DECISION MAKERS' IMAGES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS:

THE CASE OF THE KOREAN WAR

By

KEITH SINCLAIR, B.A. (Hons.)

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

November, 1968
DECISION MAKERS' IMAGES

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS
TITLE: Decision-Makers' Images in the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of the Korean War

AUTHOR: Keith Sinclair, B.A. Hons. (Wales)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. G.R. Winham

NUMBER OF PAGES: viii, 101

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: It is the object of this study to assess the thinking behind the actions of foreign policy decision-makers in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This is done by examining the perceptions of United States decision-makers during the first year of the Korean War, through a content analysis of their public speeches and communications.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My special thanks must go to my supervisor, Dr. Gilbert R. Winham, for his stimulating and demanding guidance throughout this study. Without his inspiration this piece of research would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank the two other members of the committee, Dr. Robert Cunningham and Mr. Henry J. Jacek for their valuable comments on the methodological aspects of the study.

The author wishes to thank the Interlibrary Loan Service at McMaster University, and the Library at the University of Toronto for their invaluable assistance in obtaining the materials essential for the collection of the data.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Nigel Fisher, a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at McMaster (1968-69), without whose kind assistance the concluding arrangements would have been far more difficult. Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. Stencil of McMaster University for typing the thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................. p. iv

Table of Contents ................................................ p. v

List of Tables ....................................................... p. vi

List of Graphs ....................................................... p. viii

Introduction ......................................................... p. 1

Chapter I The Decision to Intervene ............................ p. 10

Chapter II Methodology and Data ................................. p. 30

Chapter III Decision Makers' Images of The North Korean Attack 1950-51 ........................................ p. 47

Chapter IV Trends in Decision Makers Images of the Korean Situation ................................................ p. 71

Conclusion .......................................................... p. 92

Bibliography ........................................................ p. 95

Appendix ............................................................... p. 99
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE III-1  TOTAL FREQUENCIES IN SEVEN BASIC CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTIONS OVER 51 SPEECHES  p. 51
TABLE III-2  BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORY ACCORDING TO SOURCE OF THREAT  p. 53
TABLE III-3  BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORY ACCORDING TO TARGET OF THREAT  p. 55
TABLE III-5  PERCENTAGE OF THREAT TO U.S. AND WORLD PEACE PERCEIVED AS COMING FROM THE U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM  p. 55
TABLE III-6  BREAKDOWN OF NATIONAL INTEREST CATEGORY  p. 59
TABLE III-7  BREAKDOWN OF ALLIANCE CATEGORY  p. 61
TABLE III-8  BREAKDOWN OF 'Q' CATEGORY BY CAUSE OF CONSEQUENCE  p. 63
TABLE III-9  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF "Q" CATEGORY  p. 64
TABLE III-10  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF 'S' CATEGORY  p. 66
TABLE III-11  TOTAL PERCEPTIONS FOR CAPABILITY AND ESTIMATE CATEGORIES  p. 68
TABLE IV-1  FREQUENCY OF ALL CATEGORIES IN ALL QUARTERS  p. 73
TABLE IV-2  TRENDS IN PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT TO THE UNITED NATIONS OVER FOUR QUARTERS  p. 70
TABLE IV-3  TRENDS IN THREATS FROM CHINA AND FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND U.S.S.R., COMBINED OVER SECOND AND THIRD QUARTERS  p. 78
TABLE IV-4  TRENDS IN THREATS PERCEIVED TO WORLD PEACE OVER FOUR QUARTERS  p. 79
| Table IV-5 | Breakdown of Threat Categories in First Quarter According to Source and Target | p. 80 |
| Table IV-6 | Breakdown of Threat Categories in Final Quarter According to Source | p. 81 |
| Table IV-7 | Trends in Perceptions of Alliance Over Four Quarters | p. 82 |
| Table IV-8 | Trends in Perceptions of National Interest Over Four Quarters | p. 85 |
| Table IV-9 | Trends in Perceptions of Policy Consequences Over Four Quarters | p. 86 |
| Table IV-10 | Trends in Perceptions of Capability Over Four Quarters | p. 90 |
| Table IV-11 | Trends in Perceptions of Estimate Over Four Quarters | p. 90 |
| Table IV-12 | Breakdown of Capability and Estimate Categories by Months in First Quarter | p. 91 |
# LIST OF GRAPHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graph</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II-1</td>
<td>Frequency of Speeches over the Thirteen Month Period</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1</td>
<td>Frequency of Threat Perceptions over Four Quarters</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-2</td>
<td>Frequency of Threat from China over Four Quarters</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-3</td>
<td>Trends in Perceptions of Threat from International Communism and the U.S.S.R. over Four Quarters</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-4</td>
<td>Trends in Perception or Significance of Conflict Category (s) over Four Quarters</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Purpose and scope of study

The following study is an analysis of the images of decision-makers in the time of crisis. The objective is to examine how foreign policy decision-makers react to a crisis situation, in so far as this can be ascertained from an analysis of their perceptual images as revealed through their communications. The particular case under study is that of the Korean War. The idea will be to assess why the United States intervened after the North Korean attack. The purpose is to determine what the North Korean attack meant to the leaders responsible for dealing with it; thus being able to gain some insight into the motivations of decision-makers in a tension situation. The research technique that will be employed will be a content analysis of a sample of the major communications of the chosen decision-makers, over a one-year period dating from the North Korean attack.

The study of foreign policy

The study which is being undertaken, is therefore concerned with the outcome of the foreign policy decision-making process, what David Easton calls the "outputs" of the political system. The foreign policy

1 For an account of the work so far in this field, see Robert C. North, "Decision Making in Crisis: An Introduction", Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (1962), 197-200.

decision would be regarded as such; as opposed to the "inputs" to the system, such as morale, or public opinion. We feel that the study of foreign policy is an important field in International Politics, since the outputs from the national system, thus causing a particular nation to interact with another, form the basis of all operations in the International political system.

Given our concern with a policy output, there is, at this juncture, one difficulty we feel that should be mentioned. The dependent variable (in our case, the particular decision to intervene), is a single event, and consequently does not vary. The difficulty that arises, is that in foreign policy analysis it is difficult to test behavioral propositions concerning the interaction of the actors in the International System. It is therefore more difficult to measure and test the relationships between the various independent and dependent variable. The task is not totally impossible, since it would be possible to test propositions, if we had several policies over time, or several policies in various countries. What the difficulty does mean, however, is that, in the case of examining one policy in one country, any propositions will be weaker and therefore more tentative. The difficulty is especially acute when

3 For a more detailed discussion of this point; see Gilbert R. Winham, "The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1968.

dealing with such a concept as national interest, a concept which is
ambiguous and ill defined in the first place.

The various studies of the Stanford University Studies in
Conflict and Integration have illustrated how propositions regarding
human behavior can be applied in the International System. Hypotheses
testing the relationship between stress increase and time saliency may
provide insight into hostile decision-making behavior, but they tell us
little about the substantive nature of the foreign policy itself. In the
latter case we have to work more with "policy hypotheses", and integrate
as far as possible any other behavioral propositions regarding actor
behavior.

Despite the above mentioned limitation, foreign policy analyses
of this nature are important. The decisions of the national actors have
direct and indirect reactions in the International System. Research into
the formulation and subsequent development of a nation's foreign policy is
of vital importance to International political analysts.

The Study of Decisions

The action in the foreign policy of a particular nation is a
result of the decision-making process. Although the literature in this
field is sparse, there have been attempts to establish empirical studies
in that field. The main proponents of the approach were Richard Snyder
and his associates who developed a framework for international political

\textsuperscript{5}See for example Ole Polsti, "The 1914 Case", \textit{American Political
decision-making. Some empirical research has been carried out using this conceptual framework.

The most fruitful way to understand the policy outputs of which we were talking earlier is to concentrate on this human act of policy decision-making. Since policy making is the action of a few individuals, we are therefore interested in those facets of human behavior which are relevant to decision-making. Consequently we must decide which variables, or category of variables are going to be relevant to our study. The above mentioned Snyder studies offer one set of such variables. These are for example, the values of the decision-makers, the procedures for reaching the decisions, the pattern of information and communications, and the general interaction process.

Yet we must question whether these "organizational" variables are in themselves satisfactory, given our commitment to studying the human act of policy-making. We feel that the employment of "perceptual" variables would be more fruitful in regard to this approach. By "perceptual" variables we mean the psychological aspects of decision-making -- the

---


emotional reactions of the policy-makers -- to policy outcomes. For example, we would argue that, the way the particular decision-makers defines the particular situation at first hand, is more informative for the researcher, in analyzing the decision-making process. We argue that the decision-makers perception of the environment is of vital interest in this regard; as opposed to what exists in reality. We want to see what his "image" of the situation is. These variables may be subsumed under the general heading of "perceptual" variables. We are not denying the importance of the organizational category; but we argue that they can be subsumed under the former category.

It would seem that if we wish to know how a particular event were being perceived, we could explain that particular event in many valuable ways. Yet when we are dealing with past decisions, we need, for research purpose, some empirical indicator of the perceptions of the decision-makers, and one which will allow us to draw conclusions about the perception of the situation. This indicator is communication.

We use communications as an indicator of perception, since this appears to be the best and most easily accessible indicator that is available in this field. In their communications -- to their colleagues and to the people at large, they reveal to a greater or lesser extent their

---


perception of their environment. Undoubtedly there are reservations in this respect. We do not for example, expect a foreign policy-maker always to be candid about his ideas. There is however no better indicator for research purposes, and we feel that given this situation, in many cases they can be a fairly reliable indicator.

**The Korean Decision**

The decision of the United States to intervene in Korea can be regarded as an output of the decision-making process, we mentioned above. The literature in the area of American foreign policy contains a number of accounts of the decision to commit massive military force to resist the attack. Former President, Harry Truman, in him memoirs, tells the story from a first hand account.  

There are two journalistic accounts that have been written, one by Albert Warner, and the other by Beverly Smith. The latter account is fairly useful in that it is the result of interviews with participants, and the use of notes taken by a member of the White House staff. An account of the decision is also given by a professional historian, Eric Goldman, which relates the outbreak of

---


hostilities to trends in post war American foreign policy. Other works also devote sections to the making of the decision, but they are not as detailed as the above mentioned. Finally, the Korean decision was the subject of a Doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University in 1959.

Our study will differ from the aforementioned accounts in two ways. In the first place, it will utilize the "perceptual" variables mentioned in the previous section. The Paige thesis for example gave a day by day account of the decision from the point of view of the interaction process of the decision-makers. He examined the decision from the viewpoint of the "roles" of the various participants involved, such as the President, Secretary of State etc. In our study we aim to examine the decision from the framework of variables discussed previously i.e. the "perceptual" category of variables. It is hoped that through a content analysis of the major communications of the decision-makers, we will be able to determine the major reasons for the involvement.

The second way in which this study differs is through the technique used. The various accounts which we have mentioned all specify various reasons why the United States intervened. These reasons are

---


15 Paige, op. cit.

16 A discussion of this technique will be given in Chapter II.

17 The various accounts will be examined in Chapter I.
varied, yet there has been no objective method of assessing which explanation is the most important, or accurate. We would, for example, like to see if there is any substance in the point that the United States was concerned with a threat to Europe, and that the attack on Korea was simply a "diversionary" move. We would like to see if the threat to Europe was important in the minds of the decision-makers. Furthermore, we would like to test the theory that the United States was upholding the principle of collective security. It has been argued that this was an important element in post-1945 American foreign policy. We would like to see if this was an important factor after the Korean decision was made, we would like to see how far the United States saw the United Nations threatened, in comparison to any threat to its own strategic and political values. In addition to this concept of alliance with the United Nations, we would be interested in seeing if the United States was concerned with supporting South Korea, and therefore perceived itself as being friendly towards it.

Furthermore, we are interested in finding out whether the United States saw itself as fighting in a limited conflict situation, and how far it was concerned with the severity of the conflict. We wish to ask the question: was the United States aware that it was fighting in a local war, and whether it was capable of keeping the conflict localized. Thus we wish to examine the contention that the United States was always searching for global solution and not capable of fighting in limited terms. In this context we shall be looking for any statements that show the United States as being aware of its capabilities. In sum, we shall be concerned with the perceptions of threat, national interest, capability, significance of co-
lict, and alliance. From an analysis of these perceptions, we hope to gain a clearer insight into the intentions behind foreign policy formulation.
CHAPTER I
THE DECISION TO INTERVENE

The decision to intervene with massive military force in Korea during the week of June 25-30, 1950, was one of the most significant decisions of post war American foreign policy. The war became the fourth largest that the nation participated in; and cost America alone 25,000 dead, 115,000 other casualties, and 22 billion dollars.¹ Former President, Harry S. Truman in his memoirs regards it as the most important decision he had to take as Chief Executive.² The Korean decision was the outcome of the trends which American foreign policy followed during the post-1945 era, and of the factors which influenced that policy. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the background to the Korean decision, and to derive from the literature, themes concerning post World War II American foreign policy, and the Korean Decision, which, at a later point in the study will be operationalized in the form of hypotheses, which will be tested in the study.

The United States in the Post War World

In the mid-1940's the United States leaped into world leadership, something which no nation had done before. In the years following the rejection of the League of Nations, she had retreated into isolationism, yet within the decade after 1940, she fought a global war, which constituted a dramatic revolution in American foreign policy. Owing to the

¹Goldman, op. cit., p. 217.
²Truman, op. cit., ch. 21-23.
position that the United States found herself in, in 1945, it was necessary to re-evaluate the traditional concept of national interest, which apparently demanded that the United States keep within her continental boundaries.

The situation which demanded this re-evaluation, was the direct outcome of World War II. The United States came to world leadership at a turbulent time, what Carleton calls "the Crisis World of Mid Century"\(^3\), among the problems that had to be faced were: what was to happen to Germany and Japan; and how far would the Communist Revolution spread, or be allowed to be spread?

The major problem, however, was that of the Soviet Union and the Communist Revolution. Mutual fears existed even before the end of the war. There was the disagreement, for example, on whether a Balkan front should have been opened; Stalin, moreover, feared that after the war the allied powers would make overtures to Germany. By the end of the war, Russian armies had penetrated into Germany in the West; and to Korea and Manchuria in the East. They had gained ground territorially and economically. What worried Britain and the U.S. specifically was Poland and the Balkans, which the Soviets claimed, were vital to their security.

Moreover, there were problems in Asia. The Continent was in revolutionary ferment, with resentment against former colonial powers. China seemed almost certain to fall into communist hands; and it was not certain whether democratic methods would ensure stability through the

---

problems of social change which these countries were facing.

Nevertheless, for almost two years following the war, the United States clung to the concept of world peace through security and cooperation. Roosevelt and his advisers thought that friendly relations had been established with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Agreement was apparently reached on membership of the United Nations, and the future of the occupied zones of East and West Europe. This "new era of goodwill"[^4] manifested itself in the United Nations, where democracy on an international scale was supposed to function; where people would keep a close watch over their representatives, and prevent another World War through secret bargains being arrived at among diplomats and politicians.

**Soviet Post War Expansion and Containment**

Yet there were many failures and disappointments. The Soviet use of the veto, her objection to the trusteeship system, the disagreements over the admittance of new members, showed that cooperation was not being successful. The catalyst came when the Soviet Union began to impose its control upon Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania. The Soviets had their troops establish pro-Soviet regimes with key posts in the hands of the communists. It became clear that the free part of the Yalta Agreement was not being effected. Both sides became dominant in their own spheres of influence. It became increasingly clear that it was a bi-polar world. The political structures in Eastern Europe that were being set up, and with the Red Army behind them, it meant that

the United States could not afford to lapse in its security. As the Greek crisis reached a peak in 1947, it was obvious that some new policy would have to be formulated. It was George Kennan, the Foreign Service's foremost expert on the Soviet Union who presented the analyses which became the basis of a new line. 5 Since there was certain to be a long struggle between the ideologies of East and West; and since the Soviets in the long run were intent on the overthrow of the western political systems, he suggested that the United States counter the Soviet policies of provoking, and filling in vacuums, by patient, long term containment. This became the basis of the "Truman Doctrine", which was delivered in a speech before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, which was delivered at the height of the Greek crisis, and which laid down the basic policy of resisting Soviet manoeuvres wherever necessary. 6 The Marshall Plan, the Military Assistance Program, and massive aid to Greece and Turkey were part of the implementation. 7

The Far East in United States Policy

By the end of 1947, the United States had evolved a firm policy of containment towards the Soviets in Europe. As of yet, however, there

5See Mr. "X", The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs, XXV (1947) 566-583.

6The Text will be found in Congressional Record, Vol. 93, Part II, pp 1944 ff.

7Detailed accounts of the development of the Cold War and Containment can be found in many sources. See for example: William A. Beitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance C. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings 1956); Walter E. Beaty, The United States in the World Arena, (New York: Harper Bros. 1959); Spanier op. cit., and Carleton op. cit.)
was no concurrent policy as regards Asia. Yet events were to be such, that the United States would be forced to assume responsibilities, outside the European continent. Factors were such that America was forced to examine her traditional policies in the Far East.

There had of course been a long background of American involvement. The "Open Door" policy as regards China, the desire for trading markets and missionary activities were manifestations of this. Moreover, it was the Pacific theater that drew America into World War II. Step by step, the geographic scope of American involvement widened.

In 1945, however, there were certain factors, which the United States had to take into account, when formulating its Far Eastern policy. In the first place, there was the vacuum created by the decline of the colonial powers, and the subsequent nationalist outbursts. Secondly, there was the threat of Russia who presented herself as non western and against colonial domination. Moreover, Soviet policies were to a certain extent, shaped by events in western Europe. It was also possible that the Soviets could use the Far East for "diversionary" tactics. Third, there were the altered positions of Japan and China. The defeated Japan eliminated the buffer between Russia and the United States. The civil war in China, with the rapidly deteriorating social and economic conditions in that country; and the weak position of the nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, meant that the United States would not necessarily be able to rely on a

---

8 The History of American policies in the Far East, especially towards China can be found in Harold N. Vinaaske, The United States and the Far East (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), especially Chapter 3.
unified friendly China. With the victory of the communists in the fall of 1949, American policy suffered a setback, since one of the major assumptions of her policy to the Far East had been invalidated. As King says, that victory was a major disaster for American foreign policy. 9

American foreign policy in the Far East between 1945 and 1949 "followed change, rather than anticipating it!" 10 Great power cooperation in Europe failed, and a strategy of containment was developed as a result. But there was no concurrent expression in the Far East. No general purpose had been defined for the whole area; except perhaps for China, and the assistance given to the nationalist forces was ineffective anyway; and American attitudes to Formosa were very ambivalent, after the communist Chinese victory. Since the threat seemed to be in Europe, most of the energy and resources were devoted to that sphere. 11

The Place of Korea Within the Far Eastern Category Before 1949

The Korean peninsula had been a bone of contention in the Far East as far back as 1895 when it gained independence from China. In 1911, after the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was annexed by Japan. Any form of nationalism had been brutally crushed. The Cairo Declaration of 1943, asserted that


10 Vinacke op. cit., p. 82.

11 A discussion of the relative importance of Europe and the Far East in United States foreign policy will take place in a later section.
Korea would become an independent nation in due course. It was later agreed that the Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel surrender to Soviet forces while those south of that line surrender to United States forces.

In December 1945 at Moscow, it was agreed that a joint commission be set up to establish a Korean provisional Government; and to propose the terms for a trusteeship. The commission was set up in March 1946 but both sides failed to agree on the terms for a "democratic" form of government.

The failure of this commission illustrates the whole of the history of the United States-Soviet exchanges in Korea between 1945 and 1950. In 1947 the United States took the issue to the Second Session of the General Assembly. Following this on the 14th November, a resolution concluded that the issue be settled by the Korean people themselves.

A United Nations Truce Commission for Korea (U.N.T.C.K.) was established to supervise elections. Soviet obstructionism however, prevented the commission from carrying out the responsibilities north of the parallel.

(The Soviets meanwhile had been busy establishing a communist regime in the north. As early as February 1946, the People's Provisional Committee was set up as a Central Government. A cabinet was formed under Kim II Sung. The elections in November of that year resulted in a sweeping victory for the Government party.)

Meanwhile in the south (where the Americans had been attempting to form a Government sympathetic to them, with the conservative forces under Syngman Rhee), elections were held in May 1948 under U.N.T.C.K. supervision. They were declared to be a valid expression of the will of
the Korean people -- at least that part to which the commission had access. Thus the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) was established, and recognized by the U.S. and the U.N. The fact that the United States transferred the problem to the United Nations was later to be an important factor, and it made easy, an early transfer of full responsibility. In 1949 the situation was, therefore, one where two opposing regimes faced each other across a geographical boundary.

The Evolution of a Far Eastern Policy 1949 - 1950

Only Korea and China received any direct attention from the United States until this juncture. There was no European type of program for the Far East. But the early part of 1949 saw a review of American Far Eastern policy. The first step taken by the Administration was to publish a China White Paper. The implications of this were that the United States was about to cease its support of the Kuomintang. The nationalists, the paper argued, had lost control of the mainland, and therefore they were no longer worthy of United States support. It was implied that, should there be a Chinese communist attempt to take Formosa, then the United States would not intervene by military or diplomatic means. There was considerable difference between the Departments of State and Defense on this issue. The former argued that American prestige should not be tied up with keeping the nationalists, and that Formosa was likely to fall. The State Department therefore could not afford to defend it, given the global responsibilities it had. The sacrifice of prestige would make any attempt, either by diplomatic or military means, not worthwhile. The Defense Department argued on the other hand, that although the loss was unavoidable, a mission be sent to Formosa, and all diplomatic
techniques used. Secretary of Defense Johnson and General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, had conferred with General MacArthur, who held strong positive convictions regarding the strategic importance of Formosa. Nevertheless the State Department won and the policy had been re-affirmed by Truman and Acheson.  

The evolution of the new Far Eastern policy manifested itself in a speech that Dean Acheson gave in January 12, 1950, in which the policy was given further expression. The problem was to what extent should the containment policy in Europe be applied to the Far East, and where should the line of Soviet expansion be limited. The limits that Soviet expansion had reached; through the utilization of national communist parties were "roughly continental, and inclusive of Eastern Asiatic territories down to Indo China, with the exception of Korea south of the 38th parallel."  

Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn from actions taken before the North Korean attack was that South Korea was being viewed as beyond the line of military containment; while the line of containment would run from Japan to the Philippines. Policy to Formosa was still unresolved. Whether the United States would actually commit herself when challenged remained to be seen.

15Vinache, op. cit., p. 95.
The Importance of the Far East Relative to Europe

We have seen that some form of containment policy was evolved for the Far East. Yet there was much ambivalence on this score. This was perhaps due to the fact that there was some measure of disagreement between the military command in Japan, and the Department of Defense on the one hand, and the State Department on the other. During World War II General MacArthur had disagreed with the policy of giving the German war higher priority over the Pacific war. Moreover he now disagreed with the policy of listing containment in Europe higher than that in the Far East. He argued that all the areas were interlocked and therefore it was strategically fatal to give one particular area precedence over another.

The contrasting official point of view was that the security of the United States depended on preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the main sources of manpower and industry. Therefore the European landmass should be regarded as the vital area. Therefore it became apparent that the European scene was regarded as the most vitally strategic area of concern to the United States; and moreover, that the United States, expected if it were to happen at all, that any peripheral manoeuvre by the Soviet Union would come in the European theater. The point is that the United States was not really expecting a "hot" war as such with the Soviet Union at that particular time, since intelligence reports indicated that the Soviets were

16 A full account of the views of the Military and Departments of Defense and State, can be found in Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, parts 1 and 2.
unprepared for such a venture. Yet the United States was constantly aware that a peripheral move through one of the satellites was possible. The most likely places seemed to be Iran, Berlin, and Finland. Korea was given some attention, but no more importance was placed there than in any other area. Europe was regarded by the decision-makers as a crucial area.

On examining the evolution of American foreign policy since 1945, we can see from the literature, certain trends that emerged. In the first instance, the United States saw a threat from the Soviet Union and International Communism. This was specifically true of the European area which was regarded as the crucial strategic area, in the post-war world. In the Far East we can detect this same threat, albeit not as much as the European threat. Secondly, in order to combat this threat, the policy of containment was devised. This was developed initially in Europe, but by 1950 we can see the concept emerging in a more limited sense, in the Far East. It would seem that the United States saw its national interest, in the sense of its own values — political, economic and strategic — as tied up in these two areas. A third principle which seems to emerge, is a continuing sense of identity that the United States saw itself as having, between it, and the people of Asia. The United States was pre-

17 Interview, Secretary Johnson, August 1st 1955, p. 11, cited in Paige op. cit.
18 Interview
19 See the speech of Acheson, January 12, 1950, op. cit.
pared to aid the peoples in their struggle against economic poverty, and against subversion by national communist parties. The United States certainly saw Japan, and the Philippines as vital to its own security.

A final trend which emerges, is that of identity of interest with the United Nations. The United States had played a key role in the days when that organization was being founded, and it seemed to be playing a crucial role in the early post-war years. The transferring of the responsibility in the Korean issue in the fall of 1947 is perhaps an indication of the trend in American foreign policy.

The North Korean Attack and the Decision to Intervene

At 0400 hours, local time on the 25th June, 1950, the North Korean forces with 90,000 troops and 150 Russian built tanks, attacked the R.O.K. on a 150 mile wide front across Korea. The attack seemed to come as a surprise to Washington. Whilst it was agreed that, although an attack was not unlikely, an invasion in the summer did not appear imminent.

As to the motives for the invasion, sheer speculation can only be employed. It may have been a "diversionary" on the part of the Soviets, the attack being a prelude to other attacks, for example in Iran or Europe. In the second place, it may have been a "probing" exercise on the part of the U.S.S.R. to determine the weak spots in the Far Eastern defense perimeter. Furthermore, it may have been a "testing" operation,

---

designed to determine the morale of the anti-communist alliance. Moreover, it could have been part of the general Far Eastern strategy of the Soviets, being the first step in a conflict in the Far East.

The actual decision on the part of the United States to commit ground forces was made within six days — on June 30th. The immediate step was to alert the United Nations Secretary General, when it became clear that it was an all-out offensive. On Sunday 25th a Security Council resolution was passed which called for a cease fire and immediate assistance to be given to the Republic of Korea. Following the Security Council meeting, the joint Chiefs of Staff met at Blair House, with the President, Secretary of State, and the Secretaries of the Navy and Army. At this meeting, it was agreed that arms and equipment be sent from Japan to South Korea, and that General MacArthur should use Naval forces for the evacuation of American personnel from the South. Furthermore, on Monday 26th it was decided that Formosa be neutralized, and all attacks by the nationalists cease. The Seventh Fleet, besides protecting Formosa, was to ensure this.

The United Nations continued its consideration of the matter and on Tuesday, a second motion was passed which called on all members to furnish necessary assistance. Meanwhile, the situation deteriorated. Seoul, the Southern capital fell on the Wednesday, and in support of the U.N. resolution, the U.S. air force was given permission to bomb

---

21 The most authoritative account can be found in Berger, op. cit., Ch. 8, Rees op. cit., Ch. 2, Leckie, op. cit., Ch. 4, and Paige op. cit.
above the 38th parallel. Thus, so far, air and sea forces had been committed and part of the commitment had now been made.

On the evening of Thursday 28th, the National Security Council met. It was obvious that the air and sea forces that had been so far committed were going to be totally inadequate. Yet Truman was uneasy—he did not want at the juncture, to become involved in that area, at the risk of not being able to deal with other situations. Yet early that evening, a regimental combat team was sent to Pusan, the main South Korean port. The next day, the full commitment was made. MacArthur was given authorization to use the 8th army in Japan, and to blockade the North Korean coast. Thus the irrevocable commitment had been made. The United States had embarked on the fourth largest war in her history, the Korean War.

Many strands went into the making of the decision—idealism, political considerations and military factors, seemed to converge. It will be the purpose of this study to determine which of the various factors, or which group seemed most important to the decision-makers. Many writers, for example, emphasise the moral aspect that entered into the decision to intervene. They argue that the United States saw itself closely identified with the United Nations. According to this approach, it is argued that the commitment to collective security had to be lived up to. Thus one

---


theme which we will be concerned with, will be the extent of the United States alliance with the United Nations.

Second, there are the strategic and military aspects of the decision that are referred to.\(^{24}\) It is argued that if Soviet aggression were left unchecked then consequently there would be danger of aggression elsewhere. The point is made by these writers that there was inherent, in the Korean situation, a threat to Europe for example, and a threat to world peace generally. Consequently, we shall be examining the material for threat perceptions i.e. we will be attempting to determine where the threat was coming from, and at which source it was directed.

Moreover, we shall also be concerned to determine how far the United States saw itself as allied to the South Koreans themselves. Was the United States for example concerned to defend the independence of a small nation. The point has been made that the United States had a sense of identity with the nations of Asia.\(^ {25}\)

A further theme with which we shall be concerned will be that of the national interest of the United States. There is some indication in the literature that the attack on South Korea somehow affected the political and strategic values of the United States itself.\(^{26}\) Although the Acheson speech of January 12, 1950 indicated that South Korea was outside the

\(^{24}\) Goldman \textit{op. cit.}, Berger \textit{op. cit.}, Latourette \textit{op. cit.}, Reitzel et. al. \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{25}\) Latourette, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 40.

\(^{26}\) Richard H. Rovere, and Arthur H. Schlesinger Jr., The MacArthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy (New York:}
"defense perimeter" of the U.S., \footnote{Ibid., p. 102.} after the attack Korea did become of vital strategic significance. "What threatened American security on June 25 was not the possible conquest of South Korea itself, but the possible conquest of millions of minds throughout the world." \footnote{Ibid., p. 102.} To what extent the decision-makers saw the national interest of the United States tied up with South Korea remains to be seen. Almost immediately however, the survival of South Korea, it seemed, became identified with the survival of the United States itself.

The Course of the War

After the initial setbacks, the war went well for the United Nations forces for a while. A Security Council resolution of July 7 had placed all United Nations forces under United States command, and Truman designated General MacArthur as Commander in Chief of the U.N. forces. In a skilful operation on September 15, MacArthur landed an army at the western port of Inchon, 150 miles behind the Korean lines. The second largest port was captured, and the North Koreans were confronted with a two front war. This meant that supplies were cut off from their troops at the Pusan beachhead where U.N. forces had been bottled up for two months. The U.N. launched an offensive and by September 30, they had reached the parallel.

The United States had now to consider whether to go beyond that
point. Given the fact that the war had been started to save South Korea; now emphasis began to shift to realizing a five year old objective -- unification of the whole country. Thus an offensive action was undertaken to "effect a permanent change in the status quo." This was undertaken on the assumption that the Chinese would not interfere; and with the full backing, moreover, of the U.N. which expressed this objective in a resolution of October 7, 1950.

This assumption was, however, invalidated, for the Chinese did intervene, first in the cover of "volunteers"; and in November, they launched a major offensive. The result was that U.N. forces were driven below the 38th parallel. Throughout late 1950 and early 1951, the U.N. forces fought a very precarious battle; but by March they had once more reached the parallel. Thus the United States was faced with the same decision as when they reached the parallel, the previous September. General MacArthur favoured military action to unify Korea, and he advocated blockading the Chinese coast, bombarding China's industrial complex, and utilizing the nationalist troops for "diversionary" tactics.

The Administration, however, was not able to accept these recommendations. In the first place, it would be risking another World War, this time with the Soviet Union. The Soviets had signed a friendship pact with the Chinese in February, 1950, and were almost certain, thought the Administration, to intervene in some form -- whether by supplying more planes and ships, or with ground forces.

[29] Spanier, op. cit., p. 86.
Moreover, the Administration argued, the United States could not afford such a war of attrition. It would mean diverting many of the resources from Europe to Asia and thus weaken the former's defenses. The Soviets, could easily incite an attack, at a point of military weakness. Such a course would also alienate many of the allies of the United States, since Britain and France were reluctant to see United States power diverted to the Far East.

Finally, the joint Chiefs of Staff thought that the proposals were unsound on the military score. China's source of equipment lay in the Soviet Union, and even with the destruction of Manchuria Russia would still be able to supply China with military equipment. Moreover, the time that a blockade would take to be effective would nullify any possible benefits. Inherent in the Administration policy, was the reversion to the original pre-October 7, 1950 position, of restoring the status quo, given the fact that the communists had failed to destroy the Republic of Korea. It would seem from accounts in the literature that the United States saw itself as fighting a limited war situation. Whether this happened to be an important element in the minds of decision-makers remains to be seen.

General MacArthur, continued to disagree however, that his strategy was not feasible, and incurred great risk. He argued that the United States has sufficient atomic power to deter the Soviet Union from intervening. He continued to urge the President and his immediate advisers to lift the restrictions, emphasizing that the Soviet Union would not precipitate a global war. He attempted to force the Administration's hand, by appealing to the public and Congress. This produced a situation in which
the military was refusing to accept the decisions of the civil power.
No civil authority could allow a field commander to challenge its orders.
In early April, 1951, President Truman relieved him of his command.
MacArthur returned home to be welcomed by the public. In May Senate
investigations were held to examine the Government's policy, following
the dismissal.

In this regard, we will be looking for occurrences of any theme
which indicates that the United States was concerned with the nature and
significance of the conflict. We will be looking for statements expressing
attitudes toward the magnitude of the conflict. Did the decision-makers
for example perceive the conflict as limited? From this we hope to suggest
whether or not the United States found difficulty in realising that they
were fighting a limited war; given the difficulties that a nation fighting
a limited war for the first time faces -- such as managing the conflict
so that a move does not force a widening of the arena of conflict.

Meanwhile the war remained stalemated and United Nations and
communist forces became bogged down in the hills of Korea. Yet on 23
June, 1951, the Soviet representative to the U.N., Jacob Malik, hinted
that the Soviets were ready for a cease-fire in Korea. Talks began at
Panmunjon, between the field commanders, but they became bogged down,
and the fighting in the meanwhile continued. The truce talks in fact
lasted for two years, having become stalemated on the repatriation of
prisoners issue. Nevertheless the talks continued until agreement was
reached almost two years later.

This Chapter has attempted to lay the historical background to
the study pursued. It has attempted to show the reader how the Korean
War was related to post-war American foreign policy. The Chapter has also placed emphasis on the major themes, dominant in the literature. These themes will later be operationalized so that a systematic content analysis of decision-makers communications will then be possible, enabling us to gain more insight into the actions of the decision-makers.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Our study of the decision to commit military force in response to the attack on the Republic of Korea focuses on the communications of five key decision-makers responsible for that act. The primary research technique is a content analysis of public speeches -- official statements to the press, speeches before the United Nations, and statements delivered to Congress by the decision-makers. This Chapter is divided into three sections. First, we will discuss the selection of the decision-makers, and documents that are to be included. Second, we will examine briefly the use of content analysis as a research tool, paying particular attention to its limitations and capabilities. Finally, we will describe the research procedures that are used in the study.

The Selection of Decision-Makers

In the introduction we mentioned that we would be studying the decision-making process of the nation. We would therefore be looking at International Politics from the viewpoint of decision-making. A nation is therefore an actor in the International System, and has the capacity to take independent decisions in the field of foreign policy. A nation is a collectivity of individuals, but the actual decision is really the work of a few. Most foreign policy decisions are made by a small group
of people, independently of the mass of the public.\footnote{The relationship between the mass public and decision-makers is a very complex one, but this point has been made by a number of writers. See for example, Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt; Brace and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 80-84.}

The relationship between decision-makers and non decision-makers can be viewed as a pyramid, with the key decision-makers being located at the apex of the pyramid. Yet the difficulty occurs when we attempt to draw a distinction between decision-makers and non-decision makers. How, for example, can we decide where the dividing line is to be? The boundary must obviously differ with the content of each decision, and with the time period involved. The problem for the analyst is to decide which individuals to fit into the various key decision-making roles, and which individuals to exclude.

It became obvious, early on in this study, that the selection of the key personalities would to a great extent be intuitive. The literature in international political decision-making does not provide any systematic method for the selection of these individuals. However, while it became apparent that it would be impossible to separate the most important men, it was possible to delineate several key figures. The boundary was set to a large extent by the amount of data that could be analyzed.

Another consideration which affected the choice of decision-makers was the time factor. The Korean Decision was made in a relatively short time period, between Saturday 24 June, 1950 and Friday 30 June, 1950. In order to analyze the immediate perceptions of the decision-makers it would have been necessary to examine the major communications of the decision-
makers over that period. Yet, given our approach to the study, this was impractical, since the data available during that period would have been insufficient. Therefore, it was necessary to examine speeches over a period following the decision, as well as those communications during the week prior to the making of the decision. This is important, in view of the fact that, while one act constitutes that particular foreign policy decision; decisions are themselves modified by future events. This was especially so in the case of the Korean Decision, when such events as the intervention of China into the war had such an impact on United States policy.

The time span therefore selected for this study dates from the outbreak of the attack upon the Republic of Korea, June 24, 1950, to July 1, 1951, when negotiations for a cease fire agreement were about to begin at Panmunjon. In this way it was hoped that a comparison of decision-makers perceptions would be possible, at different times of the year, for example, before, and after the Chinese communist intervention.

Given these factors, the selection of decision-makers was accomplished in four stages. First, an attempt was made to list the formal decision-making positions in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Thus our first empirical indicator is a list of such positions. We should note at this point that we are confining our decision-makers to the Administration. The Korean Decision was one which was entirely confined to the Administra-

2 The study at Northwestern University (Paige, op. cit.,) examined the decisions within those six days. Yet the variables that he was focusing upon, were such that, a large amount of data was available, thus making such a study possible.
tion, and therefore it seemed proper to limit the selection to that
sphere.\(^3\)

In any case, a formal list such as this, would be heavily
weighted towards the Administration, since some writers emphasize the point
that the Administration is more influential in formulating foreign policy.\(^4\)
The position chosen and their respective roles are indicated in Table II-1

The second step involved corroborating the above listing with that
of an authoritative account of the Korean Decision. For this purpose,
we chose Carl Berger's *The Korea Knot, A Military-Political History*,\(^5\)
which gives a fairly detailed account of the decisions and subsequent
events. As regards the above listing, the author of the work does not
refer to Rusk, or Webb; and furthermore, makes only two references to
Muccio, Gross, Johnson, Marshall and Bradley. This comparison supports
the conclusion that, a formal listing of the decision-making positions is,
by itself, insufficient.

The third step in this process was to count the number of times,
a given decision-maker appeared in the *New York Times Index* during the
thirteen-month period, under the subject heading of "Korean War". This
indicator of importance was employed on the assumption that the more a
person is mentioned in a leading newspaper connected with a given decision,

---

\(^3\)This point is also emphasized in Page *op. cit.*, especially in

\(^4\)See for example, James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-
Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (Hemwood: The

\(^5\)Berger, *op. cit.*
GRAPH II-1

FREQUENCY OF SPEECHES OVER THE THIRTEEN MONTH PERIOD

NUMBER OF SPEECHES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1951</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1951</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1951</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TIME
## TABLE II-1

**FORMAL DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Truman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Acheson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Webb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense*</td>
<td>Johnson/Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to the U.N.</td>
<td>Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Ambassador to the U.N.</td>
<td>Gross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary Far East</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Bradley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Korea</td>
<td>Muccio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Marshall took over this position on September 18, 1950.*
the greater likelihood that he is influential in making that decision. The justification for our thinking that this is a useful tool, is that journalists in a leading newspaper, will, by their training, be capable of judging the importance of a particular person, in relation to particular events. The tabulation of these references in this index is given in Table II-2.

**TABLE II-2**

**INDEX REFERENCES TO DECISION MAKERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acheson</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>Ambassador to the U.N.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross</td>
<td>Deputy Ambassador to the U.N.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary Far East</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muccio</td>
<td>Ambassador to Korea</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final step in selecting the key decision-makers was to prepare a final list on the basis of the above indicators. Three people were considered unambiguous candidates for the final list because they appeared as important on all of these indicators. These were Truman, Acheson, and
The remaining positions were filled by comparing the relative standings of the others on the indicators.

Thus the incumbents of the role of Secretary of Defense were included because of their formal position of authority; and fairly strong Index ranking. Rusk was included on this basis also. Muccio, Gross, Bradley and Webb were eliminated from the final list since they did not have a fairly strong Index ranking, and neither did they fare well, in the Berger account of the decision.\(^7\)

During the process of gathering data, however, it became evident that we would include one more name -- that of John Foster Dulles. At the time, he was Republican adviser to the State Department, and he was frequently mentioned in Berger's account, and the New York Times Index. In due course he became a spokesman in many cases for the Administration, after the decision. The references in Berger, and in the New York Times seem to indicate a position of importance. Thus the final list of decision-makers is summarized in Table II-3.

Once these decision-makers had been selected, it was necessary to

---

\(^6\) It could be argued that the U.N. Ambassador is simply a mouthpiece for the ideas and policies of the Administration. The question therefore arises: is he a fitting subject to include in our list of decision-makers? This difficulty is especially acute when it is realized that he is mentioned a great deal only in newsprint. We would argue in this respect, that it is valid to include him in our list, since the U.N. did play an important role during the early stages of the crisis. The Administration, from the outset, ensured this, by taking the case to the Security Council, and obtaining official sanction before making its final commitment. Furthermore, it was a U.N. resolution which placed the United States in charge of the forces. The other Administration officials would therefore be concerned with the presentation of the case at the United Nations, and on this basis, we argue that his communications would be a fairly reliable indicator of governmental actions.

\(^7\) The Berger account served a useful purpose, in that it brought to light a name of importance, which was not previously mentioned.
TABLE II-3

FINAL LIST OF DECISION MAKERS

Truman
Acheson
Austin
Rusk
Johnson
Marshall
Dulles

decide which communications of these men were to be analyzed. This was
done by deriving a sample of all the Korean War communications of these
men during the first year, which were found in four major sources. These
sources were: Department of State Bulletin, Congressional Record,

The enormous wealth of data, and the time factor necessitated
some means of taking a sample of these communications units. Three
methods for deriving a sample were considered. First, it was considered
possible to take the first two speeches by any decision-maker in each month
of the year. This would have resulted in a total of 26 communication units
to be analyzed. This idea was disbanded since, given the frequency of
speeches, this would not have produced an accurate sample. (see Graph II-1
for the frequency pattern of all the communication units of each decision-
maker in each month. This undoubtedly would have produced the most represen-
tative sample, but this method had to be discarded, since in many cases,
each decision-maker made only one or two speeches in a particular month.
The method that was finally chosen was the third one -- that is, the first
two speeches of each decision-maker in each month were chosen. We thought
that this method would produce the most accurate sample, given the limitation of time mentioned above.

The selection process described above produced 51 "communication units", i.e. speeches or other types of communications, and these served as the basic unit for content analysis. Each individual speech, press release, or statement constituted a separate unit. In preparing the data for analysis, each unit was labelled according to the month and year the unit was communicated, the type of unit (U.N. speech, public speech etc.) and the originator of the unit. In this form, the material was ready for content analysis.

Content Analysis as a Research Tool

Content analysis is a quantitative technique for studying communications. It is a means for making inferences about the intentions behind the originator of the communication, or the recipients of it. Quite simply, what it involves, is analyzing the frequency of a unit of measurement (e.g. a word, theme, or paragraph). Consequently, verbal, qualitative material can be reduced to quantitative data; for the purpose of hypothesis testing.

Content analysis was slow to gain acceptance amongst political

8 The number of "communication units" for each of the decision-makers were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acheson</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Units</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
scientists, being first used by psychologists. But the technique became to be employed more often especially in the late fifties and early sixties. As well as testing behavioral propositions regarding the International System, content analysis can be used to study foreign policy situations; the units of analysis being defined in terms of themes which have direct relevance to the policy situation.

Despite its usefulness, content analysis suffers from various limitations, like all other research methods, and these must be discussed, in any study using that particular technique. In the first place, the researcher is limited to the data that is recorded. Recorded information means that the data cannot be changed. Moreover, recorded data poses the problem of incomplete information — data such as may be found on telephone conversations, goes unrecorded. This is an unavoidable drawback, and the content analyst can only take refuge in the fact that modern political theorists regard communication as an important part of the political process. Yet the above drawback is one encountered also by the historian, so it is not limited to content analysis.


Another limitation in content analysis is, assessing whether the communications being studies are valid. This differs of course with the nature of the communication involved -- diaries and intimate letters could perhaps be relied upon to be more genuine than public speeches of political figures. In the final analysis, the validity depends upon the objectives of the study. If the intention is to discover the hidden feelings of the originator of the messages, then it is doubtful whether content analysis will fulfil the goal. In social science research, more often than not, the aim is to discover generalizations about policy-making behavior, which are revealed in their public communications.

A further difficulty in the use of content analysis is that it reflects the assumption that the more frequent a given theme occurs, the more important that theme is. Criticisms of this assumption, revolve around the argument that policy-makers use themes that are coincidental with the values of a given society. The themes indicate acceptance of the established group norms. If this is the case, then content analysis as a research technique loses its validity. Whilst it cannot be denied that certain societal values are repeated in public, we feel that a researcher can minimize the effects of these by establishing the units of analysis in such a way that the repeated symbols do not assume high priority. If the researcher is convinced however, that the important issues are not being communicated then content analysis should not be employed.

We believe that the assumption that frequency connotes importance, to be realistic, and the research on the Korean War strengthened that belief. It is interesting to note the number of times that the United States saw a threat from International communism during the first year of the war.
That this was an important factor in post-1945 American foreign policy, cannot be doubted; and that repeated statements of threat indicate a high degree of importance in the mind of the originator of the communication; we argue is a reasonable basis for supporting that assumption.

The above has been a brief account of the uses, and limitations of content analysis.\textsuperscript{12} In the final result, whether content analysis is or is not successful will depend upon how many variables it will be possible to analyze with this method. This in turn will depend upon the state of social research, and how this advances. Given the advances made within the last decade, there is no reason to be pessimistic as regards the susceptibility of many of the variables to this type of research. The studies by North et. al., have demonstrated this fact.\textsuperscript{13}

Research Procedures Used in the Study

The materials we have selected for study are the public communications of several important decision-makers. Through a content analysis of these communications we hope to infer generalizations about the attitudes, behavior and perceptions of U.S. decision-makers in the first year of the Korean War.\textsuperscript{14} Thus we hope, through this method, that we will be able to determine which particular issues were salient to the decision-makers.

\textsuperscript{12}A more detailed account of content analysis will be found in Ithal de Sola Pool, (ed.), Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1950), and Robert C. North et.al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with application for the study of International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

\textsuperscript{13}North, "Decision-Making in Crisis : An Introduction", Holsti, "The 1914 Case".

\textsuperscript{14}We shall define perception as the "definition of the situation" referred to in the Introduction; a process whereby an actor rationalizes the events in his environment.
Moreover, information regarding the behavior of nations can be inferred from the perceptual images of decision-makers, which is provided by the content analysis.

To some extent the study on the Korean War is affected by the aforementioned limitations of content analysis. In the first place, the communications are public documents. This inevitably means that we face the problem of incomplete information -- data such as that found in telephone conversations which goes unrecorded. The central problem revolves around the point that we are attempting to make inferences about policy-making during a crisis and wartime situation, from a study of public documents. It could be argued that during such situations as this, public communication is least revealing of the intentions of policy-makers, or of their actual feelings. Moreover, we came up against the problem of genuineness in this regard. Can we be certain, because it is a crisis situation in war time, that the themes in the public communications are valid? This argument gains more force when we realise that propaganda is more used in war time. Is therefore repetition of themes in the speeches an indicator of saliency, or does it simply serve a propaganda function?

We have to admit that this is a potent argument. However, we would argue that this need not hinder this particular study of the public communications. The decision to intervene was made in conjunction with the Security Council of the United Nations, and the resolutions condemning the attack and giving sanction to the United States to take command of the situation, were passed by large majorities. There was not the necessity to use propaganda material to persuade people that it was a necessary project. Moreover, there was substantial press and other journalistic coverage of the.
events leading up to the decision, and of subsequent events. Since there appeared to be great public interest in the war, decision-makers were concerned with putting their case across to the public, and the press gave extensive coverage. We feel that manipulation therefore was extremely unlikely.

As regards the setting up of the content analysis of the Korean War documents, the most important factor is the construction of the categories i.e. the primary units of analysis. It has been said that this is the most vital stage in any content analysis.\(^{15}\) We shall use verbal themes as the units of analysis, and they will be subsumed under one general category of themes of perception, i.e., statements which define, or perceive a situation, event or object, related to the Korean War. Within this group seven basic categories were developed.\(^ {16}\)

The seven categories and their code designations are as follows:

1. Threat (T)
2. Alliance (A)
3. National Interest (N.I.)
4. Policy Consequences (O)
5. Significance of Conflict (S)
6. Capability (P-1)
7. Estimate (P-2)

Since we defined these categories in themes, a method had to be developed for extracting them from the text. Themes generally corresponded with sentences, and they had to meet the requirements of a complete


\(^{16}\)See Appendix for a description of the categories, and for examples of them.
sentence — i.e. they had to have a subject and a predicate. An example of a threat theme might be "This is clearly a threat to International peace and security." 17

The critical part of any theme is the DESCRIPTIVE - CONNECTIVE (DC) which is the verb (or verb construction) or adjective in the unit, and this defines the category the theme should be placed in. An example of the above DC would be "is clearly a threat;" in the above paragraph.

The material coded totalled 83,520 words. The coding was carried out by the author himself, with the guide of a CODING INSTRUCTION MANUAL, which was used in a previous study. 18 The coding was done by reading the texts of the communications and writing each theme on a form. On the form was inserted the code designation, the theme in full and the context which elaborated on the theme. In addition, the communication unit was divided into consecutive units of 120 words each, and the unit it fell into was recorded on the coding form. Finally a code was put on the back of the sheet which named and dated the communication.

The result of the coding was that 1,419 thematic units from the 51 speeches were analyzed. Some of these units were recoded so that additional information might be yielded. The categories that were recoded were: THREAT, ALLIANCE, POLICY CONSEQUENCES, and NATIONAL INTEREST. The procedure involved re-labelling the coding sheets. For example the THREAT theme was recoded to show where the threat was coming from and where the threat was directed.

17 The methods for coding themes for the study were taken from North, et al., Content Analysis, Ch. III.

18 Winham, Foreign Aid Decision Making, Appendix A.
Finally some mention should be made regarding the reliability achieved in the coding procedures. Reliability in many content analytic studies refers to amount of agreement that exists between the individual coders. Since in this study, the author coded all the material himself, then the amount of agreement in a series of tests had to be measured. Reliability is important since in testing hypotheses by quantitative methods, the variables must be measured correctly if they are to be related with any success.

We measured coding reliability in the study by using a formula in North's book on content analysis. The author coded four given texts twice, with a lapse of a week between the two codings. The result was an average coefficient each time in excess of 0.95. Later, the author coded two more texts and this time the average coefficient of reliability turned out to be 0.94.

There is no sure way to evaluate the coefficient of reliability in content analysis coding. The testing procedures in this study were likely to be less accurate than in others since testing by the same person is certain to be less reliable than employing other people to test the reliability; or testing reliability among different coders. Nevertheless we felt that as all coefficients fell above 0.90 this was a sufficient indicator of reliability, since the methods did conform to common standards. Therefore, the testing was discontinued.

The formula is \( R = \frac{2(C_1 C_2)}{C_1 + C_2} \) where \( C_1 \) = first coding and \( C_2 \) = second coding. The term \( (C_1 C_2) \) in the numerator indicates the frequency of agreement between the first and second coding. See Robert C. North, et.al., Content Analysis, p. 49.
Chapter I reviewed the historical development of the decision to intervene in Korea in June 1950. It served to answer the question how the United States committed itself to that action. However, this does not help us in our attempt to answer the question why the American leaders took that decision. It may partly answer that question. For example, one could argue that the United States committed itself to that military action, because it wanted to stop the spread of communism or that it was afraid of communism. This may be self-evident anyway; but it cannot carry our conclusions any further, since looking merely at the actions of decision-makers does not answer questions as to the motivation of policy-makers. Thus our inability in this sphere compels us to seek propositions with regard to U.S. actions by examining the images that the policy-makers had of the Korean situation. By studying such perceptions we would expect to suggest hypotheses why the United States felt compelled to become involved in that conflict in the Far East.

In the literature, numerous explanations were given as to why the United States took such action. One of the most prevalent of these reasons is that the United States felt that it was in its own interest to come to the defence of South Korea.¹ In more operational terms, it could

¹Latourette, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
be put something like this: in foreign policy decisions, national interest plays a major role in the formulation of foreign policy. However, while this may be valid generalization as regards foreign-policy decision-making behavior, it lacks considerable depth, since, it is not possible to assess how, or to what extent, a particular foreign policy decision is related to national interest or even what national interest means. The difficulty in this respect is that the concept of national interest is very ambiguous, and thus the problem becomes even more difficult. There could for example, be several dimensions to the concept. It would include the usual aspect — i.e. of security. Thus, in regard to the Korean action it could be said that the U.S. took the action it did because it saw itself as having certain strategic interests in preventing the communist take-over of South Korea.

Moreover, the concept of national interest could take on other meanings. For example, it could have a political connotation, i.e. that a nation may wish to gain political influence among those nations it is supposedly helping.

Another motivation, which has also been referred to in the literature, is that of a desire to assist the particular nation involved. In our study this would be the desire on the part of the United States to help South Korea. This has been referred to in the literature — the fact that the United States saw itself as having an established friendship with the Korean people,2 and with the peoples of Asia generally. This would seem to be the opposite to the concept of national interest. If a nation is

---

2Latourette, ibid., p. 45.
concerned with its own political and strategic interests, this would seem to contradict the notion that a nation is desirous of helping another nation. In the sense that the desire to protect South Korea stemmed from the U.S. not wanting to see a small, undefended nation suffering from a brutal attack, this would be viewed as being contradictory to the intention of securing strategic advantages or political interests. On the other hand, national interest, and the desire to help another nation may concur if the nation giving assistance feels it is in its own interest to protect that nation; since the consequences may be disastrous for either the International System, or the protector nation. This contradiction is perhaps a function of the ambiguity of the national interest concept; and the relationship between the two concepts thus lacks clarity.

Thus, numerous problems are raised by the studying of one motive. Partly, this is a function of the terms being ill-defined and ambiguous. Moreover, it may partly be a function of factors in foreign-policy decision-making acting not separately, but in various combinations. Therefore, in our study we hope to show which motivations were paramount during the year 1950-51 and to suggest some relationships among the motivations.

However, in this regard we are faced with a further difficulty, which was mentioned in the introduction, and is a consequence of our methodology.

The methodological difficulty is inherent in all foreign policy decision studies. A policy decision is a single not recurring event, and thus, is a dependent variable which does not vary. Thus the oppor-

---

\(^3\)See for example, Winham, *Foreign Aid Decision-Making*, p. 92.
tunity for causal testing is considerably reduced since it is not possible to relate fluctuations in the dependent variable with changes in the independent variable. One way to avoid this would be to carry out comparative studies of such decisions as Abel has done. Unfortunately this was not possible in this study because of the time-consuming nature of the task and methodology involved. What the above difficulty means, therefore, is that the testing of causal hypotheses is more difficult. Such hypotheses are bound to be weaker and more tentative. What such a study can do, however, is to serve as a guide for future research, if it cannot answer questions about foreign policy decision-making in general.

The Total Image of American Decision-Makers: Perception of Threat

The image that American policy-makers had of the situation in Korea during that year, which was derived from content analysis corroborates to a large extent what various writers have said previously, although there are some unexpected findings. In a brief review of the findings it would appear that American policy-makers were extraordinarily aware of a threat from communism and felt that non-action by the United States would lead to disastrous consequences. The fear of communism and communist expansion was paramount in the minds of the decision-makers. Furthermore, it appears that the United States was cognizant of a threat

---


5 The analysis in the remainder of this chapter is based on the total units of perception counted over 13 months (June 1950 - June 1951) in 51 speeches or press releases.
to the United Nations and to world peace, and it had a great desire to protect them both. Surprisingly little, however, comes from the data on the threat to Europe that is supposed to have been prevalent in the factors making for the Korean decision. Moreover, there does not appear to be much information on how the American leaders viewed the decision as a policy project which could or could not be carried out successfully. Finally, the U.S. decision-makers appear to have been impressed by the desire to keep the conflict limited, and from expanding the arena of that conflict into other spheres.

In going more deeply into the data, the most striking and immediate finding is that the frequency of perceptions of threat (T) was far greater than the frequencies of all other categories. (See Table III-1). The frequency of the theme "perception of threat" was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Code</th>
<th>Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>THREAT</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>CAPABILITY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>ESTIMATE</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>POLICY CONSEQUENCES</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.I.</td>
<td>NATIONAL INTEREST</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFLICT</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Units: 1419

47.1 per cent of the total perceptions recorded in 51 speeches in the first year of the Korean War. Our content analysis shows unequivocally,
(and this is borne out by an intuitive feeling for the data) that the single theme which decision-makers saw as most important to communicate was the threat that existed subsequent to the North Korean attack. In fact, the threat perception occurred 13.2 times per speech.

It should not be surprising that the U.S. decision-makers did perceive threat after the attack, and during the period under study. After all, it was an attack causing an outbreak of hostilities, and this in itself would make for a high occurrence of threat perception themes. Indeed, it would be surprising if the data did not illustrate this point.

Furthermore, during the one year period under study, the cold war, which resulted from the polarization of the East and West blocs, had become an established fact in the International System. During and up to this time, the United States had come to realize that the U.S.S.R. was implacably opposed to the policies of the West. The early attempts to foment unrest in France and Italy, and the coup in Czechoslovakia, resulting in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) designed specifically to deter the possibility of Soviet aggression, served to ensure hostility between the two blocs. In the Far East, despite the fact that South Korea was considered to be outside the defense perimeter, it was intended that some form of containment policy be applied. There was certainly a recognition that a threat from communism existed. This is borne out by the data.

In order to make more clear the dimensions of the theme of threat, the THREAT category was recoded into several sub-categories. First, threat perceptions were sub-divided according to the source of the threat. See Table III-2. Table III-2 confirms our expectation that U.S. leaders
TABLE III-2

BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORY ACCORDING TO SOURCE OF THREAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>UNDEFINED</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>678</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

would perceive most of the threats as coming from International Communism, the U.S.S.R. and China. Although the threat perceived from International Communism only amounted to 15.9 per cent of the total threat theme, the threat perceived coming from the U.S.S.R. was 32 per cent of the total. Moreover, if we combine the two (it would perhaps be fair to do this, since the U.S.S.R. was perceived as leading the International Communist Movement) then this would give a total of 47 per cent. Moreover if we combine the UNDEFINED Sub-Category then the proportion reaches 50 per cent.6 There are more interesting points that should be mentioned at this juncture. In the first place, there are the large number of perceived threats coming from Red China, -- 37.3 per cent, the largest category without combining, A, B and E. In a way this should not come as a surprise, since Red China did intervene with a considerable number of

---

6: The UNDEFINED Sub-Category grouped all threat perceptions coming from an unnamed source -- e.g. "The U.N. finds a grave threat to its existence". Since the UNDEFINED perceptions were almost implied references to a threat from Russia and International Communism, we feel they could be combined with that category.
'volunteers' in October 1950, after the U.N. forces had driven back the North Korean forces past the 38th parallel, and had reached the Yalu river. This aspect has a more interesting relationship, in a time dimension and therefore further discussion on this point will be deferred until the next Chapter. Secondly, what also should strike the researcher, is the low number of threats perceived as coming from North Korea. Given the fact that it was the North Koreans that attacked the South, would we not expect to see the threat as coming from the North, instead of only 11.5 per cent of them coming from that source? What we must conclude is that, the U.S. policy-makers perceived the situation in the Far East, after the attack, as a general threat from the U.S.S.R., International Communism, and later China. They therefore perceived it as part of a world-wide threat and conspiracy on the part of the International Communist movement. They therefore saw North Korea merely as a tool in the hands of that movement and as one part of a communist design, not as one isolated act.

A second dimension of the THREAT category dealt with the direction of the threat. See Table III-3. The data in this breakdown show that, relatively, the greatest amounts of threat were perceived as coming to the U.N. and world peace (35.8 and 37.9 per cent respectively), with the threat to South Korea ranking third with 20.5 per cent of the total threat. A further breakdown indicating both the source and the target of threat shows that, in comparison with the United States, the world situation, and the U.N. had a greater percentage of their threats coming from the U.S.S.R. and International Communism. (See Tables III-4 and III-5).

\(^7\) For this table, Sub-Categories A, B and E (International Communism, U.S.S.R. and UNDEFINED respectively) were added to get the total of the target of threat.
### TABLE III-3

**BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORY ACCORDING TO TARGET OF THREAT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>WORLD AND WORLD PEACE</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>676</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE III-4

**PERCENTAGE OF THREAT TO U.S. AND U.N. PERCEIVED AS COMING FROM THE U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE III-5

**PERCENTAGE OF THREAT TO U.S. AND WORLD PEACE PERCEIVED AS COMING FROM THE U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD PEACE</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We infer from these figures that the United States did not see itself as the main target of Soviet hostility. Rather, the threatened objects were the U.N. and world peace. It could be said the United States did not see itself threatened at all. This is not to say that U.S. decision-makers did not feel that important values were being
threatened. It is to say that the leaders felt alarmed by the events in the Far East. This would seem to confirm an earlier point, that the United States was responsive to a threat to world peace.

A surprising feature in the Table III-3, showing the direction of the threat, is the low frequency of threats perceived as coming to Europe. This amounted to 1.4 per cent of the total of threat themes recorded. This aspect of the data would seem to reject the explanation put forward in the literature that Europe was a major factor in the minds of decision-makers, when they decided to intervene; -- that the decision-makers were convinced that this was a diversionary tactic on the part of the Soviets. This finding is interesting given the amount of space that is devoted in the literature to the controversy in the Administration as to which area was vital to U.S. security. This low frequency of perceived threats to Europe is perhaps the most striking, and surprising result to come out of the data on threat perception. It illustrates the point that, in order to avoid ambiguity, several dimensions of the threat theme needed to be examined.

The threats perceived as being directed at South Korea in Table III-3, were 20.5 per cent. This shows that the United States to a certain extent, was responsive to an attack on an undefended and small nation. This would seem to bear out the point made that the United States saw itself as friendly to various countries in the Far East. This would better be discussed in the section on alliance perception.

---

Paige, op. cit., makes this point -- that one of the most likely places where a peripheral move would have been made was Western Europe. Latourette op. cit., mentions the importance of Europe also, see page 35.
We reject the notion that the United States intervened primarily because it saw itself threatened. What is a possibility, however, is that the threat from China was a major motivational factor and this will be discussed in the following Chapter.

At this juncture, however, it is perhaps necessary to delve more into the significance of the perceived threats to world peace (T-3). The large number of references to this category is one interesting feature of our data. The data indicates that the United States did not intervene because it felt threatened -- but it did intervene. The difficulty that we have to face is that these perceived threats may only be an official explanation. Were the references to world peace simply a rationale for the United States feeling its own strategic interests threatened? This brings us up against one of the major arguments against content analysis, which we mentioned in Chapter II, i.e. that the communications analyzed may not be genuine. One of the assumptions upon which content analysis is based is that we must take it as given that decision-makers mean what they say, but that we must always be on the lookout for the possibility that they do not. But in this study we would take the argument further. We feel that United States policy makers at this time were interested in maintaining the status quo in the International System, which they thought most conducive to a stable international political system. The United States policy makers felt that peripheral attacks would endanger this system, and therefore had to be resisted. Herein however, lies the difficulty of content analysis, -- that such inferences may seem quixotic. On the other hand, to find out how the policy makers felt, there is no other suitable way to investigate, other than by examining public documents.
Perception of U.S. Policy and Actions

Given the fact that U.S. policy-makers saw the need to intervene it is interesting to see how they related themselves to the act of military intervention. We initially proposed that policy-makers would view the repelling of the attack as important to the national interests of the United States. This perception of national interest is an interesting one, given the fact that many people argue that the concept of national interest is an important one in foreign policy formulation, and in United States foreign policy in particular.9 However, much of the argument over the role that national interest plays in a nation's foreign policy, is a function of the ambiguous nature of the attempts to define that concept. In this study we took the theme national interest to mean any statement which perceived that United States' political, economic or strategic values were at stake in the conflict. The aggregate data in Table III-1 show that U.S. leaders did not view the involvement in Korea to be in the U.S. national interest, according to that definition — at least to the point that the National Interest theme was mentioned only 20 times, and occurred 0.39 times per speech. See the category of NATIONAL INTEREST (N.I.) in Table III-1.

The NATIONAL INTEREST category was recoded in order to give a more precise idea of how the decision-makers related the conflict to U.S.

interests. See Table III-6. The breakdown was such that the category was divided up into two sections -- whether the perceptions dealt primarily with political concerns (e.g. maintenance of democratic institutions), or security concerns (e.g. the preservation of peace and security of strong Western nations).

**TABLE III-6**

**BREAKDOWN OF NATIONAL INTEREST (N.I.) CATEGORY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Category</th>
<th>Sub Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>POLITICAL</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that there was no one particular reason why U.S. policy-makers saw the involvement in the Korean War to be in their national interests. Moreover, we can note that they were unable to give in precise terms why it should have been that 40 per cent of the statements (Sub Category C) tended to be very vague and not substantive ones, such as "Our national interests are clearly involved here". Many of the statements, furthermore, in A and B Sub Categories tended to be vague and non substantive.

We find it extremely interesting, that policy-makers should be so vague about this, given the nature of the commitment. What we would gather from this set of findings would be that the policy-makers were unsure themselves of how the involvement was related to U.S. national interests; and thus in their communications they tended to be very vague. The findings however do illustrate the point that an adequate definition
of national interest is lacking, and certainly seem to contradict what has been previously said regarding its role in foreign policy formulation.

However, the data raise some interesting questions regarding the concept of national interest and its role in foreign policy formulation. Why for example, was there so little perception of national interest in this situation as compared to others.10 Could it be that the decision-makers saw the situation as not being in their national interests; as the data at first sight would seem to indicate. This would be logically consistent with the assumption underlying content analysis, that unless a theme occurs frequently, then that theme is of less concern to the decision-makers. On the other hand, if the decision-makers had failed to verbalize the concept of national interest, then this destroys the frequency assumption.

On this point, we would argue on similar grounds as in our discussion above on threats to world peace. We argue that the decision-makers perhaps saw the threats to world peace as threatening a collapse in the status quo in the International System. It was therefore in their interests to prevent this.

However, it may be argued at this point that this is an adverse comment on content analysis, and especially the frequency assumption. We would argue that this is not necessarily a reflection on the lack of an adequate definition of national interest. The difficulty shows that

10 For example in the Marshall Plan Study (Winham op. cit.) the frequency of perception of national interest was greater.
it is at this point in time difficult to ascertain what national interest means for decision-makers anyway and how it ought to be interpreted. Maybe this aspect of our data shows that our definition in the coding manual was faulty. But this is not a reflection on the method as such, but the lack of research in the concept of national interest and its role in foreign policy formulation.

Another aspect of the way in which the American decision-makers saw the Marshall Plan related to them was in their perception of how they saw themselves regarding South Korea and the United Nations (U.N.). As Table III-1 indicates, statements of Alliance (i.e. the A Category) occurred frequently (i.e. 329 times or 23.1 per cent of the total of thematic units). By itself the figure of 329 does not yield much information, other than to show that decision-makers did think frequently in terms of Alliance, friendliness or in terms of a special relationship with South Korea and the U.N.

The theme of ALLIANCE (A) was recoded each time a theme was perceived as an alliance with (1) the U.N. or (2) South Korea. Totals for these two sub-categories were tabulated (Table III-7) and revealed that United States policy-makers viewed themselves as more allied to the United Nations; (81.4 per cent of the total ALLIANCE themes). Given the fact that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BREAKDOWN OF &quot;A&quot; CATEGORY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the United States was fighting as leader of the United Nations forces; and that the whole action was in the name of the United Nations, this is not surprising. This would seem to us to dovetail with the recoded THREAT theme where the data showed that the policy-makers perceived a danger to the United Nations organization. The data here presented would also tend to support the conclusion in Table III-2 that the United States policy-makers perceived less threat to the South Koreans than to the U.N. We find it interesting that the United States did not feel itself having any special relationship with South Korea. This would seem to go against what many writers hypothesize when they see the United States having a long historical connection with the various nations of the Far East. It would also bear out however, that the United States saw itself as desirous of helping the United Nations, which has been claimed to have been a principle of United States foreign policy.

Another aspect in which decision-makers saw the involvements related to them was in statements regarding the future consequences of what the Korean situation may produce. As one can see from Table III-1 the statements of policy consequences (CATEGORY 0), occurred infrequently in the communications units, (only 59 times, or 4.1 per cent of the total number of units coded). What this shows is that United States policy-

---

11 See Table III-2.

12 See for example, Latourette op. cit., p.40 where he argued there was an identity of interests here.
makers did not frequently think in terms of contingencies, or of logical consequences of the situation, or their actions. This to us did not seem surprising since previous research has shown that in crisis situations as opposed to other situations, where no "rationale" decision-making may be possible, then leaders were less likely to think in terms of future consequences of actions.¹³

We recoded the O CATEGOR Y however, to see if that would yield us any more information. The first breakdown was according to whether the United States perceived a consequence as a result of (i) United States intervening or not intervening (ii) South Korea being saved or not being saved. See Table III-8. The data here shows that the United States policy-makers generally viewed the Korean situation and consequences in terms of their own actions; or inaction. This tends to show that they felt a sense of urgency in dealing with the outbreak of hostilities, and that they had the capacity to deal with the situation. This would seem to go against what we previously concluded, that in a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CONSEQUENCE OF U.S. ACTION/NON ACTION</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CONSEQUENCE OF DEFEAT/ VICTORY OF SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

crisis situation such as this, consideration of logical consequences would be less likely. However, in this respect two points should be mentioned. In the first place, it could be that American policy-makers were concerned about the defeat of South Korea, and realised that something had to be done. Secondly, as the aggregate "O" CATEGORY was infrequent anyway, to infer too much from this breakdown would probably be expecting too much.

The theme of policy consequences (O) was further broken down, depending upon (i) whether they primarily affected the U.S., South Korea, the U.N., or world peace; (ii) whether they involved the concept of national interest, or the U.S.S.R. and China. The results of this breakdown are shown in Table III-9.

An interesting point here is how the policy makers perceived the direction of the consequence, i.e. whether it primarily affected the U.S.,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>AFFECT U.S.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>AFFECT WORLD PEACE</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NATIONAL INTEREST</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

world peace, the U.N., or South Korea. Table III-9 indicates that the U.S. leaders were more concerned with the consequences affecting the United Nations, and world peace than with South Korea, or the U.S. itself.
To some extent, this would seem surprising, since, we might have expected the U.S. leaders to be acting out of self-interest. Yet this is not the case. The data here, corroborates with that shown in Table III-2 where the threats perceived as coming to the U.S. and South Korea were less than those perceived as coming to the U.N., and world peace. The data here also dovetails with the ALLIANCE CATEGORY, where over 80 per cent of the perceptions were such that the United States saw itself allied with the U.N. (See Table III-7).

The final breakdown made on the policy consequences (O) were according to cause of consequence. The data, also in Table III-9 show that the concept of national interest was hardly significant, and accounted for 11 per cent of the total thematic units in the "O" CATEGORY. The U.S.S.R. and China Sub-Categories appeared far more frequently however. This again would seem to corroborate our previous statements after analyzing the data in Table III-2, that the U.S. leaders perceived a large threat from the U.S.S.R. and China. This again is what we expected to find. If thwarting the U.S.S.R. and China generally, was a major motivational factor in the conflict, we would have expected that the United States perceptions in this regard would play an important part.

Perceptions of the Involvement as a Policy "Project".

In the early stages of the study, we hypothesized that a nation involved in fighting a "limited war" for the first time would find itself in some difficulties, for example, it would find itself unable to withstand the continual pressure of having to carry out a prolonged campaign, especially one which was stalemated. The United States found itself fighting such a war in Korea. Many writers such Alexis de Tocqueville
have emphasized the pragmatic nature of the American character; and more recently this same point has been made by Gabriel Almond in his discussion of the American character and foreign policy, especially in the desire for quick and total solutions. We feel this is a valid point as regards human behavior and that it could apply to American decision-makers. Given the fact that Korea was the first major application and test of the containment policy, it would be interesting to see if this point was borne out. Given the desire for quick success, and the prolonged stalemate campaign in Korea, it would be interesting to see if this were borne out.

We thus examined, how the policy-makers perceived the significance of the conflict, and a theme was developed SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFLICT (S). We wanted to see if the decision-makers saw themselves as fighting or not fighting a limited war. The data in Table III-1 tend to show that the decision-makers were aware of the magnitude of the conflict, to the extent that this theme was 18.5 per cent of the total number of thematic units, the third largest, and occurred 5.1 times per speech.

This in itself does not yield us sufficient information, so we recoded that theme according to perceptions of (i) limited conflict (ii) total conflict. The results are shown in Table III-10. The data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950); especially Ch. III.
shows that the policy-makers were aware that the conflict was of a limited nature, to the extent that, the 'X' Sub-Category was 91.6 per cent of the total 'S' Category. This is an interesting finding, in view of the ideas put forward in this regard. We feel that, it is not fair to say that U.S. policy-makers are or were incapable of perceiving a limited conflict. This is surprising perhaps, in view of the controversy over the MacArthur proposals which demanded that the Administration extend the war further, and into China if necessary. At this stage it may perhaps be possible to offer the explanation that this desire for immediate success, is more a function of the general public, rather than the policy-making elites and that there is a qualitative difference between the two sections of the nation. This is an interesting point in the study of American foreign policy. The MacArthur proposals, his difference of opinion with the Administration on the conduct of the war, and his subsequent dismissal, sparked off a major debate on United States foreign policy. What in effect MacArthur and his supporters wanted was a quick solution to the problem. By bombing the supply bases in Manchuria, and thus extending the conflict, he argued that this solution would be effected. An escalation of a conflict which had been more or less localized, was the means to ensure this end.

Yet, MacArthur was dismissed from his post, and his views were rejected by the Administration. The support that MacArthur gained among

---

15 Most writers on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy point out this difference. See for example, James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), and Almond op. cit.
sections of the general public, would seem to indicate that the desire for quick solutions, is a function of the mass public. The hearings before Congress between April and May of 1951, 16 illustrated the differences between the Administration and the viewpoints of MacArthur. This demand for swift conclusions to projects did not seem to occur in the Administration speeches.

Also in this respect, we thought it would be interesting to see if the policy-makers considered the involvement to be "workable". Almond, cited above, also makes the point that this has been a factor in the making of American foreign policy -- the "workability" of any project.

The results of our analyses in Table III-11 tend however, to contradict the above statements, since the capability statements amounted only to 1.5 per cent of the total. If the decision-makers were aware of the magnitude of the conflict, then we would surely expect them to be able to be aware of the capacity to carry out the project. We did find however, that the perception of estimating the time and resources needed (P-2) occurred more frequently, and amount to 3.3 per cent of the total number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>CAPABILITY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>ESTIMATE</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Hearings, op. cit.
of thematic units. The two added together give an aggregate of 4.8 per
cent of the total. It could be argued at this point that such a theme
(i.e. of "Estimate") is irrelevant in a war situation. Whereas in a
foreign aid project, where it would be surprising if a large frequency
of this category did not occur, since we would expect decision-makers
to be concerned with estimating the time and resources needed; in a
war situation, this seems less credible. In such a situation the
decision-makers would not be concerned with the time and resources re-
quired, but more with military considerations. Yet we argue that this
theme is not entirely irrelevant; since it supplements the capability
theme. We wanted to ascertain if perceptions of capability were im-
portant in a crisis situation. The estimate category was useful in that
it confirmed the findings of the capability theme.

Yet this is still basically unsatisfying, especially in view of
the fact that the low number of Capability (P-1) statements is bound to
weaken the Estimate ones anyway. On the other hand, perhaps this could
be reconciled, when looking at previous research on this point.17 This
study, unlike others, 18 is a study of a crisis situation, and previous
work on these has shown that, there is the possibility of an "irrational"
element in the decisional situation. The results of this research has
demonstrated that decision-makers in such situations are less cognizant

17See for example Zinnes et al., op. cit.

18See for example Winham, Foreign Aid Decision Making,
where the author argues that the Marshall Plan was an example of more
"rational" decision-making.
of the capacity of a nation to carry out the commitment. This was the finding of the 1914 study cited above, where perceptions of hostility were far more frequent in the communications analyzed. In our study we saw that threat perceptions (T) were the most frequent. (See Table III-1) In short the projected results, are far more tenuous in crisis situations than in others; and the study would seem to confirm the findings of the Zinnes et al. study, previously cited.
CHAPTER IV

TRENDS IN DECISION-MAKERS' IMAGES
OF THE KOREAN SITUATION

In the previous chapter we studied the perceptions of the decision-makers by summing the frequencies of the different themes in the data, thus hoping to reveal the saliency of the relative issues for that period. By deriving the aggregate totals, and analyzing some of the recoded material we attempted to determine which factors were paramount in the communications of the decision-makers. However, the perceptions were studied as a composite image without paying any attention to the time dimension. We will now focus on these perceptions as they developed over time to see if there were any changes in the aggregates of perception, that will help us in determining why the decision was made.

In determining the trends of decision-makers' perceptions over time of a policy situation, there are various procedures that are available. The one which will be adopted here will be to divide the time period into quarters and then compare the frequency of themes, segment by
Perception of Threat

A study of the total number of themes in the communications material (see Chapter III) showed that during the year 1950-1951 the American policy-makers were cognizant of a threat, primarily directed at world peace, and the United Nations, and coming from China and the U.S.S.R. This was indicated by the total number of threat perceptions in the coded material, amounting to 47 per cent of the thematic units. It is equally important to see how the threat perception developed over time in the minds of the decision-makers.

The argument put forward in the previous chapter indicated that the perception of threat was a key factor in the initial making of the decision. If this argument were correct, we would expect to find threat perceptions communicated frequently in the first time quarter, as well as frequently throughout the implementation of the decision.

The data for the threat (T) theme indicate that these points are borne out. (See Table IV-1) We can see that the theme was communicated

---

1 There is a methodological difficulty involved here. Given the fact that the frequency of speeches was uneven over the time period, it could be argued that the absolute frequency of themes would be inaccurate, since decision-makers would be concerned with a particular theme, but are not publicly communicating it. One way to overcome this would be to use the "theme/word" indicator which was used in the Marshall Plan study (Winham op. cit.). However, we would argue here that the absolute frequencies over the time period do reflect fairly accurate trends in the perceptions, since they at least show negative results i.e. that a particular theme was not important. Moreover, we did experiment with the "theme/word" indicator in some instances of the threats and the results showed that the trends were similar to the trends in absolute frequencies.
TABLE IV-1

FREQUENCY OF ALL CATEGORIES IN ALL QUARTERS *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Name</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>110 (47)</td>
<td>211 (43)</td>
<td>214 (57)</td>
<td>143 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>69 (29)</td>
<td>172 (37)</td>
<td>62 (16)</td>
<td>26 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>9 (3)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>17 (7)</td>
<td>21 (4)</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Interest</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>14 (4)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance Conflict</td>
<td>22 (8)</td>
<td>54 (10)</td>
<td>42 (11)</td>
<td>145 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Consequences</td>
<td>14 (6)</td>
<td>11 (3)</td>
<td>22 (5)</td>
<td>12 (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in parentheses indicate percentage ratios of those particular themes to the total number of themes in the quarter.

frequently in the first quarter, to the extent that it accounted for 47 per cent of all coded material for that quarter. The next most frequent theme was that of Alliance (A), which accounts for less than 25 per cent of all coded themes. During the actual implementation of the decision, the theme occurred frequently -- only once was it superseded by another theme, and that was by the significance of conflict category (S) in the final quarter. In the third quarter (after the intervention of Communist China) the theme accounted for more than 50 per cent of coded material. The data here would seem to corroborate what we have said before, regarding the role of threat perception in crisis decision-making. This was such a situation, and our data indicate that both in the making of the decision and the implementation of it, threat was a critical factor. The initial decision can therefore be explained in
terms of threat perception.

However, examining the threat perception as a whole does not yield us sufficient information regarding the importance of the theme in the initial decision or the implementation. We need to examine more deeply our data in this respect. As Graph IV-1 indicates the interesting point about the data is that the threat theme reached a peak in the second and third quarters. In the third quarter for example, out of 373 thematic units coded, 214 of them were threat themes -- over 60 per cent. This of course is not surprising since in October 1950 the Chinese communists intervened in full force, following the advance of the United Nations forces to the Yalu river. This steep rise indicated by our data is directly related to this intervention. As Graph IV-2 indicates, the threats perceived as coming from China (T-C), rose steeply in the second and third quarters, and this seems to be in relation to the total rise in threat themes for those time periods. Fifty per cent of the threat themes in those periods were accounted for by the perceived threats from China.

Another interesting feature of our data is the threat perceived as coming to the United Nations. The information is shown in Table IV-2. The data here seem to corroborate our past statements regarding the importance of the United Nations in this venture. The trend was highest in the second and third quarters, but was fairly high throughout the time period. This would seem to dovetail with the point that, as it was basically a United Nations operation, then the threat would be fairly high in the communications of the decision-makers throughout the period. The data would seem to illustrate the point that United States policy-
makers were aware of a threat to the United Nations. The data also indicate that the policy-makers were especially aware of the threat to the United Nations when the Red Chinese intervened in the second quarter; when almost one third of the threats to the United Nations occurred.

A further interesting point in our data is the perceived threat coming from the Soviet Union and International Communism. The data here
TABLE IV-2

TRENDS IN PERCEPTION OF THREAT TO THE UNITED NATIONS (T-4)
OVER FOUR QUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL (P)</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P = Perceptions T-4

is shown in Graph IV-3. This aspect of our data show that the threats from the U.S.S.R. were fairly high in the first quarter (almost fifty per cent of threat themes in that period), and were also high in the final two quarters. The perceived threats from International Communism rose to a peak in the second quarter, but never were as important as threats
perceived as coming from the Soviet Union or China. In the final quarter the perceived threats from the Soviet Union accounted for almost 50 per cent of the threat themes for that period. Although in the third quarter, they were high relative to the perceived threats from International Communism (T-A), the threats from China (T-C) were more frequent. In the second and third quarters both were low relative to the Chinese threat. (See Table II-3). The threat perceived as coming from the U.S.S.R. reached a peak in the final quarter. Perhaps the inference that we can draw from this last point is that by this juncture, the United States policy-makers viewed the whole adventure as emanating from the U.S.S.R. as head of the International Communist movement.

The fact that the United States policy-makers saw in the
TABLE IV-3
TRENDS IN THREATS FROM CHINA (T-C) AND FROM U.S.S.R. (T-B)
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM (T-A) COMBINED
IN THE SECOND AND THIRD QUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Category Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-C</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-A + T-B</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Category Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-C</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-A + T-B</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beginning and end of our time period, the major source of threat being the U.S.S.R. need not surprise us. American foreign policy since the polarization of the blocs, had been geared towards threats from the U.S.S.R. The communist takeovers in Eastern Europe were seen as being Moscow inspired, and the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, together with the Berlin blockade in the same year were confirmation of this in policymakers' minds.

A final point regarding the threat perception is the threats perceived as coming to world peace (T-3). See Table IV-4.

The data in this regard show that these perceived threats rose to a peak in the third quarter, but the final three quarters being higher than the first. This rise coincided with the attack of the Chinese
TRENDS IN THREATS PERCEIVED AS COMING TO WORLD PEACE (T-3) OVER FOUR QUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas in the early periods the threat was perceived as coming to the United Nations (T-4), it was world peace that was threatened in later periods, (T-3). The fact that the U.N. threats had a high frequency early on is perhaps a function of the busy activity at the United Nations, and the United States desire to work through the organization. The fact that the perceived threats to South Korea amounted to 35 per cent of the coded categories in the first quarter, is also perhaps a function of this United Nations activity. When the activity calmed down slightly, and the Chinese intervened, other sources were seen as threatening, and other targets seen as being threatened.

How then do these frequencies of the various sub-categories of the threat perception fit into the making and implementation of the Korean decision? Table IV-5 indicates the importance of the various breakdown categories in the first quarter. As regards the source of the threat, our data indicate that the threatening agent was the Soviet Union, with North Korea coming second. Since it was North Korean forces that headed the attack this is not surprising. The fact that the Soviet Union was seen as the main agent is not surprising either, given what we said earlier about cold war developments, and the hostility that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, at that time. The Soviet
Union in the initial stages of the policy was seen as the threatening source. During the implementation, external factors such as the intervention of Communist China had an effect on what the policy-makers perceived as the threatening source. The Chinese intervention obviously increased the threat perception frequency from that area. In the final quarter the initial perception of threat from the U.S.S.R., combined with the later perceived threats from the Chinese, made for the decision-makers to see the Soviet Union as leading the International Communist movement as a whole. As Table IV-6 indicates, in the final quarter almost 50 per cent of the threats were perceived as coming from the Soviet Union.

Some interesting findings however, emerge from an examination of the target of the threat in the initial decision. Obviously we would

---

**TABLE IV-5**

**BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORIES IN THE FIRST QUARTER ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND TARGET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Category Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-A</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-B</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-C</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-D</td>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-E</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-1</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-2</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-3</td>
<td>WORLD PEACE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-4</td>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-5</td>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE IV-6
BREAKDOWN OF THREAT CATEGORIES IN FINAL QUARTER
ACCORDING TO SOURCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Category Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-A</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-B</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-C</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-D</td>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-E</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

expect South Korea to be seen as threatened in the early stages, as Table IV-5 shows. The high frequency of perceptions of threat to the United Nations illustrate that this was an important element in the making of the decision. This dovetails with the fact that Korea had been an issue at the United Nations since 1947; and that the United States therefore saw that organization as being threatened.

However, we find it interesting that the policy-makers did not seem to be cognizant of a threat to Europe, since the point has often been made that the United States saw the attack on South Korea as a diversionary tactic. Our data would seem to indicate that this was not the case, and that the policy-makers did not see a threatened attack in Europe at the same time. The decision-makers primarily saw this as an attack, initially on the United Nations, and South Korea, and to a certain extent, world peace, (although this played a more important role in the implementation of the policy after China had intervened). The initial decision can be explained largely in terms of a perceived threat to the United Nations and South Korea. As we saw earlier, the perceived
threats to the United Nations were fairly frequent throughout, while those to South Korea became less frequent. During the subsequent implementation of the decision events such as the intervention of Communist China raised the perceptions of threat coming to world peace.

Perceptions of U.S. Policy and Actions

In the previous chapter we suggested that the United States was motivated to some extent by the desire to help the United Nations. This tended to illustrate the point that the U.N. formed a cornerstone in U.S. foreign policy. The data for example, indicated that the category of ALLIANCE (A) was a frequent occurrence; (See Table III-1) in the total number of thematic units.

The argument of the last section suggested that the United States decision-makers were cognizant of a threat to the U.N. and that this was important throughout the year. What we would now like to see is if there happened to be a similar trend in the perceptions of ALLIANCE (A) in this one year period, especially in the recode category of alliance with the United Nations (A-N). The data for this can be found in Table IV-7. The data indicate that the perceptions of the

<p>| TABLE IV-7 |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>329</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

alliance theme reached a peak in the second quarter and dropped considerably in the final two periods. Over the first two quarters it seems however that the alliance theme was fairly frequent at any rate.
In the first quarter 20.9 per cent of the Alliance (A) category occurred and 52.4 per cent occurred in the second quarter, whereas the final two quarters only had 25 per cent of the total alliance themes between them. What the data indicates is that the United States built up an early perception of friendship with the United Nations. This would seem to corroborate the statements in the previous chapter, and our intuitive feelings before the data were analyzed, namely, that since the United States worked through the mechanism of the United Nations, they built up this idea of friendship with that organization.

Many arguments could be made as to why the United States viewed itself as being friendly to the U.N. For one thing, the United States had played a leading role in the founding of that organization at the end of the second World War, and that organization subsequently played an important part in post-war United States foreign policy. Furthermore, the United Nations had given the United States the authority it had, in the Korean decision, and this in itself was perhaps a factor in the communications. It could, on the other hand be argued that the United States was only using the United Nations as an anti-communist bulwark from which to pursue its own foreign policy. However, questions such as this are beyond the capacity of the data to answer; and from the data itself we are faced with the finding that the decision-makers in their communications did perceive themselves as being friendly to the U.N. This, together with the high frequency of threat perceived as coming to the U.N. would seem to indicate a fairly high degree of friendship with that organization. The initial decision to send troops after the North Korean attack, was, as we mentioned in the previous section, to some
extent in response to a perceived threat to the United Nations.
While only 20 per cent of the Alliance (A) categories occurred in the first quarter, we feel that the data corroborate the conclusions we drew regarding the perceived threat to the United Nations. During the carrying out of the decision, the perceived threats increased, especially in the second quarter, largely as a function of the intervention of Red China.

Another way in which decision-makers saw themselves related to the situation, that we talked about in Chapter III, was that concerning national interest. The data in the previous chapter showed that, in terms of total frequencies, the United States did not perceive that this venture was not in their national interest, to the extent that this was not mentioned frequently in the communications. An analysis of the trend in this perception over the thirteen month period would seem to bear this out. (See Table IV-8) The data show that in the early stages the U.S. leaders did not talk of the U.S. national interest. It was not until the third quarter that frequent mention of this was made — when 70 per cent of all the national interest thematic units was made. One could suggest that this is connected with the intervention of Red China, but since the absolute frequency of this theme is small anyway, it is perhaps difficult to draw any significant conclusion, even over a time dimension.

The conclusion that we draw from this is however still unsatisfying. Surely it could be argued that the United States would not openly state that it was in its own national interest to be in Korea, and thus conclude that the above statements are too simplistic. On the other hand, would we not expect the decision-makers to emphasise to the public that the U.S. had strategic and political interest in being there? It is
interesting to note from the data that in a crisis situation such as this we find infrequent references to this concept, whereas in other instances it occurred more frequently, such as the Marshall Plan study. Perhaps, as regards the latter study, and foreign aid situations in general, there is more need for decision-makers to be concerned with telling the public why it should be in the interests of their country to give aid. Moreover, the decision to intervene did have considerable support in the weeks following the decision, and perhaps this was in itself, sufficient for policy-makers not to be over concerned with stating why it should be in the interests of the United States. We can see that from the data, the initial decision cannot be explained in terms of this concept. The fact that the frequency of the theme increased, subsequent to that decision, may be due to the Chinese intervention. Yet the fact that it did not occur frequently should spur on further research on the concept.

A further aspect in which the policy-maker saw themselves related to the situation was in the way they viewed the future consequences of U.S. action/inaction and the defeat/victory of South Korea. We noted in Chapter III that the theme of policy consequences (0) did not occur

2 See Winham, Foreign Aid Decision-Making, op. cit., where the theme of national interest occurred 2.1 times per speech.
frequently, but that the U.S. was concerned with the results of its own action/inaction rather than with the consequences of defeat or victory of South Korea.

In the analysis of the time dimensions (See Table IV-9) we see some interesting shifts in the policy-makers' perceptions of future consequences. For example, we can see that the frequency of the "0" category was at its highest during the third quarter when almost one-third of that theme occurred. It was of course in this period that Communist China intervened and it would seem that the decision-makers were more aware of the consequences of their actions during this period, which is what at first sight we might expect, since over 40 per cent of the perceived threats from China occurred in the third quarter. However, given the fact that the absolute frequency of the theme of policy consequences was fairly low anyway any inferences from the data may be difficult to draw. Twenty per cent of the 'S' category occurred in the first quarter, and this would seem to us to argue the point we made in the previous chapter, that initial decisions in crisis situations tend not to be concerned with so-called "rational" thinking as far as future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TREND S IN PERCEPTIONS OF POLICY CONSEQUENCES (O) OVER FOUR QUARTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

consequences of action are concerned. In this instance the decision-makers do not appear to be over-concerned with this aspect when making the
decision. The frequency did increase later -- when the Chinese communists intervened.

The final point in regard to the United States relationship to the situation is in connection with the category significance of conflict (S). The data in the previous chapter showed that the United States was aware of the magnitude of the conflict; and that it was aware that it was fighting in a limited war situation. We then examined this on a time dimension. The data are shown in Graph IV-4. What the data here show is that the tendency was for decision-makers to think of this theme in the final quarter when the frequency of the "S" category climbed sharply, (See Table IV-1) relative to other themes. This aspect, we contend, is another interesting finding from our data.

It was during this period that the dispute between Truman and MacArthur took place. In April 1951, General MacArthur was dismissed from his post as Commander in the Field, on the grounds that he was flouting the civil power. Moreover, he was the person who led the discussion on expanding the arena of conflict. By taking the conflict into China by bombing Chinese supply bases in Manchuria which were supposedly aiding the North Koreans, then the war could be over within a few months.

The Administration, on the other hand, argued that this would be dangerous, since it would invite the intervention of other forces, even Soviet Russia. The communications of decision-makers were heavy laden with this theme in that quarter. The data show that 55 per cent of that category appeared in the final quarter, while only 21 per cent of the threat theme appeared in that time period. This theme obviously became paramount in the minds of decision-makers, and the data seem to show that there is
some connection between the dispute and the frequency of theme. This finding would furthermore tend not to substantiate the argument that the United States was incapable of thinking purely in limited terms, and looking at the situation from the global aspect.

The point to be made, we feel in regard to this particular theme is that in the making of the decision, this theme was not all important -- less than 10 per cent of the theme occurred in the first
quarter. The inference that we draw from this is that it was only as the decision was being implemented, when other events (the intervention of Communist China) affected the policy-makers' thinking in this respect. Since they were dealing with a crisis situation, this finding is not surprising — in the actual making of the decision such "rational" concerns as this (like the policy consequences "O" category) would not be important in terms of frequency.

Perceptions of the Operation as a Policy Project

We mentioned in Chapter III that the threat perceptions were more important than any perceptions related to what the policy-makers actually thought they could do. We therefore found that the category of capability (P-1) occurred less frequently than many others. (See Table III-1). This we suggested, bore out the findings of the Zinnes and North study, that policy-makers would be more concerned with threat perceptions than with what they thought they were capable of achieving. On examining the theme on a time dimension however, we find that it was in the first quarter that the capability (P-1) theme had its second highest occurrence. We also find that the capability to estimate (P-2) had almost one-third of its themes in the first quarter. (See Tables IV-10 and IV-11 respectively). It is difficult to ascertain whether we can draw from this that policy-makers were more aware of their capabilities than the absolute frequencies in Chapter III at first sight indicate. In order to determine the significance of these themes in the initial formulation of the

---

\(^3\)Zinnes, North and Koch, op. cit., p. 473.
decision, we broke the quarter June-Aug into months. (See Table IV-12). The data here indicate that in June (the decision was made during the week June 24-30) no instances of these themes occurred. Therefore we would argue that our finding in Chapter III is largely substantiated. It was only later on that these themes occurred more frequently. As the decision-makers implemented the decision, they became more aware of these aspects. However, the low absolute frequency of the theme in the first instance preclude us from making any more inferences in regard to the occurrence of the themes subsequent to the decision. In the initial decision the themes of capability and estimate (P-1 and P-2 respectively) were unimportant.

To sum up the argument of the chapter therefore, in the formulation of the initial decision to intervene, the most important consideration was that of threat perception; a threat at first seen as coming from the U.S.S.R., directed at the United Nations and South Korea. In the making of the decision, a perception of friendship with the United

---

**TABLE IV-10**

TRENDS IN PERCEPTIONS OF CAPABILITY OVER FOUR QUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE IV-11**

TRENDS IN PERCEPTIONS OF ESTIMATE OVER FOUR QUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>JUNE-AUG</th>
<th>SEPT-NOV</th>
<th>DEC-FEB</th>
<th>MAR-JUNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE IV-12

BREAKDOWN OF CAPABILITY (P-1) AND ESTIMATE (P-2)
IN JUNE, JULY, AUGUST, 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Category Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nations also played a relatively important role. During the implementation of the decision external events such as the intervention of Communist China affected this, to the extent that China became the main threatening agent.

Moreover, while the decision-makers did not perceive the conflict as of a limited nature in the initial stages, it became more important in the later stages, as a function of the Chinese intervention. Considerations such as concern for future consequences, and for capabilities were relatively unimportant throughout.
CONCLUSION

The central problem of this study has been to assess what motivated the United States to intervene after the North Korean attack, and thus be able to gain more insight into the thinking behind policy-makers in time of crisis. We hoped to ascertain this from an analysis of the images of the situation that appeared to be in the minds of the decision-makers. We were thus looking at the decision as a function of the perceptual images of the decision-makers. It has been shown that, to a large extent, one single perception lay behind decision-makers thinking. That perception was threat, -- a threat initially directed at the United Nations and South Korea, principally from the Soviet Union. As the decision was implemented, the perceptions of threat were somewhat modified by the intervention of Communist China. This was seen as the prime threatening source, and the targets during the implementation were seen to be world peace, and still the United Nations. This threat perception motivated United States decision-makers into stemming the advance of communism with the Soviet Union at the head of an International Communist movement. This to us does not seem an unexpected finding in view of the post-war International scene.

The only surprising finding as far as threat perceptions were concerned was the fact that perceived threats from Europe were infrequent, especially in making the initial decision. This was in view of the fact that the literature seems to place emphasis on the concern in the minds of the Washington Administration, over an expected attack on Berlin. It is also surprising in view of the debate which centered upon whether Europe was to be the strategic area as far as the United States was con-
cerned, and in view of the "victory" of those who argued for this theater rather than those who supported a massive commitment in Asia. What this seems to indicate is that the importance in the literature on Europe, is misplaced.

However, it is the threat perception generally vis-à-vis others that is important. The study would seem to corroborate other findings regarding threat in crisis decision-making. The findings of the study dovetail with the point that in such situations it is perception of threat, rather than perceptions of capabilities, that are crucial in the decisional element. The frequencies of the threat and capability/estimate categories illustrate this point.

A further interesting point to come from the study is the policy-makers perceptions of national interest, i.e. the fact that these were infrequent, and that perceptions of Alliance with the United Nations assumed greater importance. We find it interesting that it was the United Nations rather than the interests of the United States that were perceived to be at stake. We suggest however, that further research needs to be carried out with respect to the concept of national interest, and its role in foreign policy formulation. We suggest moreover, that more examination is necessary of the role of supra-national organizations vis-à-vis the role of national interest in the foreign policy process.

A final trend that we found was that policy-makers did not perceive their actions in terms of future consequences. Again, as this was a crisis situation this is not unexpected. What we do find interesting, is that the United States saw itself in the implementation of the
decision, as desiring to keep the conflict limited. We suggest from this study that a nation fighting a limited war for the first time is incapable of thinking in such terms, not substantiated.

At this point some mention should be made regarding the methodological procedures used in the study. Was the method used a satisfactory one? We must bear in mind that the alternative method is that of the historian, and an evaluation of content analysis depends on a comparison of both. We contend that it was worthwhile using this method. In the first place, although the single motivating factor — threat — may have been obvious beforehand, the content analytic procedures enabled us to analyze the various sources and directions of the theme. Moreover, we were able to compare the perceptions at the time of the making of the decision, with the perceptions during the implementation of the policy.

Furthermore, content analysis produces quantitative data, which is precise and manipulable. We are thus able to describe foreign policies in terms of numbers, thus providing a basis for comparative research. It would be interesting for example, to compare perceptions of decision-makers in this crisis with the Cuban Missile crisis or even Vietnam. The perception of national interest would be an interesting focus in this regard. The method of content analysis spurs on research of this nature, and this in itself is a worthwhile feature.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Department of State Bulletin XXII and XXIII (1950-51).


Documents on American Foreign Relations XII and XIII (1950-51).


King, John K. *South East Asia in Perspective* New York: Macmillan Company, 1956.


APPENDIX

CATEGORIES AND CODING GUIDE

The categories for coding are divided into PERCEPTIONS (i.e., any statement which defines or perceives a situation, event or object. The individual categories will be defined as follows:

I. Category of THREAT (T)

Any statement which perceives a threat or hostility

FROM  
1. International Communism  
2. U.S.S.R.  
3. China  
4. North Korea  
5. Undefined

TO  
1. U.S.A.  
2. South Korea  
3. World Peace  
4. Europe

On the first coding the THREAT theme will be taken as one category, and on the recoding, the sub-categories will be examined. An example of a THREAT theme would be: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."

II. Category of NATIONAL INTEREST (N.I.)

Any statement which perceives that U.S. national interests (political, or strategic) or that high priority values are related to:

1. the situation in Korea
2. the U.S. fighting there

On the first coding the theme will be recorded as one category, and the two sub-categories will be recoded later. An example of the NATIONAL INTEREST theme would be: "It was clear to all concerned that the act of aggression had brought in issue the security of the nation and the forces of the United States in the Pacific."

III. Category of ALLIANCE (A)

Any statement which perceives that there exists or has existed between the U.S. and the U.S./South Korea:

i. friendly relations

ii. a natural relationship

iii. certain common values

On the first coding the two (U.S. and South Korea) will be examined as one category, and on the second coding they will be examined separately. An example would be: "The world has understood that the actions taken by the U.S. have been in support of the U.S."

IV. Category of CAPABILITY (P-1)

Any statement which perceives that the U.S. has the capacity to achieve its objectives, or a lessening of the crisis in Korea. For example:

"Our forces are adequate to cooperate in this struggle."

V. Category of ESTIMATE (P-2)

Any statement that perceives that the U.S. has the capacity to estimate the success or effect of U.S. involvement in the crisis; or, any statement which perceives that the U.S. has the capacity to estimate the social, economic or military costs involved in the operation. For
example: "We shall have to . . . expand our industrial capacity to produce military supplies."

VI. Category of POLICY CONSEQUENCES (O)

Any statement which perceives that if certain action is or is not taken, then certain effects will or will not follow; or any statement which perceives the consequences of defeat or victory of South Korea. For example: "If we . . . make it fail (i.e. the attack) then we will have made an epochal step toward lasting peace."

VII. Category of SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFLICT (S)

Any statement which perceives that the U.S. is or is not fighting a limited war; or any statement perceiving anything connected with the intensity or magnitude of the conflict. For example: "The whole purpose of the . . . U.S. from the very beginning has been to localize the conflict."