

SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE
AFRICAN ONE-PARTY STATE

TOWARDS NATIONAL INTEGRATION OR CHAOS?
SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE AFRICAN ONE-PART STATE

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis forms part of the growing
body of literature concerned with the concept of national
integration in the context of the Third World.

 The paper empirically defines national integration
in terms of social conflict, as applied to the study of
African politics, and questions the thesis of African
uniparty theory that unipartyism per se is a direct factor
in maintaining a low level of social conflict within the
state. It is argued that the concept of unipartyism is
itself too wide to be of intrinsic empirical value. The
sub-grouping of one-party states according to certain
common denominators, however, does provide a vehicle
whereby these states may be compared in their ability to

manage and control social conflict.

Some methodological questions are raised through the data analysis, since political science is still as yet a science in the state of becoming. But with the analytical tools at hand, resolutions to the problems are presented.

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INTRODUCTION

The place of this paper in contemporary political science.

The paper is written within the context of the of the vast body of literature that has evolved with the emergence from colonial domination of the new nations of Africa and Asia since the Second World War. As political influence becomes more diffused across the globe, as the voice of the Third World becomes increasingly heard, and as international interdependence becomes increasingly admitted, the study of Tropical African politics forms an integral part of contemporary research in political science.

In this paper it is promised to study the integrative and disintegrative processes in the black African states which have attained independence from their colonial rulers since 1957, predominantly by the critical analysis of social conflict and its incidence within these states.

Such an undertaking poses several tasks which are of relevance to contemporary political science. It involves a definition of the concept of integration, be it national, political, social, or otherwise qualified; a concept which is, at present, the focus of much attention. The rise of

new nations, and the internal societal strains which appear concomitant with industrial-technological and social development, have led students to inquire into the components of national integration, the stresses upon it, and the forces which promote it. With the ever-growing interdependence of the world community, the need to establish standard techniques to cope with this strain leads researchers to inquire into the nature of social conflict, its variables, and into seeking empirical methods of assessing community development and consciousness.¹

As the emergent nations have been thrust into the world arena, observers have noted the relation between the process of modernisation and the level of societal violence, between change and conflict. Traditional studies which viewed normalcy in terms of stability have been supplemented by more and more studies viewing society as "a net balance between equilibrating and disequilibrating forces",² as a function of conflict-generating and conflict-controlling factors. Huntington's work seeks to discover the correlation between violence and development in the Third World, and the

1. The writings of K.W.Deutsch have proved especially useful in this context. See particularly: K.W.Deutsch et al. International Political Communities, Doubleday Anchor (1966); and Deutsch in P.E.Jacob and J.V.Toscano (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia Lippincott (1964).

2. A.S.Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution" p.115 in H. Eckstein (ed) Internal War, NY Free Press, Glencoe (1964).

relationship of level of social mobilisation and economic development to political stability.³

Feldman sees a clash between old and new norms as a natural phenomenon, as industrialisation and development threaten a traditionally tightly-integrated and relatively undifferentiated social system with a developing varied system with functionally separate subsystems and fragmented social relations.⁴

This present paper studies integration and disintegration in terms of this conflict, where society's function depends on the extent and success of the management of tension within it; as such, the thesis forms part of the ever-increasing body of literature on social conflict.

Not only in its scope, but in its methodology, the paper becomes of relevance to current research. Political science, in its aim of becoming a scientific field, builds and tests theories by which to organise its thought, and to facilitate systematic classification of the data collected within it. African uniparty theory has developed a set of theorems which tests the theory and its assumptions, and discusses whether there can in fact be such a theory which

3. S.P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven Yale U.P. (1968).

4. A.S.Feldman, op.cit. in Eckstein.

could be empirically applicable in studying and classifying African politics.

The need for empirical testing of hypotheses and conclusions requires the analysis of data collected on social conflict in the African states; the problems of data collection and analysis in this paper are those which face empirical political science research in many fields. These problems are duly examined. The type of data collected demands both a configurative approach, that is, a concentration on the characteristics of the individual political system, and also comparative systematic analysis; for one goal is to discover whether social conflict in developing countries is susceptible to cross-national comparison, or whether the conflict is a purely culture-bound phenomenon.

Finally, the strain on traditional theoretical frameworks and conceptual vocabularies is noted, as is their inability to assimilate and codify new findings in political science research. For example, the concept of national integration assumes 'nationality' in a given state. But the traditional criteria of eighteenth and nineteenth century European nationalism, when applied to Africa, are seen to exist haphazardly, if at all; thus, a new concept of nationalism must be found if 'nations' are to exist in Africa.

Likewise, the traditional 'class' concept of society is questioned in relation to the new states, as is the traditional theoretical dichotomy between 'democracy' and 'dictatorship', based on the number of political parties in a state. Such neat categorisation is shaken by the notion of African one-party democracy. The utility of European-American concepts is doubtful when adapted to African usage.

With these problematic aspects of the discipline in mind, the paper contains an initial discussion of the concept of integration, proposing a means to study this in relation to African states, before considering the more specifically African concerns upon which the main focus will fall.

CHAPTER ONE

Approaches to the study of integration: scope and general problems.

A preliminary discussion of the concept of integration; the importance of a cohesive political structure within the state, in relation to the integrative process.

The concept of integration has been variously employed, and qualified as 'social', 'political', 'territorial', or 'national', although such adjectives often overlap without clarifying the concept. Jacob and Teune have suggested, however, that whatever the object, degree or level of cohesion, the integrative process may be essentially "the development of corporate functioning".¹

The above authors indicate many considerations to be raised in asking the question of what is political integration: the problem remains basically one of precise and consistent definition. Political integration implies a relationship of community among people within the same

1. P.E.Jacob and H.Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", pp.1-46 in P.E.Jacob and J.V.Toscano (eds): The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia, Lippincott (1964).

political entity, with mutual ties developing a feeling of identity and self-awareness. Thus integration exists when a political-governmental unit of some kind is cohesive.²

There are many definitional questions to be considered: what is the object, degree, or level of cohesion? How much constitutes integration? How many common tasks must a society perform and how persistently? Should these tasks be performed voluntarily, by habit, or is an element of coercion present also? Where does minority dissent fit in? Jacob and Teune emphasise a point too often overlooked in attempts to resolve some of these questions; namely, that integration is a relative term and not a specific condition.

The interpretation of the meaning of integration even varies from country to country because of (1) the ambiguity as to what constitutes the nation to be integrated, and (11) the great differences between countries in their history and ethnic composition.³ This results in diverse interpretations of what can and should be attempted in the integrative process. Some states of Africa may assume continued ethnic diversity (for example the Ivory Coast or Uganda), while others (for example Guinea or Ghana) see a necessity for a far greater degree of homogeneity

2. Ibid. p.4.

3. R. Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa" p.271 in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds) Political Parties and Political Development, P.U.P. (1966).

through the elimination, as far as possible, of tribal loyalties and regional distinctions.

Relationships become more or less integrated; events lead to a relative increase or decrease in the level of integration. As Zolberg states (in reference to the Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire),⁴ it is impossible to devise a quantitative plus-minus balance-sheet measuring 'how much integration' a political party promotes as against some absolute figure. But what could be done is to test roughly degrees of cohesion necessary for integration on the basis of comparative study.⁵ But ultimately, the degree of cohesiveness necessary for political integration is made evident by whether a social group coheres and holds together as an identifiable and functioning political unit.

Considering ways of identifying integrative or disintegrative factors, relatively little work has been undertaken to empirically study the structural frame

4. A. Zolberg, "Mass Parties and National Integration: The Case of the Ivory Coast" p.47 in Journal of Politics 25 (Feb. 1963).

5. For example, Jacob and Teune, op.cit. suggest calculating the proportion of public-oriented, cooperative, corporate activities in which people in various political units are engaged, as against those actions of a non-corporate or "privatistic" nature, serving personal or special group interests rather than the general well-being: thus suggesting at a relative comparison, rather than measurement against an integrative or disintegrative absolute. In this paper, the author will attempt to calculate the number of conflict-generating events in each polity as a means toward comparing and assessing the integrative process in them.

of a political system and its workings to determine whether structural differences between nations carry over into influencing community cohesion. How valid is the proposition of a one-party state that a "structure of highly concentrated political authority, with strict control over general participation, particularly on the voicing of dissent, is almost a requisite of national community organisation under conditions of threat and social change"?⁶

Deutsch cites a hypothesis generally supportative of the proposition: that integration will make substantial progress only if most major indicators pull in the same direction.⁷ Likewise, it has been stated that the possibility of a single unifying party reaching all sectors of a country depends on the nature and extent of cleavage within the system;⁸ upon the scope and intensity of religious differences, ethnic fragmentation, hostility between traditional and modernising forces, rural-urban conflict, and opposing ideologies. If these cleavages are sharp and

6. Jacob and Teune, ibid. pp.35-38.

7. K.W.Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion", in Jacob and Toscano, op.cit. p.89. Indicators:if, for example, urbanisation, education, communications and political consciousness develop at the same rate of progress.

8. J.La Palombara and M.Weiner, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development", p.416, in La Palombara and Weiner, op.cit.

no cross-cutting pressures exist, it will be extremely difficult for any one party to unite support on the basis of appeals that cut across factionalisms within the country.

Related to Africa, this is to say that traditional hostilities at the subsystem level must be broken down if the state is to make substantial progress in the integrative process.

One line of research into the area of integration is to study 'institutional attempts at coordination'; this centres on one or more institutions in the polity and the attempts to coordinate behaviour towards achieving a certain goal⁹ (for example, the assumption by one party of the whole state apparatus and total popular support). That is, a party is set up with supervisory power over individuals who are viewed as acting haphazardly, or unthinkingly, requiring governmental institutions distinct from a purely individualistic or primary group basis, to coordinate their actions. This strongly echoes Thoms Hobbes' thesis that individuals are randomly aggressive, and that life of men in the state of nature is "solitary, poor, brutish and short".¹⁰

Delegation of functions to such an organisation

9. K.W.Deutsch, "Communication on Theory and Political Integration" in Jacob and Toscano, op. cit. pp.58-61.

10. T.Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13, Fontana(1965).

leaves coordination up to the internal processes of this amalgamated agency in which the power is tightly controlled. 'Integration' is promoted to the extent to which the agency prevents the different operations of the system from interfering with each other in an antagonistic or destructive way.¹¹

To summarise, the basic notion of this Hobbes-Deutsch approach is that the function of coordination is taken away from the separate (and often hostile) componentd, and is located in a unit of the system which is in control of the other components of the state. This nearly reflects the postulated integrative role of the uniparty government in African one-party states.

Coleman and Rosberg have defined national integration as a "broad subsuming process" facing tasks in the major dimensions of

"(i) political integration; that is, the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and participant political community, and

(ii) territorial integration, that is, the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal political community." ¹²

11. See K.W.Deutsch, "Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis" in Jacob and Toscano op.cit. p. 183

J.S.Coleman and C.G.Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, U.of California (1964) "Introduction" p.9.

This definition gives some idea of the vast problem that is faced in African states in attempting to reconcile their many social diversities.

Thus, for the present paper, national integration (conceptually) involves primarily the amalgamation of disparate social, economic, political, religious, ethnic and geographical elements into a single nation-state; this is the all-subsuming concept. This implies the capacity of a party or government to control the territory under its jurisdiction; but it also suggests a set of popular attitudes towards the nation-state generally described as loyalty, allegiance, and a willingness to place national above local and parochial concerns. Such attitudes do not always appear in the populace of 'developed' states - they are certainly extremely difficult to induce in the new African states. Ultimately, then, integration involves the regularisation of structures and processes whereby the elements in a given national territory are brought into productive participation in the political system;¹³ efforts are made to develop around authority the aura of legitimacy; the rallying-cries of nationalism must give way to the development of nationality.

13. La Palombara and Weiner op. cit. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of national integration, see their "Conclusion" pp. 413-418.

CHAPTER TWO

The One-Party State in Africa.

Having hinted at the role of a united political force as an integrative prop, there now follows a discussion of the rise of African nationalist movements and their claim to unique national representation; of the case for unipartyism and its concomitant socialist-nationalist ideology; of democracy under the one-party system. Finally, the disintegrative potential of unipartyism is considered.

It is a truism to state that the newly independent African states are arbitrary products of colonial policy, and thus are faced with several principle types of non-integration:¹

(i) disunities between indigenous African cultural groups arbitrarily bunched together in multitribal states,

(ii) tensions between several racial communities making up the plural society,

(iii) socio-economic disparities between emergent political elites and relatively inert African masses.

1. J.S.Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa", W.P.O.8 (1955) pp. 44-45.

Hence as previously implied, the most important tasks politically are related to the three different situations of tribal, racial, and elite-mass non-integration. One (politically) expedient solution has been to emphasise the role of the powerful political leaders, or the nationalist movement and its subsequent nation-wide party organisation, as instruments and modes of integration. Wallerstein calls the nationalistic party "the most important mechanism to reduce conflict between ethnicity and national integration".² African independence arrives with a lower and less stable level of national integration than has been the case in the previous history of independence movements; hence extremely strong cohesive forces moving in the direction of unity are essential, as is the movement of the individual from primordial bases of loyalty to larger national units.

Lack of party competition and the tendency towards one-partyism is encouraged by the especial aura of legitimacy which falls upon the independence party (and which is denied to others) and its leaders, who become legitimate successors to pre-colonial states, and spokesmen for the 'general will'; a vanguard of the people not merely in the political sphere, but even down to the social and personal levels. For in assuming

2. I. Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 3-i p.134.

sole legitimacy to rule, the party tends "to take on a world view and represent a way of life", ³ viewing as its mission the change of all aspects of life within the society and adoption of its own 'correct' beliefs and attitudes.

AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN NATIONALISM COMPARED

A tenet of any African nationalist movement was (and is) that the people in the colonial territory constituted a nation in the process of achieving its rightful independence. But defined in terms of the European nationalism of the nineteenth century, such nationality does not exist; and in this claim to nationhood can be seen the root of much of the insecurity and conflict in the new states since independence.

The most stark difference between the two nationalisms is that whereas the achievement of statehood was seen as the ultimate goal of European nationalists, as a legal recognition of the existence of a nation - for example, Germans and Italians formed nationalities before the states of Germany and Italy existed - in Africa, nationalists viewed the attainment of statehood as the primary and necessary step towards creating a nation; first the political kingdom, and then to expand the sense of national community.

Western commentators have noted the absence of the linguistic or cultural factors in African nationalism and have been known to argue that therefore, there are no new African

3.L.W.Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, p.17. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963.

nations, but merely artificial creations of colonial rulers. The arguments against the existence of the African nation or nationalism are based, the author of this paper feels, on a historical fallacy - namely, that the historical components of a movement become, by definition, irremovably the only components by which the movement can be manifested. European nationalism was defined in terms of nineteenth century Europe - a Europe which had felt the common effect of the Reformation, in which common political ideas were known throughout - This in itself ensured that the phenomenon of nationalism would arise fairly simultaneously in different areas - also that there would be striking similarities in its various manifestations. Yet, whereas the European nationalist leader could appeal to a particular people, the African leader had to create a nation for which he had to speak. Thus a purely European ethnocentric nationalism could not apply, for certain new phenomena were common to African nationalism: it could exist by virtue of the fact of the arbitrarily - named colonies of European powers, which provided a definite, if unnatural, geographical focus for nationalist claims. The racial black - white issue was also of some importance. However, the most important characteristic of black African nationalism was, (and remains in the surviving colonies) opposition to colonial rule. This is a negative basis upon which to build a movement. The effects can be seen in the post-independence phase, when this prime focus loses its force

and new government leaders try to build their new state into a nation, where several social groupings existed previously.

But the fact of independent statehood remains, as does the fact that within these states are found nations in becoming. Though African nations are being built at the opposite pole to that which saw the rise of European nations, this writer feels that they still merit the title of nations, or nations in becoming.

Thus, bearing in mind the need to recognise the differences between European nationalism and African nationalism, the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' will be applied to the ex-colonial territories, in the text.

THE CASE FOR UNIPARTYISM

Because of the diversity of language or culture in a colony, its nationalist movement became, therefore, a larger coalition, and by definition had to be heterogenous, so that its opponents, almost by default, stressed specific and divisive affiliations. As participation became extended, "a large number of people hitherto uninvolved in politics identified with the dominant party unless there was a strong reason-- usually involving primary group ties-- for not doing so." ⁴

4. A.R.Zolberg, Creating Political Order, Rand McNally, Chicago (1969), p.21.

The assumption of responsibility for the direction of the new state made the new governments starkly aware of the magnitude of the functional load thrown on the polity. As Zolberg states, "these strains are not merely psychological or sociological, but cultural as well, stemming, so to speak, from a sudden confrontation with an unknown region with inadequate maps".⁵

Such a situation led in many states to the demand for the pooling of all (especially human) resources to cope with the dilemmas of nation-building. In the eyes of one-party advocates, opposition became considered as treasonous, a threat to national integrity; the party in power, with no tradition of respect for bureaucratic neutrality, absorbed the governmental-administrative functions to maintain itself while making 'provisions' for competition within the party. Thus, whether controlled or open, such provisions it was argued, precluded the need for multi-parties.

A major argument of the political leaders of one-party states against opposition parties arises from the fear of Balkinisation of the nation, while multipartyism wastes valuable time and manpower. Besides, party competition may be neither necessary nor natural, being an implantation from the European system of parliamentary government, rather

5. A.R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order Rand McNally, Chicago, (1969), p.39.

than arising from local conditions.

Walter Bagehot considered that there were certain pre-requisites essential for the maintenance of party government, which included: the mutual confidence of the electors, "a calm national mind, and rationality on the part of the people".⁶ But these prerequisites require the kind of solid social and economic basis which does not exist in the Third World, as events in Nigeria have illustrated, where party affiliation remained largely a communal, rather than associational, bond.⁷ Thus, the imposition of a political system from a class society (Britain) onto a plural society (Nigeria), created hostility and eventual chaos at the federal level. The main "purpose of political parties is political warfare",⁸ but in the emergent African state, politics as a zero-sum game is

6. W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Fontana, 1964), Chapter VII.

7. See R. L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, P.U.P. (1963), especially Ch. XI, for discussion of the communal (Gemeinschaft) and associational (Gellschaft) group bonds. Briefly, communal participation in a group is an automatic right of an individual who regards the group (eg. political party) as an extension of the social order into which he has been born, 'and to which he attributes spiritual or mystical significance' (Sklar p. 476). Associational participation, in contrast, arises from a voluntary social group-contract, arrived at by a rational choice and deliberate affiliation, and based on interest, not on blood or tradition. The integrative process requires that the latter bond provide the basis for national party membership.

8. W. A. Lewis, Politics in West Africa, p. 68. George, Allen and Unwin, London (1965).

anathema.⁹ For party politics based on the parliamentary 'ins and outs' system is dangerous when the parties do not agree on the rules of the game; in such a case, the governing party would rarely permit opposition to influence policy; this in turn forces the opposition into extra-parliamentary tactics in order to achieve its aims.

The assumption that "political conflict, even in the orderly form of electoral competition and interacting group pressures, will bring about the general good in some mysterious fashion, or that the clash of ideas will bring about the truth, is.....alien and inspires...little faith in Africa".¹⁰

An alternative is posed in one well-organised party providing an elaborate countrywide communications network; Nyerere pictures the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) as a "two-way all weather road leading from the village to the centre."¹¹

9. During a conference on representative government at Ibadan, Nigeria, in 1959, the Guinean delegate pointed out that opposition parties cannot be constructive precisely because there would be no distinction and disagreement over values, that is, fundamental beliefs about what is right and wrong, rather than over interests (that is, more immediate and instrumental concerns) between them and the ruling party. See Zolberg, Creating Political Order, pp. 47-50.

10. Zolberg, ibid. p.64. Thus it would appear that Louis Coser's thesis (The Functions of Social Conflict, Free Press, N.Y. 1964) that conflict supports group-binding and group-preserving functions and would prove fatal if supported at the national level in the developing pluralistic society in Africa, Lewin's more 'traditional' view (which Coser Criticises) that the avoidance of conflict provides the main content of group's skills', is of greater applicability in the present context.

11. See R. Emerson, "Nation Building in Africa" in

It is claimed that by penetrating to regional and local levels, and by admitting ethnic minorities and dissident elites, the party provides opportunities for the settlement of disputes at lower levels within the system, and at a low intensity. By a natural progression, it is stated that the parties in the pluralistic multi-party state, being based on communal divisions, promote the disintegration of the nation-state.

Thus, in recapitulation, the key element in African uniparty theory is that the great problem of nation-building and modernisation requires a central and unitary organisation of power within the state; this is moreover frequently justified with reference to its basis in the African culture.

Davidson cites Nyerere as viewing "African tradition" as the basis of TANU and African Socialism; the tradition is seen as holding within itself the main component of uniparty

 --- (cont'd.) K.W. Deutsch and W. Foltz, Nation-Building Atherton (1963) p.109. The single party seeks to form an associational, as well as communal, base of loyalty, towards the development of a national consciousness through the party structure. Within the party, at least there is a greater chance for the concept of majority rule and minority rights to be upheld than in a multiparty situation in a plural society. Youth organisations, trade unions, women's organisations or militias, all within the single party framework, cross-cut primary-group ties; this is the key to integration. Through these organisations, through education, communications, urbanisation, and even through the nationalist ideology, the slow integrative process progresses, as new patterns of political obligation and realisation of national goals emerge. See Chapter Three for further discussion of integrative unipartyism and the problems of multipartyism in the plural society

socialist development: "cooperative production".¹²

However, this tradition alone does not provide the unique rationale for unipartyism. Viewed in a broader perspective, both geographically and historically, a vitally strong argument exists that a vibrant, nationalistic doctrine (and subsequent African socialist philosophy) cannot uphold at the same time both a cohesive uniting force and a liberal-democratic ethic.

Nationalism's strength is not in a call to blood, but in its creation of a forceful and active corporate will, its belief in the power of an idea. In the African example, the initial prospect was one of independence from colonial domination and thence, the creation of nationhood from statehood.

It is highly relevant at this point to discuss the role and use of the nationalist-socialist ideologies in the newly independent African states.

THE UNITING FORCE OF IDEOLOGY

In disagreeing with Mannheim's view of ideology as rooted in vested interests, status-quo oriented and conservative,¹³ it is suggested below that ideology in the

12. See B. Davidson, Which Way Africa? Penguin (1967) pp. 117-120. This harks back to the traditional village way of life, when economic, social and political affairs were run on the basis of universal cooperation under the organisation of village councils.

13. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1964 (1936).

Third World is useful in promoting both internal stability and natural development.¹⁴ Parson's contention that ideology is dysfunctional to the system¹⁵ (although perhaps functional to the needs of the adherents) is inadequate and unjust in the African context, whereas Geertz stresses the need to see ideology as coherent and 'rational' in the sense of creating symbolic, metaphorical referents from the individual or group to the social-political whole.¹⁶

The mechanistic world-view of the post-war world as a battleground in a war of ideas between Western liberal democracy or Soviet Communism has become increasingly untenable; but where ideology plays a role in the Third World, it has tended towards socialism. Leaders have pointed to the fate of Latin American states, 'private enterprise systems' which still remain poverty-stricken, chaotic in social structure, and with dictatorship and oligarchical corruption.

The perceived need is to radically reorganise the economic and social systems; by advocating socialist programmes, African leaders seek to prove that they are

14. Lasswell and Kaplan define ideology as the political myth to preserve the social structure; that is, while not necessarily implying that ideology is a false conception of truth (whatever that is) it does exclude other ideologies as invalid since one's own perception is seen as objective, providing a total and closed belief system. Viz. H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society p.123, Yale U.P. 1961 (1950).

15. T. Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, viz. Ch. 5, 'An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge'.

16. C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution' pp.105-57 in C. Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States, Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1963.

attempting to break through the barriers of economic backwardness and fragmented social base on the broadest possible front, theoretically making possible great increases in national productivity and social awareness through cooperative and similar bodies.

The western free-enterprise system is dismissed as too slow, besides which, in a situation with a small elite and large uneducated and tribally-based mass, such a system would tend to spread wealth unevenly and to the limited socio-economic elite group; Western liberal-democratic thought and institutions would fragment rather than cohere, the diverse social elements within any one state. Therefore governments, especially one-party badly-based systems, move towards the socialist alternative. Nyerere's conception of African Socialism is enlightening:

"Ujamaa (extended family) describes our socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man, and equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man...".¹⁷

This classically utopian and moralistic interpretation

27. Julius Nyerere quoted in B. Davidson, Which Way Africa ? Penguin African Library, London, 1967 pp.118-119.

of socialism undergoes many variations in the attempt at far-reaching economic reorganisation of underdeveloped states, where economic planning is seen as the means of transposing the united nationalist movement (the strongest ideological force the nation possesses at the time of independence) from the purely political to the socio-economic development sphere. Hence ideology may perform important functions in the process of development.¹⁸

Ideology can bind the community together, defining the norms held in common and the purpose of such 'togetherness', which is vital in a culturally plural society where the existence of such norms is not immediately apparent. The asset of national purpose and unity, yet also is of sufficient flexibility to serve as a convenient rallying point for many groups and isolated individuals.

Closely related to this is the problem of the legitimisation of a new and generally unprecedented order

18. However, C.W. Anderson, F.R. von der Mehden, and Young, in Issues of Political Development, 1967, identifying political ideology with socialism, conclude from an empirical study of the economic development and policy in developing countries, that an avowedly socialist policy is not much different from a non-socialist policy (excluding exceptions at both extremes). They state this in relation to the use of government as an assertive instrument of economic and social change, noting that many of the things some states do in the name of socialism, others do simply in the name of development, with no ideological connotations. But I do believe that this similarity between socialists and non-socialists have found African socialist methods of control to be often the only feasible in the fragmented social situation.

of authority. While often claiming a traditional basis¹⁹, ideology seeks to provide a rationale for replacing more traditional or parochial forms of political life with a new pattern of political obligations, to answer the questions of why one should obey a new leadership. Nationalist ideology is essential in transforming traditional values, and in establishing a mental environment conducive to change. As Geertz states, the disorientation of rapid change may create the need for a "new symbolic framework in which to formulate, think about and react to political problems".²⁰

By stressing the supremacy of national goals, ideology provides the cry to or from the government to punish internal traitors in a situation where dissensus (or parochial preference) becomes equated with treason;²¹ Lerner mentions Iran especially in such a context.

"Nationalism and political liberties are extremely difficult to reconcile".²² This is not just a facet of modern African states; examples can be drawn throughout history of nationalist parties which brook no compromise with their ideology, and seek to eliminate 'opponents'

19. See note 12 Supra.

20. See Geertz, op.cit. p.155.

21. D.Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society Free Press, New York, 1958.

22. E.Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson University Library, London 1960 p.107.

within and without the party who diverge from the given line.

It is interesting to note Kirchheimer's distinction between the ideology that always excludes the non-believer (epitomised in Communism) and the various populist ideologies in the Third World that exclude nobody, but seek to create a sense of popular support which intimidates would-be opponents.²³ Of course, Kirchheimer is writing on an ideal level - no ideology excludes nobody. But his basic idea is correct; many African socialist parties seek total popular inclusion followed by conversion, rather than drawing an initial line between true-believers and non-believers.

The element of rigidity that socialist/nationalist ideology introduces into African society is not disadvantageous, as Parsons claims, but provides a framework on which to build a sense of nationhood.

UNIPARTYISM AND DEMOCRACY

The highly-differentiated character of the social base of the new states supports the claim that a one-party structure is the pragmatic form of governmental organisation, an integrative and stabilising structure aiming towards the fusion of both functional (for example, women's organisations,

23. O.Kirchheimer, Politics, Law and Social Change, New York, Colombia University Press, 1969, Ch.2.

trade unions, or youth movements) and ethnic diverse groups. Emphasis is placed on the essentially democratic nature of the party, in principle at least.

Vital to uniparty theory is the claim that the party provides the criterion of membership in the political community as nothing else can: most historically familiar (i.e. Western) criteria are inadequate: race is viewed in terms of ethnic groups; language and religion diversify rather than unite, while the concept of a binding territorial nation-state²⁴ has little meaning in a country whose boundaries were arbitrarily decided by alien rulers. The party is hence the only national unit to which the population, as a whole, can relate; "support for the party and its ideas is a way of entering into a social contract, of participating in a community that is in the process of becoming".²⁵

The development of one-party states in Africa has led to a need to reconsider some of the concepts used in traditional comparative government.²⁶ Such traditional analysis, evolved through the Western concept of the

24. in this particular context, 'territorial nation-state' is used in the sense employed by many Western students of nationalism, i.e., as denoting the confines of a 'people', which Deutsch has defined as "a group of persons with complementary communications habits". See The Growth of Nations, Bobbs-Merrill Reprint PS 62.

25. A.R. Zolberg, op.cit. p.46.

26. G. Carter discusses this point in the introduction to her book African One-Party States, Cornell University Press, 1963.

'democratic' institution, used number of political parties as a sound index of the character of rule in a state. The issue revolves round a basic cleavage: dictatorship versus democracy, so that one-party control became synonymous with dictatorial and quasi- or wholly-totalitarian rule, (for example, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, or the USSR).²⁷ But the African one-party states suggest the need for revision of at least part of the argument, for they claim a democratic nature by virtue of

- (i) popular elections,
- (ii) a broad base of popular participation and consent,
 - (although the notion of mass support in a predominantly illiterate or rural society may be considered an aspiration rather than a reality),
- (iii) intra-party group interplay.

Such one-party democracy automatically classes

27. The most serious flaw in D.J. McCrone and C.F. Cnudde's excellent development of a communications theory of democratic political development ("Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model", APSR 61, (1967), pp.72-79), is that their causal model necessitates the classification of the "socio-economically underdeveloped nations" as "deviant" cases in terms of the model, although the authors' analysis of the deviance, i.e. relatively high political development with a relatively low level of communications, is perceptive: in terms of our model, this nation is likely to experience severe difficulty in maintaining democratic political competition and may even collapse". (p.78). However, the analysis is based on the premise that the attainment of democratic political competition on their multiparty model is possible or desirable when applied outside the 'Western liberal' context.

extra-party oppositions and cleavages as illegitimate - and national unity is defined in terms of the absence of such opposition. Moreover, to permit sectionalism is to threaten the polity; the danger of secession in a plural society is always great: "every African nation, large or small, has its Katanga. Once the logic of secession is admitted, there is no end except anarchy".²⁸

DISINTEGRATIVE TENDENCIES IN UNIPARTYISM

So far, the emphasis has been on the integrative possibilities of, and rationale for, unipartyism. But many observers see defects and dangers in the system, and ways in which these parties may in fact also increase pressures disintegrative to the nation-state.

Nyerere, again, called TANU "a National Movement which is open to all - which is identified with the whole nation; it has nothing to fear from the discontent of any excluded section of society, for there is no such section".²⁹ Thus, not only is the absence of opposition an indication of unity, but because unity has supposedly been achieved, there is also no reason for opposition to exist.

But "despite admirable pretensions of democratic

28. Emerson in LaPalombara and Weiner, op.cit. p.271.

29. Nyerere quoted in ibid., pp.267-303.

centralism",³⁰ in many one-party states there is little room for dissenters. Emerson's theme is that the party may work for national integration, but the danger is always present that disaffected minorities might be festering towards revolt under the enforced surface appearance of unity. The widespread charges of subversion, the ousting of governments, and attempted coups, or successful and attempted assassinations of African leaders, indicate the gap between political reality and the claims to have achieved national unity under single party rule.

National unity and internal stability depend on the extent of national consensus³¹ and public order. Often the latter are at a low level, for the prime condition of nation-building, steady progress in the slow process of national maturation, is precisely what the nations are lacking. The party hierarchy faces challenges from many sources; for example, from traditional elites,³² or from university students impatient for power.³³ Geertz sees, within the people of the new states, internalised frictions arising between two powerful but independent motives.³⁴

30. Emerson, ibid.

31. S.M. Lipset defines "national consensus" as "agreement on the norms of tolerance which a society.... accepts", in Political Man, Doubleday Anchor (1964), Ch. 2.

32. For example, the central government of Ghana had great problems with Ashanti nationalism and the outbreaks of violence which erupted in the mid-fifties and since independence.

33. It appears from content analysis research of newspaper reports that left-wing student opposition seems characteristic of many French-speaking African states.

34. C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in Old Societies and New States, Free Press of Glencoe, New York (1963), pp. 108-9.

On the one hand, the desire for recognition and the search for self-identity remain bound up with the ties of blood, race, language, locality, religion and tradition. But the people also become increasingly aware of the advantages of building an efficient and dynamic modern state. And the possibilities for social reform and material progress can only come through union in a reasonably large and powerful well-ordered polity. Yet, this for the individual, involves the risk of a loss of definition as an autonomous person, by absorption into a mass, or domination by a rival community.

Unless the individual can relate national politics to his personal situation, it is difficult to become involved. But an increased awareness of the importance of the central authorities involves an educational-political process which could politicise primordial loyalties (as happened in Nigeria). So that at a time when the national party seeks to submerge social differences and divergent tensions, this associational development may in fact, be making social differences equivalent to political differences - on the path that leads to disunity.

Such a sharpening of tensions is illustrated by the experience of the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) in the Ivory Coast; leaders designed a structure which reinforced some of the obstacles to national integration, while some elements of the party

structure became even additional obstacles to the achievement of unifying goals. The main fault is now seen to be that the basic cell of the party was either the ethnic group or tribal unit, instead of being of an associational nature.

At the uppermost levels of the party organisation, such a structure encouraged the transformation of local ethnic leaders into national leaders. This, in fact, reinforced particularisms, or even created an ethnic consciousness, where it had not previously existed.³⁵

While the fact that there may be no real distinction between state and party has its integrative advantages, it also has potential disintegrative force.³⁶ Loyalty to the nation is equated with loyalty to the party. Thus, party disaffection may lead to disaffection from the nation-state itself - secession from the political process. The problems of achieving some level of integration are complicated by such a potential pattern, whether the party be "revolutionary-centralising," attempting to merge

35. Synthesis of a large part of the discussion contained in A.R. Zolberg's One Party Government in The Ivory Coast P.U.P. (1964).

36. Weiner and La Palombara op.cit. p.415; and F.R. Von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations, U. of Wisconsin Press p.58-59, are both useful on this point.

all units into one national culture, or "pragmatic-pluralist", indulging in "ethnic arithmetic and looser organisation".³⁷

In Emerson's words, "enforced political unanimity is a mere palliative",³⁸ and social-political cohesion

37. Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., in their introduction, suggest a classificatory system to differentiate styles of mass-party government, although the "inexhaustible mixture of differentiating elements" (p.4) might more readily suggest a continuum on which parties could be ranged between the poles (i.e. what the authors call revolutionary-centralising and pragmatic-pluralist systems). The differentiating factors can be broken down according to organisational aspects and degree of popular participation:

Differentiating factor	Prag-plur. pattern	Rev-centr. trend
1. POPULAR PARTICIPATION a) degree of intraparty mobilisation & expected popular commitment b) mode of individual participation	partial/ intermittent direct and indirect	high/constant direct only between individual & party-state
2. ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS a) degree of intraparty hierarchism, centralism, and discipline b) degree of associational monopoly and fusion c) degree of party-government assimilation	variable; hierarchical & centralised by tolerated and controlled pluralism variable; looser relationship limited assimilation	high; monolithic; concentration; conformity sanction severe high; total monopoly & fusion total assimilation

See pp.67/0 infra for discussion and adaptation of this schema to the requirements of this paper.

38. Emerson in LaPalombara and Weiner op.cit. p.300.

in many 'African democracies' is highly precarious; party leaders and government officials are accused of living too well, or too far distant from the mass; consequently, the concept of 'guided democracy' might come to be resented, especially if there exists a feeling that the elite is inward-looking, and not outwardly oriented.

Also, the effort to justify the single-party system on the grounds that it prevents the dissipation of the limited available high-level manpower among several parties, loses much of its persuasiveness when account is taken of the many men immobilised, imprisoned, or forced into exile by the ruling leader or party, as for example, was the case in Ghana under Nkrumah. In the face of great insecurity, there is an ever-tightening restriction of the area of dissent.

Conflict management has been called the essence of politics, and is, of essence, affected by the depth of societal cleavages; likewise, the quality of party leadership, its attitudes and skills, are important factors in how conflict is managed.

Broadly-based parties, on the one hand, are the most often likely to be torn by internal conflict, since they mirror the cleavages within society. But on the other hand, by penetrating to regional levels and localities, and by admitting ethnic and non-party elites, the party

possibly provides opportunities for the settlement of disputes at a sub-system level, as in the local units, and at a lower level of intensity.

The incentive to reconcile conflict is great - the costs of failure could be the destruction of the party, replacement of civil by military rule, or national disintegration and chaos.

In summary, although the integrative possibilities of unipartyism are great, it also breeds potentially disintegrative tensions. If then, there are such dangers inherent in unipartyism, the question arises as to whether multipartyism can provide a viable alternative in the African context.

CHAPTER THREE

Multipartyism: a viable alternative to unipartyism?

The concept of multipartyism examined. Its limitations in the plural society, both in democratic terms, and organisationally, in a situation where agreement on basic social norms and values has not yet been reached. By default, unipartyism seen to stand as the most viable integrative structure.

Political scientists have been ever ready to classify African states neatly as uniparty or multiparty, and this practice has been followed in the introductory chapters of the thesis. However, data analysis revealed that such compartmentalisation is a vast oversimplification, its main result being a sense of satisfaction to the neat mind rather than a useful classificatory system for identifying the main political trends within the independent states. It seems a reminder of the approach to politics which emphasised the study of institutions rather than the dynamics of the political process. So while for the present retaining the generic term 'one-party state' for the twelve states so classified in Chapter Four, the question of multipartyism must be examined more thoroughly.

In East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia represent

multipartyism.

In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) has been continually in power since independence. From the start, the KANU-constructed constitution operated against the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), and Kenyatta continued a strong regime, repressive against opposition parties, until KADU was absorbed into the ruling party. Even when the Kenya People's Union (KPU) split from KANU in 1966, two-party parliamentary democracy was never approached, the KPU holding a mere nine seats in the 170-seat national assembly.¹

Uganda's experience was somewhat different, in that Obote was forced into an initial coalition with the Kabaka Yekka Party, but within a year of independence, Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) had an overall majority, and thence his regime became increasingly repressive and dictatorial, crushing opposition within and without the UPC. Even vocal opposition in the National Assembly was followed by crushing physical reprisals against opposition parties.²

In Zambia, on the other hand, Kaunda occupied a

1. Percentage of seats held by KANU in the House of Representatives: 1964, 64.3% (83/129 seats); 1965, 81.4% (105/129); 1968, 94.7% (161/170).

2. Percentage of seats held by UPC in the Ugandan legislature: 1964, 39.4% (37/94 seats); 1965, 66.3% (61/92); 1967, 73.9% (68/92); 1968, 71.7% (66/92).

different position in that he tolerated the main opposition party, the African National Union, to the extent that in the 1968 elections, the ANC was allowed to put up its election list without difficulty, and in fact increased its holdings in the Legislative Assembly. However, the party voting tended to be on tribal lines, and even in the parliamentary process, the ANC had no voice in the exercise of government policy.³

Nigeria, in West Africa, was in fact the only multiparty state (at federal level) in which all political parties played an important national role, while each controlled its own region within the federal framework. But here also, forced coalitions meant that a major portion of the Nigerian people was in opposition; hence recriminations and hostility reverberated, tensions mounted, and 1966 saw the army coup which ended the party system.

The above summary of the party situation in four states reveals the limitations of the general 'multiparty' categorisation; in fact many parallels can be drawn between unipartyism and the party systems in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia.⁴ These states have been called one-party dominant states, a more accurate description. Bearing this fact in

3. Percentage of UNIP seats in the Zambian Legislative Assembly: 1965, 73.3% (55/75 seats); 1967, 68% (54/79); 1968, 70% (56/80).

4. See Chapter Five for confirmation of this statement.

mind, these states will still be included in the multiparty category for comparative purposes in the paper; a final assessment is made in the Conclusion.

MULTIPARTYISM AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY

In all four 'multiparty' states, the British parliamentary system was closely followed, and its basic rules adopted, when the states came to independence. Thus by association, the concept of democracy that the will of the majority should prevail, was likewise adopted, the majority party in the legislature therefore holding all powers of government. As suggested previously, this concept has become central to the political process in class societies.

But there is a more basic and alternative interpretation of democracy, one whose roots are found directly in the Greek polis, that all elements should play some part in the decision-making process. This rejects the inevitability of government and opposition polarisation, and also the parliamentary 'ins and outs' system, which inevitably leads, in the African situation, to group hostility through political warfare. "The democratic problem in a plural society", states Lewis⁵, "is to create political

5. W.A.Lewis, op.cit., p.66.

-institutions which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making, since only thus can they feel that they are full members of society"; and he argues convincingly that the most effective way to kill the idea of democracy in Africa is to adopt the Anglo-American system of "first past the post".⁶ This is readily apparent throughout the data for the multiparty states, especially in East Africa, the rule of minority rights, the concomitant of majority rule, never being seriously applied.

However astutely Lewis argues his case for coalition governments, his study is perhaps based more on the symptomatic, rather than casual, level. He states that only by the participation of all groups in decision-making, can they experience the united feeling of nationhood. But it is probably more enlightening to alter his priorities by arguing that it is only with the united experience of nationhood, that cooperative political participation can then be achieved.

What we are arguing here, then, is that, whatever concept of democracy is espoused, only a basic agreement on the fundamental properties of nationhood can form the cooperative foundation. This point of view approaches that

6. Ibid., p.71.

contained in Hans Kelsen's analysis of legal structure in his General Theory of Law and State, (1945). In his so-called Pure Theory of Law, he argues the existence of a basic norm or "grundnorm" as the "supreme reason of validity of the whole (legal) order".⁷

The basic norm "is nothing but the fundamental rule according to which the various norms of the order are to be created".⁸ Hence, adapting something of Kelsen's argument to the present paper, effective political cooperation in Africa is a pipedream until the basic norms and values of social action are accepted and unquestioned. This is saying that it is not merely enough to see oneself as a Kenyan or Ghanaian national, but also to have in common, within the state, a tacit agreement on basic social norms of action and decision-making whose validity is unquestionable.

At the present time, the picture in many an African state is one in which laws are passed, constitutions are made, by one section of the power elite, for personal or party (but in any case, political), the validity of a

7. Brackets mine. Kelsen quoted in S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State, George Allen and Unwin, London (1966) p.78.

8. Ibid.

-constitution, or rule of law, negating any basis for acceptance of authority, obligation to state, or in fact, to the socio-political system.

The 'developed' states of the twentieth century reached their present position after centuries of conflict and violence; hence in deducing the chances of African states reaching such a position within a decade or two, the outlook is pessimistic.

Thus it may be argued that, given the basic disagreement over values, multipartyism is by nature a disruptive system in the plural underdeveloped society. Perhaps the road to a higher level of integration lies through economic development and education above all, so that a sense of nationhood can be combined with a pride in the particularistic tribal heritage.

On a philosophical-theoretical level, then, a strong case is made for unipartyism: "We have had no time to educate our people in political subtleties, and the leader who tries is lost. Political diversification would be at best a waste of energy and at worst an opportunity for our enemies to divide us again. We have a great deal to do. We must do it fast. This (political centralisation) is the best way. We cannot afford political luxuries".⁹

9. This rationale for Unipartyism is quoted in the New York Times, 27 October 1960, attributed to an unnamed Guinean.

Hence, by default, unipartyism stands as the most viable structure to promote national integration and build social conflict in the plural society. It is time for a detailed analysis of the data on the sixteen states, to examine the validity of the inherent assumption that unipartyism per se limits conflict and smooths the process of national integration; however, a preliminary explanation of the methodology involved in the analysis is necessary before any conclusions are drawn.

CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology: Hypotheses, Definition of Concepts, Proposed Method of Data Collection and Analysis.

A sample of sixteen independent black African states has been taken, over a period of time from the month of independence from colonial rule until December 31 1968, or until a successful Coup d' etat, if this came prior to the aforementioned date. At that date, twelve states were (or had been) constitutionally uniparty, and four, multi-party¹.

HYPOTHESES

Two hypotheses are posited for testing:

Hypothesis 1. That, in accordance with the claims of the advocates of unipartyism, the incidence of social conflict over time in the one-party state is lower than that in multiparty/one-party states.

This hypothesis suggests that unipartyism is a surer vehicle through which to develop socio-political

1. Bearing in mind the fact that the concept of multipartyism here includes those states often denoted as one-party-dominant: that is, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia.

integration than is multipartyism, because party political conflict would encourage conflict of values, rather than of interests, and thus stimulate disintegrative trends within the state. Therefore, although there exists a wide variation in uniparty organisational structures, conflict within any and all of the one-party states should not exceed that in any multiparty states.

Hypothesis 2. That the more centralised and authoritarian the structure of the uniparty, the higher is the incidence of social conflict.

Having hypothesised that unipartyism per se is a surer vehicle against social conflict than multipartyism, this hypothesis suggests that variations in conflict levels are to be found within the uniparty groups of states themselves.

Coleman and Rosberg (p.34 note 37 supra) have suggested in their classification of 'revolutionary-centralising' and 'pragmatic-pluralist' mass parties, that there are considerable differences between these parties in different states. The model used in this paper (p.69 infra) plots states on two axes: (i) the revolutionary-centralising/pragmatic-pluralist and (ii) democratic/authoritarian. It is hypothesised that revolutionary-centralising states, with their high conformity sanction, exacerbate tensions by attempting to enforce total

assimilation of groups into the uniparty mould and idea , more so than those states with a lesser degree of mobilisation and hierarchism.

Likewise, those states on the democratic/authoritarian continuum closer to the authoritarian extreme, because of their repressive nature, are expected to generate the conditions for a higher incidence of social conflict than those nearer to the democratic pole.

In addition to the two hypotheses, a further methodological question will be analysed, namely that the use of comparable aggregate social conflict data is possible cross-nationally for Africa.

Given the indicators of social conflict employed below to assess the incidence of social conflict in sixteen African polities, it is hypothesised that certain categories of conflict will be evident as common to all states; thence, certain statements could be made about social conflict and party organisation, or social conflict and development, which would apply to the study of most African states, or those throughout the developing world. this in turn may provide pointers to the major problem areas facing African governments; pinpointing the areas of most violent dissent or repression may prove

useful in suggesting possible solutions to, or at least alleviations of, certain social sores.

National unity and internal stability depend on the extent of national consensus² and public order³. Conflicts arise from cultural-racial tensions or from socio-economic disparities between groups within the confines of the state, as well as from the internalised frictions of the man faced with a choice between traditional and modern values. The claim of the mass party is that it promotes national and political integration by controlling and therefore limiting, conflict within the polity. Hence, conflict management, the establishment of procedures to allow for differences and compromises between opposing points of view and to accommodate differing ideals (if not ideologies), assumes central significance in the developing areas.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

The testing of the previous two hypotheses requires the definition of the concepts of integration and social

 2. That is, "agreement on the norms of tolerance which a society accepts", S.M.Lipset, Political Man, p.2. Doubleday Anchor, 1964.

3. 'Public order' is defined in terms of a low level of social conflict. Viz. p.54 infra for a definition of social conflict.

conflict, as well as that of the one-party state.

As a concept, unipartyism is self-explanatory. The working definition utilised in this paper is that a one-party state is defined as that state which constitutionally had one-party government, or which in practice held 90% or more of the seats in the national legislature on, or prior to (in those states which had undergone a coup d'etat), 31 December 1968.

This operational definition is made somewhat arbitrarily; but no guidance as to such a definition was indicated in the source material, and it seems that any party which holds 90% of the seats in the national legislature, controls the government unilaterally, without fears of, or restrictions imposed by, serious organised opposition.

Perhaps the best conceptual/definition of integration as a 'condition' is given by Karl Deutsch et al.⁴ in defining a "security-community" as a group of people which has become "integrated". By integration they "mean the attainment, within the practices strong enough and widespread enough to ensure for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population".

4. K.W.Deutsch et al. "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area" in International Political Communities p.2.

By "sense of community" is meant "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems can and must be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'".

"Peaceful change" is the "resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force".

"A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way".

As a condition to be attained, African polities fall far short of the ideal. Deutsch used a survey on attitudes to operationally test the definition; at present, such data is almost totally lacking in relation to Africa. Although sense of community in an African state could be inferred from an assessment of the level of social conflict in the polity, as could the level of belief in basic societal norms. But there are problems in trying to operationalise this definition for Africa.

The time period by which to judge the strength and diffusion of institutions and practices, towards promoting peaceful change for a long time, is not available. Besides, Deutsch is not explicit upon what constitutes a 'long' time

nor is he on how many times social problems may be resolved by other than 'normal' means, or on what 'large-scale physical force'.

Perhaps the main problem with such a 'condition' definition of integration, the question of how far a community can slip from the ideal before it ceases to be classified as an integrated security-community. Without the 'real assurance' that no physical violence will occur, very few states in the world can call themselves 'integrated' in Deutsch's terms, or else would require continual reclassification as physical violence erupted and subsided. However, the merit of the definition is that it denotes the essential characteristics of integration.

Because it is difficult to assess what in fact constitutes the ideally integrated community, if not presumptuous to attempt to do so, it seems better to compare states as to a relative level of integration. In this vein, Haas uses the term integration to refer to "the process whereby political actors in several distinct (sub-national) settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing (tribal and regional

loyalties)".⁵ The definition, thus phrased, is applicable to Africa, and echoes the sentiment of Jacob and Teune that integration is a relative term and not a specific condition.⁶

Coleman and Rosberg define national integration as a broad subsuming process whose major dimensions are:

"(i) POLITICAL integration, that is, the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community;

(ii) TERRITORIAL integration - the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community".⁷

This definition, again, appears difficult to operationalise in the case of Africa, since data is limited on such indicators as communications flows, education levels, or miles of road built, as is survey data, which seem to be the best indicators by which to assess Coleman and Rosberg's concept of integration.

5. E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stratford U.P. 1958, p. 16. Brackets indicate our word-substitutes.

6. Viz. p. 5-6 supra.

7. Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit. p. 8.

Deutsch et al. provided a useful key to a possible operational definition for Africa with their concept of integration defined in terms of level of societal conflict⁸. It is proposed in this paper to operationalise 'national integration' in such terms.

Louis Coser has conceptually defined social conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals".⁹ This poses the question of which values and claims, what status, power and resources?

Lipset considers the existence of a moderate state of conflict to be necessary adjunct to the "democratic" political system.¹⁰ This presents a problem in the operational schema also:- what is a moderate level, what a severe level?

Feierabend and Feierabend's definition of political instability comes close to the others' definition of social conflict: it is defined as "the degree or the amount of aggression directed by individuals or groups within the political system against other groups or against the

8. Viz. p. 50 supra

9. L. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe Ill., Free Press, 1956, p.8.

10. S.M. Lipset, op.cit. Chapter 3.

complex of office-holders and individuals and groups associated with them. Or, conversely, it is the amount of aggression directed by these officeholders against other individuals, groups, or officeholders within the polity".¹¹

Here, their concern is with the indicators of stability within all national political systems. This indicates a method which is applicable to African polities, since data is available on aggressive behaviour/social conflict within these states. Hence, operationally, integration will be assessed in terms of level of social conflict and political instability. Low levels of conflict and high stability will connote relative national integration, as high levels will indicate a low integrative level. Thus the paper will be a study in relativity, although at a certain point, it would be difficult to draw the line between the level of social conflict which Coser or Lipset would deem necessary to societal stability, and that which engenders instability.

11. I.K.Feierabend and R.K.Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviours within Polities 1948-1962", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1966, p.250.

PROPOSED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Collection of the data involved recording the incidence of social conflict indicators within the territorial confines of the following states, all of which have gained independence from colonial rule since 1957.

<u>One-party</u>	<u>Multi-party</u>
Dahomey	Kenya
Ghana	Nigeria
Guinea	Uganda
Ivory Coast	Zambia
Malawi	
Mali	
Mauritania	
Niger	
Senegal	
Tanzania (mainland) ¹²	
Togo	
Upper Volta	

The data was collected in the Press Library of the

 12. Zanzibar omitted due to its confusing history and lack of data; separation and omission of the island section is possible because, "although legally 'united', they (Zanzibar and the Tanzanian central government) are in fact two separate countries. A 'Revolutionary Council rules Zanzibar, has its own security police and immigration policy, and fiscal policy". Christain Science Monitor 5/3/68.

-Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, from all English- and French-language newspapers (these were numerous) which the library has catalogued from the years 1957-1958.

Certain problems arise in the use of content analysis, in this case, of newspaper articles. The comprehensiveness, reliability, and qualitative characteristics of the data documentation need to be considered.¹³

In any study, the student will probably never possess all documents existing for any one historical situation; the RIIA Press Library provides, however, a most comprehensive documentation of contemporary events in Africa, in the form of newspaper reports which are susceptible to empirical study. It is not claimed that such reports provide a complete or totally accurate account of African affairs, but we believe that this was the best source of material available, and that by analysing reports from different newspapers, a certain control was exercised on the accuracy and extent of the data collected.

13. Viz. E.Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data", Chapter 7 in R.L.Merritt and S.Rokkan(eds.) Comparing Nations, New Haven, Yale U.p.1966. and R.C.North, O.R.Holsti, M.G.Zaninovich, D.A.Zinnes, Content Analysis. Northwestern U.P.1963, Chapter 1.

since reports could be cross-compared and verified, with less chance of important events going unnoted.

In utilising media data, it is realised that information is edited or omitted according to the policy and terms of reference of the editor and newspaper. It is also quite possible that larger or more 'colourful' states, such as Nigeria, Ghana, or Guinea, receive more attention from newspaper correspondents than do states such as Maritania or Niger, whose 'news-value' to the average media reader is low. But despite this reservation, the author feels that all states in the sample received adequate and comparable coverage in the media.

Also, newspapers probably provide a more reliable source of data, in terms of objectivity and lack of bias, than, say, government and official documents and reports, especially on the subject of internal social conflict. No newspapers indigenous to any African state were available for analysis.

CODING

Data gathered from newspaper articles was coded into thirty-two categories of social conflict:

1. Coup d'etat.
2. Terrorism/Sabotage (non-tribal), includes
 - assassination (and attempts)
 - bomb plants
 - rebel action
 - clash of terrorists and loyal police/troops.

3. Revolt/Mutiny, including, for example,
 - attempted coups
 - 'incipient' revolt.
4. Tribal rebellion/Terrorism/Regional secession, including
 - clash of central government and secessionist forces.
5. State of emergency
 - martial law
 - 'national crisis', 'upheaval' (eg. Guinea's cultural revolution).
 - curfew
 - assumption of all governmental powers by president.
6. 'Equivocal' plots includes
 - accusations of active subversion
 - treason.
7. Tribal rioting and clashes involving death.
8. Non-tribal rioting, clashes involving death includes
 - strikes, demonstrations, frays involving death
 - clashes of supporters of rival political organisations
 - violent police action in demonstrations, etc., in which death occurs.
9. Governmental/party punitive action vs. significant persons or groups
 - execution
 - arrest
 - ouster
 - trial
 - includes person in hiding, suicide, for political reasons.
 - deportation
 - imprisonment
 - lifting of parliamentary immunity
 - exile
10. Crisis within party/government/parliament
 - breach between leaders
 - internal party repression
 - radical reorganisation
11. Key government/cabinet/party reshuffle; important political resignation.
12. 'Significant' anti-government action includes
 - organisation of new opposition party
 - anti-government pamphlets, propaganda
 - arms trafficking
 - strong parliamentary opposition in multiparty states
 - opposition committees, or movement/organisation with especial anti-government purpose.

13. Mass arrest/trial etc. of 'insignificant' persons.
14. General strike.
15. Mass demonstrations or state-wide demonstrations (no violence).
16. Widespread popular discontent includes
 - 'profound political malaise'
 - general public clamour.
17. Specific tribal unrest including
 - threatened tribal/regional secession
 - tribal incidents short of physical violence
 - rival hostilities between tribes, tribal and government officials, tribal factions within parties.
18. Specific non-tribal unrest includes
 - clash of interests between eg. party/government and non-party supporters or organisation
 - call for general strike, etc.
 - pressure on government by associational/communal organisations
 - political 'incidents'.
19. Repressive use of legislative power, through law-making process,
 - laws, bills
 - increase in party/government political-constitutional power.
 - declaration of one-party state.
20. Specific non-legislative action vs. specific groups
 - censorship
 - open dispute between group and government
 - merging of parties with ruling party.
21. Corruption, equivocal or otherwise.
22. Local strikes.
23. Strains within party/government/administration, short of crisis.
24. Limited, small demonstration including
 - small political rally.
25. Action vs. few insignificant persons.

26. Administrative action related to maintaining internal security, eg.,
 - investigations
 - troop/police movements to crisis areas
(ie. falling short of direct physical action vs. persons/groups).
27. Verbal hostility.
28. Unsubstantiated newspaper reports of unease, tension, etc.
29. Non-important resignation, technical cabinet shuffle (non-crisis).
30. Racialism indicator - between different racial groups
 - racial acts, hostility
 - deportation, imprisonment, etc., for racial misdeeds.
31. Accusations by government of foreign subversion
 - whether offending state named or not.
32. Actions vs. foreign nationals, racial minority, arising from
 - 'subversive activities'
 - 'enemy of the state' etc., not from overtly racial causes.

Categories are coded thematically, in the sense that one phrase or sentence will correspond with one of the above thirty-two categories, in general. However, it occasionally happened that a sentence could be broken down into more than one categorical unit, for example,

"anti-government demonstrators are arrested"
is divisible into two units:

(i) the act of demonstration against the government, as one unit of category 24,

(ii) the act of arrest, one unit of category 25.

Notation of 'significance' in category nine indicates a person of rank - party leader, trade union leader, for example - who is mentioned as holding such high rank; if no such indication of significant position is indicated, categories thirteen or twenty-five would be used.

Also, unless specific mention is made of a demonstration being of large proportions (category 15), it is coded as limited, in category 24.¹⁴

The categories are constructed to be mutually exclusive. Certain problems are faced in this respect in that some phrases would implicitly, if not explicitly, cover more than one category. For example, (Zambia: from Financial Times of London, 2 August 1967):

"contest...between Kapwepwe and Kamanga...a major power struggle is on in Zambia", is easily coded into category 10. But knowledge of the situation indicated that this was a tribally-based feud, raising the question of codification on the tribal dimension also.

However, it was decided that only the explicit

14. All data was coded by the author, with no cross-checking by other coders. This does face the single coder with problems of bias or subjective weighting. However, having admitted these potential hazards, the absence of an alternative course necessitated the existing method.

statement of the power struggle should be coded, thus avoiding the chance of subjective misinterpretation of the situation or mistaken duplication and consequent misleading indication of conflict level. This was justified by the fact that explicit reference would generally be made in another sentence to the implicit category (here, tribalism), thus covering this dimension also.¹⁵

Having discussed the methodology of the paper, the following chapter discusses the findings of the analysis, in addition to developing further analytical models.

15. Here again, the limitations of written reports and problems of omission inherent in this kind of data collection and analysis are apparent.

CHAPTER FIVE

Data Analysis

If one fact emerged from analysis of the data, it was confirmation of the belief that unipartyism is a wide umbrella concept; in terms of party and governmental organisation, each state had its own particular variation, even if a few, for example, certain states of the former French West African Community, operated on a common theme. And as this organisation often influenced the type of conflict that occurred, especially within the elite bracket, it is relevant to give an initial outline of governmental structures in the African polities.

Charismatic presidential rule was the common feature, but the character of the president was highly influential in determining his relations with fellow politicians and the masses at large. There was no state marked by harmony in its development, although the attitude to dissent within and without the governing party varied.

By far the largest group was marked by oppressive presidential rule;¹ the leader controlled tightly, opposition parties were strongly repressed, internal party dissent was crushed or driven out (although Niger and

1. Niger, Mauritania, Togo, Upper Volta, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Mali.

Mauritania proved a little different from the others, in that their history was marked by practically total unity within the governing party). On the other hand, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia, were led by moderate and popular leaders, willing to listen to differences of opinion and tolerate opposition.

Kaunda, while expressing interest in Zambian unipartyism,² left the opposition ANC free to stand in elections. Nyerere in Tanzania, however, was hostile to the existence of outside opposition parties; but to counteract this, Tanzania provides the best example of intraparty democracy in the one-party state.³

Senghor (Senegal), while being a popular moderate, did face a serious crisis within the party, a crisis heightened by the organisational structure of the party and government; as in Dahomey, which suffered identical problems, powers were separated along two lines. The president was chief of state and president of the conseil des ministres, while the vice-president (Dahomey) or prime minister (Senegal), was head of the government.⁴ In

2. London Times, 18 January 1965.

3. For example, from the London Observer, 26 September 1965: Elections "proof that democracy in a one party state works as well as anywhere", or The Hindu, 19 May 1966, "TANU emerging as the most dynamic force to better the economic and social standards of the masses.."

4. Viz. Le Monde, 19 December 1962, re the Senegalese system, and Le Monde 27 October 1964 re Dahomey.

both states, two strong personalities with divergent views of the political process clashed continually, until either one was defeated (Dia in Senegal), or the army intervened to break the deadlock (Dahomey).

Nigeria and Uganda likewise had a structure which heightened the inevitability of conflict between groups; both suffered from major tribal and regional divisions, which necessitated the formation of the federal/regional constitutions. But as parties were based on communal participation, the political structure continually heightened tensions rather than promoting cooperation. Party deadlock was a continual shadow over Nigeria until civilian authorities could no longer cope with the situation; while Obote, holding control of the punitive force in Uganda, was able to crush his opponents, abrogate the constitution, and assert his authority by ruthless force, but at the cost of alienating much of the population.

The situation in Guinea, Mali, Zambia, and to an extent, Senegal, was further complicated in that the parties were split throughout the period into two factions, moderate versus socialist-Marxist; rather than take sides, the presidents endeavoured to mediate between the factions. They (the presidents) were largely successful in this because of the charismatic nature of their leadership and the powerful uniting force which they symbolised.

Finally, in a mere five of the uniparty states - Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali and Tanzania - was there a serious and concerted effort to develop an effective grass-roots organisation. Ghana stands distinct from the group, in that the development of the Convention People's Party down to the village level was used mainly as a means of tight control of opinion, eradication of dissent, and indoctrination with Nkrumah's propaganda. Its purpose was wholly oppressive.⁵

But continual reference was made in the data to the democratic nature of the organisations of the Parti Democratique Guinean, the Union Soudanaise in Mali, TANU in Tanzania, and the Parti Democratique du Cote d'Ivoire in the Ivory Coast. Two newspaper entries for Mali illustrate the trend of opinion felt about the political situation in all four states:

"Party officials make an effort to keep in touch with the masses and work hard to obtain support".⁶

"Party organisation is repeated exactly at district and sub-district level, leading to a close relationship between Government and People; opportunities do exist for differences

5. See New York Times 3 February 1964, and October 17 1960, for articles on the dictatorial nature of Nkrumah's rule and control of the CPP.

6. New York Herald-Tribune, 10 February 1964.

of opinion to be discussed and transmitted to the top. It is a mistake to write it off as a dictatorship remote from the people - it seems that the party has succeeded in creating a sense of nationhood, the leaders keeping in touch with the masses".⁷

But despite such democratic organisation, the data indicated that in these states, as in the others, the (especially rural) masses had very little say in the actual process of hard policy-making, and remained largely unmoved by the purges and struggles at the highest level.

In order to test the hypotheses, and Hypothesis Two especially, a means of distinguishing the organisational/control aspects of the uniparty states had to be constructed. Coleman and Rosberg's classificatory system⁸ provided a basis from which to construct such a model.

Eleven important facets of party rule and organisation were taken:

- Degree of popular participation and mobilisation
- Associational monopoly and fusion
- Communal monopoly and fusion
- Decision-making: elitist/mass involvement
- Party discipline and hierarchism
- Intraparty democracy
- Party/government assimilation
- Presidential or presidential/cabinet decision-making
- Role of president - democratic, authoritarian
- Extraparty opposition - tolerated or repressed
- Extremist or moderate philosophy

7. London Times, 7 April 1964.

8. See p.34 supra.

For each state, a high, average, or low rating was given on each facet, and in turn these ratings were scored to assess the position of any state across two dimensions, and plotted onto Diagram I (p.69 infra). The democratic-authoritarian dimension was plotted on the 'y' axis, the revolutionary-centralising/pragmatic-pluralist dimension on the 'x' axis.⁹

The 'x' axis reflects the form of governmental organisation, in general following the Coleman-Rosberg classificatory system, with some adjustments.


The 'y' axis, on the other hand, indicates the relatively democratic or authoritarian nature of the governmental system; here are included the degree of popular participation in the governmental process, intraparty competition, as well as degree of repression of opposition (within and without the ruling party), and presidential authoritarianism.

It is felt that this dimension is an important addition to the over-simplified Coleman-Rosberg model, along the liberty/control continuum, and also points out the shortcomings of that model in not distinguishing between relatively repressive and liberal states.

Along the 'x' axis, is the revolutionary-

9. See Appendix II, pp.147-151 for the components of each dimension.

DIAGRAM I
Democratic
y+ 15



centralising and pragmatic-pluralist continuum; this again appears a more valid and valuable method of classifying states. Coleman and Rosberg's differentiation model is too rigid in that it would place all states in one or other of the two extreme categorisations, without allowing for degrees of difference, which are apparent in the diagram.

The third justification for such a graph is that developments and changes in the party/government policy and control can be indicated, ranging from Mauritania's slight alteration of position, to Uganda's dramatic move to the left and increased authoritarianism. It is significant that in all cases of changed position, states moved in the direction of both increased authoritarianism and monolithic organisation and control.

While it is not claimed that this model reflects total accuracy, it is suggested that it does indicate generally, the positions of the states relative to each other, and is useful in relating degree of conflict to system typology, and of pursuing the question of whether similar conflict patterns are, or are not, reflected in the situation of the states here. That is, whether party-governmental structure is a useful guide to assessing the degree of conflict within any one state.

Several initial points may be made here in reference to the positions on Diagram I. Commentators have

usually painted the Ivory Coast as following a more pragmatic-pluralist tendency than the data indicates here. Guinea is a paradoxical case; newspaper reports of Sekou Toure's democratic party and governmental structure could equally be weighed against instances of his autocratic tendencies. As can be seen, on balance, the data pointed to a dominant authoritarian trend in his rule.

The whole question of categorisation of states as uniparty or multiparty/one-party dominant is highlighted again in that three of the four non-uniparty states were susceptible to classification and inclusion in the diagram on similar terms to the twelve uniparty states. Only Nigeria, with its complicated system, and counterbalancing of tribal-regional factions at the party level, could not be diagrammatically represented.

The data collated into the thirty-two categories for each state and contained in Appendix I,¹⁰ is analysed in the following pages. The actual total number of instances of each category per state is given in Table I (p.73 infra). However, as the data stood in this form, it was inappropriate for comparative purposes; it is of little value to compare absolute figures between states whose independence was granted in different years.

To overcome this problem, the total of data units

10. Pp.130-146 , infra.

for each category/state was adjusted as follows:

$$\frac{\text{total units in category for state 'x'}}{\text{years of independence of state 'x'}} \times 10$$

thus making all states comparable by assessing the average conflict level per ten years. The multiplication by ten was made primarily because this avoided confusingly minute figures for analysis purposes. Table 11 (p.74 infra), shows the adjusted figures.

For detailed analysis purposes, the conflict categories are grouped together in sections which reflect their common characteristics:

- 1) Corruption
- 2) Conflict within the 'power group'
- 3) Associational/physical conflict
(anti-government)
- 4) Government positive conflict action
- 5) Tribalism
- 6) Racialism
- 7) Foreign subversion.

TABLE I

Total units of conflict per category in the years of independence
of 16 African states

category state	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	Years of Indep'ce.
Dahomey	2	1	-	1	1	3	1	4	8	4	2	5	1	5	2	5	2	4	-	5	2	3	2	1	1	2	6	1	1	-	-	-	6
Ghana	1	8	-	-	7	8	-	2	30	4	4	4	3	1	4	3	5	9	34	22	12	1	1	2	9	11	26	1	7	-	4	5	10
Guinea	-	1	-	-	-	6	-	4	11	13	5	3	-	-	1	4	1	3	1	8	8	2	9	1	3	4	11	7	5	2	4	6	11
Ivory Coast	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	8	2	2	-	-	-	1	2	2	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	4	2	1	4	-	9
Kenya	-	4	1	-	2	3	1	3	9	6	2	7	1	-	2	1	5	7	12	17	8	2	4	2	9	-	28	3	4	27	2	6	6
Malawi	-	9	2	-	1	6	-	10	23	2	3	6	-	-	-	1	2	5	8	9	1	-	3	5	5	5	14	1	3	4	3	1	5
Mali	1	-	-	4	-	1	1	1	3	2	2	-	2	-	-	4	2	5	2	4	2	-	3	2	-	2	3	-	2	1	4	-	9
Mauritania	-	2	2	-	1	2	-	4	11	-	3	4	1	1	1	-	-	2	3	9	2	3	1	-	1	1	5	3	6	14	4	-	9
Niger	-	4	1	-	-	2	-	-	11	-	1	3	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	2	-	3	-	9
Nigeria	1	1	-	-	4	4	16	7	13	3	-	6	-	1	2	4	9	10	4	14	7	2	2	5	1	6	11	1	3	-	1	7	7
Senegal	-	2	1	-	6	4	-	6	19	3	2	6	1	-	1	1	11	9	9	8	6	1	6	2	6	12	5	6	-	1	-	9	
Tanzania	-	-	3	-	1	6	-	-	8	2	4	2	-	-	-	4	1	11	5	11	6	1	3	3	4	3	13	3	2	13	4	14	8
Togo	2	3	2	1	1	4	-	-	11	1	4	3	-	-	1	3	1	5	4	4	-	-	-	2	1	2	4	-	-	-	4	-	8
Uganda	-	2	1	5	15	6	8	3	11	6	3	3	2	-	-	3	16	3	9	6	2	1	4	-	3	3	12	7	2	10	4	1	7
Upper Volta	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	6	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	4	1	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	3	-	1	-	2	2	7
Zambia	-	2	-	-	-	3	1	3	6	2	2	3	-	-	-	2	10	3	5	7	5	2	2	-	-	1	10	2	3	6	-	3	5

Calculated incidence of social conflict units per category
through ten years

category state	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
Dahomey	2	1.7	-	1.7	1.7	5	1.7	6.7	13.3	6.7	3.3	8.3	1.7	8.3	3.3	8.3	3.3	6.7	-	8.3	3.3	5	3.3	1.7	1.7	3.3	10	1.7	1.7	-	-	-
Ghana	1	8	-	-	7	8	-	2	30	4	4	4	3	1	4	3	5	9	34	22	12	1	1	2	9	11	26	1	7	-	4	5
Guinea	-	.9	-	-	-	5.5	-	3.6	10	11.8	4.6	2.7	-	-	.9	3.6	.9	2.7	.9	7.3	7.3	1.8	8.2	.9	2.7	3.6	10	6.4	4.6	1.8	3.6	5.5
Ivory Coast	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	1.1	-	8.9	2.2	2.2	-	-	-	1.1	2.2	2.2	5.6	2.2	1.1	-	-	-	-	2.2	6.7	3.3	4.4	2.2	1.1	4.4	-
Kenya	-	6.7	1.7	-	3.3	5	1.7	5	15	10	3.3	11.7	1.7	-	3.3	1.7	8.3	11.7	20	28.3	13.3	3.3	6.7	3.3	15	-	4.6	5	6.7	4.5	3.3	10
Malawi	-	18	4	-	2	12	-	20	46	4	6	12	-	-	-	2	4	10	16	18	2	-	6	10	10	10	28	2	6	8	6	2
Mali	1	-	-	4.4	-	1.1	1.1	1.1	3.3	2.2	2.2	-	2.2	-	-	4.4	2.2	5.6	2.2	4.4	2.2	-	3.3	2.2	-	2.2	3.3	-	2.2	1.1	4.4	-
Mauritania	-	2.2	2.2	-	1.1	2.2	-	4.4	12.2	-	3.3	4.4	1.1	1.1	1.1	-	-	2.2	3.3	10	2.2	3.3	1.1	-	1.1	1.1	5.6	3.3	6.7	15.6	4.4	-
Niger	-	4.4	1.1	-	-	2.2	-	-	12.2	-	1.1	3.3	-	-	-	1.1	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	2.2	1.1	1.1	2.2	-	3.3	-
Nigeria	1	1.4	-	-	5.7	5.7	22.9	10	18.6	4.3	-	8.6	-	1.4	2.9	5.7	12.9	14.3	5.7	20	10	2.9	2.9	7.1	1.4	8.6	15.7	1.4	4.3	-	1.4	10
Senegal	-	2.2	1.1	-	6.7	4.4	-	6.7	21.1	3.3	2.2	6.7	1.1	-	1.1	1.1	1.1	12.2	10	10	8.9	6.7	1.1	6.7	2.2	6.7	13.3	5.6	6.7	-	1.1	-
Tanzania	-	-	3.8	-	1.3	7.5	-	-	10	2.5	5	2.5	-	-	-	5	1.3	13.8	6.3	13.8	7.5	1.3	3.8	3.8	5	3.8	16.3	3.8	2.5	16.3	5	17.5
Togo	2	3.8	2.5	1.3	1.3	5	-	-	13.8	1.3	5	3.8	-	-	1.3	3.8	1.3	6.3	5	15	-	-	-	2.5	1.3	2.5	5	-	-	-	5	-
Uganda	-	2.9	1.4	7.1	21.4	8.6	11.4	4.3	15.7	8.6	4.3	4.3	2.9	-	-	4.3	22.9	4.3	12.9	8.6	2.9	1.4	5.7	-	4.3	4.3	17.1	10	2.9	14.3	5.7	1.4
Upper Volta	1	-	-	-	1.4	1.4	-	2.9	8.6	-	1.4	-	-	1.4	1.4	-	1.4	5.7	1.4	1.4	2.9	-	1.4	1.4	-	1.4	4.3	-	1.4	-	2.9	2.9
Zambia	-	4	-	-	-	6	2	6	12	4	4	6	-	-	-	4	20	6	10	1.4	10	4	4	-	-	2	20	4	6	12	-	6

CORRUPTION

Category \ State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
21	3.3	12	7.3	-	13.3	2	2.2	2.2	-	10	8.9	7.5	-	2.9	2.9	10

Unlike demonstrations or strikes, corruption¹ is an ongoing problem, rather than a specific event; therefore, it must be borne in mind that enumeration of the category is derived from specific reporting of the word - so that one notation of the category, usually represents the verbalisation of an ongoing problem rather than a specific level or 'amount' of corruption in any one state. With this

 1. Corruption is viewed as fitting within the theoretical framework of the paper. The corruption act is a disintegrative force; it conflicts with the given values which the state or party is trying to inculcate. It conflicts with the goals of social and economic progress, and with the vertical integration gap between the elite and the mass. It breeds in itself conflict situations which can be felt, for example, in intragovernmental relations, or in the growth of popular hostility towards the government. Corruption was a major factor in the rise of social conflict in Ghana which led ultimately to the demise of Nkrumah.

As an act of aggression against national policy both in terms of values and economics, corruption must be included in the definition of political instability and social conflict.

proviso, and the inherent assumption that when no corruption is mentioned, there is no corruption, it may be added that analysis of the data tended to give an overall picture of the level of corruption in the African states.

The Ivory Coast, Niger and Togo were the only states in which no case of corruption was reported. However, considering the remaining thirteen states, nepotism, diversion of funds and ministerial malpractice, to note some specifics, posed a major problem, although the attitude to corruption showed some variations.

For Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia, specific mention was made of the presidents' efforts to stamp out corruption within the ruling party, although they met with varying success. In Guinea, Mali, Senegal major reorganisations of party and government structure were closely linked with the fight against corruption. Sekou Toure, from 1961-1968, was forced to reorganise state-owned enterprises, because of graft,² and several times (1961, 1963, 1964, 1967) purged the PDG hierarchy in an attempt to control corruption, which was openly admitted by the party newspaper as a serious problem.³ But his battle was uphill, as reflected in the action of both the United States and USSR in cutting back aid to Guinea in the face

2. See London Sunday Telegraph 27 August, 1961.

3. See Le Monde 27 April, 1967.

of government corruption and indecision.⁴ Senghor, likewise, fought an uphill battle within his party,⁵ but also extended his accusations against his political opposition.⁶ Keita managed to keep Mali relatively free of corruption,⁷ quickly dealing with any known malpractice, while Tanzania is notable for the openness with the ruling party admitted the corruption problem within its ranks.⁸ In Zambia, Kaunda established a secret police force in 1967 to stop the spread of corruption among politicians and officials. All the above presidents were faced with the common problem of subordinate corruption, of which they themselves were not a part. Kenyatta occupied a somewhat different position, for while reacting strongly to corruption within his own KANU ranks, he continually accused his opponents outside the party of corruption, and apparently used devious election procedures to keep Oginga Odinga's KPU out of parliament in 1968.⁹

4. New York Times 24 December, 1966.

5. New York Herald Tribune 14 March, 1964.

6. Viz. the Dia crisis within the Union Soudanaise in 1962 (Le Monde 18-31 December 1962, New York Times 5 Jan., 1963); and Senghor's attacks on the opposition in 1964 New York Herald Tribune 14 March 1964 and Le Monde 3 May, 1964.

7. New York Times 20 November, 1968.

8. See TANU Commission report in Guardian 8 April, 1965; and report of the parliamentary Ombudsman, Daily Telegraph, 2 May, 1968.

9. Daily Telegraph 6 January 1968; Morning Star 1 January 1968.

Malawi, Mauritania and Upper Volta cite cases of dismissals of government and party officials for malpractice or misappropriation of funds.¹⁰ Although it might be suggested that in Malawi, no government official was free enough to become corrupt, since Banda was incapable of delegating authority and maintained almost the entire control of government affairs in his own hands.

Elections seemed particularly prone to rigging. In Ghana, the 1960 and 1964 elections are cited as involving widespread governmental fraud and intimidation; Nkrumah claimed a 99.9% pro-government vote in 1964.¹¹ As stated above, Kenya suffered from a similar malady, while all but one of the corruption indicators for Nigeria involve corruption or accusations during election-times. This was particularly serious in 1964, when the parties, split as ever on tribal lines, came into such a degree of conflict, accusation and counter-accusation, that the federation very nearly collapsed.¹² Zambia's general election in 1968, (involving the opposition party, too) was considered fair, but within the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) irregularity, was noted in its elections for

10. Eg. Malawi - Daily Telegraph 8 January 1966; Mauritania - Le Monde 5 July 1968; Upper Volta - Le Monde 26 July 1963.

11. 1960: New York Times 23 and 28 April, 1964: New York Times, 6 February 1964.

12. New York Times, 31 December 1964; January 1-5 1965.

party positions, following tribal lines.¹³

Ghana stands somewhat on its own, in that Nkrumah was represented as actually engendering and espousing corruption. He never accused any member in his own Convention People's Party of corruption; any opposition accusation was automatically denied without investigation and in 1959, Nkrumah barred a probe on bribery charges against the government.¹⁴ Here, as in Dahomey, the army cited ministerial extravagance, the many charges of corruption, and waste, as prime reasons for the decision to stage a coup.¹⁵ Lastly, the only instances of corruption stated in Uganda were charges by a deputy against Obote, his ministers and an army chief; which charges were not acknowledged, or investigated by Obote's repressively authoritarian regime.¹⁶

The control of corruption then, depends above all on the attitude of the leader, especially within the ruling party, although intolerance of external opposition, expressed through accusations of opposition corruption

13. Eg. Daily Telegraph 22 August 1967: "Nearly a thousand more votes were cast in the UNIP elections than the number of people entitled to vote".

14. New York Times, 13 May 1959.

15. Ghana - New York Times 5 April 1966; Dahomey - Guardian 29 October 1963.

16. Daily Telegraph 6 February 1966.

leads one to question the veracity of such accusations. In the context of other indicators too, these accusations often appeared to be another means of attempting to discredit extra-party opposition in many states, a view further strengthened by the incidence of election-rigging, by government forces, in order to minimise the Voice of opposition parties.

The fact that the corruption indicator occurs throughout the history of independence, highlights the scope of the problem, and the difficulty to controlling it as a recurring dilemma,

Corruption is no/respecter of party system; Ghana and Guinea (x-y-), Kenya and Senegal(x+y-), Zambia(X+Y+) and Tanzania(x-y+), all have high scores, as well as Nigeria and Zambia being multiparty states amongst the uniparty states.

The presidential role is informative: Zambia, Tanzania, Senegal and Guinea have in common a moralistic president faced with the problem of eradicating corruption in the party ranks.

Kenya differs in Kenyatta's use of corrupt practices against his opponents, while Nkrumah in Ghana seems to have actively cultivated corrupt practices in the CPP, and against his opponents.

Corruption in Nigeria pinpoints the vital importance of election results to the competing ethnic parties, ballot-rigging and irregular disqualifications being much in evidence during elections.

CONFLICT WITHIN THE POWER GROUP

Category \ State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
1	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	1	-
3	-	-	-	-	1.7	4	-	2.2	1.1	-	1.1	3.8	2.5	1.4	-	-
10	6.7	4	11.8	2.2	10	4	2.2	-	-	4.3	3.3	2.5	1.3	8.6	-	4
11	3.3	4	4.6	2.2	3.3	6	2.2	3.3	1.1	-	2.2	5	5	4.3	1.4	4
23	3.3	1	8.2	-	6.7	6	3.3	1.1	1.1	2.9	1.1	3.8	-	5.7	1.4	4

The power group is defined as that body of men constituting the government of the state, involving the party and government administration, as well as those bodies within their jurisdiction, namely the armed forces and police.

Eleven states underwent serious rebellion by the armed forces. This highlights the important role of the army as an organized and disciplined force in states which often lacked such organization and discipline in the civilian sector.

However, the actions of the armed forces did differ, falling into distinct categories.

In Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, battalions mutinied

in January 1964 not against the government, but against their predominantly white officers, and to a lesser extent, about pay and conditions. The mutineers were favouring the Africanization of the army, not opposing their own governments, although in Tanzania, a second mutiny in September 1964 was believed to be politically inspired by Nyerere's pro- communist leftist opponents in the government (especially Kambona). Kambona and Nyerere were in steady opposition until the rift became open in 1967, and Kambona was expelled from Tanzania.

In Dahomey (1965 coup), Togo (1967coup) and Upper Volta (1966), bloodless army coups precipitated by civilian political rivalries and confusion. In all cases the army stepped in to end the crisis within a government split into two opposing camps. In Nigeria too, the continuing political-tribal crisis since the 1964 elections, centred on the inter-regional tensions between the major social-political groupings, was brought to an end by the 1966 coup, although here the case was somewhat different in that the coup was perhaps also a result of regional problems in the army itself.

On a more general level, a definite connection was visible between government intervention in army affairs and consequent army unrest. In Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Uganda, all leftist revolutionary-centralising regimes, and to a lesser extent in Dahomey, the government directly

interfered in the organisation and powers of the army. The first four states establishes 'People's Militias', paramilitary organizations which would weaken the power of the army, were responsible only to the government, and as in the Ugandan case, were downgrading the army and threatening to arrest officers. As a generalisation, it may be stated that the army followed conservative traditions, freedom from corruption, and a rigid discipline, as opposed to the often opportunistic extremism of their governments. The Ghana and Mali civilian governments fell to army coups because of this dispute between the two groups. Throughout Uganda's independent history, the army had been turbulent, had been frequently involved by Obote in political affairs, and was in a state of turmoil at the end of 1968 (viz. coup 1971).

It is interesting to note that in Guinea, on the other hand, the army had privately confronted Toure in December 1966 because of the weakened army role at the expense of the People's Militia. Sekou Toure backed down on this issue, so that by 1968, the army could be reported as suffering "no discontent, ..., well-paid and listened to".¹ This reflects the overall impression of Guinean government, in which government and other groups were able to meet frankly and enter into fruitful two-way communication.

1. New York Times, 16 December 1968.

Such loyalty of the army was important to Toure during the upheaval of the 1967-68 'cultural revolution'. Likewise in Senegal, the loyalty of the armed forces and police saved the Senghor regime from collapse during the 1965 government crisis.

Although the army often claimed to enter the political arena as an 'honest and impartial broker', the spectre of tribalism was apparent in army-civilian relations. Nigeria has been mentioned in this respect. The 1963 Dahomey crisis leading to the 1963 coup was exacerbated by tribal hostilities between President Maga and army chiefs ; in Kenya, Kenyatta never trusted the army since almost no Kikuyu or Luo held rank in it. Thus he avoided using it to settle political disputes or civilian political troubles. Obote in Uganda took the opposite extreme; he was faced by powerful conservative opposition in the army because of his dictatorial tendencies, but sought to overcome this by playing on tensions between southerners (Bantu) and northerners (Obote's fellow tribesmen), and then purging the army of the Bantu group and involving the Northern army faction closer in the affairs of the state.²

2. Other army problems were localised; no depth information is available re the 1962 army revolt in Mauritania: the 1963 Togo coup was not the result of political or interference problems, but due to personal military grievances. The generals wanted a larger army and more central role in Togolese affairs.

In summary, it can be stated that the more authoritarian and centralised the government was, the more likely was it to clash with the army in its efforts to control the latter's independence.

Certain patterns also emerge in the intra-party government civilian conflicts. One thing was clear, that regardless of governmental system or unipartyism, multipartyism, or one-party dominance, intraparty conflict was much in evidence and of high intensity. (In Ghana, interestingly enough, all indicators for 10, 11, and 23 categories³ were of a governmental repressive nature. As can be seen on p.92 infra the violence against the government was largely covert in the form of terrorist bomb attacks against the person of Nkrumah).

The clash of major personalities was a common feature in many states: Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia experienced such clashes. Not only were personalities involved but different political philosophies and ideas of government, and tribal divisions which in turn split the party. In

3. That is, 10 - Crisis within party/government/parliament. 11 - Key government/cabinet/party reshuffle; important political resignation. 23 - Strains within party/government/administration, short of crisis.

Dahomey and Senegal, the separation of powers between government and party served to magnify and focus competition because of the competition for power between the bodies.

In Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda, the president or government head was directly involved in the power struggle between his own camp and that of his major charismatic opposition. In Zambia and Gruitisky's Togo, however, the president was placed in the unenviable position of mediator between the two groups. This was also the case in Guinea, Sekou Toure being caught between Marxist-radical and the moderate factions. This clash between Marxists and non-Marxists or moderates was a wide-spread phenomenon , especially in the ex-French colonies, as well as in Kenya and Tanzania, where the leaders faced serious threats from pro- Chinese sympathisers, Oginga Odinga and Oscar Kambona respectively.

In general, the leader himself showed a low level of tolerance towards opposition; the average president was strict in the enforcement of his own authority, if only for the reason that intra-party opposition tended to be of the type that demanded his overthrow rather than compromise policy. Thus at the top level, democracy could not operate.

But interestingly, at a lower level, 'socialist democracy' was in evidence: the party grass-roots organisations of Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, and Tanzania operated so as to give the mass membership maximum opportunity to be aware of government policy and make known their own views. Sekou Toure (Guinea) and Nyerere (Tanzania) are several times noted as listening to and acting upon the wishes of the people, rather than, as in Ghana, indoctrinating them. Malawi was another case in which Banda issued all directives and brooked no other opinion, constructive or otherwise.

It is difficult to distinguish between uniparty and non-uniparty intraparty violence levels. In Kenya, the struggle between Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga was succeeded, after Oginga Odinga had formed a separate party, by infighting between Luo Mboya and the Kikuyu majority. In Uganda, almost a one-party state by 1966, the breakup of the UPC/KYC coalition was followed by Obote's systematic pressure against the Bantu members of the party in favour of his own Northern compatriots. In Zambia, the conflict was late in coming to the surface, but showed the definite tribal-provincial divisions within the party.

The only truly multiparty state in the sample, Nigeria, naturally experienced conflicts in the coalition situation at the federal level. But even here, it is important to note the internal rivalries within the separate

regional party governments.

The problems of uniting the single party are unique. On the one hand, the uniparty is beneficial in bringing all important persons and sectors into the governmental process. On the other, no traditional or developed procedure is in hand to ensure mobility within the party. The charismatic president is there until his death, is allpowerful, and is jealous of other potential rivals. The latter in turn are frustrated by immobility, or neglect of their ideas. There is no way around the problem but violent conflict. We return to the problem of no common denominator of norms and values, as well as party processes, by which tensions may be relieved and ambitions achieved.

Levels and Parties

When states are compared, with type of party-system related to the incidence of conflict, it can firstly be noted that the reality of unipartyism, multipartyism or one-party dominance, is not easily verified or brought out by the level of conflict.

Coups occurred in both revolutionary-centralising and pragmatic-pluralist states, as well as in Nigeria. For other indicators, states of both party structures, with the multiparty states included, suffered conflict.

Taking indicators and and three⁴ together, the basic threat to the governmental elite was posed in ten states.

In the other categories, it is interesting to note the high intraparty conflict levels within the party in the one-party democratic state. Kenya, Uganda, Zambia compare with Guinea, Malawi, and Dahomey in this respect, as well as illustrating that these states are to be found at several points across Diagram 1, although it is found that Guinea, Uganda and Malawi, both authoritarian and revolutionary-centralising, along with Kenya rapidly moving in that direction, also are grouped closely on the chart, but Dahomey and Zambia belie the guidance of the chart.

Conflict within the power group was evident in every state. This, then, must point to some other consideration besides party system. The alternatives are a combination of personality clash and policy orientation (viz, the above discussion), especially between 'left' and 'moderate' groups.

Guinea's score was inevitably high above all due to the cultural-revolution which raged within the party 1967-1968, reflecting Guinea's ideological kinship with China

4. That is, Indicator 1 - Coup d'etat: revolt/mutiny.

at that time. Ghana, the most extreme authoritarian revolutionary-centralising chartered state, has a conspicuously low average conflict level in this section. But knowledge of the regime does not render this surprising; the oppressive nature of Nkrumah's autocracy negated overt conflict within the CPP.

ASSOCIATIONAL/PHYSICAL OPPOSITION

Category \ State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
2	1.7	8	.9	-	6.7	18	-	2.2	4.4	1.4	2.2	-	3.8	2.9	-	4
6	5	8	5.5	3.3	5	12	1.1	2.2	2.2	5.7	4.4	7.5	5	8.6	1.4	6

12	8.3	4	2.7	-	11.7	12	-	4.4	3.3	8.6	6.7	2.5	3.8	4.3	-	6
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8	6.7	2	3.6	-	5	20	1.1	4.4	-	10	6.7	-	-	4.3	2.9	6
15	3.3	4	.9	1.1	3.3	-	-	1.1	-	2.9	1.1	-	1.3	-	1.4	-
24	1.7	2	.9	-	3.3	10	2.2	-	-	7.1	6.7	3.8	2.5	-	1.4	-

18	6.7	9	2.7	5.6	11.7	10	5.6	2.2	1.1	14.3	12.2	13.8	6.3	4.3	5.7	6
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14	8.3	1	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	1.4	-
22	5	1	1.8	-	3.3	-	-	3.3	-	2.9	6.7	1.3	-	1.4	-	4

16	8.3	3	3.6	2.2	1.7	2	4.4	-	1.1	5.7	1.1	5	3.8	4.3	-	4
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the single political party claims that its sphere of influence extends to all social, economic and political sectors of national and sub-national life. In fact, it disclaims partyism in the traditional sense of a fractionally

representative system, placing itself as an all subsuming organisation through which all aspects of life will be ordered and organized, the sole organ through which economic progress and national unification will be fostered.

Hence, any opposition voice arising outside this monolith is accused of subversive intent or treason, or the destruction of the national identity. Regular channels for the expression of opposition from outside the ruling party being suppressed, opponents are by default forced into silence or accomodation, or into underground organizations and violent action. This means that, by typing the opposition into a particular role, the uniparty so acts that the opposition is forced to adopt the very status given it - that is, as treasonous, which in turn keeps the process moving in a continual self-fulfilling vicious circle.

Categories two, six and twelve, 1 in this section indicate probable results of suppressing a regular flow of opposition - government debate; the physical opposition counted here is of a violent or subversive nature. But also, much of the data in these categories arises from government accusations of their occurence; hence category six is 'equivocal' in the sense that the plots can be

 1. That is, Category 2 - Terrorism/ sabotage;
 6 - 'equivocal' plots; 12 - 'significant' anti-government action.

actualities, or the invention of the ruling party as a means towards justified suppression of (suspected) opposition.

Looking at the particular categories of conflict recorded, the nature of opposition to the ruling elite can be determined, including the multiparty/one-party dominant states here. Seventy-five percent of the African states studied experienced terrorist or rebel action. In all states, plots were uncovered against prominent members of the ruling elite; and 81.25% of the states experienced 'significant'² anti-government action. Within these categories, patterns also evolved as to who plotted, or what type of anti-government action occurred.

By far the largest number of plots were laid to political opposition, members of banned opposition groups, or renegades from the ruling party. This was the case in 81.25% of the states; but the data analysis revealed that other associational groups also were significant in their opposition to the government. Trade unions and students figured prominently amongst these.

Underground activity, including the organisation of terrorist groups, arms trafficking, or anti-government propaganda, was much in evidence, as was the organisation or attempted establishment of new opposition political parties, or non-government sponsored associational

2. ie. Organisation of new opposition party; anti-government pamphlets, propaganda; arms trafficking; strong parliamentary opposition in multiparty states; or opposition committees, or movements/organisations with especial anti-government purpose.

organisations, such as rival trade unions or student groups. Underground activity scored in 68.75% of the states, and attempts to establish political parties, in 62.5% states. These were short-lived, as the ruling party either refused legal recognition to them, or physically destroyed the organisations.

Niger was unique in escaping any form of demonstration (categories 15 and 24) or non-tribal rioting (8). Opposition in this grouping was widespread in the labour movements, and in the educational sector: students, teachers, intellectuals, or university faculty. 50% of the states experienced trade union hostility in the form of demonstrations or riots. The use of troops or armed police against demonstrators was a frequent method of ending these manifestations of unrest, while in 50% of the states, riots developed from clashes between governmental and opposition party supporters and hoodlums.

Specific non-tribal unrest (18) reflected in all states their particular problems and hostilities, all states experiencing such overt conflict. Again, trade unions and students figure prominently in this category, as they do in strike categories 14 and 22, which affected 68.75% of the states. However, trade union grievances tended to follow a different pattern than those of students and intellectuals. The latter tended (i) to be left of party leaders, more radical Marxists than the leaders themselves,

who were often designated as being in favour of Marxism; (ii) to criticise strongly what they felt to be authoritarian tendencies or repressive practices in the political arena. Ex-French colonies particularly suffered in this respect; of the eleven states experiencing student-government conflict, six were in the Francophone bloc. (Nine French West African states were included in the sample).

Conflict between the ruling party and trade unions, on the other hand, arose largely because of government economic policy. The adoption of austerity measures meant government control and wage limitation. Naturally, this led to clashes with organised labour.

Economic discontent was also responsible for much of the popular discontent (category 16) which 87.5% of the states experienced. Expectations were not matched by actual progress, or there was general discontent concerning the economic gap between the elite and the masses. A point to be made here, however, is that the 'public' involved in this context is almost wholly urban. Those outside the main urban areas rarely were aware of issues in the cities, feeling little affected directly.

GOVERNMENT POSITIVE CONFLICT ACTION

Category \ State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
9	13.3	30	10	8.9	15	4.6	3.3	12.2	12.2	18.6	21.1	10	13.8	15.7	8.6	12
13	1.7	3	-	-	1.7	-	2.2	1.1	-	-	1.1	-	-	2.9	-	-
25	1.7	9	2.7	2.2	15	10	-	1.1	-	1.4	2.2	5	1.3	4.3	-	-
19	-	34	.9	2.2	20	16	2.2	3.3	-	5.7	10	6.3	5	12.9	1.4	10
20	8.3	22	7.3	1.1	28.3	18	4.4	10	-	20	10	13.8	5	8.6	1.4	14
5	1.7	7	-	-	3.3	2	-	1.1	-	5.7	6.7	1.3	1.3	21.4	1.4	-
26	3.3	11	3.6	6.7	-	10	2.2	1.1	2.2	8.6	6.7	3.8	2.5	4.3	1.4	2

Much of the conflict in this section is related to the associational opposition section, reflecting government punitive action or reaction to hostile groups. Given the fact that opposition outside the uniparty is deemed intolerable and subversive, official punitive reaction to such opposition is expected to be severe. It is also apparent that opposition tends to revolve not around policy alone, but around personalities too. Since political opposition groups are forced into the position of advocating

the overthrow of the ruling party, their own leaders attain a certain charismatic quality, focus the loyalty of members, and also present a known alternative to the inevitable charisma of the president.

Thus, government attention is focussed on the prominent members among opposition groups (within the party as well as out) who are seen as articulators of the anti-establishment threat. Reaction to this threat is apparent in category 9, extensive punitive action against significant persons. As can be seen, all states scored heavily in this category, especially Ghana, Malawi and Senegal. The Ghana and Malawi scores are felt to accurately indicate the repressive nature of these regimes. Nkrumah aimed at the systematic destruction of all opposition in the pursuance of his authoritarian personality cult; while Banda, Malawi's pathological and dictatorial leader, continually made accusations of harm to himself and the country against his opponents, most of whom had originated from his ruling party, but who had resigned because of his inability to delegate authority or trust.

The Senegal score is more surprising, although Senegal was moving towards a more authoritarian state by 1968. However, analysis of indicator 9 reveals that Senghor's campaign against corruption was responsible for part of the arrest figures, but with the attempted coup

of Dia in 1963, and subsequent events, Senghor seemed forced into a more authoritarian and rigid role by the violence of his opposition, rather than by a conscious policy of repression or personality-cult creation.

Categories 19 and 20 represent an important fact in independent Africa too - the use of government powers and the legal system to enact repressive legislation, and act against opposition in all social sectors. Niger is alone in its lack of experience of any such reported indicator. Malawi, Ghana and Senegal again feature highly, although it is also important to note the consistent scoring in Kenya and Uganda especially, and also Nigeria. Ghana's history is an amazing catalogue of repressive laws against opposition, sanctions versus potential opposition, and increasing concentration of total power in Nkrumah's hands.

In terms of Diagram I, the revolutionary-centralising/authoritarian group do have a high level of conflict here, although Kenya, Mauritania and Senegal ($x+y-$), and to a lesser extent Tanzania ($-y+$), are at a level equally as high as that of Guinea ($x-y-$). Otherwise, the remaining states from $x-y+$, $x+y+$, and $x+y-$, are in a relatively similar position.

This indicates a certain trend of heightened conflict with increased authoritarian-monopolistic control in the state. It may be posited that the more rigidly controlled the state, the more likely is the ruling elite

to eliminate opposition by any means at their disposal. But it can be no more than a statement of a trend; government offensive action is evident in all states.

In this group of categories, three of the multiparty states score highly in the conflict situation: Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda; but not so highly as Ghana and Malawi, and at about the same level as Senegal. The fourth multiparty state, Zambia, scores lower. Multiparty or uniparty states are hence not placed significantly apart, either higher or lower, but are intermixed on the conflict continuum.

TRIBALISM

Category \ State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
4	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	7.1	-	-
7	1.7	-	-	1.1	1.7	-	1.1	-	-	22.9	-	-	-	11.4	-	2
17	3.3	5	.9	2.2	8.3	4	2.2	-	-	12.9	1.1	5	3.8	4.3	-	4

As with other categories which indicate a continual process of conflict, rather than just unique events, newspaper recording of tribalism tends to be incomplete, insofar as tribal hostility often goes unreported until specific acts of physical hostility break out. However, if one fact was readily apparent from the data analysis, it was that tribalism was and is a major problem in the states under analysis.

The extent of tribal violence seemed to depend (i) on the size of tribes, and (ii) on their organisation, whether round a political figure or political party. Hence, the party organisational factor is no guide to this type of conflict.

On the positive side, for example, twenty tribes make

up the Mali population. Yet none is large enough to be a single effective political force, with the result that there was no major power struggle with a tribal basis, even though the tribes were not united by a common bond. Tanzania faced even greater tribal diversity with one hundred and twenty tribes, but here again, none was dominant,¹ thus providing "no regional/tribal focus for discontent".² Mali's main task, as with Niger and Upper Volta, was to find a way of asserting jurisdiction over the nomadic peoples, an almost impossible problem when it was difficult to even keep track of the nomads. Mali's efforts to impose increased taxation and a controlled trading system on the Tuaregs led to the latter's rebellion 1963-64, which tied up most of the Mali army in desert campaigns.

Four states stood out as suffering from crippling tribal frictions; Nigeria in the west, and Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia in the east. Each of these is characterised by having several major tribal groupings, each with a strict political alignment that precipitated (i) civil strife in Nigeria and Uganda, (ii) the splitting of KANU, the governing party in Kenya, and (iii) the increasing crisis situations within UNIP, the controlling Zambia party, as well as heightened tribal-party polarisation in

1. The Hindu, 19 May 1966.

2. Quoted from The Times, 25 October 1962.

the 1968 elections, between UNIP and the ANC.

The post-Second World War history of Nigeria is filled with tribal hostilities in the largest state in Africa, with fifty-five million people and two hundred and fifty tribal/language groups. The country at independence, was split into regions according to the three main tribal groupings, Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani. Each group controlled a government at regional level and the constitution assured that the tribally-based parties at federal level would be in a state of continual friction.

Almost every election was accompanied by great violence, the 1964 federal election crisis almost breaking up the federation.

Uganda faced a similar situation, with major tribes composing four kingdoms, who faced a continuous struggle with both the central government, and minor tribes which tried to assert their own independence from the major kingdoms. Thus, political parties were factional and tribal. The brief alliance of the UPC and the KYP split asunder as Bugandans aligned behind King Freddie, initial president of Uganda, and northerners behind Obote, the prime minister. Obote, with the army loyal to him, destroyed the Bugandan kingdom, exiled Freddie and became president himself. He consolidated his hold on the UPC in 1966 by ousting all southern and Bugandan ministers, known as the 'Bantu Group'.

Kenya, on the other hand, found its two main tribes, Kikuyu and Luo, initially aligned within KANU, while all other minor groupings formed the short-lived KADU opposition. Here again, though, the clash of personalities and politics between Kenyatta and Odinga (and later between Mboya and Kikuyu KANU members) led to the creation of the KPU, based on the Luo and Wakamba tribes, who together outnumber the Kikuyu. The animosity between the two men, Kenyatta and Odinga, "raised the ugly spectre of tribalism again".³

Finally, Zambia achieved an initial facade of unity in UNIP. Kaunda was the only leader of the four countries who was able to remain above the tribal divisions and act as a uniting force, rather than be identified with one particular tribe. But in the first UNIP internal party elections for the important party positions, bitter tribal infighting and intrigue developed 1967-1968, again around the chief personalities under Kaunda. Secondly, those tribes with little power in UNIP, that is, mainly the Lozis, Tongas, and Ilas, voted on strictly tribal lines in favour of the ANC in the 1968 elections, increasing the party's representation in the national assembly.

These brief histories make it readily apparent that the type of government system did not affect the tribal animosities; whether lines were drawn within the party, or

3. New York Times, 13 July 1966.

on associational party lines, the conflict was generated and continued with venom. The very fact of the competition for power, whether between parties or groups within parties, exacerbated the historical enmities between the larger tribes.

Traditionally hostile to each other before independence, each sure of its size and power, the fact of independence just carried the differences to a higher level. Independence meant that the fighting would now assume national and governmental dimensions rather than sub-national goals. Thus, the situation in these states is much worse than in those where no tribe is dominant, and therefore, by power and size, lacks the ability to dictate. It is also worse than those in which one major tribe dominates and is able to control the government, without significant opposition, as in Upper Volta, where the Mossi tribe dominated the government.⁴

The problem is argued above (pp.41-43) as a lack of basic national norms and consensus. Thus, a coup in Dahomey displaced President Maga of the north for a president more to the liking of the coastal people.

The tribal problem highlights the artificiality of boundaries, which not only bind tribes together, but in other cases, split a tribe in two, as between Ghana and

4. New York Herald Tribune, 23 February 1963.

Togo (the Ewe tribe), or Kenya and the Somali Republic. Also, historically, colonists pacified, educated and westernised coastal tribes first, so that these had the initial advantage in political/social/economic advancement under colonial rule. The sophistication of the Ibos, and to a lesser extent the Yoruba in Nigeria, and the spread of Ibos throughout Nigeria in administrative and entrepreneurial positions, proved a major source of conflict and resentment when northerners (Hausa/Fulani) began to flex their muscles politically and educationally.

Thus, in the state with major tribal divisions, it is difficult for national leaders to maintain a position above tribalism. Kaunda alone achieved this, although in Zambia too, tribalism was still rampant beneath him. The key elements to understanding post-independence tribal violence are thus the arbitrary creation of colonial boundaries, and the historical conflicts between tribes; whatever form of government comes with independence, the struggle for power and political organisation of communal groups, only exacerbates the historical problem.

RACISM

Category State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
30	-	-	1.8	1.1	45	8	1.1	15.6	-	-	-	16.3	-	14.3	-	12
32	-	5	5.5	-	10	2	-	-	-	10	-	17.5	-	1.4	2.9	6

As would be expected, the racism indicator occurred most frequently in those states in which more than one racial group is in permanent residence: Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia in East Africa, and Mauritania (and to a lesser extent, Mali) in West Africa. The first group of ex-British colonies is characterised by a small white (English) population, a somewhat larger Asian group, in addition to the millions of indigenous African residents; while the latter two states gave evidence of tensions between Arab and African segments of the population.

Such racial conflict is to be distinguished from the other main source of racial tension, that involving short-term resident visitors, diplomats or journalists for example, which accounts for the spread of conflict through nations other than those mentioned above. In this

group, the most common factor is domestic intolerance of criticism of the host country by foreigners. News reporters were expelled for "false despatches, "harmful" reports¹ or "subversion" or knowledge of subversive activities.² In Nigeria, a Peace Corps worker caused a major outburst of anti-American sentiment by describing conditions as "primitive" on a post-card.³

Such troubles, then, reflect the sensitivity of the newly-independent states to outside criticism. This is not just an African ethnocentric trait, but a common reaction in any part of the world.

Returning to the more serious racial incidents, these can be traced to the relative economic positions of Europeans and Asians in East African society, to the continued and prevalent colonialist attitudes of many European settlers, and to the opposing force of 'Africanisation', the pressure tended to increase over time. The basic problem was the dominant position of European and Asian minorities in the economies of the East African states.⁴ This of course seemed illogical to Africans expecting rapid benefits in

1. Ghana; see New York Times, Nov. 29 1962; June 18 1963.

2. See: Kenya - London Times, 11 March 1966; Tanzania - 16 January, 1966; Upper Volta - Paris Le Monde 8 April 1964.

3. Nigeria: see New York Times, October 16, 1961.

4. For example, Tanzania 98% black; but Asians and Europeans well off and in top jobs in Dar-es-Salaam, with feelings of superiority. Observer, 1, Jan. 1962. Kenya, 55000 whites, 17000 Asians, 8.3m. Africans - economic reliance on farming as mainstay of exports, largely European-farmer produced; Malawi, 4m. Africans 9000 Europeans.

the immediate post-independence phase, and the problem was exacerbated by the fact of the retention, by most Europeans and Asians, of their British citizenship. Resentment was especially created because of this white "imperialism",⁵ and in trade unions, business, farms and armies, hostility to whites was open. In January 1964, mutinies by battalions of the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian armies were directed mainly at the white officers, as well as over pay and conditions.

All five East African states pursued an active policy of Africanisation, although the methods and zeal differed, according to the influence of the presidents of the states. TANU (Tanzania) and the Malawi Congress Party for example, permitted only black African membership. Nyerere and Kenya's Kaunda aroused the ire of their more militant leftist party members by seeking to protect Europeans and Asians from vicious discrimination. Nyerere was rned against such discrimination,⁶ while Kaunda's "Insults Bill" made it a punishable offence to insult a person of another race, tribe or creed.⁷

Kenyatta, on the other hand, was unable to control the violent anti-white/Asian feelings, even Kenyan citizens in these minorities were heavily pressured. Yhe 1967

5. Kenya - New York Times, July 12, 1964, speech by Odinga.

6. Dawn July 19, 1963.

7. London Financial Times, Jan. 5, 1965.

Immigration Act paved the way for the major Africanisation of business, leading to a vast emigration of Asians with British passports to Great Britain,⁸ The 1967 Trade Licensing Act limited trading to Kenyan citizens, further striking at the Asian entrepreneurial strength; while in 1968, British-owned firms were ordered to leave or be nationalised.⁹ In Malawi, the Forfeiture Act was used to confiscate Britons' property, while cooperatives squeezed out many Asians in Tanzania. The government in Uganda barred Indians from civil service promotion and fettered European-owned businesses in the public enterprise system.¹⁰

In Upper Volta and Guinea also, Africanisation was even extended to the churches, Catholic priests and bishops being warned against political involvement, or expelled for views contrary to those of the government.

It can be stated that regardless of the type of regime, the presence of Africans, Asians and Europeans in the same state was concomitant with racial conflict, rooted in economics. (Moreover, government legislation and policy pronouncements are usually of little use against what is basically an emotional problem).¹¹ For example, despite Nyerere's warning against discrimination, the government

8. See Sunday Times, July 23, 1967 and Times, September 6, 1967.

9. See The Hindu, October 8, 1967 and Egyptian Mail, Jan. 13, 1968.

10. Malawi, see London Times, Jan. 10, 1966. Tanzania, Observer, July 1, 1962. Uganda, Financial Times, April 9, 1963.

11. Note the African unemployment problems in Kenya (Daily Telegraph, December 12, 1963) and Tanzania (Observer July 8, 1962) in relation to exacerbation of racial tension.

still made life difficult for Asian traders, and in 1964, unsubstantiated plot charges implicating the British were used as a justification for expropriating many white farms and businesses.¹² Moderates, such as Nyerere and Kaunda, were placed in a dilemma; their efforts to minimise racialism were often opposed within their own ranks.¹³ Kenyatta could not control his own cohorts, and none could press too hard for European/Asian rights, without being dangerously labelled as 'moderates' and having their credibility questioned.

Mali and Mauritania provide a different setting, in that the clashes noted were between Arabs and Africans. Mauritania especially, with one-sixth of its population black and the remainder Arab, suffered a major crisis because of black hostility to Daddah's pro-leftist-Arab-states policies, and his 1966 ruling that Arabic should become the official language to be taught in schools. Blacks temporarily lost all important party posts, serious clashes resulted between the two groups, and it was only in 1968 that the government made an attempt to ease the situation

12. Asian traders - Observer, July 1, 1962; British - Daily Telegraph, Nov. 12, 1964.

13. Nyerere : Guardian, Jan. 23, 1962; Kaunda-Daily Express, March 22, 1967.

by giving greater black representation in the government, with two key cabinet posts.¹⁴

Thus, given the particular composition of the racial groups in each state, and the situation of foreigners in positions of authority after independence, racism was a cross-national phenomenon, often resulting as the indigenous population sought to assert their economic independence and to resist neo-colonialism. If racism is not to be condoned, it is worth stating that states with much longer traditions of independence and freedom are no more able to come to terms with racism than are the uniparty and multiparty African states, while parallels to the African resentment of neo-colonialism are redily apparent in the 'developed' world.

14. Le Monde, Jan. 11, 1966 et seq. to Feb. 3, 1968.

FOREIGN SUBVERSION

Category State	Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Kenya	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Upper Volta	Zambia
31	-	4	3.6	4.4	3.3	6	4.4	4.4	3.3	1.4	1.1	5	5	5.7	2.9	-

, Appearing in 87.5% states, again there is no immediate or close relation between party system and number of accusations of subversion. Indeed, it is much more fruitful here to study reasons cross-nationally why foreign subversion accusations might be made, and against whom these were made.

Commentators on the African political scene have noted the accusations that have been frequently made of 'foreign subversion' by leaders in African states. Such accusations have often been suggested as ploys to divert attention from domestic conflict by focussing hostility on a foreign body of individuals or, even more nebulously, on a state, thus giving the leadership breathing space to either settle the conflict or at least dispose of the opposition.

It is not easy, in analysing the data, to decipher

every 'true' accusation from those made from domestic political expediency. But a possible key to this is suggested by seeing whether the subversion is pinned to a particular foreign state or states, or whether it is referred to more vaguely as 'foreign subversion', the work of a 'foreign subversive group' or of 'foreign agents'. It would seem that if a state is actually named, the chances are greater that the indication of foreign subversion has some substance, more so than a vague accusation. For the pinpointing of a state also focusses home hostility upon that state, a step that would be dangerous or unprofitable to make more accusations concocted and unfounded, although of course, it would still serve to unite, to some extent, divergent domestic opinion. The nebulous accusation, on the other hand, would tend to focus attention on the domestic situation. The threat to foreign subversion demands a greater vigilance on the part of men towards their neighbour, recalcitrants or suspected deviants must be weeded out. Such internal watchfulness serves the dual purpose of bringing into line by threat, those who might have been straying from the party line; it also provides the rationale for a purge of internal party apparatus, or arrest of 'dangerous' opponents.¹

1. For example, as in Senegal 1968; Uganda 1964; Mali 1961 and 1964; Togo 1966.

Such reasoning, does not, however , claim that the naming of the foreign source of subversion renders the subversion factual. For example, Togo and Ghana maintained hostile relations at least until 1966 (Nkrumahs fall), mainly due to the fact that the Ewe tribe was divided by the Ghana/Togo border, so that both claimed border extensions, while Togo, the weaker state, feared Ghana's invasion to achieve its claims. Thus, we find that in 1960, 1961 and 1963, Ghana accuses Togo of providing the base for plots against Ghana (1960 and 1963), of harbouring Ghanaian anti-regime plotters, and of cooperating with Ghana's Opposition OUP against the government. Togo, in return, specifically accuses Ghana in 1961 and 1962 of fermenting plots against the Togo state and threatening to invade the Togolese land.

These accusations may have substance (especially in the case of Ghana as explained below), but equally, both sets of politicians could equally have been making political hay in their own states by taking advantage of the strained relations between the two countries.

Likewise, Mauritania claimed aggressive tendencies on the part of neighbouring Mali and Morocco, although in this case, there was substantial evidence of physical clashes on the Mali/Mauritania and Mauritania/Morocco borders. Although here again, it is doubtful whether the

invasion threats were a major possibility. The clashes between the two sides could equally have been a physical manifestation of the drum-beating and flag-waving evident on both sides (which intend to indicate a strength and determination, rather than positive territorial incursions).

Guinea in particular luxuriated in claims of vast foreign subversion and plots. The sum total of states accused of plotting against Guinea in 1960, 1961, and 1965 included France, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger and Gabon, while some Dahomeens, and Tshombe of the Congo (Katanga) were supposedly involved too. It is difficult to accept such vast claims, especially when in 1961 and in 1965, plots involved teachers who were in fact seeking better conditions and pay, rather than seeking to overthrow Sekou Toure with the wide foreign backing claimed.

It is more than obvious that assessment of foreign subversion is at best hypothetical. But, it is interesting to note against whom the accusations are made, in addition to the above examples.

Ghana featured not only in the accusations of Togo; Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta also linked the state with subversion in their own countries and they usually linked Ghana with Communist states in the accusations. 'Communist-inspired subversion' featured widely. In the

Ivory Coast (French and Soviet bloc Communists 1963, Chinese 1965), Kenya (Russia 1965, "Communist countries" 1966) Malawi (China 1964, 1965), Niger (China 1965), Tanzania (China 1964), Upper Volta (China 1966).

Western subversion, on the other hand, featured in Ghana (U.S.1964), Guinea (France and Portugese Guinea 1960, 1965), Tanzania (South Africa and Mozambique 1963, U.S.1964, Britain 1964), Uganda (Britain 1967 and South African and Rhodesia interests) and Zambia (Port Angola).

It is interesting to point out that in 1964, in Tanzania, Nyerere, moderate, leftist but following a nonaligned policy, accused the Chinese of subversion, whereas Kambona, very much pro-Communist China, laid the same subversion at the door of the United States.

As stated initially, there is no obvious relation between party system and number of accusations of subversion: Malazi and Uganda (x-y-) Tanzania (x-y+) and Senegal (x+y-) catalogue five or over instances of subversion; while Ghana and Guinea (x-y-), Ivory Coast and Mali (x-y+), Kenya, Mauritania, Upper Volta (x+y-) and Niger (x+y), all occur between 2.9 and 4.4; Dahomey and Senegal (x+y-) and Zambia (x+y+ are at the bottom.

This indicates that for the aggregate category of foreign subversion, the position of the states according to typology is of no use as a guide in the discovery of any general trends.

CHAPTER SIXCONCLUSION

Having discussed the main groups of indicators, the final overall picture is to be drawn. The preceding discussion has indicated certain consistencies; for example, that Ghana featured consistently as a high-conflict state, whereas Niger, for example, rarely appeared in the conflict categorisation.


In order to achieve the overall assessment, categories were given an intuitive weighting to parallel the strength of the conflict level which they indicated. For example, an 'equivocal plot' would be assessed as of a greater disintegrative danger to the system than 'local strikes', and was scored accordingly.

The assessment was as follows:


<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SCORE</u>
2 - 5	25
6 - 9	21
10 - 12	17
13 - 16	12
17 - 18	8
19 - 21	5
22 - 26	3
27 - 29	1
30 - 32	8


Category one was omitted from the scoring, as it indicated destruction of the prevailing governmental system, and therefore could not be assessed as a definite score. As stated, this exercise was performed intuitively, following the example of the Feierabends¹ or Azar.² These scholars constructed their scales from the combined "judgements of experts".³ Such a panel of experts was not available for this paper, but knowledge of the field and observation of the effects of conflict led us to the conclusion that an overall measurement scale for social conflict was possible, if innovative and intuitively constructed, and useful in this context. Moreover, the scoring is not against any absolute 'high or low' fixed point, but provides a comparative method of studying the states. Based on the category figures from Chart One, the following chart was constructed through addition of the unit scores:


-
1. I.K. and R.K. Feierabend, op.cit. (p.36 supra).
 2. E. Azar, "Analysis of International Events" Peace Research Reviews Volume IV NO.1, CPRI Oakville, Canada, pp.17-19.
 3. E. Azar, op.cit. p.18.





COMPARATIVE CONFLICT - UNITS PER YEAR

 x+y-

 x-y-

 'democratic' states

 x-y+

 x+y+

It must be noted that the scores are based on the adjusted figures of Table Two (p.74 supra) on an aggregate conflict per year basis rather than on actual numbers of conflict situations; this step was taken in order to render the figures comparable, of, for example, Guinea, with eleven years of independence, and Malawi, with only five.

Again, when speaking of 'high', 'average', or 'low' conflict levels, this is by relative comparison amongst states, and not against any absolute figure or norm.

Comparing conflict levels with the position of states on the governmental typology Diagram 1, (p.69 supra), three of the four authoritarian/revolutionary-centralising states, counting Uganda in this section, are amongst those with a high level of conflict : Ghana, Malawi and Uganda. This does suggest that the more centralised and authoritarian the rule in a state, the higher are the chances of social conflict. Guinea stands out alone as only having a moderate level of conflict. However, Guinea differed from the other three states in the extent to which major steps towards integration and organisation of the party apparatus had been made prior to independence. From 1956 on, Toure's PDG had its own police, education service, vehicles and treasury. Local

village committees and agricultural cooperatives had been organised as a basis for political indoctrination; in 1957 the chieftaincy system was abolished, and Sekou Toure held full control of both party and trade unions.⁴ All this activity was outside the frame of reference of this paper, whereas other states attempting similar programmes after independence are catalogued in our conflict categories.

Nigeria, the one multiparty federal coalition state, is also classified in the 'high' group; thus giving a total of two uniparty, two one-party-dominant, and one multiparty state.

In the 'average' group, one-party dominant Zambia (x+y+) is seen with Guinea (x-y+).

The 'low' group includes the Ivory Coast and Mali (x-y+); Upper Volta (x+y-) and Niger (x+y).

Hypothesis One

These indicate that the premise of hypothesis one, - that the one-party state per se generates a lower conflict level than the multiparty/party dominant state, - is not verified. But the high position of Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, followed by a relatively high Zambia indicates the violence generated in the multiparty system - the total

4. The Manchester Guardian, 8 January, 1959.

multiparty sample occurs within the seven highest placed states, whereas nine out of twelve one-party states are below the lowest-placed multiparty state, Zambia.

While hypothesis one is not strictly verified then, it is proposed that the analysis in this paper suggests that there is a proportionately greater danger of a high level of social conflict in the multiparty/one-party-dominant state than in the one-party state.

However, having stated this from the analysis of the aggregate data, it is important to bear in mind that the detailed analysis of corruption, conflict within the party power group, tribalism, racialism and foreign subversion, revealed that while such an aggregate conclusion may be reached, individual indicators do not always follow this trend. As a whole, the analysis of the above categories disclosed the difficulty of distinguishing between uniparty and one-party dominant states in terms of detailed case studies of social conflict. This points to the advantage of being able, through a study at both the macro- and micro-levels, to note both individual characteristics and overall trends.

Hypothesis Two

Coming to hypothesis two, it has been noted that the states within the x-y- axes have high conflict levels. But the remaining states are scattered in the "low" and

"average" ranges, regardless of position in relation to each other on the axes of diagram one. This seems to suggest that the combination of a pragmatic-pluralistic organisation under a leadership with authoritarian tendencies is no more of a guide to an assessment of a level of conflict than is the combination of revolutionary-centralising organisation along democratic lines.

What is indicated is that these combinations are not likely to be as lethal as that in which both authoritarian and the revolutionary-centralising system are combined.

Thus it is posited, in a modified verification of hypothesis two, that the combination of authoritarianism and revolutionary-centralising trends is one which enhances the circumstances, and creates the conditions, for the expression of a high level of social conflict, when compared to any state which exhibits only one of these characteristics.

Chart 1 has given an overall indication of the types of social conflict occurring in each state from independence. Many categories were formed within the experience of all or most states.

Categories 6,9,18,27 are common to all states.

Categories 11, 20, 26, 29 are common to fifteen states.

Categories 16,17,19,23,31 are common to fourteen states.

Categories 10,12,21,28 are common to thirteen states.

Categories 2, 8, 25 are common to twelve states.

Therefore, out of thirty-two categories, twenty can be seen to be common to the experience of at least seventy-five percent of the sample.

Of these, categories nine (governmental/party punitive action against significant persons or groups) and twenty-seven (verbal hostility) especially can be seen to have been of frequent occurrence throughout. Eighteen (specific non-tribal unrest), nineteen (repressive use of legislative power) and twenty (specific non-legislative action against specific groups) also continuously appeared, while the frequency of category seventeen (specific tribal unrest) although unevenly spread, was experienced by all but two states. Seventeen and seven (tribal rioting and clashes involving death) are closely connected, as are eight (non-tribal rioting, clashes involving death) and eighteen (also with fourteen (general strike), twenty, twenty-two (local strikes) and twenty-four (small demonstration), while thirty (racialism) and thirty-two (actions against foreign nationals, racial minority re subversion), when taken together, indicate the racial problem encountered in East Africa.

Thus, the independent states appear to have undergone similar conflict situations, although the degree

of intensity did vary greatly. An image appears of the state plagued by plots and government accusations of treasonous actions; massive arrests of political opponents; a fairly steady shuffling and purging within the government camp; serious tribal unrest; disquieting differences between the government and other associational organisations; the frequent use (or abuse) of the legislative process in the creation of repressive laws, and also frequent arbitrary and ad hoc government decisions to quell opponents or those voicing dissident views. Also verbal discriminations have abounded and rebounded between opponents, as well as many accusations of foreign subversion.

This general picture would give strength to the premise of the methodological question (p.47 supra) that systematic cross-national categorisation of social-conflict is possible and useful in the African context since much conflict is readily classified within certain categories; and that given the attainment of independence and effort to achieve national integration, these types of conflict will be in evidence. In aggregate, this is true. But it does seem that aggregate analysis alone is lacking in one real respect, in that the wide-ranging survey of states overlooks the unique features of a particular situation and culture.

This issue weighed heavily in the organisation of the paper - hence the decision to break down the social conflict scores into groups of related indicators in the attempt to combine both the universal features, and also to highlight unique problems or situations within specific states where they warranted attention. This latter concern greatly affected the extent to which a systematic or rather, scientific, approach could be adopted in relation to the data, involving as it often did an impressionistic analysis of particular states.

However, at the same time, summation of the data scores was attempted in order to provide at least a tentative model on which to base a comparative schema.

It is felt that the dilemma of the 'particular' versus the 'world-view' was tackled, but not completely solved, for it is difficult to estimate the value of a table of aggregate data, and the effects of divergent as well as similar conflict situations, without delving into the prime cultural causality of these aggregates. Perhaps it is a problem of perspective; the general rule does give us an indication that development in the Third World breeds conflict, thus answering the methodological question; the micro-study emphasises the unique cultural factors giving rise to developmental conflict.

This paper has pointed to a number of facts which have arisen from the discussion of unipartyism, multipartyism, and classificatory techniques.

- 1) Too often, students of political science over-simplify or generalise the common basis and experience of unipartyism; in the paper we tried to show the diversity within this all-subsuming term, and to indicate that a simple statement relating a specific level of social conflict to unipartyism is not feasible or realistic.
- 2) That 'multipartyism' is an unsatisfactorily broad concept, encompassing as it does widely divergent systems. The notion of one-party dominance alleviates to some extent this problem, but analysis illustrated that rigid segregation of states according to governmental/party organisation is a greater disadvantage to analysis than it is a useful guideline.
- 3) That it is difficult to combine aggregate data analysis and detailed case studies so as to obtain maximum utility and validity from both approaches.
- 4) That in assessing the level of national integration as operationalised through social conflict, use of 'party system' as variable is of limited utility. Further variables suggest themselves for study - economic frustration seemed an important motive for the resort to social conflict in many states; while the personality of a leader was of vital importance to the direction of party development, to progress in the integrative process, and to the control or growth of social conflict.

One fact stands out: in any recently independent African state, the effort to develop both a sense of nationhood and economic growth, creates the conditions for, and engenders, social conflict.

APPENDIX I.

The Incidence of 32 Indicators of Social
Conflict in 16 African States.

DAHOMEY August 1960 - 1965 (2nd coup)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
1960																																
										I				I						II							I					
								II				I		II		III		I					I									
1961						I			II																							
										I																						
1962																																
1963																																
1964																																
1965																																
Total																																
	2	1	-	1	1	3	1	4	8	4	2	5	1	5	2	5	2	4	-	5	2	3	2	1	1	2	6	1	1	-	-	1

GHANA March 1957 - 1966(coup)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2	
1957																			I		I									I			
									II										I		I					I	III						
					I	I			II			I			I		II	I	II								I		I				
1958						I			I		I					I	I			I					I		I						
									I			I								I							I		I				
						I			I	II										I	III				I		II						
1959									I											I						I		I		I			I
									II											III	II	II				II	I		I				
																			I	6		I		I			III						
1960						I			II			I							I	I	I					I	I						
																			I	I	I					I	I						
																			I	III						I	I			I		I	
1961																				I													
						I				I				I					I	I	I		I					6					I
		II				I	II			II			II			II		II	6	II		II					6						
1962									I	I									I						I								
		III				I			I			I	I		II				II	II				I	I	II	I	I			I		
		I							I													II			I		II						
1963																				I													I
									I																								
									II						I			I	I														
1964		I			I	I			III	I	I								III	I	I				II	I	I				I	I	
										I															I								
1965									I											I								I					
									I																								
1966	I																				I												
Total	1	8	-	-	7	8	-	2	30	4	4	4	3	1	4	3	5	9	34	22	12	1	1	2	9	11	26	1	7	-	4	5	

GUINEA October 1958 - 1968

133

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1958																																
1959																				1									1			
1960		1				11		1	111	1		1				11			1		1			11		11		1		1	1	11
1961						1		1	11							1			1	11		1	11		1		11					11
1962																																
1963										11						1					1		1				1		1			1
1964									1	1											1								1			
1965																																
1966						11		1	11		1	1			1								1	1		1	11	1	1		1	
1967												1									1	1						1		1		
1968									1	1	1																					
Total	-	1	-	-	-	6	-	4	11	13	5	3	-	-	1	4	1	3	1	8	8	2	9	1	3	4	11	7	5	2	4	6

IVORY COAST August 1960 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960																1																
1961							1										1															
						1												1							1		1					
1962																																
1963						1					1								1						1		1					
						1					1				1	1					1											1
																				1						1						
1964																													1			
																	1		1										1			
1965									1																							
																																1
1966																																
1967																																
1968																															1	
																														1		
Total	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	8	2	2	-	-	-	1	2	2	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	4	2	1	4	-

KENYA December 1963 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	1	2
1963																	11										1			11		
1964			1						1								1	1		11		1				1	111			111		
		1																	1	111				1	111			11	1	7		
					1		1												11				1				1		1	11		
1965		1																			1						1			1		
		1			1				1	1		11						1		111	11	1	111			5	1			1		
											1							1		1					11							
1966										11	11		1							1	1						1			1		11
					1			11	11	11		11	1		1			1	111	11	11				11	6		1		1		
									1								1		1	1						1					1	
1967																									1			1	11			
																			1							1	1		5			
		1																	1									1				
1968						11					1						1	1	1							1		1	1		1	
								1	1	1					1			1	1										11		1	
								1						1			1		11	1			1			111						1
Total	-	4	1	-	2	3	1	3	9	6	2	7	1	-	2	1	5	7	12	17	8	2	4	2	9	-	28	3	4	27	2	6

MALI September 1960 - 1968(coup)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960																																
1961																																1
																																1
																																1
1962						1		1	11		1		1		1		1						1	11		1						1
1963																																
				1			1									1																
1964				1																											1	1
				1																											1	
1965																																
1966											1									1												
1967										1						1		111	1	11	11		11			1	1					
									1	1																				1		
1968										1						1																
	1															1		1		11							1					
Total	1	-	-	4	-	1	1	1	3	3	2	-	2	-	-	4	2	5	2	4	2	-	3	2	-	2	3	-	2	1	4	-

MAURITANIA October 1960 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960								I					I					I													I	
1961																														I		
								I				I																			I	
											I																					
1962		II	I			I			III			I																II	I		III	
																												I	I			
1963						I			I																							
		I																										I	I			
1964																			I													
												I																I				
																			I													
1965									I																					I		
																													I			
1966					I			I	III		II			I				I	I	III		II					I			9		
													I						I							I				III		
1967																																
									II			I								I			I					I		I		
1968																				I												
								I															I									
									I																							
Total	-	2	2	-	1	2	-	4	II	-	3	4	I	I	I	-	-	2	3	9	I	3	I	-	I	I	5	3	6	14	4	-

NIGER August 1960 - 1968

139

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960									I																					I		
1961																																
1962		I							I																							
1963												I											I			II				I		
			I																													
1964																																
		II				II			III			I				I															I	
1965		I							III			I																I			I	
											I																					
1966																			I										I			
1967																																
1968																																
Total	-	4	I	-	-	2	-	-	II	-	I	3	-	-	-	I	-	I	-	-	-	-	I	-	-	2	I	I	2	-	3	-

NIGERIA October 1960 - 1966(coup)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960							I		I			I								I				I								
1961																				I												
							II											I	I											I		II
1962					I			I	III	I		I					I	I		I			I			II	III				I	
						I			I									I	I	III	II			I			I					
																				II												
1963						I			I								II	II	I	I	I			I				II				
1964							I										I							I								I
						I	I		I					I		I		I		I												I
	I						III	I						I	I	I	II	I	I				I									I
					I	I	II	I	I		I					II				I						II		I				
1965									I	I		I					I				I											
					I		III	III	II	I		I					I	I		III	II	I		I		I	II					
1966	I						I					I																				
Total	1	1	-	-	4	4	16	7	13	3	-	6	-	1	2	4	9	10	4	14	7	2	2	5	1	6	11	1	3	-	1	7

SENEGAL September 1960 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960									I									I	I	I												
1961								I				I							II			I					I		I			
1962									III			I							I	I		I		II								
1963				I		I			I	I									I			I										
1964				I		I			I										II					II	I	I	I					
1965									I										II			II										
1966									I												I			I								
1967		II				I			III										III			I		I			III	II				
1968					I	I		I	I		I		I		I			II		II		II				II	I					I
Total	-	2	1	-	6	4	-	6	19	3	2	6	1	-	1	1	1	11	9	8	8	6	1	6	2	6	12	5	6	-	1	-

TANZANIA December 1961 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2	
1961																																	
1962											I							II					I				II			III			
																									I		I				III	I	
						I										I	I	I	I		I		I				II						
1963												I																		I			
1964			II		I				III																II								
			I																														
						I																											
1965																																	
1966																																	
1967												II																					
						III			I	I								II			I				I		I	I					
1968																												II					
Total	-	-	3	-	1	6	-	-	8	2	4	2	-	-	-	4	1	11	5	11	6	1	3	3	4	3	13	3	2	13	4	14	

TOGO April 1960 - 1967 (cont)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2
1960																																				
1961						1			11			1								11	11	1														
		1										1																								
1962		11							11																											
1963																																				
		1							1																											
1964						11																														
									1																											
1965									11																											
1966																																				
1967																																				

UGANDA October 1962 - 1968

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	1	2
1962							I																									
1963				II	I		II			I							II					I		I	I	I				III		
		I			I		II										I					I		I	I	I				III		
					I		I		I								I			I	I		I		I				III			
1964			I		I					I			I				II		I	I		II		I		III						I
									I			I	I							I					I							I
							I			I							I			I												I
1965																			I										I			
				I													I															
1966				I	III	II			II	II						I	I	II		I	II				I	III	II				I	
				I	II		I		I		I	I	I			I	III		III	I					I	I						
					I	I			II										I													
1967		I				II		III									I		I								III		I	I	II	
									I		I						I										I		I	I		
					I	I														I												
1968					I												I			I												
					I																							I				
										II							I															
Total	-	2	1	5	15	6	8	3	11	6	3	3	2	-	-	3	16	3	9	6	2	1	4	-	3	3	12	7	2	10	4	1

UPPER VOLTA August 1960 - 1966(coup)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	30	1	2	
1960								1																									
1961																																	
1962																1																	
1963								11										1	1			1											
								1													1												
										1													1										
1964																											1	1					1
																																	1
1965																																	
								11																									
1966	1				1	1		1	1				1	1				11		1				1			11				11		
Total	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	6	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	4	1	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	3	-	1	-	2	2	

APPENDIX II.

Eleven Characteristics of Fifteen States.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Axis on which measured</u>
1. Degree of popular participation and mobilisation	x, y.
2. Associational monopoly and fusion	x.
3. Communal monopoly and fusion	x.
4. Decision-making: elitist/mass involvement	y.
5. Party discipline and hierarchism	x.
6. Intraparty democracy	x, y.
7. Party/government assimilation	x.
8. Presidential or preidential/cabinet decision-making	x, y.
9. Role of president - democratic, authoritarian	y.
10. Extraparty opposition - tolerated or repressed	y.
11. Extremist or moderate philosophy	x.

Viz. Diagram I, p.69 supra.

Dahomey	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Malawi	
low	high but downward	high	high	low	1.
loose	rigid	fairly rigid	loose	fairly rigid	2.
low	high	fairly high	fairly high	? 0	3.
elitist	elitist	elitist with mass involved	elitist with mass involved	elitist	4.
low	high	fairly high	average	high	5.
fairly high	low	fairly high	i) fairly high ii) fairly low	low	6.
low	total	total	total	total	7.
pres./cab.	pres.	pres./cab.	i) pres/cab ii) pres.	pres.	8.
democratic	authorit.	midway	i) democrat, ii) fairly authorit.	authorit.	9.
repressed	repressed	brought in to PDCI/not tolerated	repressed	repressed	10.
midway	extremist	extremist	moderate	moderate conservative	11.

Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Senegal	Tanzania	
high	low	low	low	high	1.
rigid	loose	? 0	loose	rigid	2.
fairly high	low	? 0	low	high	3.
elitist with mass involved	elitist	elitist	elitist	elitist with mass involved	4.
high	fairly low	fairly high	high	high	5.
fairly high	fairly high	high	fairly high	high	6.
total	total	total	i) low ii) total	total	7.
i) pres/cab. ii) pres.	i) pres/cab. ii) pres.	pres/cab.	i) pres/cab. ii) pres.	pres/cab.	8.
i) fairly auth. ii) auth.	authorit.	democratic	midway	democratic	9.
repressed	repressed	repressed	absorbed/ limited tolerance	repressed	10.
extremist	extremist	moderate	moderate	extremist	11.

Togo	Upper Volta	Zambia	Uganda	Kenya	
low	low	medium	low	low	1.
loose	loose	fairly rigid	i) fairly loose ii) fairly rigid	i) fairly loose ii) fairly rigid	2.
low	low	low	low	midway	3.
elitist	elitist	elitist	elitist	elitist	4.
low	fairly high	fairly	i) low ii) high	fairly low	5.
high	fairly low	high	i) fairly high ii) low	fairly high	6.
total	total	fairly low	i) fairly high ii) total	i) fairly high ii) total	7.
pres.	pres/cab.	pres/cab.	i) pres/cab. ii) pres.	pres/cab.	8.
fairly democratic	midway	democratic	i) fairly auth, ii) auth	fairly auth.	9.
repressed	repressed	tolerated	i) tolerated ii) repressed	repressed	10.
moderate	moderate	moderate	i) midway ii) extremist	midway	11.

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