

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING:
A CASE-STUDY OF
CANADIAN--SOUTHERN AFRICAN RELATIONS

by
SUSAN LEE BROWN, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University

October 1974

MASTER OF ARTS (1974)
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A
Case-Study of Canadian-Southern African
Relations.

AUTHOR: Susan Lee Brown, B.A. (Waterloo Lutheran
University)

SUPERVISORS: Professor R.R. March
Mr. N. Sidoruk
Mr. J. Burke

NUMBER OF PAGES: viii, 236

ABSTRACT

The central purpose of this paper is to examine the Canadian foreign policy decision-making process. A case-study approach was used for greater manageability, but the specific case of relations with Southern Africa was chosen because it is the author's contention that Canadian policy in 1974 towards that area of the world is seriously in error and needs to be changed.

The specifics of Canadian decision-making regarding Southern Africa were applied to a model of decision-making suggested by Salisbury and Heinz, and adapted by Hockin, in which decisions were considered independent variables determining the actual policy process. Policy emerges as a result of the interrelationship between the demand pattern and the cost of decision-making. The model allowed for organization of the research and suggested directions which future actions might take on the issue.

In addition to emphasizing very practical reasons for changing Canadian policy towards Southern Africa, the author also argues strongly that ethical considerations do have a role to play in international and political affairs. More specifically, she accuses liberal thought of being chiefly to blame for the faults of Canadian decision-making, and lays out a program of action to correct them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An expression of thanks is obviously due to my thesis advisors, Roman March, John Burke, and Nick Sidoruk, whose advice and assistance over the past year have been much needed and appreciated. The committee provided me with a rare blend of talents ranging from writing style, to conceptual frameworks, and more abstract analysis.

I am also very appreciative of all those people who are actively engaged in the debate surrounding Canadian policy towards Southern Africa. Members of interest groups, Parliament, and External Affairs have provided me with valuable information and have allowed many parts of the paper to be original and current. There are too many names to list individually but I gratefully recognize my indebtedness to them, and commend their continuing efforts to bring Canadian policy in line with the human principals we espouse. My thanks will be best expressed if this paper in any way contributes to achieving that end.

It is also appropriate here to give credit to my parents who have made me what I am. I hope this effort will please them, for in addition to being about Canada, this paper is about me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
Descriptive Note.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
I INTRODUCTION.....	1
II POLICIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.....	13
South Africa.....	13
Early Colonialism and Imperialism.....	14
Namibia.....	15
Apartheid and the Homelands Policy.....	18
Legislation.....	27
The Reality of Apartheid.....	35
Resistance.....	41
Angola and Mozambique.....	46
Early Colonialism and Imperialism.....	47
Conditions in the Territories.....	49
Resistance.....	53
III CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA.....	60
National.....	60
Multinational.....	69
Commonwealth.....	69

NATO.....	77
United Nations.....	86
IV THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA.....	105
Trade.....	105
Investment.....	121
V PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSE TO CANADIAN POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.....	131
Interest Groups and Dialogue.....	131
Canadian Aid.....	149
VI THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADA...	162
VII IMPLICATIONS OF CANADIAN POLICY.....	183
VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....	200
Appendices.....	204
Bibliography.....	228

MAPS

Southern Africa.....	12
Bantustans.....	23
Liberation Movements in Portuguese Africa.....	56

SCHEDULES

A. International Agreements on Human Rights.....	96
B. Selected Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Eighth Regular Session.....	101

TABLES

I Bantu Homelands in South Africa.....	24
II 1971 Average Monthly Income.....	37
III Minimum Income Levels.....	38
IV The South African Labour Market.....	39
V Old-Age and Blind Pensions and Disability Grants.....	40
VI Sickness and Infant Mortality Rates in South Africa.....	40
VII Selected Canada/South Africa Trade Figures, 1970-1973.....	110
VIII Selected Canada/Angola Trade Figures, 1970-1973.....	114
IX Selected Canada/Mozambique Trade Figures, 1970-1973.....	115
X Selected Canada/Portugal Trade Figures, 1970-1973.....	116

XI Selected Southern African Imports As A Percentage of the Canadian Market, 1973-1974.....	117
XII Canadian Contributions to Portuguese War in Angola Via Coffee Trade.....	118
XIII Canadian Import-Export Figures, 1970-1973....	120
XIV Average Monthly Wage Breakdown for the Massey Ferguson Plant in South Africa.....	125
XV South African Employees of Mobil Oil Corporation.....	128
XVI Canadian Government Funds.....	153
XVII The U.N. Biennial Budget 1974-1975 Relating to Southern Africa.....	155

FIGURES

1 The Policy Process.....	165
2 The Salisbury and Heinz Model of Decision-Making.....	168
3 Hockin's Model of Canadian Decision-Making...	170
4 A Proposed Model of Canadian Decision-Making.....	181
5 Decision-Making Initiatives on a Liberalism Scale.....	195

APPENDICES

A. Political Prisoners in South Africa.....	204
B. A Letter from The Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Chairman of the Study and Action Committee of the YWCA.....	215
C. A Letter from the Chairman of the Study and Action Committee of the YWCA to The Secretary of State for External Affairs.....	220

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The central purpose of this paper is to examine the Canadian foreign policy decision-making process. A case-study approach has been used for purposes of manageability, but the specific case, that is, Canadian relations with southern Africa, has been chosen because it is the author's contention that present Canadian policy in 1974 towards that area of the world is seriously in error and needs to be changed. The term, southern Africa, will hereafter refer to the countries of Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Namibia (South West Africa).

In the past year or two, several groups in Canada have begun an active campaign aimed at publicizing the inhuman social conditions suffered by the black people in southern Africa at the hands of the white minorities there. Their contention is that Canadians are contributing, through trade and investment, to the oppressive policies of colonial and racist governments in southern Africa. On further reading and correspondence with people concerned, it became increasingly difficult to understand why Canada was conducting the policy in which she was engaged. It became imperative for my own peace of mind that I justify, or at least clarify, Canadian relations with the countries in question.

While the motivation for the research was mostly personal, it would not be improper to suppose that the general human principles which instigated the study are those imputed to be held by Canadians at large. In the Government publication, Foreign Policy For Canadians, the basic national aims propose "that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contributions they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose".¹ Furthermore, "the Government favours and is pursuing...policies at home and abroad which convince all Canadians that the Canada they have is the kind of country they want".²

The situation in southern Africa presents some very interesting questions to the conscientious, and even the most liberal-minded, student of politics. Validation of such concern has been most aptly presented by a Young Women's Christian Association publication entitled Investment in Oppression. Although their subject matter is limited to South Africa, the stated principles are universally valid. The report issues the challenge to all free peoples to face their "obligation to foster independence for individuals and

¹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 42.

²Ibid., p. 10.

nations, and to condemn legislation and institutions that would reduce or deny such independence".³ The repressive legal structures in southern Africa can have only deleterious consequences for social and economic development of non-whites in those countries. The infringement such structures make upon the minimum levels of human dignity and well-being cannot be limited to a particular geographical area. The obvious question: What we deny to others, can we demand for ourselves?⁴ The oppression of black peoples profoundly effects every aspect of the life of the black people but also of every human being. It is demeaning and destructive to the fundamental values of Canadian society to remain an accomplice to the neo-colonialism of southern Africa. The concept of democracy gives us the right to be wrong, but does free will grant one sector of society the right to oppress the other? Surely justice must be global or it is no justice at all.

Moving away from the ethical considerations for a moment, realism dictates that freedom for the non-whites in Africa will be won through struggle. Canada may very well find herself on the wrong-side even if she persists in middle-of-the-road position. Continuation of present policies could ultimately reduce the foreign policy options available to Canada as racial crises in southern Africa worsen.⁵ The

³Ibid., p. 28.

⁴YWCA, Investment in Oppression, Toronto: YWCA of Canada, 1973, p. 1.

⁵Ibid., p. 1.

more Canadian economic interests become aligned and entangled with the interests of apartheid and colonialism, the more difficult it will be for Canadians to extricate themselves from complicity in order to pursue policies consistent with their national values and the principle of social justice.

...the cost of complicity in the present social and political structure in South Africa--a cost measured both in moral terms and in terms of our relations with independent black nations in Africa --needs to be balanced against the gain to the bulk of the South African population.⁶

The Canadian government has yet to translate into decisive practice its commitments under United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the obligations pointed out to it by the International Court of Justice in 1971. At the same time, Canada professes to give full support to the work of the United Nations in an attempt to strengthen that body in its work towards international peace and justice. Canada's lagging policy contradicts these public positions.⁷

Canadians have what is referred to by the YWCA publication as a "reserve fund of goodwill", but an inadequately sensitive foreign policy towards southern Africa could easily place in jeopardy her ability to provide appropriate support to the development of an independent black Africa. In the face of an international struggle against economic and political tyranny and colonial oppression, Canada cannot remain complacent.

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

⁷Ibid., p. 4.

Southern Africa is not simply another situation with which the world must learn to live. It is a crime against humanity which has been chosen by the international community for censure. It is an oppression based on race, given the strength of law, and Canadians have invested in it, knowingly and unknowingly. Our friends in independent Africa will judge us, as we must judge ourselves.

The Canadian Government has urged that,

...Canadians should be asking themselves: 'What kind of a Canada do we want?' Canadians should be thinking about that question and in those terms, because in essence what kind of foreign policy Canada has will depend largely on what kind of country Canadians think Canada is, or should be in the coming decade.⁸

This thesis is a response to that invitation.

After justifying the reasons for doing the study, the next question is whether or not the matter is a fit subject for political science, and whether the political scientist is qualified to do such research. There has been a long-term argument carried on within the discipline between those who see the role of the political scientist limited to research and systematic observation, and those who see his greatest function in activism.

Those who saw the political scientist as the academic, were identified by the conviction that the discipline should concentrate on describing and explaining how political systems

⁸Ibid., p. 42.

operated by using methods as rigorous and as close to the natural sciences as possible. In this sense, it was concerned primarily with the process of policy-making, and followed the approach traditionally used by political scientists. The rival strain of activism held the belief that the discipline should also be involved in evaluating and prescribing policy process and content, even to becoming an active participant in the process.

More specifically, there are those who argue that the role of the political scientist is to be found in looking at what "is" rather than what "should" be. In fact, Rosenau suggests that there has been too much emphasis on the part of political scientists on the "should" aspect of politics, and that is precisely the reason that political science has never gained true credibility as an academic discipline.

Plainly, neither officials nor non-governmental leaders defer to the foreign policy expert's judgement on the adequacy of an international posture to the same extent that they do, say, to the economist's views on the soundness of a fiscal policy or the psychiatrist's assessment of the mental state of an accused murderer....Most people ...consider themselves to be as qualified or an unqualified as the next person in international affairs, and thus who specialize in such matters are not viewed as experts.⁹

The reason for this, argues Rosenau, is that in making statements of what "should" be, the political scientist is not using any expertise which he might have developed in his

⁹Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, p. 3.

research, but rather, he is relying on personal preference. The fact that he may be well-read on a particular subject establishes only that he is as well qualified as an informed journalist, or any citizen for that matter, to make statements on what "should" be.

"Consciousness of scientific method, so evident elsewhere in the study of human behaviour today, has yet to become predominant in the analysis of foreign policy."¹⁰ Rosenau suggests that the political scientist could best improve his profession's credibility if he would limit himself professionally to "if-then" propositions, and allow philosophers and theologians to deal with the "ought".

Thomas R. Dye also makes the distinction between policy analysis and policy advocacy. He does not question the ability of political science to describe, analyze, and explain policy,¹¹ however, he suggests that there is "an implied assumption in policy analysis that developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of policy designs is itself a socially relevant activity, and that such analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, advocacy, and activism."¹²

¹⁰James Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research", in Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968, p. 203.

¹¹Ibid., p. 198.

¹²Dye, op. cit., p. 1.

Ira Sharkansky argues further that policy recommendations are subordinate to description, analysis, and understanding. "Descriptive theory" he says, "is valuable not only for its own sake, but also for its contribution to more successful prescription. The more we understand the policy-making process...the better we can inform those who would make suggestions for change."¹³

The premise of this paper is that the alleged opposing thrusts for political science research are neither contentious nor mutually exclusive. Political science can be involved actively with public policy and still maintain a commitment to systematic analysis.

Rosenau levels yet another criticism at foreign policy research, particularly the case-history approach, and that is, that "For all their systematic reconstruction of decision and action through time, most case histories neither test nor yield propositions that are applicable beyond the specific situation considered".¹⁴ "Monographs accumulate, but knowledge does not."¹⁵ This lack of scientific consciousness is exemplified by the absence in research on public policy of the question, "of what larger pattern is this behaviour an instance"?¹⁶ This paper will try to answer

¹³Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁴Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science, Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970, p. 2.

¹⁵Rosenau, op. cit., p. 199.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 200.

that question.

The process of inquiry chosen begins by gathering background information on the countries of southern Africa in question (chapter II). In addition to that data, the writer will try to understand the professed and operating values of Canadian foreign relations (chapters III, IV). In attempting to answer the questions, it became obvious that many Canadians perceived an ultimate inadequacy in both the professed and operating value systems. Public opinion and response to Canadian policy for southern Africa will be analyzed in chapter V.

At the beginning of the introduction, it was stated that the central purpose of this paper was to examine the process by which foreign policy decision-making takes place in Canada. The purpose of that goal rests on the premise that if one can determine how the "system" works, one is in a better position to effect change. An examination of decision-making will be attempted by applying the specific data of the case-study to two adapted typologies proposed by Thomas Hockin (via Theodore Lowi, and R.H. Salisbury and J.P. Heinz) and David Easton (chapter VI).

The Easton model of a political system¹⁷ to be used for partial analysis of the data is presented in a slightly

¹⁷David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965, p. 32, diag. 2.

adapted form by Austin Ranney in his study of policy content.¹⁸ Generally speaking, it presents political activity as part of a larger "system", with particular inter-relationships between the various component parts, and specified directions of flow for that activity. The systems approach, however, deals with the aggregate characteristics of whole political systems, and it does not say much about what goes on within the system. While the model is useful for general conceptualization, it is not specific enough for the purposes of this paper, that is, to examine Canadian decision-making in particular. Therefore, something more detailed is required.

For this reason, the paper by Thomas Hockin will be used.¹⁹ Hockin's typology is at the end of a chain of revisions and extensions of a model beginning with Theodore J. Lowi,²⁰ though it is likely to be developed still further by other researchers. Lowi and Hockin agree on the fact that they are willing to conceptualize policy types as independent variables rather than dependent ones.²¹ Salisbury and Heinz²²

¹⁸ Austin Ranney, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁹ Thomas A. Hockin, "Towards a Theory of Public Policy in Canada: A Preliminary Discussion Paper", presented to a seminar at York University (unpublished), 1971.

²⁰ Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics, July 16, 1964.


²¹ Hockin, op. cit., p. 2.

²² R.H. Salisbury and J.P. Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications", in Sharkansky (ed.), op. cit., pp. 39-60.

extended the Lowi typology and proposed a method by which policy outputs could be classified according to the degree of interaction between the pattern of demand and the structure of the decisional system. Using recent examples from the Canadian scene, Hockin further adapts the Salisbury and Heinz typology, and it is this end-product which will be used to examine Canadian decision-making in foreign policy. The final model fits into Easton's larger schema very nicely, and the two together provide the conceptual framework for the study.

Having come to the conclusion that certain value systems are inadequate, however, is a dead-end street unless it is used as the embarkation point for alternative suggestions. In order to maintain at least the appearance of academic rigour, however, the author will attempt to heed Rosenau's admonition that the political scientist limit himself to if-then propositions (chapter VII). It should not be misunderstood that the writer has no personal opinions that may find no place in if-then statements. I will reserve them for my summary and conclusions in chapter VIII.

A new set of values consistent in the long run with the concepts of humane and humanity must be a final outcome of this paper. More critical, however, to the usefulness of such research should be a program of activity aimed at bringing about that goal, based on systematic analysis and research and founded specifically in the case of the Canadian decision-making system.



MAP OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

Chapter II

POLICIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa

The Republic of South Africa is a country of 472,359 square miles lying at the southern tip of the African continent. Its land area is more than five times the size of the United Kingdom, or larger than the combined areas of West Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal.²³ The economy is diversified and industrial, exporting gold, uranium, diamonds, copper, maize, textiles, fruit, wines and wool.²⁴

The population of South Africa is heterogeneous and multinational and totaled 22 million in 1971. Of these, 3.9 million or 17.7%, are white, descendants of Dutch, French, British and German settlers with smaller admixtures of other European peoples, mainly Portuguese, Greeks and Italians.

The non-white population is classified by three groupings. The Coloureds, of which there are 2.1 million, are descendants of the nomadic Hottentots and Bushman. The Bushmen are found in the semi-desert areas of the northwestern Cape province and live a stone-age existence. The Hottentots

²³ Republic of South Africa, Department of Information, This is South Africa, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1973, p. 6.

²⁴ Florence Elliot, A Dictionary of Politics, (7th edition), Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973, p. 424.

have interbred with other races over the centuries, and constitute the main body of the Coloured people. The Cape Malays have established a separate community within the Coloured people and practise the Muslim religion. Most of the Coloured people live in the western Cape province.

The Asian group, which is predominantly Indian, first came to the territory around the 1860's as indentured labourers. Subsequently, many came on their own initiative and established themselves as merchants and traders. The 1971 population of Asians numbered around 620,422.

By far the largest population in the Republic is the Bantu people, numbering 15.4 million and representing 70% of the total. They are of Negroid descent and immigrated from the north several centuries ago. They consist of eight main nations which speak ten different languages, but belong to one major African nation called Nguni.²⁵

Early Colonialism and Imperialism

The Western world first became aware of South Africa in 1488 when a Portuguese mariner by the name of Bartholomeu Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch East India Company established a victualling station at Table Bay to supply food to the Company's ships on their voyages to the East Indies. By 1658 slave labour had been introduced with

²⁵R.S.A. (Republic of South Africa), op. cit., pp. 6-7.

manpower being imported from Madagascar, Mozambique, and the East Indies.

Around 1671, inward expansion in search of sheltered farmlands began. After one century of such migration, the Afrikaner encountered the Bantu at Great Fish River, and was thwarted from further easterly advance. During the period from 1795-1814, European possession of the territory alternated between the British and Dutch, eventually ending in British hands. Resentment of the British intrusion and at the compensation offered when slavery was abolished in 1833, the Dutch (Boers or Afrikaners) trekked northwards into the interior and set up the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Discovery of diamonds in 1867 in the territory brought ownership disputes between the Boers and the tribes, which ended only when the British annexed the fields in 1871 and turned them into a Crown colony. A series of Anglo-Boer wars ended in 1902 when the Boers surrendered to become British subjects. Self-government was granted by the United Kingdom in 1909 when the South Africa Act was passed. The country has been completely sovereign since 1931.

Namibia

The territory of South-West Africa has an area of 318,621 square miles, with a population estimated in 1970 at 746,328, of whom 342,500 belong to the Ovambo tribe, and 90,000 are Europeans. It was a German possession from 1884

until the end of the First World War when it was entrusted by the League of Nations to South Africa to be administered as a mandated territory. No trusteeship agreement was concluded between the United Nations and South Africa after the Second World War, and the International Court of Justice ruled in 1950 that the area was still under an international mandate, and that South Africa was obliged to submit it to the supervision and control of the United Nations General Assembly.²⁶

In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice. They contended that the mandate of 1920 was still operative, that the United Nations had inherited the supervisory functions of the League of Nations in regard to the mandate, and that South Africa had failed to meet its obligations to promote to the utmost the interest and moral well-being of the inhabitants of South-West Africa.

South Africa contended that the mandate for South-West Africa had lapsed with the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, that her obligations regarding the League of Nations had not violated her substantive obligations under the mandate in any way alleged by the complaining states.²⁷

²⁶Elliot, op. cit., p. 429.

²⁷W.J. deKock, History of South Africa, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971, p. 52.

In 1966 the court gave no ruling on the substantive issues brought by Ethiopia and Liberia, but dismissed the case on the grounds that the applicants had no direct legal interest in the matter.

Following the court judgement, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to terminate South Africa's administration of the territory on October 27, 1966 by a vote of 114 to 2 with three abstentions. A United Nations' council was created to administer the territory until self-rule could be established and South Africa was ordered to vacate. In no case did the South African government comply with the United Nations' rulings, rejecting them as unconstitutional and contrary to international law.²⁸

In 1970, the United Nations took action on the issue of the mandated territory, renamed Namibia by a U.N. resolution on June 12, 1968. Resolution 284 requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia...?" On June 21, 1971, the Court advised that "South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory".²⁹ Further,

²⁸Ibid., p. 54.

²⁹YWCA, Investment in Oppression, p. 36.

the Court advised that UN members were obliged to "recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the government of South Africa implying...recognition...or lending assistance (to its administration)".³⁰ The ruling was rejected by South Africa.

Subsequent General Assemblies have reiterated their condemnation of the Namibian situation but have failed to alter the conditions significantly.³¹ For all intents and purposes, Namibia is now an integral part of the South African Republic.

+ Apartheid and the Homelands Policy

The doctrine of apartheid, which is an Afrikaans word meaning "apart-hood", is the modern response of the white minority in South Africa to the non-white majority in that country. Officially, it espouses a policy of separate development of the race groups which is considered to be

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See, for example, the most recent publication of the Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Eighth Regular Session, New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1973. For extended discussions of the Namibian question see, Garth Legge, et al., The Black Paper, Toronto: Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa, 1970, p. 5; YWCA, Investment in Oppression, op. cit., pp. 34-38; British Council of Churches, Violence in Southern Africa, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1970, pp. 22-24; Elliot, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

the only means by which the cultural values of each group can be protected, and the only way to guarantee racial peace by providing an opportunity for the development of Non-Whites.³²

The policy was introduced by the National Party when it came to power in 1948 by defeating the incumbent government whose official policy was showing a tendency towards racial integration. It advocated racial purity, segregation, and white paramountcy, and was meant to "ensure the maintenance, protection and consolidation of the White race as the bearer of Christian civilization in South Africa, and to enable it to fulfill its function of responsible trusteeship to guide the other groups towards eventual freedom in a peaceful manner".³³

There were certainly no qualms about identifying the motivation for pursuit of the segregationist policy. In 1955, the Tommlinson Commission stated clearly that "where social, economic, and other factors have free play" the inevitable outcome would be "...cultural assimilation...the development of socio-economic stratification based not on colour but on purely social-economic considerations...cultural and economic equality...increased social contact and association

³²deKock, op. cit., p. 46.

³³Ibid., p. 43.

and the ultimate result complete racial assimilation."³⁴ There are many places in this world where such statements would be honoured for their lofty sentiments, and would be worthy of being sought by all human beings. However, the Tommlinson Commission identified the predicted developments only to reject them. The reasons given were: that the European nature of legislation would inevitably disappear; that miscegenation would certainly occur; and that it would hardly be likely that the White population would ever want to give up its European character in the face of such racial assimilation.³⁵

The alternative to racial integration was racial segregation, and from 1949 onwards the National Party introduced legislation designed to implement that policy. Ideally, it meant that the races would be separate but equal, however, the laws affected the political rights of non-whites, their rights of movement, residence, property, worship, occupation, and marriage.

The policy of separate development proposed that the various nations in South Africa would progress towards eventual sovereign independence and political self-government.³⁶

³⁴YWCA, op. cit., p. 5.

³⁵Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa, Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1955, pp. 102-103.

³⁶R.S.A., This is South Africa, op. cit., p. 16.

For this purpose, the entire adult population of the country was classified by race and allotted separate residential areas based on that classification. Outside their designated homeland, the African has no political rights.

The policy of reserved land is not new in South Africa. Reserves had existed for many decades and were located in areas finally occupied by the Bantu after clashing with the Whites. There is some disagreement as to how the African arrived at these territories originally. The South African government states that the homelands of the various Bantu nations were those originally settled by them and have been enlarged subsequently by purchases of land from adjoining White areas with funds provided by the South African government.³⁷ Another study indicates that there had been very little choice offered to the Bantu about the location of the homelands because they were areas to which the Africans had been driven following the impact with the Whites.³⁸

The Land Act of 1913 legalized the territorial boundaries as they had been left after the final skirmishes. Under the terms of the Land Act, 22.9 million acres of land were reserved for the exclusive occupation of the Bantu. The Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936 set aside another 15.3

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸YWCA, op. cit., p. 10.

million acres for Bantu settlement but all of this land has not yet been turned over to the reserves.³⁹ Today approximately 13% of the land is reserved for blacks. The remaining 87% is reserved exclusively for the white population. Forty-six percent of the African population live on the reserves while the remaining 54% live in white areas where they hold jobs but have no right to vote or own property.⁴⁰

Under the Promotion of the Bantu Self Government Act of 1959, eight national units were established, each with limited powers of self-government, a white resident, and liaisons with the white areas of South Africa. Authority is based on the traditional hierarchy. The government is tribal and under strict control of the white national government. The most "advanced" unit, the Transkei, is not empowered to deal with military matters, security, external affairs, post, telegraph, radio, railways, national roads, currency and banking, and amendments to its own constitution.⁴¹


Except for the Transkei, the homelands are scattered areas throughout the country, 83 different areas to be exact. Zululand, for example, consists of 29 separate parcels completely surrounded by white territories. The Tomlinson

³⁹R.S.A., op. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁰R.S.A., Minister of Statistics, press statement in 1970 quoted in Visual Publications, South Africa: A Visual History, 1972, Johannesburg: Visual Publications, 1973, p. 148.

⁴¹YWCA, op. cit., p. 11.

MAP OF BANTUSTANS



HOMELAND	NATION	TERRITORY (HECTARES)	PARCELS	POPULATION (1970) ('000)
TRANSKEI	XHOSA	3,672,212	2	3,006
CISKEI	XHOSA	918,574	17	924
KWAZULU	ZULU	3,144,421	29	4,026
LEBOWA	NORTH SOTHO	2,214,421	3	2,019
VENDA	VHAVENDA	604,355	3	358
GAZANKULU	TSONGA	667,292	4	737
BOPHUTHATSWANA	BWANA	3,754,018	19	1,719
QWAQWA	SOUTH SOTHO	45,742	3	1,452
SWAZI TERRITORY	SWAZI	211,807	3	499

Bantu Homelands in South Africa

TABLE I

1 hectare = 2,471 acres
100 hectare = 1 sq. km. = 386 sq. miles

Source: Y.W.C.A., Investment in Oppression, Toronto: Y.W.C.A. of Canada, 1973, p. 32; and Visual Publications, South Africa: A Visual History, 1972, Johannesburg: Visual Publications, 1973, p. 150.

Commission reported the physical conditions of abject poverty. The Highveld Institute of South Africa stated that the reserves could provide subsistence for a maximum of 2.5 million people,⁴² yet somehow, 7 million live there and the South African government has designated the homelands for the total Bantu population of 15.4 million.

According to the South African government, the food-raising potential of the Bantu lands is much higher than that actually realized. Three-quarters of the lands receive an average rainfall of over 500 mm. per year, and the Highveld Agricultural Research Institute has stated that on the basis of higher yields, the Bantu homelands in Natal and the Transvaal alone could feed 20 million people.⁴³ Yet the nutritional level of the Bantu is low.

The Government points out that such status cannot be attributed to lack of adequate land or to a shortage of funds in agricultural development. Nor can it be blamed on lack of agricultural training. The Government reports:

It is significant that thousands of Bantu men in White agricultural employment outside the homelands do excellent work for their employers. They use sophisticated agricultural methods and modern agricultural machinery. They are accustomed

⁴²Quoted in Cosmos Desmond, The Discarded People, Christian Institute of South Africa, Braamfontain, South Africa, 1970, p. 14.

⁴³R.S.A., Nutrition and the Bantu, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971, p. 11.

to mechanical cultivation, the use of both organic and artificial fertilizers, to the conservation of fodder, the making of hay and ensilage, to modern techniques of animal husbandry and many other modern farming practices. But back in the homelands, very few of them will dream of employing the same methods on their own land.⁴⁴

Reasons suggested for this condition are that farming is considered by the Bantu to be woman's work, and that the use of fertilizers is considered by many Bantu a foreign technique that does not apply to them. It has not, however, been mentioned that on a Bantu's salary there is barely enough money to subsist let alone buy expensive agricultural machinery and fertilizer. Nor has it been suggested how the "trained" Bantu male is to farm his own land when he is forced for economic reasons to work full-time for the Whites, usually hundreds of miles away. Direct private investment in the homeland has been prohibited on the grounds that it would hinder independent African development.

These impoverished reserve lands provide the rationale for denying to 8 million Africans living in white areas all political and civil rights. Bantus living in the White areas remain there only at the indulgence of the Whites. "Non-productive" Africans, the unemployed, the old, women and children, are "endorsed out" and returned to the homelands when they are of no further use to the Whites, even though

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 17.

they may never have seen their homeland before. Those who remain, live in vast barrack-like blocks outside the cities and commute to work.

The policy of apartheid does not limit itself to Africans of Bantu classification. The Group Areas Act of 1950 empowered the government to declare any area a "group area" for Coloureds, Asians, Africans, and Whites, and also gave it the power to move out all members of other races than the one designated for that area. Freehold rights for all non-white groups are effectively eliminated. In 1971, 111,580 families were ordered to move, and of those, only 1,578 were white. The remainder were Coloureds, Indians, or Chinese.⁴⁵

Businesses are affected as well. Asian shopkeepers can't own stores in any non-Asian area, and all non-white professionals are excluded from the central areas of the towns and cities. Even if guarantees have been given, it is the prerogative of the Government to change its mind.

Legislation

Although the most determined efforts to implement and protect the policy of apartheid have taken place since 1948, there were already important foundations laid by the early 1900's. At the time the South Africa Act came into

⁴⁵Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1971, p. 155.

effect in 1909, two of the four provinces had common voters roles and franchise qualifications for both whites and non-whites. Though the qualifications for voting were higher in Natal than in the Cape, they were the same for all men, and promised increased participation as Africans acquired more education and incomes.

The equality was short-lived, however. In 1930, the influence of the non-white vote was considerably diminished when the franchise was extended to white women but not to black women. The following year, the income and property qualifications for White men in the Cape and Natal were removed.⁴⁶

Despite the right to vote granted to non-whites, the South Africa Act had embodied racial discrimination in its statutes. Africans could vote for members of parliament, but could not become members themselves. They remained on a common roll until 1936, when, by the Representation of Natives Act, they were placed on a separate voters list and allowed to elect three white members to represent them. This indirect representation was abolished in 1959.⁴⁷ Coloureds and Asians could also have the vote if they fulfilled the financial and education qualifications, but they, too, were placed on a

⁴⁶Muriel Horrell, Legislation and Race Relations, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971, p. 1.

⁴⁷For a complete list of all race-related legislation, see Horrell, ibid.

separate roll in 1956, electing four white members to the National Assembly. The Representation of Voters Act was amended in 1968 to abolish Coloured and Asian representation in the legislative body after 1970. After two decades of Nationalist rule, 17,500,000 citizens of the Republic of South Africa had been willfully and legally disenfranchised on the basis of colour.⁴⁸ The last door to multi-racial representation was closed when the government passed the Prohibition of Political Interference Act in 1968. By this legislation, it was illegal for anyone to belong to a racially mixed political party.

In Namibia, the situation is the same. Although the Africans make up more than 80% of the population they have no vote in the affairs of their own country. The Ovambo people have a separate "Legislative Council" but are limited to tribal representation and local responsibilities.⁴⁹

Apartheid extended into every aspect of labour for the non-white. At the beginning of industrialization in South Africa, there was a great discrepancy between the skills of the white minority and the blacks, which was also reflected in their wages. With time, however, the Africans gained the skills and represented a threat to the job security of the higher-paid whites.

⁴⁸YWCA, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁹British Council of Churches, Violence in Southern Africa, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1970, p. 38.

The mining industry was one of the first areas where the whites took legal action to protect their jobs. The Mines and Works Act of 1926 limited the granting of certificates of competency for many skilled jobs to "Europeans, Cape Coloured and Mauritius Creoles, or St. Helena persons." Under this Act, no African could receive a skilled rating for many jobs in which he was now skilled, and this was reflected in his wages.

The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 provided for the registration and regulation of trade unions and employers' organizations. Most African men were excluded from the definition of "employee". This effectively removed them from any input in labour arbitration, and since African unions could not officially be recognized, they were totally without representation. Strikes by Africans were also forbidden under the terms of the Masters and Servants Acts 1856-1904, or the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911.

Wages were determined by the level of skill required for the job, which is hardly a racist criterion, but the legislation provided that no African could be considered skilled. Even unskilled Whites had a vote and racial ties with those in power. To further secure the position of Whites, the Government adopted a "civilized labour" policy in the Public Service in 1924. Thousands of unskilled and skilled jobs were reserved exclusively for Whites but at a "civilized"

rate of pay. "Uncivilized labour" stated the Minister of Labour, "is to be regarded as labour rendered by persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood among barbarous and under-developed peoples."⁵⁰

The South African economy has maintained rapid economic growth since 1945, largely due to foreign investment. One might expect that the increased demand for skilled labour resulting from growing industry would promote more integration and less "apartness" as labour pressures require drawing from the non-white market. Quite the opposite has been the case in South Africa. Instead of skilled black labour moving into the skilled jobs and bettering their incomes, the policy has simply been to re-classify jobs and move the skilled qualifications upwards. Blacks are now doing jobs, at unskilled wages that whites used to do at "civilized" wages. Apartheid has merely adapted to the new pressures, and little has been accomplished in the way of integration.

As the result of an investigation in 1948, the newly appointed Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry recommended that African trade unions should be legalized. The Government rejected the report and introduced the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act in 1953. It provided that

⁵⁰Ralph Horowitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 196, quoting Col. Chresswell, Labour Minister.

Africans be excluded from the definition of "employee" under the previously mentioned Industrial Conciliation Act, and, therefore, they could not be represented in unions. Under the Act, white Bantu Labour officers were to act as intermediaries between the employer and African workers. The Act did provide, however, that the Africans may set up a Bantu Workers Committee under the chairmanship of the Bantu Labour Officer but they were still excluded from the collective bargaining process.

Subsequent legislation has made illegal the registration of new racially mixed trade unions, and unions which chose to continue had to establish separate branches for each race (Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956). The Bantu Law Amendment Act of 1970 gave the Government the most extensive power yet to exclude an African from any job anywhere he chose. By this law, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development could prohibit the African from being employed:

- (i) in a specified area;
- (ii) in a specified class of employment;
- (iii) in a specified trade; or
- (iv) in the service of a specified employer or class of employer.⁵¹

Beyond political and labour matters, one of the most stringent laws affecting the daily life of the African are the "Pass Laws". In 1952, the Native (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act was passed. Africans had

⁵¹Horrell, Legislation..., op. cit., p. 63.

always been required to carry passes in the early days in South Africa, but the 1952 Act transformed the pass-system into a decisive means of control. It required every African to carry a reference book containing his photograph, finger prints and details of his permission to work and travel. The book must be produced on demand, and to be without it is a criminal offence, leading to arrest and imprisonment.⁵² The laws provided the method by which "unproductive" Africans were kept out of the white areas, usually meaning spouses and children. Family visiting was not to exceed 72 hours. The Commissioner of South African police reported that the daily average of prosecutions for pass violations for 1969-70 was 1,764.⁵³

All of the above legislation was to ensure that the African was simply a migrant worker in the white areas. The rationale for removing his political rights, labour rights, freeholding rights, etc. was that the African was not to establish himself permanently within the White society because he already had his own territory in the reserve lands. On this territory, he was to develop and advance in his own way, separate from the Whites. A brief look at another area affecting the policy of apartheid is necessary to determine just

⁵²Horrell, A Survey..., op. cit., p. 68.

⁵³Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, op. cit., p. 142.

how sincere South Africans are about "separate but equal" advancement. That area is education.

Education for white children in South Africa is free and compulsory up to the age of sixteen. Non-white education is dictated by the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the Coloured Person's Education Act, 1963, and the Indians' Education Act, 1965. Bantu education was put under the control of the Department of Bantu Education, and mission-run schools were phased out. Instruction in local tribal languages was enforced throughout the entire education process dividing further the already dispersed non-white majority.

The Republic of South Africa reports that "School syllabuses are all based on generally accepted principles, but they differ, of course, in regard to certain details".⁵⁴ The generally accepted principles easily refer to the policy of apartheid. For an elaboration of the "details", one may read the statements of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, later to become Prime Minister, when he stated that "Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live".⁵⁵ Separate syllabuses were introduced so that the African would not be misled "by showing him the green

⁵⁴R.S.A., This is South Africa, op. cit., p. 52.

⁵⁵Assembly Hansard 10 of 1953, cols. 3576, 3585; Senate Hansard, June 7, 1954.

pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze".⁵⁶

Expenditure on education reflects the policy of apartheid as well. In 1967, Africans received 9% of the spending while Europeans maintained 77%, Coloureds received 10%, and Indians 4%.⁵⁷ In 1970, the African child was allotted only 6% of the amount the state had designated for a white child.⁵⁸ The vast increase in the number of Bantu children enrolled in the primary schools was handled by reducing the teaching time and doubling the number of pupils per teacher. Education is free for whites, but not free for Africans who make up the extra funds through additional rent payments, and who pay for school maintenance and cleaning, and replacement of equipment.⁵⁹

The Reality of Apartheid

The policy of separate development, whether well-intentioned or used as a sham excuse to camouflage oppressive racism, has brought about very specific maladies for the

⁵⁶Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Statement to the South African Senate, June 1954, quoted in Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, London: Renquin African Library, revised edition 1969, p. 260.

⁵⁷South Africa Institute of Race Relations Survey, 1967, cited in British Council of Churches, Violence in Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 48.

⁵⁸YWCA, op. cit., p. 12.

⁵⁹Horrell, Legislation..., op. cit., p. 65.

non-white population, particularly the Africans. World Bank figures for 1970 indicate a \$760 per capita GNP for South Africa. Whites earn on the average more than £1000 per year per capita, while the Bantu earns an average of £53 per year per capita. World Bank estimates show an average income for blacks in 1971 of \$105 (U.S.).⁶⁰ This means that the largest percentage of the population is receiving the smallest percentage of the income. In 1968, a South African survey referred to by UNESCO, determined that the black people, representing 70% of the population, received only 18.8% of the cash income for the country, while the whites took 73.3%.⁶¹ On the average, whites earn 5.9 times the black wages in mining, 6.5 times the black wages in construction, and 5.2 times the black wages in the factories.⁶² The monthly income for whites averages R.95 (Rand - South African currency) per month per capita, and the black earns an average of R.7 per month, a ratio of 14:1.⁶³

It is quite true that the whites work at the skilled jobs and the Africans hold more menial labour, but job

⁶⁰YWCA, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶¹Survey reported in the Rand Daily Mail, March 11, April 26, 1968 and referred to by UNESCO, Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information, 2nd edition, Paris: UNESCO, 1972.

⁶²Economist, London, June 5, 1971.

⁶³YWCA, op. cit., p. 37.

TABLE II

1971 Average Monthly Incomes (in South African Rand)

	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Coloureds</u>	<u>Asians</u>	<u>Africans</u>
Mining (1970)	341	71	93	19
Construction	326	110	144	49
Banks	258	73	108	61
Building Societies	269	98	127	59
Insurance Companies	299	105	185	70
Wholesale	281	76	108	54
Retail	151	59	91	43
Manufacturing (May)	315	73	80	52
Public Service				
Central Government	293	145	195	52
Provincial Administration	283	64	99	36
Local Authorities	299	94	65	44

Source: Muriel Horrell, Dudley Horner, John Kane-Berman, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1971, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972, pp. 228, 232, 235, 201, 239.

TABLE III

Minimum Income Levels

	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Africans</u>
Poverty Datum Line	not set	67.13
Minimum Effective Income	168.59	100.69

Source: Muriel Horrell, et al., A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1971, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972, pp. 176-177.

TABLE IV
The South African Labour Market

Sector and Skin Colour	1936		1951		1967	
	Employees	&	Employees	%	Employees	%
1. Primary						
a) Agriculture						
White	181,409	10.2	145,424	9.6	115,900	6.1
Non-white	1,596,418	89.8	1,363,218	90.4	1,796,200	93.9
Total	1,777,827	100.0	1,508,642	100.0	1,912,100	100.0
b) Mining						
White	46,939	10.7	56,959	11.2	60,200	9.9
Non-white	393,126	89.3	453,132	88.8	544,800	89.1
Total	440,062	100.0	510,091	100.0	605,000	100.0
2. Secondary (manufacturing and construction)						
White	131,598	42.4	256,848	35.3	420,000	29.7
Non-white	178,487	57.6	510,771	66.5	996,300	70.3
Total	310,085	100.0	767,619	100.0	1,416,300	100.0
3. Tertiary (Commerce, transportation services and administration)						
White	355,301	33.0	496,309	30.9	824,600	32.1
Non-white	720,005	67.0	1,077,801	69.1	1,797,600	67.9
Total	1,075,306	100.0	1,604,110	100.0	2,622,200	100.0
4. Total, All Sectors						
White	715,244	19.8	955,540	21.1	1,420,700	21.2
Non-white	2,888,036	80.2	3,434,922	78.9	5,134,900	78.8
Total	3,603,280	100.0	4,390,462	100.0	6,555,600	100.0

Source: W.F.J. Steenkamp, "Labour Policies for Growth During the 'Seventies: In the Established Industrial Areas", South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1971).

TABLE V

Old-Age and Blind Pensions and Disability Grants
(in Rand)

	Africans	Coloureds & Asians	Whites
Free income permitted	21	96	192
Basic pension	21	72	336
Bonus	--	--	48
Extra Allowance	30	108	--
Total pension	51	180	384

Source: Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1968, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969, p. 285.

TABLE VI

Sickness and Infant Mortality Rates in South Africa

	Africans	Coloureds	Asians	Whites
Tuberculosis per 100,000 1967	460.7	436.5	204.9	34.91
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births 1965	no figures	136.1	56.1	29.21
Kwashiorkor per 100,000 1965	980	410	40	negligible

Source: Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations, 1968, ibid., p. 275.

reservation and the difficulty blacks have in obtaining skilled certificates, ensure that their wages will always be lower than whites because they are unable to move into skilled positions. Often, when a black is required to do skilled labour, the job is simply reclassified as unskilled and the wage is readjusted accordingly.

A 1971 study established the minimum income level for health in Johannesburg at R.69.86 per month. The actual income level of the Africans in that city, however, is R.58 per month, 17% below the poverty line. Another study conducted in South Africa in 1970, showed that one half of all urban Africans earned less than R.50 per month, and a full 50% lived below the poverty line. In 1943, that figure was only 24.8%, hardly an indicator of advancement.⁶⁴

Resistance

From 1948 to 1960, there was growing unrest among the non-whites, especially the Africans. The South African government claimed to be dealing with the forces of Communism, which, according to them had become a real threat to internal stability. In 1950, the Suppression of Communism Act was passed making the promotion of Communism illegal and excluded Communists from trade unions. A Communist was defined under this Act as any person who is deemed by the state to aim at

⁶⁴See X-Ray: On Current Affairs in Southern Africa, Volume 2, May, 1971; and also Lord Hailey, An African Survey: Revised 1956, London: Oxford U.P., 1957, p. 1280.

bringing about any political, industrial, social, or economic change within South Africa by disturbance or disorder or by unlawful acts which aim at creating hostility between blacks and whites.⁶⁵

In 1951, thirty-two organizations pledged themselves to oppose racial policies through a Franchise Action Committee. The African National Congress was spokesman for the group and demanded that the pass laws, the Group Areas Act, and the Separate Voters Rolls be abolished. When the Government refused, the ANC organized a peaceful mass defiance campaign of the selected laws. By 1952, over 8,000 had been arrested for violations, most of them under the Suppression of Communism Act.⁶⁶

Other movements were organized in the mid-fifties such as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Convention, the Federation of South African Women, and the Congress of Democrats. They jointly passed the Freedom Charter calling for equal rights for all races, universal franchise, restriction of police power, abolition of child labour, and free education for all. In South Africa, it was considered open defiance, sedition, communism, and high treason.

⁶⁵Horrell, Legislation..., op. cit., p. 89.

⁶⁶YWCA, op. cit., p. 13; defiance continued into 1953 and was met by even harsher legislation from the Government "to fight Communism".

A more radical version of the A.N.C. came to life in the form of the Pan African Congress (P.A.C.) and organized further confrontations. On March 21, 1960, Africans throughout South Africa presented themselves without their passes at police stations inviting mass arrests for violation of the pass laws. In Sharpeville, police opened fire at the crowd and killed 69 and wounded 178. The Government passed the Unlawful Organizations Act which proclaimed the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. illegal. Since that time, no African opposition has been permitted.

Further legislation has made resistance very difficult for human survival. The Sabotage Act (1962) created the offence of sabotage carrying a minimum penalty of five years. Anyone caught trespassing, or in contravention of any law, who is found upon any land or building, is liable to the charge of sabotage. The onus of proof that the intent was not to commit sabotage rests with the accused.⁶⁷

The Terrorism Act (1967) is one of the most repressive of the security laws. It allowed Special Branch officials to detain persons for interrogation for undetermined periods of time. It applied to South West Africa as well, and was made five years retroactive to June 1962. Terrorist activities were widely defined, and once again it was up to the accused

⁶⁷Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, New York: Penguin, 1969, p. 217-19.

to prove his innocence. The Act stipulates that no trial for an offence under the Act can take place without the permission of the Attorney General. No bail is granted, arrest may be without warrant, and length of detention is specified. No court may intervene in the state action, and no one but state officials have access to the detainee.⁶⁸

Political prisoners are a major concern for the resisters, both locally and internationally. The United Nations' Unit on Apartheid reports the bulk of prisoners were taken after the Sharpeville massacre. Between March and the end of August, 1960, 11,503 persons had been detained without trial for periods up to 5 months; 774 persons were convicted and sent to prison. From 1960-1967, 140,000 people were convicted or detained for political offences.⁶⁹

The laws governing detainees provide for indefinite detention incommunicado in solitary confinement. Since 1967, it has been impossible to determine how many people have been detained due to the passing of the Terrorism Act which forbade the publication of such data. In 1972, 40 persons plus those detained under the Terrorism Act (the Government has admitted to 22) have died while in "detention".⁷⁰

⁶⁸Horrell, Legislation..., op. cit., p. 99; YWCA, op. cit., p. 18-19.

⁶⁹United Nations, Unit on Apartheid, "Political Prisoners in South Africa", Notes and Documents, No. 2/74, p. 1.

⁷⁰Note: Being detained is not the same as being a convicted prisoner.

Those convicted of security violations by the end of 1966 amounted to 1,825, in 1967--1,335, 1968--1,019, 1970--809, 1972--464. Reports of conditions for prisoners are depressing and are well-documented by U.N. and Church researchers.

The final restriction of any resistors comes in the form of "banning". A banned person is prohibited from attending public meetings (two or more persons), must report to the police daily, weekly, or more frequently in special cases, may be confined to a specified area, and is forbidden to publish or disseminate anything. It is also an offence for someone else to publish, or disseminate, or be in possession of anything written or stated by the banned person.

In June 1968, there were 741 banned persons in South Africa. By July 1973, there were 200. Others have gone into exile or have been banished.⁷¹ All legislation includes citizens of Namibia as well, many of whom are imprisoned in South Africa.* The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) face the same difficulties as South African resistance movements and suffer similar consequences.

The arsenal of legislation is not limited to that mentioned in this chapter. There are many more Acts which

⁷¹U.N., Unit on Apartheid, op. cit., p. 6.

*See Appendix A for further information in U.N. report cited.

have been passed to ensure "law and order", to maintain "internal stability", and to combat "Communism". They have effectively silenced all political dissent and dialogue in South Africa. One only has rights if one supports apartheid. Dissent is high treason.

"Separate but equal" is a phrase which rings clearly throughout South Africa. The facts contradict the rhetoric, however, 17.7% of the population have 87% of the land reserved exclusively for their use. They, alone, have direct control of the National Assembly. Whites make up 21.2% of the labour market and take 73.3% of the cash income. The most depressing feature about this situation, however, is that South Africa is not alone in its social policies. Her Portuguese and Rhodesian neighbours are highly supportive of current policies, and deserve brief attention as well.

Angola and Mozambique

Angola is a Portuguese territory also known as Portuguese West Africa. It has an area of 481,351 square miles and lies on the west coast of southern Africa, south of Zaire and north of Namibia. The population is estimated at 6,250,000, of whom 5.7 million (91%) are black and 400,000 (6.4%) are white.⁷² The country contains valuable deposits

⁷²Alex Brown, et al., Southern Africa: Some Questions for Canadians, Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 1973, p. 43.

of iron ore and diamonds, and currently is the base for oil exploration.

Another Portuguese territory is that of Mozambique, also known as Portuguese East Africa. It is a land of 302,250 square miles, bordered by Tanzania, Malawi, Rhodesia, South Africa and Swaziland. The population of 8,233,000 (1970) is made up of approximately 8 million blacks (97.2%) and 233,000 whites (2.8%), most of whom live in the capital city of Lourenco Marques. Mozambique exports sugar, maize, cotton, copra, sisal, and cashew nuts, and mines bauxite and gold.⁷³

Early Colonialism and Imperialism

Angola and Mozambique were first discovered by the European world in 1482 and 1498 respectively. Except for a brief period of time from 1641 to 1648 when Angola was held by the Dutch, the Portuguese have occupied the territory continuously. The chief usefulness of the land was as a stop-over station for Portuguese traders on their way to India and the Far East. The 17th century witnessed penetration of the interior by the colonials and the founding of "prazos" or landed estates.

With the "discovery" of the Americas and the subsequent demand of labour, African slave trade reached a peak in the

⁷³IDOC, The Future of the Missionary Enterprise, No. 1, 1973, Rome: IDOC International Documentation Participation Project, 1973, p. 7; and Elliot, A Dictionary of Politics, op. cit., p. 324.

18th and 19th centuries. The slave trade flourished, causing widespread chaos to the African way of life as well as great depopulation. (It was estimated that Angola once had a population of 12 million before the trade began.)

The year 1889 brought the official end of slavery and the introduction of "salaried labour" which was used to aid in the exploitation of the natural resources of the territories. Under the terms of this labour policy, anyone without a salary was conscripted by the administration on the grounds that "All natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are subject to the moral and legal obligation of attempting to obtain through work the means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition".⁷⁴

Due to the territories' wealth, the Portuguese have been reluctant to decolonize them. In spite of frequent uprisings by the Natives, they have continued to incorporate the administration of the colonies into the European centre. In 1951, the African colonies were declared overseas territories, and in 1955 they were incorporated as provinces of metropolitan Portugal.

Despite the abolition of slavery and the efforts of missionaries, conditions in the Portuguese colonies have remained oppressive, arbitrary, and authoritarian. Inequality

⁷⁴African Relief Services Committee, ABC: Angolan Book Campaign, Ottawa: South Africa Information Group, 1973, p. 2.

consistently places the black African at the bottom of the social, political and economic scale at a time when nations talk about world peace and the dignity of man.

Life expectancy for Africans in the colonies is 29 years with an infant mortality rate of 60%. Angola suffers from an illiteracy rate of 99%, while Mozambique has 90% illiteracy in a country where the blacks make up 94.5% of the labour force.⁷⁵

Conditions in the Territories

The most oppressive feature of the Portuguese regime in Africa is the policy of forced labour. Under the Labour Regulation previously mentioned, it is considered the moral and legal obligation of every African to work. If he has no salary, the administration claims the right to conscript him for "public" work. He may then be transported to any province to labour for the government, often on private coffee plantations.

The Portuguese claim that forced labour no longer exists, rather, the labourers are now called "voluntarios". Men who have no proof of employment now volunteer for labour gangs, leaving the plot of land they have traditionally kept, and leaving their family to live in bachelor barracks surrounded by barbed wire.

⁷⁵IDOC, op. cit., p. 7.

Mozambique and Angola maintain close ties with South Africa. By a Mozambique-South Africa treaty, compulsory labour is exportable. As 47.5% of the sea-borne imports into the Transvaal Province pass through the port of Lourenco Marques, Mozambique gives South Africa "recruitment privileges" for up to 100,000 mine workers per year. Under the conditions of the obligatory labour conscription policy, 75% of black Mozambiquans find themselves away from their homeland each year. On arrival in South Africa, they are charged the first three months of their meagre salary for travel, food and accommodation. On return to Mozambique, they are taxed 50% on their salary of the previous six months.⁷⁶ In the end, they are left with only one-half of a yearly salary which was low to begin with.

South Africa produces 90% of the world's supply of gold. It takes 160,000 tons of ore to produce 1 ton of gold, which is an economic absurdity. Such mines in Canada have been closed down because they were unprofitable to operate, but South Africa mines survive because of the mass of cheap labour.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁷⁷Marcelino dos Santos, head of FRELIMO quoted in IDOC--International, New York, October 17, 1970, pp. 12 - 13.

The absence of trade unions and civil liberties ensures low pay which averages 15¢ per day. In Mozambique, a white businessman earns \$1,500 per year; an Indian, \$800; an African who has left all tribal ties ("assimilado"), \$180; and a black, \$45 per year. Average industrial wages show the white earns \$4 per day and the black worker earns 27¢ a day.⁷⁸ According to a report sent to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights by the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, agricultural wages follow a similar structure with whites earning \$1,685 per year; non-whites, \$830; assimilated Africans, \$183; and non-assimilated Africans, \$48.⁷⁹

In Angola and Mozambique, the franchise is a constitutional device, and not granted to all. Prior to 1961, "assimilated" Africans in Portuguese territories did have the vote, but they represented only 1% of the Africans and there were less than 1,000 in Mozambique, so their effect was minimal. To gain the status of an "assimilado" an African had to:

- 1) read, write, and speak Portuguese fluently; 2) have the means to support his family in a Western style; 3) be a law-abiding citizen; 4) be well-educated and westernized; 5) make formal application to Portuguese authorities; 6) carry identification papers with him; and 7) break all ties with his

⁷⁸Lusitanian, June 30, 1973 (Montreal), part 3, p. 12.

⁷⁹International Federation of Free Trade Unions, "Violation of Trade Union Rights", report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, July, 1970.

tribe.⁸⁰ In 1954, the classification of citizenship was made revocable.

The Portuguese colonies also practised a rigid pass system for Africans. Any black who was not classed as an *assimilado*, which meant 99% of the population, was liable to six months labour on the roads unless he had proof of employment the previous year. Upon entry to the United Nations in 1955, contracts for labour were theoretically introduced, although reports emphasize that this was merely a technicality and the old system of forced labour prevailed.⁸¹

Education of the natives was traditionally left to the missionaries. Funds are meagre and illiteracy remains high. Today, schooling is coming more under the control of the state. However, the Mozambique Education Minister was quoted as saying that he did not want educated natives because they have no place to go. Therefore, the system moves very slowly.⁸²

The expropriation of land, the restriction of job opportunities and civil liberties, the attitude of new white immigrants, and police brutality, sparked revolt in Angola in

⁸⁰British Council of Churches, Violence in Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 33.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 46.

⁸²Ibid., p. 49.

1961 and in Mozambique in 1964. The Portuguese economic endeavours showed signs of growing white power and the lessening likelihood of black Africans moving any closer to equality.

The continuing guerrilla tactics necessitated by the vast disparity of power between the natives and the colonials, have brought more repressive measures upon the natives. The Portuguese policy of fighting the resistance has created a system of "aldeamentos" or settlements, by which the civil authorities have obliged the population in guerrilla areas to abandon their villages and settle in selected areas under white control. The settlements are surrounded by barbed wire, cleared of trees, with houses in neat rows to provide for easy surveillance by armed Portuguese. Permission is required to leave and enter the aldeamentos. Villagers resisting the move from their traditionally-held land, face extermination or defoliation of their crops by airplanes. Those continuing to live under such harassment have been facing starvation and genetically-deformed babies as a result of repeated exposure to herbicides.⁸³ The Portuguese argue that the civilians are being moved from the contested areas for their own good.

Resistance

The war in Angola began on February 4th, 1961 when the MPLA (Movimento Popular De Libertacao De Angola) attacked

⁸³Testimony of Fr. Cesare Bertulli (January 29, 1972) reported by Cablo Press, Rome, cited in IDOC, The Future of the Missionary Enterprise, op. cit., p. 9.

the Sao Paulo fortress and police station in Luanda in an attempt to free captured African members. Portuguese reaction to this attack left 3,000 Africans dead on February 5th and 6th.

Disturbances spread to southern areas leaving many tens of thousands of Africans dead or interned in prison camps. The resistance campaign moved back into the jungle where base camps were established to attack coffee plantations and harass Portuguese troops.

There are now three main resistance movements in Angola engaged in guerrilla warfare with the Portuguese. One works in the north with its base in Zaire; a second, from the east, out of Zambia; and a third, in the south of Angola. (See map.)


The MPLA is the strongest Angolan resistance force, headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto, and operates mainly in the central and eastern regions, as well as the economically important sectors of the Cabinda enclave. Of all the groups, the MPLA has made particular efforts to set up schools, health services, and communal farms in the liberated areas as groundwork for future independence.

The FLNA also began the struggle with the MPLA in 1961. Its actions are led by Holden Roberto and concentrate on northern parts of Angola between Luanda, the capital, and the coffee plantation areas of Carmona.


UNITA (National Union For Total Independence of Angola) was founded in 1964 by Jonas Savimba and was ousted from Zambia in 1967 after blowing up a railroad which ferried Zambian goods to export. It now operates entirely within Angola in the south and south-east sectors. As with the other groups, it is united in the face of the enemy but has considerable difficulty reconciling its differences with fellow resistors, a factor which will undoubtedly have considerable effect on any future independent government.

Angolan guerrillas control about one-third of the country while in Mozambique, the two northermost provinces were liberated soon after resistance began there in 1964. A second front was opened up in Tete province in the northwest in an effort to halt construction on the Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambesi River. The dam represents a symbol of white entrenchment as it is destined to be the heart of a massive hydro-electric complex in southern Africa. The expected influx of white settlers following the completion of the dam greatly threatens the security and peace of the thousands of Africans already living in the area.

The resistance of FRELIMO (Frente De Libertacao De Mozambique) began in 1961, but actual attacks against the Portuguese did not begin until 1964 in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nyassa. The movement was led by a former professor at Syracuse University, Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated



The striped areas indicate those parts of Angola which the liberation movement have largely under control



Frelimo's main thrust into Mozambique has originated from the Cabo Delgado area around Mueda and the Niassa district around Vila Cabral to the Tete District, from where they are now striking into and through the narrow stretch between Tete and Rhodesia down towards the Save River. It is believed they are aiming for the railway from Lourenço Marques into Rhodesia.

in 1969.⁸⁴ The movement is currently led by Samora Machel who has directed its expansion into the Cabora Bass dam territory.⁸⁵

A high command communique from Portugal in July of 1973 outlined new successes the Portuguese army was having against the freedom fighters, despite the fact that the latter had opened another front of resistance north of the Pungue River. In the first half of 1973, the Portuguese military had killed 3,004 enemy troops, destroyed 1,831 enemy hideouts, and captured 655 guerrillas. According to the communique, they had carried out 13,897 land operations, 38,566 aerial missions, and airlifted 145,337 troops into the liberated areas.⁸⁶

The size of the rebellion is further illustrated by the background information that Portugal, one of the smallest and poorest countries in Europe, has a military budget of \$566 million which represents from 41%-50% of the total budget.⁸⁷ She has 64,000 troops in Angola, 60,000 in

⁸⁴ Amicar Cabral, the leader of the Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese Guinea on the west coast of Africa north of Angola) resistance, the PAIGC, was also assassinated in 1972, indicating the serious threat the movements represent to the Portuguese.

⁸⁵ Brown, et al., op. cit., pp. 34-37 outline history of all resistance movements in southern Africa.

⁸⁶ South Africa Information Group release, September 14, 1973, Ottawa.

⁸⁷ South Africa Information Group, ABC: Angola Book Campaign, Ottawa: SAIG, 1974, p. 4.

Mozambique, and spent \$8 million for military activity in Guinea-Bissau in 1973. Only 10% of Portugal's total forces is assigned to NATO.⁸⁸ She is continually in debt (44 million contos in 1971) and receives healthy aid grants from western powers. Part of the debt is offset by a military tax on exports from the colonies ranging from 10%-50% depending on the commodity.

Compared to other European countries, Portugal does not lay claim to extensive civil liberties for her own population, but the violation of human rights which native Africans experience at the hands of the Portuguese are atrocities, at best. The international press has quoted many reputable observers as reporting torture, maiming, and massacres on a large scale. Recently, missionaries have left Mozambique because,

...too often certain acts of apostolic ministry, especially those aimed at promoting real social justice, are considered as subversive acts, and that they are often the occasion of painful vexations, or even imprisonment or ill treatment for certain Christian leaders....⁸⁹

Interestingly enough, the leadership of the resistance movements has been strongly tied to Christian teachings. This is most likely due to the fact that education was in the hands

⁸⁸ Brown, op. cit., p. 10.

⁸⁹ IDOC, The Future of the Missionary Enterprise, op. cit., p. 15.

of missionaries for a long time, and probably also explains why the state is concerned with gaining more control over the education of the Africans.

World attention has gradually turned to recognize, at least verbally, the immorality of the regimes in southern Africa. The independent nations of Africa, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations have become more openly opposed to the continuation of the situation. To many oppressed Africans, the most heartening sign has been the increasing activity of the Organization of African Unity in their behalf which has established a Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

The recent overthrow of the Portuguese government in Lisbon indicates significant discontent on the part of the Iberian Portuguese with the continuation of colonial policies. However, only time will tell whether the same discontent has existed for those Portuguese who immigrated to or were born in Africa.

In the final analysis, one can only expect that the forces opposing white racism in southern Africa will prevail. In the words of Amicar Cabral, the slain resistance leader in Guinea-Bissau,

We are strongly in solidarity with every just struggle in the world. We are reinforced by the support of others. Our forces become stronger each day, because our strength is the strength of justice, progress and history; and justice, progress and history belong to the people.⁹⁰

⁹⁰Amicar Cabral, quoted on a South Africa Information Group poster, Thirteen Years of Struggle, 1974.

Chapter III

CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

National

The Canadian Government made an extensive review of Canada's international relations, policies and operations in the first years of Pierre Trudeau's Prime Ministership. The series of papers, published in June, 1970, examined foreign policy in terms of basic national interest, made conclusions on past policies' effectiveness, identified areas where change was required and made suggestions for the future directions of the decision-makers.

The papers, entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians, stated the basic national aim "that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contributions they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose".⁹¹ More specifically, "Canada's foreign policy, like all national policy, derives its content and validity from the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic aims".⁹²

⁹¹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 10.

⁹²Ibid., p. 11.

With the national interests and basic aims in mind, the Government established a framework for the consideration of policy to be used as a guide both to the Canadian decision-makers and to the governments of other countries in their relationships with Canada.

The researchers determined that there were six general themes under which activities to promote Canadians' interests could be classified. They were:

- fostering economic growth;
- safeguarding sovereignty and independence;
- working for peace and security;
- promoting social justice;
- enhancing the quality of life; and
- ensuring a harmonious natural environment.

The shape of foreign policy at any given time would be determined by the pattern of emphasis the Government gave to the six policy themes.⁹³

The Government was aware that various sectors of the Canadian society placed emphasis on different themes, but the papers pointed out that, in addition to the necessary value judgements, considerations of opportunity, constraints, and resources presented by the international and/or domestic situation at a particular time would be prime determining factors in the policy choice.

⁹³Ibid., p. 14.

On the basis of the foreign policy review and an assessment of its effectiveness, the Government decided that more emphasis should be given to economic growth, social justice, and the quality of life policies.⁹⁴ It was made clear that such stress was not to indicate a neglect of the other themes, as all were considered to be essential ingredients of national policy engaging the Government's attention at all times.

Giving prominence to economic growth arose from the Government's concern for the areas of chronic under-development in Canada. Economic growth was judged to be the only answer to removing regional disparities and offering a decent and rewarding life to all citizens.

The fulfillment of that national goal meant that Canada would work for the good health of the international trading community. In a speech delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the University of Toronto on September 18, 1970, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp emphasized this point, stating that Canada's economic well-being, and that of all developing countries, depended on a buoyant world market.⁹⁵ Considerable efforts would be devoted by Canadian officials to that end.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 32.

⁹⁵Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Third World", Statements and Speeches, No. 70/12, 1970, p. 6.

The policy themes can and have come into conflict from time to time. There are a considerable number of Canadians who are concerned that the emphasis on economic development will be pursued at the expense of the more abstract and nebulous principles of social justice.

The situation in Southern Africa is a prime example of conflicting policy thrusts. It has been suggested that Canada should cut off trade with South Africa, for example, because it practices apartheid. Similarly, the suggestion has been made that economic relations with Portugal and her African territories be restricted severely because of similar racist policies that country conducts within its "overseas provinces". With the exception of sanctions approved by the United Nations, the official Canadian policy is to continue trading with all nations, even those of whose policies she disapproves.

In a radio interview programme called "As It Happens", on May, 1973, Mr. Sharp stated the Government's belief that if Canada were to begin trading on ideological grounds or on the grounds of personal views of the political attitudes of challenging governments, she would be injecting into trade a political element which was very desirable to avoid.⁹⁶

⁹⁶Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs in a radio interview "As It Happens" (CBC-Toronto) May, 1973. See Appendix for complete transcript.

According to Alan McGill, Director-General of the African and Middle Eastern Affairs Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Sharp's view of trading envisages a system without blocs or clubs, multilateral in nature, unhindered by politics, and completely neutral. He further suggests that the Minister for External Affairs calculates that such a system would be in the best interests of Canadians, and therefore, seeks a wide variety of trading partners for Canada while at the same time working against tendencies to "bloc".⁹⁷

Mr. Sharp reiterated those sentiments when he said, I think of all the countries around the world where there is internal trouble. Where would you trade if you were going to look at the ideology of the goods that are being produced? Very few places....If I had to determine whether we'd have diplomatic relations on the basis of whether we liked the governments or not, I'm afraid personally I would recommend against a great many. But we have to deal with facts, and the facts are what we try to look at when we're dealing politically, and in trade matters we try to avoid any politics whatever. It leads absolutely nowhere except to chaos.⁹⁸

The unspoken anxiety appears to be the possibility of political considerations being turned against Canada, herself. In an interview with Charles Marshall, the Director-General of the Defence Relations Bureau of External Affairs, the policy

⁹⁷Alan McGill, Director-General of the Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of External Affairs, in a personal interview with the author, February 5, 1974.

⁹⁸Sharp, "As It Happens", op. cit.

of non-political trade is a case of having one's cake and eating it too, depending on one's point of view. In Canadian terms he continues, economic priorities could work for either maximizing economic benefit, or moral priorities. The issue is not really a matter of black and white, but rather a case of alternative thrusts. Not only is it human nature to find compromise and balance, but it would be difficult and unwise to take either extreme position. Mr. Marshall illustrated the point quite clearly when he said,

...There is no other recourse if other people follow a policy of ideologically-based trade, but it helps diplomacy to be able to claim that we have been dealing unpolitically and request reciprocation. Morality is for those who are free to moralize with impunity.⁹⁹

Canada's official attitude towards the domestic programme of the governments of southern Africa are quite clear. Canadian representatives have joined other countries in condemning repeatedly and whole-heartedly the racial policies of the white minorities in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Such terms as abhorrence, debasement, indignity, and poison are only a few of the ways Canada has expressed her feelings on the matter.

At the outset of this research, the author had one basic difficulty in understanding Canadian foreign policy.

⁹⁹Charles Marshall, Director-General, Defence Relations Bureau, Department of External Affairs, in a personal interview, February 7, 1974.

The problem was created by Canada's practice of continuing to trade with all countries, regardless of her personal attitudes. The question was put to Director-General McGill, "What is the credibility of a policy which does not back up its strong condemnation and abhorrence of racial discrimination with action? In other words, what influence can Canada expect to have in changing the policies of racial discrimination when that influence is limited to words and is not supported by anything more substantial, especially in light of the fact that such policies can only benefit the racist governments? When does condemnation become meaningful?" His reply was that Canada, by itself, could have no influence either way. He suggested that it might be better to assess what might have been the effects if Canada had severed relations with southern Africa--how much worse might things have been if Canada hadn't maintained contact?

What, in practice, can we do? This policy applies to most cases. Unfortunately, only the problems of continued relations are obvious. We are really looking for a general policy rather than a specific one because it is difficult to establish a criterion for judging individual cases.¹⁰⁰

Nor is it the policy of the Government to advise private business where they may or may not invest their money or seek trading partners. The decision as to whether or not to invest

¹⁰⁰McGill, interview February 5, 1974, op. cit.

is regarded by the policy-makers as the responsibility of the Board of Directors of individual companies.¹⁰¹ Mr. Sharp has pointed out that if people, in their personal lives, want to use ideology in their trading practices, the Canadian Government has no objections whatever because it is a personal matter. But when it comes to the Government of Canada, the belief is that it is better to avoid politics in trade.¹⁰²

The extent to which the Government has become involved in the issue of Canadian companies in southern Africa has been positive, although limited. The Government has urged such investors to treat their employees in southern Africa in ways which Canadians would approve, but to do it within the prevailing legal framework. The official advocations have been unspecific, and if changes are brought about by investors, they are as often for public relations reasons as for broader, moral considerations.

Mitchell Sharp has referred to Canada as an "outward-looking, developed, Western country with a positive view of its international responsibilities", but existing in an emerging world order which "presents both opportunities and problems".¹⁰³ The desire to participate increasingly in the

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Sharp, "As It Happens", op. cit.

¹⁰³Mitchell Sharp, "Some Aspects of the World Where Canada Works and Trades", Statements and Speeches, No. 72/11, 1972, p. 2.

progress of developing nations does not always mesh with the other stated broad thrust of pursuing a "comprehensive, long-term strategy to strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability."¹⁰⁴ The overriding problem "of how to avoid isolation in a world increasingly divided into trading blocs"¹⁰⁵ appears to be one which gains the serious consideration of policy-makers in Canada.

Perhaps the best way to sum up the official attitude towards Canadian foreign policy decision-making is found in a very recent statement by Mitchell Sharp when he addressed the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in March, 1974. He pointed out that in both bilateral and multilateral matters Canadians could expect a period of negotiation and adjustment over a wide range of foreign policy issues which would require careful handling. The undercurrent of such methodical attitudes was the perception of "a continuing need to select our policies on their own merits in an unemotional, business-like and positive fashion".¹⁰⁶

In Foreign Policy for Canadians, the Government states that it has "selected the taking into accounts of forecasts and very obvious restraints as a main determinant of its choice

¹⁰⁵Sharp, "Some Aspects of the World...", op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁰⁶Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations", Statements and Speeches, No. 74/6, 1974, p. 7.

of policy emphasis. It will be desirable to assign more weight to forecasts when considering relatively short-term programmes rather than when setting broad policy."¹⁰⁷ The problems presented by the conditions in southern Africa are considered by Canadian officials specific and, hence, require short-term programmes. It will be interesting to note how the moral issues will fare in an unemotional, methodical, and business-like atmosphere.

Multinational

Commonwealth

The Commonwealth, formerly called the British Commonwealth and the British Empire, provided the first relationship between Canada and South Africa. The member states of the body were previously integral parts of the United Kingdom's imperial empire. Until 1925, the British Colonial office was responsible for all the territories except India. In that same year, a new post was created of Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs which had the duty of overseeing the self-governing Dominions, comprised of Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and South Africa, in addition to the self-governing territory of Southern Rhodesia, and the South African High Commission

¹⁰⁷Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, op. cit., p. 18.

Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster gave statutory force to the Dominion's autonomous and equal status, establishing them as freely associated with the British Commonwealth of Nations, and united by common allegiance to the Crown.¹⁰⁸

Canada had an early history of active involvement in the affairs of the British Commonwealth, an involvement which was to increase with the passing decades. With the outbreak of the Second World War, it became imperative that Canada have closer ties with other governments. The day after her declaration of war on September 10, 1939, it was announced that Canada would send high commissioners to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. The move was reciprocated.

Partly as a result of her successful war effort, and the movement towards independence of the British colonies which came out of the developments of the war, Canada found herself a member of an expanding and evolving Commonwealth. Following the decision of India to remain within the union and yet become a republic, the nature of, and the role of the monarch within it, was redefined. This new definition enabled numerous states to continue their membership without having strict rules enforced on them regarding their internal constitutions.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Florence Elliott, A Dictionary of Politics (7th edition), Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973, p. 63.

¹⁰⁹ Canada, Department of External Affairs, "The Commonwealth", Reference Papers, No. 95, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1973, p. 5.

During the 1960's, the membership of the Commonwealth increased greatly as almost all the countries of Africa became independent and the former British colonies decided to remain within the Commonwealth. This development affirmed the non-racial character of the association, a point which was most significantly registered at the Prime Ministers' meeting in London in March, 1961. The conference was the occasion chosen by Prime Minister Verwoerd of South Africa for that country's formal application for continued membership in the Commonwealth as a republic. The application as it turned out, was no mere formality.

The official Canadian view states that the Commonwealth representatives discussed, with the assent of the South African leader, racial policies within that country.

Such a great number of representatives expressed their disapproval of the principles of apartheid contained in the new constitution of South Africa that the South African Prime Minister decided to reassess his Government's desire to remain with the Commonwealth....¹¹⁰

A South African historian relates the episode as an opportunity having been

...seized upon by the Non-White members of the Commonwealth, aided by the Prime Minister of Canada, to criticize South Africa's internal policy and to place so many obstacles in Verwoerd's way that he withdrew South Africa's application for membership.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹¹ W.J. deKock, History of South Africa, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971, pp. 49-50.

The principle of racial equality has been reaffirmed repeatedly by the 32 Commonwealth members, both unilaterally and in joint communiques from the Prime Ministers' conferences. It assumes a most conspicuous place in the Commonwealth Declaration at the Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in January, 1971.

The statement of common principles affirmed the belief in:

...the United Nations and its efforts to promote international peace and order; the liberty of the individual and each citizen's unalienable right to participate in framing the society in which we may live; the principles of human dignity and equality and the inequities of colonial domination and racial oppression; the need for the progressive removal of disparities in wealth existing between different sections of mankind; and the value of the Commonwealth as a most useful means to promote international co-operation.¹¹²

Specifically on the issues of racism, the members recognized

...racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the healthy development of the human race and racial discrimination as an unmitigated evil of societyNo country will afford to regimes which practise racial discrimination assistance which in its own judgement directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy. We oppose all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression and are committed to the principles of human dignity and equality. We will therefore use all our efforts to foster human equality and dignity everywhere and to further the principles of self-determination and non-racialism.¹¹³

¹¹²Canada, Department of External Affairs, "The Commonwealth", op. cit., p. 1.

¹¹³Ibid.,

Individually, Canada has been at the forefront of the Commonwealth members in condemning racist policies in southern Africa, mentioning them specifically and referring to them in a more abstract manner. In a press conference held by Prime Minister Trudeau at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Singapore, January 1971, he commented on

the moral indignity, the moral abomination, of racial discrimination, which debases not only the states who practise it but those individuals who have it in their hearts. It poisons the relations between human beings. It makes peace in the world a less possible matter, a less possible eventuality.¹¹⁴

His statement came at a time when the Commonwealth meeting had been marked by acrimonious and protracted debate, chiefly over the question of the British sale of arms to South Africa. The arming of South Africa, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the safety of navigation in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, was, for some Commonwealth members, a direct threat to the already oppressed non-white peoples in that country.

Despite his condemnation of racism, Prime Minister Trudeau was quick to point out that the issues had to be considered within the long-term scenario of Africa.

...if, to ensure the security of the sea lanes, we encourage the British to take steps which make the assurance of Communist penetration of Africa even greater, then we have perhaps not gained much....And if, while we're arguing this short-term immediate question, we permit circumstances to develop which could end up so that...

¹¹⁴ Pierre Trudeau, "The Situation in Southern Africa", Statements and Speeches, No. 71/3, 1971, p. 2.

we have another mid-East situation on our hands --, then not only will that be disastrous for Africa, but I submit it will be disastrous for the world.

A bloody racial war in Africa could leave nobody unconcerned.¹¹⁵

As regards Namibia, Canada formally notified South Africa in 1971 that it concurred with the International Court of Justice decision that South African occupation of that territory was illegal. On public support for self-determination in Namibia, Canada joined other Commonwealth members in a joint communique following the Heads of Government Meeting held in Ottawa in August, 1973, in recognizing "the legitimacy of the struggle to win full human rights and self-determination" in South Africa. Though the Canadian Government sees difficulty in dissuading Canadian companies from investing in particular countries, it does warn them of the legal position and the unavailability of Canadian Government assistance or protection in Namibia. All such activities are seen by the Department of External Affairs as attempting to balance the themes of social justice and economic growth.

The problem appears not to be a disagreement over goals, but a question of the means of attaining those goals. Racial tension in Southern Africa has more than once threatened the survival of the Commonwealth. The free nations of Africa have used many forums to passionately urge stronger measure to bring

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 1.

down the white minority regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese African territories. Generally, they have been less than satisfied with the response.

Beyond the moral considerations of continued relations with racist regimes, Pierre Trudeau cited still another problem of "urban guerillas". He states,

We know they can, and probably will, some day upset peace in South Africa. And, if we are on the wrong side, they could also upset peace in our countries. And to this extent we're very concerned with any part of the world where peace can be upset and have consequences on the rest of humanity.¹¹⁶

When asked whether Commonwealth connections had any effect on Canadian decision-making in the matter of southern Africa, Mr. McGill suggested that it was of considerable influence. Even though it is not much of a trading block, it was useful, he said, in matters of culture, peace and security, though in a mystical way. Furthermore, he pointed out, the British influence had been significant, and Canada has often been in British disfavour over her less sympathetic attitude towards South Africa, particularly at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference in 1971.

In the long run, however, the likelihood of a changed Canadian response to the problem of racism is illustrated by Marcel Cadieux, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, when he spoke to the International Relations Club in Seattle of "the

¹¹⁶Trudeau, "The Situation in Southern Africa", op. cit., p. 3.

very real problems and uncertainties that have led to a more cautious approach by such countries as Britain and Canada."¹¹⁷

In fact, the Declaration which came out of the Singapore Commonwealth meeting in 1971 proclaimed the rejection of coercion as an instrument of policy, seemingly precluding the use of boycotts, embargoes, etc. as a foreign policy tactic.¹¹⁸ The question was more pointedly put by Mr. McGill of the Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs when he asked what was to prevent a country from using such tactics against Canada if Canada used them on others.

Indeed, the Commonwealth is a unique organization. It is a reflection of its 32 members, and of their desire to understand and co-operate with each other. There is no voting, no constitution or flag. It is neither regional nor limited to specific issues for consideration. At the most recent of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings in Ottawa, 1973, Prime Minister Trudeau referred to the organism as a "window on the world" whose importance over the years would grow because it was founded with no specific role other than to emphasize the value of the human relationship.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Marcel Cadieux, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, "The Commonwealth", Statements and Speeches, No. 73/27, 1973, p. 3.

¹¹⁸Canada, Department of External Affairs, "The Commonwealth", Reference Papers, No. 95, Appendix C, p. 2.

¹¹⁹Pierre Trudeau, "The Commonwealth - An Association Unstructured and Unfettered", Statements and Speeches, No. 73/25, 1973, p. 3.

Despite the great variety, diversity, and dissimilarity of the Commonwealth membership, the identification of racism as an evil is common to all. The means to the eradication of that problem are often disputed, and although Canada has been a worthy opponent of racism, per se, in official statements, she has been a cautious adversary in practice. Without aligning herself to a pro-racist stand, there appears to be other considerations which have taken a paramount position in the large list of priorities being considered by Canadian foreign policy decision-makers. Hopefully, this research will be able to uncover those priorities.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO was set up by the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, between the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization (Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), and Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the United States. The treaty linked the two North American powers to a group of European states in a military defence alliance by which the signatories declared a determination "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".¹²⁰ Since its inception,

¹²⁰NATO, NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971, p. 270.

the German Federal Republic, Greece, and Turkey have joined the organization, and in March, 1966 France withdrew from the military side of NATO.

The union was inspired by the west European fear of the U.S.S.R. and by a general disappointment in the United Nations which was, at that time, severely limited in its activity by the frequent use of the Russian veto in the Security Council. The North Atlantic Alliance was seen as an alternative method of dealing with threats to the peace, and aggression, but has since expanded into areas of political consultation, and economic, scientific and cultural co-operation.

The Atlantic Alliance unites fifteen of the most productive countries in the world. Whilst living standards vary within NATO, the income level per head averages twice that of the European Communist countries and is more than three times the world average.

NATO, with a total population of almost 540 million people, represents about 15% of the world population of 3.6 billion, but accounts for more than half of the world's gross national product.

The countries of NATO produce:

- about 58% of the world's electricity.
- 49% of the world's steel.
- 75% of the world's automobiles.

NATO's fifteen nations provide more than 56% of world trade. 85% of aid to developing countries comes from members of the Alliance.

Over the last ten years economic growth among NATO countries has been developing at an average of 4.3% a year.¹²¹

¹²¹Ibid., inside back-cover.

Canada's relationship to NATO has been spelled out by government officials on numerous occasions. The manner in which the organization relates to foreign policy decision-making regarding southern Africa, however, is a little more elusive. The recent reviews of Canadian foreign and defence policies brought the Government to conclude that "defence policy should flow from foreign policy and that both should be designed to serve Canadian interest."¹²² As those interests and priorities were elaborated in the foreign policy review, Foreign Policy for Canadians, one might logically expect that the stated attitude towards the issue of Canadian relations with southern Africa would be repeated in her NATO programs.

The purposes of NATO, as Canada sees them, are security by deterrence, and the pursuit of detente between East and Western power blocs. As far as the Department of External Affairs is concerned, despite considerable progress towards detente, the members of the alliance remain convinced that "pending more substantive achievements in the field of disarmament or the establishment of an effective world collective security system, their individual interests are best served by their common commitment to mutual assistance under the North Atlantic Treaty."¹²³

¹²² Mitchell Sharp, "NATO: How It Serves Canadian Interests", Statements and Speeches, No. 73/12, 1973, p. 1.

¹²³ Mitchell Sharp, "The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of NATO", Statements and Speeches, No. 74/4, 1974, p. 1.

It is interesting to note at this time that the late Lester B. Pearson was a primary advocate of expanding the purely military function originally envisaged for NATO. Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty emphasized the desirability of greater co-operation and consultation in non-military fields. It stated that the signatories "will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." In fact, Canada has used many opportunities in her NATO contacts, to express her views on the continued colonial policies of the Portuguese. Says Mr. Sharp, "I've made these representations directly to the Portuguese Foreign Minister and our representatives have been instructed, of course, to take this position on any public occasions."¹²⁴

He further states,

I meet the Portuguese Foreign Minister nearly every six months at NATO meetings and I have an opportunity of talking to him about their colonial policies. I do not agree with them. I've told him that we consider that these are obsolete policies and that they should be changed. But you must remember what Portugal says. Portugal says these are not colonies. Portugal says these are part of Portugal. This is the line they take. We don't agree with it, but that's what they say.¹²⁵

¹²⁴Mitchell Sharp, in a radio interview on "As It Happens", (CBS - Toronto), May, 1973.

¹²⁵Ibid.

Canadian views are transmitted a minimum of twice a year at the NATO Foreign Ministers meetings in December and in the spring. Mr. Sharp's practice at these meetings is to raise the continuing Canadian concern over Portuguese policies. Concern is not officially transmitted through the bureaucracy, however, because it is not considered in Canada's best interest to disrupt other affairs too frequently.¹²⁶

On a more active basis, Canada has prohibited the sale of any military arms or equipment which could be used in the Portuguese African territories. In fact, Canada has not sold arms to Portugal since the Security Council Resolution in 1963, although very limited quantities of aircraft spare parts have been exported. "But in this case", states African Bureau Chief, Alan McGill, "we have received assurances that such spare parts will not be used in Africa."¹²⁷

Mr. Sharp, the Canadian Foreign Minister, reiterated that stand when he said,

We do not have any trade in arms with Portugal that affects their colonial policies. Indeed we have on many occasions asked for any evidence that Portugal was using arms which they received as a member of NATO, from Canada in Africa, and

¹²⁶Charles Marshall, Director-General, Defence Relations Bureau, Department of External Affairs, in a personal interview, February 7, 1974.

¹²⁷Alan McGill, Director-General, Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of External Affairs, in personal correspondence to the author, December 17, 1973.

so far no one has even produced any of this evidence that was satisfactory to us. Because if they did, of course, we would reconsider even the very minor sales that we now make.¹²⁸

The actuality of an arms embargo does not exclude the possibility of selling arms if assurances as to their use could be verified. There are three categories for the classification of military materials: 1) arms; 2) military equipment - which is accompanied by the proviso that there will be no transfer to a third party without Canadian approval; and, 3) multi-purpose - which could be used by the military, but is not manufactured specifically for that use. Canada observes a group 1 (arms) embargo and a partial group 2 (military equipment) embargo, although some of the equipment might find its way into Africa as a result of further sales beyond the third party stage, a factor over which Canada has very limited control.

When sales are made, they are handled either privately or by the Crown. Somebody in Portugal can approach a business in Canada, but if an export permit is required, the Government gets involved. There are no arms passing from Canada through NATO to Portugal, as arms are nationally-tied. Members have the option of bilateral arrangements, but the economic justification for aid is diminishing. A collective policy exists

¹²⁸Sharp, "As It Happens", radio interview, op. cit.

on East-West relations, and mutual and balanced force reductions, but on other issues, the members make independent arrangements.

The Directors-General for African and Middle Eastern Affairs, and the Defence Relations Bureau had differing opinions as to the influence membership in NATO had on Canadian foreign policy decision-making concerning southern Africa. Alan McGill felt that the relationship had an insignificant effect on the situation, as NATO considered procedural and tactical questions. Charles Marshall, from the Defence Bureau, saw some very important strategical questions to be considered. In particular, the Azores Islands provided a unique staging stop for planes coming into the Mediterranean. As Portuguese territories, he judged that they had an effect on our policy. On the question, he said,

In general, we must look at the alliance as a whole and balance our aims with our needs. One must avoid gumming up the machinery. Our problem is shared with the Dutch, the Danes, and the Norwegians regarding Portugal. We must also determine in whose long-term interests it is to act, and in what way - essentially the balance between long-term and short-term results.¹²⁹

In addition to claiming the sanctity of domestic jurisdiction, from time to time the Portuguese and white South Africans have promoted themselves as the only Bulwarks against

¹²⁹Charles Marshall, personal interview, op. cit.

Communism on the African continent, thereby "strengthening" the rightness of their supremacy in their respective territories. I asked Mr. Marshall how credible the claim was, and how much effect he thought it had on Canadian policy-making in our relations with those countries. His reply was that it had no influence at all. In fact, he did not even concern himself with the truth of the claims, and suggested, instead, that Communism was not a threat to put countries "down the drain", and that an anti-Communist crusade was not, and is not, a number-one priority for Canada. He saw the role of government in this case as having to take the courage of its convictions by not responding unstably to public concerns on this issue.

The non-military contacts permitted by Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty have been used frequently by Canadian officials to express disapproval of Portuguese colonial policies; however, there are other factors which undoubtedly contribute to Canada's cautious attitude towards stronger opposition. Firstly, the major function of NATO is defence. "For a country of Canada's size and geographical location, membership in the alliance provides a high degree of security, considered a necessity, at a relatively low cost in terms of resources devoted to defence."¹³⁰

¹³⁰Sharp, "NATO: How It Serves Canadian Interests", op. cit., p. 2.

Secondly, participation in NATO means a strengthening of relations with the other countries in Western Europe. Not only does Canada have extra advantages in NATO-related trade, such as in satellite communications materials, but Western European trade in general affects her basic philosophical approach to the area. Total trade between Canada and the European Community amounted in 1972 to \$4.6 billion. Canadian exports to the Community in 1972 were \$2.5 billion, and for the first six months of 1973 they showed an increase of 14%, making it by far Canada's second largest trading partner.¹³¹

The expanding relationship with Europe, which is an essential feature of the Government's policy to diversify, is undoubtedly a significant factor in considering Canadian actions towards Portugal on the matter of her colonial practices.

The Defence Relations Chief put the final word on Canadian Policy when he said that Canada stays in alliances with groups like the Portuguese and the Greeks because, in so doing, she can use her capacity to influence, to kill two birds with one stone. The second "bird", so to speak, is that oft-repeated worry,

What's to stop other countries from exerting pressure on us? There is an international gentleman's agreement to keep out of other countries' internal affairs. Consider what position Canada would have been in with the October Crisis if NATO had been used to put on

¹³¹Mitchell Sharp, "Canada and the European Community", Statements and Speeches, No. 73/29 (corrected), 1973.

pressure. If we exert pressure on others, we have to live with the consequences of such pressure in reverse.¹³²

Though the parallel between the October Crisis and racism and colonialism is debatable, for NATO, the problem appears to be not a matter of a principle surviving in a business-like, unemotional atmosphere, as with the Commonwealth, rather it is a situation where people in glass houses should not throw stones.

The United Nations

The question of apartheid and racial discrimination has been discussed in the United Nations since 1946. Since 1962, the General Assembly has repeatedly adopted resolutions recommending that members take specific action against the Governments of the countries concerned. The resolutions since 1965 have condemned the policies of apartheid as a "crime against humanity".

The Charter of the United Nations has been invoked many times by both sides of the debate in defence of respective cases. In the general statement of principles at the beginning of the Charter, the members reaffirmed their faith in "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small". Chapter I, Article (2) lay down one of the purposes

¹³²Marshall, personal interview, op. cit.

and principles of the United Nations to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace", further, to "achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".¹³³

It is interesting to note that the principles of equal rights and self-determination were equated with universal peace. The implication was that racial discrimination and continuing colonialism were international problems requiring the co-operative efforts of all nations to be finally resolved.

This argument has been used repeatedly by U.N. members introducing resolutions opposing the discriminatory policies in southern Africa, even to the point of using Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter which deals with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The logic introduced by those in opposition to apartheid or apartheid-like programmes is that a perpetuation of discriminatory practices based on race is a violation of fundamental human rights and that such a continuation presents a threat to international peace.

¹³³United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, New York: U.N. Information.

Chapter VII gives the Security Council the right to determine the existence of any threat or act of aggression as well as the power to determine whatever action is required to end that threat.

For the most part, the objects of anti-racism resolutions in the General Assembly are South Africa and Portugal. Their major defence in the face of the opposition is to invoke Article 2(7) which reads,

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

One might rightly suspect that the time and energy expended on the numerous anti-apartheid resolutions indicates their lack of success to date. At the crux of this problem is the battle between what constitutes domestic jurisdiction and international concern. Those advocating the sanctity of domestic affairs in the debate, namely South Africa and Portugal, claim that the social policies conducted by a state are internal matters, and thereby, beyond the legal consideration of other states or international bodies.

Even beyond this assertion, has been the insistence on the part of colonial powers that the Charter's identification of colonialism as a major international problem did not imply

that the principle of sovereignty, held so sacred by the United Nations (Article 2(1), should be diminished.

Still another response of the colonial powers to the negative pressure has been the "integrationist line", or the Portuguese Thesis, which claims that certain overseas possessions of European states, having been formally incorporated into the metropolitan body, are not to be regarded as colonies. In fact, the thesis concedes the illegitimacy of colonialism not by claiming sovereignty over the territories, but by denying that they are colonies.¹³⁴

There was a time with the Covenant of the League of Nations when the problem of domestic jurisdiction seemed fairly simple. The Permanent Court of International Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (1923), stated that acceptance by a state of treaty obligations relating to a given subject had the effect of removing that subject from the purely domestic domain.¹³⁵

The question is not so easily resolved in the United Nations, however, and few, if any, subjects have been caught on the horns of this dilemma as the issue of apartheid. Inis Claude Jr. suggests that "lawyers so dispassionate as to be

¹³⁴For a more complete analysis of the Colonial arguments see U.N. Documents, Unit on Apartheid, and Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (fourth edition), New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 349-377.

¹³⁵Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco..., Advisory Opinion No. 4, February 7, 1923, Hudson, World Court Reports, I, pp. 143-162, cited in Claude, ibid., p. 182.

not of this world would have a hard time deciding individually or agreeing collectively on the abstract meaning or practical application of the Charter's jurisdiction".¹³⁶

Claude goes on to suggest that the precise legal meaning of the jurisdictional text is not only a hopeless enterprise, but essentially an irrelevant one because the question of the relationship between the international organization and its member states is preeminently of a political nature, rather than a strictly legal - constitutional matter.¹³⁷

The enlargement of the subject matter considered by the United Nations was foreshadowed by the comprehensiveness of the functional range of the original constitutional documents.

Governments do not create an organization with an Economic and Social Council if they wish to exclude international consideration of economic and social problems; they do not ratify a Charter containing a Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories if they are convinced that colonial policy is purely a domestic concern of imperial powers; they do not commit themselves to a collaborative effort to promote the universal enjoyment of human rights if they adhere to the belief that every state has the sovereign right to treat its citizens as arbitrarily as it pleases.¹³⁸

Claude refers to this effort to realize the ideal purposes of the Charter as a sort of politicalism, in the

¹³⁶ Claude, op. cit., p. 183.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 184.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

best sense, "which looks to the future to find opportunities for creative adaptation", as opposed to "the kind of legalism which looks to the past to find permission for whatever activities might be contemplated".¹³⁹ This trend has resulted in various organs of the U.N. asserting their competence to deal with virtually any matter presented to them.

Numerous resolutions have been introduced to the General Assembly over the years--far too many to mention in detail. It is possible to note a few, however, to indicate the process by which colonialism, racial discrimination, and apartheid have been handled in the United Nations.

In 1952, thirteen Afro-Asian states requested that the question of race conflict in South Africa be put on the agenda of the General Assembly as it was considered to be a threat to international peace and a violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedom. South Africa responded with Article 2(7) claiming that even a discussion of her internal situation was beyond the competency of the Assembly. The above was repeated frequently.

The Sharpville incident of 1960 brought the South African circumstances before the Security Council for the first time. The resolution which came out of that session recognized that the situation in the Union of South Africa was one that had led

¹³⁹Ibid.

to international friction and if continued, might endanger international peace and security. It called upon the South African authorities to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony and equality in order to ensure that the present situation did not recur and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination.¹⁴⁰ Of the eleven Council members, nine voted for the adoption, with France and the United Kingdom abstaining.

In 1961, the Secretary-General visited South Africa but reported that nothing satisfactory was negotiated on the matter. The Security Council reiterated the pleas of 1960. 1962 saw the General Assembly requesting members to end diplomatic relations with South Africa, to close their ports and air space to her ships and aircraft, and to impose an embargo on trade. Canada voted against the resolution along with South Africa's other major trading partners including Britain, the United States, France, Australia and Belgium.

In 1963, however, the Security Council called on all states to cease the sale of arms and all military hardware to the Republic. A report issued by a sub-committee of the Security Council the following year recommended the use of mandatory economic sanctions, but it also made note of the fact that South Africa's major trading partners were opposed

¹⁴⁰United Nations, Unit on Apartheid, "Security Council Resolutions on Apartheid", Notes and Documents, No. 2470, Oct., 1970, New York: United Nations, p. 1.

to any program of economic restraints, thereby nullifying any effect the boycott might have.

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of the General Assembly resolutions, the spirit of concern has remained strong. On October 26, 1966 the Unit on Apartheid was established in the U.N. Secretariat in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2144(XXI). Its purpose was to deal exclusively with the policies of apartheid, and to aid international efforts to abolish it.

Part of those efforts involve the establishment of conventions, the most recent being the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1973.¹⁴¹ The substantive part of the Convention is found in Articles I and II in which apartheid is described as a punishable criminal act, stressing that the acts violate the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constitute a threat to international peace and security. The convention goes on to list precisely the acts involved in apartheid programs, and deals additionally with questions of implementation and responsibility under international law.

The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid is the most recent addition

¹⁴¹The text of the convention may be found in Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 22/73.

to a system of international law relating to the suppression and punishment of violations of human rights and freedoms which has developed over the years since the inception of the United Nations. Beginning with the Preamble and Articles of the Charter, the principles of equal rights for all without distinction as to race were enunciated. The Charter, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, provided the basis for the elaboration of all provisions in the Convention. Since then, the principles have been developed in numerous declarations, and in this connection, from the standpoint of international law, the racism practised by the Governments of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal is qualified as an international crime.

The response of the International Court of Justice in the Hague to Colonial questions in general, and to the South African situation in particular have not served to resolve the jurisdictional dilemma. In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against South Africa in the IJC over the presence of that Government in South West Africa. Their case was that the United Nations had inherited the supervisory functions of the League of Nations in regard to the mandate over South West Africa, and, furthermore, that South Africa had failed to promote the well-being of the inhabitants, both allegations of which the South African Government denied. The Court found

in 1966 that the applicant states had not established their legal right pertaining to the subject-matter of their claims, and therefore made no decision.

The General Assembly then adopted a resolution by a large majority of 114 to 2 with 3 abstentions on October 27, 1966, terminating South Africa's mandate over South West Africa. Canada voted in favour of the resolution which also recognized the right of the people of South West Africa (Namibia) to self-determination, freedom, and independence.

Canada was a member of the Security Council on March 14, 1968 when the Council voted for strong censure of South Africa for the trial of thirty-seven Namibian political leaders who had been arrested under the Terrorism Act of 1967 which had been made retroactive to 1962.

More resolutions intervened dealing with censure, condemnation, and recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination. Then, in 1971, the International Court of Justice responded to a legal question put by the Security Council. It found that "South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory". It further advised that U.N. members were under an obligation to "recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the government of South Africa

International Agreements
on Human Rights*

- 1945 United Nations Charter
- 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
 of Genocide.
- 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
 Countries and Peoples
- 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
 Discrimination
- 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
 Rights
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
 Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
- 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and
 Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

*Source: United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Unit on Apartheid, "Study of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid", Notes and Documents, No. 3/74, 1974.

implying...recognition...or lending assistance (to its administration)".¹⁴²

Following the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971, Canada sent a note to the Government of South Africa which stated that Canada supported the IJC view that the South African presence in Namibia was illegal. Consequently Canadians who wish to travel or invest in Namibia do so at their own risk since Canada has no diplomatic, consular or commercial facilities in Namibia.

In all cases, South Africa has rejected the U.N. actions as being unconstitutional and contrary to international law. Conditions in that part of the African continent are unchanged, and resolutions from the General Assembly are still forthcoming, although the Security Council has decided to discontinue contacts with South Africa over the future of Namibia.

United Nations' pronouncements on colonialism and racism in South Africa have had a generalized effect on the situation in the Portuguese-controlled territories as well. The issues at stake are almost identical in each regime. The principles of individual freedom and equality regardless of race, are demanded by the black people of the white administration in both systems. In each case, the United Nations

¹⁴²YWCA, Investment in Oppression, op. cit., p. 36.

has condemned, a large number of the independent, smaller states have urged strong, active sanctions, and the question of domestic jurisdiction has arisen to thwart any action stronger than verbal condemnation.

In each case, the Canadian Government has been on the side of condemnation "in the strongest possible terms", but has balked at resolutions urging boycotts or forceful interventions in the countries of Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa. The national policy of trade without ideological blocs prevails in Canada's voting performance in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Canadian Government has expressed the view on numerous occasions that the regimes in Southern Africa should grant the people in their African territories the right of self-determination. For this reason, Canada voted in favour of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2918 of November, 1972, which called for negotiations between the Portuguese and the indigenous African people. The resolution recognized that the "National liberation movements of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and Mozambique are the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people of those territories...". At the time of supporting this resolution the Canadian Delegation expressed "...reservations about violent solutions to these problems and to references in this resolution which imply support for such activities". The delegation also pointed out

that Canada would continue to oppose attempts to interfere with trade in peaceful goods with Portugal and her territories.

More recently, Canada supported a resolution in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations in November, 1973 calling for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to carry out an impartial and responsible investigation into illegal atrocities in the Portuguese African territories.¹⁴³

At the Twenty-Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly which sat from September 18 to December 18, 1973, a total of 31 resolutions were adopted relating to colonialism, racism, Portugal, and South Africa. Canadian response in regard to these activities has been consistent with her stated policy. Of the 31 resolutions, Canada voted in favour on 20 or 67.7%, and abstained on 6, which represented 19.7% of the total. Resolutions on which she abstained were those which generally advocated violent or forceful intervention, or interdiction of diplomatic and/or economic relations.

In a telegram to the United Nations Division of the Department of External Affairs on February 4, 1974, the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations reported its activity as follows,

In discussing conditions in South Africa, Namibia and Portuguese colonies, it was agreed that Commonwealth members in a position to do so should seek to use their influence to persuade Portugal to grant a negotiated independence to its African colonies.

¹⁴³Alan McGill, Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs, in personal correspondence with the author.

Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice and Security Council Resolutions on Namibia were recalled and emphasis placed on international responsibility for that territory. There was discussion on how Commonwealth countries, especially those with economic interests in South Africa and Namibia might best bring influence to bear to promote change. Heads of Government reviewed the efforts of the indigenous people of the territories in Southern Africa to achieve self-determination and independence and agreed on need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged in such efforts. British Government reserved its position in relation to last proposal in circumstances in which assistance might be converted into military purposes.¹⁴⁴

There appears to be no question about whether Canada opposes colonialism or racism. Canadians are active in fighting such oppression, and statements in the United Nations are representative of the general Canadian Policy towards Southern Africa and Portugal. The extent of her occupation with this controversy, however, is being debated currently in Canada.

Condemnation "in the strongest possible terms" in the United Nations context is limited to words and financial aid, but does not extend to the cessation of relations, or forceful intervention. The wording of the resolutions has become much stronger in recent years, although one public servant suggests that one is dealing with diplomatic jargon in such cases. In the face of an intransigent culprit, the language indicates more than just plain concern, but is not likely to involve military or security consideration.¹⁴⁵ Nor are any of the great

¹⁴⁴United Nations Canadian Delegation, unclassified telegram, PST78, to United Nations Division, Department of External Affairs, February 4, 1974, p. 5, #24.

¹⁴⁵Charles Marshal, Defence Relations Bureau, op. cit., personal interview.

Selected Resolutions of the General Assembly at
Its Twenty-Eighth Regular Session 18 Sept.-18 Dec., 1973

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Canadian Vote</u>
<u>3061 (XXVIII)</u> 2 Nov. 1973	Illegal Occupation by Portuguese Military Forces of Certain Sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and Acts of Aggression Committed by Them Against the People of the Republic	abstain
<u>3066 (XXVIII)</u> 15 Nov. 1973	Co-operation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity	yes
<u>3163 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples	yes
<u>3164 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Dissemination of Information on Decolonization	yes
<u>3165 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa	yes
Special Political Committee		
<u>3055 (XXVIII)</u> 26 Oct. 1973	Political Prisoners in South Africa	yes
<u>3151 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa	A-F yes G abstain
Third Committee		
<u>3057 (XXVIII)</u> 2 Nov. 1973	Decade For Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination	no vote, adopted
<u>3068 (XXVIII)</u> 30 Nov. 1973	International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid	
<u>3070 (XXVIII)</u> 30 Nov. 1973	Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights	
<u>3134 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Vote</u>
<u>3135 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	Yes
<u>3136 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	yes
<u>3142 (XXVIII)</u> 14 Dec. 1973	Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	yes
Fourth Committee		
<u>3111(XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Question of Namibia	yes
<u>3113 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Question of Territories Under Portuguese Administration	yes
<u>3114 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique	yes
<u>3115 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Question of Southern Rhodesia	abstain
<u>3116 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Question of Southern Rhodesia	abstain
<u>3117 (XXVII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interests Which are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories Under Portuguese Domination and in All Other Territories Under Colonial Domination and Efforts to Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid, and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa	abstain
<u>3118 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International Institutions Associated With the United Nations	yes

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Vote</u>
<u>3119 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	United Nations Educational and Training Program For Southern Africa	yes
<u>3120 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Offers By Member States of Studying and Training Facilities For Inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories	yes
2139th plenary meeting 3 October, 1973	G.A. Invitations to Leaders of National Liberation Movements	
Sixth Committee		
<u>3103 (XXVIII)</u> 12 Dec. 1973	Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes	abstain

Source: United Nations, Press Section, Office of Information,
Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Eighth
Regular Session, 18 September - 18 December, 1973,
 New York: United Nations, 1973.

powers prepared to go to the Security Council over South Africa or Portuguese African territories. They have made it known they would veto any such move, so it is common knowledge that any resolution of that nature is denied the chance of adoption. Some of the major powers like Britain and France derive too much value from trade with either Portugal or South Africa to break off economic relations with them, and it is likely that South Africa, at least, could resist sanctions in any event. The Director-General of the African bureau repeats a generalized feeling in the government when he suggested that the U.N. should not pass resolutions which would be ineffective.¹⁴⁶

The inflation of the language in recent sessions of the General Assembly is geared to reinforcing the old resolution. The feeling is that although such condemnation might not be of any use, Canadians, and others, do not dare stop condemning the continuation of the social and economic situation in southern Africa.

A major factor in determining the response, or at least the extent of that response, is that the vital interests of all the big powers do not converge in Southern Africa, nor does detente depend on it. As a result, the problem is left to be considered as a social and internal one, warranting only the limited censure and criticism which has been meted out.

¹⁴⁶Alan McGill, op. cit., personal interview.

Chapter IV

THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

Trade

Canada has been at the forefront, especially within the Commonwealth, in expressing abhorrence and condemnation of the racial policies of Southern Africa. When it comes to the practice of that policy, however, Canadian performance is limited by several conflicting elements.

Canadian foreign policy includes a "broad revulsion" against racial oppression yet also wishes to accommodate Canadian business interests which are attracted by the "better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment" existing in the Southern continent. (By way of example, in Canada, manpower makes up to 60% of operating costs, whereas in Southern Africa they account for 30% at most.)¹⁴⁷

Moreover, 90% of Canada's trade is conducted by private, rather than government, enterprise. This produces a situation where those who state the policy are not always the ones in the most effective position to carry it out. Add to this the

¹⁴⁷High Nangle, "The Nangle Report - Canadian Business in South Africa", The Ottawa Citizen, June 22 - July 5, 1973.

Canadian Government's liberal policy towards business decision-making, and one is left with a situation where the bulk of the trade and investment conducted by Canada, the front lines of foreign policy, remains in the hands of various chairmen of the board on James and Bay Street.

The Canadian Government maintains Trade Commissioners in Southern Africa to assist Canadian investment there and the assignment of Commissioners is dependent on the market potential for Canadian goods. The contingent in Johannesburg is responsible for trade promotion in Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland as well as South Africa.

With regard to Namibia, Canadians regard the South African occupation of that territory as illegal and External Affairs has informed Canadian companies interested in Namibia that any investment is made there at their own risk without the encouragement or protection of the Canadian Government.¹⁴⁸

Despite repeated expressions of distaste for the social policies of that country, Canada continues to give South African goods preferential access to her markets, a practice which is reciprocated by the South Africans to Canadian goods. It should be noted that, the Preambles to the British Preferential Tariff Agreement explicitly state that for the purposes of the Agreement,

¹⁴⁸Mitchell Sharp, in a letter to Renate Pratt, Chairman of the Study and Action Committee, YWCA of Canada, and Co-author of Investment in Oppression, op. cit., September 14, 1974; see Appendix B.

Canada recognizes Namibia to be part of South Africa. One might recall the 1971 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion which asked U.N. members "...to refrain from any acts and particularly any dealings with the government of South Africa implying recognition...or lending assistance (to its administration)". Canadian Trade Commissioners dealing with Pretoria on behalf of firms in Namibia confirm South Africa's claim to that territory.

According to Statistics Canada, \$43,795,000 worth of Canadian goods were exported to South Africa in 1972, \$42,933,268 of them under preferential tariffs.¹⁴⁹ Canadian preferential access to South African markets is estimated by Professor G.K. Helleiner of the University of Toronto to be work 1/50 of 1% of Canada's total export trade.¹⁵⁰ Preferential reciprocity is much more valuable to South Africa. Canada absorbs almost 2% of South African exports, and under the Agreement, South Africa has been able to increase her share of the Canadian sugar market from 5.3% in 1961 to 25% in 1969, an interesting situation in light of the fact that Canada had been the chief promoter in ousting the South Africans from membership in the Commonwealth in 1961 for its undesirable racial policies. Canada is also a

¹⁴⁹Statistics Canada, Exports by Countries, 65 - 003, 1973.

¹⁵⁰Renate Pratt, Chairman of the Study and Action Committee, YWCA of Canada, in a letter to Mitchell Sharp, October 17, 1973; see Appendix C.

principal buyer of South African wines and citrus fruits. Most recent figures from Statistics Canada indicate that Canadian imports from South Africa are still on the rise from a total of \$58,942,000 in 1972 to a 1973 figure of \$86,801,000.¹⁵¹

Because of the tariff preferences, South African goods have managed to undersell products from developing nations in South America and the Caribbean on the Canadian Market, not to mention Canadian producers whose businesses are already in a very delicate condition. Yet South Africa absorbs only 0.24% of Canadian exports.

Mitchell Sharp has stated that the continued application of preferential tariffs between Canada and South Africa reflects the fact that "such arrangements are not automatically ended by a change in political status".¹⁵² Criticism has been brought against the favoured treatment received by South Africa while developing nations, who need the assistance, are forced to compete in the open market the best they can. The Canadian Government enacted a generalized tariff preference on July 1, 1974, geared to improve the market conditions for goods coming from developing countries, but it is still not justification of

¹⁵¹Statistics Canada, Exports by Countries, op. cit., see Table VII.

¹⁵²Sharp, letter to Renate Pratt, op. cit., p. 3; see Appendix B.

the fact that some South African products undersell Canadian goods, nor, in fact, why there is a preferential agreement at all.

The Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce reports that trade with South Africa has always been made up of an exceptionally high ratio (90%) of manufactured goods as opposed to raw-materials. The percentage has remained consistently high over the years, and therefore, the Department considers that trade with South Africa greatly helps the current employment situation in Canada.¹⁵³

Mr. Sharp refers to the Canadian policy of attempting to balance the themes of social justice and economic growth. He cites the aid given by Canadians to other independent African countries, enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia, and the Canadian refusal to sell arms or military equipment to South Africa. However, Statistics Canada shows that in 1972 Canada imported \$5,000 worth of goods and exported \$17,000 worth to Rhodesia. Trade in 1973 was valued at \$3,000. Nor does our refusal to sell arms to South Africa explain why Canada exported \$28,000 worth of firearms and ammunition to that country in 1973.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³R.M. Dawson, Director, Pacific, Asian & Africa Bureau, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, in a letter to the author, January 16, 1974.

¹⁵⁴see Table VII.

TABLE VII

Selected Canada/South Africa Trade Figures,
1970-1973

<u>Imports to Canada</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
apples	694,000	939,000	483,000	1,004,000
mandarines	1,780,000	1,711,000	1,421,000	1,851,000
apricots, dried	65,000	22,000	340,000	1,746,000
apricots, canned			573,000	1,203,000
pineapple			870,000	1,128,000
raw sugar	19,405,000	23,750,000	35,268,000	52,535,000
Total		\$54,590,000	58,942,000	86,801,000
<u>Exports to South Africa</u>		<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
firearms, ammunition & ordnance		22,000	18,000	28,000
Total	\$104,000,000	63,684,000	43,795,000	59,204,000

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries, CS65-006, 1971-1973,
and Exports by Countries, CS65-003, 1971-1973.

To those advocating the cessation of trade between Canada and South Africa, Mr. Sharp has replied that "in the absence of internationally agreed measures, like the sanctions against Rhodesia, it would be futile for Canada to renounce trading opportunities and leave the field to its competitors".¹⁵⁵ Yet, at the Twenty-Seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1972 Canada abstained from voting on a resolution which called for U.N. members to take actions to discontinue economic relations with South Africa.

No matter how open-minded one might be, there are times when the Government's policy of balance appears to be more like the solemn pursuit of economic advantage while the theme of social justice gains much rhetoric but receives only token attention.

Canada also maintains an "honorary" commercial representative in Luanda, Angola. His role is to assist the Canadian Trade Commissioner in South Africa to develop commercial relations between Canada and Angola. The expansion of trade in peaceful goods has resulted in Canada importing \$53,585,000 worth of goods from Angola and exporting \$875,000 worth in 1973.¹⁵⁶ Trade with Mozambique is smaller, with total transactions amounting to only \$5,506,000.

¹⁵⁵Sharp, letter to Renate Pratt, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁵⁶Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries and Exports by Countries, 1973, op. cit.

Angola's chief exports are coffee beans and oil. For both of these products, Canada is a major buyer. Angola is the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee after Brazil, Colombia, and the Ivory Coast, producing 6.2% of the world export in 1972. Canada imported 11% of its green coffee beans from Angola in that same year, a figure exceeded only by Brazilian imports.¹⁵⁷ Canada's coffee purchases from Angola represent $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ of Angola's total export economy, but in terms of coffee exports this figure is 6.4%. The 1973 figures for coffee imports are down, but they indicate that Angolan coffee beans still make up 4.2% of Canadian coffee imports.¹⁵⁸

Canada is also the largest importer of Angolan oil. In 1972, 1/3 of Angola's oil was exported to Canada. Petroleum is Angola's second major export, and together with coffee, it makes the Atlantic colony Canada's third largest African trading partner after South Africa and Nigeria.

Portugal spends from 41 - 50% of her national budget on colonial wars in the African provinces. A large portion of the revenues from exports are used to support the military activities in those territories. Portugal levies a special defence tax, ranging from 4 - 30%, depending on the commodity, on the profits of Angolan companies. Approximately 30% of the total revenue for coffee goes into the Portuguese coffers,

¹⁵⁷Statistics Canada, Imports by Commodities, 1972.

¹⁵⁸Statistics Canada, Imports by Commodities, 1973.

and of this, it is conservatively estimated that 1/3 is spent on defence. It may be deduced, then, that at least 10% of the income from coffee is spent on fighting the liberation movement. In addition to this, an extra assessment of two cents is levied on each kilo of exported coffee for the support of the local paramilitary organization. Based on this calculation, a minimum of 13% of the value of trade in coffee from Angola has gone into the Portuguese war chest. In the past four years it is moderately estimated that Canada has contributed \$4,210,140 to the defence fund of the white government in Angola through her purchases of coffee alone.

The import picture is similar for Canadian trade with both Portugal and Mozambique, although the figures involved are smaller. Cashews, black tea, and grape wines make up the largest commodities for import into Canada. The dividends from such trade have the same relationship to the colonial war as the produce from Angola.

Altogether, the African territories and Portugal exported \$83,748,000 worth of goods to Canadian markets in 1973, and received \$21,426,000 in Canadian products (see Tables VIII, IX, X). In terms of percentages, the trading area contributed 0.36% of Canadian imports and supplied only 0.09% of Canada's export market.

The significance of this trade is much greater for the maintenance of the African territories than it is for the

TABLE VIII

Selected Canada/Angola Trade Figures,
1970-1973

<u>Imports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
green coffee	9,634,000	9,556,000	9,796,000	3,392,000
Total		24,478,000	45,145,000	53,585,000
<u>Exports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
aircraft engines & parts	9,176	32,000	9,000	42,000
telecommunication equipment (transmitters & receivers)	6,430	44,000	37,000	30,000
firearms, ammunition & ordnance	-----	1,000	1,000	-----
Total	628,039	862,000	742,000 (-14%)	875,000 (+18%)

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries, 65-006, 1971-1973, and Exports by Countries, 65-007, 1971-1973.

TABLE IX

Selected Canada/Mozambique Trade Figures,
1970-1973

<u>Imports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
cashew nuts	326,000	1,622,000	2,980,000	2,939,000
black tea	698,000	595,000	656,000	565,000
baler twine	203,000	569,000	101,000	627,000
Total	1,254,000	2,781,000	3,831,000	4,343,000
<u>Exports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
aircraft parts (assemblies & equip.)	28,226	4,000	6,000	3,000
telecommunication equipment	-----	55,000	-----	117,000
firearms, ammunition & ordnance	4,938	3,000	6,000	10,000
Total	2,299,993	2,429,000	1,178,000 (-51.5%)	1,163,000 (-1.3%)

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries, 65-006, 1971-1973, and Exports by Countries, 65-003, 1971-1973.

TABLE X

Selected Canada/Portugal Trade Figures,
1970-1973

<u>Imports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
tomato paste	3,728,000	3,689,000	4,252,000	5,533,000
grape wines	1,882,000	2,495,000	2,787,000	3,480,000
Total	13,966,000	18,754,000	22,172,000	25,802,000
<u>Exports</u>	<u>1970</u> \$	<u>1971</u> \$	<u>1972</u> \$	<u>1973</u> \$
aircraft engines & parts	536,656	484,000	806,000	673,000
aircraft parts no engines	38,300	25,000	31,000	79,000
telecommunication equipment	174,096	96,000	130,000	135,000
firearms, ammunition & ordnance	1,243	-----	-----	1,000
Total	10,605,548	13,382,000	17,163,000	19,388,000

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries, 65-006, 1971-1973, and Exports by Countries, 65-003, 1971-1973.

TABLE XI

Selected Southern African Imports
As a Percentage of the Canadian Market
 1973-1974.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Imports</u> (lbs./gals.)	<u>Total from Southern Africa</u> (lbs./gals.)	<u>Quantity%</u>	<u>Dollar%</u>
Sugar (S. Africa)	1973	21,225,117	6,501,813	30.6	32.4
	1974*	6,326,728	1,462,612	23.1	20.3
coffee (Angola)	1973	171,021,531	7,225,330	4.2	3.4
	1974*	81,369,280	714,906	.76	.89
Wines (S. Africa & (Portugal)	1973	10,830,872	1,292,957	11.9	9.6
	1974*	2,172,986	338,219	15.6	11.8

*figures include imports up to May 1974.

Source: calculated on the basis of statistics supplied by
 Statistics Canada, Imports By Commodities, 1973 & 1974.

TABLE XII

Canadian Contributions to Portuguese War
in Angola Via Coffee Trade

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value of Trade</u> \$	<u>Estimated 13% Contribution</u> \$
1970	9,634,000	1,252,420
1971	9,556,000	1,242,280
1972	9,796,000	1,274,480
1973	3,392,000	440,960

Canadian market. In the case of Angola, for example, Canada sends only .000035% of its total exports to that country, but purchases from Angola have made Canada the number one buyer of Angolan oil, and the number three purchaser of Angolan coffee, that country's two leading exports. Coffee exports by themselves account for more than 1/3 of Angola's foreign exchange.

The numbers alone do not tell the whole story of Canadian trading relations with Southern Africa. A brief look at the list of commodities being exported to those territories leaves the question of Canadian neutrality open to debate.

Portugal has been at open race war with the majority of the inhabitants of its African colonies for thirteen years. The South Africans have long been condemned for the pursuit of racist programmes in that country. And yet, Canada has been delivering to both white regimes, quantities of aircraft engines and parts, telecommunication equipment (receivers and transmitters), and firearms, ammunition and ordnance.

The size of the transactions are irrelevant. Canadian-manufactured parts have been found among the debris of a Portuguese jet fighter shot down in the Portuguese African territories of Guinea-Bissau.¹⁵⁹ Materials traded to Portugal have found their way to the scene of the struggles in Southern Africa. Despite the fact that Canada supports the justness of the liberation

¹⁵⁹South Africa Information Group, Ottawa, press release, October, 1973.

TABLE XIII

Canadian Import - Export Figures1970-1973

<u>Imports</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
	\$	\$	\$	\$
All countries	13,951,903,000	15,616,893,000	18,667,755,000	23,316,806,000
<u>Exports</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
	\$	\$	\$	\$
All countries	16,491,090,762	17,396,609,000	19,589,437,000 (+12.6%)	24,643,575,000 (+25.8%)

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Countries, 65-006, 1971-1973,
and Exports by Countries, 65-00-, 1971-1973.

movements, and their existence as the representation of the true aspirations of the majority of the people, the Portuguese are considered the true representatives in commercial affairs.¹⁶⁰ Commerce has dictated that commodities most useful in the suppression of a technically-unsophisticated people will be sold to those whose legitimacy as rulers has been challenged (see export data in Tables above).

Investment

Beyond the simple transfer of commodities, however, Canada is deeply involved in the economic infrastructure of the Southern African countries via investment. Half of all foreign investment in Africa has been made in South Africa, and although the Republic comprises only 5% of Africa's total land area, and 6% of its population, it accounts for 22% of the entire continent's gross production and 40% of its industrial production.¹⁶¹

Direct investment by Canadian enterprises in South Africa was still on the rise by the end of 1973. Although Canada's South African trade and investment are not large in absolute terms, nor in comparison with the total foreign investment in that country, it is, as some researchers have pointed out, "part

¹⁶⁰ Mitchell Sharp, in a radio interview, "As It Happens", May, 1973.

¹⁶¹ Republic of South Africa, South Africa: Export Country, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1969.

of a general pattern of foreign support for the policies of an oppressive and racially discriminating regime".¹⁶²

The full extent of Canadian investment is difficult to determine, but a partial list of Canadian companies operating in South Africa includes,

Rio Tinto Canadian Exploration Ltd.
 Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd. (Alcan)
 Brilund Mines Ltd.
 Bata Ltd.
 Consolidated Bathurst Ltd.
 Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd.
 Deheuw, Cather and Company of Canada Ltd.
 Ford Motor Company of Canada
 International Nickel Company of Canada Ltd.
 Massey Ferguson Ltd.
 Manufacturer's Life Insurance Company
 Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada
 Cominco Ltd.
 Gulf Oil Company of Canada

They are involved in all sectors of the economy from agricultural supplies to exploration and extraction of minerals. Companies operating in foreign countries are subject to the laws of the host country. This requires that Canadian businesses follow the laws of apartheid in varying degrees, and deal in Namibia through the white government in South Africa. Those Canadian companies, which operate in Namibia of which we have knowledge are Brilund Mines, New Wellington Mines, Syracuse Oils, and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd.

Even for those so-inclined, investment is not geared to aid the non-white population. In South Africa, direct, private,

¹⁶²YWCA, Investment in Oppression, op. cit., p. 4.

white financing in the homeland areas has been prevented on the grounds that such investment would undermine independent African development. Instead, some new industry is located in areas which border on the homelands but remain within white territory. By this means, the vital labour force is easily tapped, but control and profits stay in the hands of the whites. In other areas of the Southern continent, labour is supplied to new industry through force or the notorious "contract". Added to the physical dispersal of the settlements, and the separation of political power centres, economic de-centralization provides yet another obstacle in the path of black dependence. Nor is it likely that Canadian investment is going to be able, even though it might be willing, to bring any significant benefits to Africans.

An investigation of Canadian Corporations in South Africa revealed that only the Ford company pays all its workers a wage above the poverty datum line and the effective minimum level for that area. The remaining businesses have wage scales which are substantially below the minimum required to live.¹⁶³

The Poverty Datum Line (PDL) is a technique used for describing the theoretical minimum cost of living. The calculation is based on the lowest possible cost to maintain a household, but is a short-term standard only. The Minimum Effective

¹⁶³The following information on Canadian businesses is taken from High Nangle, "The Nangle Report - Canadian businesses in South Africa", The Ottawa Citizen, June 22 - July 5, 1973.

Level (MEL) is 50% higher than the PDL and takes into account factors such as health and nutrition. The levels vary from area to area depending on the cost of living and are applied to non-white sectors of the South African population.

Canadian firms do not have a particularly good record of being a liberalizing force in Africa. One of the major Canadian businesses in Southern Africa is Massey Ferguson, which is a Toronto-controlled firm and has become the largest supplier of farm implements in South Africa. In addition, it operates in Southern Rhodesia and Malawi. The company's total assets in South Africa for 1972 were approximately \$30,000,000, and it had an average pre-tax return on its total capital for the past 5 years of 21.5%. Gross profit in that same year was \$8,090,000.¹⁶⁴

Of the 733 black employees at its Vereeniging plant, 642 of them (87.5%) are paid less than the PDL for the area which is \$119.43. Only white workers receive above the MEL of \$178.95.

At Massey-Ferguson, the white workers do skilled jobs and belong to trade unions. The blacks, however, are not allowed to hold apprenticeships under South African law and therefore do not qualify for skilled wages. Although the gap

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

TABLE XIV

Average Monthly Wage Break-Down for the
Massey Ferguson Plant in South Africa

Whites

<u>Wage</u>	<u>No. of Employees</u>
\$308.00	115
286.46	2
277.20	43
270.00	3 ---- lowest white wage

---- MEL - \$178.95

Blacks

\$168.79	10 (1.4%)	
140.15	81 (11.1%)	
115.45	86 (11.7%)	---- PDL - \$119.43
109.86	40 (5.6%)	
98.29	12 (1.6%)	
94.79	400 (54.5%)	
83.71	104 (14.1%)	

Source: Based on figures supplied by Hugh Nangle, ibid.

between wages paid to blacks and whites is narrowing, whites still earn a minimum wage higher than that of a non-white. In 1966, the white minimum wage was 49.2% higher than that of an African, and in 1973, this figure was 28.3%.

Africans are represented in labour negotiations by white government employees without the benefit of consultation, and although there is a works committee system to hear complaints from the black workers, wages cannot be discussed at these sessions.

The Toronto head office of Massey Ferguson has now turned over the running of the Southern African companies to people who accept the prevailing social system.

The Alcan company is another major investor of Canadian origin. It is based in Montreal and operates in thirty different countries. Its South African plant is in Pietermaritzburg where it centres its total Southern African assets of \$41,300,000. Pre-tax profits in 1972 for the company were \$4,970,000, with an after-tax profit of 40.5 cents per share.

Of the 706 black workers, 703 (99.6%) are paid below the PDL for the area (\$131.60). 165 of the 252 (65.5%) Asian employees are paid less than the PDL and 73 receive less than the MEL of \$196.80. The best wage for black workers at this company is \$27.54 per week although the poverty level has been established at \$33.20 weekly. Company executives have rejected the PDL as a criterion for establishing wages.

In spite of this, the company does not practise job reservation, and it promotes non-white apprentices through its comparatively progressive union. Coincidentally, Alcan has been subject to repeated "investigations" from the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS).

Falconbridge Mines has the worst record of all the Canadian-owned operations. It is a wholly Canadian-owned subsidiary with offices in Johannesburg, and it has bases in South Africa, Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia. Its expanding activities have left it with a 25% interest in Western Platinum Ltd., a mining enterprise in the western Transvaal, and it also deals with the Superior Oil Company which has a 50% interest in Falconbridge's exploratory activities in both South Africa and Namibia. In addition, it is engaged in co-operative ventures with the Rhodesia Mining Promotion Corporation (MPC).¹⁶⁵

The conditions for black workers in Falconbridge mines are described as slave labour. They live in corrugated sheet-metal shacks or brick dormitories with 14 workers to a building. Over the hill live white workers in two-bedroom houses, with a social club, tennis court and a swimming pool.

The Blanket Mine, near Gwanda, Southern Rhodesia, made a \$1.3 million profit in 1972, and paid a starting wage to black mine workers of 56 cents a day for a six-day week. Top wages for blacks were \$48.60 per month and for whites, \$810.00 per month. The Government of South Africa has a 25% interest in the Oamites Mine in Namibia.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

TABLE XV
South African Employees of Mobil Oil Corporation

128

Salary Groups	Typical Positions	Number of Non-White Employees			Number of Non-White Employees in Each Ethnic Group in 1972			Total White 1972	Percent Non-White in Each Group 1972
		1962	1968	1972	African	Asiatic	Coloured		
1	General depot labourer engaged in some or all of the following duties: off-loading and stacking empty packages; yard-sweeping and cleaning; washing returnable drums; loading packages for road and rail; closing and sealing drums.	687	387	365	312	—	53	—	100%
1A	General depot labourer engaged in all or some of the following duties: marking packages for loading; filling tank cars; first inspection for drum reconditioning; Messenger.	342	267	271	239	—	32	—	100%
2	Fork lift truck operator; cook; reproducing machine operator; senior messenger.	157	145	143	127	—	16	—	100%
2A	Gate guard; clerical assistant; workshop hand; senior reproducing machine operator; head messenger; clerk I.	78	142	82	63	—	19	15	84.5%
3	Clerk II; stores assistant; copy typist; chauffeur, junior stenographer;	—	22	37	30	—	7	41	47.4%
3A	Key punch operator; trainee refinery operator; clerk III; airport crewman/driver.	—	12	36	12	2	22	110	24.7%
4	Security guard I; refinery operator I; intermediate storekeeper; assistant mailing and stationery supervisor; head chauffeur; telephonist; clerk IV.	—	—	42	3	30	9	114	26.9%
5	Clerk V; junior computer operator; refinery operator II; heavy-vehicle driver; laboratory technician I; security guard II.	—	6	48	5	6	37	301	13.8%
6	Laboratory technician II; senior computer operator; sales representative, paraffin trade; clerk VI; refinery operator III; senior storekeeper; aircraft refueler.	—	6	16	6	—	10	279	5.4%
7	Plant supervisor; refinery operator IV; clerk VII.	—	—	—	—	—	—	219	—
8	Depot superintendent (minor bulk depot); sales representative—general trade; supervisor, mail and services; draftsman; stillman.	—	1	5	1	3	1	132	3.6%
9	Junior engineer; marketing assistant; chemist; assistant accounting section head.	—	—	—	—	—	—	201	—
10	Engineering assistant; depot superintendent (medium size depot); field accountant; shift supervisor.	—	—	—	—	—	—	83	—
11	Distribution assistant; engineer; mechanical foreman.	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	—
12	District manager Indian trade; retail programs manager; zone foreman; accounting section head.	—	—	1	—	1	—	85	1.2%
13 and above	Middle-, senior-, and top-management positions.	—	—	—	—	—	—	186	—
Total		1,264	989	1,046	798	42	206	1,806	

Portuguese Africa has benefited significantly from the presence of Canadian investment as well. Gulf Oil began exploring for oil in Cabinda (a small enclave between Zaire and the People's Republic of the Congo) in 1954. A major oil discovery was made in 1966, and by the end of 1972, Gulf's investments in Angola had reached \$209 million. The Portuguese Government derives a large income through taxes and royalties from Gulf's production. Payments for 1972 operations amounted to \$50 million which represented 12.2% of the total Angolan budget for the year and 60 - 70% of the provinces military expenditure.¹⁶⁶

The increasing annual payments are not the total extent of Gulf's contribution to the Portuguese, however. When their contract was negotiated in 1968, Gulf made advance payments of \$24 million dollars to the Portuguese instead of the yearly \$1 million premium, at a time when the liberation movements in the colonies were becoming most successful.¹⁶⁷ Not only did this financing come at an opportune moment for the Portuguese (military expenditures in Angola had increased from \$27 million in 1967 to \$101 million in 1972), but it also gave them security against the future application of international sanctions.

The above constitute only a few examples of the economics of Canada's relations with Southern Africa. The situation however, is repeated faithfully from company to company throughout the

¹⁶⁶Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC), "Larceny by Proxy. Gulf Oil (Canada) Ltd. and Angola", 1973, p. 24.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

territory and has shown no indication or inclination to more humane tendencies.

The most distressing factor about Canadian investment in Southern Africa is that it could be doing more to liberalize the situation in the host countries and still remain within the laws of those countries. Though some of the Canadian companies are liberal by Southern African standards, the existence of such investment has proven to be no threat to apartheid or racism. Instead, the system has proven its resilience. The greater demand for skilled labour brought about by increasing industrialization has opened up many semi-skilled and skilled operations to black labourers which were previously reserved for whites. The appointment of blacks to these positions, however, has not altered the structure of white privilege and superiority over non-whites.

Growing foreign investment in Southern Africa has paralleled increasing racial oppression in the area, and has left the white governments in those territories more secure than ever. It is in the face of this kind of private investment that the Canadian Government has opted to uphold the liberal philosophy and the right of free enterprise!

Chapter V

PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSE TO CANADIAN POLICY

Interest Groups and Dialogue

In recent years, the role of public interest groups regarding the Canadian relationship with countries in southern Africa has been increasing. Through various publicity campaigns, briefs presented to parliamentary committees, and the organization of economic boycotts, a wide variety of individuals have become involved in the process of decision-making in Canada. In response to this pressure, the business sector has become more active in the field of public relations and governmental contacts as well, indicating the dynamic situation which has been developing around this issue.

The following chapter will examine the major interest groups involved in the question of southern Africa, and will additionally attempt to report the dialogue which has centred around the dispute. Also, in this chapter, the facts of Canadian aid, both official and private, will be surveyed inasmuch as it appears to be primarily a part of the governmental response to public pressure.

The list of organizations concerned with Canadian foreign policy towards southern Africa is growing every week. Some of the participating groups were in existence for general purposes other than those specifically relating to that problem, but have become involved as a matter of principle. Other organizations have been born as a specific response to the continuing issue, and, in many cases, have become the leading coordinators of the activities. Among those involved are:

- OXFAM - Canada
- Southern Africa Information Group (SAIG)
- Ten Thousand Days
- Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)
- Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC)
- African Relief Services Committee (ARSC)
- Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa
- Third World Studies Committee
- Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO)
- Kitchener-Waterloo Overseas Aid Committee
- London Association for International Development (LAID)
- Development Education Amateur Program
- World Council of Churches (WCC)
- Presbyterian Church of Canada
- United Church of Canada
- SHAIR of Hamilton
- Canadian Council of Churches
- Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)
- Voice of Women (VOW)
- National Farmer's Union
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
- Liberation Support Movement (LSM)
- South Africa Action Coalition
- Consumers Concerned for Southern Africa (Calgary Angola Committee)
- World University Service of Canada (WUSC)
- Windsor and District Labour Council
- United Electrical Workers of Hamilton

All of the above groups have aligned themselves in an active way with the cause of alleviating the oppression of

non-white people in southern Africa. Their contributions have ranged from direct aid, to boycotts, and they have been variously involved in presentations to the government, publicity promotion, and coordination.

The sizes of the groups seem to vary as much as the types of people who have become involved in them. Some of the committees are concerned only with their local areas and constituents while others operate within a much wider framework by attempting to coordinate national, and even international campaigns. From the handful of dedicated and overworked people in a group like the South Africa Information Group in Ottawa one then ranged to the 38,000 member Windsor and District Labour Council composed of the United Auto Workers and the Electrical Workers.

The only common denominator in such alliances appears to be in their statements of goals and purposes. OXFAM for instance, which is non-sectarian and without political affiliation, was established to give aid to any person or organization capable of concrete programs aimed at relieving suffering. The Canadian branch of the organization has been active for ten years and involved in developmental projects of public education and emergency relief. In a brief presented to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence respecting humanitarian aid in southern Africa, Mr. Jacques Jobin, Executive Director of OXFAM-Canada, stated support for the Canadian government's decision to channel funds for the relief of the people of Angola, Mozambique,

Guinea-Bissau, and Namibia.¹⁶⁸ By such cooperation he stated that OXFAM-Canada could "continue to contribute to efforts to transform the social, economic and political conditions which prevent the realization of social justice, self-determination and human dignity."¹⁶⁹

Other groups have also presented briefs to the parliamentary committees established to hear the arguments focusing on Canada's contracts with the southern tip of Africa. Speaking for the Canadian Council of Churches, Rev. Floyd Honey urged the Government to follow through on program of assistance to the liberation movements because such an action was just and "entirely consistent with the Government's commitment to social justice".¹⁷⁰ The program of aid to the struggling majorities would also "serve to promote a cohesive, multiracial Commonwealth...help to maintain and strengthen the United Nations..." and contribute to the only peaceful solution by "building up sufficient pressure on the white minority regimes to induce them to adopt self-determination".¹⁷¹

An indicator of the attitude held by the Canadian pressure groups towards the southern African liberation struggle was enunciated most significantly by the Central Committee of the

¹⁶⁸Jacque Jobin, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs Respecting Estimates 1975-75 - Department of External Affairs - Humanitarian Aid in Southern Africa, House of Commons, Issue No. 12, Thursday, April 25, 1974, p. 12:5.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 12:48.

¹⁷⁰Rev. Floyd Honey, ibid., April 4, 1974, p. 9:6.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

World Council of Churches at its meeting in Addis Ababa in January, 1971, at which time, the WCC stated that it did not "pass judgement on those victims of racism who are driven to violence as the only way left to them to redress the grievances and so open the way for a new and more just social order".¹⁷²

In fact, Canadians have no choice according to Rev. Honey.

"Either we extend humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements and thus stand with those who seek to overcome oppression and entrenched injustice, or we continue as before, trying carefully to walk both sides of the street annoying no one, but helping no one either".¹⁷³

In addition to the WCC's general Fund to Combat Racism, the Canadian Council of Churches is seeking a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the body responsible for dispersing Canada's foreign aid, to supplement funds contributed by its member churches. The CIDA funds, however, would not go to the WCC's general fund, but rather to a special Program of Assistance to Non-Church Groups in Africa administered by the WCC. The program was designed to provide humanitarian aid to those liberation movements working in Africa in territories still under Portuguese control. To date, the program has given assistance to the Mozambique Institute of FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, the MPLA, and PAIGC (Partido Africano de Independencia da Guine

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 9:8.

¹⁷³Ibid.

et Cabo Verde) which has since become the government of the independent state of Guinea-Bissau in the liberated mainland section of Portuguese Guinea.¹⁷⁴

Representations have also been made to parliament by the Canadian Labour Congress. In 1967, and again in 1970, 1973, and 1974, the Congress urged the position of self-determination for colonized peoples, and within the Canadian context, sought a consumer boycott of all South African products and encouraged the Government to apply pressure on the Portuguese government to ensure the fundamental human rights of the people in its colonies.

The policy of the Congress has been to channel funds for international work through its international organization called the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) which regroups about 95% of the free trade unions across the world. Although, the Confederation has given only minimal amounts (\$1,500) to the liberation movements, for example, to help refugees of colonialism resident in Zambia to continue the fight, the move is considered by its directors as symbolically significant and very political. Another donation was made in the same spirit to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions in Lusaka.

The Canadian Labour Congress supports the Government proposal to help the liberation movements, and views the policy as a step in the right direction, but also holds that the acceptance

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 9:7.

of mutual non-interference in internal affairs by the Canadian Government and the controlling, white regimes in southern Africa, referred to by the director of international affairs of the CLC as the "hidden coalition", must be repudiated.¹⁷⁵

One of the most active groups involved in the process of trying to alter Canada's traditional response to the situation in southern Africa and the one with which this writer has had the most contact, is the Southern Africa Information Group (SAIG). It is an organization based in Ottawa that has tried to coordinate the other groups which are concerned in this issue. In addition, SAIG puts out a monthly news clipping service which surveys the international press for reports on the conditions in southern Africa. The group has produced booklets, distributed pamphlets, circulated slide shows and movies, instigated consumer boycotts, made representations to heads of government, and promoted speakers, both local and visiting from Africa. As of late 1973, SAIG had received contributions of \$3,000 from the United Church, \$1,000 from Development and Peace, and \$500 from the Anglican Church. Continued aid in the future was anticipated.

Working very closely with SAIG is the African Relief Services Committee which was formed early in 1968. The objectives of the Committee are: 1) to materially assist the liberation

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 9:10.

efforts of the Angolan people; 2) to expedite such efforts by researching and publicizing the social, political and economic aspects of Portuguese colonialism; and 3) to encourage an increased understanding of African nations, and their struggles for national liberation and independence.¹⁷⁶

The ARSC has had financial support from such organizations as Miles for Millions, Rallie Tiers-Monde, and the United and Anglican Churches. A projects summary for 1972-1973 reported contributions to the Angolan liberation movement from the ARSC of \$111,400 with supplies ranging through seeds and tools, blankets, portable homes, medical supplies and audio-visual equipment to promote greater awareness of the Angolan plight.

In February, 1974, the Angola Book Campaign (ABC) was launched to give support to the Literacy Campaign in Angola with the object of raising funds for the MPLA to buy school supplies and to finance the printing of newly-written school text books in Portuguese and the four local languages. The ABC is being sponsored by the Anglican Church with headquarters in Toronto.

Toronto is the site of several other very active programs of lobbying. TCLPAC (referred to as "ticklepack"), or the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies, has become involved in four areas--Gulf Oil, Angolan coffee, the PAIGC liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, and

¹⁷⁶From a circular released by the ARSC, Box 4328E, Ottawa, 1974.

Canada's NATO ties. Their material aid division runs eight-week series of Cinema of Solidarity, and has been active in raising \$15,000 for the purchase of an eight-ton truck, in addition to sending medical supplies to FRELIMO. Some members of TCLPAC have devoted considerable time to in-the-field research in South Africa and have turned their efforts into PhD. dissertations.

Also in Toronto, the National Board of the YWCA of Canada, chaired by Renate Pratt, has produced a book called Investment in Oppression describing at length the extent of Canadian investment in South Africa and its implications for the black people in that country. As a result of the book, Mrs. Pratt has carried on lengthy correspondence with Mitchell Sharp which has resulted in a greater clarification of the stands taken by the contending parties.

The YWCA has concluded from its study that Canadian foreign investment has not been a liberalizing force in South Africa. As a main policy recommendation it urges that there ought to be no new Canadian investment and no expansion of existing Canadian economic operations in South Africa.

In addition, the research committee made the supplementary recommendation that the Commonwealth Preferential Tariff Agreement with South Africa be abrogated, particularly since the Canadian Government had insisted that that country's continued membership in the Commonwealth would be incompatible with and offensive to

its multi-racial character. At the very least the Government should "neutralize its trade relations with South Africa and not extend preferential tariffs to a regime whose racist policies Canada has publicly condemned...."¹⁷⁷

Extending this thought further, the major interest groups have also urged the removal of all Canadian Trade Commissioners from southern Africa in an attempt to make the Canadian Government policies consistent with its public condemnation of those countries. They also recommend that additional Canadian Trade Commissioners be appointed to the independent states in Africa to recross the present trading imbalance which they endure presently.

Regarding Namibia, the Y has accused the Government of not translating "into decisive policy its commitments under the Security Council Resolutions and the obligations placed upon it by the judgement of the International Court of Justice in 1971," arguing that "this area of policy thus provides a particularly depressing example of the hypocrisy of the pronouncements of Canadian attitudes towards racial oppression in southern Africa".¹⁷⁸

The principal focus of the interest groups centres around the activities of Canadian finances. The two programs presented as alternatives to present Canadian policy constituted both active

¹⁷⁷YWCA, Investment in Oppression, op. cit., p. 41-42.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 42.

disengagement of investment, and the promotion of liberal policies by Canadian investors which are actively non-supportive of racial policies. In October of 1973, when the Ontario Department of Industry and Tourism announced that Ontario would be sending a trade mission to South Africa, organizations stepped up the pressure against the mission, and were supported in the Ontario legislature by NDP leader Stephen Lewis. Publicity over the trade mission sparked protests from the churches and resulted in demonstrations at Queen's Park.¹⁷⁹

Although the 1973 trip went off as planned, despite public protest, it is interesting to note that in 1974, the trade mission from Ontario will journey to 38 countries but not to South Africa. The Government response traditionally has been to try to separate politics from business. This year's decision to bypass South Africa was reported to be the result of the manufacturers' desire not to become involved in a public controversy over a trade mission which did not receive public acceptance.¹⁸⁰

Pressure from interest groups has been directed at the Government, at business, and at the public. The Government's response has been that it does not exercise control over private investment abroad and to seek some form of moral suasion towards

¹⁷⁹The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, October 31, 1973.

¹⁸⁰"Trade Trips Will Bypass S. Africa", The Globe and Mail, February 13, 1974.

Canadian companies to disinvest or not to invest further "would involve a departure from the Government's longstanding policy of not taking responsibility for the investment decisions of private companies".¹⁸¹ As far as the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce is concerned, the responsibility for investment must rest with the individual boards of the companies.

However, when one approaches the major corporations involved with investing Canadian dollars in southern Africa, the buck has been handed back to the Federal Government. In a reply to questions concerning his practice of buying Angolan coffee, the president of General Foods, Ltd. in Toronto stated that "trade policies are matters best handled by proper government agencies rather than by individual companies or associations through the application of trade pressures".¹⁸² It was further argued by the G.F. public relations manager that Mr. Sharp had unequivocally urged that Canada should continue to trade with other countries in peaceful goods, and he was sure everyone would agree that coffee fell into the category of peaceful goods!¹⁸³

The Nestle Company of Canada responded in a similar fashion to queries about buying coffee from Portuguese colonies. D. McCarthy, President, responded that the members of the Tea and

¹⁸¹Mitchell Sharp, letter to Renate Pratt, Chairwoman, Study and Action Committee, YWCA of Canada, Sept. 14, 1973, see Appendix B.

¹⁸²R.S. Hurlbut, President, General Foods, Ltd., Toronto, in a letter to Mike Flynn, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, November 15, 1973, p. 2.

¹⁸³G. Beatty, P.R. Manager, General Foods, Toronto, letter to Susan Sharp, November 15, 1973, p. 2.

Coffee Association of Canada maintained firmly that "boycotts and their attendant economic, sociological and political dislocations, are matters which must be considered or acted on by the Federal Government or the United Nations".¹⁸⁴ As the company had kept in touch with the Federal authorities to make sure its position was known to them, the Nestle president felt that his company's activities had remained consistent with government policy regarding Angola.

One of the companies was dismayed at the energy being devoted to a coffee boycott when the Canadian oil imports from Angola were ten times as valuable as the coffee imports.¹⁸⁵

The dialogue with Canadian businesses has also been joined by the church groups. On March 21, 1974, more than half a dozen church representatives, holding proxies for about 53,000 shares of Alcan stock with a market value of more than \$1.75 million, launched an attack at the company's annual meeting. They charged that Alcan's presence in South Africa perpetuated the racial system there and demanded that the company reform its policies.¹⁸⁶

Chairman, Nathaniel Davis, replied that although Alcan was opposed to apartheid it was company policy not to meddle in the political affairs of any nation. The best Alcan could do,

¹⁸⁴D. McCarthy, President, Nestle (Canada) Ltd., Toronto, in a letter to Miss S. Sharp, February 15, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁸⁵George Beatty, Public Relations Manager, General Foods, Toronto, in a letter to Mike Flynn, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Toronto, November 26, 1973, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶Reported by Margaret Piton, "Churches Hit Alcan's S.A. Operations", The Gazette (Montreal), Friday, March 22, 1974.

he said, was attempt to bend the rules and improve conditions within the laws of the country; however, he did not reply to a request that the company pledge to adopt the poverty datum line of \$160 a month, claiming that "within the powers that we have and the environment we are operating in, Alcan is paying progressive wages".¹⁸⁷ But the point was aptly made by the churches that to be progressive in the South African context was not very meaningful.

In the face of the government and business response, the various interest groups have made concerted efforts to get the issue before the Canadian public. While maintaining its input to various standing committees, and questioning letters to the Boards of Directors, the people of Canada have been solicited to lend their support to consumer boycotts.

At its 99th General Assembly, the Presbyterian Church stated concern for the poor and underprivileged of the world, and resolved that all Presbyterians avoid buying coffee from Nestles (Taster's Choice, Nescafe) and General Foods (Maxim, Maxwell House, Yuban, Brim, Sanka), the largest Canadian importers of Angolan coffee beans. It further requested that each Session express its concern over the force labour situation in Angola by writing to their Member of Parliament, that the executive of the Church meet with the Presidents of General Foods and Nestles in an attempt to persuade them to alter their buying

¹⁸⁷Reported by Ternece Corcoran, "Alcan Won't Meddle in Politics", The Gazette (Montreal), Friday, March 22, 1974.

practices, and lastely, that a study booklet be compiled and circulated to all sessions concerning the situation in southern Africa.

In October of 1973, the Canadian Labour Congress joined in the coffee boycott by calling on its 1,800,000 members to refrain from drinking coffee imported from Angola. The action came as a result of an unsatisfactory response to the CLC's request of the Tea and Coffee Association of Canada to stop importing from Angola. In a press release by the CLC on October 16, 1973, Donald MacDonald, the CLC President, stated that "the consumption of Angola coffee by Canadians helps the war, while the non-drinking would move peace closer".¹⁸⁸

At the other end of Canada in the same month, a Vancouver citizens' group was organizing to instigate a boycott against liquor and wines from southern Africa and Portugal. The South Africa Action Coalition called upon the NDP government to remove all South African and Portuguese alcoholic beverages from the government liquor stores, saying that the move "would give concrete expression to the statements of NDP policy and would be recognized as a strong gesture of moral support for the people of southern Africa", and that while it could not be expected to have profound economic effect on the white regimes of southern Africa, "such action...would reaffirm the position of moral leadership

¹⁸⁸ Donald MacDonald, "CLC Urges Boycott of Angolan Coffee", Information, release from Canadian Labour Congress, Ottawa, October 16, 1973.

which has been the role of the NDP in this country".¹⁸⁹

In fact, the New Democratic Party had come out the previous July at its Seventh Federal Convention in favour of boycotting products from southern Africa. In the preamble to its resolutions on international affairs, the Party rejected all forms of exploitation of the Third World for political or commercial purposes, and proposed that Canadian corporations should be required to pay fair wages abroad.

Seeing the struggles in southern Africa as one of the world's most crucial problems constituting a grave threat to world peace, the NDP convention resolved that,

1. Canada should end its ambiguous and hypocritical stance on the question of freedom in Africa and take its stand on the side of those who are seeking freedom from oppression.
2. Canada should end at once the Commonwealth preferential agreement with South Africa.
3. Canada should withdraw its trade commissioners in southern Africa.
4. Canada should give increased aid to countries which are seeking to aid the freedom fighters in southern Africa.
5. Canada should recognize and aid the liberation movements in southern Africa and embargo companies which purchase from white-dominated Africa.

¹⁸⁹Rev. Phillip Thatcher, St. Simon's Anglican Church, North Vancouver, reported in "Citizens Seek Liquor Boycott", The Vancouver Sun, October 26, 1973.

6. Canada must end its investment in oppression and provide guidelines to all corporations operating in southern Africa towards eliminating the exploitation of the non-whites of those countries.

7. Canada should join the other countries in securing effective enforcement of the sanctions against the illegal regime of Rhodesia.

In an interview with Andrew Brewin, the New Democratic Party spokesman on this debate, the current Canadian policy was strongly criticized. According to Mr. Brewin, the White Paper on Foreign Policy reveals the basic ambiguity and duplicity of the Canadian approach to many subjects. The six aims established for Canadian foreign relations place economic growth above sovereignty, peace and security, the promotion of social justice, and the protection of the natural environment.

The ambiguity of Canadian policy is especially evident regarding our policy towards South Africa and the Portuguese African territories. In the UN, we pronounce condemnation of racism and totalitarianism, and lingering imperialism which are the essence of those systems, but we actively chose to promote economic growth. There have been some restrictions such as arms embargos, but trade commissioners to encourage Canadian investment in these countries means that we condemn on the one hand and promote on the other. The ambiguity is inherent in the Canadian policy statement of priorities, and underlying the whole policy is the fact that social justice and the quality of life take a second place to the economy.¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ Andrew Brewin, NDP MP, in a personal interview with the author, February 5, 1974.

Nor are the NDP in favour of Canada's qualifications of her votes in the United Nations. The Party does not see the Canadian purpose as keeping the Portuguese colonials happy. "The Government can rule as it sees fit. Portuguese disfavour is no big threat to Canada, and there is nothing to gain from Portugal or South Africa that isn't outweighed by African prospects."¹⁹¹

Mitchell Sharp's hesitancy to act more decisively on this issue centres around the belief that business and ideology should be separate. Mr. Brewin, on the other hand, believes that we should be bothered with moral issues in politics.

National interest in the economy is still possible with moral issues first. Maintaining a livable world is a number-one priority. Peace and security must come first. A stable world is based on enlightened self-interest and South Africa and Portugal should realize they are in danger.¹⁹²

However, there appears to be limited interest in the House of Commons on this matter, although the NDP plan to maintain their concern and activity. Nor are the interest groups extensively involved in organized lobbies, either for or against. Occasionally, there are news releases and publicity from South Africa, but domestic interests are not felt. There is a lobby within the Party, itself, or cut off South African and Portuguese products, but mainly, the Party contacts are maintained by periodic information letters from groups like

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Ibid.

SAIG, TCLPAC, CUSO, OXFAM, and the Student Christian Movement. These, in turn, are supplemented by study groups in the Party which pass resolutions and keep the delegates informed.

Canadian Aid

As stated in the White Paper on Foreign Policy, "development assistance...is a principle manifestation of Canada's continuing willingness to accept its share of international responsibility, a self-imposed duty to help improve the human condition".¹⁹³

Canadians contribute three cents out of every tax dollar to foreign aid, which is then dispersed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The CIDA program can be divided into eight main categories: 1) project assistance, 2) multi-lateral assistance, 3) non-government agencies, 4) food aid, 5) commodity aid, 6) lines of credit, 7) emergency relief, and 8) pre-investment incentives.

The CIDA official development assistance (ODA) budget for 1973-74 was \$565 million compared to \$491 million in 1972-73.¹⁹⁴ The largest portion of that money (38% in 1972-73) goes into project assistance which is the bilateral section of the aid dispersal. The figure for the year 1972-73 was over \$190 million. Of its bilateral appropriations for 1972-73, CIDA allocated \$153 million, or 46%, to Asia, \$118 million, or 35%, to Africa (41.5% of that to Commonwealth Africa), \$19 million

¹⁹³Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy For Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 35.

to the Commonwealth Caribbean, and \$3 million to Latin America.¹⁹⁴

The second largest slice of CIDA's budget, \$131 million, or 26.7%, is channeled through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and regional development banks. Canada has been a major contributor to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which finances most of the development assistance programs of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Another important aspect of Canadian aid is carried out by voluntary agencies outside the government, such as churches, universities, and service clubs. In 1971, non-government organizations (NGO's) contributed \$37 million to development co-operation. Selected NGO projects are subsidized up to 50% by CIDA when necessary, and in the 1972-73 budget, \$16.5 million was set aside for NGO support.

Just briefly to round off the description of CIDA budgeting, \$90 million per year has most recently been set aside for food aid; \$50 million worth is allotted to commodity aid; another \$15 million for line of credit has so far been meted out to Canadian exporters who sell development-related items to developing countries; \$600,000 per year is reserved for emergency relief activities with the option to shift funds from other programs when needed; and up to \$2,500 can be reimbursed to businesses

¹⁹⁴ John de Bondt, CIDA, "Canada's Aid to Developing Countries", Reference Papers, No. 86 (1973), p. 3.

interested in determining investment possibilities in Third World countries.¹⁹⁵

Apart from the altruistic reasons, Canada has recognized other reasons for giving foreign aid. Powerful political and economic motives spur international development co-operation. Canada needs the goodwill of other nations in trade, and the recognition of Canada's sovereign rights. In consideration of international complexities, Canadian aid has become highly-organized and professionally-run. As a part of public expenditure, "it is carefully directed, managed and audited"¹⁹⁶ and obviously reflects the prevailing policies in Ottawa.

When those policies alter, moreover, one might expect to see the change mirrored in foreign affairs. Such a situation occurred in August of 1973 when Prime Minister Trudeau spoke to the Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa. At that time, he reiterated the oft-stated condemnation Canadians directed towards southern African domestic policies. Reflecting its concern, Canada joined other Commonwealth members in agreeing to give humanitarian assistance to the indigenous people in southern Africa involved in the struggle to gain independence. "To refuse humanitarian aid to people who happen to be politically militant would be discriminatory".¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷Mitchell Sharp, "The Major Aims of Canadian External Policy", Statements and Speeches, No. 74/3, p. 13.

This more active concern for the liberation struggles in southern Africa was also carried to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1973. It was enunciated then, that CIDA would use its offices to channel funds for humanitarian needs to the guerilla groups through private agencies (non-governmental) such as the World Council of Churches, OXFAM, and the World University Service.

Public response to the different Canadian approach was varied, although mostly in favour of the new policy. There were those who held that it did not go far enough, and was still hypocritical since Canada would continue to pursue a policy of trading and dealing diplomatically with the white regimes of southern Africa. Some believed that the proposed move was a fundamental shift in foreign policy, and as such, warranted full debate in Parliament. Still others, though a minority, charged that the new action represented a contribution to terrorism and made Canada an accomplice to the blood-bath that would be sure to result from aiding the freedom fighters.

As a result of the press debates, the Government decided to hold back on the new programs until the matter had been publicly discussed, and until the new budget estimated for CIDA had been passed. At the time of the freeze, CIDA is reported to have been on the verge of announcing several grants to the African groups via the NGO's such as the World Council of Churches, OXFAM, the

World University Service, and CUSO.¹⁹⁸

In March, 1974, Sharp told the Commons miscellaneous estimates committee that humanitarian aid to the guerillas would be an extension of the existing system of support already being given, emphasizing that the aid would be limited to non-military, such as education and medicine, etc., and would be applied only through non-governmental groups.

Aid programs which were already a part of the established system continue without too much difficulty. Canadian funds authorized for the current fiscal year are being channelled through the United Nations and various international bodies in the following manner:

TABLE XVI

Canadian Government Funds

	1972	1974
UN Education and Training Program for Southern Africa	\$50,000	\$75,000
UN Trust Fund for Southern Africa	10,000	10,000
UN Scholarships for Namibians	25,000	25,000
Commonwealth Secretariat Scholarships for Rhodesians	75,000	67,000
International University Exchange Fund	50,000	75,000
UN High Commissioner for Refugees	-	50,000
Total	\$210,000	\$302,000

Source: Information supplied by United Nations Bureau, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

¹⁹⁸Report by High Winsor, "Canada Won't Send Aid to Africa Until Policy is Debated Publicly", Globe and Mail, February 21, 1974.

Subject to parliamentary approval, Canada will contribute \$175,000 to the UN Education and Training Program in Southern Africa, and \$100,000 to the international University Exchange Fund.¹⁹⁹

To date, however, no assistance has been offered to the liberation movements under the terms of the newly-stated program. Parliament has gotten involved, and will decide. In addition, such aid will be closely tied to the CIDA estimates for 1974-75. In the meantime, Canada continues its practice of giving substantial assistance to those states bordering on southern Africa. The programs are bilateral and directed at Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. The latter, for example, received \$14 million in development assistance from Canada in 1973-74.²⁰⁰ The probability of this kind of aid increasing is good.²⁰¹

The United Nations has also developed special programs for financial assistance to southern Africa. Amongst the resolutions adopted on the reports of the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Matters) in the twenty-eight session of the General Assembly, is resolution 3195 (xxviii), Programme Budget for the biennium 1974-1975. The two-year has allotted 4% of its total budget to matters relating to the African conditions in the following manner:

¹⁹⁹SAIG newsletter, Volume 2, Number 10, March, 1974, p. 1.

²⁰⁰Alan McGill, Director-General, African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of External Affairs, in personal correspondence with the author, February, 1974.

²⁰¹According to CIDA expectations.

TABLE XVII

U.N. Biennial Budget 1974-1975Relating to Southern Africa

	<u>U.S.</u> \$
Economic Commission for Africa	13,602,000
Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization - Policy-making organs	466,000
Department of Political Affairs, Trustee- ship and Decolonization	2,922,000
U.N. Council for Namibia, and UN Commissioners for Namibia	997,000
Human Rights	4,102,000
Total	<hr/> \$22,089,000

Canada has actively supported movements opposing the oppressive incumbent governments in southern Africa. Money to the resistance movements has been tied to specialized UN agencies and limited to humanitarian projects. However, as there are no resident UN representatives in southern Africa, aid is transferred to Angola via Zaire and Zambia, to Mozambique through the representatives in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya, to Guinea-Bissau from Senegal, and to South Africa via the UN Trust Fund for South Africa in London.

In addition, African Liberation Movements (ALM's) have access and participatory rights in some special UN bodies.

As of September 1973, Canada supported the participation of ALM's in the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAAO, ITMCO, and the ECA (Economic Committee for Africa).

Over the past several years, more Canadians have become involved in providing material and financial aid to the liberation movements in Africa. Because there is no central agency coordinating these organizations, it is difficult to determine exactly what kind and how much assistance is being directed to them.

The following is an indication of the type of activities in which non-governmental groups have become involved.²⁰²

I. OXFAM

A. Agriculture and Trade Project - Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

<u>1971</u>	<u>1973</u>
\$25,000	\$25,000

This project involves support for commerce and productive activities and is part of FRELIMO's over-all effort to improve conditions of the Mozambican people living inside the liberated areas of Mozambique. Eight major trading centers now exist and there are also some mobile trading posts that can function despite the war situation. OXFAM money has gone

²⁰² Data collected from Judith Marshall, Development Education Centre, Toronto; United Nations Bureau, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

towards seeds, agricultural tools, implements and veterminary, medicines, drugs and vaccines.

B. Radio Communications Project - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

1973

\$30,000

This project has consisted of supplying radio equipment to MPLA for communications with the Angolan people. Their use is also related to programs of education on health care, literacy and popular education.

II. CUSO Water Development Project - SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia)

1973

\$1,000

This water development project is related to the Namibian Education and Health Centre, a centre being created by SWAPO for refugees from Namibia who have fled to Zambia.

Here SWAPO is creating new agricultural, educational and health programmes which will both train Namibians in these areas and will also build up a self-reliant community not dependent totally on refugee aid programmes for support. CUSO has supplied a water pump for this centre.

III. LAID (London Association for International Development)

- Blanket Project - MPLA

1973

\$1,900

Blankets are needed for Angolans in the liberated areas where normal trading activities are disrupted and production of basic necessities of food and clothing is only beginning. This development education group in London collected more than 700 blankets from the London community for MPLA.

IV. TCLPAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies) - Transport Project - FRELIMO

1974

\$12,500

This project involves joint funding with OXFAM of an eight ton truck for transport of supplies from the harbours of Tanzania to the borders of Tanzania and Zambia with Mozambique, from where they are carried by foot. All seeds and tools for agriculture, drugs for medical programmes, school supplies for education programmes and clothing and footwear for the men, women and children in the area must be transported in this way. The crops now being produced in the liberated zones such as cashew nuts, sesame seeds and groundnuts

also are transported back to Tanzania for sale and eventual export in such vehicles.

V. LSM (Liberation Support Movement, Richmond BC) MPLA

This project initiated by LSM and supported by many other groups has provided a printing press for MPLA. It has meant that Angolans have had an opportunity to develop printing skills and also produce their own printed materials. These have included textbooks for the MPLA schools. LSM has also carried out many other projects.

VI. ARSC (African Relief Services Committee, Ottawa) MPLA

1972-73

\$111,400

ARSC has had ongoing contact with a number of groups. Its financial report describes a range of items which have been sent to the liberated areas of Angola. These include seeds, tools, hospital equipment and drugs, sent from groups in Chicoutimi, Quebec City, Montreal and Ottawa. ARSC has also made a film on Angola.

VII. Glebe United Church, Ottawa/ARSC - Hand Tools Project

1972-B

\$4,000

This project consisted of gathering a variety of hand tools such as hammers and wrenches to be sent to the MPLA for use by the Angolan Trade Union (UNTA). It formed part of a larger education project undertaken by the church on Portuguese colonialism and African struggles for liberation.

VIII. World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism

1974

\$322,000

Many churches in Canada have contributed to the World Council of Churches special programmes, including the Programme to Combat Racism. In 1974, \$322,000 of a budget of \$450,000 was designated for projects for those struggling against apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa. These projects have ranged from basic health, education and agricultural projects to such specifics as supplies of sewing machines or fishing rods.

IX. United Church of Canada - Angolan Liberation Movements

1974

\$22,000

The United Church has recently granted through the Board of World Outreach an amount of \$22,000 for

Angolans struggling for liberation. The \$15,000 granted to the World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism in 1973 was increased in 1974 to an amount of \$25,000 in addition to the amount specifically designated for Angola. Since 1961, it has provided aid totalling \$500,000 to the Angolan refugee community in Zaire.

X. (ICFTU) International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

\$1,500

This money was used to aid the refugees of the war who had fled to Zambia. In addition, funds have been made available to the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions.

XI. Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace

1973

\$9,800

Money here is used to support indigenous programs of an educational nature in southern Africa.

Chapter VI

THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADA

The preceding chapters have been involved in a lengthy description of Canadian relations with the countries in southern Africa. To this point, there has been little editorializing or analysis, although it is likely that the author has revealed some of her biases, unintentionally.

The mere presentation of information, however, is not the purpose of this paper. For the author, description is useful only if it leads to analysis and understanding. It provides the foundation upon which hypotheses can be constructed, from which point critiques may be made and alternatives may be suggested. If research is not the starting point for such understanding and advocacy, it becomes merely a way to pass the time.

This chapter will try to prepare a model within which the specifics of Canadian decision-making can be analyzed. Following that, the implications of both the decision-making process and its content will be assessed.

Since 1945, Political Science has focused on the processes by which public policy has been made, rather than the content.

The discipline has still not bifurcated into a distinctive basic science and a derivative profession, but fortunately more interest has been developing of late in policy content, and the decision-making process as a whole.

At the outset, it will be useful to establish some definitions which will aid in the discussions to follow. On public policy, Lasswell and Kaplan suggest that "policy is a projected program of goal values and practices".²⁰³ James Robinson says that "policy refers to goals (objectives, ends) of any social system, the means chosen to effectuate those goals, and the consequences of the means".²⁰⁴

Ramney proposes that public policy consists of: a particular object or set of objects, a desired course of events, a selected line of action, a declaration of intent, and an implementation of that intent.²⁰⁵ This paper will refer to policy in the broadest sense of the term as including goals, means and consequences.

The component parts of public policy are, therefore, the policy content, the policy process, and the policy outcome. Content deals with the particular substance of the policy. It specifically relates to the object the policy is intended to affect, the course of events desired, the line of action chosen,

²⁰³Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven: Yale U.P., 1950, p. 71.

²⁰⁴James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962, p. 3.

²⁰⁵Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968, p. 7.

the declaration of intent, and the action taken, as they are actually chosen in each case.²⁰⁶

Policy process refers to the actions and interactions that produce the decision-maker's ultimate choice of a particular policy content over another.

Policy outcome denotes the consequence of a political output, and refers to the way in which the course of events is, in fact, affected by the implemented policy.²⁰⁷

David Easton's model of a political system as adapted by Ranney, provides the best conceptualization of the policy process, and illustrates clearly the interrelationship of its component parts.²⁰⁸

The diagram is essentially a flow-chart, indicating a chronological relationship between its parts. The overall system exists in an environment within which the actors in the system determine their needs and wants. These needs and wants are translated into demands which are transmitted to the decision-making apparatus (Easton's "black box") for action.


²⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 7-8.

²⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁰⁸David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965, p. 32; this diagram has been slightly adapted by Ranney, op. cit.

Figure 1

THE POLICY PROCESS



Source: David Easton's Model of a Political System, as adapted by Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968, p. 9.

This is the input side of the system. The political system, in turn, makes decisions and implements them. This is the output side of the system. The outputs in their turn, act on the environment, and the needs and wants it presented to the decision-makers. The environment is either changed or unchanged by the new outputs, and a feedback process transmits this information back to the authorities as new inputs.

While the systems approach tends to simplify and clarify political life, it deals with the aggregate characteristics of whole political systems, and does not go into much detail about

what goes on within the political system. As this paper is concerned with the specific decision-making surrounding Canadian relations with southern Africa, a more elaborate model is required. Thomas Hockin, of York University, has suggested the framework which will be used for the specific analysis in this chapter of which more later.

Policy content or output has typically been considered the dependent variable of inputs and pressures, etc. Lowi and Froman reversed the traditional analysis and suggested that output may be viewed as the independent variable determining the actual policy process.²⁰⁹ Hockin reiterated this sentiment in his paper when he said that "patterns in a political process will vary according to the importance, the nature, and the stakes involved in, certain public policies."²¹⁰

Lowi began by proposing that organization and activities of interest groups vary with the type of public policy involved (distributive, regulatory, or redistributive). Distributive policy refers to the government's allocation of resources equally among all the putative groups. Re-distributive policies concern allocation of resources so that some groups or individuals are advantaged and others deprived. Both of these fall into the

²⁰⁹Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics, July 16, 1964; Lewis Froman, "The Categorization of Policy Contents", in Austin Ranney (ed.), op. cit.

²¹⁰Thomas Hockin, "Towards a Theory of Public Policy in Canada: A Preliminary Discussion Paper", a seminar at York University, unpublished manuscript, 1971, p. 2.

category of an allocative-type policy. Regulatory decisions are those where no resource allocation is taking place, but where an authority structure, or rules to guide future allocations, has been set up.

Salisbury and Heinz extended Lowi's typology by adding a self-regulatory type of policy whereby the government sets up a structure to make future decisions, but gives the structure considerable self-regulating powers.²¹¹ Both regulatory and self-regulatory categories they placed under the structural heading.

For them, policies were viewed as the outputs of the interaction between the pattern of demands and the structure of the decisional system. Demand pattern, which was either integrated or fragmented, was placed on the vertical axis, and the cost of reaching the decision ranged from low to high on the horizontal axis, producing a two-by-two matrix.²¹²

The demand pattern was considered fragmented when many actual or potential groups or interests were competing for similar policy objectives--what Hockin referred to as the pluralist model. Demand was considered integrated when input groups were united in demanding policy satisfaction but were not competing with one another for differing policies.


²¹¹R. Salisbury and J. Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications", in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science, Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970, p. 3

²¹²Ibid., pp. 3-4.

The structure of the decisional system involved the cost-benefit ratio of a decision as assessed by the decision-makers. Included in the consideration of cost were such factors as the advantage or disadvantage of conferring benefits, the cost of informing one's self sufficiently to make a decision, and the cost in time, energy, favours, money, of negotiating a coalition favourable to making the decision.

Two types of policy, allocative and structural, emerged as a result of the interrelationship between the demand pattern and the cost of decision-making. The model with which Salisbury and Heinz worked looked like this:

Figure 2



According to Salisbury and Heinz, "the more costly it is to organize the requisite coalition on an issue, the more likely it is that the policy outcome will be structural

rather than allocative".²¹³ They also believed that structural decisions "appear to reflect the inability of the decisional system to meet the rising cost of making its own allocative policy",²¹⁴

Perceived costs vary from policy to policy, and from individual to individual. On non-political, public policies where accepted standards are used, the public service is likely to be the focus of the decision-making; however, on political public policies, where the cost factor is important, attention should shift to the Cabinet or the Government Party caucus.²¹⁵

Hockin took the framework proposed by Salisbury and Heinz and added a third species of policy which he called "acknowledgement", whereby the decision-makers conferred no direct benefit nor established any structure, but did recognize the interest of an inputting group. Acknowledgement policies seemed to Hockin to be more gesture than policy, but they provided a more dynamic dimension to the Salisbury and Heinz model in that they were cathartic, lowered information costs, and allowed for changing political exchange values. Hockin's model looked like this:

²¹³Hockin, op. cit., p. 6.

²¹⁴Salisbury and Heinz, op. cit., p. 10.

²¹⁵Hockin, op. cit., p. 6, footnote #20.

Figure 3

<u>DEMAND PATTERN</u>	<u>ALLOCATIVE</u>	<u>STRUCTURAL</u>	<u>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</u>
	low	high	
integrated	Redistributive	Self-regulatory	formal
fragmented	Distributive	Regulatory	informal

COST OF
DECISION

The different policy types imply different process patterns. Distributive policies may reflect a "mutual non-interference" situation among the inputting interest groups-- what Hockin refers to as incrementalism in a non-zero sum decision. The redistributive policies, however, where some groups might be disadvantaged, is a zero-sum game, and tends towards ideological debating among the groups contending for limited resources in the hopes that the higher authorities, i.e., Federal Government, might become involved. Regulatory and self-regulatory decisions provide for considerable interaction between interest groups, but the latter tends to bring out the more elite and professional contenders. According to Lowi, "each arena tends to develop its own characteristic

political structure, political process, elites and group relations",²¹⁶ and is distinguished primarily by the degree of disaggregation of benefits to the groups affected by the policy in question.

Hockin rightly suggests that since distributive politics is the opportunity to disperse stakes to a wide range of contenders, there is less chance that intense controversy will result than in the redistributive or regulatory arena where there are obvious winners and losers. If this is so, he hypothesizes that the top political decision-makers will be less involved in distributive decisions than others.²¹⁷

Furthermore, demand groups recognize that a decision is redistributive, and a different political process emerges altogether (i.e., ideological, hence, sensitive, therefore, deserving top-level attention). Cost-benefit considerations of a decision as being low, he or she is likely to leave the actual decision to others.

In their book on the structure of policy-making Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin state that in order to understand how policy is made in Canada, one must look to the executive-bureaucratic arena.

Policy-making within the executive-bureaucratic arena is continuously and increasingly a contest between the on-going and new policy structures. The new policy structure operates primarily in and

²¹⁶Lowi, op. cit., p. 689.

²¹⁷Hockin, op. cit., p. 2.

and around the cabinet in the conversion of new political policy issues into outputs. The on-going policy structure operates primarily in and around bureaucracy in the continuing conversion of the manifest or latent support for existing programs into outputs.²¹⁸

They also suggest that, recently, there has been an extended effort to relate the on-going policies with the new ones, and the improvement which has resulted in priority-setting has been due primarily to the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning.²¹⁹

It is interesting to look at how well the case of Canadian decision-making on the issues surrounding southern Africa fits into the schema outlined above. The White Paper on Foreign Policy began by proposing six basic priorities for future Canadian interests: fostering economic growth, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, working for peace and security, promoting social justice, enhancing the quality of life, and ensuring a harmonious natural environment. The paper further proposed that the shape of foreign policy at any one time would be the result of the emphasis the Government place on the various themes.

On the conditions in southern Africa, which touch very definitely on the theme of social justice, Canada appears to have been a number-one exponent, verbally at least, of liberalizing the social systems there. One can easily look at the

²¹⁸Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin (eds.), The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada, Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1971, pp. 267-268.

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 268.

minutes and reports of United Nations, Commonwealth, and NATO meetings to find that Canada likes neither apartheid nor racism, and has said so on numerous occasions.

Coupled with this position, however, the Department of External Affairs has enunciated, most clearly through Mitchell Sharp, the policy of "balancing the themes" established for foreign policy. Canada continues to invest and trade in peaceful goods with countries of whose social policies she disapproves in pursuance of a goal called "non-politicized trade". In this case, the themes being balanced are the fostering of economic growth, and the promotion of social justice. In actual fact, it means that social justice has received the rhetoric and economic growth has received the action.

The maintenance of this policy over the decades has provided what Sharp referred to as "better-than-average" market conditions, and has benefited some Canadian businesses and exporters. In their turn, Canadians have had cheaper wine, sugar, and coffee, and received an indirect boost to the Canadian economy through higher rates of return on investment, etc. In this sense, past policy can be considered, in the Lowi-Salisbury-Heinz-Hockin analysis, a distributive one, since a wide variety of the social sectors were deriving some benefit from it. Interest in changing the policy was minimal, i.e., fragmented, and the cost of continuing it as far as decision-makers were concerned was low. Controversy was minimal; the issue, if any in fact existed, was not political, and was

therefore handled in essentially a mechanical way within the bureaucratic system.

The decision-making model applies itself very easily to Canadian decision-making on southern Africa as it existed up until the late sixties. It is at this point, however, that I would like to challenge the model and its basic premise.

The basis of the Lowian argument was a negation of the traditional practice of viewing public policy as a variable dependent upon the inputs, into the decision-making system. Instead, it proposed that policy could be conceived as the independent variable affecting the process itself.

The difficulty in this conceptualization is how to explain why a policy changes in the first place. The model indicates that when the type of policy changes, the demand groups alter their tactics. However, the case-study in question appears to be the classical problem of the chicken or the egg.

Towards the late 1960's and early 1970's, the number, type, and quality of interest groups concerned with southern Africa changed significantly. They went to the Government, in both the executive and bureaucratic arena, and asked for answers. The Government responded by saying that its long-existing practice had been to avoid such politicization of economic matters, and that if the Canadian involvement in southern Africa were to be changed, the liberal policy dictated that it be done by the individual businesses involved.

The interest groups then went to the business who responded that they keep a close watch on the official Government stand on the issue, and found those policies to be consistent with their business practices. Furthermore, they held that it was not the responsibility of the business sector to set foreign policy, and at such time as the Government gave them a directive to withdraw investments or boycott products on the basis of political issues, they would continue their present programs.

From this point, but not necessarily in such a clearly-defined chronological order, the matter was presented to the general public in an increasingly sophisticated manner (slide shows, movies, pamphleting, petitions, publications, and press reporting). As the demand pattern began to integrate, the Government began to view the debate with a more wary eye.

The other half of the chicken-or-egg dichotomy can be presented in the following way. At approximately the same time as the interest groups were increasing their ability, the Government announced a thorough review of its foreign policy. It is difficult to tell precisely how influential each circumstance (interest group activity and the foreign policy review) was in the creation of the other, but either the increased interest resulted in a policy review, or vice versa. The author doubts that they were purely coincidental.

In any event, the issue became redistributive. In the foreign policy review, there was a statement of aims which considered economic growth a major priority for future Canadian decision-making. Those who had been mollified by Canada's statements of anti-racism, or perhaps had been lulled into a sense of false security by their faith in the righteousness of their country, were awakened to the realization that Canada, too, could play the money game. It is not an unlikely assumption to think that there were those individuals who viewed the statement of priorities as a loss.

On the other hand, as this group began to integrate and advocate an alternative policy in southern Africa, the business sector of the Canadian society found themselves on the other side of the redistribution see-saw, for if the interest groups won, they must surely lose.

As such, the issue became increasingly political, the cost of making a decision became increasingly higher, and the contenders began to focus on the most fundamental, ideological arguments available (i.e., the relative importance of social justice as opposed to the maximization of profit in a free market).

The Government's response to the growing interest group pressure, although they might well argue that they have been leading rather than reflecting public opinion, has been to become more and more vehement in their official condemnation

of the white regimes in southern Africa. Both in the United Nations and in the Commonwealth, Canadians have aligned themselves with more progressive resolutions and statements than ever before, although they still fall short of advocating the interdiction of trade or forceful intervention.

The interest groups still pushed for more, nor did they slacken their drive to involve the public in the issues. Letters to the editor, and to members of parliament, plus moves to organize consumer product boycotts, brought more individuals into the debate, and raised the costs involved. Parliamentary opposition parties picked up the now-politic issue and brought it before the House of Commons.

In a classic example of trying to have your cake and eat it too, the Department of External Affairs announced in February of 1974, that Canada would start giving humanitarian aid to the liberation movements, the justness of whose struggles they had earlier recognized.

The problem was not so easily solved, however. Into the debate now entered a variety of white supremacists, and individuals genuinely concerned with the fear that such aid would merely assist terrorism in Southern Africa.

Although this new sector was quite small, it was sufficient to try the Government's convictions and find them wavering. The matter was considered to represent a major change in Canadian foreign policy, and due the proper process

of parliamentary debate. A Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Respecting Humanitarian Aid to Southern Africa has been struck, and the general public has been asked to present briefs on the subject.

To date, the vast majority of the briefs presented have been in support of the policy of giving humanitarian aid, yet no action has been taken. The issue is frozen in a parliamentary committee, while the interest groups are holding a wait-and-see vigil.

Here again, the process of Canadian decision-making can be clearly traced through the schema. Hockin suggests that in Canada, demands are seldom sufficiently integrated to cause a strong redistributive policy. The case of our decision-making here supports this hypothesis. In the first instance, the Government attempted to solve the problem, not by redistributing, but by expanding the stakes to be distributed, that is, by giving extra funds to humanitarian assistance, while still maintaining its traditional practice of trade in peaceful goods with the racist regimes. In the second instance, the interest groups now find themselves being held in abeyance by the creation of a parliamentary standing committee.

In a way, this may be construed as a structural response on the part of the Government. Salisbury and Heinz suggest that structural decisions "appear to reflect the inability of the decisional system to meet the rising cost of making its

own allocative policy".²²⁰

It is more likely, however, that the fundamental, ideological debate has increased the costs so much that the decision-makers cannot afford the luxury of a structural decision. Instead, they have been forced into a position where new initiatives are virtually impossible and maintenance of past programs is increasingly unpopular. At most, the Government has been able to informally acknowledge that a problem exists but unable to act. One might well expect that if the demands were to become more integrated a formal acknowledgment policy would be the result.

It will be more than interesting to see whether the interest group will be able to maintain or even increase their activity in the face of this recent holding action. If they can raise the costs of the delay, the Government will be forced to act in a redistributive way; however, if the opposing interest groups (few, though powerful), can raise the cost of the decision-making, it is likely that the next move will be into the regulatory category.

Doern and Aucoin point out that the white paper on foreign policy has changed from an informational mechanism used for describing on-going programs to a mechanism for developing new policy. They also suggested that it might have considerable

²²⁰Salisbury and Heinz, op. cit., p. 10.

influence in mobilizing these latent constituencies which support the status quo of on-going programs.²²¹ They further proposed that there is a considerable emphasis in Canada on the need for policy-making processes that enable more public participation, and that royal commissions, task forces, and white papers have occasionally increased the level of participation.²²²

Certainly the parliamentary Standing Committee has been the focus of increased public input into the decision-making system, and if not increased input, then at least more effective input. However, there is nothing to indicate that it has mobilized any latent constituencies which support the on-going program of relations with Southern Africa. Instead, the very groups which were pressuring for a changing policy were the ones to take advantage of the new access to the system, and the rationale for their activity has been argued strongly via the priorities established in the foreign policy white paper.


Lowi has suggested that there is a trend in technologically sophisticated systems to progress from distributive to regulatory policies. Following this point a little further, one can observe the growing costs involved in making decisions as one moves towards the right hand of the matrix. In fact, it would also be more accurate to indicate that the cost of making decisions

²²¹Doern and Aucoin, op. cit., p. 271.

²²²Ibid., p. 279.

grows as the demand pattern becomes more integrated. Certainly, this has been the case in the Canadian situation. If it is possible to adapt the model even further, it might be better to represent this feature in the following way:

Figure 4



The end point of this analysis brings us back to the arguments of common sense; that is, that in order to achieve one's ends in the political game, one must organize, integrate, increase the cost for the decision-maker if he does not heed you, and, neutralize your opponent, the central focus being in the executive arena.

There appear to be a number of contenders in the process of decision-making relating to Southern Africa--those who advocate the primary emphasis of the theme of social justice,

those who maintain the primacy of economic growth, and those, who, in the name of liberalism, make no judgement at all. The implications of these positions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter VII

IMPLICATIONS OF CANADIAN POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

For years, Canada has proclaimed through successive governments her abhorrence of the racist and colonial policies existing in southern Africa. The present Government has reiterated that concern in numerous public statements both at home and abroad.

In August 1973, however, in the Commonwealth Conference Communique issued from Ottawa, a new element was introduced into Canada's position. Prime Minister Trudeau "agreed on the need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged" in the efforts to achieve self-determination in southern Africa.

Despite the apparent new direction for Canadian policy indicated by the decision to broaden the current aid program for the African people by giving assistance to the liberation struggles, the truth of the matter is that the policy today differs very little from the one this country has been following for decades. As a result of the issue being placed before the House of Commons, a move to implement a more progressive program has been delayed indefinitely. The matter has been removed from the offices of the bureaucracy and placed squarely

at the feet of the elected public representative, the implications of which deserve careful attention.

The Government has quite correctly stated that "it is in the international interest to find solutions to global problems. Indeed, we have no choice. Canada's good fortunes will be short-lived if it is not accompanied by a sense of responsibility for the fortunes of others".²²³ The world community has singled out Portugal and South Africa for severe censure of their racist policies, and on moral grounds alone it is demeaning to fundamental human values to ignore the continuation of these policies. For is the author prepared to accept that morality and justice have no place in international or political affairs.

For the more materially-minded individuals, another important dimension of this problem which warrants attention is the question of the future. Southern Africa today is the scene of bloody racial wars. The Portuguese colonies have just recently won their independence, but only at a great cost in lives and resources. The situation there is by no means settled, and it is unlikely that the white minority, which has lived at the upper levels of that social system for centuries, will lightly give up its spot to the "uncivilized" blacks.

²²³Mitchell Sharp, "The Major Aims of Canadian External Policy", Statements and Speeches, No. 74/3, 1974, p. 15.

The potential for violent upheaval in the rest of southern Africa is undeniable. In conversations with some activists of the liberation movements in exile in Canada, it is quite evident that the time of confrontation between blacks and whites in those countries is coming. The strength of the entrenched minorities guarantees that the struggle will be long and bloody and will surely invite international response. There is no doubt in my mind that Canada's choice is being watched carefully by the non-white nations of the world, and the decisions we make now will have very long-range effects on our future.

In addition, the longer Canadian dollars are allowed to support the white governments in southern Africa, the more tangled they must become with the interests of apartheid and racism. Continued trade and investment could reduce the foreign policy options open to us, should a crisis occur, and it is likely that Canadians will find themselves supporting the losing side when the situation is finally resolved.

To date, Canadians have tried to walk both sides of the street by pursuing the themes of social justice and economic development concurrently. The Government has argued that "balancing the themes" is possible, but in fact, the case has been that economic development has been getting the action, and social justice has received the rhetoric. Our policy has been a study in non-decision-making--a carefully orchestrated and rationalized program of trying to please everybody at once.

The study of decision-making has been described as the study of a system in action. In this Canadian case-study, however, we are witness to a dynamic process of inaction. The reasons for this are very fundamental to the western political ideology to which Canada subscribes. The starting point is a liberal philosophy.

Liberalism has been defined by one of its advocates as:

a system of ideas that aims at the realization of the pluralist society, favoring diversity in politics, economics, religion, and our cultural life. It is opposed to uniformity; it is opposed to conformity...it favours the widest possible degree of self-determination....It is essentially antiauthoritarian, (and) seeks to increase the individuality of man by increasing his area of choice and decision. It is essentially humanitarian in its appeal and therefore endorses toleration....²²⁴

It is precisely on these qualities that modern-day critics focus their attacks on liberalism. Reinhold Niebuhr, T.S. Eliot, John Hallowell and Sebastian De Grazia regard the liberal as wrong in leaving moral considerations out of his political discussions. According to them, the liberal is specifically wrong in assuming that man has a natural reasonableness and spontaneous goodness upon which to construct policy for making human rights secure in the political

²²⁴Alan P. Grimes, "The Pragmatic Course of Liberalism", in W.J. Stankiewicz (ed.), Political Thought Since World War II, Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1964, p. 142.

community.²²⁵

Professors Wilmoore Kendall and J. Austin Ranney, on the other hand, argue that the liberal wrongly interjects moral considerations into political discussion, and that he is specifically wrong in regarding individuals and minorities as having inviolable rights in a democracy.²²⁶

Niebuhr has castigated the American experience as demonstrating an irrational faith in reason and a moral blindness to man's inherent immorality. This argument is that liberals have failed to realize that our misdeeds are natural and persistent manifestations of man's innate sinfulness and irrationality, and that the liberal's illusions about the possible scope of moral achievement at any given time often result in a net loss for morality.²²⁷

Similar criticisms may be made of Canadian decision-making. In the case of Canadian relations with southern Africa, the Government has consistently maintained that its policy is not to interfere in the decisions of the private business sector regarding trade and investment. Rather, it is the responsibility of the individual companies to determine where

²²⁵Francis W. Coker, "Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism", in Stankiewicz, op. cit., p. 380.

²²⁶Ibid.

²²⁷Ibid., pp. 387-389.

they stand with regard to the issues being debated and take independent action on the basis of their individual viewpoints.

Some Canadian companies have responded, however, that it is not the role of their businesses to become involved in political issues. Instead, they claim to look to the Government for initiatives, and seeing none they have continued to invest and trade with the white governments in southern Africa.

In fact, the majority of Canadian businesses involved are not even willing to debate the question. In response to a questionnaire sent out by the YWCA Study and Action Committee of the World Relationships Committee, three companies took the position that the issues of company policy regarding working conditions, wages of the black labour force employed by them, and the corporations' views of the role of Canadian investment in southern Africa, were not legitimate subjects for public concern.²²⁸

Only four out of the ten companies surveyed were willing to discuss their activities in Africa and the broader issues involved.²²⁹ Even then, however, no evidence was offered to support the belief that those companies were exerting a liberalizing influence on the unjust conditions suffered by the black Africans.

²²⁸YWCA, Investment in Oppression, op. cit., Appendix II.

²²⁹Deleuw, Cather and Company of Canada, Ltd., Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., Ford Motor Company of Canada, and Massey Ferguson Ltd.

The implications of this situation are serious. Firstly, in light of the prevailing attitude of the Government, the most crucial part of Canadian foreign policy regarding southern Africa is being carried out by the business sector of this society. Secondly, not only have the majority of the businesses indicated a lack of concern for the questions of the Canadian public on this issue, but they have also demonstrated no inclination on their own to use their influence to alleviate some of the social tensions in the southern African countries. In short, we have a situation where important decisions are being left to individuals or groups of individuals who have renounced any responsibility for moral leadership, and who, for the most part, have indicated an unwillingness to be answerable to anyone, save the Government, which has publically and repeatedly advocated a non-interventionist posture!

The question of the role of a liberal-thinking government is crucial here. Essentially, liberalism advocates toleration. De Grazia condemns this characteristic as being the enemy of morality as well as of the community,... "a radical immoral force", which has turned the tolerator into a "twilight man".²³⁰ Francis W. Coker warns that optimism about human nature "may obscure the need for creative thought and imagination. Tolerance may degenerate into indifference and

²³⁰Coker, op. cit., p. 395.

irresponsibility."²³¹ T.S. Eliot believes that present-day liberalism no longer serves a useful purpose; that like democracy, it has "become a spineless creed, lacking any beliefs strong enough to stand up against the diabolic faith of racism, class war, and the selfish imperialism and revolutionary socialism...it is a religion of materialism".²³² Finally, Hallowell adds that overconfidence in man's reasonableness and goodness, inherent in liberalism, becomes an exaltation of will over reason, which leads to the triumph of evil over good. He further argues that bourgeois liberalism considers only the material individual; that extreme liberalism "denies the existence of divine authority and thus in effect makes every man a law unto himself", a situation which is congenial to the rise of tyranny.²³³

The issue of whether a government should restrict itself to simple representation of the will of the majority of the people, or whether it should, with access to superior information, take an active role of leadership on matters of serious social consequence, is certainly debatable in the Canadian context. Liberal beliefs have stressed toleration of

²³¹Ibid., p. 397.

²³²Ibid., p. 389.

²³³Ibid., pp. 391, 395.

individuality and variance of opinion. Liberalism allows one the right to be wrong. The real question here is, however, how wrong does one have the right to be? Is it possible to be unbiased, uncommitted, neutral and tolerant on the question of racism, and are we still debating the merits of slavery? The issue really is a matter of black and white.

It is simply not enough to condemn this kind of social injustice. Condemnation is meaningless without action. Moral convictions about rights imply moral convictions about obligations.²³⁴ The time has come when the merits of liberalism and toleration must be reassessed. The time has come when one must choose and act for what is right, and the time has come when the Government must lead. Nor is there a precedent about which we must worry. Canadian prisons attest to the fact that we have recognized some crimes against society as being more serious than the risk of removing personal liberties. Even then, how is it possible to rationalize civil liberty as a central principal when that principal is claimed by one faction as the right to deny liberty to others? Surely, there is no more debate on the principles at stake in racial discrimination.

The irony of the situation is that a large segment of the Canadian public is asking the Government to become more involved. Minimum demands are for a cessation of the financial support being rendered to the white regimes through trade and

²³⁴Ibid., p. 397.

investment. More active lobbyists seek Canada's direct aid to, or participation in, liberation struggles, although it must be pointed out that this view is held by a minority of the individuals in the interest groups. Canadian official response is neutrality, although it is debatable how neutral a stand is which leaves one contending faction free to perform as it wishes.

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, in a speech to the University of Toronto on October 2, 1969, put the question more clearly when he said,

...The questions remain. Will Canada at least understand that freedom means as much to us in Africa as it does to any other peoples? And, if Canada cannot support our struggle, will it at least be able to refrain from giving comfort and help to those who would deny freedom and dignity to us?²³⁵

The Government has expressed serious concern about what it calls flagrant injustices in southern Africa. Peaceful humanitarian aid was thought to be one way to demonstrate tangibly where Canada stood on the issues of racist and colonial injustices. But the prevailing liberal and business ethics did not allow the Government to work against either the white southern African regimes or the vested interests of Canadian business. It therefore chose to contribute to the movements which were fighting for independence.

²³⁵Cited in Alex Brown, Peter Bunting, Clyde Sanger, Southern Africa: Some Questions For Canadians, Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 1973, inside front cover.

The gesture served to soothe many guilt feelings and relieve some of the dissonance which inevitably results in those who speak bravely and still choose a fence-sitting position. It was a classic case of the psychologist's approach-avoidance syndrome--in short, they were damned if they did and damned if they didn't! Unfortunately, in addition to having been frozen in public debate, the gesture has totally side-stepped the real issue which is, where do Canadians stand on racism?

In his correspondence with the YWCA, Mr. Sharp has pointed out that the Government assistance available to firms investing in southern Africa is "not of any apparent significance to the firms which have already invested there, so denial of assistance does not seem to be relevant".²³⁶ He has further argued that any action Canada might take would be futile unless every other nation in the world took similar action.²³⁷ These arguments supposedly support the official decision to maintain its traditional policy towards southern Africa.

Once again, the Government has missed the point. An individual who supplies the bullet for a gun which he knows will be used to kill is guilty of being an accomplice before the fact, even though he supplied only one bullet. The size of Government involvement in injustice is really quite irrelevant

²³⁶Sharp, letter to Renate Pratt, YWCA, op. cit., p. 4.

²³⁷Ibid.

to the fact that it is a contributing agency to that injustice. Nor should a morally correct action be predicated solely on a guarantee of its success. One must begin by doing what is right, regardless of the odds.

The writer finds it difficult to understand why the Government does not act. There are possibly six alternative initiatives decision-makers could take on this issue requiring varying degrees of effort and correspondingly varying degrees of departure from the centrally-held principal of liberal thought.

A) Intervention--At the most extreme end of the continuum, we could discuss the possibility of direct intervention by the Canadian Government in the affairs of the southern African countries in opposition to racial injustices.

B) Withdrawal--A more tolerant position than direct intervention in foreign affairs would be the mandatory withdrawal of all Canadian trade and investment in order to ensure that Canadian dollars were not supporting social injustice.


C) Suasion--Less interventionist, still, and by definition, more liberal, would be a policy of active discouragement by the Government of relations with southern Africa, by means of moral suasion and removal of incentives, though the final decision by individuals to maintain relations would be self-determined.

D) Aid--Another possibility of action which moves closer to a neutral position might be a policy of giving financial aid to those activities which we support (i.e., liberation movements in southern Africa), while allowing opposing factions to freely pursue their own ends.

E) Education--In the event that a decision-maker feels that even financially aiding one faction is an intolerant and illiberal position, there is the possibility of becoming involved in an active public educational program to provide individuals with a better basis on which to make their own decisions.

F) Talk--In the absence of any desire to take action, although still inclined to have an opinion on a subject, decision-makers can limit themselves to verbal activity alone (i.e., condemnation or approval, expressions of dislike, abhorrence, or praise, etc.).

Figure 5



It was stated before that minimum demands of the interest groups opposing the policies of southern Africa were for the Canadian Government to withdraw its financial support from those governments. At the moment Canadians are doing the least possible without being completely neutral. In fact, any move which indicates greater concern would be a step in the right direction.

If there are real problems in instituting a program of humanitarian aid to the liberation movements then the next less-controversial step, but still one which is more positive than our present stance, is to engage in a widespread public information campaign exposing Canadians to the full truth of Canada's involvement in southern Africa. This writer, who has likely had more exposure than the average citizen, has gained it only as the result of one year's extensive investigation, and even now, only the surface has been scratched. When presented with these facts, the vast majority of individuals spoken to have been eager to align themselves with, and actively participate in, groups which are lobbying to change our policy. The Government, which is in a much better position to gain information, owes it to the Canadian people to inform them that they are involved in something which they have been righteously condemning for decades.

Most sectors of Canadian society seem to be able to admit that conditions in southern Africa are inhumane and should

be changed, but those who have the most to lose by a change in policy, investors and individuals who support the economic development theme, for example (although the gains to be had are questionable), have opted to maximize the ideological aspects of the decision. The Government, too, has been loath to make a move which might appear to be "un-liberal".

Because of these broader considerations the issue is becoming more and more political. As such, the policy-decisions are being moved out of the bureaucratic arena and into the executive one. Success appears to rest on being able to raise the costs of the decision in the executive branch of the Government and being able to maintain a highly-integrated and growing demand in input.

To do this, some of the lobbying groups and their supporters will have to alter or extend their activities. The focus of attention should no longer be the bureaucracy, but rather, the businesses and the legislative and executive branch of government. A concerted, three-pronged attack is required.

Firstly, the investing sector must be convinced that it is no longer in its best financial interest to maintain its relations with southern Africa. This might be accomplished by extending consumer boycott activity, and withdrawal of investments in those companies which do not respond to stockholder concern. Groups such as the churches, which have large holdings in some companies, and access to many individuals,

have a very significant role to play in this direction.

Secondly, the continuation and extension of public education is important. Many Canadians are simply unaware of the real situation in southern Africa and Canada's connection with it, and are willing to throw in their support if given an opportunity and if they are convinced that their contribution is useful.

Thirdly, the political nature of this issue must be increased. Elected representatives are receptive to public input particularly if it becomes a vote-getting issue. Continued input to the bureaucracy is also useful in that many civil servants see their first duty as protecting their Minister. If they believe that public opinion warrants it, many changes can be recommended to the executive by the people whose credibility is usually well-respected.

Canadian policy in southern Africa is the result of a compromise between the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and the Department of External Affairs, although it is also evident that the slate of decision-makers does not limit itself to the officials within the Government. The great dilemma appears to be why we are focussing on southern Africa and not on Cuba, China, Greece, or Chile. However, the situation is not parallel. Nor can we fool ourselves by claiming that economic action directed by non-economic considerations is a precedent. NATO still carries a list of goods banned to Communist countries.

The point is, that continued fence-sitting by the Canadian people can only have very negative consequences for everyone. Unless we learn that soon, and do something about it, we will deserve what we get.

It is significant to note that the situation exemplified by this case-study is not unique to Canadian foreign policy. It is undoubtedly related to the notion that Canadians have of being a middle power in international affairs. Such an attitude is accompanied by a limited vision of what we can do, and an oft-repeated practice of issue-evasion. We have made a virtue of this prudence when, in truth, it is the outcome of decision-making by a short-sighted people. If any changes in Canadian relations with southern Africa are to be effected, they must begin with a very fundamental change in Canadians' self-image. Then, and only then, will one be able to look at the whole of Canadian foreign policy and see that we are a people who believe in and who know what we are doing.

Chapter VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As a Canadian, I identify myself with Canadian foreign policy; as a student, in several senses of the word, I was driven to try to understand how and why the decisions on that policy were made and how the system worked; as a human being, with a strong sense of conscience, I was concerned with the rightness of that policy. Such was the motivation for this research.

The study began by accumulating information on the matter at issue, that being, the social conditions of the southern African countries of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. The author hopes that the simple presentation of that information, without influence or editorializing, brought the reader to the conclusion that the conditions existing in Southern Africa are inhumane and unjust, and deserve international condemnation and response.

After examining Canada's stated position on the situation as evidenced at the national and international level, the research moved to examine more closely the actual relations Canada has with those countries. It was evident, that although the official statements were severely condemnatory of the conditions suffered

by the black people in Southern Africa, at the hands of a white minority, the practice of Canadian relations through trade and investment not only was not a liberalizing force, but, in fact, contributed to the strength and maintenance of that injustice.

Over recent years, public opinion has been growing in opposition to the continuance of such relations, and the Government has indicated its unwillingness, essentially for ideological reasons, to alter its policy. Even as public pressure grew, the Government's inclination to change was dictated by political necessity more than a readiness to take responsibility for moral leadership.

This paper is not intended to be a call to abolish liberal thought or government. It is intended, rather, to make the point that there are times when issues present themselves which are so serious as to warrant widespread and concerted human intervention, liberal advocacy notwithstanding. It is also intended to make the point that there are times when decision-makers should take it upon themselves to lead, and not limit themselves to representation of the people alone. It is intended to make the point that there are times when toleration cannot be tolerated! It is intended to make the point that now is one of those times.

Nor is this paper intended to advocate the most extreme form of response from the Canadian people on the issues at stake

in southern Africa. At the very least, Canadians could eliminate the preferential treatment granted to South Africa, or extend information to the public to advise it of its unwitting involvement in this inhuman anachronism.

If it is apparent that toleration will be carried to the extreme, and that the extension of human rights to all individuals is a voluntary matter, those who are concerned will have to make their case in other terms. If we cannot look to our elected officials for moral leadership, then there are two alternatives--either make the stakes in terms they can understand (i.e., political), or change the leadership.

The Government has stated in its Foreign Policy for Canadians, the importance of sustaining "economic growth and the advances in science and technology, so that they serve to improve rather than impair the quality of life for all Canadians".²³⁸ It is all well and good to make such statements, but unless one is prepared to make them come true, it is a waste of energy.

The principal of liberalism is only one of many right things in this world, but it is not the final virtue. If one has not learned how to be human and just, one must be taught. Man's inhumanity to man must not exist in the name of toleration. The priorities are perceived incorrectly. Man must first learn

²³⁸Canada, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 30.

to be right, and then to be liberal. Things can be changed, but only if people work to change them, and the nature of Canadian relations with southern Africa is one of those things that needs to be changed.

UNIT ON APARTHEID

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

No. 2/74

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*

February 1974

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Paper by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa

[Note: This issue contains a paper prepared by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF) for a Conference on "South Africa - the Imprisoned Society," held in London on 8 December 1973 to launch a campaign for the release of South African political prisoners.

The United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 3055 (XXVIII) of 26 October 1973, had appealed to all Governments, organizations and individuals to undertake more vigorous and concerted action to publicize and support the legitimate cause of all those persecuted in South Africa for opposition to apartheid and racial discrimination.

The London conference was organized jointly by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the IDAF, the National Union of Students, Liberation, London Trades Council and other groups with the sponsorship of a number of British leaders, as well as 40 former South African political prisoners.

The IDAF, led by the Reverend Canon L. John Collins, has long been the principal source of support for the legal defence of political prisoners in southern Africa and assistance to their families. It has campaigned actively for the liberation of all persons persecuted by the South African Government for their opposition to apartheid. Its work has been commended by the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid and by the South African liberation movement.

74-05634

* All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted.

Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

This paper deals with the detention and imprisonment of men and women from South Africa. To restrict the subject in this way is, in an important sense, misleading. To the men behind barbed wire in 'bachelor hostels' in Langa, in nine compounds on the Witwatersrand, and to their families in barren 'homelands', the distinction between their lives and the lives of those on Robben Island must often appear academic. If the term 'political prisoner' is to have any meaning, there are 16 million political prisoners in South Africa. In the words of a released white political prisoner, 'I had to go inside prison to find out what it was like to be a black outside.'

A primary distinction must be made between (a) detainees held without trial; and (b) convicted prisoners, sentenced in the courts.

At the same time, there are the restrictees - political opponents of the government who, without trial or recourse to the courts, are banned, restricted or banished, and who, in effect, are made to be their own jailers.

The first great wave of political prisoners after the shootings at Sharpeville in 1960 entered South African prisons during the State of Emergency declared after the shootings. By the end of the emergency in August 1960, 11,503 persons had been detained without trial for periods of up to 5 months; 774 persons were convicted in 1960 and sent to prison, mainly for periods of less than 3 years. Since then a series of laws of increasing severity, defining political offences more and more widely, has considerably enlarged the power of the State and that of the Security Police. From 1960 to 1967, 140,000 people were convicted of, or detained without trial, for political offences.

A. Detainees

1. The laws

Proclamations 195 (1927, re-enacted in 1967), R400 (1960) and R17 (1972) apply to Africans or in African areas only; the latter two allow for indefinite detention.

The 180-day and 14-day laws (1965) and Section 6 of the Terrorism Act (1967) apply universally, the last providing for indefinite detention incommunicado in solitary confinement. A seventh law, the 90-day law, was suspended at the end of 1964.

2. Number of detainees

It is impossible to find out how many people have been detained since the passing, in 1967, of the Terrorism Act, which forbade publication of such figures.

What is known is that, from 1963 to 1967, at least 2,400 persons were detained without trial, some for periods of 200 days or more.

The following figures cover detentions under laws other than the Terrorism Act:

	<u>1965-67</u>	<u>1968-70</u>
180-day law	400	66
Proclamation 400	271	95

Figures for detentions under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act are not published and the fact that a larger number of detentions take place under this Act accounts for the apparent decrease in the above numbers. It is clear that detention periods under Section 6 have been much longer. For example, two detainees who were eventually brought to trial - Mr. Peter Magubane and Mr. Benjamin Ramotse - had been held for 586 days and 28 months respectively. A third, Mr. Desmond Francis, who was called as a witness, had been held in solitary confinement for 421 days.

3. Conditions for detainees

Detainees are held at the absolute discretion of the Security Police. They are allowed no visits or letters or any access at all to the outside world. Detainees under the 180-day law are required to be visited by a magistrate once a week; detainees under the Terrorism Act once a fortnight 'if circumstances permit'. The visiting magistrates have been criticized in the South African House of Assembly for being 'unobservant'.

Allegations of torture while in detention have become a regular feature of trials in South Africa. These allegations - by accused and by witnesses - are detailed and consistent, and describe treatment ranging from electric torture to the driving of nails through men's penises. The allegations are denied by the Security Police.

It has been officially admitted that 22 persons have died in detention, causes being given as 'suicide' (11), 'natural causes' (3), 'thrombosis' (1), 'broncho-pneumonia following minor head injury' (1), 'slipped on soap' (1), 'accidental fall down stairs' (1), 'unknown' (4). In addition to these, the Minister of Justice stated that in 1972, 40 persons, excluding those detained under the Terrorism Act, had died while in detention.

B. Convicted Prisoners

1. The laws

There are four main security laws: the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Unlawful Organisations Act (1960), the Sabotage Act (1962) and the Terrorism Act (1967).

2. Numbers

By the end of 1966, according to official figures, the number of prisoners convicted under the main security laws rose to a peak of 1,825.

The numbers at the end of subsequent years were down as follows: 1967-1,335; 1968-1,019; 1970-809; 1972-464.

3. Conditions

Prisoners are held in three main prisons: Robben Island, black men; Pretoria Local, white men; Barberton, black women. There are no longer any white women political prisoners. It should be noted that Namibian prisoners are also held on Robben Island.

Conditions of political prisoners are tied to those of common law prisoners, but there are a number of areas where politicals are discriminated against and given special treatment. The Prisons Act of 1959 prohibited the publication of any false information concerning prisons or prisoners. It had the effect of a ban on the publication of any information whatsoever. The government has refused to hold any public enquiry into prison conditions.

The Strachan Revelations

In 1965 the Rand Daily Mail published a series of interviews with Mr. Harold Strachan, a released political prisoner. Mr. Strachan told a shocking story of sadistic warders, filth, obscenity and brutality, African prisoners 'herded like animals'; of government by caprice; and the flouting of regulations by prison authorities.

The State subsequently laid charges against Mr. Strachan, the journalists and the newspaper, but the disclosures had, in the words of a recently-released political prisoner, 'broken open the whole system'. Several improvements in the physical conditions of the prisoners (not only politicals) followed and outside concern at the revelations led, for instance, to the building of a new section in Pretoria for white politicals, with better living quarters and a workshop. But conditions in black prisons are clearly worse than for whites. In 1969, the Minister of Prisons said no workshop would be established on Robben Island: black prisoners could stick to their work of breaking rocks and collecting sand and seaweed.

The Robben Island petition and the Diemont judgment

In 1973, black politicals presented a petition to the Commanding Officer of Robben Island. Complaints included: harassment and assaults by certain warders; denial of library, recreational and study facilities; insufficient and unpalatable foods; dangerously casual and unhygienic medical attention; contradictory and capricious instructions; and denial of information on their rights.

At least one of the prisoners connected with the petition was punished with 6 months' solitary confinement. In a court action arising out of this punishment, Mr. Justice Diemont declared that the punishment was illegal and ordered that prisoners be given copies of the Prison Regulations on request.

He ruled, however, that access to library and recreation facilities, and permission to pursue courses of study, were not prisoners' by right -- they could be granted at the discretion of the prison authorities.

Women

Barberton Prison has been largely ignored in the publicity and pressure that has brought about reforms for the men. It is a harsh punitive prison in the hot lowveld. The women are held in a tiny section, their longest walk being 10 yards to the matron's office. There are no recreational facilities whatever and the women are not even allowed to look out of their cell windows. They do washing and cleaning.

4. Special treatment of politicals

Officials deny that there are 'political prisoners' in South Africa and say that no prisoners are discriminated against. But the treatment of the political prisoners clearly differs from that of common law prisoners in a number of important aspects.

(a) No remission, amnesty or parole.

This means, for example, that a man with a life sentence faces the prospect of never leaving prison.

(b) No news, radio or newspapers.

This is an arbitrary order from the Security Police, which the Prisons Department must enforce and which creates severe additional tensions on all aspects of prison life, particularly letters and visits which are closely censored and monitored.

(c) No remuneration for work.

(d) Placing in Grade D.

The system of placing prisoners in categories A to D, with accordant privileges, is used as a weapon against the politicals, who invariably begin in Grade D and find 'promotion' slow and difficult. (Grade D prisoners were initially allowed one-half-hour visit and one 500-word letter every 6 months. This has improved to the extent that Ds are now allowed a letter a month. The pinnacle of privilege is A group, with 3 letters and two half-hour visits a month.)

5. Arbitrary withdrawal of other privileges

Library and study facilities are often denied to politicals in an attempt to ensure 'good behaviour', and as a means of psychological torture.

6. Ultra-strict enforcement of regulations

One Commanding Officer told politicals in Pretoria: 'I can use the regulations to break you'. For instance, though the regulations stress

maintenance of contact with relatives and friends as an important aspect of treatment, in the case of politicals other regulations are used to prevent this. Mr. Bram Fischer was refused permission to attend his son's funeral. Reasons are found to withhold letters. Normal contact and privileges allowed for A group prisoners are denied to politicals.

C. Restricttees

1. The banned

The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 empowered the Minister of Justice to ban publications, organizations, meetings or individuals if, in his opinion, they in any way furthered the aims of 'communism'. The interpretation of this term is remarkably wide and has been used against most authentic opponents of apartheid. The initial banning orders prohibited persons from attending "any gatherings with a common purpose". Amendments to the Act in 1962 substantially increased the scope and severity of the banning orders: a banned person, as a member said in the House of Assembly, was made to suffer 'civil death'.

The Minister of Justice is not obliged to give any reasons for imposing the restrictions. The banning orders are usually issued for two-or five-year periods and are renewable. A ban effectively makes a person his own jailer.

Banned persons can be prohibited from attending any gatherings, whether with a common purpose or not. Definition of a gathering has been accepted by the courts as a meeting of two or more persons, including the banned person. Banned persons have been convicted of breaking their bans, for example, by playing bridge, by chaperoning a daughter to a New Year's Eve party, and by sitting in a kitchen while a party proceeded in the living room.

Banned persons can be required to report to the police either daily or weekly or, in special cases, more frequently: one man whose work took him outside his own magisterial district had to report four times to the police on work-days.

Failure to report has led automatically to conviction; in one case at least, even when a banned person had obtained prior permission from a police officer to report at a different time.

Movement can be severely restricted. A banned person can be confined either to a specified magisterial district (not necessarily his own home district) or, in the case of "house arrest", to his own flat or house. The restrictions apply outside of working hours and at weekends and all public holidays and can also be imposed for 24 hours of every day.

Banned persons can be prohibited from entering certain areas and premises such as areas set aside for other race groups, factories, educational premises and premises where any publications, including

newspapers, are prepared. This provision has led to many opponents of apartheid being forced out of their employment, and it imposed an effective ban on the activities of many trade unionists.

It is an offence to publish or disseminate anything that a banned person has ever said or written. The ban does not apply only to political statements but to all statements and writings. In this way, South Africa's Nobel Peace Prize winner, Albert Luthuli, was not publicly heard of after his banning in 1962. Only his death in 1967 was reported.

Banned persons are forbidden to communicate with other banned persons. In some cases the Minister has granted exemptions to banned husbands and wives.

The minimum sentence for breaking a ban is one year's imprisonment. Magistrates have tended to mitigate this by suspending much of the sentences in trivial cases, but the threat remains. The maximum sentence for breaking a ban is three years - or, in the case of failure to report to the police, 10 years.

In June 1968, there were 741 banned persons in South Africa. By July 1973, there were 200. Many people, forced out of their employment by their bans, have gone into exile.

Most political prisoners, at the end of their prison terms, are now severely restricted. The African prisoners are often sent on release, to "resettlement camps" where the opportunities of any employment are remote.

2. The banished

The Bantu Administration Act of 1927 empowered the Government to order the removal from one place to another of any tribe, portion of a tribe, or individual African. This power was rarely used before 1948, but the Nationalist Government, which came to power in that year, has frequently used it to banish political 'agitators' to remote areas. By 1961, 126 men and women had been so banished. If no employment was available, they received a total of £2 a month in allowances.

As of July 1973, only two persons remained 'banished'. Instead of banishment, the Government is now using the ubiquitous policy of resettlement, which affects whole communities.

In addition, Proclamations R400 (1960) and R17 (1972) empower tribal chiefs, in the Transkei and Ovamboland (Namibia) respectively, to banish their 'subjects'.

List of Political Prisoners

(Note: Only prisoners serving sentences of five years and more have been included in this list. It must be stressed that this list cannot, because of circumstances in South Africa, claim to be comprehensive, or even absolutely accurate. It includes, for instance, "two juveniles" - the only mention made in the records of a case, in 1965, involving two persons sent to jail for life. In a number of cases, the actual dates of the trials are given as "unknown": the fact that these persons were in prison, often for long periods, emerged only subsequently. Most of these cases are probably from the unpublicized trials which took place in remote towns in the Eastern Cape from 1963 onwards.

Names marked with an asterisk are of Namibian prisoners held on Robben Island, off Cape Town, by the South African authorities.)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence in years</u>	<u>Year of conviction</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence in years</u>	<u>Year of conviction</u>
ALEXANDER, Neville	10	1964	* EKANDJO, Eino	20	1968
* AMUNGULU, Naftalie	20	1968	ESSOP, Mohammed Salim	5	1972
ANTHONY, Frank	6	1972	FAZILE, Jackson	12	1965
APRIL, James Edward	15	1971	FAZZIE, Henry	12	1963
BABENIA, N.	16	1964	FIHLA, Benson	14	unknown
BAHILA, Ephraim	12	1963	FISCHER, Bram	Life	1964
BAM, Fekile	10	1964	FRANCIS, J.	15	1963
BAOLATI, Thomas	10	1965	GCANGA, William	10	1965
BAPHELA, Patrick	10	1965	GCEBENI, Jackson	10	1965
BEJA, Rhodes	12	unknown	GOLDBERG, Dennis	Life	1964
BELL, Alfred	12	1966	GQABI, Joe	10	1965
BHENGU, Siegfried	10	1965	GQIRANA, Mibbs	12	1965
BLAAU, Jackson	10	1965	GUDLE, Tiba	10	1965
BONANI, Milton	12	1963	GUMBI, Mshiyani	12	1965
BRANDER, Simon	15	1963	* HAITA, Justus Festus	Life	1969
CHIBA, Laloo	18	1964	* HAITA, Solomon Festus	Life	1969
CHIBANE, Samuel	Life	1963	* HALUTENI, Abel	Life	1968
CHILOANE, Abel	15	1963	* HAMULEMO, Simeon	Life	1968
CHIRWA, James	12	1963	HANDULA, Government	10	1965
CHOLO, Theophilus	15	1973	HASSIN, Kader	8	1972
CULAYA, Joseph	10	1965	* HAUFIKU, Nchidipo Jasaja	20	1968
DANIELS, Eddie	15	1964	HENGGE, Butani	10	1966
DAVIS, Rev. Don	10	1964	HERMANUS, Jim Jonathon	7	1969
DAWETE, Thompson	14	1964	HLATSHWAYO, Peter	12	1965
DESAI, Amina	5	1972	HLAYA, Mnyamane	12	1965
DHIAMINI, Themba	18	1969	* HOMATENIE, Nathaniel Lot	5	unknown
DINGAKE, Michael	15	1966	HOSEY, John William	5	1973
DOORSAMBY, K.	14	1964	* IPANGELUA, Joseph	Life	1969
DUMA, Alfred	10	1964	ISAACS, Sedrick	12	1964
DU FREEZ, Richmond	12	1963	ISMAIL, Ibrahim	15	1964

Name	Sentence in years	Year of conviction	Name	Sentence in years	Year of conviction
ITIKA, Sakeus Phillipus	Life	1968	MAPUPULO, Shadrick	10	1964
JAXA, Jack	17	1966	MAQEBULA, Nicholas	6	unknown
JOYI, Twalinfeni	5	1969	MAQCTSI, Silas	18	1969
"Juveniles, 2 African male	Life	1965	MASALA, Donald	11	1965
* KADIKWA, Rudolf	Life	1968	MASEMULA, Jeff	Life	1963
KALAKE, Everitt Tsolo	7	1967	MASHABA, Andrew	15	1964
* KAMATI, Petrus	Life	1968	MASHIGO, Eliphas	10	1965
* KANYELE, Matias	Life	1968	MASCHIELA, Andrew	12	1963
KATHRADA, Ahmed	Life	1964	MATHANGELA, Donald Sifiso	7	1969
KAULELA, Simon	9	unknown	MATHEBE, Harry	15	1965
KHALIPHA, Winifred	8	unknown	MATHEWS, Philip	12	1965
KHONZA, A.	12	1963	MATTHEWS, John Edward	15	1964
KHOZA, Joseph	12	1964	MATU, Xavier	8	1966
KITSON, Ian David	20	1964	MATUTSI, Isak	12	1963
KCMANISI, Mdzendz	6	unknown	MAYEKISO, Maxwell	12	1963
KONDATI, Malcolmess	18	1964	MBANGA, Andries	10	1965
KONDILE, Bolente	15	1963	MBATA, Lombard	20	1963
LEBENYA, Sechaba Noel	5	1971	MBATA, William	10	1965
LENGE, Wilson	5	unknown	MBEKI, Govan	Life	1964
LENGISI, Amos	20	1969	MBELE, Mfolwane	8	1972
LETSOKO, Napoleon	17	1963	MBOPA, Wellington	11	1964
LOLWE, ?	14	1965	MDHLALOSI, Zakela	10	1964
LUTHULI, Dilixolo	10	1969	METSHANE, Peter	10	1965
LUZIFO, Mqcini	13	1965	MHLABA, Raymond	Life	1964
MABIKA, Bangumosi	10	1965	MJO, Brian	20	1964
MABUTO, Montford Mzoli	5	1971	MKEKEZE, Mnyamana	10	1965
MAGAILO, Peter	15	1964	MKETSHANE, Wilson	11	1965
MAGULA, Wellington	5	unknown	MKHALIPI, Kwede	20	1966
MAGXAKI, M.	10	1965	MKWANAZI, Riot	10	1964
MAHANJANA, Dom Gideon	7	1972	MKWAYI, Wilton	Life	1964
MAHATAJ, Sathyandranath	12	1964	MIAMBO, Johnson	20	1963
MAIMANE, Michael	20	1964	MLANDA, Felize	20	1964
MAKHALIMA, Matthews	12	1963	MLANGENI, Andrew	Life	1964
MAKINANA, Diliza	13	1965	MNYAMANA, Mkekeza	13	1965
MAKOFANA, J.	12	1963	MOENG, Mogani Josiah	6	1972
MALEEME, Mahlomano Joshua	10	1971	MCGORO, G.	12	1965
M. LEPE, Dimake	Life	1963	MOLEFE, Levy M.	12	1964
MAIGAS, Ernest	12	1963	MOONSAMY, K.	14	1964
MALI, Mabel	7 1/2	1968	* MOSES, Michael	Life	1968
MANDELA, Nelson	Life	1964	MOSINOA, Molefane	9	1965
MANGOANGWANA, Npolise	18	1966	MOTJI, Alfeus	10	1965
MANTANYA, Temba	15	1963	MOTSOLEDI, Elias	Life	1964
MANTANYANA, Patrick	18	1969	MOUMBARIS, Alexandre	12	1973
MAFONYA, Russell	10	1965	MPANZA, Justice	15	1973

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence in years</u>	<u>Year of conviction</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence in years</u>	<u>Year of conviction</u>
MOAZI, W.	12	1963	POKELA, John Nyati	13	1967
MOOZMANA	16	1965	RAFUSA, George	15	1963
MSHYENI	12	1965	RAMOKGADI, Martin	10	1964
MTALANA, Douglas	9	1965	RAMCSHABA, Matsao John	5	1971
MTHIMINYE, Isaac	Life	1963	RAMCTSE, Benjamin	15	1970
MTWALO, William	20	1963	SABEKHA, Isaac	10	1965
MXIMELA, Fara Cletus	15	1972	SCHOON, Marius	12	1964
NAICKER, George	14	1964	SEJAKA, Gardner Kitchener	15	1973
* NAILENGE, Shinema	Life	1968	SELEKA, Gaboikangwe	18	1969
NAIR, Billy	20	1964	SHABALALA, Alfred	10	1964
* NAMBINGA, Rehabeam	Life	1968	SHABALALA, Mandhla	10	1964
* NANKUDHU, Johannes	Life	1968	SHABALALA, Moses	12	1964
* NASHIVELA, Jonas	5	unknown	*SHIFIDI, Immanuel	Life	1968
NCAPAYI, Sisa	12	1967	*SHIHONGELENI, Simeon	Life	1968
NDHLOVU, Curnick	20	1964	*SHIKOMBA, Gaus	Life	1968
NDUMA, Stanley	12	1965	*SHILONGO, Julius	Life	1968
NDUNGWANA, Richard	10	1965	*SHIMUEFELENI, David	20	1968
NDUZA, Jack	12	1963	*SHIMUEFELENI, Jonas	18	1969
* NEHALE, Festus	20	1968	*SHIPOMENI, Johannes	Life	1968
NGCOBO, Bifana	18	1969	*SHITILIFA, Philemon	20	1968
NGOYI, Edward	12 ^{1/2}	1965	*SHITUYVETE, Joseph	20	1968
NGUBENI, Michael	12	1964	SHUMENI, Notase A.	20	1963
NGWENYA, Joseph	10	1965	SIGWELA, Ezra	10	1969
* NLENGE, Simon	20	1968	SIKUNDIA, Jacob	20	1966
NKABINDE, Victor	20	1966	SINGH, Girja	10	1964
NKIMENE, Nelson	12	1963	SINKAKANKA, George	12	1964
NKOSI, Azariah	12	1964	SISULU, Walter	Life	1964
NKOSI, John	Life	1963	SITHOLE, John	12	1965
NKOSI, Michael	10	1965	SIYATHULA, Mannert Malungisa	18	1967
NKOSI, Simon	12	1963	SOLOMONS, Marcus	10	1964
NCMPONDO, Willie	10	1965	TABANE, Teke L.	7	1964
NOYI	10	1966	TABATA, Max Bantwini	5	1972
* NQHIDIPO, Hanfika	20	1968	TABATHA, Joseph	14	1963
NTENGU, Silas	12	1964	TANGELA, S.	12	1965
NTSHANYENA, Hector	25	1963	TARSHISH, Jack	12	1963
NTUTU, Shumi	15	1964	TETU, Philemon	Life	1963
NTWASA, Clarison	20	1963	TEIBU, Petrus Aaron	15	1973
* NUNJANGO, Betuel	Life	1968	THOMS, Raymond	12	1964
NXADI, Faans	12	1963	*TJIPAHORA, Kaleb	Life	1968
NYEMBE, Dorothy	15	1969	TIALE	12	unknown
NYCPO	20	unknown	*TOIVO, Toivo Herman Ja	20	1968
PHETLA, Solomon	12	1963	TOKANI, Louis	15	1963
PHOKANOKA, Lawrence	18	1969	TOLE, Vuyisile	14	1964
PIETERSE, David	10	1965	TSHANGAMA, Albert Kwezi	5	1972

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence in years</u>	<u>Year of conviction</u>
TSHANINGUA, Ndjaula	20	1968
TUHADELENI, Eliaser	Life	1968
USHONA, Malakia	Life	1968
VAN DER HEYDEM, Elizabeth	10	1964
VENKATRATHNAM, Surinarayan Kala	6	1972
VICTORY, Messack	Life	1969
VILIBA, Ncikwa Nagi	7	1972
VUSANI, Joseph Bransby	8	1972
WILCOX, Robert Cedric	6	1972
XANDEKANO, Tecuba	13	1964
ZACHARIAH, Lazarus	20	1968
ZAKUMBA, Douglas	10	1966
ZAMILE, Boysie	10	1964
ZAMISA, Julius	7 ¹ / ₂	1966
ZIMAMBANE, Pindiso	8	1972
ZULU, Percival	12	1963

APPENDIX "B"

COPY OF LETTER FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

September 14, 1973

Dear Mrs. Pratt,

Thank you for providing me with a copy of the YWCA publication "Investment in Oppression" which has been carefully examined in my Department. I must apologize for the delay in commenting on it.

I welcome the efforts of your Committee to bring certain aspects of the evils of apartheid to greater public attention and to contribute to informed discussion of Canadian policy toward the situation in South Africa. With regret, however, I must point out a number of statements in the study which reflect misinterpretation of, or misinformation about Canadian Government policies.

On the first page of the Introduction to the study there is a statement that "Canadian businesses are encouraged to invest in and trade with South Africa. Our federal government grants trade preferences to South Africa and lavishes - by our standards elsewhere in Africa - commercial assistance on firms with an interest in establishing themselves in the Republic". This is inaccurate. As far as investment is concerned, the Canadian Government neither encourages nor discourages Canadian firms from investing in South Africa but leaves the decision to the companies themselves. None of the twelve Canadian companies mentioned later in the study with investments in South Africa, mostly of long standing, received any significant Canadian Government assistance that I am aware of in establishing themselves in South Africa.

I know of no foundation for the use of the word "lavish" in relation to commercial assistance in South Africa as compared with other parts of Africa. Certain facilities are available from Canadian Government agencies to Canadian firms interested in investing in developing countries abroad, (South Africa not being classified as a "developing country") such as investment insurance through the Export Development Corporation, financing of survey visits through the Business and Industry Division of CIDA and various programmes offered by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. There has been a good deal of activity under these programmes in such countries as Nigeria, stimulated by Canadian Government representatives. An example of successful Government encouragement of and assistance to private investment in developing countries in Africa is the recent acquisition by Labatt's of an interest in a Zambian brewery (incidentally thereby replacing a South African investment).

Mrs. Renate Pratt,
Chairman, Study and Action Committee,
Young Women's Christian Association of Canada,
571 Jarvis Street,
TORONTO, Ontario M4Y 2J1

...2

The assertion is made, in several forms, in the Introduction that the Canadian Government's policy toward the white regimes in Southern Africa has changed: "this apparently liberal trend...has not been sustained", "the Canadian Government...has reversed its earlier more liberal policy", "a softening government position". I must firmly deny that there has been any such thing as a "reversal" of Canadian Government policy and with all respect I suggest that the study does not offer valid evidence of such a change.

In the 1970 Foreign Policy Review the Canadian Government indicated its intention to continue trade in peaceful goods with South Africa and it follows logically that activity by Canadian Trade Commissioners in the Republic of South Africa has continued. There is no change of policy involved. We have maintained a policy of trading in peaceful goods with all countries, except Rhodesia, where mandatory United Nations economic sanctions apply. We did, on the other hand, reinforce the policy adopted in the early 60s of not selling military equipment to South Africa by a decision in October 1970 to stop providing spare parts for aircraft which had been sold at an earlier date.

The assignment of Trade Commissioners, to which the Introduction refers, is naturally related to the market potential for Canadian goods and in many African countries the markets are far too small to warrant a resident commercial representative. The study notes that an Honorary Commercial Representative has been appointed in Angola, but does not mention that we have posted four additional Trade Commissioners to various African countries since 1970 in response to market developments. It also does not mention that the Trade Commissioners in Johannesburg are responsible for trade promotion in Botswana, Comoro Archipelago, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion and Swaziland as well as South Africa.

The Study offers as evidence of changing policies in relation to Rhodesia that the Government has failed to reaffirm NIBMAR and did not pronounce as unacceptable the techniques employed by the Pearce Commission to establish Rhodesian views on the Home-Smith agreement. We have not altered our policy on Rhodesia and we joined with the other members of the Commonwealth at the recent Heads of Government Meeting in reaffirming that "the objective is majority rule". I am glad we did not prejudge the techniques employed by the Pearce Commission and were able to welcome unreservedly its finding that the proposals were not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. At the Commonwealth meeting African representatives congratulated the British Government on its acceptance of this finding.

I do not know what is meant by the assertion that the Canadian Government has "shied away from giving moral support to independent African countries..." We have given them not just moral but very concrete support, including our recent additional assistance in Zambia in overcoming the transportation problems involved in the closure of the Rhodesia-Zambia border. The comment I made in Abidjan in 1971 about dialogue with South Africa, which the Study couples with the "shied away" allegation, was, of course, a reference to the fact that Canada engages in dialogue with that country and was not a judgment on whether African countries should do so, which is a matter for them to decide.

The continued application of preferential tariffs (strictly speaking, the British Preferential Tariff) between Canada and South Africa is a reflection of the fact

that such preferential arrangements are not automatically ended by a change in political status. We also extend the so-called Commonwealth rate to Ireland, which left the Commonwealth long ago, and to Pakistan, which left it very recently. Many Commonwealth countries, among them Nigeria and the members of the East African Community, do not give preferential rates to Canada.

As regards Namibia, we formally notified South Africa in 1971 that we regarded its occupation of that territory as illegal. Since then, we have followed a policy of informing Canadian companies interested in Namibia that we can give them no encouragement or protection and if they go in they do so at their own risk. No change of policy is involved there.

I am particularly disappointed at what is said in the Introduction about the disposal of Polymer's interest in a South African company. Polymer's total shareholding in Sentrachem was disposed of by November 1, 1972, in accordance with the Government's wishes. I am sorry that the Study, published in May 1973, does not take account of this.

The Introduction refers to "our government's single-minded pursuit of economic advantage", a phrase which is surely quite unwarranted in the light of our aid to independent African countries, our enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia, our refusal to sell arms or military equipment to South Africa and various other aspects of a policy which "Foreign Policy for Canadians" described in 1970 as attempting to balance the themes of social justice and economic growth. It would have been fairer of the authors of the Study to say that they take issue with the Government's idea of balance.

I do not wish to dispute every point in the Introduction concerning the recent direction of Canadian Government policy and perhaps I should address myself to the conclusion of the Study and the recommendations about action by the Canadian Government.

I fully share the concern of your Committee about the denial of human rights in South Africa, but I have a good deal of difficulty in principle with what I take to be the central recommendation of the Study, that the Government intervene to bring about a cessation of further investment by private Canadian companies in Southern Africa. Your Study argues cogently that foreign investment has not been a liberalizing force in South Africa, and you may be right, although I would have thought the proposition impossible to prove as yet. Your assertion that continued Canadian private investment reinforces apartheid seems to me to be even more arguable. I suggest that we do not really know whether the black population of South Africa would be better or worse off without the contribution that foreign investment in general has made to South African economic development and there is no way of finding out accurately what the Africans themselves think of it. I cannot think they would be any better off if Canadian companies withdrew or ceased to make further investments and I would hope that Canadian companies would seek to improve the lot of their African employees to the maximum possible extent.

I am not taking issue with the Study's description of the deplorable situation of Africans in South Africa and I do not mean just to raise debating points in

questioning the effects of foreign investment on that situation. Because it would be quite an extraordinary step, and one with wide-ranging implications, for the Canadian Government to forbid or attempt to dissuade private companies from investing in a particular country abroad, I think we have to consider very carefully what the grounds might be for contemplating such steps. The Government does not exercise control over private investment abroad and to seek authority to control it in the case of South Africa would hardly be feasible unless the United Nations imposed mandatory sanctions, as in the case of Rhodesia. The several forms of Government assistance available to firms investing abroad are either not applicable to South Africa because it is not classified as a developing country or are not of any apparent significance to the firms which have already invested there, so denial of assistance does not seem to be relevant.

The third possible course of action by the Canadian Government, some form of moral suasion to Canadian companies to disinvest or not invest further, would involve a departure from the Government's long-standing policy of not taking responsibility for the investment decisions of private companies. It would be quite a different thing to urge companies, on moral or political grounds, not to invest in a particular country from our present policy of providing general information and advice on a non-discriminatory basis, specific assistance and insurance facilities in the case of developing countries and then leaving it to the judgment of the companies whether to invest or not. I wonder where we would draw the line if we were to begin advising "invest in this country but not that one". Your Study argues that South Africa is a unique case because its policies are the subject of censure by practically the whole world community but the world community has not decided to impose economic sanctions against South Africa so we would still have to make a unilateral decision. I have no doubt there would be representations from people who are opposed to Canadian companies investing in other countries than South Africa.

A further difficulty I foresee in getting into the business of specific guidance to Canadian firms on investment abroad is the possibility that firms might seek to hold the Government responsible in some degree for the consequences of investment decisions taken under the influence of Government guidance. If we advised them not to invest in one country we might have more difficulty disclaiming responsibility for their decisions about investment in other countries, a disclaimer which we have often been required to make in the past.

I notice that throughout the study there is a coupling of trade and investment but it seems to me there is an important distinction between the two. Direct investment obviously involves participation in the South African economic system, including the apartheid aspects of it, and that is why the Government took steps to get Polymer out of its investment. It is for the officers of private companies and their shareholders to decide if they are justified in participating in an odious system. Trade in peaceful goods is a different matter. As I have pointed out many times, we try to follow a policy of trade with all countries regardless of the nature of their regimes or their policies. It is in my view wrong in principle to attach moral considerations to peaceful trade. There is no way of determining when the policies of a country are sufficiently immoral or oppressive to justify a cessation of trade. And in the absence of internationally agreed measures, like the sanctions against Rhodesia, it would be futile for Canada to renounce trading opportunities and leave the field to its commercial competitors.

As regards the supplementary recommendations of the Study, may I offer the following observations:

I have already commented on the exchange of preferential tariff rates between Canada and South Africa. This is a matter of mutual trading advantage and not necessarily linked to Commonwealth membership, particularly now that the whole question of tariff preferences is in the process of renegotiation.

I see no purpose in withdrawing Trade Commissioners from South Africa on the grounds you suggest. As long as we continue to pursue a policy of trade in peaceful goods with all countries without discrimination, we will station Trade Commissioners where the trade or the potential trade warrants their presence. I expect that the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce will increase its representation in other parts of Africa when required and as its personnel resources permit.

I have no difficulty with the recommendation that the Government use the term "Namibia". As this name has come into general usage it is our practice now to use it increasingly in preference to "South West Africa", except where the older term is needed for clarity. We have, as I said above, formally notified South Africa that we do not regard its occupation of Namibia as legal. On public support for self-determination in Namibia, may I point out that we joined with other Commonwealth countries in the communique following the Heads of Government Meeting in August in recognizing "the legitimacy of the struggle to win full human rights and self-determination" in Southern Africa generally. I made some observations above about the difficulties I see in "dissuading" Canadian companies from investment in particular countries abroad but we do warn companies about the legal position and the unavailability of Canadian Government assistance or protection in Namibia. We will, of course, continue at the United Nations to support actions or proposals that we believe will further the cause of self-determination for the people of Namibia.

May I repeat what I said at the beginning, that I welcome your Committee's contribution to public discussion of these important issues. I have tried to correct what I consider to be misconceptions or misinformation about Government policies and I have sought to point out some considerations that make it difficult for the Government readily to accept all of your recommendations. Because we share, I believe, a fundamental concern about human rights and self-determination in Southern Africa I am glad to participate in discussion of the role of the Canadian Government in these matters and I believe it is of vital importance that there be informed discussion of the issues among the public. You might like to send copies of this letter to those who received copies of the Study so that they will have a better understanding of the Government's actions and policies.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) MITCHELL SHARP

Mitchell Sharp.

APPENDIX "C"

October 17, 1973

The Honourable Mitchell Sharp
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Government of Canada
Ottawa K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. Minister,

Thank you for your letter of September 4th which commented on our publication Investment in Oppression. We appreciate the attention you have given to it. We are encouraged that you have been unable to fault our publication by identifying any substantial errors in it. We agree with you of course that our interpretation of certain data is at variance with that of your department. However, we cannot accept your attribution that this difference is due to our having misunderstood or misconceived government policy. We understand the present government policy on Southern Africa very well. We differ with you in our judgement of its implications for social justice, its long term realism and its liberalism. Your letter, far from removing any misconceptions, confirms our previous carefully researched assessment. Because of our own longstanding involvement with and concern for southern Africa as well as that of the co-sponsors of Investment in Oppression, we would like to reply in some detail and specifically, to your several criticisms of our Study. We have arranged our comments under the following headings which parallel your main points of criticism:-

1. Governmental promotion of trade and investment in South Africa.
2. Divestment of Polymer's South African Shareholdings.
3. The world community's concern that economic involvement in southern Africa should decrease.
4. Canada's policy towards Rhodesia.
5. Canada's policy towards Namibia.
6. Trade and Investment as a liberalizing force in South Africa.
7. Southern Africa, next decades' Vietnam.

I. Governmental promotion of trade and investment in South Africa.

We stated, "our federal government grants trade preferences to South Africa and lavishes-by our standards elsewhere in Africa- commercial assistance to firms with an interest of establishing themselves in the Republic."

You take exception to the word "lavish" in relation to this commercial assistance. Our criticism rests upon our judgement in our introduction of the ethical and political consequences of these policies of the Canadian government:-

- a) The continuation between Canada and South Africa of the British Preferential Tariff Agreement (the Commonwealth Preferences), and
- b) the expenditure of Canadian public funds to maintain Trade Commissioners with their assistants in each of Johannesburg and Cape Town, in addition to the Embassy staff in Pretoria, while the rest of tropical and southern Africa are covered by Commercial Secretaries operating from the Embassies or High Commissions of only four countries - Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire.

Neither the fact that the Commonwealth Preferential Tariff Agreements do not automatically end when a country leaves the Commonwealth, nor the fact that we retain a similar agreement with Ireland, justify the maintenance of this favourable treatment in our relationship to South Africa. Despite repeated expressions of Canada's distaste for South Africa's racial oppression it continues to give South African goods preferential access to Canadian markets and we enjoy a similar access to South African markets. The conflict between the Canadian Government's condemnation of Apartheid and this preferential trading arrangement cannot even be explained by overwhelming Canadian economic considerations. The Canadian preferential access to South Africa's markets is estimated by Professor G.K.Helleiner of the University of Toronto to be worth a mere 1/50 of 1% of Canada's total export trade. On the other hand, these preferences are extremely valuable to South Africa. Under the agreement South Africa has been able to increase its share of the Canadian sugar market from 5.3% in 1961 to 25% in 1969. They are also valuable to South Africa as evidence that we do not take our criticisms of apartheid so seriously as to do anything about it that might have even a minimal economic consequence.

Your statement (page 6, paragraph 4) that "... we continue to pursue a policy of trade in peaceful goods with all countries without discrimination" does not apply to our trade with South Africa. Compared to our policy towards many of our trading partners - east and west - Canada does discriminate. However, Canada discriminates in South Africa's favour.

The maintenance of five Canadian commercial representatives in the Republic of South Africa appeared to the authors of our study as a lavish use of public funds. These commercial representatives perform an important role in the promotion of ever closer economic links with the Republic of South Africa and give an indication of where Canada's interests are concentrated. This excessive concentration of commercial-relations staff in South Africa has led to far more coverage of that country in the government's official publication Canada Commerce than of any other African country. As well, you will know that there is no mention in that publication of our abhorrence for apartheid, no warning to Canadian businessmen that their trade and investment supports a regime promoting apartheid, and no mention of the racism businessmen must conform to in South Africa. Rather, it is described as a prosperous and booming country with a

4 billion Dollar market for Canadians - as one recent issue put it. Even in the case of Mozambique, which is covered by our Johannesburg Trade Commissioner, Canada Commerce makes no mention of the liberation struggles in that country nor of the fact that Canada has recognized the legitimacy of those struggles.

One of the central issues between us is the view you express on page 6 of your letter that there is "an important distinction" between trade and investment. You accompany this position by persistent references throughout the letter to the government's not wanting to influence one way or the other a Canadian investor's decision with respect to investment in a foreign country, and you leave the impression that the Trade Commissioners' role is solely to promote a "policy of trade in peaceful goods" and not to help or hinder investment. In fact, through their articles in Canada Commerce, the Trade Commissioners clearly see that their role is to promote investment as well as trade, and they fail completely to make the distinction you see as "important". In failing to make such a distinction, the Trade Commissioners reflect much more accurately than your letter the reality of economic ties between countries.

Fundamentally, an export of capital abroad is an export of services from Canada's point of view, and an import of services from the recipient country's point of view. When properly accounted for in the balance of payments, investment abroad creates a flow of services over subsequent years that enter into the current account of the payments balance, just as trade in commodities does. In other words, foreign investment is a trade item in a country's economic relations with the rest of the world, as well as a capital item during the single year in which it occurs. We fail to see how you support this "important distinction" you wish to draw.

The continuation of the British Preferential Tariff Agreement and the maintenance of Canadian commercial representatives in the Republic of South Africa are important expressions of our foreign policy towards Southern Africa and cannot be interpreted otherwise. We reiterate our recommendation that both be halted in order to make Canadian government policies consistent with its public condemnation of South Africa and its racial oppression.

II. Divestment of Polymer's South African Shareholdings.

Your letter (page 4, paragraph 5) expresses disappointment that the Study Committee did not record the divestment of Polymer's South African shareholdings by November 1, 1972. The implication that we withheld this deliberately to make your position less attractive than we knew it to be, is unjustified. We stated, that, "the Government had agreed in June 1970 to ensure that Polymer, at that time a Crown Corporation, divest itself of its equity holdings in a South African company", and "that this divestment had not yet taken place by July 1972." These are statements of fact. You write that by November 1, 1972, the Polymer shares had all been disposed of in accordance with government's policy. Before completing our Study we wrote to Mr. H.A. Hampson, Chairman of the Canada Development Corporation, to secure information about the sale of these Polymer shares.

Far from being informed by him that the shares had all been sold in accordance with government policy, in a letter to us, dated by coincidence November 1, 1972, he contradicts your statement in its several aspects. Mr. Hampson on that date said that not all the shares had yet been sold. Moreover, he went out of his way to say that the selling that had occurred was not in response to Government or anybody else's wishes, but was purely a business decision. What you criticize us for failing to report, was, in fact, denied to us by the Chairman of the public body directly responsible. In the circumstances we therefore, wrote only what we knew for certain to be true, namely, that over two years after you had announced that the shares were to be sold, they had, in fact, not been disposed of.

III. The World community's concern that economic involvement in southern Africa should decrease.

(Page 5, paragraph 2), you state that although the world community has severely censured South Africa for its racial policies, it has not asked for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. This puzzles us on two counts. Firstly, the implication is that we had recommended sanctions - we did not. We have asked for the withdrawal of Canadian commercial representatives from South Africa. However, the world community certainly has asked for economic measures. We would refer you to the resolution On Apartheid of the 27th UN General Assembly Session, 1972. Inter alia this resolution called on UN member states to take actions to discontinue economic relations with South Africa. It requested "the Security Council to consider urgently the situation in South Africa with a view to adopting Chapter VII of the Charter." This resolution received a substantial majority. Canada abstained from voting on this resolution. At the same session, Canada voted in favour of a resolution on the Portuguese Territories, the Canadian delegation, however, made it clear that Canada would not support paragraph 6 of this resolution which called "upon all states to take forthwith all possible measures to put an end to all activities that help exploit the territories under Portuguese domination and ... to discourage their nationals and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction from entering into any transactions that contribute to Portuguese domination..."

In both instances, Canada joined in the condemnation of racist and colonial policies but rejected the initiation of the world community to take what you termed "internationally agreed measures" to cease greater economic involvement with white dominated southern Africa. This does seem to indicate that whatever Canada's rhetoric, there is "a single-minded pursuit of economic advantage" on the part of the Canadian Government in its policies towards southern Africa.

IV. Canada's policy towards Rhodesia

Your letter, (page 3, paragraph 1) refers to Canadian Government policy towards Rhodesia. You state that "the Study offers no evidence of changing policies in relation to Rhodesia that the Government has failed to reaffirm NIBMAR (No Independence before Majority Rule.)" We did not elaborate on this issue because the Study was primarily concerned with Canadian economic links with South Africa. However, there is a great deal

of evidence of a Canadian retreat in its policies towards Rhodesia, indeed, the YWCA of Canada has already written to you on this matter.

We would like to refer you to our letter to you of January 11, 1972 which was concerned specifically with Canadian policy in regard to Rhodesia. On page 2, paragraph 2, of this letter, we wrote that "we were most concerned (and disheartened) to learn that the Canadian delegation at the UN abstained from voting for a resolution on November 19, 1971, which reaffirmed the NIBMAR principle. "This", we said at the time - "constituted a departure from the previous Canadian voting pattern at the UN on this issue." We reiterate that this is a clear indication that the Government has failed publically to adhere to its previous commitment to NIBMAR. It might also answer your query about our assertion that the Government "has shied away from giving moral support to independent African countries."

You express satisfaction in your letter that you had not prejudged the techniques used by the Pearce Commission in establishing the views of the people of Rhodesia on the Home-Smith Agreement.

In 1969 the Canadian Government had held to the following majority opinion of the Commonwealth communique:-

"The test of acceptability of any proposed settlement would need to be made in a manner which would carry conviction in the Commonwealth and in the international community. Generally, so that its results be accepted as truly reflecting the wishes of the people of Rhodesia, many heads of Government urged that this could only be carried out through the normal democratic process of election and referendum and doubted whether adequate safeguards for free political expression and verification of the results could be provided so long as the rebel government remained in power."

In concurring with the proposed Home-Smith agreement in 1972, therefore, the Canadian Government reversed its previous stand, it did not reaffirm NIBMAR and it accepted techniques for testing opinion in Rhodesia contrary to the statement above of 1969. That this Agreement was ultimately unequivocally rejected by the African population of Rhodesia was due solely to their enormous courage and conviction. No government which had concurred in the techniques used in the inquiry can take pride in its rejection by black Rhodesians. As we stated in our letter of January 1972, the integrity of Lord Pearce and his commissioners was never at issue. What was at issue were:-

- a) the unacceptable terms of the proposed agreement which had excluded NIBMAR, and
- b) the techniques involved in eliciting political opinions under conditions of severe and continuous curtailment of political freedom in Rhodesia, i.e., the ban of major African political parties, the continuous detention of their national leaders under a prevailing state of emergency.

The agony of the Rhodesian population as it went through the procedures of opinion testing, the toll of personal freedoms, to black and white alike, the deaths which occurred during those months and the repressive measures instigated after the Pearce commission, witness to the human cost extracted by these techniques, that Canada had agreed to this procedure, is no credit to us.

V. Canada's Policy towards Namibia

In regard to Namibia the Canadian Government, as you state (your letter page 4, paragraph 4), has not changed its policy. Thus, Canada did not, as did the U.S. Government, give public notice (May 20, 1970) that the following steps were to be taken in regard to Namibia:-

- 1) The United States will henceforth officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals in Namibia.
- 2) Export-Import Bank credit guarantees will not be made available for trade with Namibia.
- 3) U.S. nationals who invest in Namibia on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2145 (October 27, 1966) will not receive U.S. Government assistance in protection of such investments against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia.
- 4) The United States will encourage other nations to take actions similar to these.

Canada has not acted in accordance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of June 1971, which asked UN member states "... to refrain from any acts and particularly any dealings with the government of South Africa implying recognition ... or lending assistance (to its administration)". Your letter does not, for instance explain, why the Canadian government has not clarified the implication of the Preamble to the British Preferential Tariff Agreement which explicitly states that for the purpose of this Agreement Canada recognizes South West Africa (Namibia) to be part of South Africa.

Were Canada concerned in your words "to further the cause of self-determination for the people of Namibia", at the United Nations we would assume that Canada would make every effort to be seated on the UN Council for Namibia. This has not been the case and Canada's absence from that Council, together with that of other western states has seriously diminished the potential effectiveness of that Council.

VI. Trade with and Investment in South Africa as a liberalizing Force.

Paragraph 3 of page 4 of your letter relates that our study has left you unconvinced that foreign including Canadian investment reinforces apartheid, and you submit that this is as yet impossible to prove. Our study spans the history of economic development in South Africa since 1945. During these 25 years foreign investment has reached \$1,000 million. Over the same period of time, as you do not deny, the political, social and economic suppression of the black population of South Africa has increased immeasurably. Is it reasonable to base Canadian policy on the assumption that given more time and more investment that there is the likelihood that foreign and with that Canadian investment will have a liberalizing influence?

Finally, you suggest that "there is no way of finding out accurately what the Africans themselves think of it." This is of course true, but it is not an acceptable reason for continuing a policy which reinforces the economic strength of the South African regime. The Study Committee took very seriously its obligation to find out the opinions of black

South Africans. Two of our members were black South African citizens and we have had extensive contacts and correspondence with black South Africans within Canada and with others resident in South Africa. All have supported our findings and our recommendations, and have welcomed our publication as a way of voicing these opinions in the absence of official representation.

VII. Southern Africa, next decade's Vietnam.

May we, in conclusion, draw your attention to a central point of our argument to which you make no mention in your letter. We refer you to pages 40-41 of our Study which warn that the racial struggle in southern Africa has already begun and that it bears the seeds of next decade's Vietnam. The Canadian government, when it voted as a member of the Security Council for Resolution 253 in 1968 recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia for freedom and self-determination. In the General Assembly in 1969 Canada voted for the recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people in Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. Thus Canada has a long standing record of being aware of the racial struggle in southern Africa. When Canada joined the Commonwealth leaders in August of this year in recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle to win full human rights and self-determination in southern Africa, it can hardly be regarded as a new stand for Canada.

Your letter omitted, however, to mention that this year's Commonwealth Communique introduced a new commitment in regard to southern Africa. Our Prime Minister "agreed on the need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged" in the efforts to achieve self-determination in southern Africa. We commend our Prime Minister on this commitment. We are all the more disappointed that your letter did not refer to this important commitment and we are anxious to hear of your plans to implement this new policy.

Despite the Canadian government's formal awareness since the middle sixties of the racial struggle in southern Africa, it has nevertheless ignored the full force and reality of this situation and misjudges, in our view, its implications for Canadian policy.

President Nyerere, you will recall, in referring to the struggle for African rights in southern Africa asked three things of Canada:- that we should realize that Africans value freedom as much as we do ourselves; that Canada should support their struggle for freedom, and failing that, that Canada should at least not aid and give comfort to those white regimes which are holding Africans in suppression. Canada's response to Nyerere on each of these points has been de facto negative. This in our judgement is a denial of social justice which is one of the four announced tenets of our foreign policy. The risk is very great that the struggle which is now shaping in southern Africa will become a racial war. Canada could now demonstrate that there are rich and white nations capable of taking a stand on her basic values. In the interest of a few more years of minor trading we are failing to do this.

Our Study argues that the more Canadian economic interests become intertwined and aligned with the interests of apartheid and colonial oppression

the more influential will be those opposed to policies consistent with Canadian values and the principle of social justice. As our stake in apartheid grows, the likelihood decreases that the Canadian government will join effectively those seeking to mediate on the side of the oppressed. Instead, the risk increases that Canada will quietly and unobtrusively back white interests. There can already be discerned, we suggest, increasing inhibitions on the part of the Canadian government to translate into policy its public statements with regard to the white dominated areas of southern Africa. These inhibitions are exemplified in Canada's waning support for NIBMAR, Canada's failure to press for the exclusion of Portugal from NATO until she has given independence to her African colonies, its continuation of trade preference with South Africa, its efforts to intensify trade promotion in South Africa, your public support for dialogue with South Africa whilst in Africa, Canada's voting pattern on the aforementioned UN resolutions, and Canada's reluctance to enter more effectively into UN activities regarding Namibia. That Canada chose this time in history to appoint an Honorary Trade Commissioner as well underlines our argument.

Canada's policy of trade in peaceful goods with all countries when applied to Communist states during the cold war period, helped to alleviate world tensions. We suggest, however, that the situation in southern Africa is very different indeed. That area is moving ever more closely towards direct racial confrontation. The racial wars in Mozambique and Angola are no longer to be ignored. The declaration of independence by Guinea-Bissau requires of western states that they demonstrate whether their public recognition of the right to self-determination is to be taken seriously. In this situation, the expansion of economic links with the white regimes of southern Africa far from alleviating tensions, aids these regimes and increases the likelihood that the struggle in southern Africa will become an international racial war.

Your letter together with this reply is being sent to our co-sponsors. We are grateful to you for this further opportunity to make our position clear.

Yours sincerely,

Renate Pratt
Vice-President
(former Chairman of the
Study and Action Committee)

RP:cm

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adrian, Charles, and Charles Press. "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation", American Political Science Review, June, 1968.
- African Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Commentary, Vol. 9, No. 3, April 30, 1972.
- Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 9, No. 6, July, 1972.
- Anglican Church. Being Black in South Africa. Toronto: Anglican Church of Canada, 1972.
- Black Sash, The. Memorandum on the Application of the Pass Laws and Influx Control. Johannesburg: Pacific Press, 1971.
- Bosgra, S. Portugal and Nato. Amsterdam: Angola Comité, 1969.
- British Council of Churches. Violence in Southern Africa. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1970.
- Brown, Alex, Peter Bunting, and Clyde Sarger. Southern Africa: Some Questions for Canadians. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Co-operation, 1973.
- Bruyn, Severyn, Norman J. Faramelli, and Dennis A. Yates. "An Ethical Prisoner on the Multinational Corporation", IDOC International/North American Edition. Number 56 (October 1973). New York: IDOC-North America, Inc.
- Bunting, B.P. The Rise of the South African Reich. New York: Penguin Books, 1969.
- Canada, Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy For Canadians. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.
- Canada, House of Commons. Minutes of the Proceedings of the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. Issue No. 30 (June 1, 1971). Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971.

Canada, House of Commons. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Respecting: Estimates 1974-75, Dept. of External Affairs - Humanitarian Aid in Southern Africa. Issue No. 9 (April 4, 1974). Issue No. 12 (April 25, 1974).

Canada, Statistics Canada. Canada's International Investment Position, 1926 to 1967. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971.

Canada. "Trade Agreement Between Canada and the Union of South Africa", Treaty Series 1933, No. 4, Article 7. Ottawa: Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1935.

Claude, Inis L., Jr. Swords into Plowshares. 4th ed. New York: Random House, 1971.

de Kock, W. J. History of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971.

Desmond, Cosmos. The Discarded People. Braamfontain, South Africa: Christian Institute of South Africa, 1970.

de V. Graaf, J. "International Inflation in the South African Economy", The South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 4, December, 1967.

Doern, G. Bruce and Peter Aucoin (eds.) The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971.

Dror, Yehezkel. Public Policy-Making Re-examined. Part IV, "An Optional Model of Public Policy-Making", San Francisco: Chandler, 1968.

Dye, Thomas R. and Harmon Zeigler. The Irony of Democracy. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970.

Dye, Thomas R. Understanding Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.

Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965.

Eayrs, James. Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

- Elliot, Florence. A Dictionary of Politics. 7th ed.
Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973.
- Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. Annual Report, 1970.
- First, Ruth, Jonathan Steele, and Christabel Gurney.
The South African Connection - Western Involvement
in Apartheid. London: Temple Smith, 1972.
- Frankel, Joseph. The Making of Foreign Policy, An Analysis
of Decision-Making. London: Oxford University
Press, 1963.
- Froman, Lewis. "The Categorization of Policy Contents",
in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public
Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968.
- Hailey, Lord. An African Survey: Revised 1956. London:
Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Hockin, Thomas A. "Towards a Theory of Public Policy in
Canada: A Preliminary Discussion Paper", a Seminar
at York University, unpublished manuscript.
- Horowitz, Ralph. The Political Economy of South Africa.
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.
- Horrell, Muriel. Action, Reaction and Counteraction.
Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1971.
- Horrell, Muriel. A Survey of Race Relations in South
Africa, 1968. Johannesburg: South African Institute
of Race Relations, 1969.
- Horrell, Muriel. A Survey of South African Race Relations,
1971. Johannesburg: South African Institute of
Race Relations, 1972.
- Horrell, Muriel. Legislation and Race Relations, 1971.
Revised. Johannesburg: South African Institute of
Race Relations, 1971.
- Horrell, Muriel. South Africa's Workers. Johannesburg:
South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969.
- Horrell, Muriel. South Africa's Workers, Their Organizations
and the Patterns of Employment. Johannesburg: South
Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1969.

- Hume, Ian. "Notes on South African Wage Movements", South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 38 (1970).
- Hunter, Guy. Industrialization and Race Relations. London: Institute of Race Relations, 1966.
- IDOC. "Salvation Today and the White Fathers", The Future of the Missionary Enterprise. No. 1, (1973). Rome: IDOC Documentation Participation Project, 1973.
- International Coffee Association. Portugal, Summary of National Coffee Policy Plan. London: International Coffee Association, 1970.
- Johnstone's, Richard. "Is Economic Growth Disintegrating Apartheid?" in African Affairs. The Journal of the Royal African Society.
- Lasswell, Harold and Abraham Kaplan. Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Leeson, Howard A. and Wilfried Vanderelot. External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1973.
- Legge, Garth, Cranford Pratt, Richard Williams, and Hugh Winsor. The Black Paper, An Alternative Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa. Toronto: Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa, 1970.
- Legum, Colin. "American Investment Bolsters Racism", in United Methodist Church, Southern Africa, A Time For Change. U.S.A., 1969.
- Lindblom, Charles. "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration Review. Vol. 19 (Spring 1959).
- Lombard, J.A. "Problems of Regional Economic Programming in the Development of the Bantu Homelands", South African Journal of Economics. Vol. 39, No. 4. (December 1971).
- Lowi, Theodore J. "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics. July 16, 1964.
- Lusitanian. Montreal, June 30, 1973.

- Luthuli, Albert. Let My People Go. London: Collins, 1963.
- Martin, Paul. Canada and the Quest for Peace. Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1967.
- Minter, William. Portuguese Africa and the West. New York: Penguin, 1972.
- Mobil Oil Corporation. "South African Employees of Mobil Oil Corporation", Mobil in South Africa (1972), in Y.W.C.A., Investment in Oppression. Toronto: Y.W.C.A. of Canada, 1973.
- Molteno, Robert. "South Africa Outlook". Reprinted in X-Ray: On Current Affairs in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, No. 10. (May 1971).
- Motlhabi, Mokgethi (ed.). Essays on Black Theology. Braamfontein, Transvaal: "Black Theology Project", University Christian Movement, 1972.
- M.P.L.A. Revolution in Angola. London: Merlin Press, 1972.
- Munger, Frank J. "Opinion, Elections, Parties, and Policies: A Cross-State Analysis", Paper delivered at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969.
- N.A.T.O., Information Service. NATO Facts and Figures. Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971.
- Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco..., Advisory Opinion No. 4, (February 7, 1923), Hudson, World Court Reports. I, pp. 143-162.
- Nyere, Julius. Stability and Change in Africa. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969.
- Randall, Peter (ed.). Education Beyond Apartheid. Spro-Cas Publication No. 5. Johannesburg: Christian Institute of Southern Africa, 1971.
- Randall, Peter (ed.). Some Implications of Inequality. Spro-Cas Occasional Publication No. 4. Johannesburg: Christian Institute of Southern Africa, 1971.
- Randall, Peter (ed.). The Death Penalty and the Church in South Africa. Braamfontein, Transvaal: South African Council of Churches, 1970.

- Randall, Peter (ed.). Towards Social Change. Spro-Cas Publication No. 6. Johannesburg: Christian Institute of Southern Africa, 1971.
- Rand Daily Mail. March 11, April 26, 1968.
- Ranney, Austin (ed.). Political Science and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968.
- Republic of South Africa, Dept. of Information. Export Country. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1969.
- Republic of South Africa, Dept. of Information. Nutrition and the Bantu. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971.
- Republic of South Africa, Dept. of Information. This Is South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1973.
- Republic of South Africa, South African Information Service. South African Scope. New York: Information Service of South Africa.
- Richards, C.S. "Problems of Economic Development of the Republic of South Africa", in E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
- Robinson, James. Congress and Foreign Policy-Making. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962.
- Rosenau, James N. "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research", in Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968.
- Rutman, Gilbert. "Some Economic Costs in Development in South Africa", Co-Existence. Vol. 8, No. 1. (1971).
- Rutman, Gilbert. "The Trankei: An Experiment in Economic Separation". Vol. 36 (1968).
- Sackur, John. in London Times, April 26, 27, 1971.
- Sadie, J. L. "Population and Economic Development in South Africa", The South African Journal of Economics. Vol. 39, No. 3. (September 1971).

Salisbury, R. H. and J. P. Heinz. "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications", Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Washington (September 1968). Also in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

Sharkansky, Ira (ed.). Policy Analysis in Political Science. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Third World", A Statement delivered at the University of Toronto (September 18, 1970). Statements and Speeches. No. 70/12, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970.

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canada and the European Community". A Statement to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Ottawa (November 2, 1973) delivered by Mr. Pierre Debane, Parliamentary Secretary to Mr. Sharp. Statements and Speeches. No. 73/29 (1973).

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs. "The Major Concerns of Canadian Foreign Policy". A Statement delivered to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (May 15, 1973). Statements and Speeches. No. 13/15, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1973.

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs". "NATO: How It Serves Canadian Interests". Notes for a talk to the Canadian Parliamentary Association (April 17, 1973). Statements and Speeches. No. 73/12 (1973).

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs". "Some Aspects of the World Where Canada Works and Trades". A Statement delivered at the Canadian Business Outlook Conference, Vancouver (May 11, 1972). Statements and Speeches. No. 72/11, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972.

Sharp, Mitchell, Secretary of State for External Affairs. "The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of NATO". A Statement (April 3, 1974). Statements and Speeches. No. 74/4 1974.

- Smith, Timothy. Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in South Africa. Vol. 1, No. 5 (October - November 1970). Washington: The Council on Economic Priorities, 1970.
- Snyder, Richard C. and James A. Robinson. National and International Decision-Making. New York: Institute for International Order, 1961.
- Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (eds.). Foreign Policy Decision-Making. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
- Southern Africa Committee. Southern Africa. New York: Southern Africa Committee, 1973.
- Stankiewicz, W. J. (ed.). Political Thought Since World War II. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1964.
- Steenkamp, W. F. "Labour Policies for Growth During the 'Seventies: In the Established Industrial Areas". South African Journal of Economics. Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1971).
- Storing, Herbert J. (ed.). Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962.
- Trudeau, Pierre. "The Commonwealth - An Association Unstructured and Unfettered". Opening Statement to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Ottawa (August 2, 1973). Statements and Speeches. No. 73/25 (1973).
- Trudeau, Pierre. "Commonwealth Meetings - Their Special Character". An Address to the closing session of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Ottawa (August 10, 1973). Statements and Speeches. No. 73/26 (1973).
- Trudeau, Pierre. "The Situation in Southern Africa". Excerpts from a press conference at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, Singapore (January 20, 1971). Statements and Speeches. No. 71/3 (1971).
- Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Union of South Africa. Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa. Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1955.

Union of South Africa. Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa. Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1955.

Union of South Africa. The Population Registration Act. No. 30 (1950).

United Church of Canada. All That Money Can Buy. Toronto: Committee On Investing Church Funds for Social Purposes, United Church, 1973.

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. Signed at the United Nations Conference on International Organization. San Francisco, California (June 26, 1945). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa. New York: United Nations, 1970.

United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. New York: Office of Public Information.

United Nations, UNESCO. Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information. 2nd ed. Paris: UNESCO, 1972.

United Nations. United Nations and Namibia, A Principle in Torment. New York: United Nations, 1971.

United Nations, United Nations Unit on Apartheid. Notes and Documents. Nos. 7/71, 51/71; No. 4/72; No. 23/73; Nos. 3/74, 4/74, 5/74, 7/74, 8/74, 9/74. New York: United Nations.

United Nations, World Bank. Africa Bureau Fact Sheet.

Visual Publications. South Africa: A Visual History, 1972. Johannesburg: Visual Publications, 1973.

Washington Post. October 20, 1973.

Waters, Maurice. The United Nations. London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1967.

Watkins, Frederick. in James C. Charlesworth (ed.). A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966.

Wildavsky, Aaron. "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting", in Austin Ranney (ed.). Political Science and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968.

Wilson, F. in The Financial Mail, May 10, 1968.

X-Ray: Current Affairs in Southern Africa. London: The Africa Bureau.

Y.W.C.A., Investment in Oppression. Toronto: Y.W.C.A. of Canada, 1973.