UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM
UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM:
A RECURRENT PHENOMENON

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The objective of this thesis is to investigate the development of Ukrainian national communism as it has manifested itself from the period 1918 until the present. Particular emphasis is placed on examining its ideological dimensions and the strategic alternatives available to its proponents. Both the major political actors and political processes involved in its development are accorded separate treatment. Using a historical perspective, the technique of comparative analysis is employed in order to study the similarities and differences contained in expressions of Ukrainian national communism in the periods 1917-27 and the 1960's.
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INTRODUCTION

In the area of communist relations there exists a dialectical tension between appeals for unity and pressures of diversity, between centripetal and centrifugal forces. One such centrifugal force is that of national communism. With the evolution of the communist movement from a monistic model to one "polycentric in form and national in substance"¹, a number of political systems, as diverse as those of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China, have selected their own "paths of socialist development." Today, national communism is recognized as the rule rather than as the exception in the communist world; it is a political reality dictated by the imperatives of power and self-preservation. This was pointed out by Milovan Djilas, one of the principal theoreticians of Yugoslav communism, when he wrote: "In order to maintain itself, it (communism) must become national."² Ideological preferences and organizational aims, nature of the leadership and "national peculiarities", have all contributed to this expanding pluralism in the "commonwealth of socialist nations."

National communism can be described as an ideology or as a movement synthesizing national interests with communist ideological and organizational structures. It has been referred to as the process of "applying Marxism creatively"\(^3\) to national conditions and national needs. The central thesis in all versions of national communism consists in an unconditional commitment to the principles of sovereignty and independence for a given communist nation-state. This basic fact was accorded official recognition in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav communique issued on June 2, 1955 in Belgrade.\(^4\)

Implicit in this declaration was the acknowledged right of every communist nation to pattern itself on the Soviet-Yugoslav mode of relations. A self-reliant or "independentist" orientation does not, of course, negate common ideological roots, similar economic or political systems as well as the common interests shared by members of the communist "league of nations." It does, however, emphasize national priorities both in matters of internal organization and in terms of policy objectives.

There are, understandably, a number of significant differences between various national communist regimes, ranging from ideological reformism, experimentations in decentralization,

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and democratization, to doctrinaire programs for social and political development. In some cases, particularly in Eastern Europe, national communism has been employed as a device for advocating democratic socialism; in Southeast Asia it has been utilized as a means of mobilizing mass support for domestic and foreign policies. The degree of success achieved in these instances by the national leadership has been dependent on the state of internal cohesiveness and on the extent of external pressures. It is important also not to identify national communism, in every instance, with "liberal" communism. Some national communists subscribe to an orthodox and totalitarian political outlook, others may be attempting to implement democratic Marxist postulates.

Not suprisingly, Soviet custodians of Marxist thought have been most vehement in their condemnations of "nationalist deviations" - the official euphemism for national communism. For instance, the Soviet Party journal Kommunist has noted:

5. Attempts have been made to formulate theories of Marxist humanism or "communism with a human face" and to identify universalist values with national prerogatives, for instance as in Czechoslovakia during 1968.

6. One need only to compare the relative positions of Rumania and Czechoslovakia during the 1968 crisis to note the crucial importance of these variables.
"The very expression national communism is a logical absurdity. By itself communism is really international." The very expression national communism is a logical absurdity. By itself communism is really international. 7 A more recent assessment of national communism describes it as a "subtle form of bourgeois nationalism...with the aid of which imperialists try to drive a wedge between socialist nations." 8 The issue, however, is not one of counterposing nationalism to internationalism or of shielding ideas behind convenient slogans; rather it consists in recognizing that national priorities are the prime concern of policy-makers, whatever their political persuasion might be. Consequently, it may be argued that Lenin developed a peculiarly Russian form of Marxism and that Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" was in effect a Soviet version of national communism. 9

While national communist regimes in Cuba, North Vietnam and Rumania have been subjected to close political analysis, there remains a certain amount of indifference and disbelief in considering national communism as a viable alternative for the multinational Soviet Union. Indeed, this situation is reflected in the attitudes of ambivalence displayed by Western scholars and statesmen toward the option

of national communism.\textsuperscript{10} Mesmerized by the Soviet empire complex with its predominantly Russian characteristics, they tend to ignore the possibility of a fragmented or "restructured" USSR. Soviet ideologues, on the other hand, have a ready-made explanation for the phenomenon of national communism.\textsuperscript{11} Yet, it can be demonstrated, on the basis of historical evidence, that most national communists formulated their programs and promoted their objectives without the aid of any "agents of imperialism." But then, Soviet writers never tire of eulogizing the "fraternal friendships between nations of our country."\textsuperscript{12} Judging, however, by the amount of invective levelled by Moscow at "bourgeois nationalists" in various Soviet republics, it would appear that the so-called "Soviet family of nations" is not exactly bound together by brotherly love.

\textsuperscript{10} For instance, Richard E. Pipes considers Ukrainian national communism "not so much a cause as a consequence", emerging principally as a result of the failure by Moscow to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Alliance of December 1920. See: The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-23 (Cambridge, Mass; 1954) pp.263-264. Even Professor F. Barghoorn claims that "Few scholars would argue that nationality problems would lead to the disintegration of the Soviet system." See: Politics in the USSR (Toronto, 1966), p. 80.

\textsuperscript{11} One example is an article in Komunist Ukrainy (July 1957) by T. Kravtsev entitled: "National Communism- the Ideological Diversion of Imperialism and its Agents in the Workers' Movement."

\textsuperscript{12} V. Yurchuk, "The Struggle of the CP(U) against anti-Leninist Currents and Factions" Komunist Ukrainy, No. 9, September 1969, cit. in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press Vol. XLI1, No. 12, December, 1969, p. 3.
The whole nationality question in the Soviet context is officially regarded as a "solved" issue and is consequently relegated to the ideological index by Soviet authorities. Any suggestions for an open public debate on the Soviet nationalities policy is greeted with cries of "nationalist deviation." Both in theory and in practice, Soviet policy has been shifting inexorably in the direction of increasing centralisation, assimilation and Russification of the non-Russian nationalities. For instance, the 1961 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) states that it regards as the ultimate solution to the problems of ethnic pluralism in the USSR the establishment of a "single, world-wide culture of Communist society" - a thinly-veiled rationale for Russifying all ethnic minorities in the Soviet federation. The document also asserts: "The boundaries between the Union republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance," implying that the very existence of the constituent republics as formal administrative entities is threatened with extinction. There

13. See B. Stenchuk's attack on I. Dzyuba in Stenchuk's pamphlet Shcho i iak obstoinie I. Dzyuba (What Does I. Dzyuba Claim and How Does He Assert This) (Kiev, 1969).
15. Ibid; p. 191. The so-called theory of "fusion of nations" is gaining currency in official circles.
is, however, an admission that the "obliteration of national distinctions...is a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions," suggesting that this problem is not yet ready for its "final solution."

In examining Soviet nationality policy one inevitably encounters the problem of national communism. This latter issue assumes both the form of a protest movement against centralist abuses and exploitations and the form of positive demands for the implementation of independent statehood for the Union republics in accordance with the guarantees stipulated in their constitutional charters. The history of national communist movements has its genesis in the Revolutionary years of 1917-1920. Ukrainian national communists were, according to all available evidence, the first group of national communists to develop political programs and to struggle actively for their implementation. Groups such as the Borotbists, the Ukapists or the Federalists and such individuals as Vasyl Shakhrai, Yuri Lapchynskyi and Oleksander Shumskyi were all engaged in promoting the aims of Ukrainian national communism. Other non-Russian nationalities raised the banner of national communism in the 1920's: the

17. See Appendices A and B for explanatory notes.
the Tartars under Sultan Galiev, the Georgians led by Mdivani and Nakhradze, the Basmachis under the command of Enver Pasha. All of these manifestations were suppressed by the Soviet regime and its leading figures were purged during the 1930's. Beginning with 1960, however, national communism in Ukraine was resurrected under the aegis of a group calling itself the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU). Subsequently a number of publications have appeared and have been circulated clandestinely in the Ukrainian SSR advocating and supporting the cause of Ukrainian national communism.

The objective of this thesis is to investigate Ukrainian national communism, to describe and analyse the variables which have influenced its development. In tracing the roots and the historical evolution of Ukrainian national communism, special emphasis will be placed on an inquiry into the ideological issues which have given impetus to and sustained this movement during the period of Soviet rule. This approach necessitates a closer examination of the programmatic demands and objectives of Ukrainian national communists. The second part of the thesis will concern itself with the men and the events, the tactics and strategies,

19. Primary source documentation of the UWPU is found in *Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB* (Ukrainian Lawyers on Trial by the KGB) (Munich, 1968).
that have promoted the aims of Ukrainian national communism. Intrinsic to this discussion is a chronological survey of "nationalist deviations" as they have manifested themselves in Ukrainian communist circles. The remainder of the thesis will assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian national communism and will venture an estimate on its future prospects. A number of policy recommendations will be included, designed to aid Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian decision-makers in refining their policy alternatives.

The technique of comparative analysis has been employed in order to study the similarities and differences in the various expressions of Ukrainian national communism, covering the Soviet period from 1917-1970. Using a historical focus, the specific features of Ukrainian national communism as they appeared in the post-Revolutionary decade (1917-1927) have been compared with those of the 1960's. This research method has been selected in order to inquire into aspects of recurrence, of continuity and of innovation in the problem under consideration. Both primary and secondary sources have been utilized for the collection of data. Two basic texts have been referred to extensively: Serhii Mazlakh's and Vasyl Shakhrai's Do Khvyli (On the Current Situation) written in

20. It is interesting to note that Soviet ideologues consider the research technique of comparing social phenomena of the 1920's with those of 1960's as being an "unscientific approach." See B. Stenchuk, ibid; p. 11.
1919\textsuperscript{21}, and Ivan Dzyuba's \textit{Internationalism or Russification?} published in the English translation in 1968.\textsuperscript{22} With regard to source materials it should be noted that the most numerous and best documented copies are found for the period of the 1920's,\textsuperscript{23} while data for the 1960's tend to be somewhat uneven and impressionistic. A small note on transliteration: a modified Library of Congress system has been used, Ukrainian place names have been written in their Ukrainian form while the commonly accepted spelling has been recorded in parentheses on first mention. Given names have been retained in their Ukrainian form.

Primary source materials for the period 1918-28 include, in addition to Do Khvylyi, the writings of Ukrainian national communists, M. Khvylovyi, V. Blakytnyi, Yu. Lapchynskyi and M. Volobuev; the Memorandum of the Ukrainian Communist Party to the Congress of the III Communist International, as

\begin{enumerate}
\item[21.] Published in English translation under the title \textit{On the Current Situation in the Ukraine} ed. Peter J. Potichnyj, Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1970.
\item[22.] This treatise was initially addressed in the form of a petition to P. Yu. Shelest, the First secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and to V. V. Shcherbytskyi, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukr. SSR, copies of the manuscript were subsequently distributed among the regional (oblast) Party secretaries in Ukraine.
\item[23.] Stenographic reports of the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses of the RCP document the struggle between the centrist and the national communist forces.
\end{enumerate}
well as stenographic reports of various Party Congresses.

From among the secondary sources for this period, an excellent reference text is J. Lawrynenko's annotated bibliography Ukrainian Communism and the Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine. Perhaps the most carefully and objectively researched study of the period in question is J. Borys' The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine. Turning to the 1960's, primary sources consist of the writings of T. Dzyuba, V. Chornovil, S. Karavanskyi, I. Kandyba and V. Moroz. All of these publications originated in the form of samvyday or "self-publishing." The most authoritative data on current dissent in Ukraine is contained in the "underground periodical" Ukrainskyi Visnyk which made its first appearance in January, 1970. Important secondary sources for the period of the 1960's are found in E. Goldhagen (ed.) Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union with up-to-date analyses of Ukrainian problems by Y. Bilinsky, J. Armstrong, and V. Holubnychy; statistical compilations by J. Kolasky, and background material in Y. Bilinsky's, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II.

In examining the available source materials, one should be aware of certain difficulties. For instance, both Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist writers analyzing the problem of Ukrainian national communism tend to assume a priori positions and use data selectively in order to argue their case. Consequently, their writing assumes the form
of a polemic. This is generally indicated by the titles of the works in question, for example, A. Lykholat's "Zdiisnennia leninskoj natsionalnoj politicky na Ukraini" (The Realization of Leninist Nationality Policy in Ukraine) or D. Solovey's "Ukraina v systemi sovetskoho kolonialismu" (Ukraine in the Network of Soviet Colonialism). Another problem centers around distinguishing constitutional myths from political realities, in recognizing the dichotomy between the theory and practice of Soviet nationalities policy. Some Western authors (notably E. H. Carr) commit the mistake of uncritically accepting and relying almost exclusively on official Soviet pronouncements in their interpretations of historical events or of policy decisions.

The significance of Ukrainian national communism becomes more readily apparent when certain data are recognized and placed in their relative context. From the point of view of political and economic relevance, Ukraine emerges as the most important non-Russian republic in the Soviet Union. For instance, in 1960, the Ukrainian SSR provided more than one half of the coal, cast iron and iron ore for the whole of the Soviet economy.24 In political terms, the Communist Party of Ukraine remains the largest and most influential subdivision

24. N. A.; Ukraine on the International Scene (Kiev, 1968), p. 224. See Table I in Appendix C.
of the CPSU, numbering 2,138,800 members on Jan. 1, 1968. More significantly, Ukrainian nationalism has remained an "Achilles' heel" for Soviet authorities ever since the inception of communist rule. Whether by accommodation or by repression, through indoctrination or force, Moscow has sought to retain Ukraine within the Soviet federation. The question, however, remains: do controls become convictions or will the Ukrainian people of some 41 million remain content with their present subordinate position? Once roused to a new level of dynamic consciousness of their possibilities for national independence, Ukrainians may well choose the option of national communism as a vehicle for their national aspirations. In the past, failure of non-Soviet authors to investigate the question of Ukrainian national communism has been blamed on the non-availability of archival materials as well as on the concurrence with official Soviet views that the nationality question has been "solved" in the USSR. It is hoped that now the problem of Ukrainian national communism will cease to be a neglected topic or esoteric subject matter for Soviet-area specialists and will command the attention of any serious student of Soviet politics.

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CHAPTER 1

THE IDEOLOGY OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM

To a Marxist-Leninist, politics - the exercise of power - cannot be viewed independently from ideology, the source of political purpose. Marxism-Leninism, in short, provides the "true believer" with a prescription for the total reconstruction of society. More specifically, ideology performs a number of vital functions in the Soviet political system. It imparts a sense of legitimacy to the existing political arrangements, it serves as an instrument of political socialization and mass indoctrination, it also determines the choice in policy alternatives. For its adherents, communist ideology provides a degree of commitment, a sense of direction and certainty that is often absent in those whose orientation is toward short-range empiricism or pragmatism.

Zbigniew Brzezinski views Soviet ideology "...essentially as an action program derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the nature of reality."

He proposes a two-part model of Marxism-Leninism which includes: the doctrinal framework with its philosophical tenets and ultimate aims; and an action program specifying methods for achieving the desired objectives. In this sense, ideology contributes the vital

link between theory and action. By combining certain doctrinal imperatives with a guide to action, Marxism-Leninism both conditions Soviet political culture and mobilizes the energies and loyalties of its disciples. This ideological character of the Soviet political system begs a closer analysis of the ideological components of Ukrainian national communism.

There is one essential ingredient in all ideological formulations of national communism, namely that of national interests. Both the means and ends of communism are interpreted within a national frame of reference. National priorities assume foremost positions and hold the crucial vote in policy deliberations. Involved in this process is the reconciliation of communist beliefs with national objectives, or at least the interpretation of the ideological gospel in the light of current national needs. This phenomenon is associated with the resurgence of nationalism in the post-World War II period as well as with the polarization and the divergencies within the communist camp. For some national communists, their national allegiances supersede their communist loyalties; many, however, have been able to synthesize their national and communist principles into a coherent ideology.

From an ideological perspective, Ukrainian national communism may be examined and evaluated according to its two recurrent themes or manifestations. One of these is contained in protests against national annihilation and national
exploitation, protests against Russian centralism and Russian chauvinism, protests against Ukrainophobias and Russification. This current of protest, both individual and collective, has been described by I. Dzyuba as constituting "spontaneous, multiform widespread, self-originating processes of a nation's self-defence" at against liquidation. Included in these processes are expressions of ideological dissent focusing on Soviet Ukraine's constitutional prerogatives and objecting against the official course of the Soviet nationalities policy. The other theme of Ukrainian national communism consists of programmatic demands for complete and genuine sovereignty and independence for the Ukrainian SSR, as well as for a separate and independent status for the Ukrainian Communist Party. Both these demands are seen as interrelated: an independent Party organization is held to be the basis for Ukraine's independence. Running as a common thread through


3. Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's are more cautious than their counterparts of the 1917-1920 period, employing "Aesopian" or ambiguous language when voicing their demands for an independent Ukrainian Party organisation.
these two manifestations of Ukrainian national communism is the expression of Ukrainian patriotism. This patriotic commitment serves as an ideological foundation stone appealing simultaneously to the Ukrainians' national awareness and self-respect, as well as to Party and State interests, calling on Ukrainians to fashion their own political destiny.

A number of similar ideological issues are repeatedly resurrected in all theoretical formulations of Ukrainian national communism. In all cases, there appears a positive orientation toward the development of Ukrainian culture; demands are made for the application of the Ukrainian language to all spheres of social, economic and political activity within the borders of Ukrainian SSR; appeals are launched for Ukrainians to abandon their national inferiority complex and to cultivate an activist stand in support of national objectives. All of these issues are counterposed to Russification pressures, evidence of indifferences and resignation to national self-destruction among many Ukrainians, symptoms of sycophancy, of "flexible spines", of the "janissary"

4. Two instances of passionate concern for the fate of the Ukrainian nation are found in statements by Ukrainian national communists of the two periods in question. The comment: "Yes, we love Ukraine with a love reserved for a living, historical personality" by V. Shakhrai and S. Mazlakh in Do Khvyli, p. 286; and one made by L. H. Lukianenko: "If I were the last Ukrainian alive, I would continue to fight for Ukraine." See: "Sered snihiv" (Among the Snows), Suchasnist, (March, 1971), p. 70.
syndrome among certain Ukrainian elite members. There are other striking similarities in the platforms of Ukrainian national communists for the period of 1917-1927 as compared to those for the 1960's. Both groups identify the nationality question with social problems by linking national liberation with social reform, both register their protests against the exploitative character of Ukrainian-Russian relations, both share a belief in their ultimate rightness and a faith in the "collective instinct" of the Ukrainian people for political development. Another similarity consists in the

5. Some of the most implacable opponents of Ukrainian national communism are Russified Ukrainians. For instance, A. Khvylia, a former Borotbist, in charge of the Press section of the CP(B)U during 1926-28, argued that proletarian consciousness should replace national feelings and accused M. Skrypnyk of "forcible Ukrainization." Source: G. Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-34 (New York, 1956), p. 104. Similarly, during the 1960's, A. Skaba, the former ideological secretary of the CCCPU instituted a witch hunt against Ukrainian intellectuals and consistently opposed any concessions toward Ukrainian cultural development. Source: P. Chernov, "Kil'ka dumok pro suchasni problemy" (A Few Thoughts about Current Problems), Suchasnist, July, 1968, p. 63.

6. In S. Mazlakh's and V. Shakhrai's words: "Sooner or later, through the difficult and bloody course of armed conflict or through agreement...Ukraine will be independent and sovereign not only in words but in reality." See: On the Current Situation in the Ukraine p. 149.
candid recognition of the existing dichotomy between theory and reality, between promise and performance in the realm of the nationality question or in noting that constitutional provisions do not describe the actual state of affairs in Soviet Ukraine. Proponents of Ukrainian national communism have consistently emphasized the democratic form and content of their political programs, have attempted to achieve a symbiosis of Marxist and Ukrainian views, and have also favoured the application of innovative approaches to textbook Marxism, for instance, subordinating economic criteria to political imperatives. 7 Motivated by a desire to be "masters in their own house", to develop Ukrainian culture and to increase the material benefits for the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian national communists have insisted that independent statehood must be an indispensable condition for Ukraine's optimum development. 8

7. Lenin was, of course, the principal revisionist of orthodox Marxism by shifting emphasis from determinist factors in the direction of revolutionary activism, by creating an elitist Party organization to dominate the workers' movement, by invoking the primacy of politics over economics.

8. To quote S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai: "There is no other alternative." Do Khvyli, p. 247. I. Dzyuba expresses his preference for independent Ukraine... as a national reality and not simply as an administrative-geographical term." Ibid., p. 206.
There are, however, a number of significant differences in the content and in the manner of presenting ideological issues by Ukrainian national communists of the earlier and latter periods. For one thing, the nature of the movement in the Revolutionary years, with its candor, its maximalist demands and its forthright political orientation contrasts markedly with the legalistic and constitutional argumentation, with the emphasis on cultural priorities and the minimalistic demands in the 1960's. Another difference revolves around the treatment accorded to V. I. Lenin: Some Ukrainian national communists of the earlier period were openly and sharply critical of Lenin's nationality policies; their present-day counterparts, however, appeal for their restoration and implementation. In the post-Revolutionary period, the ruling Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was engaged in polemical debates with its communist rivals - Borotbists and

9. It is interesting to note that S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai considered Lenin to be the most dangerous opponent of Ukrainian statehood and an advocate for the reestablishment of "iedina nedilymaya" (one and indivisible) Russia. For this reason, Do Khvyli's questions were addressed to him personally. See: Do Khvyli p. 281.

10. The canonization of Lenin by current apologists for the cause of Ukrainian national communism may be simply a stratagem employed in order to bolster one's case by citing the highest accredited source of authority.
Ukapists - in addition to settling factional disputes arising in its own ranks concerning the policies and functions of the CP(б)U in the area of nationality questions. There is no evidence, on the other hand, of any intra-Party struggles or disputes on these issues in the ranks of the Communist Party of Ukraine. 11 Other novel features of Ukrainian national communism in the 1960's include appeals for applying the norms of socialist legality and suggestions for demarcating jurisdictions between Party and State apparati. Altogether, one can observe the contrast between the revolutionary romanticism of 1918 with its uncompromising demands for total independence of both Party and State organizations, and the Realpolitik of the 1960's relying on constitutional arguments and petitions to Soviet authorities. The earlier open, organized mass movement of Ukrainian national communists has been replaced by clandestine and fragmentary elitist formations; radical, overly political demands have given way to complaints citing anti-Ukrainian discriminatory policies; the revolutionary strategy has been supplanted by a reformist orientation. Perhaps the most significant new development consists of the challenge proffered by the current group of Ukrainian national communists to the principal thesis of Soviet ideology, namely

11. Until the XIX Congress of the CPSU (October, 1952), the Ukrainian Party organization called itself the CP(б)U. From that date it bore the name CPU.
partyist or Party-mindedness. By defying the Party's monopolistic interpretation of Soviet reality, of the Soviet constitution and of Soviet law, this group of dissidents emerges as an "unofficial opposition" in the Soviet Ukraine. Its demands for the "detotalitarianization" of the Soviet political system through adherence to constitutional provisions and effective guarantees of political freedoms may, over the long run, be instrumental in evolving a radically new movement of Ukrainian national communism.

Methods of applying these issues - the question of tactics - are, to a certain extent, reflections of ideological commitment. In both instances (1920's and 1960's) one can observe the utilization of literary politics in order to defend and propagate the ideology of Ukrainian national communism. Writers, poets and literary critics have, in various ways, asserted the cultural, socio-economic and political interests of Ukraine. Increasingly, the strategy is to make references to the 1920's for comparing the current situation and to accuse the government of the Ukrainian SSR of "failing to implement its own laws and resolutions adopted in the 1920's." 13

12. Although the draft program of the UWPU is based on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, it also contains the following "heretical" reference: "The question of creating an independent Ukraine will, in the end, be decided not by the Party but by the entire Ukrainian nation." Ukrainski yurysty pid siddem KGB p. 33.
There are, naturally, some differences in the tactical approaches employed by the two groups of Ukrainian national communists. The tactic of confrontation of the earlier group has been replaced by argumentation couched in references to universalist values and the principles of humanist Marxism. Instead of accusing the Party for its anti-Ukrainian bias, the present group have levelled their criticism at the Ukrainian government administration. Just as the former group of Ukrainian national communists "based their illusory political hopes on the Comintern,"14 its current exponents have quixotically addressed their appeals to the United Nations Human Rights Commission as well as to ruling Communist parties in Eastern Europe, among them the Polish United Workers' Party. In all instances, however, the call for an open public debate on the nationalities question, an activist stance,15 a recognition of the need to change governing structures and prevailing attitudes identify the similarities between both groups of Ukrainian national communists.


15. It has been noted that Lenin's new nationality policy (1920-23) "...was carried through only to the extent that Ukrainians themselves fought vigorously for its realization." Ibid., p. 293.
One approach to the study of recurrent and dissimilar features in Ukrainian national communism is to subject the programmatic statements of its principal ideologues to a closer analysis. Representatives from both groups propose solving the Ukrainian nationality question "according to the dictates of Lenin," emphasizing the necessity for practical implementation of policy resolutions. Both perceive the role of the Ukrainian Party as a spokesman for Ukraine's national interests — for its sovereignty and independence. Both stress national self-reliance and self-respect, the abandonment of psychological barriers which prevent the conceptualization of independent Ukrainian statehood among the Ukrainian population; both accentuate the need to persuade the Russian minority in Ukraine of the viability of Ukrainian national objectives. Similar demands have also be voiced for the provision of cultural and educational facilities for some six million Ukrainians residing in RSFSR and other Soviet republics, analogous to those enjoyed by the Russian minority.

in the Ukrainian SSR. Other similar features include demands for the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian cultural heritage and for the de-Russification of Ukrainian public life. There are also recurrent specific proposals concerned with the retention of Ukrainian professional cadres in the Ukrainian republic, the establishment of Ukrainian military formations guaranteed in Article 15a of the Soviet Ukrainian constitution, and the inauguration of direct external relations between Ukraine and foreign states or the basis of Article 15b of the Ukrainian SSR constitution. Most importantly, it is recognized by both groups, although elucidated only in a hesitant fashion by the Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's, that the state-administrative, cultural and economic independence of Soviet Ukraine hinges on the de-Russification and the independent status as a policy-making body of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This last condition is generally regarded as the most serious deviation from Leninism.

20. The Eigh Congress of the RCP, held in December, 1919, while making concessions toward the development of Ukrainian culture, outlined Lenin's preferences for a centralized Party organization relegating the Central Committee of the CP(b)U to the status of a regional committee of the RCP. See: J. Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine (Stockholm, 1960), p. 50.
One of the most cogently elaborated programs of Ukrainian national communism in the early period was presented by the Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP). Among its main points were: 1. demanding the total separation of Ukrainian SSR from RSFSR, 2. establishing a separate Ukrainian economy, 3. entering into direct relations with foreign communist groups, 4. proposing the creation of a Ukrainian Red Army, 5. resisting military-political union of Soviet Ukraine with Russia, 6. opposing the unification of People's Commissariats, 7. defining the Revolution in terms of "national liberation", 8. interpreting Soviet federalism as "Soviet colonialism", 9. organizing an All-Ukrainian labor union center, 10. delegating the UCP as the sole, true representative of the Ukrainian proletariat. Underlying all of these issues was an understanding of the indispensability of obtaining mass support from the Ukrainian population in order to implement these programmatic objectives.

For purposes of comparison, a document submitted by Anton Koval in the form of an "open letter" to the deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet best outlines the aims and aspirations of the Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's.

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Written in April, 1969, this document contains a series of proposals for economic, political and cultural reforms that are considered to be essential for ratification in order to revitalize the socio-economic and political life of Ukraine. Both recurrent and novel features of Ukrainian national communism are encountered in this programmatic statement.

In the field of cultural relations, the same demands are voiced for according official status to the Ukrainian language, for Ukrainizing all institutions of higher learning in Soviet Ukraine and generally, for reapplying the Ukrainization decrees of the 1924-28 period. There is also mention of the need to make representation to the government of the RSFSR for granting the expatriate Ukrainians living on its territory—schools, theatre, and press coverage in the Ukrainian language. Recommendations for economic reforms, similar to those of the 1920's, include transfer to the Ukrainian Republican competence control over the distribution of the gross national product of Ukrainian SSR as well as control over its budgetary powers. Another proposal stipulates granting full control to the Ukrainian government over its internal economic affairs.

23. At present, only six out of a total of thirty-three ministries of Ukrainian SSR dealing with economic matters are under exclusive Republican jurisdiction.
Some of the novel aspects in the cultural sector contain suggestions for guaranteeing national development of ethnic minorities in the Ukrainian SSR and demands for cessation of repressive actions aimed at dissident Ukrainian intellectuals. Among innovative economic proposals are recommendations for stimulating the production of consumer industries, for publicising the amount of foreign aid granted by Soviet Ukraine, and for disallowing payments to Party functionaries from State funds.

The most radical propositions in Koval's treatise are advanced in the area of political reforms. While the stated intentions are to transform the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet into a viable institution of rule, the proposed changes would drastically alter the whole nature of the Soviet political system. Through the vehicle of a new constitution, a multiparty system with competing candidates at elections would be introduced, secret voting would become the norm in Soviets at all levels, censorship (Holovlit) would be abolished, and the internal passport system would be liquidated. In addition, all prisoners sentenced for their political or religious beliefs would be freed, the KGB (State Security Police) would be dissolved, and all individuals criminally responsible for the terror

24. The Soviet internal passport system, in effect, prevents Ukrainian rural dwellers from settling in Ukrainian cities while not restricting Russians from immigrating into the Ukrainian SSR. As a result, in 1970, every fifth resident of Soviet Ukraine was a Russian.
during the "cultist" period would be brought before a public trial. It was also submitted that the privileged status of certain Party officials and state employees be abrogated, that membership in the Kolhosp (collective farm) be made voluntary and that policies be introduced in order to halt the progressive Ukrainian population decline in the Ukrainian SSR. The sovereign powers of the Ukrainian Republic, it was argued, require the creation of a Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the transfer of the Ministries of education, culture and internal affairs to exclusive Republican jurisdiction, and the observance of constitutional protocol by other Soviet republics. Altogether, the emphasis in the list of proposals is on democratizing election procedures, on restricting the powers of the bureaucracy, and on securing genuine political freedoms for the Ukrainian population.

This version of liberal Ukrainian national communism is supported by a brief addressed to the USSR Council of Nationalities by Sviatoslav Karavanskyi. One of the

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25. Both the 1926 and the 1959 Soviet censuses list the "magic figure" of 37 million Ukrainians. See: I. Dzyuba, ibid; p. 14. By 1970, this figure had risen to 40.7 million Ukrainians residing in USSR.

notable aspects of this petition revolves around the concern expressed by Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's for the rights of national minorities in Ukrainian SSR. Karavanskyi documents discriminatory practices being applied against the Jewish population, citing quotas restricting the admission of Jewish students to institutions of higher learning and deploring the lack of cultural and mass media facilities for the 150,000 Jews living in Odessa. He also appeals for the repatriation of Byelorussians, Balts and Western Ukrainians to their respective homelands together with a general rehabilitation for all victims of Stalin's personality cult. Another interesting proposal is for re-establishing the statehood of Crimean Tatars whose former territory was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine in 1954. There is also the suggestion, similar to the one made by Ukrainian national communists of the 1920's, for revising the boundaries of the Soviet national republics in order to make them conform more closely to the patterns of ethnographic settlement.

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27. Karavanskyi claims that, as a result of these anti-Jewish policies, Zionism is winning an increasing number of converts. V. Chornovil, ibid., p. 200.

28. A particular source of contention is the territory of Kuban in RSFSR where 2,73,000 Ukrainians resided in 1923, Dokumenty ukrainskogo komunizmu, p. 73. Similarly, border areas of Kursk and Voronish contained sizable settlements of Ukrainians. On the other hand, some Russians even now claim the Donbas Region of Ukraine for themselves on similar grounds.
Among other points, Karavanskyi condemns the system of passport restrictions in the Soviet Union as a violation of the International Convention of Human Rights, censures the Russification of Ukrainian institutions of higher learning and criticises the "colonization of Ukraine with a large number of Russians." who occupy all the privileged posts in Ukrainian cities - a practice which contributes to national antagonisms and a feeling that Ukrainians are second-class citizens in their own land. Finally, similar to the demands made by other Ukrainian national communists, this petition recommends open and widely disseminated public debates on the nationality question in order to rectify errors and lead to the cessation of discriminatory practices in the field of nationality relations.

One of the most interesting programmatic statements by Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's is contained in the draft of the program for the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU). This document, based on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, was cited extensively in petitions addressed to Ukrainian Party and Government officials and was subsequently published in the West. It consists of a combination of protests against Russian centralism and

30. The documents are compiled in Ukrainski vyrvstv pid sudom KGB. See also I. O. Kandyba, "Ukraine's Right of Secession from the USSR", Ukrainian Quarterly, 25, Spring, Summer, 1969.
chauvinism together with a number of positive demands for assuring Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. The proposed program is highly critical of the Party's nationality policy in Ukraine during the entire Soviet period pointing out the limitations of Ukraine's political prerogatives, her dubious sovereignty and her status as a colonial dependency of Moscow. It also deplores the fact that the Ukrainian language is not being used in the Party and governmental agencies, in educational institutions and industrial enterprises, having been relegated to an inferior position in the social and cultural life of the nation. There are further objections against centralized methods of planning in industry and agriculture, protests against bureaucratic methods of administration, against the abrogation of the rights and functions of trade unions; indignation is voiced against violations of socialist legality and against instances of national oppression.

The programmatic objectives of the UWPÜ are best outlined in the following statement by Lev. H. Lukianenko,

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31. I. Kandyba's letter to P. Yu. Shelest refers to Ukraine as "an appendix to Russia - with two thirds of her natural resources being transported beyond her boundaries." Ukrainski yurysty... p. 32.

32. Mention is made of the serf-like status of the Ukrainian kolhosnyk (collective farmer), thus linking social and national factors of discrimination in the Soviet political system.
the chief architect of the drafted program for the organization:

We are struggling for an independent Ukraine which, in satisfying the material and spiritual needs of its citizens on the basis of a socialist economy, would be developing in the direction of communism; secondly, in which all citizens would have genuine guarantees of political freedom and would determine the direction of economic and political development for Ukraine.33

In order to achieve these objectives, it was considered necessary to create an organization which would legally, in conformity with the constitutional guarantees, conduct a peaceful agitation for the secession of Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union. The right of secession is stipulated in Article 14 of the Ukrainian SSR constitution and in Article 17 of the USSR constitution.34 The authors of the proposed program for the UWPJ argue, moreover, that Ukraine's prerogative of secession is an integral aspect of its right for self-determination sanctioned by Soviet law, Marxist ideology and by the spirit of anti-colonialism. It was suggested that the question of Ukraine's secession from

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33. Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB, p. 33.
34. The official Soviet publication Radianske Pravo (Soviet Law) (No. 1, 1966) states the following: "Ukraine, just as any Union republic, has the right to secede from the USSR at anytime in accordance with its wishes. The right of secession of a Union republic, which cannot be abrogated or changed by the Soviet regime, allows the population of the republic the right to express its will on the most important question - the form of its statehood." Ibid, p. 83.
the USSR be ratified either by a decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet or on the basis of a mass referendum of all citizens in the Ukrainian SSR. The aim of the UWPU would be to conduct a campaign for the Ukrainization and democratization of Soviet Ukrainian political life by addressing petitions to various political authorities in the Soviet Union as well as by engaging in the task of acquainting the Ukrainian populace with the issues at hand. Its organizational priorities were established by the following tactical consideration: "The first stage of our struggle would consist in winning democratic freedoms indispensable for the politicization of the Ukrainian people in their efforts to create an independent national state." All of these programmatic assertions testify to the high degree of civic responsibility on the part of the organizers of the UWPU together with their recognition of the malaise affecting Soviet society as well as the need for changing its existent political structures and prevailing attitudes.

All of the ideological formulations of Ukrainian national communism are rooted in certain objective factors such as language, territorial residence and recollections of a historical past evolving a distinctive "community of fate." They are also based on subjective elements including national consciousness, mutual affection and national pride as well as

35. Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB, p. 33.
on the desire to exercise one's will and power in an independent state. From one aspect, Ukrainian national communists propose a counter-ideology in reaction to Moscow's centralist policies. From a broader perspective, however, Ukrainian national communism represents a predilection to ultimately determine the course of social, economic and political development for Ukraine. This symbolic satisfaction of independent statehood combined with policy disagreements over a number of contentious issues have been the main forces contributing to the emergence of Ukrainian national communism. The most contentious issue and the fundamental inspiration for all versions of Ukrainian national communism is found in its opposition to all forms of Russification.

1. **A SELECTED ISSUE: THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE**

One of the clearest indications of ideological continuity among various expressions of Ukrainian national communism is found in the emphasis placed on applying the Ukrainian language to all areas of Ukrainian national life. Thus, the first programmatic statement of Ukrainian national communism contains references to the Ukrainian language as the stimulus of national emotions and as the affirmation of unity and equality among its people. Among

36. In the initial document of Ukrainian national communism, Ukrainians are exhorted to respect "one's will, one's language, and one's self." S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, *On the Current Situation*, p. 151.

the current exponents of Ukraine's national rights, its principal ideologue regards the Ukrainian language as a "living symbol of a people's collective individuality." \(^{38}\)

In both instances, Ukrainian is employed as the language of protest against national and social oppression. During the 1920's, Ukrainian national communists made considerable gains in securing the application of the Ukrainian language in the fields of publishing, education and even in the realm of official relations. Their successes were largely due to the official endorsement for the policy of korenizatsia (taking root) through which Soviet leaders sought to obtain support among the indigenous peoples of the Soviet Union.

In the 1960's, Ukrainian national communists were faced with the task of obtaining recognition for Ukrainian as the de facto official language of the Ukrainian SSR.

The importance of the language issue is illustrated by the continuing state of tension in the attempts of the Ukrainian language to maintain itself as the predominant medium of expression and by the inroads against this made by the proliferation and the preferred status of the Russian language. This fact has always been recognized by Ukrainian national communists. During certain periods of Soviet rule,

\(^{38}\) I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 150.
the mere act of speaking Ukrainian was a hazardous undertaking. On another level, Shakhrai's comment made in 1918 - "What sort of a Ukrainian government is it whose members neither know nor wish to learn the Ukrainian language?" - typifies the attitudes shared by many Russians and Russified Ukrainians toward anything Ukrainian. The present state of affairs in the Ukrainian SSR is described as one in which the "administration, economic and governmental bodies functioning in their native language do not exist." According to an eyewitness report, Russian has replaced Ukrainian as the language of official relations, of Party and trade union activities, of higher and professional education.

Consequently, a considerable number of self-declared Ukrainians

39. In the time of the first Soviet occupation of Ukraine in February, 1918, Bolshevik troops led by Muraviev executed any Kyevan (Kievan) resident they caught speaking Ukrainian. Source: I. Majstrenko, Storinki z istorii Komunistychnoi Partii Ukrainy Vol. 1., p. 42.

40. Quoted by D. F. Solovey, Ukraina v systemi sovetskogo kolonializmu (Ukraine in the Network of Soviet Colonialism) (Munich, 1959), p. 33. Shakhrai made this observation during his tenure as the Peoples' Secretary for Military Affairs in the first Soviet Ukrainian government.

41. J. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 127.

42. J. Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto, 1970).
have, for reasons of personal gain or proof of "loyalty" to
the regime, adopted the Russian language as their predominant
medium of expression.

This trend of linguistic Russification is illustrated
in official Soviet statistics. In 1926, 4.5 percent of the
Ukrainians residing in the Ukrainian SSR acknowledged
Russian as their "native" language or as their language of
conversation. During the 1959 census, this figure had
increased to 6.5 percent and in 1970 rose still further to
8.6 percent or 3 million Ukrainians who considered Russian
as their native language.43 Among Ukrainians residing in
other Soviet republics, the extent of linguistic Russification
is even more pronounced. According to the 1959 census
figures, only 51.2 percent of the self-declared Ukrainians
living in the RSFSR listed Ukrainian as their native or most
frequently used language.44 In the urban areas of Ukraine,
Russian is displacing Ukrainian as the predominant language
of conversation. For instance, in the city of Kyiv (Kiev),
the capital of Ukraine, 28 percent of Ukrainians declared
Russian as their native language in 1959.45 The whole process

43. Volodymyr Kubijovych, "Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia
URSP za perepysom 1970" (National Composition of
Ukrainian SSR According to the 1970 Census),
Suchasnist, (September, 1971), pp. 80-81.
44. Y. Billinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness
among Ukrainians in the Soviet Union" in E.
Goldhagen (ed.), Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet
45. Ibid., p. 158.
linguistic Russification has been described by the Ukrainian ethnographer V. Kubijovych as constituting "a demographic catastrophe."\(^\text{46}\)

Karl Deutsch suggests six qualitative "balance factors" in regard to linguistic assimilation.\(^\text{47}\) These are: 1. similarities in communication habits, 2. facilities for learning the new language, 3. frequency of contacts, 4. material rewards and penalties, 5. values, and 6. barriers. Applying these variables to the Ukrainian case, it would appear that they are all weighed in favour of linguistic Russification. For one thing, common Slavic etymological roots facilitate the learning of Russian by Ukrainians. Also, the study of Russian is compulsory in all Ukrainian schools. The presence of 9 million Russians in Ukraine has created a pervasive Russifying environment. Furthermore, official recognition of Russian as "the second native language" and as "the language of inter-national communication" encourages its adoption by career-minded Ukrainians. The only barriers resisting linguistic Russification are found in the rural areas of Ukraine where the majority of the population identifies Ukrainian as its native language and among those Ukrainians who regard the Ukrainian language as being expressive of their national identity.

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There are also indications of opposition among nationally conscious Ukrainians to the pressures of linguistic Russification. In the 1920's, Ukrainian national communists experienced considerable success in implementing the policy of Ukrainization or de-Russification of the Ukrainian educational system and of Ukrainian cultural life. A 1923 Resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee decreed "... to select Ukrainian as the predominant language for official relations." Beginning with the 1930's, however, Stalinist rule stifled the aspirations and further development of the Ukrainian language. The language issue resurfaced at the Republican Conference on Questions of Linguistic Culture attended by Ukrainian scholars and communications experts, held in Kyiv in 1963. This meeting "unanimously condemned the absurd theory that a nation has two (native) languages," in effect rejecting the theory of bilingualism promoted by the regime as a device for linguistic Russification. The conference also proposed that Ukrainian be established as the mandatory language of instruction in all Ukrainian institutions of learning. At the Fifth Ukrainian

48. For example, in 1930, Ukrainian language newspapers comprised 89 percent of the total circulation in the Ukrainian SSR; in 1963, this figure had dropped to 57 percent. Source: I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 118.
49. Ibid., p. 150.
Writers' Congress in November, 1966, Oles Honchar acting as the chairman of the Congress denounced the second-class status of the Ukrainian language. On the "grass-roots" level, a group of Ukrainian mothers addressed a complaint to the Ministry of Education accusing the official linguistic policy as being "anti-constitutional, anti-Leninist, anti-Party and anti-Soviet." In general terms, however, protests against the ubiquitous aspects of linguistic Russification consist of passive opposition, privatization or a sort of relegation of the Ukrainian language to the private domain of social intercourse.

Ukrainian Soviet elite orientations toward the Ukrainian language are essentially negative. On ceremonial occasions, Ukrainian language is accorded pro forma recognition. Thus, N. Podgorny addressed the United Nations Assembly in October, 1960 in Ukrainian and P. Shelest cautioned the Fifth Ukrainian Writers' Congress: "We must treat our beautiful Ukrainian language with great care and respect." More illustrative of official attitudes is the statement by Yu. Dadenkov, the Minister of Higher and Specialized Education for the Ukrainian SSR, that "national aspirations do not depend

52. I. Dzyuba, Ibid., p. 159.
On language." In a similar vein, A. Skaba, the former ideological secretary of the CCCPU, noted that "language is secondary; the important thing is technological progress." Other apologists for linguistic Russification invariably refer to Russian as "Lenin's language," thus imbuing it with the aura of official approbation. On the basis of these observations it would appear that the Ukrainian language can expect little support from official circles and must rely on the efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the "lower strata" of the Ukrainian population for its utilization and revitalization.

A number of controversial aspects of the language issue remain unresolved. For instance, is it necessarily true in every case that "linguistic Russification is the first stage of ethnic Russification"? There is evidence that some Ukrainians who were not conversant in their native language demonstrated greater national awareness than those who were fluent in it. Certainly, the Ukrainian language should not be regarded as the deciding criterion for membership in the Ukrainian nation. If the state of the Ukrainian language is in such a condition of disrepair, the blame must be divided

54. "Zvit delegatsiї TsK KP Kanady z podorzhi na Ukrainu" (Report of the delegation of the CC of CP of Canada about their trip to Ukraine), Suchasnist February, 1968, p. 98.
55. P. Chernov, Ibid.
56. B. Stenchuk, Ibid; p. 23
57. I. Dzyuba, Ibid; p. 189.
58. A case in point is that of O. Zalyvakha sentenced during the 1966 trials of Ukrainian dissidents, Zalyvakha taught himself Ukrainian only in his adult life.
between official policies of Russification and the indifference and acquiescence of the Ukrainian populace to the fate of their native language. To say that "pressures of circumstances... are forcing some Ukrainians to renounce their language" evades the point that no-one prohibits Ukrainians residing in Kyiv and Kharkiv (Kharkov) to speak Ukrainian. Obersvers have noted that the Russian language enjoys a much less favoured position in the Georgian SSR or even in the Baltic republics than it does in Ukraine. The principal reason for this difference resides in the attitudes displayed by the indigenous peoples toward their native languages. It has also been claimed that the Russian language is used chiefly "in the interest of preserving the unity of power." There seem to be, however, several other factors behind the concerted drive for linguistic Russification, such as bureaucratic expediency or what Dzyuba calls "office arm-chair convenience," official encouragement of denationalization, and finally, traditional Russian chauvinism.

The issue of the Ukrainian language is directly related to educational and cultural matters. In the field of education, there is evidence of discriminatory policies and procedures being applied toward the admission of Ukrainian

59. I. Dzyuba, _ibid._, p. 155.
61. I. Dzyuba, _ibid._, p. 208.
students to institutions of higher learning. The factors mitigating against the admission of Ukrainian students include entrance examinations which are generally held in Russian, the language of instruction at most faculties also being Russian, textbooks and reference texts, especially in the area of natural sciences and engineering, published overwhelmingly in the Russian language. An interesting sidelight is offered by data on the language of dissertations submitted to the University of Lviv (one of the most Ukrainianized educational institutions) during the period 1944-60. Of the 365 theses, 312 or 85.5 percent were written in Russian.

In the cultural sector, the "Ukrainian Renaissance" of literature and the arts in the 1920's has been supplanted by a situation where Russian has established itself as the predominant language in the theatre, in films and radio programs, in book publishing where in 1963, 75 percent of book titles and 81.4 percent of the copies printed in USSR were in Russian.

62. Official Soviet sources have released data indicating that in 1967, Ukrainian students enrolled in higher educational establishments numbered 451,000 or 61 percent of the total student population, with Russian students placed at 32 percent of the total, clearly a disproportionate amount when compared with the 13.5 percent of the Russian representation in the total population of Ukraine. Source: P. Chernov, ibid; p. 64.


64. I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 117. Of course, several encyclopedias and reference texts have been published in Ukrainian in the 1960's.
On another level, the importance of language as a political issue may be illustrated by the objections voiced by the defendants during the 1961 trial in Lviv who protested that the trial investigations were conducted in Russian contrary to paragraph 90 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and in violation of Article 19 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code.  

On the basis of the foregoing argumentation, it may be assumed that the Ukrainian language issue will continue to occupy a prominent position in all programmatic documents of Ukrainian national communism. This will involve demands for the practical implementation of the use of Ukrainian as the official language of Ukrainian SSR. Furthermore, attempts will be made to introduce Ukrainian as the language of instruction in all Ukrainian educational institutions and to secure the same cultural and educational rights for the Ukrainian expatriates in USSR as are currently enjoyed by the Russian minority in Ukraine. It is generally assumed in these documents that Ukrainian should be granted the same prerogatives and privileges as those which are accorded to any other national language.

2. **THE ECONOMIC ISSUE**

Debates concerning the viability of an independent Ukrainian economic system constitute an integral aspect of the programmatic demands made by Ukrainian national communists.

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There are several reasons why the economic issue has become the "central ingredient of present-day (Soviet) nationality problem." First of all, dissatisfaction with existing economic conditions and attempts made to improve their personal economic standard are the prime concern of Soviet Ukrainian citizens. Secondly, Marxist dialectics have always postulated that means of production and distribution determine the political system attributes. Arguments that economic inequities were primarily responsible for the continuing "national" problem are found in the resolutions adopted by the Tenth and Twelfth Congresses of the RCP. More recently, Soviet spokesmen have listed economic underdevelopment as one of the chief causes of "nationalist deviations." Ukrainian national communists, on the other hand, have cited evidence of discriminatory economic policies applied to Ukrainian regions by central authorities. They have insisted that the Ukrainian economy is not simply an adjunct to the Union apparatus but that it is entitled to an independent development according to its own needs and resources.

During the initial stages of Soviet rule, Ukrainian national communists engaged in polemical disputes with

representative of the "Katerynoslav group" in the CP (b) U who claimed that the "productive forces of Ukraine are indignantly opposed to the separation of Ukraine from Russia." The arguments of the Katerynoslav faction ran as follows: Russia's economic development was dependent on Ukraine's natural resources; similarly, Ukraine depended on Russia for her supply of textile goods, lumber and petroleum. This economic interdependence precluded any possibility of political independence for Ukraine. The authors of Do Khvyli recognized the existence of reciprocal economic ties between Ukraine and Russia but also suggested that "productive forces sometimes lead not to political union but to political separation." They cite the example of Sweden and Norway whose close economic arrangements did not prevent these two countries from achieving an amicable separation. Besides, they ask, why should Ukraine suffer economic deprivation simply because someone wants to exploit her? This issue of economic exploitation was also raised by the federalist faction in the CP (b) U who accused the Russian Bolsheviks of viewing Ukraine

68. Members of the "Katerynoslav group" in the CP (b) U came from the highly industrialized and Russified south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Antagonistic to the Ukrainian national movement, they advocated merging Ukraine with RSFSR. Its leaders Ia. Epstein (Iakovlev) and E. Kviring held prominent positions in the CP (b) U apparatus.
69. S. Nazlakh and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 64.
70. Ibid., p. 66.
as a larder for supplying Russia with raw materials.

The most persuasive and systematic defence of Ukrainian independence in the field of economic activity was presented by N. Volobuev in his two articles "Regarding Problems in the Ukrainian Economy" published in the journal Bilshovyk Ukrainy (Bolshevik of Ukraine) in 1928. Utilizing data on revenues and expenditures, Volobuev demonstrated that, in the period of 1924-25, fully one-third of all the revenues collected in the Ukrainian SSR were disembarshed outside its territory, mainly in the RSFSR. 

He also called the practice of allocating funds for the construction of new industrial enterprises outside Ukrainian territory, mainly in the "eastern regions" of the USSR, as being "contrary to optimum realization of profits and economic rationalization." Arguing that Ukraine was capable of maintaining its own independent economic life, Volobuev proposed a grant of budgetary powers to the Ukrainian SSR and Ukrainian control over distribution of labour resources and the activities of Union-Republican Ministries. He also warned against economic regionalization of Ukrainian territory and stressed the achievement of equitable economic arrangements as an integral aspect of solving the Ukrainian nationality issue.

71. Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu, p. 224.
72. Ibid., p. 214. During the first Five Year Plan, only three out of a total twenty-six new industrial enterprises were scheduled for construction in the Ukrainian SSR. Ibid., p. 211.
73. Ibid., pp. 227-28.
result, Volobuev's ideas were described by a leading Ukrainian communist M. Skrypnyk as being "an economic formulation of Ukrainian nationalist deviation."\(^{74}\)

Similar observations regarding the economic exploitation of Ukraine were made by Ukrainian economists in the 1960's. For instance, in 1963, the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR published a monograph on the national income in Ukraine. This study shows that in the period 1959-61, 14 percent of Ukraine's national income was withdrawn into the Union treasury and never returned.\(^{75}\) There is also mention that in 1960, only 27.7 percent of the total turnover tax of the Ukrainian republic was allocated to the state budget of the Ukr. SSR with more than two thirds of it being transferred to the Union treasury.\(^{76}\) From among all of the Soviet republics, RSFSR enjoys a clear priority in the allocation of investments per capita, calculated to be "more than 40 percent of all capital investments."\(^{77}\) in the Soviet

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Union. Consequently, whenever the question arises whether to construct a new hydroelectric installation in Ukraine or in Siberia, the Siberian location is generally favoured for "strategic reasons." Even the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers V. Shcherbytskyi has criticised the USSR Gosplan for its neglect in developing chemical industries and the petrochemical resources in the Soviet Ukraine. Other Soviet economic specialists, among them Abel H. Ahanbehian, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, have condemned the centralist abuses of economic planning in the USSR and have recommended extending increased competence in economic matters to the Union republics.78 Table 1 in Appendix C illustrates the self-sufficient aspect of the Ukrainian economy in terms of production of basic industrial commodities, as well as the crucial position Ukrainian SSR holds in the overall Soviet economic system.

In the present circumstances, Ukraine does not possess the rights of self-taxation. Consequently, financing is used as an instrument of control in the distribution of budget funds by the Union apparat. This means that the Ukrainian government cannot finance any of its programs without prior approval from Moscow. Linked with this problem of centralization is the resentment by members of the Ukrainian managerial and professional elite for being denied the opportunity

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78. See Ukrainskyi Visnyk, Vol. II, pp. 159-165.
for decision-making in the economic sector. For instance, Ukrainian economic experts recognize the need for diversifying the industrial output encouraging the production of consumer goods but are powerless to initiate change in this direction. In summing up, it may be said that Ukrainian national communists will continue to aspire for greater independence and initiative in their country's economic affairs. They will seek to control the planning and management of Ukraine's industrial and agricultural resources. They will attempt to secure the powers of taxation and control over budgetary allocations for the Ukrainian SSR government. The emphasis will not be on changing the socialist structure of the economic system but rather on rectifying the economic disadvantages of the Ukrainian peasant population and autonomously determining the direction of Ukraine's economic development.

3. THE ISSUE OF RUSSIFICATION

Successive generations of Ukrainian national communists have been most vehement in expressing their opposition to the Russification policies fostered by the Soviet regime. It is precisely the protests against the pervasive Russification of Ukrainian cultural, social and political life that initiated and supported the Ukrainian national communist movement during the period of Soviet rule. The whole problem of Russification merits a more complete and comprehensive analysis than can be presented within the scope of this study. Our commentaries will be limited to specific references of recurrent
aspects of this problem raised by Ukrainian national communists. Included in the discussion will be the demographic features of Russification, its psychological dimensions and the whole question of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

One of the underlying objectives of the Soviet nationalities policy consists of the "drawing together" of nations, of eradicating "national peculiarities" and of the eventual fusion or Russification of all nationalities in the Soviet Union. In order to achieve this objective, the regime has promoted the policy of mass transfers of the Ukrainian population to RSFSR and other Soviet republics while simultaneously encouraging Russians to take up residence in the Ukrainian SSR. This practice has been called "an incentive to Russification" contributing to a loss of territorial unity and sovereignty for the Ukrainian people. In actual figures, the number of Russians in Ukraine has increased from 3,164,800 or 8.1 percent of the total population in 1926 to 9,130,000 or 19.4 percent of the total population in 1970. During the same period, the Ukrainian population decreased, in terms of its total representation, from 75.4 percent to 74.9 percent.

79. I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 111.
80. V. Kubiovych, Ibid., p. 79. The 1970 census results were published in Radianska Ukraina (April 30, 1970).
According to official estimates, about 1,320,000 Ukrainians were "voluntarily" resettled in other Soviet republics between 1946 and 1962. Altogether, there were 5,469,000 expatriate Ukrainians scattered throughout the Soviet Union in 1970. Yet these Ukrainians have not been granted educational facilities or even a single newspaper in the Ukrainian language, thus accelerating the process of their linguistic and cultural Russification. In 1923, however, according to M. Skrypnyk's testimony, there were 820 primary schools, 46 secondary schools and two technical institutes in the RSFSR which taught in the Ukrainian language. The Russian minority in Ukraine, on the other hand, is allotted preferential treatment with the provision of Russian-language

82. The 1926 census listed 6,871,000 Ukrainians living in the RSFSR; in 1970, only 3,346,000 Ukrainians were found to reside in the Russian republic, indicating that more than one-half of the Ukrainian population in RSFSR had become Russified. The distribution of Ukrainians residing in other Soviet Republics has been compiled from the 1970 census figures. Ukrainians numbered 3,346,000 in RSFSR, 930,000 in Kazakhstan, 507,000 in Moldavia, 148,000 in Byelorussia, 126,000 in Kirghiz SSR, 115,000 in Uzbekistan, 106,000 in the Baltic republics, 50,000 in Georgian SSR, 35,000 in Turkmenia, 32,000 in Tadzhikistan as well as 74,000 in other Soviet republics. Source: Radianska Ukraina, April 30, 1970, p.2.
83. Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu, p. 87
schools as well as with a preponderant amount of Russian publications originating in the Ukrainian SSR, all of which creates an environment conducive to further Russification.

Allied with the question of population transfers, which apologists for the regime ascribe to "continuous changes in economic structures", is the policy of cadre exchanges. This practice of transferring trained Ukrainian professional and technical cadres to other Soviet republics has been condemned as an "anti-Leninist policy...that runs counter to common sense and to the economic and cultural interests of the Ukraine." For example, in 1961 alone, 3717 professionals graduating from Ukrainian universities were posted outside Soviet Ukraine. Removed from the Ukrainian cultural milieu, these professionals are subjected to strong Russification pressures. Another factor encouraging Russification is the high rate of ethnic intermarriage among Ukrainians and Russians. According to one source, in 1961, ethnically mixed marriages in the Soviet Ukraine amounted to 18.5 percent of the total. It may be that the demographic imbalance of males to females is at least in part responsible for this phenomenon. The 1970 census statistics for Ukrainian SSR indicate a proportion

84. B. Stenchuk, ibid., p. 68.
85. I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 182.
86. Y. Bilinsky, ibid., p. 153. Due to the relatively high (28 percent) figure of Russian professionals in Ukraine, it would appear that Russians are displacing Ukrainians by the mechanics of "cadre exchange."
87. Ibid., p. 157.
of 21.3 million men (45.2 percent of the total population) to 25.8 million women (54.8 percent of the total). Urbanization processes which have shifted 55 percent of the Ukrainian population into urban areas by 1970 also contribute toward assimilationist and Russifying trends. There is no evidence of any reversal in this trend of demographic Russification or of any concerted opposition to it by the Ukrainian people.

The psychological aspects of Russification are more complex and less conducive to quantification. They are, nevertheless, the root cause of denationalization among an increasing number of Ukrainians. On one hand, there is the carefully nurtured thesis about "the leading role of the great Russian people" with the consequent degrading of the accomplishments of the non-Russian nationalities. On the other hand, attitudes of indifference, acquiescence and of national inferiority among many Ukrainians create a favourable climate for Russification. Other characteristics of Soviet Ukrainian mentality, such as an excessive preoccupation with the cult of material comfort, distrust of non-Soviet interpretations of reality, and the degeneration of independent political thought and political initiative, contribute to the successful inroads made by Russification into the Ukrainian national life. Soviet

89. At the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU held in April, 1971, Party Secretary L. Brezhnev led the choir in extolling the virtues of the Russian people, their internationalism, their revolutionary energy and self-sacrifice. Source: M. Prokop, "XXIV zizd KPES i natsional'ne pytannia", (24th Congress of CPSU and the Nationality Question), Suchasnist (June, 1971), p. 84.
Russian dissidents have commented on the messianic ambitions of Russian nationalism and even the writer Arzhak-Daniel has ridiculed Ukrainian sycophancy in his short story "This is Moscow Speaking." It would appear that, with a few notable exceptions, Ukrainians generally have either been unwilling or unable to effectively counter the Russification policies imposed upon them.

One specific feature of Russification is contained in the displays of Russian chauvinism and Ukrainophobia on the part of both Russian officials and Russian "colons" residing on Ukrainian territory. Its beginnings can be traced back to the pre-Revolutionary period where in 1876 the Emekaz (decree) signed by Tzar Alexander II was issued forbidding the printing of non-fictional works in the Ukrainian language. Since then, officially sanctioned theories of a "common Fatherland", pseudo-internationalism and the identification of the Soviet Union with "Russia, one and indivisible", have gained currency. The particular strategy employed by Russian chauvinists is to disallow any Ukrainian national aspirations. During the Revolutionary period, claims were made that Ukraine was an invention of a bourgeois clique, the creation of German


Tsarist Minister of the Interior Count Peter Valuev declared in 1863 that Ukrainians were a non-existent people. Ibid., p. 682.
marks or of Austrian intrigues. Current Soviet defenders of the status quo offer similar explanations asserting that Ukrainian dissenters are either in the services of foreign intelligence networks or have been bribed by U.S. dollars. In the early period of Soviet rule, any references to Ukrainian national interests was considered to be "an expression of counter-revolutionary chauvinism." Anti-Ukrainian sentiments were promoted by the non-Ukrainian leadership of the CP(b)U whose support came mainly from the urban proletariat who were "overwhelmingly Russian by ethnic origin or by choice." More recently, an individual act of Ukrainophobia was committed by R.P. Telnova, an Assistant Professor of the Kyiv Medical Institute, who publicly desecrated the Shevchenko monument in 1963. Notwithstanding Lenin's declaration of war against Russian chauvinism, the regime has followed a diametrically opposite course. Of course, current Soviet leaders apply a more sophisticated approach with regard to the nationalities policy. Official pronouncements do not deny the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation, but national rights are reduced to ethnographic features and emphasis is placed on the "merging of nationalities" and the indissolubility of the Soviet federation.

92. S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, Do Khvuli, p. 152.
93. Ukrainski yuryusty pid sudom RGH, p. 75.
96. "A sudu tak i ne bulo", (There wasn't any Trial), Suchasnist (February, 1970), pp. 110-114; also I. Dzyuba, ibid., p. 100. In spite of public protest, Telnova was never brought before the courts for her actions.
The problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations is complicated by the establishment of Russian primacy and control over the main sectors of Ukrainian political, economic and social life. This control is reinforced in declarations made by Russian authorities as in 1917 that "an independent Ukraine is not possible" and again in the 1960's that Ukraine is incapable of self-rule. In his speech to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the late Soviet Premier N. Khrushchev stated that Ukraine would inevitably be subjugated by Western imperialist powers without the fraternal aid of the Russian people. During the Revolutionary period, Russian Bolsheviks who controlled the Ukrainian Party apparatus were openly hostile to the concept of an independent Ukrainian nation. One instance of cynical manipulation by Russian centralists was the appointment of Kh. Rakovsky to the post of Soviet Ukraine's Chairman of the Peoples' Commissars in 1919 who, in the same year, had written an article "Beznadezhnoe delo" (Hopeless Affair) in which he argued that, on the basis of ethnographic and socio-economic findings, Ukraine was a non-existent nation.

97. Maslakh and Shakhrai, Do Khvyli, p. 106. This argument was used in order to reinforce Russian control over Ukrainian economic resources and Ukraine's strategic position.
98. Ukrainski vyrystv pid sudom KGB, p. 96.
100. S. Nazlakh and V. Shakhrai, Do Khvyli, p. 196.
The First Congress of the CP(b)U held in Moscow during July, 1918, resolved that the task of the Ukrainian Party was "to struggle for the revolutionary unification of Ukraine with Russia." Subsequent Russian hegemony over the CP(b)U was retained by the appointments of non-Ukrainians - V. Molotov, E. Kvirin, L. Kaganovich and N. Khrushchev - to head the Ukrainian Party organization. The dominant presence of Russians in the ranks of the CP(b)U is outlined in Table II of Appendix C.

In the 1960's the extent of Russian penetration of Ukraine's political, economic and even cultural institutions has been documented to include eight cabinet ministers, nine deputy ministers, twenty-four managers of large industrial enterprises, and five directors of theatrical ensembles. The practice of appointing Russian officials to the CC CP(b)U in order to assure Russian control over its decision-making, initiated in October, 1918 with the election of J. Stalin as a liaison officer for the RCP(b), was continued at the 23rd CPU Congress in March, 1966 where two non-Ukrainians I. Yakubowski and V. I. Degtyarev were elected to its Presidium.

On another level, the messianic complex among Russian leaders has generated a phobia of any separatism or nationalism endangering the "territorial inviolability of the Soviet Union."

Of course, the treatment of Ukrainian-Russian relations is

101. V. Sadovskyi, Natsionalna polityka sovitiv na Ukraini (Warsaw, 1937), p. 67. Also, S. Maziaka and V. Shafray, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 34.
conducted by the regime in a diplomatic fashion. Soviet leaders tend to avoid any actions which could antagonize national sensibilities: the sovereignty of Ukrainian SSR is formally acknowledged, nominal Ukrainians hold high-ranking positions in the Soviet power hierarchy and certain Ukrainian cultural expressions receive limited support from official quarters. Policy directives, however, are oriented toward the "melting pot" concept of fusing all Soviet nationalities while preserving the primacy of Russian national interests.

With a few exceptions, current Russian dissenters and members of the Russian liberal intelligentsia have tended to ignore the existence of the Ukrainian nationality problem. In general, the mainstream of Russian dissent focuses on demands for civil rights and the democratization of Soviet society. One document in the literature of dissent entitled Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, signed by the democrats of Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic countries, acknowledges the right of self-determination for the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR. This samisdat document attempts a comprehensive critique of the Soviet political, economic and social systems rejecting the existing arrangements

103. See: Prohramovi dokumenty Demokratychnoho Rukhu v Radianskому Soiuze, New Ulm, 1969, also; A. Bolter, "A Program For Soviet Democrats", Radio Liberty Dispatch, April 6, 1970. Moreover, it was the Russian-edited Khronika tekushchnikh sobytii (Chronicle of Current Events) which informed the West about the arrests and trials of Ukrainian dissenters during 1965-66.
in favour of national self-determination, pluralist democracy and a "mixed" economic system. It proposes to solve the issue of self-determination and secession from the Soviet Union on the basis of a mass referendum conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Ukrainian national communists have disclaimed authorship of this document, insisting that Ukrainians have no more reason to self-determine themselves than had the former colonial possessions which won independence from French or British rule following World War II.

In order to counter the Russification of Ukrainian life, Ukrainian national communists have endeavoured both to influence policy, viz. Ukrainization in the 1920's and to appeal to national sentiment, national consciousness and a sense of duty on the part of the Ukrainian people. They have sought to persuade Ukrainians to retain and express their national identity whether linguistically, culturally or in terms of values and attitudes. Both rational arguments and emotional appeals are employed in order to overcome the psychological barriers which inhibit Ukrainians from asserting their national prerogatives.104 Ukrainian national communists

104. One example of an emotional appeal aimed at Ukrainian consciousness is contained in the clandestine brochure entitled Z pryvodu protsesu nad Pohruzhalsky m which accuses the KGB of complicity in the fire at the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences on May 24, 1964. It notes: "Ukrainians, do you know what was burned? A part of your mind and soul was burned," "Z pryvodu protsesu nad Pohruzhalkym", Suchasnist, February, 1965, p. 82.
urge that the passive discontent of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and mass population be transformed into active opposition to the regime's Russification policies. They also consider that Ukrainian-Russian relations can be conducted only on the basis of full equality and a recognition of Ukraine's sovereign right to self-determination.

II. STRATEGY OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM: REFORMISM OR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION?

Once ideological platforms and programmatic demands are formulated, Ukrainian national communists are faced with a task of devising a plan of implementing their objectives. This involves both demonstrating the advantages of a separate political existence for an independent Ukrainian state and obtaining mass support from a wide cross-section of the Ukrainian population. Utilizing economic arguments, historical precedents, focusing on the experiences of other socialist countries such as those of Yugoslavia, a persuasive case can be constructed in favour of Ukraine's secession from the USSR. In addition, instances of Russian chauvinism and anti-Ukrainian activities by the regime can be publicised through the uncontrolled, non-official channels of communication. Most importantly, the elitist formations of Ukrainian dissenters must be transformed into a mass movement championing the cause of Ukrainian national communism.

The strategy of winning support and potential allies to the cause of Ukrainian national communism is probably the
key to its successful operation. Consequently, this matter merits a comprehensive examination. During the initial stages of Soviet rule, the programmes of Ukrainian national communism enjoyed the support of the Borotbist Party numbering some 15,000 members, the Ukapist Party, as well as the tacit sympathies of Ukrainians with "leftist" orientations. Several Ukrainian national communists occupied prominent positions in the Soviet Ukrainian government and Party organization. Even the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with its three million members extended its unofficial support to the national objectives of Ukrainian national communism.¹⁰⁵ On another level, Emil Strauss, a German Social Democrat, appealed to European socialist parties in 1927 to assist Ukrainian national communists in their struggle with Russian Bolsheviks.¹⁰⁶ Among Ukrainian expatriates who collaborated with and supported the objectives of Ukrainian national communists were the so-called "foreign groups" of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) and the Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP) under the leadership of P. Khrystiuk and V. Vynnychenko, respectively.¹⁰⁷ These groups which operated from Vienna in

¹⁰⁶. B. Dmytryshyn, ibid., p. 112.
¹⁰⁷. J. Lawrynenko, ibid., p. 113, p. 121.
the early 1920's espoused the principle of an independent, socialist Ukraine.

In the 1960's, the main base of support for the aims of Ukrainian national communism was provided by certain members of the "creative" intelligentsia (academics, journalist, literateurs). There are indications, however, that the Ukrainian dissent movement is beginning to obtain support from the entire occupational spectrum. For instance, a petition addressed to Soviet authorities on April, 1968 protesting against the violations of socialist legality in reference to the arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965-66, was signed by 139 Ukrainians from many walks of life.108 Among the signatories were 50 representatives from the "creative" intelligentsia, 34 members of the "technical" intelligentsia (engineers and scientists), 26 manual workers and 11 physicians. There is virtually no evidence, however, that Soviet Ukrainian political leaders are willing to espouse the cause of Ukrainian national communism. On the contrary, members of the Soviet Ukrainian political elite perceive liberal national communism in the Ukrainian SSR as a threat to their established power bases and career opportunities.109 Some of them may be


109. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine P. Shelest has been quoted as saying that it is imperative to struggle against "reformism and revisionism" - a direct reference to expressions of national communism. (Pravda Ukrainy, July 6, 1968, p. 83.)
favourably disposed to increasing Republican autonomy in
the fields of internal administration or economic planning
but unwilling to consider the option of Soviet Ukraine's
secession from the USSR. From among the religious dissenters,
members of the Evangelical Christians and Baptists groups in
Ukraine could be politicised to support the objectives of
Ukrainian national communists in their common struggle for
freedom.\footnote{110} One unexpected if somewhat dubious ally supporting
the cause of Ukrainian national communism appears to be
Communist China. There have been reports of Peking broadcasts
to Soviet Ukrainian troops stationed near the Sino-Soviet
frontier accusing the Soviet regime of Russifying Ukraine and
appealing to Ukrainians to consider national communism as a
viable political alternative.\footnote{111} Ukrainian emigre organizations
in the West could also provide a useful basis of support by
amplifying and disseminating the platforms of Ukrainian national
communism. Finally, the spirit of anti-colonialism and the
proliferation of liberation movements in the 1960's may benefit
the objectives of Ukrainian national communism.

\footnote{110}{It has been estimated that 82 persons out of a total
230 confined in the Mordovian SSR hard labor camps
have been sentenced for their religious beliefs.
\textit{Ia nichotь v vas ne prosam} (I am not asking anything
from you), (Toronto, 1968), p. 120.}

\footnote{111}{Reports in the Soviet Ukrainian press confirm the
Peking broadcasts. See: \textit{"Brudnyī aliants"} (Dirty
Alliance) in \textit{Radianska Ukraina}, February 26, 1972, p. 3.
A Bulletin published by the Ukrainian Society for the
Study of Asian Problems in Toronto contains excerpts
from the Peking Review which attack the Soviet
nationalities policy.}
Both new and past sources of support must be solicited by Ukrainian national communists. During the 1920's, literary organizations such as VAPLITE and Hart actively promoted the aims of Ukrainian national communism by engaging in cultural politics. There are some indications that the Union of Ukrainian Writers could become a potential lever of support for the current Ukrainian dissenters. Its Fourth Congress, held in March, 1959, called for the preservation of Ukrainian culture against "(Russian) chauvinist saturation," while its Fifth Congress in November, 1966 attacked the theory of "fusion of nations" as "paper communism". Another possible area of support hinges on the development of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Jews constitute the second largest national minority group in Ukraine numbering 3,020,000 in 1932 and dropping to 777,000 in 1970. During the 1920's Jewish officials in Ukrainian rural Party organizations "were more sympathetic to the Ukrainian problem than were Party personnel dispatched from RSFSR." Some Jews who actively supported the aims of Ukrainian national communism included S. Nazlakh, the co-author of Do Khvyli, F. Venyamin, the editor of 'Radianske Solo' who devoted his efforts in Ukrainizing the Russified Donets Basin, and the diplomat Polotsky who was executed for Shumskism.

In his speech delivered at Babyn Yar on September 29, 1966, I. Dzyuba appealed for a new understanding and co-operation between Ukrainians and Jews. The current state of hostility between the Soviet Union and Israel as well as the demands of the Soviet Jewish dissenters could be capitalized upon for drawing support for Ukrainian national communist objectives.

Ukrainian national communism has experienced a transition from a rural-based movement in the Revolutionary period (e.g. the Borotbist Party) to an urban-centered orientation in the 1960's. This development is in line with demographic trends which have shifted 55 percent of Ukraine's population to urban areas in 1970. Thus, the situation in the period 1918-20 where the "Ukrainian movement depended mainly on the village and was led by an intelligentsia in constant communication with the village" has been radically altered with the emergence of a modern, industrialized Ukrainian state. Consequently, Ukrainian national communists will have to obtain support from the Ukrainian working class in order to realize their objectives. By identifying with the grievances of the workers against low wages and price increases, against their denial to collective bargaining and the impotent role of their trade unions, Ukrainian national communists could build

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115. S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 87. The authors also mention the close ties which existed between the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian village and their common involvement in the revolutionary struggles. See: Do Khvyli, p. 150.
up a powerful base of support in the workers' movement. There is evidence that an organization calling itself the Ukrainian National Committee which advocated the secession of Soviet Ukraine from the USSR and which was uncovered by the KGB in 1961, consisted mainly of Ukrainian workers. It has also been noted that the working youth could serve "as a strategic link between the nationalist intelligentsia and the working class." In addition, Ukrainian national communists should take advantage of the gulf existing between the student population and the Soviet establishment by mobilizing student activists to disseminate their programs and organize support among the Ukrainian population. Only by utilizing all the means at their disposal for winning mass support can Ukrainian national communists hope to achieve a successful implementation of their objectives.

One proposition that continues to resurface in debates among Ukrainian national communists centers around the question whether a cultural revolution ought to precede a political revolution in Ukraine. This theme was pertinent in the 1920's as it is in the 1960's. Then as now, evidence is cited of the low degree of national consciousness among the Ukrainian

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116. Ukrainski yuryisty pid sudom KGB, p. 46.
117. G. Hodnett and P. J. Potichnyj, ibid., p. 112.
117(a) See: R. Rakhmannyi, Ne slovom iedynym (Not by Word Alone) (Winnipeg, 1971), p. 72. In the 1920's, M. Khvylovyi outlined this dilemma in his pamphlet Dumky proty techii (Thoughts Against the Current). V. Moroz amplified this problem in the late 1960's in his article "Sered sniniv" (Among the Snows).
populace and of its general inertia to political activity caused by decades of repression. It is argued that only by inculcating the Ukrainian masses with a sense of their national identity and by bringing them to an awareness of their national needs through the vehicle of a cultural awakening, will it be possible to begin the next phase of the struggle, namely implementing a genuinely independent policy for Ukraine. This reliance on "historical processes" or, in the optimum case, on reformism or cultural politics is designed to produce a gradual transformation of the Soviet political system.

Alternatively, it is argued that only a forthright political commitment, only a revolutionary strategy will enable Ukrainian national communists to achieve their goals. The claim is made that it is impossible to instigate meaningful political change in the Soviet system without recourse to some form of revolutionary action. Only by converting the dormant Ukrainian masses to the stage of militant confrontation with the regime can Ukrainian national demands be assured of successful implementation. There is a growing realization that there is a limit to the writing of petitions and appeals to Soviet authorities which remain largely unanswered. 118

118. This fact is recognized by V. Chornovil, one of the dissident Ukrainian intellectuals, who begins his petition to the Public Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR with these words: "I am not asking you for anything." See: V. Chornovil (comp), The Chornovil Papers, p. 2.
dependence on constitutional norms and on socialist legality\textsuperscript{119} has proven itself to be ineffectual when dealing with the Soviet organs of state. It is held that a Ukrainian cultural revolution to resurrect Ukrainian national consciousness should be postponed until Ukrainian national communists have won control of the policy-making processes in Soviet Ukraine.

In their presentation of "minimalist" or purely cultural demands, Ukrainian national communists have been successful in obtaining concessions and even support from official quarters. For instance, the Ukrainization decrees promulgated in the wake of the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) in 1923 enjoyed the endorsement from the highest echelons of Soviet authority. Yet as soon as Ukrainian national communists began to voice demands for greater control over the decision-making bodies, they were immediately accused of "counter-revolutionary plans" and were removed from their official positions.\textsuperscript{120} Similarly, in the 1960's, the regime tolerated

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Socialist legality refers to Soviet legal framework which guarantee its citizens freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. It involves a broad concept of justice and an atmosphere of humanist concern for the individual.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} O. Shumskyi's proposal for appointing H. F. Hrynko to the post of Ukrainian Premier and V. Chubar as the Political or First Secretary of the CC CP(b)U contributed to his political downfall. Source: I. Majstenko, Storinky Z istorii Komunistichnoi Partii Ukrainy, Vol. 2, (Munich, 1969), p. 39.
\end{itemize}
certain Ukrainian cultural expressions, such as the appearance of the book Sobor (The Cathedral) by O. Honchar, yet it resorted to repressive measures of the "cultist period" in order to silence ideological dissenters. As one of the Ukrainian dissenting intellectuals, M. Masiutko remarked during the course of his trial in 1966: "Ideology must be fought with ideology, not with prison."\(^{121}\) This disenchantment with legal attempts at winning recognition of their demands may serve to radicalize the positions of Ukrainian national communists.

The Ukrainian national movement has experienced an evolution from its stand of "integral nationalism"\(^ {122}\) in the direction of greater political realism. Increased emphasis has been placed on social and economic problems, "irrational" elements such as those of a predestined mission or of a superior moral character of the Ukrainian people have been weakened, elitist-authoritative concepts have been abandoned in favour of organizational democratization. Attempts have also been made to place the problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations on a political and ideological level rather than relying simply on a racial interpretation. There has been a progression in shifting the Ukrainian nationality issue from

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121. V. Chornovil (comp.) *The Chornovil Papers*, p. 145.
a narrow cultural to a state-political framework. It is recognized that the vital precondition for achieving Ukrainian national objectives involves a psychological rebirth of the Ukrainian people, rejection of the Soviet ideological model with its atrophy of independent political thought and prohibition of spontaneous political activity, the emergence of a new Soviet Ukrainian patriotism to replace the false "internationalism" of official propaganda. The main arguments of Ukrainian national communists are based on the principles of justice and freedom. Their ultimate concern is with obtaining sovereignty and independence for Ukraine. In the words of one of the most prominent Ukrainian dissenters, S. Karavanskyi:

"Perhaps under the present conditions of the development of the communist movement it would be expedient if the Ukrainian socialist nation should be a separate socialist unit in the general socialist camp."123

123. V. Chornovil (comp.) The Chornovil Papers, p. 184.
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM

In order to examine all aspects of Ukrainian national communism it is necessary to explore the human dimensions of its ideology, to establish an inter-relationship between its programmatic demands and the historical events which have animated the movement. Included in this discussion will be expressions of dissent both by individuals and groups, political actors and political processes which have contributed to the emergence and growth of Ukrainian national communism. The importance of leadership roles in the formulation and execution of policy is well established; certainly Ukrainian national communists have attempted to secure leading positions in the Soviet hierarchy so as to initiate their objectives. Secondly, political parties perform a key role in seeking to implement a political program; consequently, Ukrainian national communists have sought the support of various Ukrainian Marxist groups as a means of winning control in the decision-making sectors of the Soviet Ukrainian political system. A chronological survey of Ukrainian national communist manifestations has been chosen for the purpose of showing the similar and diverse features of these trends during the entire period under consideration.

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Ukrainian national communists have always been committed to defending and propagating Ukrainian national interests. Whereas the earlier group of Ukrainian national communists considered their main task to be the establishment of a separate and independent Ukrainian communist party to function as a guarantor of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, the latter group have focused on the implementation of new constitutional provisions which would guarantee Soviet Ukraine the status of an independent, sovereign state. In both cases, Ukrainian national communists have had to contend not only with the totalitarian Soviet political structure but also with the claim that Russia's national interests precluded the possibility of accommodating Ukrainian national demands.

THE YURKEVYCH-LENIN EXCHANGE

The first appearance of Ukrainian national communist demands assumed the form of a polemic between Lev Yurkevych and V. I. Lenin in 1913. In that year, Yurkevych, a left-wing Ukrainian Social Democrat, published an article "Rosijski marksysty i ukrainskyi robitynychyi rukh" (Russian Marxists and the Ukrainian Workers' Movement) under the pseudonym of L. Rybalka. His principal argument centered around the establishment of a separate Ukrainian wing of the RSDWP in support of the federalist principle of the Party's organizational structure. He stated: "We, the Ukrainian Marxists, demand the organizational separation of our workers' movement", adding that in event of non-compliance with this demand:
Naturally, we are going to fight against this nationalistic intolerance of our Russian comrades, and we shall continue to do so until they recognize all our rights.¹

Yurkevych also criticized the Bolshevik proposal regarding the need for a referendum of the seceding nation. He argued that an independent and sovereign state does not need to hold a referendum on the question of secession by virtue of its investiture of sovereign powers.

Among other points, Yurkevych disputed the contention that Ukraine's proletariat had been largely Russified. He claimed that the close ties which existed between the Ukrainian village and the Ukrainian industrial workers nullified or weakened assimilationist trends.² The rejection of O. Bauer and K. Renner's proposal for national-cultural autonomy by Russian Marxists, on the basis that the Austrian model for solving the nationality problem was "an entirely non-Russian way,"³ was also castigaged by Yurkevych. Referring to the

1. J. Doryc, ibid; pp. 88-89 cit. references from the article published in Dzvin (Bell), Nos. 7 & 8, 1913.
2. Statistical data indicate that, in 1897, 72% of the proletariat in Ukraine were of Ukrainian background. Source: Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu p. 57.
3. J. Doryc, ibid; p. 88. Yurkevych further elaborated his views in a pamphlet Russkie Sotsial-Demokratty i natsionalny vopros (Russian Social Democrats and the Nationality Question) publ. 1917.
issue of national self-determination, prominently enshrined in the Bolshevik program, he asked: "How can a nation exercise self-determination if it is politically and culturally dead?" 4

Besides, Lenin's contradictory pronouncements on the question of self-determination transformed it from an ideological principle into a weapon of political opportunism. 5

Lenin outlined his opposition to Yurkevych's demands in the brochure "Critical Remarks on the Nationality Question" published in 1913. He attacked Yurkevych as being "typically bourgeois" for "...dismissing the benefits to be gained from the intercourse, amalgamation and assimilation" 6 of the Russian and Ukrainian proletariat. In his preference for a single, centralized Party, Lenin discarded any suggestions for federalized Party structure. He acknowledged this fact in his letter to Inessa Armand (E. F. Petrova) where he indicated his displeasure at Yurkevych's stand, claiming that the creation of an independent Ukrainian Social Democratic organization was

4. Ibid., p. 87.
5. In his letter to S. G. Shaumian, Lenin conceded that the right of secession was contrary to "our general premise of centralism", but he argued that proclamation of this right was not identical with its implementation. J. Lawrynenko, ibid, p. 304.
6. S. Nazlak and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 98. Lenin was an uncompromising centralist who, nevertheless, repudiated the use of force to achieve the assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities.
detrimental to the cause of Russian Marxism. For Lenin, national interests were "divested of any political content and reduced to 'daily cultural needs'". Consequently, he made no allowances for any political organization which could defend Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. He regarded self-determination simply as a device for guaranteeing legal equality to all nationalities. Lenin's nationalities policy included such features as viewing the assimilation of the Ukrainian proletariat as a progressive development, the belief that national demands are subordinate to class interests and a predilection for the merging of nations.

A number of interesting points are raised by the Yurkevych-Lenin debate. For one thing, Yurkevych's forthright demands foreshadow the activist commitment of succeeding generations of Ukrainian national communists. Moreover, Ukrainian Marxists were not misled by Bolshevik slogans of self-determination. They realized that Lenin was under the hypnosis of the Russian empire and was unwilling to consider the option of its dismemberment into the component nation-states. The whole issue of a referendum as a basis for secession from the USSR is currently raised by some representatives

8. "Ukraine will only exist if it establishes a military-economic union with RSFSR." V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 63.
from the Russian liberal intelligentsia. This seemingly democratic proposal obscures the fact that Ukraine's status as a colonial dependency of Russia for several centuries inhibits the expression of free public opinion among its citizens. Certainly, nations which proclaimed their independence from colonial rule did not hold a referendum to determine the validity of their actions. Furthermore, a referendum would only be meaningful if opposing views were to be freely publicized and contending groups had the right to politicise the mass population in reference to the matter under consideration. It is unlikely that Soviet authorities would give their consent to carrying out a referendum under these arrangements. Nevertheless, the proposal for a referendum represents a giant step forward in attempting to reach a Ukrainian-Russian accord on the question of national self-determination.

I. **UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD**

1. **THE KYIVAN CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE**

The first organized expression in the direction of creating a separate Ukrainian communist party took place at the First All-Ukrainian Consultative Conference, held in Kyiv on December 16-19, 1917. During the Conference proceedings, a leaflet entitled "Social Democracy of Ukraine" was circulated among the delegates. It proposed the formation of a new

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party of Ukrainian Bolsheviks, independent from its Russian
counterpart, in order to protect the interests of the Ukrainian
workers and impoverished peasants. This course of action
was justified on the grounds that Ukrainian Social Democrats
and Socialist Revolutionaries were allied with the bourgeoisie,
while the Russian Bolshevik Party was "alien to the Ukrainian
masses." The majority of the delegates, however, condemned
this leaflet as an "anti-Party and anti-disciplinarian act." Similarly,
a proposal submitted by I. Kulyk for creating a
party of Ukrainian Bolsheviks modelled on the federative
principles of the American Socialist Party was also voted
down.

This failure to organize support for a separate
Ukrainian communist party was not an unexpected development.
The overwhelming majority of Party members identified them-
selves with the "one and indivisible" Russia and with a single
Party organization. Even V. Shakhrai, who subsequently
became an ardent proponent of Ukrainian national communism,
opposed the creation of a separate Ukrainian Party organization.

10. J. Lawrynenko, ibid; p. XVI. Characteristically, the
leaflet was addressed not to Party members but to
"Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants."
11. I. Majstrenko, ibid; p. 82.
12. A. Lykholat, Zdïsnennia leninskoï nationalnoi
at that time. 13 The author of the leaflet was V. Zatonskyi who in his article "From the Recent Past" that appeared in Kommunist in 1918, defended the Ukrainian liberation movement and accused the Party of failing to implement its promises for Ukraine's self-determination. Later on, Zatonskyi abandoned his stand as a Ukrainian national communist and as Commissar of Education administered the liquidation of Ukrainization in 1933. The only supporters in favour of a federative principle, both in respect to Party and State organizations, were Yu. Lapchynskyi who was to lead the federalist faction in CP(b)U and C. Piatakov, the "leftist" leader of the Kyivan Bolsheviks, who felt that identification with Russia "hinders our work." 14 The refusal to set up a Ukrainian communist party was all the more anomalous since the first Soviet Ukrainian government was established in December, 1917.

2. THE TAGANROG CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

The highest point of achievement in the efforts of Ukrainian national communists to win formal organizational independence was attained at the Taganrog Conference held in April 18-20, 1918. This coup was mainly the result of fortuitous circumstances. Following their precipitous

14. J. Eorys, ibid., p. 137. The "Left" group of Kyivan Bolsheviks were not only internationalists and opponents of the centralist policies of the CC RCP, but were also witnesses of the resurgent forces of Ukrainian nationalism released under the impact of revolutionary events.
evacuation from Ukraine, Bolsheviks operating on Ukrainian territory agreed to a radical course of action. By a vote of 26 to 21, delegates to the conference adopted a resolution advanced by M. Skrypnyk: "To establish an independent Communist Party, with its own Central Committee, linked with the Russian Communist Party through the Third International." According to Skrypnyk's statement at the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b), this resolution was subsequently approved by the CC RCP on May 18, 1918. Thus, the Taganrog decision, brought into existence a separate Ukrainian Party organization functioning independently of Russian control, at least in theory, until June, 1918.

What was the combination of forces which caused this display of "nationalist deviation."? It appears that the most crucial factor consisted in the distribution of the voting delegates. Participating at the Conference were

16. Odnadtsiatyi ziizd RKP(B), stenografichnyi zvit (Moscow, 1922), p. 65; Dokumenty ukraïinskogo komunizmu, pp. 69-70; J. Borys, Ibid.
17. Post-Stalin historiography considers the creation of an independent CP(b)U to be "a serious error, a concession to separatist moods." Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 3, 1958, p. 44, cit. by J. Borys, Ibid.
Bolsheviks from Poltava, Katerynoslav (Dnipropetrovsk) and Kyiv with the notable absence of delegates from Kharkiv, Donbas and Kryvyi Rih which were the industrialized and highly Russified regions of Ukraine. The participants could be divided into three groups: (1) the Poltavians or Ukrainian national communists which included V. Shakhrai, Yu. Lapchynskyi and, to a certain extent, M. Skrypnyk who were united around a platform of maximalist independence, (2) the Katerynoslav faction led by E. Kviring who pressed for the subordination of the Ukrainian Party apparatus to its Russian counterpart, and (3) the Kyivan Bolsheviks headed by G. Piatakov, S. Kosior and E. Bosh who essentially adopted a neutralist attitude toward the Ukrainian nationality question. Also present at this meeting were non-voting delegates from the left wing section of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP), such as P. Slynko, who were sympathetic to Ukrainian demands for independence.

Illustrating the contending points of view was the ensuing controversy over choosing a name for the new Party. Shakhrai proposed the name "Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik)" stressing the national character of the Party organization, while Kviring suggested that the Party be called "Russian Communist Party in Ukraine" considering it to be merely a territorial subdivision of the RCP. Finally, Skrypnyk's compromise solution was accepted by selecting the name "Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. This name underlined the territorial rather than the national disposition of the
Party organization.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Conference in Taganrog was the support extended by Piatakov's group to the demands of Ukrainian national communists. Piatakov was a nihilist on the nationality issue who referred to Lenin's formula for national self-determination "simply as a diplomatic game."18 His group of left-wing communists had only tenuous connections with the Ukrainian national movement. Why then did the Kyivan Bolsheviks vote for an independent Ukrainian communist party? Communist historians explain their decision as a tactical manoeuvre to allow them greater freedom to oppose the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty arrangements as well as to prevent the Central Powers from holding Soviet Russia responsible for the actions of Ukrainian Bolsheviks.19 A more plausible argument consists in the belief that their stand was motivated by the hope of winning control of a Party apparat of their own.20

18. A. E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918-1919 (New Haven, 1963), p. 226. It is somewhat surprising that Adams would make the following statement: "Under Piatakov's direction, the Kievans succeeded in pushing through a resolution calling for the establishment of a Ukrainian Communist Party with its own independent Central Committee" (ibid, p. 17), in view of the overwhelming contradictory evidence. See: S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 35; I. Majstrenko, ibid; p. 48; J. Borys, Ibid; p. 139; R. S. Sullivant, Ibid; p. 42.

19. I. Majstrenko, ibid; p. 52.

In any case, in this time of revolutionary upheaval, little pressure could be exerted directly by Moscow on its regional Party organizations which meant that Ukrainian Bolsheviks could formulate policy without recourse to central directives.

The independence of the CP(b)U was short-lived. Meeting in Moscow for the First Congress of the CP(b)U on July 5-12, 1918, the majority of the delegates at "Lenin's insistence" annulled the Taganrog resolution. Henceforth, the task of the CP(b)U was "to struggle for the revolutionary unification of Ukraine and Russia on the basis of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic." The Ukrainian Party organization was transformed into a regional committee of the RCP subject to its control and supervision. For Ukrainian national communists, the Taganrog Conference was a qualified success. It served to "reorient" certain Ukrainian communists, such as M. Skrypnyk, in their support of Ukrainian national interests; it was also

21. Ibid., p. 43. At this Congress, the "rightist" or Katerynoslav faction of the CP(b)U gained control of the Party.
22. S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, p. 34; also V. Sadowsky, ibid.; p. 69.
23. Curiously, R. Pipes claims that "until the end of 1919, at any rate, there is no evidence in the KP(b)U (CP(b)U) of a 'nationalist deviation':. R. Pipes, ibid.; p. 144.
instrumental in dispelling the illusions of others, like V. Shakhrai, about Soviet policy for Ukraine's national development. Most importantly, it demonstrated that Ukrainian national communists could achieve their objectives if they mustered sufficient support and presented a clear-cut political program.

3. THE GOMEL CONFERENCE

The last group manifestation in support of the independence of the CP(b)U took place at a Conference held in Gomel during November, 1919. This meeting was convened by the Federalist faction of the CP(b)U without official sanction from the CC RCP(b). The Federalists derived their name from their programmatic demands for a federalist structure of both Party and State organs. Their leader Yu. Lapchynskyi proposed that the CP(b)U be reorganized under the name "Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks" to become a separate and totally independent section of the Cominform. This new party would unite all parties which worked in Ukraine and which shared the principles of the Third International. The core cadres for this party were to be provided from the merger of the CP(b)U and the Borotbists. 24

Attending the Gomel Conference were CP(b)U members from the Volyn (Volhynia) and Chernihiv (Chernigov) Party

organizations who furnished the main support for the "Federalist opposition." Also present in a personal capacity were Ukrainian Party leaders D. Z. Manuilsky, S. Kossior and Yu. Kotsiubynskyi who formed a temporary alliance of convenience with the Federalists. The main concern of these leaders centered around the dissolution of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U by Moscow on October 2, 1919, "probably on Lenin's demand."25 In this respect, the Conference was a partial success: on December 11, 1919 both the CC CP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government were restored; however, no concessions were allowed for the establishment of a separate party of Ukrainian Bolsheviks. Leading Federalists Yu. Lapchynskyi, P. Slynko and S. Kyrychenko were expelled from the CP(b)U for their factional activity on June 20, 1920. Some of them joined the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapisty) and Yu. Lapchynskyi even became a member of its Central Committee. Subsequently, instances of organized opposition within the CP(b)U against central controls, such as Sapronov's democratic centralism (March, 1920) and Kolontai's workers' opposition (November, 1920), did not involve Ukrainian national communists.26

25. A. Adams, ibid; p. 384.
26. Communist historian H. Ravych-Cherkasskyi called these manifestations "flowers transplanted into Ukraine from another and foreign political climate." Istoria Komunisty-cheskoi Partii Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1923), p. 178, cit. by J. Borys, ibid., p. 151.
4. THE BOROTBIST PARTY

The first organized group of Ukrainian national communists to appear during the formative stages of the Ukrainian SSR was the Borotbist party. Its parent organization was the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) in which a leftist splinter group sympathized with the Soviet solution to the Ukrainian problem and began publishing a newsletter called Borotba (The Struggle) in the summer of 1917. This name was subsequently adopted as the party's designation. In 1919, the UPSR (Borotbist) participated in the Soviet Ukrainian government. Then, by a merger of the "independent left-wing" of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party and the UPSR (Borotbist-Communist), a new party called the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbist) came into existence on August, 1919. The "leftist" orientations of these splinter groups were an indication of the increasingly radical positions adopted by Ukrainian political activists in the course of the Revolutionary developments.

At its founding convention in 1919, the Borotbist party numbered 15,000 members compared with 16,500 members registered in the CP(b)U. As a mass party of dedicated revolutionaries, the Borotbists were perceived as a serious threat to the monopolistic ambitions of the CP(b)U leadership. The Borotbist political program was, moreover, committed to

the establishment of an independent Ukrainian SSR - a proposition which was not received with enthusiasm in the ranks of the ruling CP(b)U. This fact was recognized by Lenin when he wrote: "The Borotbists differ from the Bolsheviks, among other things, in that they stand for the unconditional independence of Ukraine." The other differences included Borotbist efforts to create a separate Ukrainian Red Army and to organize itself as the chief representative of Ukrainian communism. In its letter to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, dated August 28, 1919, the Borotbist party attempted to execute a fait accompli by announcing that it "had assumed leadership of the Ukrainian communist movement." and applied for membership in the Third International. The Comintern, however, recommended that the Borotbist party dissolve itself and integrate with the CP(b)U. This decision by the Comintern was wholly predictable. Certainly, Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian Party organization were not prepared to tolerate the existence of a political rival for its monopoly of power. Lenin's plans, moreover, included the integration of the Borotbist party with the CP(b)U and Zinoviev who headed the Comintern in 1920 shared Lenin's objectives.

Following Lenin's assurances of independence for Soviet Ukraine, the Borotbist party dissolved itself on

March 10, 1920.  

It was only through the personal intervention of Lenin, in the face of marked hostility by Ukrainian Bolshevik leaders, that about 4000 Borotbists were admitted into the ranks of the CP(b)U. This influx of self-declared Ukrainians into the Russified Ukrainian Party organization revitalized the forces of Ukrainian national communism. Now, the CP(b)U had acquired cadres who "were distinctly Ukrainian, neither hand-picked by the Russian leaders nor subservient to them" and "who had ties with the Ukrainian masses." Many prominent Borotbists were later to participate in the Soviet Ukrainian government and the program of Ukrainization. These included O. Shumskyi (Minister of Education), L. Kovaliv (Depty Minister of Foreign Affairs), M. Poloz (Minister of Finance) and others such as V. Blakytnyi, H. Hrynko and P. Liubchenko.

The eclipse of the Borotbist party from the Ukrainian political scene was a serious setback for the forces of Ukrainian national communism. It has been noted by Peter Dornan that the Borotbists represented a "Trojan horse who attempted

30. The merger of the Borotbists with the CP(b)U also involved the liquidation of the Union of Communist Youth (Komunistychna Yunatska Spilka) organized by the Borotbists in January 1919. See: P. P. Bachynskyi (comp), V. I. Lenin i peremoha zhovtnevoi revolutsii na Ukraini (Kyiv, 1967), p. 273.
31. R. S. Sullivan, ibid; p. 56.
to subvert communist power from within by 'nationalizing' it. Yet as spokesmen for the rural proletariat, the Borotbists lacked the support from other groups in the Ukrainian population. Their greatest tactical mistake was in agreeing to the dissolution of the Borotbist party. According to a statement made by M. Skrypnyk at the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b), in 1923 only 119 Borotbists remained in the CP(b)U as a result of the Party purges following the Kronstadt rebellion. The promise of generating a Ukrainian national communist movement under the auspices of the Borotbist party remained unfulfilled.

5. THE UKAPIST PARTY

Another organized expression of Ukrainian national communism was channelled into the Ukrainska Komunistychna Partia (UCP) or, as it was commonly called, the Ukapist party. This group was formed on January 22, 1920 by left-wing "independents" of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party. Its membership never exceeded 3000; one source cites its membership figure in 1921 as being around 500. From

34. Dokumenty ukraїns'koho komunizmu, p. 76; also, B. Dmytryshyn, ibid; p. 55. Many former Borotbists became disillusioned with the Party's nationality policy and left the CP(b)U voluntarily; some were purged for "counter-revolutionary activities", others were transferred from Ukraine to RSFSR.
35. V. A. Chyrko, ibid; p. 3; also I. Majstrenko, Storinky z istorii...Vol. 1, p. 91.
1920 until 1925, the UCP functioned as an unofficial opposition party to the CP(b)U. Its main platform consisted of demands for the "separation of the Ukrainian State apparatus, the Ukrainian Army and the Ukrainian workers' movement" \(^36\) from their Russian affiliations. The UCP also demanded the recognition of Ukraine as an independent, socialist republic. Its weekly newspaper *Chervonyi Prapor* (The Red Banner) was filled with accusations of the anti-Ukrainian character of the Soviet Ukrainian government, protests against the Russification of administrative organs and charges of "Soviet colonialism." \(^37\) These observations prompted the CC CP(b)U to condemn the Ukapisty as "the leading party of the kulak counterrevolution in Ukraine." \(^38\)

On a previous occasion, a leftist faction of the USDWP led by Ye. Neronovych had attended the Second Congress of Soviets at Katerynoslav and the Taganrog Conference where they supported the position of Ukrainian national communists. At the First Congress of the CP(b)U in 1918, this faction merged with the CP(b)U introducing the "first truly Ukrainian contingent into the Communist Party." \(^39\) Some of its members were elected to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (O. Butsenko and P. Slynko), Ye. Kasianenko was appointed editor of *Visti VUTsVK* (News of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive

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\(^36\). J. Borys, *ibid*; p. 251.  
\(^38\). *Ibid*.  
\(^39\). J. Borys, *ibid*; p. 246.
Committee), and Ye. Neronovych served as Commissar for Military Affairs. During 1919, however, another group of leftist "independents" from the USDWP participated in an uprising against the Ukrainian Soviet government of Kh. Rakovsky.

Ideologically stronger than the Borotbists, the UCP cultivated a "scientific approach" to social problems. This involved a Marxist formulation of Ukrainian national demands which were presented in the form of a memorandum to the Congress of the Third International in 1920. Unlike the Borotbists, however, the Ukapists were unable to attract a mass following and remained a small organization which conceived its task as working with the Russified proletariat in Ukrainian cities. Absence of viable prospects started the UCP on its course of gradual disintegration. By 1921, some of the party's leaders, such as Yu. Mazurenko and Yu. Iavorskyi, had defected to the CP(b)U. When the UCP attempted to legalize its position and applied for a second time to the Cominform for membership in 1924, it was ordered to disband and amalgamate with the CP(b)U. Following the dissolution of the party, the Ukapists

40. See: Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu, pp. 45-66.
41. The UCP sought to establish itself as the chief spokesman for articulating the interests of the Ukrainian workers and peasants on the claim that its former association with the Ukrainian social democratic movement had best prepared it for determining the course of Ukraine's future development. By way of contrast, the Ukrainian national communist V. Shakhrai proposed to transform the CP(b)U into an instrument of rule for the defence of Ukraine's national interests arguing that this orientation was the only solution in view of the existing situation in Ukraine.
disappeared from Ukraine's political life. Its ideologue A. Richytskyi, its leaders M. Avdienko and A. Drahomyretskyi were repressed and liquidated in the 1930's. This closed the chapter of a unique phenomenon in Soviet history where the ruling Communist Party tolerated the existence of another political organization within its political system. During its tenure, the Ukapist party contributed a theoretical foundation for the tenets and programmatic demands of Ukrainian national communism.

6. UKRAINIZATION

The process of Ukrainization or de-Russification of Ukrainian administrative, educational and political institutions was formally inaugurated at the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) in April 1923 and continued until January, 1933. Interestingly enough, it was the Russian Communist Party that issued the first declaration for extending preferential treatment in the development of Ukrainian language and culture at its Eighth Congress in December, 1919. This policy decision was intended to remove the legacy of distrust and oppression toward Ukrainian national aspirations inherited from the Tsarist period as well as to obtain some measure of mass support for the Bolshevik forces in Ukraine. Both the Soviet Ukrainian Party and State organizations were, at that time, controlled by non-Ukrainians who were either indifferent or hostile to Ukrainian national aspirations. Similarly, the resolution approved by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) encouraging the
admission of Ukrainians to official posts on governmental and administrative bodies was largely ignored by CP(b)U leaders. It was only in the aftermath of the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) that the Fourth Conference of the CC CP(b)U held in June, 1923, ordered a purge of "Great Russian chauvinists" from the Party and State apparati, spoke in favour of supporting Ukrainian cadres and establishing Ukrainian military formations, as well as committing itself to promoting the Ukrainian language in all areas of national life.

According to the communist historian M. Popov, the principal rationale for Ukrainization, as perceived by the Soviet regime, was "to draw the Ukrainian masses into the orbit of communist influence." Ukrainian national communists, on the other hand, regarded Ukrainization as an exceptional opportunity for implementing their objectives. Firstly, Ukrainization policies were intended to awaken national consciousness and to develop the national identity of the Ukrainian people, thus preparing the ground for obtaining mass support for the aims of Ukrainian national communism. Secondly, the enactment of these policies enabled Ukrainian national communists to assume leading positions in the political and cultural affairs of the Soviet Ukraine. In this respect, the ten-year period of Ukrainization was a qualified success.

42. B. Dmytryshyn, ibid; pp. 72-72. cit. M. Popov in Kommunist, No. 120, 1927.
The first Ukrainization decree was issued on August, 1923 creating Ukrainization commissions to supervise the work in each government agency. The Ukrainian language was accorded the status of the country's official language and provisions were made for carrying out all governmental business in Ukrainian. This was followed by the second Ukrainization decree on May 20, 1925 to deal with the technical-organizational aspects of the program. The terminal date for Ukrainizing all State institutions and industrial enterprises was set for January 1, 1926, placing the responsibility for carrying out these instructions directly on the leadership of the given organization. Proposals were submitted for the formation of Ukrainian military units, trained by Ukrainian officers and based on Ukrainian territory. Party organizations were directed to Ukrainize their internal affairs and to increase their Ukrainian membership. Furthermore, the Russian population in Ukraine was encouraged to acquaint themselves with Ukrainian culture, history and language.

The principal obstacle to Ukrainization was the predominantly Russian character of the CP(b)U. There was a notable absence of Ukrainian personnel in strategic commanding positions, especially in the trade union organizations and the Komsomol. Governmental bodies that fell under the jurisdiction of the All-Union Ministries considered themselves immune to Ukrainization decrees. Attempts were made by certain Russian officials to sabotage or at least to inundate the
impact of the Ukrainization policies. For instance, during the tenure of E. Kviring as First Secretary of the CP(b)U, resolutions dealing with Ukrainization were not put into practice. Similarly, it was only with the appointment of O. Shumskyi as Commissar of Education in 1924 that the drive to Ukrainize educational institutions was given its required impetus. Party leaders like D. Z. Lebed considered "the task of actively Ukrainizing the Party" to be "a reactionary undertaking." 43 The leader of Ukrainian trade unions A. Radchenko opposed any attempts to Ukrainize the workers' movement. By 1929, a policy of "voluntary Ukrainization" was instituted and in 1933, P. Postyshev began its systematic liquidation.

The achievements of Ukrainization were, nevertheless, impressive in certain areas, especially in the cultural-educational field. By the end of the 1920's, all except for four newspapers published in the Ukrainian SSR were printed in Ukrainian. 44 Ukrainian literature and drama experienced a cultural Renaissance. Educational institutions were largely Ukrainized. 45 Ukrainian military academies were established

43. Ibid: p. 83. Similarly, the Russian communist Larin organized opposition to Ukrainization on the grounds that it violated the rights of national minorities in Ukraine.


45. M. Skrypnyk, in his capacity as Commissar of Education, planned to invite 1500 teachers from Western Ukraine to help de-Russify the Donbas region of Ukraine.
in Kyiv and Kharkiv; military publications began to appear in Ukrainian editions. Ukrainian membership in the CP\(_{U}^{(b)}\) increased from 23.3 percent in 1922 to 52 percent in 1927.\(^{46}\) Former Borotbists were placed in positions of authority to supervise implementation of the Ukrainization programs. Attempts were also made to expand Ukraine's sovereign powers by insisting on the inclusion of territories inhabited mainly by Ukrainians into the Ukrainian SSR, by objecting to Moscow's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, especially in the fields of education and administration of justice, by proposing that relations between Union Republics be conducted on the basis of constitutional arrangements. During the formation of the USSR, Ukrainian communist representatives to the founding convention, among them M. Skrypnyk, expressed their preference for a confederation rather than a federation of Soviet republics. In retrospect, the period of Ukrainization presented Ukrainian national communists a most favourable opportunity for instituting their programs.

There was, however, one formidable obstacle preventing the realization of this objective. As an organized movement of opposition, Ukrainian national communism had virtually ceased to exist by the late 1920's. Theoretical vestiges of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence were nullified by the subordinate and subservient status of the CP\(_{U}^{(b)}\) which executed the policy directives laid down by the Central

\(^{46}\) B. Dmytryshyn, ibid; p. 81. Ukrainian membership of the CC CP\(_{U}^{(b)}\) was only 25 percent in 1925.
Committee of the RCP(b). Individual expressions of dissent by such Ukrainian national communists as M. Khvylovyi, O. Shumsyki or M. Volobuev cannot be construed in terms of a mass protest against the Soviet Ukrainian regime. This is why one writer considers the terms "Khvylovism", "Shumskism" and "Volobuevism" as misnomers or as somewhat inflated political designations. 47

These Ukrainian national communists quite naturally shared a common ideological orientation, similar career patterns and received occasional support from one another. Both Blakytnyi and Shumsyki were former Borotbists who were elected to the CC CP(b)U in 1920. Similarly, both Blakytnyi and Khvylovyi were involved in cultural politics: Blakytnyi as the leader of the literary group "Hart" and Khvylovyi as the principal organizer of VAPLITE. Shumsyki supported Khvylovyi in his disagreements with L. Kaganovich at the plenary session of the CP(b)U in May, 1926. Actively participating in the Ukrainization process were Shumsyki and Skrypnyk who both served as Commissars of Education. Biographical data on all of these Ukrainian communists is found in Appendix A.

In an article "The Future Tasks of the Party" he wrote for Kommunist in November, 1920, V. Blakytnyi condemned the assignment of Russian cadres to Soviet Ukraine and in his speech at the Fifth All-Ukrainian Party Conference he

47. Ibid; p. 99.
analyzed the CP (b) U as a Russified bureaucratic clique conducting past Russian colonial policies. Khvylovyi, the author of the slogan "away from Moscow" called for the de-Russification of Ukrainian cities and of the Ukrainian working classes. Volobuev's economic proposals were discussed in the preceding chapter. The most serious threat to the CP (b) U control over appointments of Party and State officials was proffered by Shumskyi. In his letter to Stalin on April, 1926, Shumskyi suggested that Kaganovich be replaced by V. Chubar in the post of Political or First Secretary of the CC CP (b) U and that H. F. Hrynko be assigned as Chairman of the People's Commissars of Ukrainian SSR. Shumskyi's defiant stand contributed directly to the split in the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) in January, 1928 when the majority of its Central Committee fully endorsed Shumskyi's position. As a result, a group led by K. Maksymovych was expelled from the KPZU by the Comintern.

Perhaps the most interesting, if somewhat paradoxical personality among Ukrainian communists was Mykola Skrypnyk. As one of the founders of the CP (b) U and a leading member of the Soviet Ukrainian government, he defended the independence of the Ukrainian Party organization and the prerogatives of the Ukrainian SSR at various Party Congresses and meetings of the USSR Central Executive Committee. In his address to the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b) on March, 1922, Skrypnyk complained of the tendency among the Russian members of the
Party to liquidate the statehood of Ukraine and suggested that the independence of the CP(b)U should be affirmed, including its representation in the Cominform. As the author of numerous works on the Soviet nationalities problem, Skrypnyk deplored the contradiction between the theoretical recognition of national equality and the lack of its practical application. At the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) he assailed the "deep-rooted centralist inertia" and the Russification of Ukraine, citing the Red Army as the strongest instrument of denationalization. Holding successive portfolios of Commissar of Labour, Interior Affairs, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Education, Skrypnyk "championed the Republic's Ukrainian national personality." During the various sessions of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, Skrypnyk recommended: 1. extending the legislative powers to the Union Republics (November, 1923), 2. expanding the financial and budgetary rights of the Republics (October, 1924), 3. permitting Republics to conduct ratification of international treaties (May, 1925), and 4. non-interference in Republican cultural affairs (October, 1927). His claim was that "only

48. R. S. Sullivant, ibid; p. 344.
49. B. Dmytryshyn, ibid; p. 62. There were 60,000 Ukrainians in the Soviet armed forces in 1923.
50. I. Dzyuba, ibid; p. 57.
51. J. Lawrynenko, ibid; pp. 275-276. Other Ukrainian national communists such as O. Butsenko, H. Hrynko and V. Chubar supported Skrypnyk in his proposals for strengthening Ukrainian Republican prerogatives.
in its Ukrainian forms can the Soviet state exist in our country."\(^{52}\)

There was, however, another dimension to Skrypnyk's political outlook. He was foremost a loyal Party member dedicated to carrying out the Party's line even if he was in personal disagreement with it. This orientation was substantiated by his statement at the First Congress of the CP\((b)\)U where he noted that "communists of Ukraine in all their activities...must support the policy of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)."\(^{53}\) Certainly, Skrypnyk did not advocate secession of Ukraine from the USSR. On the contrary, on July, 1918 he declared: "We are now opposed to separation, since independence is now a disguise for anti-Soviet activities."\(^{54}\) There is no foundation for Postyshev's accusation of Skrypnyk for separatist tendencies. Following Party directives, Skrypnyk "played a leading role in the destruction of the Shumskyi-Khvylovyi opposition in the CP\((b)\)U."\(^{55}\) He was also commissioned to write a critique of Volobuev's economic proposals. Moreover, Skrypnyk was never willing to place actual, as opposed to theoretical, sovereignty

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52. I. Dzyuba, ibid; p. 11, citing Skrypnyk's speech at the Tenth Congress of the CP\((b)\)U in 1928.
53. M. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy (Articles and Speeches) Vol. 1, pp. 6-7, cit. by B. Dmytryshyn, ibid; p. 41.
and independence of Soviet Ukraine as a condition for his remaining a Party member. His suicide on July 8, 1933 was both an act of protest and of despair over the course of Ukraine's national development. Skrypnyk was rehabilitated at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 but his writings are not available to the Soviet Ukrainian reader to this day.

In spite of his formidable achievements in the field of Ukrainian national development, M. Skrypnyk cannot be classed as a Ukrainian national communist. His main area of disagreement with other Ukrainian national communists centered around the question of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Whereas the former stood for total and unconditional independence for Soviet Ukraine in the political as well as the cultural and economic sectors of national life, Skrypnyk was willing to espouse the cause of greater autonomy for the Ukrainian culture and economic system but objected to the political separation of Ukraine from Russia. This line of reasoning is found in his writings attacking the Ukapist party, Khvylovyi, Shumskyi and Volobuev whom he accused of "leading toward fascism."

Moreover, as an enthusiast for

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56. M. Koshelivets, Mykola Skrypnyk (Munich, 1972), p. 174. Skrypnyk's attacks on Ukrainian national communists are contained in articles written for Bilsnovyk Ukrainy "Khvylovischyi shumskism" (No. 2, 1927), and "Z pryvodu ekonomichnoi pliatomry natsionalizmu" (No. 6, 1928).
the world proletarian revolution, Skrypnyk believed that national oppression of Ukraine by Russia would not be resurrected under communist rule. Ukrainian national communists, on the other hand, were not as optimistic about the relationship of Russia toward Soviet Ukraine.

The struggle between Ukrainian national communists and their opponents in the 1920's was resolved with the victory of the centralist forces who continued to propagate policies in the hallowed Russian imperialist tradition. It has been noted, however, that: "Without the activity of the Borotbists and the Ukapists it may be doubted that the Bolsheviks would have recognized even the formal existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic."57 Lenin's concessions to Ukrainian national demands were granted on behalf of "revolutionary expediency' or in order to obtain some measure of support for the Bolshevik forces in Ukraine. Thus, the first Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1919 contained all of the required vestiges of sovereignty and independence for Soviet Ukraine. In the area of policy decisions however, the Ukrainian government was completely subordinate to the directives issued by the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Ukrainian national communists attempted to change this relationship by insisting on unconditional independence of the Ukrainian Party organization which would then ensure genuine sovereignty for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

II. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE 1960'S

In turning to expressions of Ukrainian national communism in the 1960's, certain problems of analysis become immediately apparent. For one thing, since the movement is in its formative stages, data about it are very incomplete. There are virtually no source materials on this subject matter written by Western scholars. Moreover, although ideological platforms and programmatic demands have been formulated, there is no evidence of organized support for the aims of Ukrainian national communists. Another difficulty consists in identifying Ukrainian national communists from among the amalgam of oppositional elements. Many of the dissenters in Ukraine are simply voicing their protests against violations of socialist legality by the Soviet regime and demanding basic civil rights. Others may only be concerned with the implementation of certain social and economic reforms. This presents a problem of delineating political or apolitical orientations contained in the literature of dissent. The whole spectrum of dissent in Soviet Ukraine ranges from the ultra-nationalist to the religious, the cultural and finally, national communist opposition to the existing political system. During the 1960's, reformist tendencies predominated among Ukrainian national communists although there was a noticeable shift toward more radical solutions by the end of the decade. Through the means of clandestine publications, petitions to Soviet authorities
and even more through the examples of personal courage and patriotism of Ukrainian dissenters, Ukrainian national communism is again emerging on the Soviet Ukrainian political scene.

1. GROUP DISSENT

Expressions of group dissent assume the forms of mass signatures on petitions, student demonstrations, and the formation of small, clandestine organizations. Since the protest movement is still in its nascent phase of "legalism", only tactics of "limited confrontation" are employed by Ukrainian dissenters. For instance, student-organized demonstrations at the Shevchenko monument in Kyiv on May 22, 1964, 1965 and 1967 had the character of unofficial celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the interment of Ukraine's national poet Taras Shevchenko. Because these meetings were conducted without official sanction by the regime, "administrative measures" were applied against its organizers. Following the 1967 demonstration, a collective letter of protest with sixty-four signatures was dispatched to the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. Brezhnev and First Secretary of the CC CPU P. Shelest, objecting against these repressive actions and demanding guarantees that such instances would not arise in the future. 58 Similarly, the arrests and trials of dissident

Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965-66, resulted in a collective petition to Soviet authorities which included 139 signatures. Another example of a collective protest is found in the letter addressed to the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers V. Shcherbytskyi and Secretary of the CC CPU F. D. Ovcharenko by the creative intelligentsia of Dnipropetrovsk in 1968, documenting cases of Ukrainophobia and demanding that the campaign against O. Honchar's novel Sobor (The Cathedral) be terminated. Many of the signatories to these petitions were later relieved of their Party membership and deprived of job opportunities.

The first expression of group dissent by Ukrainian national communists in the 1960's appeared in an organization calling itself the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU). The inaugural meeting held on November 6, 1960 represented, in the words of one writer, "the beginning of a protest movement aimed at securing legal guarantees of Ukrainian statehood." The ideological principles and programmatic demands of the UWPU have been examined in the.

59. "Lyst tvorchoi molodi Dnipropetrovskia" (Letter by the Youth of Dnipropetrovsk), Suchasnist (February, 1969), pp. 78-85. In 1964, a group of Ukrainian communists appealed to all Socialist parties to condemn the regime's Russification policies. See: "Zvernennia do komunistiv useho svitu" (An Appeal to Communists Throughout the Whole World), Suchasnist (December, 1969), pp. 92-98.

preceeding chapter. Data on the members of this group, their professional qualifications and the prison sentences imposed upon the, are listed in Table 4 of Appendix C. Information on the existence and the program of the UWPU was compiled on the basis of petitions and complaints addressed by the group's organizers Lev Lukianenko and Ivan Kandyba to Soviet Ukrainian Party and State officials.61

On May, 1961, seven members of the UWPU were tried by the Lviv District Court on charges of treason for conspiring to establish a political organization whose express purpose was to bring about the secession of the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Supreme Court subsequently revised the charge of treason to one of conducting anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation (Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR).62 During the pre-trial investigations

61. These documents were published in the West under the title Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB in 1968.
62. This article has been used to convict most of the Ukrainian dissenters in the 1960's. It reads as follows: "Agitation or propaganda conducted for the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet rule or committing certain particularly dangerous crimes against the State; the spreading, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet state and social system; as well as the circulation, production or keeping for the same purpose, of literature of similar contents - are punishable by imprisonment for a term from six months to seven years, or else by banishment for the term of two to five years."
and the trial proceedings, a number of procedural, legal and constitutional norms were violated by the judicial organs. The trials were held in camera contrary to statute 91 of the Ukrainian SSR constitution. Moreover, the proceedings were conducted in Russian contrary to statute 90 of the constitution and Article 19 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Finally, sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years were not declared publicly, which contravened Article 20 of the Criminal Code. Since three of the defendants were practicing lawyers, they were qualified to note these legal transgressions and discrepancies; consequently, the UWPU has been dubbed as the "lawyers' group."

A number of interesting sidelights were revealed in the course of the trial proceedings against members of the UWPU. The contempt for the Ukrainian language displayed by the State Prosecutor Starikov mirrored the attitudes of an earlier generation of Russian Bolsheviks. Self-determination was considered to be appropriate for former African and Asian colonies but not for the Ukrainian SSR. Denisov, an investigative officer for the KGB assured Lukianenko that the Soviet constitution was written merely for "foreign consumption." He also stated that had members of the UWPU been able to organize mass demonstrations in support of secessionist demands, they would have been crushed by government troops.

63. Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB, p. 81.
64. Ibid; p. 82.
The territorial inviolability of the USSR took precedence over any constitutional guarantees.

The defendants argued that Ukraine's right to self-determination was an integral part of the CPSU program, of the United Nation's Declaration on Human Rights of which the Soviet Union was a signatory. They claimed that they had a democratic right, in conformity with Soviet law and Marxist ideology, to advocate the case of Ukraine's secession from the USSR. One of the political prisoners, I. Kandyba, demanded to be transferred from the Mordovian ASSR force-labour camp to Ukraine, in order that he could be "re-educated" in his native land.65 Five of the defendants had professional qualifications; four of them were members of the CPSU. They may have been guilty of a certain political naivety but hardly of treasonable activity against the State.

Two other organizations of Ukrainian dissenters in the Western Ukraine were uncovered by the KGB in the 1960's. Tried in December, 1961, on charges of advocating secession of Soviet Ukraine were twenty members of a group called The Ukrainian National Committee. In connection with this trial, two of its members - Ivan Koval and Bohdan Hrytsyna, both workers from Lviv, were executed.66 Most of the other

65. Ibid; p. 55.
66. Ibid; p. 46.
defendants were sentenced to terms ranging from ten to fifteen years. Another group, organized by Dmytro Kvetsko, named the Ukrainian National Front was tried in Ivano-Frankivsk during 1967-68. This organization had nine members and published a newsletter Batkivshchyna i Svoboda (Fatherland and Freedom). There are some indications that this group had a nationalist rather than a national communist orientation in its political program. A list of the members of both organizations is found in Table 5 of Appendix C.

2. INDIVIDUAL DISSENT

The most widespread form of dissent in the 1960's was expressed on an individual basis. It ranged from protests by self-immolation to the distribution of clandestine publications and the writing of poetry contrary to the canons of socialist realism. In this respect, Ukrainian dissenters followed the pattern of mainstream dissent found in the Soviet Union, with, however, one important exception. As well as voicing concern over the violations of Socialist legality and the lack of effective civil rights, Ukrainian dissenters protested against the Russification of Ukrainian public life and expressed demands for their national rights, including full equality and sovereignty for the Ukrainian SSR. In the Ukrainian literature

of dissent, the nationality issue takes precedence over any other demands. National rights are linked with human and civil rights, proposals for democratic reforms are posited on the basis of current national needs. It is this devotion to the Ukrainian national cause, this concern with the fate of the Ukrainian nation, that serves as a well-spring for protest by the individual dissenters.

Not all of the Ukrainian dissenters, naturally, subscribe to the political philosophy of Ukrainian national communism. Some of them perceive their opposition to the regime as a part of their civic duty or their personal belief; others propose a nationalist and anti-communist solution for Ukraine. There is also a sizable community of religious dissenters consisting mainly of Evangelical Christians and Ukrainian Catholics. According to one source, there were 140 Ukrainian political prisoners and 82 Ukrainian religious dissenters confined in the Mordovian hard-labor camps during 1967.68 A number of these political prisoners have no connections with the Ukrainian national communist movement. Similarly, from the list of nineteen Ukrainian dissenters sentenced during the 1965-66 trials, only a minority would identify themselves with Ukrainian national communism.69

68. Ia nichoho u vas ne proshu (Toronto, 1968), pp. 112-120.
69. See: Table 3 in Appendix C.
One of the most prevalent forms of individual dissent consists in the writing of complaints and petitions to Soviet authorities. Certainly this is a much safer course of action than joining an organization which is under police surveillance. Individual dissenters have, generally, received much lighter prison sentences than members of organized groups. There are usually some personal or professional connections between the individual signatories to petitions. For instance, a letter addressed to the editors of Literaturna Ukraina in 1968, defending both V. Chornovil and S. Karavanskyi, was signed by such literateurs as I. Dzyuba, E. Sverstiuk and L. Kostenko. Another letter directed to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, protesting against the inhuman conditions in the forced-labour camps, was written by the political prisoners I. Kandyba, M. Horyn and L. Lukianenko. Other prisoners have written petitions protesting against the issues of Russification and denial of civil rights as well as about the legal transgressions during the course of their trials. These include I. Hel, P. Zalyvaka and M. Masiutko.

The technique of writing petitions is employed by Ukrainian national communists in order to publicise their programmatic demands. Most of the copies of these petitions receive a wide circulation through the clandestine network, thus acquainting the mass population of the political processes and programs of the Ukrainian dissenters. Both the first part of V. Chornovil's *Misfortune from Intellect* and I. Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification* were initially addressed to Soviet Ukrainian Party and State officials, but subsequently reached a large reading public. Similarly, A. Koval's letter to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR was intended for a wider audience. The memoranda written by I. Kandyba to the First Secretary of the CC CPU P. Shelest and by L. Lukianenko to the Procurator General of USSR R. A. Rudenko were probably aimed at disseminating the ideas of Ukrainian national communism. Probably the most prolific writer of petitions is S. Karavanskyi. His petition to the USSR Council of Nationalities cited instances of national discrimination and demanded certain rectifications in the Soviet nationalities policy. Petitions are also designed to stimulate political awareness and present a counter-definition of reality for the Ukrainian population. For instance, I. Dzyuba's well-known petition contains the following reference:
Only on the condition of the total recognition and deep understanding of the Ukraine's right to separation and independence will it be possible to carry out a programme of national construction that will fully satisfy national needs.\(^\text{72}\)

Various tactics of protest are utilized by individual dissenters. There are techniques of civil disobedience, as in the case of V. Chornovil who refused to testify at a closed hearing in 1966 because he considered it to be illegal and unconstitutional. A more radical form of protest took place on November 5, 1968 in Kyiv, when Vasyl O. Makukh immolated himself after making a speech in which he condemned the Russification of Ukraine and called on his listeners to remonstrate against this state of affairs.\(^\text{73}\) In that same year, workers from the Kyiv hydro-electrical plant, Oleksandr Nazarenko, Vasyl Kondriukov and Valentyn Karpenko printed and distributed circulars objecting against the proscription to hold a Shevchenko memorial meeting.\(^\text{74}\) Merely the possession of what are classed as "anti-Soviet documents" is in itself an individual act of dissent since their owner is liable to be convicted under Article 62 of the Ukr. SSR Criminal Code.\(^\text{75}\)

\(^\text{72}\) I. Dzyuba, ibid; p. 98.
\(^\text{73}\) Ukrainskyi Visnyk, ibid; p. 13.
\(^\text{74}\) Ibid; pp. 26-27.
\(^\text{75}\) Materials considered to be seditious at the 1966 trials included the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, an encyclical by Pope John XXIII, and the address by President D. Eisenhower on June 27, 1964 at the unveiling of the Shevchenko memorial in Washington, D.C.
Another act of protest took place in Kyiv in 1967 when a student Yurij Moskalenko and a worker Viktor Kuksa raised a Ukrainian nationalist flag with the inscription: "Ukraine is not dead yet." Not all of the individual dissenters are necessarily incarcerated by the regime. For instance, I. Dzyuba and I. Svitlychnyi both prominent figures in the Ukrainian dissent movement, have not suffered excessive persecution in the 1960's as a result of their activities. It is also noteworthy that while group dissent has been confined mostly to Western Ukraine, individual dissent was expressed in all the regions of the Ukrainian SSR. There is a growing trend, moreover, for individuals in the twenties age group to become involved in the defence and propagation of Ukrainian national prerogatives.

The repressions of the Ukrainian dissenters by the Soviet regime in the 1960's have created a new generation of Ukrainian martyrs. Their solidarity and civic courage, their readiness to sacrifice personal considerations for a cause they believe in - all of these qualities are a totally new development in the annals of Soviet Ukrainian history. Simply the willingness

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76. "Zasudzheni v inshykh protsesakh" (Convicted at Other Trials), Suchasnist (March, 1969), p. 103.
77. Beginning with January, 1972, the regime inaugurated a new series of witch-hunts against Ukrainian dissenters. I. Svitlychnyi, V. Chornovil and Ye. Sverstiuuk were arrested for "anti-Soviet activities". Source: Radianska Ukraina, February 11, 1972, p. 2. I. Dzyuba was expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union and arrested in April, 1972.
to express one's convictions without fear or abject re-
cantation is a giant progression from the Soviet Ukrainian
prototype of the Stalinist period. The cynicism and career
opportunism of the Khrushchovian era are being replaced by
a rediscovery of one's national identity and an awareness of
national needs. A new Soviet Ukrainian patriotism is
attracting an increasing number of converts disenchanted by
the false internationalism propounded by the current collective
leadership. Much of the credit for awakening the Ukrainian
people to a sense of national responsibility and a realization
of their national rights must be assigned to Ukrainian national
communists. Through the writings of I. Dzyuba, V. Chornovil
and I. Kandyba, by the personal example of L. Lukianenko,
V. Moroz and S. Karavanskyi, Ukrainians have begun to conceptualize
the viable alternative of a sovereign and independent Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic.

78. Biographical sketches on Ukrainian national communists
Dzyuba, Chornovil, Lukianenko and Karavanskyi
are provided in Appendix A.
CONCLUSION

It is axiomatic to state that a subject matter of scholarly research can never be fully and definitely exhausted. This certainly applies to the research topic under consideration. Indeed, in attempting to focus on the highlights of Ukrainian national communism, a certain amount of in-depth analysis and a considerable quantity of detailed material had to be deleted. For instance, the linguistic question, the economic issue or the various aspects of Russification deserve a more detailed and separate treatment. One other feature of Ukrainian national communism that was not discussed sufficiently concerned the question of support, or more specifically, regional professional or external support extended to the aims of activities of Ukrainian national communists.

With regard to the regional variations, Western Ukraine (Halychyna or Galicia) has traditionally provided the strongest support for Ukrainian national objectives. It is also interesting to note that in the 1960's organized formations of Ukrainian national communists originated in Western Ukraine. Similarly, prominent Ukrainian dissenters, such as V. Moroz, V. Chornovil and L. Lukianenko, crystallized their programs of action while residing in that territory of Ukraine. One explanation for this development is that it
was only in 1939 that Western Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after several decades of Polish rule under which nationalist sentiments found organized forms of expression. Soviet authorities still consider Western Ukraine as a breeding ground for "bourgeois nationalists."

The question of support for the aims of Ukrainian national communism has been discussed in a preceding chapter. Presently, the mainstay of support comes from members of the so-called "creative" intelligentsia, with isolated instances of workers and students rallying to the cause of Ukrainian national communism. There is, however, no coordinating network among the various groups espousing Ukrainian national interests. Most technocrats, State functionaries and other elite groups in the Soviet political system are either indifferent or hostile to Ukrainian national aspirations. It is also almost impossible to determine and evaluate the degree of support extended to Ukrainian national communists by the CPU leadership. Currently, most responsible positions in the Soviet Ukrainian Party and State apparati are occupied by nominal Ukrainians, yet Ukrainian national or even cultural demands receive little support from that quarter. One could draw the analogy between members of the Soviet Ukrainian political elite and the Irish and Scottish administrators who were actively involved in expanding the British Empire. Other possible sources of support for the
objectives of Ukrainian national communists might be gleaned from the Italian and Canadian Communist Parties.¹

Ukrainian national communism has undergone considerable structural changes during the fifty-odd years of Soviet rule. The mass organizations which espoused Ukrainian national communist programmes in the former years have been replaced by small, clandestine groups in the 1960's. Tactics and strategies have also changed. For instance, leading Ukrainian national communists in the 1920's utilized their positions of power for initiating change through political channels. Ukrainian national communists of the 1960's, on the other hand, were essentially on the defensive. Their main efforts centered around expressions of protests against violations of constitutional, legal and moral norms and against the exploitative character of Ukrainian-Russian relations. One aspect of Ukrainian national communism, however, has remained virtually unaltered. Its proponents have continuously emphasized the imperative for a practical, as opposed to theoretical implementation of sovereignty and independence for the Ukrainian SSR.

There are several difficulties which confront the current exponents of Ukrainian national communism. The

political-administrative framework of Soviet Ukraine is in the hands of centralists, committed to the preservation of the status quo, unsympathetic to Ukrainian national aspirations and implacably opposed to any proposals for the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. Ukrainian national culture is retained in a "provincial" position, no provisions are in effect for a national education in Ukrainian educational institutions, and Russification is making increasing inroads into Ukrainian national life. As a result, many Ukrainians are beset by a national inferiority complex, a spirit of resignation and indifference to Ukrainian national needs. Cadre exchanges and mass resettlements of the Ukrainian population weaken Ukrainian national strength and contribute to the progressive loss of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. Most importantly, there is no viable method for testing Ukraine's right of secession. Constitutional arguments by themselves are totally inadequate. For instance, "the right of free withdrawal" (Article 17) is complicated by the fact that in the event of a divergence between the law of a Republic and the law of the Union, the latter prevails (Article 20). Moreover, Republican ministries are subordinate to Union decrees (Article 69), jurisdiction over the State budget, defence, foreign affairs, trade relations and alterations of boundaries is reserved exclusively to the central government (Article 14), and every Soviet Ukrainian holds USSR citizenship. All of these factors have prompted Ukrainian national communists
to voice demands for a new constitution in which Ukraine would be guaranteed the status of a sovereign and independent national state.

In our examination of Ukrainian national communism, we centered on its ideological components and programmatic demands as they have expressed themselves in the writings of its major proponents: Дo Khvyli, I. Dzyuba’s Internationalism or Russification?, the Memorandum of the UCP to the Comintern, as well as documentary material by V. Chornovil, S. Karavanskyi and L. Lukianenko. We have sought to identify the similarities and differences, both in terms of programs and strategies, of Ukrainian national communists during the periods of 1920's and 1960's respectively. In addition, we have also attempted to describe the political actors and the political processes that have furthered and supported the aims of Ukrainian national communism. The early generation of Ukrainian national communists progressed from a stage of disillusionment to one of physical liquidation. What fate has in store for the current proponents of Ukrainian national communism is still uncertain.

There remain, of course, a number of problems for further analysis. How does one separate Ukrainian national communists from among the amalgam of dissenters in the USSR? Will Ukrainian national communists advance from the phase of "legalism" to the stage of direct confrontation with regime? What strategy should they adopt in order to win allies and
support from the Ukrainian mass population? Answers to these questions would clear up many uncertainties about the strength and the prospects of Ukrainian national communism.

Nationality dissent in Ukraine encompasses three-fold demands for cultural rights, civil rights and political change. At its simplest level, it registers objections against national annihilation and focuses on the retention of a national identity; its maximum aim is political independence for Ukraine. This involves the rejection of ideological dogma and the positing of alternate solutions to those proffered by the regime. The motivations of dissenters are primarily of a moral character that emphasize the principle of justice and the issue of freedom, linking democratic and humanist values with Ukrainian national rights and aspirations. This forms the essence of I. Dzyuba's appeal for "freedom for honest, public discussion of national matters, freedom for national choice, freedom for national self-knowledge, self-awareness, self-development." The passionate concern for the fate of the Ukrainian nation shared by Ukrainian dissenters is probably the greatest source of strength of the movement. This commitment enables individual dissenters to sacrifice personal freedom and personal comfort for a cause they believe in. The cause is one of self-determination or the right of Ukrainians to determine the course of their nation's development.

What are the prospects of Ukrainian national communism for the 1970's? On the basis of the assembled

2. I. Dzyuba, ibid; p. 213.
evidence, it may be assumed that both protests against violations of constitutional rights and demands for socio-political reforms are likely to find more widespread and diverse forms of expression. This would involve an increasing circulation of petitions and programmatic documents exposing the anti-Ukrainian bias of the regime and demanding just and democratic solutions to the Ukrainian nationality problem. The incipient trend toward pluralism in Soviet society could lead toward a clearer demarcation between the jurisdictions of the Party and State apparata. Such a development could then permit Ukrainian national communists to implement their policies within these decentralized spheres of influence. Also, internal changes in the Party's structure could result in the replacement of doctrinaire conservatives in positions of power by individuals more responsive to Ukrainian national demands. One should, moreover, not discount the possibility of a crisis situation developing in the USSR as, for instance, an armed conflict with Communist China, which would then provide Ukrainian national communists with a favourable opportunity for achieving their objectives. Ultimately, the success or failure of Ukrainian national communism hinges on the degree of support it is able to obtain from the Ukrainian mass population.

The contention that all-pervasive controls by the State can mould the convictions of its subjects becomes insupportable when one examines the development of Ukrainian
national communism. In spite of the formidable machinery of propaganda and repression commanded by the Soviet regime, Ukrainian national communists continue to express their opposition to the official course of the Soviet nationalities policy and to defend Ukraine's right to sovereignty and independence. This fact demonstrates the contention that no amount of surveillance and political education is able to silence dissenters protesting against national injustices and demanding the right to determine their own national destiny. A careful assessment of the meaning and potentialities of Ukrainian national communism might provide political decision-makers with the basis for a more rational policy toward political developments in the Soviet Union.
APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES

Blakytnyi, Vasyl M. (1895-1925). Pseudonym of V. Ellanskyi. Borotbist leader elected to the CC CP(B)U in 1920 on Lenin's directives. Editor of Borotba and Visti VUKr. TsVK and principal organizer of the literary group "Hart" which promoted the aims of Ukrainian national communism. In his article "Future Tasks of the Party", Blakytnyi analyzed the CP(b)U as a Russified, bureaucratic clique and condemned the assignment of Russian cadres to the Ukrainian republic as a device for furthering centralism.

Chornovil, Vyacheslav. (1938- ) Journalist and secretary of a Komsomol organization, assigned to cover the trials of Ukrainian dissenters in Lviv during 1965-66. Chornovil documented the illegal practices and procedures employed by the KGB and the judicial organs in the course of the arrests, investigations and trials of the defendants, sending copies of his brief to top judicial, police and Party officials. He also compiled a collection of materials on the twenty men and women arrested in 1965, including biographical data, letters, poems and petitions, which was subsequently published.
in the West as The Chornovil Papers. In 1967, Chornovil was arrested on a charge of possessing "anti-Soviet documents" and sentenced to three years of hard labour (later commuted to eighteen months).

Dzyuba, Ivan (1931- ) A literary critic of considerable reputation, Dzyuba has been regarded as the unofficial leader for the cause of greater intellectual freedom in Ukraine. On September 29, 1966, Dzyuba delivered a speech at Babyi Yar in which he condemned anti-Semitism in the USSR and advocated greater Ukrainian-Jewish understanding and cooperation. In his treatise Internationalism or Russification?, Dzyuba documents instances of Russian chauvinism and assigns the blame for the current discontent in Ukraine on the Russification policies of the Soviet regime.

Karavanskyi, Sviatoslav (1920- ) Philologist and translator, sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment in 1945, but released in 1960 on the basis of an amnesty decree. Disturbed by the growing Russification of Ukrainian universities, Karavanskyi wrote articles and letters to Soviet authorities accusing the Minister of Higher Education in the Ukrainian SSR Yu. Dadenkov of Russifying the Ukrainian education system. Arrested on November 13, 1965, Karavanskyi was sentenced, without investigation or trial, to eight years and seven months in hard-labor camps.
Kandyba, Ivan O. (1930- ) Lawyer by profession, sentenced to twelve years imprisonment in connection with his membership in the UWPU.

Khvylovyi, Mykola (1891-1933) Pseudonym of M. Filitov. Exponent of revolutionary national romanticism in Ukrainian literature. Founded the literary organization "Vaplite" which became involved in cultural politics during the 1920's. Khvylovyi's outlook of a Ukrainian national communist was expressed in his pamphlet "Ukraïna chy Malorossia?" (Ukraine or Little Russia?) and by his slogan "away from Moscow."

Lapchynskyi, Yuriy. Leader of the "Federalist" faction of the CP(b)U which organized the Gomel Conference on November 1919 demanding that Ukrainian SSR be accorded the status of a sovereign republic. On February 1920, Lapchynskyi submitted a brief entitled "Proposals for Resolution on the Nationality Question" in which he suggested that the CP(b)U be reorganized as a separate section of the Cominform. Ousted from the CP(b)U, Lapchynskyi joined the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapisty) and became a member of its Central Committee.

Lukianenko, Lev H. (1927- ) Chief organizer of the UWPU, graduate of the Moscow State University law faculty, CPSU member, employed as a State propagandist in Western Ukraine, Lukianenko was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in connection with the trials of the "lawyers' group" during May, 1961.
Mazlakh, Serhij. Pseudonym of S. Robsman. Co-author of Do Khvyli, journalist by profession, Jewish by nationality, Mazlakh was not an active participant in the "nationalist deviations" during the initial period of Soviet rule. He was liquidated during the Yezhovshchyna reign of terror in the 1930's.

Moroz, Valentyn (1936- ). History lecturer and author of "Chronicle of Resistance," "Among the Snows" and Report from the Beria Reserve - a devastating indictment of the brutality in Soviet forced labor camps as well as a commentary on the struggle between despotism and individualism. Sentenced to four years imprisonment in 1966, Moroz was released in September, 1969 only to be reasrrested in June 1970 and given an additional sentence of fourteen years for allegedly conducting "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" (Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR).

Shakhrai, Vasyl. Principal author of Do Khvyli (On the Current Situation), the first programmatic statement of Ukrainian national communism. Shakhrai also wrote a brochure entitled Revolutsia na Ukraini (Revolution in Ukraine) under the pseudonym V. Skorovstanskyi. As an old Bolshevik, he was appointed People's Commissar for Military Affairs in the first Ukrainian Soviet government and its delegate to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty negotiations. An active participant at the Taganrog Conference (April 18-20, 1918), Shakhrai
favoured the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Party organization. Expelled from the Party in June 1919 for his "nationalist deviations", he was executed by Denikin's troops in 1919.

Shumskyi, Oleksandr. As People's Commissar for Education and editor-in-chief of Chervony Shliakh, Shumskyi actively promoted the Ukrainization of Party and State organizations during the period 1923-1926. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) supported Shumskyi in his disagreements with L. Kaganovich which resulted in the expulsion of the majority of its members in 1928.

Skrypnyk, Mykola (1872-1933). One of the founders of the CP(b)U who defended the independence of the Ukrainian Party organization and the prerogatives of Soviet Ukraine at various Party Congresses and Conferences. In his capacity as Commissar of Education from 1927 to 1933, Skrypnyk championed the cause of Ukrainization. He was also the co-architect of the first Soviet constitution and the author of a number of articles and books dealing with the Soviet nationalities problem.

Symonenko, Vasyl (1935-1963) Due to his concern with justice and freedom for Ukraine and other non-Russian nationalities, Symonenko's poetry of high artistic merit has won a considerable following among Ukrainian youth. A posthumous collection of Symonenko's writings was published in the West under the
Volobuev, Mykhailo. Lecturer at the Institute of Economics at Kharkiv (Kharkov), member of the CP(b)U whose articles "On the Problem of Ukrainian Economics" published in Bilshovyk Ukrainy in 1928 argued the case for an independent economic system for the Ukrainian SSR. After his thesis of Russia's exploitation of Ukraine was attacked in the Party press, Volobuev confessed his errors and disappeared from public life.

Yurkevych, Lev (1835-1918) Editor of Borotba, a publication of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP), financial backer of the S. D. publishing house "Dzvin". Engaged in a polemical debate with Lenin, Yurkevych defended the right of the USDRP to organize itself as a separate wing of the RSDRP.
APPENDIX B

FORMATIONS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMUNISTS

Borotbisty (Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbist)).

This first organized group of Ukrainian national communists came into existence in August, 1919 through the merger of the "independent left-wing" of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party (USDRP) with the left-wing of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (Borotbist-Communist). At its founding convention, the Borotbist party numbered some 15,000 members. The Borotbist political programme was committed to the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, the formation of a separate Ukrainian Red Army, and to assuming the leadership of the Ukrainian communist movement. Following the dissolution of the Borotbist party on the recommendations of the Comintern in March, 1920, about 4,000 Borotbists joined the CP(b)U. This influx of nationally conscious Ukrainians into the ranks of the Russified CP(b)U revitalized the forces of Ukrainian national communism. Many former Borotbists, such as O. Shumskyi (Minister of Education), L. Kovaliv (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), M. Poloz (Finance Minister), and H. Hrynko (Head of Gosplan) participated actively in the Ukrainization policies of the 1920's.
Federalists. This factional grouping within the CP(b)U derived its name from its preference for a federalist structure of Soviet republics, commensurate with increased authority for Ukrainian Party and State administrations. Most of its members were drawn from the Volyn (Volhynia) and Chernihiv (Chernigov) Party organizations. In November, 1919, the Federalists, under the leadership of Yu. Lapchynskyi, convened a conference in Gomel without official approbation from the CC RCP. At this conference, demands were made for an independent status of the CP(b)U and for greater power over decision-making by the Ukrainian government. As a result of their factional activity, prominent Federalists such as P. Slynko, P. Popov and S. Kyrychenko were expelled from the CP(b)U in June 20, 1920.

Ukapists (Ukrainian Communist Party). This group of Ukrainian national communists functioned as a legal opposition party to the CP(b)U in the period 1920-1924. The Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP) was formed on January 22, 1920 by left-wing "independents" among the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP). In 1921, its membership numbered around five hundred. Ideologically stronger than the Borotbists, the UCP cultivated a "scientific approach" to social problems. Its weekly publication Chervonyi Prapor (Red Banner) accused the Soviet government of its anti-Ukrainian character and demanded the total separation of Ukrainian SSR from RSFSR. Unlike the Borotbists, however, the Ukapists were unable to
attract a mass following and remained a small group of intellectuals who conceived their task as working with the Russified proletariat in Ukrainian urban centers. The absence of viable prospects contributed to its process of gradual disintegration. In 1924, the UCP was ordered by the Cominform to dissolve itself and to merge with the CP(b)U. This closed the chapter of a unique phenomenon in Soviet history where the ruling communist Party tolerated the existence of another political organization with the Soviet political system. Prominent UCP leaders such as M. Tkatchenko, A. Richytskyi and M. Avdienko were repressed and liquidated in the 1930's.

Ukrainian National Committee (UNC). This clandestine group advocated the secession of Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union. It consisted mainly of factory workers from the Lviv district. Brought before trial on December, 1961, twenty members of the group received sentences ranging from death by execution (I. T. Koval and B. Hrytsyna) to ten years imprisonment.

Ukrainian National Front (UNF). This group functioned in a clandestine fashion during the period 1964-67. It published an underground journal Batkivshchyna i Svoboda (Fatherland and Freedom) where it appealed for the liberation of Ukraine from the USSR and called for the consolidation of all Ukrainian forces around the UNF. The group also submitted a
memorandum to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU and to the First Secretary of the CPU P. Shelest demanding rectification of the existing economic, cultural and political situation in Ukraine. Its nine members were all in their twenties and possessed a higher education. Tried in Ivan-Frankivsk during 1968, they received sentences ranging from eleven to fifteen years of hard labor and banishment.

Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU). This cadre formation of Ukrainian national communists appeared in Western Ukraine at the beginning of the 1960's. Its chief organizer was Lev. H. Lukianenko, a lawyer by profession, who drew up a draft of the program for the UWPU. In this document he condemned the restrictions of Ukraine's political and economic rights, Ukraine's status as an appendage of RSFSR, as well as the omnipresence of Russian chauvinism.

The aim of the UWPU would be to conduct peaceful agitation, in accordance with constitutional guarantees, for the purpose of securing the secession of Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union. Once a fully sovereign and independent Ukrainian state were established, the political order would be Soviet in nature and the economic order would be socialist working in the direction of communism. Since the majority of the members of the UWPU had legal training, the organization was dubbed the "lawyers' group." Four out of seven UWPU members had CPSU affiliations. In May, 1961, all seven members received prison sentences ranging from ten to fifteen years.
APPENDIX C

Table 1  Contribution of Ukrainian SSR to the Soviet Economic System in 1960.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Ukrainian SSR production</th>
<th>% of total USSR production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cast iron</td>
<td>24.2 million tons</td>
<td>52 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>26.2 million tons</td>
<td>40 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>59.1 million tons</td>
<td>55 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>172.2 million tons</td>
<td>54 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Engines</td>
<td>1,142,000 units</td>
<td>90 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ekonomika Radianskoj Ukrainy (Economy of the Soviet Ukraine), (Kyiv, 1962), p. 120.

Table 2. Distribution by Nationality of CP(b)U/CPU Membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Ukrainians %</th>
<th>Russians %</th>
<th>Others %</th>
<th>General or First Secretaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July, 1918</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>---93---</td>
<td>G. Piatakov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1921</td>
<td>68,100</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>D. Manuilsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1924</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>E. Kving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1925</td>
<td>167,600</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>L. Kaganovich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1930</td>
<td>270,100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>S. Kosior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 1968</td>
<td>2,138,000</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>P. Shelest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: V. Holybnychy, Communism in Ukraine (Special Reprint from Encyclopedia of Ukraine), New York, 1960, p. 8; Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press (December, 1969), p. 27; B. Dmytryshyn, Moscow and the Ukraine (New York, 1960), p. 239, p. 241. Until 1954, all of the First Secretaries CC CP(b)U were non-Ukrainians.
Table 3. **Ukrainian Intellectuals Sentenced During the 1965-1966 Trials.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hel, Ivan</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Labourer &amp; student</td>
<td>3 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereta, Ihor</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>museum assistant director</td>
<td>5 yr. suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hevrych, Yaroslav</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>medical student</td>
<td>3 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horyn, Bohdan</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>art researcher</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horyn, Mykhailo</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>industrial psychologist</td>
<td>6 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hryn, Mykola</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>geophysicist</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivashchenko, Dmytro</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>lecturer of Ukr. literature</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuznetsova, Evhenia</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>laboratory worker</td>
<td>4 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karavanskyi, Sviatoslav</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>writer and journalist</td>
<td>8 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martynenko, Oleksandr</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>engineer</td>
<td>3 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masiutko, Mykhailo</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>teacher and pensioner</td>
<td>6 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menkush, Yaroslava</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>designer</td>
<td>2-1/2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroz, Valentyn</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>history lecturer</td>
<td>4 yrs + 14 yrs in 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osadchy, Mykhailo</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>university lect.</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozerny, Mykhailo</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>sec. sch. teacher</td>
<td>3 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusyn, Ivan</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>geodesic engineer</td>
<td>1 yr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shevchuk, Anatolij</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>linotypist</td>
<td>5 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalyvaka, Panas</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>artist</td>
<td>5 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvarychevska, Myroslava</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>literary editor</td>
<td>8 mths.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Members of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borovnytskyi, Io. Yu.</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>7 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandyba, Ivan O.</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>15 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kipysh, Ivan Z.</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>militiaman</td>
<td>7 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libovych, O. S.</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>agric. specialist</td>
<td>10 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukianenko, Lev. H.</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>15 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutsiv, Vasyl S.</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>club manager</td>
<td>10 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virun, Stepan M.</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Party propagandist</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ukrainski yurysty pid sudom KGB (Munich, 1968).

### Table 5. Members of Dissident Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in the 1960's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hrytsyna, Bohdan</td>
<td>executed</td>
<td>Diak, Vasyl</td>
<td>13 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hnot, Volodymyr</td>
<td>15 yrs</td>
<td>Hubka, Ivan</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurynij, Roman</td>
<td>15 yrs</td>
<td>Kachur, Mykola</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindrat, Vasyl</td>
<td>13 yrs</td>
<td>Krasivskiy, Ivan</td>
<td>12 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koval, Ivan T.</td>
<td>executed</td>
<td>Kulynyn, Vasyl</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashtaler, Mykola</td>
<td>10 yrs</td>
<td>Kvetsko, Dmytro</td>
<td>15 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soroka, Stepan</td>
<td>15 yrs</td>
<td>Lesiv, Yaroslav</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zelymash, Hryhorij</td>
<td>15 yrs</td>
<td>Melen, Myron</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zelymash, Oleksij</td>
<td>12 yrs</td>
<td>Prokopovych, H.</td>
<td>11 yrs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABBREVIATIONS

CC  Central Committee
CP(b)U Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (1918-52)
CPU Communist Party of Ukraine (1952-)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952-)
KPZU Communist Party of Western Ukraine
RCP(b) Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1919-25)
RCP Russian Communist Party (1918-19)
RSDWP Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
UCP Ukrainian Communist Party (1920-24)
UPSR Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries
USDWP Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party
UWPU Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

An interesting historical analysis with a somewhat tendentious use of source materials.

Carefully researched monograph based, in part, on unpublished Soviet sources.

--------
Scholarly investigation of the causes and effects of "integral nationalism" in the 1940's.

Informative section on the position of the Party in reference to the nationality question.

Excellent source for background material.

Useful data on the programmes and membership of the Ukrainian dissent movement, especially in reference to such organizations as the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian National Front.

First-rate study for the 1917-20 period.

Documents include excerpts from The Chornovil Papers, the Babyi Yar address by I. Dzyuba, materials on religious dissent among Ukrainian Evangelicals and George Luckyi's essay "Turmoil in the Ukraine."

Useful section on aspects of communist ideology.

Interesting insights into some Ukrainian problems by an American scholar.
Chornovil, Vyacheslav. (comp.) The Chornovil Papers.
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Data for comparing policy applications in Ukraine with other Soviet republics.

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Perhaps the most objective presentation of developments in Ukraine during the Revolutionary period.

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