AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ORGANIZED LABOUR  
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HAMILTON  

by  
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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine in detail the ties between organized Labour (i.e. Trade Unions) and the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) in Hamilton. This aim involves a two-fold analysis. First, it requires a close examination of the degree of support which local Labour provides to the Hamilton N.D.P. This will be followed by an analysis of ongoing involvement and the operating relationship between the two organizations.

The felt need for such an analysis results from a review of the existing literature on Labour and Politics in Canada. The bulk of this literature concentrates on the total global relationship between the N.D.P. and Labour. These studies trace the development of political involvement on the part of the Labour movement which culminated in the foundation of the N.D.P. in 1961. Following this overall historical review, these studies conclude with several hypotheses concerning the role of Labour within the N.D.P. There appears to be no systematic study of the actual functioning of this relationship.


at a more local level. It is apparent, therefore, that the existing global approach needs to be complemented by an in-depth case-study approach.

The main purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to study the involvement of Labour in Canadian politics by investigating the particular day-to-day relationship between certain unions and N.D.P. riding associations at a more local level than in previous studies. It is intended that, by analyzing the relationship on a local basis, this study will thereby complement related research and also fill the gap which has been noted above.

In addition to a case study of the present relationship between Labour and the N.D.P., a secondary objective of this thesis is to explore indications of change in their relationship. The association between Labour and the N.D.P. is extremely dynamic. In view of this state of change, there is a need for constant reappraisal and testing of the accepted generalizations concerning this relationship. Projections concerning future changes will be discussed in the Conclusion.

The above objectives will be pursued by an empirical investigation into the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. in Hamilton. Hamilton was chosen as an ideal location for this type of analysis for the following three reasons:

First, it is a large, industrial city in which organized Labour is well established;²

²Exact statistics on the degree of unionization in Hamilton are not available. However, according to Canada Manpower
Secondly, the N.D.P. is a significant political force in Hamilton as measured by the party's provincial electoral returns in the area;\(^3\)

Finally, the Labour movement in Hamilton has a strong tradition of involvement with the C.C.F./N.D.P.\(^4\)

Because of the above factors Hamilton provides a favourable opportunity for an in-depth case study of the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P.

This study will begin with an analysis of existing research in this field. These studies deal primarily with the background and nature of Labour's involvement in politics. The purpose of this review will be to identify a number of hypotheses relating to the Labour movement's political relationship with the N.D.P. These hypotheses will then be tested in the second and third parts of the thesis, by investigating the situation in Hamilton. The second part of

estimates, about 15 percent of the labour force in the Province resides in the Hamilton area, while 28 percent of all union members in Ontario lived in Metropolitan Hamilton in 1969 (Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act: Part II, Labour Unions: Report for 1969, Ottawa, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Information Canada, December 1971, Table 14A, p.39 and Table 17A, p.44). Similarly, according to the N.D.P. organizer for Hamilton, about half of the work force in the area is unionized, which compares favourably with the national proportion of 33.0 percent (Ibid., Table 28A, p.70).

\(^3\)In the Ontario Election on October 21, 1971, all three of the Hamilton N.D.P. M.P.P.'s retained their seats, in spite of a swing towards the Progressive Conservative Party in the rest of the Province.

\(^4\)This factor is examined in more detail in Chapter II.
the thesis will be a detailed account of the links between Labour and the N.D.P. in Hamilton. The nature of these links will be explored by including details of financial, organizational and educational support. This section will also include an analysis of the executive membership in the Hamilton N.D.P. riding associations in terms of their trade union affiliation.

The third part of the thesis will examine the relationship in terms of the amount of potential and actual power or influence that Labour exerts in the Hamilton N.D.P. This section will seek to validate or invalidate one of the major conclusions that has emerged from previous studies in this field, i.e. that Labour has been, and still is, in a position of great potential influence within the N.D.P. but that, for a number of reasons explained in Chapter I, this potential has been markedly under-utilized. It will be shown that, in the case of Hamilton, this hypothesis can be validated.

In the absence of studies of the Labour/N.D.P. relationship at the local level, it is hoped that this study will make a useful contribution in this field. If such a contribution is achieved, then this case study will be more than a particularistic analysis of the situation in Hamilton.
CHAPTER I

This chapter examines the development of political involvement by Canadian Labour. The study is divided into two parts.

The first part outlines two models of Trade Union political activity - the American and the British. It then goes on to give the institutional and cultural reasons why Canadian Labour adopted the latter model.

The second part of the chapter outlines three major factors - internal disputes within the Labour movement (e.g. over United States influence); the nature and structure of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.); and the position of Labour within Canadian society - which led to unique developments in the nature of Canadian Labour's political involvement.

The two major conclusions of this historical review are as follows:

Labour is the major supportive element within the N.D.P. in terms of educational, organizational, and financial aid, and

Despite a great potential for significant influence in N.D.P. decision-making, Labour has not as yet exerted this potential fully.

The need for Labour to engage in political activity is well expressed by Winston Churchill when he stated that,

It is quite impossible to prevent Trade Unions from entering the political field. The sphere of industrial activity and political activity is often
indistinguishable and representation in Parliament is absolutely necessary.¹

However, the nature and type of this political involvement is contingent upon a number of factors. It will be argued here that the form of political involvement chosen by Canadian Labour was the result of two major factors.

The first of these factors was the institutional context which was, in this case, the Parliamentary system. It will be contended that this factor was a major cause of the Canadian Labour Movement's decision to enter politics by means of the endorsement of a particular, Labour-based, political party. The existence of a parliamentary system precluded the adoption, in Canada, of "Gomperism"² as the course of political action for Canadian Labour. D. Epstein, in his article on a comparative study of Canadian Parties, lays great stress on the effect of the parliamentary system, and he concludes that the reason for divergence in party systems between the United States and Canada lies in this institutional difference.³ The British type of parliamentary


²"Gomperism" - the word is derived from the name and political philosophy of the first President of the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) in the United States, Samuel Gompers. It denotes a non-partisan approach to Labour's political involvement. This approach is symbolized by Gompers' dictum that, "Labour should reward its friends and punish its enemies."

system, upon which the Canadian system is based, demands a high degree of legislative cohesion within political parties. In Canada, for instance, on only five major occasions since 1878 have there been large-scale occurrences of voting across party lines. Epstein sums up his analysis when he states that,

If a nation's size and diversity, social and structural federalism, or socio-economic class structure have anything to do with the achievement of cohesive legislative parties, as is often argued, then the Canadian result should resemble the American. The fact that, instead, Canadian legislative parties resemble British in their crucial cohesion can only in the present analysis be attributed primarily to the presence in Canada of the British Parliamentary System.

This theme is echoed by S. M. Lipset in his review of Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta. In this article Lipset argues that Canada's social structure and bases for political divisions are comparable to those of the United States or France, which would presumably result in either loose American-style parties or the French multi-party system. However, the form of government requires loose American-style parties, but without cross-party alignments in the Commons, sharp inter-provincial differences in national

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4 i.e. Manitoba Schools Crisis (1916); Conscription Crisis (1944-45); Nuclear Warhead Crisis (1963); Flag Debate (1966); Abortion Debate (1969).


party programmes, or anything like American Primaries to select party candidates. The result is that protest movements become third parties, rather than sectional factions contending for influence within one of the two major parties.

An analysis of Canadian political history, and the direction taken by protest movements, validates the Lipset-Epstein thesis. In Canada agrarian discontent led to the foundation of the Social Credit Party in Alberta and to the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan. In the United States the same discontent led ultimately to a contest for influence within the ambit of the two major parties. Labour in Canada, therefore, has had to seek political involvement through endorsement of an alternative political party to the established parties. The process of endorsement and the form which it took were influenced, to a large extent, by the next influence to be examined.

The second major factor influencing the type of political action chosen by Canadian Labour is what will be called, for the purposes of this analysis, the Hartzian factor. Hartz's concept is the result of a study of new societies founded by European immigrants. These societies can be viewed as "fragments," thrown off from Europe. Hartz states,

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The key to the understanding of ideological development in a new society is its "point of departure" from Europe: the ideologies borne by the founders of the new society are not representative of the historic ideological spectrum of the mother country. The settlers represented only a fragment of that system.8

An analysis of the leadership positions in Labour, in terms of the leader's country of origin, shows an overwhelming British involvement.9 In terms of the Hartzian thesis, these people brought their cultural baggage with them. The leaders of the earlier craft unions in Canada came from a Britain where Model Unionism was flourishing.10 They were content to make representations to the Canadian Parliament through the existing parties in order to achieve their political aims. By 1900, the type of immigrant worker coming from Britain represents, in Hartzian terms, a later fragment. They came from a Britain that had experienced industrial unionism and collective action.11

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8Ibid., p.25.

9M. Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1968.

C. A. Scotton, op. cit.

10 "Model unionism" was predominant among craft unions in the U.K. and was characterized by a politically conservative style.

Hence, they were sympathetic to the idea of a distinct Labour party, as the political arm of a united Labour Movement.

When analyzing this later type of immigrant, Scotton points out that,

In B.C., with its strong immigration ties with Britain from 1880 onwards, there was the development of numerous socialist societies. Immigrant workers from the United Kingdom brought with them strong traditions of trade unionism and political action. It is not surprising that the great coal mining centres of southern Vancouver Island should have elected Labour members of the legislature, since for many of them it was a continuation of the tradition they had brought from their native England, Scotland or Wales.\(^{12}\)

One can find numerous resolutions passed at Canadian Trade Union conventions similar to the one recommended at the 1899 Trade and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) Convention in Montreal.\(^{13}\) These resolutions called for direct representation to both the federal Parliament and to the various provincial legislatures on lines similar to the organized workers of Great Britain. In addition, one can find numerous instances of British Labour leaders visiting Canada and talking to their Canadian counterparts.\(^{14}\)

\(^{12}\) C. A. Scotton, *op. cit.* p.15.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., Scotton, p.16.

instances, these Canadian Labour leaders were old friends and acquaintances of their British visitors. For instance in Cape Breton in 1904, Keir Hardie (the first British Labour Member of Parliament) visited his friend, J. B. Maclachan, an immigrant Scottish miner who became prominent in Cape Breton Labour affairs.15

The Labour Movement in Canada, with regard to political involvement and activity, had two models from which to choose - the American and the British. From the above discussion of two major factors, it is felt that the combination of a parliamentary institutional system, together with strong cultural and personal links with Britain among a large section of Canadian Labour activists, accounts for the selection of the British, rather than the American, model. These alternative models will now be discussed in more depth.

The American model can be characterized by Samuel Gompers' advice that Labour should reward its friends and punish its enemies, irrespective of their party affiliation. This method of political action is probably the best strategy for American Labour, given the less cohesive nature of the American party system. In general, most of Labour's friends are in the Democratic Party, but at no time has American Labour affiliated with the party as a bloc, and

\[15\textit{Ibid.}, p.19.\]
they continue to support individuals rather than parties.

The British model is of a totally different nature. In the words of Ernest Bevin, the British Labour Party "came out of the bowels of the Trade Union Movement." This party was the result of the frustration felt by trade union leaders, and people sympathetic to the cause of the working man, at their lack of progress through backing the Liberal Party. Even the early name of the British Labour Party, the Labour Representation Committee, is indicative of its origins. The model is one of extreme closeness between Labour and a Labour Party. In Britain, Labour has bloc voting rights at party conventions, Trade Unions sponsor Labour Party M.P.s, etcetera.16

Canadian Labour, like its counterpart in Britain, went through an earlier period of political support for friends of Labour in either the Liberal or Tory parties. Martin Robin describes these Liberal-Labour and Tory-Labour candidates who participated in the Ontario elections of the 1870's to the 1890's as, "hybrid candidates launched to satisfy the primitive yearnings of labour organizations

"within the dominant class structure." This type of unionist, and the unions to which he belonged, were very similar to their British counterparts of the era, i.e. New Model Unions. Professor Pentland describes them as,

A settled generation that eschewed the radicalism of their fathers and accepted the industrial society in which they had been raised. The British artisan accepted also the political party system of his native country and transplanted into Canadian society his essential political conservatism.

This type of trade unionist, and the trade unions which he formed, were not vehicles of radicalism. In short, they were relatively comfortable and therefore accepting of the socio-economic system in which they operated. The Report of the 1889 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital in Canada describes trade unions as,

Sound and sensible organizations ... where organization has made progress, the moral standing of the people is also high. No one can become a member who is not sober and, as a consequence, union men and women are temperate, industrious in their habits.

The first indications of a concentrated political push were the Nine and Eight Hour Day movements which, in Toronto resulted in the printers' strike of 1872. During this

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17M. Robin, op. cit., p.7.


strike, the members of the strike committee were arrested for conspiracy. This resulted in a consolidated effort by local unions to act in unison against the conspiracy laws. A number of demonstrations were held and a year later the law was amended. The success of this collective action, according to Scotton, encouraged limited development of central Labour bodies.\(^{20}\) However, these early signs of collective political action were largely abandoned during the 1873 to 1878 Depression. During this period, trade unionism was at a low ebb and the prime motivation for most trade unionists was merely to keep their organizations alive.\(^{21}\) It was only after this lull in trade union expansion that Labour's political objectives were able to be re-asserted.

In the period from 1880 onwards, we see Labour becoming increasingly frustrated at its lack of political clout. As mentioned before, during this period there was also an influx of new British immigrants of a different type from the staid artisan. Even among the artisan unions, as the result of the Depression and of repressive government


\(^{21}\)Ibid., p.8. The ebb in union activity highlights the problem of this form of reform-oriented unionism. This form of unionism is characterized by a reactive response. Thus in good times you climb into the ring and trade punches and in bad times you cover up and hope for the best. This style of unionism has been and still is the dominant style in Canada. It is predicated upon an acceptance of the existing socio-economic system, with demands from time to time for slight modifications.
action, there was a growing questioning of the type of political involvement in which Labour was involved.

For example, in 1883, the Toronto Trades and Labour Council passed resolutions declaring that the working classes would never be properly represented in Parliament, or receive justice in the legislation passed, until they were represented by men of their own class and opinions. In 1891 the first Labour Member of Parliament, A. T. Lepine, was elected in Montreal East. At the 1889 T.L.C. Convention a special committee was established to consider the formation of an independent political party. By the 1899 T.L.C. Convention there was a resolution calling for the various central Labour bodies to take some steps to form themselves into political organizations on independent lines from the old capitalistic political parties. In the referendum vote taken on this resolution, 1,424 delegates voted in support of a Labour party, while only 167 were opposed.

The above developments culminated in the successful election of several independent Labour candidates, especially in British Columbia, where the new strategy was strongest. This development represented a realization on the part of Labour that, in order to gain its ends, it had to act outside

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22 Ibid., p.8.
23 Ibid., p.18
the existing party structures. The parliamentary institutional set-up precluded the development of a lasting Labour relationship with either the Tories or the Liberals. The cohesive legislative system that resulted from the British-style parliamentary structure would not allow the established parties, given the interests they represented, to integrate Labour's demands within them.

Thus, in 1906, we see the main national body within the Canadian Labour Movement at that time, the T.L.C., cautiously committing itself "to an independent effort of Labour in the Political Field." The results of this commitment were seen in the formation of the Independent Labour Party in Ontario, the formation of a Winnipeg branch of the International Labour Party, and the establishment of a Socialist Party of Canada at a meeting in Calgary. In British Columbia, several labour parties were formed, while in Nova Scotia a Labour Club was established. This scattered and fragmented political action by Labour continued up until and just after the First World War.

Then in the years 1919 and 1920 there was a surge forward in Labour representation at both the provincial and federal levels. Labour gained ten seats in the election that brought the United Farmers of Ontario (U.F.O.) victory in Ontario. In the wake of the Winnipeg General Strike, Labour began to make political gains in the West. In the 1920 Manitoba election, eleven International Labour Party
(I.L.P.) members were elected. In British Columbia, five Labour representatives were elected out of twenty-seven nominees. In Nova Scotia, five Labour candidates were elected. In the 1921 federal election, J. S. Woodsworth and William Irvine were elected as Independent Labour candidates. 24

In spite of an attempt to form a coalition of the provincial Labour parties into a national Canadian Labour Party in 1921, Labour's political action during this period was sporadic and diffuse, because there was still a lack of a solid commitment from the total Labour Movement. Due to this inadequate backing, the Canadian Labour Party was an unqualified failure. This situation, linked with the 1919 to 1922 Depression, weakened Labour's political clout. From 1906 onwards, the T.L.C. vacillated on the issue of political involvement. The impact of American Gomperism was a counter-weight to the desire for independent partisan action, since connections with A.F.L. unions in the United States continued to reinforce the American tradition of non-partisan unionism in Canada. However, it was in this period, from 1932 to 1940, that two developments occurred which were to vitally affect the direction of Canadian Labour's involvement in the political scene.

The first development was the formation of the C.C.F.

24 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
According to W. Young, this party was formed as the result of an alliance between urban Labour parties, who represented the section of Labour that was committed to political action, and rural agricultural groups born out of the agricultural depression.  

The second development was an internal Labour split within the T.L.C. over the issue of political action. The group that represented industrial unionism and strongly advocated political action was kicked out of the T.L.C. and became the Canadian Committee of Industrial Organization. In 1940, this outcast group joined the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.), which was dominated by the industrial unions. The C.C.L. had many contacts with the C.C.F. and, as a group, favoured a political arm of Labour. At their 1942 Convention, the C.C.L. adopted the following resolution:

The Congress expresses its appreciation of the work done on behalf of Labour by the C.C.F. and recommends to its chartered and affiliated unions that they study the programmes of the C.C.F.  

The following year it was resolved that the C.C.L. endorse the C.C.F. as the political arm of Labour.

The period from 1942 until the founding of the N.D.P. in 1961 can be likened to a period of tenuous courtship.

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26 C. A. Scotton, op. cit., p.31.
between a considerable portion of the Labour Movement and the C.C.F. It is in the details and difficulties encountered during this courtship period that one can identify the reasons why marriage, when it finally took place, was not "Marriage British Style."

By 1944 the point was reached where a considerable portion of the Labour Movement had decided, after years of acrimonious debate and sporadic efforts, to commit itself to a long-term relationship with a political party. We have already examined the reasons for Labour's commitment to a political party. We will now turn our attention to the type of party involvement that evolved, and the reasons for that particular development.

The type of party involvement that ensued was the result of three main factors. These were, internal disputes within the Labour Movement over political action, the nature and structure of the C.C.F., and the position of Labour within Canadian society. The combination of these three factors, interwoven with a number of secondary factors shaped Labour's political involvement in the past, and still influences it today.

The first factor concerns the dispute between the craft unions, represented largely by the T.L.C., and the industrial unions, represented by the C.C.L. This dispute had its roots in the United States in the parallel differences between the A.F.L. and the more recently formed
Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.). In addition to the differences that separated them in terms of union organizing matters, etc., in Canada, the major area of difference lay in their opposite attitudes towards political action. The T.L.C. unions, due to their more staid craft orientation and historical connections with Gomperism, were more cautious and, in some cases, very reticent about making any party political commitment. Conversely, the C.C.L. unions were, by and large, enthusiastically committed to a partisan approach. In many cases this commitment was maintained despite disapproval and directives from the United States International headquarters. For instance, when E. Millard was Canadian Director of the United Steel-workers of America (U.S.W.A.), he committed the Canadian Steel locals in spite of opposition from Pittsburgh. The Canadian Labour leaders justified their position to their Internationals in terms of the inappropriateness of Gomperism in Canada. In some cases, for example the United Automobile Workers (U.A.W.), the International leadership recognized the validity of the above argument, and backed the efforts of their Canadian affiliates in their commitment to a political arm of Labour.

In the early nineteen-fifties the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. were drawing closer together and, by 1956, they were prepared to talk in terms of a merger. Yet the question of partisan political involvement still separated them. Although it
must be remembered that not all the unions affiliated with the T.L.C. were opposed to such an approach and, in fact, several groups within the T.L.C. had political affiliations with the C.C.F. Therefore, pressure for a partisan approach was building internally and a motion for endorsement of the C.C.F. was narrowly defeated by only one vote at the 1955 Convention of the Ontario Provincial Federation of the T.L.C. In spite of this internal pressure, Scotton maintains that, "the differing approach of the two Congresses, the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. toward the question of politics, were widely regarded as being the reef upon which the merger might founder." Inherent in such a situation is the inevitability of compromise.

The compromise came in the form of a very carefully worded resolution on political education and action which was presented at the founding meeting of the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.) in October 1956. The motion called for the Political Education Committee of the C.L.C. to initiate discussions with the non-affiliated trade unions, the principal farm organizations, the Co-operative Movement, the C.C.F. and other political parties pledged to support the legislative programme of the C.L.C.; and to explore and develop co-ordination of action in the legislative field. The interpretation of the phrase, "C.C.F. and other political

27Ibid., p.
"parties," meant that the C.L.C. should submit its entire legislative programme to each of the four parties, and see how they supported the C.L.C. policies. Schindeler, in his study of the formation of the N.D.P., regards this as a skilful tactic, designed to preserve a facade of non-partisanship, whilst negotiations for a more direct alliance continued between the C.C.F. and C.L.C. leadership. From this point onwards, we see the Labour Movement patching up its differences and becoming more firmly committed to partisan involvement. This commitment resulted from a realization that political action is as important as collective bargaining in obtaining Labour's objectives, and that Gomperism is inappropriate in Canada.

Thus, armed with a cautious but irreversible commitment to a partisan approach, the remaining question for Labour leaders was, what was to be the working arrangement between Labour and its political arm? Some people favoured a strictly Labour-based Labour Party, but this approach was rejected in favour of a call for a party of "All the Democratic Left." The resolution which was passed stated that,

The imperative need of the Canadian political scene today is the creation of an effective,

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29 C.L.C. Second Convention, Winnipeg, 1958. This motion received widespread support.
alternative political force based on the needs of the workers, farmers and similar groups, financed and controlled by the people's political movement which embraces the C.C.F., the Labour Movement, farmer organizations, professional people and other liberally-minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through our Parliamentary system of government.\(^{30}\)

This motion implied the formation of a new party which would embrace the C.C.F. In February of 1958, at a C.L.C. Executive meeting, a motion was passed which instructed the C.L.C. Executive to establish a consultative committee with the C.C.F. to develop an effective political instrument, along the lines of the British Labour Party.

The period from 1958 to 1960 was one of intensive political education in many fields. The unions discussed among themselves the direction of political action, and held seminars for their membership. The C.C.F. and farmers' groups met to discuss the implications of the new commitment. One of the major reasons for this intensive educational campaign was to allay mutual fears concerning each other by the members of the prospective alliance.\(^{31}\).

The second factor, the nature and structure of the C.C.F., played an important role at this point in the courtship. Tensions arose between Labour and the C.C.F. as a result of their relative perceptions of each other.

\(^{30}\)Resolution passed at above Convention.

\(^{31}\)Information provided by Murray Cotterill, Education Director, U.S.W.A.
Labour feared that, "the C.C.F. wanted something for nothing, Labour support without participation."\(^{32}\) The non-union members of the C.C.F., on the other hand, feared Labour domination of party policy by means of external Labour caucusing.

In his book, *Canadian Labour and Politics*, G. Horowitz analyzes the C.C.F.ers' fears, and lists the following causes of tension:\(^{33}\)

1. C.C.F. party activists who were concerned with their own position felt threatened by a massive influx of Trade Union affiliates and, therefore, had a strong tendency to favour the existing power structure.

2. Some members of the C.C.F. felt that Labour constituted a moderate reformist group that was more concerned with pragmatic concerns than with doctrinaire Socialism. A considerable number of these party activists were more leftist, and felt that Labour's influence, especially with its United States affiliations, would lead to a watering down of Socialist principles. They anticipated that, as intimacy between the C.C.F. and Labour increased, the C.C.F. leadership would become more reformist. In short, they suffered from that perennial affliction of the left known commonly as "fear of the sell-out."

3. The close intimacy between Labour and the C.C.F. leadership was such that anyone with a grudge could blame the "hidden" influence of Labour. After losing to T. Douglas in the national leadership race, in which he was quite openly opposed by most Labour

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\(^{32}\) F. Schindeler, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

leaders, H. Argue resigned amidst chants of, "Domination of the Party by a Labour clique."\textsuperscript{34}

A study by Myrtle Armstrong is indicative of this anti-Labour, pristine-pure socialist approach by some C.C.Fers.\textsuperscript{35} In this thesis she expressed a fear of "undemocratic domination by Labour using the techniques of minority domination they used internally in their own trade unions."\textsuperscript{36} The new members, she claimed, "considered programmes, policies, principles and intellectual honesty as mere trappings in the struggle for power."\textsuperscript{37} This general fear of Labour domination, resting very heavily on suspicions and hearsay rather than on concrete evidence, was substantial enough to cause a wary approach between the C.C.F. and the C.L.C.

These mutual suspicions were reinforced by the contrary perceptions of Labour's role by C.C.F. trade-unionists. They complained that the C.C.F. was not a genuine Labour party, and that this was its only chance to become one. They also objected to an excess of academics, lawyers and other professional people. These sentiments

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., Chapter 4, pp. 210-233.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 47
were echoed by James Kidd, an executive member of the Sudbury Mine Mill local, when he stated that,

> If the C.C.F. does not become more of a Labour party... it will not be a party at all. I think we are cursed with an excess of ... professional people. All they can do is sit around and talk. They are a bunch of old women. The C.C.F., in my opinion, should be taken out of the hands of intellectuals and made more of a union party.38

The third factor which influenced the type of party involvement was an external one which came into play during the preliminary marriage compromises. This factor was the unpopularity of Labour within Canada and, although it is important, it has never been as significant as the other two factors discussed above. However, improving Labour's image was thought by some to be a necessary prerequisite in forming a winning team. How can one win electorally when one's major player is disliked by a large section of the Canadian public? A public relations research programme, carried out by Parizeau and Associates, looked at major criticisms, and their frequency, of the New Party.39 Out of ten listed criticisms, the fifth most frequently cited was that of Labour domination. A 1961 survey of public opinion of unions in Canada revealed a general distrust of Labour.40 This survey showed that, in Canada

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38 A quote taken from a mimeographed speech by G. S. Vincent to the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers of Ontario, Area Council, Hamilton, September 14, 1968.

39 F. Schindeler, p. 83.

40 R. R. March, Public Opinions and Industrial Relations
as a whole, 23 percent of the respondents disapproved of trade unions per se, with as many as 33 percent in Ontario and 51 percent in Alberta. The fact that this distrust of Labour has always, and still does, exist is reinforced by a recent survey in the Toronto Star.41 The importance of this factor was that it was used; then as now, to restrain the "Let's have a purely Labour party" lobby. It was argued that, since Labour is much more unpopular in Canada than in Britain, one could never gain political power with a purely Labour-based party. This factor, therefore was important in effecting a compromise. The fear of Labour domination, and its opposite, the actual lack of a strong Labour voice, produced, and still produces, what G. Horowitz has called, "A constant irritant, usually latent but sometimes rising to the surface in minor explosions." 42

The marriage contract that eventually resulted from this situation favoured the C.C.F. non-Labour elements. This occurred in spite of the fact that Labour was in a

41 Toronto Star, January 23, 1969. The question asked was, "What do you consider to be the greatest threat to Canada in the future?" The responses were as follows:

| Big Business | 18% |
| Big Labour   | 34% |
| Big Government | 23% |
| Don't Know   | 25% |

100%

42 G. Horowitz, op. cit. pp. 210-233
position of potential massive influence and power. The Labour Movement had become responsible, and still is, for the major portion of the fund raising, as well as the bulk of the organizational work. In short, the C.L.C. was "the breadwinner and the chief cook and bottle washer" for its political arm. Schindler asserts that the full extent of Labour support is difficult to determine, but he suggests that, in terms of direct financial aid, organizational support, and overlapping personnel, the figure of half a million dollars spent during the year preceding the founding convention of the N.D.P. is a conservative estimate of the real costs which Labour incurred. In spite of this major contribution and Labour's potentially powerful position, it will be shown that Labour was deliberately, and with its consent, under-represented at the founding convention of the N.D.P. This can be demonstrated by examining the structure of representation at the 1961 convention, as shown in Tables I and II.

Table II is taken from Schindeler's estimation of the percentage of locals of unions who supported the New Party, and the resulting percentage of each union entitled to representation at the convention. From his calculations, each New Party delegate at the convention only represented 36 people, each C.C.F. delegate represented 71 people, while each Trade Union delegate represented 214 people.
TABLE I

1961 N.D.P. CONVENTION
DELEGATE REPRESENTATION 43

1. National Committee 28
2. Provincial Party Committees 58
3. Trade Unions 681
4. C.C.F. 770
5. New Party Clubs* 248
6. Newfoundland Democratic Party and Clubs 16

Total Voting Delegates 1,801

*These Clubs were formed to attract middle-class people with no previous C.C.F. connections - they soon withered.

TABLE II

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION
AT THE 1961 N.D.P. CONVENTION 44

Members of Trade Unions 114,734
C.C.F.ers 55,000
New Party Clubs 9,000

One of the major findings of studies in this field is that Canadian Labour played as important a role in the formation of the N.D.P. as British Labour played in the establishment of the British Labour Party. Yet Canadian Labour does not have as powerful a voice in the N.D.P. as

43 Schindeler, op. cit., Table 2, p.106.
44 Ibid., Table 3, p. 106.
does British Labour in its political arm.

The above discussion has presented three reasons for the development of this situation: the desire not to aggravate a dispute with the non-partisan elements of the C.L.C.; the unpopularity of Labour in Canada, and the ambivalent feelings of existent C.C.F.ers towards a marriage with Labour.

Two major conclusions emerge from the above review of existing studies. First, that Labour is the major supportive element within the N.D.P. The second conclusion is that this position, whilst giving Labour a tremendous potential for influence, has not been used to its full extent. It is to these conclusions, and to an examination of their validity, that this study will now turn.

This study will now endeavour to analyze the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. as it now exists in Hamilton, and will try to test the validity of the above two conclusions.
CHAPTER II

This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the links between Labour and the N.D.P. in Hamilton. It will be shown that, in Hamilton, Labour is the major supportive element of the N.D.P. in terms of financing, organizational support, and educational assistance. It is largely for this reason that Hamilton provides one with a good opportunity to test the hypothesis that, whilst Labour in Canada has a tremendous potential for influence vis-a-vis the N.D.P., it has not used it.

The history of Labour support for the C.C.F./N.D.P. in Hamilton falls into two distinct phases. These are the pre-1946 and post-1946 periods. Nineteen forty six is the key year because it was in that year that the United Steelworkers of America (U.S.W.A.) attained the dominant position in Hamilton Labour. In the period before 1946, Labour support for the C.C.F./N.D.P. was diffuse, and was provided on an ad hoc basis. This can be largely attributed to the fact that the T.L.C. unions dominated the scene and, as we have already seen, these unions were not committed to involved partisan ties.

The development of organized Labour support of the N.D.P. in Hamilton is strongly related to the establishment and growth of the U.S.W.A. This union was a member of the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) and, within the
Congress, it was the leading advocate of Labour involvement in the C.C.F. This U.S.W.A. policy was further accentuated by the personality of its leader, Charles Millard. Millard was firmly committed to the idea that the C.C.F. should be the political arm of Labour and, as well as being the Canadian Director of the U.S.W.A., he was also a C.C.F., M.P.P. in Ontario, and a member of the C.C.F. National Council.¹

In 1946, the U.S.W.A. gained ascendancy in Hamilton as the result of a bitter recognition strike against the City's largest employer, the Steel Company of Canada (Stelco). The union had been working to organize the plant since June of 1936, when the Steelworkers organizing committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) held a meeting in the Labour Temple in Hamilton, at which eighteen Stelco workers became charter members of Local 1005. This was the nucleus of the group that later fought one of Canada's most bitter strikes.² This strike, known locally as "The '46 Recognition Strike," started on July 15th of that year. The result was a victory for the U.S.W.A., and it established

¹G. Horowitz, in his book, Canadian Labour and Politics, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968, deals extensively with Millard and his work in committing Labour to greater support of the C.C.F.

the U.S.W.A. as the largest union in Hamilton. From then on, the dominant section of the Labour Movement in Hamilton consisted of people firmly convinced of the need for party-political involvement by Labour.

Between 1946 and 1956, the U.S.W.A. argued for a regular contribution, on a per capita basis, from Labour to the C.C.F. The main reason for this demand was that methods of fund raising throughout this period were very "hodge-podge." The methods included draws, collections in the plant, car raffles, dances, and one very original method - moonlight love cruises around Hamilton Bay. Other trade unions helped in this "hodge-podgery," by making small, irregular contributions from their local treasurers. However when the U.S.W.A. raised the idea of a per capita political levy, many of the other unions backed off. 4

The T.L.C. unions, with their traditional policy of non-partisan involvement, rejected the proposal outright. The U.S.W.A. pushed for this form of contribution in two places; the first place being within its own area council of Steelworker locals, and secondly within the Hamilton Labour Council. 5 In the latter it was found that, when

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3 This description of financing methods comes from a taped interview with S. Cooke, the Area Supervisor for the U.S.W.A.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
seeking consensus on a universal minimum per capita levy, the agreed upon per capita was so low that it resulted in very small money collections.  

In 1949, the U.S.W.A. decided to act independently, and it raised a monthly ten cent per capita political levy. The Rubberworkers and the Textile workers helped with a two cent political levy, but the only lasting and consistent financial support for the C.C.F. throughout this period came from the U.S.W.A. In short, if one talked of Labour and the C.C.F. in Hamilton in 1950, one talked about Steel and the C.C.F. 

After the 1951 C.C.F. electoral defeat, the U.S.W.A. leadership in Hamilton realized that there was even more need for a solid organizational base, and for a more stable Labour commitment in terms of finance, organization, and education. The realization of this need was helped by the C.C.L./T.L.C. merger in 1956, which involved a tentative agreement that the C.C.F. should be the political arm of Labour. This C.L.C. endorsement of the C.C.F. at the national level widened the base of Labour support for the C.C.F. in Hamilton and thus, by 1960, when one talked of

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6 One of the major causes of this was that many of the other trade union locals were relatively poor in terms of treasury size.

7 In 1948, the C.C.F. elected three M.P.P.s from Hamilton, but in the 1951 provincial election only one C.C.F. er retained his seat.
Labour and the C.C.F. in Hamilton, one talked of more than just the U.S.W.A. and the C.C.F.\textsuperscript{8} The 1961 marriage of Labour and the C.C.F., which resulted in the N.D.P., set the pattern for the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. in Hamilton. The U.S.W.A. had been one of the major supporters of the marriage, and had put up more money than any other trade union to assist it.\textsuperscript{9}

This chapter will now turn to a detailed analysis of contemporary Labour assistance and support of the N.D.P. in Hamilton. This analysis will be carried out under three separate, but overlapping, headings - financial support, organizational support, and educational support.

Financial Support

In order to test the hypothesis that Labour is the major source of financial support for the N.D.P. in Hamilton, it is proposed to analyze the funding of the 1968 federal

\textsuperscript{8}As will be shown later, Steel contributed a mammoth share of support.

\textsuperscript{9}The details of this marriage, and the compromises made in order to achieve it, are discussed fully in the previous chapter.

F. Schindeler, \textit{op. cit.}, p.107, estimates that the U.S.W.A. contribution was $36,233 and that Steel sent 157 delegates, representing 147 U.S.W.A. locals, to the founding Convention of the N.D.P. The only other union with a contribution of this dimension was the United Automobile Workers (U.A.W.), who contributed $26,306.
election and the 1967 provincial election campaigns. This will demonstrate the sources of financial assistance at the most crucial time for any political party, i.e. election time.

**TABLE III**

**N.D.P. FUNDING IN HAMILTON AND AREA IN THE 1968 FEDERAL ELECTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.W.A.*</td>
<td>39,851.50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Council</td>
<td>2,403.43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Contribution</td>
<td>42,254.93</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Federal Ridings**</td>
<td>15,000.00</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>57,254.93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*raised by (1) appeals to Steel locals
(2) U.S.W.A. Political Action Committee - ten cent political levy.

**Mountain, East, West, and Wentworth.

**Source:** This information was dictated to me by R. Mackenzie, District Organizer for the N.D.P., from accounts he had of N.D.P. spending and funding.

Table III shows the overwhelming role of organized Labour, particularly the U.S.W.A., in funding the N.D.P. at election time. The magnitude of the U.S.W.A. contribution is partly

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10Finance for ongoing organizational purposes between elections will be analyzed under the heading of Organizational Support.
due to its size and comparative wealth in relation to the
other trade unions in the area. In this case we see
organized Labour picking up almost three quarters of the tab.
This direct financial funding by Labour does not include
time off for paid union officials to help run election
campaigns, or special election issues of the local U.S.W.A.
paper, Steel Shotts.

TABLE IV

N.D.P. FUNDING IN HAMILTON AND AREA
IN THE 1967 ONTARIO PROVINCIAL ELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union Contribution by Riding*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton West</td>
<td>5,085</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Centre</td>
<td>6,118</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton East</td>
<td>6,032</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Mountain</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wentworth North</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wentworth</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton West**</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton East**</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holdeman Norfolk</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Contribution***</td>
<td>38,811</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Labour Contribution</td>
<td>17,119</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>55,930</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The additional ridings are the result of differing federal and provincial electoral boundaries.
**These are predominantly rural ridings, fringing on Hamilton, in which the N.D.P. has little chance of success. This accounts for the smaller Labour contribution in these ridings.

*** This figure was arrived at by deducting the total trade union contribution from the total amount raised during the election campaign. This non-Labour contribution was raised by a variety of methods including: individual election contribution pledges, money from provincial head office, rummage sales, corn roasts, etc.

Source: R. Mackenzie

Table IV confirms the findings shown in the previous Table. Thus, in two elections, one at the provincial and the other at the federal level, Labour emerges as the financial mainstay of the N.D.P. In both cases Labour paid almost three quarters of the campaign expenses. The overwhelming proportion of Labour contributions came from the U.S.W.A., particularly from Local 1005 (Stelco), the largest local in the area. Money raised by the non-Labour sections of the N.D.P. amounted, in both cases, to about one quarter of the total expenditure.

The total Labour contribution, as mentioned previously, does not include indirect forms of financial support such as, union paid time off for officials during elections, free Xerox facilities, special election issues of trade union newspapers and time spent by union officials in personally encouraging their members to vote and work for the N.D.P.
Organizational Support

Organizational support, in the context of this thesis, means support given for N.D.P. maintenance and development in between election campaigns. This category of support overlaps considerably with both financial and educational support.

One of the main methods of Labour organizational support for the N.D.P. is the maintenance of a full-time N.D.P. organizer by the U.S.W.A. This organizer in Hamilton is Robert Mackenzie, a U.S.W.A. employee, who now acts as a full-time N.D.P. organizer, responsible for various co-ordinate and administrative functions within the party in Hamilton. Since his salary is paid in full by the U.S.W.A., this form of organizational support is of great assistance to the N.D.P.

Another form of organizational support is a virtual carte-blanche given to the N.D.P. riding associations with regard to use of the considerable facilities at the Steelworkers' Centre on Barton Street. This includes free access to mimeographing and other forms of reprinting devices. This privilege is very useful for publicising N.D.P. events and meetings, etc. The large hall in this building is also donated for various N.D.P. functions, (e.g. dances, federal caucus meetings, etc.). The only stipulation made by the U.S.W.A. is that, if a clash over usage of the facilities
should occur between the N.D.P. and the Union, Union matters shall have priority. 11

Another form of organizational support is active union encouragement of their members' political activity within the N.D.P. at the riding level. This kind of organizational support overlaps quite considerably with the third heading of educational support.

Educational Support

Labour supports the N.D.P. educationally through the Political Action Committees (P.A.C.) of the Unions, and through the Hamilton Labour Council P.A.C. The function of these committees is to educate their members in terms of political action. This aim is pursued by various methods - seminars in union halls, weekend camps, trade union newspapers and leaflets, and by bringing in M.P.s or M.P.P.s to address meetings. For example, in 1949, the U.S.W.A. spent approximately eleven thousand dollars on P.A.C. work in Hamilton. 12

All of this P.A.C. activity is supportive of the N.D.P. and is aimed at getting unionized workers to vote and work

11 This stipulation was mentioned by both S. Cooke, Area Supervisor for the U.S.W.A., and by R. Mackenzie in taped interviews.

12 This figure was given to me in a taped interview by R. Mackenzie, Area Organizer for the N.D.P.
for the N.D.P. Estimates of this programme's success vary and, in view of a lack of data, no attempt will be made here to evaluate its impact.\(^{13}\) What can be affirmed, despite varying accounts of effectiveness, is that this form of activity is supportive of the N.D.P., and is paid for by Labour.

This analysis has attempted to demonstrate that Labour performs the role of "head cook and bottle washer" for the N.D.P. in Hamilton. Labour is the major source of funding, both for electoral and organizational purposes, and it is also one of the major sources of educational propaganda on behalf of the N.D.P. The above analysis leaves one further link between Labour and the N.D.P. to be examined.

This area concerns participation by Trade Unionists in the N.D.P. at an active level. For the purposes of this thesis "active level" will be defined in terms of executive membership of an N.D.P. riding association. Hamilton and area contain six N.D.P. riding associations, and the total membership of the executives of these associations is one hundred and six. Table V presents a breakdown of executive members by riding.

\(^{13}\) Estimates I received from taped interviews varied from claims that sixty to seventy percent of the steel workers voted N.D.P., to a low estimate of from fifteen to twenty percent. There was quite a significant difference in the assessment of P.A.C. success between U.S.W.A. members and non-trade unionists. The former tended to give high estimates of success, while the latter were more sceptical.
TABLE V
NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE MEMBERS BY N.D.P. RIDING ASSOCIATION - HAMILTON AND AREA, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Riding Association</th>
<th>Executive Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Centre</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton East</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wentworth</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Wentworth</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton West</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The membership of each riding association executive was broken down in terms of Union or non-Union membership. In addition, the former group was further broken down by U.S.W.A., as opposed to other trade-union affiliation. The purpose of this analysis was to establish what proportion of the trade-unionists were members of the U.S.W.A. which, as we have already seen, is the largest union in the Hamilton area. The results of this analysis are shown in Table VI.

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14 This table was made up from lists supplied to me by the Area Organizer for the N.D.P., and they relate to the association's executive membership in 1970.
TABLE VI

HAMILTON N.D.P. RIDING ASSOCIATION MEMBERS
BY NON-UNION, UNION, AND U.S.W.A. AFFILIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Riding Association</th>
<th>Non-Union</th>
<th>Total Union</th>
<th>USWA</th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Centre</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton East</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wentworth</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Wentworth</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton West</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above Table shows that fifty percent of the N.D.P. Executive members are also trade-union members. In addition, about sixty percent of the executive officers with trade-union connections belong to the U.S.W.A. It is apparent, therefore, that Labour, particularly the U.S.W.A., is well-represented in the active Hamilton N.D.P. membership.

This chapter sought to analyze the extent and form of Labour support within the N.D.P. in Hamilton. Support was analyzed under four headings - finance, organization, education, and union member participation at the riding executive level. The analysis leaves one with a picture of a potentially very influential Labour position within

\[15\] Ibid.
the Hamilton N.D.P. The study will now proceed with an analysis of the nature of the Labour-N.D.P. relationship in Hamilton in terms of policy-making and the attitudes of the participants.
CHAPTER III

The analysis of the Labour-N.D.P. relationship in Hamilton will be done in three stages. The first stage will be the findings that emerged from in-depth interviews, which are described in this chapter. The second stage will be concerned with a detailed study of two major cases that emerged from these interviews, and will be contained in Chapter IV. The third and final stage, contained in Chapter V, will deal with the significance of the findings of this study vis-a-vis other studies in the field.

The major finding concerning the Hamilton Labour-N.D.P. relationship was that, although its legitimacy was rarely questioned, a great deal of mutual tension existed. This tension manifested itself in various forms. This study will attempt to analyze the nature and validity of these manifestations. It will then compare the Hamilton findings with the conclusions of other studies of the Labour-N.D.P. relationship.

The primary methodology used to analyze this relationship in Hamilton consisted of taped, in-depth interviews, plus an analysis of the case studies that arose from these interviews.

Twenty-four people were interviewed for in-depth interviews which lasted from one to three hours, and resulted in about forty hours of tape. This information
was supplemented by shorter interviews, ranging from five to fifteen minutes, with thirty-nine people. Some of these shorter interviews took place in group situations such as union halls, N.D.P. riding executive meetings, and various taverns.

I spent eighteen months acquainting myself with the N.D.P. and the Labour Movement in Hamilton. During this process, I recorded notes of short conversations which proved useful in pursuing the case-studies that emerged.

Four categories of people were selected for the in-depth interviews on the basis of their connections with either Labour or the N.D.P. These were:

(a) prominent trade union members,
(b) rank and file trade unionists,
(c) prominent N.D.P. members who were not trade union members, and
(d) rank and file N.D.P. members who were not members of trade unions.

People representing the above categories were selected at random from executive and membership lists of the N.D.P. riding associations and the local unions. For the shorter interviews, people were selected in an even more random

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1 I would like to thank Harry Greenwood, U.S.W.A. local 1005 Recording Secretary, and Bill Freeman, then President of the Hamilton West N.D.P. riding association, for their great assistance in this process.

2 In both categories (a) and (c) "prominent" means a holder of an executive position in either the union local or the N.D.P. riding association.
fashion, e.g. "Here are five trade union members having a beer, I'll join them and see what they have to say about the N.D.P. and their union." The results of this particular type of interview were largely impressionistic and anecdotal, but they were useful in terms of milieu assessment. The in-depth interviews were conducted with between five or seven people from each of the four categories.³

In some cases these respondents were re-interviewed in order to obtain further clarification of their views on the significant incidents which had emerged. These cases crystalized during interviews with the initial respondents. Later interviewees were then asked if they considered the case significant and, if they affirmed, the case was pursued and analyzed in more detail.⁴ A check list of the type of questions asked of the various categories is provided in the Appendix.

Two general categories of cases emerged. Those showing examples of trade unions pushing their weight around, and cases where the unions felt that they were short-changed by

³The breakdown is as follows:

(a) prominent trade unionists 7
(b) rank and file trade unionists 5
(c) prominent N.D.P. 7
(d) rank and file N.D.P. 5

⁴Through this re-interviewing technique, case studies emerged in the early stages of the study which, if thought to be significant by other interviewees, could be discussed with members of all four categories.
the N.D.P.

The questions pursued with people in categories (c) and (d) were concerned with the dimensions of Labour's role. Opinions ranged from "Teamwork and Partnership" to "The N.D.P. is run from the Steelworkers' Hall by the Cook/Mackenzie Machine." There was a significant difference in the assessment of Labour's role between the prominent and rank and file N.D.P.ers.

Category (c) consisted of non-trade union N.D.P. members holding an executive position in a riding association. The most significant finding among this group was a complete consensus concerning the legitimacy of Labour within the N.D.P. All seven of the in-depth interviewees in this category agreed with the Labour-N.D.P. link. But this position of unanimity ended upon pursuit of questions relating to Labour's day-to-day role in the Hamilton N.D.P.

Two of the above respondents felt that Labour had too much influence, and they displayed hostility towards Labour's role. A closer examination of their case for a

\[\text{(c) prominent N.D.P. (d) rank and file N.D.P.}\]

\[\text{6 R. Mackenzie is an officer of the U.S.W.A. and is the Area Organizer for the N.D.P. His salary is paid in full by the U.S.W.A. S. Cooke is the Area Director of the U.S.W.A., President of the Hamilton Labour Council, and is on the Area Council of the N.D.P.}\]

\[\text{7 Majority, i.e.}\]

\[5 \text{ out of 7 in group (c) prominent N.D.P.}\]

\[3 \text{ out of 5 in group (d) rank and file N.D.P.}\]
"Labour Dominance Theory," revealed very little concrete evidence of Labour throwing its weight around. When asked to cite cases and examples both respondents replied with involved anecdotes and masses of hearsay evidence.  

It also became apparent that both of these two category (c) respondents had a profound distrust of anything associated with the Steelworkers and, in particular, with Stewart Cook. Both of them viewed Labour, particularly the U.S.W.A., as the controlling power within the local N.D.P. They claimed that Labour ram-rodced its policies down the throats of the rest of the N.D.P., and one of them stated that, "If it (policy) is not accepted, then organizational and financial sanctions can be applied by Labour." The U.S.W.A.'s predominant position in Hamilton has led to dislike among both union and non-union N.D.P. members, and this mistrust is focussed upon its leadership. This factor will be examined in more detail in the analysis of The Hamilton Centre Case in Chapter IV.

The other five interviewees in category (c) perceived Labour in a different light. In general, they saw Labour

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8 This was also a common finding among people in category (d) (i.e. rank and file N.D.P. members). The interviewer was told numerous anecdotes about what was decided at the Steelworkers' Hall, what Cook or Mackenzie had told a friend of theirs, or what they had heard Cook or Mackenzie say. As will be demonstrated later, in the examination of the two case-studies, these were not objective perceptions.
in a persuasive rather than an authoritarian role. They characterized this persuasive role as a willingness on the part of Labour to put its case forcefully but, when defeated, to accept the majority decision without resort to sanctions.

In accounting for the divergence in opinion within category (c), two factors would appear to be relevant. Among the five with favourable attitudes towards Labour, two were presidents of riding associations, and two were members of the local area council. In short, these respondents were very close to the local N.D.P. decision-making machinery. This means that they had close contacts with the Labour leaders within the local N.D.P. and were therefore able to appraise Labour's role from a standpoint of wider knowledge. On the other hand, the two respondents with negative attitudes towards Labour had less prestigious positions within their riding executives, and neither of them were on the local N.D.P. area council. Hence, they were not in as close a proximity to decision-making as the other five, and so they did not have the same amount of information on which to base their opinions.

Category (d) consisted of rank and file N.D.P. members who neither hold any position on their local riding executives nor any connection with trade unions. It was amongst this

9No connections in this case means they were not card-carrying members of any union.
group that one found the least consensus about the role of Labour.

Two members of this group questioned the legitimacy of Labour within the N.D.P. In a prolonged interview, one of these two respondents accounted for his position by stating that he was "anti-American" and that the unions were American-controlled and hence had no right to play a part in the Canadian N.D.P. The other person questioned the legitimacy of union participation on the grounds that the Labour movement is corrupt: "Hoffa, Banks, Beck - that's what trade unions are about."

These two people also alleged that Labour controlled the N.D.P., but could cite little or no evidence to prove it. When questioned about local decision-making machinery it became evident that they did not know anything about its operation. In short, they were capable of analyzing the situation only to the extent of repeating the theme that the N.D.P. was in the hands of the unions.

A third member of category (d) also felt that Labour dominated party matters, but he was positive about this situation because he believed that the N.D.P. should be a working class party, i.e. a Labour party. Although this respondent willingly accepted Labour dominance, he was as unable as the former two interviewees to produce any evidence of its existence.

The remaining two people interviewed in category (d)
did not feel that Labour dominated the N.D.P. and one of them stated that, "Things are O.K. as they are, with things nicely balanced." Yet the only evidence they produced to show this balance was to point out that the N.D.P. was making electoral advances in Hamilton.

The in-depth interviews with non-union N.D.P.ers were supplemented by thirty-nine interviews of ten to fifteen minutes' duration with various individuals and groups. This was further supplemented by notes and recollections from innumerable conversations which I had during an attempt at total immersion in the subject. The findings from these sources, plus the in-depth interviews, produced the following conclusions with regard to both categories of non-union N.D.P. members.

Where charges of Labour domination occurred, there was very little evidence produced to adequately support these allegations. One also tended to find that there was a strong relationship between these conspiracy theories and distance from the local N.D.P. decision-making centres. This is probably a function of abundance or lack of information and first-hand knowledge of the situation.

The category (a) people who were interviewed in depth (i.e. prominent trade union members) and the other nine

10 The analysis of the two Case Studies in the following chapter will corroborate this conclusion.
people in this category who were interviewed less formally—
all displayed a high degree of consensus with regard to the
legitimacy of Labour's role in the N.D.P.\textsuperscript{11} All the seven
prominent trade unionists interviewed in depth, and the
others, rejected the view that Labour runs the show.
Counter claims by other N.D.P. members were rejected as
being unfounded and attributed, in five out of the seven
interviews, to either anti-Labour sentiments or else a lack
of understanding of Labour.

Six of the seven category (a) people who were inter-
viewed in depth described the marriage between the N.D.P.
and Labour as unconsummated.\textsuperscript{12} They felt that Labour had
contributed a lot\textsuperscript{13} but that in return they had received
little thanks and plenty of hostility and suspicion. When
asked for causes, they cited two main reasons. One was
that they were action-oriented or, as one respondent put it,
"we like to get things moving around town," and had little
time for interminable debate. They felt that this approach
brought them enemies because it was perceived as bulldozing.
The second reason they forwarded was the basic division in
the party between intellectuals/professionals and trade

\textsuperscript{11}It is interesting to note that there was no marked
difference in response between the industrial trade unionists
and the craft union members of former T.L.C. affiliation.

\textsuperscript{12}Six of the nine informal interviewees in this
category also expressed a similar point of view.

\textsuperscript{13}Chapter II details the extent of Labour's
contribution.
unionists/workers. They realized that intellectuals found the trade unionists to be conservative, whilst they felt that these intellectuals were impractical and idealistic. These tensions often manifested themselves in bitter wranglings at local executive meetings around issues such as community involvement by the party. The feelings of this category were summed up by one interviewee when he said that, "Every time we make a move, or argue a case, we hear clamours of Labour Domination."

Five of the seven prominent trade unionists interviewed perceived Labour's role as one of persuasion. "We will argue a case and push all we can and if we are defeated then that's that." The Ramaceri Case was frequently quoted as an example that proved lack of Labour, especially Steel, domination. The other two in-depth interviewees in this category did not even perceive Labour's role to be as strong as "persuasive." One of them stated that, "We just pay the piper and he plays whatever tune he likes." In consequence, there was a felt need among all of these people for a future adjustment of the status of Labour within the N.D.P. These proposals for future changes fell into three categories.

The first category wanted the role of Labour to remain the same, but with some effort towards a greater understanding

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14 Quote by S. Cooke, Area Director, U.S.W.A.
15 The Ramaceri Case is detailed in Chapter IV.
between Labour and non-Labour N.D.P. members. This can be characterized as the "we need you - you need us" approach. However, only one of the seven prominent trade unionists was prepared to accept this approach, and only two of the nine informal interviewees agreed with it. The others felt this approach had already been tried and failed. This failure was largely attributed to the middle-class elements within the party with "anti-union intellectual pretensions."

The second category, which was the majority, was supported by five of the seven in-depth interviewees and four of the informal respondents. They proposed that the unions should use the power which they already have under the present N.D.P. constitution. The most favoured way of marshalling this power was by caucusing among trade unionists so that they could present a solid position on party policy issues.\(^\text{15}\)

The third category of response was to propose divorce, or withdrawal from party affiliation. This approach was advocated by one of the in-depth interviewees and by three of the informal interviewees in category (a). This demand for divorce arose, not because of an apolitical view of Labour's role, but from a desire for a more direct and

\(^{15}\)These people in category (c) (i.e. prominent N.D.P.) who perceived Labour's role as a persuasive one felt that this approach would be injurious to party morale, since it would cause even greater division and dissension between union and non-union N.D.P. members.
powerful political approach by trade unions. It should be noted that two of the four advocates of this view saw the threat of divorce as a strategy in order to gain a suitable re-arrangement of the relationship. However, they felt that, if this threat failed, then actual divorce ought to be seriously considered.

There were two main sources of dissatisfaction among this third group of people, which were aired with varying degrees of intensity.

One source of discontent was the feeling that the trade unions lacked power within the N.D.P., while the second source of dissatisfaction was the nature of the N.D.P. itself. The latter feelings focussed on the fact that the party is not a workingman's party, since it is run by middle class people with little understanding of the working class. These respondents wanted the N.D.P. to be more like the British Labour Party where unions have considerable power through such mechanisms as bloc voting. This extremist group rejected the "gain the middle ground" theory that their colleagues shared. As one of them said,

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16 The idea of bloc voting was thought by members of the previous majority response group to be too strong an approach, although they favoured measures such as caucusing. It is interesting to note that three of the four people in this "threatened divorce group" were of first generation British background, with experience in the British Labour Party.
The N.D.P. should be a working class party based in the working class - that means the unions, not these middle class liberal intellectuals who've never done a hard day's work in their lives. Some of them think that manual labour is a Mexican band leader.

Among the interviewees in category (b) (i.e. rank and file trade unionists) opinion was spread into much the same categories as category (a) (i.e. prominent trade unionists); although some of them were fairly indifferent about the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P.

Two of the in-depth interviewees merely paid their N.D.P. affiliation dues because they could not be bothered to contract out. This was also the case among three of the other people within this category who were interviewed less formally. In general, however, the remaining respondents felt positively about Labour's political involvement, but also felt that Labour should have more power within the N.D.P. The splits among them concerning the question of the details of the relationship were similar to the divisions within category (a). A surprising finding was the extent of knowledge on the part of this group of rank and file unionists. This knowledge was largely the result of P.A.C. educational work within their unions.

The major finding arising out of the interviews with both categories of trade unionists was a felt need for a

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17 Three in-depth; fourteen informal.

18 This was particularly marked among the rank and file union members from U.S.W.A. and U.A.W.
re-arrangement of the marriage to favour Labour. The previously accepted role of "head cook and bottle washer" was beginning to be questioned, and, in some cases, rejected. The majority favoured re-arrangement of the relationship, while a small minority favoured the threat of divorce. This general desire for change among the trade union respondents was in marked contrast to the major findings in the interviews with the non-union respondents. The latter felt that the marriage was going along O.K., with Labour picking up the tab and contenting itself with being persuasive.

The Labour interviews also revealed a sharp divergence of opinion over the question of Labour domination. The implications of these divergences will be discussed in more detail later. This study will now attempt to portray these diverse opinions in a more concrete form in the following analysis of two major Cases.
CHAPTER IV

The two cases selected for detailed study were chosen for three main reasons. First, they were the most frequently mentioned of all cases by the various categories of interviewee. Second, they both involved the largest Labour contributor, the U.S.W.A. Third, they were cases where Labour, in particular the U.S.W.A., could have used financial or organizational sanctions. This last point was particularly important in testing the earlier-mentioned hypothesis concerning Labour's relationship with the N.D.P. The hypothesis was that, whilst Labour is potentially in a very influential and powerful position vis-a-vis the N.D.P., Labour does not exercise this power to anywhere near its full potential.

The two cases that emerged as significant and which were analyzed in detail are the Hamilton Centre Case and the Ramaceri Case.  

1 This was particularly so amongst the prominent N.D.P. and prominent union categories; in fact all of them mentioned both cases spontaneously. The interviewees were then asked for more detailed information. The cases were not always referred to by the two rank and file categories. About 55 percent of these people referred to them without prompting. After prompting, about 70 percent of these respondents had views on the cases, whilst only 10 percent had never heard of them. The remaining 20 percent had heard the names, but that was about all.

2 The labelling of these cases was chosen for convenience in data collection and description.
The Hamilton Centre Case

This case concerns the Hamilton Centre N.D.P. riding association and its relationship with the other area N.D.P. and Labour groups. Since the mid-nineteen-fifties, and to some extent before that, the Hamilton Centre N.D.P. had several disagreements with other N.D.P. groups, and with the leadership of the U.S.W.A. in particular. These disagreements were largely due to the ideological animosity existing between the United Electrical Workers (U.E.W.) and the U.S.W.A.

The U.E. favoured a more leftist stance, both with regard to union and to political activity. It had a number of Communist Party members within its officers and rank and file membership. The C.C.F. and the C.C.L./C.L.C., and in particular the U.S.W.A., were actively anti-Communist, and devoted a great deal of energy and resources to eliminating their influence within the Labour Movement and its political arm.

In Hamilton, the anti-communist fight was led by the U.S.W.A. and one of the manifestations of this policy was an animosity towards the U.E. This situation led to a suspicion of anybody or anything concerned with the U.E., and to doubts about their role within the C.C.F. Even though N. Davison, who later gained control of the Hamilton Centre riding association, was not an extreme leftist, his
U.E. membership gained him some enmity from the Labour establishment.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Hamilton Centre N.D.P. was either led by, or had within it, any communists. It was, however, on the left of the C.C.F. and had several U.E. members within it. It also contained several U.S.W.A. members\(^3\) including S. Cooke, the Area Director of the U.S.W.A. The rift between the centre and the U.S.W.A. can be accounted for in terms of a combination of a former leftist stance, inter-union conflict (U.E./U.S.W.A.) and a high degree of personal animosity between Cooke and Davison.

The persistence of this rift can still be seen. In 1967, the Hamilton Centre N.D.P. refused to join the Joint Area Council of the N.D.P. The two main reasons for this decision were, first, a feeling that the U.S.W.A. would dominate the Council, and second, because Cooke was President of the Council. Another instance of lack of co-operation with the rest of the Hamilton area\(^3\) occurred in 1970, when Hamilton Centre refused to be bound by a party decision to run on a party basis in municipal elections.

Through the above, and similar decisions, the Centre

\(^3\)G. Horowitz, op. cit., Chapter 3, p. 85, "The Struggle with the Communists," gives a good account of the Communist witch hunt.
has isolated itself from the rest of the N.D.P. in Hamilton. Its dislike of the U.S.W.A., especially their former Director, can hardly be described as muted. Yet, apart from open attempts to argue with and cajole the Centre, one can find no evidence of either Labour or N.D.P. sanctions being used against them.

All of the people within the interviewee category of "prominent N.D.P.," when asked whether or not financial or organizational sanctions had been used by the U.S.W.A. against the Centre, agreed that they had no conclusive evidence of this. A number of them suspected that sanctions may have been used, but they had no evidence to back up their suspicions.4

Similarly, among the "prominent trade unionist" category, there was also a general consensus that no sanctions had been utilized. When asked if sanctions should have been taken, the consensus dissolved, since three of the seven interviewed favoured active sanctions against the Centre. These three respondents also favoured a more active role by Labour within the N.D.P. generally. The remaining five regretted the situation and emphasized the personality problem. They felt, however, that open debate and argument should be the only weapons employed.

4Among this category, apart from the Centre member, the feeling regarding the Centre ranged from mildly disapproving to full disapproval.
Opinions about the Centre case among the rank and file in both categories were widely diversified although, once again, a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the personalities involved.

In the Centre case we have a situation where an N.D.P. riding association is at odds with and openly hostile to Labour's biggest contributor to the N.D.P., i.e. the U.S.W.A. Yet one can find no evidence of Labour retaliation in the form of withdrawal of financial or organizational support. In the 1967 provincial election the Hamilton Centre and Hamilton East riding associations received equal amounts of campaign funds from Labour; being $6,118 and $6,032 respectively. The East's candidate was a former U.S.W.A. member and an incumbent M.P.P., like his colleague in the Centre. In the U.S.W.A. minutes during this election period there were no directives or discussions concerning fund withdrawal or other sanctions against the Hamilton Centre.

Without any reservations or exceptions, the Labour Movement, including the U.S.W.A., encouraged their members to work for the N.D.P. candidate in their home riding. Paid union time off was given to U.S.W.A. members to work in all ridings, including the Centre.

Hence, neither financially nor organizationally, did the biggest Labour contributor to the N.D.P. retaliate against the Centre. On a personal basis, a few U.S.W.A. members
decided to work for N.D.P. candidates in other ridings. This decision, however, was personal, and was not officially encouraged by the U.S.W.A.

The Ramaceri Case

The Ramaceri case arose during the nominations for N.D.P. candidates prior to the 1968 federal election. The nomination battle took place in the Hamilton East riding association, an area which provincially returns Reg Gisborn, an N.D.P. M.P.P. and a former U.S.W.A. member. Federally, the riding is held by John Munro, a Liberal Cabinet Minister.

The N.D.P. had very little hope of winning the federal seat, but their strategy was to put up a very good local candidate in order to force Munro to stay within his Hamilton riding during the campaign. It was thought that this would prevent him from touring the country in order to bolster weaker Liberal candidates in other areas. It was further agreed that a good credible N.D.P. candidate would at least make significant inroads into Munro's majority.

The most likely N.D.P. candidate to fulfil the above objectives appeared to be S. Cooke, the Area Director of the U.S.W.A., and a very prominent person within both the local N.D.P. and the City of Hamilton at large. Cooke was therefore nominated as a contender for the candidacy. His
only opposition came from a little-known barber, Mr. Nick Ramaceri, who was not at all prominent in either the N.D.P. or the Labour Movement.

Yet, to everyone's surprise, Ramaceri beat Cooke at a crowded nomination meeting. Speculation about Ramaceri's backing includes theories that he was a deliberate Liberal ploy designed to ensure a weaker candidate against Munro. Other theories suggest that it was simply an anti-Cooke gesture. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle of an anti-Cooke, anti-Labour, anti-U.S.W.A., and pro-Liberal quadrangle. The result was the election of a weak non-Labour candidate in preference to a strong Labour candidate, and in particular a U.S.W.A. candidate.

Yet, as in the Hamilton Centre Case, there is no evidence of retaliation by either Labour as a whole or the U.S.W.A.; in spite of the fact that one of Labour's senior officers in the area was defeated by a non-Labour candidate. Cooke's comment on the Ramaceri case was, "I allowed myself to be out-organized."

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5 An N.D.P. activist in the East refers to, "seeing a lot of faces that I had never seen before, nor have I ever seen them since at N.D.P. meetings."

6 The above conclusion is the result of a compilation of interviews with people in all four categories who had some knowledge of the Ramaceri case.

7 The weakness of Ramaceri as an N.D.P. candidate revealed itself in the ensuing all-candidate meetings.
The Labour contribution to the 1968 N.D.P. federal campaign in Hamilton was $41,254 and the bulk of this - $39,851 - came from U.S.W.A. There was no directive concerning the re-allocation of funds away from the Ramaceri campaign, and Cooke himself contends that Ramaceri got all the money and organizational support that he would have received had he been the candidate. As in the Centre case, official Labour and U.S.W.A. encouragement and organizational support was provided.

The Ramaceri Case highlights two major factors. In the first place, it shows Labour refusing to retaliate financially or organizationally in a situation where its interests had been disregarded by the N.D.P. Secondly, Labour's reaction seriously questions allegations of "Labour Dominance within the N.D.P." In this case we have one of the senior Labour executives in the Hamilton area failing to secure a nomination, although his union pays two-thirds of the N.D.P. bills. One must conclude, therefore, that either the alleged "Cooke-Mackenzie Machine" was seriously out of gear, or else it belongs to the realm of paranoid fiction.

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8 Source: N.D.P. accounts of funding and spending in the 1968 federal election campaign in the Hamilton area.

9 These allegations came largely from rank and file N.D.P. members, and some prominent N.D.P. activists. See Chapter III for full discussion of this viewpoint.
In the above two case studies one sees Labour, when defeated or opposed, either not retaliating at all or else merely utilizing the tactics of open argument and debate. These comparatively mild reactions are significant in view of the fact that, within Labour's armoury lie the far more powerful weapons of financial and/or organizational sanctions or threats of sanctions. An explanation of the reasons for this form of reaction, both in Hamilton and within the larger N.D.P.-Labour relationship, will be attempted in the following final chapter.
CHAPTER V

The overall aims of this study were two-fold. One of the aims was an analysis, by use of interviews, participant observation, and case studies, of the relationship between the Labour Movement and the N.D.P. in Hamilton. In order to facilitate the attainment of this objective, hypotheses relating to the more general relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. within Canada were tested in Hamilton.¹

In Chapter II, the hypothesis relating to Labour as a major source of funding and organizational support was examined. It was found that, in Hamilton, Labour and in particular the U.S.W.A., is the major source of funding and organizational support for the local N.D.P. The Labour Movement was found to be very closely linked with the N.D.P. at all levels. The above situation gives Labour a position of great potential influence and power within the N.D.P.

¹Chapter I concerned the historical development of the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. It then sought to derive hypotheses relating to the present day state of the relationship. The two major hypotheses were:

(a) Labour is the major source of funds and organizational support for the N.D.P.

(b) That, whilst Labour is potentially in a very influential and powerful position vis-a-vis the N.D.P., Labour does not exercise this potential power to the full.
At this point the study turned to an analysis of the perceptions and feelings concerning the relationship. The methodology used in Chapter III was that of in-depth interviews and participant observation. Out of these interviews and observations came differing clusters of opinion. It is now proposed to summarize and arrive at some conclusions concerning the relationship.

This study found that feelings concerning the relationship between Labour and the N.D.P. in Hamilton fall into three categories. These categories will be listed and then analyzed individually. The categories are:

1. the "Pro Status Quo" position;
2. the "re-arrange within the structure of the present relationship" position;
3. the "renegotiate the marriage contract" position.

In general, the basic legitimacy of the relationship

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2"Participant observation" in this study was an attempt at "conscious and systematic sharing, insofar as circumstances permit, in the life activities, and on occasion, in the interests and affects of a group of persons," Florence Kluckholm, "The Participant Observer Technique in Small Communities," American Journal of Sociology, 46, November 1949, p.331.

3The categories are broad in that they subsume a range of differing opinions. However, the categories represent the central positions of their various devotees.

4A detailed analysis of these positions is provided in Chapter III.
was rarely questioned. There was, however, a restlessness on the part of both the trade union categories, which manifested itself in demands for either re-arrangement or renegotiation of the relationship.

In their studies of the pre-marital courtship and the terms of the marriage, both Horowitz and Schindeler found that Labour was willing to provide organization and money without demanding a great deal of influence or power in return. Both studies suggest that this was the trade-off that Labour accepted in order to achieve the marriage. Schindeler refers to this as Labour being content to play the role of "head cook and bottle washer." 6

This study of the relationship and its functioning within Hamilton is, with some reservations, in agreement with Schindeler's and Horowitz's conclusions. Within Hamilton, the Labour Movement is the major organizational and funding body of the N.D.P. 7 In spite of contrary allegations by some N.D.P.ers, Labour has exercised very little of its potential power. 8 In Chapter IV of this

5 Only three respondents questioned the legitimacy of a Labour-N.D.P. relationship. None of these people were from either the prominent N.D.P. or prominent trade union groups. Two of them were trade union members who favoured a Labour-only party. The other was a rank and file N.D.P.er who saw Labour as dominating the N.D.P. for U.S. interests, although he offered no evidence in support of his position.


7 See detailed analysis in Chapter II.

8 The allegations that a Cooke-Mackenzie machine
study we saw examples of cases where retaliation and sanctions were available but were not used.\textsuperscript{9} Throughout this study, whenever allegations of Labour domination arose, they were checked out and found to have little or no basis in fact. Labour's philosophy with regard to the N.D.P. was found to be one of open cajolery and heated debate.\textsuperscript{10} It would therefore appear that Cooke's assertion that, "Our money has been given unconditionally," is a true statement.

Reservations regarding complete concurrence with the findings of this study and with those of the studies by Horowitz and Schindeler arise because of the effect of time upon the relationship. The latter studies concentrated on the preliminary stage of the marriage, and they found that Labour was generally contented with its role within the N.D.P. in these early years. The present study was conducted after almost ten years of the marriage, and it differed from the earlier studies in that it found that the majority of Labour people interviewed felt a need for some change within the relationship.\textsuperscript{11} This felt need for dominated the local N.D.P. were made largely by people in the prominent and rank and file N.D.P. categories.

\textsuperscript{9}I.e. The Hamilton Centre Case and the Ramaceri Case.

\textsuperscript{10}R. Mackenzie attributed the unpopularity of Labour among some sections of the local N.D.P. to his own, and other Labour leaders' willingness to argue heatedly and strongly for certain positions.

\textsuperscript{11}See detailed analysis in Chapter III.
change indicates that the initial satisfaction has been replaced by dissatisfaction, albeit a relatively mild and diffused discontent on the part of Labour.

The "re-arrange within the existing structure" position received most support. Five of the seven prominent trade union respondents favoured this approach. The approach could be characterized as a commitment by Labour to use its prerogative fully within the existing relationship. The frustration felt by the people favouring this position is well summed up by Mr. Bill Inglis when he states that, given the feelings towards Labour within the N.D.P., Labour may as well be organized and use its power because, at present, it does not exercise any muscle

An example of this would be the constitutional use of Labour of its right to register its affiliated members (i.e. union members who pay the N.D.P. levy within their union) thirty days in advance of a nominating convention. Most of these people are affiliates because of the contracting out clause. If Labour were to use this mechanism it could flood local candidate selection meetings with its affiliates. According to S. Cooke, Labour has refused to do this because it has consistently maintained that only the active membership in the party should make decisions.

In Britain, on the other hand, Labour uses affiliate votes and the bloc voting mechanism to dominate policy decisions within the Labour Party, e.g. The Transport and General Workers' Union can cast one and a half million votes on behalf of its membership, although it is estimated that only a fraction of their members are actually in the Labour Party. If the use of affiliations and bloc voting were introduced within the Canadian N.D.P., the U.S.W.A. and the U.A.W. could virtually decide all policy between them. If it were used in Hamilton the U.S.W.A. could dominate every riding association.
but is still suspected of domination.\textsuperscript{13} In his words, "We are damned if we do and we are damned if we don't, so we may as well be damned for doing." The consensus among this group is that, although Labour pays a great amount of the bills and performs a good deal of the work, it gets little in return for its efforts.\textsuperscript{14} They feel that Labour should exercise its potential power more fully by use of open caucus and a clear statement of Labour policy. The people who advocate this position claim to be mindful of the delicacy of the marriage, and say that they are merely asserting their rights within the relationship.

This feeling that Labour should play a more active political role has acquired more urgency since the emergence of the Waffle group within the N.D.P.\textsuperscript{15} The Waffle is a group that openly uses separate caucus mechanisms in order to advance its position within the party. The majority of Labour N.D.P. members perceive the Waffle position to be at variance with Labour's views.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} W. Inglis is an Executive Member of U.S.W.A. Local 1005.

\textsuperscript{14} This feeling is epitomized by the often-quoted remark that, "The marriage between Labour and the N.D.P. is unconsummated."

\textsuperscript{15} The Waffle group is a group of people who consider themselves to be left of the established N.D.P. policy and who seek to push the party in a more leftward, socialist direction.

\textsuperscript{16} The lack of Labour support for the Waffle position was revealed at the 1971 N.D.P. Federal Convention. Almost all the union delegates supported D. Lewis, an avowed anti-Waffler.
The effect of the Waffle upon Labour has been a realization by the latter of the need to be tightly organized within the N.D.P. against this new group. The Waffle may be the cause, or at least the catalyst, of Labour rejecting its traditional "head cook and bottle washer" status within the N.D.P. This could result in Labour exerting its potential power to a far greater extent in the future.17

The willingness of Labour to play "second fiddle" can be accounted for, as Horowitz and Schindeler contend, by the delicacy surrounding a rather precarious marriage. This study shows that, in Hamilton, Labour has contented itself with its limited role until recently. It is predicted, however, that a combination of mounting Labour dissatisfaction with its secondary status within the N.D.P. (as seen in Chapter III), plus the emergence of the Waffle faction within the party, will cause Labour to increase the exertion of its full potential.18

Increased use of Labour's power within the N.D.P. carries with it a great potential for conflict. In Hamilton

17 This feeling was summed up in an interview with a prominent trade unionist after the 1971 N.D.P. Convention when he said, "Up 'till now we have paid the piper and not been too concerned about the tune. But I'm damned if we'll pay the piper and let him play a tune we don't like."

18 The well-organized, unified behaviour of Labour at the 1971 Federal Convention in terms of voting on issues and the leadership could possibly be indicative of the stirrings of concerted Labour action and caucusing within the N.D.P.
this study shows that, of the seven people interviewed within the prominent N.D.P. category, two of them were hostile to even the status quo position, while the other five were content with the status quo. Among the rank and file N.D.P. category, two people were hostile to Labour's position even within the status quo, while the other three respondents were content with Labour's role. It can be seen, therefore, that any attempt by Labour to further its voice would be greeted by at least strong resentment, if not outright hostility.

In Hamilton, the dominant feeling amongst non-Labour N.D.P. members was that the marriage was fine, and that Labour had all the power and influence that it should have. Among the Trade Unionists, however, the predominant opinion was that some re-arrangement of the relationship was necessary and desirable. As mentioned previously, there was considerable divergence of opinion as to the nature of the re-arrangement. The lack of congruence in the views of Labour and non-Labour participants suggests that some re-arrangement of the relationship is inevitable. The transition of Labour's role from passive to active is in fact now occurring. The Labour Movement is now actively organizing for, and pressuring for, the expulsion of the Waffle from the N.D.P. The March 17, 1972, Oshawa

19 One felt that Labour should have more influence.
Provincial Council of the N.D.P. saw the start of a movement calling for the disbanding of the Waffle as an organized group within the party. This campaign, actively waged by organized Labour against the Waffle was intensified after the Waffle made various attempts to organize a Waffle grass roots faction within the unions:


(b) January 7, Autoworker Conference in Windsor, highly critical of the U.A.W. leadership.

(c) Attacks by sections of the Waffle on so-called "Labour Bosses" sometimes highly personal.

This has led to Labour pressuring the N.D.P. leadership to get rid of the Waffle, "or else!"

In this category of "or else" can be included recent remarks by Murray Cotterill, head of Public Relations for the U.S.W.A., "I think the time may have come for Labour to disaffiliate itself from any form of political party."

The N.D.P. leadership responded to these threats by a Commission which recommended the disbanding of the Waffle. A motion calling for disbanding was passed by the

Provincial Executive of the N.D.P. on Saturday June 25, 1972, by a majority of 218 to 88. Over ninety percent of the Labour delegates present voted in favour. There is no doubt that Labour in this case had caucused and organized itself around a position and won.

In terms of the effect of the Waffle on the local

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relationship in Hamilton, we see a marked change from the former passive stance in the face of a candidate Labour disliked.

The contributions by the Hamilton and District Labour council to the campaigns of candidates in the upcoming federal election show a marked financial withdrawal from G. Gilks, the pro-Waffle Hamilton West candidate. In the last federal election the Hamilton West candidate received about $6,500. In this campaign Mr. Gilks has been given $2,000, whereas Mr. Mackenzie who is running in Wentworth has received $8,000. Even the slight edge in winability that Wentworth riding has does not account for the disparity in contribution.

The transition from passive to active roles on the part of Labour within the N.P.P. which has occurred recently can probably be explained in terms of an ideological dispute triggering latent structural dissatisfaction on the part of labour.

The Waffle with its pro-activist, pro-nationalist, and pro-socialist stance, found itself at odds with the gradualist reformist ideology of the vast bulk of Canadian Labour. This led to numerous cross-criticisms. The N.D.P. became the battleground of these opposing stances. This led to a debate within the party as to the type of "socialist

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21 Source: R. Mackenzie, District N.D.P. organizer.
party" the N.D.P. should be. The Waffle's position vis-a-vis Labour was similar in many ways to the positions of the non-Labour C.C.F.ers discussed in the first chapter.

Labour felt that it had made all the concessions within the N.D.P. marriage relationship that it intended to make. In this mood, Labour was not prepared to be "head cook and bottle washer" for a party dominated by a group (Waffle) whose ideology was actively disliked by Labour's leadership. This situation caused Labour to take an activist stance and to send to N.D.P. conventions, and decision-making bodies, all the representation to which it was entitled. Then, by use of caucus and voting to actively seek to oust the Waffle.

The strategy seems to have succeeded and may well be the harbinger of things to come. The latent structural dissatisfaction by Labour which was revealed in my survey done in 1969-71 was triggered in 1971-72 by the Waffle group's activities within the party. What remains to be seen is whether Labour's very active anti-Waffle campaign was merely a single issue campaign, or whether it means that Labour intends to retain this active stance throughout the current and future phases of its relationship with the N.D.P.
APPENDIX

CATEGORY A

Prominent Trade Unionists

1. Sets of questions pertaining to why they feel Labour is involved in politics and in particular, why in the N.D.P.

2. How involved is your union, e.g. financially, membership, education, organization.

3. What do you feel your union gains from this?

4. What say does your union have in the N.D.P. re: policy, candidate selection, local party affairs?

5. Sets of questions pertaining to Labour's position within the N.D.P., e.g. is it the same position as that of trade unions and the Labour Party in Britain.

6. Questions pertaining to role adequacy or inadequacy.

7. Questions concerning information I had of non-trade unionists' perceptions of Labour's role:
   (a) State these perceptions and cite cases.
   (b) Ask how valid is this image? What was your role in this case? Have you any evidence that this was your role? Or that that was his?

8. Are you happy with Labour's role in the N.D.P? What, if anything, could improve it?
CATEGORY B

Rank and File Trade Unionists

Similar questions to the above PLUS some questions pertaining to the role of their Union Leadership in the relationship.

CATEGORY C

Prominent N.D.P. Members

1. Usually, introductory questions pertaining to length of involvement with C.C.F./N.D.P. Nature of their personal involvement.

2. Questions pertaining to how they viewed the "marriage." Questions concerning the validity of the feelings of C.C.F.ers who feared Labour domination.

3. Questions pertaining to how they viewed Labour's role both at provincial and Hamilton level, e.g.
   (a) right wing Labour charges;
   (b) domination by Labour leadership clique; cite cases and evidence, if any;
   (c) Labour not active enough;
   (d) Labour pays the shot, why should it not have the say?

4. Questions pertaining to their feelings about Labour charges that they are:
   (a) academics;
   (b) idealists;
   (c) middle class;
   (d) more concerned with Vietnam than the problems of the working man.

5. What future developments in terms of the relationship do you see in the Party?
Similar questions.

Bank and Title N.D.P. Members

Category D
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