

VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THREE
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN
QUEBEC

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AN AGGREGATE DATA ANALYSIS OF THE
VOTING BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS OF THE
QUEBEC PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE IN
THE ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962

by

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ABSTRACT: The thesis is an attempt to gauge the voting behaviour patterns of the Quebec provincial electorate during three elections which occurred in a crucial transitional era in contemporary French Canadian society. The study attempts to discern the impact of institutionalized nationalist ideologies on the social and economic development of French Canada and, in turn, attempts to measure the effect of nationalism on the voting behaviour patterns of the provincial electorate. It is also an attempt to consider the importance of certain variables -- ethnicity and social class -- in the voting behaviour of the electorate in 1952, 1960 and 1962.

TO RENE ANDRE,

WHO FOLLOWED VISIONS AND TURNED THEM INTO
A WAY OF LIFE

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While I have never entertained but a passing interest in administrative theory, I have always marvelled at the accuracy of a statement made by a long-time student of the subject. Parkinson's Law suggests that work expands according to the time allotted for its completion. Surely the university administration had this principle foremost in mind when the completion period for an M.A. thesis was reduced from five years to three. Fortunately, at least for the author, this recent ruling was not applied retroactively, thereby permitting me to continue under the " old system " and thereby providing me with ample opportunity to prove the merit of Parkinson's Law -- much, I am sure, to the chagrin of those compelled to read this lengthy treatise.

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INTRODUCTION

Encouraged by the development of refined methodological tools of analysis and continued sophistication of statistical procedures, the study of voting behaviour has become one of the major focal areas of concentration in the initial attempts by political scientists to formulate a concise and systematic body of theoretical knowledge. The existing plethora of writings on the subject encompass varied and comprehensive fields of theory construction resulting from the analyses of group behaviour based on aggregate data sources as well as from the study of motivational patterns of electorates provided by information obtained through the techniques of survey research. Essentially, the present stage of research on voting behaviour is involved with the process of integrating these micro-theories into a larger theoretical framework. Thus it is of singular importance that additional contributions in this field of research not only attempt to refine and expand the existing body of theory through replication and innovation, but that they should also attempt to illuminate certain aspects of voting behaviour patterns by testing existing theories in geographic areas which have not been previously considered. This process distinguishes the essential ingredient of successful and systematic theory construction.

The purpose of this paper is to consider and apply various theoretical formulae and empirical findings to a political - geographic area which has not been previously researched in this manner. By determining the relationships between a number of sociological parameters of the electorate -- in this case, ethnicity and social class -- and their partisan choice at the polls, it will be possible to weigh the relevance of existing related assumptions about the beha-

viour of social groupings.

Voting behaviour is a discernable pattern of collective public expression ascertained by the degree to which certain segments of the electorate convey, through the medium of the ballot, their affiliations with various issues, candidates and political parties. These choices result directly from the varying motivational conditions of their environmental and socio-psychological situations. While a number of methodological limitations prevent the use and analysis of all sociological parameters encouraging partisan choice, the researcher does have access to the more important cleavage-characteristics of the electorate. The focus of this research will concentrate on the roles of ethnicity and social class in the Quebec provincial electorate. It is not suggested that these two indicators are the sole and most important reason why certain segments of the voting population express different political preferences. Nevertheless, it is posited that an understanding of the inter-action of these two parameters is fundamental in any attempts to discuss social and political change within the Quebec political environment.

In this particular case the problem is essentially one of measurement. Ethnicity has been a traditional and deeply ingrained cleavage in the political history of Quebec. With the rise of urbanization and industrialization -- presumed generators of class consciousness and stratification -- in Quebec society, this traditional cleavage is being affected and possibly threatened by the emergence of social stratifications.

The very dynamic of Quebec's political evolution has been a function of two forceful themes: A) The inter-relationship of dual

cultures and B) the eventual acceptance and influence of an industrial ideology. This is the thematic schema in which the social and political development of French Canadian Society can be written. The impact of the "quiet-revolution" can be analyzed in terms of a cultural and industrial dialectic which has resulted in a form of society deeply conscious of its previous socio-political isolation and deeply earnest in its attempts to somehow rejoin the mainstream of economic development without the loss of its cultural identity.

A major theoretical premise of this research suggests that while the preservation of French Canadian culture and heritage still remains a dominant issue, French-Canadians have effected an economic rapprochement with their English counterparts, provoking an institutional change in the process. This dual progression of "cultural loss" fear and economic integration with the value patterns of the more ambitious English Canadians has been a phenomena which has dominated the sociological development of Quebec society over the last two decades. Basically these twenty years have witnessed the final death of an authoritarian regime under the late Maurice Duplessis and the more recent and sudden emergence of a total social revolution which has questioned the legitimacy of all political and economic institutions directly related to French Canadian Society.

Any empirical analysis of this upheaval in the socio-political development of Quebec must incorporate a measure which will gauge the effects of social change. Possibly a study of the patterns of political preference in the Quebec provincial electorate throughout these two decades coupled with an analysis of group-cleavage will provide such a measure. As the authors of the classic study, Voting,

have suggested, "The relation of group memberships and identifications to political choice is central to the problem of consensus and cleavage in a political democracy."¹ Thus, the primary issue of concern in this research is the relationship between ethnicity and social class as viewed in the context of three provincial elections in Quebec.

The analysis of voting behaviour patterns is also the analysis of social change, for it is within this particular dimension that the fabric of any society can be weighed and measured. In determining the role and impact of social class as expressed in partisan choice over a period of time, the researcher is also examining the very dynamic of an electorate's social and economic evolution. Within Quebec this evolution remains central to its identity. An empirical measure of its recent development would be an invaluable tool enabling the political scientist to hazard a forecast pertaining to the economic and political future of French Canadian Society. Hence, "... while people in casting a ballot are engaged in an individual act, voting is not an isolated incident taking place in a vacuum, but part of a never-ending chain of social events which have deep roots in history and which are continuous in their implications."²

The problem of discerning the importance and interaction of class cleavage and ethnic affiliation is central to most analyses of voting

1 Berelson B.R., Lazarsfeld P.F., and McPhee W.N., Voting: A study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Election, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954, p.54

2 Regenstreif, P., "Group Perceptions and the Vote: Some Avenues of Opinion Formation in the 1962 Campaign," in Meisel J., (ed.), Papers on the 1962 Election, Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1964, p. 236

behaviour. In a broader sense the consideration of this problem in the Quebec provincial electorate refers to an extremely critical population, Not only because of the significance and mystery of the "French fact" as such but also because Quebec is essentially an alien culture in a broader Anglophone community. The author has found but a few empirical studies employing these two variables in an analysis of les Québécois in their own domain -- the provincial election. As a result, the available body of theory, or at least the superstructure in which micro-theories are deposited, has been constructed from the evidence provided by the analyses of non-French districts, or locales where the French are essentially a minority and therefore a self-percieved insignificant part of a larger whole.

It is hoped that the following analysis will serve to somewhat ameliorate this situation and also contribute additional information for a more critical understanding of voting behaviour.

CHAPTER ONE
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The contemporary literature on voting behaviour is fairly comprehensive. The objects of these studies range from considerations of age and sex characteristics and voting behaviour to the more detailed analysis of psychological attitudes as motivation for political preference. The purpose of this review of the relevant literature is fourfold.

A: To attempt to discern the existence of a general theoretical framework in the analysis of voting behaviour.

B: To consider the most representative analyses on the role of social class and ethnicity in voting behaviour.

C: To suggest gaps, inadequacies and contradictions in the literature where these two variables are examined.

D: To summarize these findings and subsequently determine their relevancy to the voting behaviour patterns of the Quebec Provincial Electorate.

While numerous American and Canadian writings consider the role of social class and ethnicity in voting behaviour, only two or three articles have been written on the behaviour patterns of the Quebec provincial electorate. To the author's knowledge, little has been written on the role of social class and ethnicity in this electorate and for this reason the revision will deal mainly with A) Brief summaries of American literature on the subject B) Canadian studies which have considered these two parameters and; C) Studies dealing generally with the Quebec provincial elections and peripherally with the implications of the voting patterns of the Quebec electorate.

All of the available studies on voting behaviour present empirical variations of the same conceptual theme: There exists a measurable association between political behaviour and the demographic

characteristics of the voting public such that a change in any of these characteristics is likely to produce a subsequent change in the public's political preferences. These analyses have continually probed the degree of these various relationships. In an attempt to construct an overall theoretical framework of voting behaviour it is necessary to explain the significance of these relationships in terms of discerning the meaning of associations between social data and political behaviour. This theoretical construction is, at best, a step by step operation where the common findings of individual studies are continually integrated and refined so that generalizations to electorates not previously examined may become possible.¹

One of the pioneering attempts to establish a measurable relationship between voting behaviour and various psychological and demographic characteristics is Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee's Voting.² The study led the authors to believe that voting behaviour patterns result from three major types of political cleavage.

- A) Occupation, income and social status.
- B) Religious, racial and ethnic affiliation.
- C) Regional, rural and urban adherences.

In the section dealing with social differentiation the authors posit that socio-economic status is directly related to the final vote.

Berelson, et, al., analysis of the basis of party support on the part

1. Dreyer E. C., and Rosenbaum W.A., Political Opinion and Electoral Behaviour Belmont, Cal; Wadsworth, 1966, P.82.

2. Berelson B.R., Lazarsfeld P.F., and McPhee W.N., Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Election, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

of different social and economic groupings suggests that political solidarity is high in middle class and business groups and that norms and values in upper and middle class groups are generally more cohesive.

The study emphasized a point common to all writings which discuss voting behaviour. Class differentiation is a product of differing goals and values held by differing sections of the population. Nevertheless, the process of identifying with, what can be termed, a secondary group such as class status is often nullified by the voter's allegiance to a distinct primary group, such as his racial, religious or ethnic background. The analysis presented in Voting posits that in some cases primary group identification is a stronger motivational characteristic than his secondary group status.

In "The Political Behaviour of the Electorate"³ by Warren E. Miller, the data from three American presidential elections are related to the more familiar demographic variables of age, sex, occupation, income and education. The article illustrates the political implications of social indicators by suggesting that characteristics used to measure the degree of relationship in voting behaviour vary in strength and importance over time. His findings suggest that class cleavages based on income distributions are highly volatile and continually fluctuating parameters of voting behaviour. Thus, while he doesn't explain why class politics in the United States has fluctuated widely, he does show that political preferences based on income divisions have decreased considerably over the three elections

3. In Dreyer and Rosenbaum, op. cit., p. 85-102

analyzed. Miller then suggests that if researchers are looking for consistency in relationships between voting behaviour and socio-economic characteristics then it would seem that occupation and education are better indicators of status polarization than is income.⁴ Thus the formation of class stratifications in any society can be measured by the degree to which characteristics signifying the particular class are highly correlated with the vote for a particular party. Miller's findings that the segment of the voting population with the highest income and education and high occupational ratings, vote for a particular party suggests that class cleavages are evident.

Common to the style of presentation evident in most of the available literature, Miller posits that there are basically two significant cleavages in American electoral behaviour: Class identification and group affiliation. To clarify, group affiliation denotes a real and visible demarcation in the electorate. The voter definitely falls within a certain age group, racial body and religious and ethnic category. Class identification is a far more subtle process with no clear delineating lines of stratification. Thus, the process of identifying with a certain "class-grouping" is a more tedious operation.

Concentration of the strength of the individual voter's allegiances to primary and secondary social groups provides the focus of analysis in the chapter dealing with the social and economic context of voting behaviour in Campbell et al., The American Voter.⁵

4. Ibid, p. 98

5. Campbell A., et. al., The American Voter, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964, p. 157-267.

The authors present a very comprehensive analysis of the forces which direct the explicit or implied standards of group identification, either to class or ethnic-religious groupings. They suggest that this form of analysis leads to a general model of group influence in politics. Accordingly the model should perform two distinct services.

A) Increase understanding of deviation from group political standards by individual members, i.e., the why and how of resistance.

B) Increase understanding of the waxing and waning of distinctive political behaviour on the part of certain social groupings in the population. Accordingly the analysis of voting behaviour suggests a trichotamous relationship among three factors.

A) Individual to the group.

B) Group to the political world.

C) Individual to the political world.

"A full model will call for measurements that adequately capture the important dimensions of each relationship, if we are to understand the way in which the individual will respond to politics given the presence of a group that is real in the sense that it can exert a greater or less influence on his behaviour."⁶

While it is obvious that the type of data collected for the analysis of the voting behaviour of the Quebec electorate does not permit such a refined investigation, the theoretical postulates advanced by Campbell et.al., are most useful in suggesting the relationships which might exist between social class, ethnicity and the voting preference of the electorate in Quebec.

6. Ibid., p. 163

The authors suggest that group influence is a significant motivation in the individual's attempt to express his partisan choice. No voter acts in a void and the influence of each group can be measured by the degree to which the individual participatn identifies with it.⁷

The authors carry Miller's simple hypothesis further and suggest that the higher the identification of the individual with his group, the more likely he is to behave in ways which distinguish members of his group from non-members.

If the relationship of the individual to the group is measured in terms of the cohesiveness of the particular group then the relationship of the group to the political world is gauged by its proximity to issues and candidates. The authors posit that as the perception of the proximity of the group to the real world increases, the susceptibility of individual members to group influence in political affairs increases. The influence of the proximate group over its membership depends on four factors.

- A) The transmission of Group political standards
- B) The degree of intra group conflict on political standards
- C) Political salience
- d) Legitimacy of Group activity.

Thus in any cohesive group, the probability that its influence will strongly motivate the voting behaviour of its members is greatest when the group has a forceful political lobby or pressure group (D), and when the directives issued are clear and widespread (A), and do

7. Ibid., p. 164

not cause any internal conflicts in its membership (B). The chances are heightened if a salient issue demands the attention of the group or if a candidate is a member of that particular grouping (C).

In reviewing the literature dealing with the impact of social class and ethnic-religious group affiliations at the national level in Canadian voting behaviour, it appears that regional cleavages coupled with ethnic and religious affiliations best explain the voting behaviour of the electorate in Canada. This does not necessarily suggest as Alford has posited⁸ that voting as a national phenomena is totally absent in the voting behaviour of the Canadian electorate. What it does signify is that while class voting does exist in Canada and is increasing slowly, this cleavage is overshadowed by the very real factors of regionalism and strong, ethnic binds. This fact is succinctly stated and substantiated by John Meisel as he summarizes the 1962 Canadian federal election voting trends. "Canada's political life is distinguished by the degree to which every national trend in the voting behaviour of its citizens is contradicted by some important regional or provincial exception."⁹

Another significant observation which might be posited is that regionalism is a more distinguishing factor in electoral behaviour than ethnicity in Canada. There is generally no consistent pattern of behaviour for any one ethnic or religious group across the country. Each group is subtly influenced by regional demands. This hypothesis

8. Alford, R.R., Party and Society, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. See Chapter 9. pp. 250-287.

9. Meisel J., "Conclusion: An Analysis of the National (?) Results" in Meisel J., (ed), Papers on the 1962 Election, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964. p.p. 272-288.

is substantiated by Alford.¹⁰ In 1962 the Progressive Conservative party's social base in Quebec was 84% Roman Catholic while in Saskatchewan it was 84% Protestant. Most of the available literature which analyzes national trends, stress the effects of regional voting cleavages and the variance of strength of group voting across the country. Studies by John Meisel and George Perlin emphasize these points.

Meisel's pioneering analysis of the relation of religious affiliation and electoral behaviour in the federal and provincial constituencies of Kingston in the early 1950's¹¹ found a distinct relationship between Roman Catholicism and support for the Liberal Party and Protestantism and support for the Conservative Party.¹² Meisel does not consider the effect of group cohesion and its influence on the membership. Instead he posits that membership in a church enables the individual to be identified with certain groups in society, groups which presumably share a similar outlook on the secular problems surrounding them. Unfortunately, Meisel does not distinguish between those members who are nominally attached and those who feel a strong identification with their religious group. Thus, he assumes that all members have similar opinions on secular problems which at best is a somewhat naive assumption.

George Perlin's study of a constituency in Newfoundland¹³ can be

10. Alford, R.R., "The Social Bases of Political Cleavage in 1962," in Meisel J., op. cit. pp. 203-235

11. Meisel, J., "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study" in Courtney J., op. cit. pp. 144-162

12. Ibid., pp. 160

13. Perlin G. "St. John's West.", in Meisel, Papers op.cit. pp.3-19

cited to suggest that in Canada, analyses of group voting behaviour and generalizations from these analyses must be limited to the locale of the study. The analysis is a remarkable contrast to Meisel's empirical findings. Perlin found that 78% of the Protestants supported the Liberal Party along with a sizable percentage of the upper class areas. Working class voters and Catholics tended to vote for the Conservative Party. It can be suggested on the basis of these two findings that ethnic and religious cleavages do exist in Canada but fluctuate widely. These cleavages are subject to regional issues candidates and policies.

In a somewhat impressionistic and general article, Peter Regenstreif argues that the religious cleavage is not as decisive a factor as it is sometimes made out to be. Religion as a spiritually cohesive force is breaking down, especially in the urban areas. "(Religion). . . is social and oriented towards secular and neighborhood values rather than group identified or personal and therefore its consequences here are mitigated by more powerful forces impinging upon the individual."¹⁴

It is apparent that Campbell et.al's hypotheses concerning the

14. Regenstreif S.P., "Group Perceptions and the Vote: Some Avenues of Opinion Formation in the 1962 Campaign, "in Meisel J., Papers, op. cit., pp. 235-253. For further comparisons of the relative strength and weakness of religion as an explanatory variable, see the contrasts offered by Anderson G., "Voting Behaviour and the Ethnic Religious variable: A Case Study of a Federal Election in Hamilton, Ontario, "C.J.E.P.S., 32, (1), February, 1966. Also refer to Simmons J., "Voting Behaviour and Socio-Economic Characteristics, "C.J.E.P.S., August, 1967

influence of cohesive groups are quite appropriate in discussing the religious cleavages of the Canadian electorate. Thus, we can expect, in most cases, that religious cohesion is slowly disappearing especially in urban and consequently, more secular areas. Regenstreif states that issues are more likely to be perceived in urban areas due to media exposure and status consciousness -- two factors which encourage religious secularization.

Several interesting studies have attempted to measure the basis of class - support for political parties in Canada in federal elections. In "The Social Bases of Political Cleavage in 1962," Robert Alford expands the generalizations made from most of the major findings, i.e., workers, Catholics, urban residents, youth and men support the Liberal party etc., and discusses the strength of class voting in the 1962 federal election. Many of his findings concur with his previous analysis of the Canadian electorate found in Party and Society. Alford suggests again that the 1962 federal election did not present any indications of class-voting. Aside from this observation, this article contains empirical evidence to support the assumption that the Quebec federal electorate is not entirely aware of the problems facing the Canadian nation as a whole. Although the finding is tangential to the role of social class and ethnicity in Canadian society, it is of considerable importance to the overall process of electoral identification with issues and political concepts. Among all Canadians Alford found that les Québécois are least opinionated when challenged with questions concerning the image of Canada as a nation as well as with her foreign and domestic policies. Nearly 70% of the Quebec respondents had no opinion on matters of national defence, trade

with Great Britain and federal finance matters etc. Alford posits that "These are only of concern to persons interested in or identified with, Canada as a nation, to whom the position of power and economic stability of Canada is a valued thing."¹⁵

Although not presented as comprehensively as in the American Voter, Alford does posit a general rule of thumb as to the raison d'être of social groupings:

- A) Social characteristics of individuals must be connected with some collective experience of individuals of which the social characteristics is an indicator.
- B) Political parties must have some consistent appeal to certain groups of persons with common experiences.

Alford's interpretation of Canadian electoral behaviour suggests that class-voting is virtually non-existent in Canada. Even the 1962 federal swing to Social Credit in the province of Quebec which accounted for over 40% of the available seats is viewed as essentially a religious phenomena by the author. This is, at best, a naive speculation advanced to salvage a more general hypotheses. The Social Credit support in Quebec could hardly be considered a religious phenomena. Essentially the shift represented one of the strongest indicators of regional class voting in Canada. Economic discontent at the federal level coupled with the benefits which seemed to only reach the new middle class in Quebec encouraged the predominantly rural areas to actually believe that they really had nothing to lose in voting Cr ditiste.

In one of the few articles which discusses electoral behaviour

15. Alford R.R., "Social Bases. . . , "op. cit., p. 228

in Quebec at the federal level, Vincent Lemieux¹⁶ presents evidence which supports the hypotheses of class-voting in some areas of the province. In his study of the federal constituency of Levis in the 1962 federal election, Lemieux found that over 60% of the voters with lower occupations supported Social Credit in Quebec. A notable 85% of the population of upper-class areas voted clearly against M. Caouette's party. Other articles on the nature of this class phenomena suggest similar findings.¹⁷

The political success of Canadian parties can be measured by the extent to which they forward a non-class appeal. Essentially the major parties are brokers between interests and as such, concentrate on unifying various regional sentiments. John Wilson's recent article¹⁸ on the voting patterns of an Ontario constituency suggests the possibility that at least one party, the N.D.P., is appealing to a certain class strata. Wilson's study advances two basic tenets:

- A) The intensity of influence of any one factor will vary from area to area.
- B) The influence of social class has very little influence on the prominent factor which is at work.

Wilson then sets out to test the explanatory powers of the religious variable and finds it lacking in some areas. In Waterloo South the

16. Lemieux V., "The Election in the Constituency of Levis," in Meisel J. Papers op.cit., pp. 33-53.

17. Irvine W.P., "An Analysis of Voting Shifts in Quebec" in Courtney, Voting. . ., op. cit., pp. 167-182.

18. Wilson J., "Politics and Social Class in Canada: The Case of Waterloo South, "C.J.P.S., Vol 1, September 1968, no. 3, pp. 288-310.

author found a notable religious division among supporters of the Liberal and Conservative parties but none at all in support of the labor oriented and working class New Democratic Party.

Wilson notes that "The religion to which a person adheres is so very often a function of his ethnic origin that it may be the case that the apparent connection between that party (Liberal) and adherents of the Roman Catholic faith in some parts . . . is in reality an association between that party and the dominant ethnic group."¹⁹ Yet, in the findings presented by Wilson there are no significant ethnic cleavages evident in support of the N.D.P. "The fact is that while the N.D.P. attracted broadly the same level of support among all religious and ethnic groups, the class composition of its vote makes it clear that it may be characterized -- in Waterloo South -- as a working class party."²⁰

Wilson shows an increased tendency for voters to align themselves along social class lines and attributes this to the increase of urbanization which permits the urbanite to more readily identify with a particular social status and a particular economic interest.²¹

Implied in all of the analyses of voting behaviour is the fact

19. Ibid., p. 302

20. Ibid., p. 306

21. Wilson has also written an unpublished article which generally tends to support the thesis that traditional cleavages are breaking down in many urban areas. See Wilson J., The Use of Aggregate Data in the Analysis of Canadian Electoral Behaviour, a paper prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association Conference on Statistics, Carleton University, June 11, 1967.

that the hypotheses and findings presented are limited to the ariel unit under observation. While general propositions can be suggested about the widespread behaviour of a particular social grouping, these hypotheses, proven applicable in some geographic area, must be tested in as many cases as possible. Unfortunately, empirical analyses of the relationship between the voting behaviour patterns and the socio-economic characteristics of the Quebec provincial electorate are extremely scarce. The author is aware of only one attempt to employ statistical techniques in order to measure these relationships. Rather than a comprehensive analysis, the study is of an exploratory nature. It is simply an invitation to social scientists to use aggregate data methods and a few relevant variables when analyzing the voting behaviour of the Quebec electorate.

The concern of Vladimir Cervin's "Some Correlates of Voting Behaviour in the 1952 Quebec Elections: A Pilot Study."²² is with the question of the explanatory powers of certain regional characteristics as determinants of voting behaviour in the 1952 election. "A hypothesis is put forward that certain of these characteristics are related to voting for one party and certain others to voting for the other party, and that therefore districts that have a population of a certain kind should tend to vote for a particular party."²³ Employing provincial units as the basic unit of analysis, Gervin analyzes five variables by the method of multiple correlation:

22. Found in C.J.E.P.S., Vol. 21, 1955, pp. 370-373

23. Ibid., p. 370

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>O. <u>Voting Behaviour</u>
 A) for the Union Nationale Party
 B) for the Liberal Party and
 Independents</p> <p>1. <u>Income.</u></p> <p>2. <u>Occupational Sources of subsistance.</u>
 A) agriculture
 B) other</p> | <p>3. <u>Concentration of population</u>
 A) Rural
 B) Urban</p> <p>4. <u>Ethnic Origin</u>
 A) French
 B) Other</p> |
|--|--|

Cervin found that the variables of Income and French ethnic origin are the best predictors of voting behaviour for the Union Nationale party, i.e., as income decreased, vote for the Union Nationale Party increased and as French increased voting for the Union Nationale party also increased.²⁴ While Cervin's findings do not enlighten the interested as to the relationship between the role of social class and ethnicity in Quebec, they do, nevertheless, tend to lend credence to a limited number of hypotheses which are somewhat related to this research.²⁵

Of the existing empirical analyses of Quebec electoral behaviour the approach that most closely approximates the methodological orientation of this present study can be found in Jean-Louis Desrochers' Analyse par régions des élections provinciales de 1935 à 1962.²⁶

As the author states,

L'objet de notre travail étant l'étude des comportements électoraux régionaux dans la province de Québec de 1935 à 1962, c'est évidemment l'approche sociologique qui s'imposait dans cette perspective puisque l'on referrait à la notion de comportement.²⁷

24. Ibid., p. 370

25. Of particular interest is the relationship between income and support for the UN.

26. Jean-Louis Desrochers, Analyse par régions des élections provinciales de 1935 à 1962, unpublished M.A. thesis, Université de Laval, Québec, 1964.

27. Ibid., p. 1.

Desrochers attempted to discern the relationships among the factors of regionality and three socio-economic variables. Employing the Spearman rank-order correlation as a statistical tool the author traced the effects of these parameters on the strength of voting results for the two major parties over a period of time. Using the geographic-economic areas of Quebec as guidelines the author grouped all the provincial constituencies into ten regions, thereby aggregating his socio-economic and electoral data to the regional level. The regional total became his basic or minimal level of analysis. The three socio-economic variables employed, common to most studies in this field, were the urban-rural dichotomy," qui, dans la province de Québec ne peut être ignoré pour toute étude sérieux de sociologie électorale." ²⁸ the variable of "social status" measured, perhaps too simplistically, in terms of superior and inferior occupations; and finally, "wealth" as measured by the mean salary of a particular region.

In reviewing Desrochers' findings for the three elections which are of concern to our analysis, there are but a few correlations of any significance. The author's approach to each election is systematically divided into five parts:

- A-Identification of parties and results of the general election.
- B-Majority party vote tally in each of the ten regions.
- C-Comparisons of voting trends with the previous election.
- D-Examination of the vote with respect to the three socio-economic variables and to the participation-abstention level.
- E-Conclusions on the voting trends in the ten regions.

For the provincial election of 1952, Desrochers presents the

28. Ibid., p. 3.

following relationships and concludes with the simple remark, "a cette élection - ci, la richesse ne semble pas un facteur dominant pour l'un ou l'autre des deux parties."²⁹

His findings for the 1956 election are completely void of any significant relationships.

One could accept the possibility that residence location, occupation and income do not play an influential role in electoral behaviour, but Desrochers' findings for the 1960 election -- the initial year of the "quiet-revolution" -- demonstrate the insensitivity of his operationalized variables.³⁰

Are we to believe that the influence of these three socio-economic variables is negligible? Desrochers justifies this as simply a continuation of a trend starting in 1952 where salary and class status do not affect partisan choice.³¹ As an alternate hypothesis Desrochers explains the insignificant effect of his three socio-economic variables on electoral behaviour by suggesting that if one party must come from behind to win it has to appeal to every section of the population! A hypothesis whose universality is such that it renders its applicability as quite meaningless.. If the 1960 provincial election echoed the profound changes in Quebec society and the realignment of some sources of traditional party support, the transformation is not at all evident in Desrochers' analysis. While empirical evidence out-weighs intuitive judgement as a substantive mechanism, the quality and depth of Desrochers' empirical approach does not provide the necessary evidence to permit any conclusions on the effects of these variables on electoral behaviour.

29. Ibid., p. 98.

30. Ibid., p. 105

31. Ibid., P. 106

One of the first studies to employ a technique of analysis other than the traditional, descriptive approaches to the study of provincial elections in Quebec was published in 1959 by three French-Canadian geographers. Entitled "Les Elections provinciales dans le Quebec",³² this comprehensive essay on electoral geography presented a graphic display of the results for each of the twenty-five provincial elections since Confederation (1867 - 1956). The interpretation and analysis of these graphs is divided into three historical time-periods; A) Rouges contre ultramontains - 1867-1896; B) Ottawa, norme du vote provincial - 1897-1936; C) Sous le signe de l'autonomie - 1944-1956. Aside from the main orientation of the work, sections of the essay delve into particular problems of study in the Quebec electorate. These range from an extensive survey of the phenomenon of abstention, a very popular topic among Quebec political analysts, to the influence of the rural vote and the evolution of party popularity and ideology under the parliamentary electoral system.

To the authors, their study of electoral geography in Quebec was merely a very general and superficial survey of the province's electoral history;

Il ne s'agissait pas de presenter des conclusions definitives, mais d'ouvrir des horizons et de faciliter la recherche.... Les interpretations que nous donnons des campagnes electorales et des³³ courbes ne saurient etre que superficielles,

and in a manner traditional to surveys and analyses which explore new areas of research and employ methodological techniques which had not previously been applied to the object under examination, they continue to suggest,

³² Hamelin, Jean, Letarte, Jacques et Hamelin, Marcel, Les Elections provinciales dans le Quebec, Cahiers de Geographie de Quebec, 1959,

pp. 5-209.

³³ Ibid., p

"les facteurs determinants, les causes profondes, les themes fondamentaux, il appartient aux etudes subsequentes de les faire jaillir. Notre role est de susciter et d'orienter la recherche dans ce domaine",³⁴

The emphasis of the study, while somewhat peripheral to the scope and contents of this analysis, does present some interesting findings which deserve comment.

As previously mentioned, the authors devote the first and major section of their study to an historical analysis of the Quebec Provincial elections. The authors have presented a short, descriptive paragraph for each electoral contest, accompanied by a graph, which explains the major issues of each election and the main themes or guidelines offered by the contesting parties. While the authors do not explicitly consider the relationships of ethnicity and class-consciousness to voting alignments, they do attempt to measure the pulse of the electorate in their analysis of the major themes in each election. Since the study terminates with the provincial election of 1956, there is, naturally, no mention of the political and social upheaval which began three years after this election. Nevertheless, the work does contribute to a peripheral yet important dimension of this particular study. An examination of the effects of ethnicity and class stratification on the voting alignments of the Quebec electorate is hardly complete unless it attempts to consider the historical and political framework within which these two variables interact. Thus Hamelin et al. suggest that between 1944 and 1956 the most significant issue surrounding the four electoral contests in that time period concern the increasing nationalist-isolationist tendencies of the Quebec provincial government. In effect the

elections were conducted "sous le signe de l'autonomie" or, as the authors state,

"... c'est la première fois qu'on a pose avec autant d'éclat devant l'opinion publique, à l'occasion des campagnes électorales, le problème de l'autonomie.... Depuis 1944, la question de l'autonomie non seulement suscite des résonances dans l'opinion publique, mais elle est devenue un thème important des discussions politiques, un facteur déterminant du vote qui garde dans un même parti des électeurs dont les conceptions économiques et sociales sont ... fort opposées".³⁵

Thus it is possible to extract the main themes and ideological orientations of the provincial parties from this study by Hamelin et al. This is of obvious use when attempting to analyse and relate the theoretical significance of concepts which have been emphasized in this research undertaking.

Aside from their discussion of abstentions and the electoral system in Quebec provincial elections, the authors devote considerable space to "Les facteurs déterminants de l'opinion politique". While their approach to this issue is somewhat general and non-empirical, their evaluations and opinions have proven to be quite interesting and relevant. Their main contention is similar to the hypotheses advanced by Campbell and Alford,* in that the economic situation of a collective voting entity will often determine its subsequent political alignments. The authors posit the following;

"... l'ensemble des facteurs déterminants des opinions politiques du plus grand nombre émane de la condition économique et sociale des citoyens. À une période de stabilité économique correspondrait une période de

³⁵ Ibid., p. 42.

* see above, pp. 16-17.

transformation économique correspondrait une période de changement politique." ³⁶

Hamelin et al. develop the hypothesis so that it incorporates the dimension of nationalism as well. They suggest that these two forces -- economic stability and nationalistic aspirations -- strongly affect electoral alignment, with the latter of the two occupying the dominant motivational position;

Le principe qui guidait les "leaders" de L'Union Nationale peut se resumer ainsi: la crise (economique ou sociale) ne sera enrayee que par une prise de conscience de notre temperament national qui nous orientera vers nos valeurs traditionnelles." ³⁷

The suggestion is provocative indeed. Even during periods of economic stress, the proposals for its subsequent alleviation are couched in terms which suggest that the pursuit of a strong "national" identity is a necessary prerequisite. Within this dimension of "national consciousness" the authors refer to a characteristic which each party must continually adhere to if it is to be successful. This qualification is the "resonance spirituelle d'un parti" -- a political party's ability to continually renew and assess its approach to the electorate so that it may be able to incorporate the diversified elements of the voting public in some form of a consensus or brokerage philosophy.

It is unfortunate that the authors cannot substantiate their opinions with an empirical referent with regard to the dialectic between nationalism and the prevalent economic situation. This section of their

³⁶ Ibid., p. 193.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 193.

study was potentially the most significant. While the opinions offered were enlightening, the authors do not substantiate and logically develop their claims to a satisfying conclusion. The interaction between a "nationalist consensus or consciousness" and the varying situation of economic stress or stability was not pursued. Have the motivations and orientations of the "national identity" when employed as an electoral plea, progressed as a constant? Specifically, if nationalism, or, if you will, "ethnic consciousness", has developed from a regressive-isolationist to an aggressive-participatory movement, how has this affected or been affected by the economic fluctuations of the province?

The authors view nationalism in a somewhat ambiguous manner. Apparently, nationalism is simply interpreted as the Quebec provincial government's attempt to remain firmly opposed to the co-operative and/or centralizing programmes of the federal government. Essentially, this is a weak and superficial treatment of a potent and complicated issue. On the meaning of regressive and aggressive nationalism -- hopefully a step beyond the attempts of Hamelin et al. -- more will be said later.

The authors conclude their ambitious study with an examination of the electoral systems and its effect on provincial party politics.

If Robert Alford is correct in his suggestion that "Survey data are considered to be 'snapshots' of fundamentally historical processes of change and stability in the allegiance of social groups to political parties",³⁸ then Les Electeurs Quebecois: Attitudes et Opinions

³⁸ Alford, Robert, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963) p. xi.

a la veille de l'election de 1960, represents the initial attempt of social scientists to empirically portray the forces of change and stability in Quebec provincial politics.

This pre-election study was commissioned by the Provincial Liberal Party and was conducted by Le Groupe de Recherches Sociales from Montreal. Developed and distributed between September 1959 and March 1960, before the election of the latter year, the survey was based on 1000 interviews selected at random. It was the first, most comprehensive analysis of its kind, employing the technique of survey analysis to consider the voting behaviour of the Quebec provincial electorate. Essentially, the research is a report and not an analytical study;

Il s'agit d'un document descriptif presentant 'une classification organisee et systematique des donnees' plutot que d'une etude analytique. Il ne s'agit pas d'elaboration et de verification d'hypothese ou de theorie quelconque: c'est un rapport et non une etude. ³⁹

Their primary objective, similar to the American studies they refer to, was to give empirical verification to intuitive "common-sense" notions about "les classes socio-economiques et la participation et l'allegiance politiques, etc."

The report is divided into two basic sections. The initial segment deals specifically with various socio-economic characteristics of the electorate and their voting preference. The second part concerns their socio-political opinions and attitudes to a number of questions topical to the time-period.

Understandably, the most important question to which they addressed themselves was the party choice of the sample electorate, "if an election were held tomorrow". Not surprisingly, 95% of the sample indicated that they would vote (compared to the official post-election tally of 80%, this figure is slightly inflated). Of the 57% expressing a preference, 61% favoured the U.N. while 35% favoured the opposition Liberal Party. The authors, for the sake of professional accuracy or for their employers' peace of mind, suggested that the percentage of voters indicating their support for the U.N. was slightly inflated. Apparently, psychological pressures -- identifying with the winning party etc. -- were suggested as reasons why some portion of the electorate openly "favoured" the incumbent Union Nationale. The assumption of an inflationary estimate favouring the U.N. was substantiated by the post-election results.

PROPORTION DES GENS QUI ONT L'INTENTION DE VOTER POUR LES PARTIS POLITIQUES.⁴⁰

<u>PARTI</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	
	Survey of Le Groupe.	<u>Official election results.</u> ⁴¹
Union Nationale	61	45.6
Liberal	35	51.3
Autres	4	2.1

Similar to most of the studies reviewed in this section, Le

⁴⁰

Ibid., p. 25

⁴¹

Annuaire du Québec, 1972, Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, Bureau de la statistique du Québec, Centre d'Information Statistique, Québec City, 1969, p. 110.

Groupe concentrates on four significant socio-economic variables: sex, residence, education and occupation. Intercorrelated with these are the "minor" variables of religion, ethnicity, age and marital status.

Examining those sections of the report which are of direct relevance to our theoretical considerations, Le Groupe presents some interesting findings. When "place of residence" is held constant, a few surprising finds are brought to light. While the following table suggests that the Union Nationale was strong in all residential areas, their main strength appears to have come from the province's predominantly urban areas. The Liberals, aside from their traditional urban bastion in Montreal, drew their support from villages and rural areas.

PREFERENCE POLITIQUE SELON LA RESIDENCE.⁴²

	Rural	Village	Town	City	Quebec	Montreal
Union Nationale	61	57	65	78	75	50
Liberal	36	42	35	18	21	43
	(212)	(70)	(57)	(77)	(52)	(202)

It is quite probable that the original bias affecting the proportion of voters favouring the U.N. has also entered into the above estimates. Contrary to any of the other works we have examined, the official returns of the Provincial Election of 1960 provides us with an empirical

⁴² Les Electeurs Quebecois, p. 43.

referent against which the accuracy of the above estimates can be measured.⁴³

When the ethnic variable is introduced, Le Groupe points out a significant finding. Apparently, except for the notable difference in the Montreal area, residence has some effect on the way both ethnic groups behave at the polls. This would seem to indicate that English and French vote the same way, according to their area of residence.

	<u>MUNICIPAL/RURAL</u>		<u>TOWN/CITY</u>		<u>MONTREAL</u> ⁴⁴	
	F	E	E	F	F	E
Union Nationale	59	55	71	67	56	38
Liberal	38	45	27	33	38	50
	(253)	(11)	(115)	(6)	(133)	(34)

But again, a particularly low total of respondents in some English residential areas leaves the comparison somewhat suspect.

Skipping over Le Groupe's examination of the education variable, where it was found that the better educated tended to vote for the Liberals while the less educated voted overwhelmingly for the U.N., we arrive at a socio-economic parameter which has direct bearing on our analysis.

⁴³ It was discovered that the figures estimated by Le Groupe were not comparable to the official Elections Returns in all cases. Liberal Party support in cities and metropolitan Montreal were considerably higher than the sample estimates. (Based on a percentage calculation of urban constituencies and a sample selection of "cities" as previously defined by Le Groupe.)

⁴⁴ Les Electeurs Quebecois, p. 52.

In discerning the support for both parties from five occupational strata, the authors present an interesting and paradoxical finding.

PREFERENCE POLITIQUE, SELON L'OCCUPATION. ⁴⁵

	PROFESSIONAL/ PROPRIETOR	SALES/ SERVICE	WORKERS		FARMERS
			Specialized	Non-Specialized	
Union Nationale	54	63	63	72	59
Liberal	41	29	34	26	38
	(123)	(65)	(245)	(84)	(125)

Aside from Le Groupe's original inflationary bias toward the U.N., the findings demonstrate the overwhelming appeal of the U.N. among what Le Groupe would consider working-class occupations. Also the tendency of the proprietored class to support the Liberal Party is somewhat pronounced. It is unfortunate that the irony of this situation is not further examined by Le Groupe. They simply point to what they consider a sociological discrepancy without attempting to fathom its causes. Quebec voting behaviour presents one of the rare examples where the lower income groups have consistently favoured a right-wing, economically conservative party. Lipset, Lazarsfeld et al. provide a slight clue as to why this situation exists, but it is hardly sufficient;

The most impressive single fact is that in virtually every economically developed country, the lower-income

groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right.⁴⁶

Le Groupe rather apologetically acknowledges the deviation and concludes somewhat helplessly, "ce resultat necessiterait, a notre avis, une etude approfondie en vue d'en decouvrir les causes et les consequences."⁴⁷

Since we are primarily engaged in reviewing this work, a detailed examination of this voting anomaly will be found in the next chapter.

When the ethnic variable is introduced, it can be seen that the original trends established when "occupation" is examined alone, appear to continue.

PREFERENCE POLITIQUE, SELON L'OCCUPATION ET LE GROUPE ETHNIQUE.⁴⁸

	PROFESSIONAL/ PROPRIETOR		SALES/ SERVICE		WORKERS				FARMERS	
	F	E	F	E	Specialized		Non-specialized		F	E
Union Nationale	58	45	63	67	65	41	72	67	58	67
Liberal	37	48	29	27	31	56	23	17	39	33
	(82)	(40)	(48)	(15)	(212)	(32)	(72)	(12)	(113)	(12)

Based on this evidence, it would seem that occupation, if used as a measure of distinction among class strata, does have an effect on the voting tendencies of this sample electorate. Ethnicity does not appear to be a significant demarcating force when political preferences are expressed. This suggestion is further reinforced when Le Groupe present findings based on a socio-economic index scale constructed from education and occupation levels.

⁴⁶ S.M. Lipset, P. Lazarsfeld et al., "The Psychology of Voting: an Analysis of Political Behaviour." in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954, Vol. II, p. 1136, as quoted in Les Electeurs Quebecois, p. 55.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 224.

	Lower -----			-----Higher 49
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
Union Nationale	67	66	57	42
Liberal	28	31	40	46
	(79)	(339)	(164)	(52)

They conclude their examination of the effect of various socio-economic variables on voting preference with a summary statement;

En effet, la tendance est claire, graduee et assez prononcee: plus les gens ont un statut socio-economique eleve, plus ils veulent voter pour le parti Liberal; moins ils ont un statut eleve, plus ils ont l'intention de voter par l'U.N.⁵⁰

In conclusion, a comment should be made on why we have gone to some lengths in reviewing Les Electeurs Quebecois. In so doing, we can perhaps undermine the criticism that there is little value in examining a pre-election survey or poll which presents findings based on the future intentions of the electorate and not their actual preference, which could only be discovered by a post-election analysis. To some extent this criticism is valid, for we have seen the discrepancies between some of the findings of "Le Groupe" and the actual outcome as provided by the official

49 Ibid., p. 60.

50 Ibid., p. 61.

election returns. Despite this, arguments for the inclusion of this review are easily marshalled. Les Electeurs Quebecois is the only study where the authors have systematically attempted to gauge the political preferences of the Quebec electorate based on reliable survey material. While the research is not couched within an explicit theoretical framework, the authors successfully employed and examined the effects of socio-economic variables common to all other studies thus far reviewed. In a sense, the work provides us with a practical application of variables important to the Quebec electorate. Initially, this section concerned itself with isolating and measuring the importance of those social and economic parameters which were of particular concern to our study. Les Electeurs Quebecois provides us with an empirical referent of direct concern and benefit to our analysis.

As a summary postscript to our considerations of the literature on Quebec electoral behaviour, it should be noted that there is a major deficiency common to all four works we have examined. In no sense have the authors attempted to relate their findings to a theoretical framework which would have provided in-depth analysis of the issues at hand. In some respects the criticism is unjustified, for we are evaluating their research on omissions which they themselves have readily acknowledged. Cerwin, Hamelin et al., Desrochers and Le Groupe de Recherches have provided interesting guidelines and significant findings which enable and encourage future research in the area.

While this present undertaking does not pretend to "bridge the gap or fill the void", it is hoped that the empirical evidence presented reflects the postulates and hypothesis of a broad theoretical framework.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORY OF NATIONALISM IN
FRENCH CANADIAN SOCIETY--1

So far, the attempt to define a theoretical structure encompassing the interaction of ethnic solidarity and class consciousness has had a sociological orientation coupled with general references to the historical development of French Canadian society. The influence of ethnicity and class consciousness on the voting behaviour of the Quebec provincial electorate has been viewed as a process of social change, where sociological developments affect the degrees of solidarity and cohesiveness within these two groupings. Thus, the decrease of ethnic solidarity has been associated with such factors as declining rurality, religiosity, and politically isolationist tendencies. Subsequently it has been suggested that urbanization, secularization, and economic integration are some factors which may contribute not only to the demise of ethnic solidarity but to the increase of class consciousness.

While it is essential to the theoretical development of the analysis that these two variables be studied within a sociological context, the theoretical framework is by no means complete. In isolating the examination to the inter-action of ethnic solidarity and class consciousness, the analysis becomes susceptible to serious criticism. To some extent the analysis so far has had a ceteris paribus orientation. When this approach is employed as a catchall for theoretical anomalies in the construction of a theoretical framework, as it often is, the resulting model becomes nothing more than an intellectual schema divorced from its empirical referents. Aside from this dangerous shortcoming, any theoretical model which considers its subject matter in terms of "all other things being equal" succumbs to the inflexible rigidity which the model imposes. In short, the liaison between a theoretical model and its empirical referent must be founded on the inclusion of peripheral factors influencing the inter-action and development of the subject matter under consideration. If this liaison is not attempted, the theory becomes unrealistically rigid and general since it attempts to incorporate a systematic approach without the benefits of

measuring influential and intervening variables. An example of this theoretical fallacy follows. The focus of our theoretical considerations thus far developed suggests that during the period of three recent elections there has been an increasing tendency for the Quebec electorate to align itself according to class stratifications rather than ethnic cleavages in the expression of its voting preference. This concept is theoretically significant and potentially, it is empirically valid. It is in operationalizing this concept in order to obtain a set of testable hypothesis that the researcher must employ extreme caution. If the theoretical assumption is to be substantiated, one might hypothesize that French and English lower class voters support an opposing party. This hypothesis, based on the above mentioned concept, is empirically verifiable but its extreme rigidity leaves it somewhat suspect. Empirical evidence could uphold such a hypothesis but, in general, the hypothesis is not refined enough to measure the very likely situation that one party could draw its support from both managerial-proprietory and labour groups as well, leaving the remaining party with primarily an agrarian base of support. Such evidence would still indicate class voting, yet it would be of such a nature that the original hypothesis could not detect it. As we will see, there is every reason to believe that this example is not as hypothetical as it may appear. Thus the creation of testable hypothesis in this analysis is very much a product of varying circumstances and situations which change quickly from election to election. In order to re-define our ceteris paribus approach we should say, quite simply, "some things being equal, most not." This suggests that the nature of a political scientists contribution to the analysis of political behaviour must, by necessity, encompass the study of as many related problems and issues as possible.

In addition to setting forth a theoretical framework based on sociological reasoning, we must attempt to place the entire examination in historical perspective. Thus,

Aside from casting some additional light on those complex theoretical and methodological problems involved in any attempt to develop a scientific approach to the study of politics, the nature of the contribution will inevitably be related to the historical and cultural background of the society whose political processes are being studied.¹

It is further posited that this historical connective, linking our sociological theory with our methodological approach will provide us with information essential to the entire scope of the examination.

If any single concept or term can be used to keynote the dynamic force underlying the political and social development of a society, then the most appropriate guideline for the study of French Canadian society is nationalism. The manner in which this force has influenced the intellectual and political elite in the contemporary history of Quebec must be understood before any successful interpretation of the evolution of French Canada can be undertaken. The purpose of this section of our analysis is to re-examine the political and social development of Quebec within this context of nationalism. In fact we will attempt to construct a model based on the evolution of nationalism which will permit us to comprehend the extreme significance of this influential factor on the social parameters of ethnic solidarity and class consciousness. It is posited that the varying interpretations of nationalism rendered by the intellectual and power elites in contemporary French Canadian history have had the most significant effect on the cohesiveness and expression of either of our two main variables. The analysis will attempt to discern the numerous intellectual paths that nationalism has followed in Quebec. Coupled with this approach, it is hoped that the

1- Herbert F. Quinn, op. cit., 192.

political evolution of French-Canada can be traced within this ever-changing mould of nationalist thought.

An immediate notion which must be dispelled about the meaning of nationalism in Quebec is the traditional, static interpretation given to the concept. Naturally, we can admit that there has been a constant nucleus in the philosophy of nationalism in French-Canadian society. But to state that the essence of French-Canadian nationalism has been a constant desire to preserve and maintain the culture and heritage of French-Canada within a legal political entity and against all the forces of external encroachment, is to misconstrue the true meaning of this phenomenal force.

Such an image leads to a conception of nationalism which is essentially defensive and isolationist, and therefore somewhat static. While it is readily conceded that this was the very interpretation rendered to the concept by the provincial power elite throughout most of French-Canada's contemporary history, it has been, by no means, the only one.

The "quiet revolution" was essentially a re-interpretation and a re-direction of the forces of nationalism in Quebec. The essence was constant, but the manner in which this culture was to be protected involved a dramatic shift in political philosophy among those who fashioned this new orientation. Thus we can view the interchange of nationalist ideas in Quebec as a very dynamic and evolving force centering around a constant core of cultural preservation.

It is for this reason that traditional definitions given to the meaning of nationalism are seldom appropriate. The inappropriateness results from their inability to grasp the dynamism of such a force. Instead of defining nationalism as a group consciousness of common values, culture, heritage and sense of collective purpose, perhaps we should refer to the late André Laurendeau's meaning of nationalism. In a simple

but far more relevant fashion nationalism implied

"...a very precise, conscious grasp of French-Canadian values and of the dangers that threaten them, as well as a fervent desire to work for their defense and development." 2

The latter conceptualization of the term highlights the insufficiency of common definitions of nationalism. In French-Canadian society a proper definition of the concept must include references to a continual unfolding of nationalist ideas, implying the evolutionist tendencies of the nationalist cause.

For the purposes of this paper and following our previous reasoning we can define nationalism, in the French-Canadian context, as follows: it is a dynamic, evolving force of awareness within a collective entity, of their distinctive culture, traditions, language and values. This awareness is translated into an active pursuit of goals and policies whose primary objective is the preservation and development of the French-Canadian nation. These policies are both aggressive and regressive, depending on the philosophy of the power elite who enact them.

The definition is a composite of four primary factors, all of which imply an active orientation. Nationalism is an awareness of the need to protect common values and traditions, which is effected primarily by the pursuit of policies, either isolationist or participatory (vis-à-vis the mainstream of North American society) by the political party in power.

The most significant point is that nationalism is considered as either aggressive or regressive.

This dichotomy is the most suitable one for the purposes of constructing a theoretical model of nationalism in French-Canadian society. The evolution of nationalism in Quebec has followed a dialectic pattern, emerging from the constant inter-

2-André Laurendeau, "Is there a crisis of nationalism?" in Ramsay Cook, ed., French Canadian Nationalism, Toronto, Macmillan, 1969, p. 257

action of two opposing themes on how best the French-Canadian culture can be preserved and maintained. While the basic premise has remained constant -- the survival of French-Canada -- there has always been essential disagreement in the choice of nationalist policies whose primary purpose is to ensure the continuation of this basic premise. While susceptible to the charge of oversimplification, it is posited that the history of contemporary nationalism and nationalist policies in Quebec can be analyzed within the context of a dichotomous relationship between aggressive and regressive nationalism. Nationalism in Quebec has been regressive when the elite who espouse it has advocated policies which have been defensive and isolationist in theme. Aggressive nationalism refers to those policies, advocated by the intellectual and power elites, that have encouraged a participatory offensive approach to the problems of maintaining the culture intact.

Prior to examining the contemporary historical development of French Canada within this concept of aggressive and regressive nationalism, we should broadly outline the philosophical meaning of these two terms and the manner in which either approach had been incorporated and affected by the economic and social orientation of the ruling elite.

In an excellent article by Jean-Marc Léger, a comparison is presented between the intellectual thought of classical and neo-nationalists in French Canada. It is a comparison which enables us to comprehend certain tenets of the concept of regressive nationalism. This form of nationalism, which had a tremendous impact on the evolution of French-Canadian society, displayed five chief characteristics. It was

- 1) defensive, it emphasized the preservation of the traditions and position of the French Canadian community;
- 2) it became directed toward the defense of language and culture, being interested in politics only when the autonomy of Quebec seemed at stake;
- 3) apostolic and formalistic, it tended to act more by means of propaganda and campaigns to influence public opinion

than by the modification of political structures; 4) traditionalist, it stood aloof from the industrial revolution without complaint, it willingly abandoned the world of big business to the Anglo-American element; 5) conservative and bourgeois, it became an adjunct of the middle classes, and was impervious to economic and social nationalism. It was gradually cut off from the masses -- except in time of crisis -- and became a partisan of economic liberalism.³

Along with Leger's categorizations, perhaps the single most significant addition to the character of regressive nationalism concerns its essentially ecclesiastical-agrarian nature advocated by the nationalist thought of Canon Groulx and his contemporaries. The Groulx school tended to view nationalism in terms of an ecclesiastical, missionary progression of history in Quebec. While other nations would excel in industry and the production of material values, the French-Canadian nation would surpass all others because of its faithfulness to the spiritual goals of the Church, the institution which has had the predominant position of influence in Quebec. As a result of the formidable influence of the clerical nationalists, the central foundation of this classical nationalism was the pervasive myth of the agrarian life-style and all that it embodied. Basically it was a simplistic and purist notion of encouraging "God-fearing men" to return to or remain in the most natural of environments. It was a myth

...constructed in such a way as to depict eloquently and simply the happy and triumphant aspect of national history: that aspect embodied in the patriarchal family; the hardworking, clean and independent life in the fields; that beautiful web of traditions that linked the present generation with their ancestors; and the stable uniformity of customs and beliefs that bound the parish to the region and the region to the whole territory of

³-Jean-Marc Léger, "Where does neo-nationalism lead?" in Ramsay Cook, op. cit., p. 306.

French Canada. All this was deeply permeated with religious values and placed under the attentive and benevolent authority of the Catholic Church. ⁴

The essential regressiveness implied in this characteristic of ecclesiastical nationalism is that the advocations of this agrarian policy increased in intensity whenever or wherever industrialization threatened. Quite simply, it was a policy based on the naive assumption that the secularizing, nationalist problems of increased industrialization could only be met by increasing the attractiveness of the rural-agrarian way of life. The regressiveness of this nationalist policy lay in its refusal to meet and cope with the problems of industrialization, a force which could not be halted or turned back.

A corollary of this form of ecclesiastical nationalism and yet another characteristic of the grand concept of regressive nationalism was its anti-statist orientation to the problem of economic and social development. The state or government was relegated to the role of an administrator and not an initiator in dealing with the concerns of general welfare. It could only follow and reinforce the clerical dictates and interpretations of Catholic social philosophy which abhorred any form of socialist digression from the patterns of laissez-faire capitalism. It cannot be overemphasized that regressive nationalism has always had clerical-religious overtones. Until mid-century, nationalism was regressive when intellectual thought was dominated by the social philosophy espoused by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The one qualification which should be considered suggests that the Church has often been in the forefront of aggressive nationalism, but only when its antiquated social philosophy has been dramatically changed to conform with the

4-Ibid., p. 296.

realities of existing situations. Nevertheless, the pursuit of nationalist policies in the early stages of contemporary French-Canadian history (1920-1950) has coincided remarkably with the ever-so-gradual "evolution" of Catholic social philosophy.

Turning our attention to the premises of aggressive nationalism, we can cite a number of characteristics which depict its radical differences from the tenets of regressive nationalism.

Nationalism, and nationalist policies, have been aggressive when its orientation has been directed toward the goal of reinstating French-Canadian society into the mainstream of North American economic development and social thought. Thus, aggressive nationalism is 1) participatory, when it has defined the preservation of its values in terms which have encouraged French-Canadians to gain control of the political and economic mechanisms of their society, thereby permitting them to deal forcefully with the problems brought about by such issues as industrialization and urbanization; 2) social, when it has advocated state intervention into the problems of social welfare, thereby enabling the political élite to control and promote the social welfare of its citizenry; 3) secular, where nationalist policy has rejected the strictly theological approach to values and history, where "national concerns are made up of its entire social structure in terms of its political, social and economic factors, of which the Church is only one part, and of which the essential parts are the state and the economic system."⁵

In this instance, secular does not necessarily mean anti-clerical or anti-religious. There certainly can be aspects of religious support in the meaning of aggressive nationalism, but it is only when religious doctrine has transformed and advocated necessary reforms to the social order in a manner

⁵-Léon Dion, "Pessimistic nationalism: its source, meaning and validity," in Ramsay Cook, op. cit., p. 296.

which does not imply isolationism or escapism. In fact, we will see how the Church itself has been at times in the vanguard of aggressive nationalism and we will also note that this had occurred only when Catholic social philosophy has changed drastically.

Prior to concluding our remarks about the differences between aggressive and regressive nationalism, we should examine the relationship between nationalist thought and governmental attempts to interpret the prevalent theme of nationalism through the pursuit of various "nationalist" policies.

The reason for the predominance of regressive nationalism throughout much of the contemporary history of French Canada is due to one significant factor. Because of the enormous influence of the religious hierarchy, and the political philosophy of Taschereau and Duplessis who, as provincial premiers, accounted for thirty-five of the forty years between 1920 and 1960, the fibre of nationalism and the pursuit of nationalist policies were very much the pawns of the clerico-political elite. Thus, from the beginning of the industrial era around the early 1920's until the first seeds of the Quiet Revolution were planted in the mid-1950's, nationalism was the tool of the political administration. Regardless of the issue, nationalism in Quebec was subservient to the dictates of economic liberalism. Thus its potency as a dynamic ideological guideline petrified as it became institutionalized and modified by the lengthy administrations of two economically conservative parties. This institutionalization automatically meant the implicit creation of legal structures which rigidified the ideology, thereby rendering it subservient to the whims of the power élite, who were in turn guided by the exploitive nature of economic liberalism. Nationalism soon became the defined tool of the power élite, thereby losing its position as the spontaneous motivator of governmental activity. In Léger's

terms, nationalism became formalistic, forcing all the progressive-reformist elements into an "anti-nationalist" coalition. The ruling party defined the scope and limitations of nationalism and, in so doing, became its master, not its follower. The dictates were founded firmly on the practical demands of economic liberalism and thinly disguised behind policies of "cultural preservation and betterment". In short, nationalism was equated with the philosophy of the governmental party. This view cannot but lead to a dialectical interpretation of the evolution of nationalism in Quebec. With the incorporation of the nationalist ethic into the governmental philosophy and power structure -- two facets which hardly suffer alteration in the lifetime of an administration -- the population was actually cut off from the dynamic aspects of the force. The result invites the Hegelian antithesis. The governmental interpretations of the nationalist concept are static and therefore reactionary. The manipulation of the ideology invites opposition from those forces who feel that the government has betrayed the nationalism they supposedly espouse. These "anti-nationalists" have appeared, with variations on the same reformist theme, in every election between 1935 and 1960. While their goals were different, all these academics, clerics and politicians who comprised these various opposition forces advocated a new nationalism without the conservative trimmings. Significantly, all these forces advocated differing degrees of an aggressive-participatory nationalism. Yet the only time in recent French-Canadian history when aggressive nationalism became a progressive force with institutional support was with the advent of Paul Sauvé's reforming Union Nationale and subsequently with the electoral victory of the Lesage Liberals in 1960. This is not to say that the "quiet revolution" heralded the birth of a new nationalist philosophy. This is

hardly the case, since every election since 1935 has been a confrontation between the various themes of aggressive and regressive nationalism, as previously defined. While the following quotation is somewhat rhetorical, the description is apt:

To say that everything began in 1960 would be too easy, and, what is more, it would be inaccurate and an oversimplification. Rather let us say that something new began in 1960, or more correctly, that something took shape and began to express itself, something that had been gestating for a long time. It was what has been a little too summarily called the reconciliation of the 'social' and the 'national', the link between the political and the cultural, the movement or transference of national feeling from resistance and preservation to conquest and invention. Men who called themselves 'anti-nationalists' and thought they were, when they were really anti-conservatives, who rose up against nationalism, in the name of democracy, progress, respect for human values, social justice, and intellectual freedom, discovered that these values were eminently national...." 6

What we have tried to create in these previous pages is a skeletal design for the analysis of contemporary French-Canadian history, based on the continuous interaction of aggressive and regressive nationalism. The merit of this approach will hopefully lie in the suggestion that this interaction has determined, to a very great extent, the cohesiveness of ethnic solidarity and the existence of class-consciousness. Since the basic premise of regressive nationalism is the protection of the French-Canadian culture through defensive and isolationist policies, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that the regressive form of nationalism has been the greatest contributor to ethnic solidarity. Con-

6-Jean-Marc Léger, op. cit., p. 308

versely, the adoption of an aggressive-participatory nationalism could be conducive to an awakening of class-consciousness. This suggestion is based on the premise that aggressive nationalism means that the power elite is prepared to defend its culture in a participatory manner, controlling the main sources of economic and political power while ensuring that French-Canadian society is thrust into the social and economic mainstream of North American society. The analysis which follows will attempt to sketch the development of these two forces and present historically-based arguments as to why aggressive nationalism has replaced its regressive counterpart.

CHAPTER THREE

A THEORY OF NATIONALISM IN
FRENCH CANADIAN SOCIETY--2

Much of what has been written on the historical and cultural developments of French-Canadian society has been devoted to the problems of selecting a thematic schema within which these complex developments can be analyzed. There appears to be a concensus of opinion which suggests the inclusion of three fundamental concepts in this framework. The first theme posits that the analysis of French-Canadian society is the analysis of a minority in a continuous struggle for cultural survival. A cursory glance at Canadian history leads one to understand the depth and determination of Quebec's confrontation with real and sometimes imaginary external political and social forces which have threatened her survival. The lessons obtained from the "tyrannous rule of the anglo majority" in such questions as the Riel Affair, the Manitoba and Northwest Territories school issue, the token participation in Britain's Boer War and the divisive conscription crises of the two major wars coupled with Ottawa's centralizing policies had resulted in the isolation of the French-Canadian minority coaxing her into a position of defensive nationalism. These political issues together with the enduring cohesiveness of their Roman Catholicism encouraged an ethnic solidarity which grew to become almost impenetrable. This norm of cultural survival has formed the nucleus for the major policy orientations of every provincial administration since the "renegade" rule of Mercier's *Partie Nationale*. While the suggested means for maintaining the cultural entity have varied considerably, none of them have consciously betrayed the indivisible norm.

If considered alone, the persual of policies insuring the survival of the culture is certainly not a unique or exceptional

theme. It does become so, however, when it is intertwined with the second concept in the historical framework. The extensive influence of the Roman Catholic Church and its conservative social philosophy on the beliefs and life-styles of French Canadians is a factor of considerable importance when studying the effects of nationalist policies in Quebec. What is of extreme importance in this concept is that the Church, until quite recently, had always managed to easily convince the nationalist intelligentsia that of all existing institutions none played a greater role than her in defending and maintaining French-Canadian culture. Raised under the benevolent authoritarian-hierarchical principles of mid-nineteenth century Roman Catholicism, most French Canadians accepted the predominant position enjoyed by the Church. As such she was not only the consoler and defender but the spiritual and moral vanguard of the society, rarely meeting with opposition when she emphasized and requested obedience to the dictates of a dogmatic social philosophy. This philosophy was interpreted by a clerical élite who reflected the essence of the hierarchical authoritarian structure.

The last theme, which is not of particular relevance to our examination, concerns the belief posited by many that the ideology of democracy is an alien concept in French-Canadian society. French Canada has never developed an appreciation for the philosophy of parliamentary democracy. This line of reasoning has often been cited as the cause for the outrageous political and administrative scandals which have played a dominant role

in French Canada's political history.¹

We will now examine the manner in which the two themes of cultural survival and the social philosophy of Roman Catholicism have resulted in the creation of regressive nationalism!

In order to appreciate the evolution of aggressive and regressive nationalist thought in contemporary French-Canadian society - which, for our examination begins with the industrial era around the early 1920's - it is necessary to examine the "evolution of Catholic social philosophy and the predominant position the institution had obtained as the official mold of nationalist opinion. Thirty years after the publication of the papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum, in 1891 the Catholic Church in Quebec was still structuring its spiritual and social philosophy on the antiquated guidelines of the past - Vatican I era. While Rerum Novarum had called for a revolutionary re-examination of the tenets of laissez-faire capitalism and a more compassionate approach to the secular problems of the faithful, the clerical elite in French Canada had managed to isolate their followers from

1- The manner in which these three themes interact comprise the implicit theoretical framework of at least one major work on French-Canadian politics. See Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism, pp. 3-20, 192-201, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1963. There have been numerous studies which have isolated one or two of these themes, and they all followed a similar course of analysis. While the list is exhaustive, since it includes those works of French-Canadian apologists where the theme is implied and assumed, some representative studies are found in Ramsay Cook's anthology on French-Canadian Nationalism, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto 1969. See in particular P. E. Trudeau, Quebec on the Eve of the Asbestos Strike" originally appearing in his La Grève de L'amiante, pp. 32-48. Also from the same anthology see the excellent article by Jean-C. Bonenfant and Jean-C. Fabarreau, "Cultural and Political Implications of French-Canadian Nationalism" pp. 18-31. Everett C. Hughes' classic study of the effects of Anglo-American industrialization upon a French-Canadian town, French Canada in Transition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1943,

the paths of change. In essence, the social and political remained within the sphere of the spiritual and because of this the Church continued its existence as the benevolent dictator over the obedient masses. Within a moral context, the clergy interpreted the doctrines of Christianity by advocating two forceful ideals. The first dealt with the concept of the ideal Christian. Catholicism was the medium through which man could attain the highest honor of spiritual perfection. Thus it became the mechanism which encouraged man to view the material world as an evil testing ground through which man must pass and thereby prove worthy of God's favour. It was the Church on earth which helped man overcome the influences of materialism and worldly desires. The ideal Christian would remain true to his Catholic ancestors by modeling his life on theirs. Thus he would refuse to be a part of anything the Church suggested was against Catholic principles. In this ideal, Catholic social philosophy permeated every aspect of French-Canadian life.

also emphasizes the role of these three themes in Quebec. For a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the role of the Church in the developments of French-Canadian nationalism see Michael K. Oliver, The Social and Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists, 1920-1945, unpublished doctoral Dissertation, McGill University, 1956.

Some interesting material has been written on the controversial and delicate question of the democratic orientation of political history in Quebec. P. E. Trudeau's remarks in "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec", Federalism and the French Canadians, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto: 1968 pp. 103-124, are particularly scathing, viz...as a minority they hammered the process of parliamentary government into a defensive weapon of racial warfare, and as Catholics they believed that authority might well be left to descend from God in God's good time and in God's good way". Finally there is the Hartzian interpretation of the development of the feudal-authoritarian fragment in French Canada found in Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" in Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1964, pp. 219-275.

Everything was considered in the spiritual context and therefore even secular influences were attacked with a religious connotation. In this traditional and encompassing orientation it was natural to expect that the Church would vigorously attempt to maintain existing institutions, for the reasoning followed that a change in one would subsequently encourage change in others thereby undermining the influence of this philosophy. In this context it is simple to appreciate the concern given by the clergy to the maintenance of the rural-agricultural life-style. This was the most natural of environments to the Christian man. Subsequently any change to its structure was a threat to the stability of the social, i.e. Catholic order.

The second major ideal of Roman Catholicism was founded on the premise of its essentially missionary role in the affairs of man. The concept was much more dynamic and zealous than the simple principles embodied in the ideal Christian man. The Church was convinced that God had selected the French Canadian race to perpetuate and spread the spiritual goals of Roman Catholicism. This missionary zeal had been one of the never-changing cornerstones of the faith and was the dynamic force behind French-Canadian Catholicism for well over two centuries. The remarks of Mgrs. L.-F.-R. Laflèche in 1866 and of L.-A. Pâquet in 1915 attest to the longevity of this belief:

"As for us French Canadians, whom Catholic teachings have made the fortunate possessors of all-encompassing truth, let us strengthen our faith in the great consolation of our holy religious dogma, with its reassuring presages as to our national future. So long as we remain faithful

to the mission entrusted to our forebears, so long as we continue steadily, straight toward the goal assigned us by Providence, we shall have nothing to fear. No power, no human devices will ever succeed in checking our progress or prevent us from fulfilling our destiny here as people.... What is the mission Providence gave our fathers? The mission with which Providence entrusted French Canadians is basically religious in nature: it is, namely, to convert the unfortunate local infidel population to Catholicism, and to expand the Kingdom of God by developing a predominantly Catholic mentality." 2

Consider the following statement by Mgr. L.-A. Pâquet.

It is interesting to note that this lofty spiritualism appeared almost half a century after Lafleche's exhortations and on the eve of the acceleration of the industrial era.

" 'Populum istum formavi mihi; laudam meam narrabit.' This people have I formed for myself; they shall show forth my praise. In this language of such lofty meaning and in these inspired words I see indications of the noble mission entrusted to our nationality. I think I discern in this light the exalted vocation of the French race in North America. . . . Yes, let us not forget, we are not only a religious people, we are messengers of the spirit of religion. Our mission is less to handle capital than to stimulate ideas; less to light the furnaces of factories than to maintain and spread the glowing fires of religion and thought and to help them cast their light into the distance." 3

Naturally the Church had a vested interest in keeping the focus of the two ideals in the forefront of French-Canadian intellectual thought. So long as the spiritual aspects of

Catholic social philosophy remained as motivating mechanisms in the social action of French Canadians, the Church would not lose its carefully cultivated position of eminence.

In isolating the French Canadians as the master race in affairs spiritual, the clergy was directly responsible for creating within these people, a consciousness of their religious and cultural differences from the English population surrounding their borders. While never flaunting the federal bargain, the Church played the supreme role in isolating French-Canadian culture from the secular and material influences which continually threatened her survival. French Canadians had no reason to doubt the logic advanced by Mgr. Laflèche whose words were as meaningful in the 1920's as they were in 1866. "The Church hierarchy in Canada", the Monsignor stated, "has always been fundamental to our life as a nation....The providential survival of our institutions is yet further proof of the powerful vitalizing life-blood that religion confers upon whatever it influences".⁴ The religious contract between the clerical interpreters of Catholic social philosophy and the population who received the thoughts of their wisdom was binding but not harshly demanding. The faithful had a primary allegiance to the dictates of Roman Catholicism as interpreted by the clergy "...in order to preserve and consolidate the moral unity, without which all our

2- Mgr. L.-F.-R. Laflèche, "Quelques Considerations sur les rapports de la société civile avec la religion et la famille," translated and found in Ramsay Cook, op. cit. page 98 and first published in the original in 1866.

3- Mgr. L.-A.-Pâquet, "Sermon sur la vocation de la race française en Amérique", translated and found in Ramsay Cook, op. Cit. page 153. Further evidence to depict the Church's unswerving loyalty to the missionary task of French-Canadian

efforts would be in vain, the most essential things are a filial obedience to the teachings of the Church and a complete submission to the authority of the leaders who represent among us the power of the Church." ⁵

This emphasis on the spiritual vocation of French Canadians formed the core around which Lionel Groulx constructed his nationalist thought. Many of his contemporaries in L'Action Française shared the same belief modified slightly by the equally important goal of restoring the French language to a position of prominence in all spheres of activity.

The rather sorry state of secular influence in the traditional, clerical-dominated nationalism of the early 1920's was depicted by Henri Bourassa when he stated:

"If there is a ruling class here, it is certainly the clergy. We have allowed our viewpoints to be permeated by such a curious pettiness that it has become nearly impossible to talk about the French-Canadian clergy, its history, and its social role, without being charged with toadyism or with sacrilegious insolence. This derives, no doubt, from the unique role that the French-Canadian clergy has played." ⁶

While clerical thoughts dominated the social outlook of French Canadians in the immediate post war era, it was the economic policies of the provincial administration which brought about the rapid restructuring of nationalist thought in

(3) Catholicism can be found in an article written for the nationalist group L'Action Française by Father J.-M.-R. Villeneuve, O.M.I. in 1922. Entitled "And Our Dispersed Brethren...?" a typical sentence reminds French Canadians that "...an apostolic nation...is a divine grace that we would do well to request in our prayers and to become worthy of by meditation..." The article appears in Ramsay Cook, op. cit. pp. 188-202.

4- Mgr. L.-F.-R. Laflèche, op. cit. p. 105

5- Mgr. L.-A. Pâquet, op. cit. p. 153.

this time-period. Industrialization began in earnest under the Liberal administration of Alexander Taschereau. He was correctly convinced that the economic invigoration of the province lay in a future of industrialization and the influx of foreign capital needed to develop the latent national resources of French Canada. Yet it was the manner in which this process of development was carried out that effected the confrontation between the laissez-faire liberals and the traditional, religiously oriented nationalists. Taschereau's solution to the problems of economic development lay in his attitude toward the roles of the state and private enterprise. He encouraged economic exploitation by allowing foreign companies and capital to enter the province without the reins of government control. While property depended on the foreign exploitation of resources, Taschereau equated governmental control with "state-paternalism". Thus the task of development lay strictly in the hands of private enterprise. Although his "free-hand" policies were later to be condemned by clerics and nationalists alike, his initial reasoning was based on practical and acceptable logic. Any form of democratic socialism was considered anathema by the clerical élite. State control would mean the erosion of the religious power structure and the substitution of primarily secular control.

6- Henri Bourassa, "Le Patriotisme canadien-français, ce qu'il est, ce qu'il doit être" translated and found in Ramsay Cook, op. cit. p. 126.

The growth of opposition to the economic policies of the Taschereau administration came from a number of sources all having varied reasons for criticizing the process of industrialization. The most vocal opposition came from the clerical élite. It is significant to note that their criticisms were not directed to how the Taschereau régime handled the process of industrialization and the administration's policies of allowing uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Rather, their opposition centered on the whole concept and meaning of industrialization. The process was considered the most serious threat to the French-Canadian way of life, since it directly attacked the society's most stable component - that of the rural agricultural base. With the influx of foreign owned companies and the subsequent appeal it presented to the impoverished segment of French Canada, the traditional basis of the society was drastically altered. Along with the threat to the stability of the rural areas, industrialization introduced a set of values which were strictly secular and materialistic in orientation. Thus the initial clerical reaction vigorously opposed the entire spectrum of industrial ideology.

Another source of opposition came from the spiritually-oriented lay nationalists. While they perceived the explicit threat to the traditional values of the society from the industrializing process, they were not adamantly opposed to the entire concept as were the clerical élite. They sorrowfully resigned themselves to the inevitability of the gradual

alteration and directed their attacks to the methods employed by the Taschereau administration. Specifically they were not so much opposed to the ideals of capitalism as they were to the fact that the new economic alteration was controlled and directed by foreign enterprises of predominately English and American origins. While the Church was concerned with the threat industrialization posed to the spiritual and social structure of the society, the lay nationalists, especially those associated with the influential L'Action Française, feared that uncontrolled foreign exploitation posed a direct threat to the language and culture of French Canada. Their objections were realistic and well-founded. Taschereau's belief in the philosophy of laissez-faire capitalism led to the creation of foreign owned monopolies which actually undermined the fledgling French-Canadian entrepreneurial segment. Because of the technical superiority of the financial élite who managed these foreign companies, the French Canadian with his liberal-classical education was placed in a subordinate position. We will now examine how these two forces of opposition confronted the policies of the conservative Taschereau administration and consider why the alternatives suggested were essentially regressive in nature.

The nationalism and the pursual of nationalist policies evident in the early stages of industrial acceleration were essentially regressive in nature because they could not cope realistically with the problems which industrialization presented. The nationalist policy followed by the Taschereau régime in

allowing the overt manipulation of the economy by private enterprise did succeed in industrializing the agrarian society. But the policy had the effect of isolating both the clerical élite and the lay nationalists who vigorously opposed the direction which the policy had taken. The reason why the policies of the Taschereau regime and the alternatives presented by the two main opposing groups were basically regressive is due to the following points. 1) Taschereau refused to interfere with the manner in which private enterprise had successfully gained control of the economy. 2) The Church, in answer to the threat of industrialization, advocated a vigorous return to the land campaign. 3) Initially, the lay nationalists of L'Action Française, had refused to consider the possibilities of state-controlled industries. Rather they sought a policy which would greatly bolster the rapidly decreasing smaller enterprises of French-Canadian businessmen. In short, all three groups in the political and social structure of the province were unable to present realistic alternatives to a problem which would eventually force the beleaguered French-Canadian culture into an isolationist and defensive position. The most incredible fact involved the subsequent behaviour of the Liberal régime, when prior to the election of 1936, they suddenly realized that their policy of unrestrained laissez-faire capitalism had estranged a sizeable portion of the electorate who had become disillusioned with industrialism due to the depression and who had become aware of their subordinate role in the industrial hierarchy. Heeding the advice of a worried clergy, to control the growing appeal of the political opposition, Taschereau reversed his position and advocated a futile and unrealistic

policy of a return-to-the-land. Thus the solution provided to the electorate was one of "ignoring the problem with the hope that it would eventually disappear". As late as 1936, the official nationalist policy of the Liberal régime was essentially defensive, non-participatory and as a result, isolationist.⁷ The nationalist thought that had emerged in the early 1920's from both clerical and lay sources was, in a different manner, as equally regressive. The state of nationalist ideology in Quebec throughout most of Taschereau's régime has been adequately surveyed by P. E. Trudeau when he posited the following:

"...pitted against an English, Protestant, democratic, materialistic, business-minded, and industrial environment, our nationalism's system of self-preservation glorified every contrary tendency; and made a cult of the French language, Catholicism, authoritarianism, idealism, the rural way of life, including the myth of a return to the land." 8

Before we complete our discussion on the early orientation of nationalist ideology in Quebec we need to examine two more developments which affected the political and social history of French Canada in the industrial era from 1930-1935. The first concerns the development of the trade-union movement in Quebec. The second and more significant one concerns the creation of French Canada's first aggressively nationalist political party, headed by Maurice Duplessis, formed to combat the regressive policies of the governing Liberal Party.

7- To the Taschereau liberals cultural survival meant economic prosperity even if it came from the hands of foreign capitalism. A Quebec historian describes Taschereau's economic philosophy in

While the Church was the most vigorous opponent of industrialization in the early 1920's it was not about to rest, satisfied that it had exposed the moral dangers of economic liberalism and capitalism. As we have seen, the clergy had interpreted the encyclical of Rarum Novarum in a manner which suited their traditional orientation and as such they did not necessarily condemn the capitalist system for its economic abuses against the working class, but rather its condemnation was leveled against an economic ideology which prevented the fruition of traditionalist values.

The Church-sponsored formation of Quebec's first Catholic Trade Union in 1921 - La Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada - came as a result of the clergy's concern about the secularizing influences of industrialization on the new labor stratum and not as a consequence of their interest to assure the Quebec worker of a socio-political mechanism which would champion their cause for just wages and improved working

(7)the following manner"...il ne croit pas à la colonisation mais à l'industrie, il ne croit pas à l'étatisme mais à l'initiative privée, il ne croit pas à la chance mais au labour. Il veut l'aisance des oeuvriers, mais dans le respect des droits patronaux. Il tient la prospérité des grandes firmes pour la source majeur du bien-être général". This quote is taken from Robert Rumilly, *Historie de la Province de Quebec*, XXV, Alexander Taschereau, Montreal, 1952, p. 20 as it appears on page 31-32 of Hebert Orienu, op. cit.

8- P. E. Trudeau, "On the Eve of the Asbestos Strike" in Ramsay Cook, op. cit. p. 33. It is interesting to note here that the myth of a return-to-the-land was a long time dying in prominent clerical circles. As late as 1945, Father R. Arès, S. J. stated that "the industrial revolution could only have a disastrous effect on our people...we have neither the capital, nor the industrial and business traditions; nor the great technical schools; and, above all, we have no clearly defined social and national doctrine. The countryside's lessening role is a great misfortune, because of the primary importance of rural areas in the life of nations in general, and of our nation in particular...From the social and ethical point of view, large cities, particularly

conditions. In effect, "The clergy, at the right moment, as soon as it proved feasible, did for the workers what it had done for all other classes of citizens...It once again acted here... as a far-sighted and well-inspired initiator."⁹ In a sense, clerical paternalism created the syndicates for purely spiritual and protective reasons. Eventual labor initiatives for wage parity and solidarity resulted as but a by-product of the primary goal. "It had been necessary to insulate the French Canadian from the ideas and value systems of a secular world by ensuring that his various fields of activity were concentrated in organizations inspired by Catholic doctrines and principles."¹⁰

(8) in times of unemployment wear down men's bodies and souls, disrupt families, breed quarrels and hatreds, foment revolutionary ideas and social unrest."

9- See P. E. Trudeau, "On the Eve of the Asbestos Strike" in Ramsay Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 38 when he states, "This spurious use of papal authority to support nationalism was abetted by a misunderstanding of the pope's pronouncements against the abuses of capitalism. The pope censured the capitalist system for keeping part of the proletariat in a state of abject poverty and for preventing the development among a great many people of truly human values; whereas our clerical-nationalist doctrine seemed mainly to hold it against the system that it kept French Canadians in a state of economic subjection, and prevented the developments among them of predominantly nationalist values."

10-*Ibid*, p. 46. The early union movement was not only blessed with a religious benefactor in the personage of the Church, but also with "far-sighted and well-inspired" leaders who adopted the same social outlook as their sponsors. The remarks by a labour leader, Alfred Charpentier, in *Le Devoir* in 1921 exemplifies this point. "It would indeed seem that God has allowed our people to grow in this corner of the country, despite past persecutions, so that it might become the purifying element of the whole Canadian nation...Our Catholic workers are also called upon by Providence to do their share in the task of protecting the working classes of the country against the dangers that lie in wait."

The same principle of organization was applied to the farmers union - Union Catholique des Cultivateurs - formed in 1924. While the Church was more directly concerned with improving the lot of the farmer in this instance, the primary motivation for this "progressive stand"¹¹ differed little from the philosophy behind the industrial union: If industrialization and its effects were to be firmly halted, then the agrarian policies had to have material attractions and benefits which could be promised to farmers. The Church spread its influence in many of these early unions or syndicates and fostered the formation of groups for students and workers alike. Aside from controlling the philosophical orientation of these early labour movements, the Church had yet another reason for championing the cause of farmers and industrial workers. Although Leo's Rerum Novarum condemned the abuses of the capitalist system, the encyclical was even more vehement with its denunciations of socialism, which at that time was strongly under the influence of Marxist doctrine. The Quebec clergy, not surprisingly, were in complete agreement with their spiritual superior. Yet the direction of their attacks against socialism were not so much aimed at the "statist" ideology it advocated but at the totally anti-religious character of the movement. To the clergy and the Catholic labour leaders, the neutral or non-confessional international unions represented the vehicle by which these doctrines of "atheistic-socialism" could be propagated.

11-Herbert F. Quinn, op. cit., p. 40

"The a-religious character of the unions almost inevitably confronts their members with a choice between two loyalties: to their religion, or to their labour association. The international labour movement, in view of its doctrinal sources, no more guarantees order than does the revolutionary individualism from which it flows; no more, indeed, than does communism, towards which this movement is lead by a national, so to speak, progression." 12

Another obstacle which prevented the labour organizations from evolving into a militant movement to protect and advance the economic interests of the working class lay in the conservative philosophy and the labour legislation of the Taschereau régime. The Liberal Party was not about to discourage the income of foreign capital and exploitive enterprises by encouraging the trade-union's position. The government stayed clear of policies which would provide wage parity and collective bargaining. The government's arguments were based on the grounds that such issues were more adequately handled by the non-federated company unions and loosely affiliated Catholic syndicates. Thus, rather than restricting labour influence by introducing legislation, the Taschereau Liberals simply suppressed labor demands by allowing the company-dominated unions to settle the issues. Thus, "The net result of Liberal labour policy was that the formation of trade-unions was a slow and difficult process and the vast majority of Quebec workers still remained unorganized by the early 1930's." 13

12-Esdras Minville, quoted from P. E. Trudeau, "On the Eve of the Asbestos Strike", p. 46.

13-Herbert F. Quinn, op. cit. p. 32

Regardless of the position of clerical dominance and the economic policies of the Taschereau government, the depression had a revolutionary affect on the trade-union movement and the development of nationalist thought. While the labour movement did not present an electoral threat to the incumbent party, the leaders and organizers had taken a decidedly more militant stand against the economic abuses permitted by the government. This redirection in orientation was primarily due to the "secularlization" of the labour movement. This did not mean the abandonment of spiritual values, as the movement was still strictly confessional in nature, rather it was the depression and the emergence of economic problems which necessitated a re-allocation of priorities and a larger slice of the financial pie, for the common labourer.

This re-allocation of priorities was also exhorted by a small, yet influential, core of left wing nationalists who politicized their beliefs and presented the Quebec electorate with a set of constructive reforms and alternatives, the likes of which they had never witnessed before. The premise of this now "social" nationalism was a radical departure from traditional thought.

"Its adherents maintained that if French was to survive as a distinct cultural entity it must accommodate itself effectively to the new industrial system that had developed. French Canadians had to acquire the scientific knowledge and essential techniques of modern industrial society as effectively as have their English-speaking compatriots to be able to compete and cooperate with them as equals. And according to this line of thought, the clergy had to abandon much of the direct control over secular activities in favour of a new lay leadership." 14

The Church was also trapped within a philosophical vacuum. While still espousing the virtues of an agrarian society and supporting a naive return-to-the-land policy, their influence had been continually undermined by the unhaltable tide of industrialization. The clergy correctly realized that unless it re-adapted its antiquated social philosophy to conform to the radical new developments it would quickly fall from its position of prominence. The appearance in 1931 of Pius XII's Quadragesimo Anno provided them with the redirection they so badly needed. The encyclical departed from previous ~~TEACHINGS~~ and officially endorsed some of the tenets of democratic socialism so long as the doctrine conformed to Christian values. But again the Church was spurred to action not so much by the blatant social injustices evident in the province but, more directly, by religious-spiritual concerns.

"The depression had resulted in widespread dissatisfaction with the capitalist system, and unless the Church put forward a programme of reform within the framework of Catholic social philosophy it was quite conceivable that it would be forced by the growth of a socialist or communist movement which might not only be secularist but even militantly atheistic." 15

In a previous section we hypothesized that the orientation of legislative policies to insure the survival and development of French-Canadian culture was a function of how the ruling elite interpreted nationalist thought. So long as the objective of cultural survival was not destroyed,

14- Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto: 1957. p. 56.

15- Herbert F. Quinn, op. cit., p. 56

Taschereau could successfully interpret the meaning of nationalism so that it coincided with his own political and economic philosophy. With the supportive role of the religious hierarchy, the Liberal administration had institutionalized nationalism, thereby providing the electorate with a legitimizing source for its regressive policies. With the re-direction of Catholic social philosophy, stimulated by the publication of the new encyclical, the Taschereau regime and the institutionalized nationalism it professed came under close scrutiny. While the Church was reluctant to abandon its position or the merits of the agrarian life-style it had, by 1934, become increasingly concerned about the economic policies of the party in power. Yet, the most serious threat to the stability of the administration emerged from within the ruling party and from external sources. It was the challenge of a small core of radical Liberals coupled with the support of the secular nationalist intellectuals which eventually brought down the Taschereau regime in 1936. The Provincial Conservative party, suffering from its affiliation to the Tory-oriented parent party had been in opposition for forty odd years and had not been able to dislodge the Liberal administration. While the party was to provide the leader for the new radical coalition, disenchanted Liberals and the opposition Conservatives, it had not been able to present effective alternatives to the Liberal policies. Thus the task of organizing a political movement based on reforms of an aggressive participatory nature fell to Paul Gouin and his newly formed L'Action Liberale Nationale. When the movement broke with the Liberal Party in 1935, it had amassed the support of the Union des Cultivateurs Catholique, L'Action Francaise and progressive elements within the Provincial Conservative Party led by Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis.

The result of the coalition between the opportunistic Conservative party and the radical reformists of the A. L. N.

led to the formation of the Union Nationale under the capable leadership of Duplessis. While the new leader's persistence in uncovering the administrative malpractices of the incumbent party can be cited as a major contributing factor to the victory of the Union Nationale in the election of 1936, the new party had successfully offered the electorate a set of viable alternatives to the existing policies of the Liberal Government. In fact, the initial political philosophy of the UN represented the first attempt by a political movement to obtain legitimacy for a form of aggressive nationalism. The platform included reforms which would affect the entire social and economic structure of the society. The reform party advocated the destruction of financial monopolies and the effective governmental control of foreign business concerns; the transfer of hydro-electric control from private to public ownership and other proposals for state-intervention. In the field of Labour policy, they promised legislation to govern minimum wages, hours of work, and pensions. In essence the party adopted a position which recognized the fact that cultural survival depended on the willingness of French Canadians to control the sources of economic power and to re-enter the mainstream of North American social philosophy. Thus, before Duplessis led the party back into the economic conservatism of his Liberal predecessors, the Union Nationale was the first politically organized proponent of an aggressive nationalism.

In summation, and in order to highlight the differences between aggressive and regressive nationalism, perhaps we should re-examine objective criteria of these expressions of nationalism in light of what had transpired between the early part of 1920 and the victory of the reformist Union Nationale. While the interpretation is somewhat oversimplified it will serve to point out the confrontation between these two progressions of nationalist thought.

The Taschereau Liberal Party and the clerical elite were

the foremost proponents of the regressive form of nationalism. They both adhered to a defensive-traditionalist position in dealing with the problems of an industrializing society. While the Church preached a doctrine of apostolicism and the myth of the agrarian life-style, the ruling party stood aloof from the industrial revolution without complaint thereby allowing the elements of economic control to slip into foreign, usually English hands. The "anti-statist" nature of both the political and religious elite permitted social conditions, especially among the labouring classes, to deteriorate to a serious degree. Essentially then, cultural survival was only to be enhanced if French Canadians ignored the secular influences surrounding them.

The pursuit of nationalist policies during the Liberal regime was regressive because it did not encourage French Canadians to participate in controlling their own affairs. In effect these policies led to a form of ethnic solidarity which permeated the entire structure of the society. Regressive nationalism could not lead to any other conclusion.

Nationalism and the pursuits of nationalist policies becomes aggressive when it encourages a participatory, social and generally secular orientation to the problems in a society. It develops from and results in a form of class consciousness which is absent in the philosophy of ethnic solidarity - the by-product of regressive nationalism. The reforms promised by the Duplessis-Gouin coalition were founded on the norms of aggressive nationalism. Embodied in this approach was the principle that cultural survival depended on the willingness and the ability of French Canadians to participate more fully in areas of economic and social concern.

We will now examine the reasons why the aggressive form of nationalism did not remain a constructive part of French-Canadian society during the Duplessis regime.

CHAPTER FOUR

A THEORY OF NATIONALISM IN
FRENCH CANADIAN SOCIETY--3

With the election of Maurice Duplessis as Premier of Quebec in 1935, one of many long-standing traditions began to falter and decay. Due not only to the personal magnetism of the Union Nationale leader but also to his unchallenged ability to mobilize and construct an effective political movement, the party began its painstaking task of eroding the position of prominence which the Catholic Church had so long enjoyed. In effect, there developed a gradual shift of allegiance, a slight re-allocation of values which enabled the Union Nationale to bargain on equal footing for the official position of "defender of the faith." It was not so much an overt challenge to the authority of the Church as it was a process of subtle erosion. The church eventually lost much of its influence over the secular concerns of French Canadian society to the Duplessis regime. Nationalism and nationalist policies were defined and initiated within a primarily secular and political context and not, as previously, under the aegis of clerical concern. The puppet, so to speak, was not liberated, rather the strings of control gradually passed from one master to another.

In pursuing our examination of the historical confrontation between aggressive and regressive nationalism, this concept is of some importance. In a sense it contributes to an understanding of the cyclical evolution of these two forms of nationalism. Where the church had previously been the chief contributor to the tenets of regressive nationalist thought, this role was eventually to pass to a secularized political

movement in the form of the Union Nationale party. While the function of nationalism was essentially the same, namely the preservation of the French-Canadian culture, the state, through the Duplessis regime, was to play a far more definitive role in guiding nationalist policies and creating the guidelines of nationalist thought. The church with its waning influence, was soon relegated to a supportive role becoming a moral watchdog for the legislation enacted by the new regime. Yet, it is very doubtful whether this new and emerging transferral could have developed without the astute leadership provided by the new premier.

If Paul Gouin of the newly formed Action Liberale Nationale thought that coalition with the Duplessis led Conservatives would provide his radical reform group with an effective political base, his expectations were short-lived. To the opportunistic Duplessis, the coalition was nothing more than a marriage of convenience, an appealing springboard which would jaunt an ailing party into power. Yet, it was not only Gouin, but also the electorate who had opted for the reformist platform of aggressive nationalism, who were to be disillusioned. For "le chef" completely reversed himself when he attained power; all but token reforms were paid nothing more than lip-service by the staunch economic conservative. He pursued the same economic policies as his predecessor vis-a-vis foreign economic exploitation. This is not to say that he outwardly supported a return-to-the-land policy, although subsequent

legislation bolstered the attractiveness of agricultural pursuits; rather he continued Tashchereau's earlier policies of encouraging foreign economic exploitation without governmental interference.¹ Inching his party to the right of the political spectrum, Duplessis also refused to nationalize the electric power companies. This was in apt accord with his personal conviction that any form of socialism was nothing but state paternalism. The French entrepreneurial segment also suffered a setback in the wake of Duplessis' economic policies. Duplessis' acquiescence in allowing the proliferation of large business interests which were usually controlled by English sources had a negative effect on the fledging entrepreneurial classes in French Canada.

1- While there are a number of political factors which can be cited to explain Duplessis' turnabout, his personal philosophy on the role of government and the management of the economy was by far the most influential factor. Completely anti-statist, Duplessis favoured a programme of economic development which was patterned exactly on the practices of the previous Liberal administration. Typical of Duplessis' attitude toward foreign exploitation of the province was the paltry one cent a ton tariff on ore carried out of Quebec by foreign concerns. The study of the evolution of nationalist thought during the Duplessis era is very much a study of the policies and communications of the premier himself as he certainly was the most prominent and powerful political figure between 1936-1959. To appreciate the enormous appeal of this man refer to Pierre Laporte, The True Face of Duplessis, Harvest House, Montreal, 1960. Laporte's exercise enables one to understand how nationalist thought and Duplessis' personal political philosophy were synonymous. Also see Leslie Roberts, Le Chef (Maurice Duplessis), Editions du jour, Montreal, 1963. A short, insightful analysis of Duplessis' nationalist thought can be seen in N. K. Oliver's, "Duplessis and Quebec's Intellectuals", in The Canadian Forum, no. 38, 1958, p. 55-57.

As during the Tashchereau regime, the French were again placed in a position of inferiority in the provincial economy. Perhaps the most significant reversal was in the field of social reform, particularly as it affected the labour movement. Concerned about the growing militancy of labour unions and the threat they posed to the stability of the foreign dominated, laissez-faire, capitalist system, Duplessis quickly demonstrated his contempt for organized labour. Through the introduction of Bills 19 and 20, the Union Nationale undermined the effectiveness of the unions' bargaining position. The legislation empowered the government to modify or abrogate at will the collective agreements freely arrived at between employers and employees. Also, by the creation of a Fair Wage Board the government could settle a wage contract dispute by arbitrarily imposing wage guidelines which were often well below labour union quotas.

If Duplessis was reluctant to initiate reforms which would favour the working class, such was not the case in the field of agricultural concerns. Realizing that the rural areas provided Duplessis with a base of strong political support, he introduced legislation which decidedly favoured these rural elements. Rural electrification, extensive road networks and a bountiful supply of agricultural credit were some of the policies which endeared the Union Nationale to the rural voter.

Duplessis, like his predecessor, was firmly convinced that the preservation and development of French-Canadian society lay in the pursuit of laissez-faire capitalism. Thus, by the election of 1939, one of the main tenets of regressive nationalism -- uncontrolled foreign economic domination -- was still firmly entrenched and institutionalized by the power structure. Surprisingly enough, this political betrayal did not play a significant role in the subsequent defeat of the Union Nationale in the election of 1939. The main issue which both helped the Liberals return to power and eventually caused their disastrous defeat five years later, surrounded Quebec's participation in the Canadian war effort. While the result provided the Liberal Party with a short stay in power, the circumstances which led up to the mid-war conscription crisis had a devastating effect on the provincial Liberals and virtually assured Duplessis of many years of uninterrupted rule. The significance of the war issue and Duplessis' firm stand against Canadian participation is that it refocused nationalist thought on primarily cultural concerns instead of economic ones.

The Liberal victory in the election of 1939 was due, to a large extent, to the intervention of the federal Liberal Party in the provincial campaign. Assured by the King government that conscription would not be enforced, the provincial Liberals supported the federal government's intention

to participate in the allied war effort. Yet the credit for victory was not entirely due to the Liberal endorsement. Rather, the Liberal win was assured by a brilliant political coup staged by their federal counterparts. The French-Canadian segment of the King cabinet, some of whom were holding notable portfolios, threatened to resign if the electorate did not place a firm vote of confidence in the Godbout Liberal Party. Faced with the threat of losing their only effective voice in Ottawa, the electorate replied and gave the Liberal party a resounding win.²

Having established a political link between the federal and provincial Liberal parties, Godbout continued this implicit co-operation with Ottawa throughout the length of his administration. Ignoring the severe criticism of the Duplessis opposition, Godbout strengthened his link by transferring numerous taxing powers to the federal government. This policy of co-operation might have gone unnoticed had it not been for the conscription crisis of 1942.

When MacKenzie King was forced, reluctantly, to call for a national plebiscite on the question of conscription, the French-Canadian electorate sensed that it had been betrayed. In essence the issue developed into an ethnic confrontation as the results

2- In the election of 1936 the Union Nationale had won 76 of the 90 seats in the assembly. In 1939 Duplessis' party lost 62 seats giving the Godbout Liberals 82.5% of the available seats. See Canadian Parliamentary Guide, The Government of Canada, Queen's Printer, 1937 and 1939.

indicated widespread support for conscription among English Canadians and an overwhelming rejection of it from the French segment. The Godbout administration, with their binding affiliation to the federal party, naturally became the object of attack from the political opposition. The issue of conscription totally discredited the provincial Liberals and cast Duplessis and the Union Nationale in a favourable political position in the province. While in opposition, Duplessis had carefully nurtured the image that eventually returned his party to power. He soon emerged as the only champion of provincial rights and the conscription issue strongly reinforced his position. As early as 1942, a Union Nationale victory in the subsequent election was a fait accompli.

There are two important reasons why we have examined the political developments of the war period in some detail. First, the embarrassing position of the Quebec Liberal Party not only contributed to its defeat in the provincial election of 1944 but in the subsequent three elections as well. Their co-operation with the federal government was an issue which Duplessis used with great success in the elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956. Thus, for much of the post-war period the credibility of the Liberal opposition was continually in doubt. In short, Duplessis was provided with a political tool which virtually assured his chances of success at the polls. The second reason for our detailed examination was to show how these political developments led to the re-direction of

of nationalist thought kindled by the position taken by Duplessis vis-a-vis the federal government. Emerging as a staunch provincial autonomist, Duplessis mellowed the opposition to his previous social and economic policies by providing an alternate focus of attention in the centralizing forces of the federal government. As we will see this redirection of nationalist thought to the purely cultural level is the key to understanding why the Union Nationale managed to obtain strong support from all economic groups, including the working class. Duplessis managed to convey the image that the federal government provided the greatest threat to the cultural survival of French-Canadian society and in so doing he managed to subordinate opposition to his economic and social policies. It is clear that the electorate, when presented with a choice between provincial autonomy i.e., cultural survival, or policies of social betterment, they invariably opted for the former. Referring once more to our dichotomous progression of nationalism, it is not an oversimplification to suggest that the basic theme of nationalist thought -- using the pronouncements and policies of the Union Nationale leader as a guide -- during the Duplessis regime was regressive in scope. It is important to note that this was not due to Duplessis' position on provincial autonomy. Certainly, many of Duplessis' objections to federal intervention in provincial fields of jurisdiction were valid on constitutional grounds. It is also not difficult to appreciate Duplessis' concern over

these federal excursions as some of these centralizing policies could potentially pose a threat to "la survivance". What is at issue in this case is the extremity to which this stand of provincial autonomy was carried. The preservation of the culture was the key-word and catch-all of the Duplessis regime. The theme led Quebec back into a defensive position of isolation. Perhaps the most devastating aspect of Duplessis' stand against federal intrusion was that he refused to implement alternative provincial policies, rejecting completely the old bogey of socialism or state control.

The degree to which the Duplessis regime had foresaken the social reformist policies they had pledged to implement in the pre-war election of 1936 was evident by the considerable public support enjoyed by Le Bloc Populaire. With the demise of the reformist movements of the mid-thirties, radical-social nationalism and the youthful nationalist elite that had espoused the reform doctrines, suffered a temporary stay in political limbo. The astute Duplessis, ever conscious of the potency of nationalist thought, had successfully refocused public attention on issues of provincial autonomy.

Hence "la survivance" was interpreted in a political constitutional framework and not a social and economic one. Roughly, the implementation of social reform could only develop after the external forces threatening the culture had been repressed. Much of the nationalist thought embodied in the political credo of Le Bloc Populaire was analogous to the social reform

beliefs advocated by L'Action Nationale and L'Action Libérale Nationale.

In a sense, Le Bloc was the natural successor to the radical reform movements of the immediate pre-war era. As heirs to a participatory form of social nationalism, Le Bloc did represent and advocate many of the norms of aggressive nationalism. In fact their platform for social and economic reform resembled the doctrines of the earlier movements. Denouncing Duplessis' refusal to interfere with foreign ownership and industrialization, Le Bloc strongly advocated the nationalization of important manufacturing and extractive industries along with government regulation in other industrial concerns. In harmony with this pledge, Le Bloc pledged to establish industrial cooperatives, thereby enabling the exploited wage earners to participate in managerial decisions. Leaders of Le Bloc were convinced that the primary threat to the French Canadian culture lay in the degree to which the economy had become controlled by foreign interests. Of vital importance to Le Bloc was the manner in which the French Canadian entrepreneurial class had been manipulated and threatened by the increasing number of industrial monopolies. Thus one of their foremost priorities was to guarantee legislation which would protect and develop the interests of this occupational segment.

In discussing the role of Le Bloc Populaire in the evolution of aggressive and regressive nationalism, one must be

conscious of the social and political framework which nurtured its birth. Essentially, the complexities involved in roughly attempting to categorize the form of nationalist sentiment evident in the movement, stems from the fact that its leaders, like Duplessis, were staunchly against conscription and any federal invasions in the fields of provincial jurisdiction. While these two criteria are not elements of regressive nationalism, the vehemence with which Le Bloc denounced all non-French Canadian concerns would tend to lead one to believe that the movement's nationalist orientation was a complex mixture of the tenets of aggressive and regressive nationalism. It was at once a movement of social reform and political reaction, participatory nationalism and provincial chauvinism.

The public rejection of Le Bloc Populaire in the election of 1944 assured Duplessis that the Union Nationale above all other opposition groups was the only political movement that could deal successfully with the federal incursions into provincial territory. More significantly, when given a choice between opposition to the federal government coupled with policies of social reform - as advocated by Le Bloc and a simple stand on provincial autonomy without any additional offerings, as offered by the Union Nationale, the electorate was prepared to choose a party which would wholeheartedly resist external encroachment from "les etrangers" in Ottawa.

Duplessis had promised to regain the rights lost to Ottawa during the war-time provincial Liberal regime. Consolidating the support of the clergy and other elements of

conservatism who had been disturbed by the rising tide of social unrest, Duplessis promised to reinforce the Padlock Law which gave the government a free hand in terminating the activities of the disruptive "communists and bolshevists".

Due to the conscription crisis and the new concept of welfare democracy advocated by a centralizing federal government, ethnic consciousness and solidarity had reached a peak of significance and influence. So also had the tenets of regressive nationalism for it was out of this public fear of external threats to the culture that Duplessis managed to retain power for such a lengthy period.

In studying the development of nationalist thought in the post-war Duplessis era, it is significant to note that the Roman Catholic Church did not enjoy the position of political prominence which it had maintained previous to the war period. While the Church did indeed retain its influential role in matters of spiritual concern, the secularizing influences of a modernizing society began to limit the scope of clerical influence. In a piecemeal manner, the state spearheaded the process of delineation between secular and spiritual concerns. The dialectic on nationalist thought changed from a clerical-secular confrontation to a socio-political evaluation of diverging nationalist sentiments. Nationalists were no longer primarily concerned with evangelizing the local population nor with fending off the attacks on ecclesiastical nationalism. To object to spiritual influence and clerical control was no longer anathema. In the post-war era nationalist thought was

refocused on issues of a predominantly political and social nature. In the new orientation of nationalist thought, the confrontation was between the entrenched forces of traditionalism and economic conservatism represented by the governing party and the radical social movements who saw the necessity of implementing legislation based on the norms of democratic socialism. It is during this period that the gradual erosion of ethnic solidarity was replaced by a rising awareness of class consciousness. The economic inequalities were such that the Duplessis standby of provincial autonomy and ethnic isolationism eventually lost much of its legitimacy as a rallying point for French Canadian society. It is in these post war developments that the regressive nationalism embodied in the concept of ethnic solidarity collided with the aggressive nationalism of the class-oriented social movements. In the fifteen year period between 1945 and 1960, the Duplessis doctrine of ethnic provincialism was undermined by the growth of the labour union movements and by the reinvigoration of the Quebec Liberal party. Yet, the bitter divisions and the lack of organization within these two groups prevented the mobilization of effective opposition to the Duplessis regime until the latter stages of the 1950's.

Similar to the policy orientations in the pre-war Union Nationale administration, Duplessis continued to accord preferential treatment to the industrialists and the agricultural groups. The lot of organized labour had not improved due,

primarily, to Duplessis' attitude to the trade union movement..

If the industrialists and the farmers were treated by the Union Nationale as privileged classes, the attitude of the party was quite different towards another important occupational group in the province, the industrial workers. This became apparent when the second phase of industrialization resulted in the rapid growth, for the first time in the history of the province, of a powerful and militant trade union movement. The reaction of the Union Nationale to this new development was to provide the strongest evidence of the party's right-word orientation in economic policy under the guiding hand of Duplessis and of the closeness of the ties which bound the party to the industrialists. 3

As Tashchereau had before him Duplessis' attitude towards organized labour was one of toleration. Realizing that the increasing militancy and demands of the unions would tread on the carefully protected industrial interests, the premier was quick to suppress the attempts of organized labour to gain a more equitable share of industrial profits. In actual fact, Duplessis managed to undermine the existent strength of the labour movement which it had attained under the Labour Relations Act passed in the latter stages of the Godbout administration. By the early stages of 1950, Duplessis had managed to introduce legislation which seriously curtailed the effectiveness of the labour unions. The government became the ultimate arbitrator in labour disputes and naturally this enhanced the bargaining position of industrial concerns.

3- Herbert F. Quinn, op.cit., p. 86. An excellent precis of the historical development of the various labour unions and movements can be found in Quinn's work. See pages 86-102 and 157-160.

Duplessis' extreme opposition to labour unionism was yet another factor contributing to the leader's regressive approach to the social problems unleashed by industrialization. Similar to his attitude refusing to control the activities of foreign industrialists Duplessis pursued a course of regressive nationalism because he refused to pay heed to the serious and threatening problems created by an exploited working class in an urbanized, industrial environment. The incredible manner in which the Duplessis administration dealt with the Asbestos, Louisville, and Murdochville strikes attest to the enormous gap of social understanding between the administration and the labour unions. Perhaps the most significant fact that can be drawn from this continual repression of organized labour was that it was not until the late 1950's before a shaky, yet united alliance was formed of the three major trade unions against the policies of the Duplessis regime. The reason for this "eleventh hour" coalition was two-fold. The first attests to the strength and longevity of Duplessis' attitude towards provincial autonomy. Throughout most of Duplessis' reign, the focus of the electorate was primarily on this issue of cultural preservation through political isolation. In his position as a staunch defender of French Canadian heritage Duplessis had the wholehearted support of the labour movement. The issue of cultural preservation defined in Duplessis' terms superceded concerns for social betterment.

The second reason concerned the differing philosophical

orientations of the three labour unions. With the coalition of the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. and the formation, in 1956 of the Q.F.L. the last obstacle to unity was removed and the labour movement gradually moved to the left of the ideological continuum and in so doing, allied itself philosophically with the other forces of aggressive nationalism who were attempting to revoke the old order.

With the election of Georges LaPalme as leader of the demoralized provincial Liberal Party in 1950 and the subsequent creation of the Provincial Liberal Federation, the political opposition to Duplessis began to formulate. Still smarting from its connection to lessetrangers in Ottawa, the party partially renounced its former platform of laissez-faire capitalism and took a turn to the left enlisting, in the process, the various forces of discontent. The reorientation of the party philosophy was the major alteration as it advocated state intervention for the social benefit of the population. While their new position was decidedly more nationalistic, agreeing with the Duplessis stand against federal incursions into the areas of provincial jurisdiction, "The Liberals strongest argument against the Union Nationale on this point was that the refusal of Duplessis' party to introduce various forms of social legislation provided the federal government with an excuse to invade these particular fields of legislation." 4

4- Ibid, p. 172.

The remarkable ideological shift of the Quebec Liberal Party can be seen in a platform statement issued by the party in the 1956 electoral campaign.

Une véritable autonomie provinciale exige une autonomie fiscale c'est-à-dire le droit et le pouvoir de la législature provinciale de fixer ses propres impôts selon ses besoins, dans toute la mesure permise par la constitution canadienne...La question de l'autonomie ne se limite pas aux impôts. Elle implique le droit et le devoir de la province d'avoir et de mettre en oeuvre une politique précise dans toutes les matières que la constitution canadienne lui attribue: richesses naturelles, éducation, agriculture, relations ouvrières, santé et bien-être social, etc. L'absence de politique provinciale constructive et progressive dans ses domaines met gravement en danger l'autonomie provinciale. 5

Without a doubt this was an equivocal denunciation of Duplessis isolationist policies and a clear forerunner of Jean Lesage's new dictum of "maîtres chez eux". The spirit of this newly emerging aggressive and social nationalism was embodied in the principle that the state had to play the most significant role in protecting the culture and providing solutions to the chronic social problems in French-Canadian society. In essence, the Liberal Party politicized the philosophy of state-intervention, thereby radicalizing the previous conception of governmental non-interference.

Aside from the party's political reorientation, a number of political issues contributed to the increasing attractiveness of the renovated party. As in 1942, though on a less

spectacular level, the association of a provincial party with its federal counterpart again played havoc with the incumbent provincial party. With the federal Liberal Party at the helm in Ottawa Duplessis had not encountered any difficulty in rendering the federal government as a political whipping boy upon which the many grievances of the province could be heaped in abundance. Yet the unofficial alliance between the federal Conservatives and the Union Nationale, brought about by the antagonisms of a Liberal Ottawa and Duplessis, eventually deprived the provincial leader of a focus of attack. With the victory of the Conservative party in the federal election of 1957 and 1958, Duplessis was left without a scapegoat and the party's most effective political slogan - protection from the "foreign compromisers" lost much of its impact. With the election of Jean Lesage as leader of the opposition Liberals in 1958 and the sudden death of le chef in the following year, the stage was set for the numerous forces of opposition to launch their new approach.

While the influence of the Church had declined in the post war era due to the secularizing forces of industrialization, it is doubtful whether the momentum of the opposition against Duplessis' policies would have increased without the tacit approval of the clerical elite. Although the consensus of opinion was not as strongly articulated in clerical circles as it was among the laicized social movements - due to the supposed neutrality of the Church in les affaires politiques -

there was a strong current of belief which advocated social reform based on a more liberal interpretation of Pius XI's Quadregesimo Anno. The Church had given blanket approval to Duplessis' policies because it was duly impressed with le chef's personal war against "atheistic communism and bolshevism". It was the Asbestos strike of 1949 that finally provided the social catharsis for Catholic thought. The Church, realizing the futility in pursuing a policy of messianic nationalism, finally seemed to place social justice ahead of spiritual paternalism. In a speech which soon typified the attitude of many clerics towards Duplessis' economic conservatism, Archbishop Charbonneau denounced the policies of his former ally.

The working class is a victim of a conspiracy which wishes to crush it and when there is a conspiracy to crush the working class, it is the duty of the Church to intervene. We wish social peace but do not with the crushing of the working class. We are more attached to man than to capital. This is why the clergy has decided to intervene. It wishes that justice and charity be respected, and it desires that more attention cease to be paid to financial interests than to the human factor. 6

The publication, in 1950 of the Quebec Bishops Pastoral Letter: Le Probleme ouvrier en regard de la doctrine social de L'Eglise, was yet another important indication that the clerical elite was beginning to re-evaluate its traditional assertions. The letter recognized the contribution of indus-

6- Mason Wade, op. cit., p. 1108.

trialization but deplored the social injustice to the workers. The pronouncement was significant in yet another sense in that the workers not only had a right but a duty to organize into trade unions. The bishops also completely abandoned the old myth of a return to the land. Similar to the philosophical foundation of many of the radical social movements, in the 1950's the Church believed that the state had to become a more active participant in solving the social ills of the population. Always concerned about the preservation of the culture and heritage of French Canadian society, the Catholic Church had finally joined with the forces of an aggressive, social nationalism which, combined with the other radical movements, finally launched the political manifestation of the quiet revolution.⁷

7- The extent of the clergy's outward disagreement with the policies of Duplessis' Union Nationale can be measured by the appearance of numerous publications denouncing the party's activities. Foremost among them was Gerard Dion and Louis O'Neil's Le Chretien et les Elections, Les Editions de l'Homme, Montreal, 1960. An example of the development of a left-wing orientation in the social philosophy of Roman Catholicism can be seen in "Frere Untel", The Impertinence of Brother Anonymous, Harvest House, 1962. A statement from Brother Desbiens also indicates a re-direction of nationalist thought among many of the clergy. Clearly, Desbiens rejected the trend of regressive nationalism practiced by the Duplessis regime. "What we practice here is a purity through sterilization, orthodoxy through silence, security through dull repetition. We imagine there is only one way to go straight, and that is never to set out, one way never to make mistakes and that is never to experiment; one way not to get lost and that is to stay asleep. We have invented a sure way to fight caterpillars - to cut down the trees." p. 49.

Our analysis of the role of nationalism in the political history of contemporary French Canadian society has suggested that there are a number of major factors which have contributed to the institutionalization of varying forms of regressive nationalism. Foremost among these factors was the personal political and economic philosophy of the leader of the Union Nationale, for if Duplessis had been as radical as the political platform he had endorsed in the election of 1936, it is most probable that the "quiet revolution" would have been a fait accompli shortly after the "new-dealism" of the war era. If one accepts the premise that Duplessis was the strongest force behind the movement of regressive nationalism, then the theory that the "quiet revolution" began after his death, in 1959, appears quite plausible. The extent of societal change and the emergence of severe social problems, which Duplessis had chose to ignore, was evident in the dramatic shift of policy orientation undertaken by Duplessis' capable successor, Paul Sauve. The new directions in attacking problems of a social and economic nature were premised on the belief that the state should not only administer but regulate and interfere. Based on this premise it is not coincidental that the political inauguration of the quiet revolution marked also the abrupt demise of the ideology of regressive, non-participatory nationalism.

Barrette's election as the compromise choice for the Union Nationale party leadership after the untimely death of Sauve in 1960, signified but a short interlude between the

overture and the first movement. When Jean Lesage, elected in 1958 to replace the winless Georges Lapalme, won the election of 1960 by a close margin of seats, an aggressive participatory nationalism was, for the first time in French Canadian history, institutionalized at the political level.

The key to comprehending our overall theory concerning the inter-action of regressive and aggressive nationalism and the subsequent effects these various forms of nationalist expression have had on class consciousness and ethnic solidarity in French Canadian society, lies in understanding the significant reorientation of governmental philosophy implied in the Lesage administration. As in every political and social movement before the new Liberal administration, the norm of operation was still "la survivance". Yet the manner in which the Lesage Liberals chose to deal with the issue of cultural survival allied them with the aggressive nationalist movements of the past who sought cultural insurance by advocating a participatory approach, thereby integrating the culture into the economic and social elements of the North American continent. Isolation, so long a by-product of the Duplessis regime, could no longer insure the progress needed to protect the culture.

What Jean Lesage's government did was to shatter the barriers to progress that this solution to the problem of survival had allowed to become entrenched (the tendency to protect their society by looking within it for the keys to survival). By transforming old institutions, or creating new ones where necessary, their programme rejected simple

survival as the main objective, and established the wider and even revolutionary concept of a full and open development - an epanouissement of French-Canadian society."⁸

The persistence of the nationalist theme was just as evident during the Lesage administration as it had been throughout the Duplessis regime. Yet the nationalism espoused by the new ruling elite was hardly of a traditional nature. Instead of existing under the protectionist myth of provincial autonomy the nationalism of the Liberal party was directed towards the achievement of an equal status with the federal government. The implications of this type of "cooperative-federalism" were, for Quebec at least, a radical departure from the traditional stance taken by the provincial government. "Maitres chez eux" was finally operationalized in that the government spear-headed the campaign for constitutional equality based on the compact theory of two founding cultures. In essence, the national issue became a social issue and as Leger pointed out earlier, it was found that the two concepts - cultural survival and social betterment - were not only compatible but also that cultural independence could only come about if French Canadians were willing to use their own government to better their economic and social position. Thus

⁸- Laurier L. LaPierre, "La Revolution Tranquille: The Liberal Government of Jean Lesage in Quebec, 1960-66", in J. N. Bumstead (ed.), Documentary Problems in Canadian History, Vol. II, Irvin-Dorsey Ltd., Georgetown, Ont., 1969, p. 263.

the new nationalism was truly a national concern in the sense that it encompassed and proposed to deal with issues that were beyond the scope of protecting the language and heritage. This, according to our previous definitions of aggressive and regressive nationalism, shaped the basis of an aggressive and participatory nationalism. According to Robert Cliche,

The revolution, about which we hear most often, is a national one. It is true that there has been a national reawakening in Quebec which has surprised all observers. But I prefer to speak of a reawakening because we are not witnessing simply another wave of old-style nationalism. On the contrary, the new national consciousness represents a break with the past, or at least, with the primary traditions of French Canadian thought. 9

The transformation is more precisely considered by Marcel Rioux.

Il est intervenu un changement d'inverqure dans la définition que les Québécois se donnent d'eux-mêmes: ils ont cessé de se considérer d'abord comme une culture, c'est-à-dire comme les porteurs d'une tradition pour se définir de plus en plus comme une société industrielle et pour envisager le gouvernement du Québec comme celui de leur État national.10

9- Robert Cliche, Quebec: Year Eight, Glendon College Forum, C.B.C. Publications, Toronto, 1968, p.21.

10- Marcel Rioux, "Conscience ethnique et conscience de classe au Québec", Recherches Sociographiques, Vol.6, Les Presses de l'université Laval, Québec, 1965, pp.23-33. In a recent forum on contemporary French Canadian politics, a Roman Catholic cleric, Louis Batthazer, S. J., remarked on how the citizenry had even changed their conception of the Church in this process of change during the latter 50's and early 60's, "We discovered in this new, more or less pluralistic society, a new nationalism which grows along with social mobilization, that is to say, by the exodus of people from the land to the cities, the increase in social communication of all sorts, mass media, business,

The change in self-definition among French Canadians of which Rioux speaks involved a re-examination of the function and manifestation of nationalism. The thesis of regressive nationalism, so long institutionalized by the ruling administrations was finally confronted with a powerful anti-thesis in the form of an aggressive nationalism. The resulting synthesis provided the foundation for the quiet revolution.

The purpose of this descriptive analysis of French Canadian politics has been to advance a theoretical model concerning the political manifestations of nationalist thought. In this sense, the examination has been limited to a very general overview of the development of nationalist thought in French Canadian society. The limitations inherent in this approach stem from the fact that the analysis has concentrated on the political and social implications of various trends in nationalist thought. In short, nationalism has been considered in terms of a chronological analysis of political and social events in the contemporary history of French Canada. As such, no attempt has been made to delve into the multiplicity of intellectual concepts advanced by individuals, groups and political parties and the resultant inter-action

artistic, cultural manifestations, and education. The individual is now detached from all the old customs and solidarities which were imposed by traditions and by the Church, and he is forced to communicate with people who are strangers to him... The Catholic Church has finally realized in Quebec that Catholicism has absolutely no mission of sustaining in an institutional way any particular nationalist movement." Louis Batthazer, Quebec, Year Eight, p.83

of these abstract concepts. Nevertheless, the scope of the analysis permits a number of significant observations.

In the French Canadian context, nationalism has been defined as a dynamic, evolving force of awareness within a collective entity of their distinctive culture, traditions, language and values. This awareness of a separate identity is translated into an active pursuit of goals and policies whose primary objective is the preservation of the French Canadian nation. These goals and policies can be either aggressive or regressive depending on social circumstances and the philosophy of the power elite who either advocate the goals or enact the policies. The analysis has also attempted to define the circumstances which have nurtured either of the two forms of nationalism, i.e., aggressive or regressive. An understanding of the historical interplay of these two forms of nationalism is crucial to an understanding of the role of social class and ethnicity in the provincial electorate. It may be posited that whenever regressive nationalism is the institutionalized force behind the objective of cultural survival, then ethnic solidarity is strongly enhanced and class consciousness is nearly absent. If not absent, then the awareness of class distinctions is subjugated to the demands of a "classless" ethnic unity. Conversely, the presence of an intellectual elite or a political administration which espouse the tenets of aggressive nationalism eventually leads to the development of class consciousness.

The institutionalization of an aggressive form of nationalism does not necessarily mean that class identifications are

are stronger than ethnic affiliation. Rather the presence of this form of nationalist expression contributes to the formation of class consciousness which is usually suppressed when regressive nationalism dictates goals and policies.

The relationship between regressive nationalism and ethnic solidarity and aggressive nationalism and the development of class consciousness can be better understood if reference is made to the previous definitions of these two forms of nationalism. The essence of regressive nationalism has been its defensive and isolationist nature. The emphasis has been on the preservation and protection of the ancestral norms of the French Canadian community. If the culture was threatened in any way from " external aggressors " the community would defend itself by attempting to sever political and economic connections with these " external forces ". Under the force of regressive nationalism, French Canada concerned itself primarily with the survival of the culture, no matter how her ignorance of social and economic circumstances would undermine her ability to continue this preservation. The welfare of the culture was predominant.

Regressive nationalism was also ecclesiastical. The missionary role of French Canada -- to bear and propagate the religious truth -- separated it almost irreconcilably from the " local heathen population ". Certainly, this consciousness led to a more cohesive ethnicity. Regressive nationalism isolated French Canadians from the very serious problems posed by industrialization. The agrarian lifestyle was the only alternative French Canadians could present to the

secularizing threat of the industrial order. Every aspect of regressive nationalism contributed to the isolation of French Canada from the social and economic mainstream of North America. By design or default, it contributed to the consolidation of a formidable ethnic consciousness. When regressive nationalism was institutionalized, ethnic solidarity was assured.

The primary theme in the aggressive form of nationalism is participation. In order for the culture to survive, the French Canadian community had to re-enter the social and political mainstream of North American society without sacrificing the cultural heritage of the community. The reason that class consciousness has a tendency to develop under the aggressive form of nationalism is important. With the integration of French Canada into the secularized, urbanized and industrial order, French Canadians were confronted with social problems and injustices which gave rise to a consciousness of class; an assessment of their collective " economic lot " .

Of crucial importance is the determination of the strength of class consciousness resulting from the institutionalization of aggressive nationalism. The quiet revolution of the early sixties marked the successful culmination of those forces creating an aggressive nationalism. 1960 represented the only time in recent French Canadian society when an aggressive form of nationalism became the institutional norm. If aggressive nationalism depicts the advent of a rising class consciousness,

then two facts should be ascertained. What was the strength of class consciousness in 1960 and 1962 as compared to the Duplessis period of 1952? If class consciousness did exhibit itself in the voting behaviour of the provincial electorate in 1960 and 1962, was it a more significant parameter than ethnic affiliation?

The relevance of the chronological analysis is such that it depicts at what particular time-period one or more of the tenets of either form of nationalism was dominant. The following resumé suggests the association between (a) regressive nationalism and ethnic solidarity (b) aggressive nationalism and class consciousness.

1. Regressive nationalism and ethnic solidarity

A. Ecclesiastical

i religious

ii missionary

B. Agrarian

C. Traditional

D. Defensive and isolationist

2. Aggressive nationalism and class consciousness

A. Secular

B. Social and economic

C. Statist

D. Participatory.

CHAPTER FIVE

NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY

Prior to a more detailed examination of the historical interplay of ethnicity and class consciousness in French Canadian society, some attention should be given to a number of concepts which have been discussed in the previous pages. A synthesis of our examination of the significant variables affecting voting behaviour suggests that class stratification, ethnic affiliation and voting preference have played an important role in the evolution of French Canadian society. The primary purpose of this research is to "extract" a time period from the contemporary history of Quebec and subject it to close scrutiny, in an attempt to discern the impact of ethnicity and social class on the voting behaviour of the Quebec provincial electorate.

The elections of 1952, 1960 and 1962 occurred during a crucial transitional phase in Quebec society. By examining the voting behaviour patterns of the Quebec electorate in these three provincial elections, perhaps an appreciation may be gained of the tremendous social upheaval which occurred before and after the beginning of the quiet revolution in 1960.

The analysis so far, has alluded to a number of concepts which are central to the examination of the voting behaviour of the Quebec provincial electorate and therefore, an attempt should be made to operationalize these concepts in order that their impact on Quebec provincial voting patterns may be more fully understood.

" . . . Class," said Joseph Schumpeter, " is a creation of the researcher, (and it) owes its existence to his organizing touch." ¹

1- Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, as quoted in John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 9.

Regardless of the origins of the countless definitions of social class, the analysis of social class and class stratification demand a set of criteria by which " individuals " can be classified. The problem is to choose a set of criteria which is representative of a particular social grouping. When the available data is intersubjective, the choice is rendered more difficult since any classification is usually an arbitrary one and is determined by the intuitive perception of the researcher. As we have seen, the literature on voting behaviour employ various definitions of social class from which arbitrary classifications are deduced. These classifications differ as a result of varying conceptual definitions of the nature and function of class stratification.

In this research, social class is defined as a mechanism by which individuals, within a society, sharing common social and economic standards aspire to norms and values collectively defined by the group to which the individuals belong. Social class is a set of arbitrarily determined levels or strata in a society where the objective indicators of income, occupation and education are inter-related and measured according to a "constituency classification index."

Ethnicity refers to that " influence " within a society which encourages homogeneity with groups of people sharing a common culture, heritage, language or racial origin. As objective indicators are employed to determine the class stratification in the Quebec provincial electorate, so too will they be used to operationalize the concept of ethnicity.

Voting Preference refers to the support accorded to the candidates and political parties by the Quebec provincial elec-

electorate in the elections of 1952, 1960 and 1962.

Using the Census of Canada (1951 & 1961), published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Statistics Canada), The Official Reports of the Chief Returning Officer for the Province of Quebec for the provincial elections of 1952, 1960 and 1962 along with a number of editions of The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, the socio-economic and voting statistics relevant to the three elections were aggregated to the constituency level which became the basic unit of analysis.

Using a number of methodological techniques the data were carefully scrutinized and interpreted within the context of the issues of each election.²

One of the methodological approaches to the interpretation of the aggregate data involved a classification procedure for each of the constituencies. An index (constituency classification index) incorporating important socio-economic variables was formulated and applied to each constituency. Constituencies were rank ordered according to the per centages of voters in each of the following categories: a) university education; b) average income per male wage earner; c) managerial, clerical, skilled and unskilled labour and agricultural occupations.

Constituencies were also classified as either rural or urban. These variables were then given a positive or negative value assuming that variables within each group were positively correlated, thus assuring some homogeneity. For example, university

2. Due to the length and technical nature of the methodology, it is not included in this research. Readers who are interested in studying this aspect of the research are advised to contact Dr. Roman March at McMaster University.

education, income and managerial sales and clerical occupations were given a positive value. After each of these variables were ranked and the cumulative index tallied, the negative value of the remaining variables was subtracted.

The final index suggested four classifications for the constituencies:

1. Urban-Middle Class consisting of those urban constituencies containing a high percentage of voters who had university education and occupied managerial positions and where the average income was considerable.
2. Urban-Working Class where urban constituencies did not excel in the positive valued variables of education, income and managerial occupations and where the percentage of skilled and unskilled labour was usually in excess of 50% of the labour force.
3. Rural-Working Class where rural constituencies did not excel in the positive valued variables of education, income and managerial occupations and where the percentage of the skilled and unskilled labour force was in excess of 25% and where the percentage of voters in agricultural positions was less than 25%.
4. Rural Agricultural consisting of those rural constituencies where the agricultural labour force was in excess of 25% and the skilled and unskilled labour force was less than 25%.

Thus, the constituency classification is based on an urban-rural dichotomy as well as on an assessment the importance and strength of the major socio-economic variables in a social system.

As one of the methodological approaches incorporated in this research, considerable emphasis has been placed on descriptive interpretations of statistical data for each of the three provincial elections under consideration. To facilitate the examination, the constituencies, separated into the four categories described above, were further delineated into regions -- similar to the economic regions described in the 1951 and 1961 editions of the Quebec Statistical Yearbook. The constituencies and their classifications within each region are as follows:

GASPE-LOWER ST. LAWRENCE

Agricultural

Kamouraska
 Matapedia
 L'Islet
 Montmagny
 Rimouski
 Riviere-du-Loup
 Temiscouta

Rural Working Class

Bonaventure
 Iles-de-la-Madeleine
 Gaspé Nord
 Gaspé Sud
 Matane

Urban Working Class

None

Urban Middle Class

None

EASTERN TOWNSHIPS

Agricultural

Brome
 Frontenac
 Wolfe

Rural Working Class

Compton
 Stanstead

Urban Working Class

Arthabaska
 Drummond
 Megantic
 Richmond
 Shefford
 Sherbrooke

Urban Middle Class

None

QUEBEC HINTERLANDAgricultural

Pontiac

Rural Working Class

Abitibi Est
 Abitibi Ouest 4
 Gatineau
 Papineau

Urban Working Class

Chicoutimi
 Hull
 Jonquiere-Kenogami
 Duplessis
 Lac-St.-Jean
 Rouyn Noranda
 Saguenay
 Temiscamingue

Urban Middle Class

None

MID-QUEBECAgricultural

Beauce
 Bellechase 4
 Dorchester
 Lotbiniere

Rural Working Class

Charlevoix
 Montmorency 3
 Roberval

Urban Working Class

Levis

Urban Middle Class

Quebec County

SOUTHERN QUEBECAgricultural

Huntingdon
 Nicolet
 Rouville 4
 Yamaska

Rural Working Class

Bagot 2
 Iberville

Urban Working Class

Beauharnois
 Napierville-Laprairie
 Mississquoi
 St. Jean
 St. Hyacinthe
 Richelieu
 Vercheres

Urban Middle Class

Chambly
 Chateauguay

WESTERN QUEBECAgricultural

Berthier
Maskinonge
Montcalm

Rural Working Class

Argenteuil
Deux Montagnes
Labelle
Portneuf
Vaudreuil-Soulanges

Urban Working Class

Champlain
Joliette
L'Assomption
St. Maurice
Terrebonne

Urban Middle Class

Trois Rivieres

METROPOLITAN QUEBECAgricultural

None

Rural Working Class

None

Urban Working Class

St. Sauveur

Urban Middle Class

Quebec Centre
Quebec Est
Quebec Ouest

METROPOLITAN MONTREALAgricultural

None

Rural Working Class

None

Urban Working Class

Bourget
Laurier
Ste. Anne
St. Henri
St. Louis
Ste. Marie

Urban Middle Class

Jacques Cartier
Jeanne Mance
Laval
Mercier
Notre-Dame-de-Grace
Outremont
St. Jacques
Westmount-St. Georges
Verdun

38.0000

39.0000

CHAPTER SIX

THE 1952 ELECTION: THE CAMPAIGN

It was with a certain air of understandable confidence that Maurice Duplessis announced in the legislative assembly on May 28th, 1952 that provincial elections would be on July 16 of the same year. It was more than just the knowledge that July 16th fell on one of le chef's "lucky Wednesdays"¹ or that election day fell on the feast of his personal patron saint. Rather his confidence was buoyed by the fact that since the previous election in 1948, the Union Nationale had governed without the counter-balance of a substantial opposition. At dissolution the governing party held 81 of the 92 seats in the legislative assembly with the remaining 11 seats distributed among 8 Liberal party members, 1 Nationalist, 1 Independent with the remaining seat vacant. The press and the public thought him quite serious when he called for a good number of acclamations.

The tone of the election campaign, embodied in the Union Nationale campaign slogan, "Let Duplessis continue his work",² was set out in an early election campaign editorial appearing in The Montreal Star. It appeared obvious from the beginning

1- Reference was made to Duplessis' "lucky day" in a press report appearing in The Montreal Star, Thursday, May 29, 1952.

2- The raison-d'etre for the slogan? In the same edition of The Montreal Star mentioned above, Duplessis summed up his belief. "In 1948 the Quebec electorate pronounced itself clearly in giving the Union Nationale a nonequivocal mandate to continue the policy which has done enormous good to the Province since 1944, and today this is not the time to give up or cart away those who have the experience and have accomplished progress which has been unprecedented."

that an annoying democratic principle, the occasional election, was to be considered but a minor obstacle in Duplessis mission.

"What must be hoped," said the Star forthrightly,

is that the Campaign will be fought on provincial issues. Of these there are many. Quebec has been blessed by years of prosperity and consequently buoyant revenues. These have been used by Maurice Duplessis with imagination and resource. The Government has been a true handmaiden of the province's economic growth, nor has it forgotten its responsibilities in the fields of education and public health. At the same time, no Government could spend such sums without incurring criticism. Has the direction of the money spent commanded public confidence? ... It is upon that debate that the general election should turn. 3

With the gauntlet dropped, the major political parties and movements in the province along with the aspiring candidates began to jostle for strategic position. By the time nominations closed on July 6th, the Union Nationale and Liberal Party faithful had selected candidates in all 92 ridings. The C.C.F. had selected 29 candidates to run in the Montreal area with the Labour Progressive Party nominating four candidates running in the working class constituencies of Montreal. L'Union des Electeurs, more a political movement than a full fledged party, had decided not to participate in the election even though they had fielded 92 candidates in the previous election and while unable to obtain any representation in the assembly, they had managed to garner over 9% of the popular vote.⁴

3- Ibid.

4- In an article appearing in Cite Libre, Vo.2, no.3, decembre 1952, p.29, Jean Grenier, writing "Les creditistes et l'election du 16 juillet" gave the following reason for the movement's neutral stand. "Pourquoi le mouvement creditiste c'est-il abstenu de

In spite of the participation of the minor parties and numerous independent candidates the election battle would be fought between the two traditional parties. George Lapalme, elected as leader of the Liberal Party in 1950, had mobilized the Liberal campaign strategy with the realization that victory for his party meant that the Party would have to extend itself from its urban Montreal bastion and penetrate the Union Nationale's rural fortress. By mid-June the campaigning had begun officially and in earnest.

Both Lapalme and Duplessis officially opened the campaign for the respective parties in mid-June, one month before the election. The two leaders toured the lower St. Lawrence region simultaneously; Duplessis to reinforce his party's strong position while Lapalme hoped to make inroads in the rural vote. The opening speech of the campaign was delivered by the Union Nationale leader. From it, the electorate learned that provincial autonomy, the major issue in the previous election, was still a significant item in Duplessis' campaign platform.⁵

participer a l'élection? Parce-que le but de mouvement n'est pas de mettre des créditistes dans le parlement. Son but est l'établissement du Crédit Social. Mais ne faut-il pas des créditiste dans le parlement pour établir le Crédit Social? Nullement. Les créditistes croient que l'établissement du Credit Social ne sera possible que lorsque le peuple sera créditiste, lorsque l'idée créditiste sera suffisamment répondue dans la population."

5- In this speech, as well those to follow, Duplessis made reference to this theme. "The question of the hour is the preservation of the rights and privileges of the province and it is a problem of life and death." The Montreal Star, Monday, June 16, p.2. Three days later in Rimouski, the U.N. leader stated

While the dominant theme was the casual "Laissez Duplessis continuer son oeuvre", Duplessis did not hesitate to outline a number of vital issues in the area of provincial autonomy and working class relations. The Province of Quebec would remain the fortress of Catholicism and French culture in North America where its politics had to remain independent from federal politics. His address bore the trademark of his personal philosophy. Private initiative was essential. Ignorant of the successful policies of deficit financing - introduced by Jean Lesage in his administration - Duplessis stated that government expenditures would be limited to probable revenue. In his estimation, "The Government does not create money but is simply a collector of taxes." ⁶

Aside from listing the accomplishments of his administration and lauding agricultural pursuits as the "foundation of progress in any country," ⁷ Duplessis directed a few comments to

that "Quebec is not a trailer just to be tied to the federal government. We are not and will not be wards of any government. We want to be masters at home under the terms of the B.N.A. Act. Ibid., Thursday, June 19, p.2.

6- This excerpt, as well as the text of his opening address can be found in The Montreal Star, Monday, June 16, 1952, p.2.

7- It should be noted here that, as the campaign developed, the approach and appeal to the working class was the fundamental difference between the two parties. Not once did the U.N. propose new legislation, content to "fall back on the record of accomplishments" instead. On the other hand, the Liberal Party made improved labour relations and working conditions a key issue of their platform. More than any party or movement, save for the Communist Labour Progressive Party, the Liberals tried to create a working class consciousness among the Province's labour force. Countering what Duplessis termed a "divisive influence", the U.N. preambled their appeals to the working class with calls to ignore statements which would set the "working class against the farmer."

the working class. He rightly realized that their support was crucial if the Government was to avoid any further confrontations similar to the Asbestos and Schoenville strikes. Appealing for their gratitude, the U.N. leader said,

It was the Union Nationale which gave workers in the province the right of association. It was the Union Nationale which set up minimum wages for men at a time when legislation existed only for women. It was the Union Nationale which set up the Q.L.R.B. (Quebec Labour Relations Board) and appointed Labour leaders to it ... All this because the Union Nationale is really the friend of the working man.⁸

Generally, Lapalme usually avoided reference to Quebec's relations with Ottawa. His previous position as a Liberal member of the federal government was best forgotten. Instead, his opening speech, in the prosperous agricultural and urban centres of Drummondville and St. Hyacinthe, concentrated on the problems of the working class. His promise was adequate labour legislation,

Even the hardened criminal can always appeal to higher courts ... but working man is subjected to oftentimes autocratic rulings and we are planning to remedy this by enacting adequate legislation when elected to power.⁹

Shortly thereafter, the same promise was made in Lévis coupled with promises of farm improvement loans to complement existing federal legislation. Naturally, Duplessis would have nothing to do with the heresy of federal assistance or shared cost programmes. Instead, in his second major address, he demanded a higher reimbursement of monies from the federal government.

8- op. cit., p.2.

9- Ibid., Monday, June 16, 1952, p.5.

While stressing that the province's per capita debt was lowest in Canada, Duplessis stated that Quebec needed a larger share of the 13% of all taxes it received from Ottawa.

Duplessis completed his opening campaign tour in five days, addressing audiences in Cabano and Rivière Du Loup. As he had done in Rimouski, Duplessis continued to remind his audiences of his party's generosity. Provincial and fiscal autonomy remained the most vital issues of the U.N. campaign.

We do not want to increased present taxes - God knows there are enough - and this is the reason we have requested of the Federal Government a more reasonable de-limitation of taxation fields. If Federal encroachments on provincial rights continue to decrease provincial revenues the Province will face eventual ruin. 10.

Variations on a theme, but potent electoral fodder nevertheless!

At this stage of the electoral contest, Duplessis introduced his own sub-plot to the campaign. He began his attempt to discredit Lapalme and the Liberal Party. Naturally, mention was made of Lapalme's federal connections. On June 20th, referring to Lapalme's tenure in Ottawa, "The experience necessary to administer Quebec could not be acquired in Ottawa."¹¹ The following day in Rivière Du Loup, the entire Liberal Party came under his skeptical scrutiny.

The U. N. is not fighting the Liberal Party - which is really non-existent today because all the good Liberals are on the side of the Union Nationale - but an opposition made up of inexperienced men who

10- Ibid., Friday, June 20th, 1952, p.5.

11- Ibid., p.5.

offer no guarantee for the good administration of the province and who do not possess the aptitudes to direct provincial affairs. 12

For the moment, Lapalme chose to ignore Duplessis' attacks and concentrated instead on the issues as defined by the Union Nationale. Following closely behind Duplessis, Lapalme attempted to discredit the U.N. leaders credibility. In Rimouski, Lapalme suggested that provincial autonomy was a political slogan and not a doctrine. To Lapalme, there were more serious issues that had not yet been debated. Labour relations was one of them. In the working class area of Thetford Mines, Lapalme promised labour unions the right to appeal from decisions of the Q.L.R.B. Duplessis was severely criticized for not introducing a labour code for the province. Lapalme reminded workers of the "atrocities" of the Asbestos strike and concluded with a statement which would be a major issue in the upcoming "quiet revolution", "During the past 100 years the Province of Quebec has achieved marked success in industry but that the greater part of Quebec's industrialization has been accomplished by strangers." 13

12- Ibid., Saturday, June 21st, 1952, p.2.

13- Ibid., p.2. The positions taken by the two major parties on the issue of foreign-owned industry were never fully developed during the campaign. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference can be discerned if a comparison is made between the above quoted excerpt from Lapalme's speech and one delivered by Antonio Barrette, a then U.N. cabinet minister. "We have erected about 1400 schools in practically every nook and corner of the province ... And to do all this the U.N. Government did not dip into the taxpayers pockets to find necessary funds, but invited foreign companies to develop the province's natural resources." Ibid., Monday, June 23, 1952, p.5.

Needless to say, Duplessis was much annoyed with Lapalme's initial tactics of appealing to the workers and concentrating of the U.N.'s dismal record of labour relations. Shortly after Lapalme's speech in Rimouski, the U.N. leader levied one of the sharpest barks of the campaign at Lapalme. Speaking in the agricultural community of Fortierville, he condemned the Liberals for running professional candidates in agricultural areas.

Far be it from me to raise the issue of class struggle - I am a lawyer myself - but it is essential that in the Quebec legislature the agricultural class should be well represented by members from their own ranks. The Union Nationale is not a class party...¹⁴

After he cited his government's accomplishments in agriculture, he completed his address with a final refutation of Liberal policies.

It is our intention to give justice to all classes to the cities as well as to the country, and we shall continue to help agriculture because it is the basis of true progress and stability. At this time there is a very unfortunate campaign being conducted by the Liberals who are attempting to set up the country against the towns and cities and the working class against the farmers.¹⁵

Undaunted by Duplessis' alarmist rhetoric Lapalme continued to cite the failures of the government's social policies. Well into the second week of the month long campaign, Lapalme in the town of Weedon pin-pointed another area where the U.N.'s social welfare programme had run afoul.

That is what I mean when I speak of social justice. Premier Duplessis talks about all the U.N. govern-

14- Ibid., p.5.

15- Ibid., p.5.

ment has done for the Province of Quebec but fails to mention the fact that needy families in Ontario receive nearly 200% more than a family in the same circumstances receives in this province. 16

With two weeks remaining in the official campaigns of both major parties, the major issues had been placed before the electorate. The Union Nationale stood on its record, with emphasis placed on its accomplishments in the agricultural field and the policies it had adopted to appease labour unrest. Offensively, the Union Nationale stressed the absolute need for provincial autonomy in constitutional and fiscal matters. The effect of this astute strategy was twofold. The governing party would convince the electorate that autonomy was the major issue of the campaign and that only the U.N. was capable of demanding and defending this right. Naturally, Lapalme's previous connections with federal Liberals was an ideal target for the wary U.N. leader. In the remaining weeks, with debate on the few issues exhausted, Lapalme's affiliation with 'les centralists' grew from an annoying thorn to a festering wound in the Liberal campaign.

The Liberal Party had not squandered words waiting for issues to materialize. In a typical bulldog fashion the party grasped hold of a dominant theme and emphasized it throughout the campaign. Duplessis' social policies were leading the province to catastrophe, and much of the attack was directed at the ruling party's usurpation of the rights of the labour classes. This is not to say that the Liberal Party was negligent

in realizing the role of business and industry in the development of the province. Nevertheless, they were primarily concerned with repatriating Quebec's industry and developing a thriving enterpreneurial system.

While the remaining weeks prior to the election were spent re-emphasizing the parties' respective positions, a number of interesting developments occurred which, no doubt, had an influence on the electorate. For the most part, Duplessis began to concentrate on the inexperience of the Liberal opposition as well as Lapalme's federal ties. That the electorate view Lapalme as nothing more than a federal extension or "incursion" became a major objective for the U.N. leader.

In the first major rally in an urban center Duplessis launched a vigorous attack on the previous provincial Liberal administration for releasing certain taxing rights to Ottawa.¹⁷ He suggested that the Godbout Liberals had "sold out the province" and that the present Liberal opposition, with a former federal M.P. as its leader, would do the same.¹⁸

17- The reference was to the Godbout administration which held office from 1939 to 1944. The Godbout Liberals had co-operated fully with the Federal Government in the war effort realizing certain fiscal powers to the latter. This proved to be the Liberal downfall and they were defeated in the provincial election of 1944.

18- Excerpts from an address delivered by Duplessis in Quebec City. op.cit., Tuesday, June 27, 1952, p.25. The U.N. leader went on to say, "The Union Nationale is not too strong. At a time when our future is being decided the Provincial Government can never be too strong in having its voice heard. I ask you to elect to the Legislature 92 supporters of the U.N. who will represent the unanimous voice of the province, clamoring once and for all that we want to be masters in our own home and that we want our rights to be given back to us."

Lapalme, delivering a campaign speech in Hull, continued to assail the government's social policies. He promised a health insurance programme and attacked Duplessis for not taking advantage of the Federal Housing Act. "There is no reason why the Government of Quebec should not benefit from this legislation. We all know that the ordinary worker who is dependent on his weekly salary is not in a position to obtain the necessary capital to build his own home."¹⁹ Reiterating his party's position vis-à-vis labour relations, Lapalme criticized Duplessis policies and stated that a just labour code was one of the principal planks of the platform. "I am one who believes that, united and contented labour class is one of the best safeguards we have against Communism."²⁰

Duplessis moved to Lapalme's own riding of Joliette and attracted the largest crowd of the campaign. The themes were again repeated: Lapalme belonged in Ottawa, the experience of the U.N. team and, naturally, the need for absolute provincial autonomy. The last issue was especially stressed.²¹ What was

19- Ibid., Saturday, June 30th, 1952, p.5.

20- Ibid.

21- Duplessis became more adamant about the need for provincial autonomy. During his Quebec City speech he stated, "With your help we are going to continue claiming back our rights and we are going to obtain the financial means which belong to us to administer ourselves as we should. Confederation has never been a contract between four provinces but a covenant between the two great races inhabiting Canada ... " Ibid., p.17.

needed was a provincial party independent of federal politics. In an obvious attack on Lapalme's suggestion that the province take advantage of federal programmes, Duplessis denounced "those" who wanted to replace Provincial rights by Federal subsidies.

The major rally of the Liberal campaign was held on July 4th in Montreal. At this time, Lapalme chose to correct the image that he had conveyed to the electorate about the "socialist tendencies" of the Liberal Party. Addressing a crowd in the St. James district, the heart of the province's commercial and industrial empire, he stated "I have always believed in free enterprise as the only means to transform our province into one of the most prosperous areas of the world, but the government should only cooperate and avoid direct intervention."²² The party, according to Lapalme, was categorically opposed to socialism but felt that social justice was the crucial issue of the campaign. The Government's cry for provincial autonomy was nothing but "a worn out battle horse."²³

22- Ibid., Wednesday, July 4th, 1952, p.17.

23- Ibid. The Liberal Party chose, astutely, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Union Nationale on the matter of provincial autonomy. One might suspect that Liberal strategists actually felt that "provincial autonomy" was no longer a salient issue with the electorate. However, the reasons for avoiding the debate were far more political. It was best that the Liberal Party not expose itself to continuous charges that the Party and the leader were closely tied to Ottawa. Whatever the reason, it seemed that Lapalme was not listening too closely to his advisors. Shortly after his Montreal address, at a large rally in St. Jean, Lapalme allowed himself to be introduced by a fellow colleague in the federal Liberal cabinet.

Regardless of Lapalme's attempts to befriend the labour class, the Liberals had not been able to convince Labour officials that they were a credible alternative to the government party. On July 4th, N. S. Doued, Executive Secretary of the C.C.L., asked the 55,000 membership to support the C.C.F. "The C.C.L. must regard Duplessis as anti-labour. Every case shows that it is fighting the workers. Do not vote for the Union Nationale." 24

Further ill tidings were to follow. The Liberals, during the last part of the campaign, had quietly encouraged their federal counterparts to enter the contest and add fuel to the faltering Liberal campaign. Duplessis was quick to denounce the federal intervention and his claim that the U.N. was the only party where provincial rights would be protected must have made a realistic impression on the electorate. 25

In the last week of the campaign, both parties continued to emphasize their respective platforms. The Union Nationale embarked on a typical policy of initiating grants and financial aid for local improvement projects. It must have been with these grants in mind when Duplessis addressed a crowd in Rigaud.

24- The Montreal Gazette, Wednesday, July 4th, 1952, p.7.

25- The "supposed" collaboration of provincial and federal Liberals in the election developed into such a controversy that on June 12th, four days prior to the election, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent was forced to make a statement that federal Liberals were not helping their provincial counterparts in the electoral campaign.

"It is the duty of all honest and right-thinking citizens of the Province to say 'thanks' to the Union Nationale by voting the present government back into office. We don't come to you with promises but with accomplishments."

During the final days of the campaign, the Union Nationale emphasized its accomplishments in the field of agriculture, reminding farmers of the extensive rural road network and rural electrification. Lapalme persisted with his promises for the labour classes with great zeal and rhetoric that, at times, bordered on the fanatic. In one of his last speeches, he again promised the labour code and concluded with the following. "The Union Nationale will never give you a labour code because they hate the worker and think he is trying to form a state within a state."²⁶

With the campaign concluded, the final assessments were left to the Press. It is interesting to note that both Montreal english speaking journals came out in support of the Union Nationale. In an editorial in the Montreal Star on the day before the election, the campaign was summed up as follows.

...the opposition has not succeeded in producing any firm issue upon which it can successfully appeal to the electors against the U.N. In the circumstances, the campaign waged by Mr. Duplessis, and based on his record of achievement, has been well devised and merits support. 27

26- Lapalme at Beauceville, The Montreal Star, Saturday, July 12th, 1952, p.6.

27- Montreal Star editorial, op.cit., Tuesday, July 15th, 1952, p.10.

The Montreal Gazette, lacking the verbal sophistication of its competitor, came more directly to the point, "In politics, it is hard to fight prosperity." 28

28- Editorial excerpt from The Montreal Gazette, Thursday, July 10th, 1952, p.6.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE 1952 ELECTION: THE RESULTS

The provincial election of 1952 marked the fifth time that the governing Union Nationale party faced the electorate since the party's formation in 1936. Their record of continuous success was becoming progressively more difficult to sustain. The election of 1948 had returned Duplessis' party to power with the largest number of seats ever accorded to a provincial party in Quebec's history. Prior to dissolution in May of 1952, the Union Nationale had 82 seats in the 92 seat Legislative Assembly representing a significantly low 51.0% of the electorate. The Liberal opposition had 8 seats which represented 38% of the popular vote.¹ It is no wonder that Duplessis attempted to revive the issue of provincial autonomy in the electoral campaign of 1952. The party's position on the matter was the primary reason for its outstanding success in 1948 and, it was hoped, four years would not allow sufficient time for the electorate to forget the importance of the issue. In observing the outcome of the 1952 election, it can be seen that the Union Nationale's strategy was moderately successful. While the ruling party lost a considerable number of seats, it managed to maintain its percentage of the popular vote.

1- For a quick reference to the seats won by various parties in Quebec Provincial Elections, see Appendix A, Table IV of H.F. Quinn's The Union Nationale. For statistical computations of seat distribution and percentage of popular vote refer to Quebec Statistical Year Book, Queen's Printer, Quebec, 1968, p.120.

SEAT AND POPULAR VOTE DISTRIBUTION

ELECTIONS OF 1948 & 1952

	Members Elected		Percentage of Seats		Percentage Votes	
	U.N.	LIB.	U.N.	LIB.	U.N.	LIB.
1948	82	8	89.1	8.7	51.0	38.3
1952	68	23	73.8	25.0	51.5	46.0

A cursory examination of the electoral statistics for the election of 1952 presents a number of significant observations. The Union Nationale lost 14 seats, yet increased its percentage of the popular vote by 0.5%. The Liberal Party increased its representation in the assembly by 15 seats which, considering the popularity of Duplessis, was no mean feat.² Yet, more significant than the Liberal increase in the number of seats was the party's 8% rise in popular vote. If the Union Nationale managed to maintain its electoral support while losing a number of seats, from where did the seat and popular vote increase come for the opposition Liberals?

A number of factors may provide a response to the question. Traditionally, the rural segments of the electorate have been over-represented in the legislative assembly in that the proportion of seats accorded them far out weighs the proportion of the population so situate. As a rural-based party, the Union Nationale has consistently benefited from the uneven seat dis-

2- Ibid., p.120.

tribution. This factor explains why the Union Nationale obtained a substantial number of seats while receiving but a slim majority of the popular vote. In the election of 1952, the Liberal Party gained 15 seats from the Union Nationale, managing in the process to make successful inroads into the Union Nationale's rural bastion. As we will note later on, most of these seats were won by slim majorities. Considering the low degree of population concentration in these rural constituencies, one can easily see how the Union Nationale managed to lose a number of seats without any significant loss to its percentage of popular vote.

A possible conclusion to the previous hypothesis might be that the election of 1952 did not bring about any significant changes in electoral support for both parties. Such is hardly the case.

While the increase in popular vote for the Liberal Party was due, in part, to the constituencies gained from the Union Nationale an additional and possibly more significant source could have come from a transfer of allegiance originating from the sizeable proportion of voters (approximately 9%) who voted for the Union des Électeurs in 1948. Precursors of the present Ralliement des Créditistes, the Union des Électeurs ran candidates in all 92 constituencies in 1948 and did remarkably well in economically depressed areas of the province. Their absence in the election of 1952 proved beneficial to the Liberal Party.³

3- In general the largest increase of electoral support for

Is it not a plausible theory that disillusionment with a governing party can be stronger than ideological persuasion, and that in the absence of a favoured party, a vote of protest will be entered against the government by supporting another party also in opposition to that government?

the Liberal Party originated from those constituencies where 15% and more of the popular vote went to Union des Electeurs and other candidates in the election of 1948. The following is a partial list of constituencies where the vote for non Liberal - non Union Nationale candidates was greater than 15% in 1948.

Constituencies	1948			1952	
	%Lib. Vote	% UN Vote	U. de E. & Ind.	Lib. Incr. or Decr.	U.N. Inc/Decr.
Abitibi Est	27	42	31	/16	-15
Abitibi Ouest	20	51	29	/25	/4
Beauce	21	59	20	/21	-1
Chicoutimi	18	58	24	/16	/8
Drummond	30	55	15	/20	-5
Frontenac	25	56	19	/26	-7
Lavolette	26	54	20	/21	-1
Mtl. St. Louis	38	36	26	/12	/2
Mtl. St. Marie	29	55	16	/21	-10
Richmond	30	50	20	/21	-1
Rouyn-Noranda	26	42	32	/21	/11
St. Maurice	18	53	29	/10	-11
Sherbrooke	23	57	20	/20	-1

While caution should be exercised in interpreting these election statistics, there are a number of significant observations that can be made. The constituencies listed above are primarily working class areas. They also represent those constituencies where the Liberal increase in popular vote was most significant. The possible transfer of allegiance from the Union des Electeurs to the Liberal Party in 1952 should not be underestimated. Of the fourteen constituencies gained by the Liberals from the Union Nationale, six of these constituencies had more than 15% of the vote given to Union des Electeurs and other independent candidates.

Compared with the electoral distribution in 1948, the Liberal Party nearly tripled their representation with the election of 1952. The party gained fifteen seats from the Union Nationale and one from an incumbent Independent. The Union Nationale retained sixty-seven of their previous eighty-two seats, losing fifteen and gaining but one seat from the Liberals.

TABLE A

SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN ELECTION OF 1952

FOR ALL 92 CONSTITUENCIES*

RETAINED		GAINED		LOST		DEFEATED	
Lib.	U.N.	Lib.	U.N.	Lib.	U.N.	Lib.	U.N.
7	67	16	1	1	15	67	7

*Prior to the election of 1952, Independents represented the constituencies of Montreal Ste. Anne and Gaspé-North. In 1952 the Liberals won the latter seat while the incumbent retained Ste. Anne. This explains why there is a discrepancy in totals for both parties. It should also be noted that LOST refers to those seats previously held by one party and lost to the other. DEFEATED refers to those constituencies where one party is defeated by the party retaining the constituency.

Nearly half of the Liberal Party gains from the Union Nationale were in the major metropolitan centres of Montreal and Quebec City. Five of the six Liberal gains in these urban areas were in primarily working class constituencies. The Liberals also succeeded in penetrating one of the rural-working class strongholds of the Union Nationale. Of the eleven seats in the Eastern Townships region, the Liberal party wrestled five seats from the Union Nationale. The four remaining Liberal gains were in agricultural-working class constituencies in diverse regions of the province.

One of the most interesting factors of the seat distribution in the election of 1952 was the relative increase and decrease in popular vote for both parties in all constituencies.

TABLE B

DEGREE OF INCREASE OR DECREASE IN POPULAR VOTE
FOR BOTH PARTIES IN CONSTITUENCIES IN THE ELECTION
OF 1952*

SUBSTANTIAL				CONSIDERABLE				MARGINAL				EVEN	
Lib.		U.N.		Lib.		U.N.		Lib.		U.N.		Lib.	U.N.
/	-	/	-	/	-	/	-	/	-	/	-		
47	5	19	15	10	2	9	13	16	7	11	16	4	7

*SUBSTANTIAL refers to an increase or decrease of 7% and over of the popular vote in a constituency, comparing the elections of 1948 and 1952. A change of 4% to 6.9% in a party's popular vote is CONSIDERABLE, while change of less than 4% is MARGINAL. The positive and negative signs beneath each category depict the number of constituencies where an increase or decrease occurred. Again, the total number of constituencies differ for each party. The constituency of Montreal-Ste. Anne was not considered as both parties fared poorly in the elections of 1948 and 1952. In addition, Quebec County was not included in the Union Nationale total as the party did not field a candidate in 1948.

As the table indicates, the Liberal Party increased or maintained their popular vote in all but 14 constituencies, while the Union Nationale decreased their percentage of popular vote in nearly half of the 92 constituencies. It is significant to note that in 47 of the 73 constituencies where the Liberals gained in popular vote, the increase was substantial.

Additional information can be obtained when Tables A and B are combined.

INCREASE OR DECREASE IN POPULAR VOTE IN SEAT
DISTRIBUTION IN ELECTION OF 1952

	RETAINED		GAINED		LOST		DEFEATED	
	Lib.	U.N.	Lib.	U.N.	Lib.	UN.	Lib.	U.N.
INCREASE: SUBSTANTIAL	2	17	13	1	0	1	32	0
CONSIDERABLE	1	8	1	0	0	0	8	1
MARGINAL	1	8	2	0	1	1	12	2
EVEN	1	7	0	0	0	0	4	0
DECREASE: SUBSTANTIAL	0	9	0	0	0	5	6	2
CONSIDERABLE	0	9	0	0	0	4	2	0
MARGINAL	2	9	0	0	0	4	3	2

It now becomes evident that most of the substantial Liberal gains took place in constituencies retained by the Union Nationale. The remaining substantial gains came, as would be expected, from Liberal seats won from the Union Nationale. Of the seven seats retained by the Liberals, only two provided the party with substantial gains. Yet, in five of the seven seats the Liberal vote was either maintained or increased. Even in the single seat won by the Union Nationale from the Liberals, the losing Liberal incumbent managed to increase his percentage of the popular vote.

It would appear from the election statistics of 1952 that an 8% provincial increase in popular vote for the Liberals would not warrant such a degree of concentration on shifts of electoral support for both parties. This would be a valid criticism if the 8% increase for the Liberal Party was due to tremendous Liberal gains in one particular area of the province.

In examining the tables provided above, such is not the

case. The increase in popular vote for the Liberal party was a province-wide phenomenon.

Now that the general trends in the 1952 election have been examined, we will turn our attention to regional analyses, hoping thereby to discern if there was any indication of class support for the Liberal party. In general terms, the election of 1952 permitted the Quebec electorate to weigh the importance of their ethnic affiliation against their desire to improve economic and labour conditions in the province. In a broad sense, support for the Union Nationale or the Liberal party would indicate which alternative deserved the most immediate attention.

In the election of 1952, the Union Nationale lost 16,000 votes and 14 seats while the Liberal opposition increased their popular support by 110,000 votes which translated into the addition of 15 seats. A cursory glance, without benefit of the knowledge of previous electoral trends or voting statistics, would lead one to conclude that the incumbent party scored an impressive victory. Indeed, they did just that! Winning in 68 of 92 electoral ridings, the election appeared as a landslide victory for the governing Union Nationale. Yet, as is not often the case in grandiose electoral victories, it was the vagaries of subtle change that proved to be a more dramatic issue than the final seat distribution.

Contemporary analyses of recent Quebec Provincial elections have suggested that the urban-rural dichotomy is sufficient to explain the respective electoral support for the L.P. and the U.N. Seat distribution after the election of 1952 certainly lends credence to the hypothesis. After all, the L.P. not only managed to retain all their urban constituencies but also gained 3 seats in the process. As expected the U.N. made an impressive showing in most of the rural ridings in the province. Yet, this analysis is hardly satisfactory. Too great an emphasis on the final tally of seats obscures the significant change that occurred in the election of 1952. Too simplistic a suggestion that "the urbanites voted Liberal and the farmers, the old mainstay", ignores the fact that the most significant voter shift occurred in favour of the L.P. in non-metropolitan constituencies. Hopefully, the further classification of rural

into: 1) Rural Agricultural and 2) Urban Working Class, and Urban into: 1) Urban Middle Class and 2) Urban Working Class, will illuminate some of the subtleties of voting change. While essentially recognizing the importance of the urban-rural voting phenomena in Quebec politics, it also recognizes some of the voting patterns within these settings.

Consideration of the seat distribution for the election lacks perspective unless mention is made of the fact that the rural population constituted 23 % of the population. Their representation in the legislature consisted of merely 50 % of the 92 ridings. Of the 44 seats designated as rural for the purposes of this study, the U. N. won 40 with one seat gained from the L.P. Fully two-thirds of their seat representation came from the over-represented rural population. Yet, it was not the rural agricultural constituencies as much as it was the rural working class constituencies that were solidly behind the U. N. Nevertheless, the measure of U. N. support in rural agricultural constituencies suggests that for the election of 1952 it remained a cornerstone of the U. N. victory.

One of the most striking features of the rural agricultural support for Duplessis' policies was that the U. N. won impressive victories in constituencies containing a significant per centage of voters of English origin. In the riding of Ventnor, located in the Quebec hinterland, the U. N. won 61 % of the popular vote, while 45 % of the electorate was of English

origin. High was also the case in the Eastern Township ridings of Brno where the U.W. incumbent retained his seat in a riding where the electorate of English origin numbered over 70 %.

Huntingdon (32 % English) and Fowville (15 % English) in Southern Quebec also returned U.W. candidates. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the English electorate in many rural agricultural constituencies supported the incumbent party. Ironically enough, the U.P., "le parti des Anglais", made some inroads in constituencies where the electorate was almost solely of French origin.

Aside from its gains in metropolitan areas, the U.P. fared best in the mélange of ridings in the Eastern Townships. Of the three rural agricultural ridings in that district, the Liberals gained two from the U.W. (Front was and Wolfe) increasing their vote margin substantially. Yet, the most interesting facet of their electoral gains in these ridings is that the electorate of French origin is over 96 %. It is not surprising to note then, that in nearly half of the rural "swing" rural ridings where French is the predominant language, the Liberals made impressive gains. But the victory was not of the Liberal party. The persistent Agricultural support for the U.W. is best exemplified by their solid victory in the impoverished and through County. In an area where the average annual income was less than \$1250 per male wage earner, the agricultural ridings gave them support to the U.W. in some cases the margin of victory being over 90 % (Monteregie).

One simple measure of a party's popularity in a given area or with a particular social grouping is the popular vote percentage margin between opposing parties and the consistency with which that margin is maintained in constituencies sharing a common social or economic level.

Rural agricultural constituencies have often been touted as the bastion of UN support, and while the election of 1952 reinforced that observation to a certain degree, it is apparent that an even greater degree of support came from those rural constituencies that were predominantly working class in character.⁴ Also, as was evident in some of the agricultural constituencies, English support for the UN appeared to be a contributing factor in the outstanding electoral successes of the UN in rural working class constituencies. In spite of the fact that the Liberals increased their percentage of popular support in many rural working class constituencies, that party's electoral situation was hardly improved. Even with the increase in votes, the Liberals only appeared to progress "from worse to bad!"

Suggestion of English support for the UN was probably best exemplified by the popular vote distribution in two different areas of the province. Of the four rural working class constituencies in the Quebec Hinterland, the UN candidates were re-elected. The

4-Recalling our working definition, rural working class constituencies are those where the predominant segment of the popular live in a rural habitat and where the combined skilled and unskilled labour force exceeds 27% of the working population.

Liberals increased their vote by a substantial margin in three, conceivably gaining the support of voters who had voted for the U. de E. in 1948. Yet, a very interesting development occurred in Gatineau, the only riding where the Liberals lost a substantial number of votes from their previous record in 1948 (from 44% to 36%): close to 27% of the voting population is of English origin. While a goodly degree of caution should be employed, one might suggest that the English component of a constituency could determine the measure of UN support. Combining the electoral data of the Hinterland constituencies with those in Southern and Western Quebec, a number of interesting observations are apparent.

Electoral Results and Per Centage English and French in Constituencies in the Southern, Western and Hinterland Regions of the Province for the Election of 1952

AREA AND CONSTITUENCY	%		%	
	ENGLISH	FRENCH	LIBERAL	UNION NATIONALE
<u>Hinterland</u>				
ABITIBI WEST	5	89	45	55
ABITIBI EST	5	89	43	57
GATINEAU	27	70	36	60
PAPINEAU	11	86	33	65
<u>SOUTHERN QUEBEC</u>				
BAGOT	1	99	42	58
IBERVILLE	4	95	42	58
<u>WESTERN QUEBEC</u>				
ARGENTEUIL	32	66	32	68
DEUX MONTAGNES	11	86	23	75
LABELLE	1	98	41	59
PONTIAC	3	97	45	53
VAUDREUIL-SOULANGES	3	96	45	55

A cursory inspection would suggest that Liberal support is certainly stronger in areas where French is predominant. The margin of votes between the Liberal and UN parties appears to diminish with the decrease in the English segment of the voting population. Indeed it would appear that the UN won their most resounding victories in constituencies where the English vote was significant (Gatineau, Argenteuil, Papineau and Deux Montagnes). Yet, in spite of what appeared to be an element of English support for the UN, the phenomenon was superseded by the outstanding electoral success of the UN in rural working class constituencies in all parts of the province. The Q.L.P. failed to gain a foothold. In fact, the only rural working class constituency held by the Liberals in the election of 1948 was won by the UN in 1952.

Gaspe Nord, an impoverished riding where the average wage was between \$750-1000 per annum and the skilled and unskilled labour force in excess of 65%, was won by the UN from the Liberals. Even in areas where the Q.L.P. made their most significant gains, the rural working class constituencies remained solidly UN. In the Eastern Townships where the Liberal party managed to wrest 5 of the 11 seats formerly held by the UN, the rural working class constituencies remained in the UN fold. More significant than the apparent English support for the incumbent party was the province-wide support the UN received from rural workers. In an election where the Liberal platform was strongly pro-labour, where the UN labour record was being denounced from numerous segments and where the Q.L.P. made impressive gains in urban working class ridings, why did the rural worker refuse to shift his allegiance? This has to rank as the most interesting phenomenon of the election of 1952.

If the rural voter gave little support to the policies of the Liberal Party in the election of 1952, the urban constituencies more than made up for their counterparts' lack of enthusiasm. Indeed, if an upsurge of support did occur for the Liberal opposition, it was essentially an urban phenomenon where the party retained all of its urban middle class seats and made impressive vote and seat gains in nearly all of the province's 32 urban working class constituencies. Of the latter, the Liberals retained 2 and gained 10 from the UN, the total comprising over half of the Liberal seat representation in the Assembly. In addition to this impressive gain, the Liberals increased their popular support by a substantial margin in 25 of the 32 seats. Without a doubt, the Liberals capitalized on the urban labour unrest -- not sufficiently, but significantly. The party enjoyed seat gains in almost every region of the province.

The Liberal increase was divided almost equally between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, with their best regional showing on the Island of Montreal.

Of the fifteen electoral districts on the Island, six are classified as urban working class. Discounting the riding retained by the Independent incumbent (Ste. Anne) the Liberals won 4 of the 5 remaining constituencies, retaining but one from the previous election and gaining three with very substantial increases in popular vote ranging from 12 to 21 percent. In fact, in all six ridings, including the one retained by the UN, the Liberals increased their popular support by substantial margins. Interestingly enough, the Liberals enjoyed their most significant increases (21%) in the two ridings containing the largest percentage of French voters. Yet, in partial

reinforcement of the traditional antagonism between the Island and Quebec City, the Metro-Quebec working class constituency of St. Laurent returned the UN candidate to office with a respectable 57% of the popular vote. This, occurring in a constituency where 98% of the electorate was of French origin and where over 60% of the labour force were engaged in blue-collar professions.

In spite of the strong showing by the Liberals in metropolitan areas, perhaps their most significant gains occurred in non-metropolitan urban working class constituencies. Without a doubt, the major upset in the election occurred in the Eastern Townships, long an English stronghold but slowly succumbing to the increase of French. Coupled with their gains in two of the three agricultural constituencies, the Liberal party won three of the six urban working class constituencies previously held by the UN. In two of the three seats retained by the UN, the Liberal candidates lost by 3% or less. In areas where the dominant influence was French, the Liberals managed to gain from 13% to 20% in the popular vote with substantial gains in every constituency. The Liberals, in the Eastern Townships at least, had successfully penetrated the urban working class, relying heavily on the French faction of the electorate in the process.

On a minor scale, the same occurrence took place in the other regions of the province. In Levis, a seat gained by the Liberals, the party increased its popular support by 20% in riding almost totally French. In the western and very French region the Liberals gained one seat and markedly increased their support in the four other urban working class constituencies.

While English support for the UN was certainly not strong enough to suggest a trend, a number of UN victories in some ridings did suggest that the English electorate was perhaps partial to the ruling

party. In Southern Quebec, where the Liberals retained one seat and gained one (Richelieu, where the electorate of French origin was 98%), losing in five others, the UN scored impressive wins in constituencies where the per centage of the English electorate was considerable.

From an analysis of the popular support accumulated by both parties in the election of 1952, it is apparent that the Liberals profited most from the decision of the U. de E. not to contest the election. Nowhere is this more evident than in the urban working class constituencies. While the transfer of this protest vote from the U. de E. in 1948 to the Liberals in 1952 was not sufficient to cause the UN to lose a great number of seats, it did figure significantly in many Liberal gains throughout the province.

This and additional factors suggest the acute dilemma facing the urban working class electorate in this election, especially those of French origin who were to choose between the ethnic consciousness of provincial autonomy or the social-economic position and conditions within which they worked. While the UN garnered a majority of urban working class seats, the Liberal gains, especially in areas with a high concentration of French voters, cannot be ignored.

A common truism is that the electorate will vote according to their interest priorities. As such, they will tend to choose a candidate or party which most clearly articulates or protects those specific interests. As has been noted above, the election of 1952 enabled the electorate to choose between two political platforms quite diverse in nature. The UN encouraged the electorate to opt for a program of moderate economic progress within the framework of an autonomous and French Quebec without the "external" interference of Ottawa. The Liberal party, without attempting to disavow their connections with Les Anglais, offered the electorate a platform

of radical economic reform "was the conference in Washington". The choice for more than half of the electorate was obvious. The election, more than an appeal for Duplessis' economic performance, was an endorsement for his policies of cultural protectionism. The classless society was fully expected to rally around the flag and the majority of the electorate followed suit.

In an emergent society, as was Quebec in the turbulent post war period, class politics takes root when a particular social grouping votes for that party which most closely identifies with its economic interests. To be a "have not" there must first be "haves". While the analogy is somewhat simplistic, the urban middle class of the post war period were the first of the "haves" sufficient in number to warrant attention as a social group. If class and class voting existed in the election of 1952, then one would expect the privileged to identify with the party of privilege without deference to national origin or language. In short: if class voting did exist in the election of 1952, then it should have been most evident in the urban middle class. And, if traditional political behaviour is to be acknowledged, then one would also expect that a majority of the electorate would support the party of the right--traditionally, the party most akin to the interests of the privileged classes.

Of the 112,600 residing in urban areas, 60,000 constituted the electorate in the election of 1952, 62,600 an approximately

50% voted for the Liberal Party--if not the party of the future, then at least, the pre-labour party of change. If anything, the election demonstrated that the urban middle class was the least cohesive of any of the four groupings delineated in this research. Indeed, it is apparent that ethnic affiliation was the most prominent determinant of voting behaviour.

Of the sixteen urban middle class constituencies, all save four were located in the metropolitan areas of Montreal and Quebec City. The Liberal Party won 9 seats, gaining two from the U.N. and one from an Independent, and the U.N. retained 7. Of the 9 Liberal wins, 6 were on the Island of Montreal, all but one in the Island's prosperous and English west end. Generally, the Liberal Party fared well in those ridings where a significant percentage of the electorate was of English origin, the converse being true for the U.N. It is also interesting to note, nevertheless, that the top five constituencies, according to the socio-economic index, voted for Liberal candidates and that two of the three Liberal gains were in the metropolitan Quebec City area.

1952 ELECTION
Voting Record, Per Centage Popular Vote, Per Centage Ethnic Origin
in Liberal Urban Middle Class Constituencies

Constituency	#	1944	1948	1952	%	U.N.	I	LT
Westmount	1	L	L	L	76	20	50	25
Mtl. H.R.C.	2	L	L	L	55	21	53	10
Quebec West	2	L	UN	L	51	10	11	41
Outremont	1	L	L	L	57	22	25	32
Jacques Cartier	5	L	L	L	51	12	27	55
Mtl. Jacques Cartier	5	L	UN	L	48	12	12	77
Quebec County	10	L	L	L	40	21	11	65
Quebec East	2	L	UN	L	51	11	10	32
Mtl. Westmount	1	L	L	L	39	24	12	18

indicates rank on socio-economic index scale

vote, in spite of the Liberal gains in predominantly English ridings, it is clear that their most important victories occurred in those ridings with a significant English electorate. Not even Peelers' own riding of Leeds-Liverdon could tally as high a vote as the 76% allotted to the Liberals in the English constituency of Westmorland. Without a doubt, the margin of the Liberal electoral support decreased with the decline of English constituents in these ridings. In the "English" ridings of Westmount, N.B.C. and Verdun, the Liberal per centage of the popular vote was in excess of sixty. Marginal victories occurred in those constituencies where voters of French origin were predominant. A converse pattern is established when the U.V. victories are considered.

1952 ELECTION

Voting Record, Per Centage Popular Vote, Per Centage Ethnic Origin in U.V. Urban Middle Class Constituencies

Constituency	#	1944	1948	1952	U	MUM	U
Leval	6	L	UN	UN	42	52	7
St. Hubert Centre	7	L	UN	UN	45	55	7
St. J. de Jacques	9	UN	UN	UN	42	54	3
St. Hubert	11	L	UN	UN	41	57	22
Trudon-Riviere	12	UN	UN	UN	39	41	4
St-Augustin	15	L	UN	UN	46	54	22
St. Marcien	16	L	UN	UN	42	52	6

Greater Part on Socio-Economic Index Scale

The pattern is certainly not as pronounced, but it does suggest that the U.V. enjoyed the support of a considerable fraction of the French urban middle class.

The patterns of voting behaviour in the provincial election of 1952 could hardly be used to substantiate any of the contemporary theories of voting behaviour. There should be a suggestion that working class voters tend to support the party which ad-

theater of a moderate or radical departure from the status-quo is about, a party of the left. The middle and upper middle classes tend to support that party which promises stability, an even course and a preservation of what is.

Only fragments of the provincial electorate support this theory. Save for the urban French speaking middle class, and segments of urban working class, the voting behaviour of the provincial electorate was less than predictable and quite paradoxical. The urban middle class vote was divided—more so than any other segment of the voting population. If class voting did occur in this election, then it was the French speaking urban middle class who contributed to it and not the English speaking electorate. For it was the urban middle class French whose voting behaviour was most consistent with the theory that financially successful groups vote for the party of the right, in this case the Union Nationale. Why then did the English vote in these constituencies support a party whose platform advocated a change in the status-quo, a party that courted the interests of the labour working class? Was the urban middle class French support for the Union Nationale an indication of class consciousness with that group? Or was that support an indication that even the French middle class agreed with Duplessis' somewhat ethno-centric stand on provincial autonomy?

Perhaps the most intriguing questions concern the English middle class support for the Liberal party. Jones has suggested that the English vote was an ethnic vote:

Although the English-speaking minority in Quebec would strongly object to any suggestion that it is "nationalistic", it is obvious that this group, like the French minority in Canada, closes its ranks and presents a united front whenever it feels that its point of view or interests as an ethnic group are challenged. (Quinn, op. cit., p. 101)

Essentially, this viewpoint relegates the English vote to one of passivity and defensiveness. If such were the case, one would hardly expect the English middle class to vote overwhelmingly for the Liberal party as they did in 1960 when that party constructed its platform on the theme of "maîtres chez eux". Perhaps the English middle class vote for the Liberal party in 1952 was based on a realistic assumption that economic progress could not be assured with Duplessis' politics of isolation. Yet, more than any other interpretation, the electoral statistics would suggest that ethnicity played a more distinctive role than the politics of class. Whether this was a conscious choice on behalf of the electorate is debatable. Perhaps, as Trudeau has suggested, the urban middle class vote was based on the ideology of no ideology. Of the election of 1952, Trudeau wrote:

...je ne compte pas la bourgeoisie comme une force politique distincte: qu'elle suive les financiers, ou qu'elle conduise les nationalistes, ou qu'elle fasse un peu des deux...elle ne représente pas une force de changement idéologique ni, partant, d'assainissement électoral. 5

5- P. J. Trudeau, "Réflexions sur la politique au Canada Français", Cité Libre, Vol. 2, no. 3, Décembre 1952, p. 64-65.

While the suggestion tends to exaggerate, it would appear that as a result of the 1952 elections, the Liberals were the "labour party" in the legislative assembly, in that more than half their seats were won in working class areas. Yet, they were far from being the party of the labouring man! As it had done consistently in the past, the large majority of working class voters supported Duplessis' U.N.--a remarkable allegiance considering the shambled labour policies of the incumbent party. Yet it is this paradox which suggests the working class's stubborn support of the U.N. Without a doubt Duplessis' stand on the need to retain provincial autonomy in social and fiscal affairs proved to be more than a red herring. The platform that served as the cornerstone of victory in 1948 was as important in 1952. In spite of Duplessis' record in Asbestos and Schaeferville, the working class considered the issue of provincial autonomy as an item of priority. Yet, the crucial point, at this juncture, is not to determine how Duplessis managed to convince a majority of the working class of the significance of provincial autonomy. Rather, it is to ask why the working class opted for this ambiguous theme instead of concentrating on their position in the social structure of the society.

To some extent, Lipset, in his classic study of voting

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behaviour, provides a response. Lipset's hypothesis suggests that working class consciousness develops in those areas which are considered economically developed.

In terms of economic development and industrialization, Quebec was transformed from an agrarian community into an urban society in a span of 40 years (1920-1960). Lipset's view of Quebec as an exception to the General Hypothesis is well taken. The situation unique to Quebec's industrial evolution was that French Canadian society, "had passed quickly from a rural society into an urban and industrial one, without any psychological or social adjustment".⁸

6- Lipset, S.M., et. al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behaviour", Handbook of Social Psychology, Gardner Linzey, Editor, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1954, Vol. II pp. 1124-1175.

7- Lipset, S.M., et. al., op. cit., p. 1141, where they state that "one of the most striking cases of deviation from leftist voting within the lower-income group is presented by some relatively poor and economically less-developed regions that regularly vote conservative. Such areas are found...in Quebec... action by the impoverished workers...is the extent to which their minds are dominated by "traditionalist" values--realignment to a traditional standard of living and loyalty to the powers that be."

8- Hubert de la Foe, "Canada Incertain", Documentary Problems of Canadian History---. It is interesting to note that, in that appears to be a practical substantiation of de la Foe's comments, Michel Fortin in his Urban Rural et Village Québécois, Les classes Vintaines, Recherches Sociologiques, #6, 1965, p. 47-59, demonstrates the strength of the rural-agrarian influence. "Dans une enquête conduite en 1958 auprès de 500 familles de la région de Montréal, plus de la moitié des chefs de famille étaient nés dans les villes moyennes, réacteurs to say, but neither would have been greater had the same study been conducted in 1952."

Union, following a similar program in other "developing" areas, was undermined by a process of internal stimuli and internal complexity. The structure of industrialization were erected without the foundation of a society aware of its implications. Class consciousness as a widespread phenomenon could hardly have developed.

In 1953, working class politics was in an embryonic stage. Provincial autonomy wasn't the only obstacle. Labour was still largely unorganized and rural oriented. Peasants was not playing one union off against another and with the help of the clergy, emphasized the socialist or "bolshhevik" tint of organized labour--a philosophy abhorrent and alien to the average voter. The climate was hardly conducive to a major labour swing away from the U.N. But if it was not a major swing, at least there were indications of minor but important shifts.

It is obvious that the urban-rural dichotomy was a significant feature in the election, especially in the working class ridings. The U.N. carried every rural working class constituency in the province. It was the urban working class ridings--largely French--that spearheaded the minor revolt and indicated to some degree that social conditions were more important than autonomy. If working class consciousness was to develop, it would start in the donor ridings that voted not necessarily for the Liberal party, but definitely against the U.N.

In changeover, the doit venir, changes de la classe ouvrière... Il y a de la frustration industrielle et sociale dans la province de Québec.

aurait faite loi, cette classe comble pointant pour son dans l'ensemble de l'ensemble qui en s'équilibrerait par le jeu électoral, débarrassé l'ordre politique, avec la participation. Après d'ailleurs, il faut noter à la réalité de 1940: ils comprennent que leur lutte désormais ne se livrait pas contre les anglais...mais contre les financiers, ou bien contre une certaine conception de capitalisme. 9

While the liberal party managed a minor penetration of the U. N.'s rural fortress, the governing party had no cause for alarm. The most conservative element of the electorate gave their support to the party which promised to support tradition. If not a class grouping as such, Quebec's agrarian society was certainly one of the most homogeneous and cohesive segments of the 1952 electorate. The U. N. perhaps enjoyed the highest per centage of English support for their policies than in any other segment of the electorate. The reason why the U. N. continued to receive the support of the rural voters has been examined at length in previous sections of this work. Yet it is somewhat intriguing to consider why the party of "high finance" was also the party of agrarian Quebec. Regardless of motivation, both elements had a vested interest in preserving the status quo

Par une récente victoire, les éléments ruraux de notre population ont à peu près les mêmes intérêts électoraux que la finance, bien que leur présence dans le statut quo ait d'autres motifs. D'une part, ils envisagent le radicalisme surtout sous l'aspect de manifestations sociales (assurances contre chômage et accidents du travail, plans d'habitation cliniques, etc.) qui profitent surtout aux centres industriels; d'autres vont même jusqu'à craindre pour la propriété privée de leur terre et de leur veche.

D'autre part, la population rurale ayant une députation hors de proportion avec sa force numérique, elle n'a aucun intérêt immédiat à modifier un système dont elle croit rester l'enfant gâtée, quels que soient les effets des élections. "Ceteris paribus," elle vote toujours pour le parti au pouvoir. 10

If the election of 1952 was at all noteworthy, it was due to Duplessis' success with his recurring theme of provincial autonomy. His victory was not one class versus class but rather one which was due to the broad base of support the U. N. enjoyed from all segments of society. Hardly a resurgence of nationalism, the election of 1952 was more or less a stamp of approval encouraging Duplessis "de continuer son oeuvre". Yet, in other respects it was a costly victory for Duplessis. Not since 1935 and the Action Libérale Nationale had the electorate been exposed to such radical concepts in social welfare as was advocated by the Liberal party. Duplessis' traditional interpretation of the nationalism was under siege and time and social conditions would promise a deterioration of that interpretation:

...il est fort probable que l'Union Nationale gagnera les prochaines élections provinciales (1956). Mais alors, il semble que le cristallisation des forces de droite et de gauche sera en passe de devenir si nette que le nationalisme de M. Duplessis...constituera un argument électoral moins décisif que leur conservatisme. 11

Perhaps, now that any other analysis that followed the election, P. E. Trudeau caught the temper of the time and the

10- Ibid., p. 61

11- Ibid., p. 57

...arguments that would pull away the traditional nationalism upheld by Duplessis and Taschereau before him:

Mais les peuples posent les problèmes avec les cerveaux qu'ils se sont formés, et conséquence de quoi notre malaise économique et social finit encore par se traduire politiquement par un regain de nationalisme. Ainsi donc, au sein d'une crise qui transcendait toutes les frontières, au milieu de bouleversements économiques à l'échelle mondiale, cependant que les États-Unis inauguraient le "nouveau" et que les Anglais préparèrent la révolution heppesienne, tandis que les Canadiens anglais fondaient les mouvements C.C.F. et Crédit Social, les Canadiens français, eux, voulaient que l'État remédiate au chaos économique par un raffermissement de son nationalisme. 12

CHAPTER EIGHT
PROLOGUE TO 1960

The deliberate decision to forego an in-depth analysis of the provincial election of 1956 is based on a number of factors both methodological and circumstantial in nature. While mindful of the danger of oversimplification, the choice was one of foresaking continuity for the sake of rigor or vice-versa. The election of 1956 was one in a series of four that took place within the ten year period with which this research is concerned. But rather than a chronological analysis of the political history of the province within that time span, the emphasis of this research is on certain important spatial components of that period, i.e. analysis of the elections of 1952, 1960 and 1962. Continuity then, is not a crucial factor. Yet there are more significant reasons which necessitate the omission of the 1956 election. Without writing an apologia for the methodological tools employed in this analysis, it should be pointed out that the exclusion is partially based on a desire to insure a degree of methodological rigor in our explorations. Correlating the election returns of 1956 with socio-economic data from the 1951 or 1961 census would produce a coefficient somewhat suspect in nature. Nor would interpolation justify an attempt. If our basic unit of analysis - the constituency - represents aggregate sums or averages of socio-economic data based on 1951 and 1961 census materials, then one would be hard put to justify a further delineation of these aggregates through the process of interpolation.

In addition to these methodological concerns there are

circumstantial factors which suggest, if not encourage, the omission of a serious analysis of the election of 1956. One would not exaggerate in stating that the constituency returns for the election of 1956 are highly suspect. While hardly a provincial trend, the election abuses perpetrated by the Union Nationale in many constituencies render the election of 1956 a classic in rigged electioneering. Perhaps this is overstating the case, although much of the contemporary literature on the subject might justify the statement.¹ Lending institutional legitimacy to Duplessis' actions was the passage, just after the Liberal "comeback" of 1952, of the notorious Bill 34, "one of the most glaring examples in the history of the province of a party using its control over the legislature for the purpose of weakening the electoral strength of a political opponent."² Without elaboration,³ passage of the Bill gave the Union Nationale

1- Fathers Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neill, both affiliated with Laval University, were particularly caustic in their denunciations of the Union Nationale's electoral practices. Shortly following the election of 1956, they published a little pamphlet entitled L'Immoralite politique dans la province de Quebec, Montreal, 1956. As expected, the publication evoked a major outcry, leading eventually to a small movement to reform electoral practices. For a general, if not informed, analysis of the situation refer to Herbert Quinn, op.cit., pp.142-151 and 165-167. Another interesting rendition can be found in Pierre Laporte's "Les Elections ne se font pas avec des prières", Le Devoir, Dec. 7, 1956, p.4.

2- Quinn, op.cit., p.146

3- For the abolition of the dual enumerator system in urban areas to the changes in sundry other provisions, refer to Statutes of Quebec, 1-2 Elizabeth II, c. 32 and compare it to its predecessor, The Quebec Election Act, 1945, 9 George VI, c.15 and amendments.

a legal license to beg, steal or borrow votes and intimidate voters in the process. Under concerted pressure, the Bill was finally revoked by Duplessis' reform-minded successor just prior to the 1960 election. But for one election at least, it had served them well.

Notwithstanding Duplessis' electioneering tactics, the political complexion of the province was not changed significantly by the election of 1956. An additional rural constituency had been created and of the 93 seats the Union Nationale won 72, gaining 3, plus the new constituency of Jonquière, while the Liberal opposition lost 3 seats with one seat retained by the perennial independent in Montreal - St. Anne. There was even less variation in the popular support for both parties. The Union Nationale varied little from their 1952 per centage, obtaining 51.5% in 1956 while the Liberals garnered 44.8% of the vote. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the total seat distribution tally for either party betrayed the number of constituency changes in the election.

CONSTITUENCIES WON, RETAINED, GAINED AND LOST, 1952, 1956.

	1952	1956		
	Seats Won	Seats Retained	Gained	Lost
Liberals	23	10	10	13
Union Nationale	68	59*	13	10
Independent	1	1	-	-
ALL PARTIES	92	93		

(* Jonquière - Kenogami, new constituency, counted as "retained".)

The largest number of Liberal gains occurred in the Gaspé region and in the Quebec Hinterland. The seat gains represented a good cross section of the electorate as they won in agricultural, urban and rural working class constituencies. Yet considering the province-wide gain and losses record for each party, it is clear that no major trends had developed.

Perhaps the most notable change was the eight urban working class seats the Liberals lost to the Union Nationale, most by very narrow margins.

RECORD OF SEAT GAINS AND LOSSES, 1956

	Urban Middle		Urban Working		Rural Working		Agricultural	
	Gain	Loss	Gain	Loss	Gain	Loss	Gain	Loss
Liberals	1	3	3	8	3	0	3	2
U N	4	1	8	3	0	3	2	3

CHAPTER NINE

THE 1960 ELECTION: THE CAMPAIGN

To what extent the Quebec provincial electorate voted for the political personality of Maurice Duplessis or the policies of the party he had in governing the province for fifteen years is still a matter of much controversy in contemporary literature on the subject. The failure of the Union Nationale to win the election of 1960 might attest to the strength of the hypothesis that Maurice Duplessis, until his death in 1959, was the Union Nationale. And it is only with some degree of doubt and reluctance that we can dismiss the theory as being too simplistic. Rather, Duplessis' death was but one of a series of events which placed the Union Nationale in a serious political predicament immediately prior to the election of 1960.

If the wheels of the quiet revolution began turning in earnest in 1960, the first perceptible movements began three years earlier, in 1957. The post-war boom had receded and a slight economic recession had already begun. Politically, the pendulum had also reversed. With the election in 1957 and 1958 of the Diefenbaker government in Ottawa, Duplessis had lost one of his most effective scapegoats. Allied for some time at the constituency level, Duplessis could hardly have harangued the new Conservative government as aptly as he had the former Liberal government of St. Laurent. Provincial autonomy against the "Ottawa centralizers" had lost both bark and bite. While political expediency may have demanded it, it was certainly unfortunate that Duplessis had chosen to forego his traditional line of attack against Ottawa. Not that the new Conservative government overtly continued a policy of federal incursions into

provincial field of jurisdiction, but rather because Diefenbaker demonstrated a policy bordering on arrogance towards the cultural aspirations of French-Canadians. With his Quebec ministers relegated to inferior portfolios, it wasn't long before the Conservatives had gained the enmity of the Quebec electorate that had sent a record 58 Conservative candidates to Ottawa.

Nevertheless, the demise of the UN was due, primarily, to conditions internal to the party's structure and philosophy. Obviously, the most prominent factor was the death of Duplessis in September of 1959. His successor, unanimously selected by the UN caucus was the very capable Paul Sauvé, who, had he not died but a scant three months after his appointment, would probably have guaranteed a slight majority for the party. In his short term in office, Sauvé zealously attempted to reform the government and its policies--revoking the notorious Bill 34, negotiating with Ottawa for shared-cost programmes in the field of education and welfare and, with some desperation, attempting to smooth over unfavourable relations with the alienated labour movement.

If the UN's confidence was shaken by the death of Duplessis, it was shattered by the death of Sauvé. None of the political hierarchy in the party could command the near unanimous support of the party and the result was a compromise choice in the selection of Antonio Barrette, for sixteen years Duplessis' Minister of Labour. Thus Quebec and the Union Nationale had

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their third premier in as many months. Barrette's selection as the new party chief and premier in January of 1960, a scant five months before the election in June, did not pacify all elements of the party hierarchy who had supported either Prévost or Johnson. In fact, as early as February, it had been rumoured that Bégin and Martineau, high in the echelons of the party organization, had expressed their dissatisfaction with the party's selection.²

By the election, it had become obvious that Barrette did not have the unanimous support of the party faithful. That he did not enjoy the complete confidence of the party was exemplified by the manner in which the UN conducted their electoral campaign.

The success of the Quebec Liberal Party in the election of 1960 was due, in large measure, to the party's reorganization which began in earnest in the mid-fifties under the leadership of Georges Lapalme. With the formation of the Provincial Liberal Federation the party could afford to become somewhat less reliant on business interests for campaign funds. Coincidentally, the party also veered more to the Left. This was due more to poli-

1- This was a prime example of the serious predicament facing the UN immediately prior to and after the election of 1960. Within a period of a year the UN suffered a leadership change no less than four times: Duplessis, Sauvé, Barrette and Johnson.

2- For a further account of the subject, see Quinn, *op.cit.*, p. 177 and his reference to the Montreal Star, October 15, 1960. That Barrette had failed to mobilize all the party resources was evidenced in an article in the July 20, 1960 edition of Le Devoir where an impressive list of UN constituency party organizers had defected, ideology and all, to the Liberal party.

tical astuteness than to its increasing financial independence. By the late fifties, the Liberal Party had successfully mobilized most of the political and economic factions that had become increasingly hostile to Duplessis' policies.

Perhaps of greater significance was the party's successful attempt to become more "nationalistic" in its approach. Taking the offensive on the nationalist front--a novelty which eventually reaped political rewards for the party, the Liberals castigated the UN for their lack of policy initiatives in the field of social welfare, thereby obligating Ottawa to fill the void. This was not mere political manoeuvring! The approach and implicit philosophy became a corner-stone of the Lesage Liberal's policy of aggressive nationalism. As La Pierre has cogently stated:

The Liberal Party under Jean Lesage was a nationalist party, but not in the traditional sense. While the UN had promoted a nationalism based on provincial autonomy, the Liberal's nationalism aimed at establishing an equal partnership with the federal government in Ottawa. Lesage and his followers were convinced that by assuming full control of the powers Quebec already held, and by seeking an extension of powers in areas where Quebec's powers were thought to limit the full development of Quebec society, they could achieve the hoped for 'épanouissement'. 3

With their new, or at least revised, approach to the cultural and economic problems of Quebec, the Liberal Party also inherited a new leader when Georges Lapalme resigned, winless, in 1958. He was Jean Lesage, a former cabinet minister in Louis St. Laurent's federal Liberal cabinet. Again the party

3- Laurier LaPierre, "La Revolution Tranquille": Quebec 1960 - 66 in J. M. Bumsted, op. cit., p. 264.

"had invaded Ottawa to find a leader" but this time the party was ready for the criticism, believing the proven adage that the best defense was a good offence. Barrette, too pre-occupied with the internal struggles in his own party, made little use of the criticism. Lesage hurriedly formulated what became a decisive factor in the election of 1960, "Une brillante équipe entoure le jeune chef, 'l'équipe du tonnerre'. On y remarque René Lévesque, le prestigieux commentateur de l'émission télévisée 'Point de mire'; Gérin-Lajoie, le rejeton d'une illustre famille, spécialiste en droit constitutionnel et dans les affaires scolaires; Georges-Emile Lapalme, l'ancien leader qui a amorcé le virage à gauche; René Hamel que ses démêlés avec Duplessis ont popularisé." ⁴

Reflecting the political situation, the Quebec Liberal Party embarked on a positive and confident campaign with a slogan of "C'est le temps que ça change." The election of 1960 marked the advent in Quebec provincial politics of a "team approach" to the electorate. For the Liberal Party under its new leader Jean Lesage, the new approach was by design. For the Union Nationale and their compromise choice of Barrette, the approach was by default. Prior to 1960, many of the aspiring UN candidates surely reaped the rewards of the "coat-tail" effect. To paraphrase Laporte, the party was Duplessis. With his death and that of his reforming successor, the party was hardly in any

4- Quatre Elections provinciales au Quebec, Vincent Lemieux, ed., Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Quebec, 1969, p. 13.

shape to face the electorate. Needless to say, Barrette did not command the same leadership as had the party's founder. The only alternative was to present Barrette as "the manager of a strong team, past and present". Union Nationale election publicity spoke much of "les trois grands de l'Union Nationale: Duplessis, Sauvé et Barrette" or "Vers les sommets avec Barrette et l'Union Nationale". Quite a drastic change from the self-centred slogan of "Laissons Duplessis continuer son oeuvre".

The Lesage Liberals, rather than appearing somewhat apologetic for the lack-lustre qualities of their leader, struck a more positive note. "L'équipe du tonnerre" was a youthful team ready with a new programme to meet the challenges of the 60's. The 1960 Political Manifesto of the Quebec Liberal Party represented the platform of the Lesage Liberals and reflected, in words at least, the dynamic changes which were to become the quiet revolution. The brochure and its content received wide distribution during the campaign and Liberal leaders and candidates presented a broad exposé of their blue-print for social change. The manifesto articulated policy proposals in both cultural and economic spheres of interest, foregoing the party's previous stance of a passive interest in cultural policy. Indeed, primary if not major emphasis was given to insuring an aggressive attitude towards "la survivance". Education and Culture were the first concerns of the Manifesto. From the outset, the party was concerned with the possibilities of not only retaining the culture but insuring its future development. Article 1 proposed the creation of a Department of Cultural

Affairs with provision for the creation of an Arts Council, a Linguistic Office and an Office for Cultural Relationships with French-speaking groups outside the province--the latter being a decidedly refreshing approach considering the previous Duplessis policy of isolation. The Liberals also emphasized the unsatisfactory position of Education in the province, citing impressive statistics which suggested that educational opportunities were meagre in the Province. But perhaps the most significant indication of the re-orientation of the party vis-à-vis the cultural rights of French Canada was embodied in the Manifesto under the heading of Constitutional Rights. It is here that a clear divergence between Duplessis' regressive nationalism and the Lesage Liberal's aggressive stance is most evident. The Quebec Liberals not only welcomed "cultural outreach" but suggested policy initiatives which might expedite the long needed interchange between Quebec and the rest of Canada. A new Department of Federal-Provincial Relations was proposed as a structural mechanism to harbour the new aggressive policy towards Ottawa. Along with the re-patriation of the constitution, Lesage proposed to call an Interprovincial Conference to discuss fiscal problems. The new orientation was perhaps best summarized by the "Commentary" accompanying the proposals on Constitutional Rights:

"The problems which face the Provinces in Canada urgently require that an Interprovincial meeting should take place before the scheduled Federal Provincial Conference next July and certainly before 1962 at which time the present agreements with the Federal government expire. Quebec's views must be forcefully presented. If they are to be accepted Quebec's representatives must take the initiative in submitting practical proposals at these conferences....."

in the election campaign of 1960, the Union Nationale was a
emphases placed on the subject clearly indicated that, at least
while their achievements in this field were no less real, the

L'Union Nationale a compris les problèmes des cul-
tivateurs et a sans cesse travaillé à les régler.
Depuis 1944, 55,000 fermiers ont récupéré 1,300,000
acres de terre grâce à la loi du drainage de l'Union
Nationale. 9,564 miles de routes rurales ont été
remplacés les anciens sentiers de l'époque des
Libéraux.

in this field:
field. Much of their literature talked of their accomplishments
leader. Again the party recalled its efforts in the agrarian
was indicative of the lack of faith the party had in its own
course of action was remarkable in its lack of astuteness and
accomplishments. In terms of simple political strategy, this
UN attempted to woo the electorate with reminders of past ac-
Quebec. Instead, relying on passé electoral techniques, the
campaign which suggested some kind of ill-defined future for
at l'Union Nationale" was one of the rare phrases in the UN
what hollow-sounding slogan of "Vers les sommets avec Barrette
did they propose any significant policy realignments. The some-
did not present the electorate with a comprehensive platform nor
During the election campaign of 1960, the Union Nationale

and realistic action."
Affairs will permit our province to take positive
Affairs and a Department of Federal Provincial
element Council, of a Department for Cultural
The establishment of an Economic Planning and Dev-
rights.
would return to the provinces the constitutional
be abolished and replaced by a fiscal policy which
the present financial agreements with the provinces
The Premier's Committee report... recommends that

party "with its head in the clouds and its feet firmly entrenched in the grounds of the 19th century."

The Liberals countered with statements and statistics which suggested that the agricultural community had been led down the garden path. As part of the Manifesto, the "Commentary" anticipating Barrette's glorifications of things past, suggested "The present Minister of Agriculture, the officials of his department...have advanced no plan nor new idea in the field of agriculture for the past quarter of a century". The article on Agriculture contained no less than 18 proposals to ameliorate the agricultural situation in the province. While the point taken might be minor there were broad implications in the Liberal platform. Rather than outlandish promises or reminders of what had past, the Liberal platform contained proposals or promises which seemed to indicate that the party held some idea about specific problems in the field. This was another major difference in the campaign. The UN dealt primarily in generalities with little or no concrete proposals which might divine a future for the province. The Quebec Liberal Party placed more emphasis on specifics--the Manifesto, echoed by candidates across the province, contained approximately 90 specific recommendations in all the major policy fields of interest to the government. Their emphasis on specific formulae was also developed at the constituency level. The Liberals concentrated heavily on local constituency problems. The tactic probably accounted for a goodly portion of the seats they accumulated in the election.

On those occasions when Barrette specifically outlined se-

accomplishments as he defensively did in the field of education, it was again to remind the electorate of quantitative accomplishments -- the number of schools constructed, etc. His comparisons were poorly argued--citing UN accomplishments over those of the previous Liberal administration 20 years prior!

The Liberals placed considerable emphasis on the urgent need for social and economic reforms, and while the UN leadership talked of roads and bridges, the Liberal Party was busy urging the electorate to endorse policies that would radicalize major economic institutions and establish a blue-print for the quiet revolution to come.

The Liberals proposed the creation of an Economic Planning and Development Council, the membership to consist of representatives from Labour and Industry. To loosen the stranglehold on natural resources enjoyed by industrial interests, the Liberals proposed the establishment of a Department of Natural Resources to monitor and encourage the use of the province's natural resources. As the brochure stated, "Royalties now being paid by exploiting our natural resources must be revised so that the return to the Province will bear an equitable relationship to the profits which these companies earn from their operations".

While the UN said little in the way of concrete proposals for change in social welfare policies, the Liberal's master plan was indicative not only of their commitment in this field but also of their own philosophy of government intervention in the social welfare field so as to improve the quality of services provided. To Duplassis this was anathema. The state had no

Even if the Liberals spent old ideas in new clothing it need for social reforms.

called for a Royal Commission on the matter) and the urgent centred on the need for administrative reform (the Hanfstaedt The main points of the Liberal attack against the UN agent. Also, strikes in the public service would be legalized.

become certified and therefore, recognized as a bargaining 20, Labour unions with Communist members would be permitted to enacted by Duplessis in 1954. With the repeal of Bills 19 and 20, two of the most regressive pieces of Labour legislation The Lesage Liberals also proposed to revoke Bills 19 and

- F - The establishment of a Pension Fund
- E - Publication of the decisions of the Labour Relations Board
- D - Revision of the Minimum Wage Commission Act
- C - Revision of the Workmen's Compensation Act
- B - The establishment of Labour Courts
- A - The publication of a Labour Code

heading of Labour Legislation. They included:
The most specific proposals were made under the general then had ever been previously contemplated.

theless suggested a broader commitment to state intervention proposals smacked of "political promising", the platform never- adoption of a hospital insurance scheme. Even if many of the of hospitals, etc., the Liberal Party advocated the immediate while they again spoke in terms of quantity, i.e., the number. The approach was still evident in Barnette's Union Nationale. right interfering in the personal concerns of the individual.

was considerably better than the efforts of the UN, who, in comparison to the youngish "l'équipe du tonnerre", seemed like an old party well in need of deserved respite.

CHAPTER TEN

THE 1960 ELECTION: THE RESULTS

The results of the election of 1960 returned the opposition Liberals to power after a fifteen year absence. With the addition of three constituencies, two in northern Quebec and one on the Island of Montreal, the total number of seats available in the legislature was ninety-five and both parties ran candidates in all ridings. Aside from a smattering of Independents, no splinter or third parties contested the election, similar to the 1952 election.

The Liberal Party won the election, winning 51 seats - 18 more than they had managed to obtain in 1952 - compared to the UN plummet to 43. In the process of victory the party also obtained 51.5% of the popular vote. The increase in their popular support and seat distribution came from every segment of society in Quebec.

As was cited earlier, the Union Nationale enjoyed a virtual monopoly in agricultural constituencies in the election of 1952, winning in all but two of the twenty two agricultural seats. Considering the traditional strength of the Union Nationale in the rural electoral districts, the Liberal Party gain of agrarian seats has to be considered a significant shift upset in the election of 1960. One might conjecture that even the Liberal Party organization hardly expected to increase their rural representation in the assembly by a fourfold amount. The upset was made all the more significant because of the region of the province where the Liberals scored their most impressive agricultural gains.

The agricultural constituencies of the Gaspé and the lower St. Lawrence are among the most impoverished in the province. Subsistence farming is common and the annual income for male wage earners in 1960 was in the vicinity of \$2,000. The region is also predominantly

French with all agricultural constituencies containing a French-speaking population in excess of 99%.

In 1952, all seven constituencies gave their support to the Union Nationale. In 1960, the Union Nationale was able to retain but two of the seven seats, with the remaining five won by the Liberals. This represented one of the Liberal's most successful incursions into the Union Nationale's rural fortress. Even if one of the Liberal gains was due to a local financial scandal involving the Union Nationale (in the riding of Montmagny)¹, the gains by the Liberal Party were indicative of a wide-spread feeling in the region that rural electrification and improved roads, while improving the "comfort" of the rural dweller, did nothing to improve the economic standards of farmers in the area. Even if the Liberals spoke of promises to come - land, crop and cattle subsidies, their program was qualitatively better than the Union Nationale's platform of reminding the agricultural community of past accomplishments. Part of the Liberal Platform included long and short term loans to help improve the productivity of farms, the adoption of herd loss and crop damage insurance and the creation of special wood lots to supplement the income of farmers. To many of the agricultural community in the Gaspé, government involvement in procuring a better standard of living for farmers was a welcomed initiative.

1- Lemieux, *et. al.*, *op. cit.* alludes to the scandal which had broader implications "... le 6 juin, ... Jean Lesage annonce que Honoré Pelletier, un cultivateur de Sainte-Pacôme, avait reçu \$3,200. de Joseph Alphonse-D. Bégin, pour changer d'allégeance. L'affaire Pelletier était lourde de conséquences: elle allait coûter à l'Union Nationale les comtés de Bellechasse, Beauce, Portneuf et Montmagny.

Mid-Quebec and the Eastern Townships were two areas where the Liberals enjoyed moderate success. In 1952, the four Mid-Quebec agricultural constituencies of Bellechasse, Beauce, Dorchester and Lotbinière returned UN candidates with strong majorities. In Dorchester and Beauce the margin of victory was in excess of 20%. The election of 1960 produced very different results. Possibly as a result of L'Affaire Pelletier, the Liberals won Bellechasse and Beauce. The UN meanwhile, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, barely eked out a victory in the two other agricultural ridings, winning both by a slim 1% margin.

While not as dramatic an upset as occurred in the Gaspé region, the Liberal gains in Mid-Quebec were significant nevertheless, considering the low percentage of votes they had received in these ridings in the election of 1952.

The volatility of the constituencies in the Eastern Townships was evident in the voter shifts in the election of 1952. The variation is even more pronounced in the three agricultural constituencies² when the election of 1960 is taken into consideration. No evident electoral pattern emerges here. In '52 the Liberals won two of three ridings, a feat they repeated in 1960. Perhaps the most significant factor in their victories in the Eastern Townships was the continued support given the Liberal Party by the constituents of Brome, a riding they initially won from the UN in 1956. The riding has always had a

2-Wolfe was gained from the UN in 1952 by the Liberals. In 1956 the riding went UN, and in 1960 it once again fell to the Liberals. Frontenac, a Liberal gain in 1952 was lost to the UN in '56 and was retained by the party in 1960. In Brome, a UN bastion since 1936, the Liberal won in 1956 and retained the seat in 1960.

large proportion of English-speaking constituents and without exception the UN carried the riding since 1936.³ In 1952, the UN obtained 61% of the vote. In 1960, with the English-speaking population being 44.2%, the Liberal Party won 56% of the vote. Yet, no distinctive pattern emerged for the Liberal Party in the Eastern Townships for the party also won the constituency of Wolfe where over 97% of the population was French-Speaking.

If the Liberals could claim support from the English-speaking population in the Eastern Townships, the Union Nationale could also make the same claim in some rural constituencies in Southern Quebec and the Quebec Hinterland. In Southern Quebec, the UN retained their traditional strength, winning all four agricultural constituencies. Between the election of 1952 and 1960, there was only slight variation in voter support for the UN except in the "English" constituency of Huntingdon (33% English-speaking) where support for the UN increased approximately 5% in 1960, over the 52% of votes the party had obtained in 1952.

The constituency of Pontiac also returned the UN incumbent. With an English-speaking population of 42% in 1960, the UN received 58% of the popular vote.

For the Union Nationale, stability was also found in Western Quebec where they retained three agricultural constituencies.

Of the 22 rural agricultural constituencies in the election of 1960, the Liberal Party won nine and the Union Nationale thirteen, representing, for the latter party, a loss of seven seats. Liberal

3- According to census calculations the percentage of English-speaking residents in Brome was 40%.

gains did not suggest a landslide but they did suggest that the UN could no longer expect homogeneous support from their once traditional reservoir of strength. In fact there is evidence to suggest that the agrarian community in the election of 1960 was as fragmented as the urban working class electorate of 1952. In fact, Pinard has suggested that of all the social groupings in Quebec society in 1960, the group most "opposed" to the Union Nationale was the agricultural community:

Il est vraisemblable qu'à certaines élections, au moins, les agriculteurs ont été parmi les plus solides appui de l'Union Nationale. Ce qui surprend, cependant, c'est qu'à la veille de l'élection de 1960, ils constituaient apparemment l'un des groupes LES PLUS OPPOSÉS à ce parti.

INTENTION DE VOTE 1960

PARTI	CLASSE MOYENNE		CLASSE OUVRIÈRE		AGRIC.
	PROFESSIONNELS	COMMIS	SPÉCIALISÉS	NON-SPÉCIALISÉS	
	%	%	%	%	%
UN	54	63	63	72	59
QLP	41	29	34	26	38
AUTRES	5	8	3	2	3
N	(123)	(63)	(246)	(84)	(125)

En fait, si nous excluons les résidents des centres métropolitains et si nous comparons les agriculteurs aux seuls autres résidents des municipalités, ou des villages, villes et cités, nous trouvons qu'alors que 59% des agriculteurs favorisaient l'Union Nationale et 38% le Parti Libéral, les proportions favorables à l'Union Nationale dans les autres groupes occupationnels de ces localités variaient entre 62 et 71%, et les proportions favorables aux libéraux variaient entre 26 et 34%. En comparaison avec les autres groupes de ces localités, les agriculteurs étaient donc les moins favorables au parti au pouvoir à la veille de l'élection de 1960.⁴

4- Pinard, M., in V. Lemieux (ed) op. cit., pp. 148 & 172-173.

While Pinard presents a rather liberal interpretation of his findings, they are no less suggestive of the waning influence of the Union Nationale over the agricultural community at least in the election of 1960. A proper perspective of the results in agricultural constituencies would suggest that the Union Nationale still enjoyed majority support - at least in terms of seat distribution, but they could no longer rely on these constituencies to provide the party with a spring board to power.

With the further dichotomy of "rural" into rural agricultural and rural working class constituencies, we have seen that even though the UN obtained strong support from most of the agricultural constituencies - their traditional source of strength - the party enjoyed their most outstanding successes in rural working class ridings. In the election of 1952, the UN won all of the twenty-one rural working constituencies, including a gain of one seat - Gaspé Nord - won by the Liberals in 1948. Considering the solid support for UN from these working class ridings in 1952, then a Liberal gain of two or three seats in 1960 would have been a significant accomplishment. That the Liberal Party, in fact, won eleven of the twenty seats has to be considered an upset of major significance, even more so than the significant inroads made by the party in the agricultural constituencies. According to our previous definition, rural working-class ridings are those constituencies where a majority of the inhabitants are rural residents and where a significant proportion of wage-earners are engaged in specialized and non-specialized labour occupations. Usually rural working-class constituencies also contain a notable number of inhabitants who are engaged in agricultural pursuits and

according to the census material employed in these classifications, the annual wage would indicate that subsistence farming is common. One could assume that farmers in this category would attempt to augment their income by working in non-specialized occupations such as pulp-cutting and fishing.

In considering the general economic decline in the late 1950's, the political history of nationalist sentiment in many of the rural working-class ridings and the deteriorating relationship between organized labour and the Duplessis government, the Liberal victories in rural working-class ridings were not surprising. In fact, one might assume that they were long overdue! In 1952, we noted the shift which had occurred in many of the urban working-class constituencies and we have examined some of the reasons for the numerous Liberal gains in these urban ridings. To some degree, the same rationale can be applied to the apparent rural working-class shift in 1960. Provincial autonomy and the "agrarian tradition" were no longer salient issues to the rural working class in 1960, just as they had not been salient for their urban counterparts in 1952.

In the election of 1960, the Liberal Party won rural working-class constituencies in all regions of the province, with particularly strong showings in Western Quebec and Gaspé - Lower St. Lawrence.

Not unexpectedly the Liberals fared well in the Hinterland region where the UN managed to retain only two of the four constituencies. The Liberals retained Abitibi-Ouest which they had won by a narrow margin in 1956 and gained the constituency of Abitibi-Est. In a sense, the victory represented a "maturation" of the protest vote in the Abitibi district. In our examination of the 1952 election it was

noted that the Liberals had prospered from the absence of Union des Électeurs candidates who had gained close to 30% of the vote in the election of 1948. No doubt, the victory for the Liberals was due primarily to a negative vote against the UN, but it was a victory nevertheless.⁵ Yet, despite the Liberal gains in the Hinterland, perhaps the most significant feature of the election results there was the persistence of the Gatineau and Papineau constituencies in voting for the Union Nationale. Both constituencies contained a proportionately high percentage of English speaking voters. In 1952 the margin of victory for the UN in these two constituencies was a humiliation for the local Liberal organization. Even if the Liberal showings in 1960 were more respectable, the UN still won by nearly 12% in Gatineau, where the English speaking population was close to 25%. To some extent, the pattern was similar in at least one of the two ridings the UN managed to retain in Western Quebec. The UN retained the "English" constituency (30%) of Argenteuil, winning the riding

5- The Quebec Hinterland - Abitibi-Est, Abitibi Ouest, Rouyn-Noranda, Témiscamingue and the northern ridings of Saguenay, Lac St- Jean and Chicoutimi are noted not only for their political volatility but also for their tendency of registering a strong protest vote based primarily on economic reasons. The tradition began with the significant vote given to the Union des Électeurs in 1948 and was evident even in 1966 when the Ralliement National received as much as 25% in many constituencies. The protest vote generally worked against the UN as a cursory glance of the election results between 1948 and 1970 would seem to indicate. Naturally, the tendency towards the registration of the protest vote has also occurred in federal elections, most notably through the phenomenal rise of Caouette's Ralliement des Créditistes. The entire phenomenon is most ably documented and discussed in Maurice Pinard's The Rise of a Third Party: The Social Credit Party in Quebec in the 1962 Federal Election, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1971.

with 60% of the votes. Yet one would be hard pressed to suggest a pattern here. In 1952, the "average" vote for each party considering the five constituencies was Liberal: 37%, Union Nationale: 62%, with the UN enjoying their most resounding victories in constituencies containing a high proportion of English voters. The "pattern" was not repeated in 1960. In Vaudreuil-Soulanges and Deux Montagnes, two of the three rural working-class constituencies won by the Liberals in this area, the English population had increased by 14% and 7% respectively between 1952 and 1960.

In winning three of the five rural working class seats in Gaspé, the Liberals completed their near sweep of the twelve constituencies comprising the Gaspé-Lower St-Lawrence region.⁶ But again, as in 1956 and 1952, the riding of Gaspé Sud was won, with a reduced majority, by the UN. The riding contained an English population of close to 20%.

1960 marked the first time in provincial electoral history that a distinctly "urban party" won power. The Liberals won fifty-one of the ninety-five seats gaining thirty-one seats over their 1956 representation. Of their fifty-one seat total well over half, or thirty-two seats were won in predominantly urban ridings. Yet this fact tends to overshadow the party's rather phenomenal accomplishment in the province's forty-three rural ridings. Not since before the formation of the Union Nationale in 1936 had the Liberals been able to gain any significant footholds in Quebec's rural constituencies. In 1960, the Liberal party won in nearly half of the rural constituencies in the province. In an election no segment or group in the

6- In 1952 the entire region was won by the UN. In 1960, the UN lost all but 4, losing 5 agricultural seats and 3 working class ridings.

electorate is unimportant. To gain power the Liberals had to capitalize on their own source of electoral strength - the urban voter. That they won thirty-two of the fifty-two urban ridings suggests that they were successful - if not moderately so. That result was, perhaps, not unexpected. Even the pre-election polls, while predicating a UN victory, suggested that the Liberals would do well in many urban constituencies. What was unexpected was the breadth of the Liberal gains in the rural constituencies. Again, although in a reversed political position from previous election, the rural vote was a deciding factor. The urban party came to power because of its rural support.

If the election of 1952 suggested the development of any voting patterns or trends, then the support received by the Liberal party from urban working-class constituencies was among the most notable. Aided by the absence of political protest movements - the Union des Électeurs - in the election of 1952, the Liberals were able to make substantial gains in urban working-class constituencies, increasing their representation from two seats to twelve, with substantial increases in voter support in twenty-five of the thirty-two urban working-class ridings. It was also noted that the twelve urban working-class seats won by the Liberals accounted for more than half of all the seats won by the party in that election. The results in 1960 suggests that the Liberal party capitalized on their gains in 1952 by effectively mobilizing the discontented in the labour component of the electorate. In fact, no other segment of the electorate gave as much support to the Liberals as the urban working class. In 1960, the Liberals won in twenty-two of the thirty-five urban

7
working class ridings.

Unlike 1952 though, the impetus of support came from the non-metropolitan urban working class. The results indicate that the Liberal Party did not do as well in the metropolitan urban working class constituencies as they had wanted to. Excluding the constituency of Montreal - Ste. Anne, where the perennial Independent Frank Hanley had scored a victory, the Liberals had a reasonable chance of carrying all of the remaining six ridings, with the possible exception of Ste. Marie. As mentioned, the Liberals won in the new riding of Bourget. In the remaining five, the Liberals retained two (St. Henri, St. Louis) but with a decrease in popular support; they gained but one and lost two to the Union Nationale. In two of the four Liberal wins the margin of victory was less than .6%.

On a minor scale, the results were more depressing in Quebec City's sole urban working class constituency of St. Sauveur. In a sense, it was a repetition of 1952 with the UN winning close to 60% of the popular vote in a riding where 62% of the labour force were engaged in blue collar occupations.

Of the eight metropolitan working class constituencies the Liberals won four, a respectable but not an impressive tally considering that the Liberals average of victories in metropolitan areas

7- By 1960 three new ridings had been added to the list of ninety two in the legislative assembly. The three additional ridings in the election were all urban working class. The Liberals won in all three. They included the constituencies of Bourget in east-end Montreal, and the ridings of Jonquière - Kenogami and Duplessis in northern Quebec.

was considerably less than the average they enjoyed in non-metropolitan regions of the province.

While there is insufficient evidence to suggest that a metropolitan - non metropolitan dichotomy emerged in terms of support for the Liberal Party, it is evident that the Liberals fared better in industrial communities outside of the metropolitan areas of Montreal and Quebec City. A possible rationale for this occurrence might point to the difference of labour conditions in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. It is interesting to note that much of the labour unrest in the decade of the 50's originated in non-metropolitan urban working class constituencies of which more will be said below.

In spite of the moderate successes attained by the Liberals in the metropolitan working class constituencies, the election of 1960 suggests that a major political re-alignment had occurred in the urban working class. For the first time since the formation of the UN in 1936, the Liberal Party won a substantial majority of the urban working class ridings with victories in twenty-two of the thirty-five constituencies. Their most impressive gains occurred in the Eastern Townships and in regions of the Quebec Hinterland, two areas of the province which had witnessed a fair degree of industrial strife in the decade preceding the 1960 election.

In the Eastern Townships, the Liberals scored a major upset which surpassed the gains they had made in the region in 1952 when they had won three of the six seats and lost in two of the remaining three by less than 1%.

In 1960, the Liberals swept five of the six available seats, all in predominantly French speaking ridings.

With the redistribution of ridings in the Hinterland region, specifically in northern Quebec, the number of urban working class constituencies increased from six to eight for the election of 1960. In 1952, despite the apparent support the Liberals had received from the Union des Electeurs' supporters of 1948, the party won but one of the six seats, although they managed substantial increases in all ridings. Aside from the absence of any significant protest groups in northern Quebec in the election of 1960, the Liberals obviously gained seats because of the unsatisfactory economic conditions in the region. The Liberal labour programme coupled with the deteriorating labour policies of the UN in years past gave the Liberals one of their most impressive victories in any region in the province. One of the strongest areas of national sentiment and economic protest in the province, the Liberals won six of the eight seats including the new constituencies of Duplessis and Jonquière-Kenogami. Only Chicoutimi, a long-time UN stronghold, and Témiscamingue, which the Liberals had won in 1952, were won by the UN. In many ways the results, while not expected, were inevitable. One of the notable features of the Hinterland region, particularly northern Quebec, is the large working class element in the population. The urban centres which provide work for the skilled and unskilled are situated in Quebec's only frontier, miles from the influence of major metropolitan centres like Quebec City and Montreal. Here, the clergy still played a significant role. By 1960, especially in the Hinterland working class constituencies, secular and clerical interests were on a convergent course and the nationalist sentiment focused on the economic disparities between the region and the rest of the province. Some of the

more important industrial and manufacturing centres are located in the region - Arvida, Rouyn-Noranda, and the developing Ungava mines.

The Eastern Townships have similar characteristics, and outside of the metropolitan areas constitutes the province's most significant industrial centre. Textile production, pulp and paper and asbestos mining are major industrial concerns in the area.

Using Brouillette and Dagenais in Esdras Minville's Notre Milieu, Herbert Quinn depicts the economic similarities between the regions and offers a rationale for the significant gains amassed by the Liberals in both regions.⁸ Both regions

...have economies which tend towards instability. In times of recession, such as in the late 1950's, there is an unusually high level of unemployment, because their economic activities are based on either the exportation of raw materials, like minerals and forest products, ...or on manufactured goods... which have to face stiff competition from imports. It is in these regions rather than in Montreal and Quebec City that the presence of the foreign industrialist is most obvious. Many towns have only one large industry, whose ownership and management are English-speaking.... A fall-off in production... endangers the standard of living of the whole community.... some of the most bitterly fought strikes in the history of the province have occurred in these areas. As a result of these factors nationalistic sentiments have been stronger in these regions than in many other parts of Quebec. It is here, rather than in the Montreal area (emphasis, my own) that the Catholic unions have always been most successful in organizing the workers. It was also in these areas that the smaller nationalist parties found a good deal of their support in the 1940's. 9

While the 1960 Liberal "Manifesto" certainly played some part

8- Of the fourteen urban working-class ridings in both regions combined, the Liberals won in eleven.

9- Herbert Quinn, op. cit. p. 185.

in drawing the urban working-class away from the UN, the absence of splinter parties and nationalist movements certainly helped the Liberals in these regions.¹⁰ In a sense, the Liberal party became the party of protest in these regions.

Nearly half of the fifteen constituencies in Southern Quebec are urban working class. In 1952, Southern Quebec was the only region where the UN successfully held its own. The Liberals had won but two of the seven urban working class ridings. The situation in 1960 was altered considerably. As in 1952, the Liberals won the "French" ridings of Verchères and Richelieu. In 1960 the Liberals added the highly industrialized constituency of St. Hyacinthe to their gains. The constituencies further south continued their uninterrupted habit of returning UN candidates except for St. Jean which went Liberal in 1960. This is particularly significant in the constituency of Mississquoi where nearly 20% of the population was of English origin. As in 1952, the UN margin of victory was impressive. Bertrand, a future premier of the province obtained close to 58% of the vote. Considering the per centage of voters of English origin, one might be tempted to posit a few conclusions about English support for the UN in the riding. Yet, perhaps the most significant variable was the popularity of the incumbent candidate. But it is interesting

10-In both the election of 1960 and 1962, the Union Nationale and the Liberal party had the electoral field to themselves. In the election of 1966, the nationalist-separatist movement was again represented. Le Ralliement National succeeded in obtaining approximately 25% of the popular vote in many urban-working class constituencies in northern Quebec.

to note, nevertheless, that the Liberals appeared to do very well in those constituencies where the English presence was negligible.

With added victories in Western Quebec and Mid-Quebec, the Liberal party emerged as the preeminent spokesman of the urban working class. The results the party obtained in urban working classes suggested more than any other factor, that the quiet revolution had begun in 1960. Without a doubt, a major political re-alignment had occurred and the Liberal party, contributing to its occurrence, also reaped the benefits of the social re-orientation of Quebec's urban working class.

The dramatic political re-alignment which had occurred in the other social segments of the electorate was not apparent in the sixteen urban middle-class constituencies in the election of 1960. As in 1952, the urban middle class was divided in its vote and accorded both parties the same total of seats - the Liberals again won nine seats and the UN managed to win seven.

One would suspect that the Liberal party strategists had hoped for more impressive returns in these ridings considering the urban bent of the party and the substantial success the party enjoyed in both the rural and urban working class ridings. Although the party carried a majority of seats in the urban middle class areas, the results, when compared to the number of seats the party had gained in 1952, could only be classified as a moderate success. Basically, the Liberals consolidated their gains, retaining seven of the seats won in 1952. While they managed to gain two seats from the UN, they also lost two seats in the process. The result in 1960 was a politi-

cal stalemate for both parties -- an accomplishment for the UN, and much less than that for the Liberal Party. It is certainly interesting to note that while the Liberals had gained significant ground even in the traditionally UN rural ridings, while they swept a majority of urban working class ridings and improved their position in rural working class constituencies, they were unable to gain any significant advantage in the urban middle class ridings. If one accepts the premise that the Liberal party represented the political vehicle through which the quiet revolution was manifested in 1960, then an interesting observation arises. Political re-alignment among the electorate, a by-product of the then developing quiet revolution, had occurred in all of the major social strata save the urban middle-class. Whether conscious of the revolution or not, the electorate had opted for a major re-orientation of social and economic policies when they voted the Liberal party into government. Yet, if the quiet revolution had permeated all levels of society and if the Lesage Liberals were the political vanguard of that movement, why didn't the urban middle-class react more positively to the Liberal party?

A number of reasons could be offered in response to this minor phenomenon. First, it is doubtful whether any segment of Quebec society was fully aware of the implications of its vote in 1960. The majority vote for the Liberal party was, in 1960, a collective decision to choose another political alternative. The ramifications of that decision became evident only after the Liberals had charted a new social and economic course for the province. The quiet revolution occurred as a result of the election of 1960. The decision to embark on that course was not an issue in that election. In diffusing the dramatic impact of the quiet revolution and in isolating its

beginning to a point after the elections of 1960, we are better able to understand the vote of the urban middle-class in 1960. Their response to the Liberal invitation of participating in a more egalitarian society with state-controlled benefits to all individuals was one of caution.

The results in the urban middle class constituencies strongly suggest that the same voting patterns persisted in the election of 1960 as had occurred in the election of 1952. There was no significant shift in voting patterns. English voters, ever cautious of the UN rhetoric of nationalism and isolation, continued in the main to support the Liberal party. If class consciousness was a significant factor at all in urban middle-class constituencies, it was the French electorate that rendered it so. Their support for the UN was completely rational in terms of contemporary voting theory. The electorate with vested economic interests voted for a party that promised to maintain the economic status quo.

SEAT AND ELECTORATE DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1948,
1952, 1960, 1962 IN URBAN MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUENCIES
WON BY THE LIBERAL PARTY IN 1952.

CONSTITUENCY	48	52	% ENG.	% FR.	60	62	% ENG.	% FR.
WESTMOUNT	L	L	59	25	L	L	51	26
N.D.G.	L	L	53	19	L	L	41	18
QUEBEC WEST	UN	L	14	84	L	L	11	86
OUTREMONT	L	L	25	32	L	L	20	32
JACQUES CARTIER	L	L	37	55	L	L	40	44
JEANNE MANCE	UN	L	13	77	UN	L	8	74
QUEBEC COUNTY	I	L	4	95	L	L	5	93
QUEBEC EAST	UN	L	3	97	UN	L	2	97
VERDUN	L	L	46	48	L	L	35	58

SEAT AND ELECTORATE DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1948,
1952, 1960, 1962 IN URBAN MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUENCIES
WON BY THE UNION NATIONALE IN 1952.

CONSTITUENCY	48	52	% ENG.	% FR.	60	62	% ENG.	% FR.
LAVAL	UN	UN	7	89	L	L	7	80
QUEBEC CENTRE	UN	UN	7	91	UN	L	5	91
ST. JACQUES	UN	UN	3	92	UN	UN	2	92
CHAMBLY	UN	UN	22	75	L	L	21	73
TROIS RIVIERES	UN	UN	4	95	UN	UN	4	95
CHATEAUGUAY	UN	UN	22	77	UN	L	27	67
MERCIER	UN	UN	6	91	UN	L	4	93

PER CENTAGE VOTE, PER CENTAGE ENGLISH AND FRENCH, IN
URBAN MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN 1952 AND 1960.

CONSTITUENCY	1952		% ENG.	% FR.	LIBERAL SHIFT	1960		% ENG.	% FR.
	LIB	UN				LIB	UN		
WESTMOUNT	76	20	59	25	-14	62	38	51	26
N.D.G.	65	24	53	19	+1	66	34	41	18
Q. WEST	51	49	14	84	+5	56	44	11	86
OUTREMONT	61	33	25	32	+2	63	28	20	32
JACQUES CARTIER	54	42	37	55	+5	59	38	40	44
JEANNE MANCE	48	43	13	77	--	48	51	8	74
QUEBEC COUNTY	40	34	4	95	+16	56	42	5	93
QUEBEC EAST	51	48	3	97	-4	47	52	2	97
VERDUN	62	26	46	48	-4	58	41	35	58
LAVAL	43	52	7	89	+13	56	44	7	80
QUEBEC CENTRE	45	55	7	91	+2	47	54	5	91
ST. JACQUES	43	54	3	92	+2	45	53	2	92
CHAMBLY	41	57	22	75	+9	50	49	21	73
3 RIVERS	39	61	4	95	+7	46	47	4	95
CHAT.	46	54	22	77	-2	44	53	27	67
MERCIER	42	52	6	91	+7	49	52	4	93

The tables above present a clear indication that the urban middle class constituencies were the most stable in the elections of 1952 and 1960. Even if one were to include all the metropolitan constituencies, both working and middle class, it becomes apparent that the Liberals consolidated their support without expanding it. Why the non-metropolitan constituencies were more generous in their support of the "urban" party than their metropolitan counterparts certainly remains one of the more interesting features of the election of 1960.

Nevertheless, the Quebec electorate had opted for a new political alternative in Jean Lesage and "l'equipe du tonnerre." The Liberal party would exercise two years of power before its policies in the direction of the quiet revolution would be evaluated. The provincial election of 1962 and not that of 1960 marked the first opportunity for the electorate to assess the implications of the quiet revolution.

Yet, whatever obstacles lay before the party in its attempt to initiate major policy reforms, their mandate was a significant one, having obtained considerable support from all segments of Quebec society.

Of the forty three rural seats, the Liberals won twenty -- a remarkable gain considering the meagre returns the party sustained in 1952 when it won only two of the forty three rural constituencies. The Liberal performance in urban constituencies, while less dramatic, was no less impressive. For the first time in the history of the province an "urban" party came to power.¹¹ The Liberals won thirty

¹¹ - Perhaps a more accurate statement would suggest that the Liberal victory in 1960 represented the first time that a party had managed to win an election drawing primarily on support from urban ridings. Because of the traditional rural base of support for the UN, the UN victory of 82 of 92 seats in 1948 cannot be considered a victory by an urban party.

one of the fifty two seats in urban areas. In concluding this analysis of the 1960 election, the following table presents rather stark indications of the source of their increased support.

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS BY CONSTITUENCY CLASSIFICATION AND PER CENTAGE OF SEAT INCREASE/DECREASE WITHIN EACH OF THE CONSTITUENCY CLASSIFICATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960.

LIBERAL		% SEAT SHIFT 52-60	CLASSIFICATION	UN		% SEAT SHIFT 52-60
1952	1960			1952	1960	
2 9.1%	9 40.9%	+31.8%	AGRICULTURAL (22 SEATS)	20 90.9%	13 59.1%	-31.8%
0 0.0%	11 57.1%	+57.1%	RURAL WORKING (21 SEATS)	21 100.0%	10 42.9%	-57.1%
12 37.5%	22 62.8%	+25.3%	URBAN WORKING (52- 32 SEATS '60- 35 SEATS)	20 62.5%	13 37.2%	-25.3%
9 56.2%	9 ---	0.0%	URBAN MIDDLE (16 SEATS)	7 43.8%	7 ---	0.0%
23	51		TOTAL SEATS	68	43	

1952 = 92

1960 = 95

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE 1962 ELECTION: THE CAMPAIGN

That the Liberal government of Jean Lesage called an election in September of 1962, a little over two years after they had received a mandate from the electorate to reconstruct a new social and economic course for the province, suggests immediately that an issue of singular importance to the government had emerged requiring an electoral resolution. The primary issue in the election of 1962, so far as the Liberal Party was concerned, was the need to nationalize the eleven private companies involved in the production and distribution of hydro-electric power in the province. Lesage had been convinced by the left-wing members of the party that the resolution of the question was of paramount importance to the future economic development of the province. The Liberal strategists were willing to place the future of the Lesage administration on the resolution of a single, controversial issue. The irony of the ensuing electoral campaign and the election itself was that the government had misinterpreted the significance of the issue of nationalizing electrical production. The Liberal victory at the polls had been expected - but for the wrong reasons. The electorate returned the Lesage Liberals to power with an increased majority - not because of their stand on the issue of nationalization, but rather because of the Liberal accomplishments in the first two years of the quiet - revolution.¹

By 1962, it had become evident that Jean Lesage intended to fulfil most of the promises he had made to the electorate in 1960.

¹- See Maurice Pinard's well-argued exposition on the subject in Lemieux, ed., op. cit p. 179-187.

The new government had embarked on a course radically different from the one followed by its predecessor. The institutional changes which brought about significant policy changes in the social and economic spheres of operation in the province were premised on the fact that government could no longer afford to arbitrate private interests; it had to instigate and orient social and economic change. The fundamental difference between the Liberal Party and the Union Nationale lay in the interpretation of the role of government in society. This was evident in the kind of policy initiatives undertaken by the Liberal party between 1960 and 1962, and the response to those initiatives by the opposition Union Nationale.

Even the conduct of Lesage's administration, which hinged on ministerial responsibility, was a radical departure from the practices of his predecessor, Duplessis. Lesage certainly realized his promise that the new government was to be managed not by one man but by a team of young, capable and articulate management - politicians. In Paul-Gérin Lajoie was a minister who would radically reform and secularize education in the province. In René Lévesque, the popular and charismatic minister of Natural Resources and leader of the rationalist left-wing of the party, was a politician who forced the election of 1962 over the issue of nationalizing electric power. Coupled with the moderate Lesage and right wing ministers such as Lafrance and Arsenault, the party was an amalgam of interests all adhering in varying degrees to the principle of state intervention in the social and economic affairs of the society. Regardless of slight ideological differences within the Lesage cabinet, the general objective was to revitalize the economic sector of the province:

Ces éléments ... tendent à un objective commun: sortir le Québec de son immobilisme, combler le retard, créer un État national où les Québécois pourront, non plus seulement survivre, mais vivre et s'épanouir. Une nouvelle philosophie politique semble animer le cabinet; l'État n'est plus "le dieu des veules"... mais le levier de la nation. Le dogme de l'équilibre du budget fait place aux politiques anticycliques. "Qui s'endette s'enrichit" devient le mot d'ordre de la politique budgétaire; on n'accepte plus que l'État équilibre son budget.... L'autonomie provinciale devient un élément positif qui ne signifie plus repli sur soi, mais collaboration et affirmation de soi. 2

In the process of becoming "maitres chez eux", the Lesage administration initiated social and cultural policy reforms that had significant implications for French Canada in the period of the early sixties. With the realization that Quebec had become a predominantly urban society, and with the intention of consolidating their strength in urban areas, the Liberal party moved quickly to modernize the province's social institutions and to remove the last vestiges of a traditionalist orientation. The task was by no means simple. The Lesage administration had to wage an aggressive battle on many fronts. The government had to meet the rising expectations of a new and urban middle class without alienating entirely the more traditional rural and agricultural elements of the province. In the process, the Liberal government was confronted with the initial murmurings of a potentially dangerous seperatist movement which, by 1962, had obtained the sympathetic support of segments of the academic community. The single advantage of this confrontation was that it emerged as a strong lever, an implicit bargaining tool, between the Lesage government and Ottawa. Without a doubt, the

vocal origins of the new separatist movement in the province moulded, to a very large extent, the attitude of the Lesage government toward their federal counterparts. The sympathy for the separatist movement in Quebec left Lesage no choice but to become ardently nationalistic in his bargaining with Ottawa. But the "choice" was an agreeable one for Lesage. Realizing the economic sterility of isolation, the Lesage Liberals took the offensive against Ottawa, demanding a greater degree of fiscal autonomy and negotiating ways and means by which the cultural survival of French Canada could be assured.

Recalling our previous discussions regarding the dichotomous development of nationalism in French-Canadian society, the first two years of the Lesage administration marked the first time in the history of the province that an aggressive form of nationalism had been institutionalized by the power élite. It soon became obvious that the *raison-d'être* of the Lesage administration was to insure the cultural survival of French-Canada by utilizing institutional mechanisms which would permit French-Canadians to exercise more control over social and economic policies which affected them. In addition to increased fiscal autonomy, the Lesage government vigorously pursued a policy of insuring a more equitable relationship in federal-provincial arrangements. Regardless of cause, the entire approach of the Lesage government to Ottawa was very much a nationalist one. And yet, in scope and orientation the approach was a direct antithesis to the brand of nationalism exercised by Duplessis but a few years before. Preferring political isolation, any suggestion of co-operative federalism would have been rejected by Duplessis.

Yet, co-operative federalism, i.e., the insurance of a participatory role for French Canada within Confederation, was the foundation upon which Lesage began bargaining with Ottawa.

The decision to expand government services in the public and private sector was exemplified in much of the legislation passed by the Lesage administration between 1960 and 1962. In addition to the creation of four new ministries, the government established the Salvas Commission and the Parent Commission; created the Economic Advisory Council, the General Investment Corporation and a Bureau of Economic Research. The government also passed legislation which increased family allowances, and an agreement was struck with the federal government allowing Quebec residents to participate in the Hospital Insurance scheme sponsored by the federal government and the provinces. Increased Public Works activity in urban areas was also a visible product of the legislation passed by the Lesage Liberals.

In deference to the left-wing of the party and conscious of the development of the separatist movement, the Lesage administration took a strong stand on provincial autonomy and promoted the concept of a participatory co-operative federalism. The new Department of Cultural Affairs was one of the more important ministeries created
3
by the government.

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As with the Lesage economic policy, the cultural policies of the government were not insular in scope. In addition to insuring the cultural survival of French Canadians in Quebec, the Department of Cultural Affairs attempted to establish ties with French-Canadian elements across Canada.

On a more political plane, the new administration attempted a reform of the Civil Service and the Q.P.P., and widely publicized the results of the Salvas Commission which had investigated corruption and patronage under the Union Nationale administration. By 1962, the Union Nationale were still suffering from the ill effects of the Salvas Commission.

Perhaps the most inevitable result of the expanded programmes initiated by the Lesage administration was the need to increase public expenditures to meet the long term costs. Even the new mechanics of deficit-financing were not sufficient to provide surplus monies for the expansion. The increase in taxes was inevitable and significant. It marked the initial step in a long term process which eventually resulted in the alienation of large segments of the rural and economically disadvantaged electorate. As early as 1962, it had become obvious that the main thrust of legislative reform and expansion were of primary benefit to the urban community. Implicit in the "new politics" of the Lesage administration was an attempt to placate the interests of an emergent French-Canadian middle-class.

La révolution tranquille bouscule cependant les traditions, heurte les mentalités et dérange les intérêts en place. Les ministres font un effort pour expliquer leur politique: ils parlent une langue neuve, émaillée d'un jargon emprunté à la sociologie et à l'économie qui plaît aux classes moyennes, mais que le petit peuple ne comprend pas. 4

The reasons for the urban and middle class orientation of much of the Lesage legislation were somewhat complex. That the party enjoyed the support of a majority of urban constituencies was too

4- Lemieux, ed., op. cit., p. 16

simple an explanation. Hubert Guindon offers a succinct if somewhat partial explanation.

The link between the Liberal party and the new middle class can easily be established. Its existence can be shown in terms of (a) the "nucleus" of its political support, (b) the choice of "competent" administrative personnel in the civil service, and (c) the nature of its legislative reforms. The "volunteer" workers of the Liberal party in the past elections were urban, more highly educated, younger, new middle class people.... The Liberal legislative reform is a bureaucratic reform. It has sought to expand and strengthen the bureaucratic services of education, health and welfare.... The tremendous expenditures in education and health are coupled with a constant concern with increasing the salaries of white-collar occupations in these institutions. 5

5
 Guindon, H., "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution", in Blishen, et. al., op. cit., p. 705-706. A further tract from Guindon's article touches on a more profound rationale for the middle-class orientation of the party's legislative programme. Mindful of our discussion above regarding the impact of the new wave of Separatism on the Lesage administration Guindon adds some further thoughts on the matter, "... separatism became a social force only after the death of Duplessis. By stifling the status aspirations of the new middle class, Duplessis became a scapegoat Middle class unrest did not die with Duplessis. The middle classes ... did lose a scapegoat. The Liberal party, champion of bureaucratic reform, endeavouring to meet the aspirations of this social class, could not easily be indicted. Unrest in new middle-class circles took on the form of separatist agitation. The class origins of separatism can be ascertained both in terms of the social location of its supporters and the class nature of its grievances. Separatist leaders... are to be found among the better educated, younger, professional and semi-professional... white-collar ranks. This class constitutes the core of its support. This class bias is also the reason why the separatist appeal has gone by largely unheeded by the rural classes and the lower social strata of the cities".

If the legislative orientation of the Lesage administration favoured the urban middle-class, the nationalist orientation provided the party with a bond that narrowed the rift that was developing between the urban and rural segments of the electorate. As Léon Dion suggested shortly after the election, "Les gens qui, jusqu'en 1960, votaient pour l'Union Nationale à cause du nationalisme, ces gens, cette fois, et pour la même raison, ont voté libéral."⁶

The one man who was ultimately responsible for the Lesage decision to call a "snap" election in 1962 was René Lévesque, the minister of Natural Resources and leader of the nationalist left-wing of the party.

Due to a combination of political ideology and economic necessity, Lévesque was convinced of the need to nationalize the production of hydro-electric power in the province. In practical terms this meant the termination of business activities for eleven private companies engaged in the process.

Lévesque's own campaign to convince the public and the cabinet of the need to nationalize electric power began in February of 1962, seven months before he finally convinced Lesage to call an election for November of the same year. Based on economic principles and the need for the state to intervene and control certain aspects of economic development in the province, the issue was at once economic in nature and nationalist in orientation. Lévesque's arguments,

⁶ Dion's quote which appears in Lemieux, ed., *op. cit.* p. 181, was taken from the Saturday, November 17, 1962 edition of la Presse; p. 21, a Montreal daily, French-language newspaper.

which eventually became part of the Liberal electoral platform, were cogent and well-articulated:

1. The nationalization of private companies engaged in the production of electric power was not such a new and revolutionary concept to Quebec. Precedents did exist. While the programme was never realized it was part of the platform of the newly formed Union Nationale in 1936. During the Liberal administration of Godbout during the '40's, Hydro-Quebec was created as a result of nationalizing Montreal Light, Heat and Power.
2. Both France and the province of Ontario had nationalized electricity.
3. It was essential that the state exercise some control over the development of natural resources.
4. The nationalization of electric power was also essential to the future economic development of Quebec. If "maîtres chez eux" was to be more than a political slogan, the government of Quebec had to have the power to guide the economic development of the province.
5. Due to the profit motive of companies involved in the production of electric power and the costs of providing adequate service to distant regions of the province, there was too much variation in the cost to the consumer. Nationalization would provide better service at standardized rates.
6. Nationalization would allow the government of Quebec to recuperate millions of dollars of tax monies which private companies paid to the federal government.

The initial reaction to Lévesque's proposition was cautious but supportive. The English-language press was, at first, suspicious of Lévesque's motives and hostile to the concept, defending instead the role of private enterprise in the production of electric power. But as Lévesque continued his campaign, public opinion gradually fell in behind him. With Lesage still silent on the issue, the St. Jean Baptiste Society came out in support of Lévesque on June 3rd.

With still no official word from the Lesage administration on the matter, the F.L.Q. passed a resolution in favour of nationalization in mid-August, followed in early September by a peculiarly worded endorsement from the bishops of Quebec. With growing support from the French language press, the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs and the C. N. T. U. finally endorsed Lévesque's position. After a number of heated cabinet discussions on the matter, Lesage was finally convinced. In mid-September, the premier officially announced his party's support for "progressive-nationalization", dissolved the assembly and called for elections on November 14.

As in 1960, the Union Nationale were totally unprepared for an election. The internal rift that had developed during Barette's tenure as leader, and caused his resignation in September of 1960, still persisted. Rather than soothing dissension, the leadership convention that elected Daniel Johnson in September of the following year continued the division between the moderate-democratic and centrist elements of the party. The party's position on the issue of nationalization prior to and during the first few weeks of the campaign served to reduce their credibility as a political alternative in the election. It was fortunate for the party that Johnson was sufficiently astute to playdown the entire issue of nationalization and concentrate on the legislative failures of the government.

7--Johnson was consistently vague on the subject of nationalization, often quoting the need to encourage private enterprise in the economic system. In a quote taken from Union Nationale literature on the issue, Jacob Citrin in his The Quebec General Election of 1962, McGill University Thesis, Montreal, 1963, presents a nutshell summary of the UN position, "...chaque fois que l'Etat assume des tâches et des responsabilitées qui pourraient être mieux remplies par les familles, les groupements professionnels et les communautés locales, il en coûte infiniment plus chers en argent et en liberté, pour des résultats toujours pitoyables."

After much procrastination and more internal dissent,⁸ Johnson announced that with some reservations, the party would support a gradual policy of nationalization. Leading a party still hurting from the inquiries of the Salvas Commission, Johnson began concentrating on Liberal weaknesses: the emerging alienation of the rural voter, the severity of the tax increase in economically depressed areas of the province and the "neutralization" of the educational system in the province.

As an intention of his "sincerity" on the issue of nationalization, Jean Lesage officially opened the Liberal campaign in Shawinigan on October 9 - Shawinigan being the headquarters of Shawinigan Water and Power Company and the most outspoken adversary of the plan of nationalization. Johnson, ignoring the issue for the most part, begins the UN campaign with an attack against Liberal extravagance. Lesage responds, and the issue of nationalization becomes but one item of debate in a campaign of numerous issues.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the electoral platform of the Union Nationale⁹ was the recognition it gave to the Liberal party regarding the popularity of their legislative performance in the fields of health, education and welfare. While the occasional criticism was made against government expansion into

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Jean-Jacques Bertrand, defeated by Johnson in the UN leadership convention the previous year, endorsed Lévesque's plan to nationalize.

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The party published its platform in both languages in the form of a brochure entitled "The Union Nationale presents ... The Programme.

the private sector, the orientation of the UN platform was such that the UN had accepted the new Liberal initiatives as a political reality. To have recommended the reduction of family allowances or the curtailment of the hospital insurance scheme or even the retention of the status quo in electrical power production would have been political suicide for the Union Nationale. The UN campaign was a paradox, a mélange of conflicting philosophies. On the one hand the party decried the trend of government interference and expansion in the fields of education, economic development and social welfare. Yet, the same the party castigated the government for "not going far enough" in welfare and health legislation.¹⁰ It was evident that the electoral campaign was not fought on neutral grounds but in the Liberals' home territory. Rather than a defense of its performance, the UN attacks against the inadequacy of the Liberal programme simply permitted the government to present a detailed and impressive account of its stewardship.

In a brochure circulated at the outset of the campaign - a brochure remarkable for its lack of political astuteness and reminiscent of the "quantity rather than quality" theme evident in the UN campaign of 1960, the party asks

Le gouvernement avec un budget de \$1,200,000,000
 dépense \$4,000,000 par jour ouvrable, soit deux
 fois plus que le plus gros budget de l'Union Natio-
 nale. Où sont ses oeuvres? A-t-il construit deux
 fois plus d'hôpitaux, de routes, de ponts, d'écoles

10-

The Union Nationale in a purely political move, inconsistent with their philosophy of anti-statism, advocated a raise in the minimum wage and suggested that the hospital insurance scheme was insufficient. The party advocated a more comprehensive medical scheme covering medical fees, hospitalization, etc.

spécialisées? A-t-il fait deux fois plus de travaux dans les comtés? A-t-il doublé les octrois à l'agriculture? A-t-il créé deux fois plus d'emplois?

The Liberals could not have given a more dramatic response

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then the following:

330,000 personnes bénéficient largement de toutes nos nouvelles lois sociales: leurs pensions et allocations s'accroissent de \$36 million. Les pensions aux mères nécessiteuses, aux invalides, aux aveugles et aux vieux ont été augmentées. On a accordé aux veuves et aux femmes célibataires qui sont âgées de 60 à 65 ans une pension de \$65.00 par mois. L'application de l'assurance-chômage a été généralisée. On a fourni aux travailleurs sans emploi une formation professionnelle et aux personnes incapables de travailler une pension minimum.

The electoral campaign of 1962 enabled the Liberal party to approach the electorate on two fronts: A) to convince the public that the nationalization of hydro-electric power was necessary for the future economic development of the province and B) to list in detailed fashion the legislative accomplishments of the Lesage administration in the fields of health care, individual and family benefits, education and economic development - all under the nationalist heading of "Maîtres chez eux".

The Union Nationale campaign addressed itself primarily to the inadequacies in the Liberal legislation. The party was most convincing when it lamented the Liberal shortcomings in agricultural policies - a justifiable criticism, borne out by the fact that the Assembly had been dissolved before the government could introduce legislation to assist the farmer, although a piecemeal attempt had

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The quotation is a summary provided by Lemieux, et. al. in op. cit., p. 47

been made when the government augmented farm credit. Perhaps the most stinging charge was the UN reminder to the public that the Liberals had promised all these increased benefits without an increase in taxes. To that charge, Lesage could but offer the limp response that if taxes were to be reduced, it would mean a subsequent reduction in government services - a political, if not an honest, response.

Prior to concluding this general overview of the 1962 campaign, some mention should be made of the attitude of organized labour towards the campaign as well as the activities other of political movements, specifically the Caouette-led *Raillement des Créditistes* which had enjoyed a resounding success in the federal polls but a few months before the provincial election.

During the election campaign of 1962, organized labour was in somewhat of a political quandary. The fledgling provincial wing of the New Democratic Party, while in no position to contest the election had, nevertheless, to receive the official endorsement of the Quebec Federation of Labour. The premature dissolution of the Legislature had forestalled the efforts of the Lesage administration in introducing much of the significant labour legislation which had been promised in 1960. Realizing this, the Q.F.L. were among the most vocal opponents of the government's decision to call the election. Needless to say, the election decision had not endeared the Q.F.L. to the Lesage administration. Yet, it is apparent that their affiliation with the embryonic provincial N.D.P. was, initially, a symbolic one. For while the Q.F.L. made much of "the choice is between the lesser of two evils," the organization heavily favoured

the Liberal policy of nationalizing electricity and in fact, encouraged the membership to vote for that party which promised the most expeditious method of nationalizing electricity. Whether regretful or reluctant, Provost, the president of the Q.F.L., had prompted the membership to vote for the Liberal party.

The other major trade union organization, the C.N.T.U., led by Jean Marchand, was in a similar position. While not allied with the N.D.P. in 1962, the C.N.T.U. expressed serious reservations about supporting the Liberals. Yet, the C.N.T.U. and the entire trade union movement had little choice on the matter. They could afford to reserve final judgement on the Liberal performance, but they could not afford a costly step backwards in supporting the Union Nationale.

Aside from the internal difficulties experienced by the Union Nationale during the initial stages of the campaign, the issue that caused anxious moments for the party organization was one precipitated by the phenomenal success of the Caouette-led Cr ditistes in the federal election held in June of the same year. An ideological cousin

12

to the Union Nationale, Les Cr ditistes had managed to secure federal seats in areas of the province where economic discontent had flourished.¹³

12It is interesting to note that Creditiste support in the federal election of 1962 came from those constituencies which had voted against the Union Nationale in 1960. This was most probably due to the political position of the UN in 1960. It was an "old-line" party, somewhat deaf to the interests of the economically disadvantaged. However, two years in Opposition had once again aligned the party with the interests of Les Cr ditistes. In 1962, they pursued the same electorate.

13-A superb analysis of the growth, electoral success and ideology of Le Raillement des Creditistes can be found in Maurice Pinard's, The Rise of a Third Party, cited in other sections of this work. In the federal election of 1962, the party won over 500,000 votes and 26 Quebec seats.

Their involvement in the upcoming provincial elections would have a devastating effect on the electoral chances of the Union Nationale. Similar to the proposed campaign orientation of the UN in the provincial election, Les Créditistes had concentrated on " les petits gens,"

Sa fortune a varié selon les fluctuations de l'économie: elle ne recrutait pas chez les pauvres, comme on le croit généralement, mais chez les artisans, les petits commerçants, les cultivateurs et les ouvriers des petites villes, refoulés par l'industrialisation, bousculés par l'urbanisation et l'évolution des moeurs. 14

For a number of tactical considerations, the Créditistes' party organizers and federal M.P.'s decided at a late September caucus meeting not to participate in the upcoming provincial elections. Throughout the entire campaign, Johnson made a concerted effort to attract the official endorsement of Caouette and the Créditistes, but to no avail. The slight was not a significant one. At least the UN did not have to fend off an attack on its accustomed territory from yet another well-organized and popular party.

Even with consideration given to the well-orchestrated presentation by the Liberal party of the need to nationalize the production of hydro-electric power, it is difficult to determine if there were any salient issues in the election campaign of 1962, other than the opportunity presented to the public to evaluate the performance of the Liberal government in the two years it had exercised power. Basing his analysis on a pre-election survey, Pinard suggests that this was indeed the case,

. . . nous croyons que la victoire des libéraux reflétait

14-Pierre Godin, " Le Crédit Sôcial s'en va," Le Maclean, Montreal, juillet, 1973, p. 20.

une évaluation très positive de leur administration au cours des deux années précédentes. C'est parce que les électeurs étaient relativement satisfaits du Parti Libéral qu'ils n'abandonnèrent pas ce parti en 1962. . . . 15

Since the UN eventually took a similar position to that of the Liberal party on the issue of nationalization, it would appear that Pinard's suggestion is correct.

15-Maurice Pinard, in Lemieux, ed., op. cit., p. 190. Pinard sets out to substantiate the hypothesis that voter votes according to his own self-interests and is concerned primarily with those issues which affect him directly. Pinard suggests that in 1962, nationalization was not such an issue.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE 1962 ELECTION: THE RESULTS

The results of the election of 1962 indicate that a majority of the electorate had approved the new philosophy and orientation of government policies initiated by the Lesage administration in 1960. The Liberal party increased their majority in the legislature by twelve seats, winning in sixty three of the province's ninety five constituencies. The party won 56.6% of the popular vote, a per centage higher than that obtained by the UN in all elections since 1936.¹

The Liberals retained forty three seats, losing seven to the UN, but gaining nineteen in the process. The UN was left with thirty one seats and 42.2% of the popular vote. But the most significant statistics are not to be found in the general results of that election. If there was ever any doubt about the urban support for the Liberal party prior to 1962, the results banished it completely. Of the fifty two urban constituencies, the Liberals won forty one, an increase of ten seats over their showing in 1960. In fact, of the seven losses the party sustained in 1962, none of them were in urban constituencies. Clearly, the most significant shift in the election of 1962 occurred in urban middle class constituencies. In both the elections of 1952 and 1960, the electoral battle produced a stalemate. The middle class constituencies, especially those in the metropolitan districts,

1- Perhaps more than any other statistical "fact", this clearly indicates the rural basis of support for the UN in elections prior to 1960. Except for the party's initial victory in 1936, the closest the UN ever came to matching the Liberal party popular support in 1962 was in 1956, when the UN won 52% of the vote and 72 seats !

were almost evenly divided between both parties -- nine for the Liberal party, seven for the U.N. In 1962 the Liberals won fourteen of the sixteen middle class ridings. The suspicions of a large segment of the middle class electorate, quite evident in the election returns of 1960, had dissipated. The progress of the quiet revolution and, in turn, the social and bureaucratic reforms of the Lesage administration had received a positive evaluation from the old and new middle class.

But the election was by no means a clean sweep by the incumbent Liberals. The task of rendering but a cautious appraisal of the Liberal administration, performed by the urban middle class in 1960, now fell to the rural constituencies, and the agricultural ridings in particular. Despite previous electoral accomplishments in agricultural constituencies, the Liberal were unable to obtain a majority of seats, a feat they accomplished in three other constituency groups.

The net result of the 1962 election in the twenty two agricultural constituencies in the province was similar to that of 1960. The Liberals won in nine ridings, losing five to the Union Nationale and gaining five in the process. The U.N. won thirteen agricultural seats, retaining eight seats from 1960.

An analysis of the results in agricultural constituencies indicates that the Liberals lost some popular support to the

U.N. It is interesting to note that this occurred primarily in economically impoverished regions of the province.

There are seven constituencies in the Gaspé-St. Lawrence region that are classified as agricultural. As noted previously, the average annual income in these ridings is among the lowest in the province. In 1960, the Liberals scored a major victory in these agricultural ridings, winning in five of the seven seats -- a considerable feat considering that the U.N. won all seven ridings in 1952. Considering the economic fortunes of the region and the urban orientation of the policies of the Lesage administration, the U.N. gains in the region come as no surprise.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
AND PARTY GAINS AND VOTING SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR AGRICULTURAL
CONSTITUENCIES IN THE GASPE- LOWER ST. LAWRENCE REGION

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60		1962 % electorate	
				LIB.	U.N.	ENG.	FR.
L'ISLET	UN	L	UNgn	-11	+11	0.2	99.5
KAMOURASKA	UN	UN	Lgn	+5	-5	0.3	99.2
MATAPEDIA	UN	L	L	-6	+6	1.0	98.5
RIMOUSKI	UN	L	L	-4	+4	1.2	98.0
RIVIÈRE-DU-LOUP	UN	L	L	--	--	0.7	98.9
MONTMAGNY	UN	L	UNgn	-.4	+.4	0.5	99.0
TEMISCOUTA	UN	UN	UN	-7	+7	0.8	98.7

The Liberals lost popular support in five of the seven ridings, losing two seats to the U.N. But unlike the electoral results in 1952, the margin of victory in each constituency was

low. The Liberals won Kamouraska by a slim forty one vote margin.

The volatile Eastern Townships and the Mid-Quebec regions were two other areas of the province where the Liberals lost some voter support.

SEAT DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962 AND PARTY GAINS AND VOTING SHIFTS IN 1962. FOR AGRICULTURAL CONSTITUENCIES IN THE EASTERN TOWNSHIP AND MID-QUEBEC REGIONS

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60		1962 % electorate	
				LIB.	UN.	ENG.	FR.
<u>EASTERN TOWNSHIPS</u>							
BROME	UN	L	L	+ .3	- .3	44.2	48.8
FRONTENAC	L	UN	UN	- .7	+ .7	1.1	98.5
WOLFE	L	L	UNgn	-5.3	+5.4	2.2	97.2
<u>MID-QUEBEC</u>							
BEAUCE	UN	L	UNgn	-6.1	+6.1	0.5	98.9
BELLECHASE	UN	L	UNgn	-3.5	+3.5	0.2	99.5
DORCHESTER	UN	UN	UN	-2.8	+2.8	1.8	97.8
LOTBINIERE	UN	UN	UN	-2.9	+2.9	2.6	96.4

The Liberals lost one of the two seats they had won in 1960 in the Eastern Townships while they increased their majority in the " English " constituency of Brome. The Liberals gains in 1960 in the traditionally UN agricultural constituencies in Mid-Quebec were nullified by the results in 1962. The Liberals lost the two seats they had gained from the UN in 1960. As in 1952, all the agricultural constituencies in Mid-Quebec returned UN candidates. Even in the two constituencies retained by the UN in 1962, voter

support for that party increased.

The losses sustained by the Liberal party in the agricultural constituencies of the Gaspé-St. Lawrence, Mid-Quebec and Eastern Townships were partially offset by the gains the party enjoyed in the traditional UN strongholds of Southern and Western Quebec.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR AGRICULTURAL
CONSTITUTENCIES IN SOUTHERN AND WESTERN QUEBEC

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
<u>SOUTHERN QUEBEC</u>						
HUNTINGDON	UN	UN	UN	+2.6	32.5	55.5
NICOLET	UN	UN	Lgn	+4.6	0.6	98.7
ROUVILLE	UN	UN	Lgn	+10.2	12.1	85.4
YAMASKA	UN	UN	UN	-3.7	0.1	98.5
<u>WESTERN QUEBEC</u>						
BERTHIER	UN	UN	Lgn	+3.7	1.0	98.0
MASKINONGE	UN	UN	UN	+0.6	1.1	96.5
MONTCALM	UN	UN	Lgn	+9.0	5.9	92.3

Without exception, all seven constituencies classified as agricultural in these two regions have elected UN candidates since 1944. The Liberals gains were of some significance, especially since they had managed to increase their electoral support in all but one of the ridings. It is significant to note, however, that the constituency of Huntingdon, containing a high per centage of English speaking voters, was again won by the UN.

The election results in the province's twenty two agricultural constituencies produced only marginal changes over those of 1960. While the distribution of seats remained the same, nearly half of the ridings changed allegiance, with the Liberals losing popular support in thirteen. Unlike 1960 there was no apparent trend of support for the Liberal party. In general, one might conclude that agricultural constituencies were unable to assess the performance of the Lesage administration in terms of policies affecting the agricultural community. Using the results of 1960 as the norm, it was evident by the 1962 returns that the agricultural community was not entirely satisfied with the efforts of the Lesage government. Two years did not allow sufficient time for the agricultural community to formulate a definite assessment of the Lesage government.

An analysis of the electoral results in the twenty one rural working class constituencies in the election of 1962 encourages an appreciation of some of the more subtle factors influencing voting behaviour.

Simply defined, voting behaviour is a collective manifestation of individual assessments concerning the performance and potential of political parties vying for power. Logic and empirical evidence suggest that if a political party wins a large number of seats and a considerable majority of the popular vote, one can conclude that the electorate has rendered a positive evaluation of the performance and potential of that party. The converse is equally true. A negative evaluation is translated into reduced popular support normally leading to a

reduction in seat representation. But elections infrequently result in landslide victories and overwhelming defeats. Election analyses are most often concerned with the development of trends or shifts in voter support. What can be said, then, of constituency results which, when taken collectively, indicate little more than a "holding pattern"? Can the simple definitions of voting behaviour articulated above help to explain such an occurrence?

First, however, we need to further examine a few of the underlying assumptions of this theory. If it is to be of any use then we must concede that there is analytic value in examining both the net distribution of seats in an election and the seat gains and losses incurred by participating parties. A party victory in an election may result from one of the following alternatives:

1. A considerable gain in the net distribution of seats with few, if any, seat losses --- an election where the winning party gains a large number of seats from the opposition without sacrificing any or many in the process. Accordingly, the electorate has rendered a positive evaluation of the performance and potential of the winning party.
2. Little or no gain in the net distribution of seats with few, if any, seat gains and losses. In such a case, the electorate, while not confused by the political alternatives, is adamant in its choice. The winning party retains roughly the same measure of support and opposition as it experienced in the previous election.
3. Little or no gain in the net distribution of seats with considerable seat gains and losses. The electorate is confused and is unable to render either a positive or negative assessment of the performance of the winning party or its opposition. It is this situation which might best explain the 1962 results in the rural agricultural and working class constituencies.

It is apparent that a large segment of the rural electorate experienced some difficulty in assessing the performance of the Lesage

administration during its two years in power.

Of the forty three rural agricultural and working class constituencies in 1962, over 25% had shifted allegiance from one party to another. The Liberals won a slight majority of seats in the net distribution, gaining nine, losing seven and retaining thirteen. This is in sharp contrast to the results in the urban constituencies which seem to conform to the first category outlined above --- the winning party enjoyed a considerable gain in the net distribution of seats while not incurring any seat losses. Of the fifty two urban constituencies in 1962, the Liberals retained thirty one, gained ten and lost none.

While the " holding pattern " tendency was more pronounced in agricultural constituencies it was evident as well in the rural working class ridings throughout the province.

The most pronounced political realignment of rural working class and agricultural constituencies in the election of 1962 occurred in one of the more impoverished regions of the province, the Gaspé-St. Lawrence. Of the twelve rural constituencies in that region, half of them switched party allegiance in the election of 1962. Five of these ridings are classified as rural working class. The Liberals retained two and gained two from the UN while losing one to the UN. Yet, glancing at the results of the entire region, the considerable gains won by the Liberals were offset by their losses in the agricultural ridings.

While the Liberals increased their popular support in three of the five rural working class ridings, the results, considering the region as a whole, were not impressive. The Liberals lost

votes in seven of the twelve ridings. The net results in the region replicated those of 1960. It is interesting to note, however, that the Liberal gains in the rural working class ridings in the Gaspé area continued a trend established in 1960, thereby ending the traditional dominance of the UN.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR RURAL
WORKING CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN THE REGIONS OF GASPE-
ST. LAWRENCE AND MID-QUEBEC

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
<u>GASPE-ST. LAWRENCE</u>						
BONAVENTURE	UN	L	L	+5.0	13.7	83.1
ILES d. la MADELEINE	UN	UN	Lgn	+9.0	7.3	92.4
GASPE-SUD	UN	UN	Lgn	+3.0	18.4	81.1
GASPE-NORD	UN	L	UNgn	-3.0	4.7	93.4
MATANE	UN	L	L	-4.0	2.1	97.3
<u>MID-QUEBEC</u>						
MONTMORENCY	UN	UN	UN	+1.5	2.6	96.3
CHARLEVOIX	UN	UN	Lgn	+4.8	1.1	98.3
ROBERVAL	UN	L	UNgn	-9.7	1.2	96.5

Constituency realignments also occurred in rural working class constituencies in Mid-Quebec with both parties gaining one seat and losing one seat, with the Liberals sustaining moderate increases in popular support in two of the three ridings. But the net result for the Liberal party in rural ridings in the region was less than promising. The seat representation was reduced to one from three the party had won in 1960.

While there were considerable shifts in voter support in rural working class constituencies in other regions of the province, the seat distribution was identical to that of 1960 except in the Hinterland region. Unlike the reduction in popular support for the Liberal party in agricultural constituencies, the Liberals increased their vote per centage in many rural working class ridings in the province.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962 with party gains and voter shifts in 1962 for Rural Working Class Constituencies in the regions of Southern and Western Quebec and the Eastern Townships

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
<u>SOUTHERN QUEBEC</u>						
BAGOT	UN	UN	UN	+0.8	0.4	98.9
IBERVILLE	UN	L	L	+2.4	3.1	93.9
<u>WESTERN QUEBEC</u>						
ARGENTEUIL	UN	UN	UN	-3.4	28.5	68.1
DEUX MONTAGNES	UN	L	L	+7.2	15.9	78.3
LABELLE	UN	UN	UN	-6.7	0.7	98.0
PORTNEUF	UN	L	L	-3.1	3.6	95.4
V. SOULANGES	UN	L	L	+7.1	16.6	79.3
<u>EASTERN TOWNSHIPS</u>						
COMPTON	UN	UN	UN	-2.0	18.2	79.6
STANSTEAD	UN	L	L	+5.0	20.1	77.6

The election results in the rural working class ridings of the Quebec Hinterland were significant for two reasons. The Liberal party not only retained the two Abitibi seats but

sustained a marginal increase in popular vote support. Both constituencies were won by Cr ditistes in the federal election of the same year. In addition the Liberals won an impressive victory in the " English " constituency of Gatineau winning the riding with nearly 55% of the popular vote.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR RURAL
WORKING CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN THE QUEBEC HINTERLAND
REGION

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
ABITIBI EAST	UN	L	L	+0.7	3.4	90.0
ABITIBI WEST	UN	L	L	+4.2	3.4	90.0
GATINEAU	UN	UN	Lgn	+10.9	11.1	85.0
PAPINEAU	UN	UN	UN	-1.6	23.6	72.0

One of the major upsets in the election of 1960 was the performance of the Liberal party in the rural working class ridings of the province. Victorious in only two of the twenty one ridings in 1952, the Liberals managed to win eleven constituencies in 1960 --- a majority, if but a slim one, of rural working class seats. With the gain of two additional seats in 1962, the Liberals again held a majority , a rather important achievement for an urban-based party. But perhaps of more significance than the seat gains obtained by the party in the rural working class districts was the fact that the party was able to retain the number of seats it did amid growing suspicion from the rural electorate about the orientation of the social reforms of the Lesage administration.

It is obvious, nevertheless, that if some segments of the rural electorate were not entirely satisfied with the Liberal performance, they were at least willing to allow Lesage to "play out his hand." By 1962, the full impact of the social and institutional changes wrought by the Lesage administration had not filtered through to the rural electorate. While rural voters were recipients of the enlarged welfare policies of the new government, many of the institutional changes, particularly in the field of education, had not yet occurred in the outlying rural constituencies. It is certainly a plausible theory that the issue of nationalization played as significant a role in the rural districts as did the "issue" of the conduct of the Lesage administration.

To the urban electorate the nationalization of hydro-electric power was primarily ideological in nature, i.e., should the government become more involved in the private sectors of the economy and by so doing, become more responsible for the economic well-being of the province? It is doubtful whether the rural electorate appraised the issue in the same manner. If certain segments of the rural electorate favoured the nationalization of electricity it was primarily because of the economic benefits which might accrue from such a venture.

The rural returns in the election of 1962 were a mixed blessing for the ruling Liberal party. While nearly half of the

2-In the election campaign of 1962 the Liberal party advocated the immediate nationalization of all private hydro-electric power companies, including Gaspé Heat and Power. The rates for electric power in the remote regions of the province were triple those in urban centres. Perhaps some of the seat gains by the Liberals in these regions can be attributed to the Liberal party position on the issue. The UN procrastination on the matter certainly did not help their cause.

Liberal seat gains came from rural districts, so too did all seven seat losses. That the party sustained both marginal and considerable losses in voter support in a majority of the rural constituencies was an indication from the rural electorate that they had not seen all the benefits they had been promised even though they were now paying more for them. The rural appraisal of the Lesage administration was a cautious one at best.

Retaining all of the thirty one seats the party had won in 1960, the Liberals, in the election of 1962, gained ten more from the UN, effecting a landslide victory in the urban constituencies of the province. The party won all but eleven of the fifty two urban ridings, the apogee of a trend which began in 1952.³ Both the urban working class and the middle class constituencies accorded the Liberals an equal number of seat gains. Until 1960, the party was able to gain seats in metropolitan districts, enjoying a particularly impressive showing in Metropolitan Montreal. It is obvious that the working class in a majority of urban constituencies did not concur with or share the consternation of the trade union leadership over the piecemeal progress of positive labour legislation under the Lesage administration. The vote, especially in urban middle class ridings, was a strong vote of confidence in the Liberal government. Yet the joint support given in such a strong measure to the government by both the working and middle class electorates is one of the

3- In 1952, the Liberals won twelve urban seats. In 1960, they increased the number to thirty one and again increased their victories in 1962 to forty one.

more interesting phenomena of the election.

A measure of the depth of penetration of the Liberal party in urban working class constituencies was the party's ability to increase their popular support and gain seats in regions of the province that had long been under UN dominance.

In Southern Quebec, a region with fifteen constituencies, the UN had won all but two of the ridings in 1952. Of the seven urban working class constituencies, the Liberals won two in 1952 and four in 1960. In 1962 the Liberals carried every working class riding except Mississquoi where the popular future premier, Jean-J. Bertrand, was returned.⁴ The Liberals also increased their popular support in six of the urban working class districts.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
AND PARTY GAINS AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR URBAN WORK-
ING CLASS RIDINGS IN THE REGION OF SOUTHERN QUEBEC

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
BEAUHARNOIS	UN	UN	Lgn	+1.9	5.1	93.2
NAPIERVILLE-LAP.	UN	UN	Lgn	+6.5	5.7	83.9
MISSISSQUOI	UN	UN	UN	+0.3	18.2	76.0
ST. JEAN	UN	L	L	-0.1	8.4	86.7
ST. HYACINTHE	UN	L	L	+1.2	0.9	97.8
RICHELIEU	L	L	L	+2.7	1.4	97.4
VERCHERES	L	L	L	+8.5	6.6	91.1

4-Of all the regions in the province, Southern Quebec provided the Liberals with the largest number of seat gains. In 1962 the party retained the five seats they had won in 1960 and gained five seats in 1962.

In Western Quebec, another traditional UN stronghold, the Liberal party increased their seat representation although they lost some popular support.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 IN URBAN WORK-
ING CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN THE REGION OF WESTERN QUEBEC

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% voter shift 1962-60 Liberals	1962 % electorate	
					ENG.	FR.
CHAMPLAIN	UN	UN	UN	-2.4	2.7	95.5
JOLIETTE	UN	UN	UN	-9.3*	1.0	97.6
LAVIOLETTE	UN	UN	UN	-1.9	2.7	95.5
L'ASSOMPTION	UN	UN	L gn	+5.4	4.4	93.4
ST. MAURICE	L	L	L	+2.6	2.6	96.4
TERREBONNE	UN	L	L	+0.3	7.1	89.0

* In Joliette, both the Liberal and UN parties lost a considerable per centage of votes to an Independent candidate who won 20% of the vote

The Liberal victory in St. Maurice provided skeptics of the Lesage administration's proposal to nationalize electricity with some interesting food for thought. The industrial city of Shawinigan was headquarters for one of the most vigorous opponents of the Lesage scheme, the Shawinigan Heat and Power Company. In 1960 the Liberal candidate, René Hamel, won 53.1% of the vote. Of the 111 urban polls in the city of Shawinigan, Hamel won 84. In 1962, Hamel, a strong proponent of nationalization, increased his popular support to 55.7%, winning in

the process all but seven of the urban polls in Shawinigan. Conceivably, the matter of the nationalization of electricity was greeted with some enthusiasm by that portion of the electorate that would be most affected by the change.

Of the eight metropolitan working class ridings, the Liberals retained four and gained one from the UN. In all eight constituencies the Liberals increased their popular support by a considerable margin. In fact, the Liberal victories in these five constituencies were among the most impressive in the province as the following table indicates.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962 WITH PARTY GAINS, VOTER SHIFTS AND LIBERAL PERCENTAGE OF VOTE IN URBAN WORKING CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN METROPOLITAN MONTREAL AND QUEBEC CITY

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% Liberal 1962	% voter shifts Liberals	1962 % electorate	
						ENG.	FR.
<u>Montreal</u>							
BOURGET	--	L	L	58.7	+ 5.1	8.7	69.3
MAISSONEUVE	L	UN	Lgn	58.9	+ 17.1	8.7	69.3
LAURIER	UN	L	L	58.2	+ 10.4	3.1	76.2
STE. ANNE	I	I	I	34.3	+ 8.7	28.1	53.5
ST. HENRI	L	L	L	53.0	+ 3.1	9.6	78.4
ST. LOUIS	L	L	L	58.1	+ 17.0	7.1	49.2
STE. MARIE	L	UN	UN	47.1	+ 5.9	2.6	92.5
<u>Quebec City</u>							
ST. SAUVEUR	UN	UN	UN	48.8	+ 7.6		

It is quite evident that the metropolitan constituencies were well satisfied with the performance of the Liberal party and were in general agreement with the party's intention to nationalize electricity. René Lévesque, the chief architect of the proposal to nationalize hydro-electric power, increased his majority by 10.4% in his constituency of Montreal-Laurier. Aside from the fact that the Liberals retained all the ridings they had won in 1960, the most significant feature of the election results in the metropolitan working class constituencies remained the substantial increase in voter support for the Liberals in most of the ridings, leading to the conclusion that the majority of the urban working class electorate approved the new orientation of the Liberal party. The electorate received more social benefits (family allowance, pensions, etc.) than they ever had before, making the tax increase an easier pill to swallow.

Of equal significance to the gain amassed by the Liberal party in metropolitan working class ridings was the party's performance in the Eastern Townships and Hinterland regions of the province. Along with some constituencies in the Lower St. Lawrence district, these two regions formed the backbone of support for the Cr ditistes in the federal election of 1962. Even with the aid of Cr ditiste organizers and sympathizers, the UN was unable to regain any of the territory they had lost in 1960. In fact, the Liberals in-

creased their popular support in a majority of the ridings, gaining one seat from the UN in the process. While the seat distribution in the Eastern Townships remained identical to that of 1960, the Liberals increased their vote in four of the six ridings. The most dramatic change occurred in the Hinterland region, "headquarters" for Caouette's Cr ditistes. The results must have bewildered the Cr ditiste caucus. In the federal election, the Cr ditistes had won a vote of economic protest from "les petits gens". In the provincial election, Caouette, much to the chagrin of Daniel Johnson, refused to endorse the UN at the same time making it abundantly clear that the Cr ditistes were completely opposed to the Liberal plot to nationalize electricity.

The results gave the Liberals seven of the eight seats in the district, a gain of one over 1960. In six of the eight ridings the Liberals increased their popular vote. The largest increases occurred in Caouette's own district of Rouyn-Noranda and in the riding of T miscamingue. Federally, T miscamingue had been won by the Conservatives with the Cr ditiste candidate running a close second. In the provincial election, T miscamingue was a Liberal gain from the UN.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS, VOTER SHIFTS AND LIBERAL PER CENTAGE
OF THE VOTE IN 1962 IN THE QUEBEC HINTERLAND REGION

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% Liberal 1962	% Liberal Shift
CHICOUTIMI	UN	UN	UN	49.7 [@]	1.0
HULL	UN	L	L	63.4	2.3
LAC ST. JEAN	UN	L	L	52.6	-4.0
ROUYN-NORANDA	UN	L	L	60.1	7.6
SAGUENAY	UN	L	L	57.3	-1.9
TEMISCAMINGUE	L	UN	Lgn	53.0	6.6
JONQ.-KENOGAMI	--	L	L	60.4	3.5
DUPLESSIS	--	L	L	59.8	3.5

@- The Liberals lost in Chicoutimi by 192 votes
Liberal victories in this region, in constituencies formerly held by the UN and won by the Cr ditistes in the federal election of 1962 were quite significant. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the party faced its strongest electoral test in the ridings comprising the Hinterland region. That the UN failed to increase its support while the Liberals enjoyed both seat and vote gains was an indication that the electorate still considered the Liberals to be a party of reform. An appreciation of this point is crucial to an understanding of why a majority of the electorate supported the Cr ditistes federally and the Liberals in the provincial election. The voting behaviour of the electorate was not paradoxical. There is little difference between lodging a vote of protest and casting a vote for reform. The pattern was evident in those constituencies which had opted for the Cr ditistes in the federal election and elected Liberal candidates in the provincial election. The Liberal party, even if it was one of the

"vieux partis", was still considered, in 1962, as the party of reform and it was not difficult for the electorate to rationalize its support for both parties even though the party philosophies were diametrically opposed.

The increasing support of the urban working class for the Liberal party was one of the most pronounced trends in the voting behaviour of the electorate over the ten year span between 1952 and 1960.

Over half of the twenty three Liberal seats in 1952 were urban working class. In 1960, the party won in twenty two of the thirty six ridings. And finally, in 1962, the Liberals won all but nine of the urban working class constituencies. Yet even this measure of approval was overshadowed by the spectacular gains the party sustained in the sixteen urban middle class ridings in the province.

In both 1952 and 1960, the seat distribution between both parties was identical. The Liberals won nine urban middle class ridings and the UN won in seven. The election of 1962 broke the stalemate! Gaining five seats from the UN, the Liberals won fourteen of the sixteen ridings. The party increased its popular support in all of the urban middle class ridings with substantial vote increases (over 7%) in ten of the ridings. All but one of the Liberal seat gains were made in the twelve metropolitan middle class constituencies, with two gains in Mont-

real and two in Quebec City. But the most spectacular feature of the Liberal victory in the urban middle class ridings was evidenced by the significant shift in voter support away from the UN to the Liberal party. It would be interesting to determine whether the French-speaking electorate was instrumental in the shift to the Liberals. Considering the ethnic heterogeneity of most of the constituencies, this may prove to be a difficult task.

With the Liberal gain of two seats on the Island of Montreal, the party won eight of these nine middle class constituencies. It is interesting to note the results when these constituencies are ranked according to the percentage of their English-speaking electorate.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962 WITH PARTY GAINS! PER CENT LIBERAL VOTE AND VOTER SHIFTS IN 1962 FOR URBAN MIDDLE CLASS RIDINGS ON THE ISLAND OF MONTREAL

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% Liberal		% electorate	
				vote 1962	Lib. voter shift	ENG.	FR.
WESTMOUNT	L	L	L	69.0	+ 7.2	51.3	25.9
N.D.G.	L	L	L	78.5	+12.3	40.9	18.3
JACQUES CARTIER	L	L	L	77.7	+18.4	40.2	43.9
VERDUN	L	L	L	66.0	+ 8.4	35.1	58.0
OUTREMONT	L	L	L	77.6	+14.6	20.1	32.1
LAVAL	UN	L	L	66.3	+ 9.9	7.2	80.0
MERCIER	UN	UN	Lgn	54.1	+ 5.6	3.9	92.7
JEANNE-MANCE	L	UN	Lgn	59.6	+11.6	7.6	73.5
ST. JACQUES	UN	UN	UN	47.4	+ 2.8	2.1	92.4

While it is certainly not surprising, it is evident that a relationship does exist between the Liberal vote, Liberal vote gains and the percentage of the English speaking electorate in a constituency. The Liberals obtained the highest percentage of votes in those constituencies containing a significant English electorate. While the trend is not as pronounced, the Liberals also obtained the largest increase in votes between 1960 and 1962 in "English" constituencies. But a cautious appraisal of the relationship is necessary, especially since nearly all the constituencies contain a segment of the electorate which is neither of French nor English origin.

The 1962 election results in the remaining urban middle class constituencies continue to indicate substantial victories for the Liberal party. For the first time since 1944, the Liberals swept all three middle class ridings in metropolitan Quebec City, retaining Quebec West and gaining Quebec Centre and Quebec East from the UN. As in the metropolitan constituencies of Montreal, the Liberal victories were impressive not only in terms of the Liberal vote in each riding, but also in the shift of support to the Liberal party.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FOR ELECTIONS OF 1952, 1960 AND 1962
WITH PARTY GAINS, PER CENT LIBERAL VOTE AND VOTER SHIFTS
IN 1962 FOR URBAN MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUENCIES IN QUEBEC
CITY AND NON-METROPOLITAN CONSTITUENCIES IN REMAINING
REGIONS

constituency	1952	1960	1962	% Liberal vote 1962	Liberal voter shift	per cent electorate	
						ENG.	FR.
QUEBEC WEST	L	L	L	69.7	+12.0	11.1	85.7
QUEBEC CENTRE	UN	UN	Lgn	55.1	+ 8.6	5.4	91.2
QUEBEC EAST	L	UN.	Lgn	52.2	+ 4.9	2.2	96.5
CHATEAUGUAY	UN	UN	Lgn	54.8	+10.4	26.9	67.1
CHAMBLY	UN	L	L	63.8	+13.9	20.6	72.7
QUEBEC COUNTY	L	L	L	57.8	+ 1.9	4.5	93.3
TROIS RIVIERES	UN	UN	UN	48.2	+ 1.9	3.7	94.8

Regardless of the visible relationship between Liberal votes and the per cent of English speaking voters, one conclusion is evident. Based on the Liberal election returns in most of the urban middle class constituencies, the proportion of French-speaking support for the Liberal party was higher in urban middle class constituencies in Montreal and Quebec City than it was in other regions or constituency classifications in the province. It is important to note that this conclusion does not negate the possibility of a strong positive correlation between the size of the French speaking electorate and support for the Union Nationale.

The conclusion is based on a simple analysis of three variables: a) the per cent Liberal vote in a constituency, b) the per cent of the English electorate in the same constituency and c) the per cent of the French speaking electorate in the same constituency.

PER CENT LIBERAL VOTE, PER CENT OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH SPEAKING ELECTORATE IN URBAN MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUENCIES FOR ELECTIONS OF 1962.

constituency	% Liberal vote	% English	% French
QUEBEC WEST	67.9	11.1	85.7
CHAMBLY	63.8	20.6	72.7
QUEBEC COUNTY	57.8	4.5	93.3
JEANNE-MANCE	59.6	7.6	73.5
LAVAL	66.3	7.2	80.0
VERDUN	66.0	35.1	58.0

While the conclusion is subject to a severe shortcoming, it is based on simple mathematics:

$$\% \text{ Liberal vote} - \% \text{ English} = \% \text{ French supporting Liberals.}$$

Naturally, the figures subtracted are approximations, but even if we assume that the entire English speaking electorate in a constituency supports the Liberal party then, in general, the remaining votes should come largely from the French speaking electorate -- in the constituencies listed above. Since the Liberal vote was so high in these constituencies, then we may conclude that the French speaking vote for the Liberal party was proportionately higher for the Liberal party in the urban middle class constituencies than in other areas of the province. Again, this does not negate the possibility of a

Aside from the obvious shortcomings of such an analysis, it does not account for the abstentionism in these constituencies.

positive correlation between the French speaking electorate and the UN vote.

The results of the election of 1962 in urban middle class constituencies suggest rather clearly that a large segment of the urban middle class electorate was not intimidated by the " creeping socialism " evident in many of the policy orientations of the Lesage administration during its first two years in office.

Even though the English language press reacted negatively to the Liberal proposal to nationalize electricity, the English-speaking electorate heavily endorsed the Liberal party primarily because of the performance of the Lesage administration. As we have seen, the election provided interesting results. In many respects, it would appear that residence, the urban-rural dichotomy, is an important variable in delineating the support for the Liberal and Union Nationale parties. The urban voter heavily favoured the ruling party while the rural voter was more cautious in his appraisal of the Liberal party.

The role of social class in the voting behaviour of the electorate is more difficult to determine. The Liberal party received strong support from both the urban working and middle class electorates. This would tend to suggest that the Liberal victory in 1962 was a "classless" one. But that conclusion is far too simple. Might we not conclude that the Liberal victory in 1962 was a result of the class oriented support the party received from two different segments of the electorate ! Without re-examining

the intentions of each class grouping in its support for the Liberal party, perhaps we can conclude with a phrase that is deceptive in its simplicity: When a party is a party to all people, it adequately represents the interests of many classes. This suggests a rather radical departure from the traditional interpretation given to the role and "effect" of social class in the voting behaviour of an electorate. It denies traditional arguments which have posited that in an economically developed society there exists a pronounced tendency for the working class to support a party of the left while their middle class counterparts would tend to uphold the status-quo by casting their ballots to a part of the right. Such a rigid application to the voting behaviour of the provincial electorate during those tumultuous years in French Canadian society does not contribute to an understanding of the role of class in that society. That a "left wing" party garnered the support of a significant segment of both the middle and working class electorates does not nullify the importance of class as an explanatory variable in the voting behaviour of the electorate. While empirical evidence cannot substantiate the conclusion the preceding analysis of the voting behaviour of the Quebec provincial electorate has inferred a strong association between social class and the vote.

If the analysis does nothing more than provoke redefinitions of the impact of class on an electorate and its voting behaviour then it will have made a contribution to the literature on the subject. That different classes within an electorate can perceive and define different reasons for supporting a common party may suggest that "class voting" can occur even when a party gains the allegiance of more than one homogeneous economic group.

APPENDIX
Constituency Electoral Results

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>1952</u>			<u>1960</u>			<u>1962</u>		
	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>
Abitibi-Est	43%(9423)	UN	57%(12497)	51%(14061)	L	48%(13209)	52%(14892)	L	48%(13783)
Abitibi-Ouest	45%(5459)	UN	55%(6713)	53%(6321)	L	47%(5655)	57%(6732)	L	43%(5084)
Argenteuil	32%(3896)	UN	68%(8248)	40%(5884)	UN	60%(8835)	37%(5312)	UN	55%(7922)
Arthabaska	47%(7884)	UN	53%(9003)	53%(10609)	L	47%(9340)	54%(10988)	L	46%(9535)
Bagot	42%(3745)	UN	58%(5126)	44%(4219)	UN	56%(5335)	45%(4347)	UN	55%(5336)
Beauce	42%(9290)	UN	58%(12939)	54%(12939)	L	46%(10993)	48%(11636)	UN	52%(12583)
Beauharnois	39%(6938)	UN	61%(10968)	49%(11237)	UN	50%(11385)	48%(11093)	L	52%(11884)
Bellechase	45%(4825)	UN	55%(5814)	52%(5601)	L	48%(5157)	49%(4903)	UN	51%(5176)
Berthier	49%(5948)	UN	51%(6225)	46%(5860)	UN	53%(6669)	50%(5938)	L	49%(5828)
Bonaventure	48%(8145)	UN	52%(8875)	52%(8513)	L	48%(7981)	57%(9525)	L	43%(7104)
Bourget				53%(34411)	L	45%(29141)	59%(42906)	L	34%(25178)
Brome	37%(2432)	UN	61%(3982)	56%(3578)	L	45%(2868)	56%(3417)	L	44%(2704)
Chambly	41%(13366)	UN	57%(18486)	50%(25921)	L	49%(25322)	64%(36290)	L	34%(19196)
Champlain	40%(7774)	UN	60%(11634)	50%(11425)	UN	50%(11572)	47%(11064)	UN	53%(12346)
Charlevoix	36%(4321)	UN	63%(7454)	47%(6395)	UN	53%(7097)	52%(6942)	L	48%(6348)
Chateauguay	46%(4044)	UN	54%(4691)	44%(6263)	UN	53%(7539)	55%(8727)	L	45%(7189)
Chicoutimi	34%(15466)	UN	66%(29572)	49%(15889)	UN	51%(16749)	50%(16718)	UN	50%(16910)
Compton	40%(4209)	UN	60%(6349)	46%(4923)	UN	54%(5725)	45%(4554)	UN	54%(5568)
Deux-Montagnes	23%(2266)	UN	75%(7257)	50%(6978)	L	48%(6679)	57%(8518)	L	43%(6344)
Dorchester	38%(6006)	UN	62%(9764)	49%(7714)	UN	51%(8002)	46%(6758)	UN	54%(7818)
Drummond	50%(11873)	L	50%(11755)	50%(12268)	L	50%(12167)	57%(14621)	L	43%(10953)
Duplessis				56%(6552)	L	43%(5024)	60%(7345)	L	40%(4929)
Frontenac	51%(6464)	L	49%(6178)	49%(5980)	UN	52%(6418)	48%(5635)	UN	52%(6217)
Gaspe-Nord	47%(3926)	UN	52%(4364)	50%(4824)	L	50%(4813)	47%(4739)	UN	52%(5183)

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>1952</u>			<u>1960</u>			<u>1962</u>		
	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>
Gaspe-Sud	39%(5325)	UN	61%(8473)	47%(6865)	UN	53%(7656)	50%(7197)	L	50%(7084)
Gatineau	36%(5017)	UN	60%(8268)	43%(7706)	UN	55%(9846)	55%(10289)	L	45%(8564)
Hull	36%(7311)	UN	61%(12354)	61%(15195)	L	38%(9503)	63%(14854)	L	37%(8588)
Huntingdon	48%(2906)	UN	52%(3162)	43%(2798)	UN	57%(3671)	46%(2921)	UN	54%(3449)
Iberville	42%(2553)	UN	58%(3597)	54%(4124)	L	46%(3582)	56%(4452)	L	44%(3516)
Ils-De-La-Madeleine	42%(1784)	UN	58%(2463)	43%(2082)	UN	57%(2759)	52%(2674)	L	48%(2482)
Jacques-Cartier	54%(22847)	L	42%(18052)	59%(46024)	L	38%(29699)	78%(69199)	L	22%(19811)
Joliette	42%(7482)	UN	58%(10281)	35%(6794)	UN	65%(12479)	27%(5199)	UN	53%(10236)
Jonquiere-Kenogami				57%(15310)	L	35%(9296)	60%(16100)	L	40%(10564)
Kamouraska	40%(4548)	UN	60%(6723)	46%(5192)	UN	54%(6056)	50%(5453)	L	50%(5412)
Labelle	41%(4449)	UN	59%(6394)	48%(5335)	UN	52%(5857)	41%(4310)	UN	57%(6005)
Lac-Saint-Jean	41%(5828)	UN	58%(8213)	57%(9844)	L	43%(7534)	53%(9171)	L	47%(8256)
L'Assomption	45%(4958)	UN	55%(6169)	50%(7989)	UN	50%(7999)	55%(9680)	L	44%(7696)
Laval	43%(28684)	UN	52%(34656)	56%(51752)	L	44%(39962)	66%(67316)	L	33%(33509)
Laviolette	47%(8626)	UN	53%(9598)	48%(10285)	UN	52%(11013)	46%(9782)	UN	54%(11315)
Levis	50%(9725)	L	50%(9626)	55%(13194)	L	45%(10908)	54%(13434)	L	45%(11088)
L'Islet	43%(4296)	UN	57%(5718)	58%(5862)	L	42%(4230)	47%(4600)	UN	53%(5239)
Lotbiniere	46%(5594)	UN	55%(6702)	49%(6111)	UN	51%(6272)	46%(5544)	UN	54%(6393)
Maisonneuve	50%(18393)	L	48%(17721)	42%(20552)	UN	46%(22682)	59%(28814)	L	41%(20112)
Maskinonge	46%(4353)	UN	54%(5074)	46%(4614)	UN	54%(5481)	40%(4578)	UN	54%(5312)
Matane	41%(7148)	UN	59%(10241)	54%(9131)	L	47%(7921)	50%(8204)	L	50%(8074)
Matapedia	48%(6370)	UN	51%(6797)	57%(7263)	L	42%(5533)	51%(6111)	L	49%(5859)
Megantic	49%(10133)	UN	51%(10710)	59%(14221)	L	41%(9704)	55%(13182)	L	45%(10762)
Missisquoi	39%(4516)	UN	61%(7191)	42%(5759)	UN	58%(7867)	43%(5668)	UN	57%(7630)

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>1952</u>		<u>1960</u>		<u>1962</u>	
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Union Nat.</u>
Montcalm	47%(3713) UN	53%(4141)	46%(3991) UN	51%(4432)	55%(4662) L	45%(3751)
Montmagny	41%(4364) UN	60%(6409)	50%(5865) L	50%(5856)	50%(5636) UN	50%(5747)
Montmorency	40%(3902) UN	60%(5894)	45%(5257) UN	54%(6266)	47%(5319) UN	51%(5717)
Mtl., Jeanne-Mance	48%(22666) L	43%(20048)	48%(35548) UN	51%(38015)	60%(40899)L	40%(27159)
Mtl., Laurier	44%(12804) UN	50%(14595)	48%(14012) L	47%(13883)	58%(15837)L	41%(11274)
Mtl., Mercier	42%(13069) UN	52%(16280)	49%(15494) UN	51%(16423)	54%(16992)L	43%(1367)
Mtl., N.D.G.	65%(18489) L	24%(6973)	66%(29857) L	34%(15255)	79%(37100)L	16%(7743)
Mtl., Outremont	61%(18794) L	33%(10312)	63%(27069) L	28%(11895)	78%(36076)L	20%(9429)
Mtl., Ste. Anne	2%(410) IND	31%(5589)	8%(1243) IND	34%(5452)	14%(1845) IND	40%(5312)
Mtl., Ste. Marie	51%(15019) L	45%(13246)	41%(11362) UN	57%(15690)	47%(11656)UN	52%(12977)
Mtl., St. Henri	56%(19254) L	41%(14101)	50%(17820) L	46%(16433)	53%(17548)L	45%(15008)
Mtl., St. Jacques	43%(008871) UN	54%(11049)	45%(7727) UN	53%(9190)	47%(7149) UN	52%(7854)
Mtl., St. Louis	50%(15226) L	38%(11467)	41%(10580) L	41%(10479)	58%(14082)L	42%(10133)
Mtl., Verdun	62%(17219) L	26%(7179)	58%(18354) L	41%(12957)	66%(21208)L	34%(10934)
Napierville-Laprairie	43%(5288) UN	57%(7094)	50%(8535) UN	50%(8551)	57%(9865) L	43%(7587)
Nicolet	49%(6949) UN	51%(7191)	47%(6493) UN	53%(7281)	52%(7209) L	48%(6725)
Papineau	33%(5913) UN	65%(11707)	46%(10280) UN	54%(11941)	45%(9953) UN	55%(12304)
Pontiac	37%(3545) UN	61%(5792)	42%(3695) UN	58%(5181)	40%(3433) UN	60%(5108)
Portneuf	45%(8989) UN	53%(10665)	54%(12086) L	46%(10111)	51%(11059)L	48%(10357)
Quebec Centre	45%(8008) UN	55%(9593)	47%(8241) UN	53%(9480)	55%(9750) L	45%(7937)
Quebec Compté	40%(11230) L	34%(9734)	56%(27839) L	42%(20686)	58%(3409) L	42%(24894)
Quebec Est	51%(15778) L	48%(14918)	47%(18580) UN	52%(20536)	52%(21001)L	48%(19234)
Quebec Ouest	51%(8787) L	49%(8604)	56%(11635) L	44%(9112)	68%(14582)L	32%(6890)
Richelieu	53%(8751) L	47%(7797)	53%(9617) L	47%(8472)	56%(10598)L	44%(8461)

<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	<u>1952</u>			<u>1960</u>			<u>1962</u>		
	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>	<u>Liberal</u>		<u>Union Nat.</u>
Richmond	51%(8156)	L	49%(7815)	54%(9691)	L	46%(8422)	58%(9932)	L	42%(7229)
Rimouski	47%(8229)	UN	52%(9210)	56%(11585)	L	44%(9163)	52%(10720)	L	48%(9809)
Riviere du loup	48%(8236)	UN	51%(8689)	52%(8671)	L	48%(8099)	51%(8493)	L	49%(8090)
Roberval	41%(7899)	UN	59%(11478)	59%(12761)	L	40%(8790)	49%(10635)	UN	51%(11172)
Rouville	41%(3692)	UN	59%(5263)	47%(5306)	UN	53%(5915)	56%(6575)	L	44%(5149)
Rouyn-Noranda	47%(6320)	UN	53%(6998)	52%(8387)	L	48%(7652)	60%(9386)	L	40%(6242)
Saguenay	34%(4923)	UN	63%(8977)	59%(10475)	L	41%(7238)	57%(12116)	L	43%(9010)
St. Hyacinthe	45%(7759)	UN	55%(9542)	55%(11456)	L	45%(9312)	56%(12070)	L	44%(9369)
St. Jean	39%(5129)	UN	61%(7901)	51%(8869)	L	49%(8659)	51%(8869)	L	46%(8003)
St. Maurice	58%(14489)	L	42%(10528)	53%(15040)	L	47%(13273)	44%(12460)	UN	56%(15684)
St. Sauveur	42%(9584)	UN	57%(12877)	41%(9964)	UN	59%(14216)	49%(11939)	UN	51%(12641)
Shefford	51%(9792)	L	49%(9562)	47%(10903)	UN	53%(12286)	50%(12026)	L	47%(11226)
Sherbrooke	43%(11425)	UN	56%(14905)	51%(17661)	L	47%(16265)	52%(18539)	L	47%(16714)
Stanstead	50%(6956)	UN	50%(7047)	51%(8234)	L	49%(7824)	56%(8918)	L	43%(6817)
Temiscamingue	53%(4284)	L	47%(3842)	47%(3737)	UN	53%(4289)	53%(4102)	L	47%(3640)
Temiscouata	47%(5138)	UN	52%(5776)	47%(4880)	UN	53%(5606)	39%(3842)	UN	61%(5931)
Terrebonne	43%(13793)	UN	56%(17763)	59%(25936)	L	40%(17549)	59%(26901)	L	41%(18713)
Trois Rivieres	39%(10058)	UN	61%(15493)	46%(13118)	UN	47%(13221)	48%(14287)	UN	52%(15323)
Vaudreuil-Soulanges	45%(5815)	UN	55%(7235)	50%(9051)	L	50%(8902)	57%(10780)	L	43%(7971)
Vercheres	54%(4673)	L	46%(3985)	50%(5583)	L	47%(5220)	59%(8627)	L	41%(4842)
Westmount-St. Georges	76%(12455)	L	20%(3276)	62%(10988)	L	38%(6805)	69%(13114)	L	22%(4255)
Wolfe	50%(3995)	L	50%(3929)	52%(3972)	L	48%(3638)	46%(3958)	UN	53%(3939)
Yamaska	41%(3009)	UN	59%(4382)	43%(3101)	UN	57%(4030)	40%(2701)	UN	60%(4078)
TOTALES	23	<u>SEATS</u>	68	51	<u>SEATS</u>	43	63	<u>SEATS</u>	31
	25%		74%	54%		45%	66%		33%

Source: Official Reports of the Chief Returning for the Province of Quebec, 1952, 1960 and 1962.

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