A STUDY OF CANDIDATES

IN THE

1968 FEDERAL ELECTION

IN ONTARIO

Ву

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ABSTRACT

The theoretical orientation for the data collection was based on the concept of amateurism and professionalism in politics. The concept was not productive in data analysis, however, and the more natural variables of party and occupation were found to have the greatest utility. These, and two scales, are examined in an effort to understand candidate behavior. Study of candidates enables some conclusions to be made about party organization and the federal party system of Ontario.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICIANS: SPECTRA OF INCENTIVES

The study of political activists has centered on legislators or members of political party organizations. This is a study of a category less inclusive than party activists but more inclusive than legislators—candidates for office. A questionnaire was mailed to the candidates of the three parties contesting 87 seats in Ontario in the June 25, 1968 Canadian federal election. As the response from losing candidates was considerably better than from Members of Parliament, some of the findings concern them specifically. 4

Examples of studies of legislators are: John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguen, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967). Frank J. Sorauf includes some information about defeated opponents of state legislators in his Party and Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

²For example, Samuel J. Eldersveld, <u>Political Parties:</u>
<u>a Behavioral Analysis</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

<u>Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964) summarizes findings about many kinds of political activity, including voting.

Omitted from the study were the M.P. for Stormont-Dundas, Speaker Lucien Lamoureux (Independent, formerly Liberal) and his New Democratic Party opponent as this would not be interpreted as a party contest. At the time the specific competitiveness or non-competitiveness was thought to be perhaps important. The elimination of any candidates, major-party or otherwise, now seems unfortunate.

⁴See Appendix A: The Sample.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to discover some things about motives for candidacy, activities of candidates (campaign activity), and also some things about the parties; data from the M.P.'s responses was necessary to extend the sample for comparing parties.

The study of the interrelationship of politicians and parties has perhaps evolved from an emphasis on political party organizations as determining factors in politicians' behavior to an emphasis on the influence of politicians in the structure of party organizations. It was Max Weber's hypothesis that the development of party organizations and electoral politics in this century would result in a class of "professional" politicians who would bear greater resemblance to each other, across party lines, than to the rank and file of their own parties. Weber's essential concern was with the quality of leadership and he saw, with regret, that leadership was going to have to come from political parties. His concern with political recruitment was not representation but the quality of recruitment from the point of view of the state. He favored those who live "for" politics rather than those who live "off" poli-

⁵Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", in <u>From Max Weber:</u> <u>Essays in Sociology</u>, translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), p. 77-128.

^{6&}lt;u>Ibid., p. 77-83.</u>

tics. With the dominance of parties, politics would become an activity for professionals, a vocation, not an avocation. This could prove effective if the politician has the right ends (living "for" politics); the professional perhaps would prove better than the "occasional" politician for whom politics (the state) would not be viewed as an end but a means. The growth of electoral and party politics would develop politicians: Weber hoped there would be statesmen among them.

Two "normative" perspectives of the problem of political recruiment have been suggested. Some students, like Weber, are concerned with the quality of leadership recruited for the state. We could include here those concerned with political recruitment as a part of system-maintenance⁹; the "system"

⁷ Ibid., p. 84. As he viewed it, aristocratic recruitment of leadership would have been preferable if there had been a real aristocracy. He suggests that plutocratic recruitment might be effective except that plutocrats would, by their nature, tend to live "off" as well as "for" politics. (p. 86).

Weber might even have preferred a monarchy but he had been disillusioned by, and was highly critical of, Kaiser Wilhelm and had no illusions of a return to the past. It is worthwhile to note here that Weber was a nationalist, albeit a liberal and rational one, and that the lecture was delivered in 1919, after Germany's defeat. On Weber's nationalism, see the Introduction by Gerth and Mills, p. 25-26, 37-40.

^{8&}lt;u>Tbid.</u>, p. 83.

⁹See Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 27-31.

referred to most often is the nation-state, or at least something identifiable in political geographical terms. Then there
are those who emphasize representation especially in the recruitment of legislators. 10 The perspective of these students
of recruitment is perhaps more "democratic" than the perspective
of those who start with the state.

The study of political recruitment has often been, of course, empirical. Representation is "measured" by various demographic indicators comparing politicians and the population. And there is empirical interest in the identification of types of people (in psychological terms) who become politicians, and among them, successful politicians. Il This, too, was part of Weber's concern.

One of the typs of politician frequently referred to-in popular as well as scholarly terms--is the "professional"
politician. This would be close to Weber's definition. 12

Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1954), especially p. 16-18.

Matthews, op. cit., reviews some of the early literature on this subject. See also the works cited in Footnote 1 above; Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political Decision-Makers (Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), and articles by Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, Herbert Jacob, L. G. Seligman and James D. Barber listed in the Bibliography.

¹²In the questionnaire, respondents were asked: "In your view, is it better to have people in politics who are professionals in the game, or people with a more amateur approach?" Apparently, most understood professional in the same way-making one's living from politics.

James Q. Wilson's professional, on the other hand, is something like Weber's "occasional"--one who treats politics as a means, not an end. Wilson contrasts his professional with the "amateur" politician. Both may or may not be full-time politicians, or may or may not come from the so-called professional occupations. The essential difference lies in motivation. The amateur is interested in the intrinsic rewards of politics; in Weber's terms he might live "for" politics. The professional is interested in the extrinsic rewards of political participation; he may not necessarily wish to live "off" politics but he looks for rewards in addition to those of participation itself. 13

Perhaps the essential elaboration made by Wilson is that he admits more people into the category of "politician" than Weber. Weber's contention that party professionals would come to resemble one another in outlook may have validity for describing some of their behavior. Certainly, politicians of different parties may resemble each other. Although party

James Q. Qilson, The Amateur Democrat (The University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chapter 1, especially p. 3-4. Professor Meisel defines certain kinds of politicians in the Canadian parties as "amateurs". These would correspond to Wilson's "professionals". See John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties", in High G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada (2nd edition, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 33-54 at p. 45, 48, 51.

elites have been found to be ideologically distinct, 14 this may be a "marketing" difference, more apparent than real. 15

The delimitation of the population being studied is important here; differences between members of opposing party organizations may be greater than differences between their elected representatives. 16 While it has been shown that, at least in Canada, party is a significant variable in explaining legislative behavior, this may be institutionally imposed. 17 There may be differences other than ideological which can be used to categorize politicians, differences which may help to distinguish parties or which may be independent of party determination.

One such dimension may follow Wilson's amateur-profes-

¹⁴Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers", in Beryl L. Crowe and Charles G. Mayo, eds., American Political Parties (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 263-280, show that party elites in the United States are more ideologically distinct than the general population.

¹⁵Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, Harper & Row, 1957) p. 96-98. Parties may "advertise" divergent ideologies; Downs develops this idea as being similar to product differentiation in the market situation of oligopoly.

McCloskey et. al. use convention delegates as their party elites rather than elected representatives.

¹⁷Kornberg, op. cit., p. 132-136, would suggest that party 1s a more important factor. Leon D. Epstein, in "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties", American Political Science Review, 58 (March, 1964), p. 46-59, argues that the parliamentary system, an institutional factor, has a determining effect.

sional distinction. (Ideologues would tend to be amateurs; 18 certainly degree as well as type of commitment can be useful in distinguishing participants.) Another typology of politicians, devised for first-term legislators, has been effectively described by James D. Barber. 19 Barber has four categories as described below (Figure 1). 20

	· <u> </u>	Activity High	Low
Willingness to Return	High	Lawmakers	Spectators
	Low	Advertisers	Reluctants

Figure 1

If we substitute "enjoyment of politics" for "willingness to return" we might be able to generalize the scheme to include activists other than legislators. "Advertisers" and "reluctants" would seem to be people whose original involvement in politics was virtually for apolitical reasons. They might correspond to Wilson's professionals; what they seek in politics is not participation in decision-making. It is more doubtful

David Nexon explicitly used "ideologue" and "non-ideologue" instead of "amateur" and "professional" in his "Assymetry in the Political System: Occasional Activists in the Republican and Democratic Parties," 1956-1964, American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (1971), p. 716-730 at 721.

¹⁹ James D. Barber, <u>The Lawmakers</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

^{20&}lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 20.

²¹Ibid., p. 67-71, p. 123-125.

whether "lawmakers" and "spectators" can be as easily classed as amateurs—the rewards they seek for participation may be more than intrinsic—although the spectators especially would seem to get little more out of politics than simply being politicians. 22

Classification of legislators in terms of their expressed and actual legislative practice (mainly in the language of role theory) has been carried out in studies of American state legislators by Wahlke and his associates, 23 and in studies of Canadian federal parliamentarians by Kornberg. 24 Wahlke, et. al., classify role types in four categories: purposive, representational, areal, and pressure-group. 25 Kornberg follows the typology of representational roles (trustee, politico, delegate) for what he calls "representational style" and the typology of areal roles (trustee, politico, delegate) for what he calls "representational, local, and national-

^{22 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 26. It should be noted, however, that Wilson's amateurs, at least in club politics, are anything but spectators. Wilson, <u>The Amateur Democrat</u>, p. 168.

²³John C. Wahlke, Heinze Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

²⁴Kornberg, op. cit.

²⁵Wahlke et. al., op. cit., see p. 465-470 for a summary.

local corresponding to state, district, and district-state). 26

These authors also deal with the legislative and career goals of their subjects. The concept of role adds refinements to the description of a very significant class of politicians.

The institutional setting, perhaps, makes it somewhat easier to apply the concept to legislators than to political activists in general.

The study of party organization yields further information about politicians, although in fact study of politicians may give more information about party organization. For J. A. Schlesinger the key question in the study of party organization is: "Whose party is it?" Schlesinger places the ambition of politicians at the source of politics. Parties may diverge, not necessarily due to ideology, but due to the political opportunity structure, and the ways in which competing ambitions and competing kinds of ambition—some politicians have "progressive" ambitions, some not—affect the party system. 29

²⁶Kornberg, op. cit., p. 106-108. The section of representational and areal roles in <u>The Legislative System</u> is by Heinz Eulau, p. 267-310.

²⁷Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization" in James G. March, ed., <u>Handbook of Organizations</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 764-801. Quotation, p. 765.

²⁸ Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 195.

^{29&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 119-120, and "Political Party Organization", p. 768-769. Those politicians with "progressive" ambitions may be seeking higher office than they occupy or are immediately contesting for.

The focus for the study of party organization is thus the candidate for office. 30

Wilson, and Peter B. Clark, in an article dealing with organization theory generally, develop a classification of incentives and incentive systems which may be applied to politicians and political parties. 31 Organizations may be centered around material, solidary, or purposive incentive systems. 32 While Clark and Wilson classify political parties mainly within the category of purposive organizations, still, as there are no pure types of the incentive systems, it may be possible to differentiate parties according to the degree different incentives operate within their organizations. 33 It would seem that

³⁰ Schlesinger specifies the office-seeking candidate. He posits that political ambitions are situation-determined. Hence, there may be candidates who do not seek office. However, these candidates often serve as part of a larger nucleus around another candidate (or candidates) whose situation allows office ambitions. See "Political Party Organization", p. 769, 775.

Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations", Administrative Science Quarterly, 1962, p. 129-166.

^{32 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 134-137.

³³Jacek suggests this may be possible with Canadian parties. See Henry J. Jacek, "The Comparative Study of Party Organizations in Canada and The United States", paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, York University, 1969, p. 12-13.

Wilson classifies political clubs as purposive and

Wilson classifies political clubs as purposive and machines as either solidary or material. He predicts that the clubs will enjoy greater success against organizations using solidary incentives than against those using material incentives (patronage). This is based on the relative success of the club movement in New York as opposed to its failure in Chicago. The Amateur Democrat, p. 28-29, 312-316.

parties would have to offer varying rewards to people with different motives and that parties might tend to diverge according to incentive systems. Thus ambition, which Schlesinger emphasizes, may have a determining effect throughout the whole of party organizations.

The use of role theory³⁴ and incentive analysis can order for us much of the diversity of political activity. This study focuses on one example of political activity, election campaign activity, and attempts to analyze variations within one category of politician—the candidate.

The title of this chapter has specified the plural: politicians" not "politician", "spectra" not "spectrum". This study is not of "the politician". Certainly, one should not accuse Weber of having been that simplistic. What is advocated is the substitution of what Barber speaks of as the "specialization" hypothesis for "the more-the more" hypothesis, in other words an emphasis on the nature of participation, as well as the extent. This study, however, can be concerned with only a few of the things which may differentiate politicians.

The remainder of the thesis will be concerned more strictly with the findings, mainly from the questionnaire responses. There will be references to some of the above-mentioned

Role theory has been used or advocated by Wahlke, Kornberg, Jacek. (References above.)

^{35&}lt;sub>Barber</sub>, op. cit., p. 217-219.

literature as these seem pertinent to specific findings and hypotheses.

Chapter Two deals with the shortcomings of the data collected, mainly by comparing the responses of candidates who were winners and losers in 1968. A possible reformulation of the model for studying campaign activity as a dependent variable is suggested.

Chapter Three deals with the party system from two angles. Differences between candidates from each of the parties are summarized as well as the perceptions candidates have of their own and other parties.

Chapter Four includes two scales which differentiate candidates across party lines. One may be similar to the amateur-professional typology described above; the other appears to deal more with <u>degree</u> of political involvement. Chapter Four is in many ways a report of failure--failure to discover differences in motivation of candidates.

A more successful variable in producing differences between candidates was occupation, the most useful of the "social background" variables discussed in Chapter Five. Two categories of occupations—Brokers, represented mainly by lawyers and businessmen, and Communicators, represented mainly by teachers—are compared.

The Conclusion is mainly an excursus in philosophy of science. One conclusion is that the most useful part of this thesis may be the Appendices, including the Questionnaire, with

marginal totals, and codebook (i.e., useful along with the data deck.)

CHAPTER II

THE STUDY OF CANDIDATES FROM THE 1968 FEDERAL ELECTION IN ONTARIO

The quality of the data for this thesis leaves much to be desired. The information is extensive. There is much of interest (for many reasons the questionnaire was too long) but much is obviously missing.

The questionnaire was sent to 260 people. Table 1 gives the response rate by party for Members of Parliament and defeated candidates. The response rate for losing candidates is respectable. Because of the relationship between success and party, the total sample will be referred to on occasion; this is necessary to increase the number of Liberals. (However the response rate for losing Liberals is the highest for the three parties.) On occasion, the discussion will deal with losing candidates only.

Probably affecting the response rate for a mailed questionnaire. Also, I would say that the questionnaire is repetitive, that much in it is of little or no use, and for a student writing an M.A. thesis, the data is too tempting for burying oneself in.

The potential sample was 261. One losing candidate died before there was chance to send him a questionnaire.

TABLE 1: The Sample: Respondents (Response Rate in Brackets) According to Party and Won or Lost on June 25, 1968

Party	W	on	Lo	st	Tot	als
Liberal	32	(50)	17	(74)	49	(56)
Conservative	5	(29)	<i>5</i> 0	(73) ^a	55	(64) ^a
New Democratic Party (N.D.P.)	2	(33)	52	(64)	54	(62)
	*****		-		******	
	39	(45)	119	(69)	158	(61)

^aOne (1) Conservative losing candidate died before questionnaires were sent out.

tative, comparing occupations (principal non-political occupation) with the totals of occupations listed for Ontario candidates in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer. As can be seen, there is also a relationship between occupation and party: Liberals drawing more lawyers, Conservatives more businessmen, the New Democratic Party more teachers. The party differences with respect to occupation are exaggerated by the response rate, however. The response rate for Conservative and N.D.P. lawyers is very low (partly due to the poor M.P. response rate). Occupation as a variable will be considered in detail in a later chapter.

³Ottawa: Queen's Printer (1968).

There is also a relationship between occupation and electoral success, with lawyers considerably more likely to be successful. This holds regardless of party; for example, three of five N.D.P. lawyers were winning candidates.

TABLE 2: One Test of the Representativeness of the Sample: Occupation and Party

(The sample compared with all candidates--occupations as listed in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer)

	<u>Li</u> b	eral		arty: <u>vative</u>	N.D.P.	
Occupation:	Sample	Popu- lation	Sample	Popu- lation	Sample	Popu- lation
Businessman (proprietor, executive)	12	23	24	34 ^d	3	7
Lawyer	20	33	4	15	1	5
Other Professional ^b	3	8	10	10	6	8
Teacher, Professor	9	12	3	5	21	28
Minister	600 E00	1.	3	3	8	9
Journalist	44 55	***	2	2	3	4
Farmer	2	4	4	7		200 COM
Manual labour trade union	&	1	1	1	5	15
Other ^c	3	5	4	9	7	11
			*****		Columbia de la	
	49	87	55	86 ^đ	54	87

^aIf the occupation given in the questionnaire differed from that listed in the <u>Report</u>, the questionnaire response was preferred.

b Medical doctor, dentist, engineer--generally the "free professionals" other than lawyers.

CHousewife, civil servant, etc. Also all marginal and uncertain codings.

dThe deceased Conservative was a "Businessman".

One of the basic causes of the weakness of the questionnaire (and, therefore, the data) was uncertainty as to theory and operationalizing at the time of its construction. Later in this chapter, a possible theory about the <u>subject</u> of this study will be outlined. First, a preliminary survey of the data collected.

Winners and Losers

The results of the June 25, 1968 election gave Ontario 64 Liberal, 17 Conservative, and 6 New Democratic Party elected members. 5 Some of the things the questionnaire was intended to find were differences between winning and losing candidates. The results of the election themselves upset some of these hopes. (If we divide the population sampled into six categories of winners and losers of each party, winning Conservatives and N.D.P. would be the two smallest groups, winning Liberals the largest. Party comparisons become difficult.) In much of the thesis, winners will be considered only as part of the total sample, often for purposes of comparing parties, while losers will often be considered separately. However, at this stage it will be worthwhile to note some of the differences between

⁵And one Independent. Speaker Lucien Lamoureux was opposed only by one N.D.P. candidate. The constituency (Stormont-Dundas) was not included in the survey because of the peculiar nature of the contest. This arbitrary decision to restrict the sample before data collection is regretted. For much of the analysis the sample was restricted to losing candidates, in any case.

winning and losing candidates in the sample. This will also serve as a preview of some of the considerations in the questionnaire. Some of the results will be given in tabular form; in some cases, the reader will be referred to the Questionnaire (appendix) where marginal results are reported.

First, a caution. The most significant relationship between whether or not a subject was a winner or a loser was with party (whether or not the candidate was a Liberal). Thus many relationships may be more a reflection of party (perhaps the major determinent of success)⁷ than of M.P. -- also-ran differences. (The relationship between party and winner-loser

⁶The questionnaires for M.P.s and losing candidates varied slightly. The complete questionnaire with marginal totals and a winner-loser breakdown can be found in the Appendix.

⁷It is frequently observed that the party a candidate runs for is very often the major determinant of success, especially in specific constituencies or groups of constituencies. That, to be successful, a candidate must usually run for the right party in the right place has been noted by, for example, see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics", in The Electoral Process, M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 11-13; John W. Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies (New York: Random House, 1968), espec. p. 109-111. Michael Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates (London: Nelson, 1969) comments (p. 1, 2) first that a candidate must be a party candidate and best a major party candidate and later (p. 6, 7) about the high proportion of seats (in Britain) which are "safe" or nearly safe for a given party.

status can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2.)

Very few differences can be reported on socioeconomic factors; few questions related to them. One asked for principal non-political occupation—as already noted. In addition age, religion, ethnicity (national origin of father), and sex were ascertained. There were no successful women candidates in Ontario. Five of eight N.D.P. and three of four Conservative female candidates responded. The differences with respect to religion and ethnicity followed party differences (reported elsewhere). Losing candidates tended to be younger. None of these variables—except for occupation—proved to be useful, when used as an independent variable or a control.

Political Experience

A number of questions were asked about political experience. Here there were some noteworthy differences between winners and losers—some of which, of course, should have been expected. More winners than losers had been candidates in previous federal elections. This was expected; many winners were incumbents. However, it might not necessarily have been expected that one-half of the winners but only one-third of the

⁸See Appendix: Questionnaire, Age (Columns 2-16, 17)

⁹21 of the 39, in fact, were incumbents. There were 5 incumbents in the sample of losers (from a possible 11; Ralph Cowan, Independent Liberal, and Wallace McCutcheon, deceased Conservative, were not sent questionnaires). For figures on previous candidacy, see Appendix; Questionnaire, Question 1(a), (Column 7).

losers would have had local political experience (elections and office-holding), especially since there was no difference in provincial political experience. Local political experience is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3: Respondents' Experience as Candidates for Local Office

Experience:	Win	ners	Losers	Total
None		19	79	98
Council (mayor, reeve, alderman, etc.)	14		32	46
School Board	4	20	8 40	12
Both	2		0	_2
·		39	119	158

*Chi square tests of significance were carried out for most tables but are not given as the sample is not random.

Winners and losers did not differ in political experience within their party organizations. 74% of the winners and 73% of the losers in the sample had held party office. If any-

¹⁰ Appendix: Questionnaire, Questions 1(b) and (c) (Column 10). There may be an institutional explanation for this. Because Ontario has been provincially Conservative and federally Liberal this might mean that politicians from these parties might not wish to switch between levels. A Conservative M.L.A., even if he expected to be elected at the federal level, might consider that he would be giving up on the possibility of Cabinet and other appointments should he switch. On the difference between Ontario provincial and federal politics, see John Wilson and David Hoffman, "The Nature of Conservative Dominance: An Essay on the Position of the Liberal Party in Ontario Politics", paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, York University, June, 1969.

thing, losers were more likely to have held office above riding level. 11

Success is related to whether or not there was a contest for nomination but the relationship does not show up in a straight winner-loser comparison. Losers were slightly more likely to have had a contested nomination; 12 this relationship disappears, however, when we account for incumbency. Only one incumbent—a winner—reported a contested nomination; 14 of 17 non-incumbent winners were selected after contests.

Table 4a is a demonstration of the ubiquitous party variable, this time showing a relationship with whether or not non-incumbent nominations were contested. This result, however, would seem to have been related to the relative chance of success a candidate could expect running as a Liberal, a Conservative, or an N.D.P. candidate. We might expect then, a greater likelihood of competition for more hopeful candidacies. A continuance of our digression from winner-loser differences will enable us to test this.

One question asked candidates whether they recalled thinking at the time of nomination their chances had been good, fair, or poor. (A recall question subject to the possibility that some winners would wish to claim they had had a harder

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 3 (Column 19)
Kornberg noted a high frequency of party office experience for M.P.s from all parties in the 25th Parliament. Op. cit., p.54.

¹² Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 4(a) (Column 20).

TABLE 4a: Party and Contest for Nomination-Non-Incumbent Respondents

Nomination was:

Party:	Contested	Not Contested	Total
Liberal	2 6	5	31
Conservative	28	17	45
N.D.P.	17	34	51
	71	33	127 ^a

^aWhether or not nomination was contested was uncertain in 4 cases.

time winning than in fact, some losers to claim they had known all along their situation was hopeless.) 31 of 42 candidates who had rated their chances as being good had obtained their candidacies as a result of contested nominations while 33 of 49 who recalled thinking their chances poor had uncontested nominations. Table 4b shows the relationship between this subjective estimation of chances and contest for nomination. As can be seen in the table the party relationship still holds. However, the results are given in percentage form and for all parties the percentage of those who rated their chances as having been good is greater if the nomination had been contested; conversely, the percentage of those who expected poor results is greater if there was no contest. 13

¹³This would seem to confirm the findings of Kornberg and others that the stronger a party's competitive position in a constituency is, the more attractive a candidacy will be. Kornberg found this in his sample of MPs from the 25th Parliament. Op. cit., p. 70.

TABLE 4b: Contest for Nomination and Subjective Estimation of Chances at the Time of Nomination-Non-Incumbents by Party

Subjective Chances

Nomination	Good	Fair	Poor	Total
Liberals Contested Not contested	58 20	38 20	4 60	100% (N = 26) 100% (N = 5)
Conservatives Contested Not Contested	46 31	42 44	12 25	100% (N = 28) 100% (N = 17)
New Democratic Party Contested Not Contested	24 14	18 7	59 79	$101\%^{a}$ (N = 17) 100% (N = 34)

aRounding error.

(The format--100% adds to the right--was chosen for layout reasons.)

The Campaign

For whatever reasons--realism, rationalization--losing candidates were inclined to report their chances at the time of nomination as having been poor. This would logically seem to be connected with further differences reported between winners and losers in their experiences during the campaign with party organization, constituency situations, etc.

Some differences were reported in situations which, during the campaign, would have to have affected a candidate's chances. Constituency and party organization differences were as might have been expected. Winners generally felt their local organizations were stronger. (See Table 5) Only losers reported that their constituencies were not competitive. To some extent

"rationalization." That very few winners felt their constituencies were "safe", i.e. not competitive, may be a matter of realism. In only six constituencies did all losing candidates lose their deposits. 15

TABLE 5: Winners and Losers and Strength of Party Organization

Party Organization:	Winners	Losers
"Very Strong", "Strong"	8 <i>5</i> %	35%
"Not So Strong", "Weak"	15	65
		Military of Their
	(N=39)	(N=117)

On another question—asking candidates if they recalled feeling, at some time during the campaign, that they had made progress—there was no difference; most winners and most losers reported that they had felt this was true. ¹⁶ There was, however, a considerable difference in their answers to a question

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W21, L23. On the concept of rationalization see Kingdon, op.cit., p. 22-25, 30-33.

¹⁵ In Ottawa East, Eglinton, Rosedale, Spadina, Trinity, and York-Scarborough, none of the losing candidates were able to poll 50% of the vote of the winner. Only two of the M.P.s of these constituencies (Richard from Ottawa East and Stanbury from York-Scarborough) are included in the sample.

¹⁶ Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 6 (Column 24).

asking for the source of this impression (Table 6). Gaining such an impression from the national campaign (possibly as reported in the press) would seem to have been reasonable for the Liberal winners. The apparent non-attention by winners to party workers may be good sense. 17 The press does not seem to have been relied on by anybody; yet it may be that at least in the case of the "national campaign" impression the press was responsible.

TABLE 6: Winners and Losers and Source of Impression that Chances had Improved

Source:	Winners	Losers
"Personal impression"	55%	41%
"Party workers' information"	o	36
"National campaign"	45	17
"Press"	<u> </u>	_6_
•	(N=20)	(N=64)

A number of questions dealt with campaign activity and tactics. Winners more often reported having made a greater effort than their opponents and generally reported working more hours per day during the campaign than losers. 18 One tactic

¹⁷ See Kingdon, op. cit., p. 93-95. His winning candidates frequently mentioned the importance of not paying much attention to party workers' reports.

¹⁸ Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 8 (Columns 27-28) See Table 11 below.

which winners emphasized more than losers was to develop a personal image. (Table 7) (23 winners felt a personal following is more important in assuring success than party loyalty; 13 felt otherwise. 19)

TABLE 7: Winners and Losers and the Importance of Developing a Personal Image

Developing a Personal Image	Winners	Losers
Very important	49%	28%
Important	2 8	34
Not very important	23	38
•	(N=39)	(N=118)

Political Men

Two final considerations of differences between winners and losers are motivation (Why be a candidate?) and, related to that, ideology (here limited to beliefs about their own and other parties). Many of the findings in these areas are very closely related to party differences. For instance, candidates were asked whether they more often felt they agreed or disagreed with their constituents with respect to five issue areas: civil rights, welfare, extent of government regulation of the economy, national unity, international issues—whatever differences were

¹⁹Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W26.

found usually break down into party differences. 20

Many of the differences in expressed motivation for seeking nomination or for involvement in politics have to be considered in the light of possible platitudinizing on the part of M.P.s and the rationalization effect among defeated candidates. Winners more often emphasized the importance of citizenship and public service; losers (rationalizing, perhaps) more often stated they considered the experience of campaigning important in itself.²¹ In two ways, losers (some of them) would seem to have been perhaps more "political": they were more likely to have considered important the focussing of attention on an issue (Table 8) and helping their party (Table 9). Rationalization must be considered in interpreting these re-Both motives could be considered, however, as legitimate reasons why a person would be willing to be a losing candidate. For N.D.P. candidates in hopeless contests, for instance, "helping my party" would be an obviously important reason for running.

²⁰These differences will be reported in a later chapter.

²¹ These can all be found in the Appendix: Questionnaire, Questions W12, L14 and W13, L15.

This is one of the main points Kingdon makes about rationalization. His losers felt the issues were important but ignored by the poorly educated, disinterested public. Op. cit., p. 22-23.

TABLE 8: Winners and Losers and the Importance of Focusing Attention on Issues

issues is: Very Important, Important	Winners 15%	Losers 41%
Not Very Important	85	59
·	(N=39)	(N=119)

TABLE 9: Winners and Losers and the Importance of Helping the Party

Helping one's party is:	Winners	Losers
Very important	24%	35%
Important	39	44
Not very important	37	21
	Contract to the same of	
	(N=38)	(N=118)

Perhaps more revealing than these results are the differences between winners and losers in the principal agency of recruitment they reported. A considerably greater proportion of winners than losers reported "self" rather than "party" or "friends and/or associates", as their recruiting "agent". (Table 10) Along with the contested nomination relationship,

we could interpret this as indicating a connection between ambition and success.

TABLE 10: Winners and Losers and Principal Recruiting Agent

Principal recruiting agent:	Winners	Losers
Self	46%	30%
Party	2 6	32
Friends and/or associates	28	38
		(************************************
	(N=39)	(N=115)

Significance (Self vs. Other recruiting agent)

In their views of the party system (of Canada, of Ontario, or of Ontario at the federal level) winners and losers did not differ notably. When asked to suggest criticisms of their own party, winners (mostly, remember, Liberals) more often selected too much emphasis on image. 23 Generally, the pattern of responses to questions asking which parties are closer, which party other than their own they most sympathized with, etc., can be as well or better interpreted with "party" as the independent variable. 24

One question on which differences were found asked whether or not as campaigners they had paid special attention to any specific groups. Winners were more likely to say they

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W19, L21.

Views of the party system by respondents are considered in a later chapter.

they had not.²⁵ As mentioned above, the differences in other questions with respect of "ideology" can probably be better explained by party variation. Still, it might be suggested, generally, that winners are less likely to be ideologues than losers.²⁶ (Even here, the party pattern interferes. The unsuccessful N.D.P., as we shall see, seems to have considerably more ideologues.)

Success as a Variable

While there are differences between winners and losers, the similarities between the set of winners and the set of Liberals, and winners and the set of losing Liberals²⁷ would seem to indicate that other variables have more "predictive" value for this study. (In many cases, party works as an independent variable.) Chance of success (perceived hope of winning) in some cases may be more valuable than success. This was seen in the relationship between estimated chances of winning and whether or not the nomination was contested. (Table 4b) However, our survey of winners and losers has indicated some

²⁵ Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W24, L26.

Froman, op. cit., p. 13-15 notes a tendency for candidates of losing parties in non-competitive constituencies to be ideologues.

²⁷The necessity of using different arrays of the population can be seen by comparing the size of the subsets established by two criteria, party and winner-loser. From largest to smallest, the subsets are:

^{1.} Losing N.D.P. -52 4. Losing Liberal -17

^{2.} Losing Conservative-50 5. Winning Conservative- 5
3. Winning Liberal -32 6. Winning N.D.P. - 2

of the scope of the questionnaire and limitations of the data.

Theoretical Considerations

The summary of differences between winners and losers serves as a preview of the findings of the survey. Some of the limitations of the questionnaire over and above limitations due to response rates and resulting distortions of the sample should be considered.

The intent of the questionnaire had been to obtain information on topics like campaign activity, motivation, recruitment. Probably what the data has to offer is more interesting with respect to parties (at least the Ontario federal party system). Some points can be made on the other considerations, but for various reasons—inadequately operationalized concepts and questions not really suitable for <u>mailed</u> questionnaires are perhaps most important—the data did not live up to hopes.

of hypotheses were being considered and there was, at least, a "conceptual framework" for the study. There was not an integrated theory. I think I could present one now and will outline it at the end of this section. However, this was certainly nebulous at the time this questionnaire was constructed and mailed. As a result, there have been a number of problems.

1. The basic concept employed in "measuring" motivation was amateurism-professionalism, based on James Q. Wilson's The Amateur Democrat.²⁸ It was hoped that some sort of scale could be developed to determine "amateurs" and "professionals". (The search for such a scale represents the largest investment of time in data analysis.) A better operationalization of the concept might have employed an additive index.²⁹ Any scales (or pseudo-scales), produced no relationships in line with the hypotheses derived from Wilson's meaning of amateurism. One scale was discovered which was of interest but does not seem to measure the concept originally intended for use in the study. It rather seems to measure something like degree of political-ness and is described in Chapter Four.

2. It had been hoped to develop good measures of campaign activity to enable comparison of candidates. The best answered question was one which asked for a subjective comparison of effort on the part of the respondents. (Table 11). We can expect some exaggeration perhaps (self-justification) and we must remember that the question merely calls for a subjective impression which was itself based on recall.

Other questions asked candidates to estimate the number of hours per day they had worked during the campaign and the number of constituents they met with. Hours worked

²⁸ Op. cit.

²⁹See, for example, John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention", American Political Science Review, Vol. 44 (Sept. 1970), p. 890-891.

TABLE 11: Winners and Losers and Subjective Comparison of Effort

During campaign, worked:	Winners	Losers
More than opponents	55%	34%
About the same as hardest- working opponent	40	50
Not as much as one or more opponents	5.	, 16
	(N=38)	(N=117)

showed very few differences between various groupings of candidates. The answers to the other question could not even be coded, it was so variously answered--percentages, "thousands", small numbers from obviously busy candidates, etc. So, the data contain indicators of the extent of campaign activity by respondents, but that's all.

There are also some indicators of the nature of campaign activity, at least of what candidates believe in this direction—tactics they would emphasize, things they feel they must do or not do because of the way they view their constituency—but nothing was ascertained of specific <u>practices</u> the candidates employed or emphasized which would tie in with their beliefs about campaign activity.

3. It had been hoped to develop a new concept, called perhaps "subjective constituency". The idea was that some candidates would have campaigned in something not quite like the actual constituency with its geographical boundaries and

voters' list. Perhaps they were only interested in a specific group or area within the electoral district. Or perhaps they might have campaigned as if they were running in a constituency more like one their party does well in (or theoretically should do well in). The "subjective constituency" idea was not based on some idea of mis-perception by the candidates; it was more a motivational consideration. It was considered that candidates may have known very well what they were doing but their objectives were different from just winning.

There were some findings regarding candidates' perceptions of their constituency and beliefs about campaigning³¹
--again rough indicators; the concept was inadequately defined.

4. There were a number of hypotheses to be tested by the questionnaire results. Something can be said about some which related to campaign activity and the subjective constituency concept. However, most of the hypotheses were related to the amateurism-professionalism concept and could not very well be tested, although some things can be said about motivation. 32

³⁰ Often candidates may be forced to limit their appeals, at least ideologically. See Froman, op. cit., p. 13-14.

³¹Appendix: Questionnaire, Questions W21, L23 to W29, L31.

³²The hypotheses which preceded data collection are given in Appendix D.

Beyond the findings which relate to the hypotheses, of course, the questionnaire discovered a number of things about party, some of which will be reported. And one other variable was found to be very important—occupation. Some of these findings (which may considered to be related to recruitment) will be reported.

A Theory Too Late

A theory (or model)³³ may now (<u>post facto</u>) be suggested. The central variable might be considered as campaign activity (a political variable) which will be related in turn to candidate (psychosocial variable) and constituency (ecological variable). Campaign activity almost certainly has to be a


Figure la Candidate Constituency
Campaign
Activity

dependent variable. Candidate and constituency may be viewed as interdependent: certain types of candidate may choose certain types of constituency and certain types of candidate may come from certain types of constituency.


For purposes of elaborating the theory, the first step is to conceive of campaign activity being in the middle, some-

³³What is outlined here is certainly a low-level theory. Therefore, some people might prefer to use the word "model", as "theory" is sometimes treated as synonymous with "general theory".

thing to be got at from two different directions.




Now then, to elaborate the variables. Candidate we can look at from two different points of view, social background and motivation. (Social background might be dealt with in terms of occupation; motivation might be operationalized as some measure of "amateur vs. professional." At present, let us just deal with the more nebulous variables.) This relationship might work as in Figure 2.



Next, to deal with constituency. Here, some measure perhaps of past history of competitiveness or party record in the constituency might be used to establish the objective nature of the constituency. Then we define our variable "subjective constituency" which we might establish from the candidate's perception of his constituency and of his party's appeal. (The difficulty in operationalizing this concept is in avoiding circular logic. We want to find determinents of campaign activity and there would be a temptation to use stated campaign objectives to measure both "nature" of campaign activity and subjective constituency).

Figure 3




We are now beginning to bring in more "internal" or subjective measures. The theory has no value if we do not gain substantially from the predictive value of our more "uncontaminated" variables, social background and objective constituency (competitiveness). At this point some of the relative strengths of the relationships should be suggested. Leaving out campaign activity (as yet undefined), the following is suggested.

- 1. Motivation-Subjective Constituency will be more strongly associated than Motivation-Objective Constituency.
- 2. Social Background-Objective Constituency will be more strongly associated than Social Background-Subjective Constituency. (Less certain)

Campaign activity can refer to two things (as has already been suggested) -- extent and nature. We can refer to one as campaign <u>effort</u> (not so easily determined, as we have seen); the other we might call campaign <u>style</u>--for this it may only be possible to suggest variations by a number of indicators. The relationship might now show as follows.

Figure 4



Which variables would associate more with campaign effort and which with campaign style are uncertain; at present, it is suggested that motivation and subjective constituency will be more associated with style than effort.

It is suspected that testing of this theory would destroy the neat symmetry of Figure 4. For one thing there will be some associations between variables on the left and on the right. In addition, one other very important variable is expected to affect relationship—political experience, particularly campaign experience. The theory might be tested first by limiting study to first-time candidates.

Some hypotheses about campaign activity might be stated as:

- 1. Motivation will be a better predictor than social background.
- 2. Motivation will be more highly associated with campaign style than effort.
- 3. Subjective constituency will be a better predictor than objective constituency.
- 4. Subjective constituency will be more highly associated with campaign style than effort.

All of the variables can be operationalized. There

are alternative choices for motivation. "Subjective constituency" will present some difficulties. It has been suggested that unless these add substantially to the predictive value of the more objective measures—which might be occupation and constituency competitiveness—the theory will have no value. Unless good "measures" of motivation and subjective constituency are discovered the above hypotheses would not hold, anyway.

This excursus goes beyond the data but represents a discovery from the data analysis -- mainly the failures. We will now concern ourselves with what has been found in the data.

CHAPTER III

PARTY AS A VARIABLE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CANDIDATES; CANDIDATES

PERCEPTIONS OF THE ONTARIO PARTY SYSTEM AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

Before the June 25, 1968 Canadian federal election there were changes in the leadership of the two major parties and there was a redistribution and redistricting. The leadership changes, especially in the Liberal Party whose new leader became Prime Minister shortly before the election, had a considerable effect on the Ontario campaigning. The results of the election may have affected the distribution of our sample into winner and loser groups and in the types of candidates for each party found in these groups. This division may also have been affected by redistribution. Redistribution also

Usually referred to as "Trudeaumania", a nebulous concept but undoubtedly important. See J. Murray Beck, "Trudeau: His Image Has Everything", from Pendulum of Power, in Inside World Politics, Diane P. Rogers and Robert J. Clark, eds. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), p. 119-121. Stanfield, the P.C. leader definitely suffered by comparison—at least in his treatment by the media. T. C. Douglas continued as N.D.P. leader until after the election. In attached comments on the questionnaire many Conservatives and some New Democrats referred to Trudeaumania with such comments as "I consider Mr. Trudeau defeated me, not the local candidate" (Conservative) and "My successful Liberal opponent, I like to think, was elected by Trudeaumania." (New Democrat)

Professor Lyons analyzed the results of the 1968 election for Ontario, accounting for changes from 1965 on two bases: first, changes in seats due to redistribution and redistricting; second, changes due to "Other factors" such as Trudeaumania. He calculated that the 14 Liberals gains were equally due to both; 6 of 8 Conservative losses were due to

limited comparison of election results. Table A compares 1965 and 1968 federal election results for Ontario.

Table A 1965 and 1968 Election Results in Ontario

	1965	1968
Liberals	51 ^a	64
Conservatives	25	17
New Democrats	9	6
Independent	_0	<u> 1</u> a
	85	88 ^b

^aSpeaker Lucien Lamoureux ran as a Liberal in 1965, Independent in 1968.

bAs a result of the Electoral Boundaries Commissions Act of 1964 Ontario received an increase of 3 House of Commons seats.

The data allow some observations to be made about the parties by comparing the candidates of each and their responses to questions dealing with reasons for being involved in politics and for becoming candidates, with campaign tactics emphasized, and (rather superficially) with ideology. In addition, there are some possible considerations of the (federal, at least) party system (in Ontario, at least) from the respondents' views of their own and other parties.

constituency changes; the N.D.P. would have lost 5 seats if it hadn't been for redistribution, instead of their actual loss of 3 seats. One Man-One Vote (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970) p. 93-94.

42

Motivation of Candidates

The questions on involvement in politics, on candidacy, on campaign tactics, and on ideology may be related to (and were intended to deal to some extent with) motivation.

We can summarize the differences between candidates of different parties in their responses to these questions and attempt a rudimentary profile of typical candidates of the three parties—a suggestion of some basic differences.

1. Politics -- Tables la and lb show differences between the three parties in two "reasons people enjoy politics". There is statistical significance in the difference between New Domocratic Party candidates' responses and the responses of candidates of the other parties. N.D.P. candidates were less likely to emphasize "Satisfaction of fulfilling my duty as a citizen" and more likely to emphasize "Helping my party".

Note, however, that the Conservatives, while being closer to the Liberals, occupy a position between the extremes --which, as we shall see, is often the case in questions dealing with motivation. The order follows the success pattern of the parties and could, therefore, indicate that the congratulation-rationalization effect is operative. The suc-

See Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W13, L15. Much of this question was useless. On several items, differences between party groups of candidates were slight or negligable, e.g., "Furthering my political ambitions". Very few candidates of any party said they considered important "Being close to influential people" and almost none "Making business contacts."

Kingdon develops the concept of the "congratulation-rationalization effect" which deals with beliefs about voters

cessful parties might be expected to emphasize citizenship; what they do is for the good of the people. On the other hand, an N.D.P. candidate might be expected to use "Helping my party" as a rationalization, doing (he would reason) as well as could be expected for a candidate of that party.

TABLE la: Party and Citizenship Satisfaction as a Reason for Enjoying Politics

"Satisfaction of ful-	Party		
filling my duty as a citizen is:	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not very important	35%	44%	67%
Very important	65	56	33
	-	*****	
	(N=48)	(N-54)	(N=54)

TABLE 1b: Party and Party Work as a Reason for Enjoying Politics

"Helping my party" is:	Party <u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not very important	79%	72%	54%
Very important	21	28	46
	$(\overline{N=47})$	$(\overline{N=54})$	$(\overline{N=54})$

held by winning and losing candidates, respectively. (Kingdon, op. cit., p. 31-33). Kingdon says "election outcome could play a part in structuring the cognitive world of the politician." (p. 14). I do not think it necessary to go that far; without intending to put candidates in my sample down, it would seem possible to me that the rationalization-congratulation effect need not require altered cognition.

2. Candidacy -- Party differences in importance of various "circumstances when you decided to seek nomination for M.P.?" are mainly between N.D.P. and other candidates. These differences are shown in Tables 2a to 2d. A difference between Liberal candidates and others is shown in Table 2e. (In addition, the Liberals are usually at the opposite extreme to the N.D.P. in the other responses.)

TABLE 2a: Party and Skills and Experience of Candidate as a Reason for Seeking Nomination

"You had skills and	Party		
experience you wished to use:"	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not important	12%	28%	41%
Important	88	72	59
		Wallington Colonials	
	(N=49)	(N=55)	(N=54)

N.D.P. candidates were more likely to state they had considered important "You were interested in the experience of campaigning--in itself" (although much of this difference can be explained by their lack of success) and "You were com-

⁵Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W12, L14. There is some overlap of items in this question, therefore, some repetition may be possible.

mitted to your party's ideals" (Tables 2b, 2c). Less important to them than to candidates of other parties were "You had skills and experience you wanted to use" and "You were seeking an opportunity for public service" (Tables 2a, 2d). The responses of N.D.P. candidates would seem to indicate more of a "politics for the sake of politics" orientation as opposed to other candidates whose involvement may have been more "politics for something else".

TABLE 2b: Party and the Experience of Campaigning Itself as a Reason for Seeking Nomination

10.77 m	Party		
"You were interested in the experience of cam- paigningin itself."	<u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not very important	86%	75%	59%
Important	14	25	41

	(N=49)	(N=55)	(N=54)

Both of these responses could be considered examples of rationalization. I would consider this to be especially the case with the former; on the other hand Kingdon reports that party tends to be upgraded in importance by losers. (Op. cit., p. 22, 24).

⁷ Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, Wilson, op. cit., p. 3, 4. These differences might seem to "identify" amateurs by Wilson's criteria. The problem is that the opposite responses would not seem to categorize professionals, except insofar as marking ("important" or) "very important" in response to "You were seeking an opportunity for public service" indicates a desire for rewards other than participation itself-perhaps recognition.

Candidates of other parties, conversely, were more likely to state they had considered important public service and the skills/experience they had to offer, Liberals moreso than Conservatives. In the case of "public service" this could be due to M.P. responses—all five Conservative M.P.s emphasized public service; however, neither N.D.P. winner did. Few candidates of any party emphasized focussing attention on an issue (Table 2e, only 28 respondents considered this "Very important"); Liberals were even less likely to consider this important.

It is possible that these responses indicate some greater degree of "amateurism" among N.D.P. and some greater degree of "professionalism" among Liberal candidates in the 1968 election. They do not exactly give us Wilson's criteria, but they are similar.

TABLE 2c: Party and the Importance of Party Ideals as a Reason for Seeking Nomination

97	Party		
"You were committed to your party's ideals."	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not important	28%	31%	7%
Important	72	69	93
			Tildage No.
	(N=49)	(N=55)	(N=54)

TABLE 2d: Party and Public Service as a Reason for Seeking Nomination

"You were seeking an	Party		
opportunity for public service."	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Not important	20%	31%	48%
Important	80	69	52
	-	-	
	(N=49)	(N=55)	(N=54)

TABLE 2e: Party and Focussing Attention on an Issue as a Reason for Seeking Nomination

HVen wished to form	Party			
"You wished to focus attention on an issue."	Liberal	<u>Conservative</u>	N.D.P.	
Not important	78%	58%	60%	
Important	22	42	40	
	(N=49)	(N=53)	(N=53)	

3. Campaigning -- Party differences in "things a party candidate might emphasize during an election campaign." are mainly between N.D.P. and other-party candidates and may indicate a degree of irrationality on the part of the New Democrats. In particular, they de-emphasize the personal aspect of electioneering, which is probably very important. They

⁸Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W15, L17.

are less likely than others to consider important both the party leader's image (Table 3a) and their own personal image (Table 3c). Table 3a shows that Conservatives especially emphasized building confidence in party leaders; this might be considered consistent with what happened in the election. Slightly more N.D.P. respondents emphasized building party identification; the significant difference here is that Liberals are less likely to emphasize this, possibly because they do not need to.

TABLE 3a: Party and Building Confidence in Party Leaders as a Campaign Emphasis

	Party			
"Build confidence in party leaders" is:	<u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	N.D.P.	
Not very important	66%	42%	76%	
Very important	34	58	24	
	(N=50)	(N=53)	(N=49)	

In addition N.D.P. candidates differed slightly in considering important "Educate the voters on public issues" and unimportant "Help build party organization". These responses might indicate a certain lack of wisdom on the part of N.D.P. candidates. Candidates names appeared on ballots; party labels did not (before 1972). Party organization—building might be a more promising direction of building for

the future than educating voters on public issues.9

TABLE 3b: Party and Building Party Identification as a Campaign Emphasis

"Help build voter loyalty to your party"	Party			
	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.	
Not important	33%	19%	15%	
Important	67	81	85	
		مسامر جياسيانيون		
	(N=49)	(N=52)	(N=53)	

TABLE 3c: Party and Developing a Personal Image as a Campaign Emphasis

Party			
Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.	
55%	52%	92%	
45	48	8	
(N=49)	(N=52)	(N=53)	
	<u>Liberal</u> 55% 45	Liberal Conservative 55% 52% 45 48	

Another question on the questionnaire asked candidates
"Did you feel that you had to play down certain aspects of your

Perhaps N.D.P. candidates assume their party already has a strong organization. But this certainly cannot be true of many constituencies and finances, a notorious N.D.P. weakness, are surely an aspect of organization.

party's platform or record?" N.D.P. candidates reported considerably less need to do this (Table 3d), despite the fact that some of them reported difficulties with the word "socialism". Perhaps the N.D.P. candidates either are ideologues or do not consider their party to be socialist, at least not to the extent that the actual platform need be downplayed.

TABLE 3d: N.D.P. Losing Candidates Were Less
Likely to Feel they had to Play Down
the Party's Record or Platform

"Did you feel that you had to play down cer- tain aspects of your	Party (losing candidates only)		
party's platform or record?"	Liberal	<u>Conservative</u>	N.D.P.
Yes	44%	43%	15%
No	56	57	85

	(N=18)	(N=46)	(N=52)

4. Ideology — This brings us to the question of ideology.

While this was not explored directly, some suggestions can be gained from a question asking candidates how they perceived their own views on specific issues related to the voters views. 12 In light of Table 3d the results might be considered surprising.

¹⁰ Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W25, L27.

¹¹ One candidate's comment: "Constituents fear certain words, i.e., Socialism."

¹² Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W28, L30.

N.D.P. candidates showed a significant difference in stating they thought they disagreed with a majority of their constituents on "Extent of government regulation of the economy" and "International Issues" (Tables 4a, 4b).

TABLE 4a: Party and Perceived Agreement or Disagreement with Constituents on Government Regulation of the Economy

	Party		
Agree with constituents?	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Yes	67%	63%	29%
No	33	37	71
	## ***********************************	4-1-1-1-1-1	-
	(N=46)	(N=52)	(N=52)

The question was: "Do you feel that the majority of your constituents would agree with you on extent of government regulation of the economy?"

TABLE 4b: Party and Perceived Agreement or Disagreement with Constituents on International Issues

	Party		
Agree with constituentsa	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
Yes	88%	76%	43%
No	12	24	57
	(N=42)	(N=49)	(N=49)

The question was: "Do you feel that the majority of your constituents would agree with you on international issues?"

In addition, they were slightly less likely to say they played down issues in which they were (or thought they were) in disagreement with their constituents. (Table 4c). The N.D.P. candidates might again be considered irrational in this respect. However, what is more likely is that at least some of them could be classed as "ideologues" in the motivation for political involvement to the extent of running for office (and being willing to lose) and therefore would not be expected to behave "rationally" in order to get elected (especially if there was little chance of getting elected in the first place).

TABLE 4c: Party and Playing Down of Issues when in Disagreement with Constituents

Play down disagreementa	Party <u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	N.D.P.
Consistently, to some extent	58%	57%	51%
Not at all	42	43	49
		and the same of th	
	(N = 45)	(N=51)	(N=53)

The question was: "Do you tend to play down issues where you might be in disagreement with your constituents?"

Profiles 13

1. Liberal candidates. Perhaps more "professional" (skills/experience), they are certainly aware that their's is the

Table 5 summarizes the material from Table la to

TABLE 5: Summary of Party Differences (Candidates Motivations-Indicators)

Only significant differences are reported; table references are given in brackets.^a

1. Reasons en- joy politics *(W13, L15)	Liberals	Conservatives	N.D.P. less citizenship (la) more helping party (lb)
2. Reasons sought nomina- tion *(W12, L14)	more skills /experience (2a) more public service (2d less focus- sing attent on an issue (2e)	.) :ion	less skills/ experience (2a) more experience of campaigning (2b) more party ideals (2c) less public service (2d)
3. Campaign tactics*(W15, L17)	less voter- party loyalty (3b	build con-	less personal image (3c) more play down aspects of party (3d)
4. Ideology(?) *(W28, L30)			more disagree- ment with cons- tituents on: extent of gover- nment regulation of the economy (4a) international issues (4b)

^aSee Table 3, p. 20 on the meaning of "significance".

^{*}Questions--see Appendix

successful party and hence are not in politics for ideological reasons or impersonal (sacrifice?) reasons like "focussing attention on an issue". They do mention a tendency to seek "opportunity for public service".

- 2. Conservatives. Perhaps there is a tendency for Conservatives to have an elite view of being somewhat "above politics". They are concerned with their party's relative chance of success which they impute to failure to put across a positive image of their national party leader.
- 3. New Democratic Party: Most N.D.P. candidates expected to be losing candidates. They may be more "amateur"; they are more ideological; definitely more party-oriented; they do not refer to citizenship or public-service motives.

Perceptions of the Party System

The fact that most of the statistically significant differences in motivations were between N.D.P. candidates and "others" in our sample is consistent with some findings about perceptions of the Ontario party system at the federal level. Respondents were asked a number of questions about their own and other parties.

Most candidates were willing to specify which two of the three parties they thought closer (in ideas or appeal).

^{14&}quot;Offer yourself once and that is it." as one candidate put it. Others stressed the sacrifice or else the community perspective: "During the campaign I re-acquainted myself with the individuals who make up our community--I am a richer person on this account."

In the whole sample, 90 thought Liberals and Conservatives closer, 48 Liberals and the N.D.P., 17 Conservatives and the N.D.P.--reflecting the Liberals' position as a "centre" party, but perhaps indicating more a "centre-right" position. Table 6 shows that while Liberals and Conservatives split about equally as to whether Liberals and Conservatives or Liberals and N.D.P. (slightly more favouring Liberals and Conservatives) were closer, by far the most N.D.P. candidates believed the Liberals and Conservatives to be closer in "ideas and appeal".

TABLE 6: Closest Parties

"Which two parties are closest?"	Party <u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	N.D.P.
Liberal/Conservative	48%	51%	74%
Conservative/N.D.P.	6	13	13
Liberal/N.D.P.	46	36	13
	·	Vacilities (**)	
	(N=48)	(N=53)	(N=54)

The responses to the next question on the Questionnaire would seem to support the N.D.P. candidates' beliefs in this regard. Very few Conservatives or Liberals expressed sympathy for the N.D.P.; the inclination was to state a liking for the other "major" (or "old-line") party, at least in preference to the N.D.P. (Table 7). Many N.D.P. candidates refused to express a liking for either other party; those who did seemed

to prefer the Conservatives. 15

TABLE 7: Party Sympathized With (Ns given in cells)

"Which other party do you like?"	Party	Party				
	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.	Totals		
Liberal	ees éru	38	13	51		
Conservative	28		26	54		
N.D.P.	9	11		20		

	37	49	39	125		

When the candidates were asked to <u>specify</u> things they liked or admired about the other parties, they found it considerably more difficult (Table 8). Interestingly, many of the N.D.P. candidates found it difficult to say anything about the Conservatives, the party they were more likely to sympathize with. Perhaps for the obvious reason that they were the ones to beat, the Liberals were more salient.

¹⁵ It would be interesting to know why. A number of possibilities suggest themselves for speculation. In many respects there are greater similarities between Conservatives and New Democrats in the sample (religion, ethnicity). Also, in respect to certain issues, such as nationalism, there may be a greater ideological congruence. (Or philosophical, one N.D.P. candidate specifically mentioned George Grant's Lament for a Nation and Technology and Empire on his questionnaire.) One explanation might simply be that the Liberals are regarded by many New Democrats as the "enemy" (Table 8 shows that Liberal opponents had greater salience for N.D.P. candidates than Conservatives.)

TABLE 8: Qualities Ascribed to Other Parties (Ns in cells)

Quality:	<u>Liberals</u> Conservatives	Credit	Liberals credited with
Good organization Represent important	3	21	<u>49</u>
interest, Good candidates	15	3	19 10
Clear Programme	4	3 5 2 2	0
Responsibility	4	2	2
•	Conservat credit	·	Conservatives credited
Quality:	Liberals	N.D.P.	with
Good organization Represent important	20	<u>24</u>	10
interest	11	1	<u>20</u> <u>14</u>
Good candidates Clear programme	7 0	4 6 2	<u> </u>
Responsibility	2	2	<u>13</u>
	•		New
		Democrats edit	Democrats credited
Quality:	Liberals	Conservative	
Good organization Represent important	<u>29</u>	7	45
interest	8	5	4
Good candidates Clear Programme	8 3 0	5 5 0 9	4 9 <u>8</u>
Responsibility	0	2	4

Both the Liberals and the N.D.P. received most credit for their organization. The Conservatives were credited (in order) with representing important interests, recruiting good candidates and "responsibility". The Liberals also received credit for representing important interests. The N.D.P. was the only party credited at all for "Provides a clear programme for the people to consider" and only eight Liberal and Conservative candidates credited them for this. This would seem to indicate that "programme" is not particularly important to active politicians like candidates—not as important as party organization or opposing candidates.

Table 9 reports the criticisms of their own parties suggested by all candidates. Table 10 gives the strategies suggested by losing candidates for improvement of the party's performance in subsequent elections. Generally, the criticisms and suggestions would seem reasonable given the results of the election and some of the discussion of causes. 16

Most salient to all candidates would seem to be some consideration of "groups"--to which the party does not appeal or does not appeal strongly enough. Froman suggests that a candidate should concentrate first on supporters of the party, next on possible ("latent") supporters, then on opponents. 17

¹⁶ For example, the Conservatives' concern with leader-ship image. (Beck, loc. cit.).

^{17&}lt;sub>Froman</sub>, op. cit., p. 7

TABLE 9: Criticism of Own Party (Ns in cells)

Party

Criticism:	Liberals	Conservatives	N.D.P.
Too narrow appeal (population)	3	<u>28</u>	20
Too narrow appeal (ideas)	3	12	11
Too much emphasis on image	28	5	5
Too grandiose, lacks emphasis on fitness to govern	1 35	5 50	12 48

TABLE 10: Tactics Advocated for Party (losing candidates, Ns in cells)

Party

	Liberals	<u>Conservatives</u>	N.D.P.
Specific appeal to a group	ı	3	ı
General appeal to constituency	0	10	4
Break tradition	11	12	10
Develop existing support base	4	<u>12</u>	<u>18</u>
Convince voters of possible party success	0	5	14
	16	42	47

In terms of strategies emphasized New Democrats seem most strongly to have felt the need to appeal to supporters ("Develop even more strongly the support base the support base the party already has"), ¹⁸ Conservatives to possible supporters ("Make a more general appeal to the whole constituency"), ¹⁹ Liberals to opponents ("Break the traditional support for another party of a specific group"). ²⁰ Given the results of the election, Froman would consider these to be realistic emphases. The Liberals, who probably have the highest proportion of party-identifiers in the Ontario electorate, ²¹ can afford to concentrate on opponents. The N.D.P. candidates, often concerned with simply not losing too badly, must concentrate on turning out what supporters they have—thus the criticism that the party does not show enough "responsibility and fitness for government" and the emphasis on the need to "convince the

 $^{^{18}}$ 34.6% of the N.D.P. losing candidates to 24% of the Conservatives and 23.5% of the Liberals.

For example, one woman wrote: "The trouble with my particular party (Conservatives) is that they don't keep close contact with the whole constituency between elections. There is no educative programme for the electorate. They only organize at election time." There were other "tactics" mentioned more often by Conservative candidates; however, while 20% of Conservative losers mentioned this "whole constituency" problem, only 7.7% of the N.D.P. and none of the Liberal losers did.

For example, a Liberal two-time loser: "In both campaigns I was opposed by sitting members of considerable experience. I had majorities in both--in my own community, but failed to break the traditional P.C. nature of the other major centres...I felt the P.C. had closed minds in approaching the vote". In addition, the one defeated Liberal incumbent blamed redistricting which brought in an area of traditional Conservative support. (He also blamed Ron Gostick and the Orange Lodge.) This concern with other-party traditional support was important to some members of all parties but among losing candidates involved 64.7% of the Liberals to only 24% of the Conservatives and 19.2% of the N.D.P.

²¹ For example (just one, there are several),

voters of the feasibility of party success."22

A few other points should be noted from Table 9 and Table 10. Liberals, both M.P.s and losing candidates, felt their party put a little too much emphasis on image to the detriment of programme. Conservatives, in emphasizing the need to make a more general appeal to the whole community, were concerned about a possibly out-of-date platform and the party leadership (see also Table 3a). The New Democrats were also concerned about the failure to appeal to a broad enough spectrum of the population and possible out-of-date elements in the platform.

Also related to the candidates' perceptions of the party system, are some findings with respect to perceptions

Liberals Conservatives N.D.P. 21,764 votes 18,462 votes 3,891 votes

\$22,734 spent 15,284 spent 245 spent

Lynn McDonald, "Party Identification, Stability and Change in Voting Behaviour: A Study of the 1968 Canadian Federal Election in Ontario" in The Canadian Political Process, Orest M. Kruhlak, Richard Schultz, and Sidney I. Pobihushchy, eds. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 269-271.

N.D.P. candidates must often overcome the "wasted vote" argument: "Constituents...biggest fear...is that of losing votes." "However, these people (Catholics) will vote N.D.P. if they can see the point of doing so, whereas they will not vote Conservative."

Actually, a major concern of N.D.P. candidates is lack of money: "If you have organization (and workers) you should not have to spend more than \$12,000 on a seat. We spent \$2,000." "My budget was less than 7% of the published budget of winning candidate". And one candidate reported, for his riding:

of the future and constituency conditions.²³ N.D.P. losing candidates were, surprisingly, more optimistic about the future. (Table 11). Or, perhaps, all this result means is

TABLE 11: N.D.P. Losing Candidates are More Optimistic about their Party's Future in their Constituency

Party has:	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	N.D.P.
A lot to offer the constituency	53%	59%	73%
A poor future in the constituency	47	41	27
	(N=17)	(N=46)	(N=51)

that N.D.P. candidates were more convinced of the worth of their party--idealistically or ideologically. More N.D.P. candidates did not believe they should play down any aspect of their party's programme.

On the other hand N.D.P. candidates were more likely to say they paid special attention to specific groups or areas

²³Ideology might also be a relevant consideration; what findings there are on this are discussed elsewhere. Also socioeconomic considerations—the variations among the candidates with regard to occupation, age, religion—which might be relevant to the political sociology of Ontario, are discussed later.

²⁴A French-Canadian N.D.P. candidate: "Most of all I learn that we will have to be patient and try to explain our party better."

in their constituency (Table 12). Paying special attention to groups is probably a realistic strategy for N.D.P. canddates; campaigning "ideologically" is probably not (Table 4c). But if one believes in the "rightness" of one's ideology (your party's programme) perhaps this can be reconciled.

TABLE 12: N.D.P. Candidates were more Likely to Pay Special Attention to Specific Groups (among losing candidates)

Special Attention:	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	N.D.P.
Yes	53%	55%	76%
No	47	45	34
	·		-
	(N=17)	(N=46)	(N=50)


There may be some justification for the N.D.P.s candidates' hopefulness. A question was asked of winning candidates as to whether they felt there was a real threat of another party winning in their constituency in the near future. Seven of nine Liberals who felt so specified the N.D.P. as the threat. All N.D.P. and Conservatives who specified the threatening party named the Liberals. Perhaps if the N.D.P. becomes more competitive it will recruit different kinds of candidates or its candidates—with a greater chance of winning—will modify their campaign behaviour. Different incentives should result in different motivation and may result

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question W27 (Columns 9 and 23 on Card 2).

in different candidates. 26

Conclusions

Most of the differences discovered between candidates on the basis of the indicators of motivation derived from the questionnaire—on reasons for participating in politics and seeking nomination, campaign tactics emphasized, and perceived ideological differences with constituents—were between N.D.P. and other party candidates (see Table 5). What can be learned about the party system (of Canada or Ontario), at least as perceived by the candidates, would seem to indicate that this is reasonable. A spectrum with the three parties somewhat as in Figure 1 below would probably get agreement from most respondents.²⁷



However, the parties are perceived as being qualitatively similar in varying combinations. For example, the

For example, comparing N.D.P. provincial election slates in Alberta and Manitoba, particularly N.D.P. losers in Manitoba (provincially) in 1969 and 1973, or Liberal slates (provincially) in Alberta and Ontario and Nova Scotia could produce data to test this hypothesis. It cries for more comparative material than available to this study.

²⁷ Note the rather different "spatial" picture of Canadian politics this gives to that of Alford. Robert A. Alford,

Liberals and the N.D.P. are respected for organization, Conservatives and Liberals for quality of candidates.

Views about the future seem to be related to motivation. The view for the Liberal Party in Ontario at the
federal level looks good--they are perceived as the "team to
beat"; candidates for other parties see hope for themselves
to some extent as being bound up in becoming more like the
Liberals, (or at least their party-organization, leadership,
etc.)

Despite the outlook, it would seem that the N.D.P. will carry on. According to Clark and Wilson, ²⁸ organizations centering around material incentives will usually beat organizations built on purposive incentives which in turn wil usually beat solidary organizations. ²⁹ While all political parties (in the Canadian system, certainly) are to some extent purposive, it is certainly the Liberal Party which can offer the material incentives in Canadian national politics. ³⁰ They

Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 13.

^{28&}quot;Incentive Systems", p. 150.

^{29&}lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 150-151.

The Conservative Party can offer the material rewards at the provincial level and this contributes to the national organization as well. At least one defeated Conservative candidate in our sample was subsequently appointed to a judicial position by the provincial government.

(Clark and Wilson) suggest, however, that there may be a trend (in North America?) which will lead to more success for purposive organizations (mainly the declining appeal of the material incentives—particularly in politics, broadly defined). 31 We could describe the Liberal Party as the most material or utilitarian party, the Conservative (more doubtfully) the most solidary, the N.D.P. (more confidently) the more purposive (or programmatic). This may help our speculations about the future—with the important proviso that this conceptualization applies only to the <u>survival</u> of organizations.

^{31 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 164-165.

CHAPTER IV

MOTIVATION: CORRELATES OF CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY
AND THE SEARCH FOR TYPOLOGIES OF CANDIDATES

As stated in Chapter Two, this study was conceived as one dealing with campaign activity (behaviour) with a conceptual framework based largely on Wilson's The Amateur Democrat (motivation for the behaviour). A lot of paper (computer printout, etc.) was wasted trying to analyze the data on the basis of this conception. It did generate one chapter—this is it.

"Measuring" campaign activity proved to be very difficult (as stated in Chapter Two). There were a few findings which will be related here. In particular, we will look at certain things related to campaign effort.

This chapter also deals (peripherally) with the subject of motivation. Originally, Wilson's amateurism and professionalism was intended as the measure of motivation. A "pseudo-scale" measuring something like Wilson's concept was used to test various hypotheses. Although the index is crude, it did yield some interesting results--which are reported.

One legitimate scale was discovered in the process of searching which definitely does not measure amateurism-

professionalism and has been labelled, tentatively, a Political Ambition Scale. Using individuals' scores on this scale to cross-tabulate with various questionnaire items produced some more "interesting" results.

Finally, the chapter closes with a postscript for anyone interested in pursuing the elusive "amateur-professional"
concept.1

This is a salvage chapter. It is the result, mainly, of failure. Something was learned--at perhaps too great a price.

Campaign Effort

The questions aimed at determining <u>extent</u> of campaign activity were not particularily satisfactory. Responses to a question asking for an estimate of the number of constituents encountered during the campaign were uncodable. Perhaps not surprisingly, three-quarters of the respondents said they were satisfied with their efforts. Well should they have been if their answers to another question asking for an estimate of the

It has been used, with at least some success. See John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention" American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (1970), p. 888-898.

This material repeats some of the ground covered in Chapter 2, p. 32-33. Question 9 from the Questionnaire does not appear in the Appendix as it was not used. It asked: "Can you estimate approximately how many of your constituents you met during your campaign?" Answers included "No", "Thousands", percentages, small numbers from certainly busy candidates, and vice-versa.

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 10.

number of hours worked per day were honest. One question asked candidates to compare their efforts with their opponents efforts in the campaign. Most respondents felt they had worked as much as or more than their opponents—which would seem improbable; however, this question on comparative effort was the most useful in terms of relationships with responses to other questionnaire items and is the basis for the following material.

TABLE 1: Subjective Comparison of Effort by Party

(losing candidates)

Effort compared to opponents:	Liberal	Conservative	N.D.P.
More	47%	3 8%	27%
As much as	53	52	46
Less	0	10	27
			
	(N=17)	(N=48)	(N=49)

pared their efforts with other-party candidates. It is limited to losing candidates so that some of the full-time/part-time candidacy comparison can be eliminated. It must be considered that certainly some N.D.P. candidates, at least, ran to fulfill the party objective of having a full slate. The pattern of answers to the question on hours worked indi-

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 8.

⁵Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 7.

cates that some of the N.D.P. candidates were definitely only part-time campaigners.

Constituency conditions and candidates' perceptions of them had a considerable effect on candidate campaign activity. In some cases, considerations of recruitment have bearing here. For example, political experience was related. Those respondents who had been candidates in previous federal elections were more likely to report they had worked harder than their opponents (Table 2).

TABLE 2: Subjective Comparison of Effort by Previous Federal Candidacies (all candidates)

Effort compared	Federal	Candidacies	before	1968
to opponents:		Yes	No	
More		46%	3 <i>5%</i>	
As much as or less		54	65	
	-			
	(1	N=52)	(N=106)	

TABLE 3: Subjective Comparison of Effort by Satisfaction with Effort (losing candidates)

TIOO and a among a said	Satisfaction	n
Effort compared to opponents:	Yes	No
More	38%	16%
As much as	50	42
Less	12	42
	$(\overline{N}=95)$	$(\overline{N=24})$

A significant relationship was found between effort and satisfaction with effort (for losing candidates, Table 3). This, of course, is an obvious relationship. Interestingly, proportionately more losing candidates were satisfied with their efforts than winners were convinced that their personal efforts were a major factor in their success. As stated above, the subjective of comparison of effort should definitely be considered somewhat doubtful. The level of satisfaction with their efforts expressed by losing candidates would definitely seem to indicate the rationalization effect is applicable here. 7

A question asked respondents how they had viewed their chances of being elected on June 25, 1968 at the time of their nomination. As might be expected, their view of their chances affected their efforts. (Table 4. Of course, the question may have afforded those who had made lesser efforts a chance for retroactive excuse-making).

There was a weak relationship between the candidates' rating of their chances at the time of nomination and whether or not the nomination was contested (p<.10 but p>.05 for

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 10. Compare the versions for the winners' and losers' Questionnaires.

⁷ For a discussion of rationalization, see Chapter 2, p. 23-24.

Appendix: Questionnaire, Question 5.

all candidates), but this relationship was not as strong as

TABLE 4: Subjective Comparison of Effort by Subjective Rating of Chances at Time of Nomination (all candidates)

Teent command	Thought	Chances	Had Been:
Effort compared to opponents:	Good	Fair	Poor
More	45%	47%	27%
As much as	49	43	44
Less	6	10	29
	-		*****
	(N=63)	(N=40)	(N=52)

the relationship between party and whether or not there was a contest. Liberals and Conservatives, who were more likely to have viewed their chances as having been good or fair were more likely to have been nominated as a result of a contest than N.D.P. candidates who were more likely to have viewed their chances as having been poor. The party relationship held regardless of this subjective estimation of chances, as shown in Table 5 (limited to losing candidates as it involves merely an N.D.P./other comparison).

It might have been expected that candidates representing strong party organizations would have worked harder than their opponents. However, no significant relationship was found between candidates' ratings of their organizations as

strong or weak, and effort. A significant (though not very strong) relationship was found between strength of organization and whether or not the nomination was contested (Table 6).

TABLE 5: Contested Nomination or Not by Subjective Rating of Chances at Time of Nomination (N.D.P. and other losing candidates)

	Libera]			
	Conser	vatives	$N \cdot D$.P.
	Contested	Nomination	Contested	Nomination
Chances at time of nomination:	Yes	No	Yes	No
Good, Fair	89%	72%	42%	25%
Poor	11	28	58	75

	(N=27)	(N=36)	(N=19)	(N=32)

TABLE 6: Candidates Rating of Party Organization (Constituency) by Nomination Contested or Not

		Organization in Constituency Strong Not So Strong, Weak
Nomination was: Contested	59%	43%
Uncontested	41	57

	(N=81)	(N=75)

⁹See Appendix: Questionnaire, W22, L24. Winning candidates rated their organizations almost always as strong; most often they felt they had worked harder personally than their opponents.

clusions we can make about these findings. It would seem that campaign effort by candidates was the result of <u>personal</u> motivation. Situations where the party's chances seemed good were more likely to mean a contest for the nomination which in turn was more likely to produce a hard-working candidate. But the suggestion is that the candidates came forward in these situations; a strong organization was an inducement to attract a good (hard-working) candidate rather than to make the candidate work if he was not already inclined.

One other reflection on these findings comes from Table 5. While much of the other findings about the New Democratic Party would seem to indicate we could consider it to be a purposive organization, 10 the fact that N.D.P. nominations tended not to be contested is certainly not consistent with the political clubs studied by Wilson in The Amateur Democrat; in fact, these clubs were more likely to cause contests for Democratic Party nominations in areas where the party's chances were most unlikely. 11

"Amateurs" and "Professionals"

While the "Political Ambition" Scale shows there are differences in willingness to participate in politics even at

See Chapter 3 above, especially p. 65.

llop. cit., see especially Wilson's account of the New York amateurs (Chapter 2, p. 32-64) and the relationship between club strength and the Republicanism of club districts in Loss Angeles and New York shown in Tables 4 and 5, p. 260-261.

the candidate level, it was felt that there should still be a scale which would identify differential styles of political participation—perhaps doomed to failure as an attempt to apply an ordinal measure to a nominal concept. It was felt that perhaps "Professionals" should not really consider citizenship important, so "Satisfaction of fulfilling my duty as a citizen" was recoded giving a high score to "Not very important" and a low score to "Very important". Figure 1 shows the best scale that could be developed using this recoding. 12

"Amateurism"-"Professionalism" Scale

"P	eople enjoy politics for different				Scale	e Sco	re	
	asons. How important is each of e following reasons to you?			0	1	2	3	4
ı.	Satisfaction of fulfilling my duty as a citizen (very unimportant)	У		No	No	No	No	Yes
2.	Further my political ambition (important)			No	No	No	Yes	Yes
3.	Politics is part of my way of lift (important)	е		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
4.	Helping my party (important)			No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		N	=	12	44	58	41	3

Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.854 Coefficient of Scalability = 0.503

Figure 1

¹² Actually almost every plausible and possible scale using the items from the Questionnaire: W12,L14 to W15, L17 (a total of 26 columns) was attempted. An entire course paper was written on the assumption, at one time, that I had a valid scale of amateurism-professionalism.

The higher the score the greater the degree of "professionalism". Scale scores of 0 and 1 were taken to define "amateurs" and respondents with scores of 3 and 4 were called "professionals." Thus there are 58 amateurs and 44 professionals in our sample, with 56 in between.

Table 7 shows the distribution individual scale scores by party. All parties have slightly more amateurs than professionals. The New Democrats, with all three individuals scoring the maximum on the scale might be considered slightly more professional, but that is stretching a point.

TABLE 7: Professionalism Scale Score-Individuals in Each Party

	Scale Score				
Party:	Amateurs	Others	Profession	nals	Total
<u>.</u> .	0 1	2	3	4	
Liberals	6 14 (20)	16	14 (14)	0	50
Conservatives	5 (20) 15	20	14 (14)	0	54
N.D.P.	3 (18) 15	20	13 (16)	3	54
	<i>5</i> 8	56	44		

In terms of background characteristics, these categories are similar to Wilson's in some ways, in some ways not. There was little difference between amateurs and professionals in

occupation. The amateurs tended to be older. 13

The relationship to party politics is ambiguous. Professionals are expected to be the party people, the real organization-minded party men. 14 They may be in politics to fulfill personal ambitions but they place a greater emphasis on power and therefore are more likely to work with the party, and go along with the party, to get there. 15

Our amateurs are more likely to report party as the recruiting agent in their nomination (Table 8). In other

TABLE 8: Recruiting Agent Named by Professionals and Amateurs

Major influence in seeking nomination:	Professionals	Amateurs
Self	41%	25%
Party	24	33
Friend, Associates	35	42
	$(\overline{N=42})$	$(\overline{N=57})$

¹³Wilson does not provide much demographic data about his amateurs although he stresses that they are middle-class, often Jewish--many of them lawyers. Op. cit., Chapters 8 and 9.

These are among the findings in the one real effort to operationalize the concept. See Soule and Clarke, op. cit., p. 892-896.

¹⁵Wilson is not that specific about his professionals. He does, however, emphasize how disruptive the amateurs are of party organization and efforts. Op. cit., p. 364-370.

respects, however, they are not as much "party people" as the professionals.

Professionals are more likely to emphasize developing a personal image as a tactic for a candidate (Table 9), and are more likely to report self-agency in recruitment (Table 8); however, they were far more likely to have held party office (Table 10). This profile does seem consistent with Wilson's professional—the man in politics perhaps for personal reasons but very much a party-conscious politician.

TABLE 9: Professionals vs. Amateurs on the Importance of Developing a Personal Image

Tactic is:	Professionals	Amateurs
Not important	23%	44%
Important	77	56
	(N=44)	(N=57)

TABLE 10: Professionals and Amateurs Experience in Party Office

Offices held:	Professionals	Amateurs
No party offices	19%	38%
Local offices only	51	57
Provincial or national	30 .	5
	discounts to this process	-
	(N=43)	(N=58)

Amateurs did tend to be more ideological ("ideological" being defined as tending to disagree rather than agree with constituents on issue areas—here civil rights, welfare, government regulation of the economy, national unity, international issues). The relationship was never significant but was consistent. Amateurs were also slightly more likely to say they would not play down issues where they were in disagreement with their constituents (Table 11).

TABLE 11: Professionals vs. Amateurs on Playing Down Issues in Disagreement with Constituents

Play Down Issues:	Professionals	Amateurs
Consistently, to some extent	63%	52%
Never	37	48
		
	(N=43)	(N=54)

There was some relationship between these categories and certain recruitment-constituency variables. It has already been stated that professionals were more likely to report "Self" and amateurs "Party" as the main recruiting agent in their decision to seek nomination (Table 8). Professionals were slightly more likely to have viewed their election chances, at the time of nomination, as being good. They were also more likely to say that their party's constituency organization was strong and to say that their constituency was competitive. Especially, they believed that their party should do well in

the constituency, having substantial support among the constituents (Table 12).

TABLE 12: Professionals vs. Amateurs and Party Support in the Constituency

Party support:	Professionals	Amateurs
Definite support	72%	38%
Potential or no support	28	62
	(N=36)	(N=58)

One thing that the amateurism-professionalism dimension did not help with, was in predicting campaign effort. Professionals seemed to be slightly more "rational" in working harder where constituency support seemed more substantial (Table 13)

TABLE 13: Professionals vs. Amateurs: Hours Worked and Support for the Party in the Constituency

Party support:	Profession Hours per 0-11		Amate Hours pe 0-11	
Definite support	63%	72%	48%	29%
Potential or no suppor	t 37	28	52	71
	(N=19)	N=25)	(N=21)	(N=37)

although it might be quite consistent with the amateur philosophy to expend greater effort where there is less support (perhaps on "conversion"?)

The postscript to this chapter contains a final consi-

deration of "amateurs" and "professionals" as possibly worthwhile labels. ¹⁶ In the meantime we shall deal with a more successful scale found in the data.

Citizens vs. Politicos

In the search for an "Amateurism-Professionalism" scale, one valid scale was discovered. It has been renamed, however, the "Political Ambition" Scale because it seems to deal more with <u>degree</u> of political involvement for <u>personal</u> reasons than a particular basis for involvement in politics. The scale incorporates the same items from the question on reasons for involvement in politics as the "Amateurism-Professionalism" pseudoscale. Figure 2 shows how the scale is ordered and scored. Originally, those with scores of 0 and 1 were labelled "amateurs" and those with scores of 3 and 4 were labelled "professionals". 17

Both scales are based on the same items. The categories of Citizen and Amateur and Professional and Politico overlap; Politico and Amateur, Professional and Citizen do not.

Amateurs	Citizens 28	Politicos 0
Professionals	3	26
(Ns in cells)	

Appendix D lists the original hypotheses derived before the data was collected. Much of this section related to
these hypotheses. Most of them really cannot be considered
to have been "tested". However, something can be said about
some of them. 1, 3, 4 and 7 were not really tested. Probably
we should say Hypothesis 6 was refuted—at least insofar as
there was no difference between the categories. Hypotheses 2,
5 and 8 may have some support.

"Political Ambition" Scale

"People enjoy politics for different reasons. How impor-	Sca	le So	ore		
tant is each of the following reasons to you?"	0	1	2	3	4
1. Furthering my political ambition (very important or not)	No	No	No	No	Yes
 Politics is part of my way of life. (very important or not) 	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
3. Helping my party (important or not)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. Satisfaction of fulfilling my duty as a citizen (important or not)	No	<u>Yes</u>	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	: 12	34	67	37	8

Coefficient of Reproducibility = 0.92 Coefficient of Scalability = 0.63

*There are perhaps too few items for this to be a valid scale. It is referred to throughout this section as such, although it might be more accurately described as an additive index.

Figure 2

However, the scale did not help us to identify any particular differences in political style (certainly not in keeping with the amateur/professional distinction) although it <u>did</u> in terms of degree: those with high scores showing greater involvement, with their motivation for involvement being apparently more personal. The scale was renamed the "Political Ambition" Scale. For convenience, the 46 with low scores are called "Citizens"; the 45 with high scores, "Politicos". It should be stressed that the Politicos may indeed qualify as citizens;

¹⁸Although the high scorers (politicos) do seem to be more party-oriented (See Table 17).

however, those who are Citizens do not appear to be very much like "politicians" (certainly, party politicians)—they simply are not as involved in the process. 19

Table 14 shows Citizens and Politicos by party. The relationship is neither strong nor significant. It is opposite in direction to what had been expected from the amateurism-professionalism concept and was one of the reasons the scale was felt not to measure than concept. The table includes all respondents; the remaining relationships with the Political Ambition Scale will be limited to comparisons of the two extreme groups (N = 91).

TABLE 14: Party and "Political Ambition"

Scale Score (Ns in cells)

Party	0,1 "Citizens"	2 Others	3,4 "Politicos"
Liberal	15	23	11
Conservative	14	24	17
New Democrat	<u>17</u>	20	<u>17</u>
	46		45

¹⁹This might be tapping the underlying dimension for Barber's "Willingness to Return". See Chapter 1, p. 7: Figure 1 and footnotes. It would be interesting to see whether the elected Citizens turned out to be like Barber's Advertisers and Reluctants.

There is a slight relationship between categories on the Political Ambition Scale and occupation. Lawyers and businessmen are equally likely to Citizens or Politicos. Teachers, professors, and ministers are about twice as likely to be Citizens.

First, a check was made of possible differences between the two groups in recruitment. 21 It might have been expected that the more ambitious Politicos would have looked for better chances of getting a job (i.e., of election), would have been more likely to fight for a nomination and would more often be "self"-recruited -- these might have been expected because Politicos would be more likely to want to get themselves into politics. Little difference between the two groups was found but what was found was consistent with expectations. Similar proportions of each group had contested nominations. 22 There was a slight relationship with subjective estimation of chances at the time of nomination -- Citizens somewhat more likely to run when they felt their chances were poor. (Table 15a). Of more interest, 47% of the Politicos reported "Self" as their recruiting agent to 31% of the Citizens (Table 15b). However, the findings are not significant.

The only difference here was with those in the intermediate category (scoring 2 on the scale) who were more likely to have a contest.

Nomination Contested	Scale Score 0,1 20	(Ns in cells) 2 42	3,4 19
Not Contested	25	25	26

Success was not related to scale score. 13 of 46 Citizens were winners; 11 of 45 Politicos were winners. Each party had winners and losers in both groups; naturally, more of the winning Citizens and Politicos were Liberals (10 of 13 and 8 of 11).

TABLE 15a: Citizens and Politicos and Subjective Estimation of Chances of Election at the Time of Nomination

Recalled chances were:	Citizens	Politicos
"Good", "Fair"	55%	66%
"Poor"	45	34
	nettering areas	
	(N=44)	(N=44)

TABLE 15b: Citizens and Politicos and Recruiting Agent

Principal Recruiting Agent	Citizens	Politicos
Self	31%	48%
Party	33	25
Friends, Associates	36	27
	*****	-
	(N=45)	(N=44)

There were some differences between Citizens and Politicos in their views of the constituency they ran in and their party's position in the constituency. There was little difference in whether or not they felt their constituencies were very competitive; ²³ there was no difference in how they viewed

^{2350%} of the Citizens and 55.6% of the Politicos thought their constituency was "Very competitive".

their party's future in their constituencies. 24 55.6% of the Politicos to 41.3% of the Citizens felt their constituency party organization was strong or very strong; the difference was not significant, however.

Constituency differences between Citizens and Politicos became more significant when the sample was limited to losing candidates. Politicos who were losers were much more likely to have run in constituencies they felt were similar to those their party does well in (Table 16a) and to run in constituencies where their party has a definite base of support even if insufficient for success (Table 16b). These findings are consistent with expectations; Politicos are more likely to be candidates where their political ambitions may have some hopes of fulfillment. Citizens to fulfill, perhaps, a sense of duty.

TABLE 16a: Losing Citizens and Politicos and Party Appeal in the Constituency

Constituency similar to those party does well in:	Citizens	Politicos
Yes	48%	79%
No	52	21
	AND THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS	
	(N=31)	(N=33)

²⁴²⁷ of 45 Citizens and 27 of 45 Politicos thought their party's future in their constituency was good. (1 Citizen did not respond to the question.)

TABLE 16b: Losing Citizens and Politicos and Party Support in the Constituency

Party Support:	Citizens	Politicos
Definite support	42%	85%
Potential or no support	58	15
	(N-31)	(N=34)

Or else, and as we shall see this is very possible, it is simply that Politicos believe more in their parties as part of their generally greater involvement in politics.

That the differences between Citizens and Politicos are more a matter of degree than style can be seen when comparisons are made of campaign tactics each group would emphasize. With one surprising exception where there is no difference, Politicos tended to emphasize all of them more than Citizens. Table 17 summarizes the findings. It might have been expected that Citizens would be more likely to consider important "Build community solidarity" and perhaps "Educate the voters on public issues". While more than half of them did consider voter education important (the only case where this was so for Citizens) more Politicos did and Politicos were far more likely to emphasize community solidarity. We might have expected Politicos to consider important "Develop a personal image"; most of them did not (unusual that they considered any tactic unim-

²⁵Of course, "community solidarity" is difficult to interpret.

portant), hence there was no real difference between them and the Citizens. While, for Politicos, personal image development was the <u>least</u> important tactic, for Citizens it was more important than either of two party-related tactics: building party leadership image and building organization. 26

TABLE 17: Citizens vs. Politicos: Importance of "Things a Party Candidate Might Emphasize During an Election Campaign"

Activity or tactic:	Percent Emphasizing: Citizens	Politicos
Voter education	53.3	73.3
Building party organization	22.2	55.6
Building voter loyalty to par	ty 28.9	62.2
Developing personal image	28.9	33.3
Building community solidarity	* 33.3	69.9
Building party leader image	15.6	60.0

*The answers were: Not very important/important/very important. "Emphasis" means "very important" in all cases except "Building community solidarity" which was dichotomized "Not very important"/"important" and "very important" for illustrative purposes.

The Politicos emphasized to a greater degree all three tactics relating to party--perhaps that is the key to understanding them.

The chapter closes with a final consideration of the Amateur-Professional concept. Perhaps, however, the Political

While Politicos emphasized most tactics more than Citizens, the order of importance of tactics is very similar. (Spearman's r = .70, Kendall's tau = .69)

Ambition Scale would be more useful (or some typology based on it or a similar dimension). Probably the scale could have been more useful than it was. However, it was discovered after the data collection—which was made to discover relation—ships with the Amateur/Professional classification.

To close with a methodological consideration: this whole chapter is based on efforts to fit individuals into typology categories and scale positions. Two objective labels—which were not based on any social scientist's invention—were much more useful as variables. These were party (discussed in Chapter 3) and occupation (coming up in Chapter 5). Perhaps as a rule of thumb for research one ought always to exhaust the possibilities of the more "natural" categories (like party and occupation) first.

Post Script: A Research Design for the Continued Search for "Amateurs" and "Professionals"

Soule and Clark²⁷ use an additive index to identify professionals and amateurs. They also had an intermediate category of "semi-professionals". This was not entirely satisfactory as in many instances semi-professionals scored more or less than amateurs or professionals rather than in between; for example, although considerably more amateurs

^{27&}lt;sub>Op. cit.</sub>, p. 888-898.

^{28&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 891

were "Liberal" than were professionals, slightly more semiprofessionals were "Liberal" than amateurs.²⁹

My efforts to find a scale of "professionalism" (or "amateurism") have been fruitless. I looked for some means of coming up with another index. The possibility of an additive or summated model from my questionnaire seem rather doubtful from a study of the marginal results to any questions dealing with factors Soule and Clark identify as being related to professionalism-amateurism: preoccupation with winning, willingness to compromise, intraparty democracy, programmatic parties. 30

However, I suggest there may be ways of identifying amateurs and professionals from my questionnaire. One question was worded as follows:

Following is a list of things a party candidate might emphasize during an election campaign. Please rate each activity according to how important you think it is. (W15, L17)

Six "tactics" were listed. I hypothesize:

1. Amateurs will more often mark "very important" in answer to "Educate the voters on public issues."

²⁹ Ibid., p. 893. Conversely, a considerably higher percentage of professionals came from politically active families yet an even higher percentage of semi-professionals came from politically active families (p. 892).

³⁰ Ibid., p. 891.

2. Professionals will more often mark "very important" beside "Develop a personal image."

In addition, the responses to the question in connection with one other "tactic" may be of interest. I do not expect the responses to "Build community solidarity" to divide amateurs and professionals, although this may happen. This question might identify another group: corresponding perhaps to Wilson's "solidaries". 31

One other way of identifying amateurs and professionals will be attempted, based on the following question:

Do you tend to play down issues where you might be in disagreement with your constituents? (W29, L31)

My hypothesis is:

3. Professionals will answer "Consistently" or "To some extent", amateurs "Not at all". 32

First Step

The four questions (or columns) will be cross-tabulated with each other (6 tables). In addition, they will be cross-tabulated with WINNER-LOSER and PARTY (interrelated variables), four categories of WHY SOUGHT NOMINATION (W12, L14)--SKILLS/EXPERIENCE, PARTY IDEALS, ISSUE FOCUS, and PUBLIC SERVICE--with OWN-PARTY CRITICISM (W19, L21), and in addition with IDEOLOGY.

³¹ Clark and Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations".

³² The "amateurs" here might more aptly be called "ide-ologues." David Nexon prefers "ideologue" and "non-ideologue" to "amateur" and "professional". "Assymetry in the Political

For IDEOLOGY a new column will be established -- the number (maximum five) of times each respondent answered "No" to:

Do you feel that the majority of your constituents would agree with you on:

- (a) Civil rights?
- (b) Welfare issues?
- (c) Extent of government regulation of the economy?
- (d) Problems related to national unity?
- (e) International issues? (W28, L30)

Finally, a summary of hypotheses:

- A. Professionals (as identified by 2 and/or 3) will:
 - -- include more winners
 - -- include more Liberals
 - -- more often emphasize "You has skills and experience you wanted to use".
 - -- more often criticize their own party for "Too much emphasis on grandiose plans, not enough on responsibility and fitness for government".
- B. Amateurs (as identified by 1 and/or 3) will:
 - -- include more losers
 - -- include more N.D.P. candidates
 - -- more often emphasize "You were committed to your party's ideals" and "You wished to focus attention on an issue".
 - -- more often criticize their own party for "Too much emphasis on image to the exclusion of providing a clear programme".
 - -- disagree with their constituents on more issue areas.

- C. Those who emphasize "Build community solidarity" (solidaries?) will:
 - -- include more Conservatives
 - -- more often emphasize "You were seeking an opportunity for public service".
 - -- more often criticize their own party for "Too narrow an appeal in terms of the population (groups ignored or left out)".

CHAPTER V

OCCUPATION AND POLITICAL CANDIDACY:

A POSSIBLE TREND

"The educational institutions and their staffs should stay out of politics. More conventional thinkers would save a great deal of confusion." (a dentist, and Conservative losing candidate in the 1968 election.)

Social Background

Very little information on the social background of the candidates was obtained by the questionnaire. Questions were asked about age, occupation (possibly unnecessary¹), religion and national origin. In addition, sex was determined (easily). An obvious omission was a question on father's occupation (an index of social class origin). One of these background factors, however--occupation--was discovered to be the most useful explanatory variable in the study next to party; this chapter will be mainly devoted to an exploration of this variable. First of all, a brief summary of the other social background findings.

There were very few female candidates; fewer responded.

All were unsuccessful; most ran last. This may be interesting but the result was that sex was not useful in the study.

Available in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer.

Ethnicity turned out likewise to be not very useful. 126 of 158 respondents were Anglo-Saxon in origin; there did not seem to be any systematic under- or over-representation, in terms of our sample, of any group by any particular party. (Possibly the Conservatives had a few less minority group representatives than might have been expected.)

Religion is, of course, related to ethnicity. However, religion of candidates did vary among the parties.

(Table 1). The differences are generally consistent with what is known of the political sociology of Ontario. Most of the respondents of all parties are Protestant but the Protestants who run for the Liberals are more likely to come from the lower-status denominations while the Conservatives have 12 of the 17 candidates who are Anglicans. (The Conservatives had more candidates from the United Church--15--but there were 44 United Church candidates altogether.) As expected, the Liberals had an edge in the number of Catholic

The findings here with candidates are very similar to the findings with party organizations in the Hamilton area. See Henry Jacek, John McDonough, Ronald Shimizu and Patrick Smith "The Congruence of Federal-Provincial Campaign Activity in Party Organizations: The Influence of Recruitment Patterns in Three Hamilton Ridings", Canadian Journal of Political Science, V, June 1972, p. 196-197.

³⁰n the "status" of Churches see Porter, op. cit., p. 98-103. Most of those in the "Other Protestant" category of Table 1 belong to the more "evangelistic" denominations or sects and, of course, part of the United Church was certainly not "establishment" until this century.

candidates—and their Catholic candidates were more likely to be successful than Liberal Protestants. The N.D.P. had more candidates who declared themselves atheists.

TABLE 1: Religion of Candidates by Party

(winning candidates in brackets) Religion Conservative Liberal N.D.P. Roman Catholic 13 (10) 11 (1) 4 1 (1) 12 4 Anglican 12 (4) (3) United Church 15 17 16 (11) 8 Other Protestant 10 8 (1) 8 (6) Other: 19 (2) 50 54 54

Party Totals

*The largest number here are atheists. Also included are "Don't know", Jews and members of the more "unusual" sects.

TABLE 2: Age of Candidates by Party

Age:	Party Tot (winning <u>Liberal</u>		in brackets) ve N.D.P.
35 or less	12 (5)	7	19
36-40	8 (5)	11	13
41-45	11 (8)	7	5
46-50	7 (6)	10 (2)	8 (2)
51 or more	9 (7)	19 (3)	9
	-	-	
	47*	54	54

^{*3} Liberals (2 Winners) did not give ages.

There was a considerable difference between the parties in the ages of the candidates, with the Conservatives tending to be older and New Democrats tending to be younger.

(Table 2. Generally, young candidates were losing candidates.)

Occupation was the most useful variable in separating the party candidates. (For a summary, including non-respondents, see Chapter 2, Table 2). The rest of the chapter will deal with occupation. Of all the categories shown in the Party Candidates Profile (Table 3) only occupation really differentiates—with Liberal candidates much more likely to be lawyers, Conservative candidates more likely to be businessmen, and New Democrat candidates more likely to be teachers—in each case the largest occupational category for the party.

Brokers

Occupation is generally considered an important variable in political recruitment. While it is fairly easy to determine what occupations political activists of various kinds have, basically it (occupation) is used as an indicator of

Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U.S.-A Model", <u>Journal of Politics</u>, 24 (1962), p. 703-716; Donald R. Matthews, <u>The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers</u> (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 19-32.

For summaries which put occupation in focus with other variables, see Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), espec. p. 124-128, and Robert E. Lane, Political Life (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), espec. p. 331-334.

TABLE 3: Party Candidates Profile (Social Background)

	<u>Liberal</u>	Conservative	New Democrat		
Sex	Male	Male	Male (more chance of female candi-dacy)		
.Age	30s or early 40s	over 50	young, often less than 30		
Ethnic Group	Anglo-Saxon	Anglo-Saxon	Anglo-Saxon		
Religious Affiliation	Catholic, United Church Other Protes- tant	Anglican United Church	United Church, atheist		
Occupation	lawyer	businessman	teacher		
some more nebu	lous conceptst	atus, role, some	aspect of		
personality. 5 One example is the concept of the "brokerage"					
occupation, which is viewed both as an independent and an					
intervening va	riable in the re	cruitment proces	s.		

According to Herbert Jacob's formulation, the brokerage occupation involves essentially three connections with politican recruitment.

⁵Blalock points out that background or demographic variables are often used as indicators of some "experience" variable (e.g. occupation used as an indicator of status or role) and warns that this practice is highly vulnerable to misinterpretation and measurement error. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964) p. 149-150.

⁶Jacob, op. cit.

- 1. The brokerage role involves practitioners in a mediating position with "non-subordinate outsiders". (Brokerage role as an independent variable; somehow or other it is natural to move into a political role from a brokerage role.)
- 2. Many people with a "political personality" take such occupations. (Brokerage role as an intervening variable; for example, people whose objective was to be a politician might very likely train as a lawyer.)
- 3. Brokerage roles often involve contact with government officials, etc.—are on the fringe of politics. (Independent variable; this involves the act of recruitment itself, presumably).

In his model of recruitment, Jacob says "occupation is the crucial social variable". However, he emphasizes occupational role rather than status. The brokerage role ("The lawyer is the classic example" b is the "gateway to politics". This emphasis on occupational role can lead to confusion. Often the problem is viewed as deciding which occupations to include as brokerage. To Jacobs it depends on the frequency with which a person is involved in negotiation rather than other activities—almost to the extent of suggesting that if an individual becomes a politician he has certainly had practice in the brokerage role, probably in his job. Among occupations included by him are teachers (like

⁷<u>Ibid</u>., p. 709.

⁸Loc. cit.

^{9&}lt;sub>Ib1d., p. 710</sub>

barbers, brokers of information) and physicians. Others would exclude these: physicians because they are not really in a <u>mediating</u> position; teachers, because they do not deal principally with <u>non-subordinates</u>. 10

The problem can be resolved if the concept of the role is extracted from the rest of the considerations. The relationship of brokerage roles to occupations is then an empirical question, along with the relationship between brokerage roles and politics. Jacob's points 2. and 3. above (personality predisposition to politics and what might be called opportunity) are then separate questions again. It is suggested, then, we use model (b) below rather than model (a).

"Brokers" and Politics: Two Models

- (a) Brokerage occupations correlate recruitment to politics with (Jacob)
- (b) Certain occupations correlate brokerage roles with

correlate recruitment to politics with

(Modified)

Figure 1

¹⁰R. Williams, "Political Recruitment to the Ontario Legislative Assembly", (M.A. thesis, McMaster University, 1967) p. 114-116.

Another Occupational Category

The study design (questionnaire) does not enable us to identify role incumbents if role is defined more extensively than by label such as "lawyer", "candidate". However, a number of differences related to occupation were felt to be worthy of study. It is suggested here that there is at least one other category besides the brokerage occupation category which may have significant and <u>different</u> relationships with political involvement. And, it will be suggested later in the chapter, this category may be increasing in importance relative to the political system.

After the preceding discussion, it may seem unfortunate that we are continuing to use occupation as our variable. Perhaps we might think of it as an indicator of role. Whatever, we shall deal with occupational categories. For purposes of this study, brokerage occupations are defined as lawyers, all business men, and top professionals (dentists and medical doctors). Teachers are specifically placed in a different

¹¹ One goal of this process is to uncover leads as to the <u>nature</u> of the relationship of occupation to political participation. See James D. Barber, <u>The Lawmakers</u>, p. 217-219, on the specialization hypothesis versus "the more, the more" hypothesis.

¹²I feel that this is being over-inclusive. However, there were not enough lawyers in the <u>sample</u> to limit the study to specific occupations—especially if we want to include representatives of more than one party and a fair proportion of losing candidates. Similarly, including ministers and journalists in the Communicator category definitely improves our representation of Conservatives.

category. 13

The other group corresponds to all those having occupations within what Porter called the "ideological system" (although more inclusive than his ideological elite). 14 Here are the teachers, professors, ministers, and journalists from the sample. These are all occupations included in the cultural/communications group in Hodge, Siegel and Rossi's study of occupational prestige in the United States. 15

The group of those having occupations within Porter's ideological system would seem to have characteristics of significance for politics, as have those in brokerage occupations. The fact that there is a party relationship with these categories necessitates caution in making conclusions. For example, there may be greater differences between those in cultural/communications occupations who do and do not participate in politics than between participants in politics from this group and participants from brokerage occupations.

¹³Lane specifically groups teachers and lawyers as brokerage occupations and as "civic" occupations. (Op. cit., p. 331, 333). However, he does mention restrictions on political activity by teachers which may allow them to be civic but prevent them from being "partisan" (p. 332).

¹⁴Porter, op. cit., p. 459.

¹⁵Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-1963", in Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bensix, eds., Class. Status and Power, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 325-334. None of the occupations in our "Brokers" category are found in either Porter's Ideological System or the cultural/communications group of occupations.

One can hypothesize that at least there would be a great deal of interest in politics from this group. The involvement in politics, one suspects, would be less a result of some relationship between occupational roles in their non-political and political jobs (if elected) but more an intellectual or philosophical involvement or perhaps, if it is a role relationship, the involvement in politics might be due to the fact that the teacher and minister occupations, at least, are in the so-called "helping professions" and this might lead to a desire to change or improve the "system" through political action. However, most of these considerations are beyond the scope of our study. Some of them are treated in the section on "Teachers and Politics" below.

Brokers vs. Communicators

For convenience, we shall refer to the two categories as the "Brokers" and the "Communicators". A particular limitation in comparing the two groups is that there are only

The word is used in preference to "ideologue", which denotes another thing entirely, although it is expected that some people will be both Communicators and ideologues. In fact, it might be expected that more ideologues will be found among those in cultural/communications occupations than among those in brokerage occupations. An ideologue might be more inclined to seek an occupation involving literary or communications talents and might have an aversion to the brokerage role with its negotiating and compromising. Those in cultural/communications (Porter's "Ideological") occupations might develop an interest in politics based on more "philosophic" reasons than brokers.

four in the sample of Communicators who were winners in 1968 (or 49). 30 of 77 Brokers were successful (including 16 of 22 lawyers). 17

Two sets of hypotheses were tested. The first set related to party, constituency, and contest conditions, and political opportunities. The second set included hypotheses about attitudes to political participation, and about ideology.

Generally, the (candidate-reported) differences in recruitment and nomination, and situations in the constituency are what might have been expected from the difference in the success rates of the two categories; however, it would seem that perceived "Chance of Success" was more important than Won-Lost. 18 The results seem to indicate something in the nature of a "politics-for-the-sake-of-politics" involvement for Communicators, an interest in politics somewhat less based on the seeking of a career in politics. It would seem con-

¹⁷ There were 27 "Others", including 4 winners.

¹⁸ The specific hypotheses tested were:

^{1.} Brokers will more often have been involved in contests for nomination than Communicators.

^{2.} Brokers will more often have sought nomination on their own initiative; Communicators more often will have been induced to accept nomination by their party.

^{3.} Brokers will more often run in constituencies where their party is competitive; Communicators will more often run in "hopeless" situations.

^{4.} Following (3), Brokers will run in constituencies where their party has a good chance.

Except for (2), the findings were at least mildly consistent with the hypotheses. As Table 7 shows, there were differences in the recruiting agent named by Brokers and Communicators—but not quite what had been expected.

role would bring people into politics because they wanted to be politicians. Those whose occupations are in the "ideological system" would more likely, one would think, be interested in politics because they are interested in politics. 19

TABLE 4: "Brokers" vs. "Communicators" and Whether or not Nomination was Contested (Non-incumbents in 1968 Only)

	Category	
Nomination:	Brokers	Communicators
Contested	65%	45%
Not Contested	35	55
·	and the particular par	
	(N=57)	(N=47)

Brokers were slightly more likely than Communicators to have been nominated after a contest (52% to 44%); when incumbents are eliminated from the sample, the difference becomes significant (Table 4). Perhaps related may be the fact that Brokers were more likely to run in a constituency they considered competitive (Table 5). This was true regardless of party. A majority of the Brokers for all three parties

¹⁹ The scale categories described in Chapter Four do not help us explain these results. There were no differences between Brokers and Communicators on the Professionalism (pseudo) Scale. Communicators were slightly more likely, according to the Political Ambition Scale to be Citizens while Brokers were equally likely to be Citizens or Politicos. The difference was slight and in any case does not help us to interpret these findings.

felt they had run in a competitive constituency; a majority of the Communicators in each party felt their constituency was not very competitive. 20

TABLE 5: Brokers vs. Communicators and Subjective Rating of Competitiveness of Constituencies

Constituency is:	Brokers	Communicators
Very competitive	63%	45%
Moderately or not competitive	37	55
	(N=76)	(N=49)

TABLE 6: Brokers vs. Communicators and Subjective Rating of Chance of Election at Time of Nomination

Rated chances as:	Brokers	Communicators
Good	54%	17%
Fair	30	27
Poor	16	56
	-	
	(N=74)	(N=48)

In answer to the question asking candidates how they had perceived their chances of being elected at the time of

Brokers: 19 of 32 Liberals, 22 of 34 Conservatives, 8 of 10 N.D.P. felt their constituency was "very competitive"; Communicators: 5 of 9 Liberals, 5 of 8 Conservatives, 17 of 32 N.D.P. felt their constituency was only "moderately" or "not competitive".

nomination, Brokers were much more likely to say "Good", Communicators much more likely to say "Poor" (Table 6). This definitely points to the conclusion that there is a qualitative difference in the political participation of Communicators and Brokers. The relationship holds when party is controlled although there are definite party differences in the answers to the questionnaire item; by far the most confident group was Liberal Brokers, the least confident, New Democrat Communicators. 21

"Self" as the principal agent in deciding to seek nomination (as opposed to "Party" or "Friends/Associates"). The same number of Brokers and Communicators reported "Self" as principal recruiting agent—therefore, if anything, leading to an opposite finding (the ratio of Communicators being higher—33% to 21%). Communicators were more likely to name "Party" (41% to 24%). The biggest difference was under "Friends/Associates" with 55% of Brokers and 26% of Communicators crediting the greatest influence to this group. As Table 7 shows, the surprising (to us) proportion of Communicators naming "Self" is almost entirely due to the N.D.P. Communicators; they are the only group not to emphasize "Friends/Associates". In this

^{21 22} of 32 Liberal Brokers thought their chances were "Good". A majority of all other categories thought their chances were only "Fair" or "Poor", including 29 of 32 N.D.P. Communicators.

instance we have to consider party the more important variable; only the N.D.P. had a significant number of Communicators.

TABLE 7: Chief Agent Named in Decision to Seek Nomination--Brokers vs. Communicators by Party (Ns in cells)

,	L1	berals	Conse	rvatives	N.	D.P.
Agent:	Bro- kers	Communi- cators	Bro- kers	Communi- cators	Bro- kers	Communi- cators
Self	5	0	7	2	4	14
Party	9	4	7	1	2	14
Friends, Associates	18	4	20	5	11	6
	32	8	34	8	17	34

In motivation and attitudes, the two occupational groups differed in ways more or less consistent with what had been expected. The differences indicate that Brokers were motivated to be candidates more for personal reasons; Communica-

²²The specific hypotheses tested were:

^{1.} Brokers will more often emphasize personal skills and experience they feel to be important in politics and

^{2.} the importance of "Public service".

^{3.} Communicators will emphasize party ideals and

^{4.} focussing attention on issues and

^{5.} will more often consider important the experience of campaigning itself.

^{6.} There will be more ideologues among the Communicators than among the brokers. (See Footnote 16 above).

^{7.} Brokers will more often consider building a personal image important.

Hypotheses (1), (2), (4), (5), and (7) were supported. There was some evidence in favour of (6) but the hypothesis could only be tested indirectly and by making questionable assumptions. Differences in party ideals (3) were in the expected direction but not significant.

tors are motivated for more impersonal (apparently) reasons; perhaps because they are more ideological.

TABLE 8: Brokers vs. Communicators and Importance of Developing a Personal Image

Developing a personal image is:	Brokers	Communicators
Important	79%	45%
Not Important	21	55
	(N=76)	(N=49)

TABLE 9: Brokers vs. Communicators and Importance of Public Service

Public service is:	Brokers	Communicators
Important	56%	27%
Not Important	44	73
	(-
	(N=77)	(N=49)

various reasons for getting involved in politics more often stressed "skills and experience" they "wanted to use". 23 When asked how important they considered certain tactics for campaign stress, they were much more likely to emphasize "building a personal image", by a margin of 79% to 45% (Table 8). While the fact that Brokers considered "Public Service" important as

²³⁴² of 72 Brokers to only 13 of 49 Communicators.

a reason for political involvement more often than Communicators (Table 9) might be viewed as inconsistent, this was expected. By the time this stage in data analysis had been reached it had been discovered that "public service" was not related to a party orientation to politics, so at least a deemphasis of this by Communicators was consistent.

While Communicators were more party-oriented, the difference in emphasizing the importance of "party ideals" was not significant. An interesting difference in their expressed motivation is that 47% of the Communicators to only 19.5% of the Brokers considered "the experience of campaigning in itself" an important reason for running.

TABLE 10: Brokers vs. Communicators and the Importance of Focussing Attention on an Issue

Issue focus is:	Brokers	Communicators
Important	. 30%	51%
Not important	70	49
	(N=77)	(N=49)

Ideology had not been a major consideration in the original research design. It was possible, therefore, to test the relationship of ideology with occupational category only indirectly and only in one aspect, that is, it was possible to conclude that more Communicators were ideologues—people

^{2455%} of the Communicators emphasized party ideals; 45.5% of the Brokers.

for whom a considered position on an issue is an important part of politics. Two questions were used to check this.

One simply asked how important the focussing of attention on an issue had been in the candidates' motivation; as Table 10 shows, Communicators were much more likely to consider this important. The other question aksed respondents whether they felt they agreed or disagreed with a majority of their constituents in each of five issue areas. It was felt that those who perceived they disagreed were more likely to be ideologues. This need not necessarily be true; even so, the differences between the two groups in answering this question are interesting.

TABLE 11: Brokers vs. Communicators and Whether or not they Perceived Agreement or Disagreement with Constituents on International Issues

Agree with majority of constituents?	Brokers	Communicators
Yes	80%	43%
No	20	57
	(N=69)	(N=46)

Two issue areas were selected. In answer to the question: "Do you feel that the majority of your constituents would agree with you on problems related to national unity?" only 50% of the Communicators said "Yes" as opposed to 75% of the Brokers. On international issues, the difference was

²⁵The difference was statistically significant.

even greater: 43% to 80%. (Table 11). Controlling for success or failure as candidates did not change the relationship. 26

Trends

61% of the Communicators were under 40 years of age in 1968; 65% of the Brokers were 40 or over. As it was known that N.D.P. candidates were generally younger, party was controlled—the relationship was consistent for all three parties (Table 12).

TABLE 12: Brokers vs. Communicators by Party and Age in 1968 (Ns in cells)

	Li	berals	Conser	vatives	N .	D.P.
Age:	Bro- kers	Communi- cators	Bro- kers	Communi- cators	Bro- kers	Communi- cators
39 or less	11	6	11	5	5	19
40 or more	20	3	24	3	5	13
		-	Garaffront .	-		Contract
	31	9	35	8	10	32

²⁶ For international issues and losing candidates the significance of the differences decreased.

Agree with Constituents Disagree with Constituents	<u>Brokers</u> 72% 28	Communicators 38% 62
	(N=43)	(N=42)

TABLE 13: Occupation of Candidates in the 1958, 1965, and 1968 Federal Elections in Ontario as given in the Report of Chief Electoral Officer--by Party

	Liberal		
Occupation:	1958	1965	1968
Lawyer Businessman Teacher Minister, Journalist Labour, Union Farmer Other	36.2% 28.8 2.5 2.5 10.0 20.0	34.1% 25.9 15.3 1.2 1.2 9.4 12.9	36.8% 26.4 16.1 3.4 1.1 4.6 11.5
	N = 80	85	87

	Conservative			
Occupation:	1958	1965	1968	
Lawyer Businessman Teacher Minister, Journalist Labout, Union Farmer Other	23.8% 23.8 1.2 3.8 1.2 26.2 20.0	18.8% 35.3 2.4 7.1 3.5 9.4 23.5 100.0%	17.2% 46.0 5.7 5.7 1.1 8.1 16.1	
	N = 80	85	87	

	New Democratic Party			
Occupation:	1958	1965	1968	
Lawyer Businessman Teacher Minister, Journalist Labour, Union Farmer Other	1.7% 10.3 12.1 6.9 50.0 5.2 13.8 100.0%	9.4% 9.4 21.2 8.2 23.5 4.7 23.5	5.7% 8.1 32.3 13.8 17.2 23.0 100.1%*	
	N = 58	85	87	


^{*}Rounding error.

Table 13 summarizes the percentage of candidates of each party in various occupational categories (according to the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer) in 1968 (see Chapter 2, Table 2) and two earlier federal elections, 1965, and 1958. We might conclude that participation by Communicators is increasing, although Brokers are generally continuing at a high level of participation.

Table 13 shows certain categories changing generally, others only for certain parties. Generally, proportion of farmer candidacies showed a decline. Specifically, the N.D.P. shows a considerable difference with the C.C.F. in the far lower proportion of manual labour and trade union candidacies. The Conservatives had more businessmen candidates, which, along with a slightly lower proportion of lawyers, indicates an increasing difference with the Liberals. Of the greatest interest to us is the rather large increase in the number of candidacies of educationists, especially for the Liberals and the N.D.P.

Before taking a look at the changes in the party system and their effects on this trend, it is interesting to note some of the trends with respect to occupational distribution and occupational prestige, generally.

As can be seen (Figure 2, Figure 3), there was a steady increase from 1931 to 1961 in the number and proportion of professionals in the Canadian labour force. Two professional occupations have been selected for special attention, teachers and lawyers, focussing particularly on male teachers. There




Teachers, Lawyers, and all Professionals as a Proportion of the Canadian Lobour Force, 1931-1961 (4 Censuses)

Teachers

Lawyers

Figure 2



Male Proportion of Teachers in Canada, Ontario, 1931-1961

Figure 3

has been a fairly steady increase in the proportion of teachers in the Canadian labour force, while the proportion of lawyers stayed constant. Of somewhat more interest is the steady rise in the number and proportion of male teachers in Canada and in Ontario, which had more males in teaching than the national average throughout the period.

Pineo and Porter, in a study of occupational status in Canada, challenge Meisel's statement that there has been "a relative loss in the attractiveness and prestige of politics as compared to other occupations." Of the occupations included in their study, provincial premiers received the highest score and all federal political occupations ranked high. On their ratings, University professors and members of the House of Commons scored almost exactly equal, slightly behind physicians and slightly ahead of lawyers. High school and public school teachers had relatively low prestige as compared to other professionals, lower than some in managerial and proprietorial occupations. 29

Hodge, Siegel and Rossi report trends in occupational prestige based on opinion surveys in the U.S. which permit comparison. Table 14 lists the trends, positive or negative,

²⁷Quoted in Peter C. Pineo and John Porter, "Occupational Prestige in Canada", <u>Canadian Review of Anthropology</u> and <u>Sociology</u>, 4, (1967), p. 29.

²⁸ Loc. cit.

^{29 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 36-40.

for five selected occupations.³⁰ Among major occupational groups, they report that between 1947 and 1963 there was a considerable average increase in prestige for thirteen "free professional" occupations (including lawyers), a considerable average decrease in prestige for seven cultural/communications occupations (professor, teacher, minister, journalist), and slight, perhaps insignificant declines in average prestige of ten political/government and four big business occupations.³¹

TABLE 14: Prestige Change in Five Selected Occupations

Occupation:	1925-40	1940-47	1947-1963
Physician	+	+	
Banker	+	•	-
Lawyer	+	+	+
Teacher	-	+	+
Small Store Manager	-	•	

Source: Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-1963", in Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Class. Status. and Power, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 325-334. p. 330.

It might be hypothesized from these trends that those in occupations with high and growing prestige will only be interested in the more prestigious political offices. Others might be more easily attracted to politics. In Canada, the status of federal politicians in office is relatively high.

³⁰ Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi, op. cit., p. 330.

^{31&}lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 332.

If we use any of the scales of occupational prestige mentioned above, the distribution of prestige is higher for M.P.s than for losing candidates, and also for the slates of the Liberal and Conservative parties than the New Democratic Party. It seems more reasonable to hypothesize that people from occupations with high status will be attracted to the relatively prestigious office of member of parliament rather than to attribute the rating Porter and Pineo obtained for M.P.s to the relatively high status (according to principal non-political occupation) of the membership of the House of Commons.

Mere participation (such as candidacy) might not be as attractive to top professionals as to people lower in the social scale. Even the fact that the majority of the N.D.P.'s few lawyer candidates were successful can be interpreted as evidence of this. Where perceived chance of success is greater, one suspects that a party will attract candidates from higher in the status scale. 32

Teachers and Politics

An interesting aspect of this chapter is the increased participation of teachers in politics at least as seen in

J2 Teachers and professors were not separated in the coding. University professors score higher than lawyers on the Pineo-Porter Scale. 8 of 28 N.D.P. "teachers" on the 1968 slate were professors, including the only one of this group to be elected. At least two other N.D.P. professors were thought to have a very good chance (Vichert, Hamilton-Wentworth; Harney. Scarborough West.)

federal candidacies in Ontario. 33 We can question whether or not this is a trend and then attempt to account for it.

though, as we have seen, people in federal elective offices in Canada have relatively high prestige. Participation in party politics has been looked upon as a means of upward mobility. The teaching profession, likewise, has been considered a means of upward mobility. Frank Jones, in a study of Hamilton, Ontario high schools, shows that there was increasing access to teaching by persons of lower social origin. He cites American studies reporting that, while access to professional occupations is increasing, this is especially true in teaching, which is relatively low in prestige. 36

Political scientist Harmon Zeigler's study of high school teachers in Oregon suggests a number of things which might apply in Ontario (in line with Jones' findings and the trends, particularly as in Figure 3). And, given the differences

³³ This would be the focus if there was to be direct study of some of the things brought up in this chapter.

³⁴ See Jacob, op. cit.; W. C. Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician, "Western Political Quarterly, 12 (1959), p. 683-698.

³⁵ Frank E. Jones, "The Social Origins of High School Teachers in a Canadian City", in B. Blishen, F. Jones, K. Naegele, and J. Porter, eds., <u>Canadian Society</u>, 3rd ed. (Toronto: MacMillan, 1968), p. 236.

^{36&}lt;sub>Ibid., p. 234</sub>

in the party systems it seems possible that the political consequences of some of the things Zeigler found might be more overt, such as teachers running for office, joining political parties, etc.

The theme, in educational sociology, that teachers transmit, almost mechanically, middle-class, traditional, "conservative" values of the society, although it retains some validity, has become somewhat out-of-date according to Zeigler. It developed at a time when teachers were mainly women recruited from the upper-middle and middle classes. 37 However, especially in high school teaching, more males have been recruited, and the occupation has been opened to people from lower socioeconomic strata. While the teacher remains in a "feminine" role and teachers tend to be (and become moreso with experience) "conservative", 38 nonetheless the homogeneity has gone. 39 In fact, Zeigler found that owing to variations in subjects taught and classroom practices, students were liable to view teachers as being much more liberal than

³⁷Harmon Zeigler, The Political Life of American Teachers
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 31-32.

^{38 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 11-17

³⁹ Jones, op. cit.

they actually are, and much more political.⁴⁰ Zeigler found that partisanship-activity relationships among teachers were reverse of normal; Democratic teachers were much more inclined to political activity.⁴¹

One can speculate about the effects of formal organization, sanctions, restraints, and changes in these upon participation in politics by teachers, or any group. 42 There are a number of recent developments here which can be considered: federal civil servants, at least, being released to run for office; a possible decline in traditions of nonpartisanship; relaxing of sanctions for political activity.

Zeigler, op. cit., p. 139-142. In Zeigler's study, sex was the most powerful explanatory variable. For example, he found considerable alienation among downward-mobile female teachers, indicating the powerful influence of cultural norms and expected roles (p. 43). Men teachers were found to be more politically alienated than their sex, status and education would normally indicate (p. 45), which might, if true in Ontario, explain the party relationship with teacher candidacy. It was found (in Oregon) that men teachers were notably more inclined to non-educational political affairs, and that this group tended to come from a minority of teachers who were liberal Democrats; again, if this were true in Ontario the party relationship would be much more easily explained.

⁴¹ Zeigler, The Political World of the High School Teacher (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1966), p. 123-125.

⁴² See, for example, Lane, op. cit., p. 332. Also, Ronald Manzer, "Selective Inducements and the Development of Pressure Groups: The Case of Canadian Teachers' Associations" Canadian Journal of Political Science, II (March, 1969), p. 106, 112-113.

Table 15 gives the occupational distribution of the 1967-1971 Ontario legislature. There is very little difference from party slates federally. One might have expected the Conservatives provincially to be more like the Liberals federally. However, M.L.A. status would undoubtedly be lower than M.P. status and perhaps, therefore, party distributions of losing candidates federally might resemble those of winning candidates provincially. The Liberals still have proportionately more lawyers; the Conservatives more businessmen and farmers; the N.D.P. more teachers, journalists, and ministers, and manual workers and trade unionists. However, this information wa only obtained for successful candidates.

The biggest change between 1958 and 1968 in the party system of Ontario (other than the Conservative federal decline) has been the increase in strength of the N.D.P. - C.C.F.

Candidates are much more important to the N.D.P. than they were to the C.C.F. The party now contests all seats. Its candidates also appear to run more seriously in more constituencies. It is possible that this can account for the change in the slate of candidates towards more professionals, to teachers and professors rather than manual labourers and trade unionists. The party is respectable and its candidates are not necessarily inevitable losers. One other possibility must be considered. Given the increased access to the teaching profession by lower status groups, the social <u>origin</u> of N.D.P. candidates may not be much different from C.C.F. candidates.

TABLE 15: The Ontario Legislature by Occupation and Party

Occupation:	Conservative	Liberal	N.D.P.
Lawyer	<u>13</u>	2	2
Business	<u> 26</u>	2	-
Teacher	3	3	3
Minister, Journalist	2		<u>5</u>
Manual labour, trade union	· -	1	<u>5</u>
Farmers	11	1	-
Others	6	1	2
	1200-1-1		***********
Total	61	20	17
Not given	_9	_7	_3
Totals	70	27	20

From The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1968 (ed. Pierre G. Normandin, Ottawa: 1968), p. 664-700. Occupations of many members elected for the first time in 1967 were not given.

From Zeigler's findings about partisanship of teachers in Oregon, we would not expect the N.D.P.-teacher association to be representative of the teaching profession. Perhaps teachers have a greater opportunity to become candidates for the N.D.P. because there is less competition. In any case, we are interested in the general trend of increased participation at the (gladiatorial) candidacy level by teachers. It might be worthwhile for greater attention to be paid to the teacher-politics relationship as well as the more frequently studied subject of lawyers and politics.

Summary and Speculations

Occupation turned out to be the nonpolitical variable of the most significance in our study. We were only able to treat occupation as a crude variable, perhaps an indicator of role or status—we were not able to deal with role or status specifically.

While it might have been interesting simply to compare two occupations, lawyers and teachers, sample limitations forced us to utilize two broader categories: "Brokers" and Communicators", defined by the occupations included in them and not by role or status considerations. Some differences between the two categories were discovered.

It is possible that teachers as a group may be becoming more important at the activist level in politics. If this is so, the style of politics may be changing, perhaps towards more polarization, more ideology.

We must consider variable interaction effects here, especially the interaction of party and occupation. The New Democratic Party seems to be the most congenial, for various reasons, to teacher "politicos"; the Liberal Party to lawyers interested in politics. 43 It is possible that these factors may influence (have already?) the nature of the parties them-

An example of the interaction effect at work (polarizing diagonal cells) can be seen if we make a table of the findings reported in Footnote 19. n = 100% in brackets .Percentage Rating Chances as Good Liberals Conservatives in each cell N.D.P. 43.8 Brokers 68.9 (32) (32) 40.0 (10) Communicators 37.5 (8) 25.0 (8)9.4 (32)

selves (in a somewhat circular fashion--more accurately, a causal chain with feedback). These speculations are consistent with the conclusions in Chapter Three. The political parties each offer somewhat different incentives. As a result, the motives for participation will differ and there will be different kinds of activists attracted. Thus there is no reason to conclude that party politicians, or the parties themselves, will become more similar. 44

If the New Democratic Party, for instance, did become more like the other parties, it is possible that those participants in sympathy with the Waffle might withdraw support.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: WHAT DO WE HAVE?

I would like first to quote one of my respondents (a defeated Liberal lawyer, therefore a deviant case in two senses):

The pseudo-intellectual and traditional call for clear-cut issues is phony or excessively simple. Campaigns are fought for victory--the public education required to cut through the distractions of mass cult has to go on at other times--and needs the aid of more art and talent--directed with more purpose and, perhaps, less analysis by those who have "copped out" into pseudo-scientific detachment.

Many of the respondents put in a great deal of time answering the questionnaire and appending comments and I feel the study has failed them as much as anything. (At least so far, and one federal election has passed since the data was collected). If I was to answer the respondent quoted above, I might plead guilty to pseudo-science, although the effort was as scientific as my understanding at the time. 2

But the weaknesses of the study are due in many ways to

¹ Two of the candidates have since written to ask about results.

That would satisfy a <u>history</u> of science definition: a scientist is someone who thinks he is. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The University of Chicago Press. 1962).

insufficient science.3

Perhaps I can state a principle for research: <u>Do not</u> apply an abstracted concept when a "natural" variable is more efficient in "explanation"; and a corollary: <u>do not attempt</u> to construct abstract concepts until the research possibilities of cruder variables which do not require elaborate definition have been exhausted (or nearly so). As we found in this study, party and occupation are much more useful variables than the more elaborate categories, such as "amateur" and "professional" (in the Wilson usage). 4

My usage of these categories was perhaps invalid. First of all, I attempted to scale attribute data, i.e. to "quantify" a qualitative concept, or at least to change to a "more-less" description what had been "either-or." This is

Without claiming to be a scientist, I'd say I know better now. This thesis represents part of the lesson. Otherwise, I have benefitted from a somewhat more systematic study of statistics (still at an elementary level), and reading, particularly Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., (Two books: <u>Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research</u>, mentioned above, and <u>Theory Construction</u>: From Verbal to Mathematic Formulations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

⁴Of course, it is important to keep in mind that the "cruder" variables must not be overinterpreted. If our interest is in some elaborate concept, we have to find means of measuring it. The thing to avoid is developing concepts for the sake of it.

Wilson would probably hedge on that point. One of the problems with categories is cutoff-points, in the process of creating categories data may be artifically divided on an either-or basis. I think Wilson's amateurs and professionals are either-or categories; however there may be "Others".

not necessarily wrong but if done the procedure must be carefully operationalized. Secondly, the typology may be applicable in differentiating kinds of activists within political organizations but was used in a study involving different organizations and probably better adapted to comparing or differentiating the organizations themselves.

Neither of these processes were inherently wrong but they should be carried out, if at all, very carefully. For example, a danger in these processes is that the categories become, in a sense, the dependent variable. Logically they should belong to the independent variable but if what is being looked for is individuals to put in the categories—amateurs and professionals, for example—then they are really the dependent variable in the study. The most inadequately operationalized part of this study was the original dependent variable, campaign activity. That may have been because, in this study, dependent variable was not really honestly defined.

⁶I would suggest the amateur-professional categorization or typology might be better applied, for example in a study of the Waffle-N.D.P. relationship (being careful to exhaust the possibilities of explanation using simple labels like "Union membership" and "C.C.F. background".)

⁷Selecting categories (extreme cases) of the dependent variable may lead to conclusions based on spurious relationships. See Blalock, <u>Causal Inferences</u>, Chapter 4, especially p. 117-119.

While some idea was held that role theory applied to this study, no roles were really defined or operationalized. (Candidates were not asked a question on how they viewed their role within the party organization, for example.) I could question whether role theory would have been particularly useful in this study, however. I very much question, for example, the inferring of role relationships from an occupational label.

As a final note, we should perhaps return to some of the considerations mentioned in Chapter One. Perhaps we can approach this by answering two (implicit) questions of Weber's:

- 1. Does the party system produce statesmen as well as politicians? We can't really answer this question on the basis of the data but I was impressed by the quality and variety and the, in a sense, "disinterested" interest of the respondents.
- 2. Does the party system produce an homogeneous class of "party politicians"? Certainly, not. I mentioned above the variety of candidates and I think at least in this respect that the data provides evidence. There are within and between parties considerable differences in candidates. And, perhaps more to the point, the party organizations themselves seem to be

See Chapter One. The references in Weber are in his "Politics as a Vocation".

qualitatively different at least to some

extent as a result of the kinds of people in them.

Perhaps the most use that will be made of this thesis

is in the material which follows—the Appendices, in particular the Codebook—along with the data deck.

Thus we would agree with Schlesinger's emphasis on the question: "Whose party is it?" (Ambition and Politics). As we mentioned in Chapter One, the study of politicians may yield more information about party organization than vice versa (perhaps contrary to Weber's expectation).

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Additional Methodological References

- Note: Several of the works already cited provided methodological guidance, especially the books by Blalock and, in providing perspective, Kuhn.
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Deck 1

Column	Question	Code (with Marginal Totals)
123	Identifi- cation	001-116, 154-156, losing candidates 117-153, 157, 158, winning candidates
4	Deck Number	Punch 1
5	Category	1 Winners 39 2 Losers 119 Total 158
6	Party	*Winners Losers Totals 1 Liberal 32 17 49 2 Conservative 5 50 55 3 N.D.P. 2 52 54
7	1(a)	Had you run as a candidate federally before 1968? 1 Yes 22 30 52 2 No 17 89 106
8	1(a)	If yes, number of times? Code actual number. 0
9	l(b),(c)	Have you been a candidate in a provincial election in Ontario? Have you been a candidate in a provincial election in another province? 1 Yes 6 14 20 2 No 33 105 138
10	l(b) & (c)	If yes, number of times. Code actual number 0
11	1(d)	Have you been a candidate in a local (municipal) election (for any office)? 1 Yes 20 39 59 2 No 19 80 99

^{*}On subsequent pages, W, L, T, will be used in place of Winner, Loser, Total.

Column	Question	<u>Code</u>	W	<u>L</u>	T
12	1(d)	Type of office sought: 0 1 Council (mayor,	19	79	98
		reeve, alderman, councillor)	14	32	46
		2 School board 3 Both	4 2	8 0	12 2
13	2	Have you participated campaigns of other can elections? Federal.			
		0 1 Yes 2 No	1 36 2	7 90 22	8 126 24
14	2	Number of federal electin:	tions	parti	cipated
		Number given. 0, none or no number given	3	28	31
		1-2 3-4	8 6	32 28	40 34
	•	5+	22	31	53
15	2	Have you participated campaigns of other can elections? Provincial	didat		
		0 1 Yes	1 30	3 98	4 128
		2 No	8	18	26
16	2	Number of provincial e pated in: Number given.	electi	l o ns pa	rtici-
		O SIVEH.	9	22	31
		0 1 2 3+	9 3 9 18	25 22	28 31
				50	68
17	2	Do you always try to he during campaigns?	relp 3	your pa	rty
		1 Yes 2 No	37 2	107 12	144 14
18	3	Have you held office	ln you	ır pari	ty's
		organization? 1 Yes 2 No	30 9	88 31	118 40

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	Ţ
19	3	Type of office	10	32	42
		1 Local or regional executive only	21	59	80
		2 Provincial, National	8	28	36
20	4(a)	Was your nomination for election contested?	r last	June'	s
		0 1 Yes 2 No	1 17 21	0 64 55	1 81 76
21	4(b)	If yes, how many sough actively?	t the	nomina	tion
:	. ,	Number including respo 0 No contest, or number not given	ndent. 22	55	77
		2 3+	7 10	30 34	37 44
22	4(c)	Do you recall the vote 0 1 Landslide result 2 Divided but not clos 3 Very close, or more than one ballot	5 2	81 8 16 14	86 10 23
23	5	At the time of nominat rate your chances of gune 25, 1968?			
		0 No answer1 Good2 Odds not too un-	2 31	1 32	3 63
		favorable 3 Only a long-shot	4	36	40
		possibility	2	50	52
24	6	Was there any time dur when you felt your cha considerably and you w of winning or coming of been at nomination time	ences h vere mo close t	nad imp ore hop	roved eful
		0 1 Yes, thought chances		1	6
		had improved 2 No, hadn't	20	68	88
		increased hope	14	50	64

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>	T
25	6	If yes, what made you 0 1 Personal impression 2 Party workers' information 3 National campaign 4 Press	think 19 11 0 9	so? 55 26 23 11	74 37 23 20 4
26	7	In the last four weeks would you say you were 0 1 More than your opponents 2 About the same as your hardest- working opponent			rk: 3 61
	3 Not as much as oneof your opponents4 Less than your	2	9	73 11	
27-28	8	opponents What was the number of you spent campaigning four weeks? Number of hours: Minimum estimate from e.g. 10-12 = 10. Med: wide range, e.g. 6-12 O Not ascertained	narro tan es	g the w rang timate	last e, from l
		1-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16+	0 0 3 12 9 11	11 8 12 18 18 28 24	11 8 15 21 30 37 35
29	10	(Winning candidates) your personal campaign factor in your succes, that your party's appoin the constituency, electionwas a more 0 1 Personal campaign 2 Party	n was s, or ealt or pec	the ma do you raditi uliar	jor feel onal to this

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>	Ţ
29	10	(Losing candidates) W satisfied with the eff 1 Yes 2 No			
30	11	(Losing candidates) W to go through the sacr candidate again? 0 Winning candidates 1 Yes 2 No			
31	12	(Losing candidates) Wo in future campaigns of whether or not you are 0 Winning candidates 1 Yes 2 No	your	party	(actively)
32	W11, L13	When you first sought how had you come to be 0 1 Pretty much my own idea. 2 Suggested by party leaders 3 Suggested by friends and associates	inter 0 18		
	W12, L14	Do any of the circumst below approximate the decided to seek nomina How important were the	situat tion f	tion wh	nen you
33		You had skills and exp to use. 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	9 11 20	35 39 45	wanted 43 50 65
34		You were interested in campaigningin itself 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important		74 32 13	ence of 107 37 14

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	T
35		You were committed to or interest.	a spec	ific	group
		0	0	1	1
		1 Not very important	34	92	126
		2 Important 3 Very important	3 2	12 14	15 16
		y very important	٨	7.4	10
. 36		You were concerned about of your constituency.	out the	e cond	ition
		1 Not very important	19	44	63
		2 Important	12	36	48
		3 Very important	8	39	47
37		You were committed to	your]		s ideals.
		1 Not very important		25	35
		2 Important	14	31	45
		3 Very important	15	63	78
38		You hoped to involve, involvement of, a cert the civic process.			
		o	0	1	1
		1 Not very important	32	80	112
	•	2 Important	72 4	23	27
		3 Very important	3	15	18
		y tory important	,	ر۔	
39		You wished to focus at	tenti	on on	an issue.
		1 Not very important	33	70	103
		2 Important	3	24	27
		3 Very important	3	25	28
40		You were seeking an op	p ortu	nity f	or
		public service.	8	45	۲۵
		1. Not very important 2 Important	8	24	53
	•	3 Very important	23	50	32 73
		y very important	ر 2	J0	1)
	W13, L15	People enjoy politics reasons. How important following reasons to	nt are		
41		Fun and excitement of		igns.	3
		1 Not very important	2 ⁻ 26	8 <u>1</u>	107
		2 Important	9	31	40
		3 Very important	ź	$\frac{1}{6}$	8
			~	•	J

Column	Question	<u>Cod.e</u>	W	<u>L</u>	$\underline{\mathbf{T}}$
42		Making social contacts 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	and 1 26 9	friend 1 80 36 2	106 45 5
43		Politics is a part of 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	my wa 13 12 13	ay of 1 47 36 35	Life. 2 60 48 48
44		Satisfaction of fulfil a citizen. 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	ling 1 4 9 25	my dut 1 23 41 54	2 27 50 79
45		Furthering my politica 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	1 am 26 10 2	bitions 1 77 26 15	2 103 36 17
4 6		Helping my party. 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	1 14 15 9	1 25 52 41	2 39 67 47
47		Being close to influer 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	tial 1 35 2 1	people 1 100 17 0	e. 2 135 19
48		Concern with public is 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	sues 1 6 8 24	1 9 23 86	2 15 31 110
49		Making business contact 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	38 0 0	1 117 1 0	2 155 1 0

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>	<u>T</u>
50		Helping to influence government.	the pol	litics	
		0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	1 7 7 24	1 14 34 70	2 21 41 94
51		Prestige in my commun. 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	1	1 100 14 4	2 131 17 8
52	W14(a), L16	In your view is it be in politics who are puthe game, or people wapproach?	rofess	ionals	in
		0 No opinion 1 Professionals 2 Amateurs	3 23 13	34 39 46	37 62 59
	W15, L17	Following is a list o candidate might empha campaign. Please rat how important you thi	size di e each	uring activ	an election
53		Educate the voters on 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	public 0 3 15 21	1 issu 1 11 31 76	es. 1 14 46 97
54		Help build party orga	nizati	on.	
		0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	0 4 20 15	1 19 50 49	1 23 70 64
55		Help build voter loya 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	1ty to 0 10 17 12	your 1 25 42 51	party. 1 35 59 63
56		Develop a personal im 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	nage. 0 9 11 19	1 45 40 33	1 54 51 52

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	$\underline{\mathbf{T}}$
57		Build community solida: 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	rity. 0 19 16 4	1 65 30 23	1 84 46 27
58		Build confidence in pa 0 1 Not very important 2 Important 3 Very important	rty lea 0 7 19 13	aders. 1 29 41 48	1 36 60 61
59	W16, L18	In terms of achieving goals other than actua election, do you feel ful in your campaign a 0 1 Yes 2 Partly 3 No 4 Does not apply	lly win you wen	nning	the
60	W17, L19	Which two of the three in last June's federal do you think are the cother in terms of idea of the conservative/Liberal Conservative/N.D.P. 3 N.D.P./ Liberal	electionsest s and a	ion in to ea	Ontario ch
61	W18, L20	Which of the two partiown do you <u>like</u> most (similar; this is a querather than agreement) Liberal Conservative N.D.P.	whethe stion	r or n	ot its

Column	Quest:	<u>ion</u>	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	T	
62	W19, 3	L21.	Which of the following you say is most fairly your own party?				
			1 Too narrow an appeal in terms of the popu-		20	32	
			<pre>lation (groups ignore or left out) 2 Too narrow an appeal in terms of ideas, or</pre>	3	46	49	
			out-of-date elements in the platform 3 Too much emphasis on image, to the exclu-	4	24	28	
			sion of providing a clear programme. 4 Too much emphasis on grandiose plans, not enough on responsibi-	18	15	33	
·			lity and fitness for government.	2	14	16	
	W20,	L22	If you can, pick out or as something you like a other parties.				
63			Liberals (by Conservat: 0 1 Good organization, getting a lot of	ive, N l	.D.P.) 28	29	
			people involved 2 Representative of	3	47	50	
			im 3 Red	<pre>important interests 3 Recruits good people candidates with</pre>	2	15	17
			personal qualities making for good M.P. 4 Provides a clear	l s	10	11	
			programme for the people to consider 5 Responsibility, constructive rather	0	Ò	0	
			than disruptive.	0	2	2	

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	T
64		Conservatives (by Liber 0) 1 Good organization 2 Representative 3 Recruits 4 Provides 5 Responsibility	rals, 15 1 8 5 0 5	N.D.P. 33 8 12 8 0	48 9 20 13 0
65		N.D.P. (by Liberals, 0 0 1 Good organization 2 Representative 3 Recruits 4 Provides 5 Responsibility	onserv 11 14 2 4 4 2	7atives 24 30 2 5 4 2) 35 44 4 9 8
66	W21, L23	Would you describe you 0 1 Very competitive 2 Moderately comp. 3 Not competitive	o cons 0 21 18 0	stituend 1 67 36 15	2y as: 1 88 54 15
67	W22, L24	How strong would say y zation is? 0 1 Very strong 2 Strong 3 Not so strong 4 Weak	70ur pa 0 9 24 5	1 3 38 47 29	gani- 1 12 62 52 30
68	L25(a)	(Losing candidates) constituency is: 0 Winning candidates, no response 1 Similar to constituencies where your party has been making a strong appeal? 2 Of a marginal natural far as the appeal of party goes? 3 Not the kind your padoes well in?	42 e as f your	27 51 38	your

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>		T	
	L25(b)	(Losing candidates) party: 0 No response 1 Has a lot to offer constituency such a yours? 2 Does little to appe to the major groups the constituency? 3 Alienates many in t constituency with o parts of its progra	a eal s in the certain	.2 75 22	5	your	
70	W23(a)	(Winning candidates) support for your part 0 No response 1 Is traditional? 2 Has grown fairly steadily in recent elections? 3 Is a very recent phenomenon?				y that tituency	
	L25(c)	(Losing candidates) in your constituency; 0 No response 1 Some definite support base for your part; 2 Lack of traditional support, but potent support for your part; 3 No strong support at least for the immediate future?	ther ort y? l tial arty?	eis	i 5	that,	
71	W24, L26	During the campaign, attention to any groconstituency?	ups or			n your	
		0 1 Yes 2 No	4 14 21	7 4	5 1	7 89 62	
72	W14(b)	Has your opinion in as a result of your candidates on profes 0 1 Yes 2 No	experi	ence	? (Winning	-

DECK 2

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	<u>L</u>	T
123	Idenfifi- cation				
4	Deck Number	Punch 2			
. 5	Category				
6	Party				
7	W25, L27	Did you feel that you leartain aspects of your form or record? O 1 Yes 2 No		y's pl 3 37	
8	W26	(Winning candidates) is going to be most im mining a repeat of you next electionbuilding following or building 0 No response 1 Personal following 2 Party loyalty	portan r succ g a pe:	t in d ess in rsonal	eter- the
.8	L28	(Losing candidates) We you feel would be most your party's support it election? O No response Make a more specific appeal to a group in the constituency Make a more general appeal to the whole constituency Break the traditional support for another party of a specific group Develop even more strongly the support base the party alreated had Somehow convince the voters of the feasiblity of party successions.	likel n, say	y to i	ncrease

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>	$\underline{\mathbf{T}}$	
8 .	W28 (cont'd)	6 Other (specified by respondent but not capable of reclassification into above categories	·	7		
9	W27	(Winning candidates) there is a good possib for your party in the your constituency? 0 1 Yes 2 No	ility	of su	ccess	
	W28, L30	Do you feel that the majority of your constituents would agree with you on:				
10	(a)	Civil rights? 0 1 Yes 2 No	2 34 3	4 96 1 9	6 130 22	
11	(b)	Welfare issues? 0 1 Yes 2 No	2 30 7	5 72 42	7 102 49	
12	(c)	Extent of government of the economy? O 1 Yes 2 No	regulat 2 27 10	ion o 4 54 62	f 5 81 72	
13	(d)	Problems related to no 0 1 Yes 2 No	ational 3 29 7	1 unit 5 70 44	y? 8 99 51	
14	(e)	International issues? 0 1 Yes 2 No	5 32 2	8 64 47	13 96 49	
15	W29, L31	Do you tend to play do you might be in disagrount tuents? O 1 Consistently 2 To some extent 3 Not at all				

Column	Question	Code	W	<u>L</u>	T
16-17	Age	1968 less year of birt No response 29 or less 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 or more	h. 0 0 9 17 7	1 10 43 37 18 10	1 10 52 54 25 16
18-19	Occupation	01 - 02 Businessmen 03 Lawyers 04 - 05 Other profes- sionals (engineers, doctors,	10 17	28 7	38 24
		dentists) 06 - 07 Teachers,	4	15	19
		professors 08 - 10 Ministers, journalists,	4	29	33
		social workers 11 - 20 Others (farmer trade unionist	` S	16	16
		labourers, housewives, et	4	28	32
20	Religion	0 1 Roman Catholic 2 Anglican 3 United Church 4 Protestant (esta-	2 12 1 7	8 19 17 36	10 31 18 43
		blished)	12	20	32
		<pre>5 Protestant (non- conformist) 6 Jewish 7 Atheist (specified)</pre>	1 3 1	1 2 16	2 5 17
21	Ethnicity:	Father's Nationality 0 1 Anglo-Saxon 2 French/French-	5 31	2 95	7 126
		Canadian 3 N/NW Europe 4 S/SE Europe 5 East Europe 6 Jew 7 Other	3 0 1 2 2 0	3 9 1 2 1	6 10 3 4 1
22	Sex	1 Male 2 Female	39 0	113 6	152 6

Column	Question	Code	<u>W</u>	$\overline{\mathbf{L}}$	T
23	W27	(Winning candidates one? (Party threat 0 1 Liberals 2 Conservatives	ening.) 26 2 4	es, whi	.ch
		3 N.D.P.	7		

APPENDIX B

List of Respondents

Liberals
Defeated Candidates

Arnold Vancise Robert Temple Maitland E. Edgar John R. Matheson John Maxwell Roxburgh Charlie Tatham George Wesley Cunningham Bill A. Bell Dave Logan Herbert A. Epp Bob Sutherland Walter James Ron Barbaro R. Thomas Henry Ralph Dent Peter C. Connolly

Thomas A. Beckett

M.P.s James E. Brown Harold E. Stafford Eugene Whelan John Morison Gordon Sullivan Colin David Gibson H. Gordon Barrett Judd Buchanan Gaetan-J. Serre Russell C. Honey J.-T. Richard Bruce S. Beer Robert K. Andras Leonard D. Hopkins Jack Cullen C. Terrence Murphy Jime Jerome B. Keith Penner Jean-R. Roy Donald R. Tolmie Mark MacGuigan Barney Danson John Roberts Robert P. Kaplan

Grey-Simcoe Hastings Huron Leeds Norfolk-Haldimand Oxford Prince Edward-Hastings Simcoe North Victoria-Haliburton Waterloo Broadview Greenwood York South Kent-Essex Wellington Frontenac-Lennox and Addington Hamilton West

Brant Elgin Essex Halton-Wentworth Hamilton-Mountain Hamilton-Wentworth Lincoln London West Nickle Belt Northumberland-Durham Ottawa East Peel-Dufferin-Simcoe Port Arthur Renfrew North Sarnia Sault Ste. Marie Sudbury Thunder Bay Timmins Welland Windsor-Walkerville York North York-Simcoe Don Valley

M.P.s

Walter Deakon
Kenneth Robinson
Stanley Haidasz
Ian Wahn
James E. Walker
Robert Stanbury
Hubert Badanai
Hyl Chappell

High Park
Lakeshore
Parkdale
St. Paul's
York Centre
York-Scarborough
Fort William
Peel South

Conservatives Defeated Candidates

Bill Frank John D. McPhail James Reginald Swanborough Jack Young John S. Ker Geoff Styles Lionel Hastings J.-Lomer Carriere Duncan Beattie Bogart W. Trompour UNKNOWN CONSERVATIVE Kenneth J. Higson Donald Matthews John Pratt Clark T. Muirhead Ken Binks Murray A. Heit Richard A. Bell Elwood Madill Earl K. Brownridge Archie McLean Carl Rogers Del O'Brien Dick Ford Russ Ramsay Laura Sabia George C. Wardrope George L. Cassidy Wyman Brewer Liam S. O'Brian David Alexander Gray Ken Dear

Dalton Camp

Win McKay

Murray R. Maynard

Arthur Harnett

Gordon Steward

Middlesex Algoma Halton-Wentworth Kitchener Elgin Brant Fort William Glengarry-Prescott Hamilton Mountain Kingston and the Islands (one of three possible) Lincoln London East Northumberland-Durham Ontario Ottawa-Carleton Ottawa-Centre Ottawa West Peel-Dufferin-Simcoe Peel South Peterborough Port Arthur Renfrew North Sarnia Sault Ste. Marie St. Catharines Thunder Bay Timiskaming Timmins Waterloo Windsor-Walkerville Davenport Don Valley Eglinton Etobicoke Greenwood

High Park

Conservatives -- Defeated Candidates

Stuart Summerhayes
Bob Bradley
James Taylor
Herb Crosby
Victor Bagnato
Ed Robertson
Donald Victor Stirling
Alan Heisey
Cy Townsend
Wes Boddington
Betty M. Knight
Kay Armstrong
Cecil Fielding

M.P.s Lincoln M. Alexander Bill Knowles J. Waldo Monteith P. B. Rynard Alfred Dryden Hales

N.D.P. Defeated Candidates

Eric Nelson Barry P. Whittaker Ralph M. Wensley Claude Demers David Bell Murray Kernighan Ted MacDonald Nick Ramacieri William D. Howe Gordon Steward Vichert Patricia Bruce Shirley M. Weary Harvey H. Moats John D. M. Wood Morley Rosenberg James Ronson John Martin Gwen Pemberton Ray Wilson Bob Price Wilmer J. Hill Robert L. Wing **Earold Wilson** Margaret Murray Ian MacDonald

Lakeshore
Rosedale
Scarborough East
Scarborough West
Spadina
Trinity
York Centre
York-Scarborough
York South
York West
Broadview
Parkdale
Nickle Belt

Hamilton West Norfolk-Haldimand Perth Simcoe North Wellington

Bruce Elgin Essex Glengarry-Prescott Grenville-Carleton Halton Halton-Wentworth Hamilton East Hamilton Mountain Hamilton-Wentworth Hamilton West Huron Kenora-Rainy River Kent-Essex Kitchener Lanark and Renfrew Lincoln London West Niagara Falls Nipissing Northumberland-Durham Ontario Ottawa-Carleton Don Valley Ottawa East

N.D.P. -- Defeated Candidates

Ralph Sutherland John Hilborn Keith Woollard Bruce Hodgins Gordon Oliver Rothney Peter P. Miedema Kenneth C. Widenmaier Alex Grabove June E. Cook Charles Perrie Rintoul Douglas M. Sly Murdo Martin Allan Gordon McPhail Robert Wright Phil Lanthier Albert H. Weeks Stuart Ross Otto Bressan James T. Lemon Terry Grier Bruce Rogers John Chamard Robert A. Fenn Douglas Fisher W. E. Ted Mann Val Scott Jim de Candole

M.P.s Arnold Peters Max Saltsman Ottawa West Oxford Peel South Peterborough Port Arthur Prince Edward-Hastings Renfrew North Sarnia St. Catharines Simcoe North Thunder Bay Timmins Victoria-Haliburton Welland Wellington Windsor-Walkerville Windsor West Davenport Eglinton Lakeshore Parkdale Rosedale St. Paul's York Centre York-Scarborough York West Trinity

Timiskaming Waterloo

APPENDIX C

A Further Research Possibility

All three major party candidates from the following eighteen constituencies are represented in the sample. They represent an opportunity for a possible further study of competitiveness and candidate selection, etc.

100% Constituencies

Halton-Wentworth (except Independent Liberal 399 votes)

Hamilton Mountain

Hamilton West

Lincoln

Northumberland-Durham

Peel South

Renfrew North

Sarnia

Simcoe North

Timmins

Waterloo (except Social Credit 168 votes)

Wellington

Windsor-Walkerville (except Communist 408 votes)

Don Valley

Lakeshore

Parkdale

York Centre

York-Scarborough

APPENDIX D

THE ORIGINAL HYPOTHESES

(Derived Prior to the Study--See Chapter Two) (Sub-hypotheses refer to specific parties.)

1. There will be more "amateurs" among losing candidates

than among successful candidates.
There will be more "amateurs" among N.D.P. candidates 1 (a) than among candidates of the other two parties -- in the case of both successful and unsuccessful candidates.

- If it proves feasible to subdivide the "professional" 1 (b) category, a sub-hypothesis about Liberal and Conservative losing candidates could be tested -- that they will be more interested in material and solidary rewards, respectively, than vice versa.
- 2. Losing candidates who are "amateurs" will more often have perceived that they would not win.
- Losing candidates who are "amateurs" will more often 3. have run unsuccessfully in the past and will be more willing to run in the future.
- There will be more repeaters among the losing candidates 3 (a) of the N.D.P. than will be the case for the other parties.
- In terms of extent of campaign activity, the following 4. will be the order, from most active to least active, by outlook of candidate and perceived chance of success:
 - "professionals" with hope of winning
 - 2. "amateurs" with hope of winning3. "amateurs" without hope

 - "professionals" without hope 4.
- Losing "amateurs" would not have campaigned in terms of the total population of the constituency. They will 5. have campaigned as if they were in a constituency where their party would expect to make strong, successful appeals.
- 6. Losing "amateurs" will be more likely to perceive their campaigns as having been "successful."
- 7. Losing candidates in constituencies where their party expects to make a strong appeal (due to provincial or local electoral success, or ideology) will tend to be more "professional" than other losing candidates of the same party.

- 8. Competition for nomination in these constituencies (where the party expects to make a strong appeal) will be high (greater frequency of contested nominations, greater number of competitors).
- 8 (a) For the N.D.P., competition will be more likely in constituencies where the party should appeal and does not, than where it has a perceived immediate chance of success.
- § (b) In the Liberal and Conservative parties, competition for nomination will be greatest where there is hope for immediate success for a candidate of the party.