CANDIDATE SELECTION IN GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE UNITED STATES.

CANDIDATE SELECTION

IN

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

By

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN REVIEW

This study will concentrate upon candidate selection to national legislatures, that is, those legislatures such as, the British Parliament at Westminster, the United States Congress, and the French National Assembly, which have powers to legislate for the whole country (although some will have their sovereignty restricted in some respects by federal arrangements and a written constitution). The importance of candidate selection is brought out by Austin Ranney when he tells us that, "Most free elections involve voters choosing among competing candidates whose names are printed on official ballots. Accordingly most elections are preceded by the making of nominations--that is by legal proceedings in which eligible persons are formally designated candidates and have their names accepted by public authorities for printing on the election".[1] Candidates generally have little chance of success unless supported by an effective party organisation, the situation often being in practice that each party chooses between its possible candidates, the electorate choosing between the parties, paying perhaps some attention to the personal merits of the individual candidates, but being moved primarily, by the reputation and

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[1]Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliament (Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), p.vii.

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and arguments of the parties.[2] In extreme cases, where the party

holds a completely safe seat[3], the first stage is the decisive one;

nomination as candidate meaning election.

W. J. M. Mackenzie tells us that, "such a situation may

seem in some areas to be somewhat like that of one party democracy,

or guided elections. It differs from it so long as free opposition

voting is allowed and there is a balance of parties in the country

as a whole".[4] There is a considerable area in the Southern States

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[2]For a brief review of the choices of independent candidates
in Britain see, P.G.Richards, Honourable Members (London: Faber and
Faber Ltd., 1959), p.14.

[3]A safe seat can be equated with winnability (see pages 71 & 72)
which in turn depends upon the concept of marginality. Marginal seats
are those which have a small majority for the governing party, and
which, if lost, would put an opposition party into power. The
marginal seats in the British General Election of 1964, were those
in which the government held up to a 7% majority. But one cannot
be dogmatic about marginals; their existence and type depends upon
the electoral situation at a given moment. They are calculated on
a national basis, relative to the individual characteristics of
particular constituencies. For the sake of argument and definition,
however, we can assume that a marginal seat will be one in which the
majority party had a 10% lead or less at the previous election; and
a party's safe seat will then be one in which it holds more than a
10% lead over its opposing parties. Degrees of safeness can then
be deduced from this on a scale of High, Medium and Low (see pages
71 & 72.
  a) High   shall be equivalent to a 30% lead,
  b) Medium   "   "   "   " " 20% "
  c) Low   "   "   "   " " 10% "

For further information on this, see Austin Ranney's
Pathways to Parliament, (appendix), and the series of Nuffield
Studies on British General Elections.
  It should be further noted, however, that safeness is a
very transient concept and that great care has to be taken in
comparing data on this subject which has been collected over a
long time span.

[4]W.J.M.Mackenzie, Free Elections (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd. 1958) p.38.

of the United States which returns only Democratic party represent-- atives, so that the choice is in effect made by party and not by voters.[5]   In Britain at least a third of the members of the House of Commons are returned for safe seats, divided equally between the two great parties.   Both in America and Britain the election as a whole is usually a close contest, keenly fought, and the electorate makes a real and decisive choice between parties."Nevertheless", says Mackenzie, "party choice of candidates is so important as to cause considerable heart searching about the question of democracy within the parties".[6]

Many students of politics find in the nominating function the most unique and exclusive function performed by parties.   It is regarded as their dominant mode of functioning and all else either follows or is of subordinate importance.   E.E.Shattschneider sets out the importance of the nominating way of life:-

> The nominating process is obviously one of the points at which parties can be studied most advantageously for no other reason than that the nomination is one of the most innately characteristic pieces of business transacted by the party.   A party must make nomin- ations if it is to be regarded as a party at all.   By observing the party process at this point one may hope to discover the locus of power within the party, for he who has the power to make nominations owns the party.[7]

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[5]But choice by party in the South becomes very much choice by electors in the form of the direct 'open' primary. See V.O.Key, <u>Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups,</u> (New York: T.Y.Crowell Company, 1964), p.365.

[6] Mackenzie, <u>op. cit.</u> p.69.

[7] E.E.Shattschneider, <u>Party Government</u>, (New York: Rinehart

Furthermore, H.Jacob defines candidate selection as, "a process by which individuals possessing certain personality traits and occupying specified social positions in their community are screened by political institutions for elective office".[8] It can be seen, therefore, that the role of the parties in the recruitment and election of candidates bisects the entire representational system of a democracy. In its selection function the party straddles the gulf between constituency and candidate, and frames political alternatives. Moreover within the legislature, it competes with both the constituency, and the legislator's own beliefs and ideals, for his political attention and loyalty. The representative system by which democracies govern themselves rests squarely on the interaction of legislator, party, and constituency. The study of the parties as electoral organisations, must inevitably, therefore, involve the study of the dilemma of representation.

Etymologically, the literal meaning of represent is 'to present again', and from this it has come to mean 'to appear in place of another'. In this secondary sense, a representative has been defined as an agent, deputy, or substitute who supplies the place of another or others. Other terms of similar meanings are: attorney, delegate, deputy, proctor and proxy. These terms usually imply selection or authorization by the original party and often imply some limitation of the authority conferred, though at the same time there may also be some degree of discretion on the part of the representative.

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[8] H.Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the United States. A Model", _Journal of Politics_, Vol.24, (May 1962) p.768.

In his 'History of Political Theories', Dunning tells us that representation as a principle does not appear in political theory until the later centuries of Rome, when the Prince was regarded as the representative of the Roman people taken collectively.[9] Similar views as to the representative character of single rulers and hereditary groups have been expressed by Hobbes. He has said for example, "that men who are in absolute liberty give authority to one man to represent them everyone".[10] Contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau denied the possibility of the representation of sovereignty or legislative power. He tells us that,

> Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will cannot be represented; it is the same or it is different; there is no medium. The deputies of the people then, are not and cannot be its representatives; they are only its commissioners and can conclude nothing definitely. The idea of representation is modern; it comes from Feudal government. In the republics and even the monarchies of antiquity, the people never had representatives, they did not know the word . . . the legislative

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[9]W. Dunning, _A History of Political Theories_ (New York: Macmillan Co., 1902.

[10] Hobbes, _The Leviathan_, edited with an introduction by M. Oakshott (Oxford: Blackwell Texts, 1946), p. 83.

power of the people cannot be represented, but
they can and should be represented in the
executive power.[11]

But T.H.Green in his lectures on the <u>Principles of
Political Obligation</u> said that, "there are two principal conceptions of the essential nature of the representative. According to one he is a Senator, according to the other he is an agent or delegate. The former theory holds that if he is selected for his superior wisdom or integrity or both, the election signifies that the constituency desires to entrust its affairs and those of the nation to the direction and management of his superior mind".[12]

A.H.Birch makes a very comprehensive study of these problems of representation in his book 'Representative and Responsible Government'.[13] He tells us that many misguided observers equate representation with election.[14] Electoral

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[11]
  Rosseau, <u>The Social Contract</u>, Introduction and
Translation by G. D. H. Cole (London: J.M.Dent & Sons, 1945),
Ch.5.

[12]
  T.H.Green, <u>Principles of Political Obligation</u> (London:
Longmans and Co. 1895), p. 152.

[13]
  A.H.Birch, <u>Representative and Responsible Government</u>
(London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1964), Chs. 2 and 3.

[14]
  R.E.Dowse, in his article "Representation, General
Elections and Democracy", <u>Parliamentary Affairs</u>, Vol.XV, (1962),
makes an interesting analysis of attitudes towards representation
by virtue of electoral arrangements -- "Preconception of popular
democratic theory is that there is an intimate connection between
the holding of general elections and democracy. The extent to
which parliament is representative is held to be the extent to

systems, however, are not self justifying; their function is to afford a means of appointing representatives who are expected to behave in certain ways. Moreover, how these expectations are described varies from country to country and from time to time. Thus in Britain during the 18th and 19th centuries, demands for change in the system of parliamentary representation implied that the basis of representation would influence the choice and attitude of the representative.

Edmund Burke is probably the most publicised and accomplished of all representatives who have had to face the dilemma of their relationship with their constituents. Both

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which it is democratic. This contention in various forms, is the common property of popular low level democratic theory of the Right, the Left, and the Centre . . . Conservative apologists have argued that it is the group or associations within a policy that are, or should be, represented, whilst the Left and the Centre tend to consider representation in more personal terms. For them it is the individual who is represented by another individual in a representative institution. He argues that we cannot have absolute representation and that we have to look towards other factors for judging democracy --- "The essence of democracy is limitation not electoral mathematics; if Britain is a democracy, it is not so simply because of its general election, but because the executive is limited by a continum of checks. Electoral reformists have been passed by events if they have failed to notice that democracy in Britain no longer depends solely upon the House of Commons, but also upon quite other checks such as professionalism in the Civil Service, and pressure group activity in the Consultative and administrative framework".

in his concept of the political party as an organisation pursuing
the national interest, and in his definition of the representatives
responsibility to the nation as a whole, Burke attempted to liberate
both party and legislator from the local particular and even narrowly
selfish sources of their political support. But with the increase
in the power of the party even Burke's ideas have become outdated
(at least in Britain, the U.S.A. still being firmly based on
localism). The main principle affecting this, is 'responsibility';
most commonly, in the past, it was the term used to describe a
system of government in which the administration is responsive to
public demands and movements of public opinion. Proponent's of
'party responsibility', therefore, have suggested that the party's
function must be broader than the mere selection of candidates and
the election of office-holders.[15] They argue that the party
must lay down a party programme, elect candidates loyal to it, and
hold its elected officials accountable for its implementation.
Only in this way, they maintain, can the voter be assured that the
mandate he approved will be translated into public policy.

In those countries, such as Britain, where 'party res-
ponsibility' is in evidence, the essential question to be asked
relates to the limits of democracy within the mass party

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[15] Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party
Government (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1954).

organisation.[16] Eldersveld who has studied the power

structure of political parties in one U.S.State tells us, "that

the party is a hierarchy is generally not disputed, but whether the

party structure is an oligarchy, however, has been the cause

of much speculation since Michel's famous theory of the 'iron

law of oligarchy'. Some insist that a minority inevitably assumes

leadership and control of parties, with all the expected oligarchic

phenomena which Michels predicted. Others, however, note that

even the most carefully structured American Party machines

(C.Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Free Press, 1961),

p.235-62), a reciprocal pattern of influence and responsibility

obtains between the boss and his precinct captains".[17]

In summary, therefore, we can see that there exists a

conflict between the intention of the party to control the

political processes, the intention of the legislator to be free

from all ties and the intention of the local organisation to

remain free of the party and control the actions of its

representative. These three factors are usually found, in

varying degrees, in different countries, one of them becoming

dominant.

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[16]
    See E.Liggett, British Political Issues (Oxford:
Pergaman Press, 1964), Vol. 1, p.109, and J.Blondel, op.cit. P.89.

[17]
    S.Eldesveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis
(Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1964), p.8.

But despite the importance of nominations and candidate selection, only a few writers have concentrated on this aspect of political activity.[18] Furthermore, no analyst has attempted a comparative study, which is necessary if we are to fully understand the peculiarities of each national political system, and which is necessary if we are to move towards a causal theory of politics. A science of politics, as any other science, must have universal laws, and in the final analysis, it would seem that these can only be sought in the field of comparative studies.[19] In the following chapters, therefore, we try to look at candidate selection in terms of a comparative and theoretical framework.

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[18]
For the United States: P.T.David, R.M.Goldman and R.C.Bain, The Political Processes of National Nominating Conventions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960); C.E.Merrium and L.Overacker, Primary Elections, revied (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); V.O.Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th edition (New York: Thomas Y.Crowell Company, 1964); J.Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in Safe Districts", Journal of Politics, Vol. XV, May, 1953;. F.Sovauf, Party and Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1963)
For Great Britain: R.T.McKenzie, British Political Parties, 2nd edition (London: Mercury Books, 1964); P.G.Richards, op. cit.; Austin Ranney, op. cit.; R.C.Leanard, Guide to the General Election (London: Pan Books, Ltd. 1964)

[19]
See G.Almond and J.Coleman, Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960) Ch.1, L.Lipson, "The Comparative Method in Political Studies", Political Quarterly (1957), S.Neumann, "Comparative Politics", Journal of Politics (1963), and L.Wolf-Philips, "Metapolitics", Political Studies (1964).

CHAPTER TWO

A COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the previous chapter we saw that candidate selection
is one of the main functions of political parties, and that as
political processes are dominated by political parties in the
western world, nearly all people attaining a position in the
legislature have done so on a party ticket. Moreover as at least
50% of the seats in certain countries[*] (under simple majority vote)
are safe, there is little likelihood of the opposing party or
parties gaining a majority at the next election, the person
selected as candidate of the dominant party is in another sense
elected at the time of his nomination. At the general election,
there may well be competition between the parties at the national
level, but generally the electorate have little influence on whom
their representative is to be. The amount of influence of the
electorate is determined by the freedom in which they can
become members of political parties, and the extent of inter-
party democracy. It must be understood, however, that whatever the
arrangements and beliefs in a society, there always exists certain
elitist and oligarchical tendencies. This is a function of the
specialised expertise necessary for political operators, such as
education, occupation (free time and added expertise), and money.
But these tendencies can be more or less democratic, more or less
cohesive, and more or less deliberate. In fact the tendency towards

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[*] That is, Great Britain and the United States.

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elitism takes two basic forms; firstly that of pure oligarchy[1] where the members of the ruling group or groups come from the same social, educational, and occupational background; and secondly that of polyarchy[2] where the ruling members are very different in different groups, and where no one group or set of people is pre-dominant in the community. The first example tends to be evident in a 'closed' society where there are inequalities of wealth and opportunity perpetuated by lack of mobility between the strata. The second is evident in an 'open society' where there is potentially upward mobility, and little cohesion in the class structure. Each form is therefore very dependent on environmental conditions especially those emanating from attitudes towards authority in the political culture.

The essence of this study, therefore, is to see how candidates are selected in different countries, and to see what differences in the process, if any, do exist. This does not mean that no opinions can, or will, be expressed as to the amount of democracy within a political party; the main objective remains, however, to decide why certain democratic countries pander to the pure ideals of 'populistic' or 'radical' democracy (that is every

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[1]
R.Michels, _Political Parties_ (New York: The Free Press, 1966) and T.Bottomore, _Elites and Society_ (London: Penguin Books, Ltd. 1964).

[2]
Eldesveld, _op. cit._ and R.Dahl, _Who Governs?_ (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1961).

adult shall have the right to take part in, influence, and observe every aspect of the political process), and others allow their nomination process to work in relative secrecy.

In order to make a comparative study possible, we have to break candidate selection down into its component parts, and this will be done within fairly broad categories:

1. Legislative Rules, and Rules and Regulations of the Nation Pertaining to Candidate Selection:

Every nation has some rules relating to elections which must have some effect, direct or indirect, on the selection of candidates. Thus there are rules for the qualification and disqualification of candidates; for the amount of money that may be spent in elections; and for the electoral arrangements themselves, that is those factors relating to the size of the constituency, and the method of counting the vote.

2. Party Rules and Organisation Pertaining to Candidate Selection: Formal and Informal:

Parties, (those existing as extra-legal structures) have their own regulations. These often refer to the disqualification of certain individuals or groups; the amount of money that may be donated to party funds and election expenses by groups or individuals; the controls, great or small, of the central agencies; the legitimized procedures of selection at the constituency level. We are mainly interested here, in the formal powers of the central agencies; for example, do they ratify candidates; do they have a list of candidates; do they have powers of coercion, etc.

3. The Process at Work in the Constituency. Who has the Influence?

At this point we are interested in the number of party members that have a direct influence on the selection process. We have to distinguish between influence of the party member which is institutionalized in rules and regulations, and that influence which may take place in the 'background'. Firstly, therefore, we look at the number of people that are capable of having influence as written down in the constitution of the party, and secondly at the extra-legal groups, cliques, clubs, etc. which may have influence before and during the legal proceedings.

4. Do the Formal Party Rules Work in Practice? Is Centralization Weakened or Strengthened?

We have to see if the national party organs, create informal controls such as giving aid to the local Associations, or whether they decline to use what powers they have. This is an important aspect of the study, as it is trying to break behind the facade created by many parties. We may find that those parties which profess to practice democracy from the 'grass roots' in fact centralize their procedures and vice versa.

5. Party Financial Arrangements.

We are interested to know whether the party allows large gifts from groups or personalities who were actively participating in the nominating process. If these arrangements tended to allow contributions from participants in the nomination process, one would expect that those with great resources of wealth would have an

advantage in the system, i.e. that they would be chosen over candidates without financial resources.

6.   Differences Between Constituencies

(i)   extent of party interference in prenominating stage.

(ii)   type of candidate: education, age, occupation,

sponsorship.

We are interested to see if there is any pattern in the variations, i.e. do the higher status candidates[3] contest the seats in the rural constituencies, or in those seats that they are most likely to win? Moreover how active is the local party in recruiting suitable candidates, and what factors lead to differences in activity between the constituencies?

7.   Socio-Economic Characteristics of Population, Members, Officers, Candidates and Members.

In studying the characteristics of these groups in the political hierarchy we can ascertain the representativeness of each group.

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[3]
    Status of Candidates: Status of candidates depends on two main factors, those of occupation and education. This is part of the process of differentiation, and what is differentiated is also evaluated. In any one country, therefore, we find that social positions are differently valued, and in order to ascertain who are the highest 'status' persons, we have to develop some means of measurement. Moreover we may find that our techniques of measurement or our classifactory index will have to be changed from one country to another.
    After Marx and Weber contemporary studies of social stratification focus attention on prestige attached to occupational positions. They combine both an objective and a subjective approach to the subject asking people how far they perceive occupational positions to be ranked in a hierarchy and to what extent do people diversely located occupationally agree in their grading of them. For analyzing status in Britain, Butler and Rose have drawn up a very good occupational scale (reproduced in this study, page 67) and an educational scale (reproduced, page 68). We can see from this, that

This will, also give us some indication of those people who have most chance of succeeding in the political process, and of how 'open' the political system is. It is important, in the study of candidate selection, to see whether there is a bias in favour of, or against certain groups in a particular society. Because as Almond and Powell tell us, "the background of those recruited into political roles, is bound to have some impact on their importance of those roles, no matter how thoroughly they are socialized into new values, attitudes and skills, once they have taken over their offices".[4]

Using the above categories, differences will undoubtedly be found between nations. Each feature of candidate selection (treating it as a dependent variable) must be affected by certain independent variables. The characteristics of candidate selection in any one country is, therefore, dependent on the interaction of

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a person is of high status if he comes from one of the top professions, and a public school with an Oxbridge education.

For studying the United States, a similar indicator to that produced by Butler and Rose could be sufficient for classifying status. But the problem is more complex in the United States by the intrusion of other factors besides occupation, such as:

     (i)   group membership,
     (ii)   residential areas,
     (iii)   ascription by local community leaders.

These factors are a result of the lessening of class barriers and class consciousness in the United States, in comparison to Britain. For a critique of the methods of ranking and judging social status and a catalogue of the problems in each, see Milton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1958).

[4] G.Almond and G.Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Company Ltd. 1966), p. 48.

several variables and may change drastically according to a shift
in any one variable. At this point, therefore, we can build a model
for theoretical purposes, using political culture, institutional
framework, party competition, electoral systems, and party organis-
ation as our independent variables.

Figure 1

Institutions

Party Competition

Candidate Selection

Political Culture
(taken as degrees)
(of social and)
(political defer-)
(ence)

Electoral Systems

Party Organisation
(membership and)
(finance)

The independent variables set out above, obviously have differing
degrees of significance for determining the candidate selection
process in any one country, and it is necessary for us, therefore, to
build propositions to be tested with the available information for
this study.

It can be seen that political culture is given a predomin-
ant position in the model. It is a determinant of the institutional
structures and their day-to-day workings, and it is given a causal
relationship to candidate selection. As we have seen, there is no

doubt that the parties will be hierarchical and that there will be certain elitist tendencies; but the 'formal' method of selection, and the form of elitism, will depend on the prevailing attitudes towards authority in the political culture.

1. Political Culture

Political culture is the most complex, unstructured, pervasive, and intangible variable in the model. But it is the most important determinant for Candidate selection. Political scientists, after anthropologists and sociologists, have been struggling to define and categorise it, often to no avail. As Heinz Eulau says, "culture is a mental construct, abstracted from the behaviour of people and their works . . . At the risk of ambiguity, I shall continue to use the term culture without defining it, for the simple reason that among the host of over 250 available definitions, I know of none that is neither too narrow, nor too inclusive".[5] But if we wish to operationalize this concept, we must try to reach an understanding of it. Many of the writers in this field, old and new, have used far reaching and different approaches, but if we look closely we may find a uniform theme.

The notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent

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[5]
    H.Eulau, The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 63.

patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing. Despite

the great potentialties for diversity in political orientations in

any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture

which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process.

Within the concept of political culture, therefore, there must be

conflict between the assumption of consensus, and the belief of

diversity. It is a conflict based on the peculiarities of build-

ing a definitive statement. Eulau, for instance, says that,

"political culture refers to the patterns that can be inferred from

the political behaviour of groups as well as the beliefs, guiding

principles, purposes, and values that the individuals in a group,

whatever its size, hold in common. In this sense political culture

refers to the consensus of numerous individuals, on empirical research

grounds, it is a concept probably more useful than 'constitution'

in defining a group's political working agreements".[6]

But the existence of fundamental beliefs 'in toto', has been

seriously questioned by several writers. McCloskey, for instance,

finds that the belief in consensus as a prerequisite of democracy

has since de Tocqueville been taken too much for granted.[7] Prothro

and Grigg, have questioned whether agreement on fundamentals actually

exist among the electorate,[8] and Dahl has inferred that political

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[6]
Eulau, op. cit. p. 81.

[7]
McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics",
American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII (June, 1964) p. 361.

[8]
Prothro and Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. XXII, (May 1960);

stability does not depend on widespread beliefs in the superiority

of democratic norms and procedures, but upon their acceptance.[9]

Moreover, he conjectures that agreement on certain norms is greater

among the politically active and aware (elite) than among the masses.

Furthermore, Verba tells us that culture has frequently referred to

those aspects of belief systems that are shared by members of a

society.[10] He believes that the political culture approach should

allow for a different emphasis, because to concentrate only on shared

beliefs might lead one to overlook situations where significant

political beliefs were held only by certain groups, and where the

very fact that these attitudes were not shared by most members of

the system was of crucial importance. (This is very important for

our study, because we wish to look at the sub-cultures, as exist-

ing in the political parties, and see what their relationship is to

the general culture and the working of their institutions). Verba's

approach is to begin with a set of belief dimensions that seem

particularly crucial for the understanding of the operation of a

political system, and then ask whether or not members of a political

system share attitudes on these dimensions. The degree to which basic

political attitudes are shared within a political system then becomes

a crucial but open question. Thus it is possible to differentiate

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9. R.Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1961).

10. Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.525. See also,
C.Kluckhon, "The Concept of Culture", in Culture and Behaviour,
R,Kluckhon ed. (New York: Free Press, Glencoe, 1962).

among political cultures by the number of basic political attitudes
that are widely shared and the patterning of the differences in
political belief among the various groups in society. The stand
taken by McClosky, Dahl, and others, thus becomes a realistic one,
and the analysts of political culture can then differentiate between
mass and elite cultures.

Nevertheless, the concept of political culture assumes
that each individual must in his own historical context learn and in-
corporate into his own personality the knowledge and feelings about
the politics of his people and his community. As Gabriel Almond
has said -- 'every political system is embedded in a particular
pattern of orientation to political actions'. The concept of political
culture thus suggests that the traditions of a society, the spirit of
its public institutions, the emotions and collective reasons of its
people, and the style and operating codes of its leaders are not just
random products of historical experience, but fit together as part
of a meaningful whole and constitute an intelligible web of relations.

But political culture has to be broken down into concrete
categories, in order for societies to be analysed in a comparative
sense. Samuel Beer breaks political culture into three component
parts, values, beliefs and emotional symbols.[11] In turn, within
each of these he distinguishes between elements that emphasize means
and those that emphasize ends -- between conceptions of authority and
conceptions of purpose.

11.
    S.Beer and Ulma, Patterns of Government (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1962), p. 32.

a)   Values. In treating values in terms of authority and purpose, he is able to produce much relevant information; thus, as with Richard Rose,[12] he believes that in the study of the ideals of authority and the conflicts within political cultures, the history of political philosophy may be of great help; with the proviso that conceptions of authority differ not only from place to place but also from time to time. Moreover, data can be collected by attitudiual surveys on the lines of Lane,[13] Almond and Verba,[14] and Nordlinger[15].

b)   Beliefs. Beer described beliefs as being about what is. They involve the actual behaviour of man and society, e.g. the belief in the Western world that ordinary people, on the whole, have the capacity to take part in politics with some degree of rationality.

c)   Emotional Attitudes and Symbolism. There are symbols and symbolic acts by which emotions favourable or hostile to a system are excited and by which leaders seek to manipulate the behaviour of the masses. These symbols are sometimes called expressive symbols, in order to indicate the fact that they refer to emotional attitudes

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[12]
R.Rose, Studies in British Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1966), p. 1.

[13]
Lane, op. cit.

[14]
Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

[15]
Nordlinger, The Working Class Tory (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

and feelings.[16]

It can be seen, therefore, that Political Culture, on this
high level of generality is a useful heuristic device. For our study,
however, we wish to focus on more specific attitudes and beliefs,
than this overall picture allows. As has been stated, the values of
a society can be treated in several ways. Nordlinger and others,
for example, have set up attitudinal surveys to focus on particular
aspects of the authority relations within society. Our focus is upon
those values in society which affect the authority relationships.
In Britain, therefore, we are interested in deferential relationships,
their   their
∧ pervasiveness through British Society and ∧ affect on the
particular political process of candidate selection. Moreover deferent-
ial relationships can be determined by two factors; social and
political relationships. Thus individuals can defer to a single
individual because of his social status, or because of his position
in the political hierarchy. And, as we are interested in the sub-
cultures existing as political parties, we wish to ascertain the
prevailing attitudes within the parties, that is, whether there is
social and political deferment, or whether there is just political

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16
   This threefold classification of political culture into
values, beliefs and emotional symbolism, is similar to that used by
Nordlinger op. cit., Pye and Verba, op. cit., and Almond and Powell,
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1966). Almond and Powell, for instance, say that
Political Culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orient-
ations towards politics among members of the political system;
subindividual orientations involve several components including:

   (a) Cognitive orientations: knowledge, accurate or other-
wise of political objects and beliefs.

deferment with strong egalitarian tendencies, and so on.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of data from which information for the above attitudes may be collected:

(i)   behaviour observed in natural setting.
(ii)   behaviour observed in artificial setting.

Many writers use the former, because there are no real limitations upon the nature of data falling into this category. However, utilization of such diverse data, is often precarious because of the wide gap separating the available behavioural data from the under-lying attitudes which are thought to pattern that behaviour. Nordlinger tells us, however, that the validity attaching to generalizations about cultural patterns, stemming from this type of data, are markedly enhanced when two conditions are met:

> (i)   when a behavioural trait is observed over a long period of time, there is good reason to believe that it is a manifestation of an underlying attitude, one of the defining characteristics of attitudes being their persistence over time.
> (ii)'   if a behavioural trait is found to exist in more than one sphere of activity it would suggest that the behaviour is not shaped by particular conditions or institutional influence. Rather it would appear to be the product of well embedded attitudes which give rise to a particular type of behaviour, largely irrespective of environmental circumstances.[17]

The advantages of the second type of data, of which the survey study is an example are as follows:

(b) _Affective orientations_: (emotions) feelings of attachment, involvement, rejection and the like about political objects.

(c) _Evaluative orientations_: (values) judgments and opinions about political objects which usually involve applying value standards.

[17] Nordlinger, _op. cit._, p. 51.

(i)   problems of inferring attitudes are alleviated.
(ii)   sampling methods allow for reliable and precise measurement of the pervasiveness of various cultural dimensions.
(iii) able to identify those attitudes which are so widely accepted they remain unspoken except when directly tapped in an interview situation.

From the above it can bee seen, therefore, that we can study deferential attitudes quite systematically. But there are other components of political culture which have not, as yet, been dealt with and which could be useful in a comparative study. They are, political socialization and economic and social advancement, both of which by gradual change help to make political culture a dynamic variable, and help to change or stabilize the basic attitudes towards authority and equality which we are studying.

(i)   Political Socialization.[18] This is the process by which political cultures are transmitted, maintained, and changed. In a modern society socialization, involves the direct impact of the political system upon the individual and the penetration of primary social structures by secondary ones. Thus we have:

a) Family, which can perpetuate strong or weak social ties, belief or not in mutual aid, and class differences and antagonisms.

b) Education, which by segregation and stratification can extend the influence of the family upon occupational choice, and upon the acceptance or otherwise, of one's position in society.

c) Workplace, can again help to solidify or break down

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[18] G.J.Bander, "Political Socialization and Political Change", American Political Science Review, XX, (1967).

values, according to factor such as type of work and whether shop-floor is unionized or not.

.(ii)   Economic and Social Development. This can be regarded as an auxilliary to political socialization. In fact one can suggest that changes in political socialization take place after advances have taken place in the economic activity of a country, which in turn leads to social development (great mobility, and equality of opportunity). Alongside political socialization, it can, therefore, be a great influence on 'authority relationships' and consequently have great effect on the candidate selection process, both in its method, and the type of people that are selected.

2.   Institutions.

Our main focus is upon the following: Parliamentary system (unified executive and legislative powers), Congressional system (separated executive and legislative powers), unitary state (one sovereign parliament, apex of power), Federal state (dispersed sovereignty; many centres of power), which may effect the working of the party system or the political culture of a community.

Parliamentary or Congressional government can make several tendencies; thus under Parliamentary government the Party is a much more important factor as party discipline is important for the working of the machinery of government.[19] The executive, having the right of disolution, can threaten rebellious members, and in the selection of

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[19]   R.Jenkins, "Party Discipline", The Spectator, (April 8th), 1960.

candidates one may infer that there would be a greater need, for the central party organs, to supervise and control the process as diligently as possible, in order to create a homogeneous party and rid it of rebellious personalities. The Congressional system, on the other hand, does not rely quite so much on party voting,[20] the Executive has no manifest sanction over the legislators, and one surmises that the overall effect would be to decentralize the candidate selection process.

Moreover, because of the greater flexibility that is allowed in the Congressional system one would imagine that there would be less need to form minor protest parties in order to have one's views expressed, as legislators can go against their party line with relative freedom. In parliamentary government, however, it would appear that with the rigidity of the system, there would be a greater tendency to express views in minor protest parties.

The political structures of unitary or Federal States, should also have the effect of centralizing or decentralizing the party system and organisation. In the unitary state, attention is to the central government, and local affairs and perceptions, are relegated to a minor position. Furthermore the party is able to maintain strong lines of communication as there are no power centres between the central office and the locality. The Federal state, however, with its decentralized nature, seems conducive to regionalism thus providing a basis on which to stand against central interference and coercion.

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[20]
  D. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wicey Co. 1959).

But the tendencies emanating from parliamentary government etc. are what we expect from the formal workings of the institutions. No account is taken of other variables, and the informal influences which may appear. It is therefore contended that institutions have no 'direct' effect on the method of candidate selection, because the institutional framework and the working of the institutions, are directly influenced by the prevailing attitudes in the political culture. From our experience with the developing nations,[21] we have seen that institutions are greatly shaped by the indigenous cultures. The institutions are always modified to suit their environmental conditions. Thus we see that despite the formal influences of the institutions of state, in reality they have no direct causal relationship with candidate selection. Moreover in looking at Britain and the United States one can find further information for this point of view.

Firstly, there can be no doubt that the British Constitution has been radically changed in the past 150 years. All the appendages of the old constitution remain, but in the working of modern government, we can divide the constitutional machinery into dignified and efficient parts (following Bagehot). As Rose points out, Britain is a traditional-modern community, having modified her institutions from monarchial to Parliamentary government. These changes have occurred as changes in British social and economical life have taken place. The changes in the institutions have always been behind

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21
. G.Almond and J.Coleman, Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).

developments in British social life, so that we can rightly ascertain that the institutional framework is purely an extension of the culture.

Secondly, we find that the United States has a written constitution dating from 1789. The government of the country being based on the 'federal ideal', having separation of powers between Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary, on the national level, and having the power for internal government separated between the state governments (now 50) and the Federal government.

The formal influences of the federal system of government are to decentralize controls and powers. But as we have contended previously, the institutional framework of a particular country only acts as an appendage of the cultural attitude structure. Undoubtedly Harold Laski was correct when he said, "that effective and vigorous government was made difficult by federalism and the institutional apparatus of American Federalism maximizes the difficulty of achieving creative leadership in the positive state".[22] Nevertheless that the tendency towards decentralization persists, and that the candidate selection process is decentralized remains more as a result of the attitude structure than the institutional structure.

Thus Epstein tells that

> In analyzing American methods, it is reasonable to put greater emphasis on the general weakness of party control than on decentralization ... there is no way

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[22] H. Laski, *The American Democracy*, (New York: The Viking Press, Inc. 1948), p. 121.

for parties to centralize control if they cannot organize to exercise control at some level.[23]

Epstein concludes, therefore, that it is hard to accept federalism as a cause for the main characteristics of the American candidate selection practices

> It is true that, in the federal system, state parties are stronger in most respects than national parties, but many state parties do not appear to control the selection of candidates for congressional or state legislative offices. Nor do local units of state parties regularly exercise this control. The looseness, the individualism, and the interest-group influences characterizing American candidate selection are state as well as national phenomena. They cannot be attributed to federalism.[24]

We can, therefore, conclude that for the purposes of this study, political institutions shall be treated as an exogenous variable.

3. Party Competition.

The extent of party competition in any particular country depends very much on other variables in the model, such as the cultural and electoral system. As Duverger has said

> "the party system and the electoral system are two realities that are indissolubly linked, and even difficult sometimes to separate by analysis. The influence of ballot systems could be compared with that of a brake or an accelerator. The multiplication of parties which arises as a result of other factors, is facilitated by one type of electoral system and hindered by another. Ballot procedures, however, have no real driving power.

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[23]
Epstein, op. cit. p. 209.

[24]
Ibid.

The most decisive influences in this respect are aspects of the life of the nation such as ideologies and particularly the socio-economic structure".[25]

Thus, Duverger sees a causal relationship between proportioned representation and multi-partyism.[26] The essential point for this study, however, is whether the nature of candidate selection changes as the nature of party competition changes within a particular constituency. In some countries, there are two parties competing at the national level, but within the constituencies there can be anything from one party dominance to multi-partyism. V.O.Key, A.Ranney and others, have hypothesized that party activity in the pre-nominating stages is dependent on party competition. If a party has very little chance of winning the seat, it will have to go to great lengths to find a candidate. Often the candidate they choose, will be of inferior quality --- see analysis of status in Chapter I -- or different in his socio-economic status to those chosen in the more marginal or winnable seats. In these winnable seats it is proposed that the party will have very little to do at the pre-nominating stage, as there will be an abundance of eligible candidates. The central offices of the party, moreover, could be more active in the

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M.Duverger, _Political Parties_ (London: University Paperbacks, 1965), p. 217.

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For a critique of Duverger see, A.Wildowsky, "A Methodological critique of Duverger's Political Parties" in Eckstein and Apter's, _Comparative Politics_ (New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1963), pp.368-375.

winnable seats, as they will want the man they regard as the most
likely to give good service to the party in the legislature nominated.
Thus the balance of influences and character of the candidate, can
change fundamentally between winnable and hopeless seats.

The extent of party competition in the constituencies is,
therefore, a very important factor, because it should influence both
the extent of party interference in the selection procedures, and
the characteristics of the people selected. Moreover, as this
variable is not dominated by the attitude structures, it has its
own causal effect on candidate selection, and for convenience we
can call it an 'intervening variable'; it does not give the candidate
selection process its fundamental characteristics, but it can modify
certain aspects depending on the form it takes.

4.   Electoral Systems

As with the institutions of the state, electoral arrange-
ments are normally incorporated into the written laws of the land.
Certain arrangements such as the simple majority vote have evolved
out of historical circumstances, but others such as proportional
representation have been, as it were, invented and applied in
different nations at differing times and circumstances. The method
of election can be used to reach different ends, each end carrying
with it a mark of legitimacy in this 'democratic age'. Thus
electoral arrangements might be used to enhance strong and stable
government as with the simple majority vote (despite its tendency to
over-represent the dominant factions in the society at the expense

of minority opinion); they might be used to represent equally, groups

in a society, or by gerrymandering (altering electoral boundaries

and changing the quantity and quality of certain constituencies)

they might be used to gain a majority for a particular group and

stability for the country, as in France since 1958;[27] furthermore,

as with proportional representation, they will try to give equal weight

to every individual's vote, no vote being intentionally wasted. But

what is of importance to this study, is the manner in which

different electoral systems affect:

> (i)   the degree of central party responsibility
> in the candidate selection process
>
> (ii) the degree of interference by local party
> officials in the candidate selection process.

The first problem looks at the degrees of centralization, whilst

the second problem is presupposing an electoral system in which the

country is divided into constituencies, however large or small.

Any particular electoral system, therefore, denotes its own

characteristics: the size of the constituency, the number of

people who are eligible to vote, and the manner in which the vote

is counted. Thus, Duverger tells us, "that the influence of parties

on candidatures varies in direct relation to the size of

constitutencies. The larger the constituency, the greater is

party influence, the smaller the constituency, the more restricted

is party intervention. The smaller the constituency, the more

possible is it for the electors to have individual knowledge of the

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[27]. D.Pickles, The Fifth French Republic (London: University
Paperbacks, 1965), pp.47-63.

candidate and the more does the campaign become a clash of person-
alities, between whom the elector chooses, because of their personal
qualities and not because of their political allegiance".[28] Moreover
the possibility of direct contact between the electors and candidates
is not the only related factor involved, the financial aspect cannot
be neglected either. In a small constituency (i.e. in area and popu-
lation), election expenses are not as high as in a large one, it is
not easy for candidates to stand without party support, but it
remains possible. In a large constituency (i.e. area and/or
population), this no longer remains viable, the expenses of the
campaign can be borne only by parties or by collective organisations
which tend to resemble parties.

Under different electoral systems, therefore, we can expect
to find different outcomes for the candidate selection process:[29]

(i) First-Past - The Post System; or Simple Plurality.

This system is most familiar to citizens of Britain and the United
States, being the election of one personality at a time by a
relative majority; the candidate with the most votes being declared
elected. The constituencies are small (that is in population, not
necessarily in area). Under this system, therefore, we would expect

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28
      Duverger, op. cit., p. 357.

29
      For a good discussion of Electoral Systems, see Lakeman
and Lambert, Voting in Democracies (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).

to find little central party interference, and great stress on personalities. But depending upon the attitude structure, and consequently the institutional framework of a particular country, the expected results of the system might be modified. Thus we find that in Britain, the parties dominate the electoral process to the detriment of all independent candidates, whereas the expected de-centralized effects obtain in the United States.

(ii) Proportional Representation

This system tends to increase the influence of parties over candidates. It can be divided, however, into two different systems, that of the list system and the single transferable vote.

a) List System: the existence of parties is given legal recognition, and they are treated as the units for which fair representation is sought. It is accepted that if a number of seats are to be filled, they can be distributed among two or more parties according to the proportion of the total vote, that each of those parties receives. This system, can be operated on the national level doing away with constituencies. The parties have lists containing the names of their candidates; the most prominent being at the top, and the least known at the bottom. This system gives complete power over the selection of candidates to the central party organs, and normally takes the personality factor out of politics.

But there are variations in the working of this system despite its simple foundations. The complications arise from two distinct aims:-

- to relate as accurately as possible the number of seats

held to the polling strength of the parties.

    - to permit an opportunity for the voter to express an opinion on the personal merits of candidates.

Thus there are occasions on which electors can choose candidates on different tickets, and the system is sometimes used in large constituencies giving up to ten seats, rather than on a national scale. The most rigid system of this kind was that used in France for the General Elections of 1945-1946, and the most flexible that used in Switzerland.

    b) Single Transferable Vote: there is not the emphasis on party as with the above. The system is designed to make every vote as effective as possible, whether used to support a party or not. The system was invented by Thomas Hare in 1857, it depends on large multi-member constituencies, and the electors are asked to put down their first and subsequent choices. The count is made by using a quota system:

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{\text{total valid votes}}{\text{total seats} + 1} + 1$$

The persons obtaining the quota are declared elected; excess votes are taken and distributed together with the second choices of the candidate with least votes and so-on. This system thus gives legitimacy to individual candidates, but because of the size of the constituency and the expense of making oneself known to the public, the local party's position must be enhanced. Moreover, because there is a greater chance of at least winning one seat, the interest of the central offices and local party officials will be raised.

Electoral systems, however, do not produce by themselves particular influences. The effects of the systems are very much determined by the cultural, economic, regional, religious and ethnic factors in any community; as such, therefore, they cannot have any causal relationship to the method of candidate selection, and we will treat them as exogenous variables for the purpose of this study.

5. Party Organisation (Finance and Membership)

More than any other variable in the model, this seems to have closest affinity to candidate selection. In any political system, party organisation is a result of the Party's sub-culture, and certain circumstantial and historical factors. Parties as we know them are a modern phenomenon, being formed at the time of the expansion of the suffrage in the mid-nineteenth century.[30] This is not to deny the legitimacy of the old labels of political groupings, such as Whigs, Tories, Jeffersonians and Madisonians; but the essential characteristics of these groups were their smallness and their inter-parliamentary organisation without any formal extra-parliamentary structure. The modern party is not a close knit community, but a collection of communities, a union of small groups dispersed through the country and linked by co-ordinating institutions.

(i) Because in most western countries there remain parties

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[30]
    Duverger, op. cit. p. xxiii.

which have evolved out of the old groupings, Duverger is capable
of drawing up a two-fold organizational classification.[31] This is
based on the idea that whatever their origins, parties which have
come into being outside parliament offer a marked contrast with
parties arising within the electoral and parliamentary cycle. It
is the distinction between intra (direct) and extra (indirect)
parliamentary organisation.[32] Moreover Duverger finds a correlation
between extra-parliamentary organisation and centralization. For
analogous reasons, parties arising outside the parliamentary circle
are generally more coherent and more disciplined than parties of
electoral and parliamentary origins. The former have at their
disposal an organisation already in existence which naturally binds
together all the cells at the base; the latter have all these bonds
to create with no other starting point than the co-existence of a
few representatives within the one parliament. This distinction,
furthermore, was also put forward by James Bryce. He made the
distinction, for example, between two categories of socialist parties:
Labour parties, created by Trade Unions, and Socialist parties proper,
created by parliamentarians and intellectuals, the second being much
more doctrinaire and much less realistic than the first. (In the

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[31]
Duverger, op. cit. p. 17.

[32]
Ibid., p. xxx.

former case the socialist ideology was grafted on to an
interest party, in the latter case, the ideology came first).

(ii)   Similarly the influence of the parliamentary group
is very different in the two types of party; being immense in the
case of parties of parliamentary or electoral origin, and weak in
the case of the parties of extra-parliamentary origin.   In fact
in the latter, there is often more or less open mistrust of the
parliamentary group, and a more or less definite desire to subject
it to the authority of an independent controlling committee.

It can be seen from the above, therefore, how the origins
of party organisation can affect the degree of centralisation within
a party.   This is most significant for our study, as being inter-
ested in the reasons for the differing authority relationships within
political parties.   Moreover Duverger also has a second, four-fold
classification of membership for political parties.   As with the
above set, these tend to be ideal types which exist today in a modi-
fied form.

(a)   Cadre parties:[33] these correspond approximately to
the middle class parties of the nineteenth century which still
survive in the shape of Conservative and Liberal Parties.   They
are based upon caucuses which are narrowly recruited, rather
independent of one another, and generally decentralized, their aim
is not so much to increase the membership or to enlist the masses,

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[33]
    Duverger, op. cit., p. 1.

as to recruit outstanding people. Since their activity is entirely

directed towards elections and parliamentary alliances, they have in

consequence a somewhat seasonal character and the framework of their

administration is embryonic. It does not rely on mass subscriptions,

and because these parties have no continuing stable financial backing

and live in perpetual money difficulties, they are always soft-

hearted towards candidates willing to cover the costs of the campaign,

and in practice investiture for these people is obtained without

great difficulty.

(b)   Mass parties: The structure of these parties is different,

being directed to organize as large a proportion of the masses as

possible (examples of this form of party being the Socialist parties

of continental Europe). A definite scheme of affiliation exists,

therefore, complemented by a very strict system of individual sub-

scriptions, on which the parties are dependent for their finances.

These parties, are consequently based on the branch, which is less

decentralized than the caucus. A branch is only a part of the whole,

and its separate existence is inconceivable. The branch is extensive

and tries to enrol members, to multiply their number, and to increase

its total strength. It does not despise quality, but quantity is

the most important consideration, and as the branch is a more numerous

group than the caucus it possesses a more perfected internal organiz-

ation. Fundamentally, however, Duverger finds that the real element

of the branch, is the branch committee, which meets regularly and

ensures the day-to-day functioning of the organisation.[34]

34   Duverger, op. cit. p.25.

The committee becomes nothing but a caucus of a rather special type ; it is the old caucus continuing, slightly transformed and slightly rejuvenated in the guise of a branch. "Party leaders generally deplore this state of affairs, without fully realizing that it is inevitable because it is inherent in the substructure of their groups. The middle class, whether it be upper, lower, or intermediate, is not fond of collective action".[35] Nonetheless Duverger believes that the branch acts as a legitimate structure of parties, "an institution is legitimate when it corresponds to the dominant doctrines of a period, to the most widely held beliefs on the nature and form of power".[36]

But these party groups have less taste for the caucus capitalist form of individual candidatures. Moreover their constitutions often contain clauses intended to prevent an independent personality from receiving party support at the last moment: only those who have been party members for a certain amount of time can stand for election with party support.

(c) Totalitarian: this category has very little relevance to our study as we are only interested in the 'western democracies'. Duverger uses this form of party to compare with the decentralization and semi-decentralization of the other two forms; totalitarian parties being highly centralized and controlled.

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[35] Ibid, p. 25.

[36] Ibid, p. 26.

(d)   Other: Duverger notes that some parties do not fit into any of the above categories. An example of this being the Labour parties, which are constituted on a basis of Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies (indirect structure). This is an organizational and financial arrangement, to the benefit of the lower status groups in a society. In essence, therefore, its function is very similar to the mass party. But for our study of candidate selection, the distinction is very important because of the feeling that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'.

The form of membership and basic party organisation, therefore, can fundamentally affect the extent of centralization within the party and the particular form of financing with its ramifications on the influences of would-be candidates. It must be noted, however, that political parties form sub-cultures of the polity, and that these can influence the organizational arrangements just as the general political culture affects the national institutions.

Summary

We have consequently seen the relative merits of each variable in the model, and it is hypothesised that the predominant variable in determining the nature of candidate selection and the related elitist tendencies in any one country, is the attitude towards authority expressed in terms of the desire for strong or weak leadership (degrees of political deference) and the desire for particular social groups to take the top political positions (degrees of social deference).

It has been found, moreover, that the two variables described

as Institutions and Electoral Systems, have no direct causal link
of their own to candidate selection. In their structure, and/or
their working influence, we hypothesized that they are dominated by
the attitude structure of the culture of a particular society, and
as such will treat them as exogenous variables.

On the other hand, the two variables described as party
competition and party organization, can be classified as inter-
vening variables. The characteristics of both of these variables
exist somewhat independently of the attitude structure;
party competition in a particular constituency resting on regional
and economic diversity, and party organization resting on historical
and circumstantial criteria. Depending on the forms of both of
these variables therefore, certain aspects of the candidate selection
process can alter, thus with party competition there can be differences
with the type of candidate selected, and the degree of party inter-
ference; and with party organization, financial arrangements and
certain fundamental constitutional arrangements can vary. Our
proposition, becomes rather more refined, therefore, and diagramatic-
ally looks as follows:-

Figure 2

In testing this model to see if it is isomorphic with the real world, we have to look at candidate selection in different countries and see if our assumptions are substantiated by the facts as they now stand.

PART II

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN BRITAIN

CHAPTER THREE

At this stage in the study we intend to develop the analysis
in the previous chapter into propositions, which we shall test
with the available information on candidate selection in Britain.
We have designated each variable with certain influences, therefore
we must see if these effects are manifested in British Candidate
Selection.

1.   Political Attitudes

In order to ascertain the attitudes towards authority and
personal power in Britain, we can look at several different focal
points of British life, and search for a prevailing cultural force.

(i)   Deferential Values

Most writers would agree with Eckstein when he tells us
that, "the British conception of authority . . . attributes to leader-
ship a far larger scope of legitimate independent action than that
of any other democratic country -- independent action meaning action
taken on the leader's own initiative rather than as an expression of
popular or parliamentary will".[1]

Since the time of Bagehot, political commentators have been
describing this attitude as being deferential and it has been regarded
as an attitude most peculiar to Britain.[2] As Richard Rose says, "among
the rights of Englishmen, liberty is pre-eminent, so deeply inculcated
in individuals is respect for liberty to speak, to act and to travel

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[1]   Eckstein, op. cit. p. 67.

[2]   Bagehot, The English Constitution, (London: Cox & Wyman, Ltd).

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as one pleases that there are few statutory guarantees of liberty. But the high value given to liberty is not matched by strong support for norms concerning social equality; favourable attitudes towards inequality being most important."[3]

Most recently certain academics have been studying the phenomenon of the working class Tory in Britain, as this seems to be the most strongly manifested indicator of deference.[4] "All political systems are hierarchial," says Nordlinger; "and every society has at least one political elite. However there are wide variations in both the form that these authority relations take and the elements which support them."[5] In a singularly important sense

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1963), p. 235. -- "it has been thought strange, but there are nations in which the numerous unwiser part wishes to be ruled by the less numerous wiser part. The numerical majority whether by custom or by choice is immaterial -- is ready, is eager to delegate its powers of choosing its rulers to a certain select minority. It abdicates in favour of its elite, and consents to obey whoever that elite may confide in."

[3]
R.Rose, Politics England, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 38.

[4]
Nordlinger, op. cit. and R.T.McKenzie and A.Silver "Conservatism, Industrialism and the Working Class Tory in England", in Rose, Studies in, p. 21.

[5]
Nordlinger, op. cit. p. 14.

England is regarded as a democratic anomaly; the country's
political development having allowed traditional attitudes towards
authority to become fused with more recent democratic values, to
form a governmental tradition in which leaders expect to lead. Due
to this fusion the model authority patterns brings together democractic
and hierarchial elements, and in comparison with all other western
democracies, the emphasis falls on the latter.

A good description of contemporary relations between the
government and governed, has been made by L.S.Amery. "Our
Constitution," he says, "has throughout conformed to that principle
of balance between initiative and control which Burke laid down. It
has never been one in which the active and originating element has
been the voter, selecting a delegate to express his views ... and to
select an administration conforming to his views. The starting
point and mainspring of action has always been the government."[6]

More important still, is the fact that all of these attitudes
are a fundamental part of the Conservative Party. Thus Glickman
tells us that, "the Conservatives believe that it is authoritative
leadership which is thought to produce the ordered community and the
good society. This having profound constitutional implications,
since it means that the essence of Toryism is fundamentally anti-
democratic -- distrusting the capacity and will of the people to

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[6] L.S.Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1947), p. 15.

govern themselves."[7]   This analysis leads Nordlinger and other
writers to the belief, that it is basically the Tory conception of
the relationship between the government and the governed which is
widely diffused throughout the population.

It is the contention, therefore, that attitudes of social
deference are strong in Britain, this being despite the apparent
lessening of the phenomenon in the 20th century caused by the
pervasiveness of industrialization and urbanization, two processes
which should not be conducive to socially deferential behaviour.
Added to this social deference, however, is political deference,
the desire for strong leadership, with loyalty to the office held,
rather than to the innate characteristics of the office-holder.
This unlike social deference, is a characteristic of both major
political parties in Britain. It exists in the Labour Party, along-
side egalitarian attitudes, without the predominance of social
deference. It enables the leader to possess great strength and
authority with the proviso that if he does not readily satisfy the
rank and file, he will be removed. Moreover whereas the Conservative
Party draws cohesion and stability from its social deference, it
could be surmised that the Labour Party should suffer from
fissiparous tendencies because of its single reliance on political
deference for leadership roles.

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    H.Glickman, "Toryness of English Conservatism", Journal of
British Studies, November 1961, p. 131-132.

Now we shall seek further validity for our contention that there is strong social and political deference in Britain as follows:-

(a) <u>Social and Political deference studied in its natural setting</u>

Firstly Richard Rose formulates the idea that socially deferential behaviour is based on trust.[8] He believes that the ancient legal maxim, 'The Queen can do no wrong', suggests the viewpoint that the government is not a menace to Englishmen. At the level of national political activity, this trust can be traced back to the feudal conceptions of loyalty which mixed personal honour and obligations of office. Moreover the shock of the Profumo affair in 1963 arose from the fact that a Minister would lie to the House of Commons in a personal statement. Significantly his colleagues preferred to trust the word of this ex-officer and gentleman rather than cross-examine him on the basis of available evidence. Another indicator of this factor was the Philby affair, in which this top-ranking Secret Service official was able to avoid prosecution despite manifesting certain obvious signs of being untrustworthy.[9] In fact, Rose tells us that the working of the British Government greatly depends on trust, as so much is controlled by convention.[10]

Secondly it is found that the emphasis on government over representation (i.e. political deference) comes out even more clearly in the fact that the British do not even expect Parliament as such to govern them. They not only permit, they even expect a particular

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[8] Rose, <u>Politics England</u>, p. 43.

[9] K. Philby, <u>My Secret World</u> (New York: Grove Press Inc. 1968).

[10] Rose, <u>op. cit.</u>

section of Parliament -- the Cabinet -- to govern, pretty much independent of the private will of the ordinary Members of Parliament.[11] Moreover within the Cabinet the Prime Minister has become a dominant figure, thus increasing the hierarchical ladder even further.[12]

Thirdly, we find that deference in politics is paralleled by deference in general social behaviour.[13] Eckstein tells us that, "the Social ideologies associated with the rise of democracy, especially egalitarianism, have probably had a less substantial effect on British life than constitutional theory itself."[14] Nordlinger, moreover, sees three crucial characteristics of English social structure. In the first instance the lines of demarcation between and within classes are relatively clearly drawn, and together with the occupational groupings form a pyramidal outline;[15] in the second instance there is a close correspondence between occupational stratification and the distribution of social status (prestige, honour, and respect);[16] and in the third instance, there is a close correspondence between occupation, status, rank on the one hand, and the

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[11]
Eckstein, op. cit., p. 77

[12]
R.H.Crossman, Introduction to Bagehot's English Constitution, op. cit., p. 42. Nordlinger, op. cit. p. 20.

[13]
Eckstein, op. cit. p. 92 and Nordlinger, op. cit. p. 23.

[14]
Eckstein, op. cit. p. 93.

[15]
Alford, Party and Society, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

[16]
Anthony Wedgewood Benn, Observer, January, 1963, said that

assumption of parallel positions of authority on the other. The achievements valued most of all are normally reflections of aristocratic values, and the right education matters perhaps most of all. As Eckstein says, "Affluence helps one up the social ladder, but chiefly by making it relatively easy to acquire the right education, and to indulge in the right tastes to become a gentleman." British class stratification is, therefore, a matter of social rather than economic stratification, and in this sense reflects the hierarchical ideals of aristocratic days.

Fourthly, the English tradition of the amateur (in sport, especially cricket; in law, Justices of the Peace; service on lay-appointive councils and boards; and service as Councillors in local government) -- the de-emphasis placed upon, and the mild social stigma attaching to the specialist and the expert -- can be interpreted as both a manifestation of, and support of the crystallization of class, status, and authority. The belief that the best leader, and the best administrator is the man who is the generalist (belief still held by the British Civil Service Commission, although under review by the Fulton Commission) unencumbered by the experts' narrow outlook, opens up top positions of authority to just those individuals who do not have any specialized training -- the upper and upper-middle classes.

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the Honours system as it now stands serves to buttress the class structure in England dividing people into social categories on the basis that there are superior and inferior human beings. Thus the Atlantic rowers, Paratrooper Chas. Blyth and Captain John Ridgway, received different decorations for the same incredible exercise, because one was an 'officer and a gentleman', and the other an 'ordinary soldier'.

Fifthly and finally, we see that the phenomenon of deference has been with us for a long time. We have noted earlier how Bagehot described the British masses as deferential in the middle of the 19th century, and that Britain's respect for its aristocracy has been an age-long characteristic to the anguish and despair of would-be reformers. It is perhaps just, therefore, to decide that even on the analysis of deference in its natural setting, there is a great deal of evidence for its existence.

(b)   Social and Political Deference in an artifical setting

Firstly we can refer to a very comprehensive study by Almond and Verba, who have studied political attitudes in the United States, Great Britain, Mexico, Germany and Italy.[17] They began their study with a broadest possible classification of objects and relationships; investigating those attitudes that refer to the self as a political actor, and those attitudes which refer to the input and output structures of the political system. From this starting point they developed a threefold typology of parochial, subject, and participant cultures. On this basis they found that Britain was less of a participant culture than the United States, and had a very high degree of trust in its general social relationships.

Secondly, Mark Abrams and Richard Rose have made a study of attitudes towards political leadership.[18] They found that the qualities

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[17]
  Almond and Verba, op. cit. Ch.XIII.

[18]
  Abrams and Rose, op. cit.

that help qualify an Englishman for political life are not specific
to the political system being similar to the standards set in social
relationships. Thus there was emphasis on birth, strength of character,
and native intelligence, all of which do not require political experi-
ence (i.e. social deference). Moreover they found that 50 per cent of
Conservative and Labour voters were willing to subordinate themselves
to strong political leadership (i.e. political deference).

It must be stated therefore, that the evidence produced is
overwhelmingly in favour of the proposition that Britain is a
deferential society, and as such is an easily testable determinant
for British candidate selection.

(ii)   Beliefs

In any society there are certain beliefs which are super-
imposed on the values of that society. Thus the civic culture
survey found that a great majority of the British people believe that
government has an impact on their daily lives and that it is bene-
ficial.[19] Moreover in Britain, the cultural attitudes towards
welfare services reflect a very high level of consensus; the belief
in community provision of basic necessities of welfare being traced
back to medieval times in England, when the Church was a provider of
food, shelter, and care in old age. We see here, therefore, that
there is a belief that government is good, and that there is

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[19]
    Almond and Verba, op. cit. Ch.III.

consensus on helping the needy. This perhaps partly answers the
reason for the maintenance of social and political deference in
Britain, because the people feel that they have always been dealt with
justly by their upper class   rulers. Another factor, however,
adds to this, and that is the dislike of abrupt political change.[20]
English Conservatives appreciate that those who stand rigidly against
all reform risk being swamped by social forces stronger than them-
selves, and the Fabians built their philosophy on the need for
gradualness. This factor has again, therefore, enhanced the accept-
ance of a ruling group, and allowed the deferential culture to sustain
itself.

(iii)   Emotional and Political Symbolism

It is through symbols that emotional affect is carefully
contained and channelled. As Bagehot recognized a century ago, the
use of dignified symbols of government can be of value in so far
as they excite and preserve the reverence of the population.[21] This
idea came out of his distinction between dignified and efficient
parts of the political system, the efficient parts being those by
which the government carries out its work. It would seem that the
more symbolism that there is in a society, the more chance is there to
be a lack of reality in the political attitudes and actions of the

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[20]
    R. Rose, op. cit., p. 48.

[21]
    Bagehot, op. cit.

masses. We may add, that if Bagehot was correct, the more dignified parts to the Constitution that there are in a society, the greater tendency will there be for deferential values.

In Britain, as Eckstein tells us, "the predemocratic institutions -- the Monarchy, the Lords, the Lord Mayor, etc. -- have an almost complete monopoly on the expressive symbolism of British politics. There is simply nothing of democratic vintage to compete against them except dry and abstract slogans. This helps to inject into British political culture a pervasive set of non-democratic attitudes, and it also gives Britain something that few other democracies possess: a set of intelligible symbols of government and authority that fully enlist the fancy and emotions of the people."[22]

The extent to which the predemocratic institutions have an effect on British life is demonstrated by Shils and Young in their analysis of the Coronation in 1953.[23] They tell us that the Coronation was regarded as an inspiration and a rededication of the nation. It was viewed as the ceremonial occasion for the affirmation of the moral values by which the society lived. The Coronation service and the procession which followed were shared and celebrated by nearly all the people in Britain. There was a solemn feeling that something touching the roots of British Society was involved, and the

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[22]
    Eckstein, op. cit. p.92 and Blondel, op.cit. p. 44.

[23]
    Shils and Young, "Meaning of the Coronation", Sociological Review, Vol. 1. December 1953, pp. 63-81.

writers found its manifestation in several ways. They found an increase in communal unity, even the police reporting that contrary to expectations, the pick-pockets, usually an inevitable concomitant of any large crowd, were entirely inactive during Coronation Day; antagonisms were lessened, and the Coronation became a vital common subject for people to talk about. People became more aware of their dependence on each other, and they sensed some connection between this and their relationship to the Queen. The authors were convinced that, 'the English Monarchy strengthens the government with strength of religion, and that it gives vast strength to the whole Constitution by enlisting on its behalf the credulous obedience of enormous masses'. It can be asserted therefore, that expressive symbolism also plays its part in perpetuating the deferential values in British political and social life.

Political Socialization

The agencies of political socialization both perpetuate and modify major norms of the political culture.

a) the Family -- this agency is a great stablizing influence. Children learn to take industrial society for granted and strong face to face relationships can be built up in communities with advanced industrial technologies.[24] Indirectly the family influences political attitudes and recruitment by the consequences it has for a child's education and his adult role expectations.

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[24] M.Young and P.Willmott, Family and Kinship in the East London, Rev.Ed. (Harmondsworth Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965). B.Jackson and P.Marsden, Education and the Working Class, (London: Penguin Books, Ltd. 1966).

b) education -- by segregating and stratifying young people into markedly different institutions for education, the initial influence of family and class upon the formation of complementary political attitudes and role expectations is usually strengthened. Despite changes, even today the majority of Englishmen leave school at the age of fifteen; and the job as much as the school becomes a place where adolescent formative years are spent. Because of the influence of family background and of education upon occupational choice, going to work for the great majority does not involve a major change in their social position.

It can be seen, therefore, that Britain is a highly stratified society, and that the socialization processes help to perpetuate an elite phenomenon in British society.

Economic and Social Development

But the socialization processes can change and are changing in Britain. Comprehensive education is slowly being introduced, which will no longer divide thepopulation into those who went to Grammar school, and those who went to Secondary schools. Moreover there has been an expansion of the Universities, creating far more places for the newly educated classes. On top of these new factors, there has been an increase in the mobility of the British working force, traditional ties are breaking down, with the collapse of the old staple industries. With the increase in mobility, and stretching of personal perceptions of one's own place in society, the rigid formula of family, education, occupation and social status is gradually being

broken down. It would seem, therefore, that with the development of the economic system, the socialization processes are going to lead to a change in the prevailing cultural ethos in Britain; mobility and higher education not being conducive to socially deferential behaviour.

Nonetheless it can be seen that at the present time the prevailing attitudes in Britain are deferential in both the social and political sense. We see, however, that of the two major parties only the Conservative party manifests the general political culture, the Labour party having its own distinctive sub-culture -- based on egalitarianism and political deference.

Our proposition is that there is a causal relationship between the prevailing attitudes towards authority in a society and the method of candidate selection. If this is correct, we would expect candidate selection in Britain to have certain basic characteristics, in view of the deferential nature of its culture. As we have noted already, there is a difference in the deferential attitudes between the two parties, the Labour party lacking strong social deference. This should tend to make the party more fissiparous than the Conservative, and with the special characteristic of its organisation as an intervening variable we should expect it to have different organisational principles. Moreover we would expect there to be strong informal centralizing influences in the Conservative Party, and for its political elite to be recruited from those segments of British society with high social status; on the other hand we would

expect the Labour party to recruit its political elite from lower status groups, and for the phenomenon of a social hierarchy to be considerably lessened.

1. Conservative Party

a) On looking at the organisation of the Conservative Party, we find that there are no real regulations concerning the place of the Constituency Association in the Party. In fact, it has been widely claimed that the Conservative Constituency Association is a completely autonomous body.[25] The Maxwell Fyfe report on party organisation, published in 1949, stated explicitly that no orders could be given to Constituency Associations either by Central Office or by the Area Offices. The National Union, however, does have disciplinary control over all Constituency Associations. The associations are admitted to membership of the National Union in the first instance subject to the approval of the Executive Committee. The latter reserves the right to withdraw that approval, an action which, of course, is equivalent to expulsion from the National Union.

The most interesting factor regarding the autonomy of the Constituency Associations concerns the powers of readoption. It is presumed by the Responsible Party School that the highest threat the party can give is that of refusing to have a dissident member re-adopted. But on looking at the history of readoption in the Conservative Party we find that this lever, on the rare occasions

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[25]
    Nicolson, op. cit. p. 36, and McKenzie, op. cit. p. 241.

that it has been used, has been wielded by the Constituency

Associations. It has been used, therefore, mainly in the struggle

between the Association and its member, in order to make him more

responsive to their demands. It has been the manifestation of the

dilemma between delegate or representative which was discussed in

Chapter One. But in rebuking a member, the Constituency Associations

have been performing a most unusual function, because as Epstein

tells us, "there is an indication that the Constituency service to

the party includes a partly self-generating function in relation to

the maintenance of parliamentary cohesion."[26] Epstein reaches

this conclusion from his study of the Suez affair, in which there

were several rebellious Conservative M.P.'s. He found that of the

seven left wing Suez rebels who defied the government whip but wished

to stand again, five were subjected to severe criticism by their

association, and four were not readopted; but of the eight right

wing rebels who defied and then resigned the whip, not one was even

critized by his association for his parliamentary deviation, let

alone refused adoption. This suggests therefore, that Conservative

local activists do not necessarily demand that their members follow

the party leader wherever he goes on policy; rather they insist that

he adhere faithfully to what they regard as the true principles of

Conservatism.

b) The Conservative case is therefore, a very interesting one.

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[26] L. Epstein, "British M.P's and Their Local Parties: The
Suez Cases", _American Political Science Review_, Vol. LIV, June 1960,
p.374.

Despite the contentions of the responsible party school we have found that the local Constituency Associations are almost completely autonomous. But we also found that the associations did not use this autonomy to weaken, but to strengthen the national party leadership, and that they embarassed the party more by their zeal than by their lack of it. It could, therefore, be assumed that the reasons for the lack of formal controls and the infrequent use of the few that are in existence, is for the very fact that centralizations is obtained very well by informal and indirect means. We have therefore found in the Conservative Party the expected informal centralizing factors based upon deferential attitude structures.

2. Labour Party.

a) The Labour Constituency Parties are subject to rather more detailed control by the central organs of their party than are the Conservative Associations. The latter are recommended to adopt certain model rules; but the Labour Party Constitution (Clause III, Section 2) requires that each organ of the Party must adopt the rules laid down by the Party Conference. Again, with the selection of its candidates, the Labour Associations are seen to be far less autonomous than its Conservative counterpart.

But, as with the Conservative Party, there have been instances in which the local Constituency Association has taken upon itself to refuse readoption to its sitting member, and one occasion stands out against all others. The occasion in question is the recent Desmond Donnelly dispute.[27] He has for many years been an

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27
Sunday Times, April 17th, 1968.

outspoken critic of the Wilson government, and the National Party
had for a long time been trying to remove him from his Constituency.
The matter came to a head in April 1968, when Donnelly attempted to
take his local Constituency Association out of the Labour Party, in
order that he could stand as an Independent Labour candidate with
local backing. The President of the Association and a National Party
agent tried to prevent the bid, but after an incredible uproar in which
several people left the meeting, the Association voted to disaffiliate
itself from the National Party, and give its support to Donnelly.

b)   This case is very important to us, because Donnelly was a rebel
who was straddling the centre of party politics. Contrary to Epstein's
view, therefore, we find a centrist M.P. being supported by his
local Constituency Association in the face of hostility from the
National Leadership. This case, therefore, gives us evidence of
the greater fissiparous tendencies within the Labour Party, and the
great internal conflict between centralization and decentralization.
Fundamentally the Labour Party seeks to be a more democratic and
decentralized party than the Conservatives, but because of the nature
of its organisation, and its susceptibility to fissiparous tendencies
(sub-cultural phenomenon), it appears that it has to resort more
often to Constitutional provisions.

3.   Characteristics of Party Elite.

a)   In any highly developed society, there must of course be
stratification, just as we would expect to find in the simple society
the fundamental form of organisation to be the kinship system. But

what is differentiated is also evaluated. Thus it comes about that
whilst social positions are differently valued, there is broad
but by no means complete agreement on the evaluations. Moreover
we have to decide whether the recruitment to the different positions
is open or restricted, and following Marx and Weber, we have to
find the amount of prestige attached to occupational positions.
Furthermore, in a complex society even those occupied in the least
esteemed positions need to have had some education. Literacy and
ability to do simple arithmetic are necessities; they are basic
skills which universal education seeks to provide. But the major
task, true today no less than in the past is to train an élite.
The opportunity to compete for the education to become part of that
élite is therefore very important. In some societies there is very
little equality of opportunity in education, and Britain is one such
society. Moreover certain institutions obtain more status than
others, such as the public schools. Generally it is found to be
true, therefore, that the British Educational System suppresses the
majority of the population reinforcing and perpetuating the
occupational stratification.

In looking at the type of people selected and holding positions
in the Labour and Conservative Parties we can see how far the
deferential attitude permeates the political structure.

b)   Officers of the Political Parties

As Blondel says, by what seems to be a process of selection
by apathy, 35 million electors thin out into 3.5 to 4 million members,
which in turn thin out to 1.5 million semi-active voluntary workers of

whom probably only a third are really active. A few top leaders hold
constituency offices and N.C.O.'s hold offices in the component
bodies of the local associations and local parties; for example, each
of the Greenwich local parties was found in 1950 to have about a
hundred officers of all types "The consequence is", says Blondel, "that
local parties have a hierarchy of leaders; it is the same kind of
hierarchy as one finds on local councils where the average member,
like the average officer of a Ward branch, allows himself to be
led, to the same extent at least by more influential councillors
and alderman."[28]

It seems certain once again, therefore, that the local leader-
ship of both parties is more middle-class than the membership, and
even more removed from the general characteristics of the population.
In the Conservative Party, the local leaders are two degrees removed
from Conservative electors. The manual workers seem to be almost
entirely absent from the Conservative leadership, even from its
outer circles. Leaders of Constituency Labour Parties are not a
photographic image of the whole of the membership either. Among
them as well as among the local Conservative leaders, the middle
class is over represented.

TABLE I

Distribution of occupational groups among officers

Conservatives	Labour		Higher Professional
			Middle Professional
			Lower white collar
			Manual worker

[28] Blondel, op. cit. p. 97

Yet the situation which obtains in the local Labour Parties remains very different from the situation which prevails in Conservative Associations. As Blondel says, "it is not only that the Labour Party is generally based on principles of 'equality' and 'solidarity' which make it difficult for notions of social hierarchy to develop easily at the roots of the party structure. It is also that the non-Manual groups from which the local Labour leaders come from, are usually very different groups from the groups which come to the fore in Conservative Associations."[29]

Even before we look at the candidates and members, therefore, we find great social stratification within the parties, and a difference manifesting itself between the two parties. Both parties seem to become more middle class, with the Labour Party remaining less so, and recruiting its middle class from lower status groups than the Conservatives.

c)   Candidates and Members

The contrasts between the parties are not unexpected. The most striking is the fact that 10% of Labour M.P.'s but 30% of Conservatives have a business background, while 28% of Labour M.P.'s but only 1% of Conservatives come from manual occupations.

29
    Ibid, p. 101.

TABLE II

Background of Candidates and Members

Occupation	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Elected	De-feated	Elected	De-feated	Elected	De-feated
Professions						
Barrister	72	38	27	24	4	21
Solicitor	14	22	10	12	1	11
Doctor, dentist	5	3	7	10	—	3
Architect	6	6	1	3	—	4
Civil Engineer	5	4	1	9	—	3
Chartered Secretary	9	9	3	5	—	11
Civil Servant, Local Govt.	14	3	8	8	—	6
Armed Services	37	1	3	2	—	6
Teaching:						
University	2	1	10	11	—	11
Adult	3	3	4	12	—	6
School	—	14	22	58	—	14
Minister of Religion	—	—	2	1	—	—
Total	167	104	98	155	5	96
Business						
Small business	3	9	12	9	1	16
Company Director	68	38	1	3	—	20
Company Executive	20	32	5	14	—	11
Commerce, Insurance, etc.:						
Management	19	20	3	12	—	9
Clerical	3	4	5	29	—	7
Total	113	103	26	67	1	63
Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous 'white collar'	4	10	6	20	—	9
Private means	4	1	—	—	—	1
Politician	11	2	7	2	—	1
Publicists, Journalists	26	7	25	25	—	20
Farmer	38	9	3	7	—	13
Housewife	1	6	3	4	—	1
Student	—	5	—	1	—	1
Total	84	40	44	59	—	46
Workers						
Railway clerks	—	—	8	8	—	1
Miners	—	1	34	2	—	2
Skilled	1	9	22	52	—	2
Semi- and unskilled	—	3	26	20	—	—
Total	1	13	90	82	—	5
Grand total	365	260	258	363	6	210

[30] Butler and Rose, The British General Election of 1959, (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 127.

Despite the differences between occupations, education provides an even more remarkable comparison. The Conservatives are seen to overwhelmingly favour the public school product, and those university graduates from Oxford. The Labour sample distorts the population percentages but to no where near the extent of the Conservatives.

TABLE III[31]

Educational Background of Candidates and Members

Education	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Elected	De-feated	Elected	De-feated	Elected	De-feated
Elementary only . .	2	8	39	26	----	9
Elementary ⅓ ¹ . .	4	1	53	44	----	----
Secondary only . .	43	58	47	91	----	50
Secondary ⅓ ¹ . .	9	23	13	49	----	18
Secondary and University . .	44	60	59	109	2	63
Public School only .	89	37	5	10	----	25
Public School and University . .	174	73	42	34	4	45
Total . . .	365	260	258	363	6	210
Oxford . . .	104	46	34	35.	2	30
Cambridge . .	79	35	12	27	3	35
Other Universities .	35	52	55	81	1	43
All Universities .	218	133	101	143	6	108
Eton	73	16	3	3	2	9
Harrow . . .	20	3	0	1	----	3
Winchester . .	12	7	3	1	2	1
Other Public School .	158	84	41	39	----	57
All Public Schools	263	110	47	44	4	70

We have found, therefore, to the validity of our initial proposition, that the Conservatives select their candidates primarily from a privileged sector of British society (the upper classes), which is the same sector which dominates

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31
  Ibid, p. 128.

nearly all other aspects of British life, and that the Labour Party

selects candidates from the middle classes and new professions, with

a strong working-class element provided by the Trade Unions.

As Guttsman says

— If we ascend the political hierarchy from the
voters upwards, we find that at each level — the
membership of political parties, party activists,
local political leaders, M.P.'s, National leaders —
the social character of the group is slightly less
representative and slightly more tilted in favour of
those who belong to the middle and upper classes of
our society. Ability and availability, deference and
assumed superiority contribute to this pattern at each
level. For major politicians are initially made by
minor politicians, and the political leaders in mini-
ature who man the local party executives and manage-
ment committees tend to choose as candidates men who
are like themselves and who are socially above them."[31]

It has been seen however, that the Conservative Party is

more at fault for choosing people more for their status, than the

Labour Party. It has been made apparent that the Conservatives

in the end would rather choose a man of public school education

without a university degree than a non-public school candidate

with a brilliant academic career.

There seems little doubt, therefore, that our proposition

has been thus far substantiated. We have found a marked difference

between the two parties, with strong informal centralising factor

in the Conservative Party and fissiparous tendencies in the Labour

Party. Moreover the characteristics of the elites of both parties

have great differences. The Conservative elite takes the form of a

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[32] W.C.Guttsman, The British Political Elite, (London:
MacGibbon and Kee, 1963), p. 27.

national oligarchy in the fact that it is recruited from a privileged section of society, which not only dominates politics, but also industry and commerce. On the other hand, the Labour élite is predominantly middle class which is a concomitant of the necessity for certain basic skills for political life. In looking at the other variables we shall see exactly how far the intervening variables effect British candidate selection.

2. Party Competition in the Constituencies

In our proposition, it was asserted that the extent of party competition in a Constituency can act as an intervening variable on candidate selection. In this analysis, therefore, we are interested to measure the following:-

(a) the extent of national and local party interference in the prenominating stage.

(b) the characteristics of the candidates; education, age, experience and sponsorship.

(i) Conservative Party

The selection of a candidate for a seat that he is expected to win is necessarily a more important business than the selection of a candidate who can hope to do no more than reduce an opponent's majority.[33] In the former case competition for the nomination will be much keener and people who have already stood unsuccessfully elsewhere, and perhaps ex-members, will be interested in the vacancy. Moreover, potential members often serve an apprenticeship in a 'hopeless' Constituency before moving on to a Constituency that offers prospects

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[33] Richards, op. cit. p. 26.

of success. The extent to which this is done is an important guide
to the decisions of selection Committees and tells something of
the sense of political vocation of members.

a) There is very little difference in the attitude of the National
Party officers according to the degree of competition within a
Constituency. Understandably the National officers will be more
interested in those Constituencies which they regard as winnable,
and in which they will hope a man they respect and feel would
strengthen the Party in Parliament, will be selected. But as we
have seen previously, the Conservative Constituency Associations
are completely autonomous in carrying out their selection function,
the central office only being able to give advice. In a hopeless
Constituency, however, the Central office will not recommend its
better candidates from the list of Approved Candidates, and will
use very little influence to make people stand in those
Constituencies. This has the effect, therefore, of putting the
local Constituency Association of a hopeless seat, in a very grave
predicament. In trying to find a suitable candidate, they not only
have little encouragement from Central office, but there is very
little spontaneous application from within the Constituency. The
local Party officers, therefore, have to go to great ends to find
a candidate suitable to represent the Party in that Constituency.

b) The characteristics of the candidates help us to test the
efficacy of the above. We can imagine, therefore, that in hopeless
seats the candidates will be younger, less experienced, lower

socio-economic status, and probably come from the local area --

all factors relating to a cutting down of the criteria for selection.

Austin Ranney has looked at some of these factors in detail,

and we shall look at his tables as follows:-

TABLE 1V[34]

Winnability of Constituency related to previous electoral

experiences of Conservative non-incumbent Candidates

Previous Electoral	Winnability of Constituency			
Experience	High	Medium	Low	Other
First Contest	42%	53%	67%	70%
One Previous Loss	29%	32%	24%	20%
Two or more Losses	23	12	8	5
Former M.P.'s	6	3	1	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	133	364	771	43

TABLE V [35]

Ages of Conservative non-incumbent candidates related to

winnability of Constituency

Winnability of	Age Groups				
Constituency	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-
High	4%	10%	14%	9%	
Medium	19	26	31	35	27
Low	75	62	50	51	73
Other	2	2	5	5	0
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	165	522	382	205	37

[34]   Ranney, op. cit. P. 94

[35]   Ibid, p. 97.

TABLE VI[36]

Attendance to Public School by Conservative non-incumbent

candidates related to winnability of constit.

Winnability of Constituency	Education			
	Elm. or Sec. only	Second and University	Public Sch. only	Pub.Sch and University.
High	3%	6%	16%	16%
Medium	29%	28	30	25
Low	66	61	53	54
Other	2	5	1	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE VII[37]

Personal constituency connections of Cons. non-incumbent

candidates related to winnability of constit.

Winnability of Constit.	Local Connections	
	Some	None
High	7%	12%
Medium	31	26
Low	59	59
Other	3	3
	100%	100%

From these tables it can be seen that the higher the
winnability of a Constituency the greater chance is there for the
Conservative candidate to be older, more experienced politically,
come from a public school, and not to reside in the Constituency.
Moreover, Table VII, gives us some indication of the need for a

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36   Ibid, p. 102

37   Ibid. p. 111

Constituency with little chance of winning, to have to obtain the nomination of a local man. We can conclude, therefore, that there is a fairly high correlation between the Party Competition in a Conservative Constituency, and the degree of party interference and characteristics of candidates.

(ii)   Labour Party

(a)   The same seems to hold for the Labour Party as for the Conservative Party. Thus we would expect there to be greater interest by Transport House in winnable Constituencies, and more activity by local party officials in hopeless Constituencies.

(b)   Ranney has found that in the Labour Party, as in the Conservative Party, there are variations between the Constituencies according to party competition. An important variable exists in the Labour Party, however, which does not exist in the Conservative Party, that of sponsorship. This factor seems to be the predominant influence between Constituencies and it disturbs the other factors such as age, experience and schooling, because of its over-riding importance for the Labour Party.

TABLE VIII[38]

Educational distribution by Labour non-incumbents
related to winnability of Constituency.

Winnability of Constit.	Elem and Elem +	Sec and Sec +	Sec and Un. other than Oxbridge	Sec and Oxbridge	Pub Sch.	P. S. and Oxbridge
High	9%	4%	3%	3%	0%	2%
Medium	13	14	18	16	20	23
Low	74	79	76	80	77	75
Other	4	3	3	1	3	0
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

This Table shows, for example, how those with elementary
or elementary plus education did the best whereas the other group-
ings were much of a muchness; this characteristic being predominantly
due to sponsorship:-

TABLE IX[39]

Sponsorship of candidatures by Labour non-incumbents
related to winnability of Constituency

Winnability of Constituency	By T.U.'s	Sponsorship by Co-op.	By C.L.P.'s
High	17%	7%	2%
Medium	32	25	14
Low	48	61	82
Other	3	7	2
	100%	100%	100%

[38] Ibid, p. 203.

[39] Ibid, p. 226.

We can conclude once again, therefore, that the Party
competition has a great effect upon the extent of Party interference
and the characteristics of the candidate chosen, although the
tendencies between the two parties vary greatly, according to
organisational factors.

3. Party Organisation.

In our proposition we have treated party organization as
an intervening variable, suggesting that despite the general political
attitudes of the country, and the specific attitude structures
of the parties treated as sub-cultures, the organisational frame-
work will determine certain characteristics of the candidate selection
process of each party.

In looking at the Conservative and Labour Parties, we
find that the former has evolved out of the evolutionary processes
in Parliament, and that the Labour Party has been formed on the
basis of Trade Unions, intellectual groups, and Co-Operative
societies. Duverger believed that a party like the Conservative
party, being of the direct form would be fairly decentralized, because
it would not have the extra-parliamentary organisation to maintain
discipline. Moreover, he saw the indirect form, as found in the
Labour party, to be highly centralized, being based on extra-
parliamentary groups and organization to begin with. In our analysis
of candidate selection, however, although we find the Labour party
to have more rigid rules and potentially more centralization than the
Conservative party, we also find that despite the latter having no
rules and regulations, the tendency in the party is towards

centralization. We find, therefore, that the attitude structure fundamentally effects the causal relationship between direct and indirect political structures and candidate selection, thus giving us no evidence for our proposition.

But Duverger also classified membership of parties, into cadre, mass, or other, and it is this aspect of party organization which we feel has a causal link to the process of candidate selection. Under this classification the Conservative party would be regarded as a cadre party and the Labour party will be put under the 'other' category, being neither mass nor cadre, having its membership based on affiliated organizations. The expected results would be, therefore, that in the Conservative party a few party notables would finance the party, and have great influence in the selection process, and that in the Labour party, despite professed egalitarian principles, those people backed by affiliated groups would be predominant as candidates.

(i) Conservative Party

(a)   Before the Second World War, it was commonly admitted that Conservative members were expected to make considerable contributions towards Party and electoral expenses. Benney and his associates tell us, for example, how the Conservative Party in Greenwich expected financial contributions from its candidates up to the War.[40] Richards tells us that as early as 1924, Stanley Baldwin, the newly

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[40]   Benney, et. al., op. cit., p. 54.

chosen leader of the Conservatives, was telling his supporters that few men could face the heavy financial demands made on parliamentary candidates by constituency organizations, but that his warning that the Conservative party would suffer from this limitation on its choice of representatives, went unheeded.[41] .Moreover, in 1939 a Conservative candidate, Ian Harvey, issued a memorandum to the Press entitled 'A Plutocratic System'. This suggested that potential Conservative candidates could be divided into three categories:- Class A: whose chances of selection were excellent; Class B: whose chances were reasonable; and Class C: who had hardly any chances at all. Class A were those willing to pay all their election expenses, and contribute between £500 and £1,000 p.a. to the local association. Class B could pay at least half their election expenses and subscribe between £250 and £400 p.a. to the local association. Class C could pay nothing towards election expenses and £100 or less to the association. Furthermore Ranney quotes Henry Brooke who told the annual conference of the Party as late as 1948 that:

> - Having studied the evidence, I have to tell you
> that there are still too many Constituencies -- not
> by any means a majority, but still too many -- which
> do not summon for interview with the Selection Committee
> anyone who does not promise in advance to contribute
> half the election expenses --- that means a sum of per-
> haps £400 -- and to pay £100 a year towards the
> association or if they do interview them, they make
> it all too clear to him early in the interview that
> money counts.[42]

The Conservative system of financing, therefore, always relied on a 'few hundred people' --- the aristocratic rich, business

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[41] Richards, op. cit. p. 24.

[42] Ranney, op. cit. p. 52.

or wealthy men, who would pay for a political career or hoped for a title. But after the 1945 election debacle, it was evident that this could no longer guarantee the income required for an adequate central party machine, nor was it conducive to the recruitment of the rising managerial and professional classes. In their first years of opposition, therefore, Lord Woolton (Party Chairman) and R.A.Butler set about rebuilding the party's machinery and reforming its procedures. It was necessary for them to make the Constituency Associations more active in the collection of dues, and to remove their reliance on certain rich personalities. As Lord Woolton put it in his memoirs, "I noticed that the organisation of the party was weakest in those places where a wealthy candidate had made it unnecessary for the members to trouble to collect small subscriptions."[43]

In 1947, the Maxwell Fyfe Committee was set up to look into party finance and organization, and its report to the Annual Conference of 1948, is the basis on which the Conservative Party now runs its machine. For the national level, the Conference accepted a system of annual Constituency quotas geared to the local electoral strength of the party. Thus if a marginal Conservative seat were required to give 3 pence per Conservative vote, a hopeless constituency would be asked for a halfpenny, and the most impregnable strongholds sixpence. As Martin Harrison tells us,

> The Party Treasurer decides annually on a National
> Target for Constituency contributions to Central Office.

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[43]
The Rt. Hon. Earl of Woolton, Memoirs, (London: Cassel and Company Ltd., 1959), p. 35.

This is translated into so many pence per
Conservative vote. After negotiations with Area
treasurers separate area quotas are fixed, Area
treasurers then settle Constituency quotas with
local treasurers according to their assessment
of means.[44]

The Constituency Associations now really help to finance
the party on a national basis, and the Conservative Party now
publicly plays down the importance of large contributions. But
as Harrison points out they still court them as assiduously as
ever in private,

- the Central Board of Finance, set up in 1946 and
comprising the Party and Areas Treasurers, and a few
co-opted members, still raises funds primarily from
wealthy individuals.[45]

The party at the national level still, therefore, relies
on a few notables rather than the masses for its financing. But
it is important to note that these funds very rarely have any
influence at the Constituency level, and it is at this level that
the reforms had the greatest success and effect.

The reforms were very simple and, thus easy to carry out.
From 1949, candidates were limited to a subscription of £25 annually
and M.P.'s to £50., and they could only pay for their personal
election expenses £100. These rules have been scrupulously enforced
by central office and its area agents, and there is no doubt that
Conservative candidatures can no longer be bought in the old manner.
The characteristic of the local constituency has changed drastically.

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[44]
    M. Harrison, "Finance in Britain", Journal of Politics,
Vol. XXV, 1963, p. 665.

[45] Harrison, loc. cit., p. 66.

It has become far more active enlarging its subscription paying membership, holding whist drives, etc. Moreover as Ranney points out, "not only have the majority of the association raised adequate funds, but there has been a noticeable revival in their vigour and pride in their place in the party."[46]

(b)   The Maxwell Fyfe reforms have, therefore, had the potential effect of making it easier for more middle class and lower class candidates in the Conservative Party, and have to a substantial degree taken money as a criteria of selection, out of the candidate process. But we have seen that the financing of the party at the national level is still maintained in absolute secrecy, and that it is still believed by most informed observers that the party depends greatly on donations from a few business organizations.

It can be seen, therefore, that despite the reforms, the party still has strong elements of the 'cadre' party in it with the obvious ramifications for its internal democracy, the nature of its elite, and the candidate selection process.

(ii)   Labour Party

Labour Party Finance is complicated by its practice of having sponsorship of candidates by affiliated organizations. The party's financial regulations are a function of the party's position in British society; being, initially, the party for the under-privileged it could not hope to depend that greatly on large donations from a few notables. Moreover it would have been absurd to have

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[46] Ranney, Pathways to., p. 124.

assumed that its working class candidates could have, by themselves, contributed large sums to their election expenses. The Labour Party has always had to work harder for financial support than have the Conservatives. As Harrison informs us,

> Labour leaders have failed to convince their supporters that changes in political campaigning combined with higher prices require a constantly rising income.[47]

The Labour Party can expect very little from its membership and sets the membership fee at six shillings p.a. Moreover it has the political levy from the Trade Unions, and support from other groups such as the Co-Operative movement. At the National level the Labour Party financial support looks something as follows:-

TABLE X[48]

Central Labour Party income

1958-1961.

	1958 £	1959 £	1960 £	1961 £
Union Affiliations	209,549	212,893	206,305	208,356
Other Affiliations	36,165	29,760	31,113	28,152
By-Election Funds	8,067	7,976	8,245	8,134
Investment net.	14,436	9,934	7,116	5,437
Special Donations	---	---	---	61,830
Election Grants	105,631	234,436	---	---
	377,138	497,629	256,127	316,910

47
    Harrison, loc. cit. p. 673

48
    Harrison, loc. cit. p. 684

Despite the paucity of its income, money plays a very large part in influencing local Constituency associations, because of the willingness of affiliated groups to sponsor candidates. A sponsor may contribute up to 80% of the election expenses incurred on behalf of its nominee.[49] Up to £350 p.a. towards local party funds may be paid in a borough Constituency, or £420 p.a. in a County Constituency: where a full-time local agent is employed the maxima are raised to 50% of the agent's salary in boroughs and 60% of his salary in County Constituencies. These arrangements known as the 'Hastings Agreement' were first introduced in 1933 and ammended in 1948 and 1957.

Naturally there is a strong tendency for Trade Unions to agree to sponsor candidates in safe Labour seats. McKenzie tells us that in the "1951 election for example, of 613 Labour candidates, 139 were sponsored by Trade Unions, and of these 105 or 75% were elected. In contrast only 40% of candidates sponsored by Constituency Labour Parties were elected (173 out of 436)"[50] It can, therefore, be concluded that in a safe Labour seat, the candidate sponsored by a rich affiliated organization such as a Labour Union has a great advantage over other contenders. McKenzie warns us, however, against readily seizing on this fact in order to make damning criticism. He says,

> to the charge that Trade Unions collar the best
> places, a strong reply can of course be made. Mary
> Agnes Hamilton has emphasized that it must be
> remembered that Trade Unionism has made these places

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[49] Richards, op. cit. p.24.
[50] McKenzie, op. cit. p. 554.

good. Labour's strongholds are in the mining areas
and the railway centres, in the Constituencies where
Trade Unionism has done the agonizing work and built a
powerful solidarity among workers.[51]

A more disquieting fact about the Labour Party, however, was
that before 1957 an individual candidate could make payments on the
same scale as a sponsoring body. The position was brought to a
head by the Wilson Report in 1955, and the candidate can now only
pay his personal expenses at an election, and only £50 to Party funds.

(b)   It can be seen, therefore, that the Labour Party is greatly
affected by the part affiliated organizations play in its organization,
undermining the democratic nature of its foundation. There can be
little doubt, therefore, that organizational structures can be a
very strong intervening variable in the process of candidate selection,
to the validity of our basic proposition.

It would appear that our proposition has withstood testing
in the British context; that the main determinant of candidate
selection is the prevailing authority attitude structure, with strong
intervening influences from party competition, and party organization.

In the next Chapter we briefly survey the method of candidate
selection in Britain in the light of the theoretical observations
made above.

51
    Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN BRITAIN: A DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY

1.   Rules and Regulations of the State pertaining to Candidate
        Selection.

        The extra-legal party processes must operate within boundaries

set by Britain's legal rules governing the making of nominations and

the conduct of elections.

(i)   Qualifications for candidature[1]

        Any person, male or female, who is a British subject of

twenty-one years' of age, not otherwise disqualified may stand for

Parliament.

b)   The candidate must live permanently in Britain, but does

not have to live in the Constituency he contests.

c)   The candidates must be nominated by two people and supported

by another ten.

d)   The candidate must deposit £150 with the Elections Officer,

which is returnable if he receives $12\frac{1}{2}\%$, or more, of the total vote

cast.[2]

e)   The candidate's unaccounted for personal expenses cannot

exceed a maximum of £100 for any one election; for any amount in

excess he must provide a detailed accounting and justification.

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[1]   See Benemy, Whitehall, Townhall, (London: George G.Harrap
& Co.Ltd. 1963);   Ranney, op. cit. and Schofield, Parliamentary
Elections, 2nd ed. (London: Shaw & Sons, Ltd. 1955), pp.78-118.

[2]   This rule was introduced to undermine frivolous candidates.

f)   His election expenses cannot exceed a maximum sum of

£450 plus $1\frac{1}{2}$d. for each voter in a borough Constituency.

(ii)   <u>Disqualifications</u>:

a)   Aliens cannot serve in Parliament.

b)   Must not be a certified lunatic, criminal (until served

full sentence or pardoned), undischarged bankrupt, or deaf mute.

c)   Must not be an English or Scottish Peer, unless one has

renounced one's peerage for one's lifetime under the Peerage Act of

1963 (Irish Peers who do not sit in the Lord's, may stand for

election to the Commons).

d)   Must not be an ordained priest or minister of the Church

of England, Church of Ireland, Church of Scotland, or Roman Catholic

Church (although clergy of the Church of Wales and of the non-

conformist denominations are eligible).

e)   Must not hold office of profit under the Crown. The growth

of the machinery of public administration in modern times has brought

with it a vast range of official appointments, many of which provide

but occasional employment and attract but negligible remuneration,

but which are technically offices of profit, and constitute dis-

qualification. The best known examples are, however, Sheriffs,

Judges, Returning Officers, and members of many government corporations.

2.   <u>Party rules and organization pertaining to candidate selection</u>
     <u>(Formal framework)</u>

(i)   <u>Conservative Party</u>

        The formal structure of the Conservative Party's organisation

is shown in Fig.3, Page 87. Ranney tells us that the selection
of Conservative Parliamentary Candidates in England and Wales
is supervised by three national agencies:

a)   The Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates (S.A.C.C.)
which is a branch of the National Union.

b)   Vice Chairman of the Party organization —— who is an
officer of the party's top national management.

c)   Central Office Area agents —— who are part of the party's
Civil Service.

a)   The Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates

> The purpose of the committee is to assess on
> broadest grounds the suitability of men and women
> who are desirous of becoming approved candidates.
> A list of approved candidates together with brief
> biographies is sent on request to constituency
> associations which are selecting a prospective
> candidate. When one of these candidates is subse-
> quently adopted by a Constituency Association, he
> or she becomes an official Conservative Prospective
> Candidate.[3]

The aims of the Committee may be broadly summarised as
follows:-

(1)   To protect the good name of the Party by ensuring
that no candidate is adopted unless the committee is previously
satisifed as to:-

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[3] Ranney, op. cit. p. 20.

Figure 3

National Organisation of the Conservative Party

*Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates

Leader

Conservative Party in Parliament

Annual Conference of National Union

Executive Committee of National Union

Chairman of Party Organization and Central Office

Central Council

S.A.C.C.*

Vice Chairman of Party Organ.

Area Councils

Area Offices

Constituency Associations

Agents and Organizers

Adapted from McKenzie, op. cit., p. 186.

- personal character

- party loyalty

- past record and experience

- political knowledge

- speaking ability

- financial arrangements

(2) To avoid coming to adverse conclusions unless it is abundantly clear that they are not based on personal prejudice or on insufficient evidence.

The S.A.C.C. accomplishes its purpose in three ways. First, it specifies in some detail the procedures and criteria Constituency Associations 'should' use in the selection of their candidate. Second, it maintains a List of Approved Candidates, which Constituency Associations are 'urged' to consult.[4] And, third, it is 'empowered' to withhold or withdraw approval from any locally adopted candidate whom it finds unsuitable. But despite this formal power, the S.A.C.C. has much less influence on candidate selection than does the Vice Chairman.

b) Vice Chairman. "The Conservative Central Office is the party's national professional organization for supervising and co-ordinating national and local organization, finance, publicity, research, electioneering and the selection of candidates. Entirely

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[4] The Maxwell Fyfe Report acknowledged the Constituency's right to select a candidate not on the list, but that in that case the Association should see that the candidate receives the approval of the S.A.C.C. before adoption as Prospective Candidate takes place.

separate from the National Union, it is indirectly responsible to the Leader, who personally appoints its top officers, the chairman, deputy chairman, and two Vice chairman of the Party organization."[5]

The Vice Chairman for candidates is usually a man, and an M.P. of junior ministerial standing. He has two main duties:-

(1) to suggest to the S.A.C.C. who should be included in the List of approved candidates.

(2) to consult with Constituency Association officers about persons they should consider when selecting their candidates. (He also keeps an eye on the association's selection proceedings with a view to warning any about to choose someone unacceptable, or, in the extreme case, to advise the S.A.C.C. to withhold its approval).

c) Area Agent - England and Wales are divided by the Conservatives into twelve areas. In each of these areas is an area agent, who is an employee of Central Office and responsible to it for overseeing the financial, propaganda, electioneering and other activities of the area's constituency associations. He also regularly takes some part in the selection of parliamentary candidates in his area; he attends the selection conference, answers questions about the party's rules and procedures and reports any peculiarities in the procedures or results to Central Office.

From the above it can be seen that the only formal power in the hands of the National Party is the veto over an unacceptable candidate: If the endorsement of the S.A.C.C. is refused, and the

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5
Ranney, op. cit. p. 25.

Constituency Association adopts him in spite of this, the
candidate will not be regarded as an official Party candidate at
the next election. He will not receive the usual letter from the
Leader of the party commending his candidature to the electorate,
nor will he be eligible for help from Central Office, in the form of
speakers or publications. Finally, if elected, he will not receive
the Party Whip.

(ii)   Labour Party

The formal structure of the Labour Party is shown in Fig.4
page 91; the selection of Labour Parliamentary candidates in
England, Wales, and Scotland, is supervised by four national agencies:[6]

(a)   National Executive Committee

(b)   The organization sub-committee (reports to N.E.C.)

(c)   Head Office: The Secretary, National Agent and
organization.

(d)   The Regional organizers (similar to Conservative Area
agents).

a)   The N.E.C.

All decisions are taken by votes of the whole N.E.C., usually
upon recommendations made by the organization sub-committee. The
N.E.C.'s principal supervisory powers over candidates are numerous,
and more far reaching than in the Conservative Party. Moreover
because of the greater formal centralization the other structures
become mere appendages to the N.E.C., although the model rules which

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[6] Ranney, op. cit. p. 135

Figure 4

National Organisation of the Labour Party

Adapted from R.T.McKenzie op. cit., p. 487

the N.E.C., enforces are laid down by annual party conferences. The N.E.C. oversees:-

(1) Authorization of Constituency Labour Party to select a candidate.

(2) Prescribes C. P's Selection Procedures.

(3) Sets the qualifications for candidature, and is far more rigorous than in the Conservative Party. Thus no person may be endorsed by the N.E.C., if the person concerned is

    - not an individual member of the Party

    - does not accept and conform to the Constituency programme and Principles of the Party

    - does not undertake to accept and act in harmony with the standing orders of the P.L.P.

(4) Two lists of approved candidates are maintained. List A includes persons nominated by affiliated groups and approved by the N.E.C. List B has existed since 1960 and consists of persons not sponsored by affiliated organizations. This list, however, is still not a recommended list, as with List A, and there is no expressed or implied guarantee that the N.E.C. will endorse the candidature of any person on the list.

(5) Must endorse candidates (thus can veto).

(6) Can suspend normal procedures, allowing the N.E.C. to take all residual formal authority it needs to deal with any unusual situation in any way it wishes; going far beyond any authority formally given the Conservative agencies.

(7) Moreover at by-elections the N.E.C. takes formal powers, again far different to the Conservative Party's 'advice'. As the Model Rules of the Party indicate

> If a parliamentary by-election occurs in the Constituency, the procedure laid down in Section 3 of this Clause shall be suspended and the N.E.C. shall co-operate with the Executive Committee of the Constituency Party in the nomination of a candidate. The N.E.C. may if it deems it necessary in the interest of the Party, advise the executive Committee of the Constituency to select a nomination it may submit to it.[7]

The powers and influence of the N.E.C. are so great that the other agencies have no effective power. Their function is similar to their opposites in the Conservative Party, and we have no need to go into their working any further here.

3. Constituency Organisation and Procedure

(i) Conservative Party

(a) Robert McKenzie tells us that, "the constituency association is the basic unit in the structure of the Conservative Party outside of Parliament. Since the party has no affiliated organizations, all of its approximately 2,250,000 members in England and Wales belong to the party by virtue of their membership in one or other of the Constituency Conservative Associations."[8]

Membership in a local constituency association is open to all men and women resident in, or connected with, the Constituency who declare their support of the objectives of the association and

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[7] Model Rules, Clause XII, Section (5).

[8] McKenzie, op. cit. p. 241. Also see Potter, "English Conservative Constituency Association," World Political Quarterly, Vol.lX, 1956.

subscribe annually to its funds. The average membership of a constituency association is 4,000, but most of these, as we shall see, have joined merely to express their sympathies with the Conservative cause, since only a small fraction take an active part in the Association's affairs. In Constituencies in which the Conservative Party is highly organized, branches of the Constituency organization have been set up in each ward or polling district. The basis of membership in a branch is the same as that of a Constituency Association and membership of a branch automatically entitles the subscriber to membership of the association. Moreover a number of local branch members are normally named as representatives on the executive council of the Constituency association.

The effective head of the local association is its chairman. He must see that the party is continually in efficient fighting trim and he must at all times be prepared to advise the Area Council on the feelings in the Constituency on questions of policy. It is his particular duty also 'to take the initiative in securing the best possible Parliamentary candidate for the Constituency.' Despite considerable variation in the structure of the Conservative Associations throughout the country, the governing body is usually the executive council. This body appoints certain committees, one of which - 'The Finance and General Purpose Committee' - forms an inner executive, taking responsibility for most of the essential routine work of the association.

Candidate selection is one of the most important functions

Figure 5

Organisation of Conservative Constituency Association

of the Associations and they carry the process out under fairly

uniform procedures.[9]   The process may be varied, however, by the

degree of urgency; thus the need to find a candidate for an unexpected

by-election demands speedy action, and preliminary consultations may

be cut to a minimum.   Under normal circumstances, a selection committee

is appointed by the Executive Council (in an emergency, the Finance

and General Purpose Committee performs the task), consisting of

representatives of the Young Conservatives, Trade Unions, and women's

organizations."   The chairman of the association becomes chairman

of the committee, and is by far the most influential member of the

Committee.   Names of possible candidates will be suggested by the

Conservative Central Office; local Conservatives may intimate

privately that they wish to be considered; and it is open to the

selection committee to take the initiative itself and to ask an

individual if he or she is willing to stand.   The chairman will have

travelled to Central Office with the agent, and informed them of the

sort of people his Constituency was interested in, in order to obtain

further names from the list of approved candidates.   From these various

sources, a considerable number of names can be collected if the seat

is winnable or marginal.

The Selection Committee then whittles the list down to about

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    Ranney, op. cit. P.57.   Richards, op. cit. P.15,   Benney,
Gray and Pear, How People Vote, (London: Routledge and Regan Paul,
1956), p.55, and William Rees Mogg, Conservative Party Selection,
Political Studies, Vol. VII, 1959.   "The number of people on the
Committee can vary widely, Benney, et. al., op. cit., tells us that
the Association in Greenwich had a Committee of 3. Yet Ranney, op.cit.
p.58, tells us of a Committee of 18.

twelve names so that the preliminary interview may begin. This
first stage is inevitably the most arbitrary, because the
potential candidates are just 'so many pieces of paper'. William
Rees Mogg tells us that two contradictory rules seem to operate:

> (1)   there is a strong negative selection, inevitable
> when perhaps a hundred qualified people have to be
> passed over. The selection committee may thus decide
> to see no women, no bachelors, no men over 50 and
> so on.
> (2)   anything which picks a candidate out of the ruck
> has a disproportionate effect either positively or
> negatively. 10

At Greenwich in 1938, for instance, the Selection Committee
followed two criteria. The first was that preference would be
given to a person willing to reside in the Constituency, and the
second was that no person should be selected who was unwilling to
offer financial assistance to the party.[11]

Once the Selection Committee has selected twelve or so
candidates, they are then asked to attend the preliminary interview.
Male applicants, if married, are sometimes asked to bring their
wives with them. The applicants are interviewed as to their
personal merits; and a final list of three people is selected, and
sent to the Executive Countil for the next stage of the process.
Executive Councils have, however, been known to reject their Selection

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10   Mogg, loc. cit.

11   Benney, et. al., op. cit. p. 54.

Committee's short lists. Ranney tells us of a recent example at
Chippenham in 1962:

> Sir David Eccles, member of this safe Wiltshire seat
> since 1943, had been elevated to the Peerage. In
> their search for a candidate for the ensuing by-election,
> the associations Selection Committee passed over all
> local applicants and recommended a short list of outsiders.
> But after a stormy meeting the executive council rejected
> the entire list, and instead adopted Daniel Audrey, a
> local solicitor.[12]

Benney, and his associates, give us further examples of this
in the Greenwich study. The authors tell us that the Council did
not always accept the Selection Committee's advice. On the last
occasion, when the Council was faced with a short list of four
candidates (selected from 31 names on the Central Office list, and
3 local nominations) it rejected all of them as unsatisfactory, and
combed the original list to find a more suitable candidate.[13]

The Executive Council consists of from 60-100 people and
if it accepts the short list, it listens to a speech from each of
the contenders, thus giving them an opportunity to show the quality
of their performance before a public meeting. The Council rarely
allows pre-conference lobbying on behalf of the contenders, leaving
the reasons for their choice to rest solely on the contenders'
performance. When this ordeal is over, the Council deliberates and
finally decides on a candidate to recommend to a general meeting of
the local association. Adoption of this recommendation by the general

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[12] Ranney, Pathways to., p. 59.

[13] Benney, et. al., op. cit. p. 55.

meeting is nearly always a formality, but as Richards indicates,
Angus Maude withdrew his candidature at the adoption meeting held
by the South Dorset Conservative Association in 1963, owing to the
local controversy created by his nomination.[14]

The adoption function of the General Meeting is a very
important aspect of the Conservative Selection process. Although
the process is dominated by a few people, this provision does allow
for a few unusual occurrences in which the membership has been able
to actively participate (as we will see later, the Labour Party
does not have this provision). In fact Ranney draws our attention
to the fact that in the Conservative Party on at least two occasions,
there has been selection of the candidates by procedures closely
resembling the American Primaries.[15] The first was in Hampstead
in 1949, the second and the most publicised was in Bournemouth and
East Christchurch in 1959. Both occasions were marked by feuds,
within the Constituency Associations, as to the worthiness of their
member. The latter occasion was caused by the Suez episode in which
the member, Nigel Nicolson, severely criticized the Conservative
Government for its decision. After nearly two years of open feuding,
Lord Hailsham, chairman of the National Party organization, prevailed
upon the association's executive to agree to a postal vote of all
members on the question of whether Nicolson should be readopted.

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[14] Richards, op. cit. p. 15.

[15] Ranney, op. cit. p. 62. See also, L.Epstein, loc. cit.
and Nicolson, op. cit.

Despite much adverse press comment about this 'Americanization' of British politics, the poll was conducted in February 1959, Nicholson being defeated by the majority of 91 votes out of a poll of 9,724. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Constituency Association chose its new candidate, the old rules were abided by without any criticisms.

Once the selection procedure has been accomplished in the constituency, the candidate then has to be approved by the S.A.C.C.

b)   It can be seen that this procedure is very hierarchical, some people having far more influence than others, and the mass membership being virtually powerless except at times of great crisis. Naturally those people with the power are those who are the most active in the Association. The Selection Committee has the greatest influence; the Executive Committee sometimes parry this influence and recommend candidates, and the general meeting normally only sanctions actions already undertaken. But Ranney believes that one can define the activists more clearly than this.[16] He sees the Selection Committee dominated by a few members, who in turn take their lead from the chairman; he in turn becoming the key figure in the whole selection process. Ranney builds this belief on the fact that the association elects its chairman because it feels that he is the best person it has to direct the association's affairs. The chairman

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[16] Ranney, _Pathways to_, p. 71.

usually sees to it that the Selection Committee includes a pre-
ponderance of members he regards as reasonable and co-operative. He
calls the Committee's meetings and prepares the Agenda. He acts as
the official channel of communication with the aspirants and with
Central Office. Thus Ranney says that:

> as a by-product of his administrative tasks he
> knows more about the strengths and weaknesses of
> the aspirants than do any of his committee. As a
> result of these factors, his opinion weighs heavily
> upon them. He usually can veto any contender he
> finds unacceptable, and gives crucial support to one
> he particularly favours. In short, although the
> chairman is no dictator, he is the nerve centre of
> all the association's affairs and as such plays a
> critical role in the selection of candidates.[17]

Moreover, alongside the chairman there is the constituency
agent[20] and the Central Office agent who at times can have much
influence. We find, therefore, that the Conservative selection
processes are formally very hierarchical, and that the membership
has very little say in the procedure. But we find that in the
informal workings of these procedures, a few men become dominant
making the system more centralized and hierarchical than formally
declared. Admittedly there are occasions when a 'battle' takes
place within a Constituency Association, or at the time when a
chairman loses touch with the prevailing opinion, when the membership
is aroused to do anything. At more tranquil times they are content
to let 'others' make the decisions. But we are faced with the fact

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[17] Ibid., p. 72.

that the formal structure does allow a loophole for the active member-
ship to exert influence upon the inner group 'if they so wish'. The
reasons for the chairman's dominance, therefore, must lie in other
factors besides those emanating from his organizational position,[18]
i.e., the attitude structure of the party.

(ii) Labour Party[19]

(a)   The Labour Party at constituency level duplicates to some
extent the federal principle which is operative nationally; as a
result Labour's Constituency organization is very much more
complicated than that of the Conservatives. Membership of a
Constituency Labour Party consists of both individual members and
of affiliated organizations.

The structure of the Constituency is more formalised than
the Conservatives.[20] The latter occasionally had branch organizations,
whereas the Labour Party always divide its Constituency Associations
into such units. In each ward or polling district of the borough
there will be a Ward Committee composed of individual members, and
there may also be a Women's Section, and possibly a Young Socialist
Group.[21] At the Constituency level these Ward organizations, combine

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[18] The influence emanating from an organizational position
was very clearly brought out in D.Truman's discussion of the majority
Leader in the U.S.Congress in The Congressional Party.

[19] For a general discussion on the selection process in the
C.L.P. see T.E.M.McKitterick, Political Quarterly, Vol. VII. 1959.

[20] See Fig's 5 and 6.

[21] McKenzie, op. cit. p. 538.

with a number of affiliated bodies, the most important of which are Trade Unions; less frequently a Trades Council, a Co-Operative Society, or local branch of the Fabian Society may be affiliated. Individual members, therefore, participate solely through their Ward organisations; unlike the Conservatives, they do not meet together (at a General Meeting) at the constituency level.

Because of this distinction between affiliated membership and individual membership certain difficulties arise. Thus members of affiliated T.U's are not entitled to take an active part in the affairs of the Constituency party unless they become enrolled as individual members. They may do this, however, by asking their Trade Union branch Secretary to forward their names and addresses to be recorded in the register of party members kept by the party secretary. Moreover, individual members have to succumb to more formal regulations. The applicant must 'accept and conform to the Constitution, principles and procedures of the national Party, and the rules of the particular Constituency party'; in addition, individual members must, if eligible, belong to a trade union affiliated to the Trade Union Congress, and if the Union is affiliated to the Labour Party he must contribute to its political fund.[22]

The controlling body of the constituency is the General Management Committee made up of representatives of the affiliated organizations and of the Ward Committees. The basis of the

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[22]
McKenzie, op. cit. p. 541.

Figure 6

Organisation of Labour Party Constituency Association

representation on the G.M.C. being determined by each particular

constituency party; it must, however, secure approval of its

arrangements from the NE.C.

At its annual meeting, the G.M.C. elects from among its

own members an Executive Committee which directs the work of the party

under the general supervision of the G.M.C. The Executive Committee

normally consists of the officers of the party, and as many additional

members as the G.M.C. shall decide. Moreover if the association

has an agent, he becomes the Secretary of the Party, and he often

emerges as the key figure in the Constituency Association.

As we have seen previously, the national organs of the

Labour Party play a more prominent role than does the National Union

of the Central Office of the Conservative Party in the adoption

of candidates. Consequently when the decision has been taken to

contest an election and to select a candidate, a procedure described

by the N.E.C. must be rigorously followed. It should be noted in

the first instance, as comparison with the Conservatives, that

individuals who wish to become Labour candidates are not permitted

to raise their own names for consideration. Aspiring candidates

may, of course, communicate privately with the Executive Committee,

a Ward Committee, or an affiliated organization in an attempt to

secure their sponsorship; but every candidate must be nominated

by one or other of these bodies.

When the announced deadline for receiving nominations has

passed, the Executive Committee draws up a short list. The

nomination requirements often mean, however, that it has a smaller number of choices than its Conservative counterparts usually face, but the range of choice may be as great or greater. Once the short list has been drawn up, the Executive Committee consults with the N.E.C. or its officers 'to determine the validity of the nominations'. This provision is intended to give the N.E.C. an opportunity to express its views on an individual whose qualifications have not hitherto been reviewed by the N.E.C; if the N.E.C. indicates at this stage that the individual concerned will not receive its subsequent approval, then the Executive Committee conveys this information to the G.M.C., and under normal circumstances the individual will not be selected. The N.E.C. has a further provision applying to any person whose name is on the panel of parliamentary candidates of an affiliated organization, as the written consent of the executive of the organ- ization must be submitted with the nomination. This is because the affiliated organizations give financial assistance towards election expenditure, when a member of their parliamentary panel is chosen as a candidate, and while the affiliated body may be willing to pay up, to fight a safe or marginal seat, it may not be willing to finance a contest in a hopeless constituency. Moreover besides the N.E.C vetting these local nominations it will probably suggest a few candidates from its central lists.

After the N.E.C. has validated the list, it is submitted to the G.M.C. for approval and for fixing the date of the selection conference. This is usually routine, but as Ranney points out,

there have been instances of G.M.C's ordering substantial revisions.[23]

Once these hurdles have been overcome, the individuals who remain on the list are invited to the Selection Conference held by the G.M.C. The attendance at this conference varies widely, usually depending on the desirability of the seat. As few as fifteen or twenty delegates may attend in a hopeless seat, and as many as 200 or more may be present in a winnable seat. Each contender makes a short speech before the Conference, as is the practice with the Conservative party. McKenzie believes that, "these speeches (often only ten minutes in duration) would seem to provide an absurdly inadequate basis on which to judge the personal qualifications and political opinions of a potential candidate. But in many circumstances they provide the only opportunity for such judgments to be made".[24] However, it is worth noting that in the Labour practice, unlike the Conservative, there is often pre-conference picketing. Ranney, for instance tells us that "although the degree and forms of pre-conference politicking vary from one C.L.P. to the next, and even from one party region to the next (depending to a large degree upon how much the regional organizer tries to prevent it), it is not unusual for campaigns to be conducted on behalf of some aspirants, particularly in the more desirable seats".[25]

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[23] Ranney, op. cit. p. 25.

[24] McKenzie, op. cit. p. 551.

[25] Ranney, op. cit. p. 174.

When the speech making has been completed, the decision of who shall be selected is put to the ballot, or a series of ballots, for no candidate is chosen without an absolute majority of all votes cast. Finally, the name of the selected person has to be forwarded to the N.E.C. for approval, and the N.E.C. has to satisfy itself both of the suitability of the nomination, and that adequate financial arrangements have been made to support the candidate before it can be made public.

(b)   The Labour Association contrasts significantly to the Conservative Association both in its formal structure, and purpose. As A.H.Birch has commented:

> The Labour Party still clings to the idea that the party should be something like a bond of comrades, a crusading movement, but the Conservatives have never adopted this attitude. They tend to look upon party associations simply as a means of bringing like-minded people together, and prominent Conservatives often have the slenderest connections with the local organization.[26]

There is a fervent belief in the Labour Party that the candidate they select must be a loyal and trustworthy party man, and that their Association must be run on strong democratic lines. Moreover they like to feel that the leaders take decisions from the bottom, and that the mass membership, owe no formal allegiance to their leader. But in spite of Labour's proclaimed devotion to intraparty democracy the most critical decisions are still made by a few activists holding key positions. The number who attend G.M.C.

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[26] A.H.Birch, Small Town Politics, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 50.

meetings are quite small, and certainly no larger than the number of activists in Conservative Associations. In fact the Labour Party's constitutional denial of any direct corporate role for all the C.L.P. members formalizes the concentration of power in candidate selection and makes all but impossible rebellion by the rank and file, comparable to the Conservative Associations.

Nevertheless within the Labour Party, there is no evidence of social deference and almost complete authority being given to one man, as is the case of the chairman of the Conservative Association. The Labour Party is traditionally a more democratic and turbulent party and many of its formal party rules are a function of its structural framework, having to allow so much influence to affiliated bodies. We can say, therefore, that the Conservative Party is the more willing to accept the decisions of a few, whereas the Labour Party tries to produce greater democracy and democratic safeguards in the face of the dilemma created by its organizational position.

PART THREE

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER FIVE

The United States is a nation of many dimensions and complexities. It has a vast population, vast land mass, and vast regional disparities.[1] In comparison to Britain, it is highly heterogeneous in economic, social and political life. The political mechanisms allow differences to exist and contend, and the historical perspectives of each area add to the disparities. In studying the United States, therefore, we are by no means dealing with a homogeneous nation, and sweeping generalizations about the nature of its politics can be very easily attacked. Nevertheless, our study of candidate selection, in its present form, demands that certain overall judgments are made, in order to compare the selection process in one country with that in another.

1.   Political Attitudes

Whereas in Britain the prevailing authority relationships greatly depend on social and political deference, in the United States they are based more on the rights and freedoms of the individual to decide his own destiny. Lipset[2] tells us, that dominating all 'American life'[3] are the values of equality and

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[1]   See R.Alford, Party and Society, (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1963), pp.219-225.

[2]   S.Lipset, First New Nation, (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc. 1967), p.40.

[3]   American life to be taken as life in the U.S.A.

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achievement which through their continuing dialogue manifest
tensions and conflicts in the political process. Equalitarianism
was an explicit part of the revolt against the tradition of the
Old World (Britain), while an emphasis upon success and hard work
had long been part of the Protestant Ethic. In addition, the
need to maximize talent in the new nation's search to overtake
Britain, placed an added premium on an individual's achievement
regardless of his social station. That this emphasis on
achievement must lead to new inequalities of status, and to the
use of corrupt means to secure and maintain high positions, is
the ever recreated and renewed American dilemma. As Louis Hartz
says,

> There has never been a liberal movement or a real
> liberal party in America: we have only had the
> American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of
> Locke, which usually does not know that Locke himself
> is involved ... Ironically, liberalism is a stranger
> in the land of its greatest realization and fulfilment...
> Here is a doctrine which everywhere in the West has
> been a glorious symbol of individual liberty, yet in
> America its compulsive power has been so great that
> it has posed a threat to liberty itself.[4]

The existence of the basic dilemma between equalitarianism
and corrupt practices, was clearly brought out by the Populist
Movement in the 1890's. Populism challenged the prevailing
ideologies of the period --- the success myth, Social Darwinism,
and laissez faire. It is believed that, "unbridled individualism
destroyed rather than promoted the general welfare. Its own

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[4] L.Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1955), p. 11.

Counter-formulation being simply that co-operation and mutual help, not competition and self help, led to true individualism".[5]

It would seem therefore, that desires for freedom and individualism are pervasive through American society. But as it has been too clearly manifested, appeals for freedom, and the rights of the individual can lead to evil ends as well as good. They can be manipulated into slogans for the benefit of a rich powerful minority, at the expense of the masses. The American way of life therefore, consists of a major contradiction, and this contradiction and its effect on the society, is important to us, because of its impact on the relationship between the leaders and followers.

a)   Equality and Achievement in a Natural Setting

In describing political attitudes in Britain, we mentioned the 'English Constitution': a book written in the middle of the nineteenth century by Bagehot. The equivalent to Bagehot's work, in the United States must be Alexis de Tocqueville's, 'Democracy in America'. De Tocqueville was writing with the great revolutions of Europe in mind, and he was making a remarkable comparative analysis of the social structure of the New and Old Worlds.[6] He found that the Americans had a great advantage over Europeans because they

[5]   N.Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 19.

[6]   A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Vintage Books, 1945).

arrived at their state of democracy without having to endure a social struggle and much bloodshed. They were a people born equal, instead of becoming so.[*]

De Tocqueville's perceptions were consequently, reinforced by travellers to the United States. As Lipset tells us, "many foreign travellers were impressed by the American insistence on equality in social relations, and on achievement in one's career".[7]

Baedeker's advice to any European planning to visit the United States in the late 19th century and early 20th century, for example, was that he "should, from the outset, reconcile himself to the absence of deference, or servility, on the part of those he considers his social inferiors".[8]

Moreover Denis Brogan tells us that the American value systems has formed:

> a society which despite all efforts of school, advertising, clubs and the rest, makes the creation of effective social barriers difficult, and their maintenance a perpetually repeated task. American Social fences have to be continually repaired; in England they are like wild hedges, they grow if left alone.[9]

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[*] In opposition to this point, one can argue that they were not in this position until after the Jacksonian movement.

[7] S.Lipset, op. cit. p. 125.

[8] Quoted in Lipset, op. cit. p. 125.

[9] D.W.Brogan, The English People, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1943), p. 99.

The existence of these phenomena are also manifested in the major institutions of the American society. Thus Lipset tells us that, "the lack of class conscious ideology in the American Labour Movement may be directly traced to the equalitarian, anti-class orientation of the values associated with America's national identity. Thus it may be suggested that one of the reasons unions have had trouble organizing new segments of the employed population as compared to unions in Northern Europe, is that they have been handicapped by their slightly illegitimate position relative to the value system."[10]

Moreover because of the open class system workers are found to be more individualistically orientated, and more concerned with fellow workers' wages than with the upper classes. This also leads one to the observation that American Trade Union officials want more money and disregard democratic procedures more than their counterparts in Britain. American Labour leaders are under greater pressure to formalize dictatorial mechanisms so as to prevent the possibility of their being overthrown. Their position is never very secure, unlike the situation in Britain where 86 out of 127 general secretaries have permanant status.[11]

It would seem therefore that there is considerable historical and comparative evidence to uphold the proposition that the United States is an achievement and equalitarian orientated society with an

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[10] Lipset, op. cit. p. 202.

[11] V.Allan, Power in Trade Unions, (New York: Hayman's Ltd. 1954), p. 215.

inherent conflict between democracy and oligarchy.

b) Equality and Achievement in an Artificial Setting

An indicator of the above attitudes could be the extent of class consciousness in a particular society. R.Alford,[12] has studied this phenomenon in Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States in terms of class voting. A number of public opinion polls were taken from 1952 until 1962, and they indicated that class voting was consistently higher in Australia and Great Britain than in Canada and the United States.

TABLE XI[13]

Class Voting 1952-1962

Country	Index of Class Voting*			
	Mean	Lowest	Highest	Based on number of surveys
Britain	40	35	44	8
Australia	33	27	37	10
United States	16	13	23	5
Canada	8	-1	17	10

* The index of class voting was computed by sub-
tracting the percentage of non-manual voting
for the left parties from the percentage of
manual workers voting for left parties.

Obviously there are some flaws in this analysis because it does not distinguish between the forms of class consciousness. Thus class consciousness in Britain and Australia has evolved out

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[12] R.Alford, op. cit.

[13] Reproduced from R.Alford, op. cit. p. 102.

of very differing circumstances, and have very different effects on
the institutions of each country. The main difference is that
between the general attitude structures found in the nation's
political culture, and the sub-cultural factors manifested in the
political parties. In Britain the class consciousness of the upper
classes, found in the sub-culture manifested as the Conservative party
is predominant at the national level, whereas in Australia the class
consciousness of the lower classes, found in the sub-culture
manifested as the Australian Labour Party is predominant at the
national level. Despite the existence of class consciousness,
therefore, the prevailing attitude structures can take on different
forms: thus we find elitist, ascriptive, socially deferential
attitudes in Britain, and competitive, egalitarian attitudes in
Australia.

Nevertheless the differences that Alford found between
Britain and the United States seem to be without serious difficulties
for our analysis, and do tend to show the existence of differing
value systems very clearly. Moreover the study by Almond and Verba,[14]
showed that the United States was more of a participant culture than
Britain which they described as a 'Deferential Civic Culture'.[15]
The factor of participation in the political system must be a reflection
of the desire of the people to influence, and control their leaders

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[14] Almond and Verba, op. cit. p. 313.

[15] Ibid, p. 315.

and as we have seen in our analysis of Britain, this is very dependent on the authority attitude structures in a particular society.

Finally McClosky[16] in his analysis of mass and elite cultures, finds that the electorate in the United States only displays a substantial measure of unity in its support of "Freedom" in the abstract; on most other features of democratic belief and practice, it seemed sharply divided. This evidence seems to be very much in tune with the contention that the basic attitudes are equality and achievement, as there would seem to be a desire for individual freedom, with very different desires and goals to be fulfilled with that 'freedom'.

Political Socialization

As we saw in our investigation of the British attitude towards authority, the socialization process can be the key determining factor for the prevailing attitude structure and the changes that might occur in that structure. In Britain we found that education and occupation greatly reinforced the family environment, and perpetuated the class divisions. In the United States, however, we find that the educational system helps to break down the disadvantages of family and background. The school system is based on 'comprehensive' education, without rigid divisions and separations, according to intelligence. Discrimination in schools has been

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[16] McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, June 1964.

greatly reduced since the mid 1950's,[17] and the Negro can now compete

for school places with the white children. The results of the

system is that there are no inferior or superior tags placed upon

children at an early age. There is equality of opportunity for

everybody, a fact which even impressed De Tocqueville at his time of

writing. Moreover there is no great tradition behind the private

schools. Despite their development, and persistence they do not create

strong social ties for particular elements in American society as

they do in Britain. Generally it can be seen that the school system

is based on equality, but it also inculcates the children with the

competitive spirit, and the need to seek higher and better things.

Achievement orientation is therefore inculcated in the socialization

process.

The results of the socialization processes have consequently

led David Potter to the following conclusions:-

> American social distinctions, however real they
> may be and however difficult to break down, are
> not based upon or supported by great disparities
> in wealth, education, in speech, in dress, etc.,
> as they are in the Old World. If the American
> class structure is in reality very unlike the
> classless society which we imagine, it is equally
> unlike the formalized class societies of former times.[18]

The two values, equality and achievement are undoubtedly

pervasive throughout American society, with the result that there is

a lack of social deference and a weakening of political deference.

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[17] A.P.Blaustein and C.Ferguson, Desegregation and the Law,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1968).

[18] D.Potter, People of Plenty, (Chicago: Phoenix Books,
1961), p. 102.

We see here the manifestation of the populistic ambivalence: the distrust of politicans as a class but the occasional admiration of a political leader.

In following our basic proposition that there is a causal relationship between the basic attitude structure in a given society and its institutions, we should expect candidate selection in the United States to have considerably different characteristics from that in Britain:-

(i) Decentralization

In looking at the structure and organization of American political parties, we find that they are basically decentralized. As Ranney and Kendall tell us,

> The various committees, chairmen, and conventions do not add up to a neat, pyramidal, hierarchial pattern. Indeed the relevant statutes in most states tend to make party agencies at different levels quite independent of one another....[19]

Moreover if our analysis is correct we would expect the parties to be just as decentralized, (in fact more so), in their informal workings. (It will be remembered at this juncture that in the British Conservative party the informal tendencies were towards strong centralization). In looking at the informal organization of the parties Ranney and Kendall found some contradictions, however. They found that strong leaders appeared in the party in certain states and that they wielded enormous power.[20]

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[19] Ranney and Kendall, _Democracy and the American Party System_, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 235.

[20] _Ibid_, Chapter 11.

But they perceived that party organization with effective leadership
and discipline are most commonly found not at the state level, but
at the county and city levels. In other words, state leadership
and discipline where they appear are likely to rest on the leaders
commanding position in some county or city within the state. They
concluded therefore, that

> American national parties are decentralized not only
> in their formal organization, but also in their informal
> organization; for the leader-follower relations of
> discipline and leadership tend to be stronger at the
> base of the national parties' pyramid than at the top,
> and achieve maximum strength only at the bottom.[21]

These observations are given credence by the power of the
national party over candidate selection. In 1910, President William
Howard Taft and his Conservative Republican advisers tried to block
the renomination of such progressive Republican Senators as
Dolliver, Cummins, Beveridge, and La Follette. The Taft group with-
held patronage from the rebels and contributed money and speakers
to their opponents in the primaries. Every one of the rebels,
however, retained the support of the organization in his state, and
was renominated.

Other Presidents have had similar defeats at the hands of local
organizations, some have had successes such as Wilson in 1918. But
the most outstanding example is that of President Roosevelt in 1938.
Despite his landslide triumph in the 1936 Presidential election and
despite huge Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress, he
still found it difficult to use the party machine to influence

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[21]
Ibid, p. 264.

candidate selection. He failed to get his men adopted and failed to prevent the adoption of anti-New Deal Senators.

As Ranney and Kendall tell us, -

> Decentralized control of the nominating process undoubtedly gets in the way of strong Presidential party leadership, that is, of the kind of party discipline that would enable a National party leader in the White House to force his legislative programme through Congress.[22]

Local party leaders are undoubtedly committed to the view that the party organization in each constituency should determine who the party's candidate for offices elected from that constituency will be. As James A. Farley said

> I knew from the beginning that the purge could lead to nothing but misfortune, because in pursuing his course of vengeance Roosevelt violated a cardinal political creed which demanded that he keep out of local matters . . . I trace all the woes of the Democratic party, directly or indirectly, to this interference in purely local affairs. In any political entity voters naturally and rightfully resent the unwarranted invasion of outsiders.[23]

(ii) Democratisation

Following out findings that there exists in the United States strong equalitarian tendencies, and a strong desire for freedom we would expect to find this manifested in the candidate selection process. In fact we find that the history of the candidate selection process in the United States, reveals a perpetual fight against elitism and corruption.

In the words of V. O. Key,

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[22] Ibid, P. 289.

[23] Quoted in Ranney and Kendall, op. cit. P.289, from James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1948), pp.146-147.

> Through the history of the American nominating
> practices runs a persistent attempt to make feasible
> popular participation in nominations and thereby to
> ·limit or to destroy the power of party oligarchies ...
> These transformations of nominating procedures have
> not invariably taken control of nominations from the
> party leadership, but the fact that they have occurred
> points to the persistent belief that the mass of the
> people ought to have a hand in the management of party
> affairs.[24]

We find, therefore, that candidate selection, has evolved out of the Congressional caucus, to the Convention, hence to the Direct Primary.

(a)   Soon after the Revolution the legislative caucus became the means for selecting candidates for office.   But it had hardly become established when modifications began to be made to correct its shortcomings.   The abandonment of the caucus did not take more than a quarter of century to achieve.   The climax was the overthrow of the Congressional caucus, which fell, as V.O.Key tells us, "before the onslaughts of Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, the idol of the West, the symbol of rising spirit of democracy and egalitarianism"[25]

Jackson was an aspirant for the Presidency in 1824, and as he could not hope to be selected by an unsympathetic Congressional caucus, his backers set out to discredit "King Caucus", and by 1832 the National Convention came into use. As Key tells us, the destruction of the caucus represented more than a mere change in the method of selection; its replacement by the Convention being

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[24]   V.O.Key, _Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups_, (New York: T.Y.Crowell, Company, 1964), p. 37.

[25]   _Ibid_, p. 372.

regarded as the removal from power of self appointed oligarchies.

(b)   The Convention system was ultimately a break with the old traditions as it constituted a means for transmitting, from local assemblies, the wishes and impulses of the mass party membership to a central point, where the selection of candidates was made. Nonetheless its mode of functioning was idealized, and in practice the influential groups were soon capable of controlling it.   It lasted longer than the caucus, but it came under criticism for much the same reasons, that is, it was regarded as an instrument of organizational control, as a means of boss rule, as an institution at war with aspirations toward "democratic" government. At the turn of the century therefore, the convention system was seriously questioned, and its date of virtual extinction has been set at 1910.

(c)   Under the Primary system candidates are chosen through an election in which all members of the party, or in some instances any person qualified to vote, may participate.   The voters act directly in contrast with their indirect choice through conventions made up of delegates one or two stages removed from the precinct. The mechanisms of the direct primary admirably suited the needs of the ideology of the progressive movement which stirred American politics in the years following 1900.   To them the direct primary constituted a means by which an enlightened people might cut through the mesh of organized and privileged power and grasp control of the government.   Its main feature, is that the candidate selection process

is completely governed by state laws and officials, and that the party has no direct formalised link to the process. It is supposed to be completely free from machine politics and manipulations by unseen groups. In due course, however, misgivings arose about the direct primary. It turned out, as we shall see, that party factions soon began to control the process. Yet the direct primary created new conditions of work for party leaders, conditions that affected their manner of operation and influenced the nature of party itself.

(iii) Modifications of the Primary and Informal Organization

There is a struggle in the United States between the will of the majority to influence and control the political process, and the will of the local leaders to maintain their control; and this is most strongly manifested in the candidate selection process. It is the focal point of the conflict between equality and achievement, and the dilemma between democracy and oligarchy.

(a) The democratic evolution of the candidate selection process gained impetus with the existence and proliferation of machines and Bosses.[26] Machines existed to secure and perpetuate power in the hands of a known organization, and that power was used, primarily for the enrichment, or gratification in some form of the owners of the machine. Its object was political control, and its means was the control of nominations and elections. With the enacting of the direct primary, the power of the machine was severely threatened

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[26] D.W.Brogan, An Introduction of American Politics, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1954), Ch. 4 and E.Banfield, Political Influence, (New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1961).

and it gradually became powerless in the twentieth century. Some
machines still exist today (Mayor Daley's in Chicago), and this indicates
that their decline was due to more complicated factors than simply
the rise of the direct primary.[27] There is no doubt that the merit
system reduced the affect of patronage, that 'good government'
procedures reduced the possibility of corruption and what Plunkitt
of Tammany Hall called 'honest graft',[28] and that social reform
and welfare programmes have been instigated by governments taking
away the basic grievances upon which machines used to exploit and
to serve their position. The American city dweller of today is
therefore far less deprived and needy of the rewards which machines
are prepared to offer for votes. But where underprivileged pockets
of humanity persist in America's affluent society the classical party
machine can still find a place to exist. We cannot conclude, there-
fore, that the direct primary, itself, broke down the machines,
and where they were liquidated other forms of party organization
were often introduced formally or informally in order to maintain a
dominant role for the party in the selection process.

(b)   V.O.Key tells us that in order to offset some of the less
happy results of the primary selection process, and to permit an
open and accepted role by the party organization in the choice of
candidates, a few states have enacted legislation authorizing

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[27] F.I.Greenstein, The American Party System and The American
People (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 1963), pp.37-53.

[28] W.Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, (New York: Knopf, Inc.,
1948).

conventions to designate a slate of candidates before the direct primary.[29]   Ordinarily the primary ballot indicates that these candidates have the endorsement of the party convention, and if the convention arrives at decisions acceptable to major elements of the leadership, its choices may not even be challenged in the primary.   Even where the pre-primary convention does not exist the party still endorses candidates, and gives financial assistance where necessary.   Moreover there is often little competition in the primary, except in strong one-party constituencies,[30] and the voters are given very little direct influence.

(c)   Nevertheless the continued existence in the United States of counterveiling powers between democracy and oligarchy, have again manifested themselves in certain informal democratic procedures. As Leon Epstein tells us

> Sometimes the new organizations find the statutory party too constricting and so develop extra-legally. They then perform most political functions under a new label, but also secure control of the legally established apparatus for certain formal purposes ... The point is to have an organized membership as the party. . . Loosely speaking, the basis is ideologically or policy orientated.   And, significantly, the members are called 'amateurs' distinguishing them from the professional politicians who for so long dominated American party organizations.[31]

Generally these new political clubs are based in urban areas

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[29]   Key, _Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups_, p. 387.

[30]   Key, _Southern State Politics_, p. 406.

[31]   L.D.Epstein, _Political Parties in Western Democracies_, p. 122.

and depend upon middle class support.[32] Epstein believes that

these clubs may well typify the political pattern of an increasingly

middle class nation, and that if there is going to be organization of

the middle class, it will definitely take this form and not be

based on patronage. Undoubtedly they are more democratic than many

other political organizations and posit a threat to the formal party

organization by seeking less "marketable policies and candidates".*

(iv) The Nature of the Political Elite

We have seen how the prevailing attitude structure affects

the candidate selection process in the United States. If our basic

proposition is correct it should also affect the nature of the

political elite. Thus, unlike in Britain, we should expect the

elite to vary in education and occupation, and for there to be no

close social ties between the elites in different parts of the

country. The political elite should have its own distinctive character-

istics in comparison to the other elites in the society, and should

come nearer to our conception of a polyarchy rather than an

oligarchy.**

H.Jacob has studied the nature of the American political

elite.[33] He tells us that the process which brings elected officials

and political leaders out of the body of citizens has received much

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* See Francis Carney, The Rise of Democratic Clubs in California, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1960).

** See Page 12.

[32] J.Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[33] H.Jacob, loc. cit.

attention from political analysts. He describes how there have been propositions that the political elite is based on economic power, as is the case with Marx, and propositions that it is based on dominant social positions. In Britain the political, economic, and social elites were closely interwoven, but in the United States, Jacob found some important differences. He believes that certain occupations frequently place their practitioners into a bargaining role where they deal with outsiders (non-subordinates) and try to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. The lawyer is the classic example of this type of occupation, but as Jacob notes, not all lawyers play this role nor do we find all types of lawyers in American politics. The essential characteristic, therefore, is that the occupation must contain elements of a brokerage role.

Jacob finds a second determining factor in the political structure of the particular community. Thus in the extreme south a whole class of potential activists are barred, because of the colour of their skin. Despite a black American having a brokerage occupation he will not be able to gain political appointment in certain areas. Moreover Jacob finds that where the party is dominant in a constituency only those in contact with it will be tapped for political office. This means that only those brokers who deal with the machine and its operatives in their daily work are likely to be found among candidates.

This model allows great variations to exist between constituencies and regions of the nation. We find that a particular

occupation helps one into the political elite, and that according to the social structure and party structure, differences can occur. Most of the available literature on the background of legislators in the United States supports Jacob's model.[34] It is found that there is a high incidence of lawyers (30% upwards) and that the more prestigious political positions attract people from more prestigious segments of their professions or occupations. Avery Leiserson, for example, has recently made a sample study of twenty Congressional districts and indicated his findings as follows:-[*]

TABLE XII

TRAINING AND METHOD OF ACCESS TO OFFICE OF 20 SAMPLE CONGRESSMEN (1958)

			Law	Military Service	Politics or Govmt. Service	Business (inc. Journalism)	Education	Vacancy	Defeated Incumbent
Non-Competitive									
Texas	(6)	(D)		x	x			x	
Tennessee	(6)	(D)		x	x			x	
South Carolina	(1)	(D)	x		x			x	
Louisiana	(2)	(D)	x	x				x	
One-Party Predominant									
California	(26)	(D)		x	x			x	
Missouri	(5)	(D)		x			x	x	
New York	(29)	(R)	x		x			x	
New York	(38)	(R)	x	x				x	
Montana	(1)	(D)	x		x			x	
Nebraska	(2)	(R)			x	x		x	
Competitive									
Massachusetts	(14)	(R)			x	x		x	
Virginia	(6)	(R)	x	x					x
North Carolina	(10)	(R)	x	x					x
Pennsylvania	(24)	(R)					x	x	
Wisconsin	(9)	(D)	x		x	x		x	
Highly Competitive									
California	(6)	(R)	x	x		x			x
Illinois	(19)	(R)	x	x				x	
Oregon	(4)	(D)	x	x					x
Pennsylvania	(6)	(R)	x	x	x			x	
Utah	(2)	(R)	x		x				x
	Total		13	12	11	4	2	15	5

* A. Leiserson, National Party Organisation and Congressional Districts, Western Political Quarterly, Vol.XVI, September 1963, p.644. Also see D.J.Rothman, Politics and Power, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p.115.

There can be litle doubt therefore that the middle class, and
upper middle class are the most likely to be represented in Congress.
The difference to the situation in Britain, however, is that these
men reflect the dominant interest in their constituency (in social
background, religion, business, etc.),[35] that they do not belong
to a cohesive class, and that they are more likely to have
specialised expertise for their political career.

It would seem that our basic proposition has been upheld in
the American context. We have found the dialogue between equality
and achievement in the selection process with strong historical pressures
for mass participation, and continual attempts by machines, or party
officials to manipulate and control the process. The candidate
selection process, therefore, reflects the basic attitude structure
in the society, and the political elite has the characteristics we
would expect from an equalitarian, achievement orientated society.

2. Party Competition

In our model, we have treated party competition as an
intervening variable in the process of candidate selection. We should
expect to find the extent of party interference, and the character-
istics of the candidates to vary, according to the degree of
competition in any particular constituency.

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[34] J.A.Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, (Chicago: Rand,
McNally and Company, 1966), D.Matthews, Social Background of Decision
Makers, (New York: Doubleday, 1954), and F.J.Sorauf, Party and
Representation, (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

[35] Epstein, op. cit. p. 195, "Regardless of class membership
of the ethnic group leader, there can be no doubt of the primacy of
ethnic over class recognition in American leadership recruitment".

(i)   L.G.Seligman has tested the assertion that the internal cohesion of the parties varies with the degree of competition between them.[36] He made his tests in Oregon, a state which was in transition from one party dominance to two party competition. From his findings he was able to produce three generalizations:-

a)   In areas safe for the majority party, party officials were least active in instigating or supporting candidates. The political market was freer for various groups and individuals to promote candidacies. But this conclusion had to be qualified by the fact that these districts, because they were safe for the majority party, also had incumbents who were running again. This conclusion is substantiated by V.O.Key's finding in his book, American State Politics, of the fact that incumbency tended to decrease inter-party competition in the primary.[37] Established candidates are, therefore, less threatened, and party officials are only likely to intervene if an insurgent factional movement arose.[*]

b)   In districts safe for the majority, the hopeless minority had to conscript candidates for primary.

c)   In the more competitive districts, the candidacy market was wide open.

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[36] L.G.Seligman, Political Recruitment and Party Structure, American Political Science Review, Vol. LV., March, 1961, p.77.

[37] V.O.Key, American State Politics, p. 179.

[*]   This is a contradiction of our findings in Britain, where we found the party more intent on controlling the process in a safe seat in order to get the man they wanted elected. See pages 94 and 106.

TABLE XIII[38]

Party Recruitment pattern	Safe Repub Marion County		Compet. lost Cen. Portland		Compet. have County		Safe Dem N.Portland	
Centralized Party Recruitment	D X	R	D	R	D	R	D	R X
Bi-Factional						X		
Tri-Factional			X				X	
Diffuse: Autonomous groups and/or individuals		X		X	X			
	less factional						more factional	

Within the majority party, therefore, there can be intense competition between differing factions, according to whether the imcumbent legislator is running again, and we can see that the party's cohesion is partially, at least, a function of the degree of competition within a constituency.

(ii)   Sorauf tells us that it is desired by most local parties that they should select high status candidates.[39] But the variations of status characteristics are due to an important political distinction.

> As a party becomes a majority party it acquires a
> social acceptability that in turn enables it to
> recruit candidates of more impressive social stand-
> ing. Its character as a winning party also makes
> its ballot more attractive to the ambitious. As
> the chances for Democratic victory in the district
> increases, so does the social status of the
> Democratic candidates.

[38] Seligman, loc. cit. p. 84.

[39] Sorauf, op. cit. p. 90.

TABLE XIV[40]

Status Rank of 1958 Candidates by Political Complexion of District

| Status Rank | Percentage of legislative votes won by Remus. | | | | | | | |
| | 0-39.9 | | 40-49.9 | | 50-59.9 | | Over 60 | |
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
First	0	10	4	15	5	12	11	7
Second	8	3	9	10	12	5	7	9
Third	2	1	6	1	3	1	2	2
Fourth	3	0	6	1	1	3	2	2
Fifth-Eighth	4	2	3	1	1	0	1	1
Cannot Rank	1	2	5	5	5	6	5	7
	18	18	33	33	27	27	28	28

Admittedly these findings are limited to a study of
Pennsylvania, but they uphold our preconceived beliefs, and the
relative findings in Britain. Although party influences in safe
seats were different in the two countries, there can be no doubt
that the extent of competition within a constituency has a strong
causal effect upon certain characteristics of the candidate
selection process.

3. Party Organization

In our basic proposition, we have treated party organiz-
ation as an intervening variable, suggesting that despite the
general political attitudes of the country, and the specific
attitude structures of the parties treated as sub-cultures, the
organizational framework will determine certain characteristics
of the candidate selection process of each party.

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[40]
Ibid, p. 91.

(i)   Duverger [41] distinguished between direct and indirect party structures. The former evolved out of the institutional framework, and remain in a modified form today.   In looking at Wilfred Binkley's authoritative work on the evolution of American parties, [42] we find that they fit very closely to this model.   They are based upon caucuses which are narrowly recruited, rather independent of one another and generally decentralized; their aim is not so much to increase their membership or to enlist the masses, as to recruit outstanding people.   As Duverger explains:

> Since their activity is entirely directed towards
> elections and parliamentary alliances it has in
> consequence a somewhat seasonal character; the
> framework of their administration is embryonic;
> on the whole their leadership is in the hands of
> their representatives and is very markedly individual
> in form: real power in them belongs to a particular
> group revolving round a parliamentary leader and the
> life of the party stems from rivalry amongst such
> small groups. The party is concerned only with
> political questions; doctrine and ideological problems
> play a very small part in its life, and membership is
> generally based upon interest or habit. [43]

We find that the American parties (that is the Republicans and Democrats) are very similar in their evolution and organization. Generalizations, can therefore be made for both, unlike the prevailing position in Britain. Both prominent American parties, predominantly display the prevailing national attitude structure in

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[41]   Duverger, op. cit. p. 1.

[42]   W.E.Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History, (New York: A.A.Knopf Inc. 1949).

[43]   Duverger, op. cit. p. 1.

their own particular sub-cultures, with the result that their internal workings are very similar. Despite differences in their membership and enthusiasm found by Rossiter[44] and Binkley, the authority relationship within the parties remain virtually the same.

It is found, therefore, that both parties conform to the patterns that Duverger sets for direct party structures. They are decentralized, with very little formal machinery combining the different levels of the party hierarchy. But as our study of Britain revealed these tendencies are not directly an effect of the origins of organization, because they adapt informally to the prevailing attitude structure. Thus we found that the British Conservative Party was in reality highly centralized.

Nevertheless it is important for us to note that American parties are based on the caucus; and that there is a distinction between the hierarchy of official caucuses, rising from the caucuses of counties, wards or cities, to the national caucus, and the unofficial caucuses constituted by the bosses and machines. As Duverger says, "In every case we have small groups of well-known people whose personal influence counts more than their number."[45]

(ii)   Duverger, makes a second distinction, therefore, between the form of membership of each party. Quite obviously the American parties tend to correspond to his model of cadre parties, where

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[44]   C.Rossiter, Politics and Parties in America, (New York: Signet Books, 1964) and Binkley, op. cit.

[45]   Duverger, op. cit. p. 22.

quality becomes the most important factor rather than quantity. The parties are interested in a man's prestige, skill in technique, and size of fortune. What the mass party secures by numbers, the cadre party achieves by selection. The most important aspect of this distinction, as we found in Britain, is the financial function of each party. Thus we found in the British Context that the organization of the party membership, was an important determinant of the financial arrangements within the party and the type of candidates recruited.

a)   In the United States, we would expect the parties to be greatly dependent upon a few wealthy donors. As Ranney and Kendall tell us:

> Since there are few definite and formal political organizations to conduct fund-raising campaigns, the money for a particular candidate's war chest comes largely from a handful of wealthy contributors, usually businessmen, who either wish to do business with the state or wish to be heard on such matters as tax policy or state regulations of the business-- in which they are interested. Contributors of both varieties . . . usually expect and receive assurances of fairly specific benefits if the candidate they help finance is successful.[46]

We find, therefore, that considerable sums of money have to be raised to fight an election, and that certain sources have to be tapped in order to bring a candidate before the public. It has been calculated by Professor Heard that $200,000 is spent on a Senator in an average state, and $50,000 on an average Representative.[47]

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[46]   Ranney and Kendall, op. cit. p. 186, and V.O.Key, Southern Politics, (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1949), p. 470.

[47]   Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).

As V.O.Key tells us, American politics is atomized and each candidate must in some way or another cover his own expenses.[48] The ability to raise the money to finance a primary campaign becomes an absolute necessity for a serious contender. We do not find in the United States, therefore, a situation where certain rich personnages contribute to a central party fund; we find the money from a few personnages being channelled into campaigns all over the country. The nature of financing is the same, as in the centralized cadre party, but its effect is that candidates for important offices will operate a substantial campaign effort independently of the party organization.

It would seem, therefore, that the influence given to money holders in the United States is enormous, and that candidates must be connected to this source of income or have vast personal wealth. The candidates are reduced to a very narrow and moneyed sector of American society[*], therefore, and there is little chance for other individuals without a different form of organization[49] to combat this

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[48] Key, Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups, p. 494.

[*] It must be understood that this part of the achievement-equalitarian dialogue, which allows people with money to be upwardly mobile; but it is also maintained by the Horatio Alger myth on equality and mobility (See Louis Hartz, op. cit.). Moreover it is also due to the characteristics of a stratified society, with different talents between men, and different opportunities for a political career. That there is, or will be an elite is not denied; but the important fact is how that elite is recruited, and how much competition there is allowed in the recruitment. There can be no doubt that the U.S.A. is an open society with movements between the strata; but equality in the American context, is equality to become unequal.

monopolisation of the legislative positions.

Nevertheless there are state and federal laws which try to regulate the financial arrangements, but as V.O.Key tells us, they only achieve a modicum of success.[50] The organization of campaign activity presents almost insurmountable technical obstacles to the control of finance. The most important recent act for the limiting of the influence of money, was the Hatch Act in 1940, and most states passed similar laws in order to place limits on the size of expenditure in campaigns for state and local offices. The Hatch Act limited donations of over $5,000 in any one year to the campaign of any candidate for elective federal office, but most of the regulations have been overcome by dispersing the money among a few associates of the major donor.

It can be concluded therefore, that money plays a very important part in determining the policies and characteristics of candidates in the American political area, and that the nature of American party financing is primarily a result of its membership structure. As such, therefore, party organization can be taken as an intervening variable in the process of candidate selection in the light of our information on the British and American practices.

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[49] We noted previously that Amateur Clubs were being formed in California and other states, with the intention of raising small subscriptions from individual members, so that candidates could stand who were not tied to the dominant political machine, see J.Wilson, op. cit.

[50] Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, p. 505.

It would appear, therefore, that our proposition has withstood testing in the British and American contexts; that the main determinants of candidate selection in any one country is the prevailing authority attitude structure, with strong intervening influences from party competition and party organization.

In the next chapter we briefly survey the method of candidate selection in the United States, in the light of the theoretical observations made above.

CHAPTER SIX

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

A DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY

In the United States regulations of the Nation and States not only govern who shall be qualified to be a candidate for a particular office, but also govern the procedures by which candidates are selected to represent the political parties. A direct comparison to British practices is, therefore, not possible, but in the following analysis we will be able to focus our attention onto certain party activities and procedures which will warrant analysis in respect to British practices.

1. National Regulations

   (i) Qualifications of Candidates: Article I of the American Constitution[1] lays down certain qualifications for senators and representatives as to age, citizenship, and residence.

   a)   A Senator must be thirty years of age, nine years a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of the state from which he is elected.

   b)   A Representative need be only twenty-five years old, and a citizen for seven years, but the residence requirement is the same. By custom, however, a representative must reside not only in

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[1]   C.H.Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1959), p. 162.

the state but in the district from which he is elected.

(ii)   Disqualifications of Candidates:

a)   Members of Congress are disqualified for appointment to executive office by Article I, Section 6, which provides:

> No person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuation of office.[2]

b)   Moreover no Senator or Representative, "shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created during such time".   The purpose of this restriction seems to have been to prevent Congress from 'feathering the nests' of its members by creating jobs to which they could be appointed.

c)   Each House is authorized by Article I, Section 5, to "be the judge of the elections, returns of its own members ...". Under this power, either House can in effect enforce additional qualifications by refusing to seat duly elected members; as it did a Utah polygamist in 1900, and Victor L. Berger of Wisconsin, a Socialist, in 1919 (because of his conviction under the Espionage Act for opposing the First World War).

2.   Procedures for Candidate Selection:

As we have previously noted, the selection process has evolved from the caucus, to the convention, hence to the direct primary.   The official means of selecting candidates today is limited to the

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[2]   Pritchett, The American Constitution, p. 162.

convention and direct primary, the former only existing in a few
states for certain offices, such as New York, Delaware, Indiana,
and Connecticut for selection of Senatorial candidates, and most
Southern States for the Republican candidates.[3]

The direct primary is, therefore, the prime means of
selecting candidates. Instead of a selection of candidates by party
members there is really a selection by its electors or supporters.
It is, however, difficult to describe primaries in general terms,
as each state has its own regulations about them. As Duverger says:

> In fact there is no one system of primaries,
> but there exists systems of primaries which
> are very varied and profoundly different from
> one another.[4]

According to the state we may distinguish between open and
closed primaries, both types being susceptible to numerous variations.[5]
Participation in a "closed" primary is limited to party members,
whereas under an open primary system the voter may decide when he
goes to the polls whether he will vote in the Democratic or Republican
primary.

The most common mode of determination of party membership,
and hence, of eligibility to vote in the closed primary of the party
is by enrolment at the time of registration: the elector declares

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[3] Key, _Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups_, p. 436.

[4] M. Duverger, _op. cit._ p. 362.

[5] Key, _Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups_, pp. 389-392.

to which party he wishes to belong for the primary, and cannot change until the next registration. Some versions of the closed primary, however, include no enrolment procedure. Rather, a test of party membership is prescribed by law, by party rule, or by state action supplemented by party rule: it is usually in terms of past partisan allegiance, present affiliation, future intention or a combination of these. As Duverger says:

> In certain Southern States a personal under-taking to support the party candidate appointed by the primary is demanded. This is to ensure the defeat of independents. Thus the closed primary takes it for granted that voters admit their preference for a party. The candidates are nominated by supporters rather than by electors pure and simple.[6]

He goes on to compare the situation with European parties,

> Enrolment, and even the challenge, come close to the European mechanism of membership; nevertheless there is not the regular subscription, nor the participation of membership in the life of the party, in the establishment of its hierarchy, and in the appointment of its leaders. Enrolment and challenge only concern the primaries and have only purely electoral significance.[7]

In the open primary, however, the secret of the voters' political preference is preserved. In some states the primary ballot contains several party columns. Each party column includes the names of aspirants for the party nomination, grouped by office, and the voters may make their choice for candidates for the several offices in whichever party column they choose. Some states staple different party primary ballots together and permit the voter in the polling

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[6] Duverger, op. cit. p. 363.

[7] Duverger, op. cit.

booth, to detach and mark one which he deposits in the ballot box
while he drops the unused ballot or ballots into a box for discards.

As V.O.Key tells us,

> Washington in 1935 carried the open primary principle
> to its logical conclusion by adopting the blanket primary,
> under which a voter can split his vote by voting if
> different party primaries on different offices. Moreover
> the ease with which voters may move from party to party
> under the open primary doubtless creates uncertainties
> for the party leadership in its efforts to control
> nominations as well as in tests of strength between
> leadership factions. The primary of one party may be
> raided by voters of another in order to assure the nomin-
> ation of a weak candidate who can be defeated in the
> general election.[8]

It can be seen, therefore, that some very varied techniques
are used in the selection of candidates, and when one includes the
pre-primary convention discussed at an earlier stage, it will be
understood how difficult it is to generalize for the United States.
As Epstein tells us:

> The safest point that can be made about American practices
> of candidate selection is that they vary greatly at
> governmental levels, among states, by parties, and between
> urban and rural areas. This is not because legal regu-
> lations differ, especially from state to state, but also
> because the social bases for political activity differ
> within the United States.[9]

a) Senatorial Candidate Selection: The primary can conceal
the actual influences in the process. Thus the choice may be made
by a well-knit party hierarchy which is routinely ratified in the
primary. The primary may be frequently contested or uncontested,

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[8] Key, Parties, Politics, Pressure Groups, p. 391.

[9] Epstein, op. cit. p. 203.

depending on the particular characteristics of the state concerned. In the South, for instance, the Democratic primary is no selection method at all. The primary is the election, and it takes on peculiar forms in recognition of its peculiar function. As V.O.Key tells us,

> In most southern states a double primary is used. In the first primary all those candidates run who have nominated themselves or been nominated by factional organizations or other groups. In the first primary often no person receives a majority. The two leading candidates then go before the electorate again in a second or run-off primary, and the winner becomes the party's candidate. He is in reality elected.[10]

Even though the frequency of competition for selection increases with the expectation of general election victory, especially in the South, not all selections for sure are contested.[11]

b) Selection of House of Representatives Candidates

The process of selecting representative candidates resembles in its broad outlines that of senatorial processes. The choice is made independently within each district, and it often resembles election, as many of the House districts are dominated by one party. The predominant mode of selection is again, the direct primary, with the exception in the South; (the Republicans using the Convention to select candidates who still run mainly for glory rather than for office).

3. Pre-Primary Selection:

The early advocates of the direct-primary believed that it would democratize the parties internal structure because it would

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10 Key, Southern Politics, p. 407.

11 See Key, Parties, Politics, Pressure Groups, p. 380.

take the power of selecting candidates away from the bosses and give
it to the members. Its opponents believed that the direct primary,
by destroying the power of the party to select candidates, would
cause the parties to disintegrate by reducing them to congeries of
confused and confusing factional disputes.

Ranney and Kendall believe, however, that neither set of
expectations have been fulfilled.[12] The party member and/or
electors do not have a wide open choice, and the party still has
a great deal of influence. It is true that many of the machines
have been broken down, as we saw previously, but there can be little
doubt that other non-democratic tendencies have reasserted themselves.

Nevertheless we can see that the direct primary has increased
the volume and added to the complexity of the tasks that party
leaders and workers have to perform, and in certain areas the party
has lost a great deal of its influence. This latter factor, how-
ever, is due more to the fact that the primary leads to the develop-
ment of internal factions and rivalries between party groups of
leaders, than to the encouragement of free sponsorship of candidatures.
V.O.Key tells us, for example, that:

> In reality no formal nominating procedure exists in
> one party states; hence the inquirer must look
> beyond the formal structures and procedures to
> determine how nominees are chosen.[13]

In many two-party states, the regular party organization advances a
slate of candidates for selection in the primary, and often their

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[12] Ranney and Kendall, op. cit. p. 282.

[13] Key, Southern Politics, p. 410.

ratification by the party rank and file occurs routinely. In

southern states, however, party organizations are officially neutral

in the primaries, and nearly always so in fact.

As Key continues to say:

> The process by which a person becomes a serious
> contender for the candidatures, depends on the
> character of the factional systems within a
> state's Democratic party. When there are cohesive,
> continuing factions, each, by its own informal
> internal processes reaches a decision on whom it
> will support in the primary. In states with
> factions of an amorphous and transient character,
> the personal initiative of would-be candidates
> may be more important than a group decision. The
> would-be candidate, in effect, nominates himself
> and rallies a faction to support him in the
> campaign.[14]

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the pre-primary

procedures can take many informal forms, but there can also be little

doubt, that by the time of the primary the serious contenders have

been narrowed down to a mere handful.

In states where the 'party' plays an important role,

differences again appear. The party organization can, through its

central committee or executive committee, endorse a slate of

primary candidates, and such committee action may be customary,

publicly known, and accepted. If the organization is united and well

fortified with campaign resources, challenge of its slate would more

than likely be extremely futile.

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[14] Key, _Southern Politics_. Also see, Duane Lockard, _New England State Politics_ (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 325.

Either no challenge occurs or other contenders for selection make only the most perfunctory race, and draw only a few votes. In those states where laws forbid the endorsement of primary slates by party committees, the leadership of the party may create extra-legal political committees that assume the function of slate making and leadership in the selection process.

  a) Virginia: Systematic recruitment of candidates and orderly building of pre-primary party tickets. [15]

V.O.Key tells us how in Virginia the Byrd machine had a fairly regularized procedure for determining whom it would support in the primary: a young man going into politics affiliates with the organization and begins his apprenticeship as a state legislator or in some lesser capacity. "Gradually over a period of more than a year before the primary," says Key, "sentiment of the organization rank and file crystallizes. Some aspirants see that they cannot win the favour of the organization stalwarts and drop out of the running. The high command of the organization, listens to the expressions of approval and disapproval flowing up the hierarchy and eventually reaches a decision. Once the 'nod' is given, the newspapers begin to carry announcements by lesser leaders in support of the organization designee and the ranks close for the primary". [16] Sometimes there has been an indication of an opposing faction, representing Negro and Labour interests, but it can still be held

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[15] Key, Southern Politics, p. 25. It should be understood that this is a description of selection of Governor.

[16] Ibid, p. 412.

that the line of command is strong and that the decision by the organization is firmly followed.[17]

b) Florida: Unsystematic recruitment of candidate.

In the absence of systematic 'nominating' procedures candidacies in large measure come to be self-inspired rather than the consequence of group deliberation and consultation. No formidable coalitions or personalities perennially compete for control; no organized alliances squeeze out certain aspirants and centre like-minded strength on a single candidate before the primary. Individuals put themselves forward and if it looks as though they have a remote chance they can attract enough financial support to make a campaign. The sifting of candidates, is ultimately performed by the voters in the primary, and by the ability of would-be candidates to get a campaign 'rolling'. Moreover this negative activity by party officials and factions has been shown in other studies in other states.[18]

Summary

We have seen how the selection process is dominated by two counter-veiling forces; the apparent wishes of the masses to create a

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[17] This analysis of Key's is similar to the findings of Sorauf in party controlled Pennsylvania. He found that there was strong pre-primary activity by party officials, and that this usually meant that the party controlled the entire nomination process, p. 55.

[18] Epstein has found in his study of Wisconsin Politics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), p. 93, that under 10% of party officials attempted to control the pre-primary processes.

democratic process, and the need of the party groups to institute
formal and informal mechanisms to enhance their controls, and keep
the will of the masses at bay. The Michelian thesis of the
inevitability of oligarchical controls seems to have been given
further proof. But, as we noted earlier, the basic contradiction
in American practices is a manifestation of its two fundamental values,
equality and achievement. Moreover the direct primary unquestionably
gives the rank and file voter a larger share in the nominating
process than either of its predecessors. As William H. Young says:

> It has not eliminated the need for organization to
> achieve electoral success nor consequently, the need
> for some agreement among party leaders on candidates
> that ought to be offered for the approval of the
> public. Thus the caucus of party leaders continues
> to function in many if not in most, constituencies.
> With the primary, however, the party voters have to
> ratify the leaders' choices and minority groups may
> contest the leaders' slate.[19]

That equalitarian, freedom seeking, attitudes have asserted
themselves, and continue to do so, cannot be denied in the context
of the United States.

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[19] W.A. Young, _Essentials of American Government_, (New York:
Appleton, Century, Crofts, Inc. 1952), p. 159.

PART IV

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER SEVEN

In this study we have made the attempt to ascertain why the process of candidate selection has particular characteristics in a particular country. We have studied the effects of five possible independent variables in Britain and the United States, and have found great similarities between the findings in the two countries. Basically, the proposition that attitude structures can effect institutional structures and their workings, has been a long-held belief. Talcott Parsons,[1] for instance, is the foremost contemporary exponent of the importance of attitude structures (value systems) as causal factors upon the structures of society; and his ideas are based on the works of Max Weber,[2] who believed that 'values' became determinants of the direction of social change. Furthermore, Lipset[3] has in recent years used the dynamic equilibrium model to posit the idea that a complex society is under constant pressure to adjust its institutions to its central 'value system'. He believes that authors such as Riesman and Whyte[4] are totally wrong in their interpretation of change based on the extent

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[1] T.Parsons, _Structure and Process in Modern Societies_ (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 172.

[2] M.Weber, _The Methodology of the Social Sciences_ (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), pp.182-5.

[3] Lipset, _op. cit._

of advancement in technology, bureaucracy, industrialization and urbanism. Clearly many nations may be described as urbanized, industrialized, and capitalistic, but they vary considerably in their status systems, their political institutions, authority relationships and so-on.

In order to compare attitude structures, Talcott Parsons has provided a useful tool in his concept of 'pattern variables'. These were originally developed by Parsons as an extension of the classic distinction by Ferdinand Tonnies between community and society, between those systems which emphasized — primary, small, traditional, integrated attitudes, and those which stressed — impersonal, secondary large, socially deferential attitudes.

In following Parsons, Lipset[5] tells us, that although the United States and Britain are both urbanized, industrialized, and stable politically, they are integrated around different attitudes and class relations. As both De Tocqueville and Bagehot indicated, a society, in which the historic ties of traditional legitimacy had been forcibly broken, could sustain a stable democratic policy only if it emphasized equality and it contained strong, independent and competitive institutions. Conversely if the privileged classes persisted and continued to expect ascriptive and elitist rights, a society could have a stable democracy only if the lower classes

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[4] Lipset, "American Political Culture: Stability and Change", in J.R.Fiszman, The American Political Arena (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 32.

[5] Lipset, op. cit. p. 244.

accepted the status system. That this is the case has been shown very clearly in our analysis of Britain and the United States, with the inevitable effects of each attitude structure on the particular country's institutions. The nature of the political elite also differs between the two countries according to the attitude structure, as well as the process of candidate selection.

It could be surmised, therefore, that in any country that we study, it would be to our benefit to understand the nature of its attitude structures, as this would give us considerable insights into the workings of all the political institutions of that community. It must be noted however, that as so much is dependent on the attitude structure of a particular country; as those attitudes are transformed by the socialization processes, so will the influences on the institutions change. In this regard Britain is in a less stable position than the United States. There can be no doubt that the British socialization processes are changing to the extent that they will wear down the socially deferential attitudes, through increasing educational opportunity and mobility of the Labour force. When this occurs, and it may not be a very long way into the future, the whole fabric of British society could drastically change. There is no doubt that socially deferential attitudes are based on non-democratic life patterns, and there can also be little doubt that it is this social patterning, which maintains Britain's stability in this rather unstable world.

The characteristics of the candidate selection processes in

Britain, and to a lesser extent in the United States, which we have described above, are therefore, peculiar to the first half of the twentieth century, and we can expect them to change quite radically in the next ten to twenty years.

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