IDEOLOGY: AN ESSAY IN ANALYSIS
IDEOLOGY IN POLITICS: AN ESSAY IN ANALYSIS

By

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This thesis is an attempt to examine the nature of ideological thought, and the way in which the concept of ideology is used in politics. A short survey of the concept introduces the topic. The concept is then treated in terms of epistemology, the sociology of knowledge, nationalism, and political theory and doctrine.

The conclusions are that the proponents of the view that ideology is at an end in politics may well be correct in terms of their own implicit assumptions, but it is clear that this standpoint cannot be upheld if other assumptions are made. Substantial support may be given to this proposition by the fact that it is possible to argue that the "end-of-ideology" is itself an ideological viewpoint, and one that is substantially in favour of the status quo. As such, this viewpoint appears to be inherently inimical to the philosophical critique of such basic political concepts as freedom, democracy, and political order.
I would like to express my acknowledgements, for their comments and criticisms, to Professor D. Novak, Dean J. Melling, and Professor H. Massey.
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The purpose of this study is to try and clarify some aspects of political ideology. The study was inspired by the current Anglo-American controversy, between sociologists and political scientists, about whether ideology any longer plays a significant role in political life. The topic is obviously tremendously broad and I will have to cut the scope of the study as far as is possible, so as not to lose intelligibility.

I shall not, therefore, deal with the underdeveloped world or undertake an extensive sociological discussion of the "embourgeoisement" of the Western working class. Similarly, I will have to exclude any discussion of the psychology of ideology. My main concern is with the implications of the end-of-ideology argument for political theory and political philosophy, and the related issues of human values and ideals.

In Chapter One I will introduce the topic with a survey of the concept of ideology and with a brief discussion of political ideals.

Chapter Two is concerned with the question of how we can claim to have certain knowledge of concepts and with the way in which such claims are, from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, determined or conditioned by particular social situations or milieu.

Chapter Three may appear to stand apart somewhat from the main body of the text. It deals with nationalism and will show at least some attributes of all ideologies in a more clearly defined form. In this sense the contents of Chapter Three are related to those of the preceding
and following chapters.

Chapter Four is entitled "Political Doctrine and Ideology". It begins with a discussion of theory, philosophy, and thought, and then concerns itself with "revisionism" in the East and in Great Britain in the West.

Chapter Five draws on the preceding chapters in concluding remarks on the connotations of the end-of-ideology argument.
CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology is a pattern of beliefs and concepts (both factual and normative) which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio-political choices facing individuals and groups.\(^1\)

This definition of ideology appears to be too broad in its denotation. In fact, it hides a long history of changes in the descriptive use of the term "ideology", and, like all definitions, it subsumes the varied attempts that have been made to analyse the theoretical connotations of the concept. This chapter will attempt to give a description of the changes in the use of the word "ideology" and the connotation of the concept, and will look at some of the theoretical attempts at analysing the concept. By adopting this approach, it is intended at least to lay the basis for some points which will be elaborated at later stages in the thesis. One hopes that the pedantry of a historical account of bare facts will thereby be avoided.

The term "ideology" was first adopted by Comte Destutt de Tracey in the late eighteenth century. As a philosophical and anthropological concept, it was to denote the study of ideas and of the role they performed in shaping particular doctrines about ideas. Destutt regarded ideology as a branch of physiology in so far as he held that

all ideas emanated from sensations. Destutt claimed, therefore, to address himself to the science des idées, the science of ideas. It was hoped to discover, by using the methods of natural science, to arrive at causal relationships between sensations and ideas.

"Ideology" was intended by Destutt to be a non-emotive term. The members of l'Institut, in Paris, who pursued the liberal-rationalistic branch of thought associated with the Enlightenment, were, however, quickly branded as idéologues by Napoleon when they inevitably turned against the autocratic manifestations of his régime and his imperialistic designs. As used by Napoleon, this term expressed approbrium (of a particular political viewpoint). "Ideology" itself was to Napoleon nothing better than "visionary moonshine", while to Karl Marx it was "false consciousness", disguising the real historical and sociological condition of men. Although Marx had been nurtured in the Hegelian philosophical tradition, he, with other "left Hegelians", had reacted against its substance because of what he perceived to be its profound religiosity. Hegel had conceived of his philosophy as an indictment of the Kantian synthesis of Cartesian dualism and Lockean empiricism. Neither mind nor matter had been considered predominant in the Kantian system because, Kant maintained, experience was not independent of thought. Thought was necessary in our conceptualisation of experience, but the construction of concepts could not take place outside of our experience. Thus, knowledge was both phenomenal (of appearances) and noumenal (of things-in-themselves), the former being meaningful knowledge. Hegel's reaction against this philosophy took the form of a renewed emphasis on the noumenal. Thus, far from agreeing that "the
speculative use of reason results in metaphysical theses whose very meaning is doubtful,"² Hegel believed that this approach lay at the core of true philosophy. The noumenal or "true" world, as well as the phenomenal world was the product of ideational processes. The idealisation of reality is rational, and "the rational is real". History, on this basis, is the process of idealisation, of the movement of the particular towards the realisation of the Absolute Mind. A young Hegelian, Feuerbach, reacted against the apparent subjugation of the individual man to the moving totality of the dialectic. The philosophical dilemma of the bifurcation of the individual into "self" and "not-self" was epitomised by religion. Religion as conceived by Feuerbach was a form of false-consciousness through which man became alienated from himself. To Karl Marx, however, Feuerbach was himself under the illusion of a false-consciousness. As Marx saw it, the root cause of man's alienation was the direct result of the secular divisions in mankind and did not lay in the "escapism" of a theological metaphysics. Hence, in the fourth of his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx says:

Feuerbach sets out from the fact of religious self-alienation, the duplication of the world into an imaginary world and a secular one. This work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. . . . But the fact that the secular basis deserts its own sphere and establishes an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavage and self-contradiction in the secular base case.³

Feuerbach's division of the spiritual and the secular was, then, only the beginning of an attempt to understand the "false consciousness"

²Emmanuel Kant, quoted in Henry Aiken, Age of Ideology, p. 35.

³Quoted in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels; Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, p. 4.
of man or his "ideology". It appears that Marx, and later Engels, were applying the concept "ideology" to what Destutt had regarded as 'mere' ideas. In the Marxian synthesis, ideas about religion, law, morals, philosophy, and so forth constituted the superstructure of society, the substructure of which lay in the material mode of production of a particular epoch. Ideology was originally interpreted by Marx as forming a part rather than the totality of the superstructure. However, it is clear that Marx later regarded it as the important factor which provided a basis for the others. The term "ideology" was used here in a descriptive and non-neutral, rather than an analytical sense. In Maurice Cranston's terminology it was employed as a "boo-word".

Marx and Engels held that their theory was in itself not an ideology -- it was a means of analysing and discovering the true nature of ideologies. At least one scholar appears to have seized on this claim somewhat readily:

With much insight Marx and Engels developed the doctrine that their economic interests bred in each group a corresponding "ideology", a protective web of beliefs that held no intrinsic validity, but were the rationalisation of their struggle to gain or maintain place and power.\(^4\)

When modern writers, like Roucek, maintain that Marxism is itself an 'ideology', they are using the concept in the narrow sense, as the viewpoint of a particular social class. But, surely Marx and Engels used the concept in a broader sense as well, -- one, moreover, that was much nearer the conception of ideology elaborated by Destutt

\(^4\)R. M. McIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 41. (My italics.)
de Tracey. Thus, if Marx and Engels could claim, as Destutt hoped to do, that they had discovered a means of identifying what underlay and gave rise to men's ideas and thought, then they had, indeed, developed a "science of ideas", though one that apparently did not allow for examination of its own hypotheses. It is interesting to note in this light Engels's later views on historical materialism, and his emphasis on the interrelationship between ideas and circumstances. But, even if Engels recognised that the connection between idea and circumstance was one of an interrelationship rather than a one-way relation, he still maintained that, ultimately, ideas other than those emanating from the proletarian standpoint would be historically false.

Karl Mannheim was aware of the two conceptions of ideology to be found in the works of Marx and Engels, although in his book *Ideology and Utopia* he appears to give a mainly pejorative connotation to the word 'ideology'. Nevertheless, Mannheim attempts a closer theoretical analysis of the concept. Thus, ideologies as more or less conscious deceptions of human interest groups reflect two types of falsity in observation and statement, conceptualised as the 'particular' and 'total' forms of ideological thinking. The particular conception of ideology takes place on the psychological level, and is concerned with what we regard to be the falsity of our opponent's position in relation to the true nature of the situation. The latter, it is assumed, would be against his interests if revealed to him. The distorted ideas of such an adversary "range all the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting deception", from calculated attempts to dupe others to
"self-deception".\textsuperscript{5}

It is possible to determine an argument between two persons holding particular ideological viewpoints, because the difference in views does not preclude the assumption that there exist certain criteria of common ground between them. Because of such elements of common agreement, at least part of the argument between the two opposing parties may be non-ideological. On the other hand, the total conception of ideology presupposes the complete ideological determination of the whole structure of thought:

Here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historical social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or this group.\textsuperscript{6}

Mannheim designates two categories within his total conception of ideology, the 'special' and the 'general'. The 'special' formulation refers to the totality of thought of an individual or social group, conditioned by their 'life-situation' or social circumstance. The total thought of a historical epoch is the concern of the 'general' formulation of the concept, and in this sense recalls the Weberian designation of the "consciousness of an epoch". Mannheim's total conception of ideology shows us the way to a sociology of knowledge, and an examination of such a transition and the problems of relativism which it raises for Mannheim's theory will be undertaken in Chapter Two.

We may note that Mannheim followed Marx in being able to incorporate in his analysis the psychological and sociological manifesta-

\textsuperscript{5}Karl Mannheim, \textit{Ideology and Utopia}, pp. 55-6.

\textsuperscript{6}Mannheim, \textit{loc. cit.}
tions of what he regarded as ideological thought. By 'psychological manifestation' is meant the derivation of the thought processes of an individual from certain psychological traits, such as drives, instincts, motivations, and so on. By sociological manifestation is meant those thought processes that are derived as a result of an individual's relationship to a social group.

According to Mannheim, the particular conception of ideology operates primarily with a psychology of interests, while the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis, without any reference to motivations, confining itself to an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different social settings. 7

Mannheim, as a sociologist, was more concerned with the total conception of ideology; he was therefore unwilling, or unable, to explore further the psychological nature of the particular conception of ideology. 8

Historically, however, the perception of ideological thinking as motivated primarily by psychological causes may be accorded to Nietzsche, Pareto, and Sorel. To Nietzsche, all thought was illusion, which provided rationalisations for the basic human motivation, the "will to power". It is obvious that the term "ideology" was again being used in a pejorative sense. Although the residues and derivations were construed by Pareto as forming the basis of ideologies, the vagueness and the pseudo-scientism of these concepts do not really facilitate

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7 Mannheim, ibid., pp. 57-8.

8 Most psychological investigations into ideology have been of a nature of an inquiry into the various traits entering into the so-called authoritarian personality, especially the studies by Erich Fromm. See, e.g., Escape from Freedom; by Adorno and associates, The Authoritarian Personality. An excellent investigation into the wider perspective of belief and disbelief systems (these only partly composed of ideological thought) is contained in Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind.
the location of the psychological determinants of an ideological outlook. Implicitly, at least, the term was used by Pareto as an emotive word.

Sorel, notably in his *Reflections on Violence*, perceived ideology in both a eulogistic and dyslogistic sense. Ideology was thus a rational structure of beliefs that could be either revolutionary or reactionary, i.e., intended to help either to overthrow or to uphold the *status quo*. More important to Sorel was his concept of the myth, which may be defined as an irrational concentration of beliefs (one hesitates to call it a "system"). Myth was conceived by Sorel as a concept opposed to that of utopia. Myth was thus conducive to revolutionary action, e.g., the myth of the proletarian general strike, while utopia was not.

Mannheim had, of course, examined the concept of utopia, but had given it a denotation similar to that given to myth by Sorel. Thus, although both ideologies and utopias were regarded by Mannheim as 'situationally transcendent', the former were regarded as "unrealisable", while the latter were looked upon as being "realisable". The utopian mentality could cause the bounds of the existing social conditions to be broken, while the ideological mentality could not. But to Sorel the utopian mentality was reactionary because it was unrealisable, and it was unrealisable because it failed to take account of the intuitive forces in mankind. Furthermore, "Parliamentary Socialists" were handicapped in recognising the supreme value of man's irrationality as a

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9 See Rokeach, *op. cit.*., pp. 125-129, for a discussion of the psychological difficulties that may arise as a result of a conflict between the content and structure of an ideology.
means to promoting socialism.

The social myth was important in the organisation of the irrational elements in men's thinking, and, therefore, the function of the real socialist leader was to promote such myths as the only means of overcoming the inactivity of the "petit-proletariat". In effect, the myth was more than utopia because, pragmatically speaking, it took account of the various images that men built up from the resentments they felt against existing society. Thus, the myth of the general strike comprised

a body of images capable of invoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society.\textsuperscript{10}

Sorel maintained that his conception of the role of myth as a means of organising the proletariat towards socio-political change was quite the antithesis of the utopian thought adopted by the "bourgeois socialists". And yet, one can in one respect say that Sorel's stand was not itself far removed from the paradigm of utopian thought. Although he was against the 'scientism' of the utopians and their projections of an inevitable socialist society in the future, and held that the "Ideals men hold of the future are never realised in actual historical evolution", Sorel still believed that "this is neither sufficient ground for inaction nor evidence that belief is impossible".\textsuperscript{11}

One would think that it is just as utopian to conceive of a society of

\textsuperscript{10}George Sorel, \textit{Reflections on Violence}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{11}Irving Horowitz, \textit{Radicalism and the Revolt}, p. 109.
irrational men as to conceive of a society of rational men. It is not pertinent to this essay to examine the paradoxes that Sorel's theory inevitably encountered because of its core conception of the maintenance of human irrationality and sensationalism through a kind of permanent revolution. For our purposes it is enough to note that for Sorel ideology is the prime vehicle for social action.

I have dwelt somewhat upon the Sorelian theory because it points to several emphases that will emerge later in this thesis. I wish now to expand one of the elements in Sorel's work. This element is utopian in the sense that it is concerned with the goals of mankind. It is the ideal of socialism. Ideals in the sense used here are "envisioned ends of improvement, of the better, of the excellent, of the perfect, against which we measure actual achievement". We are, then, concerned with normative propositions for political conduct. Intuitively, in common speech and in political action, we expect an idealist, in the words of Carl J. Friedrich, to be "a person who will be motivated in his actions to a greater degree than most others by the ideals he cherishes".

My reference to the "ideal of socialism" in the last paragraph may be enigmatic. Do we regard such an ideal as one to be placed against or alongside other ideals? The answer is both of these and yet neither. For, on the one hand, one would suppose the "ideal of socialism" to be to subsume the ideals mentioned above, together with

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12 Evelyn Shirk, The Ethical Dimension, p. 49.

13 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and his Government, pp. 84-85.
other ideals bearing humanistic considerations. The 'excellent' or 'perfect' society is envisaged to be one allowing for maximum freedom and individuality for man, while instilling a spirit of co-operation rather than one of competition. In comparison, Erich Fromm in his book *Escape from Freedom* considers the ideals of fascism to be totally opposed to the humanistic ideals described. However, the socialistic ideal is not to be identified with a blueprint or template for the new society. In fact, we should be well aware from our reading of the history of socialist thought that the concept of socialism has been nebulous and only vaguely defined. To Fourier and Owen socialism meant a communal society based on co-operation; to Marx it was the classless society; to Proudhon, a society where property rights had been abolished; to Bakunin, an anarchical society; to Sorel, a syndicalist one, and so on!

I have included this brief analysis of ideals in this chapter, because the fundamental question that the current controversy on the end-of-ideology seems to raise is directly related to it. The question may be phrased, 'Is idealism in the manner I have described it a form of ideology or is it something completely divorced from ideology'? If all idealism is utopian, then it may be possible to draw a conceptual distinction between this type of thinking and ideological thinking. But even Karl Mannheim, the most notable protagonist of such a division, states that "To determine concretely, however, what in a given case is ideological and what utopian is extremely difficult".\(^{14}\) What makes it more difficult is that we are not dealing with "pie-in-the-sky" visions on the one hand,

\(^{14}\) Mannheim, op. cit., p. 196.
and so-called misrepresentations of factual conditions, or 'deceptions', on the other. We are concerned with how a particular person sees what ought to be done in terms of what state of affairs he would like to see brought about.

Bertrand Russell sees this issue clearly. He states:

We must approach goals by degrees but I believe no less firmly that really vital and radical reform requires some vision beyond the immediate future, some realisation of what human beings might make of life if they chose.  

This is not to say that it is "a finished Utopia that we ought to desire, but a world where imagination and hope are alive and active". Contrary to 'popular' opinion, which appears to be changing on this very topic at the present time, these ethical presumptions were present in the work of Karl Marx. "For Marx no social life is possible without human consciousness. And there is no human consciousness without ethical ideals of some kind". Marx differed from the Utopian socialists in his perception of these ideals only, in that his was a naturalistic perception of ideals as related to the social basis and hence grounded on human need. Even when he abandoned his idealism in his attempt "to understand the nature of the historical basis", he retained a belief in the "natural activity" of the material social basis that led directly to the expression of human needs.

Since Mannheim, the treatment of the concept of ideology has been mainly descriptive. William Ebenstein, in his Today's Isms,

15 Bertrand Russell, Political Ideals, p. 67.
16 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
17 Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx, p. 87.
perhaps uses the term in the simplest manner possible. He designates four major groupings of ideologies: Capitalism, viewed as an economic system with democracy as its political counterpart; Communism and Fascism, with historical and existential variations in each of these ideologies; and Socialism, differentiated between, say, the Socialism of Great Britain or Sweden and the left wing Socialism of Italy. Gyorgy and Blackwood attempt to draw distinctions between 'free' ideologies -- socialism, liberalism, and capitalism -- and 'unfree' ideologies -- fascism, communism, and nazism. They give an "appraisal" rather than a definition of the term "ideology" as a "concise set of political, social, and economic ideas in the realm of world politics".  

This statement seems similar to Maurice Duverger's conception of "total ideology", i.e., an ideology with a Weltanschauung or world-view, as opposed to "partial ideology", i.e., that ideology which arises from a particular social class or category. 

Ideologies perform "two leading roles in the development of political conflicts", according to Duverger. The first role is that "of co-ordinating and systematising individual oppositions, thus setting them within the context of a larger conflict". The second role is to give to political disputes "the context of conflicting values". The latter role is given to ideologies because of the view that it is a function of ideologies to propagand a system of values. The designation

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18 Gyorgy and Blackwood, Ideologies in World Affairs, p. 17
20 Ibid., p. 77.
of ideologies as value systems is not, however, common today: "In
general, ideology has today a somewhat pejorative sense which does not
attach to value". 21

This is probably so because the term "ideology" has often been
employed to designate an action-related system of ideas, most speci-
ically, totalitarian ideologies. The causal relationship, implied
between theory (or more particularly ideology) and action, was perhaps
first emphasized by Karl Marx. If the bourgeois society was a reflection
of false consciousness, then to arrive at the truth, which was effec-
tively disguised by the ideology, was the task of the proletariat. As
the proletariat constituted that social class which, because of its
unique socio-economic position in history, had no need or desire for
an ideology based on false-consciousness, it would possess the true
ideology. But if this true ideology was to be attained through the
form of a fully class-conscious proletariat, a Klasse für sich rather
than a Klasse an sich, then action was required. Moreover, this action
would be necessarily revolutionary action, and in this sense related
to particular goals. Sorel's conception of the myth implies the
connection between theory and action very clearly. In short:

For Marx the only real action was in politics. But action,
revolutionary action as Marx conceived it, was not mere
social change. It was, in its way, the resumption of all
the old millenarian, chiliastic ideas of the Anabaptists.
It was, in its new vision, a new ideology. 22

21 Clyde C. Kluckhorn, "Values and Value Orientations", Toward
A General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils,
p. 431-2.

22 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 394.
The secular counterparts of the religious movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were the radical totalitarian movements of the twentieth century.\(^{23}\) Here, again, we encounter an attempt to establish the heavenly city on earth. It was noted at a very early stage in the analysis of modern totalitarianism that ideology played an important role as an organising factor. Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, and others, have shown how ideology was influential in the formative years of the Nazi and Bolshevik movements as a propagandistic and unifying force.\(^{24}\) Alan Bullock in his study of Adolf Hitler shows how dexterous Hitler was in employing anti-semitism to bring together the two wings of the Nazi movement that had become estranged over policy considerations.\(^{25}\)

Arendt points to the interrelationship of ideology and the use of terror in the Nazi and Communist regimes. Her analysis of this relationship leads her to entitle Chapter Thirteen of her book "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government". The main theme of her analysis seems to be that ideological thinking aims at a total application of a "style" idea to the realms of reality. "Hence ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive with our five senses".\(^{26}\) Her view of ideology seems very close to the special formula-

\(^{23}\) For an excellent analysis of these chiliastic movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and their affinities to the modern totalitarian movements, see Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium.

\(^{24}\) Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism; Carl J. Friedrich, Totalitarianism.

\(^{25}\) Alan Bullock, Hitler; A Study in Tyranny, Ch. 3.

\(^{26}\) Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 470.
tion of Mannheim's total conception of ideology. The awareness that "our total outlook as distinguished from its details may be distorted" leads, as Mannheim indicates, to a different problem of false-consciousness than that which emanates from a purely psychological basis — a point which Marx had obviously seen clearly. For Mannheim, the danger of 'false consciousness' nowadays is not that it cannot grasp an absolute unchanging reality, but rather that it obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the mental processes which make up our worlds. 27

Although the contents of this chapter have been mainly descriptive of the ways in which the concept of ideology has been applied and used historically, some useful conclusions may be drawn. In the first place, although most of the writers we have mentioned may agree with the definition of ideology given on page one, one point should, at least, be clear. This is that the term 'pattern' implies a concise, logical interdependence of ideas, i.e., a coherent structure. If all ideological thought is so "structured", then it may, indeed, seem that it makes little sense to talk of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism as ideologies. But we may juxtapose the content of ideologies as their distinguishing feature. By content is meant a greater or lesser degree of commitment, belief, and value orientation. "Normative" content may, thus, imply a utopian element, i.e., the looking towards certain ideals as guides to action. But it may also imply a condonement of the status quo, an attitude that there ought to be no change. The latter position, broadly conservative, may also provide a 'guide to action' or 'non-

27 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 94.
action". Social conditioning is obviously important in respect of the relative weighting given in thought to either of these elements. This will be discussed in Chapter II. But we may see here some of the reasons why the "end-of-ideology" may itself be regarded as an ideological viewpoint.

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CHAPTER II

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowing. The problem of how we can know arises in direct confrontation with the so-called common-sense theory of knowledge. Philosophically, this theory implies that what we see, in terms of shape, size, colour, etc., has really existed before, and will exist after, the act of perception. The problems that arise from this theory of knowledge are perhaps obvious. For instance, is a rose still red when we "see" it at night? A coin which appears round when placed on a flat surface and viewed from directly above, appears oval when slightly tilted and viewed from an angle; has it changed its shape? Common sense would tell us 'no', but how do we know? Physiology raises problems about how, for instance, the same nerve current can carry such different qualities as warmth, cold, sound, pain, etc., to our brain. In physics, problems arise as to how we can claim to see a star when light waves from the star take light years to reach the earth. If matter consists of atomic particles, how are these related to one another; so that we can speak of an object having mass, or, more currently, energy?

The prime impulse to the origin of epistemology was, then, brought about by raising the question of whether we can have cognition beyond experience. It is not my purpose here to elaborate on the various theories of knowledge in the history of philosophy; two schools may,

1 I am indebted for some of these examples to Olaf Stabledon.
however, be delineated: Idealism entails the view that the objects of knowledge have no existence apart from the mental states which know them. Realism, on the other hand, supposes that objects do exist independently of our knowing them. The essential epistemological problem is which of these two schools of thought, or, rather, the different philosophical viewpoints falling under these general categories, can lay claim to greater truth.

The existence of a multitude of knowledges which present themselves as true and yet opposed to each other - is the epistemological problem at its roots, a fact immanent and conscious, of which every man who reflects can be aware.2

In Ernest Gellner's view, the tradition of epistemology in Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle is reflected in the so-called Crusoe Myth.3 This myth, in brief, presupposes the Pure Visitor, who is free from error in his judgements because not hidebound by a given conceptual framework. Several techniques have been developed to 'abolish' any conceptual framework: the Cartesian scheme adopted the means of universal doubt; the British empiricists based all knowledge on perception. For Sartre, one of the modern representatives of Existentialism, the epistemological problem took a slightly different form. Being, in this view, is being-in-itself,4 and knowledge has no


3 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change.

4 Being-in-itself -- phenomenal (unconscious) existence. Cf. being-for-itself -- consciousness of a lack of being, a striving for being. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated and with an introduction by Hazel E. Barner.
content. Man is an eternal guest for being and selfhood, and in this sense is "thrown into the world" to make the best he can of it.

The Pure Visitor is, then, an impossibility; for we are, in a sense, hidebound by the language we speak, and the other social customs and practices we have inherited. It is clear therefore that, as Gellner says, we cannot divest ourselves of our conceptual clothing.

Thus our 'conceptual clothing' is part of the language we speak, and, therefore, we might agree with Peter Winch:

To ask whether reality is intelligible is to ask about the relation between thought and reality. In considering the nature of thought one is led also to consider the nature of language. Inseparably bound up with the question whether reality is intelligible, therefore, is the question of how language is connected with reality, of what it is to say something.

We may see clearly that, as language is intimately related to society, changes in social patterns are likely to necessitate and bring about changes in words and the meaning of words. It is unlikely, for instance, that, in any given language, grammar and syntax will change to anything near the same extent. As Winch says, then, our concern should fundamentally be with the "nature of language in general". Whatever meaning may be given to this statement, I think that some illumination may be

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5Gellner points out that, though we may reject the myth of the Pure Visitor, "those who reject him are mistaken in rejecting the enterprise on which he was engaged, which can, and sometimes must, be carried on without taking the myth itself seriously". Ibid., p. 108.

6Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 11.

7Loc. cit.
provided by the fact which Susanne K. Langer has so admirably brought
to our attention, namely, that language is not purely utilitarian but
also symbolic. By linguistic symbolism is meant "the record of
articulate conceptual thinking". Thus, language is more than a
communicative interaction, expressing our wants and needs as well as
the particular objects we observe.

We can, therefore, use language to 'transcend' or universalise
the particular objects we observe, so that, for instance, we are able
to talk of a table, car, etc., without the immediate presence of either.
Symbolic language may thus be both connotative and denotative. Connota-
tion involves the expression of a concept, like 'amen', which does not
embody any syntactical part of speech; the utterance is essentially
instinctive. Denotation relates to a conception or thing which is
immediately public, and, therefore divorced from any personal experience
leading to a momentary exclamation. Denotation, because it is more
'realistic', does not, to my mind, necessitate any specificity of
utterance. A conception, however vague, can carry adequately its
symbolic reference. For instance, although we may not know what a
hippie has been doing when he tells us that he has been "doing his
thing", we may safely assume that he has had a pleasurable experience.

The relevance of this discussion for our topic is that the
language of ideology can be viewed as forming part of a symbolic cul-
tural system. Ideological language is, for example, likely to be far

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8 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, Ch. 5.

9 See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System, in David
Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, pp. 47-76.
more metaphorical than ordinary language; in any case, words are likely to be employed in such a manner as to carry maximum effect. I should clarify this point. If we accept that an important part of any ideology is the orientation of certain values or ideals, then the language used by a person holding such an ideology is likely to express these factors in some form. Either explicitly or implicitly an 'ideological sentence' will often contain a condemnation of an extant (social or political) situation, and/or an expression of a desired situation, the implication of an 'ought'.

But when is political language ideological and when is it not? A person with a pejorative view of ideology would probably hold the belief that all statements which do not adequately represent the facts, i.e., cause 'distortion', are ideological statements. This leads back to the epistemological problem, namely, when are we able to assert a proper claim to knowledge? We may well encounter a situation where, as Mannheim puts it somewhere, we are "talking past one another". Such an event is likely to be the attribute of a "closed mind", but at any stage in political debate misunderstandings are likely to arise, mainly because the political debate assumes a complex of normative and descriptive (not yet 'positive') elements and meanings, plus, at times,

10 We shall discuss this point further in Chapter Three.

11 Cf. Arne Naess, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-7, for a semantical discussion of "ideological sentences".

12 See Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, p. 40. A similar distinction might be made between open and closed ideologies, which involves a discussion of the structure and content of an ideology and will be deferred to Chapter Three.
the ample adoption of symbolic metaphor. What is it to say that the Taft-Hartley Act was a "slave labour act" or that certain immigration laws epitomise 'fascist racial discrimination'?

In this respect, the attempt to discover the meaning of words by their use -- the object of linguistic philosophy -- may well be pointless or even farcical. A similar fate may befall the attempt to indulge in what Ernest Gellner calls "a-priori conceptualisation". Of significance is the debate between Peter Winch and Alasdair MacIntyre on the role of cattle in the Azande Society, when in fact cattle could not survive in the area of the Azande tribe, owing to a tropical disease. An approach to the language of politics from the point of view of how words are used (in Wittgenstein's sense, politics would then form a 'language game') is unlikely to help us in our attempt to understand the symbolic content of ideological language. Although I shall return to this point later, a digression may be pertinent here.

In the field of linguistics proper, as opposed to linguistic philosophy, the argument of John Stuart Mill that "the principles and rules of grammar are the means by which forms of language are made to correspond with universal thought" encountered refutation quite early in the advancement of linguistic research. It was found by Jean Piaget and others that the syntax of speech varies between languages; for instance, Chinese does not contain the traditional Western subject-

13 Geertz, op. cit., p. 60.
predicate form. Cassirer points out that these discoveries do not necessarily mean that "the idea of a general or philosophical grammar" is, therefore, "invalidated by the progress of linguistic research, although we can no longer hope to realise such a grammar by the simple means that were employed in former attempts".

An attempt employing new "means" has perhaps been epitomised by social anthropologists, such as Piaget and Malinowski, and psychologists, such as W. I. and D. S. Thomas. The attempt is made to link verbal behaviour to psychological traits, of "instincts", "drives", and so on. An examination is also made of the manner in which a certain "pattern" or form of objects and functions develops and is subsequently standardised in a locality or tribe, thus influencing the formation of a new conceptual scheme. Such a scheme will often regroup elements taken from elsewhere, for example, customs from other tribes. Levi-Strauss' book illuminates one dominant failure in the psychologists' attempt to study language development, and this is a failure to study language development "against the background of, or in connection with, the social act itself".

Thought is, it may be granted, essentially linguistic in that we think in terms of concepts which form part of a given language. Given this, we may agree with C. Wright Mills when he states that "A theory of mind is needed which conceives social factors as intrinsic

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16 A brief discussion may be found in Barnes and Becker (eds.), Contemporary Social Theory.


18 Barnes, op. cit., p. 347.
to mentality".\textsuperscript{19} In this context, thought is essentially social rather than personal, which does not mean that we should hypothesize such a thing as a collective or group mind, but rather that thought entails a "clear and dynamic conception of the relations imputed between a thinker and his social context".\textsuperscript{20} The core of this argument is, I feel, that whatever the debates between certain philosophers of language, such as Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap, may reveal to us as regards the logical imputation of meaning to certain sentences in respect of their "testability" and "verifiability", we still have to look for a wider context of meaning. In Mills's view research of this nature is difficult to undertake because of the absence of a set of theoretically-substantial psycho-sociological hypotheses. He attributed the sparseness of the methods of the sociology of knowledge to the absence of such a theoretical framework. More recently a similar criticism has been levied by Arne Naess in relation to ideological research.

Although it seems that the sociology of knowledge is gradually being superseded by the study of linguistics, we should now turn to a discussion of the sociology of knowledge. "Wissenssociologie" became established as a branch of sociological inquiry in the 1920's in an attempt to meet two distinct intellectual problems: the problem of historical knowledge and the solutions propounded by "historicism", and the Marxist theory of ideology and its applications to political thought.\textsuperscript{21} I do not propose to give a historical account of the main

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 426.

proponents in this field, but will briefly state their point of approach and turn to Mannheim's exposition of the topic. I shall discuss some criticisms levied against Mannheim's theory, and the light which the study of the sociology of knowledge may throw upon the concept of ideology.

It is generally agreed that the central point in the study of the sociology of knowledge is the discovery of the relations between knowledge and other existential factors in society, such as social class and group structures, as well as, culturally, values, climate of opinion, and so on. It is perhaps notable that two kinds of knowledge were excluded from existential determination by the two most significant figures in the early history of the sociology of knowledge, Marx and Mannheim.22

We elaborated briefly Mannheim's total conception of the ideology in the first chapter. It implies that the form, content, and conceptual framework of a "mode of thought" are unavoidably bound up with the life-situation. This was what Mannheim described as the "special formulation" of the total conception of ideology. We mentioned also his 'general formulation', which is taken to mean that the whole of the thought of a social group or an historical epoch is situationally determined. The special formulation implies that only the thought of one's opponent is situationally determined, while the general formulation implies that all thought is so determined.23 Mannheim derived his theory of the sociology of knowledge from the general formulation of total

22 The reader may see here implications for the 'end-of-ideology' argument. This will be discussed in due course.

23 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 77.
ideology. The transition from the one to the other involves the simple realisation that not only the thought of one's opponent is situationally determined, but that all thought is so conditioned. The sociology of knowledge has, on the other hand, as its prime objective, "the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to differences in social settings".\textsuperscript{24}

We can perhaps see the relativistic position in which Mannheim found himself, which led to his being accused of epistemological relativism.\textsuperscript{25} If all thought is situationally determined, particularly political and social thought, two general objections have been raised against Mannheim. The first is that the thought of the observer or adumbrator of a relativistic theory or position is itself situationally determined and consequently cannot establish objective criteria for assessing the social determinants of the thought of other groups or individuals. Secondly, if the observer is able to establish such criteria of judgement and establish his position as unconditionally true, then the doctrine of relativism is self-contradictory. Mannheim himself was aware of this apparent contradiction and stipulated several criteria for the circumvention of this predicament.\textsuperscript{26}

At least one thinker maintains that "These anti-relationistic

\textsuperscript{24} Mannheim, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 265.


\textsuperscript{26} For details, see Mannheim, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter Five, and Merton, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter Thirteen.
elements ignore the status and character of epistemological forms". 27 These are that "the categories upon which all discourse and inquiry depend are related to social situations, to cultural determinants", and that "closely linked with such a view of categories is the social theory of perception". 28 By "social theory of perception" is meant that by "acquiring a technical vocabulary with its terms and classifications, the thinker is acquiring, as it were, a set of colored spectacles". 29

What is important about this argument is that although, as we have mentioned above, the categories of discourse and inquiry are related to social and cultural determinants, we inevitably run into the problem of a type of Marxian "cultural lag". The form such a lag would take would be either a renewed justification of a declining social phenomenon, or an attempt to read into the present situation what is believed 'ought to happen' in the future. Either of these elements in a claim to knowledge may be described as constituting "false consciousness", and therefore as being ideological. The first type of lag makes it possible to speak of Machiavelli as "the voice of a decaying bourgeoisie", or of the Enlightenment as "a bourgeois ideology". 30 The second type of lag should reveal to us important features of totalitarian ideologies and, actually, all radical ideologies.

It seems here that we encounter the link between theory and practice, ideology and action. For Machiavelli's Prince, the prime

28 Ibid., p. 458.
29 Ibid., p. 489.
30 See the articles by Alfred von Martin and Harold J. Laski in Judith Shklar, Political Theory and Ideology.
aim was to re-cultivate the spirit of the virtu Romana; for the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the aim, in Laski's view, was, indeed, to cultivate a better society, but one for the bourgeoisie, not for the poorer classes. The link between ideology and action in totalitarian societies is obvious; I shall return to this point later. The essential point here is that the beginning of the modern age experienced what Arendt has described as a reversal of the traditional relationship between thinking and doing. This reversal took place within the hierarchy of the vita activa. Originally this term was confined to those human activities which took place within the sphere of the "public-political", but with the disappearance of the ancient city-state the term vita activa lost its specifically political meaning and denoted all kinds of active engagement in the things of this world. Thinking and doing were both facets of the vita activa as opposed to the vita contemplativa, the contemplative life. Indeed, the active life was essential to the undertaking of contemplation. The many had to "do", for the few to "behold". For Thomas Hobbes as well as Plato, "leisure is the mother of philosophy".

Even for Machiavelli, therefore, who, in the view of one philosopher, developed a strategy "based upon mental weapons instead of physical weapons", the essential criterion became doing. The ability of the Prince to govern became defined by his actions. Religion as a powerful weapon in all political struggles had "to prove its strength in action". The distinguishing characteristic of the Republic

32Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 162.
33Ibid., p. 138. A defining characteristic of the Republic, as elucidated in the Discourses.
was the ability to turn itself into a dictatorship at time of war.

All this may seem to have little relevance to the sociology of knowledge and epistemology, let alone the concept of ideology. But a number of factors are of importance. First, the elevation of doing over thinking was itself part of the broader reversal between the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa*. If, therefore, as in Arendt's view, contemplation became meaningless, it became meaningless in the face of the tendency to view life and history as process. Action as process became the art of making, and if history was process, then men, not man, made history, even if the meaning of history was concealed from them.

But if the meaning of history was concealed from men, though revealed to the right use of reason by the philosopher, its development was embodied in the collective entities of the nation and of the social class. In the first place, this meant that all thought outside this embodiment (philosophy of history) became ideological, a form of false consciousness. But, in the second place, the problem of arriving at the true consciousness took the form of action -- of nations at war, of the assertion of the proletariat.

It was but a short step from the viewpoint just described to what Lichtheim calls "the ideology concept of logical positivism", when ideology "becomes synonymous with any kind of consciousness that can relate itself to the ongoing activity of a class or group effective enough to make some sort of practical difference".34

34 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 46.
Thus, the seeds are laid for Lenin's conception of the revolutionary elite; history is process, but the process has to be understood and propagated by the standard-bearers of the social class which is uniquely placed within that process. Ideology in this view becomes the prerogative of the faithful; and the more dogmatic the faith becomes, the more it takes the appearance of an institutionalised religion. The intellectual, far from assuming the vantage point Mannheim accorded to him, from which he could overview the conflict of ideological perspectives, becomes, instead, to use a term coined by Raymond Aron, the committed 'churchman'. But this we must leave to the next chapter. If, however, political ideology is a weapon of a revolutionary elite to mobilise the masses, then it might be possible to regard political doctrine as something distinctive from ideology. I shall consider this point in the final chapter. But I hope that our discussion has clarified a number of factors.

The first of these is the broadly conceived epistemological question of how we can know what such social and political concepts as freedom, democracy, and even "the Good Society" stand for. From the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge, one's point of view in these debates is always determined by one's social situation, measured largely in terms of class. This approach is still very important, even in the face of apparently lowering class differentials. For, as W. G. Runciman has pointed out in an admirable book, feelings of class resentment may be those of relative deprivation, in terms of economic status, or power. Relative deprivation, the difference between what

one perceives one's social position to be in terms of any or all of these three categories and one's actual position, suggests the continued importance of at least one aspect of ideological thinking (that of false consciousness?). I remember Professor Bernard Crick remarking in a lecture that the classless society of the future will be one of the middle class, a peculiarly American ideal. This assumes a great deal but, above all, it assumes an easy passage through the ideological bulwark raised on the resentment felt by the existing "middle class" in the West and in the East.
CHAPTER III

NATIONALISM

In so far as an ideology is an expression of false consciousness, it is, indeed, a terrible, simplifying agent. The process of simplification takes place in two perhaps analytically separable ways. To a greater or lesser degree, the process of ideological cognition involves, on the one hand, a rejection of what is inimical to one's pattern of thought, and, on the other, what may be called a non-deliberate incomprehension of certain facts. This distinction is probably more useful than that drawn by Mannheim between total and partial ideological thinking.

In this vein, it may be useful to treat my distinction in terms of what we have called earlier 'open' and 'closed' ideologies. All ideologies may be supposed to involve both conceptual categories of deliberate exclusion and non-deliberate incomprehension. For instance, Mannheim's special formulation of total ideology would embody to a greater degree the element of deliberate exclusion, while partial ideology would involve a greater degree of non-deliberate incomprehension. We might find it useful to discuss nationalism in terms of my categorisation. In this context, the categories of closed and open ideologies could be substituted for 'total' and 'partial' ideologies in my framework, and perhaps make more sense because allowing greater influence to extra-societal factors, such as propagandising elites.

According to Elie Kedourie, "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the "nineteenth century". As such, "it
pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states.\(^1\)

The belief that "humanity is naturally divided into nations" had, as Kedourie points out, one of its chief origins in the philosophical ideas of the period, particularly Kant, Hegel, and Fichte, but the Enlightenment philosophy of a universal and "invarying law of Nature" also had its influence. The doctrine of enlightened absolutism was in fact based on this philosophy, thus providing an example of the conflict between the universal and the particular. If the state was merely a collection of individuals thrown together, the task of the ruler was to maximise his subjects' welfare. In almost a parody of mercantilist doctrine, the strength and prosperity of a state and the glory of its ruler depended "on its capacity to ensure the welfare of the individual"\(^2\). But the French Revolution was the negation of the all-too-complacent doctrine of enlightenment absolutism; in simple terms, it meant that if a people was dissatisfied with its government, however "enlightened" it might be, it could overthrow that government. Of course, this had been part of John Locke's doctrine, and the Americans, in a sense, had been the first to implement it. But the difference lay in that the French revolutionaries considered themselves a nation in a way that the Americans could and did not. Kedourie quotes from "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen": "The principle of sovereignty resides essentially in

\(^1\)Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 9.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 12.
the Nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it".3

Kedourie rightly points out that the above "is one prerequisite without which a doctrine such as nationalism is not conceivable". In fact, what makes nationalism expressly an ideology in this view is that it raises the question of the nation above the turmoil of ordinary political conflict. There is an equation (how pertinent to the 'third world'? ) of nationalism with the desire for radical political change; a plan for this becomes even clearer when considered in terms of the conservative and philosophical reaction to the French Revolution and the post-revolutionary Napoleonic expansionism. Thus, if the French conception of nationalism found its philosophical justification in the Rousseauan doctrine of the General Will, the 'antinationalist' reactions found justification in the teachings of the German Idealist school of Philosophy. It may or may not be the case that Kant's ethical doctrines of 'self-determination' provided the "ultimate paternity of nationalism".4 It is clear, however, that in so far as they provided for arguments in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling, they laid the groundwork for yet another philosophical reversal, which was to have an important influence on the politics of the nineteenth century.

Initially, what happened in philosophy was another reversal of the vita contemplativa and the vita activa. In so far as the vita activa was concerned with the pulsation of a healthy political body (and we have noted earlier Arendt's questioning of this role of the vita activa since Plato), the reversal took the form of a complete subversion of politics. It was, indeed, more than a simple reversal; in

3Ibid., p. 12.

Kedourie's view, it involved a complete enveloping of the vita activa by the vita contemplativa: "For from the life of action and the contemplative life being opposites, it was now held that the politics and the vocation of all citizens was that absorption into the universal consciousness which hitherto had been only the ambition of a few philosophers and mystics".5

The teachings of these "few philosophers and mystics" led directly to the glorification of the state as, in the writings of Fichte and Herder, the embodiment of the nation, or, in Hegel's writings, the embodiment of particular phases of the absolute Idea Becoming:

The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite shape than before, that in which Freedom obtains objectivity. . . . When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will be of man submits to laws -- the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes . . . For the History of the World occupies a higher ground than . . . the conscience of individuals. What the absolute aim of Spirit requires and accomplishes . . . transcends the obligation . . . of good or bad motives.6

And yet, nineteenth century nationalism did not take only the form of the glorification of the state (used synonymously in this sense with "nation"). Thus, the type of nationalism preached by Mazzini, John Stuart Mill, and others, may best be summarised as an attempt to expand liberty between nations and the rights of the individual. In the one case, wrote Acton in 1862,

nationality is founded on the perpetual supremacy of the collective will, of which the unity of the nation is the necessary condition, to which every other influence must defer, and against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is tyrannical.

5Kedourie, op. cit., p. 41.

6Quoted in Christopher Thorne, Ideology and Power, p. 157.
The other case was distinguished from the first because it tends to diversity and not to uniformity, to honour and not to unity; because it aims not at an arbitrary change, but at careful respect for the existing conditions of political life, and because it obeys the laws and results of history, not the aspirations of an ideal future.  

Etymologically, we have, it seems, two approaches to nationalism, one of which is generally regarded as anti-political, the other as conducive to politics. I have remarked on Machiavelli's assumption of nationalism as providing an underlying unity to the conflict of interests in a nation. This is no mere tautology, however, for, clearly, a conflict of interests could exist without a sense of national identity; Canada would be a good example of this. Modern Israel is a paradigm of the role Machiavelli assigned to nationalism; the feeling of nation permits rather than obstructs the exercise of free politics.

The question of which comes first, the nation or the freedom of political conflict, does not arise in the case of Israel, for the two go hand in hand. It is a different matter for the developing countries today, as it was for Germany and Italy earlier in the century. The overriding emphasis given to the 'nation' is largely accounted for, politically, by the failure of the political community to establish itself in these countries, owing to historical, cultural, and religious divergences. Is nationalism an ideology in the second sense but not in the first, or is it not an ideology at all?

Two authors take the view, contrary to Kedourie, that it is not an ideology at all. Carl Friedrich defines nationalism as

7Ibid., p. 159.
primarily "a sentiment or a body of feelings associated with the sense of self-identity of particular nations". It is, therefore, "typically devoid of any specific notions concerning the political or social order as such, except to insist that the order should be in keeping with nationalist traditions". Bernard Crick, typically, takes the liberal view of nationalism, following Mazzini: "The true nationalist must believe, on the contrary, in the equality of nations". The fact that every nation has its unique history means, in Professor Crick's view, that nationalism cannot be an ideology. He would take a view similar to Friedrich's, I think, in regarding nationalism as an ideology only when it is linked with such an 'ideology' as socialism or racism. It then becomes an instrument for oppression, military expansion, and so on. But this is a tenuous position, for was not nineteenth century imperialism an ideology in just this sense -- an over-elaboration and extension of "national self-identity, as well as the various economic and other motives? Nationalism -- pure, yet not so simple -- may not be an ideology in the restricted 'active-related' sense; it is just 'there -- as some would say, a "myth", or a "state of mind".

This ignores that in nationalism certain values are often involved. I mean by values here not only those of the "third World" -- economic progress, release from colonial domination, and so on -- but also the institutionally oriented, those more typical of developed countries. Thus, the talk is of American democracy and the British

8 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, p. 83.
9 Ibid.
rule of law -- the "system" breeds a national frame of mind. It is not exactly a question of 'old myths and new realities', though there is more than a modicum of truth in applying the dictum to America's attitude towards developments in South-East Asia. Today the issue is simply this: one becomes so used to one's own system that one expects others to 'behave' in the same way. It is thus possible to understand the failure of the British to comprehend the nature and inherent tendencies of the Nazi movement. With centuries of breeding under the rule of law, it was possible for many in Britain to accept Hitler's statements of intention of operating within the norms of legality, if not without question, at times, then at least with a great deal of credulity.10

In terms of my proposed categorisation, such an outlook as that adopted by the British towards the Nazi movement in its formative years would epitomise, in the main, "indeliberate incomprehension". Not entirely, however, because the Communist 'menace' provided ready grounds for neo-acceptance of a prospective bulwark. (This is not to say that a few, like Patrick Gordon Walker, did not realise that the menace was, in fact, a "Communazi Menace"). On the other hand, it is true that total rejection of many obvious facts would involve the combination of a pseudo-nationalism with some other doctrine, such as class or race, thus providing a totalitarian Weltanschauung.

Despite assumptions to the contrary, "Weltanschauung" cannot be directly interpreted as "world-view". A world-view would imply an element of rationality, the weighing of pros and cons, at least

10 For an excellent analysis of reports in the 'responsible Press' in Britain in the twenties and thirties see Brigitte Granzow, Mirror of Nazism.
to a certain extent. In contrast, Weltanschauung is no rational concept. It is rather an intuitive contemplation of the whole. It claims to be all-inclusive and unfathomably deep. It cannot be understood by rational thinking; it is a product not of the individual but of the collectivity.11

To understand Russia, wrote Tyutichev in a poem, involves not the use of reason but a belief in her peculiar nature. Kohn remarks that National Socialism changed "the character of the Weltanschauung from a metaphysical to a biological one which seemed more appropriate to a 'scientific age'.12 Because the totalitarian ideologies were regarded as "scientific by their adherents, precision was demanded, and this entailed (as we shall see in Chapter Four) the reaching of cold logic into history. A "world" view, indeed.

The concept of Weltanschauung implies a certain religious devotion, and if nationalism in itself could not be accurately described as a Weltanschauung in quite the same sense as the Nazi ideology, it formed a sort of surrogate for religion. Talmon ascribes three main causes to the appearances of nationalism in the early nineteenth century:

- the decline of religious sanction and the weakening of the religious frame-work; the doctrine of the rights of man and the democratic sovereignty of the people; economic and social processes at the onset of the Industrial Revolution.13

In Talmon's view, both the trends of nineteenth-century nationalism described above exhibited elements of the "unique" and the "universal". Thus, the Rousseauauistically inspired French rational trend emphasised

11 Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century, p. 78.
12 Kohn, ibid., p. 79.
"the constant, vibrating experience of partnership among equals, deliberating jointly on that which was common to all of them, the res publica". The unifying factor in this case was the General Will. The German irrational trend, emanating from Herder, emphasized on the one hand the uniqueness of language and the Volk, and on the other hand the universal justification of force to assert national greatness. In both cases, however, modern nationalism seeks to be a substitute for religion. It is, as well as other things, a form of striving for spiritual redemption, a straining for a solution of the contradiction between the urge to break away, and the need to belong; between the desire for self-expression, and the yearning for self-surrender; between the instinct of adventure and the hope for tranquility and security; between the impulse to display power and vitality, and the love of justice and the wish for certainty, between hubris and the sense of sin.

More simply, modern nationalism might be expressed as a dialectical interlogue between an aspiration for equality of treatment in its broadest sense, conducive to freedom, politics, and so on, and an outward-looking desire for power-satisfaction. The nationalism of the developing nations would probably involve some combination of these two elements.

The degree of influence of these factors will depend partly on the content of the ideology in terms of values, norms, and beliefs. But the degree of influence will also depend on the structure of the ideology -- whether it is more or less rigid -- this being related to other possible ideological factors, such as racism. By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that similar conclusions may be reached

15 Ibid., p. 19
in respect of religion -- the structure being determined by organisational factors.

Thus, nationalism exhibits many characteristics of ideologies. It provides a value basis in terms in which certain ideals are formulated and pursued. The ideology may be more or less open and thus exhibit characteristics of deliberate rejection or indeliberate incomprehension. The intensity with which values are held is also a significant weighting factor.
CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND IDEOLOGY

It might seem at first sight that the concepts of ideology and doctrine are the same, for both terms express a body of beliefs and commitments. It may be, however, possible to draw some sort of a distinction between political doctrine and political ideology. I regard as more than helpful here the attempt made by Professor Bernard Crick to draw a distinction -- however schematic to the purists -- between political philosophy, political theory, and political thought, as "three levels of writing and talking about political activity". The distinction is drawn in the following manner:

By political thought I mean the ordinary opinions that people hold, their immediate demands, assumptions and conditioned reflections about day to day public affairs -- often called 'public opinion': that is, attitudes and actions which can be studied as given data within an accepted or settled social context.

I mean by political theory attempts to explain the attitudes and actions arising from ordinary political life -- thus political theory is concerned with the relationships between concepts and circumstances.

And I mean by political philosophy attempts to resolve or understand conflicts between political theories which might appear to be equally acceptable in given circumstances; it can take two forms (not necessarily incompatible): a philosophical analysis of the terms and concepts of political theory or (though many cannot come this far) an attempt to establish ethical criteria to judge between the desirability of different theories (so it arises when the 'can be' of the disputants is broadly agreed and only the residual 'ought to be' remains).\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Bernard Crick, "Philosophy, Theory and Thought" (review article), Political Studies, 15 (February, 1967), pp. 49-55.
Plainly, as Crick indicates, the distinction once drawn is to be forgotten, or, at least, quietly put to the back of the mind. For it is clear that political theories, as attempts to explain why people think and act the way they do about concrete events (and other people's ideas), quickly become doctrines when they are translated into opinions about what ought to be. The translation is effectively one between the plane expressing a relationship of concept and circumstance and the plane expressing a relationship between thought and action. Political doctrines are, then (I agree with Professor Crick), founded on social theories that attempt to explain how society works. In this sense, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism were social theories before they became doctrines, but so, in this sense, was Marxism a doctrine, though claimed by many to be an ideology.

However, in Professor Crick's view, ideology is a particular type of doctrine. He means by this ideology

a theory which claims universal validity, because of a belief that all ideas derive from circumstance, but then which also holds that this truth is deliberately obscured by ruling elites, so that the theory has to be asserted in the form of propaganda to the masses.²

This view seems to me peculiarly one of Leninism rather than Marxism, though, of course, it is usual now to speak of Marxism-Leninism, and, indeed, this is the doctrine that became formulated into the totalitarian ideology of Communism. Hannah Arendt has discussed with utmost clarity the logic of immanence that formed the essential core of the ideologies of Nazism and Communism in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union:

²Ibid., p. 53.
What distinguished these new totalitarian ideologists from their predecessors was that it was no longer primarily the "idea" of the ideology -- the struggle of classes and the exploitation of the workers or the struggle of race and the care for the Germanic peoples -- which appealed to them, but the logical process which could be developed from it. According to Stalin, neither the idea nor the oratory but "the irresistible force of logic thoroughly overpowered Lenin's audience". The power which Marx (and Sorel?) thought was born when the idea seized the masses was discovered to reside, not in the idea itself, but in its logical process which like a mighty tentacle seizes you on all sides as in a vise and from whose grip you are powerless to tear yourself away; you must either surrender or make up your mind to utter defeat.  

As Arthur Koestler is poignantly aware in Darkness at Noon, the "grammatical fiction" -- "I" -- becomes even more of a fiction under this force of logic. The latter explains, at least, the cultivated cynicism of the elites in these regimes. Affirmative statements that classes or Jews were dying out meant that action had to be taken to ensure that the process of dying actually took place. The concentration and forced labour camps were thus a macabre caricature of the Hegelian process of Being and Becoming.

It may well be, therefore, that the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century were an extreme example of the attribute of false-consciousness given to ideological thinking by Marx and others. It is agreed that there is a theory of elites involved here -- as well as the personality cult in the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrerprinzip in Germany, and the worship of the duce in Italy. And yet, one feels that one should not get carried away by the theory of "the vanguard of the Proletariat", such that we interpret it as the philosopher-kings infusing the masses with the light they otherwise would not see. It is still a puzzling

_Arendt, op. cit., p. 472._
factor to those who have not forgotten that the ideologies of German Nazism and Italian Fascism were more than indebted to "clear and present trends" as Seymour M. Lipset put it in respect of the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan.

Totalitarian ideology is at least one formulation of the general concept of ideology. Totalitarian ideology must, at any rate, be total. However, the attempt to engulf all phenomenae into a realm of logic is bound to encounter difficulties. The truism breaks down at the point where the cognitive implications of such an ideology meet the apparently flat refusal of concrete phenomena, events, etc., to conform (as it were) to "interpretation". Explicitly, this is the argument put forward by Daniel Bell and others, that ideology (in this sense) necessarily breaks down under the "irrefutable" advance of scientific knowledge. Logically, this is the impossibility of imposing the dialectic on scientific experiments.

Bell maintains in one of his essays on the topic that not only the influence of science but also of Western literature and ideas has helped to "crumble the walls of faith" in Soviet Marxism. In this sense, as Z. A. Jordan points out, the crumbling of 'the walls' has been occurring for a considerably longer period in Poland. Revisionism in Poland has developed in two separate schools: that of Orthodox Revisionism and that of Philosophical Revisionism, under the main protagonists

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4 See for the intellectual origins of the Nazi ideology George L. Morse, The Crisis of German Ideology.

5 Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the Soviet Union?", in Drachkowitch, Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World.

6 See his Philosophy and Ideology. For a more limited exposition of Polish Revisionism see his article, 'The Philosophical Background of
Schaaf and Kolakowski respectively. The aim of both schools is to revise the fundamental concepts of Marxism-Leninism, so that new questions may be formulated in the face of a constantly changing socio-economic reality. The difference between the two schools lies in that the orthodox revisionists are concerned with bolstering the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine against potential breakdown, while the philosophical revisionists reject "methodological dogmatism" in every form.

The aim of the philosophical school, which adopts an attitude both rational and critical, is to achieve a new humanistic and more individualistic philosophy, without abandoning the Marxian system as a vision of the world. As Jordan says in his article, because of their essential differences a confrontation between the two schools was inevitable. "The clash of the orthodox and the philosophical revisionists is a conflict between those who are anxious to act effectively and those who wish to think correctly". The suggestion is that those who wish to "think correctly" also refuse to be 'bound' by an ideological system. The philosophical revisionists, however, propose to retain (or return to?) the idealistic visions of the young Marx. This may or may not mean that they are "abandoning" the ideology.

It is suggested, however, that the orthodox revisionists are concerned with a change in tempo, within the context of the old ideology, while the philosophical revisionists are concerned with a change in style. It is interesting to note that the orthodox school borrowed many of its ideas on conceptual changes from the philosophical school.


Ibid., p. 280.
The fact is that Marxism-Leninism does face two basic dilemmas in modern times: the necessity for deducing from the doctrine principles for ruling or governing the state, and the holding of an absolutist state doctrine in the face of advancing scientific knowledge. East European philosophies are attempting to overcome these dilemmas as well as to solve the general existential problems of death, failure, and so on. This, however, does not ascertain the prospective 'end' of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The difficulties encountered in the U.S.S.R. in establishing "socialism in one country" without the logically (and humanly) necessary economic and social conditions led to a rigidly structured ideology. Thus, the context of the Marxian doctrine, basically humanitarian and ethical, was subsumed under an authoritarian pattern emphasizing the discipline needed for a para-military, revolutionary elite. The changes we are witnessing in the Soviet Union today -- the introduction of the Liebermann profit motive, the concomitant de-escalation of emphasis given to 'heavy' industrial production, the tendency for Soviet philosophers to deal with problems of alienation, and so on -- all these may suggest that more weight is given to the content of the ideology, but there is no indication that the Soviet bureaucracy is likely to lose control over these changes.

The current trends in various Communist countries can be regarded in terms of our discussive division between political philosophy and political theory. The two levels support one another. Thus,


to quote one author, "to the Communists, theory explains and orders reality at the same time as it provides a programme for action". The aim of a programmatic party is not to win elections for the sake of winning them, but to carry out particular policies. In this respect the political parties of the United States are not programmatic, and yet policy is supposedly formulated (or connived at?) somewhere. What is lacking in the Democratic and Republican parties is perhaps a sense of purpose. Such a sense of purpose may or may not amount to what are called political ideals; it seems that political ideals are more radical than a sense of purpose. In so far as Toryism is a permanent feature of the philosophy of the Conservative Party in Great Britain, it gives emphasis to the conceptions of 'social order' and 'hierarchy'. Accepting this, we might agree with Samuel Beer that if "there is no Conservative ideology, there is a Tory conception of purpose". This sense of purpose is concerned primarily with the distribution of power in society. Conservatives are thus concerned with the defence of hierarchy, a defence which is not limited (in Beer's view) to private property, or dependent on its existence. In having a sense of purpose, there is involved a commitment to certain values. The use of the word "commitment" is not meant to

11 See Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Ch. X.
imply that all the expressions of policy intentions by a political party are completely determined by, and subordinated to, a given set of values, such as might imply a blueprint for the 'Good Society'. The more or less detailed elaboration of such a blueprint is, as we have seen, a feature of the totalitarian movement. The striving for absolute values by these movements is dictated by a kind of inner logic, which allows no sphere for disagreement about the type of action required to fulfil these values. On a lower level, most political parties, then, may be regarded as possessing some kind of value orientation. The degree of value orientation will, of course, differ between countries, and even in countries over time. Thus, the German Social Democratic Party of the nineteen-twenties could be said to have been considerably less concerned with specific values than, say, the Democratic Party in the U.S.A. at the same time. In a similar way, the German social democrats are less value-concerned today than they were in the twenties.

I use the term "value-orientation" to imply the orientation of values towards a common focus or sense of purpose, as outlined above. This is to say that there is an overriding sense of values, but that it is not so overriding as not to allow an element of disagreement. The topic could be taken in the context of the relation between ends and means. The choice of ends and means is largely a question of values, which may seem to reiterate much of what I have just said. However, the essential distinction to be drawn is between the attempt to read values through the logic based on a philosophy of history, which is less a question of what "ought to be done" than what "must be done", and the desideration of values from partly rational but mainly affective
bases of feeling. It has been the view of many writers on the British political scene that the Labour Party is no longer (if it ever had been) ideologically motivated. We can dismiss the latter part of the last sentence; the Labour Party was undoubtedly in its formation (to quote Samuel Beer) an "ideological party". Examples of this 'ideologism' are two manifestoes: Labour and the New Social Order (1918) and Socialism in our Time (1927). The former was directly Fabian, the latter was adopted under the pressure of the I.L.P. with its demands for a "living wage".

The point is that, even if we take account solely of the Fabian influence in the Labour Party, which was undoubtedly predominant, we are still confronted with an 'attitude' as to what should be done. This is not, of course, to say that all the Fabians thought of the Socialist society as the panacea for all men's problems. But Bernard Shaw and other leading Fabians did at least see such a society in terms of an (hierarchical) order of ideals and principles. There was, then, an ethical absolute, however vague, motivating political action.

It seems clear that the work of the Labour Party "revisionists" is taking place within this type of ideological context. The attempt

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13James B. Christoph seems to be concluding the ideological aspects of British politics in this light in his article "British Political Ideology" in Roy C. Macridis, Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, pp. 75-101.


15Samuel Beer, Modern British Politics, p. 158.

16Cf. A. M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918, pp. 156 ff. Here he sees equality as the primary Fabian ideal, and behind it "the vaguer and larger vision of the classless society".
radically to revise and reformulate, and even dissociate from, certain elements of dogmatic ideology meant that, in Crosland's words, "hostility was aroused by the feeling that the 'revisionists' were proposing a cynical surrender of principle for the sake of electoral advantage".\(^{17}\)

He believed that "a political party is not behaving immorally in studying the wishes of the voters, provided that it wants power not for reasons of personal ambition or prestige, but in order to put a programme into effect.\(^{18}\) The key sentence, for our analysis, is as follows:

> There is much talk ... of the dangers of sacrificing socialist principles; what is forgotten is the sacrifice of socialist objectives, not to mention human freedom and welfare involved in a long period of impotent opposition.\(^{19}\)

If, then, the British Labour Party is of the ideological or, as Epstein has put it, the programmatic type, the mere statement "sacrifice of socialist objectives" suggests a continued if somewhat altered frame of mind. "Conflicting value systems, each capable of enlisting considerable support in a given society, are thus essential to the existence of programmatic parties", says Epstein.\(^{20}\) There may, indeed, be evidence of a decline in programmatic statements; it is partly a question of the diminished role of the mandate. But such an occurrence does not necessitate, and has not brought about, a parallel decline in value commitments.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{17}\) C. A. R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, p. 118.

\(^{18}\) Loc. cit.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 118-9.

\(^{20}\) Epstein, op. cit., p. 263.

In terms of Professor Crick's trichotomy, moral imperatives still demand of socialists in Britain and in many other countries that their theory provides not only an alternative explanation of how society works, or could work, but a better explanation. Which is not to say that they cannot see that "conservatism can work, after a fashion".\(^{22}\) Richard Titmus views the situation in a light similar to that described above. He points out the ample evidence for the failure of the "social welfare state": to bring about a diminution in vast discrepancies of wealth and poverty, to lessen monopolistic concentration, to solve the problems of social disorganisation and cultural deprivation, and to deal with "the growing impact of automation". When Titmus makes the statement that the proclamation of the end of ideological politics ignores such evidence as this, he seems to be interpreting a political ideology as a set of proposals (which deal with given or prospective socio-economic situations) enumerated on the basis of an implicit if not explicit orientation of values. The suggestion is that it may still be possible to read between the mundane lines spoken at Party and Trade Union Conferences the continued expression of value-oriented "ideal-regarding" principles rather than suspect an over-emphasis on pragmatic "want-regarding" principles.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Bernard Crick, "Philosophy, Theory, and Thought", op. cit., p. 52.


\(^{24}\) See Brian Barry, Political Argument, pp. 38-9, where the analytical distinction is drawn in this way. Want-regarding principles "are principles which take as given the wants which people happen to have and concentrate attention entirely on the extent to which a certain
I do not regard it as particularly useful to talk of the "end of doctrine" rather than the 'end of ideology', though it may be that the ideologist indulges in slightly more 'visionary speculation' in terms of particular ideals than the holder of a political doctrine. Certainly, if we take the narrow conception of ideology as a refusal to allow for the possible validity in one's opponent's viewpoint, then the term "doctrinaire" could be used equally as well as "ideologist". Both, in a sense, provide for the element of "false-consciousness, for the position which says, 'my view is the only true one'.

In so far as the term "ideology" is used to refer to a value system, it can again be used interchangeably with the term "doctrine". Both, as a set of beliefs, contain an explanation of what is, together with statements about what ought to be done. Even if the ideology may have become more latent than manifest in many Western democracies, it is still a question of "given certain values, my view is the most acceptable one". "Revisionism" is thus revision within an ideology, since new explanations are demanded, or new methods, because the old ones have not worked.

In the East 'revisionism' does not imply that the existing ideology is going to be 'revised' out of existence. We have seen that in many Communist countries a change in content is taking place. As far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, the disciplined, authoritarian structure of the ideology, closely inter-twined with internal and external power politics, is likely to militate against too rapid policy will alter the overall amount of want-satisfaction or on the way in which the policy will affect the distribution among people of opportunities for satisfying wants". The ideal-regarding theory can be looked upon as the contradictory of the 'want-regarding theory'.
changes in content, even in the face of advancing scientific knowledge.

The recent invasion of Czechoslovakia has, it appears, effectively frustrated the notion of the end of the "Cold War" (mainly as a result of the alleged decline of Soviet ideology) as anything more than a tentative hypothesis.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUDING NOTES ON THE END-OF-IDEOLOGY

The arguments for the end-of-ideology are based on two main reasons: the first is the disillusionment of intellectuals in the West with the Stalinist perversion of Marxian doctrines, together with the alleged lack of scope for criticism by these intellectuals because of the quiescence of overt class struggle as a result of rising living standards (embourgeoisement) of the working class. The second reason is the breakdown of ideologies in the East and West under the onslaught of advancing scientific knowledge.

The phrase, "the opium of the intellectuals", is sometimes applied to the secular religion of ideology. No consideration is made of the possibility that science itself may be a religion; peculiarly, faith in science will save men's souls. Daniel Bell declares in the chapter entitled "The End of Ideology in the West" that he proposes to borrow from Karl Mannheim the distinction between the "particular conception of ideology" and the "total conception of ideology". Bell correctly represents Mannheim when he says that the particular conception of ideology implies a concern with a psychology of interests. On the other hand, "total ideology" is used by Bell to mean "an all-inclusive system of comprehensive reality".  

1Daniel Bell, End of Ideology, p. 40.
which is, as we have seen, somewhat in accordance with Mannheim's total conception. However, Bell completes the definition thus: "It is a set of beliefs, infused with passion and seeks to transform the whole of a way of life".²

This destroys completely Mannheim's analytical distinction between ideology and utopia; both are involved in "some other-worldly sphere" which transcends history. But ideology becomes utopia when social groups incorporate their wish-images in their actual conduct, in an attempt to realise them.

In several of his writings, Bell emphasizes the need for utopias. But the demand is supposedly qualified by reference to the use of the so-called "empirical ladder": a utopia that specifies "where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realisation of and justification for the determination of who is to pay".³ Admirable emotions in themselves, one would think, but they form no more than a glorified projection into the future. In the 'technical' view, one is sure that if Daniel Bell and his associates can point the way to this sort of "cost-benefit" analysis of the future, a great many economists who have puzzled for years over which generation is to shoulder the burden of the public debt would be pleased to hear of it.

Strictly speaking, the type of ideological passion Bell and others are referring to is that associated with the radical mass

²Loc. cit.
³Loc. cit.
movements of the 'twenties and 'thirties. Hence, as we saw in Chapter Four, Bernard Crick's view of ideology as a special type of doctrine used by an elite for indoctrinating the masses. This type of political movement, we may accept, has died down in the post-war era. One strongly suspects, however, that Bell, Shils, and the others are aware of the possible temporary nature of the lull. Thus, the phraseology is often a "call" for this or that -- the end of "enfused passion" (Bell) or "alienative politics" (Shils).

Given that there is a lull in radical political activity, why do the claimants of the end-of-ideology not draw certain logical conclusions from the history and sociology of the concept of ideology? The point has been made by C. Wright Mills and others: is not the end-of-ideology itself an ideological viewpoint? "The end-of-ideology is in reality the ideology of an ending: the ending of political reflection itself as a public fact. It is a weary know-it-all justification -- by tone of voice rather than explicit argument -- of the cultural and political default of the 'NATO intellectuals'.

There has been much debate in recent years on whether political theory still exists. One of the main symptoms providing the basis for this belief is given by Isaiah Berlin as the absence of a "commanding work of political philosophy" in the twentieth century. A commanding work is defined as one "that has in a large area converted paradoxes into platitudes or vice versa".

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It is a generally recognised fact that political theory and political philosophy have been considerably de-emphasized in American graduate schools as a result of the onslaught of the new behavioural science. Empiricism reigns! We must, à la Lasswell, collect data upon data and hope that we shall eventually stumble across some apocalyptic, previously unheard-of, conception of mankind. In short, as Berlin, Strauss, and many others have said, it is generally believed that we cannot learn from the studies of past political theorists, why men to (political) things, we tend to concentrate on how they do them.

Has the human problem changed, is it not just so enormous that perhaps we cannot grasp the sheer size of it? We are still involved in the quest for man -- it has become more urgent. Berlin makes the point in this way:

If men or circumstances alter radically, or new empirical knowledge is gained which will revolutionize our concept of man, then certainly some of (these) will be forgotten like the ethics and metaphysics of the Egyptians or the Incas. But so long as men are as they are, the debate will continue in terms set by these visions and others like them.  

For those who do not understand what a philosophical question is, he continues, "the answer's -- in this case the main political doctrines of the West -- may well seem intellectual fancies, detached philosophical speculations and constructions without much relation to acts or events".  

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6Ibid., p. 31

Daniel Bell, however, paradoxically, insists that he is not calling for an end to "ideologies". Where are these ideologies to come from if everything is relegated to the empirical ladder? The rash of empiricism within the new behavioural sciences is, in Herbert Marcuse's view, part of what might well be termed a "total ideology". The ideology of 'advanced industrial culture' he regards as "more ideological than its predecessor". It has produced in the end-of-ideology argument its own philosophy of history: "Hegel has been stood on his head once more." We have in an epistemological sense "arrived", epistemology becomes methodology. We no longer ask how we know that freedom, democracy, and so forth are what our concepts "say" they are -- we are supposed to accept them as established facts. Indeed, a large proportion of the social scientists in the United States are now employed to help maintain a war machine, raised to defend and bring 'new' nations into this 'true' world of freedom and democracy.

The end-of-ideology may, then, be the reflection of the general malaise among the intellectuals of the West. Are not linguistic philosophy, some aspects of behaviouralism, and the general lack of intellectual criticism a negation of what is a very human activity -- a contemplative inquiry into what we should be?

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8 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Boston, p. 11.

Total ideology is still with us. The content of "ideologies" appears to be changing in the East and in the West, and yet between the two world spheres there is not very much sign of a lessening of ideological conflict. The conflict in Vietnam and the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia are signs of this. The conflict between extremes of 'left' and 'right' has become muted within the countries of the West, the language of politics has changed. In so far as this is an ideological condition, we should be questioning it, not condoning it. The feelings of social well-being could change. As Marcuse puts it: "that which is, cannot be true".\footnote{Herbert Marcuse, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 120.}
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