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CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH
COMMONWEALTH WEST AFRICA 1957-1977

AT ARM'S LENGTH: CANADA'S RELATIONS
WITH COMMONWEALTH WEST AFRICA

by

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ABSTRACT

The central focus of this thesis is on Canada's foreign policy towards, and relationship with the Commonwealth West African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The paper will explore the trends and patterns of interaction between Canada and these countries from 1957 to 1977.

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INTRODUCTION

The central focus of this thesis is on Canada's foreign policy towards, and relationship with the Commonwealth West African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The paper will explore the trends and pattern of interaction between Canada and these countries from 1957 to 1977. This period is relevant because, in essence, December 19, 1977 marked a symbolic change in Canadian policy towards South Africa. Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, had announced on that date that Ottawa was withdrawing its trade commissioners stationed in South Africa.¹

Present Canadian policies towards Africa, as former Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J. MacEachen has claimed, have three underlying elements. The elements have included Ottawa's concern for the "cultivation of mutually-beneficial relations with the nations of the continent; peace in Africa and ... for social justice; human rights and dignity and self-determination"² of the Africans in Southern Africa. These three elements will be examined at a later state to demonstrate, among other things, that Canada's expressed concern has been more rhetorical than real in Africa.

This study has been occasioned partly by Ronald Michener's remark in 1958 that "it has been said that the darkest thing

about Africa has been our Canadian ignorance of it".³ Eighteen years later, it appears that Ottawa's ignorance of Africa has not yet been dispelled. However, the author was actually prodded to undertake this research as a result of the Government White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, which was published in 1970. As an African, the author felt that the White Paper had left out Africa, thus the desire to explore Canadian policy towards, and relationship with Africa.

However, for purposes of manageability, the research has been limited to a specific subregion, that is, Canadian policy towards, and relationship with the Commonwealth West African countries. This area has been chosen because Canada's first official contact with black Africa began in West Africa in 1957 and so too were other relations which have included development assistance and military cooperation. Occasional references will be made to other African countries to highlight Canada's position in Africa. However, the other regions would have to be examined to determine whether the same factors that determined Canada's policy towards Commonwealth West Africa determined Canada's policy towards other areas (like Commonwealth East Africa, etc.).

Data and Methods

The research technique that will be employed will be an analytical case study approach. However, an historical in-

terpretation approach will also be utilized to serve as the cornerstone to the former which emphasizes that a state's "policy rests on multiple determinants, including the state's historic tradition, geographic location, national interest, and purposes and security needs".⁴ These specific approaches have been employed because the nature of foreign policy, among other things, "is the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the state concerned".⁵ Given this proposition, "to understand foreign policy, the observer must take into account and analyze a host of factors".⁶

Three sources are utilized for this study: primary and secondary sources, and interviews with officials of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, and diplomatic representatives of Nigeria and Ghana in Ottawa (Sierra Leone and the Gambia have non-resident diplomatic representation). The primary sources included: House of Commons Debates, External Affairs, International Perspectives, Department of Trade and Commerce publications, Dominion Statistics and newspapers. The secondary sources include the work done on Canadian relations with Africa by, among others, R. O. Matthews and D. Anglin.

An understanding of the elements underlying Canadian foreign policy is necessary at this juncture because it will contribute to our inquiry. Prior to World War II, Canadian

trans-Atlantic ties were mainly with Great Britain, and that the continent was usually perceived by Canadian policy-makers through the British eyes . . . Canada maintained window on the world and benefited greatly from access to the world-wide information gathering services as well as to the expert analyses of the British foreign services. There were no serious divergences of British and Canadian policies on important international issues until the Suez crisis of 1956 . . .⁷

Following the end of World War II, "Canada and the United States emerged . . . as the only two allied countries whose economies had actually been enormously strengthened".⁸ Western European countries were on the verge of economic collapse, only thanks to the Marshall Plan which in the first year spent four and a half billion dollars for the rehabilitation of wartorn Europe. Given this situation, "Canada was thus in a position to act as a minor great power"⁹ in international affairs. At the United Nations, Canada was perceived as a "leader of moderate and progressive nations having championed the battle for the admission of sixteen new states"¹⁰ in 1955. As a result, "new independent nations were often content to follow a Canadian lead".¹¹ This situation increased Canada's influence and image as a peace-loving country or the "new archetype of international politics - the middle power".¹² It was under these conditions that Canada won the friendship and admiration of the developing countries which explains why Canada would successfully undertake the "honest broker" role between these

countries and the West.

The United Nations eventually "formed the cornerstone of the country's Canada external relations".¹³ To further strengthen Canada's position in the world, the Commonwealth was perceived as "another vehicle through which Canada could influence the course of international events".¹⁴ Following the East-West ideological rivalry, NATO -- had become the deterrence against Soviet aggression in Western Europe and to some degree the free world. Since 1949, until the advent of Prime Minister Trudeau in 1968, NATO had significantly determined Canada's foreign policy directions.

These external factors - a commitment to the United Nations, Commonwealth, and NATO -- became partly the basis for the Canadian stand on any given international issue, and they have contributed in one way or the other to Ottawa's position in Africa.

Furthermore, Canadian foreign policy, like that of many other states, has not only been influenced by the external, but also by domestic factors. These have included Canada's national interest (especially economic), national character, cultural composition and the political values and perceptions of foreign policy-making elite. An interplay of the external and domestic factors, a commonplace practice, have in most cases influenced or determined the foreign policy direction of many states and Canada is not an exception to this rule.

Having briefly examined the independent variables which underpinned Canadian foreign policy, it should be borne in mind that this paper is chiefly concerned with Canada's policy towards, and relationship with the Commonwealth West African subregion; and, secondarily, the omission of Africa in the Government White Paper in 1970.

An Arm's Length Relationship

This paper argues that Canada's policy towards and relationship with these countries has been one of an arm's length, that is, "sympathetic and disinterested". For the purpose of clarity, should the relationship be placed on a diplomatic continuum, it would hardly manifest a highly interdependent intercourse such as exists between, for example, the United States - Canada, Poland - Soviet Union, United States - Japan. On the other hand, the relationship was neither marked by hostility nor non-contact (United States - Communist China before 1972, Egypt - Israel before 1977, Albania - Yugoslavia after 1959). The relationship has been cordial, that is, it has been marked by friendliness, especially developmental cooperation but the degree of the intercourse cannot be termed one of close interdependence. The fact that no policy booklet, among other things, was accorded Africa gives colouration to this viewpoint. The purpose of this paper is to examine why this is so.

The nature and pattern of this relationship has been shaped by independent variables which have included Canada's membership in multilateral institutions (Commonwealth, NATO, U.N.), economic interest, domestic environment, historical and geographical factors, and the political values and perceptions of the foreign policy-making elite. To some extent, it might be necessary to avoid the overstressing of the importance of the geographic variable, though not totally because South Africa, despite its physical distance has had a more penetrated relationship with Canada than the other African states in the same locale.

The economic and security interests in conjunction with Canada's membership in multilateral institutions have contributed in a very significant manner to shape Canadian - Commonwealth West African relations. The effect of these variables on Canadian policy will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters.

An arm's length relationship can be defined as neither very close or hostile. It is one in which the actors maintain a non-committed and distant interaction while avoiding actions that may lead to the dislocation of the seemingly ambiguous intercourse. Such a relationship might tend to have oscillatory characteristics which are sustained through the use of quiet diplomacy and platitudes. In the final analysis, an arm's length relationship does involve a friendship gesture which only means keeping in touch for future

advantage.

The thesis has been divided into four chapters. Chapter I will trace the evolution of Canadian official contact with black Africa, especially Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. It will explore: Canadian diplomatic recognition of these countries; Ottawa's reactions to colonial issues as they had pertained to black Africa; and Commonwealth membership for these countries which was against the wishes of South Africa (an original member). It will further examine the motives which prompted Ottawa's involvement in Africa, and the roles which might have been associated to such motives.

The aim of Chapter I is to demonstrate that Canada's involvement in black Africa, especially Anglophone Africa has been determined by its membership in the Commonwealth. Ottawa has also remained silent on colonial issues because of its membership in NATO.¹⁵ It will also be shown that Canada has been involved in Africa to emphasize the importance of the Commonwealth which has been a "part of a philosophy of counterweight"¹⁶ to the United States.

Chapter II will explore Ottawa's responses to contentious African issues - South Africa's apartheid policy, Rhodesia's UDI, and the Nigerian civil war. It will also examine the factors which might have been responsible for Ottawa's position on the three issues.

The aim of Chapter II is to show that Canadian stance on contentious African issues, for example apartheid, has been ambiguous and inconsistent. In Southern Africa Ottawa's position has been one of peaceful settlement whereas in the other African countries, for example in Nigeria, policy-makers in Ottawa "lends themselves too readily to the charge of intervention"¹⁷ even at height of military conflict. Given this contradiction, it will be shown that Ottawa has not been a stabilizing force in Africa. Robert Matthew's argument that "Canada has been extremely reluctant unilaterally to undertake policies to ensure political stability and to prevent the prolongation of internal disorders and violence on the continent"¹⁸ lends credence to the above viewpoint. The Canadian position, as will be shown, has been greatly influenced by economic interest, and by the political values and perception of the foreign policy-making elite.

In Chapter III, the trends and pattern of Canadian commercial relations with these countries will be explored. It will also examine, as a result of the insubstantial nature of the intercourse, the factors that have inhibited the relationship.

The aim of Chapter III is to demonstrate that Canada's primary interest in Africa, especially relevant to Trudeau's economically-oriented administration, has been the "search

for economical advantage".¹⁹ It will show that Ottawa has no bilateral trade agreements with these countries, except the British Preferential Treatment (negotiated with Britain in 1937) which it accorded them at the time of their independence. It will illustrate, among other things, that a two-way trade between Canada and South Africa has been larger and more profitable than total trade between Canada and these countries. Canadian investment in South Africa (including Namibia) has also been larger than total Canadian investment in black Africa. Given the importance of commerce to Canada, it then becomes obvious why Ottawa did not want the politics of apartheid and racism to interfere with the economic link with South Africa. It might be attributed, due to the Trudeau government's emphasis on "economic growth", that the insubstantial trade relationship between Canada and these countries, black Africa in general, was a primary factor for the omission of Africa in the White Paper. Latin America, for example, was accorded a booklet because Canadian investments in that region in 1970 totalled \$820 million against Africa's (other than South Africa) \$61 million. Mitchell Sharp's statement that "the priorities are clearly set out...Economic growth takes precedence."²⁰ lends credence to this assessment.

Lastly, Chapter IV will examine the nature and structure of Canadian assistance programs to these countries. It will

explore the motives - political, humanitarian and economic - which have necessitated the Canadian development assistance to these countries.

The aim of Chapter IV is to give credence to John Holmes' argument that "It is always hard for Samaritans to avoid being Pharisees".²¹ The chapter will show that Canadian development assistance to these countries was only a humanitarian affair on the grounds that it had helped Britain to meet its post-colonial moral obligations. Initially, Canadian aid to these countries (including most of Anglo-phone African states) was more of a Cold War concern because economic aid, for its mystique, was one of the "trump cards" which the Western nations played against Soviet global expansionism. A year after Ghana's independence (in 1957) and prior to the establishment of the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP) in 1960, Prime Minister Diefenbaker called on the Western countries to "unite in an economic policy for the underdeveloped areas of the world . . . to meet the challenge of communism everywhere in the world".²²

Canadian participation in the SCAAP which was undertaken under the Diefenbaker government lends credence to the above assessment. With the passage of time, however, Canadian aid has been transformed, especially by the Trudeau government, into an economic line in order to penetrate

African markets because it will help to create jobs at home, stimulate industrial growth and could also facilitate the balancing of international payments. The White Paper which lends colouration to this assessment stated that "Development assistance is clearly an integral part of Canada's foreign policy and increasingly is being coordinated with trade, financial and political policies".²⁴ In another stance, the Paper noted that "Developmental assistance - which now implies trade and aid - is fully recognized as an expanding area of the Government's external activity . . .".²⁴ Given the Trudeau government's penchant for a statist orientation, Ottawa's continued participation in development programs might have served Canada's national interest better than the recipient countries.

Why is Canada in Africa at all? This rather difficult question can be approached from two perspectives: the psychological inducement and national interest aspects. Allan MacEachen, Trudeau's Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1974 to 1976, has argued that "Canada cannot afford to isolate itself from . . . the emergence of hundreds of millions to self-government and independence".²⁵ MacEachen's response might be termed the psychological inducement which stimulated Canadian interest in Africa. This is, however, a philosophical argument which might be termed an abstraction on the grounds that Canadian involvement, initially, in

Africa was under the umbrella of the Commonwealth, and Ottawa's participation in the SCAAP program was also under the auspices of the Commonwealth. On its own, Ottawa might never have enunciated a unilateral African policy.

"Canadian interest in contemporary Africa," Paul Martin, Pearson's Secretary of State for External Affairs has remarked, "is many-sided and permanent."²⁶ This statement seems more valid today when one takes a look at contemporary Canadian - governmental and non-governmental - activities in Africa and the motives which have prompted them. These activities, especially the governmental ones, have served Canada's national interest rather than the Africans.

In sum, Ottawa has increased the intercourse with black Africa since the 1960's through multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth and L'Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et technique des pays Francophonie. Given that the increase in the relationship has been more noticeable through multilateral instruments, and Ottawa's ambiguous position in Southern Africa, and the Trudeau government's failure to accord Africa a policy paper in 1970, this paper concludes that Canadian relationship with black Africa, including the four countries under examination, has been one of an "arm's-length".

This paper has imputed motives to Canadian activities in Africa. This is because, as James Eayrs has remarked, "A

Schweitzer or a Ghandi may impress mankind with his capacity for courage and selfless service; but the motives of government are always suspect, and properly so".²⁷ Governments, usually, might never have been prodded into action by one single motive at a given time. A country's foreign policy direction including that of Canada seems, in most cases, shaped by a combination of external and domestic factors. The articulation and aggregation of these factors also might have been the responsibility of the foreign policy-making elites, for example, Trudeau and some important members of his Cabinet.²⁸

The lessons to be drawn from this study, as will be shown in the chapters, are that Canadian foreign policy directions are usually determined by an interplay of external and domestic factors. Consequently, to understand Canadian foreign policy position towards a given geographical area or on any international issue, the observer should, among other things, analyze: the climate of the Canadian economy; internal political situation; Canada's membership in multi-lateral institutions or organizations; the foreign policy-making elite, especially the temperament of the Prime Minister; and the international issue involved.

CHAPTER I

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: NEW-FOUND FRIENDS

Diplomatic recognition has been the "necessary first step towards the establishment of diplomatic relations".¹ Thus the process through which governments extend diplomatic recognition to other states has two underlying elements: de facto and de jure recognition. The recognition of a state does not in some cases imply an approval of the underlying philosophy of a regime. Of course, in some instances, the extension of diplomatic recognition has implied both approval of, and acceptance of the underlying principles of a regime. This last proposition was relevant to Canadian diplomatic recognition of the governments of the four Commonwealth West African countries.

Diplomatic relations, the Trudeau government has argued, are "maintained and strengthened for a variety of reasons: trade expansion, collective security, cultural contact, co-operation in development assistance, exchanges in science and technology".² Consequently, diplomatic relations, it can be argued, involves cooperation and obligation and at the same time has remained the "most reliable instrument for day-to-day, year-in-year-out communications between governments".³

As indicated in the introductory portion of this paper, the purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution of Canadian official contact with black Africa, particularly

Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Its focus will be on Canadian diplomatic recognition of the four countries. The chapter will also explore Canadian reaction to colonial issues and Commonwealth membership for these new states which contradicted South Africa's apartheid policy. Finally, the motives which stimulated Ottawa's involvement in Africa will be assessed.

The arguments contained in this chapter will lend credence to an earlier viewpoint that Canada's involvement in black Africa, especially Anglophone Africa was necessitated by its membership in the Commonwealth. Evidence will be provided to show that Ottawa's position on colonial issues was a consequence of its NATO commitment. The chapter will also strengthen an earlier contention that Canada's desire to transform the Commonwealth to a multiracial association was for its own benefit, rather than for the Africans.

Up until 1957, Canada had a tenuous relation with Africa, especially black Africa. There were only two Canadian diplomatic missions in the continent. The first mission was established in Cape Town, South Africa, in 1940. The fact that the first mission was established in South Africa could be attributable to an historical affinity "which had developed from a common allegiance to the crown".⁴ The second such mission was established in Cairo, Egypt in 1955. Direct official contact with black Africa was non-existent, probably due to the colonial status of the African states and Canada's close association with the African colonial powers, parti-

cularly Britain.⁵

Given the cordiality of intercourse which existed, prior to the 1956 Suez crisis, between Ottawa and London, the latter became the former's "window on the world".⁶ During this period, before these states attained their independence, there existed a commonality of interest between Canada and Britain.⁷ Under this circumstance, Ottawa had perceived black Africa from the British viewpoint. This situation, combined with the non-interference convention of the Commonwealth, might have constrained contact at the official level because the Anglophone African states were British colonies.

In spite of Ottawa's detachment, Canadian missionaries and other private citizens had established contact with the Africans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁸ However, a change occurred in the nature of the Canadian-African relationship in 1957 when Ghana attained its independence from Britain. Following the attainment of independence on March 6, 1957, Ghana became the first black African member of the Commonwealth. Through the Commonwealth, Ottawa became involved in African affairs, especially Ghana's at that particular period. This paper will henceforth focus attention on Ottawa's reactions to the following issues: independence of, and Commonwealth membership for Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia.

Canadian Reaction to Colonial Issues and Commonwealth Membership

Ghana was a British colony known as the Gold Coast. Its radical nationalism which was championed by Kwame Nkrumah led to Ghana's early independence in 1957. However, before Ghana was granted independence, London first

...consulted with other members of the Commonwealth about the future of an independent Gold Coast at the Prime Ministers' meeting of June and July 1956. Following this exchange of views, and more formal consultation later in the year, the United Kingdom proceeded to offer the Gold Coast 'independence within the Commonwealth'.⁹

Canada's part in the negotiations which led to Ghana's independence has not been examined in the literature on Canadian foreign policy. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Ottawa had not hastened the arrival of Ghana's independence since there were no formal relations before 1957.

Howard Green's brusque statement in the House of Commons when questioned about the Southern Rhodesian crisis lends credence to this assessment. In defence of the British Government, he remarked:

The Government of the United Kingdom does not need any prompting by Canada or any other nation on the question of promoting democracy in the Commonwealth. I am greatly surprised that the honorable member would suggest that we should try to prevail upon the United Kingdom to do something about speeding up the giving of independence to members of the Commonwealth.¹⁰

Green's statement was indicative that Ottawa intended to remain silent and detached on colonial issues. The reasons behind Ottawa's reticence on colonial issues will be examined later.

In short, "both Canadian policy and Canadian opinion", James Eayrs has argued, had remained "indifferent to British colonial rule".¹¹ Canadian reactions since 1945 to the issues of colonialism, Eayrs further noted, "have been marked by diffidence and self-effacement".¹² Also at the United Nations, Canadian diplomats, as a result of their inveterate silence on colonial questions, were nicknamed the "total abstainers".¹³ In a general context, Ottawa's reticence on colonial issues "was the greater when British colonial problems were involved".¹⁴ In sum, it can be argued that Ottawa had played, in most cases, the traditional role of a "bird watcher" on colonial questions.

Ottawa's disinterest in colonial issues can be attributed to the historical, geographical and demographical composition of the Canadian nation-state. Ottawa's non-involvement attitude in colonial questions has been partly necessitated by its participation in an "alliance since 1949 with the five colonial powers of the Atlantic Pact".¹⁵ Geographic insularity has also stimulated a "lack of any direct or relevant experience of the kinds of problems with which governments of colonial peoples have to deal".¹⁶ Furthermore, of the twenty-three million Canadians, "43.8 percent trace their origins to the British Isles, 30.4 percent to France, 22.6 percent to other countries of Europe, 0.7 percent to Asia, 0.2 percent are Negroes and 2.5 percent are native Indians and Eskimos".¹⁷ The demographic factor seems to have played a major role in

the government's position on colonial questions and dis-interest in black Africa. As Douglas Anglin has noted:

Africa is not a continent which in the past has excited the interest of a great number of Canadians. One reason for this is that, in contrast to the United States, only a tiny fraction of Canada's population is African in ancestry; and her immigration laws ensure that this will continue to be the case. All other Africans excluding South Africans and Egyptians are, unless they have close relations in Canada, automatically classed as prohibited immigrants.¹⁸

Given this background, Canadians were not in the position, due to a lack of strong affiliation, to take a positive stand on colonial questions. In addition, any vote-conscious government in Ottawa, bearing in mind that many Canadians were not excited about Africa, would also not be in the position to disregard the wishes of a larger proportion of the electorate. These domestic factors combined with Canada's historical links with the Atlantic Pact countries, especially Britain, had contributed to Ottawa's silence on colonial issues.

In sum, it would be naive to argue a fortiori that Ottawa had maintained absolute reticence on colonial issues. It should be remembered that Canadian Governments prior to the advent of Pierre Trudeau had believed in "quiet diplomacy" as the effective channel to deal with allies and friends. In 1949, for example, Prime Minister St. Laurent had challenged the South African regime behind the scenes while his Liberal government continued to support South Africa at the United Nations.¹⁹ Playing according to diplomatic protocol, it has not, however, become public knowledge what went on in private

conversations between Ottawa and the colonial powers, especially London. But one thing was certain, that Ottawa had neither made any public utterances condemning British colonial policy nor had it requested the speeding up of the giving of independence to members of the Commonwealth either.

In spite of Ottawa's traditional silence on colonial issues, it had on many occasions demonstrated a strong desire to maintain a multiracial and united Commonwealth. This desire has been especially stimulated as a result of Ottawa's perception of the Commonwealth as a bridge between the nations of Africa, Asia and the West.²⁰ On January 14, 1957, Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, told the House of Commons:

On March 6 next we shall welcome a new member into the Commonwealth, the state of Ghana, at present known as the Gold Coast. It will be the first native African member and its progress as an independent nation inside the Commonwealth will be watched with great interest throughout Africa and Asia, and also in the West and by the Soviet Union.²¹

In many other instances, Ottawa was excited that the Commonwealth was soon to be further enlarged to include African states. Prior to the arrival of the African states into the Commonwealth scene, India, Pakistan and Ceylon were already the first multiracial members of the association. Howard Green, Diefenbaker's Secretary of State for External Affairs, while speaking of Nigeria's forthcoming independence, told the Advertising and Sales Bureau of the Vancouver Board of Trade on January 4, 1960 that "this year will see Nigeria take her place in our family of nations, and in a few weeks

Canada will be opening a diplomatic post in the capital, Lagos".²² Green also reiterated the theme of an earlier speech to the House of Commons:

On October 1 Nigeria is to become independent. She is the largest country in Africa . . . I believe Nigeria will play a very large part in the Commonwealth, in Africa and in the United Nations. The relations between the two countries are very close. We now have a Commissioner in Lagos who will become High Commissioner upon Nigeria attaining its independence.²³

Many government spokesmen emphasized Commonwealth membership for the African states with a facility which illustrated a desire and an acceptance, on the part of Ottawa, of a multi-racial Commonwealth.

Nevertheless, Ottawa's eagerness to enlarge the Commonwealth as a multiracial association was definitely against the wishes of South Africa. Prime Minister Malan had on February 23, 1951 declared that the notion of a multiracial Commonwealth was an "absurdity" that "should be settled without delay". On the same occasion, he declared, "the Commonwealth is a closed group, all free and equal".²⁴ Ottawa obviously did not subscribe to Malan's remarks: it instead extended friendship and cooperation to the African states.

Given this posture, Pearson remarked in 1957:

As an older member of the Commonwealth, Canada is proud, I am sure, to assist in welcoming these young countries, as they attain independence to our growing family and to assure them of our friendship and our support.²⁵

Ottawa's interest in the maintenance of a multiracial Common-

wealth, as indicated in the introductory portion, served a specific purpose to the Canadian Government. The Commonwealth was perceived by Ottawa, because of Canada's geographic insularity, as a mechanism through which Canadian diplomats could "broaden their perspective in world affairs, and to increase their influence by close contacts with colleagues from other continents".²⁶ Based on this perception, Ottawa had on three different occasions intervened, sometimes against the wishes of fellow white members, to prevent the Commonwealth from breaking up.²⁷

Within the Commonwealth context, Ottawa had developed a natural penchant for an "honest broker" role which has served Canadian interest in three notable ways. First, Ottawa's intention, a consequence of nostalgia, was aimed at maintaining traditional links with England and the Anglophone Afro-Asian states. Second, the Commonwealth had been, though exaggeratedly, perceived as a countervailing force against a rampant American influence on Canada's independent existence.²⁸ Lastly, the Commonwealth, as a result of intra-Commonwealth trade, satisfied Ottawa's commercial policy which has been fashioned towards the pursuit of "multilateral non-discriminatory world-trade".²⁹

In sum, Ottawa's "linchpin" diplomacy in the Commonwealth had served the Canadian national interest better than the African states. Furthermore, the Commonwealth afforded Ottawa the means of demonstrating its non-racist orientation

while avoiding appearing overtly anti-imperialist.

Canada's Role During the Independence Celebrations of These States

In accordance to its senior position in the Commonwealth, Ottawa participated in the independence celebrations of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. As already indicated, Ghana attained its independence on March 6, 1957. Canada was officially represented during the independence ceremonies in Accra. George Pruham,³⁰ Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys led the Canadian delegation which on arrival in Accra, presented Dr. Nkrumah with a goodwill letter from Prime Minister St. Laurent.³¹ In return, Nkrumah pledged friendship between Ghana and Canada and expressed a desire that trade with Canada would increase.³²

Ottawa's independence gift to Ghana consisted of an oil painting of Mount Royal, maps and books about Canada. Other personal gifts, engraved silver cigarette boxes, were presented to Prime Minister Nkrumah, K. Bótsio, K.A. Gbedemah, and the Ashantehene, the paramount chief of Ashanti Province.³³ The Canadian gift to Ghana can be termed insubstantial in view of Canada's senior status, and position as the richest Dominion within the Commonwealth. Ghana, at the time of independence, was not included in the Colombo Plan in which Commonwealth members such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon and non-Commonwealth countries of the South and Southeast Asia were receiving

technical, capital and commodity assistance. In the 1956-7 fiscal year, for instance, Ottawa's appropriation to the Plan was \$34 million (a rise from \$25.4 million in previous years) and \$50 million in 1959-60.³⁴

The St. Laurent government was asked in the Commons if Ghana had asked for financial assistance and what decision had been taken. To this question, St. Laurent replied that "there has been no request for financial assistance . . . and no decision had been taken".³⁵ On March 11, 1957, a further inquiry was made on the government to indicate the nature of its gift to Ghana. St. Laurent, in effect, responded that he had taken the question as a "notice".³⁶ The Prime Minister's response was suggestive that he probably was uninformed about the nature of his government's gift to Ghana which was clouded by controversy.³⁷ Alternatively, it could be that the Prime Minister might have delegated the responsibility to George Pruhum, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, as his later response on March 12, 1957 indicated. From all indications, it is plausible to suggest that Ghana was not a traditional friend and partner of Canada, thus foreign policy-making elite might have treated it as such.

Notwithstanding Ottawa's gift, a junior minister was also delegated as special envoy to Ghana's independence celebrations. While the Canadian Parliament paused in their regular business on March 6, 1957 to wish Ghana well, St. Laurent expressed "a deep sense of regret . . . to decline the

warm personal invitation from Dr. Nkrumah to attend these important ceremonies taking place today in Accra".³⁸ The Prime Minister argued that "duties here at home"³⁹ had prevented him from attendance. This stance could stimulate a debate in view of the fact that not even one of his senior cabinet ministers was in attendance when compared with the composition of the delegations from other Western nations.⁴⁰ On the other hand, it could be argued that St. Laurent and his senior cabinet ministers were not in a position to attend the Accra ceremonies because of preparations for the June 21, 1957 general election in Canada.

Against this background, this paper argues that Ottawa's manifested friendship with Ghana was an ephemeral gesture of cooperation which was decorated with diplomatic platitudes. The St. Laurent government did not back up the good words it had for Ghana with practical initiatives and this was the beginning of the arm's length relationship. As will be shown in Chapter III, trade relations between the two countries have not increased substantially either. Nevertheless, Canada recognized Ghana on the date of its independence because Ghana was granted sovereignty "within the Commonwealth". In the same year, Ottawa established a diplomatic mission in Ghana with the High Commissioner resident in Accra. This became Canada's first official political and cultural contact with a black African government. Ghana did not reciprocate until 1961 when it established a diplomatic mission in Ottawa.

Nigeria was the second black African country with which Canada established diplomatic relations, following the former's attainment of independence on October 1, 1960. Donald Fleming, the Diefenbaker Minister of Finance, led the Canadian delegation to Nigeria's independence celebrations which took place in Lagos. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, through Fleming, sent a goodwill letter to his Nigerian counterpart Alhaji Tafewa Balewa. For its independence, the Diefenbaker government gave Nigeria \$10,000 for the purchase of books.⁴¹ Speaking for Canada, Fleming stated that "Canada looked forward to increasing friendship and collaboration with Nigeria".⁴² At the same time, he unveiled Canada's development aid commitment to Anglophone Africa:

Canada had already had an opportunity to demonstrate its interest in the progress of the Commonwealth countries and other territories in Africa and that a Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan had been launched and the Canadian Government pledged \$10.5 million over the next three years for the new independent commonwealth African countries.⁴³

The Diefenbaker government's commitment to provide Commonwealth African states with development assistance was obviously a milestone in Canadian-African relations. The diplomatic relationship had widened since 1960 to include development collaboration probably because Asian countries had, since 1950, enjoyed such assistance under the umbrella of the Colombo Plan. However, as will be shown in Chapter IV, Ottawa had concentrated its Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan funds on only sovereign African states against

the original intent of the Plan. Moreover, Ottawa's initial appropriation to the Plan was placed on a "lapsing basis" as against the Plan's policy that aid was to be provided "on a continuing basis".⁴⁴

Through its participation in the SCAAP, the Diefenbaker government added more substance to Canadian-African relations which perhaps was stimulated by the Prime Minister's personal philosophy, interest in the Commonwealth, and the British Monarch (who is also the head of the Commonwealth). Diefenbaker's philosophy stemmed from his belief that "the good citizen and the good nation must recognize his obligations to the broad community of man".⁴⁵ Combined with his Cold War perception, the Conservative government extended assistance to African states as a demonstration of Canadian friendship and support, but primarily to ward off communist influence in Africa.⁴⁶

Diefenbaker was looked upon abroad "as an embodiment of the Commonwealth ideal"⁴⁷ thus the New Zealand Star declared, "He is a Commonwealth man without prefix, suffix or apology . . . A man to be reckoned with".⁴⁸ Prior to his tour to Commonwealth countries in 1958 (excluding Africa), Diefenbaker had remarked, "This tour is a practical illustration of Canada's belief in the importance of the Commonwealth".⁴⁹ Given such an interest in the Commonwealth by the Conservative government, Canadian delegation to Nigeria's independence celebrations was led by a senior Cabinet minister and the

gift was not insubstantial either. Diplomatic missions were exchanged, following the recognition of Nigeria on October 1, 1960, except that Nigeria did not open its mission in Canada until 1966 (Canada had opened a mission in Lagos in 1960).

Ottawa extended diplomatic recognition to Sierra Leone on April 27, 1961, when the latter attained its independence. The Canadian delegation to the independence celebrations was led by Thomas Carter, Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria. Carter presented Prime Minister Milton Margai with congratulatory letters and a \$5,000 book credit, Canada's independence gift to Sierra Leone.⁵⁰ The delegation entertained their hosts on board the destroyer HMCS "Algonquin".⁵¹

Following Sierra Leone's successful attainment of independence, Thomas Carter was accredited to the Sierra Leonean Government. Sierra Leone in turn accredited its Ambassador to the United States to Canada. Speaking for Canada, Carter promised Canadian assistance, under the SCAAP, to Sierra Leone. As will be shown in Chapter IV, Canadian aid to Sierra Leone, due to the policy of concentration, has been minimal relative to Nigeria and Ghana. Later, this chapter will illustrate the difficulties which have been raised by the practice of double-accreditation or non-resident diplomatic missions between the two countries.

Although ninth in a continental order, the Gambia was the fourth and last British colony in West Africa to become

free of British rule. It attained its independence on February 18, 1965. Harrison Cleveland, the new Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria, represented the Canadian Government at the ceremonies. The Pearson government, through Mr. Cleveland, sent a goodwill letter to Prime Minister David Jawara. As an independent gift, Ottawa gave the Gambian Government two kits of film projection equipment and several films.⁵² Despite Ottawa's recognition of the Gambia on the date of its independence, it (Canada) did not accredit a diplomatic representation to the Gambian until 1968 when the Canadian Ambassador in Dakar, Senegal brought the Gambia under its diplomatic umbrella.

On the other hand, the Gambia did not accredit diplomatic representation to Canada until the early part of 1977, when a Canadian businessman in Montreal was named an "honourary consul" to Canada. As has been shown, there has existed intergovernmental distance between Canada and the Gambia which of course had affected the relationship between the two countries (including Sierra Leone) in a negative manner. This distance has been stimulated by official description and perception of the Gambia as "tiny Gambia"⁵³ or a sliver of land on both sides of the Gambia River. The Gambia, as will be shown in Chapter IV, has received the least aid from Ottawa relative to the other three countries of the subregion.

So far, this chapter has dealt with the roles which

Ottawa played during the independence celebrations of these countries. The primary function of a diplomatic mission, as a contact-point, has been to stimulate a first-hand knowledge between governments for subsequent cordial and mutual collaborations in political, economic, cultural and technological matters. To what extent has Ottawa fostered these relations with Sierra Leone and the Gambia where diplomatic representations have been non-resident?

This question as well as others were raised with officials of the Department of External Affairs during interviews. Budgetary restraint, remarked these officials, was one of the factors which has inhibited the opening of missions in Sierra Leone and in the Gambia.⁵⁴ These two countries were further seen by the Department of External Affairs (DEA) as lacking in communications networks, an essential ingredient for the smooth functioning of a diplomatic mission. Furthermore, these officials also perceive Sierra Leone and the Gambia as lacking in "wealth and influence"⁵⁵ which has inhibited both countries from exerting substantial influence in African, Commonwealth and international politics.

"A nation's influence in the world", Peter Dobell has argued, "is not only of its objective power, but also of its own and others' perceptions of it".⁵⁶ This rationale might have reinforced the DEA's position towards both African countries. The Department had argued in favour of non-resident diplomatic representations in both countries but

however sees the practice of double-accreditation as "not ideal but necessary"⁵⁷ on the grounds that it stimulated a continuing relationship. This line of argument was further strengthened by the belief that Canadian development assistance personnel in Sierra Leone and the Gambia serve as "Ottawa's eyes"⁵⁸ in the absence of resident diplomatic representation.

As earlier mentioned, the absence of resident diplomatic representations between Ottawa on the one hand, and Sierra Leone and the Gambia on the other have created a lag in the relationship. DEA officials confirmed that contact between Ottawa and the two West African governments have been less than cordial when compared to Ottawa's relationship with Nigeria and Ghana.⁵⁹ On the non-governmental level, some Sierra Leonean students in Canada have indicated that they had suffered hardships when they applied for entry permits into Canada.⁶⁰

In sum, this paper is inclined to state that, in Sierra Leone as well as in the Gambia, the following responsibilities which were assigned to diplomatic missions have not been realized: "...to conduct negotiations with the government to which it is accredited; to keep the Canadian Government fully informed of political or other developments of significance in the country it is serving; to watch over Canada's interests in the country; to serve Canadians in the country; and to make information about Canada available".⁶¹ This contention stems from the fact that Ottawa has indulged in a

cost minimization exercise while at the same time aspiring to maintain a healthy relations with all countries. This is a difficult task which must involve a trade-off scheme thus Ottawa has not achieved both ends. The account contained above was a demonstration of one of the characteristics of the "arm's length" relationship.

Motives Behind Ottawa's Diplomatic Relations with the Subregion

The period under examination was marked by the East-West ideological rivalry. As a NATO member, Canada was certainly not an "on-looker" in international issues of that time. African nationalism which led to European withdrawal, especially British, had left a vacuum which Western states "feared that the Soviet Union might take advantage of" by joining the "ranks of anti-colonial"⁶² states in Africa.

The anxiety caused in Western capitals was stimulated by a legacy of bitterness and hostility which European rule had left behind. Consequently, as indicated in the introductory portion, Ottawa was perceived as capable of playing the role of an "interpreter" since it had neither colonial possessions nor imperialistic record in Africa:

... the British were extremely anxious that Canada help to fill in the gap left by their departure. By establishing relations with Africa (particularly British West Africa), Ottawa could indicate to Africans her confidence in their ability to rule themselves; emphasize the importance Canada attached to the Commonwealth; and illustrate to Africans that Canadians were relatively free from race prejudice.⁶³

As indicated in the introductory portion, Robert Matthews' findings support this paper's contention that Canada's involvement in Anglophone Africa which began in West Africa was a consequence of Ottawa's membership in the Commonwealth, but at the prompting of Britain. Matthews' argument has also revealed that Canada's involvement was associated to the desire to stress the importance it attached to the Commonwealth, a mechanism through which Canada demonstrated its independent existence.

Given this background, Ottawa had established diplomatic relations with African states, particularly Commonwealth West Africa in an attempt to secure their friendship; provide Canada with listening posts in the continent; increase Western influence, especially Ottawa's in Africa; and to expand trade. In the quest to achieve these objectives, as will be shown in Chapter IV, Canada joined with Britain, Australia and New Zealand to provide development assistance to Anglophone African states which was indicative of the advantage that will accrue to Commonwealth members. Chapters II and IV will examine these aspects of the relationship in greater detail.

Conclusion

The principle of national interest (an independent variable), as indicated in the introductory portion, can be linked to Ottawa's establishment of diplomatic relations

with the countries of the subregion. It has been argued by Matthews that a "country's policies and actions usually reflect those interests that her government and people feel are worth preserving or promoting".⁶⁴ Ottawa's primary intention, as this chapter has illustrated, in the relationship with the subregion was stimulated by the desire to promote friendship and foster the growth of the Commonwealth which satisfies Canada's national interest.

At the time of Ghana's independence, for instance, a Canadian diplomat states, at the United Nations, that the Canadian "Government and fellow countrymen are looking forward to welcoming the new state Ghana to the Commonwealth family".⁶⁵ This stance indicated Ottawa's willingness to make the Commonwealth as a multiracial association. Also, Pearson's argument that "the smaller the Empire the greater the Commonwealth"⁶⁶ pointed to the same direction, but had more to do with Ottawa's intention to convert, for its own interest, the Commonwealth as a counterpoise political force "against American influence in Canada".⁶⁷ Through the instrument of the Commonwealth, Ottawa has also increased its image and influence in the Afro-Asian states.

"What more useful role", Eayrs remarked about Canada, "than to serve as a bridge in a world where nearly all the bridges had been blown?"⁶⁸ In accordance to this rationale, Ottawa, in response to British request, moved to help fill the vacuum created by European withdrawal, especially

British. Ottawa was best suited, as outlined earlier, to play the role of an "interpreter" on the basis that it was a former colony and also at one time a ward of the Colonial office.⁶⁹

Historical accident, though a bit exaggerated, was seen as Ottawa's diplomatic "credit card" in its subsequent intercourse with the nations of Anglophone Africa. More importantly, it should be noted that Ottawa's policies toward Africa, particularly Commonwealth Africa "have quite obviously been influenced in a significant way by events and forces outside its control".⁷⁰ Matthews also argues that "Canada has rarely taken bold initiatives on her own, but has been satisfied to adjust to situations or crises as they arise at home or abroad".⁷¹ Such an attitude further illustrates the characteristic of the relationship - one of an "arm's length".

Against this background, this chapter has imputed concepts, according to the theory of foreign policy, to signify Canadian policies towards the Commonwealth West African sub-region (which might be applicable to other Anglophone African states). Given this proposition, Ottawa's policies towards the subregion might have been double-faceted. The first policy possibly has been one of a "friendly link". The aim of the policy, as indicated in this chapter, has been to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship with these countries through diplomatic relations and development assistance, as will be shown in Chapter IV, to stimulate a pro-

Western orientation among the countries of the subregion in spite of their policy of non-alignment. The second policy can be termed one of "possession oriented"⁷² which meant that Ottawa has been "aiming at the enhancement or preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value"⁷³: the Commonwealth, parliamentary form of government, democratic and free institutions and trade.

It will be justifiable, however, to place more emphasis on Ottawa's interest in enhancing and preserving the Commonwealth, and to facilitate trade; the other factors are to some measure of secondary importance.⁷⁴

CHAPTER II

CONTENTIOUS AFRICAN ISSUES: OTTAWA'S PRAGMATISM

Diplomatic relations, as indicated in Chapter I, has been the necessary channel through which governments promote and enhance a network of other relations which include: trade, cultural, collective security, and development co-operation. It has already been argued that diplomatic relations usually involve obligations and responsibilities, and these two aspects have relevance to this chapter.

These countries, as shown in Chapter I, became members of the Commonwealth following their successful attainment of independence. Within the Commonwealth context, three important African issues had surfaced: South Africa's apartheid policy; Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); and the Nigerian civil war. The African member states, with regards to the three issues, had expected firm commitments from Ottawa, among other things, in the light of its senior position in the Commonwealth.¹

The purpose of this chapter, as outlined in the introduction, is to explore Ottawa's responses and reactions to the three issues mentioned above. These issues, in the opinion of black Africans and officials of the Department of External Affairs, have been significantly important in Canadian-African relations.

The South African and Rhodesian issues have a comparative relevance to this paper because the Commonwealth, to which

Ottawa attaches great importance, has been centrally involved in the disputes, and both issues are unique because they have pertained to racialism and apartheid as the official governmental policy of the two Southern African regimes. The Nigerian crises, however, also a Commonwealth concern was not marked by either racialism or apartheid.

The significance of these issues to this paper, among other things, is to demonstrate that the pursuit of economic interest, preservation of the Commonwealth and historical factors have influenced Canada's position in Southern Africa despite the fact that such a stance has caused "friction" in Canadian - black African relations. Furthermore, by analyzing these three contentious issues, the fact will become obvious that Ottawa, on its own, does not seek involvement in African affairs partly because of the insubstantial nature of Canadian economic interest in the continent as compared to Britain, France, West Germany and the United States.

As already indicated in the introduction, Ottawa's position on the three issues has been marked by ambiguity and inconsistencies. In South Africa, Ottawa has been pursuing a policy of "double standard" because it best serves its national interest. This chapter will magnify an earlier contention that Canada's position on these issues has been shaped, especially by economic interest, and the political

values and perception of the foreign policy-making elite.

In 1960, Douglas Anglin drew the Diefenbaker government's attention to its ambiguous position towards Africa. He noted:

The Canadian Government has yet to formulate a recognizable policy towards Africa in the sense of having defined national objectives which it is pursuing. At the most, Canadian policy has been negative, an accidental by-product of policies evolved in relation to other areas.²

He further warned that Africa has "assumed far too important a role in world affairs to remain merely a marginal factor in Canadian foreign policy".³ His criticism of the manner in which Ottawa had related to the Africans constituted a reminder to the Diefenbaker government to formulate and define its policies towards Africa in the light, among other things, of its diplomatic relationship with the countries of that continent. Did the government heed Anglin's advice? No. It continued business as usual.

Ten years later (1970) the Trudeau Liberal government reviewed Canada's global foreign policy but also failed to enunciate a recognizable policy towards Africa. The Government's White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, which was published in 1970, contained six booklets which bear titles: Foreign Policy for Canadians, Europe, International Development, Latin America, Pacific and United Nations. The lack of a policy booklet on Africa stimulated further criticism of the Trudeau government, and also lent credence to Anglin's

criticism of the government in 1960.

Following the publication of the Foreign Policy Papers, Robert Matthews noted that Canadian policy towards Africa "lacked coherence" and a "sense of direction".⁴ He also remarked that:

At no time has a Canadian Government enunciated a policy towards Africa. Even the recent Policy Paper alludes only to the problem of Southern Africa and in a brief section of the pamphlet on the United Nations: the rest of Africa is virtually neglected.⁵

These criticisms by Anglin and Matthews are relevant by virtue of Africa's characteristics and international importance. Africa is the second largest continent (11,506,000 square miles) occupying twenty percent of the Earth, and the third most populous (414,000,000) region of the world. Moreover, Canada has since 1960's, as indicated in the introductory portion of this paper, been closely associated with the African countries through the Commonwealth and L'Agence de Cooperation et Technique des pays Francophones.

In spite of the close intercourse which has existed between Ottawa and the African governments, no Canadian Government has yet thought it wise to enunciate a specific policy towards Africa. This situation is indicative of the "arm's length" relationship which has existed between Canada and these countries. "Although Canada may never have voiced a coherent, easily identifiable policy on Africa, it should

still be possible to discern" from "official statements and government programmes"⁶ what structure its policy assumes.

As indicated earlier, these countries have looked upon Ottawa for firm commitments on issues of African interest because of their perception, perhaps misperception, of Canada as an ally and friend and combined with Ottawa's senior position in the Commonwealth. This African misperception of Canada had stemmed from a belief that Africans and "Canadians share a common bond . . . having suffered the indignities of colonialism together".⁷ Consequently, many African statesmen have visited Ottawa to elicit Canadian support and co-operation in the achievement of their political aspirations.

In 1958, for example, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana visited Ottawa, and during the visit he addressed a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. In his speech, he discussed the Commonwealth and certain aspects of Ghana's foreign policy. Referring to his country's foreign policy, he stated:

Basically the policy of our Government is one of non-alignment and positive neutrality. I have emphasized on several occasions, however, that this should not be interpreted as a purely negative neutralism. On the contrary, we will always adopt whatever positive policy will do most to safeguard our independence.⁸

In conclusion, he emphasized "we have a vested interest in peace and we will do everything in our power to support the United Nations".⁹ In response, M. R. Drouin and Ronald

Michener - Speakers of the Senate and House of Commons respectively - expressed "heartfelt good wishes of the Canadian Parliament and People"¹⁰ to the Ghanian people. This ephemeral gesture of cooperation was stifled in its cradle by the Diefenbaker government's detach reticence to return the visit. This attitude, at the least, pointed to the direction of an "arm's-length" relationship.

After thirteen years, however, the first official visit to Africa was undertaken by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1971. Sharp's visit took him to Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zambia and Tanzania. Ghana, the standard bearer of black Africa's independence, was left out of Sharp's African shuttle. Back in Canada, Sharp told the House of Commons the findings of his shuttle diplomacy:

Development assistance is and will remain the largest element in our activities in Africa. This is at once a measure of the need of the developing countries there and of the opportunity Canada has to contribute its resources, human and material, operating equally in English and French.¹¹

Sharp's speech suggested that he had not obtained a political insight into and awareness of nationalist sentiments which have been brooding in Africa. The speech, at the most, constituted an interpretation of the Liberal government's policy which states that the "Government believes that a firm commitment to the support of international development is one of the most constructive ways in which Canada can participate

in the international community in the coming decades".¹²

On the issue of apartheid and racism in Southern Africa, Sharp told the Commons that Canada could only influence these regimes through multilateral organs:

I think we should realize and accept that our capacity to influence the White racist minorities in Southern Africa is limited and can best be exercised multilaterally through the United Nations and Commonwealth. What we can do ourselves is to offer economic and political support to the developing countries of black Africa.¹³

Sharp's statement was a reiteration of the Canadian government stand on the Southern Africa question, a stand, as indicated in the introductory portion, which has meant non-involvement and a peaceful settlement. The Canadian position will be examined in greater detail later.

Although Ottawa has been pursuing a neutral position on the Southern Africa question, it has given moral support to the Africans in some instances. On October 25, 1968, at the United Nations, "Canada broke with most of its western allies in voting in favour of a resolution which would deny independence for Rhodesia before it achieved majority African rule".¹⁴ On November 25, 1968, Canada also "voted with the fifty-one Afro-Asian countries to condemn the government of Portugal for failing to give its African colonies independence".¹⁵ These condemnations, though diplomatically important, have failed to achieve the required

goals in Southern Africa. Consequently, Canadian exemplum has lacked practical relevance in the eyes of Africans.¹⁶

In 1975, Allan MacEachen, Sharp's successor, visited West Africa to explore alternative avenues in order to improve Canada's relations with the area. In an address in Lagos, Nigeria, he stated:

We Canadians feel that we must not be content with action at the multilateral level. We also hope to strengthen our bilateral relations with the countries of the Third World. We have tried, in the past, to cooperate with them through economic and technical assistance.¹⁷

MacEachen's speech suggested that Ottawa had related to these countries as charity cases in the past. However, his speech pointed towards a new era in Canadian-African relations. He also noted:

We feel that we must go now beyond this form of co-operation to expand trade, engage in mutually beneficial investments and industrial cooperation as well as cultural exchanges. . .¹⁸

The policy pronouncement deviated from that of his predecessors who had only pursued development cooperations with these countries.

In Ghana, he remarked, "Economic development has been a strong theme in our relationship".¹⁹ MacEachen's speeches in Lagos and Accra has lent credence to an earlier viewpoint that Canada's relations with the countries of the sub-

region has been one of an "arm's-length". Because the nature of the relationship up until 1975 constituted mainly the giving of development aid to these countries which suggested that the relationship was not a matured or full-fledged one. The nature of this intercourse might have contributed to Ottawa's failure to accord Africa a policy booklet in the White Paper. This chapter will now examine the three contentious issues which will be related to the above information.

In recent years, disagreement has surfaced over Canada's Southern African policy. Many African states, as already indicated, have perceived Canada's policy as consisting of diplomatic rhetoric. Aware of the African stance, officials of the Department of External Affairs called the Southern African question "a point of friction"²⁰ whereas an African diplomat in Ottawa called it the "Canadian blindness".²¹ This situation raises the question: what is it that has caused the "friction" and "blindness" in Canadian-African relations. This section will explore the Southern African situation, and Ottawa's response to it.

Ottawa's Response to South Africa's Apartheid Policy

Canada has developed a traditional link with South Africa which was stimulated by a common allegiance to the crown. Both countries were Dominions within the British Empire, and

also the pioneers of the Commonwealth. As indicated in Chapter I, the first Canadian diplomatic mission in Africa was established in South Africa in 1940. Against this background, Canadian-South African relationship had included trade, political and military cooperation. These links combined with the perceptions of the foreign policy-making elite have influenced the nature of Canada's South African policy.

Various Canadian Governments since 1948, when apartheid surfaced, have tended to dodge the South African issue both at home and abroad. The Union's apartheid policy surfaced in 1952 at the United Nations and the Canadian position was one of ambivalence:

Canada abstained on the initial resolution of 1952, switched her vote to the support of South Africa for the next two years and then, following the abolition of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa, relapsed into abstention during the final two years of the Liberal regime.²²

This kaleidoscopic behaviour of the St. Laurent Liberal government suggested that Ottawa had not initially stood firm against apartheid which had "disavowed the values . . . considered essential to the continued existence of the multiracial association".²³ The factors which were responsible for Ottawa's inconsistent voting behaviour at the U.N. will be examined later.

The Diefenbaker government also pursued a similar poli-

cy as the St. Laurent administration. At the United Nations session in 1959, "Canada's delegation, headed by Howard Green, abstained in spite that some Western Countries like New Zealand, United States and Netherlands, etc., were in open opposition to South Africa".²⁴ Following the Canadian abstention, Prime Minister Diefenbaker defended his government's action on the grounds that the resolution "in the opinion of the Canadian Government was one that exceeded the proper limitations of the United Nations jurisdiction".²⁵ By invoking legalistic terminology, Diefenbaker might have covered up his administration's negative handling of the apartheid issue. Diefenbaker further strengthened his argument by invoking a merely conventional concept of "non-criticism of a Commonwealth member state".²⁶ The Prime Minister's defence might be termed an excuse for doing nothing on a dangerous issue which was threatening the Commonwealth association.

Many African statesmen were displeased with Ottawa's ambivalence, but more critical of its inveterate abstentions at the United Nations. Tanzania's chief minister Julius Nyerere asserted that Ottawa's behaviour was "very disappointing" and that "silence can sometimes be as based as support".²⁷ The former Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Dr. Francis Ibiam, noted, "I don't know why he Diefenbaker shouldn't take a stand, maybe as a statesman he would not want to do it,

but as a churchman I feel he should".²⁸

Ottawa's position on the question of apartheid has been one of hypocrisy except in 1961. After failing to work out a compromise with the Afro-Asia states, Diefenbaker took a firm stand which led to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth's because the association was at the point of death. The Canadian Government's ambiguous position on apartheid has been primarily stimulated, as will be shown in Chapter III, by economic considerations. Two other factors have also influenced the Canadian stance: the values and perceptions of policy-makers and the historical consideration.

As a trading nation, Ottawa has attached a great importance to foreign trade and investment and South Africa has constituted a favourable market for Canadian goods and services. In the 1970 Foreign Policy papers, the Trudeau government had placed more emphasis on Canada's economic growth above the principles of self-determination and social justice. The decision to downgrade "social justice" as Thorndarson has noted, "in order to continue commercial relations with South Africa was taken by the Trudeau Cabinet"²⁹ perhaps against the advice of the Department of External Affairs. The Trudeau government, like its predecessors, has adopted a policy to deal with South Africa which has meant the "separation of politics from economics".

This policy puts Ottawa on the safe side to continue economic relations with South Africa but it has put Ottawa in an awkward position because as the Study and Action Committee (of the Y.W.C.A.) has noted:

The more Canadian economic interests become intertwined and aligned with the interests of the apartheid system the more reluctant will Canadians and their government become to initiate policies consistent with Canadian values and the principle of social justice.³⁰

The fears which the Study and Action Committee expressed might have already arisen because as already indicated the Trudeau government had downgraded social justice and self-determination as a necessary first step to continue commercial relations with South Africa.

Ottawa has also continued to "grant Commonwealth preferences to South Africa whose policies we Canadians have sharply rejected and whose withdrawal from the Commonwealth we encouraged".³¹ The government has also in spite of its condemnation of "South Africa's refusal to surrender its mandate over Namibia South West Africa encouraged Canadian investors and exporters to increase their involvement in Namibia".³² The above information, the economic factor will be dealt with again in Chapter III, has lendend credence to an earlier contention that economic interest has been one of the primary factors which has stimulated Canada's ambiguous position in Southern Africa, a position

which despite its causing a friction has impinged on Canada's position in black Africa.

It would, however, be myopic to maintain that Ottawa's interest and pussyfooting on the South African question has only been a consequence of economic interest. As earlier indicated, and as Matthews has noted, "Ottawa is anxious to preserve and strengthen its long and fruitful relationship with South Africa, based as it is on a common historical experience, similar institutions and extensive trading and financial ties".³³ Further, the foreign policy-making elite has also influenced the Canadian position. During the Diefenbaker years, for example, the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, had high admiration for General Smuts. Besides the cordial friendship which existed between Diefenbaker and Smuts, Green perceived Smuts as an "outstanding world statesman of my time".³⁴ Altogether, these factors had contributed to Ottawa's position and reluctance to support any sanctions against South Africa.

Despite the above factors, Canada has also cooperated with the South African regime militarily. Prior to 1963, the Diefenbaker government, as outlined above, only criticized South Africa for its apartheid policy while at the same time allowing arms to be sold to South Africa. The military equipment had comprised aircraft, communications, and air navigation instruments.³⁵ However, by complying with the

Security Council's resolutions of August 7 and December 4, 1963, Ottawa terminated its military cooperation with South Africa.

Paul Martin, Pearson's Secretary of State for External Affairs, informed the Commons of the termination of military cooperation between Canada and South Africa. He said:

Taking into account the Security Council's recommendation and wishing further to express our disapproval of South Africa's apartheid policies the Government has decided that it will not authorize the acceptance of any new orders from South Africa for items of military equipment, nor permit the shipment of such equipment to South Africa.³⁶

Martin's speech marked the end of military cooperation between the two countries.

However, the decision announced by Martin was a capitalization of the Security Council's resolution. It in no way represented a Canadian initiative or action. Indeed it portrayed the government's reliance on multilateral institutions as the best channels through which the South African question could be alleviated.

The ties between South Africa and Canada on one hand, and Canada and black Africa on the other, have placed various Canadian Governments in an awkward position. In an address to the Commons on November 28, 1963, Martin expressed the Canadian dilemma this way:

The Canadian Government can understand the fears of White South Africans about the possibility of being submerged and eventually forced out of their homeland. However, the Canadian Government cannot understand South Africa's claim that apartheid is the only solution.³⁷

Martin's statement implicitly suggested that the Canadian Government was in sympathy with the fears of the White South Africans because of the uncertainties which have clouded their future. On the other hand, South Africa's apartheid policy eluded the Pearson government's comprehension; hence it only condemned the method by which that policy was to be attained.

With regards to the method, Martin remarked "We deplore the use of harsh and repressive measures offensive to fundamental human rights which are used to carry out this policy".³⁸ The government's rejection of the harsh methods which the South African regime employed in the implementation of the apartheid policy was an expression of sympathy towards the black South African victims of apartheid. This twin sympathy which Ottawa expressed, among other things, has been the kernel of the dilemma which have confronted Ottawa on the South African issue. Consequently, Ottawa has been unable unilaterally to enunciate a definite recognizable policy toward South Africa.

As already indicated, Ottawa has on many occasions deplored the policy of apartheid, and has even placed embargo on arms shipment to South Africa, yet the government sees no

contradiction in its trade relationship with the apartheid system. Instead, it has argued that trade is a politically neutral activity. Given this line of argument, it has become obvious that Ottawa pursues a "double standard" policy in Southern Africa mainly for economic reasons. Matthews has criticized the Trudeau government for its contradictory South African policy. He remarked:

By some strange, as yet unrevealed logic, the government has reconciled Canadian businessmen's interests in the growing South African economy with the church's abhorrence of apartheid.³⁹

In principle, Matthews' criticism of Ottawa's "double standard" policy has relevance because of the brutal nature and human degradation of the South African regime. However, in the light of the concept of national interest, Ottawa's habitual concern, the opposite might prevail because as one of the world's foremost trading nations, Canada's prosperity and survival lies in foreign trade and investment. Ottawa's trade policy towards South Africa might not be unique when compared to the policies it pursues elsewhere. Canada's dislike for communism, for example, has not prevented it from trading with Cuba despite severance of ties with Cuba by her ally - the United States. In another instance, Canada began trading with Communist China prior to the recognition of the regime in 1970. The separation of trade from politics has been an inveterate Canadian formula.

In this respect, national interest, in agreement with an earlier contention, has on many occasions, been the major determinant of Canadian foreign policy direction.

Rhodesia and UDI: Ottawa's Response

The Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965, caused a nervous concern within the Commonwealth and as well as in the United Nations. The anxiety was stimulated by the fear that Smith's action was detrimental to race relations, especially within the Commonwealth context. Given this fear, Canada, by virtue of its senior position and perception of the Commonwealth as a bridge linking Africa, Asia and the West, was deeply affected by Smith's independence declaration. What was Canada's response to the Rhodesian issue?

Prime Minister Pearson issued a statement which denounced Smith and his regime. In a statement which illustrated Ottawa's stand, Pearson remarked:

The Canadian Government does not recognize either the unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Smith in Rhodesia, or the independent state of Rhodesia which he claims now exists, or the Smith Government itself in Rhodesia.⁴⁰

The Pearson government's decision not to recognize the Smith regime had its roots in earlier warnings by Canada, Britain, Australia and the other Commonwealth member states. Further-

more, Harold Wilson's Labour government in Britain looked upon UDI as unconstitutional and as an act of rebellion.

Given the above rationale, Ottawa imposed economic and military sanctions on Rhodesia. These measures included the withdrawal of the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Salisbury and the preferential tariff on Rhodesian goods was cancelled. Military aid and financial agreements with Rhodesia were also terminated.⁴¹ Ottawa's response to the Smith regime was a manifestation of its support for the principle of majority rule. It was also a gesture of reassurance to the Commonwealth African states which doubted the usefulness of remaining inside the Commonwealth since African political interests were no longer being fully served. However, Matthews has argued that the "Canadian backing for economic sanctions" against Rhodesia "constituted a reaction to a new crisis, one involving the preservation of the Commonwealth".⁴² The validity of this argument lends credence to an earlier contention that Canada's relations with these countries have been determined by Canadian position in, and perception of, the Commonwealth as a bridge.

The Commonwealth was aware that it would not have brought any meaningful economic pressure to bear on Rhodesia had it acted alone. Consequently, it needed international support to help bring about an early settlement to the Rhodesian crisis. On November 20, 1965, the Security Council

passed a resolution which called on all states to place military and economic sanctions on Rhodesia. In compliance with the resolution, the Pearson government announced further measures against Rhodesia which included a ban on the "importation of Rhodesian sugar, tobacco, ferrochrome, chrome ores, asbestos and meat into Canada".⁴³ The list also included a ban on the exportation of oil and petroleum products to Rhodesia. The "insurance facilities . . . under the Export Credit Act to Rhodesia was also withdrawn".⁴⁴ What factors prompted the Pearson government to take these measures against Smith's Rhodesia?

Prime Minister Pearson justified the government's actions in this manner:

The situation which has arisen in Rhodesia is particularly serious because of its potentially divisive effect on the Commonwealth, and on race relations, which are so important to cooperation and development in Africa.⁴⁵

Pearson's statement has lent credence to the author's, as well as Matthews, contentions that Ottawa's response to the Rhodesian issue stemmed from the desire to preserve the Commonwealth from breaking up. This desire was associated to the fact that Tanzania had severed diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965. Furthermore, the African states perceived Smith's action as a "white settler" conspiracy, thus they needed a clear conviction that it was not. Consequently,

a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was convened in Lagos, Nigeria, on January 11 and 12, 1966 to discuss the Rhodesian issue. The Conference was the first of its kind in the history of the Commonwealth that a single political issue militated the convening of a Prime Ministers Conference. Given this situation, it was a demonstration of the importance which many countries, especially the African states attached to the Rhodesian question.

The Lagos Conference established two committees which were allotted different functions. One committee was assigned the responsibility to "review regularly the effects of the sanctions on Rhodesia". The other was to "coordinate a Special Commonwealth Programme of Assistance in training Rhodesian Africans".⁴⁶ The final communique of the Conference went further by condemning any political system based on racial discrimination. Ottawa's participation in the Conference and the measures taken against Rhodesia, as already outlined, was necessitated by two factors. First, it was stimulated by the desire to reassure the African nations of Canada's friendship and sympathy. Second, Ottawa's main objective was to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth and to demonstrate that it would not condone racism.

In spite of the agreement which was reached at the Lagos Conference, the African states and Canada later began treading different paths on the Rhodesian question. First, it

was reported that "Canadian businessmen were . . . importing Rhodesian canned meat as South African canned meat".⁴⁷ This situation stimulated suspicion among the African states of Canada's sincerity on the Rhodesian question. The African suspicion has some validity because, as the Commentator had remarked:

It is more than a coincidence, however that we Canadians used to import Rhodesian canned meat, and now we are importing South African canned meat which we never did before the sanctions were imposed.⁴⁸

Against this background, the African states began demanding armed intervention against the Smith regime in Rhodesia whereas Canada stood for a peaceful settlement to the problem. An African diplomat in Canada remarked that the "only solution lay in arms struggle".⁴⁹ On the contrary, a Canadian official maintained that the Africans were accusing Canada of not doing enough. The official was still convinced, even after thirteen years, that "peaceful settlement will always remain the best alternative".⁵⁰

As has been demonstrated, the point of contention has arisen over method, not on principle because both sides condemn racialism and apartheid. The African insistence for an armed intervention has mainly been stimulated because for thirteen years, sanctions have not achieved the anticipated results. The Africans had received the support of Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General who stated that he

has been "privately urging Canada and other Western countries for years to supply arms to black nationalist groups in Southern Africa".⁵¹ He also believed that the "Rhodesian independence movement would have ended in half an hour" had the "Western countries including Canada parachuted troops into Rhodesia when Ian Smith was declaring Rhodesia's independence from Britain".⁵² Given the fact that Arnold Smith is a Canadian, and that thirteen years of sanctions have failed to produce any dividend, it then would be naive to maintain that Western policies, especially Canada's have not been inflexible on the Rhodesian issue.

With regards to the two contentious issues discussed above, it has been demonstrated that Canada's economic interest in South Africa, and membership in the Commonwealth had determined its position on the two most contentious issues in Africa. It was also shown that the perception of Diefenbaker and Green had affected the Conservative government's ability to take a strong decision against South Africa. Given the fact that Canada has been, partly, on a different wave length on these issues whereas the Africans have been on another, suggests that Canadian-African relationship has been an "arm's-length" one. This is so because Ottawa does not want to commit itself entirely to the Africans which would mean total involvement, and this Ottawa does not want to do.

The Nigerian Conflict: Ottawa's Reaction

The Nigerian civil war aroused much public concern in Canada, and in turn raised problems for the Trudeau Liberal government. Three factors accounted for the interest which Canadians showed towards the victims of the conflict. First, the media publicized the destructiveness of the war in terms of property and human life. Second, many interest groups, such as the Presbyterian church, and Oxfam, canvassed for relief aid, and also lobbied for parliamentary support. Lastly, some politicians visited Biafra for an on-the-spot assessment. These parliamentarians included two federal Members of Parliament, Andrew Brewin (NDP: Greenwood) and David MacDonald (PC: Egmont). Stephen Lewis (NDP: Scarborough) of the Ontario Provincial Legislature, Charles Taylor (of the Globe and Mail) also visited Biafra. The Trudeau government did not send any representation to Biafra, rather it relied on information from sources in Lagos.

This section will examine: the methods employed by the Liberal government in dealing with the Nigerian conflict; the government's policy towards Nigeria and Biafra; and the factors which influenced the belated policy stand. The relevance of this section stems from the fact that it will further strengthen the contention of this paper, as outlined in the introductory portion, that Canada's relationship with the subregion has been one of an "arm's-length". The two

issues discussed earlier involved racialism but this does not. On the three issues, Ottawa had expressed concern but had also refused any physical involvement which illustrates the characteristics of the "arm's-length" relationship.

As already indicated, the Liberal government's interpretation of the Nigerian conflict was based on the information it had received from Lagos. In consequence, the Biafran side which was never heard tended to be misrepresented. The first such misrepresentation and misinterpretation came from Gerard Pelletier (Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs). On March 12, 1968, he informed the Commons of the Nigerian conflict. He said:

The Eastern Region of Nigeria has declared itself in secession from the rest of the country and has used military and other means within its control to try to enforce its declaration. Neither the Canadian Government nor any other government has recognized the secessionist regime, and we have relations only with the Central authorities of the Federal Government at Lagos.⁵³

Pelletier's speech implied that the easterners, after the declaration of independence, employed force against Nigeria. The speech was reductionist, that is, it never took into account the sociological factors which led to Biafra's secession. In brief, prior to the first military coup in 1966, Nigeria was a federal structure of four regions. Biafra's secession on May 30, 1967 was stimulated, among other things, by a federal decree of May 27, 1967 which unilaterally divided Nigeria into twelve states. Following Biafra's dec-

laration, the federal forces attacked Nsukka its northern frontier on July 5, 1967. These facts perhaps contradicted Pelletier's interpretation of the conflict.

However, in spite of Pelletier's information to the House of Commons, the opposition members demanded a clearer picture of the crisis. On October 7, 1968, Robert Stanfield, the Leader of the Opposition Party moved that the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be convened the next day to hear evidence on the "conduct of the federal Nigerian troops in the prosecution of the war", and to examine the "reported famine in that country".⁵⁴ In his testimony before the Committee on October 10, 1968, Mitchell Sharp stated that the Liberal government's stand:

One of the principles of international relations is that of non-interference by one nation in the internal affairs of another. Non-interference and territorial integrity are issues of manifestly great importance to the new formed states of Africa - as, indeed, they are to Canada.⁵⁵

Sharp's statement might be termed anachronous in view of the fact that the war was already internationalized: Britain, France, Soviet Union and the East Germans were involved in the conflict.

In defence of the policy of non-interference, Sharp argued that "apart from Britain, Canada has had the closest relations of any nation with Nigeria . . . which can allow Canada to exert a moderating influence".⁵⁶ In spite of

Sharp's claim, the Liberal government acted contrary by not exerting any moderating influence on Nigeria and Biafra. The government instead demonstrated indifference to the demands made by interest groups, the media and other parliamentarians. These respective groups had demanded that Ottawa should: "try to secure a ceasefire and negotiated settlement through the United Nations; request arms supplying nations to halt their shipment of arms to Nigeria and Biafra; to urge the Nigerian Military Government to permit relief flights into Biafra; and to speed the flow of relief aid to Biafra by supplying Hercules aircraft to fly the relief".⁵⁷

In response to the demand that the government should try to secure a ceasefire, Prime Minister Trudeau contended:

It is easy to speak about a cease-fire, but this means that we are asking the government of Nigeria to accept the division of its country. Obviously, Nigeria does not agree to a cease-fire under such conditions.⁵⁸

Trudeau's statement demonstrated his government's inconsistent policy towards Africa. In Southern Africa, the Liberal government's stand, as indicated earlier, has been one of peaceful settlement but in Nigeria, Trudeau has equated a ceasefire to territorial division. The Quebec question, one of the factors to be analyzed later, obviously had an impact on Ottawa's Nigeria policy.

Given the Trudeau government's obsession with legalistic concepts, James Post charged that:

It is obvious that Canada's Liberal government will do nothing in Nigeria - even in a humanitarian way - without the according of the Federal Nigeria Government whose sovereignty it recognizes over Biafra.⁵⁹

Post's statement was a valid one because it raises the question of federalism which Pierre Trudeau has been an apostle of. The impact of federalism on the Liberal government's position on the issue will be analyzed later.

However, in spite of the government's disinterest and detachment, it expressed concern over the human problems raised by the conflict. Yet discrepancies also arose with regards to who, and by what means relief aid should be channelled. The Trudeau government had argued that relief aid should be channelled to Lagos, and by its permission to Biafra. The opposition parties insisted that aid should be channelled to the most affected - the blockaded Biafrans. Given the disagreement, on October 25, 1968 Andrew Brewin (NDP: Greenwood), seconded by David MacDonald (PC: Egmont), moved for the adjournment of the Commons regular business schedule under Standing Order 26 for the purpose of discussing relief aid to Biafra. He contended that the government should make "Hercules aircraft available to the churches and other relief organizations . . . " to fly "supplies from Sao Tome to Biafra".⁶⁰ As already indicated, these two parliamentarians, prior to the debate, had visited Biafra and their actions were stimulated by the experiences which they had encountered there.

The Liberal government had with reluctance dispatched three Hercules aircraft to fly relief aid to the victims of the war. To illustrate the government's reluctance, one of the aircraft was stationed in Lagos, the other in Tenerife Island and the third in Brazil.⁶¹ The location of these aircraft suggested a lack of eagerness on the part of the Trudeau government to send the much needed relief aid to Biafra. The delay, the government argued, had been militated due to lack of facilities in Nigeria and Biafra to handle the giant Hercules planes. This argument had, probably, no foundation in view of the fact, as Norman Depoe has noted, that "in our own north, the Hercules land and take off constantly on grass, on strips made of crushed rock or gravel. And there is no problem".⁶² It was a possibility that the Trudeau government, after having delayed the aircraft from operating via Fernando Po, was looking for an excuse to bring the aircraft back to Canada. The fact that the planes were lying idle in various locations stimulated controversial debates in parliament.

Given the controversy, David Lewis (NDP: York South) rebuked the government in hard terms:

Mr. Speaker, if I may put this as strongly as I can, I ask you to permit the Members of the Opposition to tell the government today that so far as we are concerned we will not stand for the return of these planes to Canada. They can be used. There are church organizations in Sao Tome that have already flown supplies into Biafra, and they are eager to have these planes.⁶³

In spite of mounting attacks from the opposition, the government remained unmoved and indulged in a delaying tactic strategy. Donald MacDonald, the President of the Privy Council, for example, had argued that a debate on the Nigerian issue was unnecessary on the grounds that the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was examining it.⁶⁴

It is of significance at this juncture to re-examine the government's attitude. Prior to October 25, 1968, when the debate was called, the Committee had discussed the Nigerian conflict for three weeks which was contrary to Stanfield's motion of October 7 which anticipated the Committee's report within a week. Furthermore, Stanfield had earlier indicated that 6,000 civilians, at least, were dying daily as a result of the starvation in Biafra, thus it was imperative that the Committee should treat the relief aid issue with utmost urgency. There was no disagreement between the government and the opposition on the starvation issue. Prime Minister Trudeau had indicated the government's awareness of the starvation situation in his speech to the Commons. He said, "the beleaguered parts of Nigeria are being pressured into some kind of submission either by force of arms or by force of hunger".⁶⁵ In spite of this acknowledgment, Trudeau and his Cabinet maintained a rigid attitude on the relief aid issue. It was obvious that the Committee's

delay also meant a delay of government action.

Why was the Canadian relief aid to Biafra a failure? Depoe has argued that it was a consequence of "bumbling, bureaucracy and brainwashing caused by the efficient propaganda machines at work - on both the federal and Biafran sides. Further associated to it were frustration, foolishness and federalism".⁶⁶ Of these factors, federalism had the greatest impact on the government's relief aid position. This was so because Ottawa was possessed with the "fear of setting a precedent which some day could become embarrassing in Quebec if we appear to support a separatist province in a federal system".⁶⁷ In a later course, all the factors that influenced the government's Nigerian policy will be analyzed.

As has been demonstrated in this section, events in the Commons suggested that the Trudeau government had maintained an ambiguous position on the Nigerian question. As indicated in Chapter I, it was Ottawa's traditional way of relating to black Africa by adopting a "sit-and-look" posture in African affairs under the premise of non-involvement. Given this indifference, John Diefenbaker (PC: Prince Albert) accused the government of stultifying itself by rigid adherence to rule:

It was never intended that a government should hide behind the rules when a matter as emergent as this is taking place. There are no arguments that can be ad-

vanced. The government is adamant in inaction and refuses to give the members of this house an opportunity to speak.⁶⁸

Continuing his attack on the Liberal government, he remarked:

Surely, regardless of the rules, the government will at least take a stand instead of pussyfooting around, procrastinating, promising action for three weeks and doing nothing.⁶⁹

The combined opposition members made similar accusations against the Trudeau government.

However, the delaying tactic, in the long run, enabled the Liberal government to row in a favourable tide. Towards the end of 1968, for example, the tide appeared to be in the favour of the federal Nigerian forces, thus the Trudeau government cashed in on favourable current. On November 26, 1968, the Liberal government took a definite policy stand. In his announcement of the government's policy, Trudeau remarked:

I am reluctant to strain the very real and meaningful ties of friendship which Canada enjoys with Nigeria and other African states. I have accordingly assured General Gowon of our continuing support for his government of all Nigeria.⁷⁰

The pro-Lagos policy statement was not a surprise as such because, as already indicated, the Commons had plodded through negative debates on the issue.

At the time that Trudeau made his pro-Lagos statement it

was obvious that Lagos was almost in control of the situation. The Mid-Western region, for example, had been recaptured by the federal forces, and many important Biafran towns, including Enugu, its capital, had also been captured and occupied. It might be argued that the Liberal government cashed in on the war situation. The concept of federalism was a major contributor to Trudeau's pro-Lagos stand. The prime minister has a belief that federal structures can provide adequate guarantees to personal and economic security, but this theory has never been so in many occasions. Following Trudeau's statement, Sharp echoed the policy in an uncompromising fashion. He remarked brusquely:

Canada's policy has therefore been recognized as sympathetic and disinterested. This Government does not intend to change that policy regardless of emotional appeals, however well intentioned they may be.⁷¹

Sharp's admission of the Liberal government's lack of interest in the Nigerian conflict lends credence to the charges made by the opposition parties. It has also strengthened the main contention of this paper that Canada's relations with the subregion has been one of an "arm's-length" which means "sympathetic and disinterested".

Within one month following Trudeau's announcement of his pro-Lagos policy, the Hercules planes were brought back to Canada. The return of these aircraft also lended credence to the fears which the opposition parties had all along

entertained. These planes were returned because of a diplomatic impasse between Biafra and Nigeria. The Liberal government had succumbed to the wishes of Lagos that relief flights should be undertaken in broad daylight. On the contrary, Ojukwu had preferred night flights for strategic reasons. Anxious to withdraw the planes, the Liberal government capitalized on the impasse with Sharp blaming Ojukwu for intransigence.

Whatever the arguments, it would have made little military sense if Ojukwu had opened his air space in daylight for relief purposes without certified guarantees that the federal airforce would not have exploited the situation. Such excuses may or may not necessarily be cogent. However, as James Post has noted, the truth lies in the fact that:

Canada's Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, was obviously never keen on joining the Biafran food airlift in the first place. He has stood firmly behind his stand that Canadian intervention in the civil war would be a violation of international law.⁷²

Besides Trudeau's response to the Nigerian conflict, the government was further restrained by its own strategy that "Canada intends to remain friendly with all the peoples of Nigeria long after this dispute is settled".⁷³ This gamble might have paid off.

One question arises: Why did the Liberal government undertake a pro-Lagos stand? Four factors seem to have stimulated Ottawa's policy towards Nigeria and Biafra. First,

Trudeau's philosophy, and the perception of the foreign policy-making elite influenced Ottawa's position. As outlined earlier, Trudeau has been an ardent believer that a federal system of government is closest to an ideal state. In Federalism and the French Canadians, he noted, "the ideal state would seem to be one with different sizes for different purposes . . . The present writer opts for federalism".⁷⁴

Trudeau has a trenchant belief that the mainspring of federalism lies in reason as against emotion based on ethnic sentiments. Hitherto he wrote:

. . . Federalism has all along been a product of reason in politics. It was born of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face facts of the heterogeneity of the world's population. It is an attempt to find a rational compromise between the divergent interest groups which history has thrown together.⁷⁵

Furthermore, Trudeau argues that "to insist that a particular nationality must have complete sovereign power is to pursue a self-destruction".⁷⁶ Given these philosophical arguments, Trudeau, long before he entered active politics, had been an apostle of federalism. His political values and ideas as well as those of other staunch federalists within the government, and including the bureaucracy necessitated the pro-Lagos federalist policy. This situation lends credence to an earlier contention, as contained in the introductory portion, that Canadian foreign policy direction towards the Commonwealth West African subregion had been influenced, among other things, by the political values and perceptions

of the foreign policy-making elite.

The second factor - domestic - could be attributed to the presence of the separatist (PQ) party in Quebec. The Liberals, particularly Trudeau, were elected into office to preserve the Canadian federal system. Under such circumstance, as indicated already, it would have been politically untenable for the Liberal government to give either a de facto or de jure recognition to the secessionist Biafra. Such a support, if given, would have destroyed the basis of Trudeau's rationale for the Canadian federation. It also would have given ammunition to the separatist forces within Canada, who would have emulated Biafra's unilateral formula. This internal political situation which was outlined in the introductory portion lends credence to an earlier contention with regards to the factors which had shaped Canada's relations with the subregion.

The third factor had its roots in historical ties and also the Commonwealth. Canada has continued to maintain traditional ties with Britain: it would not have pitted itself against its metropolis - Britain - which had supported Lagos politically and militarily during the conflict. It was also imperative, because of Canada's senior position in the Commonwealth, for Canada to support Britain in its quest to stop the balkanization of a Commonwealth member country. On the other spectrum, France had supported and given limited covert assistance to Biafra. The Ivory Coast and Gabon

(both Francophone African states) had recognized Biafra. These countries were associated to France, and the Liberal government was well aware of DeGaulle's divisive policy within Canada. Thus it would have been politically embarrassing for the Trudeau government to have taken sides with France against Britain. Furthermore, Ottawa had severed relations with Gabon in 1968 when that country bypassed Ottawa and invited Quebec to an international conference on education.⁷⁷

The fourth factor had to do with economics. Canadian trade relations with Nigeria, prior to the conflict in 1966, stood at \$10 million and had dropped to \$4.1 million annually during the war years. On the other hand, there were no trade activities going on between Canada and Biafra. Even if Biafra had succeeded in the adventure, its population would still have been relatively smaller to Nigeria's. Hence economic consideration, as will be shown in Chapter III, might have also contributed to the Trudeau government's pro-Lagos stand.

It has been demonstrated that the political values and perceptions of the policy-makers, the Commonwealth bond, internal political situation and economic advantages had contributed to Ottawa's pro-federal Nigerian policy. This situation gives colouration to an earlier viewpoint that the interplay of domestic and external factors have been responsible for Canada's relations with the subregion. The only exception

in this circumstance was Ottawa's reluctance to invoke the concept of peaceful settlement which it preaches in Southern Africa.

In spite of Ottawa's disinterest in the Nigerian conflict, it provided relief aid, at the end of the war, to the victims of the conflict. Relief to Nigeria amounted to \$4.7 million. Of this amount: \$500,000 was allocated to the Nigerian Red Cross; \$200,000 to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); \$500,000 to the National Rehabilitation Commission Lagos; \$250,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and \$75,000 was allocated, though given to Lagos, to rehabilitate victims of the war.⁷⁸

Canada's Strategy in Africa

Ottawa's strategy in Africa which has in most cases put it in a position of non-involvement in African affairs has been stimulated, as outlined above, by a variety of factors. The factors have included the Commonwealth, economic, historical and Cold War considerations.

Canada, as indicated in this, and earlier chapters, has maintained its traditional ties with Britain. Canada also occupies a senior position in the Commonwealth in which many African states belonged to. Furthermore, Canada is a member of NATO and NORAD. In short, Canada is a Western bloc country. These factors, as indicated in the introductory portion, have

on most occasions influenced the nature of Ottawa's position in Africa. Given this assessment, what is Canada's strategy in Africa? This section will discuss the objectives of Canadian policy in Africa.

On November 11, 1957, Douglas Jung (PC: Vancouver Centre) addressed the Commons in reference to the Afro-Asian countries. His statement was an attempt to interpret the psychology of the bloc. He prescribed a possible policy which Canada should pursue in dealing with these countries:

I suggest that Canada by acting as the spokesman for the more highly developed countries, and because of our support for the United Nations and its agencies, can with facility and confidence explore new channels in order to help the West acquire the friendship and trust of this Afro-Asian bloc.⁷⁹

Jung was not a Cabinet minister in the Diefenbaker government, but the rationale for his speech stemmed from a Cold War perspective. As indicated in Chapter I, European rule had left a legacy of hostility and bitterness towards colonial powers in these countries.

Jung believed that many of the Afro-Asian countries, "some of which are part of the Commonwealth, are being assiduously wooed by Russia"⁸⁰ through economic and military aid. He feared that the colonial experiences of these countries in conjunction with Soviet Union's propaganda would further create an atmosphere of hostility towards the West. Consequently, he suggested that Canada should play the role of

an "interpreter" between these countries and the West on the grounds that Canada was not a major power and has respected the rights of its minority groups.⁸¹ It should be borne in mind that Matthews presented a similar argument in Chapter I, that is, that British were anxious that Ottawa should become, during their withdrawal, a "helpful fixer" in Africa.

All members of the House of Commons were impressed by Jung's speech. Allan J. MacEachen (L: Inverness-Richmond) for example, called the address a "very outstanding maiden speech."⁸² Whether Jung's speech was incorporated into Canadian foreign policy has not become public knowledge but, as Chapter I and IV will show, Canadian activities in Africa have pointed to that direction. This viewpoint was given colouration in 1968 by Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau's Secretary of State for External Affairs. He said:

The basic idea is to put Canada in a position to smooth African relations with the rest of the world with the practical expectation that the African countries will assist Canadian projects when needed.⁸³

Sharp's statement indicated that Canada's objective in Africa has been to act as an "interpreter" between Africa and the world, especially Western bloc.

Earlier, Paul Martin, Pearson's Secretary of State for External Affairs had told the Federation of Women Teachers Association of Ontario on February 19, 1966, that the factors which motivated Canada's political interest in Africa included:

The political necessity of expanding our relations with African nations is clear. It is in the interest of Canada and other free nations that Africa should pursue its own destiny free of authoritarian ideologies, of a direct great power clash of interest and access to nuclear weapons.⁸⁴

By implication, Martin's statement created the impression that Canadian policy-makers, up until 1966, had perceived Africa from a Cold War spectacles. It is not, however, public knowledge why Ottawa has aimed at preventing the African states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Martin's statement also lends credence to an earlier contention that Canada's membership in NATO had partly influenced Ottawa's policies towards the subregion. In sum, one of the main objectives in Africa has been to strengthen the Western position possibly at the expense of the Soviet Union. Given this objective, Ottawa has placed its relations with the countries of continent at an "arm's-length" position to avoid being branded the "chore boy" of Western imperialism.

This section therefore concludes that Ottawa's intention in Africa could be associated to a "milieu oriented" policy.⁸⁵ The aim of the policy, though clearly dissimulated by Ottawa, has been to shape conditions beyond its national boundary for its own national interest. This assessment has been strengthened by Anglin's argument that "Canada is interested in the creation of stable, democratic, prosperous and friendly African states".⁸⁶ From the information contained in earlier chapters, and in this, it seems that Ottawa has not

approached its objectives in a realistic manner (by being detached and disinterested in African affairs) except through development assistance as will be shown in Chapter IV.

This chapter has shown that an interplay of domestic and external factors had determined Canadian response to African issues. The Commonwealth, however, appeared to be the launching-pad for Canadian activities in Africa. Economic considerations have also played a major part in Canadian position on the issues discussed, except in the case of Rhodesia. The values and perceptions of the policy-makers had contributed to the policy content which Ottawa implemented in Africa. Lastly, NATO might have contributed to Ottawa's desire that African states should pursue their destiny free of Soviet interference. These factors are in agreement with an earlier contention with regards to the factors that had shaped Canadian policy towards the Commonwealth West African subregion.

CHAPTER III

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

As has been indicated in the previous chapters, Canada depends heavily on foreign trade and investment for its economic growth and prosperity. Foreign trade, D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson have noted, constitutes 34.8 percent of the Canadian Gross National Product (GNP).¹ Ottawa's strong interest in the promotion of foreign trade has been "to provide jobs for the massive increase in its labour force; to increase its standard of living; create wealth required for desired welfare services; and to assist, through earnings abroad, in balancing its international payments".²

Given the interest attached to foreign trade, Ottawa has since the end of World War II "supported with all its powers of persuasion the establishment of a multilateral world-trading system"³ as a first step towards the achievement of its foreign trade objectives. The strategy has induced successive Canadian Governments to regard foreign trade as an unchanging phenomenon in its relations with the international community.⁴ This desire for overseas markets, among other things, has primarily been stimulated by the nature of Canada's economic interdependence with the United States: "sixty-five percent of Canadian exports went to the United States in 1970; seventy-two percent of its imports came from south of the boarder".⁵ As a result, Ottawa has been interested in diversifying its trade relations, thus the search for overseas markets.

As outlined briefly in Chapter II, trade relations between Canada and the countries of the Commonwealth West African subregion have been insubstantial. Canadian commercial activities in the continent have been centered around South Africa which had earlier accounted for two-thirds of Canadian trade with Africa. In 1970, for example, Canadian trade with South Africa, as has been illustrated in Table 1, amounted to \$104 million in exports against imports of \$45.7 million. This demonstrates that trade with South Africa has been to Canada's favour.

This chapter will examine the trends and pattern of Canadian commercial relations with the Commonwealth West African subregion. Its focus will be on trade - imports and exports - and Canadian direct investment in the area. It will also explore the factors which have restrained the volume of trade and investment between Canada and the subregion.

The chapter contends that Canada's primary interest in the relationship has been to penetrate the markets of the subregion. The insubstantial nature of the intercourse, as already indicated, has promoted the "arm's-length" relationship. The aim of the chapter is to support the argument that economic considerations have been the main factor responsible for Canada's ambiguous and inconsistent policies in Africa.

Trade

Trade relations between Canada and the subregion have

been governed by two sets of tariff system: the British Preferential and the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment. Following the attainment of independence by these countries, Canada accorded them the British Preferential Treatment and they in turn extended the MFN treatment to Canada.⁶ The British Preferential tariff accorded the subregion indicated that "Canada continued to deal with African states of the same treatment originally negotiated with countries previously responsible for their commercial relations and even by less formal arrangement".⁷ This situation suggests two fundamental phenomena: Ottawa, on its own, has taken few trade initiatives in the relationship with the subregion; Ottawa might have viewed these states as politically independent but economically dependent on Britain.

The first phenomenon deals with the fact that Ottawa merely accorded them a tariff treatment which it had negotiated with Britain in 1937 when these countries were still British colonies and it has remained that way. The second aspect suggests that Ottawa might have perceived these states as being within the British sphere of influence, in spite of their sovereign status, which required minimum Canadian interference. Furthermore, until 1960 Canada had no commercial representative in the subregion which might be attributed, among other things, to a lack of interest in the area. The fact that Ottawa has not negotiated bilateral trade relations with the countries of the subregion might

support the paper's main contention that the relationship has been one of arm's length.

The first Canadian commercial representative was included in the Canadian mission to Nigeria in 1960, but no similar post was established in Accra even though Ghana had attained its independence before Nigeria. The reasons for the decision might be attributed to these facts: Nigeria constituted a potential favourable market for Canadian goods and services because of its large population, size of territory and rich natural resources. However, a Canadian commercial representative was sent to Ghana in 1962. The possible reasons for the Diefenbaker government's decision to station a commercial counsellor in Accra could be based on the following factors: Ghana was enjoying cocoa bonanza and Accra had undertaken massive importation of industrial machines which Ottawa might have wanted to take advantage of; and Ghana had achieved the highest per capita income in black Africa.⁸

Following a government decision, by 1973, Canadian commercial representatives had been removed from Ghana and stationed in Lagos, Nigeria, their centre of activity. Ottawa's decision to use Lagos as one of the centres of its commercial activities in West Africa (the other has been the Ivory Coast) could be attributed to these factors: Nigeria has the largest population in Africa; "its gross national product is only slightly less than the total of the other thirteen West

African countries";⁹ Nigeria, as a member of OPEC, ranks in the top six of petroleum producers; and in 1970, the Nigerian Four Year Development Plan amounted to \$5.2 billion.¹⁰

Obviously, Ottawa's desire was to capitalize on Nigeria's rapid industrialization scheme to penetrate the country economically. This assessment is supported by Prime Minister Trudeau's statement in 1968. He said, "We must be able to sell our skills and goods in all the markets of the world in those particular areas we choose".¹¹ It should be borne in mind that Nigeria was chosen in 1973 as the center of Canadian commercial activities for four Anglophone and two Francophone West African countries.

In the pursuit of economic penetration into Africa, Ottawa has seven commercial secretaries in the continent (thirteen in Latin America). Of the seven secretaries, one has been stationed in Nigeria, two in South Africa and one each in Zaire, Kenya, Zambia and the Ivory Coast. The fact that two commercial secretaries were stationed in South Africa demonstrates Ottawa's interest in the South African market which strengthens an earlier viewpoint, as indicated in Chapter II, that economic interest has primarily been responsible for Ottawa's ambiguous position in the South African issue. This interest can be attributed to the fact that "Canada and Australia are the only two developed countries whose trade with South Africa is greater than their combined trade with black Africa".¹² This situation, though it has

changed since 1972, has been responsible for Ottawa's reticence "not to let action against South Africa's racist policies interfere with that trade".¹³ This argument by Peter Dobell has strengthened the contention of this paper that economic interest has shaped Ottawa's relations with the subregion.

The commercial secretary in Nigeria has been responsible for Canadian commercial relationships with six West African countries¹⁴ which indicates that Ottawa does not attach great importance to commercial activities in the subregion as in South Africa. The situation might have been warranted due to a lack of substantial trade with the area.

However, in general, Canada has a relatively insubstantial trade relationship with the developing countries, about only "one-twentieth of the world total; and no more than about one-eighth of the country's imports come from these countries".¹⁵ Canadian exports to the developing countries amounted to about "one-tenth which is a considerably lower proportion than in the case of most industrial nations".¹⁶ The developing countries on the other hand have more significant trade relations with the other industrialized countries. They (developing countries) take "almost half of Britain's exports and more than one-third of those of the United States".¹⁷ Two factors have been responsible for the difference in the pattern of trade relations between Canada and the developing countries. First, "Canada has not been a major supplier of

capital goods which these countries need".¹⁸ Next, "Canadian exporters have not in the past placed a high priority on these countries in their trade promotion efforts".¹⁹ As will be shown later, these two factors have also affected Canadian trade relations with the subregion.

Canadian trade relations with black Africa have been growing but at a slow pace:

Initially very small total trade with Africa hardly exceeded \$100 million in 1960. But in 1974 it amounted to almost \$800 million. While this represents a substantial increase in absolute terms, relative to Canada's total world trade it constitutes 1.3 percent.²⁰

The increase in the relationship has been noticeable more on the import than export side. Table 1 illustrates the trends in trade between Canada and the SCAAP region since 1968. South Africa has been included in Table 1 to provide a basis for a comparative analysis.

Table 1

Trends in Trade Between Canada and the SCAAP Area

1968-75 (\$millions)

Area	Imports to Canada from				Exports from Canada to			
	1968	1970	1972	1975	1968	1970	1972	1975
Total Africa	108.9	152.5	234.5	443.3	108.04	173.2	165.1	431.9
Total Commonwealth								
West Africa	28.0	51.5	78.8	88.0	8.9	14.2	29.87	57.5
Total Commonwealth								
East Africa	18.7	17.5	14.0	21.8	4.3	3.1	14.0	28.7
Total Others (a)	31.90	29.91	14.0	66.3	2.35	1.4	20.6	2.5
Total South Africa	39.3	45.7	58.9	193.8	68.3	104.0	43.7	134.7
Total SCAAP and Preferential Countries	95.1	134.1	174.2	369.9	84.4	128.5	100.5	244.3
Commonwealth W.A. % of Total Africa	25.7	33.7	33.6	19.9	8.23	8.2	18.1	13.3
Commonwealth E.A. % of Total Africa	17.2	11.5	5.97	5.0	4.0	1.78	8.5	6.6
Others (a) % of Total Africa	29.3	19.6	6.0	15.0	2.17	.81	12.5	.57
South Africa % of Total Africa	36.1	30.0	25.1	43.7	63.2	60.0	26.5	31.2

Sources: CIDA, Annual Reviews 1970 to 1975-76, pp. 86, 80, 150-1.
 Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book 1973, 1975, 1976-77, pp. 760,
 730, 914.

(a) Included Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius and Rhodesia.

NOTE: Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Egypt are not included in Table
 1 because they are officially included among the Middle Eastern
 countries.

These years have been selected for manageability purposes.

The data in Table 1 indicates that South Africa has been Canada's major trading partner in Africa. South Africa, in absolute and relative terms, constitutes the largest single market for Canadian exports as well as imports. Given this situation, John Holmes has argued that foreign policy-makers in "Ottawa have been quick to point out that Canadian trade with South Africa is so heavily in Canadian favour that the result of a boycott would be to punish Canada rather than South Africa".²¹ Instead of publicly admitting this, Ottawa has been arguing that "trade would have a liberalising impact in South Africa".²² In conjunction to the trade theory, Ottawa has further argued that the "apostles of apartheid could be persuaded to modify their policies"²³ through the instrument of quiet diplomacy which of course has yet to be realized.

Two decades ago, Ottawa argued that the South African regime which has been responsible for apartheid would "be defeated at the polls" reasoning that "nothing should be done to alienate moderate opinion in the Union or to render retreat more difficult".²⁴ The arguments ignore the contention that "Canadian business interests will resist if the government starts seriously to restrict normal trade".²⁵ In short, "Canadian policy towards Southern Africa is presented as a balance between the promotion of social justice and the pursuit of Canadian economic interest".²⁶ This "double standard" policy, as indicated in Chapter II, has created a

friction in Canadian-African relations.

The information outlined above in conjunction with the appointment of A.E. Ritchie, an economist, as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs by Prime Minister Trudeau indicates that the Liberal government is an economically-oriented administration. In his speech announcing Ritchie's appointment, Pierre Trudeau asserted that Canadian foreign policy direction would be more concerned with the "trade and commerce" as against the "political and metaphysical".²⁷ Following his appointment, Ritchie had supported the Prime Minister's "notion that the primary business of Canadian diplomacy is business".²⁸ This would suggest that economic considerations have been the major determinant of Canada's position vis-a-vis South Africa. It also demonstrates why Canadian relations with the subregion have been at "arm's-length".

Table 1 also indicated that the Commonwealth West African subregion has been Canada's second largest market in Africa. This is because of oil imports from Nigeria and also a consequence of the economic development taking place in the area, especially in Nigeria and Ghana. Commonwealth Africa, as shown in Table 1, has been Canada's major market in Africa. Canadian trade with the combined African states has grown larger in volume than trade with South Africa. This new trend, in conjunction with the activities of various interest groups in Canada might have prompted the Trudeau

government's decision of December 19, 1977, when Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs announced the "phasing out of all Canadian Government-sponsored commercially supported activities in South Africa".²⁹

The decision, though symbolically important, might be considered a ploy because "Ottawa will continue to pay a South African to be a commercial counsellor at its Pretoria embassy".³⁰ Furthermore, the "Crown-owned Export Development Corporation will continue to be able to lend as much as it wants to South Africans to finance the purchase of Canadian goods".³¹ The Trudeau government only phased out the "EDC government account loans for which ministerial approval is necessary".³² Given the Liberal government's procrastination, there can be little doubt that economic considerations will continue to influence Canadian foreign policy a great deal, especially when it involves the Southern African question. This chapter, at this juncture, will focus more attention on Canada's trade with the individual countries of the subregion.

As already indicated, the increase in trade between Canada and these countries has been more visible on the import than export side. Table 2 shows the trends in trade between Canada and the subregion from 1968 to 1975.

Table 2

Trends in Trade Between Canada and the CWA Subregion

1968-75 (\$ millions)																	
Country	Imports to Canada								Exports from Canada to								
	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
Gambia	-	-	-	-	3.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.09	.09	.1	-	
Ghana	11.1	7.5	7.0	7.6	11.9	6.6	7.2	5.8	5.1	5.1	6.1	8.2	8.7	8.6	20.9	18.9	
Nigeria	16.9	22.2	44.5	57.2	60.8	82.2	53.8	78.4	3.8	4.1	8.1	9.8	20.9	22.7	23.8	38.2	
Sierre Leone	-	-	-	-	3.2	3.8	3.3	3.8	-	-	-	-	.2	.2	.6	.4	
Total																	
Subregion	28.0	29.7	51.5	64.8	78.8	92.6	64.3	88.0	8.9	9.2	14.2	18.0	29.8	31.7	45.4	57.5	

Sources: CIDA, Annual Reviews, 1970 to 1975-76, pp. 86, 80, 150-1. Canada, Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book 1973, 1975, 1976-77, pp. 760, 730, 914.
CWA = Commonwealth West Africa

Table 2 indicates that the trade pattern has been marked by fluctuations and a less than rapid increase in trade relations. Canada runs an unfavourable balance of trade with the subregion. For example, in 1973 Canadian exports amounted to \$31.79 million against imports of \$92.6 million. The trade imbalance and the "significant increase in imports from the subregion since 1970 resulted from a substantial jump in imports of oil from Nigeria (valued at \$34.4 million in 1970) which accounted for almost 60 percent of the area's West and Central Africa total exports to Canada".³³

On the other hand, Canadian exports jumped from \$18.0 million in 1971 to \$29.87 million in 1972 because Nigeria had received a loan of \$20 million which facilitated the purchase of fifty-four locomotive engines from Canada.

The yearly fluctuations, and the low level of trade have been a consequence of various factors. Robert Matthews has argued:

. . . not only are the markets quite small, Canadian companies have also had a difficult time in making inroads into them, since prior to independence they were often monopolized by firms of the metropole.³⁴

The markets are not "quite small" as Matthews has suggested, but it is obvious that they have been dominated by firms of the metropole. The twenty-two countries of West and Central Africa, for example, import nearly \$4 billion worth of goods and services annually and "Canada's share of these markets has been in the neighbourhood of one half of one percent".³⁵

Nigeria's imports in 1970 totalled "\$1,000 million and Canada's share of this amount, including aid, was roughly \$8.1 million".³⁶ Ghana in 1968 had imported goods worth \$314 million and of this amount, only \$5.1 million imports came from Canada.³⁷ Some of the other industrialized countries which had encountered hard times as Canada in penetrating these markets such as the "United States and Japan have succeeded in capturing a substantial share of the imports of the countries".³⁸ Against this background, it would be more appropriate to state that Canadian companies have not been able to penetrate these markets like the other industrialized countries.

The insubstantial nature of Canadian exports to the subregion might be the result of the lack of enterprise of Canadian exporters.³⁹ C.L. Bland has argued that "many Canadian businessmen visit the subregion as part of a long trip to either Europe or the Middle East, etc." Consequently, "after two to three weeks' journey to other countries they become less effective on arrival to these countries".⁴⁰ The situation was further complicated by African businessmen who tended to spend most of their vacations in Europe where the headquarters of the large trading firms which operate in Africa are located.⁴¹ While in Europe, they have engaged in various business undertakings which precluded Canadian businessmen.

Other factors might have contributed to the pattern of

trade between Canada and the subregion. Keith Hay has argued that "these countries have no supply capability that could be directed toward the Canadian market".⁴² This proposition is valid if it is applied to Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and to some degree Ghana. However, Nigeria has the supply capabilities but has been preoccupied, in its trade activities, with other geographical areas, especially Britain. Hay also attributed the difficulties in trade to "either a lack of diplomatic representation in Canada or failure to find a commercial agent to represent their interests in Canada".⁴³ Canada has no resident diplomatic representations in Sierra Leone and the Gambia and vice versa. As a result, trade between Canada and these two countries have been minimal relative to Nigeria and Ghana.

It might further be argued that these "countries suffer from instability of world market prices of their major exports"⁴⁴ for example, cocoa, coffee, etc. This one factor, given the balance-of-payments problems, has been responsible for the low level of imports into these countries which have also retarded economic development. The inability of these countries to balance their international payments has stimulated the imposition of stringent import controls, for example, Ghana. Import controls have also affected Canadian exports to the subregion. This chapter will at this point, deal briefly with bilateral trade relations between Canada and these countries.

As outlined in Table 2, Nigeria has been, in absolute and relative terms, Canada's second largest trading partner in Africa. Nigeria's exports to Canada have included crude petroleum, cocoa beans, palm and peanut oil.⁴⁵ Of these exports, oil alone has been Nigeria's major export commodity to Canada, for example, oil constituted ninety-eight percent of that country's exports to Canada in 1975. On the other hand, Canadian exports to Nigeria have included telephone apparatus and equipment, asbestos fibre, newsprint, road construction and maintenance machinery and wire and cable.⁴⁶ In the late 1960's, Canadian exports to Nigeria declined, a consequence of the Nigerian civil war. Prior to the conflict, in 1966, Canadian exports had amounted to \$10.1 million but dropped in 1967 to \$4 million and remained at about the same level until 1970. Following the conclusion of the conflict in 1970 exports to Nigeria rose to \$8.1 million and to \$20.9 million in 1972. The presence of the Canadian commercial office located in Lagos might have facilitated the improvement of trade between the two countries.

Ghana has been Canada's second largest market in the subregion. Its exports to Canada have included cocoa beans and butter, manganese in ores and concentrates, and lumber.⁴⁷ Cocoa has been Ghana's major export commodity to Canada: for example, in 1975 it accounted for \$5.8 million. Canadian exports to Ghana have included wheat flour and log-handling equipment.⁴⁸

In the 1960's, Canadian exports to Ghana had dropped probably because of Ghana's long-term balance-of-payments problems which forced Accra to impose stringent controls on imports into the country. However, exports to Ghana seem to be on the increase since 1970 because of the signs of Ghana's economic recovery. Trade might have been hampered because Ottawa had excluded Ghana's cocoa, its major export and source of foreign currency, from the British Preferential Treatment⁴⁹ which was accorded Ghana at the time of its independence.

Trade between Canada and Sierra Leone, as indicated in Table 2, has been limited. Sierra Leone's major export has been diamonds which accounted for about seventy percent of the country's foreign trade. The traditional Canadian export to Sierra Leone was flour, which was eventually eliminated when a flour mill was set up there.⁵⁰ Trade between the two countries has not improved probably because of Sierra Leone's lack of supply capability that could be directed to the Canadian market. Its small population of 2.5 million has also inhibited Sierra Leone from becoming a major market for Canadian goods and services.

The Gambia has been the least significant market for Canadian goods and services. As a one-crop country, the Gambia has relied heavily on groundnuts for its export trade. Its population of 519,000 obviously does not make the Gambia an attractive market. Canadian exports to the Gambia has only been flour while it imports groundnuts from that

country.⁵¹

In sum, Canada's trade relations with the subregion have been on the increase. The subregion has been Canada's largest trading partner in Africa if South Africa is excluded. As shown in Table 2, Canada has had an unfavourable balance of trade with the subregion. Imports from the subregion had consisted mainly of raw primary products while exports from Canada have included flour and a relatively high percentage of fully manufactured goods - forty-seven percent to West and Central Africa in 1970.⁵² Canadian companies have found it difficult to penetrate these markets as a result of a European monopoly.

Thus Ottawa has resorted to a new strategy, that is, using aid and financial programs of the Canadian International Development Agency and the Export Development Corporation as an "over-all composition and development of Canadian economic links".⁵³ There has been no bilateral trade agreement between Canada and the countries of the subregion, though Ottawa had accorded them the British Preferences. Of these countries, only the Gambia has extended tariff preferences to any country⁵⁴ but they have accorded the MFN treatment to Canada. In the final analysis, the volume of trade between Canada and the subregion has been insubstantial. The lack of substantial trade has been a contributing factor to the over-all "arm's-length" relationship.

Canadian Direct Investment

In the quest to increase its economic links with the developing countries of the Third World, Ottawa has created mechanisms designed to encourage the corporate sector to invest in these countries. The Export Development Corporation (EDC) has a mandate to promote export of Canadian goods and services.⁵⁵ The EDC executes these objectives by providing insurance, guarantees, loans and other financial programmes⁵⁶ to Canadian businessmen to guard against such circumstances as insurrection or expropriation by foreign governments. Thus direct investment by Canadian firms have become complementary to trade relations with other states.

In Africa, most of Canadian direct investments have been centred around Southern Africa. There are Canadian investments in Nigeria and Ghana, and in other black African states. Table 3 illustrates Canadian direct investment in the developing countries from 1967 to 1973.

The data in Table 3 indicates that Canadian direct investment in black Africa has been relatively smaller compared to the other regions. In the 1960's, Canada had the largest investment in the Caribbean region, but Latin America has become the major region of Canadian investment since the 1970's. Investments in Africa have ranked the lowest, followed by the Asian region. The Caribbean area have the second largest Canadian investments.

Table 3

Canadian Direct Investment in the Developing Countries
by Area and Control, Year Ends 1967 - 1973 (\$ millions)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Area	By all Canadian enterprises						
South and Central America	235	232	230	820	827	808	917
Caribbean (including Mexico)	403	478	479	508	561	649	699
Asia	68	86	113	124	123	113	155
Africa (other than South Africa)	45	48	40	61	76	6	20
Developing Countries Total	751	844	862	1,513	1,587	1,576	1,891
Direct Investment Abroad Total	4,030	4,617	5,211	6,188	6,538	6,706	7,810
Developing Countries as % of Total	19	18	17	24	24	24	24

Source: Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book 1968-70 p. 31;
1971-73, p. 32.

*These enterprises included those controlled in Canada and in foreign
countries

Canadian investment in black Africa dropped to \$6 million in 1972 from \$76 million in 1971. It could be that in this period Canadian investors were reluctant to invest in black Africa because of the various indigenization policies pursued by the African governments. The Sierra Leonean Government, for example, had announced the intention to acquire a fifty-one percent interest in the country's four foreign-owned mining companies, which together made up sixteen percent of the gross national product.⁵⁷ In 1972, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria had promulgated Decree No. 4/1972 which was the first step towards the indigenization of business enterprises in Nigeria.⁵⁸

Investments in black Africa have also been subjected to yearly fluctuations. These fluctuations could be attributed to political instability which became a commonplace occurrence in Africa since the 1960's. Foreign investors, as a rule, have tended to invest in countries which have stable political systems. This might have been responsible for the small amount of Canadian investment in the continent.

Canadian direct investment in Southern Africa has been larger than the combined investments in black Africa. In 1971, Canadian investments in Africa amounted to \$187 million, \$112 million in 1972, and \$125 million in 1973.⁵⁹ Of these amounts, investments in South Africa in 1971 totalled \$111 million, \$106 million in 1972 and \$105 million in 1973.⁶⁰ Given this favourable economic link between Canada and South

Africa, Ottawa does not want politics to interfere with the profitable economic relations. The economic condition - favourable trade and profitable investment in South Africa - might shed light on Ottawa's ambiguous South African policy.

Ottawa's trade policy in Africa has been a subject of criticism. Steven Langdon has noted:

. . . trade policy follows conventional self-interest, because that is its mandate; foreign investment is encouraged, because it will benefit Canadian corporations; and South African ties are encouraged because they are profitable.⁶¹

In effect, Ottawa has continued to criticize South Africa's apartheid policy, while at the same time fostering political and economic links with the apartheid system. This chapter has demonstrated that Canadian foreign policy, especially Ottawa's policy towards Africa has been determined explicitly and implicitly by economic considerations while social justice has been relegated to a secondary position.

Despite South African predominance, there are Canadian investments in Nigeria and Ghana. In Nigeria the Aluminum Company of Canada (ALCAN) has undertaken operations in Port Harcourt and Lagos, and in Tema in Ghana.⁶² Bata Shoe Company also has large investments in Africa, particularly in Nigeria. There are no available figures for these investments. The Thomson International Limited (of Canada) entered into a joint venture with the Almalgamated Press of Nigeria in the establishment of a national newspaper, the Daily Express.

Thomson eventually invested \$1.1 million.⁶³ The lack of official figures and breakdown of the amounts invested in the respective countries have made efforts to determine the extent of Canadian investment activities in the subregion difficult. In sum, Canadian investments in the area are relatively small when compared to investments in South Africa.

Conclusion

Ottawa has never had an independent trade policy towards the subregion. Commercial relations between Canada and the subregion have been insubstantial. Canadian investment in black Africa has been relatively smaller to investments in South Africa. Given this situation, it might be possible that the insubstantial commercial interaction between Canada and black Africa has had a negative impact in the minds of foreign policy makers in Ottawa. In 1970, Latin America, for example, was accorded a booklet in the White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, possibly because Canadian investments in the region had jumped to \$820 million against black Africa's \$61 million.

The importance of commerce to Canada has been mentioned earlier. The main tenet of Canada's external relations has been to search for economic advantage. In 1968 Prime Minister Trudeau had stated:

An expanding economy and a fairer distribution of our national wealth are fundamental to our concept of the Just Society . . . At home we must work towards a more

efficient organization of our economic potential . . .
Abroad we must search aggressively for new markets
in order to expand the exports of this trading nation. 64

The Prime Minister's statement suggests that the Trudeau government has been an economically oriented administration, which explains why economic pursuit has been the primary factor which had determined Canada's external relations.

The lack of substantial and stable commercial relations with the subregion has promoted the arm's length relationship. The profitable South African market has also been responsible for Canada's ambiguous position on Southern Africa. This chapter suggests that the same economic consideration contributed to the omission of Africa in the Government White Paper.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COOPERATION: PROGRAMS AND MOTIVES

In May, 1960, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers established the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP) to provide economic aid "on a continuing basis to dependent as well as independent Commonwealth African countries".¹ The financing of the Plan was undertaken by Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Plan was a counterpart of the Colombo Plan which was established in Asia in 1950. Following the formalization of the Plan, SCAAP became the convey for development aid cooperation or relationship between Canada and Commonwealth African states.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature and structure of Canadian development assistance programs to Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Its focus will be on the agencies which are responsible for Canadian aid activities such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Finally, it will examine the motives - political, humanitarian and economic - which prompted the Canadian development aid to the countries of the Commonwealth West African subregion. A section dealing with Military co-operation has been included in this chapter because military assistance was undertaken in the form of technical assistance.

The relevance of this chapter is to lend credence to an earlier contention that Canada's involvement in Anglophone

Africa was a consequence of Canada's membership in the Commonwealth. The fact that Canada, as shown in the previous chapters, has been relating to these countries through multilateral organizations as against bilateral intercourse, might shed light on the notion of the "arm's length" relationship. The chapter will also give colouration to an earlier viewpoint that Canadian economic assistance to these countries has been stimulated by a Cold War concern, but has been transformed into an economic line for the eventual penetration of the African markets. Military collaboration between Canada and the countries of the subregion might have been a strategic concern to prevent the Soviet Union's infiltration into the armed forces of these countries.

The SCAAP

SCAAP, as outlined above, was created by the Commonwealth with the primary purpose of assisting the countries of Anglo-phone Africa to attain a sustained rate of economic development. However, the disbursement of aid programs was undertaken bilaterally between the donor and the recipient countries without the participation of a third party. Given the rationale for the Plan and the bilateral nature, the following questions have arisen: has Canada really contributed, and in what manner, towards the economic development of these countries?; on what factors have the allocation of Canadian aid been based --- on GNP per capita, size of population, on

a philosophy of "concentration of aid"?; and which partner has benefited more from the aid relationship - Canada or the recipient countries?

Economic assistance under SCAAP was originally intended to serve all the countries of Anglophone Africa irrespective of their sovereign status. But the Diefenbaker government reversed the policy and concentrated its assistance programs upon the independent African members of the Commonwealth.² As a result, only two West African countries, Ghana and Nigeria which attained their independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively, became the recipients of Canadian aid.

Ottawa's first SCAAP appropriation was \$10.5 million over a three year period. The allocation was grant aid but was placed on a "lapsing basis".³ In the 1964-65 fiscal year, the Pearson government allocated \$11 million for the Plan. The new Liberal government reversed the Diefenbaker government's policy by placing the Canadian aid program on a "non-lapsing basis . . . but not with respect to national allocations to the individual countries".⁴ Of this amount, \$6.5 million was earmarked as grant aid and \$4.5 million for development loan assistance.⁵ In the following fiscal year, 1965-66, Canada's appropriation rose to \$11.4 million, of which \$9.5 million was grant aid and \$5 million was in the form of loan assistance. The 1966-67 appropriation "increased to a total of \$18.5 million including \$10.5 million in grant aid, \$6.0 million for development loan assistance, and \$2.0

million for food aid".⁶ The yearly allocations for 1968 to 1976-77 are shown in Table 4.

At this point, this chapter will examine the trends in Canadian development aid to the SCAAP countries. In the first decade of the Plan, Ottawa's SCAAP appropriation looked like a crumb when compared to allocations to the Colombo Plan. In the first twelve years of the Colombo Plan (1950-62), for example, Canada had expended \$382 million. Of this amount, India had received about \$105 million, Pakistan and Ceylon about \$90 million and \$15 million respectively.⁷ In the same period, Canada's total expenditure, in general, on bilateral development aid amounted to \$391 million. Of this amount, \$382 million or 97.7 percent had been spent in the Colombo Plan area, \$6 million or 1.5 percent in the Commonwealth Caribbean Plan area (CCAP), and a modest \$3.0 million or .76 percent in the SCAAP region.⁸

In addition, Ottawa's handling of SCAAP had other flaws. The \$3.5 million which was appropriated annually from 1960 to 1963 was never spent. In the 1961-62, and 1962-63 fiscal years, Ottawa only spent \$1.22 million each year.⁹ Furthermore, following the first three years of miniscule aid activity, the Pearson Liberal government intermingled commercial interest in its SCAAP disbursements. This policy reduced the value of aid given under the SCAAP. It also bound the recipient countries to the Canadian capital market.

The trends in Canadian bilateral aid disbursements to the developing regions of the Third World since 1968 require a detailed examination. This comparative analysis, as shown in Table 4, will shed more light on the details of bilateral allocations and pattern of disbursements.

Table 4

Details of Bilateral Disbursements of Canadian Aid
to the Third World. 1968-1977

By Areas (\$ millions)

<u>Regions</u>	<u>1968-69</u>	<u>1969-70</u>	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>
Colombo Plan	103.91	140.93	172.58	148.40	174.64
SCAAP	15.44	15.73	25.08	49.93	53.95
CCAP	9.10	14.74	18.89	13.63	15.50
Francophone Africa	14.43	21.66	29.70	45.13	59.08
Latin America	<u>3.32</u>	<u>3.89</u>	<u>8.57</u>	<u>10.42</u>	<u>12.50</u>
Total	<u>146.20</u>	<u>212.65</u>	<u>278.53</u>	<u>283.28</u>	<u>329.26</u>

<u>Regions</u>	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>	<u>1975-76</u>	<u>1976-77</u>
Colombo Plan	203.80	244.25	257.81	237.19
SCAAP	64.22	109.47	108.32	92.99
CCAP	15.34	19.63	21.90	23.36
Francophone Africa	66.65	98.54	104.99	88.70
Latin America	<u>12.78</u>	<u>20.62</u>	<u>27.02</u>	<u>26.74</u>
Total	<u>367.73</u>	<u>498.48</u>	<u>525.71</u>	<u>477.74</u>

Source: CIDA, Canada and the Developing World, Annual Review 1970-71, p. 75. CIDA, Annual Review 1967-68, pp. 13-19. CIDA, Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Review 1976-77, pp. 45-48

The data in Table 4 indicates that the Asian region (Colombo Plan area) has been the main recipient of Canadian aid. SCAAP and Francophone African areas ranked second and third respectively. The CCAP and Latin American areas placed fourth and fifth respectively. The GNP and size of populations of the different regions seemed to have been the contributing factors which had influenced the pattern of allocations. The Asian region (excluding Japan) has a GNP of \$280 and a population of 1,957 million. Africa has a GNP of \$390 and a population of 414 million, Central America (excluding Mexico), \$970 and a population of 106 million, while Latin America has a GNP of \$1,050 and a population of 213 million people.¹⁰

This chapter will now focus more attention on discussion of Canadian aid to the countries of Commonwealth West African subregion, beginning with technical assistance.

Technical Assistance

The Canadian technical assistance program in the sub-region has been primarily concerned with the provision of education and other technical skills to the Africans. Ottawa has pursued the objective in two ways. First, as will be shown in Table 5, Ottawa has been assigning Canadian experts to train and teach the citizens of the countries of the sub-region. Next, as outlined in Table 6, the nationals of these countries have been brought into Canada to be trained

in Canadian institutions of higher learning.

The provision of technical assistance has been relevant because prior to the establishment of the SCAAP, the African countries had lacked sufficient trained manpower. Consequently, following the launching of SCAAP, the governments of these countries requested technical assistance from Ottawa. Responding favourably, Ottawa for the first decade (1960 to 1970) had concentrated larger proportions of its aid effort in the field of technical assistance. One question comes to mind: how favourable was the Canadian response? Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the extent of Canadian response from 1964 to 1976.

As illustrated in Table 5, a total of 1,153 Canadian educators and advisors have been assigned to the countries of the subregion since the inception of the Plan. Ghana and Nigeria have been the major recipients of Canadian technical assistance. Sierra Leone and the Gambia on the other hand have received minimal Canada attention. An interplay of identifiable factors, as indicated in Chapter IV, such as size of territory, population, anticipated political influence and commercial interest might have been responsible for the allocation of Canadian technical assistance. Nigeria has the largest territory and a population of 75 million. Ghana ranks second with a population of 9.8 million, Sierra Leone third with 2.9 million and the Gambia has the smallest territory and a population of 519 thousand people.¹¹

However, Ottawa had provided assistance to Sierra Leone in the construction and staffing of a Boys Secondary School at Koyeima.¹² The Nkrumah government in Ghana had also been assisted in the construction of a Trades Training Centre in Accra. For the project, Ottawa had provided architectural services, prefabricated parts and workshop equipment, the provision of Canadian staff and courses for the instruction.¹³ Table 6 shows the number of nationals of these countries who had been trained in Canada.

The data in Table 6 indicates that a total of 1,853 students and trainees of these countries have received various types of education and skills in Canada. Nigeria and Ghana, as usual, benefited more from the scheme than either Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Furthermore, under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, nationals of these countries have been trained in Canadian universities. By the end of 1976, over fifty-three Nigerian students, twenty-eight Ghanaians, twenty Sierra Leoneans and seven Gambians had been trained in Canada.¹⁴

As shown in Tables 5 and 6, various Canadian governments have chosen Nigeria and Ghana as the two countries of concentration of technical assistance in the subregion. The Government White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, published in 1970, also encouraged the practice of concentration of aid. It stated that Canadian "development assistance will tend to be concentrated in countries whose governments pursue

Table 5

Canadian Educators and Advisors Assigned to the CWA Countries

1964-1976

<u>Country</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965-66</u>	<u>1966-67</u>	<u>1968-69</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Ghana	31	61	53	86	50	72	53
Nigeria	34	65	63	86	65	61	48
Sierra Leone	2	9	9	-	-	-	-
Gambia	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>68</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>172</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>101</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Ghana	38	20	13	15
Nigeria	54	77	57	18
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-
Gambia	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>92</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>33</u>

Source: External Aid Office: 1964-65, 1965-66, 1966-67. CIDA, Annual Review, 1968-69, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76.

Note: These educators included teachers who taught at secondary schools and university levels. The advisors included experts in various fields such as economic planning, social welfare, public administration, health and engineering.

Table 6

Commonwealth West African Students and Trainees in Canada 1964-1976

(By Countries)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965-66</u>	<u>1966-67</u>	<u>1968-69</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Ghana	39	44	45	124	107	105	111
Nigeria	33	46	62	101	113	106	100
Sierra Leone	1	10	6	-	-	-	-
Gambia	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>79</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>225</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>212</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Ghana	96	79	94	94
Nigeria	108	73	56	66
Sierra Leone	-	-	1	2
Gambia	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>214</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>102</u>

Sources: External Aid Office, Annual Review 1964-65, 1965-66, 1966-67, CIDA, Annual Review 1968-69, 1969-70, 1971-72, 1973-74, 1975-76, 1976-77.

Note: These students and trainees included those who studied in Canadian universities and other professional fields under the Plan.

least in the long run. Under these circumstances, Canadian technical assistance has been a diplomatic tool to increase Ottawa's image and influence in the subregion, particularly in Nigeria and Ghana. Technical assistance personnel, as indicated in Chapter I, have also been serving as a Canadian presence in Sierra Leone and the Gambia where diplomatic posts are non-existent.

In spite of the discrepancies in the distribution of Canadian technical assistance to the subregion, black Africa has received the largest Canadian technical assistance of any of the other developing areas of the world. This assessment is supported by the data in Table 7.

As illustrated in Table 7, black Africa has received more Canadian technical assistance both in absolute and relative terms. The region of Asia ranked second but Canadian assistance has been on the demise since the 1970's. The Caribbean and Latin American areas placed third and fourth respectively. The discrepancy in the allocation of Canadian technical assistance, among other things, might be attributable to these factors: Africa has received the largest technical assistance because of its lack of sufficient trained manpower in conjunction with Ottawa's failure to change the nature of its assistance to Africa; the extension of Canadian aid to Francophone African states has helped to create the African predominance; an increased

Table 7

Canadians on Assignment Abroad and Students and Trainees in Canada
1968, 1970-75

(Number of Canadian Educators and Advisors Abroad)

<u>Region</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Colombo Plan	140	67	60	53	50	45	52
SCAAP	470	257	301	351	295	287	275
CCAP	190	114	129	155	93	49	50
Francophone Africa	485	287	471	569	527	445	522
Latin America	-	-	-	1	3	19	42
Total	<u>1,285</u>	<u>735</u>	<u>961</u>	<u>1,129</u>	<u>968</u>	<u>1,044</u>	<u>941</u>

(Number of Foreign Students and Trainees in Canada)

<u>Region</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Colombo Plan	1,280	573	586	440	280	231	171
SCAAP	588	458	424	383	488	472	522
CCAP	529	315	359	309	279	244	206
Francophone Africa	353	277	416	486	432	476	508
Latin America	20	-	-	27	28	18	15
Total	<u>2,770</u>	<u>1,623</u>	<u>1,785</u>	<u>1,845</u>	<u>1,707</u>	<u>1,421</u>	<u>1,420</u>

Source: CIDA, Annual Review 1969, 1970, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76.

Note: Ethiopia and Namibia were not included in the above table.

educational link between Britain and Asia may have contributed to the region's secondary position; the population factor may have been responsible for the Caribbean's third place; while American aid to the Latin American area might have limited the extent of Canadian technical assistance to the region.

Capital Assistance

Capital development aid involves the provision of loans and "non-repayable grants for the purchase of Canadian goods and services to be used in connection with specific capital projects"¹⁷ such as hydro-electricity, telecommunication, and the improvement of agriculture. In the 1960's, Canadian capital assistance to these countries was very limited in scope because of Ottawa's obsession with the provision of technical assistance. However, in some instances, Nigeria and Ghana received assistance in the fields of agriculture, aerial surveys and in industrial projects respectively. Ottawa had supplied Ghana with "twenty 50 ton capacity silos with loading machinery and various types of agricultural equipment for the Damangao project in its northern region".¹⁸

In Nigeria, Ottawa had undertaken the largest single project in collaboration with the Nigerian Government. The project had involved an aerial mapping of 36,000 square miles and an airborne geophysics survey which covered some

13,000 line miles at a cost of \$1,85 million.¹⁹ Ottawa also assisted Nigeria "in the establishment of its meteorological service by providing it with data processing equipment".²⁰ Attention will be focused, at this point, on the pattern of bilateral capital assistance given to the countries of SCAAP under the Plan. Table 8 illustrates the details from 1959 to 1969.

As shown in Table 8, Nigeria and Ghana were the major recipients of Canadian aid in the period under examination. Sierra Leone and the Gambia were excluded from the list in Table 8. However, Sierra Leone and the Gambia were among a group of countries which shared \$1.8 million.²¹ Canadian assistance, as outlined in Table 8, was concentrated in five major countries - Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The concentration of aid in these five major countries might be attributed to three factors. These countries have larger territories and populations, and had been perceived to be influential in African, Commonwealth and international politics. Given the Trudeau government's desire to foster economic growth at home, as shown in earlier chapters, it could be possible that these countries, because of their territorial sizes and growing populations, had been perceived as potential markets for Canadian goods and services. The motives behind Canadian aid will be analyzed later in this chapter.

Table 8

Canada's Bilateral Disbursements under the SCAAP
Allocations by Countries (\$ thousands)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1961-65</u>	<u>1966</u>
Ghana	Grant	134.4	3,513.7	2,000.0
	Loan	-	-	-
Nigeria	Grant	.2	5,191.0	3,000.0
	Loan	-	3,500.0	-
Tanzania	Grant	-	1,506.5	900.0
	Loan	-	-	2,450.0
Kenya	Grant	-	1,228.2	1,000.0
	Loan	-	-	-
Uganda	Grant	-	691.7	1,100.0
	Loan	-	-	-
EAC	Grant	-	-	-
	Loan	-	-	-
Other Countries	Grant	-	1,239.3	1,891.1
	Loan	-	-	-
TOTAL SCAAP		<u>134.4</u>	<u>16,870.4</u>	<u>12,341.1</u>
<u>Country</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Ghana	Grant	4,550.0	4,200.0	4,500.0
	Loan	-	-	2,000.0
Nigeria	Grant	2,500.0	2,083.3	5,628.0
	Loan	4,000.0	4,000.0	4,000.0
Tanzania	Grant	2,505.0	1,603.0	2,000.0
	Loan	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0
Kenya	Grant	1,203.0	1,294.0	1,700.0
	Loan	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0
Uganda	Grant	1,200.0	1,070.0	1,300.0
	Loan	-	-	1,000.0
EAC	Grant	-	250.0	300.0
	Loan	-	-	-
Other Countries	Grant	2,061.4	1,540.7	1,108.5
	Loan	-	-	-
Total SCAAP		<u>20,019.4</u>	<u>18,810.0</u>	<u>25,536.5</u>

Source: CIDA, Annual Review 1968-69, p. 29

Note: \$1,407.8 was unallocated during this period.

Allocations to the SCAAP area in the 1960's were minimal relative to the Colombo Plan which was receiving \$43 million annually. Two factors might have been responsible for the minimal nature of the SCAAP appropriations. First, Ottawa might not have been in the position to offer a larger economic assistance to Anglophone Africa because of its pre-occupation in other regions, particularly Asia. Second, as already outlined, Ottawa had devoted most of its attention in the provision of technical assistance which was less expensive when compared to the expenses for capital aid.

However, towards the late 1960's, Ottawa gave capital assistance to Nigeria in the augmentation of the Kainji Dam hydro-electricity project. The Kainji dam, the largest hydro-electricity project in Nigeria, will provide Nigeria with 960 megawatts of electricity at a cost of \$261 million. By itself, Lagos provided \$108 million and had received external assistance from various Western countries.²² Ottawa's contribution towards the project was "\$1,700,000 as an outright gift to Nigeria". Furthermore, Ottawa had "provided Nigeria with the services of sixteen employees of Ontario Hydro who operated the power and trained Nigerians as replacements".²³ In appreciation of Ottawa's assistance, General Gowon, former Nigerian Head of State, noted:

The Canadian Government found for us an able and experienced chairman for Niger Dam Authority and also gave us a technical team to operate the hydro-electric station and trained Nigerians for eventual take-over.²⁴

As has been shown, only Nigeria and Ghana received limited capital assistance in the first decade of Canadian assistance to the subregion. Sierra Leone and the Gambia were neglected, particularly in the field of capital aid.

Between 1970 and 1975, Canadian development assistance to the subregion was also based on the philosophy of concentration. Ottawa again displayed aid favoritism towards Nigeria and Ghana while Sierra Leone and the Gambia were left at the side. Table 9 shows the trends in bilateral disbursements of aid from 1970 - 1975-76.

As illustrated in Table 9, Nigeria, in this period, was the major recipient of \$67.32 million, Ghana 66.68 million, Sierra Leone \$0.66 million and the Gambia \$0.02 million. The discrepancy in the bilateral disbursements has stemmed, among other things, from Ottawa's policy which states that, "major portion of this bilateral funds would be allocated to selected countries of concentration".²⁵

Several arguments have been advanced in favour of the policy. It has been argued that, "aid should be directed to countries with trained personnel and economic and social structures needed for development".²⁶ This rationale suggests that aid should be an impressionistic device since it implies that donor countries should jump onto the bandwagon of economies on the upsurge. The practice, unfortunately, would certainly debase the moral principle underlying the giving of aid. Furthermore, it has been argued that should the "avail-

Table 9

Bilateral Disbursements under the SCAAP:
Commonwealth West African Subregion.

Allocation by Countries (\$ million)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>
Ghana	7.01	10.00	9.21
Nigeria	6.63	11.95	12.61
Sierra Leone	.01	-	-
Gambia	<u>.02</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total CWA	<u>13.77</u>	<u>21.95</u>	<u>21.82</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>	<u>1975-76</u>
Ghana	9.66	13.17	17.63
Nigeria	11.98	10.20	13.95
Sierra Leone	.30	.29	.06
Gambia	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total CWA	<u>21.94</u>	<u>23.66</u>	<u>36.64</u>

Source: CIDA, Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Review 1976,
pp. 129-30.

able funds be divided among a great number of countries, the effectiveness of development aid would greatly be diminished".²⁷ This argument might be out of context, at least, at the present time; "for the aid given by the industrialized countries appears to be not only insufficient but clearly declining. It was 0.52 percent in 1960, 0.44 percent in 1974 and no more than 0.35 percent in 1975. Instead of progressing towards the goal of 0.7 percent set by the United Nations for 1975, the industrialized countries seem to be getting further away from it".²⁸

Despite this state of affairs, the "industrialized countries are still wasting incredible sums of money, especially in the field of armaments. In 1973, world military expenditures reached \$245 billion, twenty-six times the total amount of aid provided by the seventeen richest countries".²⁹ Canada has not yet reached the 0.7 percent: it stands at 0.58 percent and ranked seventh among the donor countries. It might be reasoned that, should the industrialized countries, particularly Canada, reach the 0.7 percent target, there would be no need for the concentration of aid in a smaller number of countries.

In sum, Canadian aid to the subregion has been in the fields of education, agriculture, hydro-electricity, transportation, mining and geology, aerial surveys, forestry, telecommunication and industry. However, Canadian aid has

not taken into account the other sectors that make up the economies of these countries. African countries have been raw primary producers which means that they are, like Canada, trading nations, although at a lower scale. A constructive trade relationship would assist these countries to acquire foreign exchange reserves for the financing of technological machines for industrial development. The validity of this claim can be seen in CIDA's 1975-76 annual report:

With foreign exchange reserves at dangerously low levels, these countries were more dependent than even on donor countries for balance of relief payments. In addition, they were forced to impose tough import restriction controls which, while necessary reserves, hampered development in several important areas.³⁰

The above situation has arisen because development assistance has not been a selfless venture. Considerations have not been given to liberalization of trade policies, international economic imbalance, assistance to processing and canning, marketing, and the manufacture of certain goods for domestic and international consumption. Instead, CIDA has devoted most of its entire aid activities in the provision of Canadian made equipment for few urban communities of these countries.³¹

CIDA, as the agency responsible for Canada's development assistance programs to the Third World has been pursuing an ambiguous aid policy which has been tightly intertwined with trade motives and overseas investment. The

agency's publication, Strategy for International Development Cooperation: 1975-1980, confirms its ambiguous position and method of operation:

The development assistance program has involved and continues to involve, under current provisions, the procurement of a large share of goods and services in Canada for development projects and programs overseas. This strengthens industry in Canada, creates jobs for Canadians, maintains support for aid program and develops interest in overseas markets.³²

Such a stance portrays CIDA as a "self-seeking" agency since its primary motive has been towards the improvement of the Canadian economy.³³ Despite the pursuit of commercial interest, CIDA also pursues a political one. The agency stated: "Canadian development assistance will be compatible with the broad goals of the government's foreign policy which is seeking national interest."³⁴ Consequently, CIDA is an agency of varied interests pursuing different objectives.

In the earlier tables, the various amounts expended by Ottawa towards the SCAAP area was demonstrated. But what is the real cost of Canadian development aid? The economist Grant Reuber has contended that Canadian foreign aid:

. . . in terms of real resources foregone, is less than the nominal cost of foreign aid as reflected in official figures on foreign-aid allocations for two reasons mainly. The first, and most important, is that a substantial portion of our nominal aid consists, not of outright grants, but of loans that are advanced on subsidized terms. A second possible reason is that most Canadian aid is tied, i.e., is made available subject to two joint conditions.³⁵

These two conditions have included that "the proceeds be spent in Canada and; that the project supported by Canadian aid meet stipulated Canadian-content provision which is eighty percent or more ".³⁶ This assessment has been lent credence in Chapter III where it was shown that trade between Canada and the various countries of the subregion improved slightly because of having tied aid.

Having examined the cost of foreign aid to Canada, it might be imperative to explore the cost to the recipient countries of tying aid to the Canadian goods and services. On the issue, Rueber notes that the:

. . . benefits that it Canadian aid confers upon recipients, it is evident that aid-tying may be important quantitatively. The general requirement to buy in Canada subject to prescribed Canadian-content provision reduces the real value of the aid to the recipients in two ways relative to what its value would be if it were untied.³⁷

The real value of Canadian aid which is reduced because of aid-tying stems from the fact that:

Canadian prices are higher than world prices. Canadian aid commands smaller volume of goods and services than if it were untied. The dual constraint imposed on aid recipients reduces their range of choice in allocating aid funds. Moreover, there is a substitution effect arising from differences in relative prices domestically in Canada and internationally.³⁸

Given the above assessment, Reuber argues that development aid allocations have not been "governed solely by develop-

ment criteria".³⁹

Tied aid has benefited Canada in at least two ways. First, local Canadian industries benefit from Canada's participation in foreign aid because tied aid acts as a "stimulus for Canadian firms in bidding for external aid contracts to rely less on non-Canadian sources of supply, thus creating employment at home".⁴⁰ The above situation gives rise to industrial growth and more employment. However, there has arisen controversy about the number of man-years of Canadian labour sustained by tied aid. CIDA officials put the figures between 6,000 and 10,000 man-years, whereas Keith Hays has continuously claimed that 20,000 man-years are sustained because of tied aid.⁴¹ Despite the war of figures, the fact has remained that aid, especially tied aid, creates employment opportunities in Canada which can be termed a derivative advantage.

Canadian aid as disbursed under CIDA has not been a selfless program with the aim of only helping these countries develop technologically. The chief aim of CIDA has been to economically penetrate the markets of these countries (especially those with large populations like Nigeria and Ghana) to sell Canadian-made equipment and materials which will eventually tie these countries to Canadian factories when services or replacements are needed. Based on the fact that Canadian aid has been tied with a specified content material

requirement, it might be argued that the nature of Canadian aid has been complex.

Given this assessment, credence is however lent to an earlier contention that "Canada's primary interest in its role in Africa is the search for economic advantage",⁴² which has been associated to the nature of the relationship - one of an "arm's-length". Foreign aid under the auspices of CIDA might be termed a Canadian government sponsored business, however, with one exception which is the IDRC.

The IDRC

The International Development Research Centre, Canada's second development assistance vehicle, was launched by an Act of Parliament in 1970. The aims and purposes of the Centre include:

. . . to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of these regions, and, in carrying out those objectives.⁴³

Since its inception, the Centre has encouraged scientific research in Third World countries. Furthermore, of the four West African countries under examination, three - Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone - have utilized the services of the Centre in different forms. Table 10 illustrates the various projects undertaken by, and the costs to the Centre.

Table 10

IDRC Bilateral Disbursements and Projects
Undertaken in the subregion (\$ millions)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type of Project</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Ghana	1	Rural fisheries	444.0
	1	Wood-cement projects	67.2
	1	Grain storage	19.7
	1	Agrisilviculture	280.0
	1	Ground water iron removal	42.9
	1	Disposal of human excreta in rural areas	146.0
	1	Cowpea processing	180.0
Nigeria	1	Gari processing technologies	19.3
	1	Institutional modernization	116.8
	1	Library services	43.0
	1	Grain legume information centre	222.5
	1	Middle level health care delivery centre	283.5
	1	Infertility-subfertility study	84.0
	1	Grain milling and utilization Phase I	147.2
	1	Grain milling and utilization Phase II	160.0
	1	Bacterial blight	180.0
	1	Cassava study	114.0
	1	Shelter belts	247.9
	1	Grain legume information centre supplement	26.2
	1	Institutional modernization supplement	15.4
	1	Agroforestry	95.2
	1	Agroforestry	271.4
	1	Cowpea processing	14.0
	1	Water management	34.0
Sierra Leone	<u>1</u>	Mangrove oyster in tidal swamplands	<u>164.7</u>
	<u>25</u>		<u>3,442.7</u>

Source: IDRC, The First Two Hundred Projects, June, 1974, pp. 8-9.
 IDRC, Projects, 1975, p. 5. IDRC, Projects 1976, pp. 3-5.
 IDRC, Projects 1977, pp. 3-5.

As illustrated in Table 10, the Centre has undertaken twenty-five projects in the subregion between 1970 to 1977 at a cost of \$344.7 million. The largest number of projects - seventeen - have been undertaken in Nigeria at a cost of \$2,101.4 million. In Ghana, the Centre undertook seven projects which cost \$1,176.8 million, and the one single project in Sierra Leone cost \$164.5 million. The Gambia has yet to utilize the services of the Centre. All the projects financed by the centre have been carried out in the rural areas of these countries. In Ghana, for example, the grain storage project involved the "development of storage bins for maize and cowpeas with a view to reducing spoilage of food crops in tropical countries".⁴⁴

The Sierra Leonean project was undertaken "with a view to establishing an organized and profitable industry for coastal villages".⁴⁵ In Nigeria, the projects on "bacterial blight" and "gari processing" technologies can be of significant help to millions of Nigerians, especially Southern Nigerians.⁴⁶ The other important projects were undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources "for the production of basic and composite flours from local grains, to improve storage, packing and marketing methods throughout North Eastern Nigeria".⁴⁷ The projects undertaken, as outlined above, by the IDRC were primarily concerned with the improvement of rural areas where the masses live in greater misery. The Centre's significance lies in

its scientific nature. The establishment of the Centre has added relevance to Canada's development assistance to the Third World countries.

Military Assistance

As indicated earlier, Ottawa's military assistance to these countries was in the form of technical assistance. Ottawa has not given military equipment to the Third World countries of the Commonwealth except to India following the border war with China.⁴⁸ In Africa, Ottawa has given military assistance to Ghana in 1961, Nigeria in 1962, and Tanzania in 1964. This section is concerned with Canadian military assistance to Ghana and Nigeria.

After attaining their independence, the preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity were among the main preoccupations which faced many African states. After Ghana's independence in 1957, Prime Minister Nkrumah was distrustful of the British whom he had challenged in his days of "positive action".⁴⁹ He had believed that the "most efficient of the British trained Ghanaian potential officer class were the most neo-colonialist".⁵⁰ Given this distrust, in 1961, Accra requested military assistance from Ottawa which was approved by the Diefenbaker Government in June of the same year.⁵¹

Following Ottawa's approval, thirty officers and men of the Canadian armed forces were dispatched to Accra "to assist

the training of officer corps and technicians of Ghana's armed forces".⁵² The exercise or cooperation had the following specifications: ". . . the Canadian Government would be responsible for the payment of salaries and allowances of the Canadians; the Government of Ghana would be responsible for the transportation costs of moving the Canadians, their families, to and from Ghana; the Government of Ghana would bear the responsibility of additional allowances, and the provision of accommodation; the Canadians were not to be used for internal and external security purposes, and the Canadian personnel remain bound by their Oath of Allegiance to the Queen".⁵³ The venture, among other things, showed the trust which Nkrumah entertained for Canada.

The Balewa government in Lagos immediately followed the footsteps of Ghana and requested military assistance from Canada. The Diefenbaker government agreed to the request which enabled "thirty-two Nigerian cadets (ten from the army, six from the Navy and sixteen from the Airforce) to be trained in Canadian defence establishments".⁵⁴ These conditions were attached to the agreement: ". . . the Nigerian Government was responsible for the payment of salaries and allowances; and for the costs of transportation to and from Canada; the Canadian Government was responsible for the local costs, and also including quarters for the trainees".⁵⁵

Lagos had no reasons to have requested military assis-

tance from Canada because the Balewa government was conservative and had very close intercourse with London. Moreover, it was a non-ideological government unlike Accra's socialist one. It might be argued that Lagos emulated Accra or alternatively, Lagos preferred military assistance from a middle power country with no colonial records like Canada.

The relationship raises curiosity because of the nature of the juxtaposition of non-aligned states and an aligned state. Robert Matthews has argued that Ottawa's "support for military assistance to non-NATO countries was also occasioned by the fear of Communist intrigue and infiltration".⁵⁶ Matthews substantiated his claim by arguing that ". . . Canada was urged by the British and Americans to provide such assistance . . .".⁵⁷

Against this background, this chapter concludes that Canadian military assistance provided a mechanism through which the armed forces of Ghana and Nigeria were further Westernized. Given the fact that Britain and the United States had urged Canada to extend the assistance, the whole affair transcended the Commonwealth context. Canada had more or less performed the service on behalf of NATO. This assessment gives colouration to an earlier viewpoint contained in the Introduction that NATO has also contributed to Canada's position in Africa. The next section will examine the motives which have prompted Canadian assistance to the countries of the subregion.

The Motives Behind Canadian Aid

So far, this chapter has examined Canada's development aid to the Commonwealth West African subregion. It will now attempt to explore in greater detail the motives which prompted Canadian participation in the program. The three main motives will include the political, humanitarian and economic, as well as the extent to which any one factor has predominated. The factors cannot be analyzed in isolation without some information about the origins of modern economic assistance.

Modern international development assistance began in 1947, the enunciation of the Truman doctrine, to help Greece and Turkey revitalize their economies. It was militated by Communist threats and manoeuvres in the Balkans, the Near and Middle East. In his speech to Congress, Truman stated:

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.⁵⁸

In the conclusion of the speech, he warned, ". . . if we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the welfare of our nation".⁵⁹ The second such occurrence of human benevolence came with the enunciation of the Marshall Plan on June 5, 1947 for the rehabilitation and economic recovery of Western Europe. In both instances, the United States

aid helped to halt Soviet expansionism. The Canadian position in the Cold War period became evident in 1949 when it joined the NATO alliance.

In the early years of the Cold War, the Third World countries were insignificant because most of them were under colonial rule. Following the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the Bandung Conference in 1955, these countries gained international attention. Consequently, the West became interested in extending economic assistance to the countries of the Third World.⁶⁰ "This was the origin of aid policies, which were motivated at first by a mixture of commercial, political, and moral considerations."⁶¹

Canada became involved in development aid to the Third World countries for the first time in 1950 when the Colombo Plan was launched by the Commonwealth to assist the countries of South and Southeast Asia. In 1960, the SCAAP was created to assist the Commonwealth African states. What factors motivated Canada to give aid to the African states?

Peyton Lyon has argued that ". . . initially Canadian foreign aid was largely a manifestation of her attachment to the Commonwealth, especially her desire to assist the United Kingdom meet its postwar financial obligations".⁶² The validity of this argument stems from the fact that Canadian aid to the Third World, in most cases, has been under the umbrella of the Commonwealth, for example: the Colombo Plan, SCAAP and CCAP. The financing of the above programs

were undertaken concurrently by Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This assessment lends credence to an earlier contention that the Commonwealth was primarily responsible for Canadian involvement in Africa.

As mentioned earlier, the NATO countries had perceived aid as an effective instrument to combat Communist expansionism on the premise that the seeds of totalitarian regimes spread and grow in the soil of poverty and strife. The success of the pragmatic ventures in the Balkans, Western Europe, Near and Middle East necessitated its application to the Third World. Canada also subscribed to the philosophy of the aid mystique as Lyon notes:

Early in the Cold War it was believed in Western capitals, including Ottawa, that security would be endangered if many of the Third World nations were to join the Communist bloc; to prevent this happening, or even to lure nonaligned nations into the Western camp, was undoubtedly an important consideration in allocating aid.⁶³

This assessment brings into play the role of NATO in the allocation of economic aid. The political motive has never been the only factor behind foreign aid. There are other motives which are intricately intertwined.

Paul Martin adhered to the concept of mixed motives in foreign aid. In an address to the Memorial Assembly at MacDonald College, Quebec, on February 9, 1965, he told his audience, ". . . the motives behind any foreign aid pro-

grammes are likely to be mixed". He also said, "I regard humanitarian considerations to be foremost in the minds of those who have supported and sustained the principle of Canadian aid to the developing countries".⁶⁴ The humanitarian motive might never have been alien to foreign aid. However, it would be plausible to suggest that donor countries also have more profitable motives.

The third motive behind foreign aid has been the commercial one. It has become a contentious issue due to the nature of foreign aid - tying aid to the procurement of local goods and services of the donor country. This attitude has been conspicuous in Canadian aid policy: two-thirds of all bilateral loans are tied. The rationale for tied aid, as outlined earlier, has been stimulated by the argument that it creates jobs and aids industrial growth and expansion in Canada. Paul Martin has been an apostle of the aid-trade philosophy. He noted:

. . . there are millions upon millions of disenfranchised consumers in the developing regions of the world whose potential demand upon our productive facilities remains to be unlocked. Surely, then, it is in our interest . . . to enable these countries to make their proper contribution to world trade. Admittedly, this is a long range objective of foreign aid.⁶⁵

Paul Martin undoubtedly perceived foreign aid as a stimulus to induce the parochial millions of the developing countries to participate in international trade.

The strategy holds much relevance for Canada in view of the nature of its economy. Expanding on the theme of international trade, Martin stressed, "It is an objective of particular relevance to a country like Canada which, as one of the major trading countries of the world, has a vested interest in expanding world trade".⁶⁶

The link which exists between foreign aid and trade has not been widely disputed. It has, however, become a constant theme in the thinking of Canadian Governments and officials alike. In Foreign Policy for Canadians the same theme is emphasized:

Assistance to the less-developed nations serves Canada's interest in some other and more immediate respects . . . It provides an initial source of financing for export of Canadian goods and services to the less-developed nations and provides Canadians with the kind of knowledge and experience which support the expansion of Canadian commercial interest overseas.⁶⁷

The trade-aid philosophy has been adopted as a policy by the Canadian Government.

During an interview with officials of the Department of External Affairs, it was confirmed that Canada's interest in foreign aid was inspired by the desire to expand its foreign trade activities.⁶⁸ The officials agreed with the government's development aid strategy that "successful economic development in less-advanced countries will assist in the expansion of world trade as a whole and provide a growing

market for Canadian goods and services".⁶⁹ Under this circumstance, Canadian aid, in the short run, was intended to strengthen the economies of the recipient countries. However, in the long run, the Canadian economy would benefit more from the exercise, because the stronger their economies the more they can patronize the Canadian one.

Conclusion

Canadian development aid to the Commonwealth West African subregion added more relevance to Ottawa's diplomatic recognition of these states. It has enhanced Canada's image and influence in the subregion. Canadian aid was mainly concentrated in Nigeria and Ghana while Sierra Leone and the Gambia had received minimal amounts. The nature of Canadian assistance in the first decade was the provision of technical assistance to the neglect of capital aid.

Canadian aid has not assisted these countries in the sectors that would enable them to participate effectively in international trade. These countries are importers of manufactured goods and services. On the other hand, they are not exporters of highly profitable goods and services, except Nigeria which exports oil. The importation of manufactured goods has diminished the foreign exchange reserves of these countries. Therefore, the tying of Canadian aid to goods and services that are internationally uncompetitive

can create more hardship for the recipient states. As mentioned earlier, the most constructive aspect of Canadian aid was the establishment of the IDRC. The Centre is more concerned with euthenics than profit.

After the examination of the three motives, one had predominated over the others - the commercial aspect. Various Canadian Governments have been stressing the theme since the St. Laurent years. On February 9, 1965, for example, Paul Martin had stated the advantages of foreign aid to Canada were four-fold. He argued that, ". . . the resources allocated to foreign aid serve directly to stimulate the growth of our economy by contributing to the level of production, exports and employment".⁷⁰ On the following day, February 10, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson told the Canadian Club of Ottawa:

One factor in our foreign relations is unchanging, however, in a changing world - the importance to us of international trade and investment. By any standards, . . . Canada is one of the world's greatest trading nations. Our interest in expanding world trade . . . is based not only on material self-interest (no country depends more on trade than we do for prosperity).⁷¹

As has been shown in Chapters II and III, the Trudeau government tends to be more economically oriented in the conduct of Canada's external relations. In general, there has been frequent repetition in official speeches and government publications that foreign aid stimulates trade, creates jobs and leads to overseas investment. This chapter concludes

that commercial interest has become the foremost factor in Canadian development assistance to the subregion. Given the assessment that economic motive has become the predominant factor in the conduct of Canada's external relations, it becomes obvious why the Canadian position has been so in the Southern African question, and why Canada's relations with the subregion have been at an "arm's-length".

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The central problem of this research, as indicated in the introduction, has been to determine the nature of Canadian policy towards, and relationship with the Commonwealth West African subregion. The study has also focussed attention on what factors prompted Canadian interest and involvement in Africa, especially in the subregion.

The inquiry has meant the examination of two aspects of Canadian foreign policy: analyzing the policy content (dependent variable), that is, the line of action which Ottawa has chosen in the relationship; and the factors (independent variable) that have shaped the policy towards the subregion. As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, Canadian policy towards the subregion has been shaped by an admixture of constantly shifting factors. However, since 1968, the advent of Prime Minister Trudeau, one major factor has tended to predominate over others.

The diplomatic relationship which Ottawa had established with the countries of the subregion was solely determined by Canada's membership in the Commonwealth. This assessment has been strengthened by officials of the Department of External Affairs who stated that the "Commonwealth was the cornerstone of our relations with Anglophone Africa because we were ignorant of the continent".¹ These officials, however, added, "but we now relate to them on bilateral grounds".²

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, Ottawa began pursuing two primary aims in the relationship. The first aim, as indicated in Chapter I, has been to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship with these countries which would subsequently put Ottawa in the position of an "interpreter" in Africa. Canada has been noted for its traditional "interpretive" role in international politics. Prime Minister Trudeau's speech of 1969 lends credence to this assessment. He had stated, ". . . Canada will attempt to keep itself in a position to talk to all nations, and to help them talk to each other".³ Given Ottawa's posture, the first aim has been the pursuit of a "friendly link" with the countries of the subregion.

Ottawa's second goal, as also outlined in Chapter I, has been the desire to build a chasm over colour for its own end. This has been so because of Ottawa's acceptance of a multiracial Commonwealth association. As indicated in the introduction, the United Nations and the Commonwealth had served as the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. The Commonwealth holds special relevance for Canada in two perspectives because in the 1950's "it helped to bolster the Canadian identity" and also "helped to mask the decline of British power and prestige, thereby maintaining the fiction that Britain was still a power with a future distinct from Europe".⁴

The desire to transform the Commonwealth into a multi-

racial association satisfied Ottawa's political and economic interests. The economic aspect had stemmed from the Intra-Commonwealth trade and Preferences which held good prospects for Canada. From a political vantage point, a Commonwealth which could boast of the membership of the many sovereign states, with Canada at a senior position, was perceived as a countervailing political force against American influence in Canada. The Commonwealth had also strengthened Ottawa's image as a non-racist North American country. Given those motives, altruism was not the major factor, in the long run, which had stimulated Ottawa's desire to seek the enlargement of the Commonwealth. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries of the subregion, partially a compliment, had afforded Canada the convenience to attain or pursue its own national interest.

The paper has contended that Canada's relationship with these countries has been one of an "arm's-length". This has been so, because in spite of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Canada and these countries have been on different wave lengths on issues of African interest. The divergence of interests, in conjunction with Ottawa's failure to commit itself outright to the African side has been the kernel of the "arm's-length" relationship.

On contentious African issues, Ottawa has, since its official contact with the Africans, exhibited both ambivalence and indifference. Canadian statesmen were known to have been

"tight-lipped" on colonial issues, especially British colonial rule in Africa. In Southern Africa, where racism and apartheid are practiced by white minority regimes, Ottawa has pursued a "double standard" policy which has put it on an awkward position. Various Canadian Governments have on many occasions condemned the policies of apartheid and racism while at the same time, have continued to maintain and strengthen economic links with the apartheid system. Given this posture, Ottawa has been preaching a peaceful settlement to the Southern African issues, though not initiating one by itself, whereas in black Africa, Ottawa has consistently pursued a policy of non-involvement: even at the height of military conflicts, for example, in Nigeria. Canada's ambiguous position in Africa can best be described as "sympathetic and disinterested" which demonstrates the "arm's-length" relationship. Ottawa's African policies, as shown in Chapter II, especially those towards Southern Africa, have become the objects of "friction" as many Africans have become suspicious of Canada's stand.

Two factors need our analysis at this juncture: African misperception of Ottawa, and Ottawa's economic interest in Southern Africa. African misperception of Canada's dovish position in Southern Africa stems from ignorance about the psychology of the Canadian people with regards to military solutions. "Canadians", Eayrs has noted, "have always been a non-military people, distrustful of military solutions, reluctant to accord the military establishment a prominent

and honourable place in their society".⁵ While this assessment is valid, it might not dispel the ignorance of the Africans who may be inclined to argue that Canadians had fought in two major World Wars and other minor ones, and that Canada is a member of military alliances, NATO and NORAD. This kind of assertion might leave no room for Ottawa to argue otherwise, in view of the fact that moderate paths have almost failed in Southern Africa.

The above arguments notwithstanding, Ottawa's position with regards to military solutions was clearly stated in 1969 by Prime Minister Trudeau. He told the Commons, "We think nations, and groups within nations, must achieve ends through peaceful negotiations and compromise". He also added, "The military intervention we will be prepared to consider must be confined to peacekeeping within international frameworks".⁶ The Liberal government's approach to military solutions might have been stimulated by the national character of Canadians. Canada, as Peyton Lyon has noted:

. . . achieved nationhood without the necessity of a violent revolution or civil war, we have been conditioned to favour gradual change; the presence within Canada of two cultures may dispose us more than most peoples to seek compromise solutions. We find it easier to live with problems which we cannot eliminate.⁷

Ottawa's economic interest in Southern Africa appears hypocritical in view of the government's stated concern for "social justice" and "human dignity". Various Canadian

Governments, including the Trudeau administration have been strengthening economic intercourse with the South African regime. Skillfully and insistentlly, Ottawa has separated economics from politics as a necessary first step to further continue its economic relationship with the apartheid system. Ottawa seems to have succeeded in cleverly reconciling its economic pursuits with its declared concern for human rights and social justice with almost smooth facility.

Against this background, Ottawa's South African policy has been influenced by three major factors. Canada's economic interest in the South African market has been the major factor which has contributed to Ottawa's policy of separating economics from politics. This has been so because commercial relations between Canada and South Africa have been highly favourable to the former. The Canadian psychology towards military solutions or intervention in foreign lands, for example, the conscription crises have inhibited Ottawa from becoming militaristic in its external relations. Moreover, military conflicts have a tendency to disrupt the free conduct of foreign trade which has been the source of Canada's economic prosperity. Lastly, the political values and perceptions of the foreign policy-making elite, in conjunction with the historical links have also contributed to the Canadian position in Southern Africa. The interplay of these factors have been responsible for Ottawa's ambiguous policy towards

South Africa.

Commerical relations between Canada and the countries of the subregion have been insubstantial and unstable. Ottawa's trade policy towards these countries has been a result of "muddling through". Bilateral trade agreements between Canada and the countries of the subregion have been nonexistent, Ottawa merely accorded them a trade agreement (the British Preferences) which it had negotiated with Britain in 1937. This might be a naive way to view these countries, though sovereign, as the satellites or extension of the United Kingdom Government. Ottawa's commercial disposition has been one of searching out markets for Canadian goods and services, and to increase Canada's foreign investment overseas. The concept of diversification of trade has been a constant strategy which various Canadian Governments have pursued because of the fear that too close economic association with the United States might lead to a swift and easy absorption of the Canadian nation-state.

Canada's commercial activities in Africa has centered around Southern Africa. The largest Canadian investments in Africa are to be found in South Africa. South Africa has also constituted the largest single market for Canadian exports as well as imports. On the other hand, the other African states, individually or collectively, have not become important commercial partners to Canada. Against this background, Ottawa does not want black African resistance

to South Africa's apartheid policy to hinder the profitable economic link with the Union. Given the fact that black Africa, including the Commonwealth West African countries have not been significantly important as commercial partners, thus Ottawa might have treated them as such by placing the relationship at an "arm's length".

This assessment has stemmed from the fact that the Trudeau government has emphasized the "trade and commerce"⁸ aspect as the goals of Canadian external relations. The economic pursuit of the Trudeau government has to be necessitated by three major factors. First, the government has perceived economic prosperity as the main instrument through which to bring about the much needed Canadian unity. Second, in the "last half of the 1960's", Ottawa had "encountered severe fiscal pressures . . . with expenditures increasing at a much faster rate than revenues . . ."⁹ Lastly, the Trudeau Cabinet was dominated by economically oriented ministers such as Jean Marchand, Gerard Pelletier, Donald MacDonald, Mitchell Sharp and Pierre Trudeau himself.¹⁰ Given such an outlook, black Africa might not have satisfied the necessary criteria to be recognized by Ottawa as an important partner. This situation might have contributed to the omission of Africa from the White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians.

Canadian development assistance to these countries cannot in any circumstance be termed a "give away" as Logan Maclean has claimed in his article "Orgy in Montreal".¹¹ The primary

motive which prompted Ottawa's participation in the SCAAP program was stimulated by political considerations. It should be borne in mind that the Colombo Plan in which Ottawa had participated was mainly a response or reaction to the Communist victory in China in 1949.

Prior to the establishment of the SCAAP, Africa had remained the only region, in Diefenbaker's words, "where no special international economic assistance programme has been established and where the flow of investment and aid funds, in comparison with that to other under-developed countries, is disproportionately small". He also noted that Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana was "seriously concerned about this situation".¹² Given the situation, Diefenbaker warned, "There may very well develop in those nations doubts as to the goodwill of the developed countries of the West, and they may be tempted to look for sympathy and assistance in other directions".¹³ This was the origin of development aid to black Africa which was, however, militated by the fear of Communist infiltration. This rationale might suggest that the humanitarian motive was not the primary guiding factor that had stimulated the giving of aid to Africa, rather it was necessitated by geopolitical considerations.

However, with the passage of time, the economic motive has predominated, on the grounds that foreign aid constitutes a big business. The apostles of the philosophy have argued that, "successful aid programs result a few years later in sharply-increased exports to the affected developing countries".¹⁴

This argument has been substantiated by pointing to the American experience. "Following the postwar Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe", for example, "American sales to that area doubled. After the Japanese recovery, U.S. exports quadrupled. The Spanish market for U.S. goods has grown by 25 percent in the last four years 1962-66 to \$300 million annually".¹⁵

From an economic vantage point, Ottawa's aid to the countries of the subregion has been to Canada's advantage because it has stimulated an increase in Canadian exports to the area. The \$20 million development loan which was given to Nigeria in 1971, for example, led to the sale of fifty-four Canadian locomotive engines to that country which saw Canadian exports to rise from \$9.8 million in 1971 to \$20.9 million in 1972. Canadian exports to Nigeria has been growing since 1971 and in 1975 it stood at \$38.2 million. By receiving economic assistance from Ottawa, the countries of the subregion, however, have portrayed themselves as economic neophytes and might have been perceived as "charity cases" by foreign policy-making elite in Ottawa.¹⁶ This situation might have contributed to Ottawa's "sympathetic" attitude - by extending aid to the subregion - and "disinterested" posture - by refusing involvement in their course. The situation has probably stimulated the "arms-length" relationship. In spite of this situation, Ottawa has continued to give development aid to the countries of the

subregion as a necessary first step to penetrate the African markets which have been dominated by Western European countries.

As has been illustrated, the interplay of the domestic and external factors have shaped Canadian policies towards the subregion. Externally, the Commonwealth, NATO, South Africa and the presence of Communism in the international environment have been responsible for Canadian response and reactions to the events in Africa, including the subregion. Paul Martin summed up the influence of the domestic factors on Canadian foreign policy:

Factors such as our history, our tradition, our resources, our geographical location and our cultural composition are present at all times whatever government in Canada finds itself in power, and they combine to create . . . Canadian reaction to any major international development.¹⁷

The external and domestic factors, in conjunction with Canadian national character and the political values and perceptions of the foreign policy-making elite have tended to define the limits of Canadian foreign policy towards the subregion.

In sum, Canada's relations with the Commonwealth West African subregion can still be described as nascent. Ottawa has been advancing into the African continent with caution because of the volatile nature of African politics, that is, the presence of various types of nationalisms. On June 1, 1978, for example, Prime Minister Trudeau had

stated, "I don't want to get myself involved in any African adventures and I don't think Parliament would want us to".¹⁸ This cautious attitude has been a product of Ottawa not wanting to be accused of being imperialist or an accomplice to imperialism.

The above situation, among other things, might have induced Ottawa to keep the relationship at an "arm's-length", possibly, hoping that it would naturally evolve into a more meaningful intercourse with the passage of time and events. It is possible that the factors which were responsible for the nature of the relationship also contributed to the omission of Africa in the Government White Paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. Wayne Cheveldayoff, "Canada and Apartheid" The Globe and Mail, February 25, 1978, p. 1.
2. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches 75/2 "Canada and Africa", Allan J. MacEachen, February 19, 1975, pp. 1-3 Social Justice, MacEachen remarked, is to be pursued through development assistance. He also stated that the third element of the policy "has a special relevance to Africa".
3. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. III, July 21, 1958, p. 2518. Michener (Speaker of the House of Commons) used the expression in his response to Prime Minister Nkrumah's address to the Canadian Parliament.
4. Kenneth W. Thomas and Roy C. Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" in Roy C. Macridis. ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976, p. 3.
5. F.S. Northedge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy" in F.S. Northedge. ed. The Foreign Policies of the Powers, London: Faber and Faber, 1974, p. 11.
6. Kenneth W. Thomas and Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., p. 1.
7. D.C. Thomas and R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1971, pp. 34-5.
8. Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles - Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 1.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 2.
13. D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, op. cit., p. 26.
14. Ibid.
15. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches, Toronto: The MacMillan of Canada Limited, 1961, p. 88.

16. John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976, p. 27.
17. R.W. Matthews, Africa in Canadian Affairs, in International Journal, 26, Winter, 1970-71, p. 135.
18. Ibid.
19. Steven Langdon. "Canada's Role in Africa" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson. eds. Foremost Nation - Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1977, p. 196.
20. Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy - a study in decision-making, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 183.
21. John W. Holmes, op. cit., p. 41
22. Robert W. Reford, "Canada's Diefenbaker: Missionary to the Commonwealth" Saturday Night 73:24, November 22, 1958, pp. 56-7.
23. Canada, Department of External Affairs, by Authority of Mitchell Sharp, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970, p. 26.
24. Ibid., p. 36.
25. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement and Speeches 75/2, "Canada and Africa", Allan J. MacEachen, February 19, 1975, p. 5.
26. Paul Martin, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: 1964-67. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967, p. 98.
27. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 173.
28. Bruce Thordarson, op. cit., pp. 45-47.

Chapter I

1. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches, Toronto: The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1961, p. 156.
2. Canada, Department of External Affairs, by Authority of Hon. Mitchell Sharp, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Information Canada, 1970, p. 9.

3. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 156.
4. Frank R. Hayes, "The Impact of the Commonwealth on Canada's Foreign Policy: South Africa's Departure". An unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, May, 1978.
5. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 172. Canada is a member of NATO and is "bound by alliance and by tradition with the Western democracies of Europe and America".
6. D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1971, p. 34.
7. Ibid. (See Introduction chapter, quote 7)
8. Robert O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Peyton Lyon and Tareq Ismael, eds. Canada and the Third World, Toronto: The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1976, p. 60.
9. James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 194.
10. Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 28, 1960, p. 7109. Quoted in Douglas G. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa" in International Journal, 15:4, Autumn, 1960, p. 307.
11. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches, Toronto: The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1961, p. 86. However, there was "one major exception. The exception is the governing of India under the raj".
12. Ibid., p. 88
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, op. cit., p. 11.
18. Douglas G. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa" in International Journal, 25:4, Autumn, 1960, p. 291.

19. He had raised objection to the premise that "the White man had been ordained to occupy the greater part of the earth's surface while the coloured races remained crowded in a small part of the world". Quoted in Frank R. Hayes, op. cit., p. 10.
20. Robert W. Reford, "Canada's Diefenbaker: Missionary to the Commonwealth" in Saturday Night, 74:24, January 17, 1959, p. 56.
21. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, 9:1, January, 1957, pp. 21-30. (Hereafter External Affairs).
22. External Affairs, 12:2, February, 1960, p. 491.
23. External Affairs, 12:8, August, 1960, p. 71.
24. Die Burger (Cape Town) February 24, 1971. Reprinted in Nicholas Mansergh. ed. Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-51, II, London: 1953, pp. 1287-8. Quoted in James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 80.
25. External Affairs, 9:1, January 1957, p. 23.
26. D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, op. cit., p. 27.
27. Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles - Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 122-25.
28. James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 171.
29. Frank A. Knox, "Canadian Trade Strategy" in International Journal, 9:4, Autumn, 1954, p. 275.
30. External Affairs, 9:4, April 1957, p. 125. The Canadian delegation included Mr. G.C. McInnes (Head of the Commonwealth Division, Department of External Affairs), Pruham's political advisor, Mrs. Kaye Adams, Mr. D.W. Thomson and Bruce Powe (all Pruham's secretarial staff). There were also pressmen and CBC Television staff.
31. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. II, March 6, 1957, p. 1956.
32. External Affairs, 9:4, April 1957, p. 127.
33. Ibid.
34. Irving Brecher, "Canada's Foreign Aid" in Canadian Banker, 69, Winter, 1962, p. 41.

35. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. II, March 7, 1957, p. 1961.
36. Ibid., March 11, 1957, p. 2007. Prime Minister St. Laurent, however, responded to the question on March 12, 1957.
37. Ibid. See also the Montreal Gazette of March 7, 1957.
38. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. II, March 6, 1957, p. 1921.
39. Ibid.
40. External Affairs, 9:4, April 1957, p. 125. The British delegation included HRH the Duchess of Kent (representing the Queen); the Lord Privy Seal of the United Kingdom, R.A. Butler (deputy Prime Minister); R. Nixon (Vice President of the United States); the Minister of Defence of Australia, Mr. Osborne, etc.
41. External Affairs, 12:11, November 1960, p. 860.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. External Affairs, 16:9, September 1964, p. 434.
45. Quoted in Robert W. Reford, op. cit., p. 56.
46. Ibid., pp. 56-7
47. Robert W. Reford, "Commonwealth Image of Diefenbaker" in Saturday Night, 74:2, January 17, 1959, p. 14.
48. Ibid., p. 39
49. Ibid., p. 58
50. External Affairs, 13:6, June 1961, p. 203.
51. Ibid. "Two luncheons were held and 200 people were entertained on board".
52. External Affairs, 17:3, March 1965, pp. 101-4.
53. This expression was used by an official of the DEA during an interview. Some documents which come from field officers in Africa also refer to the Gambia in the same manner.

54. Interview with officials of the DEA. The cost, remarked the officials, would include office accommodation, payment of salary to Canadians and local personnel, and residential accommodation for Canadian diplomats.
55. Ibid. This is the DEA's perception of the countries.
56. Peter Dobell, op. cit., p. 1.
57. Interview with officials of the DEA. The practice of double-accreditation in Africa, remarked one official, is not unique, it is a tradition among most countries, Canada has similar practices in Latin America and Europe.
58. Ibid. The personnel referred to are those of CIDA. CIDA personnel play diplomatic roles as well as development aid. This is indicative that the DEA coopts CIDA personnel in the field. In effect, aid and politics have been intertwined.
59. Ibid. The Canadian non-resident High Commissioner may undertake two or three visits to Sierra Leone and the Gambia annually.
60. Interview with some Sierra Leone students in Canada. Many of these students had to travel to Nigeria to expedite actions on their files, during the process about half missed at least one academic year.
61. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Reference Papers, No. 69, July 1973, p. 24. These functions were assigned to Canadian missions by the DEA.
62. R.O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" op. cit., p. 89.
63. Ibid., p. 90.
64. Ibid., p. 112.
65. James Eayrs, Canadian in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 195.
66. Op. cit., p. 171.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 172.
69. Ibid.

70. R.O. Matthews, op. cit., p. 117.
71. Ibid.
72. Arnold Wolfers, "The Goals of Foreign Policy" in Naomi Rosenbaum, ed. Readings on International Political System, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 139.
73. Ibid.
74. Ottawa still maintained cordial relations with Nigeria and Ghana where parliamentary system of government have been non-existent since 1966.

Chapter II

1. Interview with African diplomats in Ottawa. These diplomats in reference to Canada, used the expression "distant cousin" because they were once colonies of Britain.
2. Douglas G. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa" in International Journal, 15:4, 1960, p. 305.
3. Ibid.
4. R.O. Matthews, "Africa in Canadian Affairs" in International Journal, 26, Winter 1970-71, pp. 124-5.
5. Ibid., p. 126.
6. Ibid.
7. Douglas G. Anglin, op. cit., p. 306.
8. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. III, July 21, 1958, p. 2516.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 2518.
11. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, 23:5, May 1971, p. 154. (Hereafter External Affairs).
12. Canada, Department of External Affairs, by Authority of Hon. Mitchell Sharp, "International Development" Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 10.

13. External Affairs, op. cit., p. 159
14. The Daily Star, December 19, 1968.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with African diplomats in Ottawa. "When moderate paths fail", they argued, "the only alternative is to resort to arms struggle".
17. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement, Allan J. MacEachen, April 15, 1975, p. 4. One DEA official told the author that MacEachen had undertaken the visit to patch up the damage done by the exclusion of Africa in the Foreign Policy Papers and to demonstrate to critics that Canada has interest in Africa.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., April 24, 1975, p. 2.
20. This expression was used by some DEA officials to show that the situation as it exists in Southern Africa has affected Canadian-African relations.
21. An African diplomat in Ottawa thinks that Ottawa has been blind to see the true intentions of the Vorster and Smith regimes. Thus he referred to the southern African situation as the "Canadian blindness"
22. Douglas G. Anglin, "Canada and Apartheid" International Journal, 15:2, Spring, 1960, p. 122.
23. Frank R. Hayes, "The Impact of the Commonwealth on Canada's Foreign Policy: South Africa's Departure". An unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Politician Science Association at the University of Western Ontario, London, May 1978.
24. Douglas G. Anglin, "Canada and Apartheid" op. cit., pp. 123-4.
25. Ibid., p. 125.
26. Ibid., p. 126.
27. Ibid., p. 136.
28. Ibid.

29. Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study on Decision-Making, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 171.
30. Quoted in Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds. Foremost Nation - Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Toronto: McClelland and Steward Ltd., 1977, p. 195.
31. R.C. Pratt, "Foreign Policy Review" in Canadian Forum, 50:594-5, July-August, 1970, p. 155.
32. Ibid. Prior to Mozambique's independence, Ottawa had "encouraged Canadian firms to become involved in the proposed Caborra Bassa Dom" in that country.
33. R.O. Matthews, "Canada's Relations with Africa" in International Journal, 30, Summer 1975, p. 546.
34. Douglas G. Anglin, op. cit., p. 136.
35. External Affairs, 15:11, November, 1963, p. 419.
36. Ibid., pp. 418-9.
37. External Affairs, 15:12, December 1963, p. 438.
38. Ibid.
39. R.O. Matthews, "Africa in Canadian Affairs", op. cit., p. 127.
40. External Affairs, 18:12, December 1965, p. 534.
41. Ibid.
42. R.O. Matthews, "Africa in Canadian Affairs", op. cit., p. 125.
43. External Affairs, 18:2, February, 1966, p. 64.
44. Ibid.
45. External Affairs, 18:12, December 1965, p. 534.
46. External Affairs, 18:2, February, 1966, pp. 59-61.
47. "Canada and the United Nations Sanctions against Rhodesia", The Commentator, 12:7-8, July-August, 1968, p. 9.

48. Ibid, p. 9. South Africa refused to comply with the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. Thus it was believed that the "Rhodesians were trans-shipping these goods through South Africa and relabelling them".
49. Diplomatic source, interview with an African diplomat in Ottawa.
50. Interview with officials of the DEA. Many of these officials remarked that Ottawa believes in evolutionary, not revolutionary process.
51. The Globe and Mail, February 21, 1978, p. 8.
52. Ibid.
53. External Affairs, 20:4, April, 1968, p. 204.
54. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol 1, September 12-October 11, 1968, pp. 842-45.
55. External Affairs, 20:11, November, 1968, p. 448.
56. Ibid., p. 451.
57. Donald Barry, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: the Case of Biafra" in A.P. Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1975, p. 120.
58. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 11, October 15-31, 1968, p. 2034.
59. The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1968.
60. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 11, October 15-31, 1968, p. 2023.
61. Ibid., p. 2024.
62. Norman Depoe, "Why our aid to Biafra never got off the ground," Macleans, 82:1, January, 1969, p. 2.
63. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 11, October 15-31, p. 2026.
64. Ibid., p. 2027.
65. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 1, September 12 - October 11, 1968, p. 843.

66. Norman Depoe, op. cit., p. 2.
67. Ibid.
68. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 11, October 15-31, 1968, p. 2028.
69. Ibid.
70. External Affairs, 20:12, December, 1968, p. 489.
71. Ibid., p. 497.
72. The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1968.
73. External Affairs, 20:12, December, 1968, p. 495.
74. Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968, p. 35..
75. Ibid., p. 195.
76. Ibid., p. 158.
77. Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles - Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 43.
78. External Affairs, 22:2, February, 1970, p. 50.
79. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 1, November 11, 1957, p. 970.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. The Daily Star, December 19, 1968.
84. Paul Martin, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: 1964-67, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967, pp. 97-8.
85. Arnold Wolfers, "The Goals of Foreign Policy" in Naomi Rosenbaun. ed. Readings on International Political System, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 139.
86. Douglas G. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa", op. cit., p. 308.

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1. D. C. Thomson and R. F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1971, p. 146.
2. R.G.P. Styles, "Export Development Corporation", The Canadian Banker, 76:5, September-October, 1969, p. 16.
3. Frank A. Knox, "Canadian Trade Strategy" International Journal, Autumn, 1954, p. 275.
4. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, 18:3, March, 1965, p. 83.
5. D. C. Thomson and R. F. Swanson, op. cit., p. 135.
6. Canada, Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book 1973, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973, pp. 745-6 (Hereafter Year Book).
7. Canada Year Book 1976-77, pp. 882-83.
8. J. D. Tennant, "Opportunities are Waiting in Commonwealth West Africa", Foreign Trade, 135:9, April 24, 1971, p. 33.
9. Ibid., p. 31.
10. _____, "Nigeria Programs Its Development", Foreign Trade, 135:9, April 24, 1971, p. 35.
11. Quoted in Donald Peacock, Journey to Power - The Story of A Canadian Election, Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968, p. 336.
12. Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles - Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 131.
13. Ibid.
14. These countries included Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Benin, Togo and Gambia.
15. Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Canada's Trade Policy in the Second Development Decade, Montreal: 2060 Sun Life Building, 1969, p. 39.
16. A.W.A. Lane, "Canada's Trade with the Less-Developed Countries" Canadian Chartered Accountant, 84:6, June, 1964, p. 444.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. R.O. Matthews, "Canada's Relations with Africa" International Journal, 30, Summer, 1975, p. 560.
21. John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976, p. 80.
22. R. C. Pratt, "The Foreign Policy Review" Canadian Forum, 50: 594-5, July-August, 1970, p. 155.
23. Douglas G. Anglin, "Canada and Apartheid" International Journal, 15:2, Spring, 1960, p. 122.
24. Ibid.
25. Peter Dobell, op. cit., p. 129.
26. R. C. Pratt, op. cit., p. 155.
27. The Globe and Mail, January 12, 1970, p. 7.
28. Ibid.
29. Wayne Cheveldayoff, "Canada and Apartheid" The Globe and Mail, February 25, 1978, p. 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. C. L. Bland, "West and Central Africa: A Developing Market for Canadian Goods, Services and Investment" Foreign Trade, 135:9, April 24, 1971, p. 3.
34. R. O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Peyton Lyon and Tareq Ismael. eds. Canada and the Third World, Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1976, p. 95.
35. C. L. Bland, op. cit., p. 4.
36. J. D. Tennant, "Opportunities are Waiting in Commonwealth West Africa" op. cit., p. 38. The chief suppliers of Nigeria's imports are Britain, United States, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

37. Ibid., p. 39. The chief suppliers of Ghana's imports are Britain, United States and West Germany.
38. C. L. Bland, op. cit., p. 4.
39. A. W. A. Lane, op. cit., p. 444.
40. C. L. Bland, op. cit., p. 10.
41. Ibid.
42. Keith A. J. Hay, "Growth and Prospects of North American Imports from the Developing World: A Canadian Perspective" Carleton International Studies 1977/11, Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 1977, p. 3.
43. Ibid., p. 2.
44. Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, op. cit., p. 21.
45. J. D. Tennant, op. cit., p. 10.
46. Ibid., p. 38.
47. Ibid., p. 39.
48. Ibid.
49. Canada Year Book 1973, p. 746.
50. J. D. Tennant, op. cit., p. 33.
51. Ibid.
52. C. L. Bland, op. cit., p. 3.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 12.
55. Canada, CIDA, Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Review, 1975-76, p. 99.
56. R. G. P. Styles, op. cit., p. 16.
57. J. D. Tennant, op. cit., p. 33.

58. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria Handbook 1977, Lagos: Academy Press, 1977, pp. 124-25.
The primary aims of the Decree are: to create more opportunities for Nigerian indigenous businessmen; to maximize local retention of profits and; to raise the level of intermediate and capital goods production.
59. Canada Year Book 1973, p. 80.
60. Ibid., p. 86.
61. Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., Foremost Nation - Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1977, p. 196.
62. Douglas G. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa" International Journal, 15:4, Autumn, 1960, p. 296.
63. Ibid.
64. Donald Peacock, op. cit., pp. 335-56.

Chapter IV

1. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 8 (Hereinafter External Aid Office).
2. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, 16:9, September, 1964, p. 434 (Hereafter External Affairs).
3. This meant that Canadian aid was either conditional or transitional against the SCAAP policy that it should be "on a continuing basis".
4. External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 8.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. A. A. Fatourous and R. N. Kelson, Canada's Overseas Aid, Toronto: CIIA, 1964, p. 18.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 114.

10. World Bank Atlas 1977, p. 14.
11. Ibid.
12. External Affairs, 16:2, February, 1964, p. 77.
13. These figures have been summed up from External Aid Office Annual Reviews 1964 to 1967, CIDA, Annual Reviews 1968 to 1976-77.
14. External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 8.
15. Canada, Department of External Affairs, by the authority of Secretary of State for External Affairs, "International Development" Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 12 (Hereafter Foreign Policy for Canadians).
16. Paul Martin, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada: 1964-67, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967, p. 97.
17. A. A. Fatourous and R. N. Kelson, op. cit.
18. External Affairs, 16:2, February, 1964, p. 77.
19. Ibid., p. 78.
20. Ibid.
21. External Aid Office, Annual Review 1966-67, p. 8. The group of countries included Sierra Leone, Gambia, Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Mauritius.
22. External Affairs, 21:4, April, 1969, p. 171. Nigeria receives loan assistance of \$105 million from the World Bank, \$15 million from Britain, \$2,900,000 from the United States, \$3 million from the Netherlands and \$28 million from Italy.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. Mr. Jasper Ings served as chairman of the Niger Dam Authority for six years. The Dam was commissioned on February 25, 1969.
25. "International Development" in Foreign Policy for Canadians, pp. 18-9.

26. A. A. Fatourous and R. N. Kelson, op. cit., p. 42.
27. Ibid.
28. Canada, CIDA, Canada and Development Cooperation 1975-76, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975, p. 14.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 45.
31. CBC, Fifth Estate, Documentary on CIDA's Overseas Activities, April 4, 1977.
32. Canada, CIDA, Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-80, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975, p. 14.
33. CBC, op. cit.
34. David Jones, "Changing the Emphasis on Aid: An Analysis of British and Canadian Reappraisals of Policies" Commonwealth, April/May 1976, p. 8.
35. Grant L. Reuber, "Canada's Economic Policies Towards the Less-Developed Countries" in Canadian Journal of Economics I, November, 1968, p. 675.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., pp. 678-79.
38. Ibid., p. 679.
39. Ibid.
40. Ronald Lebel, "Foreign Aid is Big Business" in Canadian Business, 39:9, September, 1966, p. 96.
41. CBC, op. cit.
42. Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson. eds. Foremost Nation - Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1977, p. 196.
43. External Affairs, 33:1, January, 1971, p. 34.

44. Canada, IDRC, Project 1975, p. 5.
45. _____, The First Two Hundred Projects, June, 1974, p. 8.
46. Cassave is one of the chief staple foods of Southern Nigerians. It is also important in Nigeria's domestic trade, being exported to the major cities.
47. IDRC, op. cit., p. 9.
48. Arthur E. Blanchette, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977, p. 295.
49. Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, New York: International Publishers, 1968, p. 39.
50. Ibid., p. 38.
51. Arthur E. Blanchette, op. cit., p. 295.
52. External Affairs, 14:4, April, 1963, p. 136.
53. Ibid.
54. External Affairs, 15:8, August, 1963, p. 295.
55. Ibid., p. 296.
56. R. O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa" in Peyton Lyon and Tareq Ismael. eds. Canada and the Third World, Toronto: MacMillan of Canada Co. Ltd., 1976, p. 108.
57. Ibid.
58. Louis L. Snyder, Fifty Major Documents of the Twentieth Century, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1955, p. 137.
59. Ibid.
60. CIDA, op. cit., p. 9.
61. Ibid.
62. Peyton Lyon and Tareq Ismael, Canada and the Third World, Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1976, p. xxi.

63. Ibid., p. xxviii.
64. External Affairs, 18:3, March, 1965, p. 91.
65. Ibid., p. 92.
66. Ibid.
67. "International Development", op. cit., p. 45.
68. These officials stated that Canadian aid was stimulated, initially, by the humanitarian motive. The earlier factor was later overtaken by the commercial motive.
69. "International Development", op. cit., p. 10.
70. External Affairs, 18:3, March, 1965, p. 91.
71. Ibid., p. 83.

Conclusions

1. Interview with officials of the Department of External Affairs.
2. Ibid.
3. L. Hertzman, J. W. Wamock, T. A. Hockin, Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question, Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Publishers, 1969, p. 38.
4. Robert Bothwell, "The Canadian Connection: Canada and Europe" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds. Foremost Nation - Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Toronto: McClelland.
5. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches - Canada and the Search for Peace, Toronto: The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1961, pp. 59-60.
6. L. Hertzman, J. W. Wamock, T. A. Hockin, op. cit., p. 38.
7. Peyton Lyon, The Policy Question - A Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963, p. 62.

8. The Globe and Mail, January 12, 1970, p. 7.
9. Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy - a Study on Decision Making, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 20.
10. Ibid., pp. 45-47. Mitchell Sharp, for example, had been Minister of Finance, Trade and Commerce, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce and Vice-President of the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company from 1958 - 1963.
11. Logan Maclean, "Orgy in Montreal" in Saturday Night, 73:21. October 11, 1958, p. 6. Mr. Maclean had claimed that Canada's participation in the aid program amounted to a "reckless spending of hard-earned Canadian cash in the jungles of Africa and the slums of Asia".
12. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, 12:6, June, 1960, p. 643. It should be remembered that Nkrumah was perceived as a communist because of his socialistic inclinations.
13. Ibid.
14. Ronald Lebel, "Foreign Aid is Big Business" in Canadian Business, 39:9, September, 1966, p. 96.
15. Ibid.
16. An official of the Department of External Affairs, during an interview, stated that Canadian relations with the countries of the subregion have been a "kind of aid relations". He also added that "Nigeria, as of now, is on its feet because of its oil money and we shall seek a more meaningful relationship with Nigeria".
17. Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. v., November 28, 1963, p. 5192.
18. The Globe and Mail, June 1, 1978, p. 13.

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