THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

IN

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

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By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: An examination of the position of the Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia today, and of factors which may influence their political behaviour in the future.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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C O N T E N T S

P R E F A C E

"The past few years have been a time of turmoil for the Overseas Chinese. Changes and challenges have come with growing frequency. The times have been so demanding and unsettling that the Overseas Chinese themselves are confused in response and apprehensive of the future. It is more than a little foolhardy for an outsider to attempt to examine the Overseas Chinese in their present condition of uncertainty and upheaval".[1]

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1. Lea E. Williams The Future of the Overseas Chinese , New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1966, p. 13, for the Council on Foreign Relations.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

"As the final third of this century opens, the Chinese of South-East Asia find themselves in an unprecedented state of anxiety. They are compelled to respond to contending nationalist forces, to communism, to revolutions, to economic chauvinism, and to the shock waves set up by power-bloc struggles. The insecurity of the Overseas Chinese endangers political stability and stunts economic growth in all the countries of the region. The menace of political extremism, both Chinese and indigenous, is nurtured by anti-Chinese discrimination and violence. Fear of official hostility, of mob attacks, prevents some Chinese entrepeneurs from making full use of their talents and their capital. Governments could be overthrown by the forces of lawlessness and the economic sickness thus produced."[1]

As the quotation which heads this chapter indicates, an assessment of the future role which the Overseas Chinese will play in the politics of South-East Asia has become increasingly important. Despite the great increase in books and monographs written about the Overseas Chinese there are still major gaps in knowledge about them.[2]

Some perceptive and careful analysis has been carried out. There is, however, no work which attempts to synthesize the existing state of knowledge for the Overseas Chinese communities as a whole. N.A. Simoniya's Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia - A Russian Study (Cornell Data Paper No. 45, Cornell, Ithaca) gives a valuable overall exposition of the Overseas Chinese from a Marxist viewpoint, but

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1. Lea. E. Williams, The Future of the Overseas Chinese, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966, p. 13.

2. Maurice Freedman/David Willmot, "Recent Researches on Race Relations : Chinese in South-East Asia", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 256.

inevitably concentrates almost entirely on the economic rather than the sociological or cultural aspects of the Chinese and the countries in which they live. The only other book which could lay some claim to providing an overall picture is V. Purcell's The Chinese in South-East Asia, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1965. This is a thorough and well documented historical analysis, but in the second revised edition makes only marginal use of the more recent sociological/anthropological studies of the Overseas Chinese.[3]

Three main areas of investigation into the Overseas Chinese will be examined in this thesis in an attempt to provide the basis for an assessment of their future role in South-East Asia. The three main areas are as follows:-

(i) the effect on the lives of the Overseas Chinese of the existence of Mainland China under Communist rule

(ii) the nature and extent of assimilation between the Overseas Chinese and the indigenous Asian people and the possibility of further assimilation

(iii) the effect on the Overseas Chinese of the policies of 'economic nationalism' being followed by South-East Asian governments.

These three fields of inquiry have been selected for the following reasons: the relationship which exists between Peking and the Overseas Chinese has been a subject which has aroused much controversy, and the

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3. e.g. Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriages in Singapore, London, 1957. R. Coughlin Double Identity : the Chinese in Modern Thailand, Hong Kong, 1960. D. Willmot, The Chinese of Semarang : a Changing Minority Community in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960. L. Williams Overseas Chinese and Nationalism : the growth of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, and W. Skinner's Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.

idea that the Overseas Chinese, by virtue of their being Chinese, must be actual or potential supporters of the Peking regime has gained a good deal of support in the past.

The position of the Overseas Chinese vis-a-vis Peking will be examined to see if there is any validity in the belief that

(i) Peking wants to manipulate and use the Overseas Chinese for its own political purposes in South-East Asia

(ii) if, in fact, the Overseas Chinese believe that protection of their own interests might necessitate expressions of political loyalty, and a willingness to act politically for Peking.

If political affiliation to Peking is one possible way for the Overseas Chinese to achieve their political ends (and what those ends might be will be discussed at a later stage) the other alternative which is widely canvassed is assimilation into their host societies.

An attempt will be made to see how realistic this alternative is for the Overseas Chinese. A list of variables which might tend either to assist or hinder assimilation will be formulated. There is a marked discrepancy in the various accounts of how far assimilation has, in fact, already taken place and what possibilities there are for future assimilation. It should be noted that W. Skinner and R. Coughlin studied the same Overseas Chinese community in the nineteen-fifties and came to markedly differing conclusions.

"The Overseas Chinese Associations in their totality are so influential in perpetrating social distinction between the Thai and Chinese population groups, their continued vitality as on-going institutions beyond the immigrant generation can only mean the indefinite postponement of any major move towards more assimilation of the Chinese minority in Thailand."[4]

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4. R. Coughlin, "Double Identity", Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p. 66.

While Skinner writes:

"A major proportion of the descendants of Chinese immigrants in each generation merge with their society and become indistinguishable from the general indigenous population ..... they have only to remain their sweet selves and follow a minimally sane policy through two generations to obviate the diverse problems in Thailand altogether."[5]

Coughlin, from his study of the Chinese in Bangkok, asserts:

"..... the situation of the Chinese in Bangkok supports the generalization that a functioning minority culture and society can indefinitely resist assimilation."[6]

The third area of investigation, economic nationalism, has been selected because it is obvious that the extent to which these policies weaken - and possibly eventually eliminate - the economic power of the Overseas Chinese, will be one of the crucial factors affecting their future lives. The Chinese in South-East Asia now find it increasingly difficult to pursue their traditional goal of achieving wealth. The effects of the policies of economic nationalism will be analysed to see what effect they may have in re-directing the political loyalties of the Overseas Chinese towards Peking.

Despite their superficial similarities all the Overseas Chinese communities in South-East Asia vary widely in many aspects.

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5. W. Skinner, "The Thailand Chinese : Assimilation in a Changing Society", Asia, Vol. 24, 2, Autumn 1964, pp. 86-92.

6. R. Coughlin "The Chinese in Bangkok", American Sociological Review, 1955, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 316.

"The fact is that the Overseas Chinese are anything but monolithic in their loyalties and orientations ..... divergence not uniformity is their fundamental and most widespread quality ..... it is dangerous to attempt to discuss the Overseas Chinese as a unit and misleading to handle all Chinese abroad as an undifferentiated mass."[7]

As long as this warning is always borne in mind and it is remembered that every generalisation about the Overseas Chinese must be treated with caution, it is hoped that, by taking these three broad aspects of the problem, an assessment of the future role of the Overseas Chinese can be made. To place the analysis of these three problems in context, the first two chapters give an historical outline of the Chinese presence in South-East Asia and a description of their position in South-East Asian society today.

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7. Lea Williams, op. cit., p. 4.

CHAPTER I : THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN S.E. ASIA - AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The first task is to arrive at a precise definition of the Overseas Chinese. This is by no means an easy matter. Neither legal citizenship nor ancestry are adequate guides. Millions of Overseas Chinese do not claim Chinese citizenship while due to inter-marriage many Chinese are identified as completely indigenous South-East Asians. Chinese culture traits are not sure signs of identification either, for millions of Overseas Chinese cannot speak or understand Chinese with any degree of competence.

The definition most commonly accepted in the literature is that given by Skinner.

> "The Overseas Chinese comprise the China-born Chinese residing abroad together with those patrilineal descendants of Chinese immigrants who still regard themselves personally and socially as Chinese ..... in the last analysis being Chinese in South-East Asia is essentially a matter of self-identification." [8]

Williams investigates the problem further, pointing out that Overseas Chinese membership depends far more on personal social attitudes than on official legislation. He lists the following two factors which can forward a definition of the Overseas Chinese:

(i) Chinese ancestry, at least on the father's side, but not birth actually in China

(ii) Foreign residence must be extended or permanent - therefore diplomats and students from China are not included.

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8. G.W. Skinner, "Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, p. 137.

The main difficulty arises with people of Chinese ancestry who are in a transitional state between Overseas Chinese identity and assimilation. Outside pressures such as the refusal of their host countries' government to permit further assimilation could push them back into a more active Chinese identification than that which they have at the present time. The definition which Williams gives is as follows:

> "An Overseas Chinese is a person of some Chinese ancestry who views residence abroad as compatible with Chinese cultural identity and less certainly with some remote Chinese political orientation. The Overseas Chinese considers his emigration the result of his own or his forebears economic strivings. He regards himself as a member of the Overseas Chinese people, which is in turn, part of the greater Chinese nation and is so regarded by those around him."[9]

Both definitions hinge on the issue of self-identification. Williams' inclusion of such phrases as 'part of the greater Chinese nation' and 'with some remote Chinese political orientation' is not wholly borne out by Skinner's research in Thailand during the 1950's.[10] In that country the leaders of the Overseas Chinese,

> are those who are not only in Williams' phrase "in a period of transition between Chinese identification and the assimilation but are the Overseas Chinese who exhibit the highest degree of 'Thai-ness' in the Chinese community. They are, however, still regarded as true

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9. Lea Williams, op. cit. p.6

10. W.G. Skinner, "Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand", Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.

Overseas Chinese by the community they lead and which gives them their support.

Skinner developed a scale of 'Thai-ness' to measure assimilation of the Chinese elite in Bangkok. From his five item scale he derived six scale types of degrees of 'Thai-ness'. Thirty-six per cent of the top elite he studied (135 leaders) fell within the highest - i.e. one to three - category of 'Thai-ness'. The key values in the Chinese community in Bangkok - i.e. wealth and prestige - were possessed to a marked degree by the most 'Thai' leaders. Forty-one per cent of the leaders ranked in the first and second scale of 'Thai-ness' were 'very wealthy'.[11] In terms of influence as well, these heavily 'Thai' orientated leaders rank highly - i.e. forty-seven per cent of the leaders of the first to third degree of 'Thai-ness' fall within Skinner's category of 'most influential'.

Thus, the very people who are the leaders of the Overseas Chinese community, in Thailand at least, are the people who are most likely to regard themselves by self-identification as 'Thai', especially those of the first degree of 'Thai-ness' on the scale.

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11. 'Very wealthy' is not defined in monetary terms by Skinner. His scales of wealth are derived from evaluations of wealth by members of the Thailand Overseas Chinese community. Fewer than fifty Overseas Chinese in Bangkok had achieved this degree of wealth at that time. W.G. Skinner, op. cit., pp. 84-92.

Where the process of assimilation is continuing, there are likely to be many people difficult to identify clearly as belonging to one group or the other. Rather they are 'marginals', undecided how far they wish completely to lose their identity of being Chinese and all that it entails and uncertain of their reception in another group. As Coughlin has noted "one must remember that the Chinese are a very flexible people whose main concern is self-interest" in compensation for the hardships of living so far away from our native places - to cite a familiar phrase often heard in Overseas Chinese communities. Their degree of 'Thai-ness' or 'Chinese-ness' varies from time to time, from situation to situation; depending on the way they interpret their interest.[12]

The difficulties in arriving at a precise definition of the Overseas Chinese are slight when compared to the difficulty of arriving at a reliable estimate of the numbers of Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia. The local political situation, inter-marriage, assimilation, and the disability of being Chinese in some of these countries and, very often, the sheer mechanical inadequacy of the census count combine to produce widely different figures.

Appendix I shows the figures given by Williams to be the population of the Overseas Chinese and these are the figures accepted for the purposes of this paper. Firstly, because they are the most recent (i.e. 1965) and secondly, because they are based in part on similar figures compiled by Skinner whose earlier published figures in

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12. R. Coughlin, op. cit., pp. 193-4.

the early 1950's have been accepted by most authorities as the most reliable, given the problems mentioned above.

There has been a long history of contact between China and South-East Asia. Chinese merchants had traded along the shores of South-Vietnam as early as 300 B.C. During the Third Century A.D. a formal imperial expedition was dispatched from China to observe and report on the countries of the South Seas. Chinese pilgrims visited the Buddhist centres of Indonesia and went by sea to India. Under the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279) Chinese merchants began to compete with Moslem merchants from Persia and Arabia. The Mongol Yuan Dynasty which followed also encouraged Chinese trading abroad. Diplomatic trading was practised in place of the banned private trading after Admiral Cheng Ho's official voyages to the Nanyang (1405 - 1433).

When Europeans began to enter the area they found 'infinitely industrious Chineses.'[13]

By the 16th Century trading communities were permanently established in several parts of South-East Asia. The penetration of the European traders aided the Chinese in many instances. Chinese knowledge and experience was exchanged for European protection and security. The British policy of free trade was of special importance to the Chinese. The British trading post of Penang was quickly faced with an inflow of Chinese traders while the population of Singapore jumped from 750 Malay fishermen to 5,000, most of whom were Chinese, in five months in 1819.

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13. Sir Thomas Herbert - quoted by A.T. Soon. "The Chinese in South-East Asia", Race, Vol. 4, No. 1, November 1962, p. 39.

Trade was one thing, however, and emigration another. Historically the Chinese Emperors prohibited emigration from China. This view seems to have been compounded of a mixture of incredulous disbelief that anyone would wish permanently to leave what was clearly the most advanced and civilized nation in the world and a more hard-headed realization that such emigration could be seen as an index of dissatisfaction with the "Imperial Mandate". In the latter half of the Ming and early Ching dynasty, and especially during the Manchu Regime, there was an awareness of the extent to which the Overseas Chinese could act as centres for subversive activities against their dynasty. The Emperor of the Ching Dynasty tried to prohibit people from going to sea, while the Manchu Dynasty tried to prevent people from living on the islands near the coast.

The cultural tradition of China with its respect and veneration for one's ancestors and for the family added to this feeling against emigration.

However, the Chinese did emigrate and in great numbers. The main areas of emigration were the provinces of South China, especially the Kwangtung and Fukien areas.

The traditional Chinese feeling against emigration was never so strong in these areas of China. South China has access to the sea and there were well-established contacts with foreigners. The area is cut off by mountains from central China and was thus both culturally separated from the central government and less subject to its power and authority. Attempts to enforce anti-emigration laws when the

pressure to emigrate was developing did more to line the pockets of local officials with bribes than to stop the emigration.

Writing in 1912 P. Ling suggested that emigration could only be accounted for by the special characteristics of these two provinces. He argues that they had always shown an adventurous and independent spirit, especially in their relations to the central government.[14]

During the 19th and 20th centuries population pressure had been building up for a considerable length of time and was reaching acute proportions, especially in South China. There had always been a shortage of good land in this area and although peasants predominated, more people than elsewhere had had to make their livelihood by other means than farming, especially by fishing. Against this background it is easier to see why the prohibition against emigration failed to work when there was economic hardship. Natural calamities such as flooding, (to which South China was particularly prone), and drought, and the constant struggle to work inadequate and often poor land led to emigration. After a tidal wave swept over Swatow in 1922 scores of families left to emigrate to South-East Asia.

"Phoenix Village", a South China village studied by Kulp, was periodically disrupted by flooding and he writes that "one can readily detect the yellow lines in the rooms of village houses and on the walls of the exteriors that indicate the high water mark of floods".[15] Gradually

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14. P. Ling,"Causes of Chinese Emigration", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 39, January 1912, pp. 77-82.

15 D. Kulp, Country Life in South China : the Sociology of Familism , Teacher's College, Columbia University, 1925, p. 26. Kulp also quotes the following village saying: "To be free from floods for three successive years would be to adorn our hogs with shining rings of gold".

it became, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the accepted custom for the most energetic and able young men to leave their villages and go overseas. There was still heavy emphasis laid on family obligations. Remittances were made back home and the emigrants were expected to keep in touch with the village from which they came, and to which they would eventually return. Thus a pattern was established.

> Trade and travel, once started, drew more participants like a magnet ..... in the course of time people came to be adapted to a social life in which the habit of migration was strongly entrenched.[16]

Many of the emigrants had already established links with the Nanyang. Skinner interviewed sixty first-generation Overseas Chinese leaders in Thailand.

> Out of the sixty, twenty-five had close relatives already in Thailand; twelve knew former members of their local hsien or a distant clan member already there; four were approached by friends already in Thailand, while five came as agents of firms with offices in the country.[17]

The 19th century saw the beginning of the great mass migrations of the Chinese. The groundwork had been laid by the emigration caused by economic hardships, political instability, civil wars and rebellion inside China. Changes in the world economic situation provided the opportunity for emigration on a broader basis.

Up to this time emigration had a haphazard and changeable

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16. C. Dibble, The Chinese in Thailand Against the Background of Chinese/Thai Relations, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Syracuse University, 1965, p. 61.

17. W.G. Skinner, op. cit., pp. 33-40.

character and was on a comparatively small scale. The situation began to change after the first Opium War of 1839 - 42. Hong Kong was established on the very doorstep of China and quickly became a port of departure for the Nanyang. The political causes of emigration began to give way to the economic causes and the latter became the predominant ones. In this period appeared one of the most important prerequisites for emigration on a large scale, namely the demand for immigrant labour to work the natural resources of the South-East Asian countries. The industries of the West became, to an increasing extent, dependent upon the world market. The receipt of raw materials from the colonies played a decisive role. The serious obstacle caused by the lack of a labour force was overcome by encouraging the arrival of immigrants from China. Along with free emigration from China the practice of contract or bound labour was widely developed.

From his analysis of emigration into Thailand Skinner notes that emigration was very responsive to specific changes in the prosperity of the emigrant areas in China and of Thailand itself. The state of the crop of China, which in turn was mainly dependent on the weather, and the demand for labour in Thailand were of crucial importance. He also notes, however, that the availability of means of transport, and their safety and cost, had an important effect on emigration rates. The three peak years of emigration to Thailand - 1903, 1907/8 and 1910/11 - were also the years when competition between the shipping lines produced the lowest fares.[18]

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18. W. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1957, p. 67.

Within China itself the pressure on land was still acute. For the sixty-year period 1873 - 1933 the sown area of China (excluding the north-east) increased only 1% while the population rose by more than 30%.

Kwangtung and Fukien felt some of the most intense pressure. The area of cultivated land per household was six mou in Kwantung and nine mou in Fukien as compared to thirty-six mou in other parts of China.[19]

Many of the small scale farmers supplemented their inadequate incomes by other crafts and trades. While the majority of the emigrants were from a farming background, there was a considerable number of artisans such as tailors, masons, and small merchants. The declared occupations of incoming male Chinese into Thailand for the period 1935 to 1938 were as follows:-

Occupations	1935/6	1936/7	1937/8
General Labourers	1782	1911	2731
Professionals	251	178	1742
Commercials	17100	20095	19510
Officials	4	25	-
Agriculturalists	150	109	375
Personal/Domestic	53	181	2333
Theatrical	339	106	126
Others and Not Stated	237	277	1527
	19916	22882	28344

[20]

19. The Chinese land measure mou, although varying from province to province, is approximately equal to 732½ square yards or 6.6 mou equals one acre. Matthew's Chinese/English Dictionary, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963, p. 145.

20. As quoted by R. Coughlin, Double Identity: the Chinese in Modern Thailand, from Statistical Year Book of Siam 1935/1937.

Chien provided the following table of reasons given for emigration which he found during his field work in South China:-

Cause Named	No. of Families	Per Cent
Economic Pressure	633	69.95
Previous Connection with Nan Yang	176	19.45
Losses from Natural Calamities	31	3.43
Plan to Expand Specific Enterprises	26	2.87
Bad Conduct	17	1.88
Local Disturbance	7	.77
Family Quarrel	7	.77
Other Causes	8	.88
	905	100 %

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The Chinese who left South China, (and 90% of the Overseas Chinese come from South China), were poor and often illiterate. They went to work in the plantation economies of the South-East Asian countries. They did not stay poor, however, as a group. Often disbarred from owning land, put off perhaps by memories of past hardship and deterred by the length of time before there was return on one's capital, the Overseas Chinese moved into the role of 'middle man' in their adopted countries as an urban minority. Under the colonial regimes, which brought some measure of stability to Asia, the Chinese quickly began to control and eventually to dominate the distribution of goods in these economies. They served as a channel between the Western import houses and the still tradition-bound peasantry. Gradually they moved into production themselves. Many writers have commented on the fantastic energy and economic drive of the Overseas Chinese. One writer has gone so far as to suggest that:-

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21. T. Chien, Emigrant Communities in South China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 210.

> The truth seems to be that this people has a special practical genius, an aptitude for the life struggle more than the other peoples of Asia ..... when they go to other countries they have a high average of success in life".[22]

The main motive for emigration was economic advancement:-

> "Implicit in almost every first generation's life history is the general desire to get ahead, to take advantage of a more open economy, to improve one's own station in life and one's family status".[23]

Of the first generation's leaders in Thailand, 63% were self made men who fit the stereotype of a 'rags to riches' success story.

Factors which have to be considered for any adequate explanation of this economic drive among the Overseas Chinese are the tradition of thrift as a legacy from their peasant days in South China, the desire to be able to remit money to one's relatives still on the Mainland and to pay for the upkeep of ancestral shrines as a function of kin loyalty. Careers in politics, administration, and religion were not open to the Chinese in South-East Asia, and if they were to succeed in life it had to be predominantly in the field of commerce.

The Chinese were able to take advantage of the demand for labour which the colonial opening up of South-East Asia provided. They also brought with them, however, one other skill which was to be vital in their ability to thrive economically. This was their experience in the use of credit and banking. The 'money loan' associations of South China were not only mutual credit clubs for the welfare of often poverty-stricken people but also a training ground in the use of money. In them the prospective emigrant would have learnt managerial and financial

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22. C. Dibble, op. cit., p. 89.

23. W.G. Skinner, op. cit., p. 43.

skills. They were a means of procuring cheap credit on a co-operative basis.

"Shrewdness in handling money was an important part of the equipment which ordinary Chinese took with them when they went overseas in search of a livelihood. Their financial skill rested on three characteristics of the society in which they were raised: the respectability of the pursuit of riches, the relative immunity of surplus wealth from confiscation by political superiors, and the legitimacy of careful and interested financial dealings between neighbours and even close kinsmen ..... they knew how to handle money and organize men in relation to money".[24]

The Chinese emigrant group, composed mainly of peasants, despite all the emphasis put on their 'Chinese-ness' should not be seen in terms of traditional Chinese cultural values.

"The Overseas Chinese can only, in a very attenuated sense, be considered the bearers of that great civilization ..... many of the traditional values especially of the family associated with traditional China are exemplified by the Overseas Chinese but other values are lacking ..... generally ignorant about Chinese history, philosophy, religion and the arts ..... he is mainly interested in getting rich. The acquisition of wealth helps to smooth off the rough corners but it rarely produces a Confucian gentleman and much less a scholar".[25]

The Overseas Chinese communities developed a unique sub-culture of their own. They adopted and borrowed from their memories of traditional China, from their host societies and, more recently and increasingly, from Western culture.

Without the protection of a strong homeland government in China during the period of most intensive emigration, and denied participation in the political life of their host countries, the Overseas Chinese developed an almost perfect social system satisfying

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24. M. Freedman "The Handling of Money : a Note on the Background to the Economic Sophistication of the Overseas Chinese", Man IX, 1, 1959, p. 65.

25. R. Coughlin, op. cit., p. 10.

all their needs and aspirations within the boundaries of their own community. Once Chinese women started to emigrate as well, the assimilation rate with the indigenous Asians, which had been high due to inter-marriage during the earlier periods, declined rapidly. The traditional Chinese family was able to exert a dominant influence in the socialization of the children into a distinctively Chinese way of life.

> "Here is a functioning social system which need have only the lightest, most formal contacts with the host society ..... initially at any rate any need that the average Chinese experiences can be satisfied within the Chinese community in Bangkok ..... for the great mass of Chinese who achieve something between phenomenal success and failure, the Chinese community represents stability, and opportunity, unmatched elsewhere in Thailand".[26]

The Overseas Chinese communities are honeycombed by an intricate web of formal organizations - e.g. surname associations, dialect associations, occupational groups. Examples of these Chinese organizations as found in Thailand can be seen in Appendix V. They are the means whereby all the attributes of a social system - status, power, prestige, allocation of duties and responsibilities, leadership and security are organized among Overseas Chinese. It is the top leadership of these organizations which adjudicates quarrels and disputes within the communities, makes policy decisions and mediates with the outside political authority on the communities' behalf.

The world depression of the inter-war years curtailed immigration just as the earlier economic boom had facilitated it. The communities were deprived of fresh inflows of immigrants directly from China. Many

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26. R.Coughlin, "The Chinese in Bangkok", American Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, June 1955, p. 320.

indeed returned to China during these years and, in some Asian countries, restrictions were placed on the entry of the Chinese.

CHAPTER II : THE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITIES TODAY

The position of the Chinese in South-East Asia today is the culmination of a series of events which has produced a growing estrangement between the Chinese and the indigenous peoples of South-East Asia. This is a time when the Overseas Chinese are also becoming more isolated from Mainland China.

The forces which have produced this result can be traced back until before the Second World War. This is not to imply that there was ever a period of ideal harmony between the Chinese and the native Asians of the area. Antagonism was bound to arise when the economic power of the Chinese was so apparent. The middleman role of the Chinese businessman and money lender could easily be seen in the complicated chain of business transactions. The role of the Western export and shipping companies was remote and for a long period uncomprehended by the majority of Asians. The Chinese were the people from whom the peasant obtained his credit and as such they were an obvious target for hostility.

Simoniya gives the following diagram to show the series of transactions upon which the rice trade in the colonial period rested.[1]

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1. N. Simoniya, Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia - A Russian study, Ithaca, Cornell Data Paper, No. 45, 1961, p. 42.



The function of buyers in South-East Asia was performed almost exclusively by the immigrant population of the countries of that region : in the great majority of cases these were Chinese. The Europeans played an insignificant role of the intermediary trade (except, possibly, in Indonesia). The predominance of Chinese among the intermediary traders in South-East Asia was due to their better organization and business ability at this level. The dialect Associations and the secret societies were of importance in the aid they gave to their members. In Thailand for example the main group of rice merchants belonged to the Teochiu dialect group. Members of these groups were able to prosper because of their use of mutual assistance and preferential credits.

Before 1911 Chinese women rarely emigrated. The Chinese who went to South-East Asia would often take a native Asian wife while still maintaining a Chinese wife in the homeland. This intermarriage facilitated assimilation by breaking down the clear-cut division between the racial groups. During the peak of emigration, however, more and more Chinese women emigrated. The links had been established and emigration became less of an unknown adventure.

In Thailand the number of female Chinese immigrants for the interwar period was as follows:-

1919	-	54,724
1929	-	131,510
1937	-	188,538

causing the following sex ratio for the Chinese population:-[2]

	Total	Male	Female	Numerical Increase/ Decrease of Females Since Last Census
1919	260,194	205,470	54,724	-
1929	445,274	313,764	131,510	76,786
1937	524,062	335,524	188,538	57,028
1947	470,582	319,196	157,386	31,157.

The result of this changed sex ratio was greatly to increase the number of all-Chinese homes. The basis was now laid for a nearly total Overseas Chinese community where socialization in the family and through education was into a distinctively Chinese way of life, which in turn laid the foundation for the development of Chinese nationalism. Even today it is the Overseas Chinese woman and daughter who is the least likely to have moved towards assimilation. It is in the home that Chinese will be the only language spoken and Chinese religious practices still carried out.

Under colonial rule the Overseas Chinese were able to pursue their goal of economic advancement. As their wealth and success grew, more and more Chinese moved out of their traditional occupations and into the status-enhancing fields of law, medicine and teaching. Debarred from civic affairs and politics in the countries in which he

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2. Statistical Year Book of Thailand, 1939-40 - quoted in Coughlin's Double Identity, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p. 23.

lived the successful Chinese entrepreneur devoted his energies to Chinese community projects such as the building of schools, hospitals and the giving of donations to dialect association and mutual aid funds.

Thus up to about 1939 the Chinese were in a comfortable position. They had come to South-East Asia and many of them had prospered. Those who had not were members of a tightly knit community which was able to provide effective social services to those in need. The earlier, more specialized, community associations had given way to broader organizations which encompassed the whole community and could exercise leadership on the communities' behalf.

It is true that the Chinese were subject to legal disabilities and discriminations under the colonial rulers. In Indonesia they were classed as "Foreign Orientals", distinct from both natives and Europeans, and were regarded as second class citizens. The Citizenship Law of 1910, which had changed their status, was still felt to be an unjust one. However, they were tolerated because of the economic role they performed.

The exclusiveness of the European rulers, in rejecting the aspirations of prosperous Chinese to join them, only made the Chinese communities more inward looking and cohesive.

Independent Thailand under the Phibun[3] regime was the only country able to enact discriminatory measures against the Chinese

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3. Field-Marshal Phibun Songkhram, Premier of Thailand, 1938-1945. Returned to power through a military coup in 1947. Unseated by Sarit Thanarat in 1957.

affecting their economic life. This was a forerunner of later Asian nationalism.[4]

A. The World Depression of the 1930's

The depression of the 1930's not only made the economic lives of the Chinese more difficult, but was to alter the demographic composition of their communities. Just as the boom of the earlier period of colonial advance into Asia had been the mainspring for emigration so the collapse of the economies of these areas curtailed emigration. This cutting off of emigration was to have far-reaching effects. Increasingly the communities have come to be composed of local-born Chinese rather than emigrants. Attachment to China based on family ties has inevitably declined. Today only a minority have any living memory of their ancestral homeland and as this generation dies the last vestige of personal ties to the Mainland will have disappeared. (At a time when their future is increasingly uncertain and the environment increasingly hostile the Chinese are isolated from their country of origin). The Overseas Chinese have a high birth-rate - (in Singapore half the inhabitants of Chinese ancestry are under fifteen years old). Locally born Chinese are now in the majority in all the South-East Asian countries with the possible exception of Burma where there has been substantial clandestine emigration.[5]

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4. i.e. The Immigration Amendment Act (BE2474) of 1931/2 when the fees required for entry and residence in the country were raised. By 1939 it had risen to 200 baht from a previous figure of 30 baht in 1931. In 1939 all but one of the Chinese newspapers were closed down by the Government.

5. This has been partly due to the physical proximity of the two countries. The continuing political instability in Burma has precluded effective control by Burma of her border areas. Some of the migration into Burma from China may have been organized by China for the purposes of subversion. H. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, p. 120.

The relationship between Peking and the Overseas Chinese will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Three, where their isolation from China, at a time when their position in South-East Asia is far from secure, will be examined.

B. Rise of Chinese Nationalism

The rise of Chinese nationalism among the Overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Republic was a major factor in alienating the Chinese from the local populations. Up to the twentieth century, Chinese links to the homeland were mainly sentimental. These ties were re-enforced by occasional visits to China and a return there, it was hoped, for retirement and burial. There was not in the Chinese political tradition the idea of individual loyalty to the state as such, but rather a great cultural pride in belonging to the Chinese civilization. The Chinese governments of the nineteenth century until 1890 displayed no interest in the Overseas Chinese and the Overseas Chinese reciprocated this indifference.[6]

However, this changed with the rise of Chinese nationalism as a response to European intervention in China. Missions were sent out from China to gain the loyalty of the Overseas Chinese. Leading opponents of the Manchu regime began turning to the Overseas Chinese for financial help. K'ang Yu-wei, who was tutor to the Manchu Emperor, when he was forced to leave China because of his advanced views, went to Singapore and Penang where he appealed to the Straits Chinese for support. The first President of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-Sen, canvassed for support in the Nanyang, offering mining concessions and monopolies in exchange for financial help. After the

6. When British troops landed in the British colony of Singapore on their way to invade China during the Opium Wars, Chinese merchants in the colony gave their officers a banquet to aid them on their way. A.T. Soon, "The Chinese in South-East Asia", Race, Vol. 4, No. 1, November 1962, p. 41.

1911 Revolution the Draft Constitution of the Chinese Republic, the organisational rules of the Kuomintang, and the rules of the Peoples' Political Council, all provided for participation and representation of the Overseas Chinese in the politics of China.

The rise of Chinese nationalism was an impetus for further Chinese education and language instruction in the Chinese communities of South-East Asia. (See Appendix VI). The use of Mandarin helped foster a new pride in being Chinese and gave the Overseas Chinese the basis for a common 'lingua franca'. The Chinese school system expanded rapidly using Mainland texts which encouraged loyalty to China. The exams taken were Mainland examinations and there was a contant flow of Mainland teachers into Asia. In Malaya the number of graduates from specifically Chinese schools outnumbered the graduates of government-run and government-subsidised English language schools by four to one. Chinese education in Indonesia had been largely ignored by the Dutch. In 1900 the first private Chinese school was set up. In 1908 there were seventy-five schools with over five thousand pupils and by 1949 seven hundred and twenty-four schools with nearly 172,600 pupils and 3,800 teachers. These schools were nationalistic and orientated towards China.

The campaign for Chinese schools helped to fuse the various Overseas Chinese groups in Indonesia into a distinctly Chinese unity and provided the starting point for other Chinese social and political organizations, most of which were exclusive and nationalistic. The Chinese in South-East Asia began more and more to see their interests as being linked to those of the Mainland. One indication of the growth of this feeling of Chinese patriotism was the speed and efficiency with which the Overseas Chinese organized help for China

in her war with Japan.

This involvement of the Overseas Chinese in Chinese national politics, linked as it was to a development of closely-knit Chinese communities in these Asian countries, created hostility from local populations beginning for the first time to develop a nationalism of their own.

C. South-East Asian Nationalism

Significant movements for political independence in South-East Asia are scarcely found before the Second World War. When Nehru visited Malaya in 1936 to seek support for his independence struggle against the British he found it "a political back-water".

The Japanese invasion proved that European supremacy was a thing of the past. Opposition to the Japanese when they proved more brutal than the former white colonialists provided a new focal point for unity among the nationalists. After the end of the Second World War neither European nor Japanese hegemony was established in the area, and there began the struggle for independence. Independence was gained, with the exceptions of Thailand - which was always nominally independent - and the Philippines, through a process of violence and revolution. In Indonesia the attempts by the Dutch to re-impose their rule were defeated in two bitter wars. In Burma there was guerilla warfare immediately after independence. Both the Philippines and Malaya fought off communist-dominated insurrectionary movements. There was a legacy of violence bred by the Japanese invasion, the Second World War, followed by the struggle for independence and a fight for political stability in these countries.

The Chinese were in an uncomfortable position. As a group they were

unable to identify with the new nationalist movements. Some, as in Indonesia, saw the danger they would face in the newly independent countries and sided with the colonialists. The majority stayed neutral, hoping for the best.

The Chinese quickly became a major pre-occupation of the new Asian rulers.

> "In most South-East Asian countries where extortion and persecution of the Chinese has been institutionalized, the winning of freedom from colonial rule seems to have meant that mistreatment of the immigrant communities has achieved new respectability as an expression of national devotion."[7]

The nationalists, however, have only been perfecting a lesson which they had been taught earlier, first by the Europeans and then by the Japanese.

The European rulers in Asia had regarded the Chinese with contempt while still recognising the economic role which they played. The Thai elite learned its anti-sinicism from its contacts with Europeans. It was H. Warrington-Smyth, the British director of the Thai Royal Department of Mines who wrote in his Five Years in Siam that the Chinese were the 'Jews of Siam' and that the Chinese virtues were perhaps equally shared with the buffalo.

The crude pamphlet published in 1914 in Thailand entitled "The Jews of the East" was written by the Cambridge educated and western influenced King Wachirawst.

> "The European coloniser, with his own anti-semitic prejudices, his romanticisation of the 'sons of the soil', and his tendency to value primitive 'honesty' against commercial 'cunning' provided the native nationalists with the justi-

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7. L. Williams, op. cit., p. 29

> fication, terminology and technique of the Sino-phobic campaign. Charges of Chinese cunning, social separatism, arrogance, usurping, dual loyalty, refusal to assimilate and readiness to help only Chinese, became the stock-in-trade of militant Asian nationalists."[8]

The Japanese gave a further lesson in how the Chinese could be treated. Chinese business losses in Indonesia from looting and theft during the Japanese occupation have been estimated at fifty million dollars.[9] The Chinese are a convenient scapegoat for the frustrations and tensions generated in a transitional period of nation-building. Latent racial prejudice can easily be brought to the fore by the new elites facing the difficult realities of political rule. Sukarno of Indonesia, after a decade of financial and economic mis-management, can tell the Indonesians:

> "These are foreigners utilising the peoples' difficulties to get as much profit as possible. Government regulations are violated, outsmarted, avoided and sabotaged. These foreigners have sown the seeds of race hatred."[10]

The reasons for the attacks made on the Chinese by Asian nationalist governments are not hard to find. Because of the colonial experience, independence in South-East Asia means control over one's own economy. The dominant economic position of the Overseas Chinese in these countries is intolerable to the new Asian elites. The existence of Communist China is an uncomfortable reality which has to be recognized by the South-East Asian nationalist governments. Historically whenever China has been strong she has tried to extend her influence into South-East Asia. Cultural tradition and the international situation combine to make South-East Asia the one area in the world which China would have to dominate to be regarded as a World Power.

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8. A. Soon, op. cit., p. 37.

9. Figures from Der Kroef's "Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia", Social Research, Vol. 20, Winter 1953, p. 468.

10. A. Soon, Ibid., p. 17.

For South-East Asian countries, whether the solution is one of careful neutrality as in the case of Burma and Cambodia, or membership in a protective military alliance as in the case of Thailand, the problem of China remains.[11]

The failure on the part of the Chinese to assimilate means that the South-East Asian governments are highly suspicious of the political loyalties of their Chinese population. Their attacks are directed at Chinese education and language in an attempt to weaken the distinctive Chinese communities which are in their countries. The situation facing the Overseas Chinese is thus an unpleasant one. They are faced with a situation where they are under pressure from the governments of the countries in which they live and where measures against them can easily be presented as anti-communist in intent. Williams, writing of the position of the Chinese in Indonesia during the army revolt and the subsequent massacres of 1965, says:

> "The Chinese population as a whole appeared to be frozen with fears sadly justified, that anti-communism would be twisted into anti-Chinese persecution."[12]

The extent to which the Chinese might attempt to preserve their own identity and seek protection from Peking, and the degree to which full or partial assimilation into their host countries is likely to take place, in response to their position today, is discussed in Chapters Three and Four respectively.

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11. "National prestige and considerations of security as well as revolutionary determination to advance the cause of communism impel China to strive for a position of major importance in Asia and to extend its influence beyond its borders." R. Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, edited by A. Doak Barnett. New York, McGraw-Hill Co. for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966, p. 90.

12. Lea. E. Williams, "The Overseas Chinese and Peking", Trans-Action, Vol. 4, No. 3, January/February 1906, p. 6.

CHAPTER III : THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND THE TWO CHINAS

The relationship between the Overseas Chinese and Peking is a subject surrounded by myths and polemic. Two quotations will, perhaps, suffice to indicate this.

> "Everywhere in South-East Asia, with the possible exceptions of the Philippines and Thailand, the Overseas Chinese are an indigestible lump in the body politic. Peking's ability to use them as a channel for conquest of South-East Asia perhaps most apparent in Malaysia and Singapore, endures because of their aloofness from their neighbours and their cultural dependence upon China. The Overseas Chinese will continue to serve the communist conspiracy unless the pattern is altered by persuasion or force. Ten years time will see the transformation of the Overseas Chinese. Peking's determination to utilize their economic strength as a political force has made their survival an even more complicated matter. They are trapped between native governments which would destroy them if they could and aggressive maniac communism which uses them to destroy themselves."[1]

and Williams:

> "Reports that the Overseas Chinese are woven into a giant subversive net ready to paralyse and conquer South-East Asia on command from Peking are both frightening and inaccurate ..... the fact is that the Overseas Chinese are anything but unifold in their loyalties and orientations; diversity not uniformity is their fundamental and most wide-spread quality."[2]

The extent to which Peking has recruited Overseas Chinese as underground agents cannot be evaluated with any degree of accuracy. Contacts are undoubtedly maintained via Embassies, trade links and through 'front' organi-

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1. R. Elegant, The Dragon's Seed - Peking and the Overseas Chinese, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1959, pp. 12 and 17.

2. Lea E. Williams, Future of Overseas Chinese, New York, McGraw-Hill : for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966, p. 3.

zations. The size of the Overseas Chinese pro-Peking 'underground' will not be so important in the long run as the political loyalties which the main body of the Overseas Chinese communities may eventually acquire.

The appeals of both Chinas to the Overseas Chinese will be presented followed by an account of Peking's attitude towards, and experience with, the Overseas Chinese in the light of Peking's foreign policy.

Both Peking and Taiwan are interested in gaining the support of the Overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Nationalists to them has been more consistent, since Taiwan does not have to reconcile the conflicting aims which afflict Peking's foreign policy in South-East Asia.

1. The Nationalists and the Overseas Chinese

The Overseas Chinese are more 'vital' to the Nationalists than to the Communists. If they are to keep alive any idea of a return to the Mainland they must gain the active support of the Chinese in Asia.

Half the Chinese with whom the Kuomintang can hope to maintain contact are Overseas Chinese. They have sought to gain support for their regime by appealing to the Chinese cultural tradition. Taiwan is presented as the repository for all that is valued in traditional Chinese heritage. This has meant, for example, attacking Peking for its introduction of a modified written language in China. When the Nationalists fled the Mainland they managed to take with them many art treasures and artifacts of Chinese culture. By the use of expensive publications the attempt is made to convince the Chinese overseas that Taiwan is his real ancestral home, upholding the cultural tradition of China.

There is also extensive propaganda for Taiwan economic progress and there are appeals for remittances and investment in the island's industry. Tours are

arranged of Taiwan and visits of groups of Overseas Chinese are given extensive publicity in Taiwan publications and newspapers.

The main aim of Taiwan is to maintain the appearance of diplomatic credibility. Hence the full publicity given to the work of the Nationalist Embassies in Bangkok, Manila and Saigon. Diplomatic credibility is furthered if it can be shown that the Nationalists speak on behalf of the Overseas Chinese. In this way the international position of the Taiwan government is strengthened and it can hope to carry more weight among the pro-western nations. Full press coverage and publicity is given to visiting foreign diplomats of whatever status to try and create this credibility.

Essentially, however, the Nationalist efforts are a holding operation. After enjoying the almost unanimous support of the politically conscious Overseas Chinese before the Communist conquest of the Mainland they are faced with holding onto the support of the Overseas Chinese in a situation which is revolutionary, but where they themselves are conservative.

2. Peking and Overseas Chinese

The Communists never had a definite link with the Overseas Chinese in the same way as the Nationalists did. The Overseas Chinese were not important in the Communist take-over of the Mainland.

Once in power, however, the Communists, like all Chinese governments since the Chinese Republic, were immediately concerned with the Overseas Chinese. They inherited the belief that the backing of the Overseas Chinese is important to Chinese domestic policies. Typical of the statements made at the time is the following from a speech by Madame Ho Hsiang-ning, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission:

"All Overseas Chinese should unite, support the Motherland, and strengthen their unity. Strong and broad patriotic unity among all Overseas Chinese irrespective of class, occupation, political view or religious belief, should be encouraged."[3]

Protection for the Overseas Chinese against attack by South-East Asian governments was promised. Peking based its appeal to the Overseas Chinese on three main grounds:

i) protection of Overseas Chinese interests through diplomatic means and the deterrent of Communist power

ii) its right as the legitimate government to patriotic loyalty and its appeal to pride in China's new international position and internal accomplishments

iii) the special privileges, services and amenities extended to the Overseas Chinese in China proper.

In this initial period after 1949 it would seem that there were three advantages for Peking in gaining the allegiance of the Overseas Chinese:

i) it would provide Peking with a valuable lever to embarrass and harass the South-East Asian governments, to further revolution and/or actions favourable to themselves.

ii) it would give Peking added legitimacy and prestige

iii) by furthering close ties with the Overseas Chinese, much needed foreign exchange could be gained through investment and remittances, as well as the return of educated and skilled man-power to aid their new policies.

As Doak Barnett writes:

"The issue of communism pervades almost every facet of the Overseas Chinese problems in South-East Asia. Every government has pursued its Overseas Chinese policy with an acute awareness of Peking's growing power. Up to 1954, Peking's Overseas Chinese policy did nothing to dispel mistrust in Asia or to suggest that the vision of Peking's

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3. quoted in C. Dibble, op. cit, p. 357.

> protection of the Overseas Chinese would not grow as Peking's international influence grew."[4]

Promises of help were made to the Overseas Chinese:

> "The central government of the Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese living abroad ..... we will not tolerate any insults or injustice to be done to our fellow countrymen on foreign soil."[5]

This was combined with measures designed to tie the Overseas Chinese closer to China. These measures included the provision of trips to China; the provision of special facilities for returned Overseas Chinese; the provision of higher education for youth from abroad (40,000 went to Peking in the 1953 - 1955 period alone); and the setting up of special party and state organizations to deal with the Overseas Chinese.

The Party organs were:

i) the commission for overseas work of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

ii) Third Office of the Bureau of the United Front Work of the Central Committee of the C.C.P.

iii) Social Department of the Central Committee of the C.C.P.

The state agency was the "Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission"; a body with full ministerial status working directly under the Government's Administrative Council. The New China News Agency began distributing material for Chinese language newspapers and journals in South-East Asia. Extensive radio broadcasts were also developed for the Overseas Chinese in every dialect and language.

The Overseas Chinese were allocated thirty seats at the first All-

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4. A. Doak Barnett, China and Asia - Challenge to United States Policy, New York, Praeger 1959, p. 357.

5. A. Doak Barnett, Ibid., p. 184.

China People's Delegate Conference. None of the delegates, however, were elected by the Overseas Chinese but were appointed by Peking. No elections for these seats have subsequently taken place on the grounds that such elections would antagonise the governments of South-East Asian countries.[6]

Relatives of Overseas Chinese, especially in Kwangtung and Fukien, were given special consideration when government policy was being implemented.

Peking was well aware of the two-way flow of information between these two provinces and South-East Asia. According to a Peking estimate there are over ten million relatives of the Overseas Chinese inside China living mainly in these two areas.[7] The relatives of the Overseas Chinese presented a special problem to Peking. Often wealthy because of remittances from abroad they were obvious candidates for Peking plans for social reform. Their Overseas links meant, however, that there was a danger of adverse reports on the regime reaching South-East Asia.

Financial aid has also played a part in the attempts made to woo the expatriate Chinese. Loans were offered on favourable terms by the branches of the New China Bank, (often with strings attached such as donations and support to pro-Peking Chinese Schools). Investment corporations were set up inside China to attract Overseas Chinese capital

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6. Most of the delegates chosen to represent the Overseas Chinese had in fact returned to China some years before. Peking did try, without success, to secure prominent Overseas Chinese to act as delegates. See Lu Yu-Sun Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong Union Research Institute, 1956, pp. 24-26, for an analysis of some of the delegates who were actually chose to represent the Overseas Chinese.

7. China Digest, 1949 - October 15.

and to make the Overseas Chinese feel involved with the rebuilding of the "New China". In 1955 these were merged into several large 'Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations' with a guaranteed 8% return on one's investment.

The main appeal to the Overseas Chinese was in terms of patriotism and pride in the new united China rather than in communism. Students were encouraged to send letters to relatives and boy or girl friends still in South-East Asia urging them to do their duty and support the 'Motherland'.

Two changes have occured in Peking/Overseas Chinese relations:

i) the change in Chinese Foreign Policy towards South-East Asia beginning in about 1954

ii) the beginnings of a re-appraisal of the communist regime by the Overseas Chinese themselves.

Peking was now concerned to present a favourable image to the South-East Asian governments and to develop friendly relations with them.

> "The major development of China's shift in Overseas Chinese policy is Peking's growing reliance on the goodwill and active support of Asian governments in international relations ..... as Communist China settled down to a sustained programme for obtaining general international recognition, its needs for friends and benevolent supporters among the nations of Asia became of paramount importance."[8]

By 1954 the Overseas Chinese were being advised to come to terms with the countries in which they lived. In 1954 Chou En Lai spoke of Peking's willingness to settle the question of dual nationality and urged the Chinese abroad to become law abiding citizens of the country in which

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8. W.G. Skinner, "Report on the Overseas Chinese", Ithaca, Cornell Data Paper, No. 1, Cornell University Press, 1951, p. 145.

they lived.

Statements such as the following were made by 1958:

> "We hold that the Overseas Chinese should choose the nationality of the country in which they reside on the basis of the voluntary principle and be loyal to that country and its people. As for those who wish to remain Chinese subjects we ask them to continue to observe the policy, law and regulations of the country in which they reside and to respect the customs and habits of the local people. The Overseas Chinese should be encouraged to invest and to co-operate with native capitalists to help develop the independent economy of the countries in which they live. Children of the Overseas Chinese should study local languages, geography and history and acquire certain skills so that they may enter high school or earn a living there."[9]

China's main aims in South-East Asia have consistently been the following, although the means to their achievement have varied:

i) to present China as a world power. A century of humiliation at the hands of the West, linked with the traditional conception of her place in the world as the centre of civilization, makes China insistent that her new strength and unity be recognized

ii) to achieve predominance in South-East Asia not on the basis of military conquest and rule, but rather by the development of a series of states which recognize the predominant position of China and which come under her protection. This must involve, therefore, the aim of withdrawal of all western - especially American - power in the area.

China would like to see revived the South-East Asian countries' habit of looking respectfully towards China, perhaps as present day Cambodia does.

There is little evidence, despite the calls for revolution emanating from Peking, that China would like to set up a satellite empire on her doorstep. Not only is it contrary to Chinese political tradition, but it contradicts one of the main tenets of Maoist thinking, that revolutions

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9. Current Background, April 10th, 1958, "Ho Hsiang-ning at the China National Peoples' Congress."

cannot be exported.[10]

Changes in Chinese foreign policy away from over-emphasis on revolutionary aims were stated as early as October 1952 at the 'Asian and Pacific Peace Conference' in Peking.[11] This conference opened up new vistas for Communist China's Foreign Policy. It marked a partial retreat from militant revolutionary dogmatism and was a first step in Peking's bid for leadership in Asia on a broader and less doctrinaire basis. It stressed above all the idea of a common Asian interest cutting across ideological lines; this fore-runner of the 'soft line' was largely overshadowed by fighting in Korea and Chinese threats against Taiwan and Indo-China.[12]

This approach was later developed more freely and assured a more central position in Chinese thinking. It reached its climax in the Bandung Conference of 1955 and after, with the enunciation of China's 'Five Principles'. China was now seen as a force to be reckoned with by Asian leaders, following the cessation of the Korean War and Chou En Lai's role at the Geneva Conference.

> "Fearful and uneasy about the Chinese communists many Asians felt increasingly the need to seek an accommodation with

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10. R. MacFarquhar, Chinese Ambitions and British Policy, Fabian Tract 367. Forafuller discussion of the foreign policy of Communist China see H. Hinton's Communist China in World Politics, Boston-Houghton Mifflin 1966, especially part two - "Communist China on the World Stage" and R. Boyd's Communist China's Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger, 1962. C.B. McLane's "Chinese Words and Chinese Actions", International Journal XVII, 3, 1963, gives an account of the foreign policy actions of China in 1949-1962, contrasted with the ideological declarations of intent which Peking has issued.

11. A Doak Barnett, op. cit., p.p291-336 & David A. Wilson, China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung, Rand Corporation, 1962, pp. 14-16.

12. The position of the Overseas Chinese had become increasingly uncomfortable due to Peking's strident calls for revolution and offers of protection for the Overseas Chinese in the period 1949-1952. Peking needed to retain the goodwill of the Overseas Chinese in order to help the major export drive in South-East Asia in 1954. This was to gain foreign exchange in order to help repay U.S.S.R. credits due in 1954. H. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, p. 404.

> Peking and many of them welcomed any sign from Peking that this might in fact be feasible on acceptable and dignified terms."[13]

The Chinese attempted to create an area of 'collective peace' which would exclude the United States. This policy was conceived in the face of a radically changed world situation. There was a strengthening of United States ties in the Far East. United States re-armament, the Japanese Peace Treaty, the beginning of rapprochement between Japan and the rest of Asia. The ANZUS pact had been created and a United States/Phillipines treaty signed. The problem facing China was not one of promoting revolution as it had been in 1949. At that time there was the uncertainty and instability caused by the 1948 revolts in South-East Asia and the possibility of Soviet advance in Europe. Now the problem was to stop further United States influence and commitment in Asia. Mao was convinced of the United States' imperialistic designs.

> "When Mao gained power his views on 'imperialism had hardened because of United States aid to the Nationalists' ..... anti-imperialism is still the basic factor in Mao's emotional make-up ..... it colours his whole view of the world, for Mao imperialism is a national and personal experience."[14]

By 1953 and 1954 this concept of peaceful co-existence had acquired greater flexibility and included recognition of non-alignment.

Mao was, perhaps, reluctantly impressed by the neutrality of Nehru during the Korean War and by the attention which was being paid by other nations to the policies of 'non-alignment' being followed by Third World leaders. Under the strategy followed in this period of flexibility

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13. A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 101.
14. R. MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 3.

the concept of 'collective peace' was to be changed from a tactical device by which the imperialists could be attacked to a strategy of detaching certain states from alliance with the West.

China, in fact, offered an unspecified period of peace to any nation which would exclude the United States system of military alliances from its borders and assist in pushing it out of Asia altogether. Benefits of trade were offered if any nation would contribute to the breaking of the embargo of trade with China.

This policy towards Asian countries was suited to the resources at China's disposal at the time. It involved no great risk to herself and enabled her own internal domestic policies to develop. The policy was based on the fact that all Asian nationalists were becoming aware of China's increasing power in the area.

> "The pursuit of goodwill in Asia is facilitated by the vigorous hostility which China maintains towards the imperialists, for this discourages Asian co-operation with the West, gives prominence to China's ascendence in Asia and thus recommends peaceful co-existence to other Asian countries ..... the strategy of peaceful co-existence is put into effect by formal Chinese pledges of dedication to that ideal, but with fairly clear implications that they can enjoy security and China's goodwill only if they avoid co-operation with the West. If a country which has accepted peaceful co-existence then begins to co-operate with the West,then it can no longer expect China to be bound by the principles of respect for its independence which are summed up under the heading of peaceful co-existence."[15]

The appeal of communism to the indigenous peoples of Asia can only be weakened by suggestions that the predominant support for their communist parties and 'front organizations' comes from the Overseas Chinese. This may have been one factor which helped the British in their suppression of the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist Party.

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15. J. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 93.

China now seems unwilling to permit the plight of the Overseas Chinese to affect her attempts at more conventional international relations with the South-East Asian nations. Consideration of the impact of internal policies on the Overseas Chinese has become less important.

> "On issues affecting the Overseas Chinese since 1954 Communist China has stressed its willingness to make concessions especially if it can make political gain or capital out of it, and thereby promote closer relations with the South-East Asian government concerned."[16]

Pride in the Motherland was also a reaction against the hostility engendered by rising local nationalism. For Chinese youth in Asia, support for the new regime in China was a convenient method of rebellion against their parents. It provided an orientation in the confusion and frustration of living as an alien. Between 1948 and 1954 thousands of Chinese Secondary School students formed Communist study groups, while teachers used Communist texts on Chinese history. Several thousand young Overseas Chinese left home, some without parental consent, to go to China to work for the revolution.[17]

Within the Chinese Community Associations there was a bitter struggle between the supporters of Taiwan, Peking and the neutralists. The effect of this political struggle was to weaken the formerly cohesive Chinese communities.

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16. A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 186.

17. "from the time the communists took over the Mainland to the end of 1953 probably more than 9,000 Overseas Chinese students returned to Red China." Lu Yu-Sun, op. cit., pp. 42-43. Also R.S. Elegant, The Dragon's Seed, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1959, p. 31.

Sympathy for China did not mean direct support for the communist regime as such or a willingness to work on its behalf.

Links with China have also been getting weaker since the last decade. Travel to the Mainland has almost ceased as well. There is no longer the inflow of Overseas Chinese youth eager for higher education and a chance to see the 'New China' as there was during the early years of the Communist regime. The hopes of the old to return to China after a life-time's work abroad have faded for the Overseas Chinese as they increasingly realize how ill fitted they are to life in China today and as travel restrictions are tightened. Even the return to China for burial in China in one's ancestral village has now stopped.[18]

Chinese language schools in South-East Asia have found it increasingly difficult to recruit able Chinese language teachers for their schools. The teachers, who were one of the essential elements in the rise of Chinese nationalism among the expatriate communities, are now drawn from locally-born Chinese who have only a second-hand knowledge of China. When one adds to this the increasing prohibition and harassment of Chinese language schools it becomes apparent that more and more Overseas Chinese youth will be linguistically isolated from China. They will, therefore, find it less easy to identify with China and be cut off more and more from Chinese publications.

Remittances of money to China are the most tangible and direct sign of the link between the Chinese abroad and China proper. The financial support of the Overseas Chinese was essential for the success of Sun Yat-sen and remittances provided much needed foreign exchange for

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18. Lea. E. Williams, "Overseas Chinese and Peking", Trans-Action Vol. 4, January/February, 1967, p. 7.

Peking in the early 1950's. Figures for remittances are unreliable due to their political implications and the channels through which they have to pass. Most writers seem to agree that the amount of money remitted to China has declined greatly over the past ten years. Williams accepts a figure of a 25% decline since 1950.[19]

Links with kin still in China are declining in number as more and more Overseas Chinese are born overseas. Social reform inside China has destroyed the feelings of solidarity with one's own village. The blatant manipulation of exchange rates to gain foreign exchange by the Peking government and uncertainties in the remittance procedures, plus the crude blackmail and threats practised by Peking in the early 1950's have all combined to weaken the desire of the Overseas Chinese to make remittances to the Mainland.[20]

Remittances decreased during the purges of landlords which were at their height in 1950. News also began to reach South-East Asia of the actions carried out by local officials against families who were receiving remittances. Families were forced to write to their relatives overseas asking for money under threat of imprisonment. Letters asking for money

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19. Lea. E. Williams, Future of Overseas Chinese, New York, McGraw-Hill 1965, p. 81. An average of $30mil.per annum for the period 1949 to the period of the Great Leap Forward, $17mil p.a. for 1959 and $15.00 mil. p.a. in 1960 are quoted by H. Hinton, op. cit., p. 407.

20. L. Mitchison, The Overseas Chinese, Pennsylvania, Dufour Editions, 1961, p. 49, See also Lu Yu-Sun op. cit., especially Chapter Seven, "The Exaction of Foreign Exchange from Overseas Chinese". R.S. Elegant, op. cit., pp. 23-24 gives a case history of blackmail practised on one Chinese person living near Foochow who had sons living in Manila.

were given to them to sign and pressure was put on the families to buy State bonds with the money they had received. Exit permits for wives and parents were sometimes made dependent on Overseas Chinese relatives remitting large sums of money.

> "Under the present conditions of isolation there will virtually be no overseas settlers with close relatives on the Mainland within another generation. The end of remittances may one day signal the fact that the Overseas Chinese have all been born within their countries of residence."[21]

The Overseas Chinese, although relegated to a lower position in the foreign policy priorities of Communist China, are not now neglected entirely. Communist China can never ignore the Overseas Chinese while the Nationalists still attempt to get Overseas Chinese support. During the height of the period of peaceful co-existence, from approximately the Bandung Conference of 1955 to 1958, China still continued to try and gain the allegiance of the Chinese abroad. There was an intensive trade offensive in an attempt to build up links with Chinese merchants in South-East Asia.

3. Appraisal of Communist China by Overseas Chinese

How have the Overseas Chinese reacted to the existence of Communist China? Although there were never the close links between the Communist Movement in China and the Overseas Chinese as there were in the case of Kuomintang or with Sun Yat-Sen, (who called the Overseas Chinese 'the mother of the Chinese Revolution'), there was an immediate goodwill and loyalty to the new regime from those who were not politically committed

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21. Lea E. Williams, Ibid., p. 84.

to the Nationalists. Pride in the fact that China was at last active, dynamic and imbued with a new purpose and direction was the over-riding reason.

The main attraction of China was the appeal to patriotism which Peking was able to engender. However, the actual policies implemented inside China have alienated large numbers of Overseas Chinese from active identification with China. Unfavourable publicity was produced by the accounts of students returning from China disillusioned by what they found there and the way they had been treated.

Land reform and collectivization - which were theoretically separate but viewed by the Overseas Chinese as interrelated also endangered support for Peking from abroad.

Letters from kin still in China told the stories of collectivization, and propaganda from Taiwan made full use of the changes taking place within China.

> "By 1958 official pronouncements from Peking had seriously jeopardized each of its major appeals to the Overseas Chinese and circumscribed the immediately advantageous result of the earlier policy. Appeals based on special privileges and concern for the Overseas Chinese ran afoul of the Chinese socialization programme."[22]

Thus, one has to add to the growing isolation and estrangement from China of the Overseas Chinese, the separation caused by the domestic policies of China. Measurement of the political loyalties of the Overseas Chinese is

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22. W.G. Skinner's "Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, p. 148.

an almost impossible task. The situation in Asia does not lend itself to frank and open disclosure of political loyalties. It is safe to guess, however, that a majority of the Overseas Chinese still feel some identification with China as the 'Homeland'. Politically, however, they are following a policy of 'wait and see' based on pragmatic self-interest. Few Overseas Chinese not directly recruited by Peking have been able to accept the emotional and intellectual discipline of Marxism. There is a gap between the aims of the majority of Overseas Chinese and that of China today.

> "The Overseas Chinese are eminently orientated towards middle class goals and values. Chinese land reform, the collectivization or communalization of agriculture, the socialization of industry and commerce and the ideological campaign in China urging great leaps forward and learning from the thoughts of Mao - these can have no substantial meaning for expatriate Chinese long powerfully guided by the profit motive."[23]

The events within China of the last year can only have served further to alienate the support of the Overseas Chinese for Peking. The picture of China as a modern, progressive nation has been shattered by the paradoxes and inconsistencies of the 'cultural revolution'. The effectiveness of commercial and diplomatic missions maintained by China in South-East Asia has suffered due to the confusion inside China.

Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore has been quoted as saying:

> "the vision can never be the same again because the cultural revolution has left China's supporters utterly demoralized.

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23. Lea. E. Williams,"Overseas Chinese and Peking", Trans-Action, Vol. 4, January/February, 1967, p. 9.

Lee Kong Chian, millionaire elder statesman of the Chinese community of Singapore, has been reported as advising the Chinese community:

> "..... that in view of events in China the time has come for them to concentrate their hopes on the city state in which they live and work."[24]

It was always a simplification to believe that the Overseas Chinese directed their cultural and political loyalties towards Peking. At the present time nothing could be more untrue. The Overseas Chinese are now becoming increasingly isolated from the Mainland, both in terms of political identification and viable cultural and physical ties. It was similarly untrue to believe that Peking was always intent on using the Overseas Chinese to promote subversion abroad. Only in Malaya, with its 40% Chinese population, was a direct attempt made to use the Overseas Chinese as a political force. Where Peking has followed a policy of subversion it has attempted to exploit the grievances of, and give support to, indigenous disaffected groups such as the hill tribes of Indo-China, the Huks in the Phillipines, and more recently the Viet-Namese minority in the North-East of Thailand.[25]

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24. D. Middleton,"Overseas Communist Parties Shaken by Sudden Shifts in Chinese Doctrine",news report in Globe and Mail, Toronto, May 1, 1967, p. 4.

25. The extent to which China has actively fostered subversion abroad is difficult to determine. There would seem to be general agreement that the foreign policy of Communist China has not been overtly agressive, except where her own territorial integrity is felt to be in danger. "The Chinese Communists have resorted to the direct use of military force relatively rarely and only when security objectives or the wish to re-incorporate Chinese territory under the control of Peking seemed to be at issue." M.H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York, Praeger 1965, p. 14. See also A.M. Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage : Viet-Nam and American Democracy, 1941-1966, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967, especially Chapter Six "Is China the Enemy in Viet-Nam?" D. Warner, "China Fans the Fires" and "Thailand : Peking's New Front" in Viet-Nam : Why. A collection of Reports and Comments from the Reporter, New York ,Reporter Magazine Co., 1966 outlines Chinese subversion in both [illegible]rica and South-East Asia. W.E. Griffith "Moscow, Peking and Africa" in The [illegible]-Soviet Conf[illegible], Washington House Document No. 237, 19[illegible]5, pp. 26[illegible]37, discu[illegible] Chinese actio[illegible] Africa.

The hopes which the Overseas Chinese had of protection from Peking have been generally disappointed. The only communist rebellion in the region failed and brought the Chinese poorer status in Malaya than before, while the existence of Communist China has not helped the Chinese in Thailand, Cambodia or the Phillipines, nor did its protests help to stop the persecution of the Chinese in Indonesia, India and Burma.

CHAPTER IV : THE ASSIMILATION PROBLEM

> "They are now paying the price for having remained Chinese. The Homeland has remained (in fact, by a freak of political history is has doubled) and can be used as an argument for denying to the Overseas Chinese their full rights as local citizens. On a cold appraisal of the evidence one might well come to the conclusion that their 'Homeland' is now in reality an embarrassment, and certainly of little value to the Chinese in South-East Asia."[1]

This chapter is a discussion of the extent to which the Chinese are likely in the future to want to go on 'paying the price of being Chinese'. Assimilation into their 'host societies' has been widely regarded as the only alternative left open to the Chinese if they wish to go on living in South-East Asia.[2]

Reliable estimates of how far the Chinese have actually assimilated in the past are difficult to obtain. Williams, in the latest book published on the Overseas Chinese, can only describe the present situation with regard to assimilation as follows:

> "There are extremes in acculturation;the vast majority find themselves in an intermediate state."[3]

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1. M. Freedman/D. Willmot, "Recent Researches in Race Relations : Chinese in South-East Asia", International Social Science Journal II, 1961, p. 260.

2. W. Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas : A Comparison of Thailand and Java", Journal of the South Seas Society, 16, p. 100, "In the long run the only future of the local-born Chinese in most of South-East Asia is to assimilate completely to indigenous society."

3. Lea. E. Williams, op. cit., p. 14.

This chapter will analyse what factors are liable to either increase or hinder further assimilation of the Chinese in South-East Asia. Before these various factors are discussed, however, it is necessary to investigate further the nature of assimilation and to try and see how it takes place.

A. Assimilation

The concept of assimilation has been utilized to cover varying degrees of socio-cultural changes by minority groups and their increasing identification with other cultures. The difficulty is to devise a suitable means of measuring degrees of assimilation. Coughlin conceives the term 'assimilation' to cover nearly all interactions between Chinese and Thai.

> "Contacts may be fleeting and superficial, but daily, in a hundred different ways, assimilation constantly goes on. It goes on in the schools, on religious festivals, which give occasion for social integration, and no less in business with its demands for recreative gatherings and relaxation after hard bargaining."[4]

He then goes on to point out other factors which hinder further assimilation for the Chinese in Thailand.

Skinner defines assimilation in the following terms:

> "Assimilation is defined as increasing social intercourse with members of Thai society, first public and then privately; increasing self-identification as Thai in an

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4. R. Coughlin, Double Identity, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p. 193.

ever increasing number of situations."[5]

Skinner's definition implies that there are degrees of assimilation which can occur. It also seems to imply, however, that assimilation, once started, will continue until there is 'complete assimilation'. This is in contradiction to Coughlin who views a degree of assimilation as taking place, but not progressing any further because of inherent factors in Thai Society. Assimilation as a concept will be broken down into a number of stages and analysed further. This scheme is adapted from M. Gordon[6] who has used it to examine assimilation in the United States.

The Assimilation Variables (Diagram II)

Sub-Process or Condition	Types or Stages of Assimilation
1. Change of cultural patterns to those of host society.	Acculturation (behavioural assimilation).
2. Large scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host society on primary group level.	Structural Assimilation.
3. Large Scale Inter-Marriage.	Marital Assimilation.
4. Development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on host society.	Identificational Assimilation.
5. Absence of Prejudice.	Attitude receptional assimilation.
6. Absence of Discrimination.	Behaviour receptional assimilation.
7. Absence of value and power conflict.	Civic Assimilation.

The advantages of using a model as given above is as follows. It

5. W.G. Skinner, "Chinese Assimilation and Thai Politics", Journal of Asian Studies, February 1957, Vol. No. 17, p. 237.

6. M.M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: . the Role of Race Religion and National Origins, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, especially Chapter Three, The Nature Assimilation.

enables the confusion cited previously about what is to be defined as assimilation to be clarified. When Coughlin talks of assimilation in terms of

> "..... the social mixing of the two peoples, and sees it as the process by which Chinese persons become members of Thai social groupings and Thai persons join Chinese groups, or both belong to a third party group."[7]

this will be termed acculturation (variable I as above) and further analysis can be made of the groupings, whether primary or secondary, in which interaction takes place. This use of acculturation (which Gordon terms cultural or behavioural assimilation) is consistent with the definition given by Redfield, Linton and Herskovits:

> "..... it comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups."[8]

The crucial factor is to observe the relationship between (1) acculturation and (2) structural assimilation. Once structural assimilation has occurred all the other stages will follow. However, acculturation need not necessarily lead to structural assimilation. It is open to question whether 'attitude receptional' and 'behaviour receptional' assimilation - i.e. elimination of prejudice and discrimination can occur without structural assimilation.

One part of this chapter will outline which factors will further influence

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7. R. Coughlin, op. cit., p. 192.

8. R. Redfield, R. Linton, M. Herskovits, "Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation", American Anthropologist, Vol. 38, No. 1, January/March, 1936, p. 149.

the likelihood of the Chinese in South-East Asia progressing from acculturation to structural assimilation.

Assimilation can be seen as part of a process of socio-cultural change for a society. Most definitions of assimilation contain some notion of 'changing cultural patterns or adoption of other values'.[9] This, therefore, raises the question of motivation. Assimilation and acculturation are types of change which involve group acceptance of innovations from alien societies and cultures. Is assimilation an inevitable process once certain conditions exist? Which innovations will be accepted, and why?

Skinner, in his study of the Overseas Chinese elite in Thailand, investigated the degrees of "Thainess" of the Chinese leaders. Seven per cent of the leaders were placed in the category of First Degree of 'Thainess'. This is equivalent to almost complete structural assimilation.[10] The motivation of these leaders was desire for the prestige to be gained by association with the Thai elite and for political protection against government action detrimental to their own economic interests. Yet earlier in his investigation of the factors which account for the varying degrees of 'Thainess' found among the Chinese elite, Skinner says:

> "To a large extent, the degree of 'Thainess' is directly related to whether or not the leader was born in Thailand

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9. e.g. Assimilation is defined as "a social process through which two or more persons or groups accept and perform one anothers' patterns of behaviour", by J. Fichter in Sociology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 229, and by B. Berry in Race Relations, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1951, p. 217, as 'the process whereby groups with different cultures come to have a common culture'.

10. W. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958, p. 233.

> and/or his father was born there, whether or not he had his formative years there, and whether or not he had all or part of his education there. Assimilation to Thai society thus appears to be largely a function of time and intensity of exposure to Thai society and culture."[11]

Objective factors have to be considered such as education, family background but also opportunity. The Chinese elite in Thailand have a very strong motive to assimilate. This desire to assimilate may not exist for other Chinese of a different socio-economic level or for Chinese leaders in other societies in South-East Asia.

The problem of assimilation now has been divided into two parts:

(i) What general variables affect the level of acculturation (Sub-Process I) between the Chinese and their host societies?

(ii) Will already acculturated Chinese go beyond this and become structurally assimilated? (Sub-Process II).

B. Variables Involved in Chinese Assimilation in South-East Asia

Skinner has argued:

> "Differentials in the degree of Chinese assimilation from one part of South-East Asia to another cannot be accounted for by factors inherent in the Chinese. They must flow, rather from differences among the receiving societies."[12]

For the purposes of analysis, however, the variables affecting assimilation will be divided into three types:

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11. Skinner, op. cit., p.234.

12. Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas : A Comparison of Thailand and Java", Journal of the South Seas Society, 16, 1960, p. 87.

(i) long term demographic and other external factors affecting the Overseas Chinese

(ii) the nature of the host society

(iii) the changing nature of the Overseas Chinese communities (even if they flow from 'external' action of host societies as is implied by Skinner above).

I) Long Term Variables Affecting Assimilation

These are (i) the percentage of Chinese or local born Chinese and (ii) Chinese linked with China either by travel or extensive communications.

The percentage of Overseas Chinese born in China in all communities is declining. As has been noted earlier, immigration was sharply curtailed by the depression of the 1930's and the advent of World War II. Since 1949, with the Communists in power in China, immigration has been reduced to almost nil.

Children brought up by parents both of whom were China-born are less liable to be assimilated than those brought up in a house where the marriage is mixed and the Chinese parent is local-born. Between these two extremes - i.e. where both parents are Chinese, but both have been born within the country they now live in - the likelihood of assimilation increases in an inverse relationship to the strength of ties with China.

The estrangement of the Overseas Chinese from China is due, among other things, to social reform within China, and has been documented in an earlier chapter.

The possibilities of returning to China whether for education or on a business trip have now been sharply reduced. The exodus to China of young Chinese from South-East Asia for higher education has also declined sharply.

The culminative effect of these long term trends is to provide the basis for a diminution of feelings of identity with China and an increasing realization of the need to come to terms with the country in which they live. An increased awareness of the need to focus their loyalties towards their host societies might reasonably be expected of the Chinese, therefore. This will inevitably increase the possibilities for acculturation (Sub-Process I).

II) Nature of the Host Country

The variables affecting assimilation/acculturation are as follows: (A) cultural values of the country; (B) social structure of the Host Society.

(A) Cultural Values of the Country

The system of cultural values which exists in any one of the South-East Asian countries will affect the extent to which assimilation is possible and the degree to which it is seen as desirable.

The two main aspects which need to be analysed are:

(i) attitudes towards the Chinese as a group;
(ii) religious values of the country in question.

The Chinese as a group in all of the South-East Asian countries are perceived as having certain characteristics which are the basis for hostility and prejudice. By virtue of the economic power which they wield the Chinese have been seen as exploiters of the indigenous peoples. The existence of Chinese community organizations is used as evidence of Chinese 'clannishness'. The Chinese seem usually to be regarded as 'fair weather citizens' by the indigenous peoples of South-East Asia.

An Indonesian government official told Willmot:

"We distrust them because they are opportunists. They will

> do anything for profit. When the Dutch were here, they supported the Dutch. And they would do it again if the Dutch came back. They supported the Japanese; anything to protect their money. If they say they are loyal Indonesia citizens - or that they were born here, will die here and consider this their homeland - this is true only so long as it is in their economic interest. We may mix with them, treat them as friends and so on, but we always feel a distance, a distrust."[13]

Although actual face to face meetings between Chinese and indigenous Asians seem to be on the whole fairly harmonious, this undercurrent of distrust associated with stereotyping of the nature of the Chinese, means that inter-action in primary groups is made less likely. The acculturation which follows from these meetings of the two peoples is what Coughlin has termed 'assimilation for convenience'. It is dictated by the demands of one's livelihood and public life. Indigenous Asians cannot, by definition, join Chinese community organizations. The facilities for social interaction between Chinese and indigenous Asians in primary groups are few. The Chinese who do mix socially with members of the indigenous peoples in primary groups will be those who have gone furthest already in rejecting their Chinese identity and cultural values. They do not confomm to the normal stereotype of a Chinese person and are, therefore, accepted.

The differences between Chinese religious practices and those of the countries in which they live may be a barrier to assimilation (See Appendix VIII for map of religions of South-East Asia).

In the predominantly Moslem areas it is often held that the doctrinaire exclusivism enjoined by the Islamic religion is a barrier to further assimi-

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13. D. Willmot, The Chinese of Semarang : A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960, p. 96.

lation, of the eclectic - generally non-religious - Chinese.

In countries where Buddhism is the major religion it is felt that the easy-going tolerant dictates of the Buddhist religion are no barrier to assimilation and that there can be a rapprochement in the religious sphere.

While it is true that the cultural values of the pork eating Chinese are abhorrent to devout Muslims, the extent to which religion is a barrier should not be carried too far. The fact that there is an easy meeting between the tolerant Buddhism and the this-worldly Chinese means that there is no impetus to closer assimilation. They can co-exist quite happily. A Chinese citizen in Thailand who prays at a Thai Buddhist temple for business success can still utilize the ancestral shrines of his Chinese religion for the same end without any feeling of incongruity. While there is a clash between the Chinese and the Moslem faith, especially regarding the family, the fact that there can be no in-between stage does mean that once a Chinese has become sufficiently acculturated to accept Islamic religious identity, further assimilation is almost inevitable and the step taken towards assimilation is a definite and recognisable one.

This raises the whole question of the meaningfulness of the various factors generally cited as being barriers or aids to assimilation. They would seem to be far less deterministic in one direction than has previously been suspected. For example it is said that assimilation of the Chinese in Thailand has been aided by the tolerant and easy-going nature of the Thai people.[14] However, it can also be argued that because of this tolerance, the

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14. e.g. For a discussion of Thai cultural values and their permissiveness see J. Embree, "Thailand - A Loosely Structured Social System", American Anthropologist, Vol. III, 1950, and R. Benedict, Thai Culture and Behaviour, Ithaca, Cornell Data Paper, No. 4, Cornell University Press, 1957.

differences between the two groups are also tolerated. The value of arranged marriages is accepted by both peoples and ethnic endogamy is perpetuated. Neither groups engage in religious proselytism, but accept the other's religion as legitimate. A more intolerant attitude towards Chinese values with stricter enforcement of laws might increase assimilation by forcing more Chinese to see the advantages that assimilation would bring.

(B) Social Structure of the Host Society

The economic activities carried out by the indigenous peoples are often in competition with the Overseas Chinese. To the extent that the Chinese are skillful and experienced entrepreneurs, able to utilise the credit and trust of the whole Chinese community, hostility is likely to be aroused by the success of the Chinese. Because of the level of economic development in the majority of the South-East Asian countries the government has had to play a large part in national economic development. The effects this has had on the Chinese will be discussed in the next chapter. The absence of indigenous economic activity is also a factor counteracting assimilation.

A Chinese person is most likely to enter an all Chinese work group, but has little chance of entering a work situation where he meets indigenous Asian employees on a 'face to face' basis. There is no incentive for a Chinese person to look beyond the Chinese community for employment. A majority of the indigenous people of South-East Asia are still engaged in agriculture which is not attractive to the Chinese, while a career in the government bureaucracies is not open to the Chinese in the majority of South-East Asian countries. Basic economic considerations mean that a Chinese youth will enter the still strongly family-based Chinese commercial world and accept its values. This economic dualism mitigates against an integration of the

Chinese with native Asians in a work situation and stops the possibility of further acculturation and structural assimilation.

The absence of effective social services for the Chinese in South-East Asia means that continuation of the all-Chinese community associations is a vital necessity for the Overseas Chinese. It is only through these organizations that relief and help can be obtained, in times of troubles. The value of community associations as protective organizations increases as more government restrictions and political uncertainties make the future less predictable. (The strengthening of these in-group ties works further against the possibility of acculturation and more especially structural assimilation).

C. Nature of Host Country's Elite and Its Policies Towards The Overseas Chinese

During the colonial era the Chinese, with only a few rare exceptions, were not accepted into the society of the colonial elite, while there was no status to be gained by assimilation into the ranks of the indigenous Asians. Since these countries have gained independence, the situation has changed. In Thailand, the only non-colonial country in South-East Asia, the desire for social mobility into the ranks of the Thai ruling elite had always been an important factor in the motivation for assimilation. The same may well happen in the other independent South-East Asian countries, where the political elite are now the social elite also.

Skinner noted during field research in Java that Perankan leaders were giving their children Javanese names and dropping the Chinese surname altogether. Perankan leaders supported the Indonesian government's discriminatory policy against the alien Chinese in West Java.[15]

15. Perankan: the name given to the group of Indonesians of Chinese origin who are now neither Chinese nor Indonesian. They have evolved their own culture, dress, and institutions. The Perankan are set apart from both other groups.

The option of full structural assimilation is only open to the elite and those of the Chinese community who have already moved beyond the stage of acculturation. The impetus to further identification with the indigenous Asian elite may well be given by the policies of economic nationalism now being carried out against the Chinese in most of these countries.

The motivation provided by the need for economic survival is added to the desire for upward social mobility. In Thailand extensive ties between the Overseas Chinese leaders and the Thai ruling elite have developed. Sixty of the hundred most influential leaders were formally involved in business co-operation with members of the Thai elite, and thirty-six out of the top fifty were on joint corporation boards.

The extent of this inter-dependence is probably a result of special conditions in Thailand. The Thai political elite needed to gain an economic base to help secure its own position. The small size of the Thai elite and the overall degree of assimilation of the Overseas Chinese leaders themselves also helped to favour this inter-dependence. Eighty-two per cent of the top Chinese leaders had extensive links with the Thai elite. Seventy-one per cent of the most wealthy Chinese leaders had what Skinner has classified as 'extensive and considerable' links with the Thai elite.[16]

It is by no means certain that similar alliances will develop in other South-East Asian countries. In Indonesia, where the Chinese have been subject to the most violent attacks, there can be little likelihood of this kind of inter-ethnic alliance occurring. Although there is a political alliance in Malaysia, the Chinese trading economic power for the Malay's political power,

16. W.G. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958, pp. 302-319.

the stability of this coalition remains to be seen. The relationship between the Chinese leaders and the Thai elite seems destined to continue in Thailand, however. Although it may have started out of expediency as protection against 'Thai-ification' of the economy it now serves to bring the Chinese leaders into close contact with the Thai elite. It provides them with prestige[17] and gives them a vested interest in the continuance of the present system.

Links with the Thai elite are also a function of age. Half of the leaders with a large number of connections with the Thai elite are fifty years old or under; as against only 19% of the leaders with no Thai connections. For these leaders, who have often gained their prestige because of links with the Thai elite, their leadership and status is dependent on this cross ethnic-leadership alliance.[18]

The leaders of the Chinese communities have the motivation to develop these ties and accept further assimilation.

Williams argues that leadership in the Chinese communities is now based on the ability to negotiate and bargain with the indigenous political elite.

> "The emphasis of the new Overseas Chinese leadership is on guiding their compatriots toward the best possible accommodation within the societies and states of South-East Asia."[19]

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17. i.e. between 1952 and 1956 twenty-six Chinese leaders were decorated by the King.

18. All the above figures are taken from Skinner's Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand, Chapter 9, Part B, Chinese leaders and the Thai elite, pp. 302-321. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956.

19. Lea. E. Williams, op. cit., p. 84.

Willmot in his analysis of Semarang found evidence to support this. He concluded that ability to work with diverse political groups, to exercise leadership and a general ability to 'get along with people' were now the prerequisites of leadership within the Chinese community rather than, as formerly, leadership in the specifically Chinese religious or educational sphere.[20]

The Overseas Chinese communities have never been static entities, but have always adapted to new conditions. The changing nature of Chinese education and the impact on Chinese life of western values and culture will be examined to see how these may affect assimilation.

(A) Chinese Education Today

Minority ethnic groups have nearly always viewed education as one of the most important means of perpetuating their distinctive identity within an alien society. The Chinese are no exception. As has been discussed earlier the development of Chinese schools to meet the needs of the Chinese communities in South-East Asia was one of the most important aspects of the rise of Chinese nationalism. The links with China created by the separatist nature of Chinese education inevitably ran afoul of the nationalist aspirations of the South-East Asian leaders. The K.M.T. Congress of 1946 calling for an educational system for the Overseas Chinese similar to that of the Chinese themselves and the communist-backed Chinese schools in South-East Asia alike were viewed with distrust by South-East Asian nationalists.

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20. D. Willmot, The Chinese in Semarang, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960, p. 168.

Chinese schools have been subjected to government legislation in the post-1949 period.

Text books have been barred, schools closed and the contents of courses controlled. The total effect has been to weaken drastically the whole system of Chinese education within South-East Asia. In Indonesia only alien-Chinese are allowed to go to Chinese schools and even here there is compulsory teaching in the Indonesian language and Indonesian history. South Viet-Nam has forbidden the use of Chinese as a primary language of instruction. Malaysia has pursued a restrictive policy against Chinese schools. English or Malay has been instituted as the main language of instruction at the secondary level. While Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia, the government refused to grant aid to the Chinese University of Nanyang or to recognize the degrees of its students. In Thailand there has been a long history of control over Chinese education. The number of Chinese schools there has decreased from 271 in 1933 to 195 in 1956.[21] Figures for the extent of Chinese education are given in Appendix VII. At present the situation would seem to be that, while Chinese education can be obtained, (even if only by the judicious use of a Chinese tutor), in nearly all of the South-East Asian countries, the cohesiveness which characterized earlier periods of Chinese education has disappeared. There is now little prospect for a Chinese youth to have a completely 'Chinese' education. To this extent the ability of the Chinese communities to socialize their children into a

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21. R. Coughlin, Double Identity, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p. 164.

distinctly Chinese way of life by the perpetuation of a Chinese home followed by a Chinese schooling inculcating traditional Chinese values has been lost. Two other factors tend to suggest that Chinese education will decrease in South-East Asia.

As the restrictions on Chinese education become more and more effective, more and more Chinese families will see the advantages of a non-Chinese education. Already the lack of knowledge of Chinese displayed by the Overseas Chinese students has made it more difficult for them to be able to study in either Peking or Taiwan. Higher education, inside their own country, is increasingly the road to the better paid jobs. It will also hamper the Overseas Chinese youth if he cannot show evidence of his ability to speak and use the local Asian language. In Thailand only about 10% of the graduates of Chinese primary schools have gone on to study in Thai secondary schools and less than 1% have left Thailand to go abroad for higher education. In this situation there are signs that the Chinese in Thailand will increasingly have to accept education in Thai schools if they are not to damage their hopes of a good job.

In Singapore, fewer than half of the Chinese children now attend Chinese schools.

> "At present a majority of Chinese parents in Singapore have chosen English schooling for their children. Not long ago, parents exposed themselves to social censure if they opted for non-Chinese education and thus had their children grow up alien to Chinese culture and intellectually dependent upon foreigners."[22]

The second factor making for a decline in Chinese education is the

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22. Lea. E. Williams, Future of Overseas Chinese, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1966, p. 107.

failure of the existing Chinese schools to teach the very skills most in demand in these countries. The Chinese have realized that in order to compete effectively in business they need people with the ability to speak English and to use modern commercial methods. Therefore, more and more parents are prepared to send their children to non-Chinese schools where they can learn these skills.

These two factors must mean that there will be a further decline in the exclusively Chinese school. Even where in the future schools are financially backed and controlled by the Chinese community, their curriculum will not be solely or even mainly Chinese.

The extent to which the importance of Chinese education has declined in the eyes of at least the leaders of the Chinese community in Thailand is shown by the following figures.

For non-Chinese secondary and primary education in Thailand one or more children of eighty-three of the top leaders of the Chinese community in Thailand had sent their children to Catholic schools not teaching Chinese. Children of twenty of them had gone to Protestant schools and children of thirty-eight to private or Thai schools not teaching Chinese. About two hundred and ninety of the children of the seven hundred and thirty-five leaders had been educated wholly or in part in non-Chinese schools as against one hundred and fifty who had some or all of their education in local Chinese schools. One hundred and twenty-eight of their children had attended the Assumption Commercial College (which offered a large amount of English and commercial instructions), as compared to seventy who went to the Chinese Huang-Hun School.

It is true that only these top leaders have the resources to educate

their children in this way. However, when this influential elite fails to organize and protect Chinese schools from the Thai authorities it does mean that there is less likelihood of Chinese education in Thailand ever again being as important in the community as it once was. Important Chinese leaders in Bangkok have ceased to be active on the Chinese school boards. The laws which limited the teaching of Chinese to ten hours per week, (and only six to obtain a government subsidy), and the decree which forced the employment of Thai teachers, have meant that the Chinese leaders have lost interest in many schools which have progressively become Chinese in name only.[23]

The ability of Chinese schools to act as agents of retentionism, (defined as the attempt by a minority group, either through the school or by any other means, to retain unique values and behaviour, either in an altered or adapted form[24]), is therefore on the decline. Fisherman has argued that for a school to be successful in promoting retentionism at least four conditions must exist. It must be part of a whole series of institutions which are able to reinforce the values it is attempting to inculcate. It must be firmly ethnocentric and exclusive. There must be support from the parent society abroad and it must serve a definite need for the community and be actively supported by that community. The last three factors do not exist in the case of Chinese schools in South-

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23. Thai teachers have outnumbered Chinese teachers in Chinese schools since 1950. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958, p. 129.

24. The term is used by J.A. Fisherman, "Childhood Indoctrination for Minority Group Membership". Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 90, No. 3, 1961, pp. 339-340.

East Asia. As a barrier to acculturation and assimilation the importance of Chinese education has decreased significantly in the last two decades.

D. Impact of Western Culture and Values

The Chinese communities in South-East Asia have never been purely 'Chinese'. By virtue of living in these societies some degree of acculturation had to take place. The rural China the immigrant left was entirely different from the urban life he came to in South-East Asia. Whether it is style of clothing, eating habits, or the worshipping of different Gods, the Chinese immigrant acquired new cultural patterns. The Overseas Chinese community which he entered, however self-contained, inevitably prepared him for a new way of life in a different society. Increasingly, however, the distinctive Overseas Chinese culture has come to be influenced not only by traditional Chinese values and the values of their host societies, but also by those of the West.

Chinese parents want their children to learn English; the entertainment and the consumer goods sought after are increasingly Western. The values of the Chinese match in many respects those of the Western businessman. Both cultures extol the value of work, individual initiative, and the ideas of contractual obligation. There is evidence that Western business firms prefer to deal with the Chinese entrepeneur wherever possible and will pefer to employ Chinese clerks.[25]

Western culture may well provide a common meeting ground for the new

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25. R. Coughlin, op. cit., p. 192.

generation of both Chinese and indigenous Asians. The young Chinese are not prepared to work the long hours their parents once did.

The introduction of Western techniques and values has widespread ramifications for the traditional Asian societies and Chinese societies. The discipline of the Chinese family has been challenged by the new values of the younger generation. Fixed hours of work are being increasingly adopted; new leisure-time activities have become popular. Bangkok has its A-sia, the name given to young, rich Chinese youths who are more interested in spending wealth than acquiring it.[26]

Hostility and apprehension caused by political and economic discrimination make it more unlikely that an atmosphere conducive to the process of assimilation will emerge. There is no prospect, however, of the impact of the West declining in South-East Asia in the immediate future. Whether it is military bases or aid officials which are the agents of change, the result is the same.[27]

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26. In Indonesia an editorial in Kuongo, an Indonesian language Chinese newspaper said, '..... great changes are evident in the young generation of today -- they are impatient for luxuries, they lack responsibility; they make almost no effort to examine the work methods of their colleagues even if they are only workers they want to outdo their employers in outward splendour". Quoted in Willmot's op. cit., p. 73. Even if this quotation proves nothing else, it does at least show attitudes towards the young in newspaper editorials are increasingly the same whether one is in London, Toronto, Athens or Jakarta.

27. The Philippines have traditionally been thought of as the most Western influenced of the South-East Asian countries because of their long-standing ties with the United States. While there are vast differences between individual South-East Asian countries (compare North Borneo with Saigon) there seems to be no reversing of the trend of Western influence. With the exception of South Viet-Nam, Thailand has now the largest number of American personnel and aid officials. "Ten years ago, Bangkok could be summed up by the Thai self-descriptive term 'maibenrai, or roughly translated 'What the Hell?'. Five years ago a Hong Kong boatman perhaps caught the spirit of Bangkok best when he asked an innocent U.S. tourist, 'You want to see the lotus flowers, mister?' Bangkok today retains some of both the 'maibenrai' and 'lotus flower' atmosphere. But it no longer is a city of dirty canals and Golden Buddhist temples. They are still there, but they are difficult to find behind the four-lane freeways, exhaust fumes, glittering shop windows, neon lights and 'come-on' signs. Stretch pants have replaced sarongs-- taxis have replaced pedals. First class hotels are going up so fast that it is difficult to keep track of them." Toronto, Globe and Mail, January 20, 1967. For details of the extent of U.S. aid to Thailand and for U.S. aid teams, see D. Warner's "Aggression by Seepage in N.E. Thailand", Reporter Magazine, Vol. 27, No. 7, October 25, 1962, and J. Audris, "The Changing Face of Thailand", Eastern World 18, No. 6, June 1964, pp. 13-15.

E. Assimilation - Conclusions

No definite conclusions can be reached about the extent to which assimilation has taken place, or is liable to take place in the future. There is little doubt that a large amount of acculturation has occurred. With the decline of Chinese education, the growing isolation of the Overseas Chinese from China and the possibility of an ending of the cultural differences between the Chinese and their host societies by the common impact of Western values, it is likely that further acculturation will take place. It would seem, however, that other factors, such as continuous feelings of hostility and prejudice, the difficulties over language and the nationality problem, the economic dualism of these countries and the on-going nature of the Chinese community associations will preclude large scale structural assimilation in the immediate future for the majority of Overseas Chinese. Just as there is little common agreement between academic observers of the Overseas Chinese on the nature of assimilation, so there is disagreement between the Chinese and the South-East Asians themselves. The Chinese feel that if they work hard, pay taxes and are law-abiding citizens then this is as much as should be demanded of them. They should then be left in peace to run their own temples, associations and schools. South-East Asian nationalists largely view assimilation as a more thorough-going process involving a more complete identification with the host society and a dropping of distinctively Chinese values and patterns of behaviour. Some Overseas Chinese are motivated to accept this. The rewards involved in doing so outweigh the costs for them. However, these are only a small minority of the Chinese and they are mainly the more prosperous members of its community.

Long term trends, especially the ending of large-scale Chinese immigration, favours increasing acculturation by the Chinese. However, the increasingly uncertain environment which they face as more demands are made upon them by the South-East Asian governments may mean that for those able to do so there will be increased structural assimilation; while for others there will be a drawing back into the Chinese community and the development of an ethnocentric communalism.[28]

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28. The possibility of division arising in the Chinese community due to the almost complete assimilation of former Chinese community leaders will be discussed further in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER V : ECONOMIC NATIONALISM - THE OVERSEAS CHINESE ON THE DEFENSIVE

The Overseas Chinese came to South-East Asia in search of economic advancement. In this they were astonishingly successful. Thus when they are placed in a situation where their right to economic activity is placed in jeopardy this can be expected to have an important effect on their behaviour and attitudes.

Economic nationalism is defined as the policy of placing the economic activity of a country in the hands of indigenous members of that society. The means which have generally been employed in South-East Asia in an attempt to curb alien economic power have been

(i) reservation of certain occupations for nationals of that country
(ii) the setting up of special government sponsored or government run firms in competition with alien enterprises
(iii) the placing of restrictions by quotas, licence, or special taxes on business enterprises run by aliens.

In South-East Asia these policies have been aimed mainly at the commercially powerful Overseas Chinese. The main exception has been in Burma where the Indian minority were expelled from the country and their possessions confiscated.

The actual extent of Chinese economic control over the economies of South-East Asia is open to a variety of interpretations. Estimates of the extent of their enterprises in each of the South-East Asian countries vary widely.[1]

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1. For a detailed treatment of Chinese economic interests country by country see V. Purcell's The Chinese in S.E. Asia, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1965. Also for a more dramatic interpretation, complete with character sketches of top Chinese tycoons, see R. Elegant's The Dragon's Seed : Peking and The Overseas Chinese, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1959.

The difficulties to which the Chinese are now subjected mean that an accurate assessment of their actual holdings is made even more difficult; 'front' companies where ownership is formally in the hands of an indigenous Asian, but control actually resides with a Chinese businessman abound all over South-East Asia, especially in Indonesia.

Several points about Chinese economic power have to be made. First, the Chinese are now no longer restricted to their traditional occupations. As they have prospered they have moved out to new fields, including the professions. Many moved into the banking and export business when a vacuum was left by departing Western enterprises after the Asian countries gained independence.

Second, it is inaccurate to say that the Chinese are in complete control of the economies of these countries. It must be remembered that Western-owned companies still play an important role in many areas of South-East Asian economic life.[2]

Third, not all Overseas Chinese are large-scale prosperous businessmen. The majority are engaged in small-scale trading and retailing (Appendix IV gives a detailed statistical analysis of the occupational specialization in Krungthep Thailand and shows in which types of occupation the Chinese are predominant). It can also be seen that the Chinese fall

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2. In Thailand a private survey of the top fifty leading commercial firms revealed that of these (exclusive of banks) twenty-nine were Western-owned; four were Chinese and seventeen were owned by other nationalities, mainly Indians, and people from the Near East - quoted in R. Coughlin's op. cit., p. 4, while Willmot found that the predominant part of Semarang's import/export trade was handled by Europeans, mainly Dutch companies, Willmot, op. cit., p. 45. In 1957 25.8% of the Philippines' Foreign Trade was estimated to be done by American companies. Philippines Census Report quoted in S. Appleton's "Overseas Chinese and Economic Nationalization in the Philippines", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 20, February 1960, p. 153.

mainly (i.e. 70%) within the category of mid-high status and mid-low status in occupations such as small businessmen and artisans, mechanics and craftsmen.

Willmot's survey of occupations of the Chinese in Semarang, the capital of Central Java, a commercial metropolis of 360,000 people, led him to conclude

> "..... that by far the greater part of Semarang's total value of production is turned out by Chinese enterprise --- it can be said that in 1955 the Semarang Chinese owned and managed from three-quarters to four-fifths of Semarang retail, transport, science and wholesale enterprise."[3]

Appleton estimates that the Chinese in the Phillipines controlled in 1948 30% of the total investment in retail and export and import trade, 70% of lumbering, 10% of industry, while they also ran three of the fifteen commercial banks in the Phillipines. In the retail trade the Chinese take a lion's share of the business. They owned in 1951 36% of retail assets, but 46% of the actual business was theirs.[4]

The reactions of the new political elites in South-East Asia to the economic position of the Chinese is understandable. In their eyes the Chinese are taking advantage of the lack of an indigenous middle class. They are viewed as unreliable citizens whose only aim is to make money and

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3. D. Willmot, op. cit., pp. 44-46. Willmot's breakdown of occupations for Chinese men 1954/1955 was as follows: Professionals - 2%; Owners and Managers of Big Business - 2%; Business and Trade, small and middle - 50%; White Collar Clerks/Employees - 27%; Government Employees - 2%; Technicians/Craftsmen - 12%; Unskilled Labour - 5%. D. Willmot, Ibid., p. 37.

4. S. Appleton's op. cit., p. 152. Vandenbosch estimates that the Chinese were even more powerful in retail trading controlling 70 to 80% of the retail business in 1946. A. Vandenbosch, "The Chinese in South-East Asia", Journal of Politics, Vol. IX, February, 1947, pp. 80-96.

maintain a loyalty to their own Chinese society. The response has been to try and curb the Chi... ownership of business and trading in the name of indigenous control of the economy and increased economic development. It is believed that the Chinese have monopo... occupations preventing indigenous Asians from entering them and preve...ting their learning of these trades.

If these poli... ...face value, the very livelihood of the Overseas Chinese is in danger. Thailand led the way in restrictions against Chinese enterprises.[5] Cambodia began a campaign to weaken the Chinese hold on the rice trade in 1956 and also barred the Chinese from eighteen trades and professions. In South Viet-Nam (also in 1956), 500,000 local-born Chinese were ordered to pay taxes and register for military service as citizens of South Viet-Nam. All other Chinese automatically became foreigners and were forbidden to own businesses in important trades in which they had previously been dominant.

The Chinese position in the retail trade of the Philippines has been attacked by successive pieces of legislation. Magsaysay's "Retail

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5. e.g. The formation of the government-controlled Thai Rice Co., of 1938, which aimed to end Chinese control of the rice industry, in 1939, 'Salt and Tobacco Act' which forced the majority of Chinese salt exporters out of business. A Royal Decree in 1942 specified twenty-seven occupations for Thai only. Since 1952 there have been further ministerial directives and decrees, while anti-Chinese actions by individual government departments, especially those concerned with issuing licences, have increased. See R. Coughlin's Double Identity, Chapter 4, Economic Organization and Interests. Hong Kong, 1960. Also W. Skinner's Chinese Society in Thailand. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1957, Chapter 9, Repression and Reconstruction: Chinese under the Second Phibun Administration, pp. 298-383, for fuller accounts of legislation passed against Chinese business interests.

Trade Nationalization Act" was designed to end Chinese co-ownership completely.[6] In 1959 the Philippines' Central Bank started to refuse foreign exchange to non-American and non-Filipino firms who wanted to import consumer goods. Up until then the Chinese had controlled 39% of the import business of the Philippines.

Citizenship of the country does not preclude economic discrimination. Preferential treatment in licences has been given to the Malays in Malaysia in attempts to develop Malay industry. The quota system of the Malaya Service is organized so that posts are supposed to be filled in the ratio of four Malays to every one non-Malay, Chinese or Indian.

Indians in Burma were the alien group who were affected most by economic nationalism.[7] However, the state ownership of business under the Burmese policy of military socialism prevents the Chinese from operating through the facade of indigenous firms.

It is in Indonesia that the Chinese have felt the full pressure from economic nationalism. Estimated to control 70% of the country's economic activity at the time of independence, they have found themselves in an increasingly defensive position. In 1959 Chinese shops in West Java were replaced by rural co-operatives. The Chinese are now forbidden to trade in nine commodities including rice, salt, fish and textiles in Celebes. More than one hundred and seventy Chinese businesses have been closed down in

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6. "No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and no association, partnership or corporation, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business" - section of the 1954 Act quoted in S. Appleton, op. cit., p. 156. There were forty-eight nationalization bills which would affect the Chinese pending in August 1958.

7. They were expelled from the country and x-rayed at Airports to prevent their taking out any jewellery or gold.

East Java.[8] Chinese entrepreneurs have also been ordered to take on native Indonesians as partners so that at least fifty per cent of the company is native-owned. Chinese owned firms were also ordered to provide training facilities for Indonesian workers.[9] All Chinese nationals living in Achin, the northernmost part of the province of Sumala have been expelled while there are reports that in West Kalimantan the military authorities are also seeking to force all Chinese nationals to be repatriated to mainland China.[10]

These restrictions on the Overseas Chinese have had several results. One of the results has not been, however, to damage the economic power of the Chinese to the extent intended. The Chinese have succeeded very largely in delaying and outwitting the restrictions placed upon them. They have been able to bribe and manipulate the officials who have attempted to enforce the laws. In some countries, notably Thailand, contacts with the political elite have secured protection. At the present time the middle class of the majority of these countries is just too small to be able to run and organize the businesses in the way the Chinese can. The necessary business skills are still not developed enough. Where indigenous Asians have been taken on as

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8. "A Hard Line on the Soft Life of the Chinese in Indonesia", Dennis Bloodworth, Toronto, Globe and Mail, News Report, May 12, 1967. All Chinese language schools have been closed as well.

9. D. Willmot, op. cit., p. 57.

10. New York Times Service Report: "Chinese Taking Stand Against Harassment in Indonesia", Toronto, Globe and Mail, March 29, 1967. Estimates vary over the number of Chinese killed in the slaughter which followed the Military coup in Indonesia in 1966. The figure may be as high as 300,000. See H. Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror", Saturday Review, Vol. 82,5, February 4, 1967.

partners they have been relegated to the role of 'front men' often taking another job and drawing an unearned income from the Chinese business. At the most they have been employed as public relations managers, especially with the government authorities, while the Chinese have actually run the businesses and taken the decisions. Willmot was able to observe the workings of these new types of enterprises closely during his research in Semarang and concluded

> "..... that for the most part the 'new structure' of jointly-owned Chinese-Indonesian enterprises is as yet not very different from the old : management and control is still largely in the hands of the Chinese."[11]

The South Viet-Namese government's attempt to eliminate the Chinese from the rice trade resulted in rioting in Saigon and Cholon. Because of a boycott of Viet-Namese goods in Hong Kong and Singapore by Chinese merchants and a Chinese organized run on the banks the value of the Viet-Namese piastre dropped by a third on the Hong Kong market. The Chinese are now re-asserting their position in the rice trade although using Viet-Namese partners to comply with the law.

The Filipino attempts to curb Chinese retail trading do not seem to have been as effective as was first expected. The Chinese have been able to work through indigenous concerns and officials have been bribed.[12] Overseas Chinese investment was taken overseas in retaliation and credit refused by the Chinese to Filipinos.

Overseas Chinese businessmen in Thailand who have been subjected to

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11. D. Willmot, op. cit., p. 58.

12. So many Chinese used Filipinos as 'fronts' that a special section of the police was set up to combat it. Another side effect was that municipal tax revenue suffered a drastic drop in Manila as so many Chinese firms ostensibly disappeared : by ½ m. pesos in 1956.

police raids or have failed to get licences to trade are now blamed by the Chinese community for failing to take measures to protect themselves by forming alliances with members of the Thai elite or by taking members of the department concerned on to the firm's pay-roll.

An unintended result of such measures has been the damage done to the economies by the difficulties placed in the way of the Chinese, (the only experienced entrepreneurs in these countries).

An atmosphere of distrust and hostility has been caused on both sides. The Chinese feel they are being unfairly discriminated against. The political elite are frustrated in their plans. The defence methods employed by the Chinese, especially bribery, provide more evidence to Asian nationalists that the Chinese are unreliable, scheming and not to be trusted.

The fear of further economic restriction being placed upon them and the atmosphere of uncertainty produced is not conducive either to sensible economic planning for the future or to harmonious ethnic relationships. It forces the Chinese to rely more and more on their community associations for protection and this hinders assimilation. By virtue of their already dominant economic position the Chinese have often moved into new fields of business to avoid restriction and thus more hostility is produced.

The Asian elites, because of their revolt against Western economic colonialism, inevitably wish to place control of their economies firmly in indigenous hands. If assimilation is to occur the economic dualism existing at present has to disappear. While the process is going on, however, hostility and hatred is caused. There are not enough trained indigenous

Asians to replace the Chinese at present. The Chinese also provide an easy scape-goat for political elites.[13] The possible effect of anti-Chinese economic measures on the Chinese leaders and on their political orientations will be discussed in the next chapter.

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13. This has certainly been the case in Indonesia and in the Philippines under Magsaysay: "..... the Chinese issue is being used by Filipino politicians to divert public attention from more fundamental economic issues such as the polarization of wealth and mass unemployment, official corruption and retarded economic development." Appleton, op. cit., p. 161. Anti-Chinese laws in the Philippines are also a useful way of obtaining election funds through Chinese bribes and as a means of obtaining U.S. aid. President Garcia, to qualify for U.S. aid, had to make an attempt to end corruption. The series of police raids on Chinese businesses in 1958 were probably an attempt to place as much blame for corruption on the Chinese as possible, under the guise of anti-communist measures. The Chinese in the Philippines are now debarred from owning land, exploiting natural resources or operating public utilities.

CHAPTER VI : CONCLUSION

A number of trends in the development of the Overseas Chinese can now be summarized. This does not imply that accurate predictions can be made about the future of the Chinese in South-East Asia. Today, more than ever before, each Chinese community is faced with special difficulties to which there are many possible responses.

It is postulated that the Chinese have three main aims which they will strive for:

(i) to achieve security and stability in an increasingly hostile environment

(ii) to pursue their traditional goal of economic progress

(iii) to try and preserve at least some degree of Chinese identity.

To achieve these goals they must seek some kind of accommodation within South-East Asia itself. They are increasingly isolated from Peking and feel that they cannot gain effective protection from the Mainland. The National regime on Taiwan has become discredited in their eyes as a viable political force which could be used for their advantage.[1] Already there are signs that the new generation of leaders of the Chinese

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1. The economic successes of Taiwan in recent years have probably helped to boost the prestige of the Nationalist Regime. It seems likely, however, although the Overseas Chinese will invest in Taiwan and respect its economic progress, that they still regard the Mainland as the main political factor to be reckoned with in the future. "A rump regime on Formosa cannot compete for the loyalty of the World's supreme realists with an arrogant, dynamic government which controls all of continental China. The choice seems so obvious that judgement on the two Chinas is often delivered in an offhand manner. A Singapore rubber merchant of liberal sympathies casually remarked to me: 'You've got to look at things this way: there are six hundred million people in Communist China. But what's the population of Formosa? I don't see any practical value, for the present or the future, in pretending that the Formosan Government is still the Government of China.'" R.S. Elegant, op. cit., p. 19.

communities are those best able to seek political accommodation inside their South-East Asian societies. This accommodation will take a variety of forms due to the different conditions prevailing in each of the countries in South-East Asia.

It may involve open participation in the political life of the country as in Malaysia,[2] or political bargaining at the top as in Thailand. The Chinese communities in some countries seem to have adopted a careful neutrality in the hope of avoiding trouble. In Indonesia any hope for a realistic accommodation seems to have disappeared. Even if the post-Sukarno leaders seem to favour a more tolerant attitude (mainly because of economic considerations) the mass of the people and some regional army leaders do not.[3]

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2. Malaysia is sometimes cited as an example of a country whose ethnic divisions have not precluded the creation of a viable state. It must be remembered that Malaysia is an exception in South-East Asia if only by virtue of the steep numerical size of the Chinese population. The alliance between Chinese, Malay and Indian political leaders must be seen as at best a fragile one, partly kept in-being by the diplomacy of Prime Minister Tengku. "There has been no attempt to assimilate the non-Malays --- the compromise worked out with the alliance is an attempt to push Malay nationalist ambitions as far as they can without upsetting the communal balance." M. Freedman, "Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya", Pacific Affairs, XXXIII, No. 2, June 1960, p. 168.

3. "Indonesian mass organizations and representative bodies are now demanding that special ghettos be allotted to the alien Chinese, that their temples should be closed down and that they should be forbidden to write in Chinese characters and should adopt Indonesian names. Most urge that all 'peoples' Chinese should be sent back to China, or at least confined to towns in Indonesia and barred from buying, selling or transporting essential products. It has been suggested that they should not even be allowed to use the telephone or to send letters or telegrams, and that all Chinese bank accounts should be frozen." New York Times Service, Toronto, Globe and Mail, March 29, 1967.

Two further possible developments should be noticed, however, when 'accommodation' by the Chinese is canvassed as the solution to their difficulties. Both are connected with the economic restrictions which are now affecting the Chinese.

Firstly, the increasing severity of the economic restrictions, and the difficulty of evading them, may result in a renewed identification with Peking in the hope of obtaining protection.[4] The Chinese still aspire to economic advance; Chinese workers still save so as to be able to open their own businesses. Small businessmen still dream of expanding their concerns into commercial empires. Their hopes for this are no longer as realistic as they once were. It may well be that further restrictions by South-East Asian governments in pursuit of indigenous control of the economy will frustrate the chances of upward mobility for members of the Chinese working class. No matter how hard they work and save they may not be able to run successful small businesses.

The development of Western business techniques, the growth of joint-stock Chinese companies instead of the old family concerns and the trend towards larger companies will tend to reinforce this. It is

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4. S. Appleton found that this was the situation in the Philippines during field research in 1959. He found a wide scope of disillusionment with the lack of protection given by the Nationalist Ambassador in Manila when anti-Chinese legislation was being passed and Chinese businesses raided. Chinese businessmen were also willing to do business with Mainland China if the opportunity arose. General Gruy, who was in charge of the police raids on Chinese property, was told by a delegation of leading Chinese businessmen: "The C.R.C. raids on Chinese business establishments must stop, otherwise we shall be forced to embrace communism." S. Appleton, "Communism and the Chinese in the Philippines", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 32, 1959, p. 390.

only the larger companies and more prosperous businessmen who are able to 'buy' protection or have the money to find loopholes in discriminating laws. Middle-sized businesses may also find it more difficult to make economic progress as competition becomes severer from large companies and restrictions tighten. Small businesses too may be tempted to look to Communist China for protection as a last resort.[5]

Secondly, although the leaders of the Chinese communities may seek accommodation inside South-East Asia, they may not be able to carry the bulk of their communities with them. If the Chinese are placed in a really difficult economic situation this might well occur. The leaders are likely to be the most assimilated of the Chinese. As they develop links with the political elite of the country they also develop a vested interest in that elite's continuation in power. Able to gain protection for themselves there is no reason to suppose that they will be willing to endanger their own position for the interests of the rest of the community who are in a poorer position to withstand legislation or actions by the governments.[6]

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5. As. C.P. Fitzgerald put it: "..... free enterprise must mean that capitalists are given scope to carry out their operations, restrained from too great an exploitation of the workers, but unhampered by racist ideologies and exclusive nationalist policies. In South-East Asia the capitalists are Chinese. It is not possible to discriminate against capitalists because they are Chinese and at the same time successfully oppose communism, because that, too, is backed by China. In the long run South-East Asian countries must decide whether they want Chinese capitalism or Chinese communism." "Overseas Chinese Communities in South-East Asia", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 8, No. 1, May 1962, p. 77.

6. This has already been the case in Thailand where the most assimilated Chinese are still the leaders of the community, but failed to protect Chinese education when it was under attack in the mid-50's, despite the loss of prestige which they suffered by not doing so. Recent reports indicate that Chinese education in Thailand is increasing again and that Chinese schools have been reopened (April, 1967), personal communication from Professor K.H. Pringsheim, McMaster University, June, 1967.

The loss of their leadership by the Chinese communities might well lead to increased assimilation, but it could equally well lead to a re-assertion of communalism with new leaders from a different socio-economic grouping, who look to Peking for protection and wish to preserve Chinese rights and values.[7]

The critical problem for the Overseas Chinese now is not the possibility of their alliance with Peking, but rather how they can manage to adapt themselves to the new South-East Asian societies so that their economic experience and capital can be utilized in the attempt to develop the economy of these countries. All of the South-East Asian countries face the difficult problem of economic development. Because of the tensions produced in the process of modernization the Chinese can be easily used as a scapegoat for political and economic difficulties, as has been shown in the case of Indonesia.

Many of the actions of the Chinese must be calculated to bring them into conflict with the South-East Asian governments.[8] However,

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7. L. Williams argues that in Singapore the battle between Lee Kuan Yew's Peoples' Action Party and the Barisian Socialist Party can be seen as the battle between these two trends: political accommodation and communalism, in the Chinese community today. The 71% which the P.A.P. gained in the referendum to join Malaysia in September 1962 is interpreted as a victory of the "appeal to the Chinese in Singapore to place their own local interests above Chinese nationalism and separatist communalism." L. Williams' op. cit., p. 98. That there are difficulties in the path of political accommodation is seen by the eventual separation of Singapore from Malaysia when Lee Kuan Yew tried to extend the influence of his Chinese dominated party onto the Mainland.

8. e.g. The Chinese in Singapore have been accused of arranging with Chinese in Jakarta to dump cut-price goods from China in Indonesia. Toronto, Globe and Mail, May 12, 1967.

despite some hopeful signs[9] the economies of these countries are not in a position as yet to be able to dispense with the business skill and capital of the Chinese. The question to be asked is whether the social and political factors, which have caused tensions and hostilities between the Chinese and their host societies, can be overcome in sufficient time to allow these skills to be used to the benefit of both the Chinese and indigenous South-East Asians.

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9. i.e. the setting up of the Asian and Pacific Council in June 1966 and the projected meeting in Bangkok of the same organization to consider economic co-operation and technical assistance, the conference in Japan on Asian economic and agricultural development in 1966 and the newly created Asian Development Bank. For a pessimistic review of the difficulties of economic development in South-East Asia see D.S. Paauw's "Economic Progress in South-East Asia." Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIII, November 1963, pp. 69-97.

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I

Number and Percentage of Overseas Chinese in the Populations of Southeast Asia

	Number of Ethnic Chinese	*Total Population*	*Percentage of Chinese*
Brunei	25,000	95,000	26.3
Burma	400,000 [a]	25,300,000	1.6
Cambodia	435,000	6,250,000	7.0
Indonesia	2,750,000	106,000,000	2.6
Laos	45,000	2,100,000	2.1
Malaysia	3,315,000	9,455,000	35.1
Malaya	[2,920,000]	[8,090,000]	[36.1]
Sarawak	[275,000]	[830,000]	[32.5]
Sabah (formerly British North Borneo)	[120,000]	[515,000]	[23.3]
Philippines	450,000	32,100,000	1.4
Portuguese Timor	5,000	575,000	.9
Singapore	1,400,000	1,880,000	74.5
Thailand	2,600,000	30,500,000	8.5
North Vietnam	190,000 [b]	18,400,000	1.0
South Vietnam	860,000	16,300,000	5.3
Total	12,475,000	248,835,000	5.0

[a] As an untallied but presumably substantial number of Chinese have illegally crossed the border into Burma, figures for that country are especially uncertain.

[b] U.N. figures indicate that this many *Hoa* people are in North Vietnam. As no "Chinese" are listed and as *Hoa* is a Vietnamese term for Chinese, Skinner has concluded that the Chinese population of the country is 190,000. This is an unusually high figure.

Sources: Chung-hua min-kuo nien-chien [*Republic of China Yearbook*] (Taipei: Chung-hua min-kuo nien-chien she, 1961), pp. 327–328; *Chugoku no keizai-kensetsu to Kakyo* [*China's Economic Development and the Overseas Chinese*] (Tokyo: Ajiya Keizai-kenkysuho, 1960), p. 8; *Malaysia in Brief* (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 1963), p. 8; Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook, 1963* (15th ed.; New York: Author, 1964), *passim;* Statistical Office of the United Nations, "Population and Vital Statistics Report," *Statistical Papers*, Series A, v. 16, no. 3, 1964, *passim;* *The New York Times*, October 21, 1964.

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
THE CHINESE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Population is a very rough estimate of likely 1958 figures designed to illustrate varying proportion of Chinese to total population in each country.
CHINESE 150,000
TOTAL 17,500,000
BURMA
CHINA
Amoy
Swatow
Canton
Hong Kong
FORMOSA
Hanoi
NORTH VIETNAM
HAINAN IS.
Rangoon
THAILAND
Bangkok
CHINESE 37,000
TOTAL 2,600,000
Manila
PHILIPPINES
CAMBODIA
Saigon
CHINESE 1,400,000
TOTAL 15,500,000
CHINESE 500,000
TOTAL 31,000,000
PACIFIC OCEAN
CHINESE 300,000
TOTAL 24,000,000
SOUTH VIETNAM
CHINESE 310,000
TOTAL 6,000,000
CHINESE 3,000,000
TOTAL 31,000,000
Jesselton
BRUNEI
SABAH
CHINESE 115,000
TOTAL 400,000
MALAYA
SUMATRA
Kuching
SARAWAK
CHINESE 250,000
TOTAL 800,000
Singapore
CHINESE 3,250,000
TOTAL 8,000,000
BORNEO
Palembang
CELEBES
TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA
WEST IRIAN
Djakarta
CHINESE 1,350,000
TOTAL 1,600,000
INDONESIA
PAPUA
JAVA
Port Moresby
TIMOR
CHINESE 3,100,000
TOTAL 36,000,000
INDIAN OCEAN
Darwin
Cooktown
AUSTRALIA
100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 STATUTE MILES

III

Chinese associations, listed according to their index of association importance 1952 *

Association	Type	No. of interlocks	Size of office staff	No. of interlocks per officer
Chamber of Commerce	—	103	22	7.4
Tien-hua Hospital	Benevolent	120	20	6.0
Teochiu Association	Speech-group	182	32	5.7
P'ei-ying School Board	Educational	84	15	5.6
Hsieh-ho TB Sanitorium Com.†	Benevolent	76	16	4.8
Huang-hua School Board	Educational	120	28	4.3
Tou-hsien Society	Social	78	21	3.7
P'ao-te Benevolent Society	Benevolent	57	16	3.6
Bangkok Friendship Society	Social	76	22	3.5
Chin-te School Board	Educational	67	21	3.2
Chung-hua Association	Political	85	27	3.2
Ch'eng-hai Association	Hsien	87	30	2.9
Hakka Association	Speech-group	79	28	2.8
Rice Millers Association	Business	31	11	2.8
P'u-chih School Board	Educational	58	21	2.8
Ch'ao-an Association	Hsien	77	28	2.8
Chung-hua Charitable Clinic	Benevolent	48	20	2.4
Hua-ying Association	Business	52	22	2.4
Ch'ao-yang Association	Hsien	69	30	2.3
Hardware Merchants Assn.	Business	39	20	2.0
Kuang-chao School Board	Educational	40	21	1.9
Cantonese Association	Speech-group	40	22	1.8
Textile Merchants Association	Business	30	18	1.7
P'ei-ying Alumni Association	Educational	36	22	1.6
Hainanese Association	Speech-group	38	24	1.6
NE Rice Millers Association	Business	22	14	1.6
Ta-pu Association	Hsien	17	14	1.2
Yü-min School Board	Educational	40	33	1.2
Hokkien Association	Speech-group	20	17	1.2
Sawmillers Association	Business	16	15	1.1
Insurance Business Association	Business	12	12	1.0

IV

Occupational classes, Krungthep, arranged according to ethnic-group dominance *

Occupational classes in which:	No. of ethnic Chinese per ethnic Thai		
	Male	Female	Total
Chinese nationals are a majority			
Weavers & dyers	30.7	24.3	30.3
Shoemakers	54.7	4.3	23.5
Hotel & restaurant employees	21.4	1.3	7.6
Jewelers; gold-, silversmiths	13.1	1.8	6.9
Carpenters & furniture makers	6.2	—	5.8
Market sellers	15.3	.84	5.2
Metal workers (base metals)	7.0	1.4	6.1
Actors	13.3	.32	4.7
Workers in building trades	6.3	.43	4.7
Barbers	3.2	—	3.2
Miscellaneous craftsmen	6.4	.37	2.3
Business owners & mgrs.	6.1	1.1	2.4
Sailors & ships' crews	2.4	—	2.4
Miscellaneous technicians	2.3	2.5	2.4
Ethnic Chinese are a clear majority			
Business clerks	2.6	.34	1.9
Tailors & dressmakers	26.4	.84	1.5
Repairmen, machinists, etc.	1.4	—	1.4
Unskilled laborers	1.5	.53	1.2
Ethnic Chinese & Thai are about equally represented			
Cooks, bakers, food processors	13.2	.49	1.09
Market gardeners	1.4	.60	.89
Ethnic Thai are a clear majority			
High-ranking office staff	.72	.17	.63
High-status industrial staff	.51	—	.52
Lesser & semi-professionals	.58	.15	.38
Low-status domestic & service	.55	.20	.35
Auto, bus, & truck drivers	.32	—	.32
Highest-status professionals	.27	.09	.26
Hairdressers	—	.04	.04
Farmers & fishermen	.01	.00	.00
Government clerks	.00	.00	.00
Government officials	.00	.00	.00

* This table is based entirely on Table 21; the ethnic ratios are computed from the absolute figures given there. When the total of one sex in a given category is less than 100 (as occurs several times for females and once for males), the ratio between Chinese and Thai would be next to meaningless and unreliable; such cases are indicated by a dash in the table.

V

Occupational specialization by Chinese speech group, Bangkok *

Teochiu	Hakka
Bankers	Sundry-goods dealers
Rice merchants & exporters	Newspapermen
Insurance brokers	Tobacco manufacturers
Gold and jewelry merchants	Tailors
Hardware merchants	Silversmiths
Textile merchants	Metal-workshop proprietors
Liquor merchants	Shoemakers
Pawnbrokers	Shirtmakers
Canned-goods & grocery dealers	Barbers
Local-products dealers	
Timber merchants	
Rubber manufacturers	Cantonese
Book and stationery dealers	
Chinese (type) doctors	Printers
Chinese (type) druggists	Machine-shop proprietors
Pork butchers	Silk piece-goods dealers
Actors	Tailors
Rice-mill laborers	Restaurant proprietors
Dock workers	Machinists
	Auto repairmen
Hainanese	Beef butchers
	Construction workers
Western (type) pharmacists	Furniture makers
Sawmillers	
Ice-plant proprietors	
Hotel proprietors	Hokkien
Remittance-shop proprietors	
Tailors	Rubber exporters
Machine-shop proprietors	Tea merchants
Contractors	
Coffee-shop proprietors	
Furniture makers	Mandarin
Goldsmiths	
Hotel and restaurant employees	Teachers
Domestic servants	Furniture dealers
Actors	Furniture makers
Ship caulkers	Chinese (type) doctors
Fishermen	
Barbers	
Lighterage "coolies"	Taiwanese
Sawmill laborers	
	Tea merchants
	Japanese-goods importers

* Occupations are listed only when the proportion of the speech group in question in the occupation is, at the .01 level, significantly greater than the proportion of the speech group in the total population. Significance, where not obvious, was computed by the difference-of-percentages method. The original statistics were collected by the Cornell Research Center in Bangkok, in 1952–1953.

The Development of Nanyang Chinese Education

(Total enrolment in Chinese schools is expressed as a percentage of total Chinese population. Except for Malaysia, the population figures are only estimates, and the resulting percentages therefore are only suggestive, not exact.)

	1931–32	1935–36	1949	1952	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Borneo	...	5	13	...	17	...	20	...	22	22	25
ak	...	...	16	...	....	22·5	...	...	21·5	21·5	
	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	20·5	...	...
a	1·5	...	9	11·5	14	13·5	...	16·5	16·3	...	16
pines	...	...	...	...	12	...	...	...	...	...	15·5
pore	...	...	9	...	...	10·3	...	...	12	12	12
	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	11	...	...	12[a]
odia	1·5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	(7–10)
tnam	...	...	...	...	...	6·5	...	5·5	7	...	...
a	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	10
esia	2·5	3	...	10	...	13	...	...	(4–5)	...	...
nd	0·5	0·4	8·5[b]	4	2.1	...	2.7	3.0	...	2·9	...

[a] figure for 1963
[b] figure for 1948

These percentages are best appreciated with reference to age distribution. *Approximate* figures for school-age populations in most *hua ch'iao* populations in 1962 would be as follows: ages 5–14: 23–25 per cent; ages 5–19: 33–36 per cent.

Enrolment in Chinese Schools

(Schools in which Chinese is the medium of instruction, or taught as the second language)

	Year	Primary		Joint Primary-Secondary and Secondary		Total	
		Schools	Enrolment	Schools	Enrolment	Schools	Enrolment
Malaya [a]	1962	1,128	358,300	111	57,540	1,239	423,950
Singapore [b]	1961	247	132,637	28	23,067	275	152,540
Sarawak [c]	1961	244	44,200	16	5,000	260	49,200
N. Borneo	1962	116	27,000	6	1,100	122	28,100
Brunei	1960	7	2,690	1	1,780	8	4,470
Indonesia	1960	—	—	—	—	490	100,000*
Thailand	1962	167	71,700	0	0	167	71,700
S. Vietnam	1960	—	—	—	—	228	60,000*
Philippines	1963	149	57,000	16	7,000	165	64,000*
Burma	1962	225	—	34	—	259	39,000
Cambodia	1962	—	—	—	—	200	(30–40,000?)*
Laos	1963	11	1,350	3	3,650	14	5,000

* My estimates

a Excluding 101 night schools enrolling 8,000 students. The 1963 *total* enrolment was 416,150.

b Excluding 2,877 in the Chinese stream of 7 "integrated" schools; primary schools include 20 private kindergarten with less than 3,000 children. The 1962 *total* enrolment was 158,000.

c Excluding 5–10 private and estate schools; including these, total enrolment probably reached 51,000.



By courtesy of the *Geographical Journal*, cxxix, Sept. 1963.

RELIGIONS PROFESSED BY MAJORITY OF INHABITANTS IN AREAS SHOWN

(based on map by Professor C. A. Fisher)

VIII



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