THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
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OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION

The specific research problem posed in this study is an attempt to identify the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations with respect to a conception of the political system.

The first chapter, however, will make no attempt to apply systems analysis but, instead, will trace the origins of the F.A.O. from the time of its predecessor, the International Institute of Agriculture (I.I.A.). It is hoped that this chapter will put the Organization into historical perspective and, thereby, provide an appropriate platform from which to examine the three hypotheses, which form the basis of the study.\(^1\) The hypotheses will help to clarify the specific research problem. The F.A.O. has been in existence for more than twenty years and some, more or less, arbitrary selection of material had to be made to avoid a study of inordinate length. It was decided, therefore, to adopt a selective case approach. The inclusion of

\(^1\)To avoid unnecessary repetition, it was decided not to include in the Introduction a summary of the steps taken in Chapters II to IV, where the hypotheses are each considered in turn. An appropriate summary will, however, be found below, pp.74-77.
the Proposals for a World Food Board (W.F.B.) is made on grounds that they were probably the most far-reaching set of proposals ever considered by the F.A.O. Technical assistance is a fundamental part of the Organisation's activities. Because of this the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance (E.P.T.A.) is included in the study.

When referring to the phrase "the political system" we are assuming that it is possible to abstract, for analytic purposes, certain kinds of social interactions from other kinds of social interactions. In other words, we are assuming the ability to distinguish what is political from what is not. Definitions of the political system are legion, but one that is precise (owing its genesis to Talcott Parsons, David Apter and David Easton) is: "A political system consists of the most inclusive structures in a society that have recognised responsibility for performing, at a minimum, the function of goal-attainment by means of legitimate decisions or policies".

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2 D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 96-97. D. Easton identifies the political as the authoritative allocation of values for society, i.e. a reference to a process of decision-making in society which is characterized by relatively frequent acceptance as authoritative by its members.

3 D. J. Grady, "'Political System' as an Analytic Concept" (unpublished paper, McMaster University: 1965), p. 5.
Goal attainment refers to the process by which society manages to reconcile the diverse aspirations generally involved in the pursuit of social objectives. Inclusiveness most obviously refers to lines of territorial demarcation, but it can also refer to a unit, like the United Nations, in which members recognise some mutual identification. Legitimacy is a reference to values internalised by members of the system, in particular a belief that decisions are binding regardless of personal preference. Legitimacy is probably a quality beyond reach of most current international organisations and it might, without too great loss, be replaced by the notion of expediency.\(^4\)

The political system has boundaries that help to distinguish it from other subsystems of society. D. Easton has provided us with an inventory of the subsystems lying beyond the boundaries (that is, in the environment) of the political system.\(^5\) The Easton political system is a framework which explains the external dimensions and the internal processes by which demands upon the system are converted into authoritative outputs. The political system "...offers

\(^4\) The notion of expediency is embodied in the second of three indicator categories designed by E. B. Haas to measure the performance of the specialized agencies over time. The three categories are institutional autonomy, authority and legitimacy. E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p.130.

a context within which partial theories of allocation may obtain greater meaning and significance..." 6

The partial allocative theory, or functional components of the system, to be used in this study will be taken from the work of Almond and Coleman. 7 In The Politics of the Developing Areas the authors are concerned with the structures of, and the functions performed by, the political system, thus avoiding a commitment to a state/non-state classificatory scheme. M. Haas holds that one advantage of this approach is that it lends itself to the analysis of international political systems. 8 On the other hand, Almond and Coleman derived their functional categories from an examination of complex Western or "modern" territorial systems, in which "structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent". 9 Their utility for international political systems analysis


is not entirely self-evident, therefore, and should be tested by application. The Almond and Coleman functional categories are as follows: political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication.

Political socialisation and recruitment forms the first of the functional categories, or conversion functions. It refers to a process by which members are inducted into the political system and is analogous to the socialising influences of family, school, church or work group. It is a means by which subsystems of society tend to perpetuate their existence. The end product of socialising influences is a set of attitudes toward the political system\(^{10}\) which, in the context of international organisation, may help to modify the particularistic behaviour of national societal governments or of the permanent officials employed by the organisations.\(^{11}\)

The more sharply the boundaries are drawn between the F.A.O., as a subsystem, and the United Nations political system the easier it is to locate a separate socialisation process within the F.A.O.\(^{12}\) Political recruitment refers to

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\(^{10}\)These attitudes always contain an affective element, e.g. pride in the aims and achievements of the F.A.O. See below, pp.60-61.

\(^{11}\)See below, pp.78-79.

\(^{12}\)See below, pp.60-62.
the induction of members into the specialised roles of the political system and supplements the function of socialisation.

The second conversion function is interest articulation, which is a reference to the stating of a demand on the political system and "... is of crucial importance since it occurs at the boundary of the political system."\(^{13}\)

Interest articulation is, therefore, of some utility in determining the location of the F.A.O., in terms of the political system concept. The function of interest articulation can be put forward by a variety of structures. Demands by the secretariat of the F.A.O. tend to be what Almond and Coleman would call institutionalised, whereas demands by the Conference of the F.A.O. tend to be associational.\(^{14}\)

Interest aggregation is the third conversion function. It is a combination of demands, collectively advocated by members of the system. The Conference of the F.A.O., which is charged with policy-making, is also the most public arena.


\(^{14}\)Institutionalised interest articulation is not as specialised as associational articulation. The former articulates interests which may or may not be its own. The latter articulates interests which are peculiarly its own, in the manner of a trade union. Both exist in contradistinction to anomic interest articulation, which is characterised by spontaneous breakthroughs in society, like riots. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
within which interests are aggregated within the Organisation. It is not always easy to distinguish interest articulation from aggregation. Departments within the United States Government, for example, publicly articulated opposed interests towards the W.F.B. proposals. But these various interests were aggregated into a definitive policy by that Government and articulated as a demand in the international political system.

Although communication is a feature of all social interactions, political communication is the fourth distinctive function of the political system. It is essential to the performance of all other functions within the system for without a means of communication it would be impossible to transfer demands upon the system into authoritative outputs. An attempt is made in this study to locate the boundaries of the political system in communication terms. The attempt rests on a judgement of the extent to which national societal governments use the structures provided by the United Nations,

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15 See below, pp.20-21.
16 See the discussion on the World Food Board proposals, below, pp.30-31 and 73n.
17 This function is discussed at length below, pp.38-41.
such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), or the structures provided by the specialised agencies, for their communications.\(^{18}\)

The fifth conversion function, rule-making, is a self-explanatory category, best illustrated by an analogy with the functions of a political executive or bureaucracy within a territorial community. The function of rule-making will assume some importance in this study as, even more than interest articulation, it will indicate the boundaries of the political system.\(^{19}\)

Almond and Coleman posit two more functional categories: rule-application and rule-adjudication. Rule-application refers to the stage at which decisions are put into practice, that is, administration or enforcement processes. Although undoubtedly a useful category in other contexts, rule-application does not figure as large as rule-making in this study. To a considerable extent this is a reflection of the accessibility of appropriate materials and not a judgement of the utility of the category. The final category is rule-adjudication. This function implies the ability to arbitrate in the manner of a supreme court, and will be discussed with respect to F.A.O. by examining the

\(^{18}\)See below, pp. 59 and 62-63.

\(^{19}\)See the discussion under the third hypothesis below, pp. 63-65.
relevant activities of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). As will be seen in our discussion, the extent to which the I.C.J. can perform an adjudicative role, where the F.A.O. is concerned, is limited.

Some of the conclusions reached in this study are not, perhaps, beyond dispute. For example, secondary sources were used for much of the study of the activities of the Economic and Social Council\(^{20}\) and the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance.\(^{21}\) But by carefully defining the scope of our analysis, and by stating the condition of the evidence consulted, we hope to present a viable interpretation of an enormously complex set of materials.

\(^{20}\) See below, pp.45-48.

\(^{21}\) See below, pp.49-53.
CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE F.A.O.

The institutional antecedent of the F.A.O. was the International Institute of Agriculture (I.I.A.), founded in Rome in 1905. The inspiration behind the Institute was David Lubin, a Polish-born American. Lubin had conceived of an international body capable of representing farm opinion on a world-wide basis, processing it and channelling the information through its member governments. He finally persuaded King Victor Emmanuel of Italy to promote the idea.

The Institute emerged as primarily an academic body whose chief function was to be an impartial bureau of research for the collection, analysis and dissemination of agricultural statistics. The I.I.A. was not to exert the dynamic leadership that Lubin had hoped for, primarily because governments were determined that the Institute should not infringe their notions of state sovereignty. As Article 9(f) of the I.I.A. Constitution put it, "all questions concerning the economic interests, legislation, the administration of a particular nation shall be excluded from the consideration of the Institute."¹

Internationalism had not progressed very far by the early years of this century. As Elihu Root wrote to Lubin in 1908, "it was never the wish or purpose of this Government to take an active or prominent part in the founding of the Institute, or to assume any special responsibility with regard to it."  

Despite Italian dominance (the President of the Institute was always an Italian, as were two-thirds of the staff) the I.I.A. developed an institutional interest of its own. It resented the somewhat late curiosity shown in agricultural matters by the League and proclaimed a competence to assume any additional tasks that governments were willing to treat internationally. This wide assertion of competence has been categorised as that of a "university", as distinct from the consultant's approach with its preference for specialisation over a limited area. This was one of the main features bequeathed to the F.A.O. A second feature, transmitted from the I.I.A. was one that inspired some of the founders of the F.A.O., namely, a demand to restrict the Organisation to academic, or "service" functions and to allow it no sanctions against recalcitrant member governments.

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2 Ibid., p.68.
3 "The attempt to cover the whole field of agriculture has resulted in covering little or none of it well." Ibid., p.317.
The debates on the topic of food in the League Assembly from the mid-thirties onwards reflected an humanitarian interest in the eradication of poverty which, in part, was occasioned by the years of mass unemployment. Another factor in the quickening interest in the problem of poverty was the rapid development of the science of nutrition. Food no longer was thought of solely in quantitative terms, that is, calories as producers of energy, but also in terms of quality. Nutrition in the nineteen thirties was not only knowledge; it became a movement. Nutrition, as knowledge, changed the value that people as consumers put on food. As a movement, it assumed social and political importance. J. B. Orr's politically explosive survey of Britain came to the conclusion that two-thirds of the population were poorly fed. Similar results were revealed elsewhere in the economically developed countries in the consequent rash of self-analysis.

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5 This is the same as the distinction between undernourishment (quantity) and malnourishment (quality).

6 "Poverty is old, but the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something can be done about it are new." E. Staley, Future of the Underdeveloped Countries (N.Y.: Harper, 1961), p.20.

Secondly, the food movement had international repercussions. The League Assembly established the Mixed Committee on Nutrition, which reported in 1937.\textsuperscript{8} This document became part of the armoury of those individuals who looked forward to the establishment of a permanent agency with positive, perhaps supranational, responsibility, for food, nutrition and agriculture. J. B. Orr felt that the union of food and agriculture, implicit in the League Report, was feasible given adequate international planning.\textsuperscript{9}

The Second World War was to make it clear to governments, beyond the few crusading individuals, that international action in the field could have beneficial results.

\textsuperscript{8}The Committee stated that: (a) the provision of food adequate in quantity and quality would have a more profound effect upon the national health than any other single reform; (b) nutritional science was capable of laying down optimum standards; (c) the application of science to agriculture would enable mankind to produce all the food required; (d) the accomplishment of these aims required the international co-ordination of national action and international assistance to many countries; (e) the adoption of sound nutritional standards on a world-wide basis would have a highly favourable effect on world agriculture and trade. The Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and Economic Policy, Cited in F. L. McDougall, "International Aspects of Post-War Food and Agriculture," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 225 (1943), 122.

for their populations. Britain, in particular, was forced to produce plans for the emergency feeding of its population, on a co-ordinate basis with the United States and Canada. The Combined Food Board, which lay at the heart of Anglo-American planning, had jurisdiction over "the supply, transportation, disposal, allocation or distribution in or to any part of the world of foods".10

Advances in nutritional science had enabled the British Government to institute an effective rationing scheme, which at the end of the war left the population better fed and more healthy than it had ever been before.11

It is not surprising that J. B. Orr and others like him saw the production, distribution and consumption of more of the right types of food not as a political problem, but as one that was essentially uncontroversial.12 This belief was bolstered by several other factors, not least the international nature of the natural sciences, about which there


seemed little room for debate.  

Political developments among the Allies also augured well for the future of international cooperation. In his message to Congress, in January 1941, President Roosevelt mentioned freedom from want as one of the four freedoms of the post-war world. In August of 1941 the President and Mr. Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, which included as its fifth point a statement of the "desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security." The United Nations Declaration, January 1942, subscribed both to the Atlantic Charter and to the goal of freedom from want.

Two other background factors should be mentioned. First, governments recognised that there was the prospect of severe post-war food shortages, the alleviation of which

13"Whatever may be said about man's moral or spiritual progress, science has given him a new understanding of material things and a power to develop the resources of the earth, which open up possibilities for immense advances in the well-being, health and productive ability of human beings the world over. Nor is the knowledge on which these possibilities are based by any means complete. There is every reason to believe that it is only at its beginning, and progress far beyond anything now known is a reasonable expectation." U. N. Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, The Work of FAO, 1945, p.1.

would require international action on an unprecedented scale. Second, the focus of the problem had widened. The I.I.A. was primarily a Western organisation, in the sense that most of its funds came either from Europe or English-speaking countries, and the Institute practiced weighted voting according to the size of contributions. The F.A.O., on the other hand, was to have global responsibilities and the problems associated with the alleviation of poverty appeared correspondingly both more acute and more complex. In conclusion, there seemed to be reasonable possibilities for post-war cooperation in food and agriculture. A far greater awareness of poverty and an humanitarian interest in its eradication had been aroused. Governments knew better how to adequately feed populations for which they were responsible and, some at least, had developed the machinery with which to deal with the problems associated with the production, distribution and the consumption of foods. For men like J. B. Orr all that remained was that this machinery be transplanted from national to international society. And this, he could claim, had in part been done.

There were, however, other portents that suggested the future of a food and agriculture organisation might not be that of a supranational authority. In economically developed countries of the world, agriculture had become the most regulated sector of the economy, a feature which was reinforced if governments chose to support farm incomes.
The institutions governments set up to control their own economies could have devastating international repercussions, as the depression of the nineteen thirties had demonstrated. Moreover, disparate goals pursued by individual governments could hinder the establishment of analogous machinery at the international level.

The genesis of the F.A.O. should, in part, be considered against the stimulus provided by the Second World War. War-time appears to be a period of intense organisational activity and high expectations. Planning and propagandising, as Myrdal has pointed out, were important parts of the psychological warfare directed at the enemy. It is difficult, nevertheless, to believe that the Hot Springs Conference was part of the Allies' psychological warfare since, on Roosevelt's directions, it was held in secret. As Myrdal has remarked, "as is usual with propaganda it had its most profound effects on the people who made it."

The Hot Springs Conference was convened "to consider the goal of freedom from want in relation to food and agriculture". The delegates had three sets of facts in

16 Ibid., p.10.
mind: that the majority of the world's population did not have enough to eat, that adequate nutrition was of fundamental importance and, finally, that technology in production had increased sufficiently to bridge the gap between hunger and need. A wide area of agreement was reached at the Conference on the need to establish a permanent organisation for food and agriculture. The consensus was probably made possible by the fact that the Conference was not asked to specify, in any detail, the scope of the proposed organisation. Furthermore, a majority of the delegations were from countries which were likely to benefit from the establishment of the organisation, and "the international distribution of food supplies raised a question that was as much ethical as it was economic: whether the existence of gross inequalities in the available food supplies imposes a

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19 Suggestions for the organisation's scope covered a spectrum ranging from increased food production to the need for international commodity arrangements. United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, "Text of the Final Act," Department of State Bulletin, VIII, No. 208 (June 19, 1943).
moral obligation on the part of the more favoured nations to come to the aid of the less favoured."\textsuperscript{20} It was left to the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture to decide whether the organisation would be an "action agency", that is, a body with some supranational executive authority, or a "service agency."\textsuperscript{21}

The Interim Commission, which met between the time of the Hot Springs and the Quebec Conferences, came under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson ("young, modest, responsive, intelligent, and possessed of a quick sense of humor\textsuperscript{22}). Its purpose was to work out a constitution for the organisation. The Commission contained representatives of all interested governments, a factor which assured that the constitution would be accepted, when finally drafted.

The forty-four governments represented at the Quebec Conference (October, 1945) established the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, as the first of the post-war specialised agencies. Besides accepting the Constitution the Conference endorsed the Interim Commission's


\textsuperscript{21}J. D. Black, "The International Food Movement", American Economic Review, XXXIII No. 4. (December, 1943), 804.

proposals for a programme of work. Sir John Boyd Orr was elected first Director-General and a temporary headquarters established in Washington. The chairman of the Quebec Conference, L. B. Pearson, summarised the F.A.O. as "something entirely new in the field of international affairs and there is little by way of precedent on which it can lean; ... the F.A.O. is the first which is so audacious as to aim at the liberation of the peoples of the world from hunger." The F.A.O. emerged, however, as a "service" rather than an "action" agency, although this did not deter its first Director-General from interpreting the Organisation's work in a different light.

The Conference, which meets biennially, is the sovereign organ of the F.A.O. It "shall determine the policy and approve the budget of the Organisation" (Art. IV, sect. 1). It is democratic in a literal sense, the decisions being taken by a simple or a two-thirds majority vote (Art. III, sect. 8). Unlike the I.I.A. the F.A.O. does not practice weighted voting (Art. III, sect. 4).

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23 The tasks were: (a) to stimulate, promote and where appropriate conduct research "focused on world needs in food, agriculture, forestry and fisheries;" (b) collect and interpret data "promoting the dissemination of knowledge;" (c) to advise member nations, where necessary in collaboration with other international organisations; (d) to undertake technical activities in the field; (e) to conduct inquiries concerned with agricultural credit and agricultural commodity arrangements. Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, First Report to the Governments of the United Nations (August 1), 1944.

The Council of the F.A.O. has twenty-seven members, who are elected by Conference. In practice, all those governments contributing a substantial proportion of the Organisation's funds are members of the Council. Meeting between sessions of the Conference, the Council concerns itself with the overall programme of the F.A.O., paying particular attention to any special problems that might arise. Members of the Council remain the official representatives of their own governments.

The Director-General is appointed by the Conference (Art. VII, sect. 1). He enjoys full power and authority to direct the day-to-day work of the Organisation, subject to the general supervision of the Conference or the Council (Art. VII, sect. 5). A specific focus of loyalties is demanded of the staff of the Organisation: "Their responsibilities shall be exclusively international in character and they shall not seek or receive instructions in regard to the discharge thereof from any authority external to the Organisation" (Art. VIII, sect. 2).

The first Director-General, Sir J. B. Orr, had a profound impact on the F.A.O. during its early years. He had an apolitical approach to the solution of international problems.25

25"Food is something to eat. If the existing system says that the earth yields for the market—and not for the man—then the system is wrong, and we must change it." Cited in F. Reynolds, "...Based on Human Needs", Survey Graphic, XXXVII (March, 1948), 158.
As head of the Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen (an animal research centre) he had found it comparatively easy to convince farmers of the profit to be had from the better feeding of their stock. 26 As a campaigner for improved human nutrition he had expected a similar reaction from governments. 27 The British government was suspicious of Orr. He had not been included in the British delegation to the Hot Springs Conference and, at the Quebec Conference, had only been included at the last moment, in a technical capacity. His election to the office of Director-General was sought largely by economically underdeveloped and undernourished countries, 28 who not only formed the majority at Quebec but were also the most likely to encourage the exercise of supranational responsibility.


27 Ibid., p.100.

CHAPTER II
THE F.A.O. AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

The purpose of this chapter is to raise the first of three hypotheses, all of which are aimed at indicating the location of the F.A.O. in terms of the concept "the political system." Our first hypothesis concerns the development of the institutional independence of the F.A.O. and might be phrased thus: the more a specialised agency manages to establish its independence, the easier it is to view the agency as a political system in its own right, serving to define and pursue its own goals and whose decisions are accepted as legitimate by member states. In connection with the F.A.O., the hypothesis will be considered largely in terms of the Proposals for a World Food Board (W.F.B.).

Two features of the early years of the F.A.O. helped to strengthen the hand of the Director-General in his relations with member governments. The first feature concerns an omnibus provision in the Constitution of the Organisation, which Orr proceeded to interpret in a forceful manner. Article I(c) states that the Organisation shall "generally ... take all necessary and appropriate action to
implement the purpose of the Organisation as set forth in the Preamble."¹

It should be noted that Sir J. B. Orr was profoundly dissatisfied with the Constitution that had been given him: "His aim has always been a supranational agency rather than an inter-governmental body. He wants to get food above politics. To him, as he has often said, F.A.O. is a prototype department of the World State."² It is not surprising, therefore, that Orr interpreted Article I(c) as conferring a degree of supranational executive authority to his Organisation and it was under this guise that he was to formulate his Proposals for a World Food Board.

The second feature concerns a weakness in the Constitution of the F.A.O., which was not rectified until 1947 when an amendment was passed. The Executive Committee, the predecessor to the Council, was supposed to represent the interests of the Conference between its regular sessions.

¹The Preamble states: "The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purpose of: raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective jurisdictions; securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products; bettering the condition of rural populations, and thus contributing toward an expanding world economy; hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations." Basic Texts (Rome: F.A.O., 1964, Vol. 11.), p.7.

The Delegates to the Executive Committee, therefore, had a dual function: on the one hand, they represented the interests of their own governments and, on the other hand, they represented the interests of other F.A.O. member governments. In practice, delegates did neither well and, consequently, the Executive Committee failed to provide authoritative direction for the F.A.O. As a corollary, for this brief period greater authority must have rested in the hands of the Director-General, with implications for the consideration of the F.A.O. as a political system in its own right.

The General Assembly of the United Nations (Meeting in London, February 1946) was particularly concerned with the prospect of acute food shortages over the following two years. The Assembly also drew attention to the imminent demise of some of the temporary agencies concerned with food and agriculture, for example, the Combined Food Board and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, (UNRRA) the disappearance of which would likely make the situation worse.

The General Assembly called upon governments and international organisations concerned with food and agriculture for special efforts. In the context of the hypothesis

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4 Ibid., p.62.
5 Res. 45(I), December 11, 1946.
posed in this chapter, the Assembly resolution was a message from the environment of the political system. Without consulting the Organisation's Executive Committee the Director-General cabled the General Assembly: "F.A.O. willing accept responsibility for mobilising world resources to meet crisis." 6

This action was, no doubt, taken under Art. I(c) of the Constitution and it may help to substantiate the point made earlier that the Executive Committee was unable to provide central direction for the F.A.O. It also seems clear that the Director-General wanted to prevent the establishment of a rival international organisation, an idea discussed at the General Assembly meeting. 7

The United Nations accepted F.A.O.'s offer and the Director-General thereupon issued invitations to a conference, the Special Meeting on Urgent Food Problems, convened in Washington, May 1946. The two substantive recommendations of this conference were: a communication to governments to establish machinery to deal with the short-term emergency shortage of basic foods, 8 and a communication to Sir J.B. Orr,
requesting him to present proposals at the forthcoming session of the F.A.O. Conference for international machinery of a longer term nature to deal with both shortages and surpluses.

The proposals articulated by the Director General represent one of the last attempts to make the F.A.O. into an "action" agency. They were presented at the Second Session of the F.A.O. Conference in Copenhagen, September, 1946. Orr's arguments in favour of international cooperation on the scale he envisaged were disarmingly simple and may account for the apparent initial enthusiasm with which

9Proposals for a World Food Board (Washington: F.A.O., October 1946). The tasks of the Board were to be:

1. "To stabilise prices of agricultural commodities on the world markets, including the provision of necessary funds.

2. To establish a world food reserve adequate for any emergency that might arise.

3. To provide funds for financing the disposal of surplus agricultural products on special terms to countries where the need for them is most urgent.

4. To cooperate with organisations concerned with international credits for industrial and agricultural development, and with trade and commodity policy, in order that their common ends might be more quickly effectively achieved." p.11.
they were received by most governments represented at Copenhagen. "The starting point for policy depends on what we are aiming for. If the welfare of the people be the objective, then the provision of food, the first essential of life, should be the first goal."\textsuperscript{10} Earlier he had stated that, "the provision of food for the people should not be dependent upon the success or failure of measures promoted solely in the interest of trade."\textsuperscript{11} He went on to say that the existing international machinery was inadequate, "which so far provides fully for consulting together but not for putting the results of the consultation into effect when cooperative action is required."\textsuperscript{12} He concluded that the "objective of the operations of the World Food Board would be to ensure that sufficient food is produced and distributed to bring the consumption of all peoples up to a health standard."\textsuperscript{13}

The Board would have attempted, therefore, to consolidate the "marriage of health and agriculture," a phrase coined by Lord S. M. Bruce, one time prime minister of Australia and a forceful advocate of international cooperation. The relationship between the Board and the F.A.O. was a matter for the Conference to decide.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p.5.  
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p.5.  
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p.10.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p.12.  
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p.10.
There was widespread support at Copenhagen for the objectives of the Orr Proposals. Norris E. Dodd, who was to become the second Director General of the F.A.O. and who was chief United States delegate at Copenhagen, "strongly favoured the general objectives laid down by Sir John Boyd Orr."15

India was one of the foremost advocates of the World Food Board, but as its delegate remarked, was suspicious of commercial attitudes to food: "Europe and America look mainly to the stabilisation of prices. Asia looks mainly to the stabilisation of life."16 Fiorello La Guardia, then head of the UNRRA, spoke passionately and without discretion at the Conference in favour of the Proposals.17 The British were somewhat less enthusiastic, as they feared any steps that might eventually raise the price of imported foodstuffs upon which the country was dependent.

Bearing in mind the far-reaching nature of the Proposals, it is not surprising that the Conference failed


16 W. F. Stanton, The Food and Agriculture Organization, p.104.

to implement them at once. As no immediate decision was involved the aggregation of interests was a relatively simple matter. The prevailing view was summed-up thus: "This Conference...accepts the general objectives of the proposals... It does not say that a World Food Board will be set up forthwith. What it does say is that there is a necessity for international machinery for achieving those objectives."\(^1^8\)

The Orr Proposals were referred to a Preparatory Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bruce, which met in Washington six weeks after the end of the Copenhagen Conference. In the interval the attitudes of some governments, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, had begun to harden. The United States Government came under strong domestic pressures, which crystallised in Congressional opposition.\(^1^9\) "While endorsing the broad general aim of eliminating world hunger, leaders of the industry in this country cannot believe that the United States Government is willing to abolish the free enterprise system in America."\(^2^0\) Other responsible interests referred


to the W.F.B. Proposals in terms of the sovietising of agriculture and the establishment of "a world-wide totalitarian system." 21

The American reaction, however, was not wholly dictated by prejudice and self-interest. 22 The W.F.B. would also have involved some international control over American agricultural surpluses. 23 As N. E. Dodd remarked, in officially rejecting the Proposals, "Governments are unlikely to place the large funds needed for financing such a plan in the hands of an international agency over whose operations and price policy they would have had little direct control." 24

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21 The National Association of Commodity Exchanges and Associated Trades, Ibid., p.140.

22 The domestic opposition is relevant, as the W.F.B. Proposals were also competing against State Department support for an International Trade Organisation (ITO), which was based on free trade principles, rather than the extensive international planning involved in the W.F.B. The ITO never materialised, but it formed the roots from which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) eventually emerged. It should also be noted that the Under-Secretary of State at the time of the W.F.B. Proposals was William L. Clayton, partner of the largest cotton factoring firm in the world. "Mr. Clayton was bitterly opposed to Sir John's ideas from the very beginning." G. Jackson, "The Food and Agriculture Organisation," Review of International Cooperation, (March, 1949), p.59.


The British were also unwilling that they should become committed to support any plan that would give an international agency supranational executive authority, operating without reference to the participating countries. As the Proposals stood, underdeveloped countries would have benefited from rather than contributed to the W.F.B. and they, largely, supported the Proposals.

The Preparatory Commission Report suggested, in fact, that the Conference reject the Orr Proposals. In place of the W.F.B. the Commission recommended a structural change in the F.A.O., involving the creation of a World Food Council to replace the Executive Committee. This was the main substantive proposal in the Preparatory Commission's report.

Sir J. B. Orr is reported as commenting that, "the failure to establish a World Food Board with the required powers illustrates the stark fact that the great powers are not yet ready to sink their political differences and begin

25 Ibid., p.121.
26 Ibid., p.165.
27 The World Food Council, now known as the Council of the F.A.O. was charged with general oversight of the work of the Organisation, in between meetings of the Conference. The Council was limited mainly to advisory tasks, in vivid contrast to Orr's vision of the policy formulating tasks he proposed for the W.F.B. See G. Hambidge, "The F.A.O. at Work," International Conciliation, No.432, (June, 1947), 357.
the evolution of a world government."  

The point has been made that if an international organisation is to grow in authority (in the context of this chapter, to progress toward institutional independence) there are three prerequisites which Directors-General must satisfy.  

First, the goals articulated by the agency's head must be sufficiently expansive to appeal to some viable coalition among member governments. Sir J. B. Orr failed to satisfy this criterion, for he misjudged the extent to which political considerations influence governments in international relations. Second, the proposals should be specific enough to act as a reliable policy guide to the officials entrusted with carrying them out. In the case of the World Food Board this criterion was probably not satisfied.  

Third, there should be some felt need and demand in the environment, which the goals articulated by the

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30 "The proposals made for the Board's operations were clearly of a very sketchy character." "Functions of a World Food Reserve-Scope and Limitations," F.A.O., Commodity Policy Studies, No.10, (1956), p.47.
organisation could satisfy. The W.F.B. proposals met this criterion, but they failed to gain the support of those national societal governments upon whom success depended. These three factors go some way to suggest that the goal-attainment function\(^{31}\) is not institutionalised within the framework provided by the F.A.O.

It was hypothesised at the beginning of this chapter that if the F.A.O. was to be conceptualised as a political system it would need to be moving in the direction of independent activity. Sir J. B. Orr stated the goals he would have liked the F.A.O. to pursue in his proposals for a W.F.B. There is no barrier to the articulation of interests by a Director-General, except prudence. The Preamble to the Constitution and Article I(c) in principle gives to the Director-General a wide area of initiative. The relative weakness of the Executive Committee facilitated the initiative

\(^{31}\)It will be remembered that goal-attainment is the minimum function which a political system must perform. See above, p.2. In the context of this study, however, goal-attainment refers to a set of processes by which demands upon the political system are converted into decisions, which seek to approximate objectives, or goals, desired by members. Goal-attainment can be reduced to its, functional, constituent parts. This study, for example, utilises those provided by Almond and Coleman, namely: interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making and rule-application. Rule-making is judged, in the context of the summary to this chapter, to be the decisive element in the goal-attainment function.
for a World Food Board. The immediate difficulty in concep-
tualising the F.A.O. in terms of a political system lies, 
however, in one aspect of the goal-attainment function:
rule-making. The interests articulated by the secretariat 
of the F.A.O., if they involve the accretion of new tasks 
and require additional funds, depend for their implementa-
tion on the approval of national societal governments. 32
The rule-making process belongs to the Conference of the 
F.A.O., which is the "sovereign" organ; but, the Conference 
is a fictitious sovereign, for it is composed of delegates 
who must, perforce, articulate the interests of their 
governments. Thus, the rule-making function, a vital aspect 
of the goal-attainment function, is not institutionalised 
within the structure provided by the F.A.O.

The quality of inclusiveness is, as well, prere-
quiste to the presence of the political system as we have 
conceived it. 33 In a formal, but narrow, way the F.A.O.

\[32\] In this context the phraseology of D. Easton is 
evocative: national societal governments within the F.A.O. 
perform the role of gatekeepers who winnow-out unacceptable 
demands upon the system. The secretariat obviously also 
performs this role, depending upon the importance of the 
demand to the political system. See D. Easton, A Systems 

\[33\] In a strict sense, inclusiveness refers to the 
most comprehensive unit, territorial or otherwise, with 
which members of a society identify themselves. D. J. Grady, 
"Political System' as an Analytic Concept" (unpublished 
does constitute an inclusive unit. The secretariat of the Organisation, for example, is required to act in the interests of the F.A.O. alone.\textsuperscript{34} It is indicated elsewhere that the secretariat does, in fact, identify itself with the interests of the F.A.O. to the exclusion of the wider U.N. family of specialised agencies.\textsuperscript{35} On the other hand, national societal governments obviously do not regard the F.A.O. as the most inclusive unit with which an individual ought to identify (even in the limited area of agriculture). As it is through governmental delegates that the decisions within the F.A.O. are taken, the absence of the quality of inclusiveness is, in this case, of more importance than the presence of the same characteristic among members of the Organisation's secretariat.

Legitimacy is the second quality that attaches to our concept of the political system.\textsuperscript{36} In the case of the World Food Board it was demonstrated that national societal\textsuperscript{34}\textsuperscript{35}\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34}Art. VIII, sect. 2. See above, p.21.

\textsuperscript{35}See below, p.61n.

\textsuperscript{36}Legitimacy refers to the belief that decisions are binding, even if they are thought by those affected to be wrong. It is, therefore, closely associated with the function of goal-attainment. D. J. Grady, "'Political System' as an Analytic Concept" (unpublished paper, McMaster University: 1965),pp.40-41.
governments were not bound to accept as binding proposals with which they did not agree. As indicated below, legitimacy is the final stage in the process of establishing the independence of a political system.\textsuperscript{37} It is not, however, a stage demonstrably reached by the F.A.O. The range of evidence in support of the first hypothesis might well have been more extensive. But, on the evidence considered it appears quite clear that the F.A.O. is neither an inclusive unit within its area of competence, nor are goals articulated by the Organisation's secretariat regarded as legitimate expressions of policy by national societal governments. Finally, a crucial aspect of the goal-attainment function (the making of rules for the F.A.O.) occurs outside the system's boundaries.\textsuperscript{38} The F.A.O. is not, therefore, a political system, but may be located somewhere along the continuum of points which lies between the political system and the non-system. Two interesting classificatory possibilities are: that F.A.O. is, in fact, (1) a subsystem of a U.N. political system, or (2) a subsystem of a larger and more comprehensive international political system. It will be the purpose of the following chapters to consider the evidence bearing upon these alternative characterisations of F.A.O.

\textsuperscript{37}See below, p.79.

\textsuperscript{38}For example, Art. IV, sect. 3 of the Constitution of F.A.O. states that "the Conference may, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, make recommendations to Member Nations and Associate Members concerning questions relating to food and agriculture, for consideration by them with a view to implementation by national action."
CHAPTER III
THE F.A.O. AND THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL SYSTEM

The purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for an answer to the question, "Is the F.A.O. a subsystem of a larger entity, the United Nations political system which embraces the specialised agencies?"

The chapter will mainly investigate the co-ordination of the activities of the F.A.O. with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), an entity which was set-up to provide a link between the United Nations and the specialised agencies.¹

The research tool to be used will be political communication which forms one of the Almond and Coleman functional categories.² Communication is an essential con-

¹Article 57, sect.1 of the Charter of the United Nations, reads as follows: "The various specialised agencies, established by inter-governmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related fields, shall be brought into relation­ship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63." Article 63, sect.1 stated that the "Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57". Sect. 2 stated that "It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialised agencies".

stituent in any political system; indeed, without it the other conversion functions provided by Almond and Coleman would be meaningless, because it serves to link each of them. For example, within the F.A.O. a decision had to be taken on the future location of the Organisation in the first years of its existence. It was the opinion of the ECOSOC that the specialised agencies should be situated at or near the permanent seat of the United Nations, so that they could "partake of the advantages that flow from centralisation". This information was communicated to the F.A.O., that is, arrived as an input of the Organisation.

It can be assumed that various interests were articulated within the F.A.O. with regard to its location. The United States Government had made a submission to the Organisation that Washington was the best site available. No doubt the American delegate argued in favour of his Government's submission. On the other hand, the International Institute of Agriculture, the predecessor of F.A.O.,

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was located in Rome and in view of the Organisation's eventual location some delegates must have supported that city's merits. Political communication was the essential process by which delegates informed each other of their various interests in this matter. It was also the means by which they arrived at a consensus, or aggregation of interests, and were enabled to communicate a decision back to the ECOSOC as official Organisation policy.

The communication function does not respect boundaries. It is a transaction that occurs across the boundaries of the political system or subsystem, like the message communicated between ECOSOC and the F.A.O. It also occurs within the boundaries of the political system or subsystem, as with the flow between the articulation by delegates of particular interests and the final aggregation of these interests in the message communicated to the ECOSOC.\(^5\)

The communications flow between the United Nations and the F.A.O. will, it is hoped, provide evidence for our treatment of the second hypothesis, which might be phrased

\(^5\)The F.A.O. officially accepted the ECOSOC request regarding location, but, in fact, retained its freedom of action. It agreed (a) subject to being able to "effectively and economically discharge its duties and maintain effective liaison with those specialised agencies with which it is particularly concerned," and (b) "subject to satisfactory arrangements being made for the provision of a site and necessary facilities." F.A.O. moved to Rome in 1951. W. R. Sharp, "The Specialised Agencies and the United Nations, Progress Report I," *International Organization*, I (1947), 465.
thus: the more the specialised agencies coordinate their activities, not of their own volition, but by directives or encouragement from the U.N., the easier it is to locate the specialised agencies as functional subsystems of a political system which is the U.N., which serves to define the goals of members and whose decisions are accepted as legitimate by them.

It should be noted that the particular aspect of the communications flow relevant to this chapter has been summed up in the word "co-ordination". In the previous chapter, by contrast, the emphasis had been put on the search for the institutional independence of the Organisation.

The United Nations articulates its interests in respect of the specialised agencies in three ways: through the General Assembly, which exercises some authority over the budgets of the agencies; through the ECOSOC, which is endowed by the Charter with the responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of the agencies (Art. 63, sect.2); and through the Administrative Committee on Coordination,


7Article 63, sect.2 of the Charter of the United Nations states that the ECOSOC "...may coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations".
whose chairman is the Secretary-General and whose members are the heads of the agencies. These represent formal channels of communication only, but it is inconceivable that they are not supplemented by other means.

One of the first acts of the ECOSOC was to set up a Standing Committee on Negotiations with the Specialised Agencies (in February 1946), for the purpose of concluding Draft Agreements between the agencies and the United Nations, as suggested in the Charter (Art. 63, sect.1). The Council articulated the view that the budgets of the U.N. and the specialised agencies should be co-ordinated into one, probably on the basis of the fear that the agencies would otherwise enjoy too great an autonomy. The representatives of the agencies articulated an opposing view, as it was felt that a consolidation of their budgets would put them into a subordinate position in their relations with the U.N. As the chairman of the International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) delegation put it, their purpose "was to seek cooperation with the United Nations as partners.

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9 Ibid., p.464.

To this end they might have to make some sacrifices of their sovereignty, but they did not intend to act in a subordinate capacity.\textsuperscript{11}

In the Draft Agreement concluded between the U.N. and the F.A.O. in June 1946, the autonomy of the Organisation was recognised in its field of competence; in particular, it kept a separate financial structure. Although the General Assembly could examine the F.A.O.'s budget it was restricted to making recommendations in this area.\textsuperscript{12} The seeming ease with which the agencies managed to keep their budgets separate from that of the United Nations may be attributed to the lack of obligations placed by the Charter on them.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, although the ECOSOC is charged with a responsibility to coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies, there exists no corresponding obligation upon the latter to follow the initiatives of the ECOSOC. Despite the wishes of the Council, therefore, the F.A.O. was not willing to share responsibility for its regular budget.


\textsuperscript{13}Article 58 of the Charter of the United Nations only states that "The Organisation shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialised agencies".
The interests articulated by the Council and communicated by the Standing Committee on Negotiations to the F.A.O. were thus largely over-ridden.\textsuperscript{14}

In another attempt to coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies, ECOSOC sought to channel F.A.O. requests for advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) through its own communications network.\textsuperscript{15} This was contested by the F.A.O., which felt that it should of right enjoy the same privileges as the I.L.O. with respect to access to the Court. Moreover, the F.A.O. felt that as it could submit conventions to member states for their approval it should have the right to refer directly to the ICJ. The ECOSOC eventually agreed.\textsuperscript{16}

Here, therefore, are three examples (location,}

\textsuperscript{14} In the field of financial and administrative matters, the F.A.O. Conference considered that, "such cooperation should not be allowed to jeopardise in any way the autonomy of F.A.O. This cooperation should be on the basis of reciprocity and should not place F.A.O. in a subordinated Position. Particular concern was expressed regarding the view that the budgets of the specialised agencies should be approved by the General Assembly". F.A.O., Relationship Between the U.N. and the F.A.O. with respect to Technical, Information and Budgetary Questions (Geneva: August 24, 1947).


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p.466.
budget, and advisory opinions from the International Court) in which the interests articulated by the U.N. were opposed to those presented by the F.A.O. The interest articulation functions occurring within the structure of the Organisation (in Conference, Executive Committee and Director-General) were converted into authoritative outputs of the F.A.O., that is, the rule-making and rule-application functions. Although rule-adjudication was given to the International Court, it was left to the F.A.O. to select the instances in which reference would be made to the Court. In any case, the Court's advisory opinions are not authoritative in the sense of binding the F.A.O. to a particular course.17

In view of the importance assigned to the ECOSOC by the Charter, particularly in respect of the coordination of the activities of the specialised agencies, and its probable relevance to the hypothesis posed in this chapter, its functions will now be looked at more closely. Coordination was the original stimulus to the creation of the Council.18 At Dumbarton Oaks the great powers were willing to forego any special privileges of membership. Unlike the World Bank, for


18The U.S. Government proposed the ECOSOC, which was to be subordinated to the General Assembly and to have the task of coordinating the work of the specialised agencies. I. Lubin and F. Murden, "ECOSOC: Concept versus Practice," Journal of International Affairs, IX, No.2 (1955), 68.
example, the ECOSOC does not practice weighted voting and, unlike the Security Council, does not involve the veto. 19 Due to pressure from smaller powers the Council was considerably elevated in status at the San Fransisco Conference, 20 as a consequence of which the Council took upon itself a host of new functions. 21 Due to their potentially weaker position in the ECOSOC, however, the great powers insisted that the Council remain subordinate to the General Assembly, a factor which is reflected in Article 60 of the Charter. 22


21 Article 62, sect.1 of the Charter of the United Nations states that the Council "may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters." The Council, therefore, is not only a coordinator, but, through its Commissions, it has important initiatory functions.

22 Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organisation set forth in this Chapter* shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council." (Article 60)

*That is, international economic and social cooperation.
In 1946 the ECOSOC decided of its own accord that its members should be government representatives, not, as in the technical committees of the League of Nations, independent experts. The Council, therefore, became a platform for the expressions of governmental policies.

In the context of the coordination or the decentralisation of the activities of the specialised agencies, governments are often motivated by tactical considerations rather than considerations of efficiency. The repercussions of this tendency for political systems analysis are that interests articulated by members of the Council are disparate, due to failure to agree on the purposes for which the Council

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24 Although the Council only has 18 members its commissions contain representatives of other governments.

25 The Soviet Union, in particular, has practiced this policy. At one stage they sought tighter control of the specialised agencies, through the ECOSOC, in order that they might better influence them. The Soviet bloc have nearly always been in a minority on the Council and they have since opposed increasing the authority of the central organs of the U.N. For this reason, they have been prepared to recommend decentralisation of the activities of the agencies. See J. S. Magee, "Structure and Substance: The Politics of Decentralisation in the United Nations," Journal of Politics, XXVII (1965), 518.
should be used. Where a failure to aggregate the interests of the Council occurs its outputs are unlikely to be considered authoritative by the specialised agencies. The actions of the Council only reinforce difficulties already implicit in the Charter which nowhere gives the Council sanctions with which to enforce coordination.

Thus, the structure of the U.N. system has not facilitated the coordination of the activities of the agencies. This may be due, in part, to the influence of American views on the proper decentralisation of executive authority and to the convictions of the Founding Fathers regarding the separation of powers.\(^{26}\) There was also a need for decentralisation by subject-matter, in the interests of efficiency in the social and economic field. But, this has led to "a specialised agency picture consisting of loose congeries of autonomous organisations, physically dispersed in relation to the U.N. and one another, and charged by their respective constitutions with responsibility for handling a great variety of activities, many of which are vaguely defined and some of which are sweepingly broad."\(^{27}\) Moreover, the agencies have their own structures of authority,


with direct communications links to member governments.  

Each was established by separate international agreement which recognised their equality of status with the U.N.  

The constitution of each agency varies, regular budgets are kept separate and, as the Charter of the United Nations states, they have "wide international responsibilities." (Art. 57)

In the years before the establishment of the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance (1950) there appeared to be little coordination between the central organs of the U.N. and the F.A.O. although there was reciprocal representation at each other's meetings.  

This was probably due to the fear that coordination involved centralisation, a consideration which appears to have been operative in negotiations over the F.A.O. budget, location and advisory opinions. The implications of this picture for the political system will be summarized at the end of the chapter.

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28 F.A.O. has, in most member countries, a National Committee, whose purpose is to facilitate liaison between Organisation and member.


The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was the result of an idea first floated in President Truman's Inaugural Address in 1949, which called for a "bold new program" to assist underdeveloped countries. Its purpose was to stimulate their economic development, under the auspices of the United Nations and the specialised agencies. The EPTA was to supplement, not replace, technical assistance programmes already in operation. It was left to the ECOSOC to bring the various parties together and to launch the Programme.

Immediate difficulties arose over financing the EPTA. The ECOSOC saw the flow of additional funds into the U.N. system as a further opportunity to exercise some measure of control over the specialised agencies. It, therefore, articulated the view that there should be unified control over the distribution of the funds. The specialised agencies debated the wisdom of central control and the compromise that emerged has, in practice, favoured the agencies.

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The ECOSOC set up a body known as the Technical Assistance Board (T.A.B.) to coordinate the Programme. The T.A.B. is made up of the heads of the participating specialised agencies. It is largely on the basis of information supplied by the Board that donor governments come forward with funds at a biennial (since 1961) pledging conference. The funds, however, are not deposited with the specialised agencies but with the recipient governments participating in the Programme, although this is done largely on the basis of a preselection of recipients by the Board. It is up to the governments receiving funds from the EPTA to approach the specialised agency of their choice.

In practice this arrangement has not facilitated coordination of the Programme between the U.N. and the specialised agencies. The General Assembly, for example, never interferes with the appropriation of funds. Similarly, the TAC, which is a committee of the ECOSOC (composed of the

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34 The T.A.B.'s channel of communication with the ECOSOC is through a committee of the Council, the Technical Assistance Committee (T.A.C.) D. Bleloch, "Bold New Programme: A Review of U.N. Technical Assistance," International Affairs (U.K.) XXXIII (1957), 38.


37 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
representatives of governments participating in the Programme) does not interfere with the administration of the EPTA. This apparent lack of interest is probably due to the fact that appropriations tend to go to the same countries year after year; for example, Israel and Yugoslavia have benefited considerably under the Programme.38

For purposes of political systems analysis, suffice it to say that there is an established communications link between the central organs of the U.N. and the specialised agencies participating in the EPTA. There appears, however, to be little articulation of interest directed by the U.N. along this network. Indeed, there are clear indications that the articulation of member governments interests is accomplished directly through the appropriate specialised agency.39

The EPTA does not facilitate coordination between the specialised agencies. In fact, it tends to exacerbate the competition between them. Two factors are involved: first, the more an agency can interest governments in particular projects the greater will be that agency's share

38 "these two countries obtained a rather larger share of the funds available than they would have been given in a share-out based on population and need...and they have continued to benefit." Ibid., p.98.

of the funds made available by the Programme.\textsuperscript{40} Consequently, the agencies send out "high pressure technical aid salesmen" to accomplish this purpose.\textsuperscript{41} Second, initiative by the agencies can forestall the ill-formulated plans often presented by governments and which are encouraged by the very design of the Programme.\textsuperscript{42}

The T.A.B., despite its composition, has no constitutional authority to coerce the participating agencies.\textsuperscript{43} In the field, the responsibility for the coordination of the Programme rests upon the U.N. Resident Representative, who is the projection of the authority of the U.N. The terms of reference of the Representative are not clear and, to a large extent, he is dependent on the technical judgement of representatives employed by the agencies themselves.\textsuperscript{44} Except in the case of Yugoslavia,

\textsuperscript{40}The agencies "are constantly striving to multiply the number of such requests addressed to them." D. Bleloch, "Bold New Programme: A Review of U.N. Technical Assistance," \textit{International Affairs} (U.K.), XXXII (1957), 43.


\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p.41.

which has demanded that all agency communications pass through the office of the Resident Representative, many agencies insist that their experts deal directly with the host government. A typical complaint was voiced by the U.N. Resident Representative in Columbia, "I was not consulted either by any participating organisation...on any single project, nor had I any ground for official complaint--they were under no obligation to consult me." It is clear that the coordination of the U.N. activities in the field is the exception, not the rule. The agencies appear to resist coordination in the interests of their own autonomy.

There are, however, two further ways in which the U.N. exercises some control over the specialised agencies. The United Nations Special Fund was set up in 1958 to stimulate technical assistance to pre-investment projects. Although the Fund could have been incorporated into the EPTA the decision was taken to keep it separate. It was part of a deliberate attempt to centralise technical assist-


The agencies articulated the view that they should have some control over the appropriation of the funds, following the practice of the T.A.B. The Special Fund has successfully overridden these pressures and employs the agencies on a fee-paying basis for projects it decides to undertake.

The second means by which the U.N. attempts to secure some coordination of the activities of the specialised agencies and to keep them informed of its own interests, is through the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The Committee meets twice yearly. While this Committee undoubtedly performs useful functions, for example, with regard to common recruitment difficulties and standardisation of budgetary and fiscal procedures, it is restricted to making recommendations.

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48 "Naturally it was resisted: the feuding princes of a loose federation, who have been vigorously pursuing demarcation disputes among themselves, have always resented the centraliser." Ibid., p.101.

49 Ibid., p.101.

50 It is composed of heads of the specialised agencies, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. Its purpose is to take "all appropriate steps, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, to ensure the fullest and most effective implementation of the agreements entered into by the United Nations and the specialised agencies." Cited in I. Lubin and F. Murden, "ECOSOC: Concept versus Practice," Journal of International Affairs (U.S.), IX, No.2 (1955), 71.

This section of the chapter will be concluded with a brief summary of the steps covered thusfar. On balance, the specialised agencies within the U.N. system appear to be subject to two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the ECOSOC has been charged with the duty to coordinate the activities of the agencies, largely in the interests of efficiency. On the other hand, the specialised agencies were originally decentralised within the U.N. system, also in order that they might more efficiently discharge their duties, according to the various specific matters with which they were concerned.

Although no attempt has been made to cover the whole field of coordination within the United Nations system, in the case of EPTA and in connection with the activities of the U.N. Resident Representative, this function of coordination does not appear to have been particularly effective. Moreover, coordination is made still more difficult by the fact that the Charter of the U.N. is not clear as to the extent to which the specialised agencies shall be brought into relationship with United Nations through the ECOSOC. Furthermore, the ECOSOC performs tasks, through its commissions, which parallel the work of the


53 Coordination in the sense used here refers not of coordinating among the specialised agencies themselves, but between the central organs of the U.N. and the agencies.
agencies themselves; a feature which probably tends to dissipate the coordination of activities of specialised agencies within the U.N. (for which the ECOSOC was originally established).

In the interests of its independence the F.A.O. appears to have opted for the decentralisation of U.N. activities, as opposed to coordination with the central organs of the U.N. The F.A.O., for example, was insistent that its headquarters should be located where it could most effectively discharge its duties, and not necessarily in geographical proprinquity with the headquarters of the U.N. The F.A.O. was also successful in retaining ultimate control of its own budget, an area in which the interests of the Organisation's secretariat coincided with those national societal governments which constituted the Organisation's membership. Finally, the F.A.O. succeeded in re-establishing the principle of direct representation to the International Court in the case of disputes, a privilege long enjoyed by the I.L.O., but into which the ECOSOC attempted to interpose itself.

Since the U.N. has not been particularly successful in coordinating the activities of the specialised agencies, the F.A.O., for its part, has been reasonably successful in establishing its independence of the U.N. The hypothesis

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\[^{54}\text{Art. 62, sect.1 of the Charter of the United Nations.}\]
posed at the beginning of this chapter has to an extent, therefore, not been substantiated. In the interests of our analysis this chapter will be continued with an examination of the hypothesis according to the terms of the following Almond and Coleman conversion functions: interest articulation, interest aggregation, political socialisation and recruitment, political communication and rule-making.  

(a) Interest articulation: The General Assembly and the ECOSOC are the instruments through which national societal governments articulate their interests, within the U.N. system. Those sources should not be confused with a further source of interest articulation, emanating from the centre of the U.N. framework, that is, the interests of the permanent staff (the Secretariat) in New York.

Considering the specialised agencies as subsystems there is a second level of interest articulation, which involves the permanent officials of the agencies and national societal governments as members of these agencies. The F.A.O., for example, articulates a particular interest with respect to budgetary relations with the U.N. and the Secretariat, at one stage, opposed this view. It can be

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expected that the specialised agencies as members of the U.N. political system, exhibiting role specialisation, would articulate a variety of interests.

(b) **Interest aggregation:** Interest aggregation within the U.N. political system is difficult. We have noted in the case of the F.A.O. a concern for the autonomy of the Organisation whereas the permanent officials of the U.N. have been motivated by the need for greater coordination and centralisation. In one case, budgetary relations, government members of the F.A.O. supported the quest for institutional autonomy. Interest aggregation is particularly difficult within the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The delegates are bound to express the policies of their home governments, and it is unusual for their voting behaviour to be influenced by the debates all are forced to listen to. Delegates, or the governments which they represent, are often not motivated by concern for the

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56 Secretary General Hammarskjold tried, for example, to strengthen the hand of the U.N. Resident Representatives, but the F.A.O. and the I.L.O. were not interested in cooperating. J. S. Magee, "Structure and Substance: The Politics of Decentralisation in the United Nations," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (1965), 531.

57 As has been remarked, "One of the diseases of the United Nations is an excess of formal parliamentarianism, with too little of its substance." A. Shonfield, *The Attack on World Poverty* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p.94.
efficiency of coordination between the U.N. and the specialised agencies.

The greater the difficulty the central organs of the U.N. have in aggregating interests the less likely are their recommendations to be considered authoritative by the agencies. Thus, it is probable that the desire to centralise the activities of the agencies by the Secretariat, has been weakened by the attitudes of national societal governments.

(c) Political socialisation and recruitment: The staff of the F.A.O. are, in principle, responsible to the Organisation alone (Art. VIII, sect.2 of the Constitution). Each specialised agency, in fact, has its own secretariat, which is organisationally distinct from the U.N. Secretariat in New York. They are "subject only to such coordination and administrative unification as might be agreed upon by the agencies." There has, however, been an Agreement between the F.A.O. and the U.N. dealing with personnel arrangements recognising, for example, the desirability of a unified international civil service with standardised conditions of employment. The recruitment function, that is, the induction of staff into the roles they are to play, is obviously performed by the F.A.O. itself, although it is not


possible to calculate the degree to which this occurs, because of lack of data.

Political socialisation induces feelings of loyalty and pride in the political system. It is through this feature that the staff of the F.A.O. has developed a vested interest in the maintenance of the Organisation through time. These affective characteristics are, however, most difficult to elicit from a general study of this kind, but they have probably been best expressed in the desire not to become too closely associated with the U.N. 60

Political socialisation and recruitment give some indication of the location of the political system. The U.N. appears to play a peripheral role. It does not, for example, exercise any central control over the selection of

60 As Werner Levi has put it, "The agencies showed little enthusiasm for establishing relations with the U.N., in spite of the fact that the membership of both is largely identical. There were indications of rivalry, jealousy and distrust, not very surprising if one remembers that an agency once established develops a vested interest of its own existence independent of its purpose. More than that, it tends to expand its jurisdiction and increase its power. Pre-occupied as it is with special problems, the activities of other agencies shrink into relative insignificance. It is the center of its own universe. The urge toward independence develops from the fear that outside interference and too close cooperation with the other agencies may endanger the success of its own work." W. Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 42.
staff, which remains the responsibility of the Director­
General, "in accordance with such procedure as may be
determined by rules made by the Conference" (Article VII, sect.1 of the Constitution).

(d) Political communication: There is no absence of
channels of communication between the U.N. and the F.A.O.
In this respect the ECOSOC forms, not without considerable
difficulty, the most important link between the General
Assembly and the agencies. The practice of mutual
representation at each others meetings probably enhances
the accuracy of the information flowing between the ECOSOC
and the F.A.O.

The contact between the Secretariat of the U.N.
and that of the F.A.O. is informal. But, in any case,
provision is made for regular contact through the meetings
of the A.C.C.

It should be noted that most national societal
governments have an alternative means of communication with
the F.A.O. other than through the U.N. General Assembly and
the ECOSOC. An important aspect of the location of the F.A.O.
in the context of the U.N. political system is the frequency
with which national societal governments choose to use the
framework provided by the U.N. In the case of the EPTA, the
source of a large part of the F.A.O. funds, governments do
not appear to interfere with the administration of the
Programme by the T.A.B. It is hypothesised that those governments not seeking tactical or propaganda advantages may prefer to influence the specialised agencies, through their membership of these agencies, rather than through the ECOSOC. Certainly the ECOSOC provides a less direct line of communications and, moreover, one that is more public.

(e) Rule-making: The making of rules, for the political system to which F.A.O. belongs, is of decisive importance to this analysis. The specialised agencies are not subordinate to the United Nations. Agreements between them recognise the equality of status enjoyed by the agencies.\(^6\)

The U.N., therefore, is restricted to making recommendations to the agencies and they, in turn, are under no obligation to obey. For practical purposes the agencies are independent of the U.N. as an institution, although not beyond the influence of those national societal governments represented in the world organisation. Further, their status is enhanced by the capacity to act as a legal person and to

\(^6\)"The Charter is hesitant in suggesting specific terms under which the Specialised Agencies are to be brought into the United Nations....This is an attempt of the Charter to leave the autonomy of the Specialised Agencies essentially intact....Unless an agency surrenders its independence, the Council can only suggest, implore, persuade, or apply pressure, but it cannot force." W. Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p.41.
refer disputes to the ICJ. 62

In theory, it would be quite possible for recommend-
ations by the U.N. to become authoritative rules of
behaviour for the specialised agencies. Such a development
could accompany a growth in centralisation of the activities
of the agencies by the U.N. Partly because of disparate
interest articulation and aggregation by governments, working
both independently as well as through participation in the
U.N., this has not occurred. Similarly, it would be possible
for U.N. recommendations to be considered authoritative by
the agencies in the sense that they were legitimate requests
in pursuit of agreed goals. But, equality of status and
disparate interests do not facilitate such a development.
In three cases examined (budgetary relations, location of
the Organisation, and advisory opinions from the Court) the
F.A.O. effectively asserted its independence of the U.N. and
made its own decisions. Moreover, the Constitution of the
F.A.O. gives to its Conference the power to determine policy. 63

In the case of the U.N. Special Fund there has been
a tendency toward closer coordination with the agencies.
The Special Fund, however, is not an adjunct of the U.N.
Secretariat and it has shown that it has not yet become

dependent on the political organs of the U.N.\textsuperscript{64} The EPTA decision-making process appears to be diffused among the agencies and the governments concerned, with the central organs of the U.N. playing a quite limited role. As regards the regular operations of the F.A.O. the U.N. Secretariat has no apparent influence, other than stressing the value of coordination, decision-making being internalised in the Organisation itself.

On the basis of our analysis and the foregoing inventory of the conversion functions within F.A.O., several general conclusions may be derived concerning the agency's approximation of the functional requisites of a political system.\textsuperscript{65} Any political system must perform the function of goal-attainment. It is clear, however, that the central organs of the United Nations do not monopolise this function. The F.A.O. is probably more capable of articulating goals, within its field of competence, than is the U.N., if only because of the proximity of expert advice in close contact (through Conference or Council) with the representatives of governments. Moreover, the Constitution


\textsuperscript{65}The most inclusive structures of a society that have recognised responsibility for performing, at a minimum, the function of goal-attainment by means of legitimate decisions or policies." See above, p.2.
of the F.A.O. gives to the Conference the power to determine policy. The U.N. can, of course, make recommendations to the F.A.O., but they do not necessarily carry any mandatory weight. In other words, recommendations by the U.N. do not carry the force attached to the quality of legitimacy, a notion embodied in our conception of the political system.

Furthermore, inclusiveness, although a feature of our concept of the political system, is not a characteristic of the U.N. system. We have seen, for example, how national societal governments can make representations to the specialised agencies through direct communications with the agencies concerned and not through the framework provided by the U.N. The concept of inclusiveness in a U.N. political system is weakened by this apparent diffuseness in communications between specialised agencies and their membership. Moreover, it appears that the affective focus of the F.A.O. secretariat is not toward the U.N., but is directed at the purposes embodied in the F.A.O. and in the maintenance of a distinct identity for the Organisation.

66 Art. IV, sect.1 of the Constitution of the F.A.O.

67 See above, pp.39/41-44 for a discussion of responsibility for the location of the Organisation, F.A.O. budget and reference to the ICJ.

68 See above, pp.60-62.
On balance, it would appear, then, that the F.A.O. is not a subsystem of a U.N. political system. The final chapter will raise a third hypothesis to explore the possibility of a more likely location of the F.A.O. within the context of our conception of political system.
CHAPTER IV
THE F.A.O. AS A SUBSYSTEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The third hypothesis concerns the location of the F.A.O. in an international political system, which is analytically distinct from the U.N. political system. The previous chapters have indicated that the F.A.O. has certain of the characteristics that Almond and Coleman would associate with the content of the political system.¹ The secretariat of the Organisation, for example, is capable of articulating interests, such as the Director-General's Proposals for a World Food Board.² Interests can be aggregated within the Organisation and converted into authoritative decisions, as in the case of the F.A.O. retaining control over its regular budget. Furthermore, the Organisation appears to retain control over the selection of staff, their induction into the particular roles they are to perform and, to an undetermined extent, becomes the affective focus of their loyalties. In other words, political


socialisation and recruitment are performed within the F.A.O. by its secretariat.

The third hypothesis might be phrased thus: the more the F.A.O. approaches the "action" agency conception of its role the easier it is to view it as a political system in its own right, serving as it does to define and pursue its own goals and whose decisions are accepted as legitimate by national societal governments. Conversely, the more the F.A.O. performs a "service" agency role, the easier it is to locate the F.A.O. as a functional subsystem of an international political system.

The idea of an action agency is most succinctly summed-up in the phrase, "funds and power to do internationally what governments do nationally." It is clear that the first Director General, Sir John Boyd Orr, sought to mould the F.A.O. to this pattern. He used as his pretext an omnibus provision in the Constitution. The service agency role refers essentially to a fact-finding and information body, an agency (like a research organisation or library) for the governments that wanted to use it. The two governments instrumental in founding the Organisation sought to confine the F.A.O. to service agency functions.

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4 Article I, sect.(c) of the Constitution of F.A.O.
In his message to Congress, on March 26, 1945, President Roosevelt stated, "In becoming a member of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, we will retain complete freedom of action in determining our national agricultural policies; ... the Organisation...will have no power to coerce and command."⁶

Similarly, "the role of the British...continued to be what it had been from the very start of the F.A.O., namely, to discourage all moves aimed at developing F.A.O. into an institution with more than mere research, technical and advisory functions."⁷ Underdeveloped countries, as beneficiaries of any F.A.O. programme, wished that the Organisation could play a much larger role than the Americans and British were willing to assign to it.⁸

The demise of the W.F.B. proposals had spelled the end of the action agency conception of the F.A.O. The proposals would have involved the exercise of supranational executive authority, that is, they envisaged intervention


by an agency in some aspects of the relations between states. Whereas the W.F.B. would have been genuinely international, the task of technical assistance is wholly intranational. Insofar as technical assistance, which forms the largest part of F.A.O. operations, is a less controversial aspect of the Organisation's work, governments are willing to allow the day-to-day operations to remain under the control of the secretariat. ⁹ Although not strictly service agency tasks, technical assistance operations are not those of an action agency, as envisaged by Sir J. B. Orr. The location of the F.A.O. in the context of the political system must, therefore, be sought in the relations between the Organisation's secretariat and the national societal governments composing its membership, rather than in an "action" and "service" agency dichotomy.

Although the secretariat of the F.A.O. enjoys some powers, for example, in respect of the supervision of technical assistance programmes, ultimate responsibility lies with the Conference. The Conference, which meets biennially, "shall determine the policy and approve the budget of the Organisation" (Art. IV, sect.1). In other words, the power of decision-making rests, in the final analysis, with the Conference, although the application of

⁹Art. VII, sect.5 of the Constitution of F.A.O.
rules is the responsibility of the secretariat.\textsuperscript{10} Not only are the powers of the Director-General derived from the Conference, but the interests which he articulates only carry the weight of recommendations. Sir J. B. Orr acted under the omnibus provision in the Constitution to formulate his proposals for a World Food Board, but he was dependent on the goodwill of the Conference to translate them into authoritative decisions. Successive Directors-General have pared down their conceptions of the role of the F.A.O. to bring them more into line with the early wishes of the United States and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{11} General oversight of the work of the F.A.O. is delegated by the Conference, in between its sessions, to the Council (Art. V). Rule adjudication is a function of the Conference or, if that fails, the I.C.J. (Art. XVII, sect.1).

While the powers of the Organisation depend on the Conference, the Conference is itself dependent on the national societal governments composing its membership. Delegates to the Conference are not independent of their governments and must, ultimately, articulate the interests

\textsuperscript{10}The application of rules refers to the administration and enforcement, by the secretariat, of decisions made by the Conference.

\textsuperscript{11}See, for example, Norris E. Dodd, "The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the U.N.: Its History, Organisation, and Objectives," \textit{Agricultural History}, XXIII (1949), 81.
of the government to whom they are responsible. To a considerable extent, therefore, the articulation of interests is diffused among a variety of national capitals. Moreover, in decisions of major importance (which invariably involve the expenditure of money) the Organisation is dependent on the goodwill of those governments contributing a substantial proportion of its funds. There would have been no EPTA without the original American initiative, and there was no W.F.B. because this body was not acceptable to the governments who would have had to find the funds to pay for it.

The Conference of the F.A.O. is not like the legislative assembly of some of the countries composing its membership. The delegates are appointed, not elected to office, and there are few sanctions which the Conference can apply against recalcitrants. More important, the process of decision-making is not determined by considerations of the F.A.O.'s best interests, as decided by its permanent officials, but by what is acceptable to national societal governments.

12 At the Copenhagen session of the F.A.O. Conference (1947), which considered the Proposals for a World Food Board, the United States delegate, N. E. Dodd, "was so outspoken... in support of Sir John's concepts that the U.S. State Department came down heavily on him when he returned to Washington." G. Jackson, "The Food and Agriculture Organisation," Review of International Cooperation (March, 1949), p.59.
In conclusion, the authority and powers of the Director General are derived from the Conference, while the Conference itself is ultimately dependent on the goodwill of governments. At this level, the F.A.O. thus remains an agent of national societal governments and the proper location of the Organisation, therefore, is as a subsystem of an international political system.

The thesis will be concluded with a more explicit formulation of indicators of systems change, for international organisation, than that provided by our categories of independence and coordination. This is an appropriate point, however, to briefly recapitulate the steps by which we have identified the F.A.O. in terms of the concept of a political system.

In chapter II the first hypothesis posed the question of the independence of F.A.O., from a United Nations or an international political system. After an examination of a possible weakness in the Constitution, which probably enhanced the authority of the Director-General, and the residual powers belonging to his office, we turned to an examination of the Proposals for a World Food Board. The W.F.B. was an attempt by Sir J. B. Orr to make the F.A.O., or a like entity to be established for the purpose, into an agency with supranational executive
authority. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom found these proposals unacceptable and, despite support from economically underdeveloped countries, the W.F.B. was rejected. It was decided, largely on the basis of our analysis of the W.F.B. proposals, that the secretariat of the F.A.O. was not in a position to both articulate and to pursue goals through to a successful conclusion. In other words, the F.A.O. had not succeeded in achieving that independence of influences external to its boundaries (in particular, the facility of rule-making) which the hypothesis suggested was a prerequisite to a political system. Chapter II concluded that F.A.O. had neither the qualities, legitimacy or inclusiveness, nor certain of the functional prerequisites that made for a political system. No attempt was made in Chapter II, however, to determine with which political system (if any) the Organisation might more accurately be identified and associated.

Chapter III raised a hypothesis which sought to determine if the F.A.O. was a subsystem of a U.N. political system. The emphasis in this chapter was placed on the coordination of the activities of the F.A.O. with the U.N. After an examination of the role of the ECOSOC, the functioning of EPTA and the role of the U.N. Resident Representative in the field, it was concluded that the United Nations had not
been particularly effective in coordinating the activities of the specialised agencies. On the other hand, we observed that the F.A.O. had been successful in establishing its independence of the U.N., in the cases of budget, location, and advisory opinions from the International Court. Moreover, it was noted that F.A.O. had been established by separate international agreement, that it had a distinct Constitution and performed tasks which required decentralisation from the central organs of the U.N. in the interests of operating efficiency. After an analysis of the various conversion functions performed within F.A.O., with special emphasis on the direct communications link between national societal governments and the Organisation, it was concluded that the F.A.O. was not a subsystem of a U.N. political system. For example, it was noticed that goal-attainment was not a function performed by the U.N. for the F.A.O., a characteristic that undermined the notion of the legitimacy of U.N. recommendations for the Organisation. Further, it was observed that the U.N. system was not the most inclusive unit with which national societal governments or the F.A.O. secretariat associated themselves.

It remained, therefore, for this chapter to explore a third hypothesis, regarding F.A.O. as a subsystem of an international political system. Although we found the
"action/service" agency dichotomy an unacceptable basis by which to examine the hypothesis, nevertheless it was decided, largely on the grounds that the secretariat and the Conference of F.A.O. in practice enjoyed powers which were derived from and dependent on the goodwill of governments, that the most viable interpretation of this Organisation was as a set of interactions most closely approximating a subsystem of an international political system.13

The F.A.O. has made only slow progress toward functional independence, for example, in the area of technical assistance. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceptualise a situation in which the Organisation's capabilities to make decisions and implement change in the areas of world food production and distribution could develop further.

Looking toward the F.A.O.'s potential for growth in these dimensions, E. B. Haas provides three indicators of systems change against which the performance of such a specialised agency may be measured.14 This Haas instrument

13 No attempt has been made to explicate the dimensions and the boundaries of an international political system, a task which goes beyond the purposes of this study. It is assumed, with G. A. Almond ("A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, XVII (1965), 183-214, passim), that such a system does exist.

would, as well, be applicable to the process by which the F.A.O. may have evolved into a political system in its own right, or become a subsystem of a U.N. political system or, as we have concluded, operates as a subsystem of an international political system. The first indicator is institutional autonomy, which involves the acquisition of independent powers of some kind. The F.A.O. may have taken some initiative in this direction with its technical assistance activities, although earlier attempts at the acquisition of such powers were unsuccessful. By contrast with the F.A.O. experience to date, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) appears as the most successful example of a specialised agency moving in the direction of supranational authority. 15

Haas' second indicator refers to the growth of an organisation's authority. The secretariats of specialised agencies are limited to recommendations for action, but their authority widens to the degree that governmental decision-makers accept their recommendations as binding, without necessarily expressing unqualified agreement with them. This particular indicator needs to be qualified, as the growth of authority is dependent on the economic or the

diplomatic influence of the national societal government concerned. Thus, the acceptance of F.A.O. recommendations by Ecuador is of less importance than their rejection by the United States, particularly if the expenditure of money is involved.

The third indicator is legitimacy, which refers to the internalisation by individuals or governments of the values embodied in the agency, along with the belief that they are not only binding but are also right. Thus, a government would have accepted the legitimacy of the specialised agency concerned if it consciously invoked the agency's purposes and principles to justify an item of national policy, or even more vividly, adapted a national societal decision to conform to the achievement of an agency's programme of international goals. At this stage in the history of the F.A.O., however, the Haas indicators of systems change have largely a theoretical interest. The three hypotheses posed in this study, and our examination of the F.A.O. in terms of the concept of a political system, have demonstrated that the Organisation enjoys only limited institutional autonomy from national societal governments.
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