IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY IN THE POLITICS OF GUYANA
IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY IN THE POLITICS
OF GUYANA

(An Application of Partial Allocative
Theories of Inputs)

by

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The study deals with the adaptations of the concept of Political System to the analysis of the Politics of Guyana. In forwarding his research, the author has focused attention on the element of "Stress" upon the Political System of Guyanese society. Sections on theory and comparative method have been organized in order to develop a framework of partial allocative theories of inputs. This instrument has been applied by assessing in turn, the environmental content of Guyanese society, patterns of demand and support behaviour, and in the formulation of proposals for an explanatory model of the process of national Political Development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many persons facilitated this research in various ways. It is possible here to acknowledge my indebtedness to only a few of them.

I deeply appreciate the sympathy and constant encouragement given me by Professor Donald Grady, whose remarkable patience, guidance and friendship helped me to complete this thesis.

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My thanks go as well to Professor Grant Davy, McMaster University, Professor Hugh Whalen, University of Toronto, the Librarian and Staff of Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, the Librarian and Staff of Sigmund Samuel Library, University of Toronto and Jeffrey Grant among other Guyanese, who in varying degrees assisted me in obtaining material for this project.

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I

METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose of the Study

This study is concerned with the application of theories of Comparative Politics to the politics of Guyana. It proposes to discuss selected 'partial allocative theories of inputs'¹ as they relate to political interactions in Guyana. In so doing the paper hopes not only to locate the areas of 'stress' but also to prescribe measures for 'system maintenance' against stress.²

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¹ Partial theories are to be distinguished from a general theory of politics since they seek to explain allocative consequences of political interaction. While partial allocative theories take for granted the existence of some kind of political system, a general theory seeks to explain the existence as well as the interactions of the political system. A general theory such as David Easton's Systems Analysis (as cited in footnote 3) offers a context within which the partial allocative theories to be discussed in this paper may be given greater meaning and significance. Therefore these partial theories are not to be thought of as competitive with the general theory. By concentrating on the problem of stress in the politics of Guyana and the capacity of the political system to deal with it, this paper is in fact analysing the partial allocative theories of inputs in systems terms.

² 'Stress' refers to that constellation of relationships capable of imposing serious strain on the ability of the political system to survive or persist. 'Stress' may originate in wars, revolutions or other social traumas. 'Stress' may also stem from daily pressures of political life, one outcome of which might be impediments to national integration. For a more detailed discussion of 'stress' see David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), especially chapter 7.
2. **A Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical formulation in this paper is drawn mainly from Professor David Easton's systems approach to politics. Hence the other theories discussed and applied merely reflect a synthesis and supplement of the basic outlines of Professor Easton's general theory of political systems.³

Professor Easton conceptualises a political system as a set of inter-actions dealing with "the authoritative allocation of values". His analysis suggests that we can view political life as a system of interrelated activity. Hence when we speak of a political system we mean to include not just the structures based on law, like parliaments, executives, bureaucracies, and courts, or just the associational or formally organised units, like parties, interest groups, and media of communication, but "all of the structures in their political aspects, including undifferentiated structures like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups, as well as anomie phenomena like riots, street demonstrations, and the like".⁴

Therefore if we visualise the system of political actions as a unit, what keeps the system going are inputs of various kinds. These inputs are converted into outputs (of decisions) which have consequences both for the system and for the environment in which the system exists.

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This paper will not be concerned with allocative theories of outputs. In concentrating on the theories of inputs together with a synthesis and supplement of the Easton formulation, it will however, give special attention to the works of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, Karl Deutsch and Lucien Pye.

These theoretical works are particularly relevant to this study since they help us to fill in the details of the Easton analysis. Moreover, they help us to formulate more precise categories with reference to the inputs of the political system. These inputs, in turn, focus our attention on the mechanisms whereby political actions, political roles and political groups are integrated or induced to cooperate in some minimal degree. We can anticipate therefore, that an application of these theories to a particular polity may help us to discover areas of stress and to discern forces that are potentially disintegrative in their consequences for the political system.

5. In so doing the study does not in any way deny that the interactions classified as inputs influence the outputs (policies, decisions) of a political system.

6. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially Part One; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Karl Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., Nation Building (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963); Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government (Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). These by no means exhaust the list of theoreticians whose analyses may have been used in this study. The list has been thus limited, partly because the writer believes the contributions of these theorists to be most useful to his undertaking and partly because the writer claims greater facility with the tools provided by these political scientists than with the scores of others that might have been used.
3. Theoretical Categories used in this Study

Inputs of Demand

Inputs give a political system its dynamic character. "They furnish it both with raw materials or information that the system is called upon to process and with energy to keep it going." Easton distinguishes inputs of demand from inputs of supports.

Inputs of demand originate in wants but require some special organised effort on the part of the system to settle them authoritatively. Many demands never rise to the level of being transformed into issues. But demands arise and assume their particular character either in the environment or within the political system.

Inputs of Support

Inputs of support are vital to maintaining the system against stress. They are reflected either in overt forms of behaviour like voting at elections or in such internal behaviour as orientations.


8. Environment should be seen as comprising all the other sub-systems of the society that fall outside the boundaries of the political system. The environment may be divided into the intra-societal and the extra-societal. The intra-societal environment consists of the ecological, biological, social, cultural and personality systems i.e. systems in the same society as the political. The extra-societal environment includes all those systems outside the given society itself, e.g. the international political systems, the international cultural system, the international economy. See Easton, Framework of Political Analysis, pp. 69-75 and Systems Analysis, pp. 21-22.
attitudes, predispositions and readiness to act on behalf of the political system. 9

Political Culture

The concept of political culture used in this study is derived from Gabriel Almond's observation that, "the 'political culture' thus refers to the specified political orientations --- attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system". 10 By its very formulation the political culture influences the inputs of demand and support (as put forward in Easton's analysis) which, in turn, determine the effectiveness of the outputs of decision-making process. According to Verba, "the political culture of a society consists of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides an orientation to politics". 11

Political culture therefore provides us with a vital tool, the use of which helps to give us an idea of the quantity and quality of demands and the extent and variety of supports likely to enter the political system.

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9. This point is elaborated in David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", in S. Sidney Ulmer, ed., Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, pp. 141-145.


The concept is particularly useful to this study since it forms the basis of our understanding and assessment of the demands and supports that enter the political system. It helps us to answer such questions as—

(1) what are the attitudes of Guyanese toward the political system; toward other actors in it; toward the decisional outputs of government; and toward the political input processes?

(2) what is the political style of the society? To what extent, in what manner, and with what expectations do Guyanese participate in the political process?

(3) what kinds of values affect public policy and how firmly are they held?

According to the responses to these queries, we can speak of a particular political culture as essentially fragmented or cohesive; integrative or isolative; allegiant or alienated; parochial, subject, or participant. Although the political system of Guyana might well include citizens who fall into all these categories, by reviewing patterns of orientations and values it may be possible to detect a central tendency insofar as the political culture is concerned. This central tendency will presumably have telling impact on the operation of the political system of Guyana.

What is more, by analysing the political culture one is able to discover the influences of the intra-societal environment on the political system. The "ecological", the "demographic", the "personality", "cultural"

12. For an elaboration on this point see Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, chapter 1.
and "social" systems — all "comprise a set of interconnected and interdependent systems whose character in any given case directly influences the nature and performance of the political system." \(^{13}\) In other words, since the political culture — as formulated in this study — embraces the inputs of demand and support, it provides the linkage between the intra-societal environment and the political system.

**Within-puts of Demand**

The orientation—attitude and the behaviour—responses patterns moulded in the political culture influence the style in which the range of 'within-put' functions is performed. \(^{14}\) In this respect Gabriel Almond and James Coleman have made a major contribution. The theoretical assumptions underlying the Almond—Coleman categories of within-puts of demand are: that every political system has structures; that these structures perform functions; that the style of performing these functions may differ from political system to political system. \(^{15}\) But in many developing nations, dysfunction and stress occur because of distortion

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14. Within-puts are to be distinguished from the inputs discussed in conjunction with the Political Culture. The within-puts are the input functions operating within the analytic boundary of the political system. The inputs (of demand and support) are enveloped by the political culture and may be located on the threshold of the political system.

between the quality and quantity of demands entering the system and the capacity of the system's political structures to process these demands adequately.

The relevant components in the work of Almond and Coleman to be applied in this study may be classified as the 'input-set'. This category includes the functions of political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication.

Political Socialisation and Recruitment

According to Almond and Coleman, this is the process whereby people and groups are inducted into the political system. "Its end product is a set of attitudes — cognitions, value standards and feelings — toward the political system; its various roles and role incumbents".  

Political socialisation thus involves the process of learning about 'the political'. It begins with the socialising influences of the primary structures in the social system, for example, the family, the church, the school, the work group and the voluntary associations. Political socialisation continues in the secondary structures more closely associated with the political system, for example, the interest group (associational, non-associational, institutional or anomic), the political party, and the mass media.  


17. See Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, pp. 28-30 where they associate primary groups with latent political socialisation and secondary groups with manifest political socialisation. Note also Grady, "Schema", 1966, p. 32, takes exception to this 'manifest-latent' distinction.
Interest Articulation and Aggregation

Interest articulation and aggregation are "closely associated with the political socialisation function and the patterns of political culture associated with it". Interest articulation and aggregation occur within the political system when associational, non-associational, institutional or anomie groups make claims or demands for political action. These claims or demands may be 'manifest' or 'latent', i.e., they may be explicit or implicit; they may be 'specific', demanding a particular remedy or 'diffuse', taking the form of a 'general' statement of dissatisfaction or preference, or they may be aimed at securing 'particular' ends for a special group or groups within the society. Hence these categories help us to determine whether there is a persistence of non-associational groupings of an ascriptive communal character or whether there exist specific structures for articulating and aggregating interests within the political system.

Political Communication

This category comprises those interactions which communicate to the structures of authority demands and supports emanating in the intra-societal environment and the political culture. In addition, political

18. Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, p. 33.

19. In Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, especially pp. 33-40, the categories, interest articulation and interest aggregation are treated separately. This two fold classification obviously assumes a western and modern model of political behaviour. Hence for our study, we have modified the Almond-Coleman formulation and have combined these two categories to emphasise their inter-relationships.
communication may describe those interactions or devices which are used by the structures of authority to disseminate knowledge about the roles and role-incumbents within the political system.

Karl Deutsch's proposition provide a supplement to the Almond and Coleman version. He offers the view that political systems or networks of decision and control are dependent on the process of communication. According to Deutsch all governments, as all communication systems, are dependent upon the processing and disseminating of information. Implicit in this notion is that information about the political, might be communicated in such a manner as to lead to cohesion and integration or disaffection and disunity within a political system.

We shall therefore investigate the extent to which the structures performing the function of political communication alter the patterns of interaction within the system. How far do the composition of political groups and the development of mass media, for example, contribute toward system maintenance? To what extent are these variables dysfunctional?

Basic Political Objects of Support

What strengthen a political system against stress, however, are the inputs of support. These inputs of support, either in the form of overt behaviour or orientations and attitudes, are focused on objects located within the political system. David Easton provides a brief inventory of the objects of supports viz., the political community, the

regime and the authorities. According to Easton, they are vital elements of any political system in that they are most relevant to its capacity to persist in the face of threatened loss of support. 22

Political Community

According to Deutsch "a political community is a community of social interaction supplemented by both enforcement and compliance". 23 While not denying the value of Deutsch's concept for the political system, Easton's formulation of a political community seems more applicable to our study. Easton refers to a political community as "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour". 24

It is not impossible that within any given political system there might exist several political communities each distinguished from the other "by the display of different even though overlapping division of labour for negotiating and regulating political problems". 25 But even if we can identify the most inclusive group within the political system, sharing political division of labour as a political community, there is no guarantee that this group would have developed a sense of community.

To Easton, "these feelings of community will indicate the extent to which members support the continuation of the existing division of political labour", i.e., the perdurance of a political community.

A sense of community is vital to maintaining a political system under stress. But especially in developing nations this feeling of solidarity and of belonging together politically is often either at a low level or virtually absent. Hence to stimulate this "we feeling", is a major precondition for the establishment of a viable political community.

The Regime

Even if there is strong feeling of mutual identification in a political community one still needs to establish some recognised method of ordering relationships within the political system. It is the regime which prescribes the values, norms and structures of authority that limit and validate political actions. But the regime includes more than this. It also takes account of "the general matrix of regularised expectations within the limits of which political actions are usually considered authoritative, regardless of how or where these expectations may be expressed". 27

Therefore, persistence of a system as a means of converting wants into binding decisions will depend in part upon the capacity of the system to stimulate enough support so as to establish and maintain a viable regime of norms and expectations.

Authorities

Persistence of a system depends not only on a minimal flow of support for the regime but equally on support for the incumbents of roles, i.e., the occupants of the structures of authority.

According to one interpretation of David Easton's work on this point, "it appears that the 'authorites' are the incumbents of the 'roles' in the 'regime' as measured by their ability and effectiveness in influencing the behaviour of others in the political system and in the intra-societal environment". Hence the analyst has to determine the capacity of these occupants of regime roles, to direct, or order, or command, or compel behaviour that is in keeping with system maintenance. In this respect the weight of control available to the authorities depends partly upon the conviction of the nature of legitimacy behind their control and partly upon "the degree of expectations held by the general members of the system with regard to the way in which authority ought to be used".

In Guyana where there tend to be strong ethnic affiliations, an analysis of the authorities as an object of effective support is essential to assessing system-maintenance capabilities.

4. Specific Research Problem

In attempting to apply the range of partial allocative theories of inputs thusfar specified to the case of one political system, this paper

not only hopes to highlight areas of stress in the politics of Guyana, but also to explore the major options available to the authorities in a Guyanese society faced with considerable problems of cohesion.

This difficulty is by no means peculiar to Guyana. It is endemic in the process of political development underway in most of the societies of the world. Lucien Pye's summary view of political development outlines three broadly shared characteristics: concern with equality, with the capacity of the political system, and with the differentiation or specialisation of governmental organisations. These characteristics of political development have relevance to the inputs of demand and support insofar as they attempt to show how a less fragmented political culture may reduce inequalities with respect to the types of wants which are converted into demands and ultimately into decisional outputs. These characteristics are also relevant in that they attempt to show how increased support for the authoritative structures, and greater differentiation among non-authoritative structures may improve a political system's capacity to withstand stress.

5. Technique and Procedure

The method used in this paper is mainly an attempt to organise the material examined in order to assess the performance of a limited range of political functions in terms of their consequences for the political system of Guyana. In so doing, the paper breaks away from the

institutional and legalistic approach to politics and hopes to apply a small segment of systems analysis to one empirical case.

The writer will set up a heuristic model and will refer to quantitative data to show how the categories of inputs of demand and support relate to the interactions within the political system on the one hand, and to the dimensions of the Guyanese intra-societal environment on the other.\textsuperscript{31}

The inputs of demand and support are discussed in conjunction with relevant empirical referents. The referents are drawn mainly from the work of Banks and Textor, along with that of Russett and Alker.\textsuperscript{32} Selection of referents depended on the availability of suitable and/or up-to-date statistics.

Since the nature and organisation of the intra-societal environment have both direct and indirect consequences for the political system, this paper will also include a brief examination of the demographic system, the economic system and social structure in an attempt to identify the 'sources' of stress.

The data used in this study are of both quantitative and qualitative types. As far as quantification is concerned, a limited volume of the available documentation on Guyana was collected and examined. The Guyana government Information Services publication, 'Informatives', provided useful

\textsuperscript{31} In its general structure this model was set up in the Graduate Seminar in Comparative Politics, (McMaster University, 1965-1966).

information. Economic and demographic referents were drawn from a wide variety of West Indian and International publications. In general, however, we were disappointed by the paucity of information available from the Statistical Bureau of Guyana. Failing access to a wider range of empirical referents which might have enhanced the clarity and significance of our exposition, we were frequently confronted by the challenge of limited information of varying reliability.

The qualitative data used were limited to informal interviews and discussions with a relatively limited group of Guyanese students, immigrants and visitors in Canada. Most helpful, too, was the writer's correspondence with a cross-section of persons in Guyana.

No value scales or questionnaires were used. But in adapting the descriptive or inferential approach in interpreting the meaning of the "hard" data available, the paper hopes to explain the nature and significance of impediments to unity in Guyana. For example, by utilising some of the indices in Banks and Textor, Russett and Alker, the paper will attempt to explain the degree and nature of access to the political system by examining such variables as group opposition, the electoral system, press freedom, articulation and aggregation of interests by parties, and by associational and non-associational groups.33

However, we should bear in mind that the data employed in the study have been treated in such fashion as to derive answers to the following range of questions:— Why did stress develop the way it did?

33. This exercise has direct relationship to the categories associated with the inputs of demand and should be significant insofar as we can discover how inputs get into the system, and how efficient are the means of converting "wants" into demands. More detailed discussion of this conversion function is contained in Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems" World Politics, XVII (1965), pp. 183-214.
Can we refer to a political system in Guyana, or are there in fact two or more political systems? What are the possible remedies?

In chapter II, the paper proposes a heuristic model in an attempt to trace the influence of the intra-societal environment on the political system of Guyana. For this purpose the paper emphasises demographic, economic and social factors. Chapter III links the political culture to the intra-societal environment on the one hand and the political system on the other. It shows how the political culture affects the inputs of demand and support. It also shows how the style in which within-puts functions are performed, leads to stress on the political systems of Guyana. Chapter IV is mainly concerned with the inputs of support as a measure in assessing the capabilities of the political system of Guyana to withstand stress. In this chapter we also draw conclusions based upon the data and analysis developed in the paper.

Finally, chapter V --- perhaps precipitously and ambitiously --- attempts to go beyond the bounds of diagnosis and examination, i.e., beyond evaluation and explanation. It offers a prospectus for national political development in Guyana based upon the systems analysis undertaken in the body of the thesis. Thus the prospectus is primarily concerned with posing a series of perspectives designed to deal with impediments to unity in the politics of Guyanese society.
II

THE INTRA-SOCIETAL ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY

1. Introduction

Like other colonies and ex-colonies, Guyana faces the difficult task of trying to bring about rapid economic, social and cultural change while creating the requisite political consensus and stability to make this possible. This chapter will discuss the influence of the demographic, the economic and the social factors in the intra-societal environment on the identifiable political system of Guyana.

2. A Heuristic Model

The model (fig. 1) is an attempt to conceptualise a political system and to distinguish it from the intra-societal environment in which it operates. The conception here proposed, is one formulated by Donald Grady in the following terms: "a political system consists of the most inclusive structures in a society that have recognised responsibility for performing at a minimum the function of goal-attainment by means of legitimate decisions or policies." Hence the political system functions within the social system. But its boundaries are not identified with any particular territorial unit. Instead the political system is

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1. Donald J. Grady, "Political System as an Analytic Concept", unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1965, p. 5. He offers a detailed analysis of this concept, and pp. 37-42 are of special relevance to our model.
Fig. 1 A Model of the Intra-societal Environment and the Political System

Intra-Societal Environment

- Ecological System
- Personality System
- Social System
- Cultural System
- Biological System

Demographic Indicators

Economic Indicators

Social Structure

The Political System

- Political Socialisation & Recruitment
- Interest Articulation & Aggregation
- Political Communication
- Political Community
- Regime
- Authorities

Political Inputs

Political Outputs

Output Functions

Feed back loop
concerned with "those structures that produce decisions that have a particular quality and are backed by a particular sanction. The quality is that of legitimacy — that of being considered rightfully binding regardless of personal preferences."²

By conceptualising the political system in this way our model points to the direct influence of the environment upon the political system. In so doing the conception does not account for the total environmental context of the political system proposed in the Easton Analysis.³ But constructing our instrument as an adaption of the Easton model, we have accepted the ecological system, the biological system, the personality system, the social system, and the cultural system as environmental givens.⁴

The model concentrates on the influence of the social system along with that of demographic, economic and social indicators on the political system. This appears appropriate since Grady's modification of the Easton model shows a direct link between the social system — via the indicator-categories — and the political system.

The model proposes demographic indicators, economic indicators and indicators of social structure as components of the social system. These indicators provide a direct link with the political system. By

² Donald J. Grady, "Political System", p. 40.
³ Easton, A. Framework, p. 70.
⁴ Donald J. Grady, "Schema", pp. 4-11, offers the rationale for so doing.
associating each of these indicators with a range of empirical referents we have attempted a systemic assessment of the environmental context of the political system.

The demographic indicators point to the size, the density, the growth rate and the natural increase and the urban-rural distribution of the population of Guyana. The economic indicators denote the national income, national product, patterns of consumption, levels of trade and unemployment. The social structure indicators draw mainly on an historical survey of the interacting groups within the social system. It is the individual characteristics and the cultural heritage of these groups which particularly demonstrate the influence of the intra-social system on the political system.

3. The Demographic Indicators

In discussing the demographic indicators, we recognise the difficulty involved in disentangling this indicator from the economic and the social indicators. Social attitudes as to the size of families, the level of education, the economic development and the rise of income per capita --- all obviously help to shape the size and distribution of the population.

Table 1 gives a summary picture of demographic development in Guyana over the last 35 years, and simultaneously provides a quantitative insight into the demographic factors as they affect the political system.

As can be seen in the Table, the net additions to the Guyanese population were only 3,000 - 5,000 a year on average during the period
1931-1945. Following World War II, the annual increase tripled.5


<table>
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<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-61</td>
<td>535438</td>
<td>23056</td>
<td>5297</td>
<td>17759</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-65</td>
<td>621400</td>
<td>26567</td>
<td>5224</td>
<td>21043</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1959-61: Cols. (2) to (4) from Quarterly Statistical Digest, September 1962 (Georgetown: Government Printer, 1963), Tables 6 and 7.


Characterising the accelerated population growth is a shift in the age distribution of the population. These changes are shown in Tables 2a and 2b which demonstrate clearly how over time the population...
has become markedly younger. In 1921, 10.4 per cent of the population were between the ages of 1 month and 5 years old, 21.9 between the ages of 5 and 15 while 50 per cent were between 15 and 45 years old. By 1960, 58.4 per cent were between the ages of 15 and 45 years old while 28.7 per cent were between the ages of 5 and 15 and 17.5 in the youngest age group.

TABLE 2a. Age Distribution of the Population, 1921-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1921 Census</th>
<th>1931 Census</th>
<th>1946 Census</th>
<th>1960 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 0 and under 5</td>
<td>30754</td>
<td>45077</td>
<td>62732</td>
<td>98195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 5 &quot; &quot; 15</td>
<td>64613</td>
<td>66369</td>
<td>84338</td>
<td>161075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 15 &quot; &quot; 45</td>
<td>148448</td>
<td>146563</td>
<td>162241</td>
<td>215255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 45 &quot; &quot; 64</td>
<td>42666</td>
<td>43607</td>
<td>47597</td>
<td>67072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 65</td>
<td>9136</td>
<td>8459</td>
<td>12422</td>
<td>18809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age not stated</td>
<td>2074</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297691</td>
<td>310933</td>
<td>369678</td>
<td>560406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2b. Percentage Distribution of Table 2a, for those whose age was stated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 0 and under 5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 5 &quot; &quot; 15</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 15 &quot; &quot; 45</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 45 &quot; &quot; 64</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 65</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of dependents per person of working age (15-64)

|                | 0.55 | 0.63 | 0.76 | 0.98 |

Sources: 1921 and 1931, R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table on p. 158.
1946, R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table 4, p. 160.
What is more, as shown in Table 3a and 3b, there have been marked differences in the rates of growth in the numbers of the various races in Guyana. The increasing proportion of East Indians especially after World War II is notable. By 1960 this group constituted just under half of the total population and in 1964 they numbered 50.16 per cent of the population. As noted in Table 3a, East Indians numbered 289,790 while Africans numbered 192,660 of the population.

Table 4 shows the marked distribution of population by race. In the urban areas of Georgetown and New Amsterdam, the East Indians make up 21.9 per cent and 24.7 per cent of the population respectively, while the Africans number 48.5 per cent and 53.9 per cent respectively. When the mixed and African groups are taken together, they total 70.6 per cent and 71.8 per cent respectively. The trend is reversed in the rural areas where the Indian population, except in Essequibo, numbers over 50 per cent and as high as 71.5 per cent in Berbice. Hence reflected in the demography one finds an impediment to unity in the politics of Guyana in the pockets of racial cleavages.

4. Economic Indicators

To appreciate fully the impact of the economic indicators on the politics of Guyana, one has to realise that it was European capital and the existence of European markets that stimulated the creation of this new society in the South American mainland. It was working on the sugar plantations and other crops that Europeans, Africans, Indians, Portuguese and Chinese had their direct contacts. But most important is the fact that effective control of the economy is still to a large extent located outside Guyana.
TABLE 3a. Census Returns by Race, 1911-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>East Indians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Other Europeans</th>
<th>Amerindian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>126517</td>
<td>115846</td>
<td>30251</td>
<td>2623</td>
<td>10084</td>
<td>3937</td>
<td>6901</td>
<td>295001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>124938</td>
<td>117169</td>
<td>30587</td>
<td>2722</td>
<td>9175</td>
<td>3291</td>
<td>9150</td>
<td>297690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>130540</td>
<td>124203</td>
<td>33800</td>
<td>2951</td>
<td>8612</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>8348</td>
<td>310933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>163434</td>
<td>143385</td>
<td>37685</td>
<td>3567</td>
<td>8543</td>
<td>2480</td>
<td>16322</td>
<td>375701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>267840</td>
<td>183980</td>
<td>67189</td>
<td>4074</td>
<td>(11873)</td>
<td>(               )</td>
<td>25450</td>
<td>560406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>289790</td>
<td>192660</td>
<td>66420</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>7390</td>
<td>4760</td>
<td>23600</td>
<td>590140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3b. Percentage Composition of the Population by Race 1911-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Total non-Amerindian population</th>
<th>East Indians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>All others except Amerindian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>289140</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>288540</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>302585</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>359379</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>534956</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1946, R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table 1, p. 153.
### TABLE 4a. Geographical Distribution of the Population by Race, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>East Indians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>All other except Amerindians</th>
<th>Amerindians</th>
<th>Total including Amerindians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana Urban</td>
<td>267840</td>
<td>183980</td>
<td>67189</td>
<td>15947</td>
<td>25450</td>
<td>560406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown and suburbs</td>
<td>32474</td>
<td>72027</td>
<td>32769</td>
<td>10729</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>148402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Amsterdam</td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>7580</td>
<td>2523</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Demerara</td>
<td>68351</td>
<td>45179</td>
<td>10122</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>127404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Demerara</td>
<td>42848</td>
<td>14646</td>
<td>2920</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>62219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbice</td>
<td>91470</td>
<td>27350</td>
<td>6918</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>127994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essequibo</td>
<td>29221</td>
<td>16198</td>
<td>11937</td>
<td>1089</td>
<td>21883</td>
<td>80328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4b. Percentage Distribution of Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>East Indians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>All other except Amerindians</th>
<th>Amerindians</th>
<th>Total including Amerindians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana Urban</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown and suburbs</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Amsterdam</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Demerara</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Demerara</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbice</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essequibo</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A quantitative background of economic development in Guyana is provided in Table 5. Row 1 shows that during the period 1953-64, the Gross National Product (GNP) increased by 51 per cent. Row 6 shows that except for 1955 and 1959 there was little difference in household income per capita between 1953 and 1960. An interesting observation in the Table (Row 4) is that exports were constantly over half of the GNP. Thus we note the heavy dependence of the economy on exports, but at the same time the large payments abroad in profits and interest (Row 7).

But the economic indicator category --- as a means of assessing intra-societal influences on the political system would not be complete without information on employment and unemployment. Amid the lack of reliable data one discovers a labour survey which was conducted in April 1960. The material derived from this study is presented in Table 6.

As is clear from the statistics, the unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force was 10.8 per cent in 1960. Unemployment in Georgetown and its suburbs at 12.4 per cent was significantly higher than unemployment in the rural areas where seasonal farm employment was supplemented by piece work in factories or by small scale one-man and family businesses.

Apart from these unemployment trends, the economy of Guyana is dominated by a few foreign companies. In 1964 five enterprises --- Bookers

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5. Basic Economic Statistics for British Guiana, 1953-1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(millions of West Indian dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157.9  174.0  173.2  187.4  201.5  207.5  212.4  238.3  260.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Personal Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136.1  143.7  146.2  158.5  167.4  172.1  178.2  191.8  ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Government Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.8   22.2   26.0   28.4   32.2   32.8   33.5   35.8   ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Exports of Goods and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.5   87.9   93.1   98.2   114.6   104.0   110.8  134.8  146.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Imports of Goods and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.8   80.9   95.4   100.9   120.9   119.2   113.7  149.8  147.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Per capita household net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income at constant 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prices ($)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364    379    347    361    358    353    344    376    ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Net income payments to rest of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3   9.9    9.4    11.1   14.6    11.2   11.4   13.8   ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Exports as a percentage of national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.1   50.5   53.8   52.4   56.9    50.1   52.2   56.6   59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversion index: 1.7 B.W.I. dollar to 1 U.S.A. dollar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whole of British Guiana April 1960</th>
<th>Georgetown and suburbs April 1960</th>
<th>Rest of British Guiana April 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Population</td>
<td>560.4</td>
<td>148.4</td>
<td>320.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Male</td>
<td>279.2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>164.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Female</td>
<td>281.2</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>156.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Labour Force</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Male</td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Female</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Labour Force as percentage of population</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Male</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Female</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployed as percentage of Labour Force</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Male</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Female</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brothers Limited, Demerara Bauxite Company (Alcan), Reynolds Metals, Sandbach Parker and North West Guiana Mining Company --- together accounted for nearly 80 per cent of Guyana's exports ($90 million). These companies operate on a large scale, and until the early 1960's the administration of these companies was exclusively foreign. The image of these firms tended to be that of exploiting monopoly capitalists. Under such circumstances the Guyanese political leaders, especially the left wing leaders of the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) agitated for national ownership and greater control of these businesses. Ironically enough, together with political instability and remoteness from large markets, the desire for economic nationalism has discouraged new businesses from entering the country.

5. Social Structure Indicators

Guyana's contemporary social structure originated in the slave plantations. As R. T. Smith points out, "a social system evolved on these plantations". At the top of the hierarchy were the owners, or managers acting for absentee owners in Britain. In the middle ranks were the artisans and overseers, poorer whites as well as free 'men of colour', the offspring of Europeans and Negro slave women. At the bottom were the slaves who were themselves divided into hierarchies with the locally born ranked above those from Africa, and house slaves above field slaves.

This society retained its rigid status hierarchy of class and colour. But even after emancipation in 1834, the Africans remained dependent for their cash income in large measure on the plantation economy.

and this meant that they remained within the framework of the "creole" society.

Especially after 1838, the social system of the African, the mixed and the whites continued through a common participation in social and economic life. In turn, they shared certain values and cultural forms especially in trying to emulate the English culture and adhering to the tenets of Christianity.

The stream of new immigrants after emancipation posed few problems for the creole society. The new Africans and West Indians were easily absorbed, the Portuguese and Chinese too, partly because their pigmentation placed them almost on par with Europeans and partly because they were few in number.

However, the great influx of indentured East Indian immigrants set a different problem. Their distinctive customs and religions, their poverty, their willingness to accept slave-like conditions on the estates made them

8. In this study, 'creole' society refers to a system which originated in plantation economies under colonialism. A creole society embraces the white, the mixed and the African groups. In Guyana, these groups all came to share a common conception of the colonial society; a conception in which things English and 'white' were valued highly, whilst things African and 'black' were valued lowly. However, what we refer to as the creole society has more or less been built up around the 'coloured' or racially mixed groups who were poised uneasily between the white aristocracy and the black proletariat. They were for a long time a privileged group, occupying important positions in the society and government and they demanded special consideration on the grounds that they were English in all but colour. See Smith, British Guiana, pp. 40-45 and Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism", Annals of New York Academy of Science, lxxxiii (1960), pp. 821-822.
objects of the scorn expressed in the designation, "coolie". Even after the Indians began to climb out of poverty they found themselves in comparative geographical isolation on the estates, cut off from the centres of creole society which were now concentrated mainly in the towns. As will be shown in our analysis of the political system, this initial stratification and segmentation of society still has consequences for the performance of such functions as interest articulation and interest aggregation within the political system of Guyana.

**Summary**

In this chapter we have noted that the "plural" society of Guyana came into existence in the nineteenth century as a direct consequence of the plantation economy. Heterogeneous cultural elements were drawn together primarily for production. The plantation was the setting in

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9. "Coolie" derives from the Hindu word "quli" meaning hired labourer. In Guyana the term was originally used in a derogatory sense to refer to the inferior role and status of the Indians who arrived as indentured labourers on the plantations. Even today, to refer to a person as a "coolie" is to stigmatise him as an inferior being.

10. This theme is fully developed in J. S. Furnivall, "Tropical Economy", in R. Henden, ed., Fabian Colonial Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945). The term plural society which is also associated with the writings of Furnivall, has gained wide currency in recent years. In this paper we use "pluralism" and plural society as a classification concept and not as an analytic one, i.e., we use it as a label for "multi-racial" societies such as Guyana.

which socio-economic differences became aligned with racial and cultural differences. During the period of British hegemony, any conflicting group interests of the East Indians and Africans were kept in abeyance by parallel status deprivation as well as to a certain degree by their common opposition to colonialism.

By identifying the demographic, the economic and the social structure indicators as direct points of contact with the political system, we suggested that the empirical referents associated with these indicators are vital to our understanding the nature and the performance of political functions.

An analysis of the demographic referents shows a close correlation between urbanisation and creolism on the one hand, and ruralism and a great Indian agricultural population on the other. The economic indicators exemplify a low annual growth rate, a large unemployment figure and a great proportion of externally owned companies. These demographic and economic trends are super-imposed on a social structure in which ethnic cleavages are inherent.

That these indicators help to shape the 'political culture' of Guyana, and hence the inputs of demand and support will be demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4.
III

INPUTS OF DEMAND AND IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY

1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall aim at assessing the political culture of Guyana and at relating it to the within-puts of demand. We shall show how the political culture links the interactions in the environment to the interactions within the political system.

The political culture will be shown to reflect the society's attitudes and orientations toward the political system. Simultaneously, the political culture will be seen to affect the demands and supports that enter the political system. The consequences of this demand-support behaviour, will be illustrated by the way in which the political system responds to the input functions of political socialisation, interest articulation and aggregation and political communication. In short, the sources of stress identified in the intra-societal environment will be examined not only as they reflect the type of political culture but also as they are relayed via the input functions to affect the capabilities of the political system.

2. The Political Culture

When we speak of the political culture of Guyana, we are not referring to what is happening, but to what people believe about the events of their society. These may be beliefs about the actual state of political
life or the goals or values that ought to be pursued.\textsuperscript{1} These perceptions and attitudes can be classified as "cognitive, effective and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects and the self as a political actor".\textsuperscript{2} Cognitive orientations involve knowledge of and beliefs about the roles and incumbents of roles in the political system; effective orientations refer to feelings about roles, personnel and performance of the political system; and evaluational orientations, to the judgements and opinions about political objects.\textsuperscript{3}

These orientations can be evaluated in connection with the input-objects of support (to be examined in chapter 4), since specific roles and incumbents of roles --- the objects of orientations --- correspond to the 'role' aspect of the regime and the 'incumbent' aspect of the authoritative structures.\textsuperscript{4}

The different types of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward the political system can be assessed by applying empirical referents associated with voting behaviour, group violence and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Belief is used to mean a combination of cognitive, evaluative and expressive aspects of thought. The three involve no clear differentiation with respect to patterns of thought about politics. Belief in this sense is a more general term than 'attitudes' and 'opinions'. See Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture", in Fye and Verba eds., \textit{Political Culture and Political Development}, p. 516.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Almond and Verba, \textit{Civic Culture}, p. 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} These orientations are more fully described in Almond and Verba, \textit{Civic Culture}, chapter 1 especially pp. 12-16.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Donald J. Grady, "Schema", pp. 20-22 provides an analysis of the relationship between the categories offered in Almond and Verba and the input objects of support in Easton's political system.
\end{itemize}
sectionalism to the input categories of the political system of Guyana. In so doing, we can derive persuasive generalisations about Guyana's political culture as this factor reflects the condition and level of stress on the system.

In Guyana, voting patterns in national elections reflect a highly participant political culture. As Table 7 shows, in 1953, 71.5 per cent of the electorate voted and in the 1964 elections, 96 per cent of the electorate voted.

Despite the highly participant political culture reflected in these figures, there is nonetheless a tendency towards fragmentation and isolation among the political parties and the sectors of support which they mobilise. That the elections present a markedly racial alignment is to a great extent influenced by the role of the long established social, economic and demographic factors in the intra-societal environment. We have seen that the East Indian Society and the creole Society exist as separate cultural sections in Guyana, that occupationally Indians dominate the agricultural sector while the creoles dominate the Civil Service administration; that Indians form a greater proportion of the rural population than all the other races combined, while creoles outnumber the Indians in the towns.

Until 1955, race was not an issue in the politics of Guyana. But with the development of two parties with almost identical programmes of militant Guyanese nationalism and welfare socialism, an appeal to racial sentiment quickly developed. Since 1955, the relationship between

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5. Here we realise that voting behaviour alone cannot be used as data to prove the existence of a participant political culture. Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, especially chapter 2 measure the participant mode of behaviour of the citizens of the five regions, they examined, in terms, not only of their awareness of the outputs of the governmental machinery but also of their readiness to contribute to the inputs, by putting
### TABLE 7a. Votes in National Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Electors</td>
<td>208939</td>
<td>227466</td>
<td>239495</td>
<td>247604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes polled</td>
<td>154429</td>
<td>172161</td>
<td>194362</td>
<td>238530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage poll</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7b. Percentage of Votes for Individual Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Force (UF)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labour Front (NLF)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party (JP)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Equality Party (PEP)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples National Congress (PNC)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
political parties and ethnic groups have become obvious. The faction of
the Peoples' Progressive Party, led by Cheddi Jagan, an Indian, received
predominantly Indian support, while the faction led by Forbes Burnham,
an African, attracted predominantly African support. In 1961, when the
Indians comprised 49 per cent of the population, the PPP gained 43 per
cent of the votes cast at the General Elections of that year. At the
same time, the Africans comprised 30 per cent of the population, but the
PNC received 41 per cent of the votes. The disparity between percentage
votes received by the PPP and Indians as a percentage of the population
was mainly accountable to the large proportion of East Indians under
voting age. That the PNC received 41 per cent of the votes meant that
it acquired substantial support from outside the African population among
the creole group. In each of the general elections since the formation
of the United Force (UF) in 1961, its percentage of votes has closely
approximated the size of the combined European, Chinese, Amerindian and
Portuguese populations.

But voting patterns in the elections of 1964 provide, perhaps, the
best guide to the cognitive and affective orientations towards the political
system of Guyana. In deciding between "first past the post" and proportional
representation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies felt that
proportional representation would be likely to result in the formation of
coalition parties supported by different races, and this would go a long
way toward reducing racial tension. In fact, the election proved to be

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pressure on those who control the machinery. We shall also be examining
other measures of participation when we are discussing interest articulation
and interest aggregation. See below pp. 48-58.

6. See Appendix I for a statement by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, p. 94.
an extension of the previous racial tensions and hostilities. "People used their ballots like bullets". As shown in Table 7a, over 96 per cent of the electorate voted, and the result was a victory for the non-Indian parties.

It must be pointed out that after 1953, few valid conclusions relevant to the political culture theme could be drawn from the distribution of votes recorded for right wing-left wing parties. Both the PPP and the PNC draw their support from the working class. But whereas in the 1953 elections a united PPP propounded left wing ideologies and attracted wide segments of the working class, after 1955, left wing policies seemed to have been superceded by an appeal to race. 7

We include data on the right wing-left wing ideological continuum primarily to show that it is still a factor in the politics of Guyana. However, the influence of this syndrome has diminished appreciably since 1953.

In the 1957 elections, five political parties contested fourteen seats in the new legislature. Jagan's faction of the PPP won 11 seats, Burnham's faction won 3 seats, all of them in Georgetown constituencies where Burnham had a personal following among the African workers. The United Democratic Party (UDP), the then political arm of the African middle class, won the remaining seat in the middle class African town of New Amsterdam. As the 1961 elections approached, "Apanjaht" became the election cry. 8 But the implications of "apanjaht" politics for a

fragmented political culture in Guyana are reiterated in an observation by Hugh O'Shaughnessy on the 1964 General Elections. He wrote, "Guyanese trooped to the polling stations, the East Indians in the villages to vote for Cheddi Jagan and the PPP, the Negroes in Georgetown and other cities to back Burnham and the PNC and the Portuguese and Amerindians to support Peter D'Aguiar's UF".9

Voting behaviour is usually an index of competition for power between two or more groups. In Guyana voting behaviour assumes an additional index, viz., an index of conflict between two major ethnic groups, the Indians and the Africans.

Conflict between these two groups was manifest in the group violence which occurred during the general strikes of 1962, 1963 and 1964. It has been reported that when the three-month strike ended on July 8, 1963, 135 persons had been killed, 450 were injured and the estimated cost of damage to houses and other business property was $50 million (B.W.I.).10 Again in 1964 it was established that when the 161 day strike ended on July 27, 160 persons had died as a result of racial violence while 950 were injured and 1000 houses were destroyed at a financial cost of $14 million (B.W.I.).11

Group violence expressed itself mainly in terms of Afro-Indian conflict.

On May 24, 1964, for example, 1200 Indians were evacuated from Wismar, a mining town, as a result of attacks by Africans. It was reported that in this case 100 houses were burned and 60 persons were killed, including two Indian shop-keepers beaten to death by Africans. What is more, as a result of these violent clashes between the two racial groups it is reported that there was voluntary segregation in some villages such as Paradise, Good Hope, Better Hope, Sorrow, Bachelor's Adventure, Friendship, and Annandale where Indians and Africans formerly lived side by side. This spontaneous movement seemed to have been caused by well-founded fears of the minority group in most villages that they might be bombed, murdered or burned in their beds.

Group violence was not only widespread, but it underscored the growing sectionalism based on race. This sectionalism and the attitude of hostility among the races finds its sources in the intra-societal environment context, i.e., in the racial cleavages demonstrated by the demographic, the economic and the social structure indicators. The voting patterns as well emphasise a strong racial bias based upon tensions between urban creole cultural sections and rural Indian cultural sections. It is for these reasons that we have come to relate the effects of the intra-societal environment upon the fragmented political culture of Guyana.

But apart from the influences of the environment, beliefs about the political life, the goals and the values that ought to be pursued, are closely related to the process by which people are inducted into the


13. For a full account of these events see Wallace, "Cause of the Present Discontent", p. 540.
political system. Hence the type of political culture found in Guyana can be further illuminated in our examination of the political system by reference to the character and performance of the functions of political socialisation and recruitment.

3. Political Socialisation and Recruitment

According to Almond and Coleman, all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures over time. Political socialisation therefore pervades the family, the church, the neighbourhood, the village, the schools. Many of the attitudes toward politics a person evinces in his adulthood can be traced back to these primary associations. But political socialisation is continuous, involving secondary associational activity in later years as well as such obvious phenomena as the exposure to the mass media. These latter experiences may conflict with or reinforce general orientations toward the political, acquired in childhood.

The English policies, ideas and customs which dominated the Guyanese society (of which the political system is a part), assisted in separating the bulk of the population from the source of its values, rather than stimulating the process of integration so vital to the unification of a nation. The period between the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, and the final abolition of slavery in 1834 saw the consolidation of a remarkably stable hierarchy in which anything white and English was highly valued; anything African and black was lowly valued.

Following emancipation, a strong African peasantry emerged. The

14. Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, p. 27.
African families came together in two types of villages: one in which each villager held a separate title for the land he purchased, and the other in which land titles were vested in a single deed in the names of all those who had pooled their resources. The latter became the dominant form of African rural settlement.\textsuperscript{15} Organised in this manner, the African peasantry as a cultural form, lacked survival value. There was physical fragmentation in the communal village as each shareholder received a proportion of good and bad land which were in many cases widely separated. There was also social fragmentation in the communal villages as each generation inherited proprietary rights to what Guyanese call "children property". These rights could not be alienated unless all members of a group agreed to alienate them. Meanwhile each member of the group could use the land as he or she saw fit.

As a result, over the past 100 years, the progressive fragmentation of African land forced increasing numbers to seek a livelihood outside the villages usually in the urban environment. The urban emigration was further facilitated by the spread of primary education to rural Africans as a result of the compulsory education bill of 1877.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast to the African Slave System, the indentured system under which the Indians came to Guyana favoured a continuity in East Indian culture patterns. Indians were confined to the estates. They were thus prevented from mixing with other groups. In addition, the law prevented planters from imposing their customs on Indian workers.


Indian parents did not want to send their daughters to Christian schools, where they might "take up" with Africans. This would make it difficult for their families to arrange marriages with suitable husbands in the Indian community. At the same time Indians preferred their sons to work in boys' gangs on the estates in order to supplement family income. No doubt the planters found these attitudes profitable as the Indians were exempted from the compulsory education law of 1877.17 Thus many avenues of so-called modernizing influence were not completely available to the Indian family until the indenture system was terminated in 1917 by the Government of India.

Hence we notice that within African and Indian communities, the process of socialisation was markedly different in a fashion immediately relevant to the way these groups responded to institutional and functional dimensions of authority within the political system. The creole and the African absorbed westernisation, its culture and its transplanted political and social structures. For the Indian however, endogamy or cultural persistence outweighed the trends toward assimilation. Since indenture was initially entered into as a temporary contract, there was no impetus to assimilation on the part of the early Indian migrants. Educational deprivation, for example, inhibited occupational and professional mobility and maintained the rural framework of the East Indian ways of life.

The church also became one of the chief instruments through which values and orientations were inculcated especially in the African and creole sectors. The London Missionary Society was formed in 1795 for

the sole purpose of evangelical work among the heathen. Missionary Society clergymen started a primary school in Georgetown in 1809 and many planters contributed money to the missions believing that they would make the slaves more tractable. What in fact did happen was that conversion to Christianity made the slaves dissatisfied with their status. This in turn led to a number of insurrections and rebellions. The slaves were beginning to articulate their interests.

As a socialising agent, the church had little influence among the Indians. The West Indian census shows that in 1946, for example, 90 per cent of the Indian population was classified as non-Christian. It is not surprising to discover that there were special Indian organisations to foster cultural cohesiveness in the Indian communities, a trend which was undoubtedly reinforced by the Indians' perception of social rejection by the larger society. Hindus organised the Sanatan Dharm Maha Sabha and its reform sect the Bharat Sevashram Sangh, while Muslims organised in exactly the same way into orthodox and reform movements called the Sunnatwal Jamaat and the Ahmediyya, respectively.

This development is of national importance since the Muslim and Hindu organisations have taken on an increasing amount of responsibilities for social work among Indians parallel to that performed by the Christian churches for the African and creole populations.


19. See R. T. Smith, British Guiana, pp. 120-127 for a more detailed description of these organisations. For their relationships with the caste system, see C. Jaywardena, Conflict and Solidarity in a Guyanese Plantation (London: Athlone Press, 1963).
The process of political socialisation is also developed in the schools where children learn about the English countryside, English History and English Literature. In itself this may have assisted in creating a unifying base for the creole and Indian cultures. But the difficulty is that the pupils "could not identify themselves as English and were not encouraged to think of themselves as interesting, valuable or potentially creative." 20

Table 8 shows that in 1961 the number of primary and secondary school children as a percentage of the population between 5 and 20 years was above 70 per cent. It also shows that in this period, students enrolled in higher education were approximately one per thousand of the total population. These figures however do not account for the number of Guyanese students who may be pursuing higher studies by extension courses, or the number of students who might be pursuing extramural education by private study and by correspondence courses.

However, it seems appropriate to observe that as one of the primary structures performing the function of socialisation, the schools, with a curriculum weighted with English values, English models and standards, have failed to orient the strong racial patterns away from racial cleavages. This is in some way connected with the demographic and social factors since, especially at the primary school level, many of the schools in the villages have a predominantly Indian or African roll depending upon whether the school is situated in an Indian or African community. 21

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21. The writer makes this observation on the strength of his knowledge.
TABLE 8. **Student Enrolment in Primary, Secondary, Technical and Vocational and Higher Education 1961**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number on roll</th>
<th>Percentage of 5-20 years old on roll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Primary Government Aided</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>35239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>94134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Secondary Government Aided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6428</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Technical and Vocational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Adult Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>665</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>137701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) University Students</td>
<td>810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of University students per thousand of population


e: *British Guiana 1961* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1961), p. 140 where the number of Guyanese in Canada is given as 50; in the United States of America, 199; and at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 161. Smith, *British Guiana*, p. 140 gives the number of Guyanese students in England and Ireland as approximately 500.
Hence the cultural and family patterns, the religious and educational systems tend to reinforce the race-culture distinctions of the Indian and creole societies. These, in turn produce a process of political socialisation and recruitment that emphasises the gap between cultural communities as societal groups. The style in which the primary structures --- the family, the Christian churches, the Hindu and Muslim organisations and the schools --- perform the function of socialisation is manifestly incapable of sustaining general goals, general orientations acceptable to the two major cultural segments in Guyana. Equally clear in these trends is a political culture which lacks national cohesion, i.e., a fragmented political culture.

The interactions within the political system are affected by the citizenship experiences which are gained via the primary structures performing the functions of political socialisation and recruitment. This effect is better understood by an examination of the structures performing the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation.

4. Interest Articulation and Aggregation

In examining the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, we are specifically interested in the way the structures performing these functions continue or alter the process of political socialisation begun by the primary structures within the society. We are

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of the school-racial patterns in the Indian and African communities of Guyana. This view is also supported by Rudolph J. Grant, "The Role of the Canadian Presbyterian Church in the Educational System of Guyana", (M.A. Thesis) unfin. M.A., University of Toronto, 1966.
also concerned with the way in which these structures, located within the boundary of the political system, assist in recruiting the citizens into the political system.

In this respect, we shall be using the structural-functional measures provided by Almond and Coleman. But we hasten to point out that in the political system of Guyana, we find the distinction between the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation to be a fluid one. Among the input functions, interest articulation and interest aggregation are of crucial importance since they occur at the boundary of the political system and since the particular structures which perform these functions "and the style of their performance determine the character of the boundary between the polity [political system] and the society [intra-societal environment]."

According to Almond and Coleman, four main types of structures may be involved in interest articulation. First, there are institutional interest groups which perform other social or political functions but which may articulate their own interests. These institutional interest groups occur within such organisations as legislatures, political executives, armies, bureaucracies and churches. Second, there is the non-associational interest groups "which articulate interests informally or intermittently", through lineage, ethnic, regional, status and class groups. Third, there are anomie groups which articulate interests by

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22. See Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, pp. 30-38.
23. Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, p. 33.
means of spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system such as riots and demonstrations. Fourth, there are associational interest groups which are specialised structures of interest articulation, and are organised to transmit their demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures and bureaucracies.

According to the analysis developed here, interest aggregation is performed via these four types of groups and additionally by political parties which formulate interests and demands, and in turn, transmit them to other political structures such as the legislature, the executive and the bureaucracies. In many respects, as we shall see, political parties and interest groups in Guyana do not constitute differentiated autonomous structures. They interpenetrate each other.

Hence by examining the way such structures as interest groups and political parties perform the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, we should be able to make partial assessment regarding the inputs of demand and their effects on the political system of Guyana. It may be possible for us to further characterise the performance of the interest articulation and interest aggregation functions as "manifest" or "latent", "specific" or "diffuse", "general" or "particular", "instrumental" or "affective". If interest articulation or aggregation is manifest and specific, then there tends to be an explicit claim or demand or request. The performance of the functions are latent and diffuse when behaviour is implicit or when demands are of a general nature. Interest articulation and aggregation may be general "when they are couched in class or professional terms or particular
when they reflect individual and family terms. Interest articulation and interest aggregation may be instrumental when they take the form of a bargain or they may be affective when they take the form of an expression of gratitude, anger or disappointment.  

In Guyana today, the non-associational and associational interest groups are continually enmeshed in the political lives of the citizens. Not only are ethnic associations and organisations a fundamental aspect of community life in Guyana, but by projecting their activities on the political system, in an informal and intermittent style, they also provide examples of non-associational interest groups. In recent years these ethnic associations have increased their activities as structures performing the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation. The Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha among the Hindus, the Sunnat Wal Jamaat among the Muslims, and the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA) — wedded to the doctrine of negritude and self-realisation of the black man — these have all tended to intensify their campaign to win national concessions for their own group. Although the programmes and activities of these groups are expressed in terms of philanthropic and educational goals, these associations give evidence of substantial involvement in competition for formal power in the system. Thus both Indian associations pledge support to the PPP and Cheddi Jagan, an Indian. ASCRIA, on the other hand, while making Africans

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25. For a more detailed analysis see Almond and Coleman, *Developing Areas*, pp. 33-36.
more aware of the beauty and richness of their African heritage, also
is clearly committed to the PNC, led by Forbes Burnham, an African.26

The process of induction into the political culture and the
political system of Guyana has been further accelerated by the develop-
ment of associational interest groups. Together with the ethnic
associations, the trade unions, the civic groups and the political parties
have fostered openness of the political system to demands coming from
various groups in the intra-societal environment.

The trade unions in Guyana are a formidable set of associational
interest groups. In organising the workers they teach the lesson that
industrial action is useful, necessary and instrumental, but in the last
resort it is helpless unless backed by political power, i.e., unless
industrial interests can be articulated so as to influence the policies
of the decisional units, the roles, and role-incumbents within the
political system.

During the 1930's, the years of the world depression, Hubert Nathaniel
Critchlow, the pioneer of local trade unionism in Guyana was painfully
making gains in his attempt to organise the workers. By 1937, there were
three trade unions: the British Guiana Labour Union, the Workers League
and the Manpower Citizens Association. The latter was formed by Ayube

26. For an account of the Sanatan Dharm Maha Sabha and the Sunnatwal
Jamaat, see R. T. Smith British Guiana, pp. 120-127. Since little is written
on ASCRIA, we gained much of our information from discussions with the
Registrar of the movement (at present a student at McMaster University).
The movement was founded in March 1964 by Sidney King who was a Minister
in the 1953 PPP government when the Constitution was suspended. The
doctrine of "negritude" propounded by ASCRIA finds ideological support
principally in terms of cultural links with East and West Africa. One
leading theoretician of "negritude" is President L. Senghor, poet and
statesman, now President of Senegal.
M. Edun in an attempt to organise the Indian worker on the sugar plantation. By 1947, there were twenty-three unions and five associations of independent tradesmen, none of which except for the M.P.C.A. claimed more than 600 members. The unions in Guyana have always had strong political involvement. Considering the size of the population, the dearth of leadership, and the necessity of the politicians to demonstrate their interest in the cause of the enfranchised classes, this was not surprising. As soon as the franchise was extended beyond the narrow confines of the small upper-middle classes, the politicians made their appeal to a class that was homogeneous in regard to its economic depression, no matter how internally divided in terms of race.

It is perhaps out of lack of appreciation for the functions of trade unions in developing nations like Guyana that the Waddington Commission commented as follows:

The trade union movement has been too much used by would-be politicians as a means of obtaining power, and not as a way of improving the conditions of labour; too many presidents and officials of trade unions even today are mere politicians; many of them are not and never have been "workers". Among the rank and file of the unions there does not seem to be that sense of 'belonging' and of owing constant loyalty and support to protect their interests which is fundamental to trade unionism and characterises the movement in the United Kingdom.


28. For a more detailed enumeration of figures see Informatives (Georgetown: Government Information Services, 1948), p. 96.

But if the Commission objected to the politicisation of the trade unions, what would they have had to say about the role of the bureaucracy which in recent years performed the equally political function of interest articulation in the country. In Guyana, the Civil Service, as a structure, performs the functions of processing wants into demands, articulating and aggregating interests in conjunction with other structures within the political system.

Since February 1961, the Civil Service Association has been a union of the Trade Union Council (TUC). The Civil Service brought solid organisation and effective internal bureaucracy to the TUC as exemplified in the General Strikes of 1962, 1963 and 1964.

In other South American countries, it is typical for the army to articulate interests, to engineer and spearhead coups d'etat and even control the structures of authority. In Guyana, there is no organised section analogous to a regular army to check unpopular government action. Hence in the general strikes of 1962, 1963 and 1964, the Civil Service provided the spirit and leadership and the resistance to the PPP government. In all three strikes, the Civil Service Association remained a militant wing of the TUC. They not only answered the call by the TUC for strike action but they also demonstrated with and bargained for the TUC against the PPP government. These activities of the Civil Service and the trade union are even more striking when we see that they both have a predominantly urban creole membership and in fact are factions within the organisation of the PNC.

Hence the interest groups in Guyana are closely related to political parties. And as we shall see, the political parties, both in their organisation and their style of performing the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation contribute to racial cleavages. Except for a brief period in the early 1950's political parties in Guyana developed along racial lines. In January 1950, the PPP was formed. Under the leadership of Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, the PPP organised itself into the first really operative political party the country had ever had. The general aims of the party were self-government, economic development and the creation of a socialist society. Whatever its merits, such a social revolution was incompatible with the declared colonial policy of gradual advance to self-government.

In most of its aims the PPP were, in fact, articulating and aggregating interests in a style which was manifest and specific. It was doing so for a cross section of Guyanese who were opposed to the principle of colonialism and who wanted economic progress and 'social justice'.

With the achievement of self-government in 1953, the party appeared to have brought together both major races and presented a truly national front in opposition to British rule. Its overwhelming success in the General Elections of 1953 testified to its popularity. Of five political parties contesting the elections the PPP won eighteen of the twenty-four seats.32


32. For details on the 1953 elections see R. T. Smith, British Guiana, Chapter VII; also see Table 7a, above, p. 37.
With the suspension of the Constitution on October 8, 1953 and the British removal of the PPP government, the advance toward nation-building was abruptly halted. We do not intend to assign credit or blame, but we note that the net effect of the suspension of the Constitution was to postpone the development of responsible planning for the solution of the society's acute economic and social problems. Even more important, the interruption of the PPP government also effectively moved the focus of Guyanese politics back to constitutional problems, and laid the basis for the eventual development of racial division. As a sequel, the cross current of race have been increased with corresponding stress on the political system. The elections of 1957, 1961 and 1964 tell, in increasing degrees of intensity, the story of a political system where the political parties perform the functions of articulation and aggregation in a particularistic style, i.e., along racial lines. It also implies that as agents of socialisation and recruitment, political parties in Guyana tend to perpetuate the fragmented political culture of Guyana. Since the political parties aggregate and articulate interests along racial lines, they reinforce obvious impediments to unity in the politics of Guyana.


34. See Appendix I for extracts from a statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the British Guiana Conference 1963. This statement seems a good description of some reasons for impediments to unity in the politics of Guyana. See also Appendix II for a brief description of the splinter parties.
The structure and functions of the other major parties, the PNC and the UF, also reflect racial bases which have already been considered in connection with the voting patterns in Guyana. In 1958 the Burnham faction of the PPP changed its name to the PNC, and in 1959 the United Democratic Party (UDP), merged with the PNC. This party (the PNC), is organised in cells similar to the PPP, and holds an annual Party Convention at which general party policy and resolutions are, in principle, formulated. The PNC was able to bring the African-dominated labour unions within its organisation. It receives substantial support from the Federated Teachers Union and various Civil Service unions (such as the postal workers, government clerks, transport, communications) as well as industrial unions (such as the building trade, mine workers and printers). Hence while the PPP formed the government and controlled the structures of authority, these unions were critical both of the government's economic policy as well as the administrative operations of the government. Each of these represented structures which effectively articulated interests in opposition to the PPP government.

With the development of deeper bifurcation of associational life reflected in the PPP with its Indian support, and the PNC with its African support, the UF emerged as a party drawing its adherents mainly from the business community and the Portuguese-European elements in society. The

35. This political party was formed in 1952. It was comprised mainly of the urban and middle class African and creole sections of the population. Its leader, John Carter, now Sir John Carter and Guyana's ambassador in Washington, has been identified as essentially conservative in ideology. Originally, any identification of the PNC with this group would have meant the alienation of many of the African proletariat.
formation of this party in November 1960 was mainly in protest against
the greater degree of state control of church-primary schools, which
were financed by the state but run by individual churches —- Protestant,
Anglican and Catholic. With its leader Peter D’Aguiar of Portuguese
catholic descent, the party depended upon the support of a multi-racial
but deeply conservative creole middle class Guyanese. It also could
count on the unofficial support of the Catholic and the Anglican churches,
and from the Amerindian population among whom the influence of Catholic
missions was important.

That the PNC and UF formed a coalition government after the 1964
elections can be explained partly by their mutual opposition to the PPP,
and partly perhaps, by the common creole base shared by the factions
supporting the UF and PNC respectively. Since, as we have shown, the
political parties like the interest groups tend to aggregate and articulate
interests along racial lines they perpetuate the impediments to unity
in the politics of Guyana.

Whether or not this tendency towards stress is further accelerated
by the mass media, the press, the radio, will be examined in our analysis
of political communication.

5. Political Communication

The function of political communication helps the political system
respond to the demands coming from various groups within the political
system as well as from groups in the intra-societal environment. In
other words, political communication provides a network of linked channels
of information especially concerned with the processes of authoritative
decision-making in society. The structures performing the function of
political communication might simultaneously communicate demands and supports from the intra-societal environment to structures of authority and convey the content and rationales for such decisions from the political system to groups and individuals in society. These structures include such media of communication as radio broadcasts, newspapers, foreign and domestic mail. The structures also include such face-to-face contacts as those typical in political parties and interest groups "which determine to a large extent what in fact will be transmitted and who will be the insiders in the organisation, that is, those persons who receive both information and attention on highly preferred terms". 36 Hence political communication may in greater or lesser degree depend upon the same structures which aggregate and articulate interests.

We have shown how in the political system of Guyana, interest groups and political parties reflect strong ethnic loyalties. This has important implications for the performance of political communication within the political system of Guyana. According to Deutsch "without effective control of the bulk of actual face-to-face communications network ... the nominal holders of the legitimacy symbols may become relatively helpless vis-a-vis those groups that have control". 37

We may recall that in 1961-1964, the PPP occupied the formal structures of authority, i.e., held constitutional and formal power to rule, make decisions and communicate their decisions to other structures within the political system and in the environment. At the


same time, the bulk of the face-to-face communications network was under the control of the leadership of the combined opposition groups mainly composed of the creole and African populations. The Jagan government was therefore unable to manipulate the human and the institutional chains of communication associated with the Civil Service, the trade unions and creole society. The fact that the communication network was effectively used by the opposition leaders helped to weaken the general recognition of the legitimacy of the Jagan administration. In 1962, for example, the Jagan government was forced to withdraw its budget proposals because of the opposition made manifest by interest groups, including the Civil Service. In this case the functions of interest articulation and aggregation were combined with the function of political communication bringing pressure on the government and forcing it to yield to the demands of anti-government groups and parties.

In many respects political communication by face-to-face communications networks needs to be supplemented by more impersonal structures. These impersonal structures include the types and orientations of mass media, the number and content of items of domestic mail and the basis for such devices supplied by a society's literacy rate. Thus to some degree the general measures of these impersonal structures provide empirical referents of the process of political communication.

As yet Guyana does not enjoy the luxury of television services. Hence the main channels of mass media are the press and the radio. Table 9 shows the circulation figures of the main national and party

38. See above p. 57.
TABLE 9. Newspaper Circulation in Guyana, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Col. (1) Average Daily Circulation January-December 1965</th>
<th>Col. (2) Circulation per thousand of Population 15 years and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dailies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Chronicle</td>
<td>7893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening Post</td>
<td>8100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana Daily Graphic</td>
<td>20412</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror (PPP)</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43905</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weekend</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Chronicle</td>
<td>20662</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana Sunday Graphic</td>
<td>35300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Nation (PNC)</td>
<td>11000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun (UF)</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>69962</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figures in Column 2 were derived by compiling daily and weekend circulation respectively as a proportion of population over 15 years (Table 3a).

newspapers. On a crude average, about 200 out of every 1000 people in Guyana read the daily news, while 330 out of every 1000 read the Sunday news. However, taking into account that each family might purchase at maximum two or three dailies and a corresponding amount of weekend news, it is likely that the average number of newspaper readers per thousand of the population would be slightly higher than is indicated in column 2.
Despite the inadequacy of these figures, a good summary of the press is given in a report on the general elections of December 1964. The report noted that there was no official interference or censorship of the press but remarked that "the press in reporting and comment was intensely partisan. We observed that the PPP was handicapped in the use of the press, as all the newspapers were against it. The Mirror, an evening daily, was the only paper through which the PPP could express its views."\(^{40}\)

In addition to the newspapers, there are two broadcasting stations in Guyana. These give a complete coverage to the whole of the coastal strip and for some distance inland. It is estimated that they reach some 400,000 listeners through 90,000 receivers, and extensive communal listening facilities.\(^{41}\) Working on the basis of the 1964 population census (Table 3a), the radio as a medium of political communication reaches 660 out of every 1000 persons. This fact has important implications for the function of political communication especially when the two radio stations in Guyana together devote about one-twentieth of its broadcasting time to social, economic and political affairs.\(^{42}\) Thus, if we can interpret the style of political communication by radio as reflecting a


\(^{42}\) This figure is derived on an estimate reached on the basis of a limited random-sample count of programme content advertised in the Guyana Daily Graphic for the week ending Saturday, January 20, 1966.
more neutral interpretation of political events, this would suggest
that the instrument --- radio --- has special utility in promoting cohesion
in the political life of Guyana.43

During the 1964 elections, radio assisted in this function of
political communication with broadcasting time allotted to various parties
as follows:

TABLE 10. Distribution of Broadcasting Time
(General Elections 1964)

(i) Before Nomination Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of 15-minute broadcasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUMP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) After Nomination Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>7 broadcasts including the last broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>6 broadcasts with the right to the first broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>5 broadcasts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>2 broadcasts each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUMP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Whatever the immediate impact of the radio and the press on the
audiences, they appear, in the circumstances, manifestly insufficient to

43. The rationale for this assumption is provided by the Report by the Commonwealth Team of Observers on the Election in December 1964 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1965), p. 5. The Commission states that it found no evidence of partisanship on the part of the two broadcasting stations in Guyana.
the task of channeling information about political goals and processes Guyanese society, or in exercising effective influence on the socialisation function on behalf of the authorities of the political system.

6. Summary

The inputs of demand appear clearly laden with elements of stress on the political system. That stress can be identified in the political culture of Guyana is exemplified in the voting patterns and group violence in Guyana. The political culture, though highly participant, is fragmented rather than cohesive. The political culture is greatly influenced by the interactions within the intra-societal environment. But as shown in this chapter, the political culture links the interactions in the intra-societal environment with the demands and supports of the political system. Consequently, the political culture affects the input functions and is in turn affected by the way in which the relevant structures perform these functions.

Taking the complete pattern of structures and performance into account, we observed that the functions of political socialisation and recruitment are carried out in a manner which perpetuates the fragmentation of the political culture. Such primary structures as the family, the churches, the schools --- all help to consolidate distinctive trends of two identifiable cultural systems; the creole and the Indian. The interest groups and political parties, too, are structures which have contributed to stress on the politics of Guyana. These structures have capitalised on the race-culture divisions in such fashion that interest
groups and parties are obviously identified along racial lines. It follows, therefore, that in performing the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, these structures accentuate the process of political socialisation in terms of the distinctions between creole and Indian society, rather than in pursuit of an integrated intra-societal basis for the political system of Guyana.

We have also shown that the interest groups and political parties provide the structures of communication networks. These face-to-face structures, together with the impersonal structures of the radio and the press fail to channel information about political goals and processes in a way designed to aggregate and integrate group interests in the political culture. Lacking such consensual framework, the groups performing the input functions in society enhance rather than diminish stress upon and within the political system of Guyana.
IV

THE OBJECTS OF SUPPORT AND IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITY

1. Introduction

Political systems have been transformed as a result of civil war, military defeat or revolution; Germany at the end of World War II, France during the French Revolution, and Russia during the height of the revolution, provide examples. But in spite of the disturbances in its society, the political system in Guyana has survived.

That political systems manage to avert tendencies to complete destruction is in many respects due to the residue of positive response and evaluation for the basic objects of support: the "political community", the "political regime" and the "authorities". These, according to David Easton, are vital elements of any political system in that such structures bolster its capacity to persist in the face of threatened loss of support. These objects are important since "change of a political system will turn out to mean change of one or other of these objects". 1

This chapter will examine the patterns and potentials of support in the politics of Guyana. It will estimate support for the three political objects as a means of assessing the capabilities of the system to withstand stresses derived from the inputs of demand. For convenience, our estimate of support for the basic political objects will be limited to the post-1953 period, i.e., the period described by one writer as

"the awakening of political consciousness among the Guyanese people".2

The 1953 Constitution3 granted full internal self-government to Guyana, and in the elections of that year we witnessed the first nationally organised political party, the P.P.P.

For this reason we shall identify the political community with the political structures, the parties, interest groups, mass media and the structures of authority in the period 1953-1966. We shall attempt to find out the extent to which these political structures link individual members together and give them a sense of community i.e., a sense of togetherness. The political regime will be identified with the norms and roles of the political system and the way in which they are codified (for example, in the type and scope of the Constitution). But moreso, we shall be concerned with the level and kinds of political roles and norms. The authorities will be identified as the incumbents of regime roles and will be assessed in terms of their ability to allocate adequately, values for the society so as to make for systems maintenance against stress.

Finally this chapter will draw conclusions based on the analysis developed in this paper. In so doing it will be primarily concerned with reviewing the discernible areas of stress in the politics of Guyana.

2. The Political Community

No political system can exist without some minimum sharing of a


political division of labour. In 1953, for example, the plurality of political relationships in Guyana, the parties, the interest groups, the mass media, linked both individual members to each other while pursuing the political objectives of independence, increased economic development and "Guyanisation".

With the growing racial divisions and their outcome in the form of deep antagonism between the African and Indian groups, there has been a tendency for a sizeable proportion of Guyanese to withdraw support from the political community and to refrain from positive actions and attitudes with such substantial effect that in recent years, there has been singularly little indication of the fellow-feeling on which nation-building is based. "Few people refer to themselves as Guyanese, members of a Guyanese political system, instead of Indians, Africans and Portuguese." This fragmented, isolative orientation has serious implications for the level of support available from and manifested by groups in relation to the political community.

As is common in developing politics, the need for a political community i.e., the need for systems' integration, partly explains the appeal of Marxism among some actors. In Guyana, it was the rapid rise of the P.P.P. (1950-1953), whose Marxist ideology furnished the universalistic achievement values which provided a challenge to the particularistic political culture fostered by British colonial rule. Not only did this ideology present an integrated and unified set of values allowing

4. David Easton makes this point in his analysis of the critical measures of political community. See Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 178.
for the working off of aggressive feelings against the dominant power, but it also allowed the political community to identify itself with the Soviet Union, both a foreign and a nationalist power.

The PPP therefore initiated a political community which combined a broad nationalist front with the principles of Marxist-Leninism. But as is evident in the subsequent racial tensions and the split on racial lines, the leaders of the PPP failed to consolidate the convergence of Marxism and nationalism, and this contributed to the tendency of disintegration in the political community of Guyana.6

But there is another factor which further deepens the crisis of support in Guyana. The ethnic groups tend to seek psychological comfort by identifying themselves with the respective cultures and national societies from which they originated. Such organisations as ASCRIA, with its emphasis on African culture, and the Maha Sabha, with its enthusiasm for Indian culture, compromise support for the political community in Guyana by projecting loyalties of ethnic groups outside the system. It is therefore not surprising to find that in 1961, Sidney King, the President of ASCRIA, advocated partition of Guyana,7 and that in the 1964 elections when Jagan failed to gain a majority of votes,

6. See Halpern, "Racism and Communism in British Guiana", pp. 113-117. In his case study the writer discloses the petty jealousies that existed among the PPP leaders, their divergence in views about the extent to which Marxism ought to be applied to the politics of Guyana. (In the study Halpern interviewed most of the members of the 1953 PPP hierarchy and this provides some interesting insights.)

7. Sidney King was until his expulsion in August 1961, the Secretary of the PNC. His proposal for partition was that Guyana (like Gaul) should be divided into three parts, one for Indians, one for Negroes and one for those who wished to live with other races. See Peter Newman, Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 90.
the Maha Sabha called for partition. 8

In the post-election (1964) period, Jagan first remained away from the Assembly, then attempted to extend the area and level of his boycott campaign by urging his supporters to avoid certain government enterprises. It is reported, for example, that, as a consequence, rice farmers began to under-plant their holdings. 9 The rationale for this campaign was the party's claim that since all productive forces of the nation were in the rural area it was the rural worker (Indians) who was carrying the cities (Africans) on his back. If we read Indian for 'rural' and African for 'urban', "it is easy to see how a campaign such as this in a country in which ethnic, geographical and occupational boundaries run roughly along the same lines can lead to a further entrenchment of racial hostility and ultimately to a partition movement". 10

We are not however suggesting that there is no Guyanese political community. Instead we note that the strong racial identification within the political community does not augur well for the maintenance of a viable Guyanese political community. In other words there tends to be a

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8. See "British Guiana Partition", New York Times, December 14, 1964, p. 4 where it was reported that a Hindu and a Moslem group warned that they would press for partition unless Dr. Jagan's party joined the coalition. See also "Jagan Hints Partition" Georgetown Sunday Graphic, December 13, 1964, p. 1.


lack of strong feelings of mutual identification in the political community of Guyana.

This lack in the sense of identity is confirmed to some small degree in a limited investigation carried out by the writer. This was simply an attempt to produce an empirical set of cases in attitudes so as to assess better the sense of community among Guyanese. Over the past nine months, we have spoken informally to eighty-five Guyanese in Hamilton and Toronto, primarily to find out how, whether and to what degree they identify themselves with a describable Guyanese political community. At the opposite end of the same continuum we have been concerned with the level of negative affect, hostility or rejection operative in their views.

Our procedure was quite preliminary and subject to several important limitations, chief among which were: the absence of any attempt to construct a stratified sample keyed to Guyanese demography and social structure; reservations concerning the selection and salience of questions posed as measures of attitudes; and, finally, the problem of the identification of the interviewer, who might well be perceived by those canvassed as a person likely to be a member of a community or ethnic association in Guyana. Under these circumstances it is highly probable that a considerable element of unreliability has been incorporated into the data of the interviews.

Nevertheless, with these limitations understood, the sample revealed that 50 per cent of those interviewed expressed no firm identification with or commitment to Guyana and had in fact decided not to return to the country except on holidays. Whatever their motives, it is significant
that among the group, the fourteen Indo-Guyanese interviewed identified themselves least with Guyana. The greatest source of positive identification with Guyana, came from the Afro-Guyanese in Canada, though many felt that they would choose to remain in Canada because they enjoyed a higher standard of living in North America. Of twenty Guyanese of 'mixed' origin, fourteen identified themselves positively with a Guyanese political community while the remainder were non-committal. Those of Portuguese ethnic origin tended to be less committed to Guyana than the Afro-Guyanese and the creole. However, all twenty-one of the Portuguese who were interviewed preferred the present UF - PNC coalition to the former PPP government.

In spite of the limitations built into this sample, we derived a strong impression (based on the simple positive-negative continuum) that if the attitudes expressed in this survey were at all suggestive of patterns of identification in Guyana, Afro-Guyanese and Guyanese of mixed and Portuguese communal backgrounds tend to offer positive support and neutral acceptance of the current government while Indo-Guyanese offer least support.

We discovered however that the reverse trend was discernible under the Jagan administration (1961-1964). During this period many Guyanese of non-Indian descent seemed to have withdrawn their support from the political community. A newspaper report estimated that between 1961 and 1963, five hundred civil servants resigned their jobs and emigrated to England, Canada, the United States of America and to other parts of the West Indies.  

11. See Appendix III for outline dimensions of the informal questionnaire.

From Table 11 it is difficult to tell what percentage left Guyana as a consequence of political frustrations. But it is significant that net negative migration trebled in the period corresponding to the political disturbances in Guyana. The fact that over 80 per cent of the emigrants were reported to have been of non-Indian extraction, indicates that general support for the political community during 1961-1962 was rapidly diminishing. Implicit in this hypothesis is the judgement that the Guyanese political community typifies one in which a sense of national identity is not general. This factor, in turn, reflects the ethnic particularism and fragmented values already associated with the intra-societal environment, the political culture and the input functions. In other words, based on our limited observations, it appears that the low level of support for a discernible Guyanese political community has negative consequences for the political system of Guyana.

TABLE 11. Net Emigration (Total Emigration minus Total Immigration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Emigration</th>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>25867</td>
<td>23170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4908</td>
<td>29026</td>
<td>24118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5520</td>
<td>28250</td>
<td>22730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. The Regime

But even where there is a weak feeling of mutual identification

within the political community of Guyana stress might be counterbalanced if some method of ordering relationships within the political system is firmly established.

The political regime sets the range within which political expectations and norms are regularised and within which political actions by the structures of authority become authoritative. Political expectations reflect the broad consensus guiding the day-to-day policy of the community. The norms specify acceptable procedures for implementing demands while "the structures of authority designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organised with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of decisions".

Prior to the 1953 Constitution which granted full internal self-government to Guyana, the method of ordering relationships was one in which the Colonial Office in Britain regulated all legislative and administrative relationships.

The Colonial Constitution, as it existed up to 1891, consisted of a Governor, Court of Policy and Combined Court. The unofficial members of the Court of Policy were chosen by a College of Electors. The functions of an Executive and Legislative Council and House of Assembly were performed by the Governor and the Court of Policy, except as regards to taxation and finance which were dealt with by the Combined Court and six financial representatives. By an Act in 1892, the administrative functions of the Court of Policy were transferred to an Executive Council and the duties of the former became purely legislative.

16. For details on the constitutional history of Guyana see, Informative (Georgetown: Government Information Services Publication, 1956), pp. 120-128.
By an Act of Parliament in 1912, His Majesty in Council might determine and amend the Constitution of the colony and other powers thereof. He was also empowered "to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Colony of British Guiana". 17

Even under the amended Order-in-Council (1943), the executive power continued to be vested in the Governor appointed by the Crown and advised by an Executive Council. The Governor's reserve powers in the interest of public order, public faith and good government were both extensive and carefully defined. 18 These prescribed powers seem to have been effective, partly because there was a dearth of structures aggregating and articulating interests on behalf of the Guyanese masses, and partly because of the general acceptance of British values by the dominant and still influential creole section of the population. Under these constitutional arrangements, political expectations and political norms were reconciled to domination by the mother country. Political actions on the part of the structures of authority were authoritative despite the fact that there was a growing demand for self-government on the part of the increasing number of Guyanese elites who were returning home from England and America.

The increasing pressures of interest articulation and aggregation on the part of the Guyanese elites led to the Waddington Constitutional Commission in 1950 19 and subsequently to the British Guiana (Constitution)

Order-in-Council 1953. 20 For the first time in Guyana's political history the latter document introduced a Constitution embodying the principle of universal adult suffrage. While the structures of authority remained the same, the PPP, then the government, sought to revise the norms and expectations that had characterised the pre-self-government period. Whereas the norms and expectations were patterned to reflect loyalty to Britain, the British Flag, the British type bicameral legislature and the British Monarch, Jagan and his "comrades" sought to substitute transplanted values and expectations in the form of a policy of Guianisation with a socialist framework. We have already noted that the suspension of the Constitution on October 4, 1953, ended 133 days of PPP rule during which this first Guyanese government had little time to build a viable regime. In the PPP, the Guyanese people had supported a party which cut across race, religion and social standing. It had initiated a campaign to mobilise the masses whose support for the regime expressed itself in the demonstrations in protest against British suspension of the Constitution. 21 But with the sweeping away of the colonial regime and the subsequent dissolution of the Jagan government before it had established a set of norms for political conduct in society, the process of building support has become both more difficult and more hazardous.

20. This Order-in-Council was made on April 1, 1953 and on April 8, 1953 the new constitutional instrument was brought into operation by a proclamation of the Governor, Sir Alfred Savage. For the main features of the 1953 Constitution see Informative (Georgetown: Government Information Services publication 1956), pp. 127-128.

What has characterised political regimes in Guyana since 1953 is their evident lack of broad popular support. That they lack support required for nation-building has been clear in their evident failure to integrate factions and parties around the broad consensus of norms and expectations which constitute a viable regime for the political system.

Guyana's contemporary political regime can claim no broad consensus. The regimes 1957-1966 have operated in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion; every political act is or is alleged to be dictated by racial prejudice. Africans accused the PPP government, 1957-1964, of governing in the interest of the Indians and demanded a share in political decision-making. The Indians accused the police of partiality towards Africans and demanded the creation of a separate defence force recruited more extensively from the Indian community to counterbalance the police.

On June 1, 1964, Mrs. Janet Jagan resigned as Minister of Home Affairs. She accused the Police (85 per cent African) of brutality and of "planned genocide" towards the Indian community and of not cooperating with the government. This type of conflict between two structures of authority in Guyana was not uncommon. In the context of this discussion of regime, such instances indicate that support for the political regime has been considerably undermined, since these open conflicts tarnished the expectations and confused the norms delimiting the scope of political interaction in Guyana. In other words, instead of strengthening supports for a cohesive regime, the events encouraged attitudes and feelings about the regime which reflected a fragmented political culture. In short,

political actors tended to remain loyal to the regime only if their particular group was in charge of the structures of authority.

The extraordinary role of the Civil Service in the General Strike of 1963 illustrates the political situation. Until recently, the Public Service has been staffed by persons drawn from the African and creole sections of the population, the former supporting the PNC and the latter the UF. Consequently, the PPP government was served by a Civil Service drawn from largely anti-PPP elements in the society. On April 20, 1963, the Civil Service obeyed a strike call by the TUC in protest against the Labour Relations Bill. When the Civil Service demonstrated against the government, this was a telling blow which seriously undermined support for the regime.

The Civil Service Association ignored a threat of dismissal by the Governor, Sir Richard Luyt, who warned the members that according to the British Guiana General Orders, "any officer who absents himself from duty without leave and without an adequate excuse renders himself liable to summary dismissal from the Service".

According to Dr. Collins, Civil Servants who remained at their desks during the eleven-week strike included the majority of very senior officials, for example, heads of all communication services, the Commissioner

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23. This is said to have been the longest General Strike in Commonwealth history. It began on April 20, 1963 and ended July 27, 1963.

24. The Labour Relations Bill empowered the Government to decide which union should be the bargaining agent for specific categories of employees although workers retained the right to join the union of their choice.

of Labour and his Deputy, the District Commissioners, sworn in as Emergency Commissioners, and all Permanent Secretaries. But below this level a certain distinguishing feature of the strike was evident. Though there was a good number of conspicuous exceptions, it could be seen that in general, the Indian public servant turned out to work while the non-Indian stayed at home. When, for example, it was announced that the Government Training College, whose lecturers are civil servants, was reopening after the Easter Holidays with a skeleton staff, among a staff of eleven teachers the only ones who appeared were the two Indian members of the staff. Similarly these patterns were reflected in the government schools throughout the country.26

This strike has had implications not only for support of the regime but also for the political culture theme. While it is true that complex motives may have influenced the decisions of individual civil servants to strike or not to strike, still it appears evident that in most cases political attitudes based upon other types of identification of self and community, coloured the outlook of strikers and non-strikers alike. Thus as a particular case, the Civil Service reflected widespread anti-government sentiments of the cities from which they were largely drawn.

As early as 1951, the Waddington Commission noted that "intra-racial animosity is beginning to show itself in the Civil Service".27

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Another report on the Civil Service said that a "suspicion, even though it be ill-founded that appointments are made or promotions are arranged under political patronage, tends to destroy the sense of impartiality that must animate the public service". And more recently Al Haji wrote "if anything, this strike 1963 by the Civil Service has demonstrated a positive need for change from the traditional English system of appointments in the Civil Service. It is worth considering ... the spoils system of America or some variant of it." 

This paper does not propose to discuss the merits and demerits of an American-type administration in Guyana. But what is significant from the observations quoted above is that conflicts between the authoritative structures are ominous for support of a viable regime of norms and expectations. Added to the context of tension built into the political culture and the patterns of demand in Guyana, these conflicts of support have great significance for the incumbents of regime roles i.e., the occupants of the structures of authority.

4. The Authorities

By interpreting authorities as incumbents of the roles in the regime we are here concerned with "the ability and/or capacity of these incumbents to direct, marshal or compel behaviour --- within the political system and the intra-societal environment --- in such a way as to make for 'system maintenance'."


To fully understand the scope available to the incumbents for influencing behaviour within the political system, we need to point out that a feature of the administration in Guyana is its centralization. Almost all authority tends to be concentrated in Georgetown, the capital, and little responsibility is delegated to local government bodies or to the departmental representatives in the country districts. As a result a great deal has to be referred to the centre, and with the serious difficulties in communication, this leads to delays and misunderstanding.

Hence in Guyana, beliefs about the desirability of government activity (an aspect of political culture) are entirely associated with central government and the incumbents of governmental roles. It is these beliefs which set the goals of the political system and define the load or overload, the capacity for system-maintenance or the level of stress that the political culture places on the system. Consequently, the rise in expectations among the masses as to the governmental output, places pressures upon the elites to satisfy an exponentially increasing number of requirements.

During the period of total colonial administration and prior to the constitutional developments of 1953, support for the authorities meant support for incumbents who represented some super-ordinate system of government in England. We have already noted the extent of the power of

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the Governor and his executives who performed the functions of rule-making and application on behalf of the Colonial Office. At this time peoples' expectations were conditioned to accept the decisions of these authorities as basically in their own interests. However the rise of the PPP to power, its career as a government, and the suspension of the Constitution have greatly increased the awareness of the common man of his political environment without necessarily enhancing his positive disposition toward the new political authorities. Simultaneously, expectations shifted to these Guyanese leaders who as local elites were assumed to be true champions of the society's requirements, and who appreciated and understood the needs of their own people.

Unfortunately, the split in the PPP in 1955 diverted centralised support for the authorities on a nationalist basis. We have already noted how local and racial cleavages caused the leaders of the PPP government to depend almost entirely on support from the rural Indian section of the population. The opposition PNC leaders drew their support entirely from the cities and the African section while the minority groups of Portuguese, Chinese and Amerindians aligned themselves with the UF.

Consequently, this vertical support behind ethnic leadership poses obvious problems of cohesion in the society. So much was this the case that during the Jagan administration, 1957-1964, British battalions were required to perform peace-keeping duties, while the ethnic groups were engaged in bitter attacks against each other. On February 16, 1962, British troops rushed to Georgetown at the request of Governor Ralph Gray and Prime Minister Jagan as "strikers set fires, looted shops in uprisings
aimed at toppling the government." Both Burnham and D'Aguiar led demonstrations defying a government's ban on gatherings in excess of three. The Guyana Police Force seemed helpless against this mass demonstration of anti-government supporters in the city. An alternative explanation of their ineffectiveness may be in the fact that the police, a significant proportion of which are supporters of the PNC, were simply unwilling to use force against those who were articulating interests with which they sympathised. British troops were again called to Guyana on April 8, 1965, during the general strike which lasted eighty days.

With this anti-Jagan campaign concentrated in the cities, the government's functioning as a legitimate authoritative decision-making body was obviously minimal. But for the British troops in Guyana there seemed to be littlerespect from the anti-PPP section for the political authorities. There was a distinct diminution of values which normally set a premium of obedience to the law. There seemed also to be a belief among the creole sector that the authorities (especially 1961-1964) were hostile and exploitive towards them, a belief manifested more specifically in the riots, strikes and reprisals during this period.

The authorities therefore seem to lack general support since there is a belief among the masses that those who control the governmental roles are usually concerned with racial and political loyalty rather than with national unity.

Conclusions

According to our pattern of analysis, the political system of Guyana abounds with impediments to unity.

In the intra-societal environment we have accounted for several substantial sources of stress. Demographic, economic and social structure indicators, all suggest the presence of factors affecting the process and character of the political culture in Guyana. The resultant fragmented political culture, in turn, affects the way in which the within-put functions are performed in the system. Political socialisation, interest articulation and interest aggregation, and political communication, uniformly point to a lack of consensus and cohesion in Guyana. Political parties, interest groups, trade unions and the Civil Service are structured cases clearly reflecting the disintegrative condition of both the society and its political processes.

It is therefore not surprising to discover that the inputs of support for the political community, the regime and the authorities, lack viable cohesion and effect. We have shown that there is a lack of strong feeling of mutual identification in a political community of Guyana and that a broad consensus on the values, norms and authorities of the regime is absent. Finally, we have observed that, at maximum, the authorities mobilise deeply partisan rather than national support.

But the political system of Guyana has not disintegrated. This probably is due to the fact that regimes and authorities (especially since 1953) have been able to depend on a commitment to the objects of support by one or other of the cultural sections. At the same time
regiments of the British Army, stationed in Guyana since 1953, have acted as guardians of the peace and have assisted considerably in maintaining the system against the most notable consequences of its dysfunctions.

Despite these tendencies to stress in the politics of Guyana our analysis both of demands and supports, shows a highly participant political culture. In other words, the observable political interactions in Guyana characterise a situation where interest groups, political parties and voting patterns show racial rather than national claims. But at the same time the opposing groups compete actively --- even though at times violently --- to gain control of the authoritative structures, and thus have greater influence on the political community, its regime and its authorities.

It is nevertheless with these impediments to unity of its political system that Guyana, formerly British Guiana, embarked upon its independent status on May 26, 1966. If Guyana is to develop into a unified nation, then its authorities need to give priority to a programme for national integration, to an ideology based not on race or 'isms' but on a commitment of sharing access to and support for the political regime and the political authorities. There is a need too for indigenously achieved structural change --- not for transplanting political institutions from outside --- but for a reorganisation based on the immediate and long run goals of societal integration. Without concerted efforts to achieve social integration there seems little hope for rapid and effective removal of the impediments to unity in the politics of Guyana.
V

TOWARD A MODEL OF NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A PROSPECTUS

1. Introduction

That this thesis has drawn attention to the incapacities of the political system does not mean that we have adopted a negative approach to politics in Guyana. On the contrary, we believe that it is only by perceiving the realities around us that we can devise standards and values arising out of the needs and possibilities of our own environment. In other words, the solution of problems of disunity and conflict in Guyana is dependent on acknowledging their existence in the underlying social, economic, cultural and political fabric of the society. We have analysed the shortcomings of certain aspects of Guyana's political system, not for the purpose of criticising either the Guyanese leaders or the Guyanese people. Instead our main aim has been to focus our attention on the political predicament of Guyana; to systematically discern the problem areas; and to form some judgements about the available range of means for dealing with the political problems of Guyana.

In this chapter we propose a model of national political development. It is not a model intended as a blue-print for Guyanese politicians, nor does it purport to solve the political problems of Guyana. Instead it merely suggests general prescriptive measures which might assist in removing impediments to unity. At the same time we realise that even this general prescription could only be tentative, since our terms of reference did not permit us to examine the total set
of interactions with respect to the political system of Guyana.

In advancing recommendations for maintaining the system against stress, it must be noted that the social disorganisation manifest in Guyana, emanates from sources different from those of the newly independent states of Africa. Guyana has no long history of traditional social organisations — tribes and kinship groups — operating on a small scale equilibrium; there was never economic self-sufficiency among the racial groups, nor was each group socially definitive, making and enforcing its own rules, ascribing and rewarding its own roles.

But like the newly independent nations of Africa, Guyana emerged from artificial political entities contrived to preserve mercantile privileges and to serve colonial administrative conveniences. It is hardly surprising that the movement for Guyana's independence could not guarantee the establishment of a national focus. At best, the independence movement in Guyana reflected a common resentment against the centralising pressure of colonial rule. At worst, Guyana suffers from frail national ties and a disruptive society reflecting racial cleavages. This latter combination could generate the kind of stress associated with anomic pressures, which no political system can long withstand.

The model therefore stresses the need for national integration, for an ideology of progress, for certain pre-requisite structural changes,

1. It should be recalled that we set out to examine the allocative theories of inputs of demand and support. Consequently our analysis did not include the output functions and feedback functions which form a vital component of systems analysis.
and for power to maintain national independence in Guyana.

2. **Towards National Integration**

Integration is vital not only for stability but also for developing a unified political system. Integration is the process which holds the political system and society together. It refers to the process of developing a sense of nationality. Hence one solution to problems of Guyana is the achievement of national integration.²

As we have seen, the colonial government was not concerned with national loyalties but with creating classes who would be loyal to the colonial power. They paid little attention to evolving a national culture but stressed separate community roles and responsibilities to the constituted colonial administration. The constitutional history of Guyana, but especially the hasty suspension of the British Guiana Constitution in 1953, implies that the colonist viewed the development of national loyalties as a threat to his political authority. The process of political socialisation, stimulated during the colonial era reflects itself in the fragmented political culture and parochial sentiments. These, in turn, affect the style in which the other functions within the political system are performed. This, as we have already noted, leads to stress on the political system of Guyana.

Integration in Guyana may be achieved by the formulation of a national culture --- a process of "Guyanisation" --- which recognises the richness of the society's pluralist heritage. National integration should

mean a broadly synthetic culture accommodating each racial grouping within its ambit. This would provide an opportunity for Guyana to establish integration without obliterating distinct cultures and their bearers by assimilation or partition.

In this respect the roles of organisations like the Maha Sabha and ASCRIA can perform a useful function, provided that they operate within the goals of societal integration.

3. Towards an Ideology of Progress and a Commitment to Sharing as a Long Run Goal

Goals of societal integration can be achieved more easily if there is some motivating force or forces to stimulate a sense of community and a feeling of togetherness among the fragmented cultural segments in the society. There is need for the authorities to initiate an ideology of progress and a commitment to sharing as a long run goal — an ideology based on a conception of social change, capable of inspiring action and accomplishing integration. As an instrument, we ought to search for an ideology capable of creating the type of political culture which can counteract the disintegrative tendencies among the multiple communities in Guyana today. It must be capable of stimulating new orientations about individuals, groups and society. It must be capable, above all, of fostering a new pattern of behaviour which makes for system-maintenance against stress.

This ideology for nation-building is what Almond calls the "symbolic capabilities" of the political system. In his words, "there is need to build up some political liturgy and iconography, revered and
respected offices and office holders, and the development of attitudes of reverence and respect for these political rites and ceremonies, political roles and political persons.3

In Guyana, 'symbolic capability' is essential if there is to be general rather than parochial loyalty and respect for the objects of supports. But if symbolic capability is to be achieved there is a need for developing structures and processes for allocating values based on cohesion and effect.

4. Towards a Process of Power Accumulation and Structural Change

Since the structures of authority are supposed to allocate values for the society, organisationally they provide sources for embarking upon the task of unity in Guyana. In this respect the government needs to expand its control through a gradual and balanced development of its capacities of coercion and persuasion. It must be able to stimulate and restrain the rate of social and economic changes as these are vital sources of system maintenance. By allocating values it needs to initiate the type of environment from which the political system can draw the functional requisites of long-term stability, i.e., the type of environment in which a community spirit cuts across ethnic, social and religious differences.

In order to maximise the capacity to persuade, the authorities have to dispel all features of their specific commitment to a particular

ethnic group. To obtain voluntary compliance they will have to provide incentives to national consciousness.

Hence, dysfunctional inputs of the political system may be offset by the capabilities of other systems in the intra-societal environment. A new system of production and distribution, of massive efforts at capital formation, of attracting a steady influx of foreign aid, might lead to increased income per capita. This might, in turn, lead to a reduction in the demands on the political system for welfare services. Again education for "Guyanisation" in the culture system might fuse races, and reduce the fragmented and competing demands which are directed toward ethnic self-assertion.

The benefits of these environmental developments for removing stress in the politics of Guyana is best expressed in the words of Almond: "Thus the development of capabilities in other social systems may affect the rate of flow of dysfunctional inputs, keeping the flow at an incremental and low intensity level, and perhaps help to avoid disruptive consequences of multi-issue dysfunction". 4

By providing new opportunities and greater hope for the future, economic and cultural development would mitigate the long-run effects of impediments. But in the politically crucial short-run they do not eliminate the attachments to old divisions. In the short-run we require political prescriptions for maintaining national independence.

5. **Towards Sufficient Power to Maintain National Independence**

If the political community, the regime and authorities are to have

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sufficient power to maintain national independence, they would need to rationally direct their efforts toward satisfying the social needs of the maximum possible proportion of the population.

It is imperative that institutional developments should not lag behind the pace of individual acculturation or this could lead to profound insecurities, to personal frustrations and subsequently to a decline in effectiveness and competence of the political system. "People who have been disappointed too often cannot be effective agents for the great and demanding tasks of nation building". ⁵

To counteract these tendencies towards disintegration, there is a need, firstly, to orient the political culture of Guyana away from fragmentation and isolation towards cohesion and integration. This necessitates some authoritative structure dedicated to achieving the long-run goal of national integration. A Ministry for Cultural Integration for example, with extensive resources and facilities for Guyanese art, Guyanese music, a Guyanese culture and the development of a sense of belonging to a Guyanese community, might help to improve the supportive potentialities of the political regime and its authorities.

Secondly, political education for 'Guyanisation' rather than racial cleavages, is dependent on how citizens are inducted into the political system. As primary socialising agents, the schools and the newly established University of Guyana should re-emphasise Guyanese history and literature, but above all, call attention to the need for a

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Guyanese culture. These structures should educate people to believe in and emulate Guyana's national motto, "one people, one nation, one destiny".

Thirdly, there is a need for a national party embracing all factions. In Guyana, events over the last 13 years have shown that the two party and multi-party models are inadequate for achieving integration. We have shown how most political parties draw their strength mainly from regional, ethnic and/or religious interests so insistent that overarching identity with policies of common concern to Guyana is not often available. For this reason a merger between the PPP and the PNC would not only bring together the two major racial groupings but would also increase support for the political community, the regime and the authorities.

Fourthly, national integration is to a great extent dependent upon the attitude of the elites in Guyana. As in most developing nations elites are highly esteemed, and because of their academic, social and/or political achievements become opinion leaders from whom the 'masses' take their cue. It is therefore the role of the Guyanese elite to initiate the kind of nationalist ideology which places emphasis on moulding a national opinion capable of problem-solving.

This prospectus evinces the need for a broader consensus in Guyana, so that the pattern of values and interests may be classified in other than racial terms. One consequence of such a situation is that agents for aggregating and articulating interests in the system can communicate these proposals to the structures of authority, without fear or suspicion of bias. Under such circumstances, anomic eruptions of riots, looting and group violence would be minimised while system-maintenance capabilities would be maximised.
APPENDIX I


STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES ANNOUNCING HIS DECISIONS

The root of the trouble lies almost entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines. In its present acute form this can be traced to the split in the country's main political party in 1955. It was then that the Peoples' Progressive Party, which had previously drawn its support from both the main races, broke into two bitterly opposed political groups, the one predominantly Indian led by Dr. Jagan, and the other predominantly African led by Mr. Burnham. Both parties have, for their own political ends, fanned the racial emotions of their followers with the result that each has come to be regarded as the champion of one race and the enemy of the other.

In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion objectivity has entirely disappeared. Every political act is, or is alleged to be, dictated by racial prejudice. The Africans accuse the government party of governing in the interests only of the Indians, and demand a share in political decisions. On the other side, the Indians accuse the police, which is mainly African, of partiality towards the Africans and demand the creation of a separate defence force, recruited more extensively from the Indian community to counterbalance the Police.

This state of general distrust has had a profoundly demoralising effect throughout the country. It has not only undermined political stability, but gravely threatens economic progress. It has led to such financial difficulties that the government is unable, despite severe economies, to balance its budget and will be obliged to seek outside assistance.
APPENDIX II

1. Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP)

This party was formed in February 1964 under the leadership of Mr. Hoosain Ghanie. It draws its support mainly from adherents of the "All Guyana Council for Muslim Rights". The emphasis of its programme seems to be in denouncing Jagan's loyalty to 'Marxism'.

2. Justice Party

This political party was formed in August 1964. Its leader is Mr. Balram Singh Rai, formerly Minister of Justice in Dr. Jagan's government. Its programme is basically conservative and emphasises justice for all.

3. National Labour Front

This political party was formed in 1953 under the leadership of Mr. Lionel Luckhoo. Its main aim was to oppose the 'communist influence' in British Guiana. The party hardly functions today except for the meagre number of candidates entering under its name in the last three elections. The present leader is Mr. Cecil Gray.

4. Peace and Equality Party

It was formed in July 1964 and is led by Indian lawyer, Jainarine Singh. According to its manifesto for the 1964 elections, it was formed to "reactivate its forces" and "to take steps to promote a policy of prosperity, patriotism and nationhood".

Little is known about the organisation of these parties. They seem to function less as aggregators and more as articulators of interests.
### APPENDIX III

**Dimensions of Informal Interviews with Guyanese in Canada**  
December 1965 – July 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indo-Guyanese</th>
<th>Afro-Guyanese</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>I. Number interviewed</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Number of years residence outside Guvana</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Over 4 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Between 1 and 4 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Under 1 year</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Reason for Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Political Instability</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) To Pursue Higher Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Non-Political and Personal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Assessment of National Spirit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Would like to return permanently</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) On holiday only</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Not at all</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Don't know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. Voting Tendency</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Would vote for the PPP</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Would vote for the PNC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Would vote for the UF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Don't know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
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### APPENDIX III (con't)

#### VI. Support Tendency

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>In favour of PNC-UF Coalition</th>
<th>In favour of PNC-PPP Coalition</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Guyanese</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afro-Guyanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Portuguese</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
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Supplementary and Background Reading


