THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH ON MODERNIZATION IN COLOMBIA
THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
ON
MODERNIZATION IN COLOMBIA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the influence of the Roman Catholic Church on the modernization of Colombia. Although a history of the Church's political involvement is included, the major emphasis is on the recent changes in the role of the Church in Colombia that have been prompted by the Vatican and by pressure from leftist priests within the country. The activities of various groups of these progressive priests are examined and the validity of their contribution to the modernization process is questioned. Despite the struggles of the leftist clergy, it is concluded that because of the position of the hierarchy of the Colombian Church and the nature of the Church's ties to developed countries, unless there are further radical changes in the position of the Colombian Church, it will not be a significant force in the necessary restructuring of Colombian society.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Although the characteristics of underdevelopment—illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, squalor, unemployment and inequalities—are well known and easily identified, the concept of development has no clear definition. Twenty-five years ago when many Third World countries began efforts to become modernized, the focus of their attempt was economic growth. Despite honest efforts by some governments of developing nations, and despite foreign aid programs launched by developed nations, the increase in per capita income for about two thirds of humanity has been less than one dollar per year. Even this meagre increase has not been equitably distributed and for the poorest 40 per cent of the population, the per capita income has sometimes fallen.\(^1\)

Development must mean more than a high economic growth rate, and even if this can be achieved there is no guarantee that the benefits will trickle down to the masses. It must instead be seen as a social transformation including economic, political, social and cultural aspects. When development is viewed as a total social process, it necessarily implies a concern for human values, for how people live and not simply how much wealth the nation possesses.

This human perspective is expressed by Francois Perroux
who describes development as:

the combination of mental and social changes of a people which enables them to increase, cumulatively and permanently, their total real production. . . . Development is achieved fully in the measure that, by reciprocity of services, it prepares the way for reciprocity of consciousness.2

During the 1950's support for development was high in Latin America, but because those who advocated this goal failed to attack the root of the problem, development has failed and frustration has increased. One of the major causes of this failure has been the fact that development programs are usually promoted by international organizations closely linked to the groups and governments which control the world economy. Great care is taken to attempt change within the existing framework and to avoid attacking the interests of the large international economic and political powers. What "changes" are made too often serve to increase the strength of already powerful economic groups.

Awareness is increasing in Latin America and the rest of the Third World that their underdevelopment is an active by-product of the development of wealthier nations. Timid measures at reformism and modernization will continue to be ineffectual and even counterproductive to achieving necessary and real social transformation. Many believe that only a radical break with the status quo - an attack on the economic, social, political and cultural dependence of some countries on others - will promote development.3
In Latin America, one of the strongest groups speaking out for this type of change is a sector of the Roman Catholic Church. They describe the process as one of liberation for:

liberation expresses the aspirations of oppressed peoples and social classes, emphasizing conflictual aspects of the economic, social and political process which puts them at odds with wealthy nations and oppressive classes. In contrast, the word development and above all the policies characterized as developmentalist . . . appear somewhat aseptic, giving a false picture of a tragic and conflictual reality. The issue of development does in fact find its true place in the more universal, profound, and radical perspective of liberation. It is only within this framework that development finds its true meaning and possibilities of accomplishing something worthwhile.4

A more analytical definition of development is needed in order to test what contribution these theologically inspired goals can make to the transitional process. Many developmental theorists commonly use such concepts as: a change in social relations from status to universalistic achievement norms; increased differentiation and a high degree of occupational and skill specialization; mass mobilization and participation in a political system able to deal with continuous change and capable of adjusting to new situations; and a secular political authority, seeking to maximize rational and scientific knowledge to meet man's physical and material needs. The structural-functionalist theorists who use these criteria to measure development are concerned with the functioning of all the parts of a society and the maintenance of the system.
In this paper, a different approach will be taken. Development will mean the social transformation of a society which frees its people from a daily struggle to exist and prepares them to take an active part in determining their lives. It necessarily includes efforts to improve education, health care and an equitable distribution of the resources the country has to offer. In order to accomplish this, structural changes are necessary. The elitist system must be replaced and the economy restructured under state control to meet the needs of the people rather than cater to the demands of the developed nations. As Fals Borda stated:

Development is achieved when the transition from one social order to the next is completed; that is when the corresponding subversion is created, resolved, and surpassed.5

Religion and Development

Institutional religion has usually been a reactionary force opposed to change and used to legitimize the values of ruling elements of the existing social structure. Despite the fact that the Church has sometimes been an important factor in bringing about political change, only rarely has this political change been transformed into significant social change.6

Myron Weiner, who studied the problem of increased political participation in developing societies, pointed out that if there is a competitive elite (as there has been for most of Colombia's history) each side will attempt to mobilize
the masses in order to defeat the other side.  

But we cannot speak of electoral procedures or party structures as being institutionalized unless those who participate in politics value these procedures and structures.

In recent Colombian history, the problem for the masses has been that the political parties and elections have not presented them with any real political choice. As a result, political participation has included a great deal of illegitimate activity taking the form of guerrilla warfare, demonstrations and general unrest. New interest groups and new roles for old institutions must be created in order to provide channels for the dissidents to redress their grievances legitimately.

A crisis of participation therefore can be viewed as resolved when there is a new agreement among governing elites, contending elites and political participants on the legitimacy of demands and on the value of certain institutional procedures created to meet the demands.

The movement from elite politics to mass politics is a fundamental characteristic of political modernization. Although politics is not a mass phenomenon in developing nations, religion is, and as such it can be used to motivate mass political participation in the short term, until politics generates its own motivation.

It is this characteristic of mass participation in religion which can make it a potential force for the legitimization of change. As the Church withdraws her absolute support for the old order she gives scope to the emerging
social forces. Although religion is an aspect of traditional society, Milton Singer argues that theorists like Max Weber failed to recognize that legitimacy can be given to innovation by traditionalizing change through a series of steps. In Colombia, the mass media have been used by priests not only to spread the traditional religion but also to introduce new agricultural techniques and to teach improved methods of hygiene. In this way, religion can help a society dedicated to progress cope with tradition, or, as in the case of Colombia, can help a traditional society deal with change. \(^{12}\)

Leonard Binder emphasized that: "Social development (in a disciplinary and not a value-oriented or ideological sense) means increased social complexity." \(^{13}\) As a country comes to grips with the problems and challenges of a development effort, the institutions become increasingly complex. In the case of the Church in Colombia, the role has changed radically as the Church has begun to recognize the importance of empirical reality. The current split in the Colombian clergy further illustrates the different outlooks as some of the clergy continue to stress the greater importance of spiritual life while others insist that the Church's correct role is to become actively involved in creating a new social order. Although the institutional changes within the Colombian Church will be touched on, it is mainly the social relationship of the Church to the Colombian people that this paper will focus on.
The more autonomous the religious organizations are, the less they are identified with the existing political order, and the more they can develop new types of central political and cultural symbols. The idea that secularization of the state is a precondition of modernization has almost universal acceptance. Colombia, the Catholic country par excellence, still adheres strictly to the conviction that the Church and the State are the two pillars on which Colombian society rests. This fact, however, also puts the Church in a position of unique influence and if it were able to present a united front to the government demanding change, it could act as a strong and positive force for modernization.

Both Eisenstadt and Bellah put great emphasis on the need for religion to become involved in the secular world in order to be a force for change. Empirical reality must be seen as a "meaningful, valuable and valid sphere for religious action." Eisenstadt further stresses the importance of religion having a "transformative capacity" by which he means the capacity to legitimize in ideological or religious terms the development of new activities and institutions not encompassed in the original aims of the religion. Both the emphasis on reality and the necessary transformative capacity are integral parts of the reformist movement in the Colombian Catholic Church.

A segment of the Colombian clergy have adopted Paulo Freire's idea of conscientizaciön of the masses. Concientizaciön
is a psychological pre-requisite of genuine development and is an effort to increase awareness so that the masses can move beyond being manipulatively mobilized by interested parties to the point where they can intelligently engage in formulating the methods and goals of development.

This "disinterested" politization effort indeed springs from religiously rooted concepts of man and society, but essentially regards development (cultural, social, economic and political) as an end in itself. A number of the clerical intellectuals which espouse the "ideology of development" are in fact convinced that the changes they seek will likely undermine the institutional church within which they now operate. 18

Is the Colombian Church moving from the centuries old emphasis on ascetism, renunciation and other worldliness to a recognition of the importance of empirical reality and of the Christian's role in the real world? Will the Church become a force which motivates and initiates change in the society? Is the Church more or less reformist than the government? Is it ready and willing to challenge the political elites and thus to risk the very real possibility of losing its own elite status? Is the Church prepared to use its unique position with regard to the Indians and its power in the educational system to become an effective force in the conscientizacion of the Colombian masses? Are the leftist clergy able to utilize the Church to promote revolutionary change—either by non-violent or violent means?

These questions, which constitute the core of this thesis must be addressed in the context of a similar set of
questions regarding changes in the larger Colombian society. To what degree are segments of the population becoming politically mobilized by the process of modernization? Are new groups in the society becoming conscious of their interest in actively participating in the development process? Is there greater opportunity for the masses of Colombians to participate meaningfully in the society and is technical skill and functional specialization increasing?

In order to attempt an answer to these questions, it is necessary to look at the history of Church-State relations in Colombia, the changes in Catholic doctrine directed by Rome and the challenge of Camilo Torres, Colombia's first guerrilla priest. Finally, the response of the Church to these changes and challenges will be examined to see if it can indeed become a positive force for development in Colombia.

The Setting

Colombia, one of the four remaining representative democracies in Latin America, was liberated from the Spanish by Simon Bolivar in 1821. It is the fourth largest country in Latin America and has a population of over 20 million. It also has one of the world's most rapid population growth rates, and during the 1960's population increased at more than 3 per cent per annum.19 In 1970, the ethnic breakdown was 2 per cent Indian, 4 per cent Black, 22 per cent Mulatos 26 per cent White and 46 per cent Mestizos.20 Slightly over one
half of the total population is now urbanized.  

Latin America is unique in that the nations came into being as a "result of the juxtaposition of quite extraordinarily unequal classes and races; descendents of conquistadors alongside descendents of slaves, or of primitive Indians at a far lower level of civilization." To some extent, in over 150 years of independence, a mixture of these divergent races has taken place but there still remains throughout one of the most stratified societies in the world in which only a small minority takes part in modernization.

Geographical features have hampered efforts to increase Colombian unity. The Andean Mountain system divides the country into several climatic regions and makes transportation and communication difficult and expensive. It is also the mountainous and jungle regions that make the country an ideal arena for waging guerrilla warfare.

Mexico has been described as a beggar sitting on a bag of gold and this description is equally apt for Colombia. The country has a Pacific and Caribbean coastline, petroleum, platinum, gold, silver, emeralds, coal, forested regions, and a variety of climate and soil ideal for growing coffee, sugarcane, tropical fruits and rubber. Colombia has however remained dependent on the export of coffee for most of its foreign exchange and, as is the case for any nation dependent on primary products, crippling fluctuations in the world price make a planned economy virtually impossible. Although the country has the agricultural potential to be more than
self-sufficient in food production, the latifundio system prevents thousands of acres from being cultivated and devotes the majority of cultivated land to the production of export crops. The result is that the peasants go hungry while over $100 million of precious foreign exchange is used to import the needed rice and wheat.25

Many theorists now attribute Latin America's underdevelopment to the dependence of the economy on international economic powers. Penetration into Colombia's economy, mainly by U.S. multinationals, makes the area a showcase for Galtung's and Prebich's theories of Centre and Periphery nations as well as the more recent theories of Dependencia expounded by Frank, Dos Santos and others.26 The elites of Colombia benefit so greatly from the continuing underdevelopment that there is now an unprecedented polarization of those who aim to maintain the status quo and those who desperately want change.

No other country in Latin America — and few nations of the world — have in the mid twentieth century experienced internal violence and guerrilla war as has Colombia.27

Social unrest in Colombia has traditionally been a symptom of its economic ailments. Recent statistics show the per capita GNP to be about $358.00. This in itself is a meaningless statistic to anyone not living in Colombian society but what is enlightening is the fact that the lowest 40 per cent of the population receive 9 per cent of the GNP and the top 20 per cent receive 61 per cent.28
From the mid 1800's until the late 1950's, political conflict was almost exclusively intra-elite and centred on the divisions between the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The Conservatives were traditionally made up of the aristocratic Spanish landowners while the Liberals attracted the Creole entrepreneurs. Originally, the Conservatives were in favour of centralization, Church privilege, religious intolerance, and limited suffrage while the Liberals favoured federalism, secularism, religious tolerance and universal suffrage. In the 1960's, James Payne tested the responses of the two parties to the issues of government control of industry, housing, the protection of unions, the size of the army and the role of the Church. He concluded that the only significant difference between the parties now is that the Liberals are strongly anti-Church.

The political attempts to modernize in Latin America have included populist-authoritarian regimes like Peron's in Argentina, reformist military governments like Valesco's in Peru, Chile's elected Christian Democratic Party under Frei and the more extreme Union Popular government headed by Allende. Castro's communist regime in Cuba has rejected North American modernization in favour of popular national development. Colombia's situation is rare in contemporary Latin America in that it is ruled by a modernizing elite which holds a virtual monopoly of political, social, economic, educational and other resources. The elite is traditional
in origin and attempts to transform the nation within limits that will enable it to retain control over the essential levers of power.

Its approach to change has on the whole been that of palliative, paternalistic reform, designed to alleviate severe stresses in the system and to respond to certain cues (such as anarchic rural violence) or to certain demands on the part of counter-elite groups, without at the same time yielding up any real share of effective control over the major power resources.31

The elite wants to modernize Colombia so that it will be able to hold a secure place in the world economy, a place strong enough to resist world fluctuations in primary commodities. But it must make only the limited changes necessary to this goal and keep the campesinos in their place on the latifundias. The manipulated and contained changes produce stresses which the elite cannot always manage within the framework of a representative democracy. Until very recently, the Church has been an integral part of this ruling clique, physically and culturally separated from the masses and active in maintaining the stability of the old order. As the order changed, the Church was split and some idealists in the clergy have tried to take the society beyond the neo-colonial structure that the elite has built.
Footnotes


4. Ibid., p. 36.


8. Ibid., p. 194.


10. Ibid., p. 194.


Like most underdeveloped nations, Colombia has both modern cities and backward rural areas. Galtung and Prebich are "dualists", stating that the more advanced areas are linked to the developed capitalist world and the traditional sectors are still in a feudalist state. According to the dualist theory, land reform, import-substitution and regional economic integration could overcome the structural barriers to inward-directed development. The benefits of the modern sector would then slowly diffuse into the traditional sector until the whole area becomes modernized. See M.H.J. Finch, "The Politics of Economics," Journal of Inter-American Studies 5 (1973), 279-287.

Frank and the "dependencia" theorists argue that underdevelopment is not an original condition but is instead part and parcel of the historical process of the global development of the international system. Latin America has never been feudal and both the modern and traditional sectors of each country are simply two faces of one single universal process. Under the capitalist system, there is no chance of the benefits of the modern
sectors trickling down to the backward sectors because the underdeveloped areas must be kept underdeveloped in order to serve the needs of both the national and international elite. See Andre Gunder Frank "Development of Underdevelopment," in Wilber, op.cit., pp.94-104.


28. Hollis Chenery et. al., Redistribution with Growth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 8-9. These figures are relatively similar throughout Latin America. The greatest exception is Argentina where the lowest 40 per cent of the population receive 16.5 per cent of the GNP and the top 20 per cent receive 47.4 per cent. On a cross-section of countries studied, several Asian and African nations (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Niger, Chad and Uganda) displayed low inequality in income distribution along with highly developed countries like the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia. Guyana, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina fell into the "moderate inequality" category and the rest of the South American nations, including Colombia, were rated as displaying high inequality.


CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH
IN COLOMBIA

Introduction

From the early colonial days until the present, the Church has wielded a great deal of influence in Colombian politics. Although the internal organization and discipline was always weak, the Church managed, until the early 1960's to be virtually unified in her efforts to preserve the status quo. In a few instances, some of the clerics pressed for reform but on the whole, the Church's influence was a reactionary one. In the political upheavals endemic to Colombia's history, the Church failed to become a force for peace by allying herself firmly with the Conservative Party. The alignment prevented the Church from becoming an apolitical arbitrator in the conflicts. This chapter will first trace the Church's historic role in politics from independence until the late 1950's and will later, examine the effect the Church had on the Indians and on the educational system.

The Nineteenth Century

The State must, therefore, be separated from the Church, and the Catholic from the citizen . . . .
For the Church to trace out and prescribe for the citizen any line of action, on any pretext whatsoever, is to be guilty of an abuse of authority, against which one is bound to protest with all one's might.

(Pope Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 1907)
The history of Colombia is one of almost unceasing political turmoil and violence. In the first century of independence, the country was ravaged by ten revolutions, and more than seventy uprisings which resulted in fifty-one different national executives. Central to this unrest has been the political power of the Roman Catholic Church, for no other institution in Colombia has commanded as much influence. The Church has done far more than perform spiritual functions, for as a major land-owner, the recipient of compulsory tithes collected by the state officials, and charitable institutions, it clung adamently to its claim to political authority. Long before independence was won, the clergy allied themselves with the ruling class, and the gap separating the Church from the masses became firmly institutionalized, creating a cleavage between the Colombian Church and the precepts of Christianity.

The State of New Granada, as Colombia was first called, was established in 1830 and in 1831, a provisional government led by the Archbishop of Bogota wrote into the constitution that the Roman Catholic religion was to be the only religion in the new republic. All other faiths were outlawed. In 1833, another constitution stated that it is the rigorous duty of New Granada to protect the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion; this divine and only true religion, precious cause of the good which the people of New Granada inherit from their fathers will be preserved pure and intact.

The Republic was the first in Latin America to be recognized
by the Holy See. Ten years later, yet another constitution was passed which outlined in even more emphatic terms the close union between the Church and the State.\(^5\) During the early years of the Republic, prelates held many important political positions and the clergy often constituted one quarter to one third of the membership of Congress.\(^6\)

### Political Parties

En Colombia, son Liberales los que toman en publico y rezan en particular; son Conservadores los que rezan en publico y toman en particular.

(Popular saying to express party differences)\(^7\)

There were an unusually large number of meaningful elections during the nineteenth century and with the rise of parties in the 1840's, the Church aligned herself firmly with the Conservatives.\(^8\) This forced the Liberals to become the anti-clerical party, but their opposition was never directed toward the Roman Catholic religion. It was instead, a political opposition to the Roman Catholic organization in Colombia and the Liberals' eventual abolition of tithes, suppression of religious orders and confiscation of property were acts of vengeance against a political opponent. The anti-clericals were not reformers in a spiritual, economic or social sense. The party was made up mainly of Creoles who were part of the privileged class with little concern for the welfare of the masses. They had no complaint against the dogmas and tenets of the Church but opposed clerical wealth solely on the grounds that it made the Conservatives politically strong and prevented
entrepreneurs from making more efficient use of Church-owned lands. The few sincere reformers in their ranks were hopelessly impractical idealists whose actions usually resulted in more harm than good. Similarly, the Conservative attraction to the Church was not based on an effort to preserve the Roman Catholic religion but was a pragmatic alliance to keep the adherence of the masses desperately in need of the kinds of social and economic reforms that the Liberals, because of their anti-clerical stance, proved to be better at instituting.

The political parties in Colombia were thus from their inception elite parties, and political cleavages developed along vertical rather than horizontal lines. The Spanish tended to be Conservative, the Creoles, Liberal and the campesinos followed the lead of the local patron. There is little specific information available on what the geographical distribution of the parties was and the only class-based trend emerged in the late 1950's when the Liberals seemed to be gaining strength in the urban lower class. The Church remained consistently on the side of the Conservatives. A mass party able to articulate the demands of the popular class did not develop and despite the differences between the two major parties, whenever the demands from below grew strong enough, they managed to overcome their political differences.

Participation in elections has been low in spite of the fact that all Colombian males over twenty-one have had the right to vote since 1853. However, the tendency to align
with one party has traditionally been very strong and the masses have been less successful than the elites in overcoming political differences in order to promote their own interest. Throughout the nineteenth century, the role of religion was the major issue between the two parties. Despite the occasional mergers on the part of the elites, the religious conflict became so emotional and rancorous that people had to align themselves with one side or another. Geography influenced the patterns of settlement and the isolated communities which grew up fostered the intense political rivalry. It was not unusual for entire towns to adhere to one party and the country became divided into regional enclaves of Liberals and Conservatives.

Thus, far from this being an "element of national unity" and "social order" as the Colombian Constitution states, the Catholic religion has been rather a source of conflict and bloody disunity among Colombians.13

Because the majority of priests have always come from oligaric or upper middle class families and because those at the top of the religious hierarchy are almost exclusively from upper class backgrounds, the Church has been a firmly entrenched part of the ruling elite. Whether it is used as an instrument of partisanship or whether it is itself acting as a political partisan, the Church's role in politics has ruled it out as a force for peace during the many times in Colombian history when political violence has erupted.14

The Liberals won the election in 1849 and remained
in power with only short interruptions until 1880. In 1853, they brought a new constitution into effect separating Church and State, making Colombia the first secular state in Latin America. In 1880, Dr. Rafael Nunez, a Liberal, was elected president. When he came to power, the Church was in a unique position for a Roman Catholic country of that period. Ecclesiastical courts had been abolished, tithes were no longer compulsory, all Church property except the actual Church buildings and residences of the clergy had been appropriated by the state and sold to large land-owners, religious orders were abolished, cemeteries secularized and marriages were strictly civil ceremonies.

With his re-election in 1884, Nunez, hoping to resolve the issues that were threatening national unity, restored the power of the Church. According to some accounts, he switched his allegiance to the Conservative Party. The new constitution of 1886 was strongly centralistic and pro-clerical declaring God as the supreme fountain of all authority. The government authorized a concordat with the Holy See to define and establish the relationship between Church and State.

The Concordat, ratified by Congress in 1888, declared the Roman Catholic religion to be an essential element in Colombian society and granted the Church complete liberty and independence of the civil power. Although the Church was not given back the huge landholdings she had lost in 1861, she was allowed to buy new land and all residences, seminaries and
Church buildings were exempt from taxation. All educational institutions were to be run in conformity with Roman Catholic doctrine and religious instruction was obligatory. The Archbishop of Bogota was given the power to choose texts for religious and moral education. In filling positions in the religious hierarchy, it was decided that the president of the Republic and the Vatican would co-operate in order to ensure the selection of mutually agreeable candidates. The government agreed to provide the Church with 100,000 pesos annually to go to dioceses, chapters, seminaries, missions and "other proper works of the civilizing action of the Church."16

In 1903, the Republic was consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and each year this is renewed in a ceremony held on June 21. An Image of the Sacred Heart, followed by the president, his cabinet, the cardinal, priests, nuns, a contingent of the armed forces and hundreds of Colombian children is carried through the streets of Bogota from the cathedral to the Basilica of National Vow.

In 1968, the Colombian ambassador to the Vatican in an address on this occasion expressed thanks to God because the Republic had been guided and elevated "from the very moment in which His Heart was incorporated into the existence and even the essence of the nation . . . ." The Apostolic Administrator pronounced the blessing on the sacred enclave, while in the background the military bands softly played the national anthem. The president in a fervent prayer then renewed the consecration of the Republic to the Sacred Heart.17
The Twentieth Century: 1930-1960

From 1886 until 1930, the Conservative party relied heavily on the influence of the Archbishop of Colombia in its choice of candidates for presidential election. In the election of 1930, there was a split in the Conservative Party and the Archbishop, after first supporting one candidate, saw that the other was gaining in popularity and so, switched his support to the second. As a result, the Liberal, Enrique Olaya Herrera won and the election marked the first time a fundamental change in executive power was achieved without violence. 

During the nineteenth century, as was previously described, the Liberals had extended suffrage, improved the educational system somewhat and made abortive attempts to curtail the power of the Church. By the 1930's, although still dominated by an elite sector of the society, the Party's main interest was in social and economic reform. The change in their emphasis was due to the influence of European liberalism and to the international depression of the 1930's. The decrease in foreign investment and the drop in the export market prompted a period of industrialization and import-substitution in Colombia which created a new interest in the working class.

Olaya passed legislation to bring about reforms in education and housing and then was succeeded in 1934 by a far more determined Liberal reformer, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo.
Lopez's aim was to meet the demands of groups that would serve as a counter-weight to the demands of the Church, the army and the campesinos. He planned to reduce the influence of the Church in education and the electoral process. He also hoped to organize urban labour and promote industrial growth through import-substitution industries in order to produce a new class of industrialists whose power would soon supercede the power of traditional authorities.\(^{19}\)

In the Constitutional Codification of 1936, which was the basis for Lopez's reforms, no mention was made of the Roman Catholic religion being the national religion of Colombia. Religious associations were reduced to the legal status of other associations and priests were excluded from holding office. He also opened the possibility of taxing Church property. In the end, the laws of 1936 did little to alter the actual influence of the Church.

Lopez did manage to legislate a graduated income tax (which had little effect on the unequal distribution of wealth), and introduce new labour laws. But wages remained low. The expansion of the school system failed to keep pace with population growth, and clerical influence over textbooks and curriculum remained. There was some effort to redistribute land but little was achieved.\(^{20}\) In all, there was a persistent disparity between policy enactments in the 1930's and their enforcement in Colombian society.\(^{21}\)

The proposed reforms did however, look threatening
enough to revive anti-Liberal hostility and convinced the Conservatives to publish a directive against the Liberals on March 17, 1936. On the same day, the Archbishop issued a protest similar in tone stating that if the situation called for the Church to fight for justice, it would not remain passive. Many Conservatives argued that the amendments of 1936 would promote a battle that would be basically a contest between Christ and Lenin.22

In 1938, the Liberals won again but their leader was the more moderate Eduardo Santos. The revisions begun by Lopez in 1936 resulted in a new Concordat with the Vatican signed in 1942 which modified the Concordat of 1888. As a result, the Church lost much of its formal control over education. Only Colombian nationals were eligible to become ranking prelates in the local hierarchy and the Colombian president had the right to approve or disapprove appointments of bishops and archbishops who had to swear allegiance to the Colombian state before taking office. There was, however, little change in the Church's position in a political sense. The government exercised only weak control over education and the Liberals gradually became more accommodating to the Church. By 1942, only some local parish priests clung to their historic hostility and refused to accept the apparent conciliation of the Liberals.

Lopez won again in 1942 but his Revolucion en Marcha had lost most of its thrust during the four years of Santo's
government. A changed and beaten man, threatened by scandal, he resigned in 1945.²⁴

In the elections of 1946, the Liberal Party became wary of reforms going too far and split over the candidacy of Gabriel Turbay and the more revolutionary Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Consequently, the Conservative, Mariano Ospina Perez won the presidency backed by a minority government. Gaitan, the son of lower class parents, was seen as the leader of the underprivileged and all opponents of the oligarchy. A spell-binding orator and "one of the most powerful agitators in Latin American history"²⁵ he continued to dominate the political scene despite his defeat. The social and economic problems of Colombia at the time, contributed to his appeal and his popularity soared. With the prospect of having to wait until 1950 for another election, worker and peasant discontent erupted into smoldering violence.²⁶

La Violencia

On April 9, 1948, Gaitan was assassinated on a street in Bogota. The incident cracked open the thin veneer of civilization in Colombia and for the next ten years, the country was torn by an acephalous, bloody civil war which resulted in a death toll which is estimated from between 200,000 and 500,000. It was in the words of Norman Bailey, "... a phenomenon of unparalleled ferocity in modern times, insofar as movements at least to some extent spontaneous are concerned."²⁷
At first, the violence was dominated by traditional Liberal-Conservative hatreds but as the years passed, it reached its height in areas where cash crops were produced and where there had been a recent influx of migrants — areas where the traditional social structure had been underminded. La violencia was in part, a crisis of modernization brought on by the structural barriers to upward mobility in Colombian society.28

Both parties claimed that Gaitan's death was a Communist plot planned to unleash a revolution and the attacks on the Church, which were characteristically un-Colombian, did point to Communist involvement. Churches, convents, ecclesiastical colleges, schools and institutions were burned. Priests were beaten and stoned to death. The leaders of the initial riots in Bogota announced over National Radio that the priests were firing on the people from church roofs and that the Archbishop was leading the attacks. The mob stormed the Archbishop's palace destroying historic and sacred relics and forcing the Archbishop to flee for his life.29

On the eve of the elections of 1949, the Archbishop called for respect for all parties and urged the priests not to be partisan. The parish priests, however, continued to condone Conservative attacks on Liberals claiming that the latter were heretics and enemies of the Church who "would open the doors to immorality and Communism."30 They preached from the pulpit and admonished from the confessional that a
vote for the Liberals was a sin. In some areas, Protestants, who made up about two per cent of the population, were the targets of violence but since most Protestants were Liberal, it was hard to distinguish religious persecution from political violence.  

Laureano Gomez, the Conservative candidate, won the election in 1949. He believed that Church and State were inseparable and stated:

The political, social, moral, economic and educational doctrine is that which flows from its natural fountain-head, the Roman Catholic apostolate religion. . . .

Until 1953, he headed a ruthless dictatorship modelled after Franco's in Spain, taking refuge behind the Catholic Church to maintain a strong enough hold on the people to remain in power.

It was during Gomez's term in office that the Union de Trabajadores Colombianos (UTC), a Church-supported, passive and submissive labour union was created to counteract the growing influence of Communists in the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC). The UTC was openly accused in the early 50's of promoting the interests of industrialists and the Colombian oligarchy rather than those of the workers it was organized to represent.

The hierarchy of the Church did make several efforts to ameliorate and abate the violence. The Conservative Party began to issue cards carrying Gomez's picture testifying that the bearer was Conservative and that his life, property and
family were thus to be protected. Possessors of the cards had to first swear an oath before a priest that they were indeed Conservative. The Archbishop threatened suspension for any priest involved in these ceremonies.

In mid 1952, the Church co-operated in the abortive "Crusade for Peace" and in 1953, many priests and bishops were members of the "Committees for Pacification" which worked to decrease partisanship and promote the idea of a coalition government. The efforts were hampered by the lack of discipline within the Church and even more, by its historic involvement in partisan politics. In 1955, a Colombian historian wrote:

We all just let it go on, because we did not hear the weeping of wounded children, and because the river of blood did not physically reach up about our feet. These hundreds of thousands of dead, of exiled, of fugitives, killed or shriveled the souls of everyone. But especially they left their stain on the only spiritual and political power that might have been able to disarm the government and the parties. In place of religious and human reasons, the Church preferred "Political Reason".35

Gomez's regime was overthrown in a military coup by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in a coup on June 13, 1953. The dictator's authoritarian regime forced the violence to subside somewhat and his offer of amnesty was accepted by hundreds of partisan fighters in rural areas.

Rojas knew the importance of backing by the Church and eight days after he took over, the Archbishop endorsed his regime calling it a Christian and legitimate government.
Rojas himself referred to his regime as the "National Christian Movement of the 13th of June" and favoured a return to pre-1936 Church-State relations.

By 1957, demonstrations and civil strikes protesting the repression and violence of Rojas's regime were common. The majority of Colombians had turned against the dictator. Even students at the conservative Jesuit University in Bogota were prominent leaders in street demonstrations. But the Church and the army were still officially backing Rojas. However, Rojas's plan to create a state labour movement that would interfere with the Church-controlled UTC, put his regime in an increasingly precarious position.

Early in May, a priest in a fashionable district of Bogota preached that all Roman Catholics must fight criminals—especially those imposed from above. The people left the mass chanting "Cristo, si — Rojas, no!" Before the Church was empty, the police attacked with tear gas and a few days later, the Church officially withdrew its support from the regime. On May 10, the armed forces followed suit, Rojas was exiled and a ten man junta took over the government. On December 1, 1957, a plebiscite was held and the codification of 1936 regarding the Church was reversed.

The Church and the Indians

The principal motive that urges us to make new discoveries is the preaching and diffusion of the Catholic Faith, so that the Indians might be educated and live in peace and order.

(Philip II of Spain, 1753)
The Church has historically regarded the elites of Colombia to be worthy of special consideration. The poor have been treated paternalistically but the Indians have been relegated to a sub-human category by virtually all of Colombian society. In the years before independence, Spain used the Church to transmit the Spanish culture and the idea of Spanish political ascendancy to the indigenous peoples of Colombia. After the first and often bloody battles to conquer the region were over, the Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, Agustinians, Capuchins and other orders moved in to begin their civilizing missions and to spread the Christian gospel. The conversion of the Indian and his integration into Spanish culture raised fundamental philosophical and theological questions for the clergy. They wanted the Indian to become Catholic but, was he rational enough to be entitled to the protection provided by Spanish Law? 

Although the conservative Colombian historian Jesus Henao consistently refers to the sacrifices made by the missionaries and their efforts on behalf of the Indians to temper the despotism of the conquerors, most other historians and even theologians are far more critical. "Conversion" was often so rapid that the Indians, never really Christianized, retained many of their old concepts and continued to worship their ancient gods in secrecy. Between 1824 and 1831, the Franciscan friars alone baptized over one million Indians — often as many as 1,500 in a single day. Severe physical
punishment was employed to eliminate "heathen" practices among the Indians. Their temples were torn down and idols were burned or smashed. "The Indians were never really taught to be much more than helpless, dependent children."

The Spanish conquerors were faced with a shortage of labour to cultivate the land and work in the mines so each settler was given a number of Indians to work for him. The Indians were given moral and religious instructions in return for their services. The natives apportioned to the Spanish were called encomienda and were not slaves but sons did have an obligation to succeed their father in working for the owner or encomiendero. The lands were considered to be the property of the crown and in return for their use, the encomiendero was obliged to give military service when requested. The abuses of Indian labourers were so great that the Spanish government began to phase out the system in 1542.

The Church received vast tracts of land and a permanent system of labour tribute maintained a steady supply of workers. Many churches, monasteries and religious houses were built by forced labour and although the Church cannot be held responsible for the creation of the latifundio, the concentrated ownership of so much land discouraged immigration. Ecclesiastical tithes added further to the burden of the Indians as well as the rest of the population. The historian Clarence Haring concluded:

Whatever may have been the services of the Church in maintaining and spreading the Christian religion
and in gradually weaning the Indians from barbarism, there can be little doubt that in certain respects the ecclesiastical establishment ... was a burden upon the colonies.51

Simon Bolivar, the Liberator of Colombia, decreed that land should be returned to the Indians but most of the natives, with no idea of the values of their property, quickly sold their plots for a figurative bottle of rum. The land was integrated into latifundios and they became peons or tenants. Church lands were scarcely touched until the Liberal reforms of 1861 when they were sold in blocs to the wealthy creating a new landed aristocracy.52

Political quarrels caused the Jesuits to be expelled in 1767. They were allowed to return in 1815 but were expelled twice more until their final return in 1886. Each time, their departure resulted in a socio-cultural regression among the Indians and the educational system suffered most.53

The Concordat of 1888 states that:

Agreements between the Holy See and the government of Colombia for the encouragement of Catholic Missions among the barbarian tribes will require no additional approval on the part of Congress.54

In 1902, a convention concerning missions was negotiated with the government. The Church was to receive $75,000 annually and was to be given lands for cultivation and pasturage in order to assist in its efforts to spread culture and civilization in Indian regions.55

During the height of the Protestant persecutions, the Treaty on Missions was negotiated with the Vatican in 1953
allowing only Roman Catholic mission activity in areas designated as Catholic Mission Territories. Seventy per cent of Colombian territory and about twelve per cent of the population was put under the temporal as well as spiritual control of the Church.\textsuperscript{56} The Chief Prelates of the Missions were given the right to run all educational institutions in the areas and to appoint and dismiss teachers. All lands needed by the Church for agriculture were to be granted to the missions.

Civil functionaries for Mission territories will be appointed from among those who can be recommended from every point of view and who are known to be favourable to the Missions and the Missionary religious . . . . The complaint of the Head of a Mission shall be sufficient cause for the dismissal of employees of the Government if the facts are proved.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1972, Victor Daniel Bonilla published a book Servants of God or Masters of Men? - the story of a Capuchin Mission at Sibundoy in the Amazonian state of Putumayo. The book is the history of a mission run by priests with a deep-rooted scorn for all things Indian who regarded their charges "as badly brought-up children with certain evil tendencies."\textsuperscript{58} The Capuchins tried unsuccessfully to have the book suppressed first by the Colombian hierarchy and later by the Vatican. However, when the editor of El Catholicismo, the Catholic weekly, called it "a brave and worthy work", he was fired and the newspaper was used by the missionaries to launch a counter-attack.\textsuperscript{59}
Their cruelty, both intentional and unintentional, alarmed even the white settlers in the area and in 1930, one reported:

The natives had to provide the monastery with wood for fuel, otherwise off to the cepo! They had to work on its farms, otherwise off to the cepo! If they didn't pay their first fruits (eighty paires [about 200 kilos] of maize), then off to the cepo! If they didn't marry when they were supposed to, then off to the cepo without more ado!60

As the monastery prospered, the people were gradually destroyed by liquor, ritual suicides and infant mortality rates sometimes exceeding fifty per cent. A hospital was established in the district but the cost of medical care was more than the majority of Indians could afford. In his capacity as a member of the governing board of the Colombian Institute of Agarain Reform (INCORA), Camilo Torres called Sibundoy "a classic case of the Church's having yielded to the temptations of economic and political power."61

The Church and Education

The Church has been the major influence in education in Colombia and the inadequacy of the educational system today is, in large measure, due to the historic role of the Church. Because of its international ties, the education offered by the Church was usually imported from more developed nations and not geared to national needs. The battle against Protestant influences further retarded the growth of an adequate educational system. After independence, the state
gradually took more control but until the 1960's, the Church was still the most important force in the field of education. However, not all the clergy were reactionary and in the 1940's, the efforts of one priest put the Church in the vanguard position in the fight against illiteracy.

**Early History**

In the universities, colleges, schools and other centres of learning, education and public instruction will be organized and directed in conformity with the dogmas and morals of the Catholic Religion... The government will prevent, in the conduct of literary and scientific courses, and, in general, in all branches of instruction, the propagation of ideas contrary to Catholic dogmas and to the respect and veneration due the Church.

(Articles 12 and 13, Concordat of 1888)

The Catholic educational system in Colombia is the largest in Latin America. From the 1500's until independence in 1821, the Church was the principal authority in education. The Spanish Crown did contribute funds to be used in educating the Indians and the major thrust of education was conversion. Although there was no rift in the clergy comparable to the division which began in the 1960's, some clerics in the early colonial years did try to change the Church's attitude to the education of the Indians. In 1582, an archbishop in Colombia founded a seminary to train Indian clerics but bitter opposition from the Spanish-born aristocracy and the Creoles forced the institution to close four years later.
Secondary education was almost exclusively religious during the colonial period and pure Spanish origin was an explicit condition for admission in virtually all of these schools. By the nineteenth century, even the Conservatives wanted some secularization of education but the Church stood firmly against state interference and its virtual monopoly in higher education discouraged the possibility of scientific advancement.

The principle that education was a responsibility of the state was accepted in 1821 and in the second half of the nineteenth century, the public school system made great advances. In 1843, there were 491 public schools and 712 private institutions. By 1893, public schools had increased to 1,221 while private schools declined to 624. Of the 83,626 pupils enrolled in schools in Colombia, 66,174 were attending public schools. Although a Jesuit university had existed since 1622, and other religious orders established universities in the 1700's, it was not until 1868 that a national university was founded.

In 1903 and 1904, legislation was passed making elementary schooling free but it was not until 1927 that it was made compulsory and then, only if a school was within two and a half kilometers. By 1924, ninety per cent of the 6.5 million Colombians were still illiterate and only 17,000 were enrolled in secondary schools. From 1912 to 1927, expenditure on education quadrupled and enrollment more than doubled but at least two thirds of Colombian children were still not
attending any educational institution. Literacy did not increase greatly but more attention was being given to agricultural, industrial and business training. The influence of the Church prevented women from attending secondary schools until 1934.

Lopez's regime in the 1930's was especially important in the extension of education. There was a disestablishment of formal Roman Catholic control over schools and an increase in state inspection and regulation of the educational system. However, there was no denial of the Church's rights over moral education in all schools or of its rights in private education in general. It was largely due to the efforts of Liberal regimes that illiteracy rates dropped to 47.7 per cent by 1951.

In her efforts to educate the Indians, the Church was particularly insensitive and unsuccessful. The natives took refuge in the otherworldliness presented to them by the indoctrinating priests. They became fatalistic, indolent and submissive to upper classes. "This Christ-centred cult of death led to attitudes of contempt for life on earth, asceticism, and passivity among believers."

In the early 1900's, in the Amazon area, education took place in "orphanages" in which the children from near-by tribes were incarcerated. A mission report stated: "The opposition of the parents is a terrible problem; it can only be overcome by force of promises and flattery." After
fifty years of the Capuchin Ministry in Sibundoy, the territory had only primary schools and two teachers' training colleges. The Indians were limited to four years of education and, because of the Convention of Missions, the state, even if it was willing, was unable to better the educational system. In 1952, 10.5 million pesos were granted to the heads of missions for elementary schools but only if they wished to seek government recognition were they forced to conform to the public curriculum.

The influence of the Church over education was far greater than was evident in the Concordat. Representatives of the Church were almost always found in official and semi-official organizations concerned with educational decision-making, and teaching was the most important activity of several of the larger orders.

Traditionally, the Church's major concern in education has been to teach the politically influential classes. Protestant schools attempted to challenge the Catholic educational monopoly, but found it difficult to overcome Catholic opposition. In 1876, a new educational policy allowed the establishment of normal schools under German Protestant teachers -- a move which precipitated a civil war in the southern part of the country. Rojas Pinilla encouraged and abetted the persecution of the Protestants claiming that only those meddling in politics were harmed. In the mid 50's, parents with children attending Protestant schools were threatened with
excommunication but the nearly fifty per cent Roman Catholic enrollment in those schools which remained in operation did not decrease. 76 By 1959, however, more than 200 Protestant schools had been forced to close. 77

A great deal of the blame for Colombia's poor system of education must go to the state which has historically been all too willing to leave this essential field in the hands of the Church. Although a public school system began in the late 1860's, parochial schools vastly outnumber those which are state run. From 1951 to 1960, private schools increased from 856 to 2,277. During the same period, there was no increase in the number of public schools. 78 As a result, three quarters of the secondary schools in the country in the 1960's were run by the Church, catering to upper and middle class students able to afford the fees. 79 Rural areas have also been traditionally neglected by the Church and in the 1950's, only seven per cent of the priests and nuns working in the educational system were employed in rural areas. These few were working mainly on the Capuchin missions in the Guajira and Putumayo regions. 80

A few priests have been aware of the problems of the educational system and have tried to rectify it somewhat. In the early 40's, Father Miguel Geraldo Salazar, pastor of the wealthiest parish in Medellin, collected enough money from his parishioners to endow over thirty schools to provide basic education, religious training and hot lunches for the poor. 81
A far more constructive reform program, and the most innovative in Colombian history, was begun by Father Jose Joaquin Salcedo when he founded Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO) in 1948. The wide dispersion of population in Colombia results in both geographical and cultural isolation. When Father Salcedo arrived at his parish, a town called Sutatenza in 1947, he found a primitive village whose inhabitants were mainly illiterate and showed no interests in learning.

Funded partially by private donations and helped by contributions from the Church, he began a system of radio schools. A Boy's Institute, able to train 125 boys for community leadership in the literacy program, was founded in 1954 and was followed in 1956 by the construction of the Girls' Institute which can accommodate 200 pupils. The trained leaders return to their villages where their job is to transcribe into writing the lessons received over the radio for the rest of the students. In 1958, he began the publication of El Campesino, a semi-official Catholic weekly dealing with the problems of Colombia's peasants. By 1965, 28,535 schools had 240,915 registered students — three per cent of the rural population.82

As well as giving religious instruction, the schools promote social change. Surveys show that where the schools are active, hygiene, nutrition, living accommodations and agricultural methods improve. Acceptance or rejection of change was heavily influenced by the attitude of the local
priest, and studies have documented that improvements are
greatest in areas where the local priest was directly in-
volved in the schools. The changes, however, were seen in
a better mode of living rather than an improved standard of
living. In the 1960's the schools suffered added problems
with the influx of cheap Japanese transistor radios smuggled
in from Venezuela. It became harder to get the peasant to
buy the more expensive ACPO fixed frequency receivers and
many with ACPO receivers learned to alter them to receive
other stations. In 1970, the schools reached only .5 per
cent of the rural population and had made no effort to
minister to the needs of the increasing numbers of urban
poor. The entire ACPO program is now denounced by pro-
gressive reformers for viewing underdevelopment as a defi-
ciency of individual resources which each person willing to
make the effort, can overcome. Although the Radio Schools
of Sutatenza are widely criticized for being the epitome of
a conservative literacy program, Father Salcedo's efforts
drew attention to the beginning of a trend among many younger
priests who were concerned with social conditions in Colombia
and who displayed an unwillingness to align themselves with
the conservative oligarchy.

The Beginnings of Change

... in conformity with the order established by
God ... there should be in human society, princes
and subjects, patrons and proletariat, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, nobles and plebeians.

(Pope Pius X, 1903)

Until the late 1950's, the hierarchy of the Colombian Church was an important part of the ruling oligarchy. In its dealings with the elite, it played the role of political bargainer struggling with fierce determination to maintain its own privileged position and its control over the country. To the masses, it emphasized the love of Christ and the promise of heavenly bliss. The pulpit, the confessional and the threat of excommunication were powerful weapons in its demands for obedience. The misery of the people's temporal existence was something to be passively and fatalistically endured. Orphanages, hospitals and soup kitchens run by the Church were paternalistic, palliative measures that did not and were never intended to bring structural reform. From the infallible Pope to the village priest, the Church conditioned the masses to an unquestioning submission to authority.

The official change in this attitude began in 1958 when the Conservatives and Liberals agreed to establish a National Front in which they would alternate power for four year terms. Moral degeneration was so great that the Church, the one institution uniting virtually all Colombians, was relied upon to mobilize support for a new type of political regime and a new standard of political behaviour. The agreement, which would last until 1974, was an effort to
de-politicize the masses. By ensuring a degree of relative political stability, it also effectively reduced the Church's role in partisan politics, freeing it to act as an agent for reform. By the late 1950's, the Liberal Party and the Church had reached a consensus and soon became the most vocal agitators for agrarian reform.87

The death of the conservative Archbishop Luque Sanchez in 1959 and his replacement by the more moderate Luis Concha Cordoba, inaugurated a new approach to Protestantism. Violence against Protestants was replaced by intensive programs of indoctrination to make Colombian Catholics impervious to Protestant propaganda. Both churches joined forces in several conferences to devise methods to combat communism but the most important effect of the ecumenical cooperation was the spread of the Protestant concern for social services and an improved standard of living for the masses.88

The growing shortage of clergy and the threat of spreading Protestantism prompted the Latin American bishops to establish the Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELM) in 1955. Before this, "Latin American bishops lived in isolated self-assurance"89 believing that since there was no need for new ideas, there was no need to meet to exchange them. The Vatican set up the Secretariat of CELAM in the conservative stronghold of Bogota rather than Santiago, the centre of liberalism.90 However, the orientation of CELAM shifted in 1959 when Dom Helder Camara, to whom Pope Paul VI
affectionately referred as "my Communist bishop", was elected vice-president. Although CELAM has only persuasive authority over the bishops, its liberalizing and progressive influence grew to substantial proportions in the 1960's.

The greatest influence on the Colombian Church has not, however, come from within the country or from within Latin America. To the surprise of many, the elderly Pope John XXIII proved to be a force for change that within the Catholic context can be termed radical. In a country like Colombia where the organization and discipline within the Church has been traditionally weak, only changes from the Vatican carry enough force to reach the local clergy, a large proportion of whom are foreign and report directly to their superiors abroad. In order to see the effects of these reforms, it is necessary first to make a brief examination of the papal encyclicals.
Footnotes


5. Ibid., pp. 115-119.


12. Ibid., p. 282. Women did not get the right to vote until 1957.


15. Mecham op.cit., Church and State, pp. 120-126.
16. Ibid., p. 130. For the entire text of the Concordat, see pp. 126-131.


20. Ibid., pp. 85-90.


22. Dix, op.cit., p. 92.


25. Martz, op.cit., p. 43.


29. Vernon Lee Fluharty, op.cit., p. 112.


32. Martz, op.cit., p. 149.

33. Ibid., p. 149.


35. Antonio Garcia, Gaitan y el Problema de la Revolucion Colombiana, (Bogota: M.S.C., 1955) p. 335, quoted in Fluharty, op.cit., p. 121.

36. Dix, op.cit., p. 117.
37. Ibid., p. 119.
38. Ibid., p. 120.
40. Martz, op.cit., pp. 239-240.
46. Ibid., p. 173.
47. Ibid., p. 186.
49. Henao and Arrubla, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 75-76.
53. Houtart and Pin, op.cit., p. 23.
54. The Concordat of 1888, quoted in Mecham, op.cit., p. 133.
55. Ibid., p. 133.


60. Ibid., p. 194. "Cepo" is translated as "stocks".

61. Ibid., p. 247.


64. Ibid., pp. 46-56.


71. Ibid., pp. 242-243.


84. Renner, op.cit., pp. 159-160.

85. Quoted in Smith, op.cit., Religion and Political Development, p. 278.

86. Benoit, op.cit., p.79.


CHAPTER III

THE CHANGES DIRECTED BY THE VATICAN

Introduction

Although not all the encyclicals quoted in this chapter bear direct reference to Colombia, they are important to this paper because they illustrate the growth of official Roman Catholic policy from a concern for the poor in general to a later concern for developing countries. It is necessary to have a grasp of these developments in official policy in order to understand the revisions in the stance taken by the Colombian hierarchy in the late 1960's and early 1970's. More important, the new direction prompted by the Vatican intensified the split in the Colombian Church by giving some degree of official backing to the growing numbers of progressive clergy.

The early encyclicals concerned with social justice dealt mainly with the plight of the working class in developed nations and although the Popes displayed sympathy for their miserable situation, the advice offered the poor was to resign themselves to their lot, accepting that a marked disparity of wealth in a society was part of God's plan. The rich were exhorted to display charity and generosity in accordance with Christian teachings.

Under the guidance of Pope John XXIII, the Church
made some dramatic changes in her attitude to social problems. *Mater et Magistra, Pacem in Terris* and some of the documents of Vatican II expressed the Church's horror over the unjust international order and encouraged efforts to create a more humane existence for the two thirds of mankind living in the Third World. In 1967, Pope Paul VI following his predecessor's line, published the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* which dealt specifically with the problems of underdevelopment.

The changes directed by the Vatican were accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm. As might be expected, the Colombian hierarchy was the most reluctant in Latin America to promote the new direction the national Churches were encouraged to take.

**The Early Encyclicals**

Although it was not until the 1960's that the Church began to revise her attitude toward the temporal order, there were some encyclicals in the 1800's and early 1900's which expressed concern for social welfare. The most notable was Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* on "The Condition of the Working Class", published in May 1891. In a vehement denunciation of laissez-faire capitalism, this document pointed out the injustice of a system which created the "enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses."\(^1\)

It was not, however, a denunciation of capitalism per se and socialists were labelled as "crafty agitators ...."
intent on [trying] to pervert man's judgements and to stir the people up to revolt."² Private property was emphasized to be a just and natural right and equality would only mean "the levelling down of all to a like condition of misery and degradation."³

The solution the Church offered to the unjust conditions of the time was one of paternalism and Christian love. Class conflict was stated to be unnatural and where such conflict erupts,

... there is no intermediary more powerful than Religion (where of the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing the rich and the poor bread-winners, together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other and especially of the obligations of justice.⁴

Christian precepts would keep down the pride of the rich and incline the poor to "meek resignation" creating conditions where the "rich and poor [will] join hands in friendly concord."⁵ Authority was derived from God and should be exercised with a "fatherly solicitude".⁶ Workers must have fair hours, just wages, proper sanitation and good working conditions and should be "specially cared for and protected by the Government."⁷ In return, they were instructed not to riot or revolt but to give good work and obedience⁸ and in order to keep from being exploited, they should form labour unions. However, the unions must be organized to "pay special and chief attention to the duties of religion and morality."⁹
In May 1931, Pope Pius XI published a follow-up to Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, an encyclical "On Reconstructing the Social Order". Free competition as the deciding factor in economic life was deplored but the major thrust was a condemnation of Marxist socialism. While private property was defended, this encyclical expressed the idea "that men must consider in this matter not only their own advantage but also the common good."10

The document stated that:

... economic dictatorship has supplanted the free market; unbridled ambition for power has likewise succeeded greed for gain; all economic life has become tragically hard, inexorable and cruel.11

It went on to say:

... And as to international relations, two different streams have issued from the one fountain-head: On the one hand, economic nationalism or even economic imperialism; on the other, a no less deadly and accursed internationalism of finance or international imperialism whose country is where profit is ... .12

Again, a solution to the injustice was offered and that solution was to adhere to Christian social philosophy.

The only encyclicals of this period directed specifically to the Third World were those pleading for justice for the Indians. Pope Benedict XIV published one in 1741 which was followed up by Pope Pius X's L'acrimabili Statu in 1912. Pope Pius stated:

Indeed when we consider the crimes and misdeeds which still are commonly done against them, our mind is stricken with horror and we feel the deepest pity for that unhappy race.13

The cruelty toward the Indians was attributed to a combination
of greed and the climate "... which infects the blood with a certain languor and enfeebles strength of character. ..." While both Benedict and Pius condemned acts of violence against the Indians and any efforts to deprive them of their liberty, their attitude remained paternalistic and no effort was made to equip the Indian better to defend himself against the onslaught of the conquering civilization. Again, Christian charity was relied upon to right the wrongs.

The Change in the Vatican

In the early 1900's in France, concern was expressed by some priests for the lack of Christianization in the masses and in 1940's, the first worker-priest went to work as a docker in Marseilles. As the movement grew, it came into increasing conflict with Rome and in 1954, Pope Pius XII ordered all worker-priests to leave their secular jobs. The Pope's major concern was that direct involvement with the working-class would promote the ideas of Marxism. Although the movement suffered a great set-back in the mid-50's, it did not disappear and worker-priests throughout the world continue their efforts to understand the problems of the working class and to spread Christianity.

The efforts of the worker-priests, especially in France and Belgium, coupled with the work of theologians like Emmanuel Mounier and Henri de Lubac, contributed greatly to the idea that the Church should offer more than submission, confession and absolution to the solution of human problems.
When John XXIII became Pope in 1958, he brought to the office "a profound awareness of the gulf between the contemporary problems of the world and the inward-looking attitudes at Rome." He was convinced that the Church needed to make an agonizing reappraisal.

The encyclical *Mater et Magistra*, published in May 1961, was directed specifically to the problems of international social justice and the need to right the wrongs of the international system.

We all share responsibility for the fact that populations are undernourished. Therefore, it is necessary to arouse a sense of responsibility in individuals and generally, especially among those more blessed with this world's goods.

*Mater et Magistra* advised that agricultural goods be equitably distributed but that such emergency aid would not eliminate the problem of inequality. Workers in developing nations must be helped to acquire technical skills and professional competence.

Moreover, economically developed countries should take particular care lest, in giving aid to poorer countries, they endeavor to turn the prevailing political situation to their own advantage and seek to dominate them.

Such domination would be but a new form of colonialism and therefore, political disinterest was urged to be an essential part of aid-giving.

In discussing the population problem, the document acknowledged that the population explosion often wipes out the effects of development in underdeveloped countries.
"Hence, in poorer countries of this sort, the standard of living does not advance and may even deteriorate." Although it is almost inevitable that the situation will get worse, Catholics were warned that the solution could not be found in the use of artificial means of birth control. The Pope put his faith in God's goodness and man's reason and ingenuity to extend his mastery over nature by scientific and technical means.

The solution to the problems outlined in *Mater et Magistra* was an all-out attack on inequality, social injustice, poverty and human degradation and the effort to establish a new order was not limited only to Catholics. "Toward its fulfillment we exhort not only our brothers and sons everywhere, but all men of good will."

In a pronouncement that was surprising to those who saw the Church was an institution existing in an ivory tower far removed from the problems of secular life, section 222 stated:

Hence, though Holy Church has the special task of sanctifying souls and making them partake of supernatural goods, she is also solicitous for the needs of man's daily life, not merely those having to do with bodily nourishment and the material side of life, but those also that concern prosperity and culture in all its many aspects and historical stages.

The encyclical also urged that social doctrine be a required item in the curriculum of Catholic schools and particularly in seminaries. Catholic newspapers, periodicals,
and radio and television programs were asked to help heighten awareness and laymen were urged to become a bridge between the Church and the modern world.\textsuperscript{23}

Pope John's second major encyclical on the problems of international disparity is \textit{Pacem in Terris}, published in April 1963. It dealt with political evolution and supported the idea of a world government, which moral law demands and stated that the nations of the world must be subordinate to the common good of all mankind.

It, too, stressed the need for liberty in developing countries and warned that wealthier states

\[\ldots\text{ in providing varied forms of assistance to the poorer, should respect the moral values and ethnic characteristics peculiar to each, and also that they should avoid any intention of political domination.}\textsuperscript{24}\]

If, however, political domination should occur, he quoted Pius XII in saying:

\begin{quote}
Violence has always achieved only destruction, not construction; the kindling of passions, not their pacification; the accumulation of hate and ruin, not the reconciliation of the contending parties.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

Pope Pius XII placed a great emphasis on the dangers and errors of communism. In contrast, Pope John XXIII put his hope in the promise of fruitful dialogue with those adhering to different ideologies. In both \textit{Mater et Magistra} and \textit{Pacem in Terris}, there was no condemnation of communism and inflammatory language was studiously avoided when making reference to it. For the first time, the United Nations and its intergovernmental agencies were praised despite the fact
that its membership includes communists.\textsuperscript{26} Hope was expressed that communist regimes would change and when they do, that the Church would be there to fill the vacuum. Many saw the absence of attack as proof that the "international left" had made its impact on even the Vatican but the change in tone really marked the beginning of new tactics. The Church no longer aimed to suppress war or communism but to encourage social changes that would remove the causes for both.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Vatican II}

On Pope John XXIII's initiative, steps were taken to set up the Second Vatican Council to discuss the "aggiornamento" (an Italian word meaning bringing up to date) of the Church. Between 1963 and 1965, meetings were held which eventually produced sixteen texts. At first, the press reported the sessions as a battle between conservatives and progressives but by the end of the first session, it was apparent that the majority of the 2,500 bishops in attendance were pushing for reform. They wanted a revision of the hierarchy within the Church and a change in the Church's relations with the modern world. A broad, if guarded sympathy with the forces of liberal humanism was evident.\textsuperscript{28}

The Latin American Church has long had a reputation for political and theological conservatism but the 600 Latin American bishops at the conference including the representatives from Colombia, did not present a united conservative front.
About 100 were decidedly progressive from the beginning and the others voted almost consistently on the progressive side. The greatest influence on the Church's relations with the Third World was found in the "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World". The document recognized that social, cultural, moral and religious transformations have taken place and the Church no longer belittled these changes, but faced up to the need to humanize as well as spiritualize earthly life. For the first time, the Church acknowledged that although she had much to offer the world, the world had much to offer her -- that the Church must listen to the world before she can speak to it.

The Pastoral Constitution began by describing the conditions that exist today.

Never has the human race enjoyed such an abundance of wealth, resources, and economic power. Yet a huge proportion of the world's citizens is still tormented by hunger and poverty, while countless numbers suffer from total illiteracy.

The gap between developed and underdeveloped nations was underlined and it was pointed out that despite some efforts, the poorer nations "continually fall behind while very often their dependence on wealthier nations deepens more rapidly, even in the economic sphere." The impact that technology, urbanization and the abandoning of religion has had on traditional societies was described as well as the generation gap that this produced.

Further on it was stated:
... we are at a moment in history when the development of economic life could diminish social inequalities if that development were guided and co-ordinated in a reasonable and human way. Yet all too often, it serves only to intensify the inequalities. In some places, it even results in a decline in the social status of the weak and in contempt for the poor.

While an enormous mass of people still lack the absolute necessities of life, some, even in less advanced countries, live sumptuously or squander wealth. Luxury and misery rub shoulders.33

Although no explicit solutions were offered to the problem, the former reliance on paternalistic Christianity was absent. It was warned that the international economic system cannot be left under the control of a few wealthy nations34 and that the practices of the modern business world must undergo profound changes.35

If an economic order is to be created which is genuine and universal, there must be an abolition of excess desire for profit, nationalistic pretensions, the lust for political domination, militaristic thinking, and intrigues designed to spread and impose ideologies.36

Developed countries must feel an obligation to increase efforts for global development, working through international organization to coordinate and stimulate economic growth and foster more just trade. The first draft of "International Co-operation in Economic Matters", read that aid should be accepted "with complete honesty and gratitude". The word "gratitude" was later struck out on the grounds that aid is a matter of justice.37

Although international economic and social structures need to be reformed, developing countries were urged to become
more self-reliant—advice which echoes the Communist Chinese view of development. The issue of violent revolution was skirted but it was affirmed that: "If a person is in extreme necessity, he has the right to take from the riches of others what he himself needs." The government was charged with the duty to prevent the misuse of private property but there should be compensation for expropriation. In contrast to the anti-socialist stance of Quadragesimo Anno, approval was given to social or welfare systems in both developed and developing nations.

The document was directed not just to Catholics, but to the whole of humanity. Christians were asked to join with the rest of mankind in the search for solutions to the social problems of the world. Like Pope John's encyclicals, there was no condemnation of communism and while atheism was rejected,

... the Church sincerely professes that all men, believers and unbelievers alike, ought to work for the rightful betterment of this world in which all alike live. Such an ideal cannot be realized, however, apart from sincere and prudent dialogue.

The growing interdependence of men on each other was pointed out and this, it said, results in a need for each social group to take into account the legitimate aspirations of all men and to work to make everything necessary for a truly human life available to all.

... a special obligation binds us to make ourselves the neighbour of absolutely every person, and of actively helping him when he comes across our path....
Respect and love ought to be extended also to those who think or act differently than we do in social, political and religious matters too.45

Not only pluralism in the world at large was accepted but also pluralism within the Catholic Church. For the first time, absolute authority was rejected and in a statement that in effect opened the Church to dialogue with the world, the text asserted:

Yet it happens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that with equal sincerity some of the faithful will disagree with others on a given matter . . . . Hence it is necessary for people to remember that no one is allowed in the aforementioned situations to appropriate the Church's authority for his opinion. They should always try to enlighten one another through honest discussion, preserving mutual charity and caring above all for the common good.46

An amiable separation of Church and state was approved and there was no mention made of the need for Christian or Catholic political parties. Democracy, where the free will of the people determines the form of government and selects the leaders was advocated. It is not surprising that the Church chose to support democracy because in a democratic system, she is guaranteed the most freedom to operate as she sees fit. Although the Church "must in no way be confused with the political community, nor bound to any political system",47 she had a duty to pass moral judgements on some political regimes and on international problems like the arms race.

For laymen, however, the logical consequence to total Christian commitment was political involvement and high praise
was given to Catholics working to bring about social change. The gap between the faith they professed and the lives that most Catholics led was noted as one of their most serious failings making them at least partly responsible for the increase of atheism.48 Seeking heavenly salvation did not discharge them from their duty to work to reshape earthly existence.

In the document on Christian education, the Church reasserted the right to separate schools.

... the Church gives high praise to civil authorities ... that show regard for the pluralistic character of modern society, and take into account the right of religious liberty, by helping families in such a way that in all schools the education of their children can be carried out according to the moral and religious convictions of each family.49

However, there was a new emphasis on the need for Catholic schools to relate education to a pluralistic society and to their duty to educate "... students to promote effectively the welfare of the earthly city."50

Pluralism was also a recognized fact in the "Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church". The emphasis of the document was on proselytizing rather than on means to better the lot of indigenous peoples, but for the first time, the Church relinquished her religious monopoly. Ecumenism was stressed and Catholic missions were urged to

... search out ways and means for bringing about and directing fraternal co-operation as well as harmonious living with the missionary undertakings of other Christian communities.51
Vatican II suffered from a shortage of skilled social scientists and economists working on the documents as well as from the lack of an adequately developed theology to deal with contemporary social and political problems. It has also been criticized for its too positive and hopeful approach which is evident in statements like:

Now for the first time in human history, all people are convinced that the benefits of culture ought to be and actually can be extended to everyone.

However, there was an absence of the kind of triumphal assertions found in earlier encyclicals and for the first time, the Church accepted a large measure of responsibility for the conditions of the world. Although she made no attempt to give answers to the problems, she did make efforts to define her own position and to initiate a dialogue between the Church and the world. The spirit of Vatican II was new, creating a vision of the Church as a servant and as Pope Paul said at the closing ceremony of the Council, "the idea of service has been central." The greatest effect of the Council has been its encouragement of free discussion within the Church. It has also stimulated a considerable proportion of both clergy and laymen to seek a new synthesis between their faith and the world they live in which has inspired a changed conception of secular responsibility. Many theologians viewed Vatican II as the beginning of what would likely be a long revolution within the Church.
Popularum Progressio

In 1967, Pope Paul published an encyclical concerned specifically with the problems of development. Its appeal was directed mainly to developed nations and their responsibility to ameliorate conditions in the Third World. Colonialism, with its resultant development of one-crop economies, was criticized but the scientific and technical benefits brought by the colonial powers were praised.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, the work of missionaries was positively affirmed but their ethnocentric attitudes were repremanded, underlining the fact that the Church no longer wished to be associated with one culture.\textsuperscript{58}

The encyclical condemned again what Pope Pius XI called "the international imperialism of money" and asserted that certain types of capitalism have been the source of injustice and inequality.\textsuperscript{59} There was no suggestion of the abolition of the competitive market but free trade was labelled as unjust as long as the partners are unequal. International agreements to regulate prices and support new industries,\textsuperscript{60} as well as interest-free or low interest loans and the cancellation of debts were all suggested as ways to combat the perils of neo-colonialism.\textsuperscript{61} Aid, equity in trade relations and universal charity were the three steps suggested to increase human solidarity which would decrease suffering.\textsuperscript{62}

We must make haste: too many are suffering, and the distance is growing that separates the progress of some and the stagnation, not to say the regression of others.\textsuperscript{63}
Development demands bold transformations, innovations that go deep. Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay.64

Statements like these were strong but their effect was moderated considerably by an "escape clause" which cautioned that the process of development must be smooth and hasty reforms would only result in failure.65

"To speak of Development is, in effect, to show as much concern for social progress as for economic growth."66 Because economic growth is dependent on social progress, basic education has to be the first object of any plan of development.67 Social progress also demands the limitation of population expansion.68 Although the role of the sexual expression of love in marriage was acknowledged for the first time in the previous documents of Vatican II,69 artificial means of birth control were still ruled out.

In keeping with the other modern social encyclicals, the right to private property was to be exercised only when it did not override the common good and if landed estates were not properly used, the common good might demand their expropriation. Unlike Vatican II, no mention was made of the need to compensate for expropriation.70

Populorum Progressio was noted for its coming to grips with the problem of revolutionary violence.

There are certainly situations whose injustice cries to heaven. When whole populations destitute of necessities live in a state of dependence barring them from all initiative and responsibility, and all opportunity to advance culturally and share in social
and political life, recourse to violence, as a means to right these wrongs to human dignity, is a grave temptation.71

We know, however, that a revolutionary uprising—save where there is manifest, long-standing tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country—produces new injustices, throws more elements out of balance and brings on new disasters. A real evil should not be fought against at the cost of greater misery.72

Clearly, the Church was not advocating violence but it was taking a stance—albeit a cautious one—on the side of the masses and against an oppressive ruling elite.

The new emphasis on the importance of secular concerns as well as the encouragement of ecumenism, came out in the statement:

The struggle against destitution, though urgent and necessary is not enough. It is a question, rather, of building a world where every man, no matter what his race, religion or nationality, can live a fully human life, freed from servitude imposed on him by other men or by national forces over which he has not sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an empty word. ...73

The encyclical ended with an appeal to laymen to work to reform the temporal order, to educators to awaken concern for peoples of the Third World and to the press to promote mutual assistance and keep the wealthy of the world aware of those who live in misery. Finally, it asked governments to co-operate in peace and work for brotherhood.74

Conclusion

As has been pointed out, the documents concerning development issued by the Vatican in the 1960's have marked
a dramatic change in the Church's attitude. However, although they displayed a relatively good understanding of the problem, the suggestions to ameliorate the suffering of two-thirds of the world's population were remarkably naive. Far too much faith was placed in a sense of human solidarity which would inspire the wealthy through good will, charity and love to relinquish their position of dominance. The fact is, that a feeling of international human solidarity is non-existent and no system, however unjust, is going to willingly bring about its own destruction.

Throughout history, the Church has displayed an extraordinary ability to survive and the changes initiated by Pope John, although undoubtedly motivated by genuine concern for the plight of the Third World, are but another step to ensure that this survival continues. It was realized that development is essential to peace and that without some progress, the peoples of underdeveloped nations will turn to totalitarianism. However, the Church refused to recognize that capitalistic democratic regimes have proven to be unable to cope with the overwhelming problems involved in an effort to develop. Furthermore, there was no recognition of the fact that there are simply not enough resources to support a global consumer society of the type upon which capitalism depends. There are condemnations of some aspects of capitalism and a few cautious approvals of social welfare measures but the fear of communism — although not specifically expressed —
was blatantly evident.

The social doctrine documents of Vatican II were widely distributed among both clergy and involved laymen in Latin America. Enthusiasm for the "new Church" ran high but much of the spirit of Rome seemed to dissipate on the long journey from Italy to Latin America and many of the hierarchy displayed their traditional conservative outlook once they were home. Shortly after the end of the Council, the Archbishop of Colombia stated: "... in what is social, there are disputable things, and the Church does not enter disputable fields because its truth is permanent." He went as far as to suspend the publication of the Church's official weekly, El Catholicismo in 1965 for commenting on issues raised by the Ecumenical Council of Vatican II.

Despite these criticisms, the changes initiated by the Vatican have had far-reaching consequences. The Church was now theoretically, at least, firmly aligned with the forces of liberalism and the move has given substantial backing to a few notable bishops and many parish priests working against the conservative forces. Most of the Third World's leftist clergy are far more radical than the official Vatican pronouncements but the documents of Vatican II and Populorum Progressio have added a degree of acceptability to their stance. Changes in Rome have also forced ultra-conservative national hierarchies, like the one in Colombia, to initiate some reforms. They undoubtedly contributed to the work of
Camilo Torres, Colombia's first guerrilla-priest, and an internationally acknowledged martyr of the Catholic left. It is Torres's challenge to the Colombian Church that will be the subject of the next chapter.
Footnotes

2. Ibid., p. 167.
3. Ibid., p. 172.
4. Ibid., p. 174.
5. Ibid., p. 178.
6. Ibid., p. 183.
7. Ibid., p. 184.
8. Ibid., p. 178.
9. Ibid., p. 192.
11. Ibid., p. 235.
12. Ibid., p. 235.
18. Ibid., no. 171, p. 56.
19. Ibid., no. 187, p. 60.
20. Ibid., no. 189, p. 60.
21. Ibid., no. 221, p. 69.


25. Ibid., no. 162, p. 55.

26. Ibid., nos. 142-145, pp. 48-49.

27. Riga, op.cit., p. 197.


29. Ibid., pp. 118-119.


32. Ibid., no. 9, p. 207.

33. Ibid., no. 63, pp. 271-272.

34. Ibid., no. 65, p. 273.

35. Ibid., no. 85, p. 299.

36. Ibid., no. 85, p. 299.


38. Abbott, op.cit., no. 86, pp. 300-301.

39. Ibid., no. 69, p. 278.

40. Ibid., no. 71, p. 281.

41. Ibid., no. 69, pp. 278-279.
42. Ibid., no. 16, p. 214.
43. Ibid., no. 21, p. 219.
44. Ibid., no. 27, p. 226.
45. Ibid., no. 28, p. 227.
46. Ibid., no. 43, p. 244.
47. Ibid., no. 76, p. 287.
48. Ibid., no. 30, pp. 228-229.
50. Ibid., no. 8, p. 646.
55. Campion, op.cit., p.77.
58. Ibid., no. 12, p. 9.
59. Ibid., no. 26, p. 17.
60. Ibid., no. 61, pp. 36-37.
61. Ibid., no. 47, p. 29.
62. Ibid., nos. 47-79, pp. 29-44.
63. Ibid., no. 29, p. 19.
64. Ibid., no. 32, p. 20.
65. Ibid., no. 29, p. 19.
66. Ibid., no. 34, p. 21.
67. Ibid., no. 35, p. 22.
68. Ibid., no. 37, p. 23.
70. "Populorum Progressio," op.cit., no. 24, p.16.
71. Ibid., no. 30, p. 19.
72. Ibid., no. 31, p. 20.
73. Ibid., no. 47, p. 29.
74. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
75. Ibid., no. 11, p. 8.
76. Alexander W. Wilde, "Death of a Rebel Priest," Commonweal LXXXIII (March 18, 1966), 695:
CHAPTER IV

THE CHALLENGE OF CAMILO TORRES

The duty of every Catholic is to be a revolutionary.
The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolu­tionion.

(Camilo Torres)

The life of Camilo Torres is a story of personal evolution from elitist to liberal socialist to radical revolu­tionary. Camilo was born in Bogota in 1929, the son of upper class, well respected parents. He attended the best schools where he was an indifferent scholar showing a marked preference for social activities. After one year of studying law at the Catholic university, he became interested in reli­gion under the influence of a group of visiting French Domin­icans and he entered a seminary. When he returned to Bogota, he was little changed. Handsome before, he was even more striking in his long black robes and he continued to mix with the elite of Bogota, attending official functions and gaining a minor reputation for enamouring young nuns. Probably to get rid of him for a while, the Church sent him in 1955 to Louvain in Belgium to study.

In the mid 50's, Louvain was a hot-bed of revolution. Studying social and political science, Camilo was exposed to the works of Emmanuel Mounier and the Roman Catholic socialism of the Jesuit, Roger Vekemans. He travelled in Europe, joined
worker-priests collecting garbage in Paris for a short while and formed a group of Colombian students in Louvain who met to discuss how they could best put their training to use in Latin America. When he returned to Colombia in 1959, the National Front was securely in office; John XXIII was promoting new ideas in Rome; John Kennedy became President of the United States in 1960, and in this atmosphere of hopeful, evolutionary change, Camilo Torres was a rising star.2

The National University in Bogota eagerly accepted Camilo as chaplain and also as a lecturer in sociology. He did not work as a parish priest among the impoverished and isolated but, as a professor of privileged university students, he founded the "Movement for Community Improvement", working with his students in a slum in Bogota. It was here that he discovered the importance of having the people work as agents for change in their own lives.3

In 1962, ten students, pushing for reform, were expelled from the university which action triggered a student strike. Camilo sided with two of the students he believed were unjustly accused, and backed the student demands that professorships be awarded on the basis of national competitive exams and that the university be given authentic autonomy.4 The students proposed that he be made the next rector and Archbishop Concha ordered him to resign his post. He obeyed his superior and wrote: "... it would be deeply painful to me if any of this were regarded as a banner for temporal
struggles.\textsuperscript{5} He then took a post as the dean of the Institute of Social Administration, a section of the School of Public Administration, a job which included a position on the board of the Colombian Institute of Agricultural Reform (INCORA). It was his work with INCORA which included efforts to form mobile units to spread information about agrarian reform, that brought him into contact with the masses, gradually convincing him that neither the Church nor the state were moved by the misery of the majority of Colombians. In his view, the problems of social justice were avoided by the clergy and the politicians who engaged in rhetoric and avoided constructive action.\textsuperscript{6}

Although much of his sociological work was of a high quality, he was constantly oscillating between theoretical research and concrete involvement. Also, his move to the left came too late to affect his scholarly publications. During \textit{la violencia}, rebels seized some areas of Colombia and set up independent "Republics". In his paper on "Social Change and Rural Violence in Colombia", published in 1963, Torres expressed a belief that these "Republics" would ultimately force the ruling class to begin development programs.\textsuperscript{7} When the army crushed the rebels without making any concessions, Torres revised his thinking. He believed that \textit{la violencia} had been a useful tool of the elite, perpetuated by them to keep the masses divided. Only when violence was no longer
under some degree of control — only when it posed a very real threat to traditional authorities — did they chose to end the bloodshed by instituting a democratic farce they called the National Front. 8

Torres's efforts to work to bring about non-violent change lasted approximately five years and by 1964, he was becoming increasingly radical. The popular class continued to suffer and in 1964 in Colombia, 24 families virtually controlled the economy which was overly dependent on coffee exports. Thirty to 40 per cent of the urban population lived in slums, 20 per cent were unemployed and 150,000 workers entered the labour force each year to compete for the 12,000 new jobs available annually. Sixty-one per cent of the agricultural land was owned by 3.6 per cent of the landowners. Less than ten per cent of the people had clean water and less than five per cent had electricity. The infant mortality rate was greater than ten per cent and an estimated 25,000 children died each year of malnutrition. Thirty per cent of the people had no education, eighty-six per cent had no secondary schooling and only three per cent attended university. 9

Until this year, Torres was anti-capitalist but he advocated only liberal socialist reforms rather than promoting structural revolutionary changes. 10 His new radical approach was first evident in a paper presented at the Second International Congress of Pro Mundi Vita in Louvain in September 1964. In an obvious reference to Colombia, his paper stated:
In countries where Church and State are united, the Church is an instrument of the ruling elite. Moreover, when the Church possesses great economic power and controls the educational system, the Church is sharing in the power of the ruling minority.11

He stressed that fundamental structural changes — the overthrow of the elite and the restructuring of the economy to serve the needs of the people — would not come about without pressure from below and that only the foresight of the ruling classes could determine whether or not a peaceful revolution could be possible. He criticized the monolithic dogmatism of Christians and stated that in developing countries, they have an obligation to work toward structural change and in doing so, must enter into collaboration with Marxists.12

The United Front

In 1957, voter turnout in the Colombian national elections was over seventy per cent but by 1962, disillusionment with the National Front prompted over seventy per cent of the eligible voters to abstain.13 In an effort to capture the support of the disenchanted and the non-aligned and form a united leftist movement, Torres started the United Front as a challenge to the National Front. He recognized the need to form a pluralist political apparatus and managed to attract to his side the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL), a leftist wing of the Liberal Party led by Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (son of the reformer President of the 1930's), as well as
Christian Democrats and Communists. His movement did not aim at forming a new political party. It was instead, an effort to create a broad based coalition of followers large enough to challenge the traditional parties and expose the undemocratic nature of Colombia's political system.

The Platform he published in March 1965 is hardly distinguishable from hundreds of other similar Latin American leftist platforms. It called for land reform, urban reform, the abolition of free enterprise, a progressive income tax and improvements in health, education, and welfare. Private property was not to be abolished and the only communist tinge was a proposal to nationalize banks, hospitals and natural resources. In essence, the Platform was not important because it was radical but because it presented a real choice to Colombians and was a program which could generate a mass following.

On May 22, 1965, after six years of unsuccessful efforts to reform his country, Camilo announced that as a Colombian, a sociologist, a Christian and a priest, he was a revolutionary. As a Colombian, he could no longer disregard the struggles of his people. As a sociologist, he now realized that a solution could not be reached without a revolution. As a Christian, because the essence of Christianity is to love one's neighbour, he claimed that only a revolution could achieve the best possible life for the popular class. As a priest, his devotion to the Christian cause demanded that
revolutionary action be taken to fulfill his mission.  

**Conflict with the Church**

I took off my cassock to be more truly a priest.  
(Camilo Torres)  

Even before he published his condemnation of the Colombian Church in Belgium, Torres wrote in 1964:

The ecclesiastical power in our country is united to the financial and political powers because they possess interests in common. The conformity of ecclesiastics lends support ensuring the maintenance of these interests.

In May of 1965, he responded to President Valencia's accusations that Communists had infiltrated the Church by saying:

Communism holds a philosophical system incompatible with Christianity, although in its socio-economic aspirations most of its postulates do not conflict with the Christian faith.

He believed that only Christianity and Marxism were in a position to lead a revolution because only they had a world view, and he advised Colombian clergy to place greater emphasis on the preservation of humanity and less on preserving humanity from communism. He also urged that occasional paternalistic charitable measures be discarded and that a secular body be formed by Colombians recognizing the need for change to transform temporal structures.

When the Platform of the United Front was published, Archbishop Concha Cordoba issued a press statement claiming it contained points "irreconcilable to the doctrine of the Church." Camilo asked him to specify his remarks but he
refused. It was at this time that he was asked to resign his post as dean of the Institute of Social Administration and was offered a job doing research in the Church's statistics department in Bogota, which he turned down.

In mid-June, he began a campaign against the Catholic hierarchy and claimed that "the Colombian clergy is the most backward in the world." Only a poor Church could be progressive and he spoke out strongly in favour of expropriating Church property. On June 18, Archbishop Concha warned Colombians against this dangerous priest and on June 26, 1965, he requested, under pressure from the hierarchy, to be returned to the ranks of the laity. Camilo was given a choice by the Cardinal — to abandon his cause or give up the priesthood. In a statement published in El Tiempo on June 25, 1965, he explained his reasons for choosing the latter.

> When circumstances impede men from devoting themselves to Christ, the priest's proper duty is to combat these circumstance, even at the cost of his being able to celebrate the eucharistic rite. . . .

He believed that the essence of Christianity is the precept "love thy neighbour" and said:

> Upon analyzing Colombian society, I realized the need for a revolution that would give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, clothing to the naked, and bring about the well-being of the majorities in our country. I feel that the revolutionary struggle is a Christian and a priestly struggle.

He never stopped considering himself a priest but now, he devoted all his time to politics and his attacks on the Church did not subside. He called the Concordat of 1888
an anachronism and expected it to be terminated after Vatican II claiming that it "has been converted into a political instrument, a subject of dispute between the traditional political parties." He added:

I believe that the Colombian Catholic Church unfortunately because it possesses material wealth, follows, at least among its hierarchy, the wisdom of men rather than the wisdom of God.

In August 1965, he began publishing Frente Unido, a paper which quickly sold out 50,000 copies each week. One issue pictured the Archbishop with business and political friends, seated at a table overflowing with food and alongside, stood one of the thousands of ragged, undernourished, Indo-Colombian children. From August until December, he published twelve messages in Frente Unido directed to various target groups in Colombian society, attacking the status quo and winning the support of the masses. He criticized the lack of class consciousness in the country and pointed out to the unemployed that things could not possibly change as long as the oligarchy continued to strengthen ties with U.S imperialism. He emphasized the need to redistribute income in order to increase the internal market and then, to diversify exports and begin industrialization.

Because Camilo realized that the ruling classes in Colombia were incapable of developing the foresight to allow a peaceful revolution, the most fundamental element of the United Front was an educational program aimed at creating
awareness and stimulating class consciousness in order to build up pressure from below.\textsuperscript{31} In his Platform, he called for free and compulsory education until the end of technical or secondary school. Universities, he said, should have one major role — to study and to attempt to resolve national problems.\textsuperscript{32} Now, he called on the students to join the workers and spread the idea of revolution in the lower classes.\textsuperscript{33}

Although he had been involved with the Indians while working with INCORA and had criticized that government body for being insufficiently concerned with education for the Indians, none of his messages was directed specifically to the indigenous people. His only reference to the Indians appeared in the United Front Platform which proposed that native communities be strengthened by giving them land.

Travelling around Colombia from May to September 1965, he did what few Latin American revolutionary leaders have managed to accomplish in recent years. With his message of popular control of the government, expropriation of landed estates without compensation, nationalization of natural resources and urban reform, he built up a following of trade unionists, students and peasants. Figures on the number of United Front adherents are not available. The movement sprung up quickly but what likely happened is that in each new area Camilo travelled to, he gathered in new recruits but when he moved on, those who had joined because they were swayed by his passionate oratory, quickly lost interest.
In spite of the fact that the majority of United Front followers were attracted mainly by Camilo's dynamic personality, the movement grew large enough to worry the oligarchy. They offered him a seat on the national Senate, a position of influence in the Church, made veiled and open threats and finally offered to finance his campaign if he would run in the next elections as leader of the opposition. He refused to run claiming that Colombian elections were a sham and his candidacy would only help support the oligarchy's claim that Colombia's government was democratic. Unlike Lopez Michlesen, the leader of the MRL, and his Communist Party supporters, Camilo had no faith in the electoral process of reform and urged his followers to abstain from voting.

At first, the United Front program lacked definition but as his speeches and editorials grew more doctrinaire, factionalism increased. At the communal and neighbourhood level, groups were dominated by leaders from Christian Democrats to Communists and as Fals Forda pointed out, the pluralist apparatus "instead of manifesting the expected tolerance, turned the subversion into a Tower of Babel." The Christian Democrats withdrew their support in September, the circulation of Frente Unido declined and in October 1965, Torres joined the Cuban oriented guerrilla group, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN).
The Priest as a Guerrilla

The Catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal sin. (Camilo Torres)

After la violencia, violence in rural Colombia did not abate completely but was instead transformed. Gradually groups of roving bandits were replaced by guerrillas. The almost thirty year struggle by peasants and later by guerrilla leaders to alter the structure of land-ownership did not change statistics but it did, in some areas, begin to create a new feeling of group solidarity and sureness among the campesinos. Because of this result, unforeseen by the ruling class, la violencia was seen by Torres and others as the most important socio-cultural change in Colombia since the Spanish conquest.

The ELN was the first well-organized revolutionary guerrilla group to form in Colombia. When it was founded in 1963-64, the recruits were mainly students who followed the Castroite line. Two other guerrilla groups had been operating in Colombia since the mid 1960's — the Moscow-line Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), and the pro-Peking Ejercito de Liberacion Popular (ELP). The three guerrilla groups were the only real opposition to the National Front and although they each had periodic victories, the army, with U.S. training, managed to keep their minimal successes temporary. Torres's addition to the ranks of the ELN made it party to a historical political event in Latin
America. Revolutionary circles were enthusiastic at the prospect of harnessing the Roman Catholic faithful to the revolutionary movement.\textsuperscript{40}

In January 1966, leaflets were spread around Bogota picturing Camilo Torres in guerrilla uniform under a heading "Liberacion o Muerte". The leaflets urged Colombians to take up arms against the oligarchy.\textsuperscript{41} The same month, Camilo’s only message written from the mountains was published in \textit{El Vespertino}. The "Message to Colombians" called on the poor to take up arms against the oligarchy because armed struggle was the only way left to bring justice to Colombian society. He warned that the struggle would be long and drawn-out but that victory was assured "because a people that throws itself into the struggle until death will always achieve victory."\textsuperscript{42}

With the exception of posing in guerrilla uniform for the leaflets and the one message sent from the mountains, Camilo’s life in the hills was the same as that of any guerrilla.\textsuperscript{43}

The next month, on February 15, 1966, Torres was killed in a skirmish with the Colombian army. Student riots and rallies protested his death and fearing another \underline{Bogotazo} — the riots that triggered \underline{la violencia} — his brother and other influential people appealed for peace. The sporadic violence quickly ended.

\textbf{The Legacy of Camilo Torres}

Both critics and supporters of Camilo Torres agree
on one point—his death made him far more powerful as a symbol than he was alive as a revolutionary. As a true Colombian revolutionary, a continental hero second only to Che Guevara and, more important, as an international martyr of the Catholic left, Torres has shaken assumptions and inspired revolutionaries throughout the world.

The Colombian oligarchy, after failing to prevent his joining the guerrillas, was obviously pleased by his death but reacted in a magnanimous manner, assuring the people that what he had tried to do was unnecessary. The people responded with demonstrations and eulogies. February 1966 marked the point of greatest intensification of intra-Church conflict in Colombia and clerics were forced to openly support or condemn Torres.

The most critical were the Jesuits who had been cooperating closely with the Liberal-Conservative coalition. Torres was a threat because he had recruited support from all the groups with which the Jesuits worked most closely—the UTC labour union, university students, youth and communal action organizations. The Jesuits were organizing groups of peasants to get land legally by paying compensation for expropriation. Camilo had urged the peasants to seize the land which was theirs by right of necessity and to refuse to pay compensation. Furthermore, Torres had called for free secondary education which would have meant the abolition of expensive tuition fees at Jesuit high schools. While other
conservative clergy labelled Torres as "mentally imbalanced", a "madman" or a "demagogue", the Jesuits, in their denunciations, emphasized one point—that he had disobeyed the Cardinal.\textsuperscript{46}

The Jesuits were backed in their attack by the United States Jesuit publication, \textit{America}. In a mocking editorial the latter stated:

\begin{quote}
\ldots whatever may be said of his practical judgments, his motives were as pure as Galahad's. His presence charmed everyone, and his impassioned appeals to kick out the oligarchy and give the 'little fellow' a better deal whipped up enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

The editorial portrayed Torres as a charismatic spell-binder whose concepts were "ill-digested and impractical". In a final insulting comparison, it claimed: "Like Jimmy Dean, Camilo after his death, became a cult."\textsuperscript{48}

In a similar vein, a \textit{New York Times} editorial called his death "a colourful note to a spectacular career."\textsuperscript{49} It criticized his lack of a sense of political timing, pointing out that by the second half of 1965, conditions had improved a great deal in Colombia. Inflation had dropped thirty-five per cent in six months, a recently negotiated loan was to bring $332 million into the economy and income taxes for the wealthy had been raised.

Although the dark patches remain, Father Torres has chosen a poor time to make his sensational move—and a poor method. Colombia, like other Latin-American countries, needs evolution, not revolution.\textsuperscript{50}

As Fals Borda explained, Torres attempted to form a
pluralist utopia based on Christianity and politics. He had two basic ideas: the dignity to be gained through nationalism (anti-United States imperialism), technical control and communal action; and the moral justification of rebellion or counter-violence. His utopia was not clerical, not Liberal or Conservative and not a copy of European models. It was instead a society in which differences of opinion were to be respected for the purpose of increasing the common good within a just structure.51

The United Front died out as quickly as it had sprung up and the reasons for Camilo's failure were many. He was not a particularly adept politician and although he had a clear idea of what society should be, he was hazy on how to achieve the goals. The disconfianza—the rootlessness, hopelessness, and bitterness of the peasants made them more prone to amorphous violence or apathy than revolution. Groups from the Alliance for Progress to the Communist parties have failed to overcome this feeling. Despite the glaring evidence that Latin America needs a revolution, it was not yet ripe for revolution.52

United States intervention—not only its role in the economy and its historic backing of the elite, but also its anti-subversive measures—has been decisive in maintaining the status quo. The other major block to reform is the inability in all of Latin America to form a united left. Only
Fidel Castro's "26 of July Movement" succeeded in overcoming leftist factionalism. In Colombia, there was a lack of commitment on the part of leftist intellectuals to organize the peasantry and the guerrillas have been the major group to recognize the vital importance of the peasantry. Agrarian reform is necessary to provide a stable base for industrialization.\(^5\)

The most decisive political struggle waged by Camilo was his repudiation of what he called the two-party dictatorship established by the National Front.\(^5\) Camilo's Platform and his "messages" certainly meet the definition of development given at the beginning of this paper but his efforts failed. In order to modernize, a government must have the support of its people and to the extent that Camilo undermined that support, it can be questioned whether his actions were more positive or negative to the cause of development.

In its brief period of success the United Front raised great hopes in the Colombian masses. When he joined the ELN, Camilo knew that he laid himself open to attack. With the growing rifts in his movement, and his consequent inability to bring about reform within a legal framework, Camilo hoped that his assistance to the guerrillas would be meaningful and that his struggle would become exemplary. He did take the revolutionary struggle out of the universities and to the masses but he left no organization to carry on his work.\(^5\) Houtart, a theologian Camilo knew well in Belgium
has written:

Even if we cannot approve of it, Camilo's gesture has a prophetic meaning: to recall to his people their sin. Let us hope that at least some of them will understand. 56

Donald E. Smith describes Camilo as a humanist and given the institutional violence permeating Colombian society, he points out the possibility that authentic humanism in such a situation might well demand revolutionary action. 57 According to Slant, an English magazine dedicated to the formation of a revolutionary Roman Catholic Church:

In a very real sense, Torres was the embodiment of what Slant stands for, the working out of a Christian mission in terms of a revolutionary community of belief. 58

The Colombian correspondent to the Latin American Department of the National Council of Churches in the United States has written:

. . . In Colombia, the 'case' of Camilo Torres Restrepo did reveal one thing of importance: there exists a revolutionary potential in Christianity which can be understood and felt by the masses in Colombia. And this 'potentiality' alone produces a superstitious panic among the domineering and exploiting classes. 59

In his effort to create a broad-based leftist coalition, Camilo often de-emphasized his connection to religion. However, he did at times, use religion in his appeal for political mobilization and his greatest stress was placed on the same Christian teaching he had used to justify his own laicization—the command to "love thy neighbour". He urged Catholics to put into practice "the love for our fellow man,
the essence of our religion." He assured the people that since the hierarchy had declined to point out where the United Front Platform violated Church doctrine, Catholics need have no compunctions about joining the movement.

His Message to Christians advised them that they had an obligation to fight tyranny and that "... Revolution is not only permissible but obligatory for Christians who see in it the one effective and complete way to create love for all." In his appeal to the Communists, he stressed the similarities between Christianity and communism and said: "... even though the Communists themselves do not know it, there are many among them who are truly Christian."

Torres attempted to use the transformative capacity that Eisenstadt recognized in religion. He used his position as a priest, a figure of authority and respect, and combined it with traditional Christian precepts to add a degree of comforting familiarity and reassurance to the revolutionary ideas he preached.

It was the combination of modern revolutionary social message presented within the framework of a traditional doctrine by a dynamic, articulate, and prestigious figure breaking from the traditional system of authority, which presented the greatest single challenge to the Colombian elite.

Camilo contributed a great deal to the awakening of the Colombian masses and thus, to the movement to apply pressure from below for change not only within the oligarchy but also within the hierarchy of the Church. He was at least
as aware as the New York Times editors of the timing of his move but, realizing that he was working against impossible odds and recognizing that successful revolutions are based on a long series of thwarted attempts, he made his choice. John Womack Jr. pointed out the dilemma which faced Camilo:

In Colombia, still, the more informed and the more concerned a man is about his country, the more consciously he lives a lie—or the more subversive he becomes... In the end, for the few who push so far, the choice is still moral or physical suicide.65
Footnotes


6. Ibid., Zeitlin, "Introduction: Camilo’s Colombia!" , p. 7.


12. Ibid., pp. 223-231.


14. See Appendix for the complete Platform of the United Front.


17. Gerassi, op.cit., p. XIII.


22. Ibid., p. 273.


24. Ibid., p. 274.


26. Ibid., pp. 264-265.


28. Ibid., p. 304.


37. Gerassi, op.cit., p. XIII.


39. Ibid., pp. 115-116. The leftist faction of the Liberal Party, the MRL led by Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, had disintegrated by 1967. The former dictator, Rojas Pinilla, formed the ANAPO (Alianza Nacional Popular) in 1960 and had been running candidates as either Liberals or Conservatives since then. Opposition parties were allowed to run in the 1970 elections in order to gradually open electoral competition for the 1974 elections when the National Front came to an end. In the 1970 elections, when ANAPO stood as a legal opposition party, Rojas was winning by such a margin that the official reporting of the voting returns was cut off. The next morning it was announced that the incumbent Conservative President, Pastrano had won by a small margin.


43. Ibid., p. 30.

44. Ibid., p. 32.


46. Ibid., p. 188.


48. Ibid., p. 214.
50. Ibid., p. 28.
52. Wilde, op.cit., p. 695.
61. Ibid., p. 282.
64. Petras and Zeitlin, op.cit., p. 336.
65. Womack, op.cit., p. 16.
CHAPTER V

THE GROWING RIFT IN THE CHURCH

Introduction

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, several events in Colombia prompted the Church to move away from its strict conservative stance. The historic visit of Pope Paul VI to Bogota in August 1968 to attend the 39th International Eucharistic Congress, was important not because it stimulated reform but, rather, because it split the Church further by showing the limited extent to which the Vatican and the Colombian hierarchy were willing to act on the new rhetoric. However, the comfort to the hierarchy of the Pope's reactionary statements did not last long for immediately following his short visit, the second general conference of Latin American Bishops, CELAM, was held in Medellin, Colombia. The meetings resulted in the publication of a set of controversial guidelines written to apply to the Latin American Church as a whole.

The contrast between the Pope's words and the "Medellin Statements" further intensified the growing rift in the Colombian Church and by the late 1960's, an organization of radical clergy known as the "Golconda Group" was posing a very real threat to the unity between Church and state. During its four years of existence, the Golconda Group became a major pressure group for the poor in Colombia.
The Pope in Colombia

The only people in the streets were fruit-sellers and Pope-sellers -- innumerable little Popes were sold at every street corner, on handkerchiefs, paper, glasses, bread and cakes, even on petrol pumps: "Welcome, pilgrim, Esso greets you"; and respectable firms had their signs up: "Chrysler Imperial takes its part in the Holy Father's visit", "The Association of Funeral Directors is overjoyed by the International Eucharistic Congress", "Welcome pilgrim, Welcome to Paul VI, envoy of love, the cement companies greet you . . . envoy of love, the beer companies thank you . . . envoy of love, the lottery welcomes you -- become a millionaire! . . . "

Before his arrival, radical clergy across the continent wrote open letters to the Pope, imploring him not to visit Colombia.

Do not come, do not make yourself the accomplice of those who are selling their country and exploiting and torturing the people.  2

This Congress intended to honour the poverty of Christ is going to be celebrated in a country where 30,000 children die from hunger and malnutrition every year. Tens of millions of dollars have been invested in the preparations to ensure the greatest possible outward success, outstanding pomp, the height of ostentation. But the masses will still hunger for justice and for the basic needs of survival. 3

As Mgr. German Guzman Campos, the spiritual heir to Camilo Torres, stated in an editorial in Frente Unido, the Catholic Church was faced with the choice of being a church of the people or an institutional church which was not a true church at all.  4 The Colombian hierarchy, with the support of the oligarchy, chose the latter.

Every effort was made to ensure that the Pope was given a false image of Colombian society. In honour of his visit to Bogota, a highway had been constructed from the
airport at El Dorado into the city and the bright new street lights obscured the few hovels still left along the road. The city was disinfected for the Holy Father's two-day visit. Most of the gamines, the estimated 5,000 homeless street-children in Bogota, were rounded up along with beggars, thieves, cripples, lepers and shoeshine boys. These eyesores, the shame of the Colombian elite, were packed into buses and transported to the country for an enforced two-day holiday.⁵

The main reason for the Pope's visit was to retract *Populorum Progressio's* cautious statement justifying revolutionary violence under certain conditions. In a regressive move, the Pope reiterated the age-old praise of poverty as a condition more conducive to the realization of spiritual values and the bliss of heaven in eternity.⁶ He expressed concern for the poverty in Latin America but his statements contained no reference to the historic and still-perpetuated exploitation under which Latin America was suffering. Christian dignity was proposed as the solution to the problems of inequality and poverty; by contrast, violence was categorically rejected as "contrary to the Christian spirit. . . . Violence is not evangelical, it is not Christian."⁷ He stressed the "beatitude of evangelical poverty" and told the Colombian masses:

. . . your condition as humble folk is more propitious for the kingdom of heaven, that is, for the supreme and eternal blessing of life, if it is borne with the patience and hope of Christ.⁸
According to a British journalist present, this statement was greeted with an audible groan from the 200,000 peasants brought in from surrounding areas to hear the Pope. After centuries of suffering, the official change in attitude from the Vatican and, even more, the example of Camilo Torres had stirred new hopes in the peasants—hopes which the Pope's speech effectively crushed. His lack of analysis of the causes of poverty and his identification with civil, military and religious representatives of the established powers in Bogota, identified him symbolically, if not in intention, on the side of the status quo. As Alain Gheerbrant stated, the Pope let the masses know that "their destitution was wealth, their agony a beatitude and their anger something to be ashamed of." At the end of the Pope's speech, Gheerbrant bitterly noted that:

The people applauded, and their clapping was like so many strokes of the whip on their own flesh. Amen! said the Pope.

The CELAM Meetings in Medellin

Immediately following the Pope's visit, the Latin American Bishops met in Medellin from August 26 until September 6, 1968, to discuss the Latin American response to Vatican II. Unlike the Vatican Council which produced a series of disparate papers on many issues, the Medellin Statements gave a cohesive interpretation of the contemporary condition of the Church and Latin American society, and projected a
 unified approach to the common task of development. The central theme was liberation from all the forces holding the continent in material and spiritual subjection. In pursuit of that objective, the Conference explored methods to change Catholicism from "a religion of imposition to a religion of liberation."¹³

The working draft of the Medellin conference was prepared by the Brazilian Bishops and their advisors. Since the coup in 1964, the Church had been steadily emerging as the strongest institutionalized opposition to the military government. The radicals in the Brazilian Church had benefited greatly from the prestigious support given them by Archbishop Dom Helder Camara of Recife, the most internationally renown leftist prelate in Latin America.¹⁴

There was little conservative input in the working draft. It contained an explicit condemnation of United States imperialism and of the relationship of dependence maintained by the "pigheadedness" of the national oligarchies. It discussed the political alienation of the people, the destruction of native cultures and it was, in general, critical of the Latin American Church for not being adequately concerned with social problems. The denunciation of institutionalized violence was far stronger than its rejection of revolutionary violence.

We should not be surprised to hear talk of violence, because the aforementioned conditions themselves are acts of violence against human dignity and personal
freedom. What should surprise us is the patience of our people, who for many years have put up with a state of affairs that could hardly be accepted by anyone who has a clear awareness of man's basic rights.15.

The Colombian hierarchy was the most critical of the working draft. The chief advisor to the Jesuit-controlled Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social (CIAS) in Bogota, criticized the document for emphasizing political and economic colonialism but making no mention of "religious colonialism" imposed on some segments of the Latin America Church by radical Dutch and Belgium priests.16 His criticisms were a reaction to the fact that the Brazilians had relied on Dutch and Belgium advisors in preparing their draft. However, he made no reference to the influences on other segments of the Church by reactionary hierarchies - influences which by his term could, with equal justification be called "imposed religious colonialism".

The final documents which came out of Medellin watered-down the ideas of the working draft but still remained far to the left of the Colombian hierarchy. It was acknowledged that the Church had failed in many ways but now had to close the gap between herself and the masses and work to promote social justice.

Both liberal capitalism and Marxism were condemned but it was recognized that justice demanded political reform. Because of the general lack of political consciousness, the role of the Church in creating a "liberating education" was considered to be essential.
Education is actually the key instrument for liberating the masses from all servitude and for causing them to ascend "from less human to more human conditions. . . ."17

The Church's contribution to "concientizacion" must be disinterested, promoting human dignity, self-determination and a community spirit. Illiterates, especially Indians

... must be liberated from their prejudices, and superstitions, their complexes and inhibitions, their fanaticism, their fatalistic attitude, their fearful incomprehension of the world in which they live, and their distrust and passivity.18

Universities were criticized for being blue-prints of similar institutions in developed countries and thus being unable to respond to problems peculiar to Latin America. Roman Catholic universities were singled out for failing to give proper attention to science.19

In their emphasis on "liberating education" the Bishops showed that they were well-aware that such enlightenment would weaken the often superstitious hold of the Catholic Church on the masses. But recognizing that this hold was based on the kind of unrational terror Bertrand Russell, Marx and others have criticized religion for, and realizing that modernization would erode the traditional power the religion had over the people, they proposed to work towards a more relevant legitimacy. Allegiance to true Christianity was admitted to be weak in Latin America and they hoped to build up a new basis for strength by exhibiting a greater understanding of the social problems afflicting their people.
The Church, they said:

... cannot remain indifferent in the face of the tremendous social injustices existent in Latin America, which keep the majority of our peoples in dismal poverty, which in many cases becomes inhuman wretchedness.20

Bishops and priests were asked to adopt a life-style closer to the level of the poor.

In her relations with the elite, CELAM advised that the Church must point out the dichotomy between faith and social responsibility to conservatives and traditionalists of the upper-class. In regard to political leaders, prelates should have "contact and dialogue relative to the demands of social morality, not excluding the necessary energetic and prudent denunciation of injustices and abuse of power."21 The Church was warned to remain independent of political regimes and avoid any suspicion of alliance with the ruling classes; however co-operation in the field of education was to be maintained.

The section on Peace drew liberally from the ideas of Raul Prebich in its condemnation of international imperialism, internal colonialism and the growing tensions between classes. Populorum Progressio was quoted legitimizing revolution in cases of prolonged and evident tyranny, and for the first time in official Church documents, the word "tyranny" was applied to unjust structures as well as to dictatorships.22 However, the Bishops did not encourage violence. They expressed hope that the promotion of grass-roots organizations and the
peaceful awakening of a sense of responsibility and Christian solidarity would be used to overcome institutionalized violence.  

Only a few of the Bishops in attendance at Medellin were openly conservative but the final documents, rather than being a reflection of the majority were the work of a well-organized progressive minority. The conservatives arrived unprepared and unorganized and many later admitted to signing the documents without having a clear understanding of what they were saying.  

The moderates sided with the progressives on the condition that the most extreme radical views and demands be eliminated from the final documents which blunted the drive of the progressives and prevented the Church from being even symbolically identified as a radical force for change.  

A number of progressive priests and laymen invited to speak at the conference were struck off the program by order from Rome.  

The final documents failed to recognize that the international capitalist system is a primary cause of dependence and internal inequalities in Latin America, an economic area born as a satellite and structured to remain so. The Bishops steadfastly ignored the class conflict inherent in a liberation struggle and somewhat inconsistently deplored class tensions at the same time that they called for liberation of the poor and oppressed. Their universal appeal for justice was not followed by a coherent strategy of action because of
its non-specific nature and its imprecision. Like the Vatican encyclicals, the symptoms of underdevelopment were carefully outlined, the injustices were denounced in colourful superlatives but the recommendations suffered from a lack of socio-political and economic analysis of the structural cause of the continent's problems. What they did manage to do was spur a deepening commitment of the progressive and radical minority and undercut some of the criticism their actions would otherwise have received.\textsuperscript{27}

At the next annual Planning Assembly of the Colombian Episcopate in 1969, a report was published ostensibly to deal specifically with Colombian underdevelopment but in reality, to overrule and reject the "Medellin Statements". Underdevelopment was blamed not on imperialism and neo-colonialism but on lack of industrialization. Latin American solidarity was downplayed and the emphasis was placed on international linkages through aid and investment. Radical clergy were condemned for being as dogmatic as conservatives and it was stated categorically that the Church's role was not to promote new structures. She was instead, to cooperate with state initiatives to bring about non-violent change. Like the early encyclicals, the solution to underdevelopment was to be found in the charity of the upper class and the good will and patience of the masses.\textsuperscript{28} The Colombian document was later presented to CELAM which refused to even consider it. But that did not prevent it from being adopted as an
official statement by the Church in Colombia.  

**The Growth of Golconda**

The split in the Colombian Church was exaggerated by the ultra-conservative stance of the hierarchy. In the rest of Latin America, the hierarchies were less reactionary but as the priests taking a Marxist or revolutionary stance grew in numbers, they began to face greater difficulties. After Camilo Torres's death, the Christian revolutionary movement in Latin America tended to concentrate in Brazil, Uruguay and Colombia. Brazil had the most cohesive segment of revolutionary priests led by Bishops Helder Camara of Recife and Antonio Fragoso of Ceara.

An Argentinian lay-priest, Garcia Elorrio, started a magazine called *Cristianismo y Revolucion* in September 1966 and later, launched the "Movimiento Camilo Torres" which first met in Montevideo in February 1968 to discuss topics such as Christianity's relationship with Marxism, class struggle and revolution. Earlier, in May 1967, he read out a revolutionary manifesto during mass in Buenos Aires which was attended by the then President of Argentina, General Juan Carlos Ongania. Elorrio was eventually forced to live in exile and in 1970, most likely because of his revolutionary activities, was mysteriously killed.

In Colombia, German Guzman Campos re-launched the weekly *Frente Unido* in April 1968, making it much more radical
than it had been when Torres was editor. The opposition of the Colombian hierarchy forced him to flee to Mexico in the Fall of that year and Frente Unido ceased publication completely in 1971.

Another friend of Torres's, Father Gustavo Perez Jimenez, was the head of the Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Social (ICODES), a religious organization which did consultatory studies on social development for the hierarchy. In 1964, when ICOIDES was secularized, the Jesuit-run CIAS gained influence as the only remaining social research organization relied upon by the Colombian Church. Perez's support of Torres's Platform in 1965 resulted in his total exclusion from the ranks of episcopal advisers and both he and Father Francisco Houtart were refused admission to the CELAM meetings in Medellin. Like Guzman, Perez was eventually forced to leave Colombia.

The Golconda Movement

In Colombia, the radical priests became increasingly concerned about the gap between their beliefs and the documents issued by the hierarchy. In July 1968, fifty dissident priests met to discuss the Church's role in Colombia. They met again in December of that year in Golconda, Colombia, and forty-eight priests and one Bishop issued the Golconda Declaration condemning conditions of underdevelopment. They had absorbed the spirit of Medellin, believing
that the Church should be identified with the masses and should move with them to effect profound social change. They insisted that the change had to be revolutionary. Condemning the lack of self-awareness of the masses and the economic dependence on coffee exports, they stated:

Clearly this situation cannot be overcome without real revolution, one that will displace the present ruling classes in our country through whom foreign domination is exercised.36

Priests were urged to develop a sincere commitment to the temporal world, organizing grass-roots movements and social education programs to develop self-awareness. "We must insist that good will is not enough, that knowledge of the real situation is necessary."37 To them, the real situation of exploitation and institutional violence demanded "revolutionary action against imperialism and bourgeois neo-colonialism."38

The declaration criticized aid from developed nations in the statement:

We do not relish the idea that foreign organizations serve as distributors of food surpluses. Under the guise of aid, they exploit us by tearing down the fabric of sound trade relations. Under the halo of generosity, they make beggars out of those who receive their help.39

They called for the end of current Church-state relations in Colombia, denounced the traditional parties and planned to take concrete initiatives to build a socialist society.40

The harassment of the Golconda priests by the Colombian hierarchy began almost immediately, aided by government officials, who labelled the Golconda Group as Communists.41
The conservative Archbishop of Manizales denied that such ideas had reached the higher ranks of the clergy but stated his fear that "the Colombian priests who have placed themselves on the side of revolutionary ideas could have been infected by the conduct of the priest Camilo Torres." In 1969, government repressive tactics included vilifications, distortions in the press of statements by Golconda priests, character assassinations, jailings and beatings. The Church disciplined them by removing some priests from poorer parishes while others were suspended or expelled. On one occasion, the army was called in to remove a priest against the will of his parishioners. In 1969, peaceful demonstrations of peasants and workers were organized at universities in Bogota and Cali but when the priests tried to do the same in Medellin, four were arrested, imprisoned and beaten up.

In the 1970 elections, the Golconda priests worked, as Camilo had done before, to convince the people to abstain from voting. They described the National Front as a "diversionary manoeuvre" and criticized "the existence of the so-called traditional political parties which line our peoples up in two great camps, directed each by sectors equally submissive to and colonized by foreign monopolies."

By 1970, one third of the Golconda priests had been expelled, jailed, or removed from their posts by either religious or civil authorities who worked in open co-operation to purge the dissident priests. One member, Father Domingo
Lain, a Spanish priest, was expelled from Colombia in 1969 but managed to return secretly in 1970 to join the ELN along with three other Golconda priests. As a worker-priest in Colombia, Lain had experienced the same exploitation as the masses and finally came to the conclusion that there was "no alternative other than revolutionary, liberating violence." He rose to become a principal leader of the ELN before he was finally killed by the army in February 1974.

The one Bishop behind Golconda, Gerardo Valencia Cano, was a moderate until he became Bishop of Buenaventura. Buenaventura epitomizes Andre Gunder Frank's hypothesis concerning the devastating effects that the international capitalist system has in its "development of underdevelopment". Valencia believed that just as the United States exploits Bogota, so Bogota exploits Buenaventura using its port, its wood, its cocoa and its fruit to enrich the Colombian oligarchy and their foreign supporters. According to Valencia,

As a result, people here live by theft, and prostitution. They are diseased, physically and morally and their lives are a continuous frustration.

Because of his political views, Valencia became known as the "Red Bishop". He started most of the schools in the area, a night school program and was responsible for organizing mobile teaching teams to reach people in the remote areas of his diocese.

In January 1972, Bishop Valencia was killed in an airplane crash. Despite the fact that many progressive priests
in Colombia who did not sign the original declaration, sympa­thized with the movement, repression by the Church and the government over the four preceding years ensured that the Golconda Movement died along with its one high-ranking member. The major clerical organization for revolutionary change in Latin America thereafter became the priests of "Tercer Mundo" based in Argentina.51 In Colombia, an under­ground group called Christians for Liberation tried to carry on the work of Golconda. It surfaced in 1974 when it held an assembly in Bogota but it failed to make the kind of impact that Golconda did during its short existence.52
Footnotes


14. Bishop Camara is an advocate of non-violent revolutionary change. An indication of the kind of respect he commands was shown by the 4,000 priests assembled in the Colombian Cathedral to hear Pope Paul's opening address to the Eucharistic Council when they burst into deafening and unprecedented applause as Camara entered the Church. "The Church: no Papal ruling for the bishops," *Latin America*, (August 30, 1968), p. 278.


49. Malcolm W. Browne, "Riches Pour Into Colombian Port, but


CHAPTER VI

REFORMIST MOVES IN THE COLOMBIAN HIERARCHY

Introduction

Pressure on the Colombian hierarchy from the Vatican, CELAM and from the dissident priests within the country continued to mount during the 1960's and the early 1970's. In some instances, the Colombian government proved to be more reformist than the Church, forcing the Church to liberalize her stance. However, although the hierarchy was no longer ultra-conservative, the changes were responses to external pressures and the Church failed to initiate reforms in Colombian society and thus to become a force for development. This chapter will give an historical account of the areas which best show the extent to which the Church began to change and the limitations of those changes.

In two areas essential to Colombia's development—agrarian reform and birth control—the hierarchy of the Church did little to inhibit change. The Vatican encyclicals made it virtually impossible for the Church to hold on to her underutilized land and, with few exceptions, the clergy were united in support of turning it over to INCORA. The birth control campaigns initiated by the government in the mid-60's, failed to become an issue of conflict between Church and state but in this instance, it was pressure from within threatening to
split the Church which kept the hierarchy's objections to a minimum. As a result, Colombia became the first Latin American country with an extensive birth control program.

Although the conflict between the progressives and the hierarchy remained, from 1971 until 1973, it abated somewhat as the Church broke from its position of solidarity with the government and began to show some signs of reformist trends. However, an examination of the Church's role with the Indians and her influence in the educational system reveals that most of the professed new attitudes were not put into action.

With the end of the National Front in 1974, and the election of President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, the former leader of the leftist MRL, increased Church-state clashes in Colombia were predicted. To the surprise of most observers, the temporary breech with the state was healed. The Church became more repressive to internal dissent and a firm alliance was forged between the President and the Cardinal.

**Agrarian Reform**

The first progressive sign in the Colombian hierarchy was its abstract statement in favour of agrarian reform delivered in September 1960. Even this move was too radical for one Bishop who labelled government attempts to introduce land redistribution as:

... an impious and truly apostate attack against
the beautiful Catholic social organizations which are doing so well . . . under the care and guidance of the bishops.2

The first President of the National Front, Alberto Lleras Camargo, was not only a devout Roman Catholic but also an advocate of land reform. During the 1950's, joint United States-Latin American conferences on rural life stressed the need for agrarian reform both to promote social justice and to undermine the growing communist support in Latin America. Largely due to the efforts of President Lleras, and with the encouragement of the United States, extensive agrarian reform laws were passed in 1962.3

Unexploited estates were to be sold to INCORA and the land was to be re-sold or leased to landless peasants.

By 1965, the Church was more open in its support giving recognition, in a general way, to the defects and injustices in Colombia's socio-economic structure and speaking in favour of "changes necessary so that all members of society may acquire their just share of material goods."4 Two years later, citing Populorum Progressio, one bishop gave 800 acres of diocese land to the government to distribute among the peasants.5

In July 1967, the Bishops finally released a document pledging to give all unexploited rural estates to INCORA. In a typically paternalistic statement, they expressed hope that their example would inspire other land-owners to fulfill their Christian and patriotic duty. However, they added approval of
expropriation of land if the collective well-being demanded it. It was not a radical move—the Chilean Church had done the same thing years before—but it did indicate an awakening of conscience in the Colombian hierarchy and was a personal triumph for a progressive Bishop, Mgr. Raul Zambrano Camader, an economist who was the Church's representative on INCORA.  

The move was actually more pragmatic than daring for a few weeks before, INCORA had announced that it would bring legal proceedings against four orders for 1,976 acres of agricultural land that were "deficiently exploited".  

Sale of real estate owned by the Catholic Church in France resulted in the setting up of a one million dollar "Populorum Progressio Fund" in 1969, to be administered by the Inter-American Development Bank and to be used for agrarian reform in Colombia. The United States had a great deal of control over the use of the money but Colombia's efforts at land re-distribution remained haphazard and inefficient.  

During the 1970's, there have been numerous charges that leftist priests, moved by the plight of half of the population who are campesinos, have been promoting invasions of estates by the landless peasants.  

Such action is not surprising for in 1971, Paris Le Monde reported that at the rate the Colombian government is going, it would be 1,000 years before the haciendas would be broken up.  

The Church can no longer be accused of being a wealthy landowner at the expense of poor Colombian peasants but her
interest in land re-distribution ended with the (sometimes reluctant) disposal of her own lands. Unlike the leftist priests, the hierarchy has not backed the landless peasants and has done little to pressure the government into speeding up agrarian reform.

Birth Control

The one area of development where Colombia has led the rest of Latin America is in birth control. When Carlos Lleras Restrepo became President in 1965, he consulted the hierarchy, ignored its advice, and began a campaign for state-supported birth control clinics. Describing the conditions in the overcrowded slums in the cities of Colombia—the rampant alcholism, incest and prostitution—he said:

I find it impossible to stop and discuss the morality or immorality of contraceptive practices without at the same time meditating on the immoral, often criminal, conditions of the very act of conception...

Ten birth control centres were started privately by Roman Catholic doctors and Pro Familia, as the centres were called, spread rapidly. Accion Cultural Popular has been tolerant of Pro Familia and does not interfere with priests who take courses to enable them to teach family planning to their parishioners. By 1976, 1,260 centres were in operation and the population growth rate had dropped from more than 3 per cent in the 1960's to 2.4 per cent.

It is now widely accepted that people will reduce their fertility rates in context with social conditions
that make it reasonable and acceptable to have fewer children. However, in the 1960's in Colombia, it was more than evident that a tremendous number of pregnancies were unwanted. One hospital alone in Bogota was taking in 8,000 victims of botched abortions annually and child murder was the eighth highest cause of death between the ages of five and fourteen. The number of abandoned children in Colombia today is estimated to be 50,000 and although many priests have been involved in efforts to rehabilitate the gamines, no method has been successful.

When the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* was published in 1968, the Colombian Church firmly supported its stand. Most Bishops believed, with the Pope, that artificial methods of birth control were immoral while some, like Bishop Zambranco, saw birth control as just another form of United States imperialism. However, perhaps in recognition of the blatant fact that Catholic moral teaching in this area has been notably ineffective, the Church's few protests against Pro Familia have been mild. In 1974, the Bishops announced that they were preparing a document on birth control and demography but a threatened split in the Church over the issue forced the project to be abandoned.

Considering the Vatican stance one could hardly expect any national hierarchy to actively promote artificial methods of birth control. What was interesting about this issue in Colombia is that it shows the extent to which the
hierarchy was willing to go to ensure its own survival. The threat of an internal split combined with the possibility of jeopardizing its own position of privilege with the government was enough to keep the hierarchy silent on an issue it otherwise would have actively condemned. The pressures from two radically opposed sides prevented the Church from opposing this step in Colombian development.

**Criticisms of the Government**

During the 1960's, the National Front was providing an unusual degree of political stability and Colombia was chosen by the U.S. to be a showcase for Alliance for Progress objectives. Yet by 1969, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study labelled the Colombian aid program "a shabby story of the waste of U.S. funds and a defeat of Alliance for Progress objectives."\(^{18}\) The report concluded that the Alliance funds had only helped Colombia to postpone reforms in government taxation, education and agriculture that were necessary in order for a development effort to succeed.\(^{19}\)

Although it is not proven, it is widely believed that in 1970, the National Front stayed in power only by fixing the election results to allow the incumbent Conservative, Misael Pastrana Borrero to win. By 1971, national discontent with the lack of progress had reached the point where the hierarchy, for the first time, moved from its position of solidarity with the oligarchy and became a critic. In a fifteen-point
statement to the government, the Bishops pointed out the need for widespread social and economic reforms and claimed that the tensions in Colombian society stemmed from the just claims of the population which finds itself in a state of misery or subject to the anguish of uncertainty or spurred by the hope of progress.20

They urged the government to accelerate land reform and housing projects and to give the workers a greater voice in management.

The government was shocked at the attack and the Minister of Education justifiably reminded the Church that it had taken the same approach to the problems of development as the government. He then asked the Church for permission to hold classes in some of its under-utilized buildings. The head of INCORA, supporting the Church's criticisms, stated that the peasants had turned to seizing land because they had a "justifiable mistrust of the legal channels of agrarian reform."21 He was promptly dismissed from his post.

At the 29th Planning Assembly of the Colombian Episcopate held in 1973, the new stance was continued. The Bishops denounced the violations to Indian land rights, the rigidity of the educational system, the unjust taxation, and the traditional political parties for their failure to present a real choice to the people. However, after recognizing the problems of free enterprise, foreign intervention and exploitation by trans-national corporations; they did not call for a socialist government but placed a naive reliance on the same trans-nationals
and foreign investment to combat underdevelopment. The con-
demnation of violent revolution remained but they expressed
an understanding of the temptation to resort to its use in
order to overcome institutionalized violence. The report
ended with proposals to organize courses, meetings, and pro-
grams on justice and on the need to convince all priests and
bishops to work towards change. The clergy, they said, had
a duty to denounce all injustices — after first making certain
that their information was correct and well-documented.22

Results of the New Stance
Some reform measures begun in the 1960's were accepted
and encouraged by the hierarchy. The Minuto de Dios, dedi-
cated to the development of model neighbourhoods in working
class districts, was strongly supported. The Archbishop of
Cali, in an attempt to mobilize the poor rather than provide
paternalistic protection, supervised the planning of a new
parish centre which contained a medical dispensary, food
stores with low prices, a social centre and schools, along
with a church and living quarters for the priests.23

However, despite some very outspoken statements, there
was no sign that the Church's status or role was being changed
significantly. The radicals, and even the progressives who
moved too far to the left, still had their efforts blocked.
In 1972, Bishop Raul Zambrano Camader was, like Bishop Val-
encio of Golconda, killed in an airplane crash, leaving the
leftist clergy without support in the hierarchy.

After 1970, Colombia remained in a virtually constant state of siege until 1974. Many radical priests were arrested and detained secretly without the permission of the Archbishop—a protection provided by law. In the rural areas, as guerrilla activity increased, the army began torturing campesinos and burning their houses in order to obtain information about the guerrilla bands. One rural priest who spoke out strongly against this, disappeared.24 Priests working with slum-dwellers in Bogota and Medellin were repudiated by the Bishops. In 1972, thirty priests working in a Bogota slum formed a Union of Southern Parishes—an attempt to coordinate their efforts to try to combat the problems of the urban poor. They were quickly transferred and the movement ebbed.25

The Salesian Fathers began to document social injustices in two periodicals, Denuncia and Encuentro, criticizing the hierarchy for not commenting on such events as the government repressed march of the campesinos on Bogota in 1972.26 The same year, Sacerdotes para America Latina (SAL), a socialist non-violent movement began to take root. Considering the fate of the Golconda Group, it remained without a national organization, in autonomous and often anonymous small cells, avoiding open conflict with the hierarchy. By 1975, it claimed 300 members among Colombia's 4,000 priests.27 Despite the lack of a national left-wing organization, in 1974, 500
priests issued a statement calling on the government to act against United States influence in Colombian affairs and accusing their own hierarchy of "betraying Jesus Christ in social politics."²⁸

With few exceptions, the hierarchy of the Colombian Church managed to sustain a strongly co-operative arrangement with the National Front and the only threat to the Church's elite position came from within. There was a possibility that Church-state relations would change when, in 1969, the Vatican proposed that the Concordat of 1887 be revised. Many of the clergy in Colombia acknowledged that some parts of it were obsolete and the planned revision was expected to bring about changes, especially in relation to education and to the Indians. The revision, finally completed in 1973, failed to alter any crucial aspect of Church-state relations and the final agreement was so reactionary that it was criticized by both Conservatives and Liberals.²⁹ The Church continued to be allowed tax exemptions amounting to 50,000,000 pesos annually and, as an added bonus, won compensation for their lands seized in the nineteenth century.³⁰

The Church and the Indians

That the Indians in Colombia have had some rights recognized in the last twenty years was due more to the efforts of the government than the efforts of the Church. In many cases, the government has had to battle with the mission orders,
especially the Capuchins, on behalf of the Indians and the major issue of contention has been agrarian reform.

In 1960, with the establishment of the Department of Indian Affairs (DAI), the government began to institute policies to aid and protect the aboriginals. Two years later the Supreme Court ruled that the land reserves were entirely Indian property and any non-Indian owning lands in these areas had no legal right to it. But when INCORA arrived in the Sibundoy Valley in 1964, it met with strong resistance and the missions joined with large landowners to set up a "Committee for the Defence of the Sibundoy Valley".31

While ignoring land claims against them, the Capuchins continued to preach from the pulpit on the obligations to make restitution on all unfairly acquired possessions.32 Despite the fact that INCORA compensated land-owners generously before it leased or re-sold small areas to the peasants, the Capuchins ignored the Colombian hierarchy's stand on agrarian reform and refused to sell unless the Holy See ordered them to. They feared that losing their land would mean losing their hold over the Indians subject to their theocratic rule.33

In 1966, the Department of Indian Affairs came into the area and organized courses to promote improved agricultural methods and housing. The missionaries opposed the intervention, claiming that the Convention of Missions gave the government no rights in the area and warned the Indians that the DAI officials were communists. According to an account
in Latin America, at a meeting convened by DAI in 1966, a native confronted one of the priests:

What are you doing to us? What you did was take away land from the old people and on it today you have thousands of cows, you get thousands of bottles of milk and you never even give one glass to a child. Every day in this valley children starve and when do you give us a drop of milk?

He went on to accuse the priests of calling the DAI officials Communist only because they were attempting to help the Indians alleviate their miserable existence and lessen their total dependence on the Church.

The only influence capable of forcing the Capuchins to change their attitude was the publication of Populorum Progressio. In 1968, they sold all but 300 acres (more than the maximum legal limit) to INCORA.

Father Gustavo Perez, the head of the social research institute ICODES and a former friend of Torres's, was involved in a series of televised debates in 1970 with an army colonel over the protection of the Guahibo Indians. The Church was being discredited by allegations of a number of Indian massacres in mission territories and Perez accused the army of committing atrocities against the Indians. Massacres did occur with frequency. For example, in one raid in 1968, forty Cuivas were slaughtered to prevent damage to private property on white farms near their reserve.

In 1967, nine Colombian and two Venezuelan ranchers lured sixteen hungry Cuivas Indians into a house by offering
them food. When the Indians began to eat, the ranchers murdered all sixteen. They were arrested and the "Death Banquet" trial, held in June 1972 commanded national attention. The ranchers pleaded guilty but assured the court: "Indian hunting is a centuries old tradition." At the trial, one Colombian told the judge that he shot a six year old Indian girl because he could not stand the sound of her sobbing. The eleven accused stated: "We did not think killing Indians was a crime. We were taught from childhood that they were vermin." After a twenty-day trial, the ranchers were acquitted.

The Bishops of Colombia strongly protested the verdict and called for a solution to the marginalization and exploitation of the indigenous people but offered no precise recommendations. They also made no reference to the Church's obvious failure to carry out its duties to protect the Indians. Considering its powerful position in Colombian society, if the Church had shown proper concern, there would be no excuse for any Colombian in 1967 to believe that killing Indians was not a crime.

Belated as their concern was, the protest of the Bishops, joined by other groups in Colombia, forced the acquittal on the grounds of ignorance to be overruled and seven of the accused faced a new trial. In 1975, six of the ranchers were sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment — the maximum sentence allowed for the crime and for the first time in Colombian history, a crime against an Indian was punished.
In 1972, despite the fact that the Church's strong approval of land reform was five years old, the Archbishop of Popayan was still clinging to 300 hectares of land which the Coconuco Indians claimed was illegally taken from them in the 1940's. In 1972, the Indians began a campaign to recover their land and a year later, when they had achieved no results, they occupied it. The Archbishop called in the police and 190 Indians were imprisoned. After a series of invasions, he relented, agreeing to sell the land to INCORA but on the condition that only those Indians who had not been involved in the invasions would be allowed to farm it.43 Once again, the Church acted as a regressive force, allowing the benefits of paternalistic charity to be bestowed only on those who were willing to passively wait for justice.

The 400,000 Colombian Indians (roughly the same number as existed in 1778), are the survivors of an undeclared war which has lasted five hundred years. For centuries, the Indians of Colombia have fought for land and the Church has blunted the aims of their struggle by paternalistic treatment and offers of mystical compensations for the lack of material well-being. Since 1975, the Indians have begun to organize, aiming to present a united front to demand land and to prevent further massacres.44

There is no nation in North or South America that can be proud of its treatment of indigenous peoples and in Colombia,
most of the blame for the pathetic condition of the Indians today must go to the Church. The government can only be held culpable for being disinterested enough to avoid responsibility by entrusting the natives to the Church's care. As Colombia develops and the remote areas are opened up, the chances of the survival of the native population are grim.

The Church and Education

In the past twenty years, advances have been made in Colombia's educational system but it still remains woefully inadequate. Despite the rhetoric of the hierarchy and the criticisms and efforts of the progressive clergy, the Church has more often been the target of efforts to improve education than the initiator of change.

The beginning of badly needed reforms was a law passed in 1962 to ensure that professionally qualified teachers be favoured in hiring over those with good social or political connections. The education budget also increased but although a law in 1957 recommended that ten per cent of the national budget be spent on education, the target was not reached until 1962. However, even though the percentage of the GDP spent on education in 1969 was eight times as much as was spent in 1960, it was still below the UNESCO target for Latin America which was four per cent of the GDP.

From 1955 to 1966, enrollment in elementary schools increased 184 per cent. In secondary schools it increased
300 per cent and in post-secondary, 331 per cent. The illiteracy rate however, still stood at approximately 27 per cent.

Much of the problem of the educational system stems from the de-centralized administrative structure. Three different agencies are responsible for education and each of the twenty-two departments has a great deal of autonomy, leaving the central government with minimal powers of coordination. Political instability further complicates the situation; from 1935 until 1970, there were fifty-five different Ministers of Education.

A lack of technical and scientific education available has been blamed on the influence of the Church. Almost fifty per cent of the secondary school students are enrolled in Catholic schools which still tend to organize their curricula on academic rather than technical lines. The major technical schools, the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA) receive no funds from the Ministry of Education or the Church but are instead supported by a direct two per cent tax on the payroll of all firms employing more than fifty.

Since the 1960's, even the Catholic universities have been more flexible in their attitude towards natural and social sciences; and engineering, agronomy and economics are beginning to replace law and medicine as the most popular subjects to study. Nearly one half of the university students in Colombia attend Roman Catholic universities. These
institutions along with those that are state-run, have recently used standardized tests to establish competency for admission. In the 1969 revision of the constitution, the Church lost her authority to veto scientific courses in universities which challenge Catholic beliefs.

The inter-dependence of public and private schools is complex. Public schools meet in Church buildings, priests and nuns teach in public schools, and Roman Catholic religious teaching is a required part of the public school curriculum. Since 1968, the State has had the right to supervise private schools. The clergy have positions on the board of public educational institutions and still have a say in the public school curriculum which is also imposed on private primary and secondary school. Subsidies, scholarships and some teachers are provided by the government to private schools and an estimated ten per cent of the Ministry of Education's budget goes towards financing Catholic schools. The Roman Catholic education of Colombian children is still an officially recognized aim of the national education policy.

During the Church's brief militant period in the early 1970's, the critical stance of the priests resulted in a backlash. Dozens of schools were closed by religious orders because the government refused to subsidize them, give them tax exemptions or allow them to charge high enough tuition fees to cover costs. The public school system was unable to absorb the sudden increase in students and the government was
soon forced to make concessions.

The Catholic schools in Colombia are elitist as parents with sufficient money, send their children to Catholic private schools. The most serious failing of the Catholic schools is that they are established in areas where people can afford the fees — not in areas where the need is the greatest. Consequently, only four per cent of the children in rural areas attend Catholic schools and most of these are in mission areas.

Experts like Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire have recognized the importance of education — especially in developing countries — as an instrument of social control. Freire's idea of concientizaciôn is an educational process which attempts to change an unreflective "magical" view of the world. It begins with self-criticism, forcing the student to step back, look at his life situation, recognize whether or not he is an object of forces surrounding him, and if he is, take steps to transform himself and his life situation. The educational system awakens consciousness, changing the student's mentality to give an accurate and realistic awareness of his role in society. By analyzing the causes and consequences of his role and by then comparing it to the other situations and possibilities, habits of resignation are overcome. Although concien-
tizaciôn in a country like Colombia can be nothing but revolu-
tionary, the Church's official statements endorse it. Unfor-
tunately for the campesinos and Indians, the Church's enthusiasm
on paper has only been put into action by a small number of progressive priests.

An example of a passage from one of Freire's textbooks reads:

I live and I struggle. Pedro lives and struggles. The people live and struggle. I, Pedro, and the people struggle. We struggle to live. To live is to struggle. Pedro is disturbed and thinks. Why is our life so harsh? Why do so many children die here? Why don't the people have housing? Why don't the people learn to read? Why aren't there schools for our children? Why do the people suffer so much injustice?61


Question: In brief, to what do we owe the progress of the Putumayo?
Answer: With justice and sincerity, we may say that the general progress of the Putumayo is due to the community of Capuchin missionaries.

Question: Are the inhabitants of the Putumayo therefore grateful to the Capuchin missionaries?
Answer: Of course. Seeing the achievements of the Capuchin missionaries, both spiritual and material, the intelligent inhabitants of the Putumayo (both Indian and settler) feel indelible gratitude to them in their hearts.62

It is the glaring contrast between these two passages which shows most clearly how far the Colombian Church is from making any real contribution to development. In the field of education, because of its emphasis on conservatism, individualism, and its refusal to adapt, the Church has failed to contribute to a solution to fundamental economic and social problems and has instead, added to the severe class divisions
and antagonisms in Colombian society. Any Colombian government attempting to make a sincere effort at combatting underdevelopment must institute a progressive tax system to finance enough schools to greatly diminish the hold the Church has over education.

Current Trends

The official end of the National Front in 1974, and the election of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen as President presented the Church with a new challenge. It was predicted that Lopez would prove to be no friend of the Church and that the Church's role in Colombia would undergo significant changes.

Lopez won the 1974 elections largely because of his leftist image. His major aims were export promotion, agricultural productivity, regional growth and the creation of a dynamic industrial sector. However, from his first days in office, Colombia has continued to be plagued by riots, strikes, and social unrest. The Andean Common Market, formed in 1969, failed to become the expected solution to the country's economic problems. Even the current boom in coffee prices has brought only inflation to the masses with little discernible re-distribution of income.

Lopez did not end the National Front but offered the Conservatives a deal to partially prolong it by having each party appoint six cabinet ministers. The traditional parties also share the top jobs in administration. The elections of
1978 promise to bring little change. The left-wing opposition is so divided it is powerless. The former Liberal president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo plans to challenge Lopez but even with a split in the Liberals, the Conservatives are too weak to win and are therefore hoping to maintain the National Front coalition.64

As the reforms fail to materialize, Lopez's leftist image is becoming tarnished. Even the predicted clash with the Catholic Church has not occurred and the only step he has taken to antagonize the Church has been the legalization of civil marriage and divorce. From time to time, government officials charge that radical priests are fomenting subversion and disorder65 and both priests and nuns are occasionally arrested for assisting guerrillas.66

The greatest flare-up within the Church took place in the Spring of 1976 when a growing number of clergy, including three bishops, showed support for government bank employees who had been on strike since February, by allowing sit-ins in their churches to protect the strikers from the police. In June, Cardinal Anibal Munoz Duque (who took over when Concha Cordoba resigned in 1972), suspended over one hundred priests and nuns — including several members of the socialist group, SAL — for their support of the strikers.67

As a reward for his swift action, along with his refusal to allow Bishop Camara into Bogota and his consistent instructions to the faithful to beware of Marxist clergy and
not to support left-wing parties, Cardinal Munoz Duque was made Brigadier-General of the Colombian army in June 1976.68 The alliance between the Church and the state was firmly sealed by having a papal decoration arranged for President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen.69

Two hundred priests and nuns attacked the Cardinal in an open letter calling him "an accomplice of the system of injustice." They claimed his conduct "frustrates the expectations of the people who want their church to support their demands for justice", and said that he represented an "entrenched, bureaucratic, commercialized Church, insensitive to the conditions of the oppressed, dictatorial and sold out to the rich." They further condemned the religious medal to Lopez who was maintaining a "cruel situation of hunger and of repression of the just claims of the people."70

The almost endemic state of siege maintained by Lopez indicates the extent to which internal unrest and discontent with the government continued to threaten Colombian unity. Despite the fact that the people have continued to agitate for reforms, Lopez's claim to be an avowed leftist has been sufficient for the Colombian hierarchy to drop its short-lived role as antagonist and to align itself more firmly with the government than it has been for years. The Lopez regime is now planning to restrict United States investment and to phase out AID projects. It also has begun to use some of the money from the coffee boom to buy shares in foreign
owned firms operating in the country. However, the government cannot in any way be called left-wing and it is certainly incapable of instituting the kinds of reforms that the recent encyclicals, the CELAM statements and even the Colombian Church have all called for.

The Vatican, which began the change, has lost its first flush of enthusiasm for reform. Under Roman influence, as early as 1972, CELAM took a turn to the right with the election of a conservative from Argentina as president and a stauncher conservative from Colombia as secretary general. If the Colombian Church is to become a strong advocate of reform, the change now will have to be forced from within.

Although an estimated forty per cent of the priests have left the Church since 1968, the progressives remaining continue to work cautiously among the people at their task of conscientización. Even among those who have left, a large number, employed as teachers, are continuing their attempts to increase self-awareness and solidarity in the masses. To have as President a man like Lopez—a man with a reformist reputation but without the actions to back it up—was probably the greatest blow to their hopes for a new Church in Colombia. He provided the perfect excuse for the hierarchy to back down from the initial steps it had taken very reluctantly in the early 1970's.
Footnotes


10. *Latin America* (March 5, 1971), pp. 78-79


35. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Roman Catholic Missionaries accused


42. "Jail Terms upheld in Indian Murders," Miami Herald (June 30, 1975), in ISLA, 1975, no. 3333.


49. Weil, op.cit., p. 175.

71. Onis, *op.cit.*, "Population Rise eases in Colombia"

CONCLUSION

James C. Davies has postulated that rebellion occurs not during a period of great deprivation but instead, when improvement drops off after a period of relative prosperity. As the gap between expected need gratification and actual need gratification widens, frustration increases and the psychological state of the people makes them more prone to rebel. This hypothesis could help to explain la violencia of the late 40's which followed a period of Liberal reforms and economic growth in the 1930's. If Davies's theory is correct, the possibility of a revolution now would be remote. Colombia's growth has been small but steady over the past twenty-five years. There have been some set-backs and improvements have been slow but in general, changes within the existing framework have taken place.

Statistics from any developing country are less than accurate but they can give a general idea of the economic and social conditions. On a 1950 based index of per capita GNP, taking 1950 as 100, by 1960 it had increased to 117 and by 1970, to 140. However, the per capita GDP growth rate had declined from 3.8 per cent in the early 1970's to 1.6 per cent in 1975. Agriculture employed 53.1 per cent of the working population in 1951, 47.2 per cent in 1964 and 38.6 per cent in 1970. In 1964, 12.8 per cent of the working population was employed in manufacturing and this had increased to only 15.4 per cent in 1970. Commerce, however, accounted
for an increase from 8.6 per cent in 1964 to 13.6 per cent in 1970.9

Colombia has remained largely dependent on one export crop. Coffee accounted for 76.7 per cent of the total export value in 1955. By 1965, this had decreased to 64.8 per cent and by 1975, to 44.9 per cent. However, with the rise in coffee prices, it increased to 55.5 per cent in 1976. The second highest export crop was cotton which accounted for only 5.5 per cent of the total national exports in 1976.11

Life expectancy in the 1950's was about 45 years.12 By the 1960's, this increased to 57.5 years and from 1970 to 1975, it had increased again to 60.9 years.13 Infant mortality rates decreased from 113.3 per 1,000 live births in the 1950's to slightly over 90 by 1970.14 Clean drinking water was available to 64 per cent of the population in 1961 and to 71 per cent by 1971. However in 1971, only 47 per cent of the rural population had clean water.15

Illiteracy dropped from 47.7 per cent in 1951 to 27.1 per cent in 1964.16 In rural areas, 38 per cent of the males and 44 per cent of the females were still illiterate in 1964.17 In 1969, only 49 per cent of the population between the ages of five and fourteen were enrolled in primary schools. From ages 15 to 19, 33 per cent were attending secondary schools and only 4 per cent of the population attended university.18 In the mid 1960's, Colombia had 191 university students for every 100,000 inhabitants. In the United States,
there were 1,738 students attending universities for every 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁹

The elites of Colombia are not to be viewed as evil and heartless ogres who express no concern for the masses. Many of them have worked to bring about reform and despite the defects of the National Front, the majority of presidents elected since its institution have been noted for their attempts to improve social conditions. What this paper argues is that sincere as the efforts of some of the elite may have been, they have been unwilling to break ties with the international capitalist system. Until they make this break, reforms will be piecemeal and the necessary structural changes will not take place.

Because of their close ties, it is often difficult to distinguish whether the Church or the government has been more responsible for what minimal improvements have taken place over the last twenty-five years. Economic growth has been almost exclusively due to the efforts of the government but social changes have, to some degree, been motivated by the Church. The improvement in literacy, as has been noted, was largely due to the Church-supported radio schools. Pressure on the government to provide clean drinking water has often been led by activist priests who also are noted for organizing campaigns to promote social changes like better housing and nutrition. Because of the different responses to the idea of a "new Church", it is difficult to judge what effect
the Colombian Church has had on development.

As was pointed out in the introductory section of this paper, Leonard Binder stresses that in a modernizing process, institutions become more complex. The increased complexity of the function of the Church in Colombia has reached the point where the Church is now split over the question of what its role should be.

There have been four basic responses to the Vatican's call for social change. First, some believe that the elitist system is natural and right and the Church's duty is to keep emphasizing that death is the great equalizer and that life is to be lived with one goal—to merit the promise of eternal heavenly bliss. In the Colombian hierarchy and among certain orders—most notably the Capuchins—there are still some who adhere to this belief. However, the majority of Colombian clergy and certainly most of the bishops, take the second position which is that the existing system is good in principle but can be improved upon by charity—the distribution of food to the needy, the support of orphanages and other similar gestures of concern. It is this position which most Catholics accept and as a consequence, the status quo is entrenched by diminishing the growth of bitterness and despair which creates revolutionaries.

Those who adhere to the third and fourth responses, which includes most of the younger priests in Colombia, believe that justice demands change, that the role of the priest must
be re-defined and that a social revolution is necessary in order to make the system correspond to the needs of the people. Within the ranks of these progressives, the division is over whether or not the social revolution can be peaceful. For a small minority, violent revolution is the only answer and one of Colombia's leading Roman Catholic radicals, German Guzman Campos has said: "... violence may actually become the supreme act of love for millions of one's fellow-men."

The Hierarchy

Although the Church has a more tenacious hold on national life in Colombia than in any other Latin American country, there is, in the people, a great ignorance of the precepts of Catholicism, and although religious identity and symbolism are important, religious belief is not a vital force in their lives. The Church as an institution still wields a great deal of influence but instead of realizing the transforming potential that Eisenstadt, Bellah, Singer and others have recognized in some religious belief systems, the hierarchy of the Colombian Church continues to reinforce the status quo.

Pressure from the Vatican on the Latin American Churches to become a vital force in society is great. The area has one third of the total baptized membership of the international Church and because Latin America is under-developed, the appeal of communism is high. The real test
of Vatican II will be what happens to Catholicism in Latin America in the future for if the Church fails here, it loses much of its authority to speak to the world on development issues. However, the great fault of Vatican II and the Medellín Statements is that there is no reference made to the specific political conditions necessary for development. According to Father Francisco Lage Pessoa, a Brazilian priest living in exile in Mexico:

Once it is recognized that capitalism is the evil par excellence in the realm of the economy and organization of society, it is necessary to do away with it, to put in its place a social system "less separated from the gospel," for the advent of which "the Church rejoices," as the few bishops of the Third World say. We would prefer the more realistic expression, "the Church should rejoice," because, unfortunately, we see no symptom of joy in the Church over the strengthening of socialism in the world.

But can a Catholic be a socialist? Not only can they, but, according to the degree of their consciousness of the social problem, they have the obligation to be socialists, if the historic moment in which they live thus determines it and there is no other solution for the development and welfare of the peoples of the earth.

As elite institutions, the international Catholic Church, the Latin American Church and the Colombian Church have all failed to give firm support to socialism. In an effort to keep from alienating its elite adherents and to maintain its own alliance with them, the Church refuses to realize that reason, co-operation and commitment to universal values rule out the important role of nationalism and class conflict in overcoming underdevelopment. As long as the Church fails to come to grips with economic facts, it will
continue to have little to contribute to reform in Latin America.

In Colombia one of the problems has been the refusal of the Church to promote a secular state. Internal tensions have forced the Bishops to cease to sanctify the status quo but their condemnation of socialism and revolution leaves them fluctuating between conservatism and mild reformism. The internal divisions within the Church plus the fact that half the clergy are foreign and report directly to their own superiors abroad, keep the Church from making a unified stand as the religious leader in society.

In answer to the questions asked in the introductory chapter of this thesis, although the hierarchy of the Church is placing a much greater emphasis on empirical reality, it is not motivating change, it is not willing to challenge the elites, and it is not promoting the conscientización of the masses. In its perpetuation of an elitist education system, its support of the National Front's radical rhetoric coupled with a policy of palliatives, and its refusal to break ties with the state, the hierarchy fails to meet the definition of an agent for development given in this paper. The Church's support of the goals of the liberation theologians has stopped at hesitant lip-service. From this, it can be concluded that the hierarchy of the Colombian Church is not a force for social change. However, its reactionary tendencies are tempered by the split in the ranks of the prelates under its
control. The question of whether or not the radicals are contributing to political development is more difficult to answer.

The Radicals

There is an identity crisis among priests in Latin America. Uncertainty about their role has prompted a large number to ask for lay status or to leave the Church completely. For some in rural areas who wish to change their function, this often cannot be accomplished without leaving the priesthood. In many rural areas, the priests, still dependent on the wealthy landowners for financial support, find it very difficult to reject conservative policies. Similarly, although upward mobility is possible in the Church, the basic criteria is conformity with the status quo. Consequently, the hierarchy is almost exclusively composed of priests from upper class or upper middle class backgrounds and the few who were not born into the elite are conservatives. The radicals have very little influence in elite circles.

Harold Isaacs has a chapter on religion in his book Idols of the Tribe. He recognizes that religion is an important bond in a society and as reform splits the Catholic Church, it affects more than the priests.

For millions of people who depended on the Church precisely because it spoke for the firm certainties that sustained them and provided the strongest anchor they had for their sense of themselves, the crisis of the Church opened a group identity crisis of great depth and unpredictable outcomes.

The radicals have undoubtedly been a disruptive force
but Colombia is badly in need of disruption that will challenge the institutionalized violence of the status quo. As Marxists discover unexpected allies in the Roman Catholic structure, anti-clericalism declines and within Marxist parties and the clergy, there are small groups whose ultimate aim is a Marxist revolution tempered by the humanism of Christianity.

Until the hoped-for revolution takes place, the radicals have managed to mitigate some of the extreme reactionary tendencies of the hierarchy. Although those priests who try to promote reform often suffer repercussions, some efforts do succeed. The occupation of land by campesinos, community organizations in working class and slum neighbourhoods and general strikes to protest such things as the lack of clean water have all been successfully led by priests from time to time during the past decade. By focusing discontent into specific action, the progressive priests have made the Church the leading spokesman for groups that were before not represented by any institution in the society. By having the Church take on this new role, the progressive priests are helping to avert the kind of participation crisis outlined by Myron Weiner which was discussed in the introductory chapter of this paper.

One of the weaknesses of the Dependencia theory is that it argues that this type of reformist effort made within a capitalist framework, is actually regressive for it merely
alleviates the general suffering enough to postpone the inevitable revolution for a few years. According to Andre Gunder Frank and other Dependencia theorists, until the miracle of a successful revolution occurs, one must avoid all stop-gap measures and concentrate on "working to make the revolution". What this actually entails remains a mystery. It is evident then, that the Dependencia theory is useful in explaining some of the causes and reasons for the perpetuation of underdevelopment but in the face of conditions existing today, it fails to contribute to its liquidation.

Ivan Illich, although committed to radical change in Latin America, criticizes the progressive priests for different reasons. The change, he says, has to be secular because radical priests have no more right to manipulate the gospel to their purposes any more than do the conservative oligarchies.

Ivan Vallier, while insisting that religious reform is a prerequisite of social reform says that when radical priests assume that the Church must be the vanguard of change, they are asserting the old idea that the Church is the all-knowing, all-seeing entity and thus the solution to all of society's ills. "Consequently, some of the most retrogressive and traditionalizing impulses are found among Christian revolutionaries." The function of the Church in society, he says, is not to mastermind the revolution. As traditional
society is destroyed, and extended families and neighbourhoods disappear, new bases will be needed to gratify traditional needs and to give confidence in the new secular order. It is here that the Church is crucial because it is the best tool to bind old values to new situations.  

The position of a progressive priest in Colombia is not enviable. Surrounded by poverty, he knows that he commands respect and often is the best qualified individual in an area to organize the people and try to help them reach some degree of self-awareness. If he works with the masses and manages to bring about a few changes to lessen their misery, he is condemned by the traditionalists for being radical and condemned by leftists for sacrificing the next generation's chance at revolution for the sake of a few paltry improvements now. If he takes the final step as did Camilo Torres, Domingo Lain and others, and joins a guerrilla group, he is virtually committing suicide.

The contribution to the revolution of the guerrilla priests presents many problems. First, there is the basic contradiction between a leader in a Church which preaches universal love participating in a class revolution. Then, as in the case of Camilo Torres, it can be asked whether a decision to join a guerrilla group is the right decision for the revolution. Was engaging in violent combat the best use of Camilo's talents or would he have contributed more to the cause by working at the kind of peaceful, consciousness-
raising that Helder Camara is internationally noted for? Because Camilo was the first martyred guerrilla-priest, his gesture has had international consequences but the handful of priests who have followed his example have been quickly forgotten. Is their decision to fight a courageous one or is it instead, a desperate and selfish escape from the despair they are surrounded by every day?

As Singer and Bellah emphasized, religion can play a role in development by legitimizing change. When Torres became a guerrilla, he became a revolutionary like any other revolutionary and in so doing, forfeited the contribution he could have made to development through religion. When a priest becomes a guerrilla, he gives up the role the Church can play in humanizing the revolution because in order for the Church to fulfill this function, it must forego the vanguard position and always be slightly behind the revolution.

Although the leftist priests are criticized from all sides, the tremendous increase in efforts to repress them proves that they are a threat to the status quo. Throughout Latin America, a large number of radical priests, most of whom are not guerrillas, have paid with their lives for their commitment to change. The progressive priests are contributing to political development in Colombia but the extent of their contribution will remain weak as long as the hierarchy thwarts their efforts. Without official backing, they are forced to walk a tightrope between betraying their people by not doing
enough and betraying the Church by assuming too much personal authority.

The Potential of the Church as an Agent for Change

Ivan Vallier claims that it is the weakness of the Church in Latin America, not its strength, that is responsible for political instability. The Church’s weakness forces it into constant political manoeuvres and prevents it from creating a religio-moral foundation in Latin American countries. In the book, Violence and Repression in Latin America, Duff and McCamant test Vallier’s thesis and conclude that Vallier understates the case. The Church not only has failed to create a religio-moral foundation for the society but also has stimulated dissensus and conflict in its fight for political and material gain. Colombia, they say, has suffered more violence over clerical issues than any other country in Latin America. What they discover when testing Vallier’s hypothesis against data is that a strong Church does not necessarily decrease political instability. Without the backing of established political parties and an entrenched military, the Church has little effect on the smooth functioning of a political system.\(^{30}\)

If the Church has difficulty contributing to political stability, it has more difficulty contributing to political change. The tendency to think in ultimates and the difficulty in accepting different points of view not only cause internal conflict but also prevent active participation in pluralist groups working to promote development. As the Church struggles to overcome
her view of herself as the absolute authority, political
leftism and Protestantism with their emphasis on horizontal
solidarity, continue to erode the Church's support. 31

The Church in Latin America cannot preach national
independence as a solution to the continent's problems of
economic dependence for she is herself, a colonial church.
In 1962, the U.S Catholic Church launched a program aiming
to get 2,250 priests, brothers and sisters to volunteer to
go to Latin America. The program fell far short of its aim
and as Illich says, the reaction to the failure of this band-
aid operation to stem the appeal of Castroism, should be
relief. To those who answered the call, Illich warned that
they must:

... accept the fact that a limping ecclesiastical
assistance program uses them as palliatives to ease
the pain of a cancerous structure, the only hope
that the prescription will give the organism enough
time and rest to initiate a spontaneous healing. Much
more probably, the pharmacist's pill will both stop
the patient from seeking a surgeon's advise and addict
him to the drug. 32

David Mutchler, himself a former Jesuit, is far more
critical of the results of the Church's dependency. He claims
that the Latin American Church is an instrument of U.S. and
Western European policy interests and that her own prime in-
terest is neither reform nor reaction but only survival. In
the introduction to Mutchler's work, Horowitz states:

... the intricate network of relationships between
the cross and the stars and stripes makes the con-
nection between the cross and the hammer and sickle
something less than a full blown romance. 33
He agrees with Camara and Illich that the Church's adaptations to change are mired by her international affiliations—both secular and religious. Disagreeing with Vallier's belief that Catholicism is a pre-requisite for societal improvement, he says that the Church spreads and legitimizes dependency by creating her own grass-roots organizations in competition with the national left. The Jesuit social agency, CIAS, in Colombia, he claims, gets money from the CIA to build peasant organizations to counteract Marxist ones.

By 1974, international agencies like Misereor and Adveniat were no longer supporting "subversive" social projects in Latin America. Whether the pressure came from European or Latin American bishops is uncertain but there is a tacit understanding that European money now goes to saving souls, not to bettering social conditions.

The great threat to the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America is not found in the spread of Marxism or of Protestantism but in the internal hemorrhaging of the Catholic system. A Rand Corporation report in 1972 correctly predicted that the Church "will increasingly reject all active sponsoring of violent revolution" and will not guide the process of social and political change. Any attempt by the Church to translate moral abstractions into political action would create such rifts that the survival of the Church would be jeopardized.
The hierarchy of the Church in Colombia is an elite institution concerned more with the suppression of the masses than with their mobilization. Its aim is to maintain the Church's privileged position in the society by supporting a government more concerned with preserving the status quo than with adjusting to change. Far from being a force for modernization, the hierarchy's complex international and internal ties make it an accomplice in the "development of underdevelopment".

Despite the regressive tendencies of the hierarchy's policies, the possibility of the Church making constructive contributions to change in Colombia remains. It is necessary in the final analysis to differentiate between the hierarchy and other segments of the Church. That the Roman Catholic Church in Colombia is becoming increasingly pluralistic is made evident by the split in the Church and the efforts of the leftist clergy show that one segment of the Church is now showing a new concern for groups of people in Colombian society that were before not represented by any institution. Furthermore, these often highly educated reformist priests serve as a vehicle for ideological inputs into Colombian society from other leftist Latin American Catholics and from Marxists in both Latin America and Europe. With their influence in the educational system and in their contact with the Colombian people, the effect of this radical ideological input could be significant in the years to come.
During the 1960's, the new directions initiated by Pope John and other progressive Catholic leaders prompted a brief period of significant changes in the Roman Catholic Church. In the past few years, however, the challenge of Vatican II and the Medellin Statements had diminished. As often happens when an organization or government moves radically to the left, a counter-action soon sets in and the Church is now swinging back to a more right-wing stance. However, some of the changes have had lasting effects and in ten or fifteen years, as the older more reactionary Bishops in Colombia are replaced by younger more progressive men, the Church may take on a new role. Although it is the view of the author that the Church can not be at the forefront of revolutionary change, eventually it may well become an influential force assisting in the re-structuring of Colombian society.
Footnotes


5. Wilkie, op.cit., p. 147.


7. Wilkie, op.cit., p. 147.


10. Ibid., p. 147.


15. Ibid., p. 115.


17. Wilkie, op.cit., p. 118.


34. Ibid., pp. XI-XII.

35. Ibid., p. 412.


38. Ibid., p. 154.
Appendix

Platform of the United Front of the Colombian People

To all Colombians, the popular classes, the organizations of communal action, labour unions, cooperatives, mutual aid societies, peasant leagues, Indian communities, and worker organizations, and to all the discontented and those who are not aligned with the traditional political parties, we present the following platform to unify all sectors of the Colombian populace with concrete objectives.

1. Motives

1. The decisions that are indispensable for our Colombian political system, if it is to be oriented for the benefit of the majorities rather than the minorities, must be made by those who hold power.

2. Those who now possess real power constitute an economic minority who make all the fundamental decisions concerning national policy.

3. This minority never makes any decisions which might adversely affect their own interests or the foreign interests with which they are connected.

4. The decisions required for a socio-economic development of the country beneficial to the majorities and for national independence necessarily affect the interest of the economic minority.

5. These circumstances make a structural change of political power absolutely indispensable in order that the majorities
may make the decisions.

6. At the present time the majorities reject the political parties and reject the system in force, but they do not have a political apparatus that is capable of seizing power.

7. The political apparatus that is organized must seek the greatest possible support from the masses. It will need technical planning and should be based upon principles of action rather than upon a popular leader so that the danger of "kitchen cabinets," demagogy, and personalism may be avoided.

2. Objectives

1. AGRARIAN REFORM

Ownership of the land will be vested in those who are working it directly.

The government will appoint agrarian inspectors who will deliver titles to the peasants but will require that cultivation be controlled by cooperative and communal systems in accordance with a national agrarian plan, and with credit and technical assistance.

Land will not be purchased by anyone. Any land that is necessary for the common good will be expropriated without compensation.

The Indian councils will enter into real possession of the lands which belong to them. This will promote the development and strengthening of these native communities.
2. URBAN REFORM
All those who are living in houses in cities and towns will be owners of the house which they inhabit. Persons who depend only on the rental of a house as a source of income may keep it, even if they are not living in it, if they can prove that such dependence is the case.

An owner will be fined if, in the judgement of the government, his house is not sufficiently utilized. This fine will be invested by the State in its housing projects.

3. PLANNING
An obligatory plan will be prepared with the aim of reducing imports, increasing exports, and industrializing the country.

All public or private investment will be subject to the national investment policy. Operations in foreign currencies will be handled exclusively by the State.

4. TAXATION POLICY
A progressive income tax will be collected from those whose earnings are greater than the income required by an average Colombian family to live decently, as for instance five thousand pesos in 1965. Anything more than this limit which is not invested in sectors indicated by the official investment policy will be completely surrendered to the State. No institution will be exempt from taxation. Wages up to a certain limit, for example five thousand pesos a month in 1965, will not be taxed.
5. NATIONALIZATION

Banks, insurance companies, hospitals, clinics, centers for the manufacture and distribution of drugs, public transportation facilities, radio and television, and natural resources will belong to the State.

The State will provide free education for all Colombians, respecting the ideology of the fathers of families until the end of secondary education, and the ideology of students after the secondary level.

Education will be obligatory until secondary or technical education is completed. There will be penal sanctions against fathers who do not comply with the obligation of educating their children. Financing will be covered by the official investment policy through increase of taxation.

Underground resources will belong to the State and the exploitation of oil will be undertaken in the interests of the national economy. Oil concessions will not be given to foreign firms except under the following conditions:

1. The participation of the State will not be less than 70%.
2. Refining, distribution, and production of fuels will be public services under State control.
3. After a period of not more than 25 years, there will be reversion to the State of all enterprises, equipment, and installations, without compensation.
4. Wages and salaries of Colombian workers and employees will be at least equal to those of foreigners of the same occupational categories.

6. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Colombia will enter into relations with all the countries of the world and will foster commercial and cultural exchanges on conditions of equity and mutual benefit.

7. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
The State will introduce a complete and progressive program of social security which guarantees the population the right to free health and medical attention without prejudice to the private practice of the profession, and will carefully examine all the aspects related to unemployment, invalidism, old age, and death. All personnel of the health professions will be employed by the government and will be paid up to the limit fixed by law in accordance with the number of families who ask to be under their care.

8. FAMILY POLICY
There will be sanctions against fathers of abandoned children. The protection of the wife and children will be assured by law through effective sanctions.

9. ARMED FORCES
The budget for the armed forces shall be adequate for their purpose without affecting the health and educational needs of
all Colombians. The defense of national sovereignty will be the responsibility of the whole Colombian nation. Women will be obliged to render some public service after they are eighteen years old.

10. WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Women will participate on an equal footing with men in the economic, political, and social activities of the country.

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