Humane Nature, and read many useful Lectures upon the several Parts, both Containing and Contained" (123). This linking of experimental science to Epicureanism is, as I have said, precisely what most scientists after Charleton sought to avoid. Swift not only links the two, but in the phraseology -- "Contining and Contained" -- also implicates William Wotton, as the Guthkelch-Smith edition points out.

At the conclusion of the next section -- VI, the last to deal with the three brothers, the persona reports that Jack eventually founded the "most Illustrious and Epidemick Sect of Aeolists" (142). Having said that he is "advancing to gratify the World with a very particular account" of Aeolism, the persona misquotes a line from Lucretius and thereby confuses "muses" and "honey". In the original line, Lucretius promises to touch "all things with music's magic charm" (I, 935). He mentions neither muses nor honey. Yet a few lines later, in this passage which opens both Book I and IV, Lucretius likens himself to a healer who in giving bitter draughts of wormwood will first overlay the cup with honey. Thereby, the "trustful age of childish innocence" will swallow the nauseous draught "deceived but
not betrayed”. The confusion of the quoted line may result simply from Swift's own faulty memory. But, since Lucretius is elsewhere quoted accurately, the confusion may well be a deliberate clue concerning the deceiving systems of Aeolism and Madness for which this passage prepares.

Section VII, "A Digression in Praise of Digressions", perhaps accounts for the persona's switch to Aeolism in Section VIII, rather than to another installment on the brothers. The initial plan of prefatory material followed by alternating digressions and sections concerning the three brothers, shifts at this point. Section VIII and Section X are still labeled "A Tale of A Tub", but Aeolism is only remotely related to the brothers, and Section X not at all so. Aeolism, possibly founded by Jack after he ran mad "with Spleen and Spight and Contradiction" (161) acts as a bridge between the rest of the Tale and Madness.

Aeolism does satirize Puritanism, which Jack represents, but it is also closely associated with Madness. In fact it is the religion of Madness. In the beginning of "A Digression on Madness" the persona outlines the three areas in which madmen have been innovators: "The Establishment of New Empires by Conquest; The Advancement and Progress of New Schemes in Philosophy; and the contriving as well as the propagating of New Religions" (162). Since in expounding Aeolism which derives from a mad founder, Jack, the persona has already described a new religion, within Section IX he accounts only for new empires and new schemes of philosophy. The only comment on religion within Madness itself is that without the vapour of madness "even all Mankind would unhappily be reduced to the same Belief in Things Invisible" (169). This same belief in things invisible is Swift's norm, but it has no place in Madness.
Furthermore, Aeolism and Madness share the same "material" foundation. Wind is the material of Aeolism. Pumped into the breeches, it emerges as belching -- "the noblest act of a Rational creature" (153). In discussing Aeolism the persona notes that "whether you please to call the Forma informans of Man, by the Name of Spiritus, Animus, Afflatus, or Anima; What are all these but several Appellations for Wind?" (151). He might well have added "vapour" to his list. And, in "A Digression on Madness" vapour is explicitly equated with spirit (165). While vapour is not pumped into breeches, it follows the same course of ascending from lower to higher extremities, although it need not remain there.

Once more, a line from De Rerum associates Aeolism and Madness with the Epicurean system. After introducing the Aeolist theory that wind is the original cause and the final end of the universe (150), the persona quotes Lucretius on the same subject -- "may our guiding fortune steer afar/From us these terrors" (Lucretius V, 109-110). Both Aeolist and Epicurean theory posit the totally material constitution of reality. While Aeolism holds that the universe must be resolved" into wind, Epicureanism holds that not only the world, but heaven itself will pass away (Lucretius, V, 94-95). Lucretius wished to convince men that since all is material and accordingly finite, they need not concern themselves with a life after death. In affirming the actuality of the world's future dissolution, Lucretius wished that "reason's power/Rather than the fact itself" would convert men to his theory. Yet his use of reason to deny an immaterial soul or an existence after death conflicts with Swift's view of reason's proper use. Amusingly obscene and ridiculous as Aeolism is, it perhaps simply carries further the perversion of the rational faculty until it arrives at the parody of belching, as its noblest act. The lone Lucretian line in
Section VIII pales in comparison with the extensive references to dark writers and Puritan practices. Its position in the opening of the chapter yet keeps in mind the similar materialistic basis of Epicureanism, Aeolism and Madness.

In the following analysis of Madness, Epicurean satire -- which includes a specifically Lucretian element -- is seen as a significant part of The Digression. Furthermore, Madness, the climax and core of the Tale, also culminates the Epicurean theme. The only subsequent reference to it is a casual half-line in the Conclusion. At that point the persona compares the end of a treatise to the end of life "which hath sometimes been compared to the End of a Feast; where few are satisfied to depart, ut plenus vitae conviva" (208) -- (Lucretius III, 937). In view of the succession of Epicurean references, this off-hand incorporation of Lucretius's words may not be so unimportant as it seems. The passage from which the persona draws his words concerns the end of human life -- to Lucretius, the final end of man. Lucretius has nature chide man:

> why dost thou not
Like one who riseth from a festal board
Depart, full-fed with life, thou fool, and take
With mind serene a rest that knoweth no care?

(Lucretius III, 935-938)

The persona's comment that he is only too happy to contribute to "the Repose of Mankind" makes the Tale's conclusion considerably more flippant than its Lucretian antecedent. Yet the final evocation of the serene, satiated fool can hardly seem an accident to one who has carefully read "A Digression on Madness".

After this preliminary to Madness, suggesting that references to Lucretius elsewhere in the Tale prepare for an anti-Epicurean satire in this section, let us go on to examine in detail the digression itself.
In order to account for the varieties of madness he has outlined, the persona concocts a theory of vapours, arrived at by literally applying a figurative analogy:

"the upper Region of Man is furnished like the middle Region of the Air; the Materials are formed from Causes of the widest Difference, yet produce at last the same Substance and Effect" (163). He then assumes that all things said about air equally apply to the mind of man: "then it will follow that as the Face of Nature never produces Rain, but when it is overcast and disturbed, so Human Understanding, seated in the Brain, must be troubled and overspread by Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, to water Inventions and render it Fruitful" (163). This metaphor -- become-reality process is one which Swift, in his own person, was most aware of. Kathleen Williams calls attention to Swift's own perspicuity in detecting it in his Remarks upon Tindall's Rights of the Christian Church. Miss Williams says that Tindall, "writing of the state, civil and ecclesiastical, as the body politic, assumes that it should be managed as if it were a body in the literal sense. Swift's comment on this argument from metaphor is: 'What, because it is called a Body, and is a Simile, must it hold in all Circumstances?'"

In describing nature, the persona uses metaphoric words such as "face" and "disturbed", but even more metaphoric are those words ascribed to Man: "trouble", "overspread", "water", and "render fruitful". Yet such words become for him words of literal description. He next equates the two parts of his analogy and attempts to prove how the "crop", which

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16 Kathleen Williams, "Restoration Themes in the Major Satires of Swift", RES, XVI, (1965), 258-271.
now means human reaction, differs according to the "soil" -- that part of the human anatomy where the vapours settle. In view of the Epicurean nature of madness, and the association of Epicurus with gardens, the use of this "growth" terminology might well be one more connecting link to the "garden" philosopher.

Having established the vertical motion of vapour as the physical cause of behaviour, the persona produces two instances of vapour's operation in his first category -- "The Establishment of New Empires by Conquest." The examples, two French kings, are historical figures but the process accounting for their behaviour coincides with that described by Lucretius in the epilogue to Book Four -- "The Passion of Love". The teller uses the Lucretian description of passion's effect, if one does not "elsewhere turn the motions of the mind" (IV, 1065); described as "the Poet's never-failing Receipt" (T.T. p. 164). This passion, says Lucretius stirs the seed which straightway through every limb and member, aye/Through all the body... doth pass (IV, 1042-43). For "that body whence the mind is sick with love" (IV, 1048, T.T. p. 164) "when it is struck, thither goes and tries to join with it" (IV, 1056, T.T. 164) in order "to cast into that frame/The humor drawn from out his own" (IV, 1056-57). But whereas Lucretius prefaces the verse paragraph (from which the Tale strategically draws) with an account of the convenient dreams of child or man, the persona concludes that in the case of his frustrated king the seed "raised and inflamed, became adust, converted to Choler, turned head upon the Spinal Duct, and ascended to the Brain" whereupon the king began raising mighty armies. To produce this extraordinary example of sublimation the persona has merely superimposed his theory of "the Crop differs according to the Soil" on the Lucretian passage. Swift's persona has either parodied or temporarily absorbed the
system and the style of his Epicurean master who had called love's process "madness" (IV 1089, 119). Since in the persona's first example of vertical progress the vapour has gone up to fix in the brain, in his second the vapour quite naturally goes down to conclude in a fistula, thus showing the importance of "where those Exhalations fix".

Swift's own footnote relates that the "mighty King" to whom this happened is actually the "present French King", that is, Louis XIV. Both Sir William Temple and Swift had previously written about Louis XIV, Temple in regard to the king's leisure time in gardens and Swift in regard to the king's "Fistula in Ano". In the Gardens of Epicurus, Temple, having affirmed the pleasures of the garden as the most refined sense remedy for those disturbances reason brings, lists kings who have chosen such pleasure. Among them is Louis XIV:

And thus the King of France, after all the successes of his councils or arms, and in the mighty elevation of his present greatness, and power, when he gives himself leisure from such designs and pursuits, passes the softer and easier parts of his time in country houses and gardens. . . And those mighty emperors, who contented not themselves with these pleasures of common humanity, fell into the frantic or extravagant. 17

Six years after Temple's essay, Swift in his Ode to the King (William III) had applied to Louis XIV a vapours-to-fistula process very like that of madness. While the Ode's final stanza foreshadows the physical system of Madness, Temple's essay may have provided the inspiration for linking the king both to frantic behaviour and to Epicurean peacefulness. Swift's early Ode says of Louis: "Stay but a little while, and down again

17 Temple, "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus" in Five Miscellaneous Essays, p. 73.
'twill come/And end as it began, in Vapour, Stink and Scum". The poem concludes with the same image as the "Emperors by Conquest" passage of Madness: Louis, "as a Mortal to his Vile Disease/Falls sick in the Posteriors of the World.

An additional literary source of this version of the vapour theory might be the following passage from the Satyricon in which the vulgar Trimalchio gives his opinion of the effects of vapour not properly vented: "Take my word for it, friend, the vapours go straight to the brain from you know what system. I know of some who have died from being too polite and holding it". Trimalchio's guests mock him though they leave undisturbed his pleasure in being well-deceived. Since the Satyricon has an Epicurean basis and since Swift read Petronius, Arbiter of pleasures, in 1697, the passage very probably echoes Trimalchio, a speaker likewise mocked by his author.

When he discusses originators in his second category -- new schemes in philosophy -- the persona again oscillates between Modern standards and Swift's. As modern philosophers and their systems are more important objects of Swift's satire in the Tale than are the establishers of new empires by conquest, the persona's tone shifts accordingly. Before he begins his own systematizing, that is, before he adjusts his mechanistic theory to account for all philosophers and their followers, and in his turn

18 Swift, "Ode to the King", in Swift's Poetical Works, p. 6, 11.128-129.
19 Ibid., p. 7, 11. 128-129.
reduces "the Notions of all Mankind exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, and Height of his own", he lets proper judgment come through:

Let us next examine the great Introducers of new Schemes in Philosophy, and search til we can find, from what Faculty of the Soul the Disposition arises in mortal Man, of taking it into his Head, to advance new Systems with such an eager Zeal, in things agreed on all hands impossible to be known: from what Seeds this Disposition springs, and to what Quality of human Nature these Grand Innovators have been indebted for their Number of Disciples. Because it is plain, that several of the chief among them, both Antient and Modern, were usually mistaken by their Adversaries, and indeed, by all, except their own Followers, to have been Persons Crazed or out of their Wits, having generally proceeded in the common Course of their Words and Actions, by a Method very Different from the vulgar Dictates of unrefined Reason: agreeing for the most Part in their several Models, with their present undoubted Successors in the Academy of Modern Bedlam (whose Merits and Principles I shall farther examine in due place.) Of this kind were Epicurus, Diogenes, Apollonius, Lucretius, Paracelsus, Descartes and others; who, if they were now in the World, tied fast, and separate from their Followers, would in this our undistinguishing Age, incur manifest Danger of Phlebotomy, and Whips, and Chains, and dark Chambers, and Straw. For, what Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, and Height of his own? Yet this is the first humble and civil Design of all Innovators in the Empire of Reason. (166-167)

Despite the "flattering" adjectives for all Swift opposes — "great Introducers", "Grand Innovators", and "humble and civil Design" — and the "unflattering" adjectives for all Swift supports — "Vulgar Dictates of unrefined reason", and "this our undistinguishing Age" satirical inversions which, if the persona is consistent in this passage are ironical on his part, or if he is not consistent, suggest his customary see-sawing standards the norm is established. The following phrases manage to do this:

"advance new Systems... in things agreed on all hands impossible to be known", "Innovators... mistaken... by all except their own followers, to have been Persons Crazed, or out of their Wits," and especially "For
what Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive
it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the
same Length, Breadth, and Height of his own? Yet ... etc." The indictment
of the Ancient, Epicurus, and a representative Modern, Des Cartes, is
unmistakable.

The persona uses the terminology of both philosophers to show
further how each presumes to reduce other men's notions to the "Length,
and Breadth, and Height" of his own. The quotation is continuous with the
previous, extended one:

Epicurus modestly hoped that one Time or other,
a certain Fortuitous Concourse of all Men's Opinions
after perpetual Justlings, the Sharp with the Smooth,
the Light and the Heavy, the Round and the Square,
would by certain Clinanima, unite in the Notions of
Atoms and Void, as these did in the Originals of
all Things. Cartesius reckoned to see before he
died, the Sentiments of all Philosophers, like so
many lesser Stars in his Romantick System, rapt
and drawn within his own Vortex (167).

The underlined terms (italicized in the original) -- "Clinanima", "Atom",
and "Void" refer particularly to Epicurean atomistic theory, while
"Romantick" and "Vortex" relate to the mechanistic theories of Descartes.
Sir William Temple had mentioned that "Descartes, among his friends, always
called his philosophy his romance". The "Sentiments of all Philosophers"
fits nicely with the "Romantick System". Descartes' theory of vortices,
which included the attraction of stars and planets to a revolving vortex,
was for many years after its promulgation in 1644, the leading theory of
the universe. The article on Descartes in the Eleventh Edition
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica calls the theory of vortices
"one of the grandest hypotheses which have ever been formed

21 Temple, "Some Thoughts about the Essay" in Five Miscellaneous
Essays p. 73.
to account by mechanical processes for the movements of the universe."

The theory still longered at the end of the seventeenth-century, apparently to Swift's dismay.

In accounting for these philosophers' adherents, the author rapidly passes from the phase of "conjecture" to one of "the reason is easy to assign". This reason, not surprisingly by now, is a literal application of the sympathetic-vibration-of-matter theory to human understanding (167). This portrayal of man's mind as a stringed instrument recalls his most recent use of the technique of arousing the reader's curiosity and then satisfying it by presenting a mechanistic theory. Before he revealed the Lucretian key to "the great prince's" behaviour (164) the persona queried: "Now, is the Reader exceeding curious to learn, from whence this Vapour took its Rise, which had so long set the Nations at a Gaze? What secret Wheel, what hidden Spring could put into Motion so wonderful an Engine?" (164)

Besides being a humorously lewd play on words the passage also openly exploits the reader's curiosity and leads him to expect a mechanistic solution. The "string" "spring" and "wheel" references lead, I suggest, to Hobbes, a philosopher whom Swift, like many in his age, associated with Epicurus and to some extent with Descartes. The well-known metaphor of the Leviathan, which I quoted in connection with the tailor system of the brothers, probably provides the persona with his vocabulary: "For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joyns, but so many Wheeles" etc. Miriam Starkman thinks that curiosity, upon which

the person so pointedly relies here and elsewhere in the Tale, (see p. 203), also refers to Hobbesian theory. Hobbes does emphasize curiosity. He designates the desire to know how and why as the "singular Passion" which, along with reason, distinguishes man from other animals. For Hobbes, curiosity is a "Lust of the Mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall pleasure. Although the link between curiosity and Hobbesian theory remains unproven, it is -- given other, more substantiated parody of Hobbes in the Tale -- most probable.

In the course of turning the theory of sympathetic vibration of matter into an explanation for human communication, the persona relates the dire consequences of miscalculation in this regard: "for if you chance to jar the String among those who are either above or below your own Height, instead of subscribing to your Doctrine, they will tie you fast, call you mad, and feed you with Bread and Water" (168). The Tale Teller knows whereof he speaks. Several pages later he relates his own previous confinement in Bedlam. His friend, William Wotton, has made a similar mistake and now the "base detracting World" reports that Wotton's "Brain hath undergone an unlucky Shake". He is then, just like Jack, "a Person whose Intellectuals were overturned" (162).

Because the persona is in his Modern pose, he can hear the whispers about Wotton even in the Garret in which he writes. The Tale Teller summons all his Modern abilities in his attempt to show to "a Nice and Curious Reader" exactly how the "Angles" at which the vapour strikes, or the "Species of Brain" to which it ascends, determine whether a man becomes an Alexander the Great, a Jack of Leyden, or a Descartes. He achieves only a hiatus.

Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 44.
The argument's breakdown at this moment of proof deftly exposes all its previous stages, and it does so to Swift's obvious enjoyment. Swift's own footnotes to this hiatus and to a similar one on page sixty-two, reveal how versatile, and how disrespectful of the Author, these hiatuses are. They occur several times in The Battle of the Books, and in A Fragment replace "the whole Scheme of spiritual Mechanism" -- deduced and explained.

The hiatus which substitutes for the crucial proof of madness also marks the close of the digression's opening section on the origin of madness. In his transition to the digression's middle section which is the crucial one, the persona distances himself slightly from the system he has just articulated. An "if-then" construction signals the temporary divorce: "if the Moderns mean by Madness, only a Disturbance or Transposition of the Brain, by Force of certain Vapours issuing up from the lower Faculties; Then has this Madness been the Parent of all the mighty Revolutions, that have happened in Empire, in Philosophy, and in Religion" (171). At this point the speaker is not putting forth his own system but that of the Moderns from whom he stands apart. Before he followed Epicurus and Descartes in setting up his own encompassing system the persona gave a rational critique of such an attempt: "what Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking" etc. (166). Now, before he proclaims the Epicurean ideal of happiness and tranquillity which is the heart of this middle section, the persona executes a similar maneuver. He reviews the norm for the entire opening section and implies a critique of the ideal he will soon praise:

For, the Brain, in its natural Position and State of Serenity, disposeth its Owner to pass his Life in the common Forms, without any Thought of subduing Multitudes to his own Power, his Reasons, or his Visions; and the more he shapes his Understanding by the Pattern of Human Learning, the less he is
inclined to form Parties after his particular Notions; because that instructs him in his private Infirmities, as well as in the stubborn Ignorance of the People (171).

The phrase preceding the first semi-colon judges innovators in empire, philosophy, and religion in a way closely related in terms and structure to the evaluation which preceded the mechanical philosophers' section. It adds, however, the explicit norm of "common Forms". The phrase after the first semi-colon adds a sound and conservative general axiom which evinces respect for traditional learning and a corresponding diffidence toward Modern Departures from it. The final portion soberly evaluates human nature in its post-Eden state, allowing no easy optimism concerning either the individual or the people. The judgment of this final portion is not consonant with a happiness consisting of delusion.

The next sentence vividly describes the destruction of sound judgment from within and bridges to its destruction from without. Delusion, that is, destruction of sound judgment from without, is Swift's concern throughout the remainder of this middle section:

But when a Man's Fancy gets astride on his Reason, when Imagination is at Cuffs with the Senses, and common Understanding, as well as common Sense, is Kick'd out of Doors; the first Proselyte he makes is himself, and when that is once compass'd, the Difficulty is not so great in bringing over others; A strong Delusion always operating from without; as vigorously as from within. (171).

The metaphor of fancy astride reason, integral to the teller's prevailing method, is particularly significant here for it recurs at the end of the "Digression on Madness". At that time the persona, in his Modern phase or pose, applies it to his own experience. The phrase "Imagination at Cuffs with the senses" presents a vivid paradigm of the total reliance on one or the other of these faculties which the persona, as Modern, reveals. Indeed
"Imagination" structures most of the Tale. But in the ensuing section the persona concentrates on the Senses. However, he kicks out "common Understanding, as well as common Sense" and relies exclusively on the individual senses. He thus will pose the dilemma of either resting well-deceived in surfaces or probing, experimentally, only to find defects beneath. For proper estimation of man and his destiny, Swift would have us keep understanding and common sense.

Having suggested the process by which innovators pass to delusion from within, the persona, in one of his protean changes, himself exemplifies it by once again becoming a Modern. As such he is a living example of delusion from within. He next demonstrates how in works from without:

For, Cant and Vision are to the Ear and the Eye, the same that Tickling is to the Touch. Those Entertainments and Pleasures we most value in Life, are such as Dupe and play Wag with the Senses. For, if we take an Examination of what is generally understood by Happiness, as it has Respect either to the Understanding or the Senses, we shall find all its Properties and Adjuncts will herd under this short Definition: That, it is a perpetual Possession of being well Deceived. (171)

At this juncture the persona has easily adopted the Epicurean ideal of serenity as the highest good. Yet where Epicurus taught that the sense knowledge leading to a serene life was infallible, the Author delights in it as fallible. From his statement on Cant and Vision which suggests but does not prove the difficulty of ascertaining truth from sense knowledge, the persona go on to assume that we value most what deceives us. His progression in turn to happiness as "a perpetual Possession of being well deceived" links the Epicurean ideal of happiness (which Epicurus and Lucretius would find justified by true sense knowledge) with deception.
The persona thus advances the Epicurean ideal in terms which discredit its validity. The adjective "perpetual" juxtaposed with "possession" and the adjective "well" juxtaposed with "deceived" suddenly and perversely push the definition to an unexpected extreme. The seemingly judicious moderation of the preceding phrase -- "for if we take an Examination of what is generally understood by Happiness" etc. -- is shattered as much by the extraordinary terminology as by the idea expressed. Later, at the conclusion of this section on the use of madness, the persona returns to his memorable but by then established terms, and by adding one more unexpected phrase, again shatters what has gone before. The writing throughout this passage manifests the intensity and elusiveness of complex poetry. Swift may well have found it one of his favorite riddles.

After defining happiness in a manner entirely by-passing traditional Christian morality, in which happiness involves something other than what the senses apprehend, and true happiness is found only in God, the persona continues his advocacy of being well deceived:

And first, with Relation to the Mind or Understanding; 'tis manifest, what mighty Advantages Fiction has over Truth; and the Reason is just at our Elbow; because Imagination can build nobler Scenes, and produce more wonderful Revolutions than Fortune or Nature will be at Expence to furnish. Nor is Mankind so much to blame in his Choice, thus determining him, if we consider that the debate merely lies between Things past, and Things conceived; and so the Question is only this; Whether Things that have Place in the Imagination, may not as properly be said to Exist, as those that are seated in the Memory; which may be justly held in the Affirmative, and very much to the advantage of the former, since This is Acknowledged to be the Womb of Things, and the other allowed to be no more than the Grave. Again, if we take this Definition of Happiness, and examine it with Reference to the Senses, it will be acknowledged wonderfully adapt. How fade and insipid do all Objects accost us that are not convey'd in the Vehicle of Delusion? How shrunk
is every Thing, as it appears in the Glass of Nature? So, that if it were not for the Assistance of Artificial Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish and Tinsel; there would be a mighty Level in the Felicity and Enjoyments of Mortal Men. If this were seriously considered by the World, as I have a certain Reason to expect it hardly will; Men would no longer reckon among their high Points of Wisdom, the Art of exposing weak Sides, and publishing Infirmities; an Employment in my Opinion, neither better nor worse than that of Unmasking, which I think has never been allowed fair Usage, either in the World, or the Play-House. (172-3)

The source for this investigation of imagination and memory and this comparison between them as the "Womb of Things" and the "Grave" may be Hobbe's Leviathan. If so, the source is amusingly twisted to fit the persona's own argument. In his chapter "Of Imagination" Hobbes gives a famous definition of imagination as "nothing but decaying sense." Hobbes goes on to say that "this decaying sense, when we would express the thing it self, (I mean fancy itself), we call Imagination, as I said before: But when we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath diverse names". Hobbes, who after dealing with what most interested him -- man and the political commonwealth -- also found time for a third section (The Christian Commonwealth) involving a critique of Scripture, is throughout the Tale one of the persona's materialist predecessors.

The persona has neatly applied his definition first to the mind and then to the senses. Despite his air of discreet exposition, his thought

process is as curious as ever. In his espousal of fiction over truth because imagination can "produce more wonderful Revolutions that Fortune or Nature" he shows his own preference for distortion. In the context of madness "revolutions" is a charged word. It implies the productions of a Jack, a Peter, a William Wotton, or of the persona himself. After attributing his own preference to all mankind, the persona slightly shifts his terms: the issue now becomes a debate between "Things past" and "Things conceived". Pretending to investigate whether things conceived exist as much as do things past, he in fact does nothing of the sort. Instead he converts the opposition to one between metaphors and proceeds from there.

Metaphor now becomes the issue. Memory is the "Grave", a word with pejorative connotations; imagination is the "womb", a word with more promising connotations. Since "womb" is more attractive than "grave" the persona need say no more. He has implied that things existing in the imagination are more valid and more interesting than those existing in the memory, but he has proven nothing. The reader might well remember a more candid instance of the persona's Modern sensibility: "Memory being an Employment of the Mind upon things past, is a Faculty, for which the Learned, in our Illustrious Age, have no manner of Occasion, who deal entirely with Invention" (135, Section VI).

When he applies his definition of happiness to the senses, the persona's rhetorical questions indicate his advocacy not simply of illusion, enjoyed by most fabulators, but of delusion. His position recalls Bacon's musings on the "natural though corrupt love of the lie itself". In the essay "Of Truth" Bacon puts forth a point of view rather like the persona's:
"Doth any man doubt that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?" Bacon adds judgment -- "it is the lie that sinketh in and settleth that does the hurt" -- and a norm -- that truth "is the sovereign good of human nature". The persona rests in deception.

His vocabulary in these rhetorical questions (How fade and insipid do all Objects accost us that are not convey' e in the Vehicle of Delusion? How shrunk is every Thing, as it appears in the Glass of Nature?) is very close to a passage in Swift's Ode to Mr. Congreve, 1693. Swift, in saying that a poet's fancy should be allowed to develop without hindrance, compares the harmful attempt to "fix" it to the alchemists' attempt to fix mercury.

The result in each case is disaster: "The subtil spirit all flies up in fume; /Nor shall the bubbl'd virtuoso find/ More than a fade insipid mixture left behind. To Swift, in the Ode passage, the natural process is satisfactory. Only the attempts to go against nature result in the "fade insipid mixture". The persona, who favours delusion, reverses Swift's judgment. His list of necessary aids to felicity runs the gamut from "Artificial Mediums" to "Varnish and Tinsel". The unashamed descent into the latter terms most likely indicates a typical Swiftian list that satirizes anyone who accepts its "surface" value.


27 Bacon, ibid., p. 12.

28 Swift, "Ode to Mr. Congreve", in Poetical Works, p. 37.
In his final remarks on deception the persona slides into a position much more difficult to assess. After his advocacy of delusion, the reader might well dismiss the persona's statement that if he were taken seriously "Men would no longer reckon among their high points of Wisdom, the Art of exposing weak Sides, and publishing Infirmities". As a defender of delusion he is obviously going to be against its exposure. But what is Swift's view? Since as a satirist himself, Swift exposes moral fraility and strips veneers, we may judge he respects this activity. Swift's poems written after 1698 frequently are masterpieces of "stripping" satire -- they strip both moral and physical delusive coverings. In such a poem as "A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed" which relates the removal of six "coverings" normally permanent to feminine anatomy we remember the process of physical stripping. But the moral unveiling is even more important. We become aware of the horror of her existence and of the evils in a society in which she so exists. Though the wit and cleverness of the stripping process have value, the process in itself is not a "high point of wisdom". It is important, less for revealing that reality is ugly, than for revealing the distance of the actual from the ideal. Wisdom involves more than "publishing Infirmities".

In the context of the passage we see that the persona is condemning what, in the next paragraph's Modern experimentalist pose, he puts forth as the function of reason -- the "cutting, and opening, and mangling and piercing" which demonstrates that things are not of the same consistency throughout. As a Modern he deals only in terms of deluding or cutting. He leaves no room for wisdom achieved through any other method.

This false dichotomy structures the persona's judgment in the
following paragraph. He begins -- "in the Proportion that Credulity is
a more peaceful Possession of the Mind, than Curiosity, so far preferable
is that Wisdom, which converses about the Surface, to that pretended Philosophy
which enters into the Depths of Things, and then comes gravely back with
Informations and Discoveries, that in the inside they are good for nothing" (173).
To the first part of the proposition (up through "Curiosity") even the wary
reader assents. After that point, the surface plausibility is undermined
by the vocabulary which, in the context of the Tale, is highly charged.

The general skepticism concerning the value of reason has a predecessor
in Sir William Temple's similar disparagement in the Gardens essay:

The same faculty of reason, which gives mankind the
great advantage and prerogative over the rest of
creation, seems to make the greatest default of
human nature, and subjects it to more troubles,
miseries, or at least disgusts of life, than any
of its fellow creatures.29

Temple however, though he approves the Epicurean placing of happiness
"in tranquillity of mind and indolence of body" (p. 7), never openly adopts
it at the expense of reason. The persona does so. His vocabulary itself
seems meant to deceive. Alliteration makes "credulity" and "curiosity" sound
like plausible opposites, but the critical reader should keep in mind
credulity's second meaning of readiness to believe on weak or insufficient
grounds (OED). In modifying "credulity" the word "peaceful" takes on a less
desirable connotation than the normal good one which the persona relies on
our accepting. Swift has thus set a context for "peaceful" to reappear at
the paragraph's close in damning association with "Serene" and "Fool".

29 Temple, "Upon The Gardens of Epicurus", p. 1. Subsequent references
to this essay will appear within the text.
Furthermore, in the Tale's context "Curiosity" is another loaded word. Within the "Digression on Madness" the persona openly relies on the reader's curiosity to the extent of taunting him about it -- "Now is the Reader exceeding curious, to learn from whence this Vapour took its Rise?" (164) Later in the Tale, curiosity becomes "that Spur in the Side, that Bridle in the Mouth, that Ring in the Nose, of a Lazy, an impatient, and a grunting Reader" (203). In the seventeenth-century "curiosity" could mean a desire to know or learn which verged on prying or undue interest -- a sense which probably is intended in this passage. It is related to "curioso" which at this time meant one curious in matters of science or art, a sense which subsequently meant a virtuoso (OED).

Even the word "possession" used in this passage, in the initial definition of happiness, and again at the paragraph's close, can have a derogatory meaning. Ronald Paulson notes that "possession" hovers between two meanings: (1) 'the holding or having something . . . as one's own,' and (2) 'the fact of being possessed' (OED) by demon, spirit, or lover, or by madness". Paulson discusses the words "possession" and flay'd in relation to the scientific style of the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions. He finds this style important to the Tale because "it seeks complete secularization while revealing the strongest moral quality in its every action." In letting his persona make improper use of language, Swift is very much aware of its proper use. In regard to "possession" both meanings are operative in this passage. The latter, though disguised, is more important. Swift may have had in mind Sir William Temple's remark that the natural philosophy of Epicurus lacked demonstration "to any thinking and unpossessed man". (my underlinings) The persona, however, is not unpossessed.

30 Paulson, Theme and Structure, P. 61.
31 Paulson, ibid., p. 165.
The second half of his statement on credulity and curiosity slides into the value judgment that "Wisdom which converses about the Surface" is preferable to "pretended Philosophy". Although wisdom has a meaning of knowledge "especially that of a high or abstruse kind" (OED) which Swift might be using ironically here, its general meaning—the capacity to judge rightly in matters relating to life or conduct, or a soundness of judgment (OED) has nothing to do with surfaces or with sense knowledge as such. The persona has wrested wisdom from its proper meaning in order to lend surfaces respectability. In the paragraph's conclusion this unnatural union between wisdom and surfaces recurs in the man who "truly wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and Dregs for Philosophy and Reason to lap up" (174).

The opposition between reason and wisdom does, however, closely resemble the opposition between Stoic reason and Epicurean wisdom. Sir William Temple reports that "all concluded that happiness was the chief good, and ought to be the ultimate end of man; that as this was the end of wisdom, so wisdom was the way to happiness." (p. 6). Temple says that for the Stoics, with whom he has little affinity, "reason seems only to have been called in to allay those disorders which itself has raised to cure its own wounds, and pretends to make us wise no other way than by rendering us insensible." (p. 7). (In the distorting realm of satire, the example of the French king whose vapours go to his head to be "cured" only by the operation which kills (164) may owe something to this passage.) Temple finds the Epicurean solution more congenial. The "tranquility of mind" which to Epicureans defines happiness may proceed, says Temple "from so diverse causes as
human wisdom, innocence of life, or resignation to the will of God" (p. 7). Temple's statement is acceptable. The persona however, construes that human wisdom through which one attains happiness to mean an innocence of life gained by delusory surfaces.

Though the persona's trust in the senses of sight and touch as they operate upon the "outward of bodies" is Epicurean, his language reveals his conception of reason to be that of a seventeenth-century experimentalist. To him reason involves "anatomy" and a knowledge of "corporeal beings" derived from watching and conducting experiments:

Last week I saw a Woman flay'd, and you will hardly believe, how much it altered her Person for the worse. Yesterday I ordered the Carcass of a Beau to be stript in my Presence; when we were all amazed to find so many unsuspected Faults under one Suit of Cloathes: Then I laid open his Brain, his Heart, and his Spleen; But I plainly perceived at every Operation, that the farther we proceeded we found the Defects encrease upon us in Number and Bulk. (173-174)

The satire aims at the persona more than at the beau. The woman flayed and the beau dissected are Swift's devastating version of the procedures reported in the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions. From such knowledge the Teller concludes that a "Philosopher or Projector" (and the latter term suggests Swift's disapproval) who solders and patches up nature's "Flaws and Imperfections" has an art more creditable than that which widens and exposes them. Without the term "projector" this judgment, like the similar one which concludes the preceding paragraph, might seem perfectly
acceptable. And it almost is. But it also bridges to and becomes associated with a position Swift intends to expose:

And he, whose Fortunes and Dispositions have placed him in a convenient Station to enjoy the Fruits of this noble Art; He that can with Epicurus content his Ideas with the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses from the Superficies of Things; Such a Man truly wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and the Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to lap up. This is the sublime and refined point of Felicity, called the Possession of being well deceived; The Serene, Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves.

Once again a marked similarity exists between the persona's espousal of the Epicurean ideal and Sir William Temple's language in The Gardens of Epicurus. Temple links sense pleasure to gardening in terms which may resemble the persona's merely by coincidence. However, given the pervasive parody of Epicureanism and given Swift's intimate connection with Temple's essay, the persona's terminology and even his conclusion that such a one is a "Fool among Knaves" perhaps stem from the Gardens essay. In introducing the pleasures of gardening to his readers, Temple presents gardening as a way of diverting "The pursuit of passions and perplexity of thoughts which our reason furnishes us". (p. 1). In the life of a private man, he says, "the pleasers of the senses grow a little more choice and refined; . . . And the most exquisite delights of sense are pursued in the contrivances and plantation of gardens" (p. 3). In discussing the similar aim of Stoic and Epicurean philosophies Temple says furthermore: "All agreed the greatest temper, if not the total subduing of passion, and exercise of reason,
to be the state of greatest felicity, to live without desires or fears, or those perturbations of the mind and thought which passions raise." Furthermore Temple recommends a retreat into private life for which Epicurus, the first Athenian to so retreat to the pleasures of his garden, is the prime model. A man who thus retreats from a world which does not duly appreciate him might well also be a model of the "Fool among Knaves".

The language of the passage is quite obviously Epicurean. In order that the reader not miss this, one sentence links this kind of knowledge with Epicurus by using the terms "Films", "Images" and "Superficies of Things" and italicizes them all. A reference to the beginning of Book Four, in which Lucretius puts forth the Epicurean theory of knowledge, confirms the accuracy of the linking:

So then, I say that likenesses and shapes
Of slender mold are by all bodies cast
From off their outermost zone, which one might term
A film or husk . . .

(Book 4, 11 48-51)

. . .
Since thus it does befall, it needs must be
That from the surface of each thing is cast
A slender film.

(Book 4, 11. 61-63)

Swift further points to his condemnation of Epicurean physical and moral theory by the contrived excess of flattering terms in "the sublime and refined Point of Felicity" which is then juxtaposed to "the Possession of being well deceived." Beyond this clue to the passage's satiric intent is the capitalization of adjectives, which were not normally capitalized—"Serene" and "Peaceful." The force of the final phrase perhaps stuns even those who have understood the
digression's satire. The numerous, barely perceptible deceits, the careful and gradual distortion of words from their proper meanings, form a matrix from which the final phrase emerges. By one word -- "Knaves"--it strikes down all that has gone before.

A momentary return to the tradition of indirect irony to which Swift's Tale belongs, may provide additional insight into this core section of "A Digression on Madness". My second chapter, on the concept of persona, related the personae in Swift's ironical works to this tradition which reaches from Menippus and Lucian through the writers of the Renaissance. This ironical tradition is characterized by the same penchant for extremes and avoidance or disguise of a mean that exists in Madness. Indirect irony blurs the relation of the author to his persona (or personae if the work is a dialogue or a play). Swift shares this tradition with Ben Jonson and Erasmus. All three men write from a common position of Christian humanism; yet sometimes so persuasive are their personae in embracing vice or folly that we run the risk of misinterpreting their positions for that of the author. In this ambiguous irony the perpetual possession of being well deceived may be embraced not only by its stage or literary advocates, but inadvertently by their audiences as well.

In an article on "Ben Jonson's Lucianic Irony" Douglas Duncan calls attention to the ending of Bartholomew Fair, which presents a situation still satirized by Jonson but recognizable as such only through awareness of his indirect irony. The final
banquet which joins various representatives of human frailty resembles the standard jovial reconcilement of comedy. However, in another sense this, like the final pardon of the likeable knave, Face, in *The Alchemist*, is an instance of Jonson's irony. Professor Duncan notes that "mocking the urge of the ridiculous censors to unmask the actors and spoil the play, he (the gamester, Quarlous) proposes an All Fool's Banquet in celebration of human frailty, a wholesale rejection of the critical faculty in favour of "flesh and blood" at which an embarrassing number of Jonson's critics have connived".

The situation is not so different when Swift's persona ridicules unmasking. In his advocacy of delusion, the Tale Teller compares its opposite--"the Art of exposing weak sides and publishing Infirmities"--to "Unmasking, which (he thinks,) has never been allowed fair Usage, either in the World or the Play-House" (173). His allusion to unmasking invokes the familiar Renaissance comparision of the world to a stage, of life to a play. But, as usual, the implications of the teller's language must be closely examined for he charts a course of extremes. By inference he invites us to condemn the unmasking operation he defines as reason and remain content with deluding surfaces. The reader must find his own way between these two. A mask is sometimes desirable in life as on the stage; fiction's illusion can be valid. Yet, if one accepts this, does it imply, as the persona would have it, complete abandonment to delusion? Though unmasking is not allowed
fair usage "either in the World or in the Play-House", does this entail rejection of all that is not masked, such as the "Glass of Nature"? It does to the persona but not, I think, to Swift. Like Jonson and Erasmus, Swift distances himself while his fool comes to terms with the world.

Erasmus's persona in *The Praise of Folly*, Folly, herself, is, as I discussed in the second chapter, very like the Tale-Teller. Her foolishness at times contains truth while she herself exhibits a flexibility and a persuasiveness equal to that of Swift's persona. Folly is relevant here for more than her convincing espousal of foolishness which, like that of the Tale-Teller, requires continual evaluation to discern where the truth may lie. Sections VI, VII, and IX of her oration advance the same argument as this crucial, more concentrated passage of the digression. The general pattern is close enough to warrant a brief reproduction.

In her case for "true" prudence Folly says:

"Destroy the illusion and any play is ruined. It is the paint and trappings that take the eyes of spectators. Now what else is the whole life of mortals but a sort of comedy, in which the various actors, disguised by various costumes and masks, walk on and play each one his part, until the manager waves them off the stage.  

It is imprudent, she offers, to demand that a play should no longer be a play.

The part of a truly prudent man, on the contrary, is (since we are mortal) not to aspire to wisdom beyond his station, and either, along with the rest of the crowd, pretend not to notice anything, or affably and companionably be deceived. (p. 38).

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From the happiness of fools, Folly expands to that of madmen, particularly that which comes from her and "of all things is most to be desired":

> It is present whenever an amiable dotage of the mind at once frees the spirit from carking cares and anoints it with a complex delight . . . Nor was that Greek in Horace far afield, whose madness took the form of sitting alone in the theater all day long, laughing, applauding, cheering, because he thought fine tragedies were being acted before him (though nothing at all was on the stage). . . When the care of his family and medical treatment had driven away these fits, and he was fully restored to himself, he protested to his friends. "By Pollux, you have killed me, not saved me," he said, "taking away my enjoyments this way and destroying by force the very pleasant illusion of my mind." (p. 52).

Concluding, as does Swift's persona, that "the more a man is deluded, the happier he is", Folly lists those who belong to her college of madness. While her madmen are happily adjusted to the world (pp. 53 - 63) the Tale-teller's madmen, currently in Bedlam, would as happily adjust. (T.T. 176-179). Folly again states the case for delusion, and then impugns its opposite, a procedure of Swift's author as well:

> But it is a sad thing, they say, to be deceived. No; the saddest thing is not to be deceived. For they are quite beside the mark who think that the happiness of a man is to be found in things as such; it resides in opinion. For such is the obscurity and variety of human affairs that nothing can be clearly known. Or if something can be known, usually it is something that makes against the enjoyment of life. (p. 63)

While Folly doesn't dwell on the manner in which knowledge destroys enjoyment, Swift's persona, assuming the pose of a Modern experimentalist, employs the reason of the knife to prove the point.
More benign to her followers than the Tale-Teller, Folly, just before she finishes this subject, allows them company in their madness:

Hence there either is no difference (between the fool in Plato's cave and the wise man who sees ugly realities) or, if there is a difference, the state of fools is to be preferred. First, their happiness costs least. It costs only a bit of illusion. And second, they enjoy it in the company of so many others. (p. 64)

With calculated intensity Swift's persona forces his fools out of Plato's cave. His fools are not allowed to enjoy their delusion. Rather, the "company of so many others" turns against them. In being well deceived they enjoy only the "Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves."

From the close resemblance between Folly's arguments and the Tale-Teller's at crucial points, it is possible that her discourse provided a convenient model for linking Epicurean knowledge of surfaces and Epicurean serenity with folly and madness. Even if the parallels are purely coincidental, Folly's reasoning is pertinent here because she speaks from the same tradition of indirect irony. While preserving a "decorum in her character" Erasmus manipulates her foolishness in which we may at times discern wisdom. With a manner more gentle but a technique not fundamentally different from Swift's, Erasmus stands behind his persona, controlling her praise and her satire.

33 Erasmus, in his Preface to Sir Thomas More, mentions that he has preserved "a decorum in her character".
Walter Kaiser asserts that until *The Praise of Folly* "never before has a fool praised foolishness" nor in a mock encomium had the mocking itself been mocked. 34 In this regard, Swift's persona is Folly's worthy successor. However where Folly demurely and sometimes misleadingly reminds us of her identity, the Tale's speaker, while he is demonstrating the use of madness, encourages us temporarily to forget the point of view from which he speaks. As a result the reader may not only be challenged but under attack. When Erasmus's Folly bemuses him the reader loses a game of wit; whereas if Swift's folly does so, he loses a good deal more. If he accepts the persona's alternatives he may, after the fool among knaves passage, find himself saying with F. R. Leavis—"What is left? 35 Leavis is right in suggesting that the passage shows "the undisguisable flimsiness of any surface". But in assuming the Church of England, the common form, to be the decent surface or "cover over the void" he misjudges Swift's rhetoric. His point of view on the Tale passage is consistent with his interpretation that the Houyhnhnms in *Gulliver's Travels* who "stand for Reason, Truth, and Nature", therefore stand for what Swift regards as adequate for man. 36

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36 F. R. Leavis, *ibid.*, 26-27.
To me, the choice between all Houyhnhnms and all Yahoo is for man no more realistic or necessary than that between delusion and hacking.

Two other astute critics of Swift's satire, Robert C. Elliott and Edward Rosenheim also think that the final passage of this middle section presents a valid choice between delusion and the operation of reason. Elliott thinks that the persona, the ingenu, delivers the passage until the last few words when "we can see Swift momentarily drop the strings controlling the ingenu, thrust him aside, and lash out directly from his own hatred of the glitter of false appearances". He finds this "reason" a "blasted weapon, bringing its own curse and its own responsibilities to those who possess it"--yet valid. There is left as the "positive", Elliott states, "precisely the integrity which enables Swift to face reality, as he sees it, without compromise". Rosenheim likewise accepts "reason's" conclusion as valid. For him "the entrails of sinners and fops are doubtless unpleasant spectacles; but their authenticity is undeniable and they remain in this respect, preferable to the 'films and images'".

I suspect these critics are right in giving due emphasis to the intensity and force of the exposure of delusion. It is superb "stripping" satire; such "reason" is preferable to delusion.

38 Elliott, ibid., p.454
One might agree with Rosenheim's final estimate that "man's incapacity to detect truth, his weak surrender on the forces of delusion, his susceptibility to fraud, above all his hedonistic urge for serenity at the expense of reason are the ultimate objects of Swift's exposure". But to assume, as Rosenheim does, that the persona's reason here is true reason, misjudges the rhetoric. Perceptive as Leavis, Elliott, and Rosenheim undoubtedly are, they appear to judge more from their experience in satire than from an insight into Swift's thought. If one concentrates on Swift's satire which in its particular context often presents unacceptable extremes for man, be it Houyhnhnm or Yahoo, the beautiful young nymph before or after her evening ritual, one can easily miss the norm of the Brobdingnagian king who wisely rules a far from perfect populace, or Stella, who bears time's traces on her face but retains humour and good sense. Because satire in general strips off false coverings and because Swift's satire in particular does so with zest and conviction, the expert on satire is apt to conclude that at this point Swift or his persona is a bona fide satirist revealing, once and for all, man's inherent nastiness.

The persona does destroy all easy optimism about man.

40 Rosenheim, ibid., p 204.

41 Swift, "A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed", Poetical Works.

42 See the "Stella" poems, Poetical Works.
Moreover, he destroys delusion with such intensity that even though the mean of true reason—presented earlier but left out at the passage's conclusion—remains, it is undermined. Swift's irony in this eulogy of delusion, like the irony in mock heroic, tends to pull down in some degree that mean or reference which remains the ideal. Perhaps the greater the satire's force, the less secure is that which remains.

Furthermore, Swift's skill in presenting two opposing extremes leaves critics from the eighteenth century onwards still debating his own position. That Swift's real position does not appear in the persona's conclusion is a view held by a number of critics who base their opinion on the rhetoric of the passage seen in relation to Swift's adherence to an orthodox Anglican tradition. Kathleen Williams holds that for Swift "Nature, the approximation to absolute truth, which is all we can hope to attain" can be known only "by the mind that orders and interprets the material which the senses present". She adds "reason must act, but it must keep within its proper bounds, and not lay bare what nature herself has hidden 'since that too is only to distort'." Martin Price comes to a similar conclusion that "the Tale Teller has reduced the choice to carping or serenity, and from this opposition true reason has escaped...To choose between inside

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43 This idea is developed further in Chapter IV.

44 Kathleen Williams, Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise, (Lawrence, Kansas, 1958), p.142.
and outside is either to seek a transcendent purity impossible for
man or to settle for mere appearance to the neglect of the spirit". 45
Ronald Paulson and Harold D. Kelling take this same general
position. The choice is the Teller's, not necessarily Swift's
or ours.

Throughout the Tale the persona regularly over-rides any
norm he presents. He allows Martin more prominence in the allegory
than he allows to common sense and common forms in the rest of the
Tale. Yet he always demonstrates the same predilection for extremes.
In this final section of the digression, the "Improvement of
Madness in a Commonwealth", he includes in his roster of madmen—
lawyers, merchants, physicians, taylors, beaus, fidlers, poets,
politicians, and most notably, himself. All come under his theory
of vapours. Momentarily he returns to a critic's vocabulary by
commenting, after his latest explanation of varieties of madness:
"By which are mystically display'd the two principal Branches of
Madness". For the most part, however, his account of madhouse
candidates fit for worldly bliss occupies most of the final section.
Here the digression relaxes from its former intensity. The Bedlam
inmates that the persona would rehabilitate belong to classes
Swift continued to satirize long after Tale of a Tub. The future
member of the Royal College of Physicians, for instance, is a
forerunner of a projector in the Academy at Laputa. The Modern
writer, "very short of Sight but more of Memory". . . .One that has

45Martin Price, Swift's Rhetorical Art: A Study in Structure
and Meaning (New Haven, 1953), p.94.
forgotten the common meaning of Word but (is) an admirable Retainer of Sound" (178) suggests the Teller himself in his dominant role as Modern. For, after candidly admitting that he himself was at one time an unworthy member of Bedlam (176), he shrewdly satirizes Moderns from a viewpoint rather superior to his predominant one. This is the same shift from one point of view to an opposite that, earlier in the digression, enabled him to properly estimate the value of common forms, common sense and common reason—before he himself espoused their opposites.

In the digression's final lines the persona returns to a Modern viewpoint. The description by which he establishes this goes back to his first development of the use of madness. There (171) his description of madness began "but when a Man's Fancy gets astride on his Reason". Now he has slightly modified his expression: "even I myself, the Author of these momentous Truths, am a Person, whose Imaginations are hard-mouth'd, and exceedingly disposed to run away with his Reason which I have observed from long Experience, to be a very light Rider, and easily shook off" (180). He thus establishes further, if it were necessary, his own tendency to madness.

The horse and rider metaphor perhaps comes from Dryden's "Preface to Troilus and Cressida" as Miriam Starkmen suggests. She notes that Dryden "under the influence of Hobbes" had said: "No man should pretend to write, who cannot temper his fancy with his judgement: nothing is more dangerous to a raw
horseman than a hot-mouth'd jade without a curb". If intentional, as it probably is, the similarity marks one more instance where the persona echoes a writer Swift wants to satirize, even when that writer has little to do with the previous context. Swift often uses phrases from the "dark writers" to discredit more reputable men. Here he discredits both Dryden and the persona by echoing Dryden's words in a context carefully arranged to convey madness.

In his pose as a Modern praising Moderns then, the persona is also a madman praising madness, and we accept his words with a discretion similar to that we employ in hearing Folly praise folly. Like Folly, the persona sometimes tells the truth but rarely for long. Rather, he must "vent (his) Speculations in this, or the like manner, for the universal Benefit of Human Kind" (180) or, like Henry IV or Louis XIV, he may become a victim of excess vapours.

The mad persona thus concludes his digression by acknowledging his own subjection to the material cause responsible for all men's behaviour. His mechanistic theory reigns supreme. Martin Price notes that in the persona's "gradual absorption of a vast range of folly" this pattern "is intensified more and more, from folly to bestiality to mechanism". I would add to this that by the time the persona reaches the total mechanism of Madness,


he has created a super-system which outdoes those elements he has absorbed. Epicurus, Lucretius, Hobbes, Descartes, and the various "dark writers" all had their own theories to which they tried to convert the world. The Tale-Teller has incorporated some of their theories in his own, equally encompassing system composed of the tailor cult, Aeolism, and Madness. Together these three account for God, the universe, and all human behaviour.

Forming an important group within the alternating and related sections of allegory and digression, these three reach a climax in the "Digression on Madness", also the climax of the Tale. As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, the materialistic view they represent finds its way into other parts of the Tale by a series of quotations from De Rerum Natura. The persona has unobtrusively spun an intricate web whose center is subtly presented materialism. His Tale and the materialistic systems it presents are vehicles of delusion which deal only in the extremes of insides and outsides, slighting common forms or common sense. The tailor cult, Aeolism, and Madness make up the religious and philosophical counterparts of those "Vehicles of Types and Fables" hawked by the Grub Street Sages. And a Modern consciousness which envisions reality in terms of inside-outside metaphors delivers them both.

This consciousness, while dominantly a Modern one which deals in extremes, is yet not confined to presenting Modernism. It plays another role as well—that of a commentator on Modern
errors. Each time a Modern view subsequently overwhelms any rational judgment. In "A Digression on Madness" for example, the persona gives clues to a sane perception of reality: "For what Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, and Height of his own?" (166) Yet he goes on to reduce all behaviour to his own "Phoenomenon of Vapours". Since he never reminds us that he is demonstrating the use of madness, he more readily leads us into the delusion he recommends. Swift intends this confusion. Throughout the Tale he matches wits with his readers, satirizing those who lose and leaving always the unsettling image of the serene but deluded fool.
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