

**THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION**

**THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION**

By

William James McGrath

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts**

McMaster University

September 1969

**THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION**

MASTER OF ARTS (1969)
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Organization of Soviet Foreign
Policy Formulation

AUTHOR: William James McGrath, B.A., McMaster

SUPERVISOR: Dr. P. J. Potichnyj

NUMBER OF PAGES: iv, 136

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The subject of this thesis is the machinery through which Soviet foreign policies are processed, the men who staff positions in this machinery and the "interest groups" which affect the decision-makers. This analysis attempts to establish the division of powers and responsibilities that exist among the agencies which deal with foreign affairs and to establish through the analysis of social background and career pattern data conclusions about the type of men recruited into foreign policy decision-making positions. It seeks further to analyze the interplay of competing foreign policy positions within the Soviet Union. A convenient shorthand form of describing this thesis might be to call it an attempt at a decision-making analysis of Soviet foreign policy by means of elite and interest group analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my appreciation and gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Peter Potichnyj, for his assistance, guidance, and especially his prodding. Professors J. Silverman and K. H. Pringsheim contributed constructive criticisms which were especially useful in improving the style of this work. Finally, my special gratitude goes to my wife and family for their encouragement and assistance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I Foreign Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union	16
CHAPTER II The Elite Concept, Sample and Analysis	55
CHAPTER III The Dynamics of the Policy Process	90
CHAPTER IV Conclusion	116
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

INTRODUCTION

Soviet foreign policy has been a subject of considerable attention in the Western world throughout the half-century of Soviet history. The processes of Soviet foreign policy formulation, on the other hand, have received relatively little attention. There have been some recent efforts to trace the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy.¹ These discussions contain some important insights but they can hardly be considered systematic treatments of the problem. The discussion to follow, here, proceeds on the assumption that the internal institutions, politics and social dynamics of the Soviet Union are of considerable significance in the formulation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Attention will be focused explicitly on the organizational context through which policies are processed, on the elite who take part in the decision-making process

¹John Armstrong, "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Affairs, VI (1965), pp. 37-47; S. I. Ploss, "Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy," Canadian Slavonic Studies, I (1967), pp. 44-59; and V. V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and the Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 212-287.

and on the dynamic interplay of "interest groups" which attempt to shape the direction of Soviet foreign policy.

This work, then, might be described as an attempt to carry out a decision-making analysis of the Soviet foreign policy process by means of elite and interest group analysis. The analytical focus is not addressed to the substance of given policies or interactions of the Soviet and other international actors but to the internal nature of the Soviet power structure, to the agencies and the domestic forces that shape the policies. For purposes of illustration the competing positions within the Soviet Union on the general prospects of detente with the West will be examined.

Robert Sharlet has complained that there are not enough bridges between Communist studies and "systematic and comparative political science."² An attempt is made here to utilize the tools of "comparative and systematic political science." It is imperative that considerable discretion be exercised in this application. The best studies of Soviet politics, to this point, have been written by scholars who utilized traditional methods of analysis. Men, such as Merle Fainsod, Adam Ulam and

²Robert Sharlet, "Concept Formulation in Political Science and Communist Studies," Canadian Slavonic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter, 1967), pp. 640-649.

George F. Kennan have proceeded on the basis of a sophisticated and penetrating reading of history and through judicious analysis of public and private records. Profound insight and the traditional methods of historical and political research have characterized the cream of Soviet studies. However, this tradition of scholarship has in large part been outside of the theoretical and methodological innovations witnessed in the contemporary literature of political science. Adam Ulam, for one, is of the opinion that this is for the best and that Western students of the Soviet system should concentrate their attention and efforts in the field of analytic history.³ The outstanding quality of Ulam's own efforts in this field adds considerable force to his argument.⁴ However, it seems to me that a variety of methods of inquiry can be profitably utilized in Soviet studies. Thus, this work might also be described as an attempt at bridge-building. The theoretical and methodological issues raised by the attempt to utilize the analytical tools mentioned above will be discussed throughout the body of the work to follow.

³Adam Ulam, "The State of Soviet Studies - U.S.A. Some Critical Reflections," Survey, No.50 (January 1964), pp. 60-61.

⁴See especially his most recent contribution, A. B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968).

Decision-making analysis has become increasingly prominent in political science literature since the 1950's. H. A. Simon, a leading decision-making theorist, has pointed out that "The tools of political analysis -- legal, historical and behavioural -- have always been adapted to the analysis of decision. The use of a decision-making framework for political research is not novel; rather it represents continuing development along paths that stretch back to the beginnings of political science."⁵

A conceptual framework, explicitly developed for systematic analysis of foreign policy decision-making, did not make an appearance, though, until 1954.⁶ Barrington Moore Jr. has cogently criticized the preoccupation of contemporary social science theorists with conceptual frameworks. He has charged that "The development of abstract categories evidently has a seductive attraction in its own right whether or not they are useful in ordering data" and that conceptual frameworks often represent "a collection of verbal categories, empty file drawers arranged in neat and at first glance imposing patterns."⁷ These criticisms are,

⁵H. A. Simon, "Political Research; The Decision-Making Framework," in D. Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Ltd., 1966), p. 15.

⁶R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

⁷Barrington Moore Jr., "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics," World Politics, Vol. VI, No. 1 (October 1953), pp. 128-9.

at least in part, appropriately applied to Snyder's schema. I found the frame of reference, developed by Snyder, useful though; especially in that it directs attention to the "internal setting." Thus, rather than focusing on the stimuli emanating from the international political arena, attention will be directed initially to what Snyder termed the "political-institutional setting." The first chapter of this analysis, then, will explore from a decision-making frame of reference the organizational context through which Soviet foreign policies evolve.

In the second chapter, "The decision-participants" are examined at closer range. As a means to this end, the methods of elite analysis were utilized. This poses unique problems. The notion of an elite within Soviet society is unacceptable to Soviet Marxist sociology. The New Party Program of 1961 proclaimed that "The state.... has in the contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole."⁸ However, whether it is in the "state of the whole people," or in "bourgeois-capitalist democracies," government everywhere is government by a few. Indeed, access to the channels of authoritative decision-making in the Soviet political system is especially unequal in its distribution.

⁸Herbert Ritvo, ed., The New Soviet Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: The New Leader, 1962), p.107.

The closed nature of the Soviet decision-making process makes it impossible to observe and analyze the interactions of the Soviet political elite. However, the centralized command structure of the Soviet polity makes identification of the power elite in the Soviet Union a less onerous problem than it is in the West. Social background and career pattern data on the Soviet elite has been compiled by researchers at the Munich Institute for Study of the USSR. The career patterns of the individuals oriented to foreign affairs were analyzed in detail. This examination focuses on the elites of the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev period.

Finally, in the third section an attempt will be made at appraising the effect of "interest groups" on the foreign policy process in the Soviet Union. Dogmatic proclamations of the community of interests of all the Soviet people cannot obscure factional activity in the Soviet polity. However, the primacy of the party and institutionalized controls limit this activity in such a way that we cannot speak of interest group activity similar to that in the West. There is a considerable range of opinion among Western analysts in respect to the feasibility of an interest group analysis of the Soviet system. Gordon Skilling argues that this approach sensitizes the observer to an analytically promising previously unexplored range of

activity.⁹ T. H. Rigby and Y. Bilinsky demonstrate, on the other hand, some scepticism as to whether the interest group approach to political analysis is appropriate for the study of Soviet politics.¹⁰ The predominance of the Party in the Soviet polity is the chief factor in objections to the interest group approach to analysis of Soviet politics. Avtorkhanov has suggested with some justice that the Soviet Union is a "partocracy" and that the party machine is the only really significant agency in the political system.¹¹ However, the Party can be considered a unified interest group only on highly general issues such as preservation of the Party's primacy in the polity. Furthermore, the Party leaders do not formulate their policies in a vacuum. The production of functional decisions in modern social systems depends upon the input of specialized technical advice. Individuals outside the party apparatus, by virtue of their official positions, can influence the formulation and implementation of policy. Thus, Brzezinski and Huntington have called attention to "policy groups" in the Soviet polity.

⁹H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No.3 (April, 1966), p.449.

¹⁰T.H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," Survey, No.50 (January 1964), pp. 183-194; and Y. Bilinsky, Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of The Soviet Union 1961-1966, University of Denver Monographs in World Affairs, Vol. 4, Monograph No.4 (Denver, Colorado, 1968), p. 28.

¹¹A. Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), p.372.

These groups, the highest state officials, the managers of industrial enterprises, the agricultural specialists, the military, and the police, are institutionalized as part of the administrative machinery. They "advocate to the political leadership certain courses of action; they have their own professionalized or specialized newspapers which, at times and subject to over-all Party control, can become important vehicles for expressing specific points of view; but for their own sake they are careful not to cross the shadowy line between advocacy and pressure."¹²

It has been pointed out that social scientists generally approach the subject they are studying with a conceptual scheme, normally referred to as a model.¹³ The totalitarian model, it is generally agreed, has dominated Soviet studies in the past. Theoretical interpretation of the Soviet system has been stimulated in the post-Stalin era and there are a variety of models currently available. Some of these models will be briefly reviewed at this point. The focus will be on those models which underline aspects of Soviet reality relevant to this analysis.

The distinguishing characteristics of a totalitarian system, according to Friedrich and Brzezinski, are six in

¹²Z. Brzezinski and S. P. Huntington Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 196.

¹³A. Inkeles, "Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society," Survey, LX (July, 1966), p. 3.

number. The "totalitarian syndrome" consists of an official ideology, a single mass party usually led by one man, a terroristic police and three kinds of monopolistic control. These are a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and control of all organizations including a centrally directed economy.¹⁴ Totalitarian societies are possible only in modern industrialized societies because modern technology makes the requisite techniques of control possible.¹⁵ The ideology is "focuses and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind."¹⁶ Therefore, revolutionary social change is necessary. The difference between totalitarianism and other forms of non-democratic politics: "The innovation of totalitarian regimes, is the organization and methods developed and employed.... in an effort to.... (effect) total control in the service of an ideologically motivated movement, dedicated to the total destruction and reconstruction of a mass society."¹⁷

A host of complaints have been raised recently to the effect that the totalitarian model is outmoded as a tool for analyzing the Soviet system. Professor Meyer, for one, has charged that "in dealing with the communist world, our notions of what a political system is and does have been

¹⁴C. J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (2nd ed. rev. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), Chapter 2.

¹⁵Ibid., p.27.

¹⁶Ibid., p.9

¹⁷Ibid., p.17.

suspended. For describing that world we have used concepts and models reserved for it and a few other systems considered inimical."¹⁸ The totalitarian model, according to its critics, has not kept apace with the changing reality of Soviet politics. The elimination of terror as the main instrument of internal control has certainly undermined one of the principal elements of the totalitarian model.

Alfred Meyer has formulated as an alternative, a bureaucratic model.¹⁹ He argues that the Communist systems have principles of organization and management similar to modern bureaucracies. Rational social management by complex organization is the outstanding feature of Communist societies from this perspective. Meyer views Soviet society as a bureaucratic command structure. The principle of careerism governs giant industrial bureaucracies. Thus, the principle of careerism governs the Soviet system. The promotion of rapid economic growth is regarded as the chief

¹⁸A.G.Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review, Vol. XXVI, No.1 (March, 1967), p.11.

¹⁹A.G.Meyer, "USSR: Incorporated," in D.Treadgold, ed., Development of the USSR (Seattle, 1964), pp.21-28. This article first appeared in the discussion section of the Slavic Review as part of the symposia on the nature of the Soviet system. Zbigniew Brzezinski provided the lead article and Prof. Meyer and Prof. R.C.Tucker provided commentaries. This exchange of views is reprinted in the above acknowledged book, pp.3-40. Meyer has gone on to develop in more depth his analytical approach comparing Soviet politics to those of a large corporation in an interesting and important book. See, A.G.Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York, 1965).

aim of communist systems. Meyer, then, underlines the similarities between Soviet society and Western corporations.

Brzezinski wrote a reply to Meyer which is very persuasive in some of its criticisms. He points out that "the functional requirements of a company are far narrower than the demands of the revolutionary party with an ideology far beyond the demands of merely the industrial way of life."²⁰ Meyer's model overestimates the similarities of communist societies to Western bureaucracies and de-emphasises the critically important political context in which Soviet bureaucrats must function. However, the bureaucratic model is not altogether inappropriate, for the Soviet Union is a highly bureaucratized country.

Another critic of the totalitarian model charges that it obscures and minimizes the importance of political competition within the Soviet regime.²¹ Carl Linden has proposed a "conflict model" as an alternative to the totalitarian model. The analytical orientation is self-explanatory. "A crucial point about Soviet politics has been the absence of well-defined or regularized methods of resolving problems of authority and decision-making within the leadership. The conflict school sees in this condition a major source of disorder and conflict in the regime throughout its history."²² Those who adopt this frame of reference emphasize the competition in the Soviet political hierarchy. Soviet politics

²⁰Z.Brzezinski, "Reply," Ibid., pp.35-36.

²¹C.A.Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), pp.4-5.

²²Ibid.

is characterized by conflict over power and policy. This conflict includes the bureaucratic, professional and intellectual groups in Soviet society. The "conflict model," though, is sketchy at best. Further, this position does not provide as radical an alternative as it might appear. Merle Fainsod, for instance, who adopted the concept of totalitarianism, pointed out that during the Khrushchev interlude: "behind the monolithic facade, clique rivalries and struggle for power continue to rage even though they are rarely publicly ventilated. Reality falls short of totalitarian aspiration."²³

Another model embraced by a number of contemporary Western social theorists is the pluralist model. Prominent sociologists such as Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and William Kornhauser are pluralists.²⁴ They point out that a significant aspect of the industrialization process is the increased division of labour in society. This school maintains that modern society is necessarily pluralist society. Not only does the modernization process result in an increasingly complex division of labour; it must produce a division of power as well. Political pluralism results from "a

²³Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.127.

²⁴For example, see T. Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review, Vol.29, No. 3 (June 1964), pp.329-357; W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1958); and Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1956).

plurality of groups" whose existence "not only protects elites and non-elites from one another but does so in a manner that permits liberal democratic control."²⁵ Totalitarian control is impossible according to the pluralists. Parsons argues that modern society "is certainly a stratified society, but it no longer has anything like a unitary elite based on lineages, on wealth, on political power, or on monopoly of religious legitimation."²⁶ One of the characteristics of modernization, then, is the proliferation of structures adapted to the performance of specialized functions.

A recent critique of the pluralist model which poses an alternative model at the same time can be found in The Soviet System and Modern Society.²⁷ Its author, George Fischer, argues that modern societies need not evolve into pluralistic societies. According to this monist model, it is possible to hold a complex society together by means other

²⁵W. Kornhauser, op.cit., pp.80-81.

²⁶T. Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review, Vol.29, No.3 (June, 1964), p.356. T. Parsons, "Introduction," in T. Parsons et al, eds., Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p.262. Parsons has predicted that communist totalitarian organization will not match "democracy" in the long run and will "either make adjustments in the general direction of electoral democracy and a plural party system or "regress" into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of organization..."

²⁷George Fischer formulates the monist model. "The monist model holds for a social order in which all power is public power. Such power rests in the state. Control of the state puts power into the hands of a single ruling group. With that type of public power, the ruling group guides closely the economy and other key spheres of life." G. Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society (New York: The Atherton Press, 1968), p.14.

than social autonomy. In pluralist societies much of the power lies outside the state. Fischer points out that it is entirely possible that a social order might develop in which private power plays no important part. The problems of making a modern society work can be coped with, Fischer contends, if the political leadership cultivate the necessary technical skills. "Because the economic realm tends to be central in any modern society, it is economic skills that political leaders of a monist system must increasingly possess."²⁸ Fischer's model is in critical need of further elaboration, but he emphasizes, correctly I think, the lack of autonomy of social resources in the Soviet context.

The discussion of these models has necessarily been highly compressed and is therefore probably guilty of oversimplification. It should be emphasized that each of the models is interesting and useful. Similarly, each has its strengths and weaknesses. Each underlines aspects of Soviet reality, relevant to the following analysis.

The focus of the following chapters, then, will be on the domestic politics, the domestic foundations of Soviet foreign policy. The analytical concepts used will be discussed further as their application to the Soviet system raises theoretical and methodological problems which cannot be easily dismissed. By cultivating an understanding of the internal foundations of Soviet foreign policy formulation,

²⁸Ibid., p.13.

it is probable that a sounder analysis of Soviet foreign policies will be attained. While Soviet proclamations are not always reliable guides to Soviet political behaviour, it is noteworthy that the 1961 Party Program declares that "the CPSU considers that the chief aim of its foreign policy activity is to provide peaceful conditions for the building of a communist society in the USSR and developing the world socialist system, and together with the other peace-loving peoples to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination."²⁹ Domestic considerations, it seems, are central to the foreign policy activity of the Soviet system. The focus of this work, therefore, will be on the Soviet polity, on its structural or organizational features and on the dynamics of its policy process during the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev period.

²⁹H. Ritvo, ed., The New Soviet Society, p.100.

CHAPTER I

FOREIGN POLICY MACHINERY IN THE SOVIET UNION

The shroud of secrecy that envelops the process of foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union is at one and the same time a source of fascination and frustration to Western students of Soviet political life. Considerable attention has been given by Western academics and statesmen to the problems posed by Soviet foreign policy. Much of this attention has been devoted to questions of some controversy, such as, whether national interest or Communism is the ultimate aim of the Soviet elites. Some students of Soviet political life contend that the ambitions of the Soviet leaders are unlimited, that the Soviets will not be content until a world-wide system of Communist states is established firmly under Soviet control.¹ Others argue that the ultimate goals prescribed by Communist ideology no longer

¹For example see E.R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960); and W.R. Kinter, Peace and the Strategy of Conflict (New York: P.A. Praeger, 1967).

exercise the imaginations of the Soviet power elite. According to this school of thought, the Soviet leaders are oriented to traditional power-bloc politics based on nation-state interests. This argument is based in part on the premise that the Soviet elite now has a vested interest in the preservation of a stable world order. Professor Aspaturian, for instance, maintains that "as Soviet power grew, so did the risks and costs of implementing a forward policy. The general tendency was for Soviet ideological goals to recede or to erode into ritualistic rhetoric while the growth in Soviet power created greater opportunities for the pursuit of traditional great power politics."²

There is no shortage of debate over the controversial questions posed by Soviet foreign policy. More fundamental questions, unfortunately, have been left comparatively unexplored. Relatively little attention, for instance, has been focused on the machinery through which Soviet foreign policies are processed. An understanding of the divisions of authority and responsibility among the party and state organs which deal with foreign policy, it seems to me, is an important initial subject for analysis.

The decision-making conceptual framework, which Richard Snyder and his associates produced, emphasizes the

²Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in A. Dallin and T. B. Larson, eds., Soviet Politics since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 131.

importance of the peculiarities of the structure and processes of the given social system under examination. Thus, this frame of reference is well designed for students who seek to apply Western-derived social science concepts to political behaviour in the Soviet system. Decision-making theory focuses on "the processes through which state action evolves."³ The literature on decision-making has expanded remarkably since the publication of Snyder's conceptual framework.⁴ Indeed, Robinson and Majak claim that "the act of human decision no longer regarded by social scientists as the constant complication of our study, has become a primary object of research aimed at unlocking the 'secret' of human choice."⁵ Perhaps it should be pointed out at this juncture that formulation of policy and decision-making are terms that are used interchangeably throughout this discussion; though, an analytical distinction might be made between the two. At any rate, the decision-making frame of reference was elaborated with policy formulation in mind.⁶

³R. Snyder, H.W.Bruck and B.Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the study of International Politics (New York, 1962), p.33.

⁴For a well-balanced discussion of the successes and disappointments of decision-making analysts and a brief history of the evolution of this frame of reference, see J.N.Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," in J.C.Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp.189-211.

⁵J.A.Robinson and R.Roger Majak, The Theory of Decision-Making, "Ibid.", p.173.

⁶R. Snyder, H.Bruck and B.Sapin, op.cit., p.4.

Robinson and Majak recommend that a framework of five variable clusters-- 1) decision situation, 2) decision participants, 3) the decision organization, 4) the decision process and 5) the decision outcome -- provides a useful way of looking at decision-making.⁷ They recommend, further, that the decision-making process can be divided rewardingly into three analytical subprocesses.⁸ They distinguish among the intellectual, social and quasi-mechanical aspects of the process. The intellectual aspect consists of problem recognition, definition and design of alternative courses of action. The quasi-mechanical aspect is worthy of mention. This concept refers to the production of the impulse for decision from the decision-making machinery itself. Thus, decisions may be made because routine or custom demands that they be made. Interpreting this category in broader fashion than the authors probably intended, this aspect could include the self-conscious creation of decision-

⁷J.A. Robinson and R. Rojer Majak, op.cit., p.178.


⁸Ibid., p.180. A number of other analytical divisions can be found in the literature. Harold Lasswell, for example, identifies seven stages -- 1) an intelligence phase during which there is an influx of information and problems are identified; 2) a recommendation phase follows during which alternative policies are formulated; 3) a prescription phase comes next as sanctioned alternatives are selected; 4) an invoking phase follows and is characterized by provisional enforcement of the policy selected; 5) during the application phase the policy is specifically implemented; 6) an appraisal phase follows during which decision consequences are reviewed; and finally 7) a termination phase witnesses renewal, revision or repeal of the policy. See H. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science (New York: The Atherton Press, 1964), pp.15-26.

situations by a given agency in the decision-making machinery. The probable motivation for such an occurrence might be legitimation of one's own existence. The whole of the decision-making machinery might be activated by the artificial creation of a decision-situation. It is possible that the security organs in the Soviet system which have apparently diminished in stature in the post-Stalin era, may act in this way. It is conceivable that their intelligence dispatches on the Czechoslovakian situation, for instance, might have exaggerated or misrepresented elements of that situation. The third aspect, social processes in the formulation of policy, consists of such activities as coalition-formation, interest group interaction and interest aggregation. Snyder, perhaps the best recognized decision-making theorist, specifically allocated a place in his analytical schema to "groups: kinds and functions" but left this aspect of the decision-making process virtually unexplored.⁹ This schema is reproduced on the following page.

As the brief recapitulation of Robinson's and Majak's discussion and Snyder's schema demonstrate, there is a profusion of analytical categories to be examined if the decision-making frame of reference is utilized. The focus in this paper is necessarily limited and only three aspects of the policy process will be discussed. The three most

⁹R. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin, op.cit., p.72.

FIGURE 1



See R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making. An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York, 1962), p. 72.

immediate points of analysis defined by decision-making theory are the "political-institutional setting," "the decision-participants" and the "groups" affecting the decision-makers. Thus, the organizational complex through which policies are processed will be discussed. The backgrounds and career patterns of the elites oriented to foreign affairs will be examined and finally the "social" aspects of the policy process will be accounted for. .

George Kennan contends that the Anglo-Saxon mind is ill-equipped for understanding Russian life. The Russian, Kennan argues, embraces contradiction, whereas the Anglo-Saxon's tendency is to smooth it away. Contradiction, according to this thesis, is a familiar component of the Russian existence and as a result the Russian tends to deal in extremes which he feels no acute need to reconcile.¹⁰

The enormous philosophical problems a diplomat must confront in his attempt to function in an alien environment are only the beginning of the problems with which the Western student of Soviet politics must contend. Soviet decision-making is veiled and difficult to analyze in detail. There is no systematic disclosure of the considerations brought to bear when decisions are made. Archives and personal accounts are

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp.561-64.

virtually inaccessible.¹¹ Official records are not published and generally it can be said that direct evidence of policy evolution is difficult to obtain. It is generally agreed, though, that the executive is pre-eminent in the policy process. Especially important is the primacy of the party and its leaders.

The Politbureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is generally recognized as the single most important agency in the Soviet policy-making process. However, little is known of the inner workings or procedures of the Politbureau.¹² The Politbureau, at present, is apparently a genuinely collective decision-making body.¹³ Merle Fainsod argues that we can assume that the Politbureau's

concerns embrace the definition of goals, the determination of priorities in both domestic and foreign policy, the reconciliation of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the identification of major problems, the formulation of broad policy directives, checks on their implementation, and decisions on important appointments to party and governmental offices. It is at the Presidium level that

¹¹For an encyclopedic listing of the problems with which foreign policy analysts must contend, see V. V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy in World Politics, R.C.Macridis, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962.) p.152.

¹²During the Khrushchev era it was disclosed that "Meetings of the Presidium (Politbureau) are regularly held once a week, and according to both Khrushchev and Mikoyan most decisions are unanimous. Mikoyan has further elaborated by stating that if a consensus were unobtainable, the Presidium would adjourn, sleep on the matter and return for further discussion until unanimity was achieved." Ibid., p.159.

¹³Adam Ulam contends that a quadrumvirate, of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov, in that order of importance, is superimposed over the remaining members. See A.B.Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York, 1968), p.729.

the basic decisions of Soviet life are either made or approved.¹⁴

During Stalin's lifetime the importance of the Politbureau was downgraded in order to minimize the risk of concerted opposition from any source.¹⁵ The Politbureau was returned to its position of dominance during the Khrushchev interlude and apparently still maintains it.¹⁶ Thus, the Soviets claim that the "cult of the personality" is dead and the principle of "collective leadership" has been restored. Foreign policy is a matter of especial concern to this collective leadership. However, the Politbureau has so many responsibilities that a division of labour exists and certain members are more clearly associated with foreign affairs than others.¹⁷ In crisis situations it is likely

¹⁴M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 337.

¹⁵Khrushchev claims that Stalin stopped consulting the Politbureau about matters of substance and that the collective nature of its work was destroyed by having subgroups deal with separate problems, with the result that some were excluded from participation in decisions. "He (Stalin) thought he could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians." N. Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the 20th Congress of the CPSU," New Leader (July 16, 1956), p. 21.

¹⁶It should perhaps be mentioned that the term Politbureau is used to refer to the same body which went under the name of Presidium from 1952 to 1966. The recent change in nomenclature has not produced any evident change in the decision-making pattern of the Soviet Union.

¹⁷J. Triska and D. D. Finley have analyzed the current Politbureau membership and argue that seven of the nineteen incumbents have foreign affairs responsibilities. See J. Triska and D. D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 76-86.

that an even more select group comes into play.¹⁸ Policy initiatives are the virtual monopoly of the Politbureau. Thus, it is imperative that the machinery for the conduct of policy provide the members of the Politbureau with reliable information that is condensed into manageable proportions.¹⁹ Furthermore, decision-making analysis has made it clear that policy formulation is seldom a tidy, sequential process.²⁰ New policies are derived in halting and tentative fashion. As H. A. Simon points out: "Our world is a world of limited serial information processors dealing with complexity that for all practical purposes is infinite with their information-gathering and computing powers."²¹ Thus, important as the Politbureau members may be, they are dependent upon subordinate agencies in the party and governmental bureaucracies. Information must be assembled in order that functional decisions are produced. The key role in Soviet

¹⁸Apparently during the Cuban missile crisis, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Suslov and Brezhnev, serving as a planning council perhaps, met with Khrushchev a number of times. Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union, Report to the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1963, p.25.

¹⁹This machinery is successful in doing this, according to an American Government Report. See National Policy Making Machinery in the Soviet Union, Report to the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1960, p.22.

²⁰For example see C.B.Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol.29, No.2 (Spring, 1959), pp.79-88; and R.Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.3, No.4 (December, 1959), pp. 361-383.

²¹H.A.Simon, op.cit., p.19.

policy formulation is played by Politbureau members but others are important as well.²²

The decision-making pattern in the Soviet Union is similar to that in the West in that the organization of the decision-making machinery reflects the interrelations between domestic and foreign-policy making. That is, it is not feasible to sharply differentiate between institutions concerned with domestic politics and those with foreign policy.

The most important agency in the Party hierarchy below the Politbureau is the Secretariat. The historical importance of the office of General-Secretary commands special attention, as it has been decisively important in the succession struggles following Lenin and Stalin's death.²³ This office may yet prove to be a springboard for a single leader to assert himself above his colleagues, in the post-Khrushchev era.²⁴ The title of this office was changed

²²Harold Lasswell maintains that "since the decision-making process includes application as well as formulation and promulgation of policy, those whose acts are affected also participate in decision-making." See H.Lasswell and A.Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p.74.

²³For a succinct discussion of the importance of this office, see J.E.Turner, "The Two Succession Conflicts: An Overview," in J.B.Christoph, ed., Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966), pp.376-83.

²⁴Jerome Gillison feels that this is unlikely. He cites the factors that led to instability and one man rule in the past and argues that the present alignment of factors favours a rotating collective leadership. Gillison argues that no longer can a single individual efficiently control

from General to First Secretary in 1953 when Khrushchev was elected to this post. The title of General Secretary was restored at the twenty-third party congress in 1966. As in the case of the substitution of Politbureau for Presidium, the change was represented as a return to Leninism. However, as Frederick Baghoorn points out, these terms carry "Stalinist rather than Leninist connotations."²⁵ The Secretariat members have an institutionalized advantage over others who might care to influence policy in that they are exclusively preoccupied with party affairs. Perhaps the most potent power resident in the Secretariat is the considerable one of having the capacity to make and break careers. The Secretariat is responsible for assignments, appointments and dismissal of personnel who are in turn important in the decision-making process. It has the further important responsibilities of preparation of the agenda for Politbureau sessions and it plays a part in the execution of Politbureau directives. The Secretariat might be termed the nerve centre of the CPSU. The party secretaries are in daily attendance upon the party's organizational problems and the checking of fulfillment of party decisions.

the complex structure of Soviet system. In addition he feels that the growth of restraints, a growing sense of the rules of the political game and a reduction of the stakes of the game have reduced the consequences of victory in a power struggle. See J.M. Gillison, "New Factors of Stability in the Soviet Collective Leadership," World Politics, XIX, No. 4 (July, 1964), pp. 563-581.

²⁵ Frederick Baghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 391.

Certain of the staff agencies responsible to the Secretariat, usually referred to as the Central Apparatus, have foreign policy responsibilities. The Agencies most directly concerned with the matters of foreign policy are the sections for cadres abroad, relations with bloc parties, defence industry, main political administration of Soviet army and navy, the propaganda and agitation department, the organizational party work commission, and the international department. Three of these agencies are especially concerned with the staffing of the personnel who in turn are involved in foreign affairs. The Commission for Party Organizational Questions, the Department for Cadres Abroad, and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy have this function. The current chairmen of these sections are I.V.Kapitonov, A.S.Panyushkin, and A.A.Yepishev respectively. The first of these is also a member of the Secretariat and F.Barghoorn reckons that he is a member of Brezhnev's coterie.²⁶ Panyushkin's office requires him to check and clear the credentials of any candidates selected for assignment outside the Soviet Union. Yepishev, according to Kolkowicz, was one of the more pro-party candidates available for the position and he obviously owes his primary responsibility to the Secretariat rather than the military.²⁷

²⁶F.Barghoorn, op.cit., p.369.

²⁷For a discussion of the fluctuating fortunes of the various chiefs of the MPA, see R.Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), pp.80-98.

The department for relations with bloc parties and the international department, which deals with non-Communist bloc communist and workers' parties, "are subdivided geographically and include among their activities the gathering of intelligence through agents' contacts with native communist and sympathizers abroad, the organization of bilateral and multilateral exchanges of delegations and conferences, and the transmission and execution of policy decisions of the Secretariat and Politbureau with regard to foreign parties."²⁸ The Agitprop Department has wide jurisdiction. One of its many responsibilities is the operation of the press section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁹ The scope of Soviet propaganda activities is impressive and the controlling mechanism of these activities is the Agitprop Department. The Department, then, serves as a directing link in the mass persuasion and indoctrination activities of the Soviet Union and also acts as an information channel to the decision-makers.

The Central Committee is in theory the executive of the Party and the Secretariat and Politbureau are supposedly subordinate to it. During Stalin's lifetime the Central Committee degenerated into a vestigial organ but its importance

²⁸J. Triska and D.D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, 1968), p. 346.

²⁹A. Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago, 1966), p. 346.

has been enhanced since Stalin's death. Khrushchev had the body convene regularly and reported to it on policy areas over which there was apparent disagreement in the Politbureau.³⁰ The Central Committee has played a crucial role in the factional struggles of the power elite in the Secretariat and Politbureau.³¹ Most of the functional elites of the Soviet Union, such as the prominent military, scientific, managerial, and cultural figures, enjoy full or candidate membership in the present Central Committee of 195 full and 165 alternate members. The size of the body, though, makes it unlikely that it could ever function as the highest policy organ in the Soviet system. The Central Committee, then, normally ratifies decisions already reached in the organs above it in the Soviet hierarchy. However, the constitutional fiction is maintained, that the Central Committee is the "highest organ" of collective leadership in the party. Its importance cannot be downgraded too much, though, for as has been mentioned already, it contains the important functional elites in the Soviet system and it has been decisively important during instances of factional strife. It is interesting to note that the Central Committee

³⁰T.H.Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader?", Problems of Communism, Vol. XI, No.5 (September-October, 1962), p.3.

³¹The outstanding example, perhaps, was the plenary session of 1957 which expelled the "Anti-Party group" and maintained Khrushchev in office. See M. Fainsod, op.cit., pp.327-8.

was assembled on three occasions during the period from 1966-1968 to discuss foreign policy questions.³² In December of 1966 the Assembly discussed Sino-Soviet relations and matters important to the world communist movement; in June 1967 the Middle East crisis was focused on, and in July 1968 the Czechoslovakian problem was raised.

The Party Congress is theoretically the sovereign organ of the party but, as is well known, it has been degraded to the position of a rubber-stamping body. The Congress, according to the Constitution, is to meet every four years. Stalin's disdain for this stipulation was such that he ignored it for a full thirteen years. The body is so unwieldy (approximately four thousand delegates attend) that even though it is convened, it serves only as a sounding board for the party leadership. The highlight of the sessions, if it might be called that, is the report of the Central Committee delivered by the party leader. Though the Congress in no way performs a deliberative function, its function is not solely ornamental. The Congresses provide a unique medium for communication. As Triska and Finley point out, "It (the Congress session) is a transmission belt between the formulators and implementers of policy -- a communications device for elaboration and clarification of leadership demands in both direct and esoteric language.

³²T.B.Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp.28-29.

The Congress is carefully orchestrated to leave a record which may be studied as a guide to action by Communists at home and abroad."³³

The party is the leading core of all Soviet public organizations. Its official definition as vanguard of the working class entitles it to lead the Soviet people. The legal recognition of this relationship can be found in Article 126 of the Constitution, which states that, "the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, working peasants and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."³⁴ Lenin provided the cardinal organizational and operational principles for the party. Democratic centralism is the characteristic feature of the party's operation. Lenin argued that "The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy of local institutions means specifically freedom of criticism, complete and everywhere, as long as this does not disrupt the unity of action already decided upon -- and the intolerability of any criticism undermining or obstructing the unity of action

³³J. Triska and D.D. Finley, op.cit., pp.55-56.

³⁴J. Meisel and E. Kozera, eds., Materials for the Study of the Soviet System (Ann Arbor, 1953), p.263 (Art. 126).

decided upon by the party."³⁵ However, practice has thus far made a mockery of the democratic rhetoric. This simple point is worth emphasizing. It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that a vital relationship exists between a country's foreign policy and its structure of power relationships. The Soviet power structure is characterized by concentrated and virtually unchecked power in the higher organs of the party. The power elite is dependent, though, due to the complexities of the policy process in modern societies, upon competent information from the subordinate technical and administrative organs.

As Farrell has pointed out, "policy making is not just ultimate responsibility or ultimate determination. In a minimum sense, it includes identification of problems, gathering and analysis of information, defining alternatives, decision and implementation."³⁶ With such a perspective, both communist party and state organs must be included in our discussion. Administration is a very prominent feature in Soviet life, a fact which is contrary to Lenin's vision of the revolutionary state the Soviet Union would be. "From that moment all members of society, or even only the vast

³⁵Lenin, "Freedom of Criticism and Unity of Action," in R.V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. I (New York: Random House, 1962), p.48.

³⁶R. Barry Farrell, "Foreign Policy Formulation in the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe", Eastern European Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1 (June, 1967), p.48.

majority, have learned to administer the state themselves... from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether... The more democratic the "state" which consists of the armed workers, and which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word," the more rapidly does every form of state begin to wither away."³⁷ The forms of state, though, have proliferated rather than withered away. The state apparatus is subordinate to the party and is interpenetrated by it at all levels as well but is not without consequence. The state apparatus consists of the representative bodies of the Soviet state and of the administrative agencies supposedly responsible to the representative organs. The state representative organs have certain responsibilities in foreign affairs. According to the Constitution, state sovereignty is vested in the Supreme Soviet. Its duties include the ratification of the general line of foreign policy and the approval of state acts such as negotiation of international treaties. The Supreme Soviet has two chambers which are presided over by a chairman and vice-chairman. These bodies meet simultaneously twice a year and elect a Presidium to hold power in their place. The Presidium has wide-ranging constitutional jurisdiction and could exercise broad powers, but historically it has not been a powerful component in the policy process. For

³⁷ Lenin, "State and Revolution," in R.V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. I (New York, 1962), p. 105.

instance, the Presidium can "proclaim a state of war in the event of armed attack on the USSR, or when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defence against aggression."³⁸ The two most recent chairmen of the Presidium have been Brezhnev and Podgorny. Thus, the importance of this body in policy formulation may have been enhanced. Both chambers of the Supreme Soviet elect permanent commissions on foreign affairs. Again, these agencies have the legal potential to play an important role in the foreign policy process. It is noteworthy that the chairmen of these two bodies, M. A. Suslov and B. N. Ponomarev, hold important positions in the party policy organs. Apparently none of the other standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet have had such powerful personalities as chairmen.³⁹ Both of these individuals have had long-standing concern with foreign affairs. However, thus far, there is no evidence of a significant role in policy formulation or execution by these bodies.

Another body related to the Supreme Soviet, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, should be examined. The USSR Parliamentary group formed in 1955, by members of the Supreme Soviet gained admission to the Inter-Parliamentary

³⁸Meisel and Kozera, op.cit. (Art.49,m), p.250.

³⁹V.V.Aspaturian, Union Republic in Soviet Diplomacy (Geneva: Librarie E. Droz), pp.142-3.

Union in that year. "The IPU, a world society of parliamentarians, is the only one in which there are members from both the Soviet Union and the United States."⁴⁰ The Union provides a unique medium of communication for parliamentarians and the inclusion of members from the new states of the "Third World" has provided the Soviet members with a convenient avenue for spreading propaganda. The Soviet representatives have attended a number of sessions outside the Soviet Union, which is a mark of trust and confidence in the discretion of these officials. They, thereby, provide the Soviet leaders with an information source on parliamentarians' perspectives outside the USSR.

Another aspect of the organization and control of Soviet foreign policy that might be discussed appropriately at this point is the role of the Union Republics. The USSR is purportedly a federal system in which each of the fifteen republics has the right "freely to secede from the USSR."⁴¹ Political centralization, again, makes a mockery of democratic rhetoric. An important amendment to the 1936 Soviet constitution, however, gave the Union Republics the right to enter into their own military formations and the right to enter into direct negotiations with foreign governments.

⁴⁰P. Juvilier, "Interparliamentary Contacts in Soviet Foreign Policy," American Slavic and Eastern European Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February, 1961), pp. 25-26.

⁴¹Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., p. 246 (Art. 17).

Thus, each of the Union Republics is entitled to maintain its own foreign ministry. Party control and the necessity of Supreme Soviet approval of any agreements independently arrived at renders this autonomy a fiction. Stalin effected this change in 1944 as a ploy to strengthen his later claims that all sixteen⁴² of the Union Republics should be represented in the U.N. General Assembly.⁴³ In fact, this ploy was partially successful and the Ukrainian SSR and Belorussian SSR were included as independent members. Aspaturian warns that we should not dismiss this matter altogether. He argues that "these constitutional amendments continue to be viewed in many quarters as merely the vestigial reminders of an old diplomatic trick rather than as the ingenious and useful device which they continue to be."⁴⁴ Aspaturian's argument is convincing. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, for instance, has been relieved of embarrassing problems by having them sidetracked through the Union Republic Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Soviet diplomatic flexibility, therefore, has been enhanced, particularly in irredentist claims on bordering states.

"The fundamental principles of Soviet administration emanate from its very tenor, which corresponds completely

⁴²It was not until 1956 that the Karelo-Finnish SSR was absorbed into the Russian SSR.

⁴³A.B.Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York, 1968), p.373.

⁴⁴V.V.Aspaturian, The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy, p.16.

with the problems of the socialist state, whose administration is characterized above all by the fact that its aim is to carry into effect the tasks of building socialism and strengthening the new society."⁴⁵ Vyshinsky's appraisal of the nature of Soviet administration, while possibly not in keeping with reality, implicitly recognized that no large state can do without administration. The Soviet Union, it is clear, is a much administered country. The administrative organs of the Soviet state are nominally responsible to the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium. The most important of the administrative organs is the Council of Ministers and its Presidium.⁴⁶ The Council of Ministers consists of approximately ninety members and is therefore too large to process policy effectively. The determination of administrative policy is handled more easily by the Presidium which is made up of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, his

⁴⁵A. Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 376.

⁴⁶The Council of Ministers has numerous powers in the sphere of foreign relations. These include the right to: 1) grant or withdraw recognition of new states or governments; 2) to sever and restore diplomatic relations with foreign states; 3) to order acts of reprisal against other states; 4) appoint negotiators and supervise the negotiation of international treaties and agreements; 5) to declare the adherence of the USSR to international covenants not requiring ratification; 6) to conclude agreements and covenants not requiring ratification with other heads of governments; 7) to confirm all treaties and agreements which do not require ratification; 8) to give preliminary examination to all treaties and agreements which do not require ratification; 9) to appoint and accredit all diplomats below the rank of plenipotentiary. J. Towster, Political Power in the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 279.

First Deputies, Deputy Chairmen and others that this group decides to include. "Controlling in its daily operations a wide variety of subordinate ministerial and non-ministerial agencies, the leadership of the Council is theoretically, legally, and in fact, the central institution for administration of Soviet foreign relations with non-communist states. It draws together the chief administrators of both domestic and foreign policy."⁴⁷ It is generally agreed that Kosygin, the present chairman of the Council of Ministers, is one of the pivotal figures in the present Soviet leadership.⁴⁸

The Ministry which has primary responsibility for foreign relations is, not surprisingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry was to be initially an instrument for world revolution. The failure of the revolutionary spark to spread made it imperative that the ministry develop regularized procedures in order that it might serve as an instrument for advancing the interests of Soviet decision-makers. This was largely accomplished under Chicherin's administration. There have been only seven

⁴⁷J. Triska and D. Finley, op.cit., p.69.

⁴⁸It is the opinion of Wolfgang Leonhard that Kosygin represents the "modernizing viewpoint" in the Politbureau and is in favour of relaxed international tensions. See W. Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in A. Dallin and T. B. Larson, eds., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p.69.

foreign ministers throughout the fifty year period of Soviet history. Trotsky filled the position for a year; Chicherin followed and served for eleven years (1918-29); Litvinov served for ten years (1929-39); Vyshinsky was Minister for four years (1943-53); Shepilov served for only one year (1956); and Gromyko has served from 1957 to the present. These individuals differ considerably in their party rank and it is likely that their weight in policy initiatives has varied proportionally with this rank. Gromyko's influence on policy formulation has probably been essentially technical. As Slusser pointed out during the Khrushchev era, "Khrushchev is fond of making Gromyko's subordinate position brutally clear."⁴⁹ The Foreign Minister, the First Deputy Minister, the Deputy Ministers and whatever additional experts are appointed, constitute the collegium of the Foreign Ministry. A U.S. Government report contends

⁴⁹R. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry," in I. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 239. Slusser's article is interesting and informative and as is his penchant, as one of the more distinctive Kremlinologists, he constructs a controversial argument. He contends that Maxim Litvinov had important influence on the direction of foreign policy. Due to divisions within the Politbureau the influence was important until 1938. This was followed by a period of transition which, according to the author, was characterized by administrative chaos in both the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy and it was not until 1938 that Stalin authoritatively imposed his control. For an argument which directly contradicts Slusser's picture of disorganization and independent influence by Litvinov, see A. Ulam, Coexistence and Expansion (New York, 1968), pp. 143-145.

that the collegium is the directing staff of the Ministry:

Overall supervisory chores are divided among the Deputy Ministers, with the First Foreign Deputy acting in a general capacity as the Minister's right-hand man. The collegium advises the Minister, and at the same time, serves as a coordinating board for the activities of the various components of the ministry. It helps translate policy directives into specific assignments, oversees their implementation, and assesses the result."⁵⁰

The Ministry is organized into conventional geographical and functional divisions. There are fifteen of the former and ten of the latter. The Ministry must coordinate the information and analyses channelled to it by the people serving in these divisions. This demands organizational and analytical expertise of a high order in such a complex system." "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs derives a special significance by reason of the technical competence within it. Herein are experts in the affairs of most of the countries of the world who possess knowledge and capacity for analysis available nowhere else. This knowledge and technical competence may give the ministry a role in policy of crucial importance."⁵¹

The Defence Ministry has been included as an organ of significant import in the foreign policy process. The party, it should be pointed out, has been generally successful in resisting any tendency of the military to expand its sphere of influence. Kolkowicz points out that it is ironic

⁵⁰ National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union, pp. 41-42.

⁵¹ R. Barry Farrell, op.cit., p. 60.

in a system that "has so many characteristics of the authoritarian garrison state, that the instruments of violence play a relatively minor role for they must submit to the bureaucratic elite in the Party hierarchy."⁵² The military elite, though, performs an essential function in providing professional advice and its preferences must be accounted for in decisions on what share of the national resources will be allocated to the armed forces. The fact that arguments for increased defence expenditures have prevailed recently may provide some indication of the current importance of the Defence Ministry in the decision-making organs.⁵³ The military has demonstrated little interest, thus far, in occupying formal political power. However, it is reasonable to assume that they attempt to bring their influence to bear upon decisions affecting the national security of the Soviet Union. The organization of the Ministry is not unlike that of the other Ministries. The current Minister of Defence is A.A. Grechko, a member of the "Stalingrad Group" which came to prominence during the Khrushchev period.⁵⁴ The

⁵²R. Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.103.

⁵³T. Wolfe reports that the 1966 budget showed a five per cent increase for military expenditures and in 1967 there was a further increment of eight per cent. The boosts, in fact, may have been higher. As Wolfe points out, actual expenditures are sometimes hidden under deceptive headings in the budget. See T. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Policy After Khrushchev," in Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, pp.113-14.

⁵⁴R. Kolkowicz, op.cit., p.417.

Ministry has been headed by a professional soldier ever since 1955 when Zhukov assumed that position. However, the absence of military men in the higher party and state policy-forming organs attests to the military's subordinate role in the policy-making process. Another agency, the Higher Military Council, may be a forum where military influence is acutely felt. Politbureau members and military elites reportedly meet together in this body for discussion. Wolfe feels that "its role may be more to furnish recommendations on matters raised within the Politbureau than to initiate policy on its own account."⁵⁵

The Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade should also be considered in a discussion of the agencies involved in the foreign policy process. The Soviets have extensive involvements in this sphere and the Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises the state monopolies through which all foreign trade is conducted. "The Ministry is divided into geographical and functional administrations, charged with directing all of the country's foreign trade activity, working out and implementing measures for developing trade relations with foreign states, compiling and carrying out

⁵⁵T. Wolfe, "The Military," in A. Kassof, ed., Prospects for Soviet Society (New York, 1968), p. 116. See also The Penkovskii Papers where this body is referred to as the Supreme Military Council. O. Penkovskii, The Penkovskii Papers (London, 1965), pp. 151-152.

export and import plans, working out tariff policy and directing the customs service, guiding the work of its subordinate organizations, and exercising control over the trade monopoly corporations."⁵⁶ An agency closely related functionally to this Ministry is the State Committee for Economic Relations which administers the technical and economic assistance programs for the developing countries.⁵⁷

The Directorship of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) is another important agency in the policy process by virtue of its position of administration over important information channels. David Cattell surmises that Tass reports from abroad influence Soviet elites in somewhat the same manner that New York Times reports affect the American elite.⁵⁸ While the analogy is imperfect it does indicate the significance of news collection and information to policy-makers. Tass functionaries, it should be noted, have been involved in espionage work in the past which adds a strategic dimension to the reporter's information-gathering function.⁵⁹

⁵⁶J. Triska and D.D. Finley, op.cit., p.41.

⁵⁷For a detailed distinction between the responsibilities of the two, see Ibid., p.42.

⁵⁸D. Cattell, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in P.W. Buck and M.B. Travis, eds., Control of Foreign Relations in Modern Nations (New York, 1957), p.665.

⁵⁹T. Kruglak has examined Tass's history and contends that the espionage function has been minimized increasingly in recent history but that their other non-news function as propagandists has in no way abated. See T. Kruglak, The Two Faces of Tass (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p.209.

Foreign intelligence plays an important role in the policy-making process. The Committee for State Security (KGB) administers the foreign espionage activities of Soviet agents. This committee is nominally responsible to the Council of Ministers and has enjoyed its present form since 1954. It represents the culmination of a series of organizational changes which have witnessed the MGB, the NKGB and other agencies dating back to the original Cheka of 1917. Soviet intelligence, according to Andreevich, is a "powerful weapon of the cold and hot war against the non-Soviet world. It is aggressive, ever-watchful and untrammelled by any moral scruples or economic limitations.... The inherent aggressiveness of the totalitarian system forces the Soviet police to go much further than the mere collection of information. The Soviet intelligence agencies aspire to influence the policies of the free countries in a way favourable to the Kremlin by using all their freedoms and institutions."⁶⁰ The KGB is divided into geographical and functional divisions and it is the first main administration which is primarily responsible for espionage. The importance of the secret police in the Soviet system has declined with the denigration of terror as an instrument of control. Evidence of this decline can be seen in that neither in 1961 or 1966 were the secret police represented on the Central Committee by a

⁶⁰E.A.Andreevich, "The Structure and Function of the Soviet Secret Police," in S.Wolin and R.Slusser, eds., The Soviet Secret Police (New York: F.A.Praeger, 1957), p.138.

professional.⁶¹ This lack of representation on the CC of the CPSU is significant for this body "includes in its ranks the overwhelming majority of the Soviet power elite, i.e., those who make the final decisions, those who have the greatest influence on the decisions at the highest and intermediary levels."⁶² This decline in importance, it should be recognized, has not been absolute. The role of the KGB in Soviet politics is still a substantial one. There has been an interesting recent change in the leadership of this committee. V. Semichastny, who had followed Politbureau member Shelepin, in the positions of Komsomol head and KGB chairman, was dropped and posted to a minor position in the Ukraine. This has been interpreted as a setback for Shelepin in the factional rivalries of the Soviet elite.⁶³

The scope of activities which the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries oversees is worthy of note. In 1960, for instance, cultural exchanges were effected with sixty-seven countries.⁶⁴ The channels this agency administers are especially valuable for propaganda purposes.

Finally, the Soviet embassies should be considered. A. Kazacheev, a defector from the Soviet Mission in Burma, has written about the inner workings of these missions and

⁶¹Y.Bilinsky, op.cit., p.20.

⁶²S.Bialer, "How Russians rule Russia," Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, No.5 (Sept-Oct. 1964), p.46.

⁶³T.B.Larson, op.cit., p.31.

⁶⁴A.Avtorkhanov, op.cit., p.20.

and emphasizes their orientation to political intelligence work.⁶⁵ Ambassadors generally supervise the missions but are not involved in any intelligence activities in order that they comply with the letter of Agreement reached with the particular foreign government in which they have representation. Soviet diplomats generally do not rank high in the party hierarchy but all are members of the CPSU. Therefore, their powers of initiative are presumably quite limited and their work as it relates to the policy process is likely that of reporters. This is probably especially disconcerting for apparatchiks who have been "dumped" into the diplomatic service. It is not clear whether the motive for assigning such individuals to the diplomatic service has been due to a desire to tighten party controls or whether the diplomatic service is regarded as a convenient post of exile for those who have fallen into disfavour. Current examples are ambassadors Aristov, Mikhaylov, Pegov, Chervonenko, Organov, and Titov. The first three had been members of the Politbureau.⁶⁶ These six account for eleven of the "Foreign Affairs Specialists" on the Central Committee; whereas in fact they are professional party apparatchiks. This demonstrates, as Bilinsky has pointed out, "How difficult it is to predict political behaviour on the basis of professional group representation in the CC, CPSU defined in terms

⁶⁵A.Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott Company, 1962).

⁶⁶Y.Bilinsky, op.cit., pp.21-22.

of current employment.... Many of these professional groups include non-professionals from the Party apparatus."⁶⁷

It has been argued that it is physically impossible for an isolated elite to attend to all the details of producing functional decisions in modern society. Therefore, it is necessary to consider more than the role of the Politbureau, however compelling that role may be. The administrative machinery is an essential component of the decision-making process. At the same time, the primacy of the party's role should not be obscured. Foreign policy initiatives are one of the most closely guarded of the Politbureau's prerogatives. The administration is interpenetrated at all levels by Party personnel. Further, administrators must attend to certain Party duties. The Foreign Minister, for instance, must attend local party meetings regularly and pay monthly dues, amounting to three per cent of his salary, to the party.⁶⁸

Former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, lamented in his memoirs that "there are no experts on the Soviet Union. There are only varying degrees of ignorance."⁶⁹ Though this charge may not be as pertinent in 1969 as in 1950, it contains a kernel of truth. One of the reasons we have difficulty in understanding

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.22.

⁶⁸ A.Avtorkhanov, op.cit., p.347.

⁶⁹ W.B.Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (New York, 1950), p.55.

Soviet foreign policy is that relatively little attention has been paid to the machinery through which this policy evolves. It is hoped that the examination of the organizational complex discussed in the preceding pages has clarified the divisions that exist among the components of the foreign policy machinery. R. Barry Farrell has attempted to portray these relationships as they exist in Eastern Europe in diagrammatic form. This figure has been modified slightly and reproduced in the next page.


An implicit dimension of the preceding discussion that deserves further mention is the topic of political communication. Kurt London has emphasized the importance of information in the policy process. "Information is the fuel for the machinery of foreign affairs. Without it, the machinery will slow down or idle."⁷¹ The patterns of political communication in social systems have become an increasingly important area of inquiry.⁷² The organization of information gathering and reporting in Soviet policy formulation has been discussed in the preceding pages but comment on the overall pattern has been reserved to this point. Fainsod's perceptions of this process are worth quoting at length:

⁷⁰R. Barry Farrell, op.cit., p.54.

⁷¹K. London, The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p.14.

⁷²Two of the better known and important works in this field are Karl Deutsch's The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966); and R.R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).

FIGURE 2. COMMUNIST PARTY AND STATE ORGANIZATION FOR FORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY



What the rulers read reflects the selections and emphases of a screening staff, which may be guided by its own preconditioning as well as its sensitivity to the anticipated reactions of its readers. The tendency to embrace data that confirm established predilections while rejecting the unpalatable facts that offend one's preconditions is a weakness from which no one is wholly free. Totalitarian societies with a strong ideological commitment appear to be particularly susceptible to such manipulation. Every dictatorship has a tendency to breed sycophancy and to discourage independence in its bureaucratic hierarchy....

No dictatorial regime can wholly escape the distortion of this echo effect. The ideological screen through which facts are received, filtered and appraised contributes to an additional possibility of misrepresentation. The danger in the case of the Soviet Union is accentuated by the rigid doctrinal stereotypes about the outside world which acceptance of Communist ideology imposes."⁷³

A chronic problem of the Soviet communication process, then, is that "rings of silence" are likely to develop in the communication channels to the decision-makers. Perhaps this is compensated somewhat by the fact that the Soviet elites maintain a number of hierarchies of information gathering and processing. They, therefore, are not excessively dependent on any one channel of information.⁷⁴ One information source not discussed thus far is the staff of research facilities oriented to analysis of foreign affairs and international relations, especially the Moscow Institute of World Economics and International Relations which is within the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The analysis of international relations has developed rapidly in the Soviet

⁷³M.Fainsod, op.cit., pp.340-341.

⁷⁴A.Kaznacheev, op.cit., pp.79-95 and pp.179-187.

Union since 1956 into an autonomous and self-conscious discipline.⁷⁵ Prior to 1956 this was an insignificant and practically unrecognized area of inquiry in the Soviet Union. However, this information source became especially important toward the end of the Khrushchev interlude. William Zimmerman has wondered whether "the years 1963-64 may be viewed as the adumbration of a new era in Soviet inquiry in which specialists engaged in technically sophisticated short or middle-range theorizing on topics of policy relevance to the regime; or they merely represent an idiosyncratic phenomenon -- a product perhaps of the post-Cuban missile crisis atmosphere in the Soviet Union and of dissension within the ruling group. The evidence thus far is mixed."⁷⁶ One critical source of information the Soviet leaders lack, comparative to Western political systems, is that of public opinion.⁷⁷ So long as the Soviet elite ignore the possibilities of establishing channels for the manifestation of dissent by the general Soviet populace the preferences of

⁷⁵For an account of the evolution of this discipline see W. Zimmerman, "International Relations in the Soviet Union: The Emergence of a Discipline," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February, 1969), pp. 52-70.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 66.

⁷⁷For a discussion comparing the force, or more appropriately the lack of force of public opinion in Tsarist and Soviet Russia, see R. Pipes, "Domestic Policy and Foreign Affairs," in I. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1963), pp. 145-70.

the public will remain largely unknown.⁷⁸ Thus, it seems to me that "the learning capacity and potential for creativity" of the Soviet system, to use Karl Deutsch's terminology, are inherently handicapped.⁷⁹ Deutsch's discussion of these particular qualities does not focus on public opinion but he points out that "the ability to produce novelty and to recognize new solutions once they have been found seems related to the combinatorial richness of the system by which information is stored, processed and evaluated. This creative intelligence function in the society is not directly related to either enforcement or compliance but it forms an essential aspect of the intellectual resources on which the survival of the political or social system may depend."⁸⁰ My point relates to Deutsch's theorizing in that public opinion is a dimension of the Soviet resources which remains largely untapped. The process of Soviet decision-making is structured so that the ultimate power of decision lies in the Politbureau. The party leaders have the right and power to determine the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union. However, the

⁷⁸Dissent is allowed. Indeed, it is solicited in ideologically untroublesome areas. The general contours of policy or wisdom of the Soviet elite are not brought into question, however this dissent is utilized as pressure for more production from administrators of the areas criticized. Housing might be an appropriate example of such an issue-area.

⁷⁹K.Deutsch, op.cit., pp.163-181.

⁸⁰Ibid., p.164.

formation of policy requires the efforts of a wider circle than just the Politbureau members. Complex machinery is maintained for the conduct of foreign affairs. The party and state bureaucracies engage the services of a host of bureaucrats who attend daily to the details of policy formulation and implementation. The "leading role" of the party seems clear but, at a minimum, state administrators contribute much-needed expert technical advice. Furthermore, this system is not as monolithic as it appears but this is a subject which will be dealt with in greater detail in the third chapter. In the next chapter the discussion will focus on the elites who are important in the foreign policy process.

CHAPTER II

THE ELITE CONCEPT, SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS

According to David Easton, one of the characteristics which sets contemporary political research apart from previous work in the field is the search for "stable units of analysis which might possibly play the role in social research that the particles of matter do in the physical sciences."¹ Explicit discussion of a profusion of concepts has been witnessed recently. Action, power, system and decisions are only some of the possibilities that have been proposed as the most fruitful unit of analysis. Easton claims that this intellectual activity marks the coming of age of theory in the social sciences.² A persuasive counter-argument might be made that these concepts are so abstract and static that they are antithetical to the dynamism of the political life

¹D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 13.

²Ibid., p. 22.

they are purported to systematize. These arguments, though, fall outside the province of this analysis. The act of decision, which is perhaps the most generalized unit of analysis in contemporary political research, has been mentioned repeatedly in the previous pages. Our focus will shift now to the men who take part in the making of Soviet foreign policy decisions. In order to know something about the men who make Soviet foreign policy, the methods of elite analysis have been utilized. Since it is impossible to interview or psychoanalyze the Soviet political elites, this admittedly imperfect alternative can be used to gain some sound evidence pertaining to the type of men who occupy decision-making positions in the Soviet Union.

The origins of the elite concept in social science are attributed by T.B. Bottomore to middle class aversion to Marx's social theory.³ Bottomore argues that this aversion provided the motivation for Pareto and Mosca's development of the elite concept in opposition to the concept of social classes. Machiavelli, though, addressed himself to instructing a political elite.⁴ Indeed, the origins of the elite concept might be dated back as far as Plato's notion of philosopher-kings.⁵ Whatever its origins, the elite concept

³T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1966), p.19.

⁴N. Machiavelli, The Prince (ed.) T.G. Bergin (New York, 1947).

⁵Plato, The Republic, translated by F.M. Cornford (New York, 1945), pp.175-265.

is much in evidence in contemporary political analysis. Indeed, Harold Lasswell has asserted that "by this time recognition is widespread that the world inclusive study of power elites is indispensable to all serious inquiry into political processes."⁶

In all societies there are many different kinds of elites. In our own society we can point to social, economic, military, cultural, and political elites. Suzanne Keller has written an erudite and stimulating study which identifies four main types of elites in modern societies.⁷ Keller has adopted the conceptual framework of Talcott Parsons which identifies four functional problems -- goal attainment, adaptation, integration and pattern maintenance, and tension management -- common to all social systems. The strategic elites are aligned with these four functional problems. Keller emphasizes the functional consequences of strategic elites. "They are a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way.... as societies become occupationally and educationally more differentiated elites become ever more important both as guardians and creators of collective values and as managers of collective aims and ambitions."⁸ The goal attainment of political elites

⁶H.Lasswell "Introduction: The Study of Political Elites," in H.Lasswell and D.Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.4.

⁷Suzanne Keller, Beyond The Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963).

⁸Ibid., pp. 5-6.

are socially decisive in the Soviet system. Whereas, in other social systems a number of elites co-exist. Within the Soviet system an entrenched and extraordinarily powerful group lays claim to the right to direct all aspects of social life. Thus, the elite concept is well-tailored to the conditions existing in Soviet society.

Harold Lasswell is perhaps the best recognized of contemporary elite theorists. In fact, he has equated the study of politics with the study of elites. "The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential.... The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get.... Those who get the most are the elites; the rest are the mass."⁹ Lasswell's writings seldom refer specifically to the Soviet Union but they are of a general theoretical cast and have some application. He suggests that political elites must possess certain skills. Political elites rise on the ladder of power and maintain their ascendancy through manipulation of their environment. Lasswell specifies that political elites manipulate symbols, violence, goods (their destruction, withdrawal and apportionment), and practices (that is, the recruitment and training procedures and the forms of policy-making and administration),¹⁰ An effective political personality,

⁹H.Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958 edition), p.13.

¹⁰Ibid., pp.31-94.

according to Lasswell, is one which combines an emphatic demand for deference, along with skill in manipulation.¹¹ Political elites, then, are those who have more influence in the political sphere than the masses. Those who exert real influence in the politics of any society are always very limited in number. They enjoy special rights, prestige and certain socio-economic privileges, or, as Lasswell puts it, they enjoy more safety, income and deference than the masses. However, at the same time, they are burdened with more responsibilities. Lasswell persuasively expounds the idea, then, that society is a pyramid which has at its apex a small elite who constitute the high command of the society. The elite embraces, as well, those in subordinate positions who exert more influence on policy formulation than do the ordinary citizenry.

C.Wright Mills is another interesting and controversial Western social scientist who has utilized the elite concept. His book, The Power Elite, is at one and the same time an analysis and indictment of the American power structure. Some of his observations, though, have more general application. Mills perceived that industrial societies (capitalist or non-capitalist) are subject to many of the same dynamic forces.¹² Modern mass societies are subject to

¹¹H.Lasswell, World Revolutionary Elites, p.12.

¹²See the chapter on Mass Society. C.Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 298-324.

an ever-increasing rationalization due to revolutionary changes in technology and the development of bureaucracy. Whether Mills' portrayal misrepresents the power structure of the United States is a source of debate.¹³ However, it is appropriate in certain respects to the conditions existing in the Soviet Union. Thus, the power elite make the crucial policy decisions and there are few constraints to which they are subject. The masses have been atomized and are relatively powerless because they lack autonomous social bases for competing in a power struggle. Particularly appropriate to Soviet conditions is the emphasis on the attempted manipulation of the masses by organizations and media controlled by the power elite. Mills warned that prospects for change of elite monopoly of decision-making are not promising. "As the institutional means of power and means of communications that tie them together have become steadily more efficient, those now in command of them have come into command of instruments of rule quite unsurpassed in the history of mankind. And we are not yet at the climax of their development."¹⁴

¹³For critiques of Mills by American social scientists who disagree with his notion of a unified elite. See R.Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, Vol.52, No.2 (June, 1956), pp. 463-469; and T.Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics, X, (October, 1957), pp. 123-143.

¹⁴C.Wright Mills, op.cit., p.23.

Lasswell has identified the political elite as those who influence public policy. These individuals might be those who have legitimate political authority because of the office they hold or they might be individuals who have power in fact whether they hold office or not. Thus, private income or social stature might enable a person to exert more influence on policy formulation than an official office-holder which complicates the task of identifying the elite. However, the task of identification of the political elite within the Soviet Union is facilitated by the central command structure that exists in the USSR.

The primacy of the Party in the Soviet system is a theme that has been underlined in the first chapter of this analysis. Party membership is prerequisite to the holding of a power elite position. However, not all party members can be considered a part of the political elite. The general party membership has gradually swollen to over twelve million and even in Western democracies the political elite embraces at the most a few thousand. The Soviet political system, like every political system, "is continually involved in recruiting individuals into political roles.... The recruitment function must be performed if its roles are to be manned and its structures to function."¹⁵ The focus in this discussion is confined to those who have been recruited into positions

¹⁵G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 22.

in the decision-making machinery relevant to foreign policy formulation.

Soviet social structure simplifies this identification in that it is not necessary to consider whether or not private vested interests were able to influence those in public positions to engage in foreign adventures. Foreign policy elites are those individuals who staff the party and state organs discussed in the first chapter. Positional criteria are the most reliable guide to elite status in the Soviet context.¹⁶ However, not all of the functionaries staffing the party and state organs dealing with foreign affairs can be considered elites. The importance of Central Committee membership to political figures was mentioned in the last chapter.¹⁷ The Central Committee of the CPSU, in fact, provides a logical cutting off point for distinguishing political elites in the Soviet Union. It includes the party leader, Politbureau and Secretariat members, and the most prominent party and government officials. Leading figures from the other important sectors of society are included as well. The Central Committee is currently made up of one hundred and ninety-five full members, and

¹⁶I am indebted to Prof. Peter Potichnyj of McMaster University for much of the comment to follow on boundaries of the elite sample, the importance of Central Committee membership and for suggestion of a variety of variables that might be tested against the elite.

¹⁷See p.43.

one hundred and sixty-five alternate members. Although the Central Committee is admittedly not an important locus for policy initiation, the regularity of its sessions indicates that it has become an essential component in the decision-making process. Yaroslav Bilinsky, who has written an excellent monograph analyzing changes in the committee membership from 1961 to 1966 is of the opinion that whether factional struggle intensifies in the Politbureau or the current oligarchical rule remains stable -- "the role of the CC will grow either way.... It has to grow because for decades it has been the small CC CPSU rather than the large and unwieldy Supreme Soviet that has fulfilled the function of the country's representative assembly, and there are no indications that the relationship will be reversed."¹⁸ Central Committee membership, then, sets an individual apart from his colleagues who are engaged in the performance of similar functions. There are at least four advantages of Central Committee membership which accrue to an individual. One advantage is enhancement of one's status and prestige, which in turn might be translated into power. Another advantage is that one's career chances are enhanced by sheer force of visibility. A Central Committee member has greater access to the key leadership. Therefore, he has greater chance of creating a strong impression. Further, an individual's security vis-a-vis his colleagues is strengthened due to

¹⁸Y. Bilinsky, op.cit., p.2.

his association with those who exercise ultimate sanctions in Soviet society. Thus, the prospects of securing the cooperation of one's subordinates is furthered. Finally, the Central Committee member has access to information. This can be vitally important in Soviet power struggles. The Central Committee member has an institutionalized advantage in that he has access to information on policies before they are promulgated. Similarly the political leaders can keep themselves informed of the preferences of the functional elites throughout the Soviet Union before finalizing their decisions.

The elite sample in question here is composed, then, of those individuals who are Central Committee members and who serve in the organs oriented to foreign affairs. However, not all of these individuals enjoy equal importance in the policy process. The best objective indicator of elite status in the Soviet context is the placement of an individual on the ladder of positions established in the Party and government bureaucracies. The elite sample, therefore, has been divided into a fourfold hierarchy. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that any given individual will wield power disproportionate to his official station. A. N. Poskrebyshev, Stalin's personal secretary, for instance, is a figure with a sinister reputation who quite possibly exercised great influence on policy and personnel

selection.¹⁹ However, the gradations of political influence in the Soviet Union generally correspond to positional criteria. The bulk of power lies with those who hold key positions in the party and government hierarchies. The elite sample, therefore, has been divided for classificatory purposes into (1) salient elites, (2) elites, (3) sub-elites, and (4) marginal elites. Politbureau members have been categorized as salient elites. Elites include (1) party secretaries, (2) members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and (3) those ministers and deputy ministers concerned with foreign affairs. Sub-elites include (1) the chairmen of those staff agencies which are oriented to foreign affairs and which are responsible to the Secretariat, (2) ambassadors whose careers have been served essentially in the party apparatus, (3) ambassadors in the major countries of the world, and (4) chairmen of the state committees with foreign affairs duties. Marginal elites include any figures affiliated with one of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Commissions or with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This is admittedly an awkward device but it does serve to differentiate the figures of this sample of one hundred and twelve in order of decreasing

¹⁹Robert Slusser constructs an interesting but questionable case concerning Poskrebyshev's influence. See R. Slusser, "America, China and the Hydra-headed Opposition: The dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy," in P. Juvilier and H. Morton, eds., Soviet Policy Making (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 186-260.

importance.

The principal strategy for study of the Soviet elite entails the laborious exercise of collecting and analyzing the social background and career pattern data available on the elite. The secrecy which characterizes Soviet politics does pose difficulties. Relatively little is known, for instance, about the private lives of the Soviet elite. This is not a fatal handicap, though, because the Soviet official is so pressured by the burden of his duties that he has relatively little time to cultivate interests outside his official existence.²⁰ The public careers of these officials are, in fact, relatively well documented.²¹ Therefore, it was possible to collect data on the social backgrounds and careers of the one hundred and twelve elites in the sample. Data was collected on such variables as age, sex, nationality and education, with the assumption that social backgrounds and career experiences importantly affect elite attitudes. Altogether data was collected on thirty-seven variables. Frequency distributions were made of all variables and then a correlation matrix was utilized to ascertain relationships between two of the variables, education and nationality, and

²⁰J. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1959), p. 11.

²¹Career pattern and social background data was drawn from the following sources: L. Crowley, A. I. Lebed, and H. E. Schultz eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey, 1968); H. E. Schulz and S. S. Taylor, Who's Who in the USSR 1961-1962 (Montreal, 1962); and -----, Who's Who in the USSR 1965-1966 (Montreal, 1965).

the rest of the variables. The limitations of this analytical approach have been forcefully underlined by Dankwart Rustow who has pointed out that "a study of social background can furnish clues for a study of political performance but that the first cannot substitute for the second."²²

R. Barry Farrell collected data on a sample similar to the one here, but it was restricted to those who held office in 1964. His study was a comparative one and he found that Soviet elites are generally better educated, older and have more experience in foreign affairs than their counterparts in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. From a sample of seventy-four, it was found that seventy-two and six-tenths percent had university education or beyond, more than fifty percent had more than ten years experience and that fifty-seven per cent were fifty to fifty-nine years of age.²³ Another study by D. D. Finley focuses explicitly on the backgrounds of what are the salient elites in this sample. He has constructed a composite profile which shows that the salient elite

.... is a man just over sixty years old, who became a Communist just before or after the Revolution. He has had some higher education, probably received in his late twenties and with an even chance that it was in the practically oriented, bootstrap technical schools of Stalin's USSR. He is a product of the European USSR geographically and culturally. He probably owes his elite status to success in Party administration posts and to a highly developed political sensitivity that has enabled him to foresee shifts both in the

²²D.A.Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How," World Politics, Vol. XVIII (July, 1966), p. 699.

²³R.Barry Farrell, op.cit., p.44

pattern of power and of policy. He has survived the Stalin purges as a party official and has been a member of the Central Committee over the transition from Stalinism to "peaceful coexistence."²⁴

The social class of elites is a variable that is usually included in elite studies. Knowledge of a person's class origins generally provides a good indication of their life's chances. The top political leaders of the Soviet Union are drawn primarily from working class or peasant backgrounds.²⁵ This does not mean that they were workers or peasants, but that their parents were of this class. Seymour Lipsett's investigations have led him to the conclusion that in Western social systems the lower classes seem to be the least tolerant and flexible in society.²⁶ According to Lipsett they tend to simplify issues in rigid opinionated terms.²⁷ Brzezinski and Huntington press a similar conclusion in regard to the Soviet political elite. Soviet political elites, according to these authorities, "simplify issues and reduce them to black and white categories."²⁸ Individuals of lower class origin, then, prevail among the

²⁴D.D.Finley, "Soviet Foreign Policy" (Stanford University: Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 1966), p.172.

²⁵Z.Brzezinski and S.P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, p.135.

²⁶S.M.Lipsett, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1958), pp.85-126.

²⁷Ibid., p.76.

²⁸Z.Brzezinski and S.P.Huntington, op.cit., p.140.

Soviet political elite. Brzezinski has speculated that the failure of the political elite to tap other sources of social talent thus far may be a signal of degeneration of the Soviet political system.²⁹

Nationality is another aspect of an individual's social origins which importantly shapes his life's chances. Previous studies on elite social backgrounds in Germany and France have shown that nationality is significantly important in explaining elite attitudes.³⁰ Russians account for approximately one hundred and fifteen million of the two hundred and ten million Soviet people. Ukrainians account for thirty-seven million and Belorussians for eight million. Thus, the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly Slavic in population. It is at the same time a remarkably diverse population encompassing twenty-two nationalities. Brzezinski has speculated that the nationalities issue is a potentially explosive one. Thus he argues that if the situation continues to develop along its present pattern the possibility of a crisis of even greater proportions than the American racial problem

²⁹Z. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration" in Z. Brzezinski, ed., Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967 revised edition), p. 124.

³⁰See K.W. Deutsch, Lewis T. Edinger, R.C. Macridis and R.L. Meritt, Arms Control and European Unity: Elite Attitudes and Their Background in France and the German Federal Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

is likely.³¹ The predominance of Russians in the Soviet power elite would likely prove to be one of the outstanding issues in this crisis. Russian predominance is not clear through quantitative measurements but the detailed investigations of Severyn Bialer have led him to emphasize a qualitative predominance. That is, Russians are normally in the positions that are especially important. Ukrainians also enjoy a significant measure of trust but other nationalities are generally restricted to positions which entail local duties.³²

The Soviet political elites would not admit to the possibility that national peculiarities could affect their scientific outlook on foreign policy. Many in the West, though, have been impressed by the continuities in the themes of the foreign policy of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. As Adam Ulam so eloquently puts it: "Communism, a materialistic and rationalist philosophy with international roots and pretensions appears today to many as just another emanation of Russian imperialism of the nineteenth century, of nationalism and panslavism founded, among other things, upon a semi-mystical if not obscurantist notion of the uniqueness of Russian society and the special historical

³¹Z.Brzezinski, "Reflections on the Soviet System," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVII, No.3 (May-June, 1968), p.48.

³²S.Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia, Problems of Communism, Vol.VIII, No.5 (September-October, 1964), p.52.

mission of the Slavs."³³ The question of national interest in Soviet foreign policy will not be pressed here. It is maintained, though, that nationality is clearly important in the careers of the elites involved here and that it is one of the factors shaping the outlook of these individuals.

Thirty-five members of the elite sample of one hundred and twelve were Russians. Ukrainians and Belorussians accounted together for eleven of the sample. There was one Georgian, a Latvian, a Lithuanian, a Jew and the Kazakhs and Uzbeks, together, accounted for five. It was not possible to determine the nationalities of thirty-one individuals and twenty-six others were assigned on the basis of their names to a presumed Slav category.

Nationality was correlated with the other variables on which it was possible to collect data. A correlation with geographic mobility indicated that Russians and the presumed Slavs, who are probably mostly Russian, enjoyed positions which allowed the most travel outside the Soviet Union. Seven indices of geographic mobility were established. Individuals were categorized according to whether they had held positions only within the USSR; if they held positions outside the USSR but in the Communist bloc and finally, if they held positions both in the Communist bloc and outside the Communist bloc. Similarly, individuals were categorized

³³A.B.Ulam, "Nationalism, Pan Slavism, Communism," in I.J.Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1962), p.39.

according to whether they were members of delegations outside the Soviet Union but in the Communist bloc and if they were members of delegations which went outside the Communist bloc, and finally, if they were members of delegations to both the Communist bloc and the world outside the Communist bloc. The Russians in the sample accounted for seventy-five per cent of those who attended delegations in the Communist bloc and sixty-four per cent of those who attended delegations outside the Communist bloc. The presumed Slavs accounted for twenty-five per cent of the first delegation category and seven per cent of the second. Travel outside the Soviet Union is granted to individuals who enjoy a strong measure of trust. The Slavs in the sample enjoyed this privilege more than the other nationalities. Presumed Slavs accounted for eighty-three point three per cent of those holding positions outside the USSR. This high percentage is explained by the fact that the data source seldom gave the nationalities of the diplomats in the sample but most of these individuals had Slavic names. (See Table next page.)

The monist character of Soviet rule has been noted by a number of distinguished scholars.³⁴ George Fischer has elaborated this concept recently in greater detail than was

³⁴See S.Bialer, "But Some are More Equal than Others" in A.Brumberg, ed., Russia under Khrushchev (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p.254, and Gordon Skillling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, Vol. XVIII (April, 1966), p.449.

TABLE I Digits express percentage of each mobility index accounted for by the given nationalities in the sample.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Ukrainians and Belorussians	Georgians	Kazak and Uzbek	Latvian and Lithuan- ian	Russian	Jew	Presumed Slav
Positions inside USSR only	16.7	4.2	12.5	0.0	50.0	0.0	16.7
Positions held within Communist Bloc	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	71.4
Positions outside the Communist Bloc	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	83.3
Positions both in Communist Bloc and Outside of it	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Delegations to Communist Bloc	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	0.0	25.0
Delegations outside Communist Bloc	14.3	0.0	7.1	7.1	64.3	0.0	7.1
Delegations both outside and within Communist Bloc	15.4	0.0	3.8	33.8	38.5	0.0	38.5

formerly the case.³⁵ Fischer, as mentioned earlier, maintains that pluralism is not the predetermined form for modern society. Fischer argues that social autonomy need not hold modern complex society together. "The monist mechanism consists of the executives getting and then using technical skills, in the various major spheres (most of all in the economic sphere) to counteract the proliferation of specialized activities and the very real pressures these may set up for division of labour. As this mechanism fuses two kinds of skills -- economic and political -- we can call it a mechanism of dual leadership skills."³⁶ Those with dual leadership skills, then, according to Fischer, are the most crucial segment of the Soviet political elite. Engineering training is regarded by Fischer as one of the most relevant to guidance of modern complex society, and the acquisition of dual leadership skills. The non-political professions of those in the sample were accounted for and it was found that forty point eight per cent of the Russians in the sample were industrial engineers by profession and they accounted for fifty-four point two per cent of all those who were engineers. A remaining thirty-seven point five per cent of the industrial engineers were made up of presumed Slavs. The Ukrainians and Belorussians were oriented

³⁵G. Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society (New York, 1968).

³⁶Ibid., p.14.

to the military and accounted for thirty-eight point five per cent of those whose non-political profession would be the military. The Russians and presumed Slavs, if Fischer is correct in his analysis of the importance of dual leadership skills, are particularly well-trained, then, to provide these cadres and therefore perpetuate Russian predominance in the top political leadership.

This may account for the fact that the analysis of this sample indicates that the proportion of Russians coming into what were categorized as "high-high" positions has increased recently.³⁷ (See Table Two) For all of the individuals in the sample the first important "high-high" position they served in was coded. It was found that prior to 1939, Russians accounted for thirty point eight per cent of the sample who came into "high-high" positions but from 1958-1964 they accounted for fifty per cent of those who came into these positions.

An attempt was made to gauge the horizontal mobility of the elites. All the positions held by each of the elites

³⁷"High-high" and "high-low" positions were two of the variables on which data was collected. Dividing lines were established for each of the apparatuses to mark when an individual moved into a significantly important position. A "high-low" position would be the first prominent position occupied. A "high-low" position in the party apparatus, for instance, would be a post as a Central Committee worker in an important republic. "High-high" positions marked the first decision-making position occupied, such as an Obkom secretary.

TABLE No.2

Year of High-High Position Attainment	Uks. and Belo- Russians	Georgian	Kazak and Uzbek	Latvian and Lithuanian	Russian	Presumed Slavs	Jews
1. Prior to 1939	7.7	0.0	7.7	0.0	30.8	53.8	0.0
2. War Years	16.0	0.0	8.0	8.0	44.0	24.0	0.0
3. 1945-1953	15.8	5.3	0.0	0.0	42.1	36.8	0.0
4. 1953-1957	14.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	50.0	14.3	7.1
5. 1958-1964	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	50.0

Digits express percentage of High-High positions occupied by given nationalities in the sample in each time period.

were coded in order to determine whether individuals circulated among the party, government and economic administrations or remained within one of these bureaucracies. Individuals who circulate among these apparatuses apparently have multiple executive skills. They supervise the work of others and are both vertically and horizontally mobile. Again, the Slavs enjoyed the greatest circulation. A differentiation was made between those who had a low circulation and a high circulation among these apparatuses. Russians and presumed Slavs clearly accounted for the majority of those who have this mobility whether the circulation among organizations is high or low. This evidence supports George Fischer's argument that "the nationality factor leads to an unusual ethnic division of labour: different tasks or combinations of tasks are assigned to top party executives from the country's main ethnic group than are assigned to those from other nationalities."³⁸

This sample of foreign policy elites is dominated by Russians and presumed Slavs, who are probably in large part Russians as well. The influence of nationality on their foreign policy outlook is problematical but those who perceive a strong flavour of Great Russian chauvinism in Soviet foreign policy will not be surprised by the predominance of Russians in the Soviet foreign policy elite.

³⁸George Fischer, op.cit., p.87.

Educational attainment has been the focus of much attention in Western social science literature. Lipset, in particular, has been interested in the correlation of levels of education and democracy. One of his more important conclusions is that "if we cannot add that a 'high' level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence suggests that it comes close to being a necessary one."³⁹ Great stress is placed on educational attainment in the Soviet Union and vast resources have been invested in the educational system. This has led to speculation that the capacity of the Soviet populace for democracy has increased.⁴⁰ Whether this is the case or not, it does seem clear that schooling affects a person's outlook and life chances in modern societies.

The Soviet educational system is decidedly oriented towards technical training. "Above all, the engineering graduate still holds a unique place in the USSR. The country's political leaders remain personally most active in bringing about ever increasing industrial output. The schooling and work of Soviet engineers are equally oriented to such output."⁴¹ The individuals in this sample reflect the technical orientation of the Soviet educational system.

³⁹S.Lipset, op.cit., p.53.

⁴⁰See J.Azrael, "Bringing Up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress," Problems of Communism, Vol.XVII, No.3 (May-June, 1968), p.31.

⁴¹G.Fischer, op.cit., p.93.

It was not possible to ascertain whether twenty-four individuals in the sample had any higher education and it seemed fairly clear that six others had not had any education beyond the elementary or secondary level. Of the three women in the sample, one went to university as did seventeen of the men. Forty-two of the men and two of the women went to institutes of a technical nature. Twenty of the men had military educations. The most notable difference in educational backgrounds of the political leadership comparative to the west is the dearth of lawyers. "In the Soviet Union.... law plays a purely instrumental role, and legal training and experience has no special relevance to a political career."⁴²

A correlation of nationality and education did not indicate an outstandingly strong orientation on the part of a nationality towards a particular educational background with the exception of the Ukrainians and Belorussians, forty-five point five per cent of whom had military backgrounds. The largest group of Russians, thirty-four point five per cent, had mining, mechanical or chemical engineering as their educational background. There was only one Latvian and one Lithuanian in the sample, both of whom were university educated. Their elite status, then, is likely due to their educational background, which counteracts the handicap of

⁴² Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, op.cit., p.146.

non-SRAPP (Slavic-stock, Russian-born apparatchik) status.

The correlation of nationality and "high-high" position has already been discussed. A correlation of education and high-high position indicated an interesting trend as well. The percentage of those coming into "high-high positions" with mechanical, chemical, and mining engineer backgrounds has gradually increased. This finding is similar to the previously mentioned research of George Fischer.⁴³ The majority of the military elites in the sample who are in the high-high category achieved this status during the war years. The recent deaths of a number of high-ranking military personnel will probably affect the current influx of those who came into "high-high" positions with military educations. The data source indicate in only a few isolated cases whether or not the individuals in the sample had attended Party schools; thus it was not possible to gauge whether this trend was increasing or decreasing. However, the Higher Party School of the Central Committee has undoubtedly been an important part of the educational experience of a number of the elites. "In 1956 two hundred officials were in attendance at the Higher Party School

⁴³Fischer argues that engineering training is the formal academic training which best equips an individual to be a dual executive. Fischer believes that a trend is emerging in which dual executives will prove to be the elites best equipped for leadership of Soviet society. George Fischer, op.cit., pp.53-64.

TABLE No.3

Yr. of Attainment of High-High Position	No Higher Education	University Education	Military Education	Mech. Mining Chemical Inst.	Trans. Agric. Inst.	Pedag. Econ. Inst.	Other Poly- tech. Inst.
Prior to 1939	25.0	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	8.3	0.0
War Years	0.0						
1945-1953	0.0	31.8	9.1	22.7	13.6	13.6	9.1
1953-1957	15.4	7.7	0.0	30.8	23.1	7.7	15.4
1957-1964	12.5	12.5	12.5	37.5	12.5	12.5	0.0

and three thousand more were studying by correspondence."⁴⁴

The elites in the sample were categorized as salient elites, elites, sub-elites and marginal elites in decreasing order of importance in the policy-making process. A correlation of educational background and elite status showed that the largest number of salient elites had technical engineering backgrounds. (See Table IV.) It is noteworthy that twelve point five per cent of the salient elites had no higher education. The potential exists, then, for conflict with the younger, better educated individuals who have been recruited into subordinate positions.⁴⁵ Those with military education accounted for the lowest percentage, six point three per cent, of the salient elites. Military elites, while a prominent segment of the elite sample, are a subordinate segment. The political leaders have been especially sensitive about the threat of Buonapartism and have generally been successful in maintaining the upper hand in their dealings with the military. The largest percentage, thirty-six point four of marginal elites have university educations. This is probably due to the fact that a significant segment of the Inter-Parliamentary Union representatives

⁴⁴Z. Brzezinski and S.P. Huntington, op.cit., p.43.

⁴⁵See Borys Lewytzkyj, "Generations in Conflict," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No.1 (January-February, 1967), pp.36-40.

TABLE No.4

	No.Higher Education	University	Military	Mech. Min. Chem.	Trans. Agric. Inst.	Econ. or Ped- ag. Inst.	Poly- tech. Inst.
Salient Elites	12.5	18.8	6.3	31.3	12.5	9.4	9.4
Elites	0.0	9.7	48.4	22.6	0.0	16.1	3.2
Sub-Elites	7.1	35.7	21.4	7.1	21.4	0.0	7.1
Marginal Elites	9.0	36.4	0.0	18.2	10.2	18.2	0.0

are prominent academicians and writers.⁴⁶

A further correlation which tended to separate those with military educations was that of educational background and age of entry into the party. Military elites tended to join slightly later than others in the sample. Fifty-seven point nine per cent of the military elites in the sample joined the party some time between their twenty-second and twenty-fifth birthday, whereas forty-two point one per cent of those with engineering education joined while they were eighteen to twenty-one years of age.

Individuals in the sample were categorized according to whatever was their general functional identification. Those who performed in foreign service positions differed somewhat in their educational backgrounds. Fifty per cent of the sample which had gone to economic or pedagogical institutes were oriented to foreign service positions. Of the whole sample of foreign service positions thirty-one point eight per cent were accounted for by those with university backgrounds and twenty-two point seven per cent by those from economic and pedagogical institutes.

Education, then, plays an important part in an individual's career chances. Further, it shapes to a certain extent, in the language of decision-making theory, an individual's "strategic image." Educational experience

⁴⁶See P.Juvilier, "Inter Parliamentary Contacts in Soviet Foreign Policy," American Slavic and Eastern European Review (February, 1961), p.28.

importantly shapes one's outlook on events. Soviet elites have predominantly experienced a technical educational background. Although the point cannot be pressed too far, it seems to me that the problems the engineer normally confronts are mathematical in nature. That is, they are subject to solution. Therefore, there may be a tendency on the part of Soviet foreign policy elites to approach foreign policy issues as problems which lend themselves to well-defined solutions. Those with educational backgrounds in the humanities and social sciences might approach these issues with more trepidation and perhaps greater sophistication. Dramatic change in the foreign policy outlook of Soviet political elites due to increased educational attainment is not likely. As John Armstrong has pointed out, "the high proportion of outright ideological indoctrination and the fact that all courses are taught from the Communist standpoint are powerful safeguards."⁴⁷

Whatever their educational backgrounds, Soviet foreign policy elites are committed with differing rates of intensity to an ideological perspective on foreign policy issues. According to the official text-book of communism, "Marxism-Leninism has great merits that distinguish it from all other philosophical systems. It does not recognize the existence of any supernatural forces or creators. It rests squarely on reality, on the real world in which we live. It

⁴⁷ J.A. Armstrong, op.cit., p.42.

liberates mankind, once and for all, from superstition and age-old spiritual bondage. It encourages independent, free and consistent thought."⁴⁸ Many in the West would counter with the charge that the Marxist-Leninist outlook is characterized by an unparalleled enslavement and stifling of the free intellect. Marxism-Leninism, at any rate, importantly affects the frame of reference of the foreign policy elites and their definitions of political situations. Thus, Brzezinski points out, "It is precisely because the ideology is both a set of conscious assumptions and purposes and part of the total historical, social and personal background of the Soviet leaders that it is so pervading and important."⁴⁹ The Soviet decision-makers, though, have certainly found it convenient to disregard a number of the specific propositions of their dogma. Conclusive objective evidence cannot be marshalled to prove or disprove interpretations of the effect of ideology on Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism, though, continues to provide the vocabulary for discussion of foreign policy issues and such is the power of auto-suggestion that even the most cynical power-oriented individual must come under its sway. Marxism-Leninism, then,

⁴⁸V. Kuusinen, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961), p.16.

⁴⁹Z. Brzezinski, "Communist Ideology and International Affairs" in Z. Brzezinski, ed., Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, 1962), p.132.

is a variable which must be considered in a discussion of elite strategic images. Though it should be accounted for, it is equally important to note that its effect is variable. Thus, there is likely a commitment of differential intensity towards the dogma on the part of the different decision-makers.⁵⁰

The power of initiation in Soviet foreign policy formulation is restricted to a small insulated number of individuals, who are predominantly party professionals who look back over approximately forty years of party service. Their career experiences have equipped them to deal with domestic issues more expertly than with foreign affairs. They are not men who are likely to favour radical change in the Soviet system or its foreign policy priorities. Armstrong has pointed out that "the Soviet system is a vast collection of personal followings, in which the success of middle-level officials depends on the patronage of dominant leaders."⁵¹ These middle-level elites are climbing the same ladder to power climbed by the dominant leaders. Thus, they probably do not represent a different species of political

⁵⁰Triska and Finley found on the basis of a content analysis of the records of the XXII CPSU Congress that "The density of doctrinal stereotypes in the verbal formulations of older members of the Soviet foreign-affairs elite will be greater than that among the younger members." See J.Triska and D.D.Finley, op.cit., p.122.

⁵¹J.Armstrong, op.cit., p.146.

animal. The bureaucratic subordinates in the organs of administration and information collection and coordination are reliable functionaries whose training has conditioned them to execute their tasks unquestioningly.

The subject of change in the Soviet political elite has been raised in a number of recent studies. Brzezinski has dwelt on the question of degeneration of this elite. "A political system can be said to degenerate when there is a perceptible decline in the quality of social talent that the political leadership attracts to itself in competition with other groups."⁵² Other analysts have been impressed by the increasingly high educational attainment of the Soviet elite. Gehlen cites the growing technological orientation of the Central Committee membership. "The trend is slowly transforming the party from a ruling elite, distinct from and superior to the functional units of society into one which contains a composite of the principal social elites for the purpose of making general high-level policy decisions on a functional basis."⁵³ The limited size of the sample and time period involved here makes generalization

⁵²Brzezinski, "Transformation or Degeneration," op.cit., p.124.

⁵³Michael P. Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the CC of the CPSU," The American Behavioural Scientist, No.9 (April, 1966), p.14.

hazardous. The increased educational attainment of the elite, though, is clear and the data involved here confirms this trend. An equally pertinent point which emerges from this data is that these increasingly formally educated elites often perform in political roles totally unrelated to their academic training. Thus, the lessons which have particular salience for these figures have been political ones. This is especially important in the case of those at the very top of the elite strata. The political leaders of today in the Soviet Union benefited from the great purges and the lessons they learned with greatest urgency were administered by Stalin and his closest associates. Increased educational attainment of the Soviet elite probably will result in a political group better equipped to administer a complex modern society. Whether it will result in any dramatic shift in the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet Union is not so clear. These priorities are being learned by the coming generation of elites in a context that does not foster diversity or challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy. As C. Wright Mills pointed out in reference to the American power elite, "Those who sit in the seats of the high and mighty are selected and formed by the means of power."⁵⁴ The selection and formation in the Soviet system has produced, thus far, a remarkably uniform type. There is little evidence to suggest that this mould has been broken.

⁵⁴C.Wright Mills, op.cit., p.361.

CHAPTER III

THE DYNAMICS OF THE POLICY PROCESS

Students of politics have long been interested in the interplay of groups and their affect on public policies. As Beard put it, "This great fact stands out clearly, that through the centuries down until our own day group interests were recognized as forming the very essence of politics both in theory and in practice."¹ The modern interest group approach to political analysis has been developed primarily by Americans with the American polity in mind but has been used since with qualified success in comparative political analysis.³ Interest group analysts have demonstrated with considerable success that groups both within and without the official authority structure of the polity play an important

¹C.Beard, The Economics Basis of Politics (New York, 1934), p.67.

²The generally recognized modern day father of interest group theory is Arthur Bentley. See A.Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago, 1908).

³G.Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, LII (March, 1958), pp.270-290; and Henry Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh, 1958).

role in shaping public policies and that public policy does not evolve in precisely the way legal and constitutional documents would lead one to believe. Conventional interest group theory maintains that the authoritative allocation of values for society is the result of a parallelogram of organized pressure group forces. Thus all relevant political behaviour tends to become group behaviour. Therefore, interest group theorists argue that it is not possible to develop an adequate explanation of the political system without studying interest group interaction. David Truman, who is generally recognized as the foremost exponent of the group approach to political analysis, has argued that "the behaviours that constitute the process of government cannot be adequately understood apart from the groups, especially the organized and potential interest groups, which are operative at any point in time."⁴ Political institutions, viewed from this perspective, are essentially arenas of conflict.

The interest group approach has been subjected to a number of cogent criticisms.⁵ It has been pointed out that

⁴D.Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1950), p. 502.

⁵See for example R.C.Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis" in R.C.Macridis and B.Brown, eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois, 1964), pp.139-144; H.Eckstein, "Group Theory and Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," in H.Eckstein and D.Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York, 1963), pp.387-389; and J.Lapalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," ibid., pp. 421-430.

interest group theory has little or nothing to say about the political culture existing in a system under examination.⁶ Further, knowledge of interest group activity does not enable the analyst to explain the structural framework in which groups operate.⁷ Harry Eckstein contends that the interest group approach fails to meet scientific criteria. "Nothing in it can be correlated, nothing depicted on a two dimensional or multidimensional graph.... It does not make the terminology of political science more precise."⁸ The general consensus which these critics arrive at is that the limits of the interest group approach are such that it cannot provide an adequate general theory of politics. It does not enable an analyst to make "if-then" propositions about political life. This limitation is not a fatal one in my estimation. I would agree that the interest group approach is inherently incapable of providing a theory of the entire political process. However, this shortcoming does not disqualify the interest group approach from the methods of inquiry available to political scientists. While this approach might have limited import for the advance of political theory it has significant utility as an analytical tool.⁹ The interest group approach is especially useful in

⁶R.C.Macridis, *op.cit.*, pp.139-144.

⁷*Ibid.*, p.142.

⁸H.Eckstein, *op.cit.*, pp.392-393.

⁹For a similar argument, see Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCXIX (September, 1968), p.106.

alerting the analyst to what forces are operative in specific issue areas and thereby makes an important contribution to the study of the policy process and the general operation of the political system. The group approach provides "a useful way to talk about and analyze the political process."¹⁰ Although the group approach has provided a useful way to talk about the political process, terminological confusion is evident. Lasswell and Kaplan identify special interest groups, general interest groups, expediency interest groups and principled groups.¹¹ Almond and Powell have developed another classification scheme. They identify anomic, non-associational, associational and institutional interest groups.¹² It seems that there are a variety of forms or types of interest groups operative in Western political systems.

The possibility that interest groups might affect the policy progress in the Soviet Union would not have been recognized only a generation ago. Indeed, Soviet leaders would deny that pressure groups with distinct interests could affect Soviet policy in the present age. The pretensions of Soviet doctrine to universality denies the right of

¹⁰Ibid., p.105.

¹¹H.Lasswell and A.Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), pp.29-51.

¹²G.Almond and G.Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966), pp. 74-79.

autonomous groups to have views independent of the Party.

"In the Soviet jargon an interest group that develops interests that deviate from the party line is a hostile class, the faction that represent it within the party is an attempt to form a party within a party, and its articulated views on policy and doctrine constitute an ideological deviation."¹³

There is, however, a significant gap between Soviet theory and reality. The fact that Soviet doctrine denies interest groups the right to existence has not entirely eliminated conflicts of interest and tendencies towards group politics in the Soviet Union. It has become a common-place observation in the post-Stalin era that the circle of decision-making has widened in the Soviet Union. It has been pointed out, for instance, that group awareness has gradually developed within the Soviet polity and that groups have increasingly enjoyed success in gaining access to Soviet decision-makers.¹⁴ The monolithic patterns of Stalinist decision-making have not been maintained by Stalin's successors and it has become increasingly clear that a modified form of group conflict exists in the Soviet polity.

¹³V.V.Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in R.C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962), p.163. Frederick Barghoorn makes a similar point in his discussion of Soviet political culture. See F.Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966), pp. 20-21.

¹⁴Michael P. Gehlen, The Politics of Coexistence (Bloomington, Indiana, 1967), p.40.

It might seem, then, that the interest group approach to political analysis might be useful to students of Soviet politics. However, the conventional interest group approach has focused essentially on well-defined pressure groups and the conditions in Soviet society are such that it is not possible to observe and analyze distinct pressure groups. Thus, a persuasive argument has been made which recommends that we would be better off jettisoning the conventional interest group approach altogether in discussing Soviet politics.¹⁵ This particular author recommends that if we return to the work of Arthur Bentley, the father of the modern group approach, we will find a notion more appropriate to the analysis of group activity in Soviet politics.¹⁶

Bentley is an interesting figure who has aroused the ire of a number of critics.¹⁷ He rejected psychological explanations as a basis for political analysis. The use of metaphysics in the explanation of political phenomena was largely speculative nonsense in Bentley's view and he characterized it as so much "soul-stuff." He wrote in the

¹⁵Franklyn J. Griffiths, "Interest Group Activity and the Soviet Political System," unpublished paper read to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association (June, 1968).

¹⁶Ibid., p.15.

¹⁷For example see, Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image (New York, 1964), pp.99-110, and B.Crick, The American Science of Politics (Los Angeles, 1964), pp.118-130.

fly-leaf of his book, The Process of Government, that "This book is an attempt to fashion a tool,"¹⁸ The publication of a legion of studies on interest groups since would indicate that Bentley enjoyed remarkable success in his attempt. Bentley's conception of interest-group activity differs markedly, however, from the "billiard-ball" conception so much in evidence in contemporary literature. The emphasis was on activity more than on group in Bentley's work. His conception of a group was any mass of human activity tending in a common direction. He also distinguished "certain forms which are not palpable or evident to the same extent... One way of stating them is to call them tendencies of activity."¹⁹ This rather impressionistic notion, it has been convincingly argued, is particularly appropriate to the political conditions which exist in Soviet society.²⁰ While it is not possible to observe autonomous interest groups with effective operative sanctions in Soviet political life, it is possible to discern conflicting "tendencies of articulation" on specific issue areas. The communication of differing expectations and expert judgments on specific issues can be observed in the Soviet context, whereas the demonstration of interaction on the part of a coherent group of men cannot. Similar expectations on an issue constitute a tendency.

¹⁸A. Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago, 1908).

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 185-186.

²⁰Franklyn Griffiths, op.cit., p. 20.

The nationality issue in the Soviet Union provides an excellent example of the competition of opposing tendencies. The timetable for the movement of Soviet nations towards full unity is a particular source of contention. There is apparently a division between those who prefer a rapid merging as the most appropriate policy and those who favour what they have called, a prolonged flourishing of nations.²¹ It might be noted at this point that the very existence of a number of nationalities within the Soviet Union affects the foreign policy process in the USSR. The stance the Soviet Union assumes in relation to various nations is in part determined by the internal ethnic composition of the Soviet Union. Only one example that might be cited is the Armenian irredentist claims on Turkey. These claims, it has been reported, have not been forgotten and are manifestations of a deep-rooted Armenian nationalism.²² Thus, on issues which affect the traditional interests of the various nationalities, it is possible to speak of a given nationality as a "tendency of articulation." Griffiths is convincing in his argument that "tendency analysis" is more appropriate to Soviet conditions than "group" analysis. Unfortunately, he is not particularly

²¹For an insightful discussion of this conflict of interest see G.Hodnett, "What's In a Nation," Problems of Communism, Vol.XVI, No.5 (September-October, 1967), pp.2-15.

²²Mary Matossian, "The Armenians," Problems of Communism, Vol.XVI, No.5 (September-October, 1967), p.69.

helpful on the source of these tendencies.

Generally those analysts who have attempted to identify interest groups in the Soviet system refer in most cases to what are "institutional groups" in Almond and Powell's taxonomy. Thus, the party apparatchiki, the military, the economic bureaucracy, the governmental bureaucracy, and the police apparatus, have been regarded as distinct interest groups.²³ The identification of institutional groups in Soviet politics, while convenient for analytical purposes, oversimplifies the policy process. Each of these groups is split along a number of lines. Conflicts exist over ideological, sectional, generational and personal interests.²⁴ The so-called institutional groups take internally differing approaches on policy issues. Alliances are effected across institutional boundaries among those who share a common interest in a given issue-area. Thus, the source of the "tendencies" in Soviet politics are the "institutional groups" of Soviet society.

The Party is generally recognized as the main initiator of policy in the Soviet polity and its controlling position has been emphasized by numerous scholars. Krushchev

²³For example, see R.Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics (London, 1962), p.12; W.Leonard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York, 1962), pp.12-15; and M.Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1968), pp. 429-436.

²⁴Sidney Pioss argues this point convincingly. See S.I.Pioss, "Interest Groups" in A.Kassof, ed., Prospects for Soviet Society (New York, 1968), p.85.

once pointed out that "the party is responsible for everything whether it is army work, Chekist work, economic work, Soviet work -- all is subordinate to the party leadership and if anyone thinks otherwise, that means he is no Bolshevik."²⁵ Most Western scholars would concur with Khrushchev's description of the comprehensive scope of party activities. However, the party does not act as a cohesive interest group in the policy process. In fact, as Merle Fainsod has recognized, the monolithic party is a facade.²⁶ The party splits along a number of lines: apparatchik verses non-apparatchik, central officials versus regional officials, older established figures versus younger ambitious ones. The informal organization of the party, according to Fainsod, "approximates a constellation of power centres, some of greater and some lesser magnitude and each with its accompanying entourage of satellites with fields of influence extending through the party, the police, the administrative and military hierarchies."²⁷ Thus, group conflict in the Soviet Union cuts across the organizational boundaries of party, military, police and state apparatuses. Brzezinski and Huntington have portrayed the apparatchik as a figure outside of group rivalries. Their picture of the

²⁵Cited in J.A.Armstrong, op.cit., p.145.

²⁶M.Fainsod, op.cit., p.234.

²⁷Ibid., p.235.

apparatchik as a balancer -- "an expert in dealing simultaneously with a verity of issues and pressures, balancing one against another, attempting to resolve problems at the least cost to the greatest number of interests!"²⁸ - is only partially correct. The party is fragmented along a number of lines and it is more appropriately viewed as a congerie of interest groups rather than as a cohesive interest group. Thus, the apparatchik is intimately involved with, rather than outside, of group conflict.

The Soviet decision-makers, as the better Kremlinological studies have amply documented, are often seriously divided among themselves.²⁹ Conflict over power and policy is "a fundamental, normal, and centrally important fact"³⁰ of Soviet political life. Similarly, the institutional groups are also divided among themselves on most issues. The decision-makers, then, have to select from competing alternative policies and they endeavour to maximize support among the intermediate strata relevant to the resolution of a given issue.³¹

²⁸Z.Brzezinski and S.P.Huntington, op.cit., p.141.

²⁹Three of the better known works which utilized the Kremlinological approach are: R.C.Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (London, 1961), C.A.Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Maryland, 1966), and M.Tatu, op.cit.

³⁰R.C.Tucker, "The Conflict Model," Problems of Communism, Vol. XII, No.6 (November-December, 1963), p.59.

³¹Michel Tatu interprets the policy process in a similar manner. He argues that Khrushchev used the Destalinization theme to maximize support among those social constit-

The Soviet policy process, then, is one in which "we have to deal with conflicting vertical tendencies of articulation in which opposing combinations of elite and intermediate participants interact with reference to a given issue. The role of the elite members in this interaction is to articulate values, make recommendations, and formally to decide while intermediate participants are primarily influential in defining the situation for decision-making and implementation within the limits of the party line."³²

The party line in respect to relations with the Western world at the present time prescribes that the policy of peaceful coexistence be followed. The tactic of coexistence with the West had been adopted during Lenin's leadership in order to ensure the preservation of the Soviet state. A clash between imperialism and socialism was inevitable, though, in Lenin's calculus, due to fundamental antagonisms that existed between the opposing systems.³³ Stalin, too, felt that a violent clash was ultimately inevitable between the imperialist and socialist world systems.³⁴ Capitalist encirclement

encies receptive to "liberalization." Whereas Kozlov and Sublov omitted references to Destalinization in order to elicit the support of "hard-liners." See M.Tatu, op.cit., pp.24-57.

³²F.Griffiths, op.cit., pp.40-41.

³³V.Lenin, The State and Revolution (New York, 1932), p.17.

³⁴M.Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), pp.114-115.

was a spectre that was manipulated to justify internal repression and totalitarian controls throughout the history of Stalin's regime. With the massive task of post-war reconstruction largely accomplished and the passing of Stalin, the need for an objective external enemy was not so imperative. Thus, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 witnessed important doctrinal innovations. The threat of thermo-nuclear holocaust and an optimistic appraisal of Soviet opportunities for expansion of their influence without the necessity of war motivated the Soviet elites to modify their theory. Therefore, Khrushchev was able to announce that "war is not a fatalistic inevitability. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war..."³⁵ Furthermore, due to the new correlation of forces in the world, it was maintained that it was now possible for communist parties to gain power by peaceful means. The possibility of the victory of communism within given nations through electoral victories was given official sanction. The chief feature of the epoch, according to Khrushchev, was the emergence of a world socialist system capable of competing economically with the imperialist camp and eventually gaining its inevitable triumph.

If we take the countries that are in the socialist state system and the countries which are waging a

³⁵L.Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies II (New York, 1957), p.37.

violent struggle against imperialism and colonialism for their freedom and national independence, the preponderance of forces is now on the side of these peace-loving countries and not on the side of the imperialist states."³⁶

The policy of coexistence, then, in no way meant a laxing of the struggle versus the forces of imperialism. It provided instead a refined and updated organizational construct for the operative procedures of Khrushchev's foreign policy. Gromyko has emphasized that peaceful coexistence provides no foundation for abatement of the struggle against the class enemies of the Socialist camp:

There is no contradiction whatsoever between the Marxist-Leninist position concerning the inevitability of the victory of communism and peaceful coexistence.... Peaceful coexistence of the states of the two systems does not presuppose a compromise on ideological questions. It is impossible to reconcile the bourgeois and the Communist world outlook and indeed this is not required of the peaceful coexistence of states.³⁷

The party line of peaceful coexistence apparently enjoys general acceptance among the Soviet decision-makers.³⁸

The cardinal principle of Soviet foreign policy has always been that the Soviet state must be preserved. The destructive

³⁶L.Grulow, ed., Current Soviet Policies III (New York, 1968), p.201.

³⁷Cited in C.E.Black, "Anticipation of Communist Revolutions," in C.E.Black and T.P.Thornton, eds., Communism and Revolution (Princeton, N.J., 1964), p.433.

³⁸However, it should be noted that it does not enjoy universal acceptance. The professional military journals have featured recently a debate as to whether victory in a nuclear war is possible. For a perceptive discussion of the contrasting positions in the debate see T.W.Wolfe, "Soviet Military Policy after Khrushchev," in A.Dallin and T.B.Larson, eds., Soviet Politics since Khrushchev, pp.115-118.

consequences of modern nuclear warfare have made it imperative that such a war be avoided in order that the survival of the Soviet state be ensured. Thus, it has been officially recognized that "the question of war and peace is the basic question of our times.... The chief thing is to prevent a thermonuclear war...."³⁹ Khrushchev was successful, then, in establishing the party line of peaceful coexistence.

However, Khrushchev's foreign policy was given to rapid fluctuations and veers and was not as consistent as the party line of peaceful coexistence might lead one to believe. An analysis of the history of Khrushchev's foreign policy is not the task at hand but it is suggested that the reverses and veers of Khrushchev's foreign policy were due in part to the interplay of domestic tendencies with differing objectives. According to the conflict school of writers, Khrushchev's voice was privileged rather than supreme in policy formulation.⁴⁰ Khrushchev was, in the opinion of Carl Linden, on the reforming end of the Soviet political spectrum. Thus, Khrushchev returned again and again to the same themes: "agriculture, consumer goods production, resource allocation, chemicals for the parts and pieces of his persistent and seemingly elusive quest for a more

³⁹ C. Saikowski and L. Grulicow, eds., Current Soviet Policies IV (New York, 1962), p. 13.

⁴⁰ Carl Linden attempts to document this thesis throughout his study of the Khrushchev years. See C.A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore, 1966).

abundant society."⁴¹ Given Khrushchev's domestic preferences, a relaxation of international tensions was necessary.

Khrushchev certainly acknowledged that the staggering cost of maintaining nuclear and conventional forces was hampering achievement of his domestic priorities. He frankly admitted on one occasion that "the need to support the defence might of the USSR.... hinders raising the well-being of the people.... Rockets and cannons -- these are not milk, not butter, not bread and not kasha."⁴² However, Khrushchev was unable to cut back the military and heavy industry expenditures in the manner which he hinted that he would have liked. This failure was due in part to the opposition of tendencies within the Soviet Union.

Franklyn Griffiths has argued that there are three main tendencies whose preferences are manifested in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.⁴³ He has categorized

⁴¹Carl Linden, "Conflict and Authority: A Discussion," Problems of Communism, Vol.XII, No.5 (September-October, 1963), p.27.

⁴²Cf. L. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interest in Arms Control and Disarmament (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p.228.

⁴³Franklyn Griffiths defined these tendencies in an unpublished paper read to an audience of scholars specializing in Communist studies which met during the past year at McMaster University. See Franklyn Griffiths, "Soviet Policy and the Future of the Detente," unpublished paper read to the McMaster Colloquium on the USSR (October 1968) (cited by permission of the author). The author of this thesis has adopted Griffiths' definition of these tendencies. However,

the most militant tendency as "marginal anti-imperialist." Those who subscribe to this perspective accept peaceful coexistence only in its most literal sense. That is, they perceive the necessity of avoiding a nuclear clash in order that the Soviet social order may be preserved. However, they are convinced of the aggressive designs of Western imperialism and of the need for vigilance and defence preparedness. Spokesmen, such as the recently deceased Marshal Malinovsky, warn that "time has taught the imperialists nothing" and "it must not be naively supposed that the imperialists have laid down their arms. The events that we are witnessing today show that not everyone has yet learned to assess soberly the balance of forces that has taken shape on the international scene."⁴⁴ Tension-preserving policies are preferred by the proponents of this tendency and detente with the West is likely regarded as an unnecessary impediment in the struggle against imperialism. William Zimmerman, a perceptive student of Soviet-American relations, has discovered that Soviets conflict in their modes of analyzing American foreign policy.⁴⁵ Zimmerman

the relationship of these tendencies to the party line of peaceful coexistence and the illustrations used to demonstrate these relationships to be discussed in the following pages are not drawn from Griffiths' work.

⁴⁴Cf. L. Bloomfield, W.C. Clemens and F. Griffiths, op.cit., p.253.

⁴⁵Wm. Zimmerman, "Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1957-1964" (Columbia: Columbia University, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 1965).

provides the best available evidence of the existence of differing "tendencies of articulation" in the Soviet Union though he does not choose to call them that. He identifies a traditionalist mode of analyzing American foreign policy which corresponds with the outlook of the marginal anti-imperialists. This outlook is characterized by hostility towards the West. The essential homogeneity of the American ruling class is stressed and the imperialist powers are uniformly condemned. Traditional characterizations of American motives and behaviour, it might be noted, have enjoyed a resurgence in the post-Khrushchev era.⁴⁶ The predominance of this tendency in the domestic political struggle in the Soviet Union would mean a prolonged exacerbation of the international environment. However, international politics is too complicated for the black-white perceptions of this tendency to prevail persistently. The deployment of the ABM system around Moscow could be owed to the articulations of this tendency. The hesitation to install a "heavy" ABM system points at the same time to the limited persuasiveness of these articulations and the fact that this tendency coexists with others.

A second tendency which is important in the Soviet foreign policy process has been defined as the "activist

⁴⁶Wm. Zimmerman, "Soviet Perceptions of the United States," in A. Dallin and T.B. Larson, eds., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), pp.124-179.

tendency." This outlook is based on the perception that divisions exist between the capitalist countries and that these divisions are open to exploitation. Thus, the proponents of this tendency prefer a fluctuation between threatening and accommodating behaviour, in order to facilitate this exploitation. The proponents of this tendency are not averse to manipulating the threat of nuclear war in order to resolve issues in its favour. Successful short-cut effort to resolve the strategic imbalance between the Americans and Soviets would sit particularly well with this tendency. Khrushchev's failure in Cuba, though, is likely to dissuade its proponents of the feasibility of such attempts. In regards to Europe, it is likely that the activist tendency prefers a weakened NATO which allows exploitation of the divisions that exist within it. Accommodative behaviour towards the West is functional from the activist perspective because it erodes the original reasons for the existence of the Atlantic Alliance. However, tension-producing behaviour is favoured by this tendency as well. Fears of West German revanchism and the unpredictable nature of possible relations between Bonn and Washington dictates that pressure be brought to bear on the West and that tensions be generated. It is possible that this tendency prefers the survival of NATO in some form, then, as a convenient pressure point and as a guarantee that Bonn and Washington do not move into any kind of nuclear agreement. The

activist tendency is more sophisticated than the anti-marginal imperialists but it is still "hard" and therefore draws support from the guardians of Communist orthodoxy. The two tendencies have merged in the past on occasions such as the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1960 and pressed a highly intransigent position.

The main thrust for substantive detente policies with the West comes from what has been labelled the "analytic tendency." The proponents of this tendency are inclined towards the outlook that important political actors in the West are disposed to cooperate in stabilizing the international environment. The establishment of the so-called "hot line," the multi-lateral test-ban treaty, the Soviet-American agreement providing for consular facilities in each other's major cities, the astronaut recovery treaty and the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, might be viewed as successes for the analytic tendency in its competition with the other two tendencies. This tendency is characterized by a propensity to differentiate between "warmongers" and "realistic forces" in the West. Again, William Zimmerman provides evidence of the articulations of this tendency.⁴⁷ However, the proponents of this tendency do not interpret peaceful coexistence to mean that complete accord is possible with the West. They

⁴⁷Ibid., pp.168-174.

are content, though, to trust in the inevitable processes of history and to cooperate with the West on matters of mutual advantage. This tendency generally has greater awareness of the need for prudence in the conduct of foreign affairs in the nuclear age. The analytic tendency, despite Communist Chinese claims to the contrary, is not seeking through collusion with the Americans to co-manage the world. Its proponents, though, are predisposed to "adopt the position that 'reasonable men' or 'realists' are in the majority in the American ruling group."⁴⁸ Like the so-called neo-isolationists in America, this tendency articulates a concern that overinvolvement presents danger and that restraint is more feasible than a smashing forward policy.

The dynamic interplay of these tendencies and the displacement of one by another is a crucially important factor in explaining the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union at any given time. These tendencies are articulated in the newspapers and professional journals of the institutional groups discussed previously. The institutional groups are divided among themselves. The Party, the most important of the institutional groups, is fragmented along a number of lines. The study of career patterns of elites discussed in the last chapter indicated that apparatchiki circulating in a given area such as agriculture have more in common with

⁴⁸Ibid., p.169.

their counterparts in the state apparatus than with their apparatchiki brothers in other areas such as Agitprop. Institutional boundaries are broken down due to the horizontal mobility of the apparatchiki. There are further divisions between the dominant men of '38 (that is the men who benefited from the Stalinist purges and moved into positions of power at that time), and the younger, better educated individuals staffing subordinate positions. There are divisions between central and regional officials. Further, there are patron and client relationships which develop between the dominant political leaders and their subordinates which fragment the Party. The Party members act as a cohesive interest group only on highly general issues such as preservation of their privileged positions in Soviet society.⁴⁹

Thus, under Soviet conditions, while it is not possible to discern pressure groups, it is possible to discern tendencies of articulation which emanate from the institutional groups discussed above. The general Soviet public has little opportunity to manifest its policy preferences. The growing assertiveness of the technical and creative intelligentsia may develop into specific policy demands but they have not as yet been significant in the articulation of foreign policy

⁴⁹M. Tatu interprets the reuniting of the agricultural and industrial branches of the apparat and the caution in assignments of apparatchiki by the post-Khrushchev leadership to the pressures of the apparatchiki. See M. Tatu, op.cit., pp. 432-439.

demands. Larger social groupings such as the industrial workers and peasants have had even less opportunities to demonstrate their policy preferences. It seems reasonable to assume that on a basis of self-interest they could prefer detente-producing policies which relax international tensions and allow for greater allocations to spheres of production which are responsible for consumer goods. However, at the same time, the Soviet public is probably as disposed as the American public to look askance at measures which might be interpreted as "surrender" to the opposition.

Although the general Soviet public has few opportunities to express its policy preferences it should not be forgotten that the Soviet public is composed of a number of nationalities which have their own traditional national interests. The nationalities clearly do not have the immediate power or influence of the "institutional groups" in Soviet society but their very existence shapes Soviet policy. The Union Republics have been allowed, thus far, to retain their national symbolism. Indeed, each of the Union Republics has nominal independence in international relations and two of the republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia, have been granted membership in the United Nations. It was pointed out in the first chapter that the rights granted to the Union Republics cannot be totally dismissed as a diplomatic trick wrought by Stalin in order to secure

UN membership for each of the Republics. The Union Republics have, in fact, negotiated a large number of treaties, covenants and agreements since World War II. The Soviets then, find it prudent to allow the handling of some business by the Union Republican Foreign Ministries. Similarly, they find it prudent to have certain of the nationalities represent them in given countries. A Ukrainian, for example, is generally the Soviet representative in Canada. The possibility that the nationalities may increasingly manifest differing policy preferences cannot be dismissed.⁵⁰ Professor Richard Pipes ventures the opinion that the intelligentsia indigenous to the various republics are frustrated by being able to enjoy the appearance but not the substance of power. "These two considerations --the psychological reality of statehood and the discontent of the native intelligentsia, especially those serving in the bureaucracy -- endow Soviet federalism with a significance it lacks when viewed purely from the point of view of power distribution. Devised to mollify nationalism, it in effect intensifies it and provides it with institutional outlets."⁵¹ The explosiveness of the nationalities issue in the Soviet Union is

⁵⁰Whether the Union Republic Parties would provide an effective vehicle for the articulation of these interests is questionable. This is due to the fact that Russians and Ukrainians hold key positions in the Republican party organizations. For a competent discussion of this point, see Y. Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No. 5 (September-October, 1967), pp. 16-26.

⁵¹R. Pipes, "'Solving' the Nationality Problem," ibid., p. 128.

the source of some interesting conjecture.⁵² Whether or not destructive consequences will ultimately result from this issue is a question outside the province of this paper. However, we cannot ignore the manifestations of dissent in the Soviet Union, and one of the most sensitive triggers of dissent is the nationalities issue. The dynamics of ethnic allegiance lend an element of uncertainty to the Soviet future but at present national assertiveness is empirically demonstrable and may yet profoundly affect Soviet foreign policies.

Three main tendencies of articulation can be observed in Soviet foreign policy. The usual sources of these articulations are the institutional groups of the Soviet polity, which take internally differing approaches on policy issues. Broader social groupings do not have significant access to channels of decision-making but are potentially important shapers of policy. Thus, the Party remains the main initiator of policy and its controlling position in Soviet society must be underlined. However, the party apparatus does not enjoy absolute power and it is divided within itself. Therefore, the policy process in the Soviet Union is more complex than the stereotype of a monolithic Soviet Union, so often entertained in the West, would suggest. One cannot explain the reverses, veers and contradictions of Soviet

⁵²Z. Brzezinski, "Transformation or Degeneration," op.cit., p.123.

foreign policy simply by accounting for the competition of these tendencies. The policies are as much a function of the leaders' personalities and the independent logic of external situations as they are of the internal conflict of groups. Thus, while the ebb and flow of the detente discussed above cannot be attributed solely to the interplay of "tendencies of articulation," they do play a critical role in shaping policy.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The image of a monolithic Soviet Union oversimplifies the foreign policy formulation process in the Soviet Union. The internal institutions, politics and social dynamics in the formulation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy are topics which have not received their deserved attention. The domestic foundations of Soviet foreign policy is an area critically deficient in analysis.

This particular discussion has attempted to explore this area. Specifically, it was concerned with the organization of Soviet foreign policy formulation. The three most immediately relevant points of analysis: the "political institution setting," the decision participants and the interests which impinge upon the decision-makers, have been discussed at some length.

The Party is the apparatus of outstanding importance in the organizational machinery for conduct of foreign affairs in the Soviet Union. The party apparatus cuts across and interpenetrates all the mechanisms of the Soviet

state. The leaders of the CPSU make a determined effort to conduct, control and coordinate all the activities of Soviet society. Foreign policy initiatives are the domain of the Politbureau members. The predominance of the Party in the Soviet system of rule is not questioned. However, the process of decision-making in modern societies is a complicated one. As C. E. Lindblom has pointed out, "Policy is not made once and for all; it is made and remade endlessly. Policy making is a process of successive approximation to desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration. Making policy is at best a very rough process."¹ Decision-making is a process which requires extensive machinery operating on a systematic basis. Though Politbureau members decide on new policies and initiatives in international politics, they are dependent upon others for information and its analysis. State administrators cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the process of Soviet foreign policy formulation. At a minimum, they are required to play an advisory role. Subordinates in the party and state organs of the decision-making machinery are influential, then, in defining decision-making situations and in the manner which they administer policies. The institutional context, though, structures the process of policy development so that all initiatives come from above. Power is concentrated in the

¹C. E. Lindblom, op.cit., pp.79-80.

Politbureau. This can be dysfunctional if there is no clear-cut leader in the Politbureau and if divisions exist among the members. It has been suggested recently that a policy paralysis has resulted in the present-day Soviet situation for precisely these reasons.² It seems clear, at any rate, the Stalinist monolithic patterns have eroded and decisions are no longer the emanations of the arbitrary will of one leader. At the same time, it must be noted that power is still highly concentrated among a small group of men, who make decisions which can affect all mankind. These men are not accountable, at least in the short run, to the people of their state.

The individuals who occupy the strategic positions in Soviet society have generally experienced some form of higher education. This tendency is an ever-increasing one. That is, those individuals who are coming into elite positions have even more formal academic and technical training than their predecessors. This raises the question as to whether a new breed of political elite is emerging in the Soviet Union. Michael Gehlen has stressed the point that the CPSU has been transformed due to the influx of cadres with better qualifications and academic experience

²Z.Brzezinski and W.Leonhard both make this argument. See Z.Brzezinski, "Reflections on the Soviet System," Problems of Communism, Vol.XVII, No.3 (May-June, 1968), p.47; and W.Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in A.Dallin and T.B.Larson, eds., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p.58.

than the original Bolsheviks who formerly held office.³ While current Soviet elites may have superior formal academic training, the analysis of the career pattern data of the elites in the sample involved in this discussion demonstrated that this training was often totally unrelated to the political functions many of the elites performed. Thus, it does not seem feasible to argue that a radically different type of political elite is emerging in the Soviet Union. Political generalists continue to occupy the most strategic positions in the polity.⁴ The average central committee member has been a party member for a minimum of twenty-five years. Their backgrounds do not give one the impression that these are the type of men who would welcome a fundamental transformation of the Soviet system. Though a radically different kind of leader does not appear to be in the wings, we cannot go as far as Nathan Leites who has argued that "current Soviet attitudes and images have not evolved far from their Bolshevik antecedents" thus, "the terms 'Bolshevik' and Soviet can be used interchangeably."⁵ The Soviet outlook on international relations has become more sophisticated than Leites' statement would lead one to believe.

³Michael P. Gehlen, op.cit., p.15.

⁴Political generalist is used here in the same sense as it was employed in the work of Brzezinski and Huntington. See Z.Brzezinski and S.P.Huntington, op.cit., p.141.

⁵N.Leites, "Kremlin Thoughts, Yielding, Rebuffing, Provoking, Retreating," Rand Memorandum RS1-3618-1SA (Santa Monica, California, 1963), p.iv.

Current Soviet interpretations of international relations reveal a capacity to realistically discern the operative tendencies in world politics. The Soviet elites are now willing, for instance, to recognize that there are aggressive and moderate forces in the imperialist camp. It is now possible for Soviet elites to admit that there are forces in the West disposed to seek reasonable solutions to disputed international questions. Brezhnev's address on June 7, 1969 to the International Communist Conference points out that

We know very well that the formulation of foreign policy in the major capitalist states is frequently influenced by extremely aggressive circles. In order to curb their activities what is needed is firmness.... We also recognize then the existence of a more moderate wing in the imperialist camp. While remaining our class and ideological adversaries, the representatives of this group evaluate the present balance of forces quite soberly and are inclined to seek mutually acceptable solutions to disputed international questions. Our state takes these tendencies into consideration in conducting its foreign policies.⁶

Thus, while the Soviet system continues to be dominated by political generalists, these individuals must acquire new skills and keep abreast with the changing realities of the world in order to survive in the political game. Furthermore, Soviet society has become increasingly differentiated

⁶L. I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communism, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 38 (New York, 1969), p. 16.

as the process of modernization has advanced. Thus, the dominance of the political generalists is further qualified and the goal of total social control is virtually impossible of achievement. One observer goes so far as to argue that no contemporary society can, on the one hand, run all the complex activities of the state, political, cultural, social and economic, exclusively by its own ubiquitous and omniscient servants without collaboration and bargains with, or checks by other interest groups.⁷

The discussion in the preceding pages has pointed out that there is not complete uniformity of interest in the Soviet polity. Thus, it is important to note the domestic interplay of interests. However, due to the conditions that exist in Soviet society the conventional interest group approach was not particularly appropriate for the analysis of this interplay. While it is not possible to discern coherent pressure groups in Soviet politics it is possible to analyze tendencies of articulation. The policy makers, after all, cannot operate in a vacuum. They are dependent upon the expert judgments, analyses and recommendations of the various institutional groups concerned with foreign policy. Conflicts over values, perceptions of situations and power are inescapable aspects of political life whether in the Soviet Union or the West. Thus, it was

⁷Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States (London, 1967), p.4.

argued that the requirements of peaceful coexistence are interpreted differently within the Soviet Union. One way of interpreting the fluctuation of Soviet foreign policy from aggressive to accommodative behaviour towards the West might be to argue that this was due to the predominance of either "hawkish" or "doveish" tendencies within the Soviet Union at any given time. The hawks would emphasize the historic policy priorities; the necessities of world struggle and vigilance against dangers from outside enemies. The doves' emphasis falls on stabilizing the international environment and achieving a more ordered relationship with outside powers. The hawks, then, stress heavy-industrial development, maintenance of central administration of the economy, and the importance of renewed ideological vigour; whereas the doves underline the need for consumers' goods, the further development of light industry, decentralization of the economy and material incentives in the agricultural sphere. Thus, there is a dynamic interaction of conflicting tendencies which favour different foreign policies. This interplay is an important aspect of the Soviet foreign policy process.

The decision-makers in the rarified atmosphere of the Politbureau are relatively free of the encumbrances encountered by Western decision-makers. The decision-makers do not have to "sell" policies to Congress or Parliament and negotiate with key influentials in the legislature in order

to mobilize support for their policies. Similarly, they are comparatively free of scrutiny and criticism by an independent press or opposition parties. This enables them to conduct their foreign policies with greater flexibility. It is dysfunctional, at the same time, though, as Khrushchev's febrile improvisations demonstrate. That is, the decision-makers have greater leeway to take dangerous risks which could culminate in nuclear holocaust.

The future direction of Soviet foreign policy is not clear. Vernon Aspaturian contends that the Soviet decision-makers must decide whether they are directing a state or a movement. "The current transitional attempt to behave like a state while hanging on to the rhetoric of revolution cannot be sustained indefinitely."⁸ However, the current elite have given little demonstration that they are men of the calibre necessary to creatively confront such fundamental problems. Historically, Soviet foreign policy, in periods when Soviet decision-makers considered themselves to be in a position of weakness and vulnerability, has been outwardly aggressive. If Brzezinski's diagnosis about impending domestic problems is correct,⁹ then, it is quite conceivable that the Soviet foreign policy towards the West may take on an ever more strident and aggressive tone.

⁸V.V.Aspaturian, "Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," op.cit., p.161.

⁹Z.Brzezinski, "Transformation or Degeneration," op.cit., pp.95-127.

That is, domestic imperatives may lead to the need for an objectified external threat. Thus, in order to justify the stringent internal controls which would be needed to enable the current regime to maintain its position, the bogey of an external threat might be manipulated. The specific aspects of the future foreign policy line can only be guessed at. However, it seems safe to conclude that the Soviet power elite will continue in their attempts to control Soviet society as far as possible and to expand Soviet power as widely as possible. We might also conclude that the domestic structures and politics discussed above will continue to play a considerable if not a determining role in the Soviet decision-making process.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Armstrong, John A. The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1959.
- , The Politics of Totalitarianism. New York: Random House Inc., 1961.
- , Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962.
- Aspaturian, V.V. The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy, Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1960.
- Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. The Communist Party Apparatus. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966.
- Barghoorn, F.C. Politics in the USSR. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- , Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Bentley, Arthur. The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908.
- Bilinsky, Y. Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1961-1966. University of Denver Monograph in World Affairs, Vol. 4, Monograph No. 4, Denver Colorado: University of Denver Press: 1968.
- Black, C.E. and Thornton, T.P. Communism and Revolution. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Bloomfield, L., Clemens, W.C. Jr. and Griffiths, F. Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interest in Arms Control Disarmament: 1954-1964. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1966.

- Bottomore, T.B. Elites and Society. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964.
- Brzezinski, Z., and Huntington, S.P. Political Power: USA/USSR. New York: The Viking Press, 1963.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ed. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (rev.ed.) New York: F.A.Praeger, 1967.
- Busek, Anthony. How the Communist Press Works. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1964.
- Churchward, L. Contemporary Soviet Government. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Conquest, R. Power and Policy in the USSR. London: Macmillan and Co., 1961.
- Crowley, L., Lebed, A.I., and Schulz, H.B., eds. Prominent Personalities in the USSR. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968.
- Dallin, A., and Larson, T.B., eds. Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1968.
- Daniels, R.V., ed. A Documentary History of Communism. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1962.
- Deutsch, Karl. The Nerves of Government. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
- Dinerstein, Herbert S. Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1968.
- Dzyuba, Ivan. Internationalism or Russification: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem. Ed. by M. Davies. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1968.
- Easton, D. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1965.
- Fagen, R.R. Politics and Communication. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- Fainsod, M. How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Finley, D.D., and Triska, J. Soviet Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1968.

- Fischer, George. The Soviet System and Modern Society. New York: Atherton Press, 1968.
- Friedrich, C.J., and Brzezinski, Z. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Rev.ed. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1966.
- Gehlen, Michael P. The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967.
- Goodman, Elliot. The Soviet Design for a World State. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
- Grulion, Leo. ed. Current Soviet Policies I The Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death. Translated by Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York: F.A.Praeger, Inc., 1953.
- , Current Soviet Policies II The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath. Translated by Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York: F.A.Praeger, Inc., 1957.
- Grulion, Leo. ed. Current Soviet Policies III The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Communist Party Congress. Translated by Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York: F.A.Praeger, Inc., 1960.
- Grulion, Leo and Saikowski, C. eds. Current Soviet Policies IV The Documentary Record of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Translated by Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1962.
- Kaznacheev, A. Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat. Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott Company 1962.
- Keller, Suzanne. Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society. New York: Random House, 1963.
- Kennan, G. Memoirs: 1925-1950. New York: Bantam Books, 1967.
- Khrushchev, N. The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: The New Leader, 1956.
- Kolkowicz, R. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

- Kruglak, T.E. The Two Faces of Tass. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.
- Kulski, W. Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959.
- Kuusinen, O.V. ed. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Translated and edited by Clemens Dutt. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961.
- Larson, T.B. Disarmament and Soviet Policy: 1964-1968. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1969.
- Lasswell, H. The Future of Political Science. New York: Atherton Press, 1964.
- , Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Meridian Books, 1958 edition.
- Lasswell, H., and Kaplan, A. Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Lasswell, H., and Lerner D. eds. World Revolutionary Elites. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965.
- Lederer, Ivo J. ed. Russian Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Leonhard, W. The Kremlin Since Stalin. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1962.
- Linden, C.A. Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966.
- Lipsett, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1958.
- London, Kurt. The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West. Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott Company, 1965.
- London, Kurt. The Permanent Crisis. New York: Walker and Co., 1962.
- Meisel, J. and Kozera, E. eds. Materials for the Study of the Soviet System. Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing Co., 1953.
- Merton, R. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965.

- Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Morton, H.W., and Juvilier, P. eds. Soviet Policy Making: Studies of Communism in Transition. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1967.
- Pethybridge, Roger. A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962.
- Floss, S.I. Conflict and Decision-Making in the Soviet Union. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Ritvo, Herbert. ed. The New Soviet Society. New York: The New Leader, 1962.
- Rosenau, J.N. ed. Linkage Politics. New York: Free Press, 1969.
- Schapiro, L. The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967.
- , The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1960.
- Scott, Derek. Russian Political Institutions. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1961.
- Schulz, H.E. and Taylor, S.S. Who's Who in the USSR: 1961-62. Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., 1962.
- , Who's Who in the USSR: 1965-66. Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., 1965.
- Simon, H. Administrative Behaviour. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1958.
- Snyder, R.C., Bruck, H.W., and Sapin, B. Foreign Policy Decision-Making. New York: Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1962.
- Tatu, Michel. Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin. Translated by Helen Ketel. New York: The Viking Press, 1968.
- Towster, J. Political Power in the USSR: 1917-1947. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- Treadgold, D.W. ed. The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.

Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence. New York:
F.A.Praeger, 1968.

United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
86th Congress 2nd Session, National Policy Machinery
in the Soviet Union. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1960.

-----, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Staffing Procedures
and Problems in the Soviet Union. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1963.

Wolin, Simon and Slusser, Robert. eds. The Soviet Secret
Police. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1957.

ARTICLES AND PARTS OF BOOKS

- Almond, G. "The Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Policy Process" in Comparative Politics: A Reader edited by H. Eckstein and D. Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
- Armstrong, J. "Comparative Politics and Communist Systems: Introductory Remarks." Slavic Review: A Symposium XXVI (March, 1967).
- , "Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy." International Affairs, VI (January, 1965).
- Aspaturian, V.V. "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, edited by R. Barry Farrell. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- , "Soviet Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy in World Politics, edited by B.C. Macridis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962.
- Azrael, J. "Bringing Up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress." Problems of Communism, No.3, XVII (May-June 1968).
- Bialer, S. "How Russians Rule Russia." Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, No.5 (September-October 1964)
- Bialer, S. "But Some are More Equal Than Others" in Russia Under Khrushchev, edited by A. Brumberg. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962.
- Bilinsky, Y. "The Rulers and the Ruled." Problems of Communism, Vol.XVI, No.5 (September-October 1967).
- Brzezinski, Z. "Reflections on the Soviet System." Problems of Communism, XVII, No.3. (May-June 1968).
- Cattell, David T. "Formulation of Foreign Policy in USSR" in The Control of Foreign Relations in Modern States, edited by F. Buck and M.W. Travis. New York: Norton and Co., 1957.
- Dahl, R. "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model." American Political Science Review, Vol.LII, No.2 (1958).
- Eckstein, H. "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups" in Comparative Politics: A Reader, edited by H. Eckstein. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

- Edinger, L.J. and Searing, D.D. "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry." American Political Science Review, LXI, No.2 (June, 1967).
- Farrell, R. Barry. "Foreign Policy Formulation in the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe," Eastern European Quarterly, No.1, Vol.I (March, 1967).
- , "Foreign Politics of Open and Closed Political Societies" in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, edited by R. Barry Farrell. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Fleron, F.J. Jr. "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies." Soviet Studies, No.3, Vol. XIX (1968).
- , "Note on the Explication of the Concept 'Elite' in the Study of Soviet Politics." Canadian Slavic Studies II (Spring, 1968).
- Friedrich, Carl J. "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends." Problems of Communism, No.3, XVII (May-June 1968).
- Gehlen, Michael P. "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the CC of the CPSU." The American Behavioral Scientist, XI (April 1966).
- Gehlen, Michael P. and McBride, M. "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis." American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No.4 (December 1968).
- Gillison, J.M. "New Factors of Stability in the Soviet Collective Leadership." World Politics, XIX, No.4 (July 1964).
- Hermens, F.A. "Totalitarian Power Structure and Russian Foreign Policy," Journal of Politics, XXI, No.3 (August 1959).
- Hilsman, R. "The Foreign Policy Consensus." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.3, No.4 (December 1959).
- Hodnett, Grey. "What's in a Nation?" Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No.5 (September-October 1967).
- , "The Obkom First Secretaries." Slavic Review, Vol. XXIV (December, 1965).

- Hollander, P. "Observations on Bureaucracy, Totalitarianism and the Comparative Study of Communism," Slavic Review, Vol. XXVI (June 1967).
- Inkeles, Alex. "Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society." Survey, LX (July 1966).
- Juvilier, P.H. "Interparliamentary Contacts in Soviet Foreign Policy," American Slavic and Eastern European Review (February 1961).
- Kassof, Allen. "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics, Vol. XVI, No.4 (July 1964).
- Kautsky, John H. "Communism and The Comparative Study of Development." Slavic Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1967).
- Kissinger, H. A. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in Conditions of World Order, edited by S.Hoffmann. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1968).
- Lapalombara, J. "Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," in Comparative Politics: A Reader, edited by H.Eckstein and D.Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
- Lewitzkyj, Borys. "Generations in Conflict," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (January-February 1967).
- Lindblom, C.E. "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1959).
- Macridis, R. "Groups and Group Theory," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, edited by R.C.Macridis and B.Brown. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964.
- Meyer, A.G. "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems." Slavic Review, XXVI, No.1 (March 1967).
- Moore, Barrington Jr. "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics." World Politics, Vol. VI, No.1 (October 1953).
- Parsons, T. "Evolutionary Universals in Society." American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 1964).
- , "The Distribution of Power in American Society." World Politics, X (October 1957).

- Pipes, R. "Solving the Nationality Problem." Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No. 5 (September-October 1967).
- Ploss, S.I. "Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy." Canadian Slavonic Studies I (1967).
- Rigby, T.H. "Crypto-Politics." Survey, No.50. (January, 1964).
- Rigby, T.H. "How Strong is the Leader." Problems of Communism, XI, No.5 (September-October, 1962).
- Robinson, J.A. and Majak, R.Roger. "The Theory of Decision-Making" in Contemporary Political Analysis, edited by J.C.Charlesworth. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Rosenau, J.N. "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" in Contemporary Political Analysis, edited by J.C.Charlesworth. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- Rustow, D.A. "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How." World Politics, XVIII, No. 4 (July 1966).
- Sharlet, R.S. "Systematic Political Science and Communist Systems." Slavic Review, XXVI, No.1 (March 1967).
- Simon, H.A. "Political Research: The Decision-Making Framework," in Varieties of Political Theory, edited by D.Easton. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966.
- Skilling, H.Gordon. "Interest Groups and Communist Politics." World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No.3 (April 1966).
- Snyder, R.C. "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena" in Approaches to the Study of Politics, edited by R.Young. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958.
- Sprout, Harold and Sprout, M. "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" in International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by J.N.Rosenau. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
- Triaka, Jan F. "A Model for Study of Soviet Foreign Policy." American Political Science Review, LII, No.1 (March 1958).

- Turner, John E. "The Two Succession Conflicts: An Overview," in Cases in Comparative Politics, edited by J. Christoph. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- Ulam, Adam. "The State of Soviet Studies - USA, Some Critical Reflections." Survey, No.50 (January 1964).
- Wolfe, T.W. "The Military" in Prospects for Soviet Society, edited by A.Kassof. New York: F.A.Praeger, 1968.
- , "Soviet Military Policy After Khrushchev," in Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, edited by A.Dallin and T.B.Larson. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968.
- Zimmerman, Wm. "International Relations in the Soviet Union: The Emergence of a Discipline." Journal of Politics, Vol. 31 (February 1969).

UNPUBLISHED THESES AND ESSAYS

Finley, D.D. "Soviet Foreign Policy: Decision-Making."
Stanford University: Unpublished Doctoral Thesis
(1966).

Griffiths, Franklyn. "'Interest Group' Activity and the
Soviet Political System: Some Methodological
Considerations." Unpublished paper read to
annual meeting of Canadian Political Science
Association (June 1968).

-----, "Soviet Policy and the Future of the Detente."
Unpublished paper read at McMaster Colloquium on
USSR (October 1968).

Williams, D.L. "The Indoctrinational Group in the Soviet
Political System." Columbia University: Unpublished
Doctoral Thesis (1968).

Zimmerman, Wm. "Soviet Perspectives on the International
System, 1956-64: An Inquiry into Changes in the
Soviet Appraisal of International Relations."
Columbia University. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis
(1965).