POLITICAL RECRUITMENT
TO THE ONTARIO
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY:
A RESEARCH SCHEMA
ABSTRACT -

Political recruitment is a process by which individuals with certain expectations and occupying certain specified social positions in their community are screened by representatives of political institutions for elective office.

In this inquiry, three pairs of variables corresponding to the three elements of the process -- resources, opportunities, and motivation (interpreted as expectations) -- are structured into a research schema. This schema is applied to the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly with the objective of identifying recurring uniformities of activity among the recruitment experiences of those political actors.
POLITICAL RECRUITMENT
TO THE ONTARIO
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY:
A RESEARCH SCHEMA

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Numerous studies have been conducted in the social sciences into the process by which private citizens become elected public officials or political leaders. There are two general classifications of these studies: one type, mainly found in political science, has been concerned with the institutions which are involved in this process (for example, political parties, interest groups and electoral systems). A second type has been concerned with the individuals themselves; modern investigations of this type have been grouped in three categories -- elite theories and studies, studies of the social backgrounds and career ladders of political leaders, and psychological theories and investigations.

Under the heading of "elite theories and studies" would be classed works by Marx, Pareto and Mosca; these men each contended that the control of the state was in the hands of a small ruling group who, because of power in social or economic terms, has come to hold political power as well. More recent studies by Floyd Hunter and C.W. Mills have identified powerful groups which hold political power because of social or economic assets. Other analysts have attempted to refute the elitist notion of political power,
and have concluded that several groups share power. These authors, and particularly the members of the "Yale School" (Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby and Raymond Wolfinger), seem to move from an oligarchic to a polyarchic view of political leadership. In general, the elite studies have "identified elites, but they have neither explored their genesis nor examined the process by which certain individuals entered them while others, occupying similar social positions in the community, remain outside."¹ These are mainly descriptions of groups which are assumed to have political power, with little attention in them to the process by which these groups are formed, or how they actually use the power attributed to them.

One of the most frequent approaches to the examination of individual political actors has been to focus on the social backgrounds and career ladders of certain officials. The studies seem to be clustered at both ends of the political ladder. Some important studies have examined United States Senators (Matthews), Supreme Court Justices (Schmidhauser), and State Governors (Schlesinger), but these studies have concentrated on the paths of promotion leading up to these ranking positions, to the neglect of initial interest and participation in political activities. At the bottom of the

ladder, studies of party workers have been made; these investi-
gate initial recruitment into political activities, but fail to pursue the careers of those who enter electoral politics themselves. "In brief, such social background studies give us excellent examinations of segments of the recruiting process but fall short of fitting them together in a comprehensive theory of political recruitment."  

The third category of investigations attempts to discover why some individuals seek political office while others, in similar situations, do not. On the theoretical side of this subject, some important hypotheses about the personalities of politicians have been developed by H.D. Lasswell, although they have not been subjected to elaborate empirical examination. Several other studies have attempted in a more empirical fashion to isolate the motivations of office-seekers and office-holders (McConaughy, Rosenzweig). While more recent studies are considering the impact of personality and motivation on politics, the merging of such information into a theory of political recruitment has been attempted only modestly.

All of the studies mentioned above have contributed something to the understanding of the various factors which tend to have an impact upon the transformation of the private citizen into the political actor. But, for the most part,  

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2Ibid., p.706.
these individual investigations have only been concerned with one aspect of the process. Very few attempts have been made to present a theoretical approach to the process known as political recruitment, much less attempts to consider the importance of both the institutions and the individuals in the single process.

In this study, again, concern will focus mainly only on one side of the process -- or at least the approach to the process will be made from one point of view, although it should be possible to learn something of the other "side". Political recruitment will be treated in this inquiry in terms of political behaviour research. As Eldersveld, et al. point out, "The political behaviour approach is distinguished by its attempt to describe government as a process made up of the actions and interactions of men and groups of men. . . . The study of political behaviour attempts to discover the extent and nature of uniformities in the actual behaviour of men and groups of men in the political process."³

Why is there now need for a theory of political recruitment? "Every political system is continually involved in recruiting individuals into political roles. We speak, then, of the recruitment function, which must be performed in all political systems if its roles are to be manned and

its structures are to function." In general terms, the cause of cognitive inquiry would inspire the need to "systematize" the approaches towards such functional, universal political processes. Theorizing is a form of systematizing. Hans L. Zetterberg calls theories "systematically organized, lawlike propositions . . . that can be supported by evidence: this is 'theory' in the sense this word is used in other sciences." In this sense, then, political science is an empirical science which does not aim simply at a description of particular events, but which looks for general principals which permit their explanation and prediction. If a scientific discipline lacks these principles, then it is unable to establish any connection between various phenomena, and is thus inapplicable in predicting the impact of one phenomenon upon another. "It is," writes Carl G. Hempel, "of paramount importance for science to develop a system of concepts which is suited for the formulation of general explanatory and predictive principles." 


The political behaviour approach itself inspires the formulation of theory in its objective of identifying recurring uniformities of political activity. "To this end it requires the formulation of concepts that can be tested by successive researchers and that will facilitate the building of a body of systematic knowledge about this phase . . . of the political process." There are two stages to an inquiry of this kind. First concepts, hypotheses and explanations in systematic terms must be formulated; some of these may be adapted from other social sciences. Since the actions of men and groups cannot be known without direct observation or inference from other behavioural data, empirical methods of research must follow, either adapted from other social sciences or developed distinctively.

One of the purposes of this study, then, is to attempt to propose a systematized approach to the study of political recruitment. It is hoped that by building upon aspects of the three types of approaches to political recruitment which concern the individuals themselves, a comprehensive, integrated theory may be developed -- one which earns "the saving quality of a theory", that is, it will "coordinate many methodologically imperfect findings into a rather trustworthy whole in the form of a small number of information-packed sentences or equations."

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7 Eldersveld, loc.cit.
8 Zetterberg, op.cit., p.vii.
Before attempting to set up a theory of political recruitment, the general boundaries of the subject should be drawn somewhat more explicitly. It seems that the term "political recruitment" is closely associated with two other terms, namely "political socialization" and "political participation". For the purposes of this paper, political recruitment is a more specialized term than either of these.

The functional categories of inputs which Gabriel Almond has developed in several studies include "political socialization and recruitment". The two processes are related. Succinctly, Almond calls political socialization "the process of induction into the political culture." \(^9\) All members of the society experience some common socialization, as well as particularistic introductions into specialized groups. "The political recruitment functions takes up where the general political socialization function leaves off. It recruits members of the society out of their particular subcultures . . . and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political system, trains them in the appropriate skills, provides them with political cognitive maps, values, expectations and affects." \(^10\) As Almond has recently added,

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\(^10\) Ibid., p.31
"The recruitment function cannot be fully separated from the socialization function . . . The background of those who are recruited into political roles is bound to have some impact on their performance of those roles, no matter how thoroughly they are socialized into new values, attitudes, and skills once they have taken over their offices."\textsuperscript{11} In sum, the process of socialization, and the nature of an individual's personality, will produce a number of receptive and eligible people; but, political recruitment is concerned with the way people of this sort are drawn into political activity.

However, people may be drawn into political life in varying forms and degrees of intensity and duration. Milbrath notes that "acting politically seems to have two types of contrasts: inactive and passive. Most citizens have both active and passive attitudes towards politics."\textsuperscript{12} Thus, "active" may be considered the "positive" end of two related, though distinct continua -- one relating to support behaviour for the system or regime (active-passive) and the other relating to types of political involvement (active-inactive). The behavioural "scale" starts at the bottom level with

\textsuperscript{11} Almond and Powell, \textit{op.cit.}, p.48.

"indifference" and ranges through expressive and instrumental
types of actions such as party activity and leadership
selection (i.e. voting). An individual's position on this
scale will be determined largely by the socialization process.
On the other "scale", inactivity may be thought of as the
zero or base point from which quantities of action may be
measured. Thus some citizens perform no political acts
whatsoever. Other citizens take part in minimal supportive
roles -- exposing themselves to political stimuli, voting, or
contacting public officials. Still other citizens, in much
smaller numbers, take part in these activities, but also
play more instrumental roles as they contribute increasingly
to the political process. The major clusterings of citizens
in these three role-areas were described by Milbrath as
"apathetics, spectators, and gladiators". While he does
recognize that an additional role differentiation might be
made within the gladiatorial category to account for those
who make politics their profession, in most societies there
are not enough of these persons to provide a statistically
significant group. Thus, the definition of gladiator is
expanded to include any person whose participation is greater
than attending a meeting or rally; that is, persons who
contribute money, who take part in political campaigns or

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p.20\]
who hold office in the party or the community are considered gladiators.

While these two hierarchies (and especially the involvement hierarchy) seem to have a kind of internal logic -- a natural progression of becoming more involved in politics, which in turn means that although persons engaged in the topmost activities are likely to engage in the behaviours ranking lower, the reverse does not hold -- they are not adequate enough distinctions to allow a clear conceptualization of what the recruitment process describes. Nor do the differentiations in citizen perceptions which Almond and Verba present -- the parochials, subjects and participants\textsuperscript{14} -- contribute very much to such a clarification. The major drawbacks of these studies is that the classification schemes do not take into consideration the transformation in perspectives which accompanies increased or changed activities.

Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon, in attempting to demonstrate how American campaign-workers differ from either voters or political leaders, point out the problems of assuming all political activities as part of a single hierarchy.

The factors distinguishing barely interested, passive voters from highly interested, strongly

\textsuperscript{14}Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, \textit{The Civic Culture} (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp.16-18.
partisan voters are presumed to be the same factors distinguishing the latter from deeply-involved, active campaign-workers. In significant ways, however, an active worker's behaviour and orientation to politics differs from a voter's, however active and partisan he is, the campaign-worker has joined an organization; the voter has not . . . . The campaign-worker is engaging in activities that focus his attention upon influencing the electorate; the voter is intent largely upon the candidates and issues from which he must choose.15

The politician, even more than the campaign-worker, is removed from a general continuum of political participation because of his orientations, motivation and rewards. "There is a considerable difference . . . between stopping for a moment at the polls, mailing a check to the party, chatting about the campaign, or stuffing envelopes for a few evenings and undertaking to change one's occupation to politics."16

In a similar way, James C. Davies makes the contrast:

The ordinary citizen is taking part in the process of making basic ends-and-means decisions for the members of the society, for all people who are physically located within the boundaries of the state . . . . But the candidate differs from the voter in that he is responsible for articulating (i.e. giving coherent expression to) the publicly manifest needs of the members of the society and the public means appropriate for achieving their satisfaction.17

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Studies of political recruitment and political participation would include considerations of many of the same phenomena; while a distinction may be made between the roles of the voter, the campaign-worker and the politician in a participation or socialization study, in considering recruitment one would be concerned with the way certain aspects of those roles might influence the voter to become the campaign-worker or the campaign-worker to become the politician. In fact, the roles which individuals tend to play are rather stable; "by and large, personality and environment factors encourage persons to stay in their roles. There seems to be a kind of threshold that must be crossed before a person changes roles."¹⁸ The focus of this study, then, will be on the factors, mainly environmental, which stimulate the movement of individuals across a threshold from non-political to political roles. Recruitment describes a process of moving from some role to another.

Further limitations on the term political recruitment have been made for this study to bring the subject into more manageable terms. A major part of Almond's definition -- "trains them in appropriate skills, provides them with political cognitive maps," etc. -- shall be considered a further socialization process within the political system.

¹⁸Milbrath, loc.cit.
and not part of the process of crossing a boundary which recruitment will imply. Also, the study of elite recruitment (in the very narrow sense of the term "elite" -- "a group of persons in any society who hold positions of eminence") is, in terms of this study, a variety of recruitment, and not something substantially different. If, instead of a single empirical inquiry, it were possible to observe individual career patterns, it might be possible to include in the theory some consideration of recruitment at more than one stage: into the legislature, into legislative leadership positions, and/or into executive positions. It was this sort of consideration which Seligman had in mind when he suggested three types of recruitment (moving up to higher positions from the next lower level, advancement by jumps, and entry from outside the political organization); in this study emphasis will be upon the shift rather than either starting or finishing points, although it has been necessary to select a certain "finishing point" as a basis for empirical research.

The schema, to which the paper now turns, is concerned with the initial recruitment of individuals into a

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20 Lester G. Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics", The American Behavioural Scientist (PROD), I (1958), p.15 Hereafter referred to as "PROD".

21 Although the author is tempted to label the succeeding proposal a "model" of political recruitment, such
Canadian provincial legislature; wider application of the theory will be possible, it is hoped, because of the similarities which may be noted in the initial entry into any elective office.

terminology would not be accurate, for the structure to be described is mainly geared to organizing information about political recruitment, to explaining or hypothesizing (directly) about it. Thus, the term "schema" will be used to describe this research "structure".
CHAPTER TWO
A RESEARCH SCHEMA

"Model building should not be indulged in without
consideration of the tools necessary to measure the
variables selected for examination."¹ Since the study which
has been conducted in relation to this schema is confined to
a single-time inquiry, and is further limited in other aspects
(to be discussed later), it has been necessary to produce a
new research approach. At least two earlier attempts have
been made in the literature to produce a more rigorous frame­
work for inquiry into the process of political recruit­
ment; these models have provided a worthwhile starting point,
but, as mentioned, they must be modified to suit the research
techniques available to the analyst.

A preliminary definition of political recruitment may
be derived from Herbert Jacob's paper (1962), in which he
views "initial recruitment as a process by which individuals
possessing certain personality traits and occupying spec­
ified social positions are screened by political institutions
for elective office."²

¹ Jacob, op.cit., p.713
² Ibid., p.708.
From that basis, Jacob proposes a model of recruitment in which three factors have an impact on the outcome of the process: personality development, occupational choices and political opportunities. The model which he constructs he calls "longitudinal" -- one in which a succession of events determine entry into politics. Thus, a man without the psychological syndrome which he describes would not likely be successful in politics; similarly, an individual who does not perform a brokerage occupation is also barred. Also, those who wish to participate must be accepted by the local political system. According to Jacob's model, the individual must, if he is to gain elective office, not be lacking in any of the three components. To some extent, success in one will make the individual eligible to achieve the next step.

Two major drawbacks exist in this model, at least from a research perspective. The first problem arises as one attempts to gather data for the succession of phenomena in the model, for a given moment collection of data makes reconstruction of a sequence of events somewhat difficult, especially when such phenomena occur over a long time period. Secondly, a major component of Jacob's model is personality; the hypothesizing, testing and analyzing of personality traits for politicians is outside the research capabilities of this study.

James Barber also presents a three-part model of
political recruitment. He points out that the study of political recruitment and official behaviour has been approached in at least three ways (very similar to the distinctions in the various investigations made in Chapter One). From these three types of studies Barber poses that, in theory, motivations, resources, and opportunities are the three fundamental elements of political recruitment, providing three different analytical approaches. In this case, also, proper forms of all three aspects must be present for the candidate to be recruited.

The Barber model is also useful for the purposes of this study, but is not without drawbacks. Since it is Barber's intention to "maintain a focus on the political significance of personality impact on the recruitment, adaptation, and performance of political leaders"\(^3\), very similar problems arise with the use of his motivational factor as arose with the use of Jacob's personality factor. It is not the intention of this analyst to negate or ignore the importance of personality in the political process; however, for the purposes of this research, personality must be treated as a "non-variant" factor.

Briefly, "elected officials have characteristic

\(^3\)Barber, op.cit., p. vii. Model developed in Chapter 1, pp.10-15.
personality traits, the core of which consists of a greater need for prestige, power, helping others, and being in the public eye than the general population; they also rank lower in the need for establishing close personal friendships.\(^4\) There are, in fact, many ideas of just what the political personality actually is. "The political 'type' is variously described in such terms as extrovert, other-directed, oral-optimist. And he is sometimes described by these traits, among others: gregarious, power-conscious, egoistic, affable, and out-going."\(^5\) These are not by any means traits which are all evident in every elected official, nor are they a description of his whole personality. They are simply those characteristics that distinguish elected officials from the rest of the population.

The significant notion here is that psychological factors are not the only ones that recruit individuals into the political arena, "for not all who possess the politician's personality will enter politics or seek elective office. Some of these needs can also be satisfied in business or professional careers."\(^6\) The basis of the present schema,

\(^{4}\) Jacob, \textit{op.cit.}, p.715.


\(^{6}\) Jacob, \textit{op.cit.}, p.709.
then, will be, for the most part, "external" factors, or environmental situations which transform the distinctive personality type (however it may be described) into an elected official. While Barber's terminology will be retained in this schema, it must be remembered that his third category -- motivation -- is somewhat beyond the bounds of research, and thus will be amended to fit the schema to follow. 7

The research schema is a structure designed to test the relationships between the following variables which seem most important in the recruitment process:

I - The Recruitment Base (resources)
   A. Social Position
   B. Entrance Assets

II - The Selection Process (opportunity)
   A. Personal Attraction to Nomination
   B. Nature of the Party System

III - The Career Perspective (motivation)
   A. The Role of the Legislator
   B. Individual Evaluation

7In social psychology, motive refers to the state of an organism in which energy is mobilized and directed in a selective fashion towards goals. It is pointed out that motive does not refer to the carrying out of behaviour, but to the state of the organism that accounts for the fact that the behaviour has direction toward a certain goal.

In the present study, all respondents have made the same "move", that is, they have all directed their energy to the achievement of elected office. From that point of view it might be possible to make some observations of the motivated behaviour of a large number of persons to achieve some understanding of their underlying motive states. However, the drives involved in most social behaviour are complex and difficult to
An explanation of the significance of each of the variables follows. An overview of the research model will conclude the chapter.

Two points may be noted before the variables are discussed. First, for the individuals themselves, recruitment involves two processes: the transformation from non-political roles to eligibility for influential political roles, and the assignment and selection of people for specific political roles. "Recruitment includes both eligibility for elite status and further selection or assignment to specific elite positions." In some cases, Seligman has described the two portions as "recruitment" and "selection"; thus the term "recruitment" is used here for both a portion of and the whole process. In another case the distinction is drawn between two stages in the recruitment process: "certification includes the social screening and political isolate. Thus it is more convenient, and equally as useful, to label motives according to the goal rather than its source or state of drive.

In this study, then, the general term "motivation" is used to designate those factors which relate to the individual's application of his resources towards a particular goal. See Theodore M. Newcomb, et al., Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp.21-24.

channelling that results in eligibility for candidacy, while selection includes the actual choice of candidates to represent parties in the general election."\textsuperscript{9} Despite the confusion likely to arise with the same term denoting two overlapping processes, it was felt that the term "certification" implied too formal a process to be used in this study. The distinction is very important; the terminology is most acceptable in the form used.

The second point to note is that some attention will be paid to comparative criteria, although it may not be obvious. In other words, it will be necessary to point out how the variables to be presented will contribute to comparisons based on ascriptive or performance criteria and particularistic or universalistic criteria.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{I - The Recruitment Basis}

With the distinction made above in mind, these first two variables refer to the environmental resources (as opposed to personality resources) which provide individuals with the incentive to perform political roles.


A. Social Position

It is widely held "public expectation" that legislators will not only represent their constituents psychologically, but also "physically". That is, it is expected that the legislator will identify with the values and reflect the attitudes and aspirations of the constituents, as well as being similar to them in such characteristics as religion, ethnicity, and social class.\(^\text{11}\) Seligman believes that the politicians come from various strata and occupations, corresponding somewhat to the levels of political work which may be chosen. Jacob also contends that, despite the assumptions of the elite theorists, political officials in the United States come from all levels of the social structure.\(^\text{12}\) Kornberg and Thomas attempt to refute this popular idea of democratic representation, as does D.R. Matthews, whose study of United States Senators suggested that legislative bodies are not representative of the populations which elect them. "In fact, Matthews argued that the more prestigious the elected office, the higher the status of the officeholder."\(^\text{13}\)


\(^{13}\) Kornberg and Thomas, loc.cit.
While some preliminary investigations tend to support the latter contention -- that recruitment patterns tend to reflect the social system of stratification -- at least to the extent that the voter seeks "the successful, the respected man -- the common man writ large, so to speak"\textsuperscript{14}, such judgements are by no means conclusive. A minor objective of this study will be to examine the extent of social stratification among legislators. A second objective will be an evaluation of Matthew's contention that there will be a difference in status between the elected representatives in the various levels of a federal system.

An investigation of the "social position" of the elected representatives will be a crude measure of the extent of ascriptive or achievement criteria in the recruitment process. From a personal viewpoint, class origins, occupational status, and educational levels may be considered ascriptive criteria (although education is decreasing in importance in this area), while from a functional viewpoint, these are achievement criteria. Religious or ethnic affiliations may carry some particularistic importance.

Thus, the social basis from which elected officials begin will be of significance in a theory of recruitment, either because of the presence of large numbers who are

highly unrepresentative of the population of which they are a part (in terms of social origins, education, and primary occupations), or, almost equally important, the low frequency of such individuals.

B. Entrance Assets

In discussing elite recruitment in developing nations, Seligman has noted the blurred line between political and non-political roles; one result of this situation is that there is no clear idea of what preparation is necessary for those who fill political roles. While we may agree that there does exist a more evident differentiation between political and non-political roles in "western" societies, there is still no clear notion of what preparation for political roles should entail. Mitchell, in a study of the ambivalent social status of the American politician, suggest that "the fact that Americans have tended to regard political offices as not requiring any special training and the fact that political office has been so accessible to poor and formally uneducated has in turn attracted persons whose performances have not always been very exemplary. Thus, a vicious circle developed ...." This variable attempts

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to consider the preparation which elected officials made before seeking office; it includes two categories -- occupation or professional training (regardless of the "status" of the occupation or profession) and pre-legislative "political" experience.

In the Jacob model which was briefly examined earlier, occupation was the crucial social variable, rather than status alone. What Jacob considered important were the so-called "brokerage" occupations: "certain occupations frequently place their practitioners into bargaining roles where they deal with outsiders (non-subordinates) and try to reach mutually satisfying agreements."¹⁷ The lawyer is the most common example of the brokerage occupations; other examples include insurance salesmen, realtors, independent merchants, undertakers and local union officials.

While it will not be possible to test the longitudinal aspect of Jacob's model (that many of the individuals with his political personality type go into such lines of work, and thus increase their chances of being recruited), there are other reasons which facilitate political activity by "brokers". For one thing, the occupations often allow time to seek office, either because of flexible daily hours or because they can often be laid aside temporarily. Many

¹⁷ Jacob, loc.cit.
brokerage roles are performed "at the fringe" of politics and may promote close contact with governmental officials or regulations. Also, brokerage roles allow the individual to develop many personal skills useful in political office (the skill of bargaining, the ability to convince, and the art of "inspiring trust and confidence", as Jacob described it).

Empirical research will be used to attempt to discover the occurrence of individuals with such occupations, as well as the status of any clusterings of such occupations. In this way, some inter-relationship between certain of the variables may be detected (that is, for example, there may be some relationship between the general status of the officials and the occurrence or non-occurrence of brokerage roles).

The second category which describes how an individual may prepare for an elected position concerns those activities in which the individual may gain political skills and support in essentially non-political roles (in terms of this particular reference, "political" means "legislative"). Many formal organizations in society display characteristics which are found in the more general political life of the community -- they recruit members, elect officials, spend money, perform services, etc. In such groups, then, it is possible for an individual to perform many roles which are very similar to roles he might perform as an
elected public official.

While there is a widely held popular view that candidates are self-starters, free of organized social or political relationships, some findings by Seligman in the United States indicate that candidates are the products of "group enterprise". In other words, the so-called self-generated entrepreneurial candidate was surrounded by a network of social relationships from which he gained support for his political aspirations. Consideration of the social networks from which candidates are drawn, and, to some extent, the role played by the individual in those networks, is another rough attempt at discovering the occurrence of the performance or achievement criteria. Some of the networks from which individuals may be drawn include business or professional circles, church groups, service clubs, and in the situation to be investigated (i.e. the middle level of a federal system) local governmental bodies. Further, it is possible to speak of persons belonging to groupings even though there is no formal organization which they have joined. For example, ethnic minorities are often called political groups, for, despite their loose structure, such groupings have some impact on the political behaviour of the system, especially in terms of voting. To some extent,

18Seligman, "Case Study", p.85.
19See Milbrath, op.cit., p.131.
the success of individuals whose particular social netwo:... are of a certain variety will be a measure of the particular-
istic criteria in the recruitment process.

These, then, are some of the most important con-
siderations which arise in describing the resources of
potential politicians; the mere acquisition of such resources
will not, however, ensure entry into political life. There
must also be a suitable opportunity to apply such resources
in the political system.

II - The Selection Process

There are certain environmental situations which
provide individuals with the opportunity to perform political
roles. The variables to be discussed here are related to
the structuring of the presentation of the candidate to his
party for election.

A. Personal Attraction to Nomination

To be elected to the political roles under consider-
ation in this study, it is almost imperative to have the
support of a political party. The concern of this section is
the roles which the candidates played in the groups involved
in the instigation of their candidacies.

There are four types of "mechanisms of candidate
entry". When the party organization persuades one of its
activists to run, it is often a case where the party is in
a minority position, and feels unlikely to win the election.
This is conscription. When individuals present themselves to the party organizations in the manner of an entrepreneur -- eager to get ahead by his own efforts -- it is a situation of self-recruitment. When the individual is involved in a social network which is clearly removed from the political conflict, and he is persuaded to seek election to enhance public support for the party or the group, it is a case of co-optation. In some cases the social networks, with or without the leadership of the potential candidate, take steps to secure the candidacy of certain individuals who will act to represent the social network in the legislature. This type of mechanism may be called agency.\textsuperscript{20} It may also be noted that conscription can also be found in a majority party; Barber adds such an observation in his study of Connecticut lawmakers. "When talents are in short supply the dominant party may have to sell the nomination even more vigorously than the minority party does, because the nominee must be persuaded to take on two years rather than two weeks."\textsuperscript{21}

It must be remembered that "the pure self-starter, as defined as the person who files without circles of networks, is a rare case indeed. It is suspected that the belief in this prevalence is a cherished 'myth' in an anti-party

\textsuperscript{20}\textsuperscript{20}Seligman, "Case Study", loc.cit.

\textsuperscript{21}\textsuperscript{21}Barber, op.cit., p.28.
organization tradition."22 We may say that the self-recruited candidate is one who transfers himself from particular social networks in which he has some support into control of that social network which is geared toward political ends, namely the party organization. In such a transfer, it would be unlikely that the candidate brings into the party organization his circle of social networks; that occurrence would be more like agency, where the party acts as the agent of a network other than of its own. It is to be expected, in the light of the myth of self-recruitment, that most respondents would designate themselves self-starters; such designations would have to be tempered by the nature of the social networks reported by the respondents and by information about the party system of the constituency at the time of the candidate's initial attempt to gain the nomination.

B. The Nature of the Party System

The recruitment of candidates is a basic function of political parties; the party which cannot nominate candidates cannot hope to achieve political power. This variable concerns the impact of the structure of the political system on the recruitment of candidates, the structural index

---

employed being the degree of party competition found in the political system.\textsuperscript{23}

On the constituency level, the state of competition between parties will influence the type of recruitment process through which the candidate may pass. In areas safe for the majority party, the officials of that party may not have to instigate or promote individuals to seek the nomination. In such cases the political market is reasonably free for various groups and individuals within the party to promote candidates. In constituencies safe for one party, officials of the other party often have to conscript candidates; this is a case where recruitment may be almost entirely a party affair (i.e. very little interference by outside networks). In more competitive districts, the recruitment process becomes more diffuse as groups, party officials and self-motivateds all instigate and support candidacies.

On the aggregate level (in this case the province-wide level), the degree of party competition affects the status of the individuals recruited, as well as the type of experience which those candidates needed to gain the nomination. A four state study by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson suggests that the more competitive the state's

\textsuperscript{23}This type of index employed by John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson in \textit{The Legislative System} (New York: Wiley, 1962), p.119.
party system, the more likely it is for the legislators to have some previous governmental experience.\textsuperscript{24} Kornberg further suggests that the more successful the party is electorally, the higher is the status of the candidates which it is able to recruit. Another connection between recruitment and the general political atmosphere is tested by Kornberg on the basis of suggestions by Eldersveld, Ranney, and Marvick and Nixon; this suggestion is that the status of the individuals recruited will vary with the party's position on an ideological continuum. The further right is the party on the continuum, the higher is the status of the candidates. Although some preliminary evidence tends to support Kornberg's own verdict that "in a gross sense the occupational status of Canadian M.P.'s does not vary with the ideological position of the parties but rather with how successful they have been", one of the purposes of the study will be to discover whether any status differentiations exist between the parties, whether based on "ideology" or success.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p.96.

\textsuperscript{25}Allan Kornberg, "Canadian Parties as Recruiters", a paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 1966, mimeo.
III - The Career Perspective

When a particular opportunity is perceived in the light of particular resources, the action which will take place at that time will be stimulated by certain motivations. In this schema, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, those motives will be related to the perceptions which the candidate has of the elective offices available, and the evaluations which he has of his own position.

A. The Role of the Legislator

Since, as pointed out briefly, the political recruitment process describes a going from some role to another, this variable is a crude attempt at assessing the importance of the objective toward which the process is directed.

Since there are several facets to representative political work, it is likely that the primary orientation of the candidate will have some relevance to the recruitment process and pattern. Generally, politicians may be directed in any one of four directions: toward the title and its status, to the tasks or skills involved, to the significance of one's position in the larger community, or to a party or institution.\(^\text{26}\) Depending upon the orientation which the politician feels that he is following, he may view himself as, for example, a representative, a negotiator, a "watchdog", a technical expert, or a parliamentarian.

\(^{26}\) Seligman, "PROD", loc.cit..
This variable is rather highly dependent upon the nature of some of the variables already discussed, and upon some of the assumptions of the schema, mainly the type of personality which the politician displays. A person who has a high status or a commitment to a particular social network may try to make opportunities for himself, while someone who perceives office holders as merely representatives of certain groups of people may wait for opportunities to present themselves. One of the interests of this study will be the relationship between certain recurrences in the recruitment basis and selection processes among the office-holders and particular roles which such office-holders might play.

B. Individual Evaluation

In the United States, the office of state legislator is the most common "port of entry" into a serious political career. At the same time, it is a rather non-professional introduction. Salaries are often rather low, meetings are in many cases rather infrequent, and the factor of biennial elections contribute to a rather high turnover in membership. Sorauf, in his study of legislative politics in Pennsylvania, found that members of the House of Representatives who stayed for more than two or three terms (and there was a high frequency for such an occurrence) seemed to be at the end of their political careers, or had limited political ambitions because they were content to make their career in
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. 27

One of the contentions of this schema is that perspectives about the significance of a seat in a provincial legislature in Canada will have some influence on the recruitment process, at least on the individual level. The much longer period of office in a parliamentary legislative system, plus the greater demands upon the time of the legislators contribute to a greater professionalization of the offices. A further measure of professionalization may be made in relation to the level of party competition in the system. Wahlke, et al., made the tentative inference that in competitive party systems it is important for potential legislators to have had some governmental experience before seeking a seat in the legislature. 28 At the same time it may be considered that professionalization arises also because of the small turnover and long tenure in the membership of the legislature. Thus, individual attitudes towards the recruitment process and participation in that process, will be significant if the hopeful candidate considers himself a professional or at least knows that he faces the prospect of becoming a professional politician.

Related to the above point is the importance which the individual attaches to the office which he has attained

27 Sorauf, op.cit., Chapter 4, pp.63-94.
28 Wahlke, et al., op.cit., p.98.
in relation to other elective offices or other areas of "public service". The recruitment process through which individuals pass may be influenced by the individual's assessment of the alternatives which he has available.

IV - An Overview

The process with which this study is concerned, then, is the one by which individuals with certain expectations and occupying certain specified social positions in their community present themselves and are screened by representatives of political institutions for elective office.

In general terms, the three pairs of variables of this schema correspond to the three main elements of the process -- resources, opportunities and motivation (interpreted as expectations). This is not the longitudinal schema of recruitment, as is Jacob's model. In that case, a proper personality for political activity had to be isolated first; very often, persons with such personalities choose brokerage occupations. Finally, an opportunity in the local political system would have to arise. The three sets of variables in the present model will each simultaneously although probably to different degrees, have some impact upon the actual process by which a given individual moves into elective office.

The variables, also, are not so clear-cut as Jacob's variables. In fact, they are highly interdependent and reinforcing. The schema attempts to do what Barber considered
a model of political recruitment could not do: it treats the three elements as three different approaches, although to Barber from an operational, research perspective, it is impossible to consider each element in isolation. 29

The general applicability of the schema will hopefully be based upon the differences in emphasis among the three variables as they are applied in several political systems. "In every society there are more or less definable grooves to political power. The determinateness of the routes themselves distinguishes one political system from another." 30 The value of this set of variables must come from some application of them in an "experimental" situation. The variables, then, have been transformed into several hypotheses about the expectations which may be made about their application to the political system known as the Province of Ontario.

29 Barber, op. cit., p.15.
30 Seligman, "ER & PD", p.620.
CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

"Geographically and historically, Ontario is, in many ways, the keystone province of Canada. Centrally located among the ten provinces, it links East and West. Historically its resources, and the activities of its people, have given it a major role, not only in the economy of the country but in the development of its institutions, its public policy and every aspect of its national life."\(^1\)

While Ontario is not the largest province in terms of land area (Quebec is larger), it is the largest in terms of population (in the 1961 census almost one in three Canadians lived in Ontario) and the richest in terms of economic wealth and development.

Ontario has the largest representation of all the provinces in the Canadian Parliament, with 85 members in the House of Commons and 24 Senators. As well, many key cabinet posts are traditionally allotted to Ontario members.

As a separate political system, the Province of Ontario is governed by a unicameral legislature which supports an Executive Council (Cabinet) from within its membership.

The Legislative Assembly had 108 seats for the 1963 General Election, and will have 117 seats when the next General Election is called. All members of the Assembly are elected by simple plurality in single-member districts for a maximum term of five years.

In the eight Federal General Elections since (and including) 1945, Ontario has swung from large support for the Progressive-Conservative Party in 1957 and 1958 to large support for the Liberal Party in the succeeding elections. The CCF-NDP during that time won only a very few of the Ontario seats, although their total has climbed slowly and consistently.

**TABLE 3.1**

Number of Seats Won in Ontario for Canadian House of Commons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
<th>PROG-CONS.</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>CCF-NDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In provincial politics, the story is rather different. In 1943, George A. Drew led the Conservative Party to victory over a Liberal Party which had formed the government since 1934. Since that time, the Progressive-Conservatives have
been immovable with Thomas L. Kennedy (1948-49), Leslie M. Frost (1949-61) and John P. Robarts (1961- ) succeeding Mr. Drew as leader of the party and leader of Ontario. The status of Official Opposition has recently been held by the Liberal Party under a number of leaders, with the CCF-NDP slipping to a rather minor role in the Legislative Assembly.

**TABLE 3.2**

Number of Seats Won in Ontario Legislative Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>TOTAL SEATS</th>
<th>PROG-CONS.</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>CCF-NDP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The most conspicuous feature of Ontario politics, then, is the absolute and continuous control which the Progressive-Conservative Party has had over the province. To some extent, however, certain areas of the province have maintained a steady commitment to one or the other of the opposition parties. Notable are the strong Liberal areas in some Toronto suburbs and in many parts of western and southern Ontario, and the traditional CCF-NDP core areas of Toronto and Hamilton. The impact of the 1966 Representation Act, which has created new electoral districts, may not be significant in terms of traditional party support in Ontario. Twelve cities in
Ontario have a population greater than 50,000 people, and seven of these are in metropolitan areas of more than 100,000 people.² Ridings which may be considered rural may still be in a majority because of the vast areas which the province covers and the very high concentration of population along the shores of the southern Great Lakes.

When this inquiry was directed to the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly, there were, as mentioned, 108 seats. In effect, though, there were 105 sitting members: two veteran Cabinet Ministers had announced their retirement from the Legislature. The recent leader of the Liberal Party in the legislature had effectively dropped out of legislative activities because of poor health and was subsequently appointed to the Canadian Senate for his services to the Liberal Party in Ontario.

This, then, was the general setting in which this study was conducted.

In order to apply the model of political recruitment in a "complete" system, it was decided to direct an inquiry towards the members of a provincial Legislative Assembly. This is the first level in the hierarchy of political roles for which party affiliations are relevant in Canada. Further,

² Canada Year Book (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), p.190. A rough calculation from the electoral maps show these twelve cities have 29 seats; when metropolitan areas are included the total is 49.
it is at the beginning level of policy-making and issue-orientation in Canadian politics. While it is perhaps more valuable to have some basis for comparison for results in a study of this sort, the very tentative nature of this particular study encouraged a simple observation of the pattern in a single setting.

The obvious choice, of course, is the closest legislature -- Ontario's. Several problems of inaccessibility would have made significant returns from some other provinces nearly impossible; several provinces held elections recently -- some in which new governments were formed. Such examples would have provided useful contrasts with Ontario's case; however, basic information about new members was not available. Cross-cultural comparisons with the Province of Quebec was felt to be too difficult at this stage of theory-building. Further, the fact that the Ontario Legislature is accessible in person to the analyst was of some significance in securing the high proportion of returns which were obtained. This, of course, would not be possible for the other provinces within the time limits of this study. Some basic information for inter-level comparisons for this study may be obtained from such sources as the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, and some published studies by Allan Kornberg and others.

The basic method of obtaining information was a mail questionnaire which was sent to all 105 members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly. In the questionnaire, respondents
were asked about personal aspects of their backgrounds (their
own and their father's occupation, education, and social
class); about previous party, governmental, and public
activities; and about their feelings on and evaluations of
the job they perform as M.L.A.'s. A complete outline of
the questionnaire will be found in Appendix A.

The main reason that the questionnaire was sent to
the entire membership of the legislature was, again, the
very tentative nature of this study. The universe was
small enough to reach in its entirety, but too large to
cover completely in personal interviews. Any sampling in
directing the questionnaires would be a very complicated and
delicate process in such a small universe. In the distri-
bution of the results, however, there is not a great deal
of disparity between the actual distribution in the Legis-
lative Assembly and in the returned questionnaires. The
main drawback, and the biggest gap, in the returns lies in
the government front benches. Of twenty-four Progressive-
Conservative party leaders, responses were obtained from
only thirteen. A possible explanation of this situation may
be the double duties which these men perform; they are both
members of the legislature and responsible executives in
some of the largest employing and spending concerns in
the provincial economy.

Questionnaires were delivered to the three party
offices at Queen's Park at the beginning of the legislative
session which opened April 3, 1967 (the fifth session of the Twenty-seventh Parliament). Returns were received from that time. A follow-up personal visit was made in mid-May, at which time second copies were left with some members, reminders were left with several members, and several completed copies were collected from other members. In all, 66 responses were included in the tabulations and evaluations.

**TABLE 3.3**

Proportion of Returns on Questionnaire to MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>MEMBERS IN L.A.</th>
<th>RETURNS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE RETURNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.C.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105 66 62.8

The questionnaire responses were transcribed into 145 "yes-no" questions for the purpose of computer tabulation and correlation. One question from the questionnaire was dropped from the computation, and information was added about the nature of the respondent's constituency (as drawn from electoral statistics and constituency descriptions). From this form, aggregate data were obtained for use in this study.

There are several drawbacks to this technique and inquiry. A major defect may be the questionnaire method itself, and especially as it is used here, for there is a bias which this approach often introduces into the information
gathered. This is the problem of reactive measures. As Webb, et al., note immediately in their book on the subject, "Interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign element in the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, . . . they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate . . . ." 3 Many of the fifteen or more effects in measurement caused by this technique are sure to be found in the responses analyzed for this study; more specifically, response sets, role selection, an awareness of being tested, population restrictions, and interviewer errors will all be found, and hopefully will all be noted, in the ensuing study. Some attempts are made, however, to achieve a more integrative approach by the use of some available records on the subjects, along with the measures devised for this study. In addition, though, the very tentative nature of this study, mentioned so often, means that this is an initial step in what will hopefully be a series of "linked critical experiments, each testing a different outcropping of the hypothesis." 4 A second type of defect concerns the sources of information in another way. They are, of course, not the only ones involved --


a more accurate picture might be obtained from party workers, defeated aspirants for the nomination, and other persons involved in the party's nominating process. The respondents, also, are only those who were successful in making the transition from private life to the public office. More information from those who were unsuccessful electoral candidates and the whole range of persons involved in the nomination of all of those persons would also be important. Needless to say, the fact that all of the activity of this sort which went on for the present members took place several years ago, as well as the great difficulty of surveying all such individuals means that the given study is limited in its source of information. While such activity has been in progress for an impending election, the uncertain date of that event did not suit the demands of the present academic year.

In sum, though, there is some merit in directing the questions to only the successful candidates for the office of MLA. While background information on the Members which could be used for the first pair of variables could be obtained elsewhere, for the most part it is insufficient for the type of investigation embodied in this study. The second variables are likely to be most disturbed by subjective influences, but, as discussed just above, information about these variables cannot be obtained economically from any other source. The MLA himself must supply the answers to
judge the importance of the last set of variables, simply because those variables are related to the personal expectations of the individuals involved. For those reasons, then, this study may rely on the responses which the legislators give to this single set of questions.

The paper now turns to the actual results of the survey and their significance for the schema proposed earlier.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE STUDY

In the present chapter, the schema described in Chapter Two will be examined in terms of the Ontario Legislative Assembly. From information and impressions gained from the literature, and from the author's subjective impressions of the Ontario political system, a series of hypotheses will be posed. For each of these hypotheses a number of questions were asked in the questionnaire; the results of those questions provide the basis for the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses, and hence, for the schema.

I - The Recruitment Base

A. Social Position

While one of "the most persistent images that Canadians have of their society is that it has no classes", John Porter has shown that the reality of Canadian society is much different. He finds not only a vertical mosaic of ethnically-based social classes, but is also able to observe that "class differences create very great differences in life chances, among which are the chances of individuals' reaching the higher levels of political, economic or other forms of power."^1

As pointed out earlier in this study, there have been numerous investigations of the socio-economic backgrounds of politicians, or at least some attention has been paid to that aspect of legislative politics in broader studies of legislatures. In all cases which have been examined in the preparation of this study, there has been some consensus that "political decision-makers are not a cross-section of the society but . . . tend to come from near the top of society's system of social stratification." Matthews suggests several reasons for the tendency to select decision-makers from among those with relatively high prestige positions. The first reason is that the recruitment process reflects, and thereby reinforces, the dominant values of the society. The individual who has achieved the symbols of a high social status has attained success according to the society's definition. He is likely to be considered a better man than those who have not acquired the symbols of success. (This point is not inconsistent with the comments from Mitchell supra, page 24. It is possible, in North America at least, to achieve the symbols of success without a corresponding level of personal "qualities".) Financial resources, free time, and the motivation necessary to achieve high elective office are also attributed to those with high status by Matthews.

The final factor is the inequality of opportunity to obtain requisite special training and skills needed to fill technical offices, all of which adds up to "substantial inequalities in political life-chances" in most societies.\textsuperscript{3} We should not expect, though, that all decision-makers are of one class, or that they are a homogeneous group. In fact the expectation would be that there will be representatives of most strata of society in the various political activities of the society. Further, the situation is likely to be one where persons with political resources will have a choice of the type of political office which they seek. This is mainly the case in a federal system where there are at least two legislatures (in the U.S. there may be four) for which the aspiring politician might strive, as well as numerous local offices. Matthews has expressed the expectation that governmental offices are class ranked -- the more important the office, the higher the social status of its normal incumbent. "A stratified society places different evaluation on various social positions, and the prestige of the office or position tends to be transferred to the person who fills it."\textsuperscript{4} Thus, the esteem in which the community holds the political office determines, to some extent, which potential politicians seek

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p.57.
which elective office. "It seems likely that an individual must initially seek an office that commands about the same respect as his own social position."\(^5\)

In the middle level of a federal system, then, we might expect, in the light of both the Matthews and Jacob comments, that the status of the elected members is of a median sort. We would expect that the situation is very much like the trend which Sorauf found in Pennsylvania; the social backgrounds indicated that the legislators came from "second-rung" elites in the status symbol of the districts. They are not part of the "favoured families" but are established and reputable in their own way. Below that, politics in the local areas remained in the hands of the middle or upper-middle status groups, who might use that activity as a means of rising in the local status system.\(^6\)

It seems to the author that as far as this aspect of recruitment is concerned, there would be little significant change in a parliamentary system. Thus:

I - Hypothesis

\(^1\) Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly

will have a generally lower status upon entering the legislature than will Ontario members of the Canadian House of Commons.\(^7\)

\(^5\) Jacob, op.cit., p.711.
\(^6\) Sorauf, op.cit., pp.75-76.
\(^7\) At the same time, however, both legislatures will have a higher aggregate status than the general population. This
II - Results

The hypothesis may be accepted on a visual comparison of the distribution of the principal occupations of members of both legislatures. It is not possible to perform any other statistical tests between the distributions of occupations in the two groups because of the nature of the raw data on the members of the House of Commons.

In visual terms, then, a slight majority of Members of Parliament held occupations which are classed in the highest level. More than 90% of those legislators occupied the top three categories, while in the Legislative Assembly just over 80% of the respondents reached that level. The support for the hypothesis is based upon the apparent situation in which a greater proportion of MP's held occupations at each of the three highest levels of the occupational scale used.

expectation is in keeping with the belief that "recent empirical studies of the social backgrounds of political decision-makers have rather effectively undermined the log-cabin-to-congress or for that matter a poverty-to-parliament conception of legislative leadership. The romantic notion . . . has been largely invalidated by the revelation that legislative leaders are elite groups which are highly atypical of their societies."

III - Method of Investigation

To explore the relationship between social status and political recruitment, one of the traditional factors which contribute to social status was used to rank members of both legislatures. While income, education, and occupation as indices of class correlate highly, the most important single criterion of ranking, and also the one obtained with the least subjectivity and antagonism, was occupation. Many scales of occupational ranking are available; the index which was chosen (it is summarized in Appendix B) takes into account education and income, as well as comparative necessities. The major Canadian scale, developed by Bernard Blishen, was unacceptable for use in this study because it was based on the 1951 census and accompanying attitudes towards the occupational hierarchy. As well, it was not as complete a scale as the one chosen. Thus, a scale developed for comparative use, based on American evaluations of occupations,

The empirical evidence of the study may be compared roughly to the approximate distribution of the Ontario labour force in the 1961 census:

- Managerial: 9%
- Professional & technical: 9%
- Clerical & sales: 22%
- Service & recreation: 12%
- Transportation & Communication: 6%
- Farmers & workers: 7%
- Fishing, trapping, logging: 2%
- Mining: 3%
- Crafts, production process: 26%
- Labourers & unclassified: 9%

was employed in the belief that the evaluations embodied in it were reasonably close to Canadian expectations.

For the MLA's, the basis of ranking is the responses to questions about their principal occupations; for the MP's, information about principal occupations was obtained from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide.

Additional information on the formal educational achievements of the members of both legislatures was obtained in a similar fashion. Some comparative information has also been drawn from other published studies.

IV - Analysis and Comments

The internal distribution of both legislatures according to principal occupation shows a greater proportion of MP's held the occupations in the highest rank, with virtually all respondents in the three highest ranks. The MLA's, on the other hand, were distributed almost evenly among the three top ranks, with more in the second rank than in the others.

TABLE 4.1

Distribution of Principal Occupations on Hollingshead Scale for Ontario Legislators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION LEVEL</th>
<th>MLA'S</th>
<th>MP'S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>30.3 % (20)</td>
<td>51.9 % (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>34.8 % (23)</td>
<td>23.5 % (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>27.3 % (18)</td>
<td>21.0 % (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>4.5 % (3)</td>
<td>1.2 % (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1.5 % (1)</td>
<td>1.2 % (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>0.0 % (0)</td>
<td>0.0 % (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>1.5 % (1)</td>
<td>1.2 % (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0 % (66) 100.0 % (81)
In terms of this model, the fact that a greater proportion of Federal legislators hold higher status occupations would indicate that there may be a difference in the status of legislators in federal and provincial bodies even before entry into political roles.

This trend is further substantiated by the achievements in formal education reported by the two groups. These results show, again, a greater proportion of Federal legislators at higher levels of formal education than MLA's\(^9\); the suggestion is that differences in social status influences the choice of which electoral office to seek.

### TABLE 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Formal Educational Achievements - Ontario Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MLA's</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other post-secondary school#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec'd'y school completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some sec'd'y school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school compl'n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than prim. school compl'n</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99.9% (66) 99.9% (81)

*includes law training, medicine, etc.

#includes teachers college, business college, other forms of "semi-professional" training

\(^9\)Further corroboration of the trends within these samples may be found, first, in tables presented by Kornberg and Thomas, op.cit., p.94 and p.96. In that case, findings are based on a random stratified sample of the 1962-1963 Parliament. There, 72% of respondents held college degrees, and 60% had some graduate studies. Fully 51% of his sample were listed as "professionals" (level one) and another 25% were "proprietors and executives" (mainly level two). Only 12% had "low status occupations".

Sorauf's study of Pennsylvania shows a great deal of
The occupations which account for the major status trends at each level are, for the House of Commons lawyers, and for the Legislative Assembly, independent businessmen and directors of small corporations. Corresponding to the status differences between the levels is a difference in "legislative competence", which may encourage lawyers to seek membership in the House and businessmen to seek membership in the Assembly. Further, the predominance of a "conservative" party in the Assembly may account for the large number of businessmen in that body.

Information about the social status of legislators in Ontario may permit some other discoveries about the recruitment process. One of these aspects concerns the concept of mobility.

This term is usually applied to an individual in relation to his social environment. The general expectation is that in politics, more than in most other professions, the actors will have moved from the status of their birth to a somewhat higher level before embarking on a political career, or will achieve that higher status by indulging in politics.

In the information available, it will only be possible

similarity with the trends among Ontario's MLA's. The Pennsylvania candidates were 27.8% "professional and semi-professional" (mainly level one) and 36.8% "proprietors, managers and officials" (level two). Sorauf, op.cit., p.71.
to look at the MLA's in the aggregate, but from that basis some tentative conclusions may be drawn.

I - Hypothesis

$H_2$ Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly occupy higher status positions than their fathers.

II - Results

The hypothesis may be accepted on similar grounds as the first hypothesis, that is, in a merely visual assessment of the distribution of the respondents on the scale employed.

From the point of view of principal occupation, the factor which most often determines the social prestige of the candidate's family in the community, it seems that most Members came from middle-to-upper status families. The greatest clusterings are in levels two, three and four, which is lower than the major clusterings of the Members themselves, in levels one, two and three. The simple, and perhaps oversimplified, conclusion is that the candidates as a whole pursue more prestigious occupations than their fathers, and that this indicates the presence of upwardly mobile individuals.

III - Method of Investigation

The occupations of the MLA's were ranked, and presented, for the discussion on Hypothesis I. Information was collected and will be presented for the fathers of the Members in the same manner.
IV - Analysis and Comments

The distribution of the fathers of the MLA's according to their principal occupation may be compared with the information on the MLA's in Table 4.1 page 53.10

TABLE 4.3

Distribution of Principal Occupations on Hollingshead Scale for Fathers of Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION LEVEL</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>13.6 %</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>18.2 %</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>22.7 %</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>22.7 %</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>10.6 %</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>10.6 %</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0 % (66)

Additional support for the upward mobility of the Members may be gained by a similar comparison with the level of formal education reached by fathers and sons. In comparing the educational patterns of the two groups, we find a large clustering of fathers (more than half) with less than secondary school completion. For the Members, on the other hand, just under one half completed at least one university degree, while almost half of that number pursued even higher studies.

TABLE 4.4

Distribution of Formal Educational Achievements—Fathers of Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other post secondary</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school completion</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some secondary school</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completion</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than primary school completion</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0% (66)

While there has been a growing trend towards more formal education for the children of all classes, the Members under consideration here were not, for the most part, continuing their studies at that time. Thus we may accept this rough indicator of upward social status for the MLA's in this study.

In summary, then, the Ontario Legislative Assembly includes members from, mainly, "middle status" occupations, although the group is not homogeneous in that respect. The Members are also, generally, involved in higher status occupations than their fathers. A supplementary indicator of social status, formal education, indicates similar trends on both counts. On both indices (occupation and education), the Members of the Legislative Assembly ranked lower in status than the members of the Canadian House of Commons from Ontario.

11 In a subjective sense, upward mobility was not so readily expressed by the MLA's. Respondents were asked to
B. Entrance Assets

As discussed briefly in Chapter Two, there are certain types of occupations which provide their holders with some advantages which may be applied directly to political office-holding. As Barber classifies the possibilities, he bases the distinction on the ability of the individuals to arrange their affairs to accommodate an extended commitment in a distant centre. Of the three types described, only one might be expected to be evident to any great extent in Ontario. The three are - those who can give up what they are doing with no financial sacrifice; those whose superiors are willing to release them for candidacy and office-holding; and those in flexible occupations who can postpone or temporarily pass on to others their current duties. In the first rate themselves and their fathers on a scale of "social-class" based on income, education and occupation. There was considerable reaction to these questions, both in the form of critical comments and conscious omission of responses to the questions.

In the results there is some evidence of the "middle-class syndrome" which is common in Canada. (See Porter, op.cit., Chapter I)

TABLE 4.5
Subjective Assessment of Social Class - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>FATHER</th>
<th>INITIAL SELF</th>
<th>PRESENT SELF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upper-upper</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-upper</td>
<td>4.5 %</td>
<td>4.5 %</td>
<td>15.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-middle</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
<td>36.4 %</td>
<td>42.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle-middle</td>
<td>28.8 %</td>
<td>33.3 %</td>
<td>28.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-middle</td>
<td>25.8 %</td>
<td>9.1 %</td>
<td>3.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-lower</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
<td>4.5 %</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-lower</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>10.6 %</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
<td>6.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0 % (66) 100.0 % (66) 100.0 % (66)

*See questions 11 and 24 as presented in Appendix A for the meanings of these two categories.
case are found females (for the most part), the retired and the independently wealthy. At present only one woman sits in the Assembly, and many respondents indicated that they had retired from their principal occupations just before or after their initial election to the Assembly. Independent wealth is not a political asset in terms of voting sympathy, and thus all respondents claimed to have some occupation. There would not be many in the second category of occupations because of the partisan nature of participation in the Assembly, and the reluctance of employers to be identified in any way with any party. Further, the likely connection in some form or another between the employer and legislative responsibilities and the long time periods involved in legislative sessions reduce the possibility of large numbers of Members with occupations of this sort. The main expectation, then, will be for individuals to have had some sort of flexible occupation.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, many of these occupations combine free time with opportunities to develop wide circles of acquaintances so necessary for political success, with favourable vocational training and with social status.

It may be expected that, then:

I - Hypothesis

\[ H_3 \text{ Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly} \]

\textsuperscript{12}Barber, op.cit., pp.233-36.
will have had brokerage occupations before entering the Assembly.

II - Results

Both in visual terms, and in terms of the chi square test, neither group showed a high enough proportion of respondents with brokerage occupations to confirm the hypothesis. Thus, it seems that in Ontario, contrary to Jacob's expectation, a brokerage occupation is not a pre-requisite to entry into political life.

III - Method of Investigation

The principal occupations of the Ontario MP's and MLA's were classified as brokerage or non-brokerage according to Jacob's definition as cited in Chapter Two, pages 24 and 25. A listing of the occupations of respondents as either brokerage or non-brokerage is found in Appendix C.

IV - Analysis and Comments

The samples of the two legislatures displayed virtual equality in the proportion of respondents who held brokerage occupations before their election to the House or Assembly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Ontario Legislators with Brokerage Occupations*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of brokers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\chi^2 - 1.78
\]

*- for a breakdown by levels, see Appendix D.
The typical image of the political personality is one of a gregarious person, "the active citizen". Although this study has attempted to move away from the general "participation" concept, there is considerable importance which may be attached to the type and extent of community activities in which elected representatives had participated. The general, although often pejorative, description of this sort of person as a "joiner" has some merit and political relevance.

Some of the benefits of such activity was mentioned in Chapter Two (political skills learned in non-political organizations), but there are some other assets which the political party might gain by seeking out such "joiners" as potential representatives. "Participation in a wide range of public activity ensures that the candidate has at least a modest circle of acquaintances, that he is gregarious and a 'good mixer', that his peers have found him socially acceptable, and that he will be known for his interest in the community."\(^{13}\) While membership can signify many degrees of loyalty and involvement, at best it seems that those persons who take part in community organizations will be genuinely committed to the community's welfare and have supported that commitment with time and effort.

\(^{13}\) Sorauf, op.cit., p.80.
"It would not be amiss to call these joiners the 'go-getters' of the community. Even though academics and intellectuals may dismiss them as Babbitts, they fill the average community's picture of the local leader."14

Political experience and involvement may also be gained in public office. In Canada there are (relative to the United States) few possible offices available at the local level for aspiring politicians. Thus, although there is a strong relationship between the activities of local and provincial governments, and considerable dependence upon the provincial government by local authorities, the number of elected members who have had experience in local government (defined simply as membership on any local authority, with no reference to the length or quality of the service), will be less than those who have been active in other forms of political "training".

Since there is no case of a successful candidate for the Legislative Assembly who has not had the backing of one of the three parties, it must be assumed that some experience in the party ranks is helpful in gaining the party's nomination. Even without information about the reasons for initial involvement in the party's activities, the commitment to the party may be measured through the assistance provided in several forms, and the holding of

14 Ibid..
executive positions in the party.

The expectation about pre-legislative experience will be that:

I - Hypothesis

\[ H_4 \] In terms of the pre-legislative experience of the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly:
(a) most will have had some experience in civic organizations.
(b) fewer will have had previous experience in political party activities.
(c) even fewer will have had experience in other governmental bodies.

II - Results

The hypothesis may be accepted as it is expressed, both in simple visual terms and also in terms of the chi square tests done on each category.

III - Method of Investigation

Questions were directed to the MLA's to indicate the type and extent of participation in "civic organizations", other governmental offices, and their political parties. Answers concerning the extent of that activity is used in the analysis of the hypothesis; answers about the type have been tabulated and are presented in an accompanying note in Appendix D.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)Comparative figures for these tables may be found in Epstein, op.cit., pp.181-207.
IV - Analysis and Comments

The proportion of respondents who indicated that they had participated in the three types of activity declines from civic organizations to party to other governmental offices. The chi square tests of significance also decline in value in the same pattern.

TABLE 4.7

Proportions of Ontario MLA's with Pre-legislative Experience in Civic Organizations, Political Parties and Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERIENCE IN</th>
<th>(a) CIVIC ORG'NS</th>
<th>(b) PARTY</th>
<th>(c) GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81.8 % (54)</td>
<td>71.2 % (47)</td>
<td>60.6 % (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10.6 % (7)</td>
<td>27.3 % (18)</td>
<td>39.4 % (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>7.6 % (5)</td>
<td>1.5 % (1)</td>
<td>0.0 % (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0 % (66)</td>
<td>100.0 % (66)</td>
<td>100.0 % (660)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df = 1</td>
<td>( x^2 = 34.7 )</td>
<td>( x^2 = 27.0 )</td>
<td>( x^2 = 2.59 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although we are not able to present the extent of overlap between the three categories, it may be suggested that, in aggregate terms, experience in civic organizations is the most important type of experience which a would-be candidate should have. Known support for the party, expressed in terms of holding executive positions in the constituency organization, is important, although somewhat less important than the non-partisan activities. Experience in office is important, although not so important as the other two.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) It may be noted that Ontario legislators reporting no party experience are far fewer in number than in any of
Although it has been pointed out that this study is not concerned with political socialization, one aspect of that phenomenon may have some relevance here. It has been observed that, as a group, the MLA's are characterized by upward status in relation to their fathers. In many cases, though, political experience and involvement on the part of a Member may be an extension of a family tradition. In a case where a member comes from a family with strong political orientations, he receives a considerable political education and at the same time may acquire a political name.

Thus, while early family experiences and observations have some impact on the socialization process which the member experiences, they also may influence his recruitment.\(^\text{17}\)

In Ontario, however, because of the extent of mobility, we do not expect that there will be a large number of traditional families in provincial politics.

\(\text{the four states in the survey by Wahlke, et al. In one-party Tennessee, 66% of the legislators reported no party experience. The lowest proportion reporting no experience was 41% in New Jersey. Thus, it seems, party activity is an important asset for those seeking election to the Ontario Legislative Assembly. Prelegislative experience, however, conforms more to the patterns found in the Wahlke study. Wahlke, et al., op.cit., p.95 and 97.}\)

\(\text{17} \) \text{Ibid., p.82-85, and Kornberg and Thomas, "The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites in the United States and Canada", Journal of Politics, XXVII (1962), pp. 761-75.}
I - Hypothesis

\[ H_5 \] The fathers of the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly, because of their lower social status, will not show a tendency for political activity.

II - Results

The hypothesis may be accepted as expressed, both in simple visual terms and because of the high chi square result.

III - Method of Investigation

Respondents were asked to indicate whether their fathers had been active in politics, either as a public office-holder, a candidate or a party worker.

IV - Analysis and Comments

It seems that political experience and involvement among the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly is largely a "first generational" phenomenon. We attribute this pattern to the upward status of the Members over their fathers.\(^{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation of Fathers of Ontario MLA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers political actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers not active in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df - 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{18}\) Sorauf finds very similar results -- 30.4% of his candidates reported fathers active in politics (p. 85). Wahlke, et al., find much higher proportions of legislators
Although there is not a necessity for candidates to live in the constitutions they represent, the actual degree of local involvement may be rather significant in the recruitment process.

The American case, where it is necessary for the legislator to live in his district, shows that legislators have very deep roots in their states, and near life-long attachments to their districts.

The questions which were directed to MLA's in this study only asked them to indicate the number of years in which they have lived in their constituencies. Although the information gained does not permit the pursuit of several interesting questions, it does allow a very crude assessment of the importance of local connections.

I - Hypothesis

H6 Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly will have maintained long residence in their constituencies.

II - Results

The visual assessment of the distribution of responses confirms the hypothesis, however tentative it might be. More than half of the respondents have lived in their constituencies for more than twenty-five years, many of them reporting life-long residence in the area. A further

with relatives (not just fathers) in politics (loc.cit.).
13.6% report residences of 16 to 25 years; in most cases these represent most of the adult life of the respondents.

III - Method of Investigation

Respondents were asked to indicate the number of years they have lived in their constituency.

IV - Analysis and Comments

The distribution of respondents reporting is the only information available to confirm the hypothesis. There is no other analysis which can be performed with the type of data collected.

TABLE 4.9

Length of Residence in Constituency - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>(Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than five years</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six to fifteen years</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteen to twenty-five years</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than twenty-five years</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100. 0 % (66)

Of the five who reported never having lived in the constituency, all were in metropolitan areas, with the Member simply living in another part of the urban area. It may be suggested that any respondent who has lived from 16 to 25 years in his constituency could have settled in that area after military service in the Second World War and/or completion of university or other training. In these cases, the respondents would have effectively established
local roots in his constituency.

In summary, the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly gained some political skills from their occupations, although the proportion which had this sort of "entrance asset" was much smaller than the proportions who gained their skills in their "leisure" time. Thus, the most common form of experience came in civic organizations, with party activities next in significance and other governmental activities less important than the other two. Further implications of these results may be derived from subsequent portions of this study.

II - The Selection Process

A. Personal Attraction to Nomination

Without the device of the party primary, the selection of candidates to run in an election in Canada takes place within the party apparatus. There is no clear impression of just how new candidates emerge to be chosen by the various constituency associations, and just which groups have an influence in that process.

It is known, to some degree, what both the party and the constituency seek when they choose their candidate: they try to select potential legislators who are attuned to the values and interests of the party and who also will respond to constituency values. Presumably, several persons will have these orientations in each constituency, as well as some assortment of the political resources we found relevant
It is the contention of this analyst that the factor which determines how these "receptive and eligible" people are actually drawn into the contest for nomination is the degree of party competition at the constituency level. As discussed in Chapter Two, the relation of the individual to his original interest in seeking political office, and of the role which the constituency party played in choosing the candidate may be dependent upon the recent success of the party in the constituency.

While the Progressive Conservative Party has formed the government in Ontario for almost twenty-five years, many constituencies have changed hands, sometimes rather often, and sometimes among all three parties. The expectation which would be made is that if the constituency has been a stronghold for any one of the parties, there will be considerable freedom in the support and selection of candidates within that party, and that the party would either be divided into two or more groups, each attempting to secure the nomination for its candidate, or it would take no large part in the promotion of potential candidates, leaving "outside" groups to rally behind any potential candidates. In the case where the constituency had given consistent support to some other party, it would be expected that people would be reluctant to seek the nomination in one of the minority parties because of their poor chances of success in the elections. In that
case it would be expected that individuals would be approached by the party, and that it would have to persuade or encourage them to run in the name of the party. When the constituency has a mixed tradition (i.e. it has changed hands often), the case will be more like the former situation; opportunities for success are possible in the election, so there will be considerable activity on the part of many groups in the contest.

I - Hypothesis

\[ H_7 \]

There is a definite relationship between the nature of the selection process and the state of the party competition in the individual constituencies. In constituencies which
(a) were held consistently by the Member's party before his first election, officials of his party take the least active role in recruiting candidates.
(b) were held consistently by a party other than that of the Member before his first election, the officials of his party take the most active role in recruiting candidates.
(c) had changed hands frequently before the Member's first election, candidate recruitment is "wide-open."

II - Results

In a very generalized fashion all aspects of the hypothesis may be accepted. However, some aspects of the responses are not consistent with the over-all picture. In this case, again, acceptance of the hypothesis is based on simple visual assessments of the distribution of the alternative responses.
III - Method of Investigation

Using a statistical summary of the electoral districts of Ontario, a summary prepared by the province's Chief Elections Officer, trends in the individual constituencies for the five elections preceding the respondent's first election were compiled. Respondents were then divided into three groups according to the electoral tradition of their constituencies. Category (a) includes constituencies in which the respondent's party won at least three of the five elections, including the last election; category (b) includes constituencies in which the respondent's party lost three or more of the elections, including the last election; and in category (c) are constituencies which changed hands at least twice, and especially cases where all three parties won during the five elections.

Answers to questions concerning the Member's original interest in the nomination, and about his perception of the role of his constituency party in that original attempt to gain the nomination, were compiled according to the first division made in the responses.

IV - Analysis and Comments

The main interest in the data concerns the differences between the three types of constituencies, although some connections between the two sections of the data may have some importance.
TABLE 4.10

Interest in Nomination and Constituency Party Role - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Interest</th>
<th>CONSTITUENCY TRADITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own idea</td>
<td>18.2% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested by party</td>
<td>21.2% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested by friends</td>
<td>60.6% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0% (33) 99.0% (17) 100.0% (16)

Constituency Party Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>3.0% (1)</td>
<td>17.6% (3)</td>
<td>31.25% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage</td>
<td>51.0% (17)</td>
<td>35.2% (6)</td>
<td>31.25% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favoured other</td>
<td>3.0% (1)</td>
<td>5.9% (1)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support split</td>
<td>30.0% (10)</td>
<td>29.4% (5)</td>
<td>25.00% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No action</td>
<td>9.0% (3)</td>
<td>5.9% (1)</td>
<td>6.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>3.0% (1)</td>
<td>5.9% (1)</td>
<td>6.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99.0% (33) 99.9% (17) 100.0% (16)

The typical pattern seems to be one where a group of community minded individuals urges one of its members to seek the nomination, and the leaders of the local party organization (perhaps the same people) confirm support to the candidate-to-be. These are cases where the primary support seems to come from non-partisan sources, and secondary support is offered (rather than solicited) from the party organization. The case where primary support came from the party is found, as predicted, in cases where the Member managed to win a riding which was traditionally in the opposition's camp. We may suppose that for many of the respondents the "friends and associates" to whom they give credit for initial support are actually party workers, for, as discovered in an earlier test, most Members were active party workers before their election.
The evidence about the role of the majority party does not indicate either an internal "struggle" to secure the nomination, nor an idle party leadership in the nomination process. In all three categories, the largest proportion of responses came from Members who claimed that the party had to encourage them to seek office. In other words, there was some degree of interest in the possibility (the support of friends), so that perhaps the party was merely ensuring that such eligible people did not pass up the opportunity. We may take this to mean that, in Ontario, the majority of the politicians do not (publicly) regard their presence in the Legislature as the result of their own quest for power or status (the low amount of the upward trend reported between parts two and three of Table 4.5 may add support to this suggestion). The main feeling seems to be that they are in the Legislative Assembly because it provides them with an opportunity for public service, or because their constituency had needs which they hoped to satisfy, or because they wanted to advance their party's ideals.

Responses to one of the questions in the survey may also contribute to the foregoing discussion.

**TABLE 4.11**

Motivation for Election - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills to use</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to group or interest</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to party ideals</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for constituency</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for public service</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>(66)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, Ontario MLA's do not indicate widespread entrepreneurial activities or attitudes in securing nomination for election. For the most part, they attribute the original support for their candidacies to come, not from themselves, but from their "non-political" (as indicated by the alternative chosen -- friends rather than the party) associates; they further indicate, in general terms, support to have been forthcoming from the party since it actually encouraged them to seek the nomination, rather than seeking to block the candidate (perhaps all candidates the parties wanted to block were actually blocked), or simply sitting back to wait.

In the case where the winner broke traditional support against his party, there was a high proportion of cases where the respondent felt that the party had actually suggested his candidacy. In cases where the tradition was mixed, there was, except for the predominant tendency indicating support from friends, almost equal responses for all other alternatives, indicating that these situations were "wide open".

B. Nature of the Party System

The expectation made in the last section about the importance of the party's electoral success at the constituency level may also have some relevance at the "macro" level of this study, in other words at the province-wide level. While it is the method of recruitment which is influenced by
the state of party competition at the constituency level, the general level of party success at the province-wide level will, it is expected, determine the type of candidates which the party is able to attract.

The relative success of the parties in electoral activities may correspond to the relative individual "success" of their candidates. It is expected that in Ontario, the Progressive Conservative Party will, because of its long tenure in office, be able to recruit the more "successful" candidates, that is, those with the highest status. The Liberals, as mentioned earlier, are reasonably strong in some areas of the Province; they also have gained some status of their own because of the successes of the federal wing of the Party. In sum, they should be able to attract some candidates from status occupations, although not so many as the P.C.'s. The New Democratic Party had two very successful elections in the P.C. era, but have not recently posed a great threat to the government. Thus, the N.D.P. is not expected to draw great numbers of high status occupations because of marginal probability of success.

In Kornberg's 1966 paper to the A.P.S.A., he notes a trend which was evident in three studies of candidates and party workers; in those studies it seems that the status of the recruits which the party was able to attract varied on an ideological continuum. The further right the party, the higher the status of the candidates. In the study which
he did himself, he found that this did not hold in the Canadian House of Commons from 1945 to 1965. Rather, he found that the variation was based on the relative success of the parties in the electoral contests in that time. It would be helpful to test this proposition in the present case; however, recent electoral successes in Ontario have corresponded exactly with the right-left continuum -- the most conservative party has been the most successful, and the most socialist party has been least successful. Thus, it seems that the test of such a proposition will not be possible with the data available at present.

I - Hypothesis

H The status of the Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly is directly related to the competitive position of the parties. The more successful the party's electoral record, the higher the status of the party's Members.

II - Results

In terms of a visual assessment of the principal occupations of the Members, the hypothesis is not confirmed. As supplemental measures, education also fails to confirm the hypothesis, but perceived status supports the hypothesis. The relationship between these two trends can, it is hoped, be explained.

III - Method of Investigation

The breakdown of the sample according to principal occupation, used in previous discussions, was further divided according to the party affiliations of the respondents. Tabulations on formal education and perceived class, as developed earlier, will be presented on party lines also.

IV - Analysis and Comments

Although the evidence does not support the hypothesis, the pattern which emerges in some aspects of the results are interesting in their relation to the recruitment process.

TABLE 4.12

Distribution of Principal Occupations on Hollingshead Scale for Ontario MLA's - by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUP'N LEVEL</th>
<th>P.C.'s</th>
<th>LIB's</th>
<th>N.D.P.'s</th>
<th>P.C.'s</th>
<th>LIB's</th>
<th>N.D.P.'s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>30.2% (13)</td>
<td>40.9% (6)</td>
<td>12.5% (1)</td>
<td>100.0% (43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>46.5% (20)</td>
<td>20.0% (3)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>16.3% (7)</td>
<td>40.0% (6)</td>
<td>62.5% (5)</td>
<td>100.0% (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>4.7% (2)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>12.5% (1)</td>
<td>100.0% (43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>12.5% (1)</td>
<td>100.0% (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0% (43) 100.0% (15) 100.0% (8)

TABLE 4.13

Distribution of Formal Educational Achievements - Ontario MLA's by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P.C.'s</th>
<th>LIB's</th>
<th>N.D.P.'s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>16.3% (7)</td>
<td>26.6% (4)</td>
<td>50.00% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>23.2% (10)</td>
<td>40.0% (6)</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other post second'y</td>
<td>23.2% (10)</td>
<td>13.3% (2)</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second'y compl'n</td>
<td>13.9% (6)</td>
<td>13.3% (2)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some sec'd'y school</td>
<td>20.9% (9)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school compl'n</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less prim. school compl'n</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>6.6% (1)</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99.8% (43) 99.8% (15) 100.00% (8)
The high proportion of lower status occupations among the N.D.P. is caused by two factors; the first is the leftist tendencies of the party, and its willingness to support for candidacies many who represent the occupational groups which support the party electorally. The second cause of a low concentration of occupations is based on the occurrence within the party membership of three respondents who held organizational posts in the Party or a trade union before their election to the Assembly. These men were highly educated (all three had done some graduate studies), but the posts are not high in the occupational status hierarchy. The image of the working man's party is evident in their perceptions of themselves as coming from lower class rankings, but not climbing into the upper levels because of their political successes.

The high proportion of Liberal respondents at the top end of the hierarchies is caused by the fact that the sample of Members is drawn from professionally trained occupations or from the group of independent businessmen or managers. In general, the group felt that it had middle class values, with only minimal shifts in status evident because of political office-holding.

It may be expected that since the Progressive Conservatives have been successful for so long, and with such wide recent majorities, that it is likely that there will be more diversity in the Party's membership. The large
number of businessmen draws the emphasis in the distribution of occupational status downward (although if economic status were measured in this case, the pattern might be considerably different), and since many are so-called "self-made" men in the North American tradition, there would be a lower average level of education in this group, since many would have left school at an early age (in many cases before or during the 1930's) to go into the commercial and industrial world.

The pattern of perceived class among the parties, the only case in which the hypothesis seems valid, might suggest that the hypothesis could be supported in future tests. This speculation is based on the suggestion that those Members who consider themselves as having a high status have tended to gather in the Progressive Conservative Party. The hypothesis could be supported if it were established that these Members were using the Progressive Conservative Party to support their higher status.

TABLE 4.14
Subjective Assessment of Social Class - Ontario MLA's - by Party

(a) PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Level</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upper-upper</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-upper</td>
<td>6.97% (3)</td>
<td>20.9% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-middle</td>
<td>34.88% (15)</td>
<td>41.9% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle-middle</td>
<td>34.88% (15)</td>
<td>23.2% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-middle</td>
<td>4.65% (2)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-lower</td>
<td>4.65% (2)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-lower</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>13.95% (6)</td>
<td>9.3% (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99.98% (43) 99.9% (43)
TABLE 4.14, cont'd

(b) LIBERALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upper-upper</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-upper</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>6.6% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-middle</td>
<td>40.0% (6)</td>
<td>40.0% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle-middle</td>
<td>33.3% (5)</td>
<td>40.0% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-middle</td>
<td>13.3% (2)</td>
<td>6.6% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-lower</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-lower</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>13.3% (2)</td>
<td>6.6% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>99.9% (15)</td>
<td>99.8% (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upper-upper</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-upper</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-middle</td>
<td>37.75% (3)</td>
<td>50.00% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle-middle</td>
<td>25.00% (2)</td>
<td>37.75% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-middle</td>
<td>25.00% (2)</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-lower</td>
<td>12.25% (1)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-lower</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
<td>0.00% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.00% (8)</td>
<td>100.00% (8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, there does not seem to be a direct correlation between party success and the status of its Members, at least so far as this study is concerned. Some evidence exists, in very tentative form, to suggest that such a correlation might be discovered in later tests.

III - The Career Perspective

A. The Role of the Legislator

In a parliamentary system, the legislator does not have the flexibility in his activities which the congressional member is able to attempt. The control of the Cabinet over the business of the Assembly and over the spending of money is rather strong. Cabinet Ministers, of course, have
some specialized roles in the legislature, as well as some members of the opposition parties who take on specialized critical roles. In fact, there are several roles which the legislator might attempt to play to advance either himself or some particular cause. We are interested in what the Member believes he should do with the resources and opportunities which may give him access to political office.

The hope in this portion of the study is to establish, again in aggregate terms, whether there are any similarities in the responses to questions about the recruitment base, the selection process, and the roles which Members attempt to play in the legislature. In political systems where candidates may emerge from non-party groups to gain political support, and/or the candidates themselves claim to be originators of their candidacies, the legislators will feel much more disposed to play specialized roles in the legislature. Such tendencies might be evident among those Ontario legislators who fulfill those "requirements", or whose election to the Assembly was based on some other special circumstances.

In most cases, however, there is not likely to be great motivations toward playing specific roles in the Legislative Assembly. This belief is based upon the trends found earlier in this study; more specifically, the responses outlined in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 seem to imply that Members are not political entrepreneurs nor do they have support from many non-party groups, at least in the nomination process.
I - Hypothesis

The role which the Member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly tries to perform is directly related to the recruitment base and selection process which put him into political office. Specialized legislative roles will be played by those whose nomination involved some special circumstances.

II - Results

In general terms, the hypothesis may be accepted as valid. In earlier discussions, certain patterns were discovered; Table 4.10 shows that Members credited the support of friends and associates for inspiring their interest in political office. They also seemed to feel that the party was a supporter of their political careers since, for the largest number of respondents, the party encouraged them to seek the nomination. In Table 4.11 the respondents showed that most of their motivations toward the acquisition of political office was based on "altruistic" motives; most claimed that their interest was not based on personal skills which they could use in politics, nor in the desire to advance the cause of specific groups. Rather, responses indicated interest in the "general welfare" of their constituencies or of the province itself through the advancement of the ideals of his party, or simply through the Member's wish to serve.

In harmony with these general trends are the roles which the Members felt they were performing in the Legislature. The pattern of those responses indicates an over-
whelming majority of the respondents played simply the role of "representative".

III - Method of Investigation

Tabulations were made earlier of the interest of the legislators in their original nomination, in the role of their constituency party, and in the motivations which they expressed as reasons for seeking election. Tabulations were made in this section on the roles which the Members felt that they were playing in the legislature. The cases of those who expressed specialized roles were examined to determine any trends or similarities in their experiences, both in nominating and before.

IV - Analysis and Comments

The contention here is that the occurrence of a large number of "representatives" may be related to the tendencies described above, where Members feel that they are not involved in political life for their own gain, but for what they can contribute to the party, the constituency, etc. At least two other factors, however, tend to detract from the validity of such a conclusion. For many respondents, the term "representative" was closest to the traditional idea of just what an elected legislator should be. Further, as pointed out, the parliamentary system prevents widespread variations in roles by Members of such bodies. 20

20A more rigorous discussion of legislative roles shows
Those who listed roles other than "representative" show a number of special circumstances in their backgrounds and selection experiences. Some of the special roles may be explained through perceptions of those trends by the analyst: one Cabinet Minister, a recent conscript from business, considered himself an expert; one N.D.P. Member felt that none of the headings were suitable because he considered himself a spokesman for his party's ideals. Most of those who considered themselves "parliamentarians" were either in the highest status groups, or had fathers or relatives who were active in politics (and thus perhaps felt that they had more knowledge about parliamentary life), or did not live in the constituency which they represented. While those who responded to specialized roles were not the only Members having these experiences, they could be interpreted as special cases which might tend to make the Member believe he had a special role to play in the Legislative Assembly.

some interesting differences. The rejection of the terms "negotiator" and "spokesman" in this study are supported by the same results among Canadian legislators in the published work; American legislators chose that response in 11% of the cases. But the category of "ritualist" (roughly equivalent to "parliamentarian") was not accepted as a role by any Canadian legislators, but was by 15% of the American respondents. Kornberg and Thomas, "The Purposive Roles of Canadian and American Legislators: Some Comparisons", Political Science, XVIII (1965), p.40.
### TABLE 4.15

Legislative Roles - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokesman</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarian</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the test which has been made here is admittedly crude, and the inferences not entirely evident, it may be stated that the pattern of recruitment and selection seems to have a direct impact upon the roles which the Members perceive to be theirs. In the Ontario case where community interests seem to stimulate candidacy the most widely accepted role is the most generalized role. If there were substantial variations in the processes examined earlier, it may be expected that the elected Members will be more willing to perform more specialized roles in the Assembly.

### B. Individual Evaluation

One of the earlier conclusions of this study was that individuals have clustered in the two available legislatures in such a way that the upper level has a greater number of higher status persons. The intention here is to examine, again in rather crude form, how or why individuals choose to seek election at a particular level of the governmental hierarchy. A part of the expectations which the candidate must have are his views upon the impact success will have
upon his occupational pattern; with the long-term nature of the parliamentary legislatures in mind we would expect that most members would not expect to be able to continue to practise their regular occupations. Before proceeding any further, it would be useful to examine one aspect of professionalization in Ontario politics.

I - Hypothesis

H₁₀ Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly will consider their political office to be their principal occupation.

II - Results

The hypothesis is confirmed in terms of a visual assessment of the responses, and in terms of the chi square test performed on the results of the question.

III - Method of Investigation

A tabulation was made of the responses to a question in the survey which asked Members whether they still considered the occupation indicated as their principal occupation when they were first elected to the Assembly still could be considered their principal occupation. If they indicated that it was not, they were asked whether their political office was not their principal occupation. Those respondents who indicated that they still practised their principal occupation were examined to discover any similarities in their occupations, or in some other factor.
IV - Analysis and Comments

TABLE 4.16
"Professionalization" of Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Still practising principal occupation</th>
<th>27.3% (18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MLA now principal occupation</td>
<td>72.7% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df-1</td>
<td>$x^2 = 12.7$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the eighteen respondents who did not feel that MLA was their principal occupation, all but one were self-employed, and still rely on these businesses as sources of income. Five are lawyers in Metropolitan Toronto, and one is a lawyer who can commute for daily sessions. Another is a retail merchant in Toronto, and another is a manager of his own company who can also commute. Two real estate agents, one insurance agent, one lawyer and one undertaker from scattered parts of the province would be able to keep these enterprises in operation in their absence. Similarly, two others are owners of their own companies and three are farmers; all of these would be able to maintain some control over these operations while fulfilling legislative duties.

The only employed respondent in this sample is the director of a large public association with headquarters in Toronto. Thus, although these Members could not consider their legislative office their principal occupation, they were able to do that because of occupations which could be considered flexible and/or compatible with legislative life.

A second aspect of professionalization, mentioned
earlier, concerns the relevance of previous experience in competitive political systems (competition again measured by the degree of competition among the parties). The inference made by Wahlke, et al., is that experience is necessary in competitive systems; in other words, tendencies towards professionalization will come in competitive systems.

I - Hypothesis

H1: Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly who have had previous governmental experience will display a greater tendency to be elected from competitive constituencies than from non-competitive constituencies.

II - Results

If competitive constituencies are those in which there is a two-party or even three-party contest, the results do not confirm the hypothesis. In cases where the individual party faces the greatest amount of competition to succeed (that is, it is a minority party), the expectations of the hypothesis are found.

III - Method of Investigation

A manual resorting of the respondents who claimed to have local government experience was made according to the competitive nature of the constituency (as defined in an earlier test). The proportion of respondents in each type of constituency who reported previous experience was calculated.
IV - Analysis and Comments

The significance of previous governmental experience was suggested earlier in this study. The findings here indicate that candidates who had this experience were very successful in winning constituencies in which their party had not been recently successful. Another related finding is that previous experience is a greater political asset in rural than in urban ridings. 21

**TABLE 4.17**

Previous Governmental Experience - Ontario MLA's - by Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF COMPETITION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES</th>
<th>NUMBER WITH EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>PROPORTION WITH EXPERIENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional support-Own Party</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17 - 5 urban</td>
<td>12 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional support-Other Party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12 - 4 urban</td>
<td>5 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional support-Mixed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 - 2 urban</td>
<td>2 rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the feelings towards professionalization, though, the legislator will have made a more specific evaluation of his own resources in terms of the alternatives available. In Canada, the political career can begin at the municipal, provincial or federal level. It can also proceed

---

21 Some interesting suggestions about the relationship between previous experience and party competition are made by Wahlke, et al. They find that in competitive areas the parties are active in nominating those who have served the party at the local level. Such findings are not evident in Canada because of the non-partisan nature of local governmental offices. Wahlke, et al., op.cit., p.96.
through all three levels. A part of the evaluation of the alternatives includes the perception of the political escalator, and whether the Members feel that they should attempt to seek higher office, perhaps because of experience at the lower level.

As discovered earlier, some sixty percent of the respondents had some prior governmental experience before entering the legislature. Only two of them had been elected to the House of Commons at any time, so that for those two Members there is not a strong likelihood that they would consider re-election to be part of an upward trend in their careers. For the remaining Members, though, it might be expected that they would seek election at a higher office if they felt that it could improve their political position. Those who are content to make a career of their Legislative office will not indicate any interest in other elective offices. In an effort to discover the extent of the "political escalator" tendency in the Canadian federal structure, it may be suggested that:

\[2^2\] Seligman, PROD, loc.cit.

\[2^3\] Respondents tended to agree that there was another possible office which would be higher in status than the Legislative Assembly -- the Canadian House of Commons. For the respondents' evaluations of the various public offices in the Canadian political system, see Appendix D, "Ranking of Positions of Public Interest and Service - Ontario MLA's."
I - Hypothesis

$H_{12}$ Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly who are disposed toward further service in other elective offices will have held previous public offices.

II - Results

Only a very small proportion of the respondents indicated that there were other possible offices which they considered, and even fewer felt that they would attempt to change at this time. Thus, we cannot accept the underlying assumption that there is a logical sequence in service from local to provincial to federal levels, at least in Ontario at the present time.

III - Method of Investigation

In this area, respondents were asked two questions. They were first asked whether there were any other elective offices which could provide them with the opportunity to achieve the ends which inspired their original decision to serve in the Legislative Assembly. Those who indicated there were other possibilities were examined in terms of their previous governmental experiences.

The second question asked whether the Member felt that he could make his greatest public contribution in certain alternative offices outlined in the question.

IV - Analysis and Comments
(a) Other Possible Elective Offices - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>NO RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.2% (14)</td>
<td>75.8% (50)</td>
<td>3.0% (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ df - 1 \quad x^2 - 9.57 \]

(b) Alternative Elective Offices and Experience - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices desired</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>No.exper'd</th>
<th>No.non-exper'd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bench</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 9 5

TABLE 4.19

Career Expectations - Ontario MLA's

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain in Legislative Assembly</td>
<td>86.4% (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt to become MP</td>
<td>7.6% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enter local government</td>
<td>1.5% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in non-gov't activities</td>
<td>3.0% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RESPONSE</td>
<td>1.5% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0% (66)

The differences in responses reported in the two tables above may be explained from either one of two possible reasons. The first may simply be the nature of the questions which the Members were asked. The first question simply asked whether there were any possible offices which they might be able to enter, but the second did not ask whether the Member had any intentions (immediately or at some later time) of seeking some other office, but rather which office they felt that they could best fill. The second reason for differences in responses between the two questions would be
plain reality. In other words, because the Member would have to resign his seat and seek election in a legislature which is orientated to many different responsibilities, he would obviously feel that it is in his own best interests to "stay put". Further, if the Member is older, it will not be easy to embark on a new career; if he has considerable experience in the Assembly, he may be eligible for leadership positions in his party. The present Liberal strength in Ontario in federal politics would mean that most respondents in this study (PC's) would not have an easy time winning in federal contests; again, reality means that they will "stay put", and be content to make their provincial post a career.

But at the same time, these trends correspond to some extent with the findings made earlier in this study. The members are, for the most part, from the middle ranges of the status system, and consider themselves middle classes. They also, again in aggregate terms, consider the provincial legislature to be second in importance to the House of Commons. It might be suggested, then, that many Members do not have further ambitions because they realize that the provincial legislature best approximates the status, skills and ambitions which they bring into political life.

In summary, it has been found that most Members in the sample do not have upward ambitions in the federal structure of alternatives. These Members consider themselves professional legislators suited to the task of representing an
electorate in the fields of competence assigned to the provincial legislature. It may be inferred from this discovery that, in Ontario, there are two separate party structures, each recruiting candidates for a different electoral office. In other words, although there may be some overlapping in the leadership of federal and provincial constituency parties (it is usually necessary to have separate organizations because of different constituency boundaries), the two groups recruit basically different people, and do not attempt (or are not successful in attempts) to select candidates who have been elected at the other level. Thus, Members of the Legislative Assembly are professionals, both in their acceptance of the legislative role as a full-time occupation, and in their desire to retain their membership in the Assembly.

IV - An Overview

This study has discovered some new information about the Ontario Legislative Assembly, and about the relationships between and among aspects of the political recruitment process. Without recapitulating the entire study, some main conclusions may be drawn, both about the Assembly and about political recruitment in Ontario.

The emphasis in the political recruitment process to the Ontario Legislative Assembly is upon non-partisan orientations, at least in an overt sense. This tendency is evident in the high proportion of Members who participated
in civic organizations, often in executive capacities, and who felt that their support for nomination was offered by, rather than wrung from, the local political party. Most respondents further felt that the role which they played in the Legislature was basically one of representative -- a role which is highly compatible with the generalized type of support which (to the candidates) underlies their candidacies. At the same time, however, partisan activities are important in the recruitment process for almost as many Members as participated in non-partisan activities also played active parts in their local party organization.

Recruitment to the Legislative Assembly has also been easier for individuals who have achieved some form of education beyond secondary school, and whose occupations are of higher status than the population's average occupation. It is easier, however, for individuals with lower status occupations or class rankings to be recruited for the Legislative Assembly than for the House of Commons. Most Members of the Assembly are "professional provincial politicians" -- both in the sense that they have given up their pre-legislative occupation (at least temporarily) in favour of their elected position, and in the sense that they have not, to any significant degree, indicated any political ambitions beyond the Legislative Assembly. This apparent satisfaction with the provincial legislature as the scene of a political career, combined with the fact that only half the respondents
claimed to have had local government experience may be further support for the earlier contention that the Members displayed rather passive attitudes toward their recruitment into the Legislature. In other words, again, while the present position requires most of their attention, their evaluations of the resources which they have brought into political life, and of the various alternatives that the Canadian political system offers them, apparently leads them to accept provincial politics as the most relevant area in which to serve.

The study now concludes with a brief examination of the original schema in the light of the discoveries made in the empirical study.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Through a limited empirical inquiry, based on a narrow definition of the topic, this study has attempted to explore the process of political recruitment as a dependent variable in the political system.

The use of this research schema has confirmed several aspects of the political recruitment process which have been examined individually elsewhere. For example, the basis of social stratification and its articulation with the political system have both been demonstrated throughout this study. The upward status of politicians also seemed evident in the study. The pre-legislative experience of the legislators in civic and community organizations also conformed to the expectation that political actors are often "active citizens" before their election, and have had reasonably long association with their community's interests and needs.

Expectations about other aspects of political recruitment and legislative life were not confirmed in this study. There was no indication that politics was a "family tradition" among most respondents to the study. Most of the legislators were content with the most generalized role in the legislature, and most acknowledged a passive role in
their own nominations. A very high proportion were very active in the internal operations of their local political parties, in fact more than in similar studies in the United States.

Some newer aspects of the process were examined in this study, but the results of those investigations were not too successful. The connection between the electoral success of the parties and the status of their legislators, found in other studies, was not found in this case. The original attempts to discover the association between the legislators' interest in political office and the role of his constituency party was also not too successful.

The main drawback in the assessment of this model is based on the absence of clear comparative information. As for what the model set out to do, it is, I believe, reasonably successful. Information has been structured from at least three "directions" into an integrated pattern which may be substantiated by similar results which were observed in several parts of the study.

Further work on political recruitment as a dependent variable must be based, of course, on comparative information. Systems in which there have been recent changes of governments can be compared with those which have not changed; successful candidates may be compared with unsuccessful candidates; two levels of a federal system may be compared directly; or comparisons may be made between
recruitment processes and patterns in systems with different cultural bases. Other "internal" aspects of the process which could be examined and incorporated into the model include, of course, personality and motivations (as proposed by Barber, and to some extent by Jacob). Research directed through the parties themselves, or through the constituencies, will provide added insight from the micro level.

A further interesting variable, which was not considered in this study, would be the level of salary paid to the legislators. It would seem to this analyst that the salary paid to the members might be inversely related to the over-all status of the legislators; in other words, in legislatures where Members receive very low pay, there will probably be more legislators from higher status positions. Where pays are high, more legislators may have come from lower status occupations. Such a factor may also have some bearing upon whether the legislator feels that he has improved his status through political activities, and also upon the general impression he has of his role as a legislator.

A most interesting comparative study in Canada based upon salaries paid to legislators and the social status of the Members could include Ontario, Quebec and the Canadian House of Commons. The last group received an annual sessional indemnity of $12,000 plus $6,000 as an expense allowance. The Quebec Legislative Assembly, during a time when provincial "nationalism" was very strong, awarded itself a salary and
expense allowance equal to the Canadian House of Commons; this level of pay would be only fitting, they believed, since they were the official parliament for the French-Canadian nation. Ontario Members receive a sessional indemnity of $8,000 with a $3,000 expense allowance for Members from Metropolitan Toronto, and $4,000 for all others.¹

Political recruitment can also, of course, be treated as an independent variable. Once a refined model is developed, it can be used to investigate and reflect several other aspects of the political system. The development and stability of a system may be influenced by the political recruitment process of the system. The distribution of status and prestige may be influenced by the political recruitment process of the system. The distribution of status and prestige may be influenced by the political recruitment process of the system. Political recruitment will also have some impact on the political attitudes, and secondarily upon the policies enacted, in the legislative or executive offices of the system.

Thus, a research schema is only a very tentative beginning. Repeated applications and refinements must be made

to achieve a praxiological model -- one from which maximum results may be obtained from the most streamlined approaches. The schema proposed here, while it "moves", requires considerably more molding before it is able to carry out the larger investigations which lie ahead.
APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO MEMBERS OF ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

In those following questions which ask you to make a choice, please place a check-mark in the space provided.

In the other questions, please write in the appropriate responses.*

1. What was your principal occupation when you were first elected to the Legislative Assembly?

2. Do you still consider it to be your principal occupation? Yes  No

   If your answer to the above is "No", do you consider your position as MLA to be your principal occupation?

   Yes  No

3. What level of formal education did you receive?

   post-baccalaureate studies
   bachelor's degree
   other post secondary school studies
   secondary school completion
   some secondary school studies
   primary school completion
   less than primary school completion

4. What was your father's principal occupation?

5. Was your father in politics (as a public office-holder, a candidate or a party officer?)

   Yes  No

*- In this version, spaces for written answers reduced.
6. What level of formal education did your father receive?
   ___post-baccalaureate studies
   ___bachelor's degree
   ___other post secondary school studies
   ___secondary school completion
   ___some secondary school studies
   ___primary school completion
   ___less than primary school completion

7. If we use as general terms of reference the factors of income, education and income, in what "class" (or level of society) would you place your father?
   ___upper-upper
   ___lower-upper
   ___upper-middle
   ___middle-middle
   ___lower-middle
   ___upper-lower
   ___lower-lower

8. How many years have you lived in your constituency?
   ___Years

9. Before your first election to the Legislative Assembly, were you active in community organizations (professional groups, service clubs, etc.)?
   Yes
   ___No
   Which ones were most important to you?_________

10. Did you hold any elected positions in those organizations?
    Yes
    ___No

11. If we use as general terms of reference the factors of income, education and occupation, in what "class" (or level of society) would you place yourself before your first election to public office?
    ___upper-upper
    ___lower-upper
    ___upper-middle
    ___middle-middle
    ___lower-middle
    ___upper-lower
    ___lower-lower
12. Besides your present office, to what other public offices have you been elected? (please check as many as applicable)

- local councillor
- mayor or reeve
- Federal MP
- other? please specify
- none

13. For what public offices have you run and not been elected (even if at another time you were elected)? (please check as many as applicable)

- local councillor
- mayor or reeve
- Provincial MLA
- Federal MP
- other? please specify
- none

14. For how many years have you been a registered member of your political party? _____ Years

15. Before your election to the Legislative Assembly had you ever held office in your party organization?

- Yes
- No

If your answer is "Yes", what office? briefly please

16. Had you been active in the party organization in any other way? (please check as many as applicable)

- made monetary contribution
- attended meetings
- contributed time in political campaigns
- other? please specify
- no party activities

17. When you first sought the nomination for the Legislative Assembly, how had you happened to be interested?

- pretty much own idea
- suggested by party leaders
- suggested by friends and associates
- other? please specify
18. When you were first elected to the Legislative Assembly, was your constituency:

- held by your own party
- held by another party
- a new constituency
- other? please specify

If your answer was "held by your own party",
- did the member vacate the seat, and you
- won the nomination in an "open contest"?
- did you win the nomination from the sitting member?
- were there other circumstances? please specify

If your answer was "a new constituency", did the area in which your new constituency was created show:
- traditional support for your party?
- traditional support for another party?
- no clear support for any party?
- unknown

19. When you first sought the nomination for election to the Legislative Assembly, what part did the leaders of your constituency organization play?
- persuaded you to run
- encouraged you to run
- generally favoured another candidate
- some favoured you, others did not
- took no action or stand on the question

20. Which of the following descriptions best approximates the role which you try to fulfill as a Member of the Legislative Assembly? (Choose only one please)

- a representative of all elements of your constituency
- a spokesman for a particular group or interest
- an expert on some more technical aspect of the responsibilities of the Provincial Legislature
- a negotiator -- someone who offers services or support in return for benefits
- a watchdog -- someone who attempts to protect the interests of the electorate and taxpayers
- a pipeline for the dissemination of information between the electorate and the government

(continued ....)
(20 -- continued)

_____ a parliamentarian — someone proficient
______ in the skills of representative democratic
________ government
_______ other? please specify

21. Please rank the following positions of "public
interest and service" according to the order
in which you judge their importance: give #1 to
the most important, #2 to the next most important,
etc. *

____ Federal MP
____ Federal Senator
____ Provincial MLA
____ member of the Bench
____ member of local/county government
____ member of senior, non-elective civil service
____ leader of public association or interest group

22. Are there any other elective offices which could
provide you with the opportunity to achieve the
ends which inspired your original decision to
attempt to serve in the Legislative Assembly?
____ Yes
____ No

23. Do you think you could make your greatest
public contribution as an individual, considering
your skills, your goals, and your experience, by:
____ remaining in the Legislative Assembly?
____ attempting to become a Federal MP?
____ moving into local governmental activities?
____ engaging in non-governmental activities?
____ other? please specify

24. Using the factors of income, education and occu-
pation as general terms of reference in what "class"
(or level of society) would you place yourself
at present?
____ upper-upper
____ lower-upper
____ upper-middle
____ middle-middle
____ lower-middle
____ upper-lower
____ lower-lower

*Responses to this question omitted from computer
tabulations.
25. Do any of the circumstances described below approximate the situation when you decided to seek the nomination for MLA? (check the most important one, please)
   ___ you had professional status -- skills and experience gained from your profession which you wanted to use
   ___ you were committed to a specific group or interest
   ___ you were committed to your party's ideals
   ___ you were concerned about the condition of your constituency
   ___ you were seeking an opportunity for public service
   ___ none of these

26. If you have the time, could you please attempt to expand your reasons for seeking election to the Legislative Assembly (as opposed to some other public body), and your reasons for seeking election when you did. Thank you for your time and consideration.
APPENDIX B

AN INDEX OF SOCIAL POSITION

from A.B. Hollingshead, Yale University

Seven Socio-Economic Scale Positions

1. Higher Executives of Large Concerns, Proprietors and Major Professionals
   a. Higher Executives: (Value of corporations $500,000 and above)
      Bank Presidents: Vice Presidents, and Assistant V-P's Businesses -- Directors, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Assistant Vice-Presidents, Executive Secretaries, Research Directors, Treasurers
   b. Proprietors: (Value over $100,000)
      Brokers Dairy Owners Lumber Dealers
      Contractors Farmers
   c. Major Professionals:
      Accountants Geologists
      Actuaries Judges (superior courts)
      Architects Lawyers
      Auditors Military, Comm. Officer
      Clergymen (professionally trained) Officials of Exec.Br. of Gov't(federal, provincial or local)
      Dentists Physicians
      Economists Teachers, University
      Engineers

2. Business Managers, Proprietors of Medium Sized Businesses, and Lesser Professionals
   a. Business Managers in Large Concerns (Value $500,000 plus)
      Advertising Directors Manufacturers' Reps/
      Branch Managers Office Managers
      Brokerage Salesmen Personnel Managers
      Directors of Purchasing Police Chief
      District Managers Postmaster
      Executive Assistants Production Mgr.
      Export Managers Sales Engineer
      Gov't Officials (minor) Sales Mgr. Nat'l Concern
      Farm Managers Store Manager
b. Proprietors of Medium Business (Value $35,000-
100,000)

Advertising  Farm owners
Clothing store  Poultry business
Contractors  Real estate business
Express company  Rug business
Fruits, wholesale  Store
Furniture  Theatre
Jewellers

c. Lesser Professionals

Accountants  Nurses
Chiropodists  Opticians
Finance writers  Pharmacists
Labour relations consultants  Social workers
Librarians  Teachers

3. Administrative Personnel, Owners Small Businesses, and Minor Professionals

a. Administrative Personnel

Advertising Agents  Section heads - gov't and
Chief clerks  business
Credit managers  Managers - Dep'ts
Insurance agents  Shops
Purchasing agents  Stores

b. Small Business Owners ($6,000 - $35,000)

for example -
bakeries  garage
dry goods  manufacturing
food products  real estate
funeral directors  restaurant
furniture  trucking

b. Semi-Professionals

actors and showmen  publicity and p.r.
appraisers (estimators)  reporters, newspapers
interior decorators  surveyors
physio-therapists  tool designers

d. Farmers (own farm - $20,000 - $35,000)

4. Clerical and Sales Workers, Technicians, and Owners

Small Businesses (under $6,000)

a. Clerical and Sales Workers

Bank Clerks and tellers  route managers
Bookkeepers  sales clerks
Business machine operators  shipping clerks
Clerical or stenographic  supervisors, factories
b. Technicians

- Dental technicians
- Draftsmen
- Inspectors
- Lab.technicians
- Locomotive engineers
- Safety supervisors
- Technical assistants
- Timekeepers


c. Owners Small Businesses

- Flower shop
- Grocery
- News stand
- Tailor shop


d. Farmers (own farm - $10,000 - $20,000)

5. Skilled Manual Employees and Small Farmers

a. Skilled Manual Workers
   for example -

- Bakers
- Barbers
- Bulldozer operators
- Die makers
- Firemen
- Foremen
- Lithographer
- Machinist
- Mechanic
- Painter
- Policeman
- Shoe repairman

b. Small Farmers

- Owners (under $10,000)
- Tenants with own equipment

6. Machine Operators and Semi-skilled Employees
   for example -

- Aides, hospital
- Assembly line workers
- Drivers and delivery men
- Gas station attendants
- Operators, factory machines
- Receivers and checkers
- Solderers
- Steelworkers
- Welders
- Wood workers

7. Unskilled Employees
   for example -

- Amusement park workers
- Dairy workers
- Domestics
- Janitors
- Labourers, construction
  un employed. (no occupation)
- Peddlers
- Porters
- Stevedores
- Street cleaners
- Unskilled factory workers
APPENDIX C

BROKERAGE AND NON-BROKERAGE OCCUPATIONS

In this study, brokerage occupations were considered to be those occupations in which the practitioner is placed in a bargaining position in dealing with non-subordinate outsiders; the purpose of his mediating position is the achievement of mutually satisfying agreements with these individuals.

Those occupations reported in this study which were classed as brokerage include the following:

- industrial supervisor
- insurance agent
- journalist
- lawyer
- merchant-retail
- wholesale
- pharmacist (merchant)
- political organizer or official
- postmaster
- real estate agent
- sales manager
- stock broker
- undertaker
- union organizer

Among the occupations which were classed as non-brokerage were the following:

- accountant
- business executive
- engineer
- farmer
- firefighter
- housewife
- industrial worker
- life underwriter
- machinist
- owner-manager small corp.
- physician
- senior civil service

Only those occupations which fulfilled all aspects of the definition of brokerage roles were included in the category of brokerage occupations. Some of the occupations
which were not classed, though, provided certain resources which could be applied to political activity in some form or another. For example, physicians had wide contacts but did not perform a mediating role; owners of small firms (in manufacturing, etc.) would have some flexibility, some independent sources of income but, again, would not have a mediating role in everyday life; teachers and professors might have social status, requisite skills in speaking and handling people, but their relationship to their students was not of the mediating, and, therefore, of the brokerage type.
APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TABLE D.1

Distribution of Brokerage Occupations - Ontario Legislators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION IN LEVEL</th>
<th>MLA's Total</th>
<th>Brokers</th>
<th>%Br's</th>
<th>MP's Total</th>
<th>Brokers</th>
<th>%Br's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | 66          | 38      | 57%   | 81          | 47      | 58%   |

TABLE D.2

Previous Elected Offices - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local council</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-reeve</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(mainly school board)</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE D.3

Electoral Defeats - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local council</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-reeve</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D.4

Type of Party Activities - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party officer</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donated money</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended meetings</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed time in elections</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE D.5

Ranking of Positions of Public Interest and Service - Ontario MLA's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>FREQUENCY OF RANKING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal MP</td>
<td>29 12 4 4 1 0 0 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Senator</td>
<td>0 4 4 4 6 18 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial MLA</td>
<td>18 32 5 2 1 1 0 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the Bench</td>
<td>3 2 11 14 7 4 2 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member local/county gov't</td>
<td>5 4 20 7 10 5 2 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member senior civil service</td>
<td>3 3 8 14 7 3 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader public assoc./int. group</td>
<td>0 1 2 5 4 16 13 41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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