ATTITUDES AND MOTIVATIONS

OF WELSH NATIONALIST PARTY ACTIVISTS

by

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ABSTRACT

A considerable amount of attention has been paid by political scientists to the rise of public voting support for third parties, including separatist parties in such western democratic states as Canada and the United Kingdom. This study, however, attempts to probe within such a party in order to discover the characteristics of its active members rather than its voting supporters. It is hypothesized that here very different factors may be operating.

The study focuses on a group of activist members of Plaid Cymru, the Welsh Nationalist Party, whose motivations and attitudes are diagnosed, together with their consequences for political action. The importance of cultural and idealistic as against political and economic motivations is examined, while the major attitudinal dimensions considered are those of political efficacy and opinions on the use of violence and other extra-legal methods, both of which are central to an understanding of the nature of Plaid Cymru as a political party. Finally, party activity, as an indicator of depth of involvement in the party, is examined, together with those factors which determine its intensity. In these ways it is hoped to construct a theory of separatist party involvement which may supplement existing models attempting to explain the rise of third parties.

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T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The Celtic Genius - Cornwall, Scotland,

Ireland, Wales

Is to the English ascendancy, the hideous

Khaki empire,

As the white Whale is to the Killer Whale ...

Red rags to John Bull - the celtic colour

Flounting again."

Hugh Macdiarmad

This study of nationalism in Wales shall attempt to determine those distinctive motives which lead individuals to involve themselves in Welsh nationalist politics. These shall be examined within the framework of the rise of social movements and more particularly of the growth of third parties in general. The study will focus on the attitudes and motivations of nationalist party activists and will attempt, through the use of personal interviews, to find and explain notable similarities and differences in these respects between those of different age, class and educational backgrounds.

On July 21, 1966, the first Welsh Nationalist in history to be

elected to the British parliament, entered the House of Commons in London. He had taken decisively the constituency of Carmarthen in South-West Wales from the Labour Party in a by-election held only three months after Labour's resounding General Election victory. Nine months later, in a similar by-election in the South Wales constituency of Rhondda West another Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalist Party) candidate polled 39.9 % of the total vote compared with only 8.7 % in the General Election a year earlier, nearly taking the seat in the process. On the same day, in a by-election in Glasgow, a Scottish National Party candidate took over 30 % of the total vote. On the 3rd of November Mrs. Winifred Ewing became the new Member of Parliament for Hamilton, only the second S.N.P. member in history to sit in the House of Commons.[1]

In May, 1968, the S.N.P. polled over 300,000 votes in the Scottish local elections, establishing itself decisively as a force to be reckoned with by the major parties. Later the same year Plaid Cymru delivered a further shock, receiving 40.4 % of the vote in the relatively highly anglicized Caerphilly constituency in South Wales.

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[1]In 1945 Dr. Robert McIntyre had won Motherwell for the S.N.P. in a by-election but this had been in a two-cornered fight, the only other contender being a Coalition candidate. He lost the seat at the General election a few months later when Britain returned to normal partisan politics.

The nationalist causes ebbed somewhat after this but they still exhibited considerable strength in the General Election of June, 1970.

In this election Plaid Cymru obtained a total vote in the 36 Welsh constituencies of 175,000 (11.5 %) though losing its only member of Parliament. The Scottish Nationalists lost their member at Hamilton, but gained another in the Western Isles, obtaining 350,000 votes in 70 Scottish constituencies (11.4 %).[2]

This sudden surge of nationalism may or may not have been a short-lived phenomenon, a mere voice of protest against what appear to many voters, English as well as Welsh and Scottish, to be the remoteness of a seemingly over-centralized government in London. What cannot be denied is that these developments present a particularly fascinating example of the rapid rise of third parties within a two-party system.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Wales was officially united with England in 1536, having

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[2]See The "Times". Guide to the House of Commons. London, "Times" Newspapers Ltd., 1970, p. 246.

finally lost its independence with failure of the Glyndwr Revolt from 1400 to 1415. However, due to its rugged terrain and particularly to its fortuitous preservation of its language, which though in decline is still spoken by 26 % of the population, Wales retained much of its individuality within the United Kingdom, although it was not until the nonconformist religious revival of the late nineteenth century and the battle for the disestablishment of the Church of England in Wales that this sense of difference once again began to gain expression in political terms.

Scotland's situation is somewhat different. Scotland and England achieved de facto unity in 1603 when James VI of Scotland became James I of England. However, Scotland retained its own parliament until 1707, when a majority of its members voted for union with England. Whereas, at the time of Wales' incorporation into England, the Welsh language was still the only one spoken by the vast proportion of the population, English had begun to replace Gaelic while Scotland was still under its native kings and Gaelic is now considered the native language, even by most nationalists, not of all Scotland, but only of that portion of the highlands and islands known as the Gaeltacht, where it is still spoken. Also, because she entered into a voluntary union, Scotland retained such independent institutions as her system of law, the Kirk (The established Presbyterian Church in Scotland), and her own universities.

Thus, in Scotland, memories of historic independence, existing independent institutions, and folk customs and traditions perform the function in maintaining national feeling which in Wales is per- formed almost exclusively by the language. This point shall be further enlarged upon in a later chapter, and it constitutes one of the major differences between the Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements.

FOCUS OF STUDY

Most studies which have been conducted of nationalism have concentrated on that typical of the nineteenth century, which manifested itself in the glorification of existing states, the unification of unnaturally divided national communities, or the violent rebellion of national groups against crude alien oppression (e.g. France, Italy, the Balkans). E. H. Carr typifies this approach, outlining as the causes of nationalism such factors as the breakdown of class divisions, the growth of communications, the nationalization of economic policies superceding those of laissez-faire, the advent of mass propaganda, the decline of international religion, mass involvement in military and economic effort etc..[3] He and other writers have dealt

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[3] E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After. London: Macmillan & Co., 1945.

more with the national movements of the nineteenth century, tending

towards amalgamation or violent revolution, generally ignoring those

typical of Wales, Scotland and Quebec which are for the most part

constitutionally separatist. Most academic concern with recent mani-

festations of nationalism has been directed towards its growth in the

ex-colonial areas of Africa and Asia. However, there has been a

distinct lack of concern with its development within already well-

established democracies, perhaps because to date, with a small

number of notable exceptions such as Ireland, few of these movements

have been successful and hence have little disturbed international

or regional stability as did the nationalist revolutions of the nine-

teenth century or the Afro-Asian revolutions of the present and recent

past. It is the contention of this writer, however, that a study of

separatism of the Welsh and Scottish variety can make a considerable

contribution towards a general theory of nationalism and towards

existing knowledge of the rise of third-party movements in two-party

states.

DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

The student of nationalism finds himself confronted initially

by a major problem--the definition of such vague and oft recurring

terms such as "nationality", "race", "nationalism", "patriotism", and

"culture".

It is first of all necessary to make a clear distinction between the concepts of "nationality" and "race", emphasizing the cultural and linguistic connotations of the former as opposed to the biological bases of the latter. Carlton Hayes, for example, has been careful to stress the role of intermarriage in reducing rigid racial distinctions, while drawing attention to the primacy of language in the determination of nationality.[4] Language, he observes, provides the community with its solidarity and continuity. Karl Deutsch makes the same nationality/race distinction and pulls together several strands of thought in pointing to the connection between nationality and certain common relationships a group has to part of its physical environment, to historical events and to subjectively experienced common feelings, habits and memories exhibited by members of the group.[5]

The second factor Hayes stresses as being of importance in bringing about a sense of nationality is that of historic traditions, although in some individual cases such traditions, combined with other factors such as common customs, laws, religion and institutions

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[4]Carlton J. Hayes, Nationalism - A Religion. MacMillan Co.: New York, 1960.

[5]See K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1960.

may entirely supercede language as the bases of nationalism (as is the case in Switzerland for example).[6] Hayes usefully subdivides the factor of historic traditions into religious, territorial, political, fighting, industrial and economic, cultural and historical traditions, all of which create a sense of past experience held in common.[7]

It is certainly possible to accept Hayes' dictum that a combination of historical traditions and national language constitute the _cultural_ bases of nationality; and culture, in this sense, will constitute one of the dimensions with which this study shall be centrally concerned. Deutsch is valuable in approaching a definition of nationality, in emphasizing those things that it is not. For example, he demonstrates the uselessness of such notions as "will" and "consciousness" when applied to subjectively experienced national identity and points to the traumatically changed position of apparently fully integrated German Jews during the thirties to exemplify this point, as they were pressured into awareness of their Jewish identity. He defines culture as being "based on the community of communications, consisting of socially stereotyped patterns of behaviour including habits of language and thought, and carried on through various forms of social

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[6]For the importance of a common past in generating nationalism see Leonard Doob, _Patriotism and Nationalism_, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964, p. 236.

[7]C. J. Hayes, _Nationalism - A Religion_, MacMillan Co., New York, 1960, pp. 4 - 5.

learning".[8]

Nationalism must not be confused with patriotism. Patrio-
tism, as H. Munro Chadwick has pointed out, is of an essentially land
based rural nature, and lacks the element of reaction against external
"alien" forces manifested to varying degrees in different types of
nationalism.[9] Doob makes the distinction particularly clearly,
classifying patriotism as a set of subjective and internal predisposi-
tions involving a sense of loyalty to the "patrie" while nationalism
"arises psychologically when patriotism leads to certain demands and
possibly also to action ... Potentially ... patriotism can give rise
to nationalism if the beloved society is threatened, then preserving
it can quickly become a national policy".[10]

A great deal of difficulty has centred around the definition
of the term "nation". Hayes viewed a nation as being the entire popu-
lation of a nation-state.[11] However, this seems to be defining a
fundamentally cultural entity in political terms. He claims that a
nationality, by obtaining political unity and sovereign independence,

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[8]K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, 1960.

[9]H. Munro Chadwick, The Nationalities of Europe, Cambridge
University Press, 1945.

[10]Leonard Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1964, p.6.

[11]C. J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, MacMillan Co., New York,
1926, p.4.

becomes a nation and so confuses the nation with the state. His definition would seem to imply, for example, that Ireland, having been subdued by England, ceased to be a nation, while she became one once again in 1922. This is unacceptable. A nation then should be regarded as a community asserting its nationality in political, in cultural, or in both of these terms. Inis Claude has emphasized this perceptual aspect of nationhood: "a group of people constitute a nation when they feel that they do—when they have an active sense of belonging together and of being distinct from other groups, a sense of solidarity and differentiation".[12] As this study shall be primarily concerned with motivational and attitudinal aspects of nationalism, this definition is probably the most suitable. Most authorities in the field seem to agree that one cannot objectively ascribe nationhood to a community—nations exist primarily in the hearts and minds of men. As Rudolf Heberle has commented, "A nation is not merely a multitude of people who have similar ethnic and linguistic characteristics—what constitutes a nation are the sentiments, the attitudes and the goals which unite the people".[13]

Hayes divides nationalism in four ways. Firstly, it can be

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[12] Inis Claude, National Minorities. Havard University Press, Cambridge, 1955, p. 2.

[13] Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements. Appleton-Century Crofts Ltd. New York, 1951, p. 2.

viewed as a historical process, in the course of which national

communities become political units; then as the theory implicit in

this process (i.e. The intensification of national identity); thirdly

as the political movement combining the historical process and a

political ideology; and finally as a condition of mind which takes

the form of loyalty to the ideal or fact of the nation-state. This

study shall be primarily concerned with the third of these. Hayes

views nationalism as a social phenomenon stemming from a fusion of

patriotism and nationality and draws the obvious but neccessary line

between cultural nationalism based on language and tradition alone,

and political nationalism which usually requires economic and political

discontent as sustenance for growth.

In its broadest sense nationalism has been defined as, "the

attitude which ascribes to national individuality a high place in the

hierarchy of values."[14] However, a more precise definition is re-

quired if the frame of reference is to be narrowed down to political

separatism--such a conceptual definition as that above is of little

help in empirical study, as the range of phenomena to which the term

nationalism can apply is at the very least considerably broad. Lloyd

Fallers, for example, refers to an ideological commitment to the "pur-

suit of unity, independence, and interests of a people who conceive of

[14]Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol. II., MacMillan Co,
New York, 1933, p. 231.

of themselves as forming a community".[15] We are not told what kind

of community is referred to here, while a phrase such as "ideological

commitment" seems extremely vague. Carlton Hayes describes nationalism

as a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or fact of one's

national state is superior to all other loyalties and of which pride

in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and

mission are integral parts".[16] This, however, is too narrow, for

recent experience has shown that the nationalist may also adhere to

other ideologies than that of the nation's intrinsic right to poli-

tical independence. He may, for example, also subscribe to doctrines

of social or class revolution, with the result that it may prove

impossible to determine whether his nationalism is the supreme value

or merely one of several intertwined values. The National Liberation

Front in South Vietnam presents such a problematic case. In addition,

this writer feels Hayes' belief that a sense of mission is a pre-

requisite for nationalism is a mistaken one, as self-government may

be viewed as an end in itself rather than as a means towards a greater

goal.

It is required for the purpose of this study to find an

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[15]Lloyd Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism",
American Anthropologist, Vol. 63, No. 4 (August, 1961), p. 677.

[16]Carlton J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, MacMillan Co.,
New York, 1937, p. 6.

operational definition of the concept which is applicable to that "separatist" form of nationalism with which one is primarily concerned in Wales. It will therefore be defined as: An attitude which ascribes to national individuality, in the form of a distinctive language, customs, history, religion, geography, law system or economic condition, or a combination of all or some of these, a high place in the hierarchy of values, and seeks its embodiment in a self-governing political unit with borders co-extensive with what are perceived to be the ethnic, linguistic, or historical limits of the nation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Initially, it is neccessary to examine the conditions under which nationalist sentiments arise, the socio-economic pressures which bring about the politicization of purely cultural sympathies. The growth of nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland can be viewed within a general theory of the rise of third parties in states characterized by two-party systems. Maurice Pinard, in his studies of the rise of Social Credit in Quebec, has produced a particularly useful study of this phenomenon from which can be extrapolated just such a general theory.[17] He follows Seymour Lipset in regarding the

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[17]See Maurice Pinard, "One Party Dominance and Third Parties", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXXIV, No. 3, August, 1967.

rise of such movements as being a function of structural cleavages
(economic, regional, ethnic, or religious). Economic policies of
a central government, for example, may be perceived by a regional group
to be incompatible with its interests, resulting in its alienation
from that one of the major parties which holds power at the centre
and to which it traditionally gives its electoral support. This
may result in a reversion to a party which seems committed more ex-
clusively to a defence of its interests. As Duncan Macrae has pointed
out, "While traditional allegiance to one party does not preclude
political change, it renders very unlikely the possibility that this
change will take place through a switch to the other major party".[18]
Pinard's theory rests upon the premise that "if strain is an important
condition for the appearance of any type of collective behaviour (in-
cluding social movements) other determinants—in particular "structural
conduciveness"—must also be present. That is, the structural charact-
eristics of the social system must be such as to permit or encourage
an episode of collective behaviour, given, among other things, the
existence of strain".[19] He views the rise of Social Credit in Quebec
as being partly a function of the existence of a one-party dominant

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[18]Duncan MacRae, "Occupation and the Congressional Vote
1940-50", _American Sociological Review_, XX, No. 3, June 1955, p. 339.

[19]Maurice Pinard, _op. cit._, pp. 358-9.

system in that province. The Labour Party in Wales and the industrial belt of Scotland stands in a dominant position similar to that of the Liberal Party in Quebec. Writing of Quebec, Pinard observes that "the ... electorate could not perceive the Conservatives as a likely substitute for the Liberals. They did not possess completely open avenues of political protest as would have been the case with a healthy two-party system".[20] Traditional allegiance to one established party, then, makes it extremely difficult for its supporters to switch to that party's traditional opponent. In Wales and Scotland many Labour supporters, being socialized into a strongly class-conscious environment typical in Britain of areas relying on such basic heavy industries as coal mining and steel production, find the prospect of voting for or supporting the Conservative Party as an alternative to Labour little less than abhorrent.

Pinard qualifies his observation by noting that in areas such as Montreal, where Social Credit had little success, there was little evidence of strain--similarly, in areas such as Cardiff in South Wales, where anglicization and urbanization have broken down the old basically rural, religiously nonconformist (i.e. non-Anglican) way of life, where there is relative prosperity, and where the Conservative Party is strong, the Nationalists have made virtually no impression.

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[20]Maurice Pinard, op. cit., p. 361.

Structural cleavages, Pinard continues, lead, in situations such as those referred to above, to alienation from one major party and to the seeking of an acceptable alternative, which is sought in a third party. He points out that in most cases in Canada, gains by a third regionally based party accompany gains made on a national basis by the opposition major party, which is weak in that region in particular. The credibility gained by a third party as a result of its surge in support offers an opportunity of persistence, although such support may drop after its initial leap. Political change of this nature occurs according to Pinard at a structural and at an individual (psychological) level (see Fig. 1.1 below). It is hoped to test this at the individual level among nationalist activists in Wales.

Figure 1.1

Structural Level (Macro or Systemic Level)

| Structural Cleavages (Economic, thnic, etc.) | → | Alienation from one of major parties | → | Emergence of one party dominant system | → | Search for alternative to party in power | → | Rise of third parties. |

Individual Level.

```
                          Perceive a strong        Switch to
                  ──────> traditional    ────────> traditional
                          alternative              party.

Short-term grievances
(Often economic)    ──────
against party in
power

                          Perceive no              Switch to
                  ──────> traditional    ────────> new
                          alternative              party.
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
Support for nationalism, it appears, also satisfies certain psychological needs in the satisfaction of individual self-esteem and in providing the same kind of outlet for youthful idealism that membership of radical left-wing groups has been hypothesized to provide in England. Electoral success also seems, to some extent, to have had a snowball effect in giving these movements a credibility which acts as a foundation for further growth. The influence of these variables in the growth of nationalist support is represented in Figure 1.2 (see below). It should be added here that this writer believes Pinard to have ignored one factor which could possibly influence those who decide to give their support to a third party.

Figure 1.2

| GROUP IDENTIFI-CATION | a) desired preservation of language b) Desire to preserve historical traditions | → | CULTURAL NATIONALISM |

PERCEPTION OF ECON-OMIC DEPRIVATION

OVERCENTRALIZATION (alienation from central government)

REPRESENTATION (perception of no traditional acceptable alternative)

DESIRE TO PROTEST

CREDIBILITY (nationalist party perceived as acceptable alternative with chance of success)

SUPPORT FOR NATIONALIST PARTY

This is the strength and nature of the political attachments of close family members, particularly of parents. It seems possible that those whose parents are non-voters, weak in their political attachments, floating voters, or of differing political loyalties, may be more likely to change by virtue either of a lack of strong party identification, or the existence of familial cross-pressures.

Leonard Doob has definded "culture" as "the social heritage and system of interlocking habits which people acquire during socialization and which both in fact and in fantasy they share with one another".[21] However, if the term is to be made meaningful for use in empirical study, it is preferable to break down the concept of culture into its component parts. The Report of the Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs follows this method, pointing to three key elements in culture; Language, Intelligibility or faith in the nation and its purpose, and the traditions transmitted through the socialization process.[22] For the purpose of this study a modification of this breakdown will be adopted. Being concerned with the set of perceptions held by individuals and groups

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[21]Leonard Doob, Op. cit., p. 7.

[22]Nationalism, a report of a study group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1934.

which lead to the growth of social movements, one must be greatly
concerned with that consciousness of identity to which a distinctive
culture often gives birth and which is referred to here as "Group
Identification". This group identification promotes the rise of
cultural nationalism, the desire to preserve intact those components
of society, such as language and history, which are perceived of
as being neccessary for the maintenance of a nation's distinctive-
ness. Cultural nationalism combines with more tangible sources of
discontent such as those indicated in Figure 1.2 to bring about
the growth of more politically oriented movements. Four other
variables are hypothesized to be of importance in studying the
nationalist movements in Wales; economic deprivation. overcentrali-
zation, representation, and credibility. It must first be stated
that all of these are merely labels for subjectively experienced
perceptions of discontent, not neccessarily for objectively observed
conditions.

Economic deprivation is employed as an abbreviation for the
belief by a regional group within a state that it is suffering econo-
mically to an unjustified degree, particularly in comparison with
groups in other areas within the same state. Secondly, "Overcentrali-
zation" denotes that feeling of a regional group that the central
government of the state, and the bureaucracy through which it operates,
are geographically remote from the area where the group resides, and

are therefore ignorant and inconsiderate of that group's interests when deciding policy for the wider political unit. Thirdly, the variable "Representation" is used as a convenient term for the perceived lack by the voters in a region of a traditional or acceptable alternative to the party in power to which they customarily give their support. Finally, the concept of credibility indicates belief that a vote for a third party will not constitute a wasted vote, that the party does have a reasonable chance of success which increases with each success it manages to achieve.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

In the study of nationalists in Wales the technique of personal interview was used. Two samples were employed, both taken from the city of Swansea in South Wales. This city was suitable in many ways. Firstly, it presented few difficulties with respect to expense, travel, accessibility etc. by virtue of this writer's residence there from 1969 to 1970. Secondly, in its linguistic situation and its voting habits in particular it represents a microcosm of Wales in general (see tables 1.1 and 1.2).

TABLE 1.1

Welsh-speaking population (1961 Census)

	Swansea		Wales	
Welsh-speaking	27,947	(17.6%)	656,002	(26%)
Non Welsh-speaking	131,397	(82.4%)	1,862,715	(74%)
Total	159,344		2,518,717	

TABLE 1.2

Relative voting habits (1966 Election)

	Swansea (t.77.2%)	Wales
Labour	68 %	68.6%
Conservative	32 %	31.2%
Total (L. & C.)	100 %	100 %

In Table 1.2 it was decided to restrict the comparison to the respective Labour and Conservative performances. This is because the Liberals, while obtaining 6.3% of the toal Welsh vote in 1966, have not contested the Swansea seats since the war. Plaid Cymru gained 4.3% of the Welsh vote in 1966, while in the Swansea East constituency(they did not contest Swansea West) they took 7% of the poll. The comparative results of the 1970 General Election in Wales and Swansea are shown in Table 1.3 below.

TABLE 1.3

1970 General Election

	Swansea East (t.1970-70%) (t.1966-80.4%)	Swansea West (t.1970-75%) (t.1966-73.8%)	Swansea-total (t.1970-72.7%) (t.1966-77.2%)	Wales (t.1970-77.4%) (t.1966-78.6%)
Labour	28,183 (68.5%)	24,622 (50.2%)	52,805 (58.6%)	809,343 (53.3%)
Con.	8,191 (19.6%)	21,384 (43.6%)	29,575 (32.8%)	419,884 (27.6%)
P. Cymru	4,188 (10.1%)	3,033 (6.1%)	7,221 (8.0%)	175,016 (11.5%)
Cummunist	563 (1.3%)	----	563 (0.6%)	6,459 (0.4%)
Liberal	----	----	----	103,747 (6.8%)
Total	41,125	49,039	90,164	1,514,449

With a population of 150,000, Swansea is the catchment area, in terms of communications, cultural and entertainment facilities etc. for approximately 250,000 people and borders on a Welsh-speaking rural hinterland. The city contains two parliamentary constituencies, Swansea West, containing the South-Western area of the town, is highly anglicized, and contains a large proportion of the city's white collar workers who occupy the high number of residential houses. Although the Labour Party holds the seat at present, it is by a margin of only just over 2,000 over the Conservatives. Swansea East, the other constituency, offers a marked contrast ... A decidedly working class area, consistently returning Labour Party M.P.'s with five figure majorities, it contains the bulk of Swansea's Welsh-speakers and as one travels northward through the constituency away from the sea, the Welsh influence becomes increasingly apparent.

The two samples were taken respectively from those active in the six branches of the Nationalist Party in Swansea and from those registered in the branch at Swansea University. Activity shall be regarded in this case as being membership of branch committees and participation in their work. It is assumed that such membership demonstrates both a personal willingness to work for the party and a reputation among fellow members as one prepared to sacrifice time and effort.

In Swansea itself the party is organized in its usual manner. Each constituency has its "rhanbarth" or district committee, consisting of one or two representatives from each of the three branches which make up the rhanbarth. The rhanbarth committee is responsible for parliamentary campaigns, large scale social activities (e.g. dinners, dances etc.) and for co-ordination between the branches, while branch committees run local government election campaigns and social and moneyraising activities at the branch level. The committees vary in size, depending on the size of the branch, from three to five. The position in Swansea East at the time of interview was somewhat in flux due to a recent reorganization, but this presented no problem as it was aimed at changing branch areas, not personnel.

It was decided to interview all members of the six committees (a total of 27 individuals in all), taking committee activity as already indicated, as evidence of a strong commitment to the nationalist cause. It proved possible to interview 24 of these (see Table 1.4), three being unavailable, due respectively to lack of co-operation, hospital illness, and "personal reasons".

By interviewing the members of the university branch, it was hoped to obtain an all-Wales perspective (the bulk of British students, thanks to the grant system, study at universities and colleges away from home). The total enrollment of Swansea University (a constituent

university of the University of Wales) was 3,300 from 1969-70, of whom just over 30 % were recorded as coming from Welsh homes. Of these it was estimated by the secretary of the university branch of the party that about 100 were members of the party. However, many of these were enrolled in local branches in their home towns, and although they attended occasional meetings, did not register with the college branch, in which only 24 were listed. It was decided, therefore to interview these, and it proved possible to contact 22 (see Table 1.4). Of the two unavailable, one was absent from the university at the time of interviewing (May-June 1970) and the other proved consistently impossible to contact. Due to its length, the interview took approximately one hour to complete and therefore was generally conducted in as informal an atmosphere as possible to alleviate problems of monotony.

A number of questionnaires had also been mailed, early in 1969, to a number of individuals active in the Scottish National Party. The head office of the party unfortunately failed to co-operate in providing names and addresses of parliamentary candidates by mail, as was twice requested. Some fifty questionnaires were eventually dispatched. Firstly, thirty were sent to a number (selected at random) of the 100 S.N.P. candidates who were successful in the Scottish burgh elections of Spring, 1968. The winning S.N.P.

candidates, as listed in the "Glasgow Herald" for May 8, 1968, were placed in alphabetical order and the total divided into groups of ten, from each of which the third, sixth and ninth individuals were selected, giving a sample of thirty in all. The most conspicuous successes were in Glasgow (13 seats), Edinburgh (7 seats), East Kilbride (4 seats), Alloa and Renfrew (each 3 seats). Twenty-two were sent to letter-writers to the Scottish Nationalist newspaper, the "Scots Independent", and whose addresses, as well as names were provided. The editions of the newspaper examined covered the year from October 1968 to October 1969. Response was unfortunately disappointing. Only some 13 municipal councillors responded, due probably to the questionnaires having to be sent via the town halls or municipal offices, and only seven of the letter-writers responded (see Table 1.5). However, it was felt that, bearing in mind the limitations of the sample, the responses would still prove of some value in comparisons with the Welsh respondents, especially on such questions as those concerning the importance of language.

TABLE 1.4

Numbers interviewed

	Intended Sample	Number interviewed	% interviewed
Swansea West	14	13	92.9
Swansea East	13	11	84.3
University	24	22	91.7
Total	51	46	90.2

TABLE 1.5

Number of S.N.P. members interviewed

	Intended Sample	Number interviewed	% interviewed
Councillors	30	13	43.3
Letter-writers	20	7	35.0
Total	50	20	40.0

CHAPTER II

MOTIVATION OF PARTY WORKERS

Generally, British commentators during the period of the

impressive surge in nationalist party support from 1966 to 1968,

interpreted popular support for Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nation-

alist Party as constituting a protest against prevailing economic

conditions, and the apparent insensitivity of a remote centre of

government to local problems. This is probably a correct explanation,

but how far can this be said to be true of activists in, rather than

voting supporters of the nationalist parties; how far is their activism

motivated by basically negative attitudes toward the alternative major

parties in Britain? Conversely, how far are they motivated primarily

by idealistic concerns of a fundamentally cultural or nationalistic

nature?

As Peter Clark and James Wilson have pointed out, "all viable

organisations must provide tangible or intangible incentives to indi-

viduals in exchange for contributions of individual activity to the

organisations".[1] They list three broad categories of incentive system;

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[1]Peter Clark and James Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of
Organisations", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VI., 1961-62,
p.130.

those relying primarily on "material" incentives, offering in return

for participation, rewards of a tangible, usually monetary nature.

Secondly, there are those offering rewards of a "solidary" kind, funda-

mentally intangible and taking the form of social returns, such as

the satisfaction, enjoyment and prestige gained from the act of parti-

cipation itself. Finally, there are "purposive" rewards, in which

satisfaction is derived from the general suprapersonal stated ends

of the organisation. All these are found to some degree in all organi-

sations, but one generally predominates, and this is a crucial factor

in analysing organizational characteristics and behaviour.

It would appear from the responses to the question, "What

first motivated you to join Plaid Cymru?" that in the case of those

active in the party, "purposive" or cultural/nationalistic motives are

uppermost. (See Table 2.1 below).

TABLE 2.1

Primary Motivations of Activists

Motivation for Membership:	% N
1. Basic nationalist feeling	34 (16)
2. Culture/language	17 (8)
3. General condition of the nation	7 (3)
4. Influence of other people	11 (5)
5. Social concerns	2 (1)
6. Economic conditions	4 (2)
7. Protest/disillusionment	11 (5)
8. Politically inclined	9 (4)
9. Don't know/no answer	4 (2)
Total	100 (46)

As can be seen, of the 46 respondents, 24, or 52 per cent, offer clearly cultural or idealistic reasons for their initial decision to join the nationalist party. The factor "basic nationalist feeling" was employed to include all those responses which expressed the rather nebulous "love of country" emotion. Typical of this is a student respondent who stated as his reason for joining the Nationalist Party a desire "to express my identity with the Welsh people and nationality" and another who explained: "I was becoming aware of my Welshness and joining Plaid Cymru was the extension of this into politics". A local Party official exhibited similar feelings, explaining that he joined Plaid Cymru, "on discovering its existence, having already long been thinking along these lines".

Those who allude to their concern for the preservation of the Welsh language and culture generally sum up their motives concisely, like one student who was overwhelmingly concerned that "Wales and its language are neglected by the British Government". Not surprisingly, disillusionment is generally a strong underlying emotion. Those whose responses to the question are of a cultural/nationalistic nature generally express a lack of faith in the ability or willingness of the British Government or the major parties to satisfy Welsh cultural aspirations. In addition, this lack of faith or disillusionment is a strong motivating factor among those whose Party membership was engendered by less culturally and idealistically orientated reasons.

Such sympathies are expressed by a monoglot English-speaking student who claims: "Wales would get a better deal. As it is now, there is not enough concentration on Welsh matters. There will be better jobs if there is complete concentration on Wales." The Parliamentary candidate for the Swansea West constituency expressed the same emotions: "At University at Aberystwyth I became more involved in the Labour Club. I saw the Labour Party was as central-ised as the Tories, and this has been borne out by the present Government".

It was hypothesized in the introductory chapter that a Party as clearly idealistically charged as Plaid Cymru, would have a strong appeal to younger members of the population. Past opinion polls have indicated this. In 1968, one such poll found that twenty-four per cent of those aged from twenty-one to thirty-four years expressed support for Welsh self-government within the Commonwealth, compared with fifteen per cent in the thirty-five to fifty-four age group, and seventeen per cent of those older than fifty-four.[2] In the same poll, twenty per cent of the youngest group intended to vote for Plaid Cymru in the next election compared with nine per cent

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[2]Western Mail, September 25, 1968, p.6

and twelve per cent in the next two age groups respectively. A
later poll in the same newspaper showed that twenty-four per cent
of those in the twenty-one to thirty-four age group opposed the idea
of investing the heir to the British throne with the title of Prince
of Wales, compared with thirteen per cent and seven per cent for the
two older groups.[3]

These findings appear to be substantiated in this study. All
those in the student group, as would naturally be expected, joined
Plaid Cymru before reaching the age of twenty-one, but it is more
important to note that of those in the sample of local officials
no less than twelve (50 per cent) joined Plaid Cymru when they were
under twenty-one years of age. A further four (17 per cent) joined
before they were thirty and only two (8 per cent) were over forty
years old when they joined the Party. The same tendency is apparent
when one examines the occupations held by respondents when they
joined Plaid Cymru. Of the twenty-four local officials, thirteen
(54 per cent) were students when they became Party members. There
seems little doubt, therefore, that Plaid Cymru does have a strong
appeal to youth, particularly, it would seem, to the University

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[3] Western Mail, September 27, 1968, p.6.

student, though by no means exclusively so. This helps to substantiate the claims of both press commentators and nationalist Party spokesmen that nationalism has a strong appeal to the youthful segment of the population.

The frequency distribution also reveals that one of the variables hypothesized in the introduction to be of importance in motivating Plaid Cymru members is not in fact significant. Credibility, the perception of the party as being a feasible alternative, does not appear to be a strongly motivating factor among the activists themselves. Of the local officials of Plaid Cymru, only five (21 per cent) have been members (active or otherwise) only since the beginning of the Plaid Cymru upsurge with the Carmarthen election of July 1966, with the other nineteen being active members before that date. Yet before this, prospects appeared poor for the nationalist party, especially as it only increased its percentage vote in the nineteen seats it fought at both elections, from 8.4 per cent in the 1964 General Election to 8.7 per cent in 1966, gaining votes in ten seats, but losing ground in nine.[4] Credibility, or confidence in the possibility of success for the party, is indeed related to activity, as

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[4]Butler, E.D., and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966, London: Mac Millan Co., 1966, p. 290.

will be seen in the following chapter, but it would appear to be irrelevant to a discussion of motivational influences.

A total of twenty-four (52 per cent) of the forty-six people interviewed have at some previous time supported another party other than Plaid Cymru, and there are some interesting differences in the breakdown of primary motivation for joining Plaid Cymru between those who have always been nationalist supporters and those who have defected from another party (see Table 2.2).

It can be seen in the above-mentioned table that there is a tendency for those who have always been nationalists to view cultural considerations as the basic driving force of their political activity. Those, however, who have defected from other parties, generally are more likely to have done so for less directly idealistic reasons. The explanation for this seems reasonably clear. One would expect cultural and nationalistic idealists to be amongst those least easily absorbed into the general pattern of British political life. The mere nature of the stated objectives of the major parties, the concern with primarily British cultural and British economic interests necessitates this. Those however, with an interest in political activity as such, and whose concern in politics is less charged with strong nationalistic and cultural feelings are more likely to find a place in the system as it stands, although this

does not preclude the possibility of a change of allegiance, should various expectations be denied realization.

TABLE 2.2

Previous Support for Nationalist
Party: Primary Motivation for
joining Plaid Cymru

Primary Motivation	Supported other Party		Always Nationalist	
1. Influence of others	17%	(4)	5%	(1)
2. Protest/disillusionment	17%	(4)	5%	(1)
3. Social Concerns	4%	(1)	0	(0)
4. Economic Concerns	4%	(1)	5%	(1)
5. Politically inclined	17%	(4)	0	(0)
6. General National Conditions	4%	(1)	10%	(2)
7. Basic Nationalism	29%	(7)	45%	(9)
8. Culture/Language	8%	(2)	30%	(6)
Total	100%	(24)	100%	(20)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha -- .04[5]

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[5]In his book Social Statistics (McGraw Hill, New York, 1960, Hubert Blalock has defined Goodman and Kruskal's Tau-Alpha as a measure "which tells us the proportional reduction in error (in predicting B) when A is known". Hence a Tau-Alpha value of .05 means that by knowing the row values in a contingency table it is possible to reduce the errors made in predicting the column values by 5% (Blalock, p.234).

Of the 24 defectors, 14 (58 per cent) were formerly committed to the Labour Party. This is slightly higher than Labour's total percentage vote in Wales in the 1970 General Election (53 per cent). Of the remaining 10, 4 are former Liberals, 4 were "floating voters" (i.e. they have at different times, before joining Plaid Cymru, voted for at least two other parties) and a surprisingly low two (one student and one local official) were formerly Conservatives. As can be seen from Table 2.3, this compares with a Conservative percentage vote in Wales in the General Election of 27.6%.

TABLE 2.3

Breakdown of Former Party Defectors.
Breakdown of Welsh Vote - 1970 Election.

Party	No. of Defectors in Sample		Welsh Vote 1970	
Labour	70%	(14)	60.6%	(809,343)
Conservative	10%	(2)	31.3%	(419,884)
Liberal	20%	(4)	7.8%	(103,747)
Total (for three above)	100%	(20)	100.0%	(1,332,974)

A value of 1 indicates total predictability. This measure shall be extensively used in this paper as, being a conservative measure, it is particularly suitable for small samples in which a stronger relationship between variables is required in order to establish politically important findings. It should also be noted at this stage, that except where otherwise stated the "no answer" and "don't know" responses are excluded from the contingency tables.

As can be seen in Table 2.3, if the floaters are eliminated from the table, the proportion of Labour defectors rises to 70 per cent - an indication, particularly considering the small number of Conservative defectors, that Pinard's theory may well have a degree of application to those third party activists who change from other parties.[6] It would appear from this restricted sample that the Labour Party suffers disproportionately here, although more extensive research would be needed to confirm this.

Respondents were then asked if they had changed allegiance, how far various factors played a part in this decision, and if not, how far such factors had made them decide to support and join Plaid Cymru from the first, rather than an alternative major party. (See questionnaire). Points were alloted for the extent to which each factor influenced the decision. If the respondent answered "a little" one point is alloted. If he or she responded "to a considerable degree" two points are scored, and three are given for a response of "very much". Forty-three individuals responded to this question and the results are tabulated in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.

The results set out in these tables are interesting. They demonstrate once again the primacy of cultural and idealistic motivations over those of a political or economic nature. It should be

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[6]Pinard, op.cit., pp.359-61.

noted that there is little apparent "ethnic" animosity towards the dominant English group. Only five (13 per cent) of the respondents strongly consider that the English and Welsh could not "get along" together and list this as an influential reason for their own political loyalties.

TABLE 2.4

Sample Breakdown of Strength
of Factors influencing Decision
to join Plaid Cymru.

	Effect of Factor		Possible Factors Influence Plaid Cymru Support.			
	i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi
None	9%(4)	5%(2)	14%(6)	28%(12)	11%(5)	14%(6)
A little	18%(8)	30%(13)	21%(9)	28%(12)	14%(6)	28%(12)
Consider-able	21%(9)	30%(13)	33%(14)	25%(11)	30%(13)	47%(20)
Very much	51%(22)	35%(15)	33%(14)	18%(8)	44%(19)	11%(21)
Total	100%(43)	100%(43	100%(43)	100%(43)	100%(43)	100%(43)

	vii	viii
None	2%(1)	67%(29)
A little	16%(7)	21%(9)
Considerable	33%(14)	9%(4)
Very much	49%(21)	2%(1)
Total	100%(43)	100%(43)

TABLE 2.5

Score for Each Factor in Terms of Overall
Importance in Motivating Members to join
Plaid Cymru

		Factor influencing Support	Score for Respondents		
			Actual	Possible	% A/P
Cultural	vi	Saving of identity	98	129	76
Nationalism	ii	Preservation of Culture	92	129	71
	v	Something to strive for	89	129	69
Non-cultural	i	Economic Problems	84	129	65
	iii	U. K. too large	79	129	61
	vi	Unemployment	67	129	52
Purpose	iv	Sense of purpose of others	58	129	45
Ethnic bias	viii	Anti-English	20	129	15

These findings are also reinforced by the responses received
to another question. When asked what kinds of rewards they expected
from activity in the Nationalist party,14 (34 per cent) of the 43
respondents who give positive answers, give reasons of a specifically
idealistic/nationalistic nature. (See Table 2.6)

TABLE 2.6

Rewards Expected by Activists

	Type of Reward Expected	No. expecting Reward	% expecting Reward
1.	Don't know/no answer	3	6.5
2.	None	8	17.4
3.	Idealism	11	23.9
4.	Welsh Identity	3	6.5
5.	Party Success	10	21.7
6.	Political Activity per se	5	10.9
7.	Social/meeting people	6	13.0
	Total	46	100.0

If it is assumed, as it probably can be, that a response of "no rewards expected" indicates a devotion to the party for strictly non-personal reasons, then 22 (51 per cent) or over half the respondents foresee only rewards of an idealistic nature. A further 11 stated Party success as the projected rewards, and it is quite possible that a significant proportion of these view such success as the instrumental means to a greater goal. Only 11 (26 per cent) of the respondents place political and social rewards at the apex of their priorities.

Finally, this interpretation is confirmed by the replies
to the question, "People enjoy politics for different reasons. How
important are the following to you?" Again, as in Table 2.5, points
have been alloted for responses of various emphasis, from one point for
the answer, "not too important" to three points for "very important".
The results are tabulated in Table 2.7. Again, the idealistic,
nationalist, and to a lesser extent the political motivations dominate,
and personal and social considerations take second place.

TABLE 2.7

Importance of Reasons for Enjoying
Politics

Reason for Enjoying Politics	Score		
	Actual	Possible	%A/P
e. Help country	130	138	94
f. Help party	125	138	91
g. Concern with public issues	113	138	82
i. Influence politics	103	138	75
c. Duty as citizen	92	138	67
b. Social contacts	87	138	63
h. Help people with problems	84	138	61
a. Fun and excitement of campaign	70	138	51
j. Social prestige	26	138	19
d. Political ambitions	16	138	12

Socialization has long been accepted as a crucial contri-
butary factor influencing the formation of individual political
loyalties. It is interesting to note that 18 (39 per cent) of the
respondents do not know their parents' political opinions, or have
parents who are (or were) abstainers, floating voters, or are divided
in their political loyalties. This is far above what one would expect
of the population as a whole.[7] Political socialization, in 39 per cent
of the cases, is at a minimum, thus facilitating conversion to a non-
traditional alternative. Undoubtedly, the testing of this finding
in other political situations may contribute towards a general theory
of third party development. The weakness or conflict of parental com-
mittment, it can be assumed, withdraws from the arena a major deterrent
of political behaviour which deviates from that traditional in the
immediate social environment.

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[7]Unfortunately, this writer can find no comparable statistics
for either Welsh or British activists in, or voters for the non-nation-
alist parties, with which to compare this finding. However, in a
comprehensive survey of 2,263 British voters by Butler and Stokes in
1963, 72% of voters could specify their father's political allegiance,
and 54% their mother's. The nationalist activists would seem to com-
pare approximately then with the non-activist supporters of the other
parties. (D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, Mac
Millan, London: 1961, p. 209). An American study has observed that
political activists generally have politically interested parents,
(Marvick, 1961, p. 209) finding that only 22% of Los Angeles party
campaign workers had parents who were not interested in politics.
Another U.S. study has found that "independent" voters, those who are
both non-partisan and politically involved to a degree, flexible in
their political outlook rather than indifferent or apathetic, tend to
be more likely to have parents who had voted for opposite parties.
(Meyer, 1962, pp. 66-77). Most important, only 10 per cent of these
independents stated that both their parents were partisan adherents

This observation is supported by other U.S. studies which have found that strength of party allegiance is strongly correlated with the strength of parental allegiance while weak party supporters tend to be ignorant of their parents' loyalties, or have parents who were divided politically, shifted in their voting habits or abstained regularly.[7]

There are some interesting variations within the sample. As might be expected, those who consider themselves to be basically inclined to the left in their political outlook tend to state that the economic shortcomings of major party policy was a strong influence in their decision to join Plaid Cymru. There is no such difference among those who state that they are in the political centre or are inclined toward the right. (See Table 2.8).

This is easily understood. Those on the left, one can assume, are more concerned with the social and economic questions whose projected

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of the same party. As Meyer states: "... the independent voter ... is a deviant in the electorate, for he violates the rule that partisanship goes with involvement, non-partisanship with apathy". In this respect he is similar to the Plaid Cymru activist.

[7]Angus Campbell et al. The Voter Decides, Row, Peterson and Co., New York, 1954, p. 99.

solutions have traditionally characterized this section of the political

spectrum, particularly in areas of perennial economic depression like

South Wales.

TABLE 2.8

Political Inclination
Reason for joining P.C. - Economic

Reason for joining - Economic Policies of other Parties	Self assigned political Inclination			
	Left		Centre/Right	
Not important	23%	(5)	48%	(10)
Important	77%	(17)	52%	(11)
Total	100%	(22)	100%	(21)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .07

Another economic factor is significantly correlated with the political attachments of the respondents' parents. Those who were strongly motivated to join Plaid Cymru because they considered that it had the best solution to the Welsh unemployment problem, generally had parents whose influence in their own political socialization was minimal (e.g. their parents were either divided in their loyalties, abstained, were 'floating voters' or were so apathetic that the respondents do not know their political views. In future, for convenience, this group of parents will be designated as "politically uninfluential". The opposite was found to be true of those whose parents were supporters of one of the major parties. (See Table 2.9).

TABLE 2.9

Parents' Political Allegiance:
Faith in Plaid Cymru's Unemployment Policy.

Reason for joining-- Plaid Cymru's Unemploy= ment Policy	Major Party		Plaid Cymru		Divided D.K. Abstain	
Don't know/no answer	1		1		1	
Not important	59%	(13)	25%	(1)	24%	(4)
Important	41%	(9)	75%	(3)	76%	(13)
Total	100%	(22)	100%	(4)	100%	(18)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .13

This is a difficult finding to interpret, but one suggestion seems particularly plausible. Those who are not subject to strong parental pressure in the process of growing up are perhaps less likely to question the ability of the third party they join or support to solve practical political and economic problems. Those whose parents gave them some kind of minimal political education may be more sophisticated in adjudging Plaid Cymru's problem-solving ability, or simply be cross-pressured into doubting its capacity for finding answers to deep-rooted economic questions. Also, those with a stronger background of political socialization may be more likely to view the end (self-government) on the future form of which they may have definite ideas, rather than the instrument (the party) as the means for the solution of various economic problems.

The economic factor seems to be of considerable importance in moulding the respondent's attitude towards the major parties. Of those who state that the lack of concern on the part of the Labour and Conservative Parties for the Welsh economic situation was a strong reason for their joining Plaid Cymru, a significant minority (31 per cent) stated that if they were English they would not entertain voting for a major party. Of those who feel that the economic factor was of less importance, however, only one rejected any possibility of voting for a major party were he resident in England. (See Table 2.10).

TABLE 2.10

Reason for Joining-Economic
Vote if English

| Vote if English | Reason for Joining-Economic | | | |
	Not important		Important	
1. Major Party	93%	(14)	69 %	(18)
2. Minor Party	7%	(1)	31 %	(8)
Total	100%	(15)	100 %	(26)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .08

One of two reasons could account for this, and both may be correct, influencing different individuals. Either the respondents feel a particularly intense bitterness towards the major parties and find their economic policies a strong focus for criticism, or those who join Plaid Cymru because they sense Wales has been economically deprived may be more angry as a result of this, and be more likely to reject the major parties all the more bitterly.

It was also found that among those who say that a specific event instigated their decision to join Plaid Cymru, is a great majority whose belief that the Labour and Conservative parties were

not concerned about the Welsh economy was an important reason for joining Plaid Cymru. This is difficult to explain, although it may well be that these individuals generally pay more attention to current events (events which influenced them included reading specific books, hearing speeches, meeting with other activists, election campaigns, and particularly the damming of Welsh valleys as reservoirs for English water requirements). They may therefore tend to think in more concrete and political terms than those who simply drift into the party for diffuse reasons. Their traumatic experiences may also make them generally more intense in their critical attitude towards the major parties. (See Table 2.11)

Among those who state that they had a strong belief that the major British parties had "lost their sense of purpose" at the time they joined, a significant majority have never, at any time, supported a non-nationalist party. (See Table 2.12).

TABLE 2.11

Event as Cause of Entry into Plaid
Cymru: Reason for joining-Economic

Reason joined-Economic	Event causing Entry:			
	No Specific Event		Specific Event	
Not important	52%	(11)	18%	(4)
Important	48%	(10)	72%	(18)
Total	100%	(21)	100%	(22)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .13

TABLE 2.12

Past Support for Non-Nationalist Party
Reason for Joining-Lack of Purpose of
Main Parties

Reason for Joining Plaid Cymru-Others' lack of Purpose	Past Support for non-Nationalist Party			
	Support		No Support	
Not important	38%	(9)	79%	(15)
Important	62%	(15)	21%	(4)
Total	100%	(24)	100%	(19)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .17

Bearing in mind the indication in Table 2.2 that those who had never supported any party other than Plaid Cymru were more likely to put forward strictly cultural or nationalistic reasons for their political attachment, this is to be expected. Such people, it is reasonable to believe, are more likely to criticise a party for its "lack of purpose" (i.e. sincerity or idealism) rather than for its more practical shortcomings on policy formulation and application.

There was also a slight tendency for defectors to be more likely to advance as a strong reason for joining Plaid Cymru the

perception of the United Kingdom system of government as being

overcentralized.(See Table 2.13).

TABLE 2.13

Past Support for Non-Nationalist Party
Reason for Joining-U.K. Overcentralized

Reason for Joining-U.K. over-centralized	Past Support for non-Nationalist Party			
	Support		No Support	
Not important	25%	(6)	47%	(9)
Important	75%	(18)	53%	(10)
Total	100%	(24)	100%	(19)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .05

The explanation for this seems to be that those who have always

supported Plaid Cymru are more likely, from their first interest in

politics, to have thought in mainly Welsh terms of reference. Those,

however, who have supported a major party have presumably thought

politically, at some time in the past, in an all-British focus and

would be more likely to have had to react against this before changing

their allegiance. This finding is to some degree complemented by the

evidence in Table 2.14. Here, again, there can be seen to be a slight tendency for those who have always been nationalist in sympathy to be more likely to join Plaid Cymru for strong cultural reasons, a further substantiation of the findings of Table 2.2.

TABLE   2.14

Past Support for non-Nationalist
Party: Reason for Joining - Previous
Parties' View of Welsh Culture

Reason for Joining -- Previous parties' view of Welsh culture	Past Support for non-Nationalist party			
	Support		No Support	
Not important	38%	(9)	16%	(3)
Important	62%	(15)	84%	(16)
Total	100%	(24)	100%	(19)

Goodman and Kruskal Tau-Alpha = .06

SUMMARY

In conclusion then, in terms of Clark and Wilson's typology,[8] the primary rewards expected by Plaid Cymru members and activists, and the strongest forces motivating them to become active are of a "purposive" rather than of a solidary or material kind. The prime motivation is a deep rooted concern for Welsh culture and identity. A slight majority of respondents are defectors from other parties, particularly from the Labour party, with surprisingly few from the Conservatives. Two fifths of the respondents were weakly socialized, with parents who were abstainers, politically divided, 'floating voters', or whose views they did not know at all, a high proportion considering that the sample is one of activists, not merely voters.

The most interesting aspect of the chapter is, perhaps, the difference in ideological orientation between the cultural/Nationalist and economic or practical political motivations of those in the sample. Those who place themselves on the political left in sympathy, not surprisingly tend to have been more motivated to join Plaid Cymru by their perception of the Welsh economic situation, while those who felt a strong attraction to Plaid Cymru because they thought it could improve the employment situation were more likely to have had politically uninfluential parents (i.e. their parents constituted a weak

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[8] op. cit., p. 130

socializing force). It was hypothesised that the latter may be due to a tendency for those with less political education in the home not to question the overall policies and potentialities of Plaid Cymru. Such people may also confuse the instrument (the party) with the end (self-government) for which it fights, in terms of such problems and their eventual solution.

Those with strong economic reasons for joining Plaid Cymru are more likely to refuse even to consider that if they had been born English, they might vote for a major party. They seem to have a particularly negative perception of the major parties. Those who join because of a specific event, rather than those who just 'drift in' to the party, tend to be more economically motivated, possibly because they are more aware of what is going on around them, and are therefore politically critical in several directions, or equally likely, because such events (e.g. the drowning of valleys for reservoirs) may have made them judge the major parties negatively on all issues for emotional reasons. It may be that those who were spurred to join because of specific events are simply more emotional by nature, a proposition which would need further research to probe and sustain.

Defectors are also more likely to have felt, when they became Plaid Cymru members, that the United Kingdom government was over-

centralized and unresponsive to local needs.

Finally, and complementary to the above, non-defectors, those nationalist in sympathy as long as they can remember, tend to feel more strongly that the major parties lack any sense of purpose and also tend to have been more strongly motivated by cultural considerations than the defecting group, though it is significant that even among the latter, a majority are strongly critical of the major parties' perceived lack of concern with the maintenance of Welsh culture. As has been explained already, this is probably because strongly cultural nationalists - those whose frame of reference in itself rejects all-British institutions, are from the beginning less easily absorbed into the existing political system. Generally speaking, unlike those more economically or politically orientated they are less easily disillusioned, simply because they expect nothing to begin with.

CHAPTER III

CORRELATES OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

This chapter shall examine the importance of a sense of
political efficacy, both as a dependent and as an independent variable,
as a determinant of other political attitudes and activities and as a
function of such variables as education, sense of citizen duty and
non-political organizational membership. The above statement implies
that perceptions of political efficacy will prove to be a central
variable in the study of Welsh nationalists. It may be possible,
however, that while such perceptions have been found in other studies
of major party activists and voters to have a great impact on parti-
cipation, it may not prove to be as important in this study, which
deals with a rare type of political deviator who may be subject to
different influences.

Personal perceptions of political efficacy have consistently
been found to have a great impact on political behaviour. The indi-
vidual does not behave in isolation, but within the psychological
environment of a number of precognitions and expectations which help
to form his attitudes to all kinds of social activity. One study has
pointed out that such attitudinal measures "may tap more enduring
orientations to politics ... The individual does not react "de novo"

to each election but tends rather to respond to the stimuli of a
new campaign in terms of stable attitudes and dispositions he has
towards politics generally."[1] Although this is a statement on voting
participation, it is nevertheless equally applicable to more extensive
involvement. As Bernard Berelson has commented, "the conviction that
things can be affected is needed to give people the energy to care".[2]
This observation may or may not be the case with Welsh Nationalists.
One may surmise, on the one hand, that those active in a political
party, even a minor one, which subscribes to a doctrine of non-violence
and to striving for attainment of its goals through the ballot box,
would feel such activity to be effectively worth while. It is equally
possible, however, that as such activists have withdrawn or refuse to
indulge in major party activity, that they are active despite their
lack of faith in the system. Believing that Wales should be independent
is, after all, an indication of a strong feeling that its interest are
not being fully catered for under the British government.

Political efficacy, in the sense that the term is used here,
has been defined as "the feeling that individual political action

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[1]Angus Campbell et al. The American Voter - An Abridgement,
John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1964, pp. 57-58.

[2]Bernard Berelson et al. Voting, University of Chicago Press
Chicago, 1954, p.25.

does have or can have an impact on the political process ... that
it is worth while to perform one's civic duties".[3] In this study
a similar measure of a sense of perception of political efficacy is
that used in Campbell's 1954 study is employed, constructed from
four questions.[4] (See Appendix A). The scale and variations on it
have been used in a large number of studies (Campbell et al., 1964,
Milbrath, 1965, Agger et al., 1961). Guttman, in developing his
familiar scaling techniques, has demanded a coefficient of reproduci-
bility of .90 as the criterion of scale reliability. Using a method
developed by Ford[5] for the scaling of six or fewer attitude questions,
the four questions mentioned above were found to produce a scale
with a coefficient of reproducibility of .89 and a coefficient of
scalability of .71, .60 being the minimum required for the latter.[6]
A five-point scale is thus produced, ranging from a score of zero,
indicating a negative non-efficacious response to each question, to
five, denoting a full set of positive responses ("negative" and"posi-
tive", as used here, are of course value-free terms). In constructing

[3]Campbell et al., The Voter Decides, Evanston, Illinois, Row
Peterson & Co., 1954, p. 187.

[4]Ibid., pp. 187-194.

[5]Robert W. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Proceedure for Scaling
Attitude Questions", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1950,
pp. 507-532.

[6]For a simple but clear description of these two measures of
scale viability see G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science
Methods, Boston, Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971, pp. 120-128.

contingency tables, the scores have been trichotomized into three

categories; low, medium, and high perceptions of efficacy.

Several findings were expected to emerge. Firstly, it seemed

probable that those respondents feeling more politically efficacious

would tend to be more active in the party because, as Milbrath has

pointed out, "a person who knows more about the political world is

more likely to feel that he can do something to manipulate it."[7]

It was anticipated that those who score low on the efficacy scale

would be more likely to view politics as a "dirty game", politicians

as dishonest individuals and be willing themselves to play down

controversial issues and generally adopt a more pragmatic approach

towards political competition. In other words, those with low feelings

of efficacy, those less politically trusting, would be more likely to

"play a crooked game" themselves. There would also be, it was hypothe-

sized, a tendency for defectors from other parties to be more dis-

illusioned with the system and so perceive of themselves as being less

able to influence governmental decision-making.

It was anticipated that those who feel more efficacious would

be more likely to discuss politics with others and try to influence them.

As Milbrath has noted, "persons who are psychologically involved in

politics are more likely to be efficacious about political action".[8]

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[7] Op. cit., p.57.

[8] Op. cit., p.56.

Discussing one's beliefs in what are at least un sympathetic, and may even be openly hostile surroundings, is reflective of a deep psychological commitment to a cause. It was strongly expected that perceived efficacy and organizational membership would be significantly correlated. As Almond and Verba have stressed, membership in other political and non-political associations helps the individual "to avoid the dilemma of being either a parochial, cut off from political influence, or an isolated and powerless individual, manipulated and mobilized by the mass institutions of politics and government".[9]

It was also expected that a high degree of involvement with organizations other than Plaid Cymru would be significantly correlated with a strong sense of political efficacy. As it has been noted elsewhere, "we cannot ignore the fact that group influence is in part contingent upon the life situations of the membership. But the important point remains that group influence is an additional element in the picture; shared membership provides a focus and direction for behaviour that is lacking among non-group members who happen to be placed in the same life situation".[10] It has also been observed that those who are members of more politicized organizations, such as trade unions, tend to feel more efficacious politically than those who are members of non-politically oriented organizations, such as social

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[9]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1965, p.245.

[10]Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter - An Abridgement, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, p. 251.

clubs and cultural associations. In this study organizational members have been categorized into four types. Firstly some are members of Welsh organizations exclusively, including Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society), eisteddfodau or musical festival groups, Urdd Gobaith Cymru (the Welsh League of Youth), U.C.A.C. (the National Union of teachers of Wales, a nationalist-orientated association) and other organizations with a purely Welsh focus. Others are members of social organizations; these need little elaboration and include youth clubs, sports clubs, drama groups, ex-servicemen's clubs etc.. The Professional/Academic/Trade Union category includes those who are members of teachers' and lawyers' associations, trade unions and similar occupation-based organizations while those who are members of more than one type of organization have been grouped under the "Variety" category. It was expected then, that those in the third mentioned Professional/Academic/Trade Union category would have the strongest feelings of political efficacy, but there were no expectations of the variations, if any, that might exist between the other three categories.

Almond and Verba have also pointed out that, "the extent to which an individual is active in the organization seems to be related to his political perspectives ... Organizational members who have held active positions in their organizations are more likely than rank and file members to receive high scores on this (political competence) scale".[11] Respondents were asked to rank their organizational atten-

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[11]Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 260.

dance on a four point scale, and it was believed that this together with whether or not they held office would be correlated with perception of efficacy.

It was also expected to find a correlation between a sense of efficacy and political knowledge. In this regard, two factors were cross-tabulated with efficacy; awareness of separatist problems in areas outside Wales (see Appendix C) and perception of differences between the major parties in Britain. Those with a strong sense of duty to participate, it was predicted, would also feel more efficacious. Respondents were asked how far adhering to their duty as a citizen was a significant factor in their enjoyment of politics, and this was cross-tabulated with perception of efficacy, as it was hypothesized that those who feel a duty to be active are more likely to believe that activity to be worthwhile.

In addition, it was anticipated that those with higher education would feel more efficacious politically. It has been observed that "The educated person is distinct from the less educated not only in the number of facts about politics at his command but also in the sophistication of the concepts he employs to maintain sense of order and meaning amid the flood of information".[12] Agger and others make

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[12]Angus Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 251.

a similar observation: "There is a strong relationship between political potency and educational level, with feelings of potency increasing sharply with higher education".[13] It was also theorized that those who had participated for a longer period in party activity would tend to be drawn from the ranks of those respondents with a greater sense of potency - the less efficacious, one would assume, even if they become high participators, would be less likely to maintain this activity over a long period - their activity may even take the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy and be, in their own eyes, ineffective. Closely associated with this, it was suspected that those who feel that they have more influence in the local branch of the party, would tend to feel more efficacious - again, this association derives from the intercorrelation between different types of group behaviour.[14] Finally, it was anticipated that the inefficacious would be more likely to voice agreement with the statement that "politicans only concern themselves with the wishes of the people when they stand to gain personally." A study by Agger and others found that, "at every educational level the more potent are more trusting of politics and politicians than the less potent."[15]

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[13]Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning", Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, 1961, p. 494.

[14]Allardt, H. et al. "On the Cumulative Nature of Leisure Activities", Acta Sociologica, Vol. III (fasc.4), 1958, pp. 165-172.

[15]Op. cit., p. 494.

The results in many ways are somewhat surprising and are
summarized in the matrix below (Table 3.1). As can be seen, in the
majority of cases the variables with which this writer is particularly
interested are considered as dependent on variations in efficacy, al-
though in the four cases where the tau-beta correlation is employed,
efficacy is considered a dependent variable. These four factors are:
time of political participation, citizen duty, organizational member-
ship and education. To begin with, there is no correlation between
sense of efficacy and willingness to play down issues or to be poli-
tically pragmatic in campaign tactics (at the expense of principle)
or with the extent of perceived local party influence. The last
finding is particularly surprising, more so than the lack of observed
association between efficacy and education which is probably due to
the small number of those in the sample who failed to obtain higher
education. The correlation between perceived efficacy and activity
is surprisingly weak, although Milbrath has pointed out that "the
efficacy scale showed a stronger relationship with spectator activities
(voting, proselyting and wearing a button) than with gladiator acti-
vities (giving money, attending meetings, joining a club, and working
in a campaign).[16] In connection with this observation, it is also

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[16]Ibid., p.57.

TABLE 3.1

Correlates of Political Efficacy

Correlates of Efficacy	Correl. Coeff.	Effic. Score	View of Publ. Officials	Value of Vote	Say in Govt.	Compli- cation of Politics
1. Time of Participation	tau-beta.	.03	.06	.09	.04	.16
2. Awareness of Separatist issues	tau-alpha	.05	.00	.16	.07	.13
3. Enjoy Politics- duty	tau-beta	.06	.11	.00	.10	.02
4. Play down Issues	tau-alpha	.02	.00	.13	.00	.02
5. Political Pragmatism	tau-alpha	.02	.09	.03	.01	.05
6. Local Party Influence	tau-alpha	.00	.00	.02	.05	.02
7. Other Parties same	tau-alpha	.06	.13	.01	.00	.02
8. Discuss with Others	tau-alpha	.07	.02	.02	.01	.04
9. Politicians' Honesty	tau-alpha	.12	.05	.00	.02	.07
10.Numerical organi- zation. Member- ship	tau-beta	.05	.00	.13	.04	.00

TABLE 3.1 ... continued

11. Type of Organiz. Membership	tau-beta	<u>.11</u>	.06	<u>.13</u>	.07	<u>.61</u>
12. Organizational Office	tau-beta	.01	.06	.04	.00	.02
13. Activity Index	tau-alpha	.04	.07	.05	.02	.00
14. Higher Education	tau-beta	.02	.00	.00	.01	.01

useful to recall Erbe's observation that 'generally speaking, characteri-
zations of alienation may be divided into two major categories, according
to whether alienation is treated as "rebelliousness" or "retreatism". .
Rebellious alientation is characterized by a desire to strike back or
somehow violently manipulate the world from which the individual has
become estranged; it is the kind of energy that activates the "true
believer". Retreatist alienation, on the other hand, expresses itself
in detachment and despair ... The more commonly used scales of alienation
seem to measure retreatist alienation".[17] Erbe admits the difficulty
in creating a new scale to measure "rebellious alienation", the type
which this writer believes probably more nearly corresponds to the
perceptions of Welsh Nationalists.

Above all, however, it must be remembered that this study is
concerned with political deviators, individuals outside the mainstream
of major party politics, yet politically interested and motivated to
participate. Consequently, what has been found to be true of major
party activists may have to be drastically revised or even forgotten
when attention is turned to third party participation. The mere fact

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[17]William Erbe, "Social Involvement and Political Activity:
A Replication and Elaboration", American Sociological Review, Vol. 29,
(April), 1964, p. 206.

that only ten (22 per cent) of the Plaid Cymru activists are highly

efficacious, with 27 (59 per cent) scoring low on the scale, would

seem to substantiate this. In Campbell's study (1954) only approxi-

mately 10 per cent of high participators were found to feel ineffica-

cious.[18]

Significantly, the question concerned with activity (but not

included in the activity scale) which is most strongly correlated with

sense of efficacy (.07) is that most closely related to the proselyting

by non-activists to which Milbrath refers. Those who feel more

efficacious are more likely to discuss politics with friends and

acquaintances who are not nationalists; while only 58 per cent (15)

of those who score low on feelings of efficacy often involve them-

selves in such discussions, the corresponding figure is 83 per cent

(15) for those with medium or high efficacy scores. Sense of efficacy,

therefore, while not strongly influencing political participation as

such within the sample studied, does appear to be influential in the

exhibiting of what might be called "missionary zeal", a willingness

to advance what may be viewed by one's peers as a minority, perhaps

even eccentric point of view.

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[18]Ibid., p. 190.

As has been previously pointed out, knowledge of politics is a concept closely related to efficacy. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that those respondents who demonstrate stronger feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be highly aware of other separatist problems elsewhere in the world (for the construction of an index of separatist awareness see Appendix C). Such awareness is an indication of a greater sophistication in political judgement which is also likely to exhibit itself in personal analyses of the responsiveness of the British system of government to pressures from below. Although fully 70 per cent (19) of those scoring low on efficacy score high on separatist issue awareness, the corresponding percentage for those at both the medium and high levels of efficacy are 89 per cent (8) and 90 per cent (9) respectively. Also, as was earlier anticipated, those respondents who feel highly efficacious are less likely to believe that the major British parties are the same. Those at the medium and high levels efficacy levels (67 per cent) show a greater awareness of major party differences than those lower on the scale (47 per cent), the tau-alpha correlation here being .06. Again one would expect the more efficacious, the more politically sophisticated and trusting to be more aware of and perceive major party differences despite their third party allegiance.

As can be seen in the matrix (Table 3.1) enjoyment of politics
for reasons of "satisfying my duty as a citizen" is significantly cor-
related with sense of efficacy (tau-alpha = .09). Because so many
indeterminate psychological variables are at play in any attempt to
explain the above, only one, which as well as seeming most probable
to this writer, is also very simple, will be suggested here. This is,
that those who feel it their duty to participate actively in politics
are also likely to feel that activity to be worthwhile - a sense of
obligation to act in a certain direction would tend, it is believed,
topresuppose negative results should that obligation not be carried
out.

As far as organizational membership is concerned, the results
are again quite surprising. The number of organizations of which the
party workers are members is moderately correlated with their scores
on the efficacy scale (.05), but in the very opposite direction from
that anticipated in the introduction to this chaper. While 37 per
cent of those who are members of less than three organizations out-
side Plaid Cymru score higher on the efficacy scale, the corresponding
percentage for those who are members of three or more such organizations
is only 11 per cent. (See Table 3.2). Also, on one of the scale
questions, there is a particularly significant correlation with effi-
cacy, again in a direction contrary to that expected. While only
37 per cent (ten) of those in more than two organizations agree that

"the way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are
run in the U.K.", 73 per cent of those with low organizational member-
ship answer in the affirmative to this question. The tau-beta correl-
ation here is .13. A similar though weaker correlation is observable
(tau-beta = .04) between low organizational membership and disagree-
ment with the statement "People like me don't have any say about
what the government does", although in both organizational groups
a minority reply efficaciously to this question.

TABLE 3.2

Organizational Membership:
Efficacy

Efficacy	Organizational Membership	
	Under 2	Over 2
1. Low	47% (9)	67% (18)
2. Medium	16% (3)	22% (6)
3. High	37% (7)	11% (3)
Total	100% (19)	100% (27)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .05.

These surprising results are difficult to interpret. However, a partial explanation can be found in the fact that it was discovered that the bulk of those holding membership in over two organizations are members of exclusively Welsh-orientated groups (Table 3.3) and as will be seen in the next paragraph, those who are members of exclusively Welsh-orientated groups and of no others are very likely to demonstrate low perceptions of political efficacy. While 14 (87 per cent) out of 16 of these last named individuals are members of three or more organizations, fully 13 (81 per cent) score low on political efficacy. Unfortunately, the sample is too small to fruitfully allow the introduction of controls for different types of organizational membership; otherwise one might be able to discover correlations between the numerical strength of organizational membership and sense of efficacy among the other three groups. However, the evidence would seem to indicate that as far as Plaid Cymru members are concerned, the type of organization they join, rather than the number and the degree of activity within them, is the crucial variable.

TABLE 3.3.

Organizational Membership:
Type of Organization

Type of Organization	Organizational Membership			
	Under 3		3 or over	
1. Welsh only	13%	(2)	52%	(14)
2. Variety	6%	(1)	22%	(6)
3. Social	44%	(7)	11%	(3)
4. Professional/Trade Union Academic	37%	(6)	15%	(4)
Total	100%	(19)	100%	(27)

As stated in the previous paragraph, however, contrary to the
finding above, a correlation of a less surprising nature does exist
between the type of organization of which respondents are members
and their perceived degree of political efficacy. (Table 3.4). This
finding is further substantiated by the very strong correlation which
exists between type of organizational membership and a view of politics
as being too complicated for personal understanding (Table 3.5).

It certainly appears from these tables that as one moves
through the spectrum from the non-politicized, fundamentally parochial

organization, relatively remote from the political mainstream, to
the more outward-looking, more politicized organization, where involve-
ment in and discussion of politics is more commonplace, that there is
a corresponding increase in political knowledge.

TABLE 3.4

Nature of organizational Member-
ship: Efficacy

Efficacy	Nature of Organizational Membership			
	Welsh only	Social	Variety	Prof/Union Academic
1. Low	81% (13)	60% (6)	29% (2)	40% (4)
2. Medium	6% (1)	20% (2)	43% (3)	30% (3)
3. High	13% (2)	20% (2)	28% (2)	30% (3)
Total	100% (16)	100% (10)	100% (7)	100% (10)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .11.

It was rather unexpected, once again, to find no correlation
at all between organizational office-holding and sense of efficacy
as originally hypothesized. Like numerical membership however, this
lack of association is probably heavily influenced by the unusual
characteristics of the Welsh organizational group. There is a cor-

relation however (tau-alpha = .06) between office-holding and view of public officials. Those who hold office in organizations outside Plaid Cymru tend to disagree that "Public officials don't care much what people like me think". One may surmise her that personal experience in an official capacity in a non-political organization is likely to create more sympathy for the tasks of other office-holders, whether they be political or non-political. All such individuals have to confront a variety of fundamentally similar problems in both the administration and public relations fields.

TABLE 3.5

Nature of Organizational Member-
ship: Perceived Complication of
Politics

Perceived Complication of Politics	Welsh only	Social	Variety	Prof/Union Academic
1. Uncomplicated	94% (15)	80% (8)	0% (0)	20% (2)
2. Complicated	6% (1)	20% (2)	100% (7)	80% (8)
Total	100% (16)	100% (10)	100% (7)	100% (10)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .61

Although sense of efficacy is not itself correlated signifi-
cantly with willingness to be politically pragmatic or play down sensi-
tive issues during a campaign, the responses to two questions are so
related to these. There is a strong tendency for both those who feel
that "public officials don't care much what people like me think"
and those who believe that "politicians only concern themselves with
the wishes of the people when they stand to gain personally" to also
subscribe to the point of view that political pragmatism at the ex-
pense of principle is not justifiable even if it assists the cause
towards success (tau-alpha = .09 in both cases). Also, those who feel
that politicians are only concerned with their own interests, tend
generally to express strong reluctance to play down sensitive issues
during a campaign, even for the sake of party gain, compared with
those who have more faith in politicians' integrity (Table 3.6).

TABLE 3.6

Perceived Sincerity of Politicians:
Willingness to play down sensitive issues

Play down issues	Perceived Sincerity of Politicians			
	High		Low	
1. Would	39%	(10)	72%	(13)
2. Would not	61%	(16)	28%	(5)
Total	100%	(26)	100%	(18)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .11

The three observations above would tend to indicate that
those who mistrust politicians and public officials, their motives
and their actions, themselves seem to morally object to reciprocating
what they perceive to be unjustified activity by indulging in similar
activities themselves. Those who are less disturbed by the activities
of those in power, on the other hand, probably feel that their acti-
vities are "all in the game", or as one respondent commented, that
"politicians are neccessary whatever their faults", and therefore
see no wrong in playing the political "game" themselves, even if
occasionally at the expense of principle. It is interesting, how-
ever, that those efficacy scale questions less oriented to the per-
sonalities of the system are not correlated in any way with political
pragmatism and willingness to play down certain issues. This is hardly
surprising or course - we all tend to justify our action or inaction
on the basis of the corresponding action or inaction of others.

SUMMARY

To conclude, sense of efficacy is correlated with degree of political discussion with friends and acquaintances, partly perhaps because of its close association with political knowledge - it is correlated also with awareness of non-Welsh separatist problems and to a lesser extent with perception of difference between the major parties. Those who feel highly efficacious tend to the those who enjoy politics because of a strong sense of civic duty - this writer believes that this is because the execution of an act of duty presupposes negative results from its non execution.

The expected correlation with numerical organizational membership does not exist, but sense of efficacy and type of organizational membership, are indeed so related, those in purely Welsh organizations feeling less efficacious and also forming the great majority of those in more than two organizations. Thus the type of organization joined, rather than the number, seems to be the more important variable.

Organizational activity level is not correlated with perception of efficacy, although it is with one of the scale questions; that on attitudes towards public officials - this seems to denote an empathy with the problems and requirements of office-holding in general,

political or otherwise.

Efficacy is also unconnected with a willingness to be prag-
matic or to play down sensitive issues, although these are correlated
with attitudes to the responsiveness of public officials and belief
in the sincerity of politicians. Those who respond negatively (i.e.
non-efficaciously) to these two questions are, perhaps for the same
moral reasons, more likely to adhere strictly to ideal standards when
campaigning, while those who are less negative on these points also
tend to be willing to "play at politics", to play down issues, and
occasionally to allow pragmatism to come before principle if political
expediency so dictates.

PARTY ACTIVITY

Most studies of political behaviour, particularly of that variety of political behaviour known as participation, the investment of time and effort in political activity, have either dichotomized the variable of political activity in terms of active and passive behaviour, or like Milbrath, have divided individuals into three groups: "apathetics", "spectators" and "gladiators".[1] Then they have set out to isolate those factors which explain these differences. In terms of the above, all those in the sample with which this paper is concerned are, of course, gladiators. However, this writer contends that many of the factors explaining the active/passive dichotomy are also applicable to variations in political activity within the sample of gladiators with which this study is concerned. One might even go so far as to contend that political scientists have been so concerned with the differences between activists and non-activists that variations in activity within politicized groups has been ignored, to the detriment of research in the field.

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[1] Op. Cit., p. 20.

It was decided to employ an eighteen point scale of political activity based on nine questions (see Appendix B). The responses were then dichotomized for the purposes of this study into "higher" and "lower" activity. In the majority of cases activity is viewed as the dependent variable, antecedent to and dependent upon such variables as education, socialization, organizational activity, ideological commitment, anticipation of success, time of political participation, motivation and place of residence. It will occasionally be regarded as an independent variable, as in choice of political tactics, although in some cases, particularly, for example, in the influence of activity rate on personal efficacy (perceived personal influence on others) there may undoubtedly be a strong feedback effect; activity may increase personal efficacy, personal efficacy activity, or each effect the other concurrently. This is, of course, a question of theoretical evaluation and interpretation.

A general study of relevent literature suggested a number of relevent independent variables which might in this case influence political activity, the more important being socio-economic status, civic duty, psychological involvement, self-esteem, ideological commitment and organizational activity. The first named embraces a wide range of information, including in particular, income, economic status and education. It has been observed that "generally speaking,

in Western two-party democracies, persons of higher occupational status are more likely to participate in politics,"[2] and it was anticipated that this would be no less true of Welsh Nationalists, that in the sample of local activists the "skilled white collar" professional group would predominate. The fact that the nationalist movement in Wales has always appealed particularly to university educated intellectuals, the "cultural elite", provides an additional reason for this expectation. Equally it was predicted that among the local activists a significant majority would have received a higher education. Campbell has observed that, "people of college background tend to go to the polls, however indifferent they may be to the election outcome, and however cynical they may be about the importance of participation".[3] Campbell also found a significant correlation between education and other types of activity such as discussing politics with others and trying to influence others. Lipset has commented that "opinion leaders are to be found disproportionately among the better educated and also tend to be more active in associations of all kinds".[4] No data were recorded on income, but as one study has noted, "perhaps, for a simple conventional act such as voting, income

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[2]Ibid., p. 124.

[3]Angus Campbell, The American Voter, p. 254.

[4]Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday, 1960, p. 196.

is more important, while more complex forms of participation are more dependent upon qualities associated with education".[5]

A number of psychological, attitudinal variables are generally linked with activity, such as ego strength, commitment, ideological outlook and sense of civic duty. Firstly, the local officials can be assumed to have a greater psychological and social investment in the party than the students, and also to feel a greater obligation, by virtue of their elective post, to indulge in many administrative and campaigning activities. It was confidently expected therefore that the local activists would be a great deal more active than the student sample. Also, they are generally older than the students, and as Milbrath has pointed out, "older persons tend to have stronger party preferences than younger ... long identification with a party and long residence in a community tend to encourage strong partisanship."[6]

Closely linked with this is the anticipation that those who ascribe to themselves a considerable or very great amount of influence in the local party organization, who are more likely to be officials, will tend to be more active than those who believe they have little

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[5]Robert E. Lane, Political Life - Why and how people get involved in Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1959, p. 222.

[6]Op. cit., p. 53.

voice in the way local party affairs are run. In this regard, it
is surmised that perception of personal influence may reflect a degree
of ego strength which, to slightly amend a quotation from Lane, is a
"pervasive feeling that the world is not an unpredictable place in which
their (peoples') influence is minimal and their mastery of the
situation small".[7] Again, to quote Milbrath, "persons with high
self-esteem welcome political discussion and expose themselves directly
to political stimuli".[8] In addition, office-holders often attain
their position because of their known work on behalf of the party
and therefore are already highly active.

It was noted in the last chapter that those who state that
a sense of duty is an important factor in their enjoyment of politics
also tend to be more politically efficacious. It was also anticipated,
much for the same reasons, that they would tend to be more active than
those who place a sense of duty low on their list of priorities. As
Campbell states, "the more strongly a person feels a sense of obligation
to discharge his civic duties, the more likely he is to be politically
active".[9] The internalization of such a norm into the value system of

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[7]Op. cit., p. 53.

[8]Op. cit., p.

[9]Angus Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 199.

an individual, must, it is assumed, influence him on a moral plane.
in taking a decision to commit himself to political action.

Ideological commitment, it was predicted, particularly on the
cultural level, would be related to activity. Campbell has defined
ideology as "a particularly close-woven and far ranging structure
of attitudes. By origin and usage its connotations are primarily
political, although the scope of the structure is such that we expect
an ideology to encompass content outside the political order as nar-
rowly defined - social and economic relationships, and even matters
of religion, education and the like".[10] In Plaid Cymru, the left-
right continuum is of little importance as an analytical tool. Not
only is there a wide spectrum of views on such subjects as nationali-
zation of industry and government intervention in labour disputes,
but self-assigned political leanings are not significantly correlated
with opinions on such issues. One respondent calling herself a
socialist, for example, opposes nationalization and supports govern-
ment intervention in strikes. Nationalistic considerations seem to
be overriding and opinions on economic issues very much in the back-
ground, often only half formed. Only seven (15 per cent) of the

[10]Angus Campbell, The American Voter, p. 111.

respondents replied to the question on nationalization by showing

an awareness of Plaid Cymru's own policy of workers' control (an

adaptation of the Yugoslav model). The only visible ideologically

unifying attitude is some measure of commitment to the preservation

of Welsh culture and national identity. Respondents were asked how

far concern for Welsh culture and identity influenced their decision

to join Plaid Cymru, how far they thought the Welsh language is vital

to the future of Wales, and the extent of their knowledge of and sup-

port for separatist movements elsewhere (see Appendix C). It was

predicted that those greatly concerned with these, the "cultural-

nationalist ideologues" would generally tend to be more active. Stein

Rokkan has cited such ideological commitment to party as an important

determinant of political behaviour.[11] It was also hypothesized that

commitment to the nationalist cause would be stronger among those

who originally sought to join Plaid Cymru and that they would be more

active than those who were solicited to join, the assumption being that

their commitment is more self-generated and as a result possibly more

self-sustaining than the that of latter.

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[11]Stein Rokkan, "Cross-national Studies in Political Partici-
pation", in Edward Dreyer and Walter Rosenbaum, eds. _Political Opinion
and Electoral Behaviour_. Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing Co. Ing., 1966,
pp. 436-37.

It was anticipated also that those more confident of eventual success would tend to be more active. There is no doubt, for example, that the rise in nationalist fortunes after the Carmarthen by-election victory of 1966 galvanized large numbers of members into activity, as was demonstrated in later by-election campaigns when other constituencies were literally saturated with Nationalist campaign helpers. It is also worthwhile to take note of Lane's contention that "projections of history into the future and the expected relation of future events to the individual enter into participant and non-participant motivations".[12] Closely connected with this hypothesis, it was expected that "issue congruence", the belief that one has the agreement of the majority of one's fellow constituents on important issues central to one's own political philosophy, and "personal efficacy", the influence an individual feels he has on the opinion formation of his peers, would both be significantly correlated with activity level. In both cases, the activist, it is assumed, would anticipate less resistance to his views, have more confidence in his impact on others when propogating them, and consequently experience fewer psychological disincentives to becoming highly active. It was also felt that certain

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[12]Op. cit., p. 154.

attitudes would be a result as well as a cause of activity, that those
more highly active, and therefore more deeply involved in campaigning
and other activities in support of their cause, may, in the course
of experience, become more likely to see politics as a "dirty game",
be more willing to play down sensitive issues, and be willing to be
politically pragmatic on occasions in order to gain support for the
cause.

The third category of independent variables comprise those
of a social-organizational nature such as place of residence, organi-
zational membership, and family socialization. Firstly, it was anti-
cipated that those who come from families where political discussion
had been commonplace, where interest in politics would have probably
been encouraged, would tend to rank higher on the activity scale.
Then, it was hypothesized, those living in anglicized areas (less
than ten per cent Welsh-speaking) would be the most active, due to
an acute awareness of the problem of cultural erosion and to the
fact that having made the decision to deviate in such an environment
they may involve themselves all the more wholeheartedly in the work
of the party, in a political manifestation of the "in for a penny,
in for a pound" attitude. In view of the findings of the previous
chapter that in this particular sample numerical organizational member-
ship and efficacy are unrelated, it was not expected to find any sig-
nificant association between the former variable and political activity.

It was expected,however, that the type of organization joined would
be so related, that those in purely Welsh organizations would tend
to be less active on the party's behalf, while those in the Profes-
sional/Academic/Trade Union category would tend to be the most active.
Using a "power at the polls" index in a study of Washington lobbyists,
Milbrath and Klein have ascertained that those representing organi-
zations with high "power at the polls" are generally more active in
political parties than representatives of organizations ranking low
on this scale.[13] Berelson has noted that unions, with their high
degree of issue involvement are also important mobilizers of acti-
vists,[14] while Rokkan points out that the extent of the activity of
individuals in non-party organizations and also the decision-making
participation they enjoy, is correlated with political activity.[15]
On this basis, those who hold office in organizations should be
more politically active than those who do not. It was also hypothe-
sized that the more highly educated would be more organizationally
active. As Lipset has stressed, "those higher up in the social struc-
ture are more likely to belong to organizations than those below

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[13]See Lester Milbrath and Walter Klein, "Personality Correlates
of Political Participation", in Dreyer and Rosenbaum, Op. cit.

[14]Bernard Berelson, Voting - A Study of Opinion Formation in
a Presidential Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954,
pp. 50-51.

[15]Op. cit., pp. 436-37

them ... That the more privileged are more involved in organizational activities has been found in every comparison between higher and lower status, whether the difference is between occupational status, different educational levels, income, owners and renters, or those employing servants as compared with those who do not".[16]

It is interesting to note to begin with, that as in other political parties, there is a preponderence of individuals of upper occupational status (lawyers, teachers, professional men etc.) within the sample, and more surprising, a complete absence of unskilled manual workers (Table 4.1). This finding is reinforced by the observation that only 15 per cent of the sample of local activists in Swansea did not receive higher education. It should also be noted from the evidence of the frequency distribution, that 59 per cent of the total sample are high participators (members of more than two organizations) while only seven per cent (three) are members of no organizations at all outside Plaid Cymru. There is also a great difference in the degree to which respondents devote themselves to various gladiatorial party activities, with 28 (61 per cent) scoring in the lower half of the activity scale and 18 (39 per cent) in the upper.

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[16] Op. cit., p. 195.

TABLE 4.1

Occupational Breakdown of Nationalists
Activists

1.	Unskilled Manual	0%	(0)
2.	Skilled Manual	25%	(6)
3.	Unskilled White Collar	13%	(3)
4.	Self-employed	4%	(1)
5.	Skilled White Collar	58%	(14)
	Total	100%	(24)

In order to comprehensively indicate the association of the
hypothesized independent and dependent variables with both the
overall scale of party activity and each of its component items it
was decided to employ a cross-tabulation matrix (Table 4.2). It is
interesting to note that of the six most significant independent
variables, three are closely related to depth of involvement in party
work. Those who are local officials, who have participated in party
activity for five years or more and who perceive themselves as being
considerably influential in the local party organization tend to be
significantly more active than the students, those active less than
five years and those who believe they have little local party influence.

TABLE 4.2

Correlates of Political Activity[17]

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

	correl. coeff.	active score	neighb. acts	get out vote	collect money	get others active	talk to locals	talk to party officers	talk to govt. officials	get others take stand	work for Welsh or groups
Student, non-st.	Tau-b.	.25	.02	.11	.05	.09	.10	.23	.04	.02	.02
Place of residence	Tau-b.	.24	.04	.10	.13	.10	.12	.22	.06	.13	.14
Import.of language	Tau-b.	.21	.10	.06	.06	-.13	.06	.05	.04	.07	.10
Time of partic.	Tau-b.	.17	.00	.11	.03	.09	.10	.23	.04	.02	.02
Enjoy pols.-duty	Tau-b.	.14	.04	.02	.04	.02	.01	.00	.01	.02	.07
Local party infl.	Tau-b.	.11	.10	.09	.06	.14	.13	.15	.06	.04	.04
Separatist support	Tau-b.	.09	.01	.03	.01	.03	.12	.06	.02	.05	.01
Confidence	Tau-b.	.08	.01	.01	.03	.14	.05	.14	.04	.06	.01
Influence others	Tau-b.	.08	-.02	.21	.10	.20	.13	.13	.10	.13	-.14
Org. Office	Tau-b.	.08	.04	.02	.05	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.03	.03
Issue congruence	Tau-b.	.07	.00	.06	.08	.01	.03	.01	-.09	.02	.08
Reason joined-cult.	Tau-b.	.07	.02	.04	.00	.00	.02	.02	.03	.02	.04
Reason joined-i.d.	Tau-b.	.06	-.02	.08	.01	.00	.00	.01	.05	.02	.11
Type of org.mem.	Tau-b.	.05	.13	.09	.04	.10	.06	.08	.15	.08	.43
Separatism knowledge	Tau-b.	.04	.00	.07	.01	.05	.09	.02	.02	.02	.02
Reason joined-econ.	Tau-b.	.03	.04	.04	.00	.06	.02	-.02	-.03	.09	.01
Politics dirty	Tau-al.	.03	.08	.02	.03	.02	.01	.02	.00	.03	.02
Pol. Pragmatism	Tau-al.	.01	.07	.07	.05	-.04	-.03	-.02	.00	.16	.05
Talk to non-nats.	Tau-al.	.01	.04	.01	.03	.06	.01	.01	.03	.02	.04
Nature of join.	Tau-b.	.01	.07	.02	.01	.06	.07	.03	-.07	.05	.04
Discuss in home	Tau-b.	.00	.01	.02	.03	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01
Play down issues	Tau-al.	.00	.01	.00	.03	.01	.01	.06	.10	.13	.01
Other Orgs.(no.)	Tau-b.	.00	.04	.00	.01	.03	.00	-.13	-.07	.04	.17
Education	Tau-b.	.00	.05	.01	.00	-.04	-.04	.13	.02	.02	.09
Reason join-unempl.	Tau-b.	.00	.02	.00	.01	.01	.01	.03	.02	.02	.00

[17] The tau-alpha and tau-beta correlation coefficients do not indicate the direction of a relationship. To indicate those correlations which are in the opposite direction from those expected from the majority of other correlations of activity items with independent variables, a minus sign has been employed.

Such a high correlation was expected and the reasons for this have

already been given, but it was surprising to find that place of residence

is such a central factor, although it was anticipated that it would

indeed be significantly correlated with activity. It was not believed

however, that it would exceed ideological commitment in importance.

It was also unexpected to discover that the most active groups is not

that of respondents who live in anglicized areas, but those who reside

in what have been designated as "Anglo-Welsh" areas, regions where a

significant minority of ten to thirty-five per cent of the population

speaks Welsh and which still retain a considerable degree of Welsh

tradition and sentiment as a result. The reason for this will be

probed at a later stage. As was predicted, commitment to the language

is a highly significant variable, as is support for separatist causes

elsewhere. However, specification of concern with Welsh culture and

identity as reasons for joining Plaid Cymru are not as important, which

would appear to indicate that the attitudes of some respondents have

changed over time. Some of those who originally joined the party for

cultural reasons may, in the course of their involvement, have

broadened their range of concern with Welsh affairs, while others to

whom economic factors were important may, through contact with cultural-

nationalist ideologues, have channelled their mental energies into

concern for the future of the language. However, cultural reasons

for joining, unlike economic reasons, are still significant correlates

of activity and this would seem to indicate that in the case of most

respondents original motivations and present attitudes are congruent.

Civic duty proves to be highly important, and to a greater degree than was originally hypothesized. The indication is that despite adherence to a third party, social education, with its accompanying inculcation of ideas of civic obligation, still exerts a strong influence. While nonconformist in party choice, the highly active respondents generally show continuity in social attitudes. One might add that despite the Nationalist Party's anti-establishment aims, its advocacy of peaceful, constitutional methods as the best way to see these realized, would tend to ensure that many of those attracted to it would still exhibit many characteristics of those active in other parties; that despite their minor party allegiance, many conventions of British political thinking would still show their influence in the internalized social norms of nationalist adherents. The earlier obligations instilled during socialization in the family and the school, it can safely be assumed, do not all disappear with a change in political loyalties. This also is relevent to the discussion of attitudes to violence and other forms of extra-legal activity which follows in the next chapter.

It was expected that those items of information concerned with organizational membership and activity, the type of organization to

which respondents belonged would be the prime variable influencing activity. However, as can be seen in the matrix it is depth of organizational involvement as indicated by the holding of office which appears the most important. It should, however, be noted that in the case of two of the items of the activity scale, particularly that of Welsh pressure group activity (the other being participation in neighbourhood activities) membership of exclusively Welsh organizations is the significant independent variable, while it is membership of professional, academic or trade union organizations which is the main determinant of high activity on all other items. Consequently, this writer asserts that in analyzing party activity, the type of organization joined is still the most important part of the data on organizational membership and is the main predictor of most aspects of political activity.

Predictably, numerical organizational membership proves to be unimportant. Family political socialization is also insignificant and this tends to be consistent with the fact that a large minority of those in the sample come from family backgrounds where political socialization was minimal (see Chapter II) - this will be elaborated upon later. Education appears at first to be of no importance either, but the number of respondents who did not receive higher education (7) is too small to make any such assertion tenable. Finally, political

activity is of little utility as an independent variable, explaining
positive or negative attitudes to politics as a whole. Those who are
more highly active are no more likely than those who are not to feel
that political conflicts are not generally cleanly fought, or that it
is acceptable to place pragmatism before principles and play down
issues for the sake of increasing support. High scoring on the activity
scale has no meaningful influence on personal attitudes to the use of
fair or foul political tactics.

It has already been observed that the local activists are
generally more active that the students and this same tendency can
be seen in most of the scale questions. The former show no greater
propensity to indulge in neighbourhood activities, or to work for
otherWelsh organizations but it is possible that a wholehearted in-
volvement in party work, leaving little time for other kinds of
activity, is the reason for this. Also, those highly active in Plaid
Cymru may well feel that they are already making an adequate contri-
bution towards the protection of Welsh interests, without needing to
become involved in other groups such as the Welsh Language Society,
though many respondents are signed-up members of this organization.
It is interesting to note that of the seventeen (37 per cent) indi-
viduals in the sample who are members of the Language Society, only
seven are drawn from the ranks of the generally highly active local

officials. There is an additional explanation of the high rate of activity of the local party officials, however, and this can be seen in the significant correlation between length of time of participation and degree of activity. Ideally, with a larger sample, one would wish to control for length of time of active participation in comparing activity scores for students and local officials. However, it can be seen clearly in Table 4.3 below that the local officials collectively, in comparison with the students, comprise a group of long time members. Strong involvement with any organization, it is fair to suppose, will usually result in a deeper commitment to that organization, with an accompanying increase in expenditure of effort on its behalf.

TABLE 4.3

Length of Time of Political Participation:
Students and Local Officials

Time of Participation	Students		Local Officials	
1. Under 5 years	77%	(17)	21%	(5)
2. 5 years or more	23%	(5)	70%	(19)
Total	100%	(22)	100%	(24)

This clear distinction between students and local officials
in terms of length of participation and its influence on activity,
may also point to an explanation of the observed tendency for those
who believe they have considerable influence in the local party
organization to be more active. Again, viewed as a group, the local
party officers, not surprisingly in view of their membership of
decision-making committees, see themselves as being much more in-
fluential than those in the student group. It is worthwhile noting,
nevertheless, that 33 per cent (eight) of the local officials see
themselves as having no influence at all locally, a reflection, per-
haps of the few individuals with a strong drive for power who can
be attracted to a minor party (Table 4.4).

TABLE 4.4

Type of Respondent:
Perception of Influence in Local Party

Perception of Influence	Type of Respondent			
	Student		Local Offical	
1. Low	86%	(18)	33%	(8)
2. Medium	5%	(1)	29%	(7)
3. High	9%	(2)	38%	(9)
Total	100%	(21)	100%	(24)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .18.

Also, those who sought of their own accord to join the nationalists score no higher on the overall activity scale and in fact tend to contact and speak to local or national government representatives less than those who had been encouraged to join the party. It is possible, however, that those who sought to join the party are perhaps more intensely nationalist and as such feel more distant from unionist government officials and representatives. Those who volunteered membership, however, are more likely to talk to others, try to get others active and to attempt to persuade others to take a stand on public issues. They tend, that is, to be more extensively involved in trying to win converts than those who were persuaded by others to join. Members of this latter group, perhaps, have required more reinforcement of their views from others compared with those in the former. However, as those who sought to join are no more likely than the persuaded group to discuss their views with non-nationalists, some doubt would seem to be cast on this interpretation and the question must be left open.

Psychological involvement with the party is obviously connected with the next independent variable to be considered in detail. It has already been observed that there is a strong tendency for the cultural ideologues, those who believe that "the preservation of the Welsh language is vital to the future of Wales" to be highly active, compared with those who regard the language's preservation to be less

than vital (Table 4.5).

TABLE 4.5

Perceived Importance of Language:
Activity

| Activity | Perceived Importance of Language | | | |
	Vital	Considerable	Fairly	Not too
1. Lower	46% (12)	80% (8)	100% (6)	100% (2)
2. Higher	54% (14)	20% (2)	– –	– –
Total	100% (26)	100% (10)	100% (6)	100% (2)

Goodman and Kruskal tau–alpha = .21

In addition, commitment to the preservation of the language is significantly correlated with every one of the activity scale items. Also, those who responded that the lack of concern of the other parties with Welsh culture and the belief that only self-government can preserve Welsh identity were important factors in their decision to join Plaid Cymru tend to be more active. It has been already emphasized

that there is no such difference between those who consider economic

factors to have been important in this decision and those who do not.

Given that Plaid Cymru, is without doubt, a party which is strongly

culturally orientated it is not surprising that those with particularly

strong feelings about a subject so close to the ideological core of

the Nationalist Party and of the historical development of the Welsh

nationalist movement should be the most galvanized into action. No

such variation in activity exists, however, between those who speak

Welsh and those who do not - it is those who place the language first

among their priorities, whether their own language is English or Welsh,

who are the more active. Not surprisingly, while only seven (44 per

cent) of the sixteen English speakers consider the language to be

vitally important, 19 (68 per cent) of the Welsh-speaking group have

this view and it is most prevalent among the members of the Welsh

Language Society (81 per cent). In addition, it should be observed

that a less exclusively Welsh ideological outlook is also correlated

with activity - those who demonstrate strong support for separatist

movements elsewhere also tend to rank highly on activity, and parti-

cularly with those items on the scale which are indicative of a strong

desire to win over adherents to the cause, such as talking to local

people about political problems and trying to get others to take stand

on important issues. It may be suggested that this is a reflection

of the link between education, with its accompanying political know-

ledge, and competence, but the lack of a strongly significant association between a mere familiarity with other separatist issues and activity would appear to make this doubtful. It is more likely that knowledge, competence and ideological commitment are all interlinked in producing a deeper commitment, in the words of one respondent, to "spreading the Gospel".

As was expected, anticipation of goal achievement is closely related to activity, particularly once again, with those aspects of activity which involve person to person contact. Those who are very confident that Plaid Cymru will eventually win self-government for Wales are more willing than those who are not as confident to take part in drives to get others active, talk to other local people about politics, and to try to get them to take a stand on public issues. Basically, it would seem that activity is largely an indication of an enthusiasm which feeds on confidence. It has often been observed that one of the great appeals of communism is the conviction it carries that victory is inevitable. Though nationalism in Wales cannot offer this incentive, there are undoubtedly those who are fired by this very conviction, to whom every political action is worthwhile as it must pay dividends. Again, the general increase in the level of Plaid Cymru activity after the by-election victory at Carmarthen in 1966 would add weight to this interpretation. Likewise, and it is

contested, for similar reasons, those who feel that the majority

of their constituents generally agree with them on nationalistically

loaded issues (see Appendix D) tend to be more active than those

who feel that their views are basically the exception to the rule

in their respective constituencies. In connection with this, those

who believe that they have a strong influence on the views of their

friends and relations tend to be more active – this again may well

reflect a sense of personal competence in dealings with other people,

though it may equally be the result of, rather than a cause of, a

high activity level. The most important fact to note is that this

factor is most highly correlated with getting out the vote, getting

others active, talking to local people and party officials (which may

constitute an effort to obtain information rather than be a two-way

interaction) and trying to get others to take a political stand, all

of which involve a sense of competence in interpersonal relationships

and a relative lack of concern about public resistance or hostility

to one's point of view. Surprisingly, however, there seems no apparent

link between political activity and a willingness to discuss politics

with non-nationalists. This was particularly unexpected in view of

the tendency for the more active to feel that they have more influence

on their friends and relations and no explanation can be suggested for

this lack of association between activity and discussion. The question

must therefore be left open.

It appears surprising that there is an absence of association between family political socialization and activity. Those who were reared in an environment where political discussion was commonplace are no more active than those to whom it was all but nonexistent. It should be noted also that those whose relatives were politically active when they were young are no more likely to be highly active than those who could name no political activists within their early family environment. Once again, however, when one turns from the major parties to the study of minor political groups, circumstances change and occasionally different rules may hold. It has already been noted in Chapter II that 18 (39 per cent) of the respondents have experienced a minimum of political socialization, either not knowing their parents' political affiliations, or having parents who are or were abstainers, 'floating voters' or divided in their political loyalties. This lack of association between activity and political socialization in the home consequently fits into a possible pattern of third party involvement. As has been already stated, the individuals with which this paper deals, by being presumably alienated from the existing constitutional system yet still being willing to participate peacefully within that system are, in political terms, deviators and one cannot always expect the familiar correlates of major party participation to be effective in their case.

Within the social-organizational category of independent variables, organizational membership, as the matrix can be seen to show, is an interesting factor. The relationship between type of membership and party activity, with the unexpected behaviour of the Welsh organizational group on two of the items, participation in neighbourhood activities and particularly in participation in other Welsh pressure groups, has already been noted. The latter is only to be expected in view of the comments on organizational membership in Chapter III, but the former is more difficult to explain, although it is quite possible that the exclusively Welsh participatory group could include their activity in area branches of such associations as taking part in "neighbourhood activities".

Place of residence is an even more interesting factor. The ealier discussion of the findings of the matrix noted that it is not those resident in highly anglicized areas, but those who live in areas with a significant minority of Welsh speakers, which have still retained much of their Welsh character, who are the most active (see Table 4.6).

TABLE 4.6

Place of Residence:
Activity

Activity	Place of Residence						
	Welsh-speaking		Linguistically divided		Welsh-speaking minority		Highly Anglicized	
1. Lower	83%	(5)	100%	(5)	29%	(4)	67%	(14)
2. Higher	17%	(1)	–	–	71%	(10)	33%	(7)
Total	100%	(6)	100%	(5)	100%	(14)	100%	(21)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .24.

There are two reasons which can be advanced for this. Firstly,
like those in anglicized areas, they are strongly aware of the erosion
of Welsh cultural identity, and secondly, like those in Welsh-speaking
areas, and unlike those from anglicized areas, they live in a social
environment where nationalist activity, while unusual, is not as
socially unacceptable – in fact, some such constituencies polled re-
markably well for Plaid Cymru in the 1970 General Election. In the
South Wales constituencies of Aberdare and Caerphilly, for example,

the nationalists polled respectively 30 per cent and 28 per cent of
the vote in 1970,[18] although Welsh-speakers in both constituencies
number a minority.

It has already been pointed out that education is not correlated
at all with the activity score. It is particularly interesting to
note that the more educated are considerably less likely to speak
to party officials. All seven of those with only secondary education
speak to party officers often, compared with only 14 (36 per cent)
of those who have higher education. This may well constitute an
effort by the less knowledgeable to acquire information from those
they consider more articulate. It should also be noted that those
with higher education are members of more social organizations than
those with none. This confirms the observation of many others (Almond
and Verba, 1963; Milbrath, 1965; Lipset, 1960) as can be seen in
Table 4.7.

It has been observed already that as an independent variable,
overall political activity has no utility in predicting negative or

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[18]Western Mail, 22nd. June, 1970, p. 2.

TABLE 4.7

Education:
Numerical Organizational Member-
ship

Organizational Membership	Education			
	No higher education		Higher Education	
1. Under 3	100 %	·(7)	31%	(12)
2. 3 or over	–	–	69%	(27)
Total	100%	(7)	100%	(39)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .26.

positive attitudes to politics. In fact, those who often attempt to

persuade people to take a stand on important issues are likely to

reject pragmatism, and to adhere strictly to principles during cam-

paigning. This may well be connected with the fact that the cultural

ideologues are considerably more active than other respondents and

one would assume that they in particular would be most unwilling to

desert their principles, even if only temporarily, for the sake of

short-term gain. Also, it must be remembered that Plaid Cymru is a

goal-oriented party; it has little attraction for those seeking public office, whom it is reasonable to believe, are more flexible on questions of policy and electioneering tactics. However, those who try to get others to take a stand on public issues are more likely to play down those which are sensitive - it can only be suggested that these respondents consider that they are not being politically dishonest, or disguising their principles, because they regard such tactics as both politically and morally acceptable.

SUMMARY

The typical highly active nationalist, then, is very likely
to be a local official in the party rather than a rank and file
member. Understandably, such an individual feels a strong obli-
gation to involve himself in party work and some task are simply
unavoidable. He also feels that the preservation of the Welsh
language is vital to Wales and this galvanizes him into activity.
He is probably a resident of an area where the Welsh language is
spoken by a significant minority of the population, where both
the lack of social hostility to nationalist party activity and the
presence of visible cultural erosion are conducive to high activity.
He tends to feel that he has a significant amount of influence in
local party affairs and to have been active for a period of more
than five years, both characteristics being mainly attributable to
the local party officials. He perceives a strong sense of duty to
participate and less important, but still significant, he tends to
be a strong supporter of the principle of self-government for other
national minorities outside Wales. Not surprisingly, he feels that
he has a considerable degree of support from his fellow constituents,
that he is able to influence others, and consequently perhaps, is
usually very confident of future success for the nationalist cause.
He is likely to be a member of a professional or trade union organi-

zation and to hold office in a non-party organization, but he is
more likely to channel his work on behalf of the Welsh cause through
the party rather than other Welsh-oriented pressure groups, though
he may indeed be a member of such a group. Finally, he is most
active in proselyting his views, in talking to others on political
matters, getting out the vote at elections and persuading others to
take a stand on issues of public concern.

The less active nationalist on the other hand is usually a
rank and file member, in this case a student. He is particularly
likely to live in an area where the Welsh language is spoken by at
least half of the population and where it is relatively secure for
the time being. He is less likely to view the language as abso-
lutely vital to the future of Wales and is, therefore, a little
more distant from the central ideology of the whole movement. He
tends to be relatively new to politics and therefore has less time
and effort invested in the progress of the cause; as other studies
have shown, length of time of involvement in a party is am important
determinant of partisanship. He is probably less motivated by strong
feelings of duty than the highly active member, thus lacking an
important moral spur to deep involvement. As might be expected, he
perceives himself as having little influence in the local party
organization; activity, with its resulting contacts with the other

active members, helps to bring about a sense of political potency within the local ranks of the party. The less active member is less committed to self-government for minorities as a universal ideology, being somewhat indifferent to separatist movements outside Wales, and he is significantly less likely to feel that the majority of his fellow constituents agree with him on Welsh cultural and constitutional issues, that he can influence others and that the aims of the party will eventually be realized. All these factors undoubtedly make him feel less at ease in trying to convert and activate others, and in indulging in other forms of activity. He is very unlikely to be a member of an occupation-based pressure group (e.g. a trade union) but is likely to be an active member of one or more exclusively Welsh pressure groups such as the Welsh Language Society. He may therefore be as politically or socially active as the highly active party member but seems to be more likely to spread his activity over a number of organizations. However, he is not likely to hold office in non-party organizations, Welsh or otherwise. Finally, he is a little less likely than his highly active fellow member to have joined Plaid Cymru because of a great concern with the Welsh cultural condition. This is, of course, closely related with respondents' views on the neccessity of preserving the Welsh language and with their general ideological commitment to the party. An intensity of belief seems to be a strong compelling influence for more total devotion to

the party.

Some concluding comments can be made about the characteristics
of both groups. As a whole, there is a concentration in the sample
of local officialsof those from the upper occupational and educational
strata. Education, however, is not a significant determinant of
activity level (although the number of those in the sample with no
higher education is small) although it is so related to numerical
organizational membership. However, the less educated do tend to
converse more often with local and national party officials, possibly
to elicit information. Lastly, family political socialization (dis-
cussions in the home etc.) does not apparently influence party
activity and this dovetails with the theory of third party mobili-
zation suggested in chapter II; that in view of the high number
(39 per cent) of those with politically uninfluential parents, the
weakly socialized are more likely to be converted to a third party and
will constitute a high proportion of its adherents.

CHAPTER V

EXTREMISM

Most Nationalist movements which have appeared in the last
hundred years have employed, often through necessity, extra-legal
methods of some kind, or rather, significant minorities within such
groups at the very least, have preached and practised such methods.
This has been equally true of the Irish before 1922, the African
Nationalists in the nineteen-fifties and the Basques of modern Spain.
Yet in a few areas, such as Wales, Scotland and Quebec, separatist
nationalist movements have been primarily peaceful, though minute
splinter groups such as the Scottish Liberation Army, the Free Wales
Army and more significantly the F.L.Q. have been spawned in the pro-
cess of their growth. This chapter deals with three main aspects
of this question. First it discusses the reasons for the low inci-
dence of violence evidenced by the Welsh Nationalist movement as a
whole and the way in which these reasons are apparent from the case
study. Secondly, it examines different attitudes taken towards force
by those in the sample. As the interviews were taken relatively
shortly after the Investiture of the Prince of Wales, when many
Nationalists were being observed by the police in connection with
extremist action and threats, it was considered inappropriate to ask

the respondents directly if they believed in the use of violence. This
may have created feelings of suspicion and mistrust which would have
influenced other questionnaire responses. However, respondents were
asked if they thought violence would be justified in a situation where
the majority of Welsh people had voted for Plaid Cymru, but where the
British government had refused to grant self-government. A few
respondents showed distinct discomfort when asked even this, but gener-
ally, most of them vehemently denounced the use of force in the present
situation, while 27 (59 per cent) agree with its use if the majority
will were to be overridden. Thus the respondents can be divided into
two groups - "absolute" pacifists who discount the use of force in any
situation and "conditional" pacifists who can conceive of circum-
stances in which direct action can be justified. Thirdly, it was
decided that a comparison between members and non-members of the
Welsh Language Society might prove interesting. This society, while
not subscribing to the use of violence, has pursued a policy of civil
disobedience in pressuring for more widespread recognition of the
Welsh language. It was formed in 1962, its first move being a sit-
down strike on a much-used bridge in Mid-Wales in February 1963. This
was followed by a campaign of refusal to pay court fines for petty
offences unless summonses were written in Welsh. Similar campaigns
followed in the mid-sixties to obtain birth-certificates and motor
taxation forms in Welsh. In 1964 a campaign centred on destroying

road signs in order to force the adoption of bilingual signs was
begun and has continued until the present day. Sit-ins have been held
in television studios to protest against a lack of Welsh language broad-
casting and fourteen students disrupted a high court case in sensational
fashion in February 1970. Thus, it can be expected that members of
this society are somewhat more extreme in the methods to which they
subscribe than non-members, and an explanation for this will be sought.

A number of theories have been developed by leading researchers
in an attempt to build a theory of civil violence. These theories
stress, to varying degrees, three major factors accounting for the
widespread outbreak of violence: social atomization or isolation;
relative deprivation in one or several segments of social, political
and economic life; and the incongruence of authority patterns within
the body politic. Kornhauser has pointed out that social atomization
generally occurs as a result of abrupt social changes, as in periods
of rapid industrialisation, damaging rural depopulation and economic
depression.[1] Such traumatic socio-economic changes uproot masses of
people and leave them isolated from the wider society. Such situations

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[1]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1963, pp. 142-50.

are characterised by a lack of intermediate social organisations and intermediate groups in which individuals may participate, through which they may displace any feelings of discontent, and in which they feel that they can make their voices heard. As a result, citizens become divorced from their community, consequently develop strong feelings of apathy and alienation, and in the absence of alternative non-aggressive methods of goal-seeking become prone to the appeals of extremist and mass movements through which they believe they can directly influence events. In the absence of intermediate societal institutions it is difficult, if not impossible, to exert influence on those in power. As Kornhauser notes, "intermediate groups help to protect elites by functioning as channels through which popular participation in the larger society may be directed and restrained ... In the absence of intermediate groups to act as representatives and guides for popular participation, people must act directly in the critical centres of society, and therefore in a manner unrestrained by the values and interests of a variety of social groups".[2] With few social and psychological roots in the community, accepted social norms and modes of conduct cannot be strongly internalized in the individual's

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[2]Op. cit., p. 77.

code of behaviour. Consequently, a pronounced gap develops between primary groups, such as the family, and the state, creating circumstances in which the rational solution of system crises becomes virtually impossible.

The overcentralization of government can produce similar results, by taking away the functions of intermediate groups. "The greater the bureaucratization of public life, the greater will be the attraction of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one could present grievances, on whom the pressure of power could be exerted".[3] Such overcentralization creates strong feelings of impotence and "loss of power tempts into substituting violence for power".[4]

Social discontinuity, Kornhauser emphasizes, is not caused by the quantity of change, but by its rapidity. If changes are gradual, dislocations can be compensated for, though some measure of discontent may still be in evidence, but not at a sufficiently high

[3]Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence", Journal of International Affairs, vol. XXIII, no. 1, 1969, p. 33.

[4]Ibid., p. 20.

level to cause a major social disruption, because unhurried adaptation to new social conditions is not impossible.

Gurr has made a great contribution to the analysis of the effects of feelings of deprivation on social violence. He defines "relative deprivation" as "the perceived discrepancy between their (individuals') value expectations (the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amount of goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep)."[5] In other words, it refers to the extent of perception by an individual or a group of individuals that the chances of having legitimate expectations satisfied are low. If it seems that expectations are being frustrated by external resistance, particularly from the government, frustration can lead from mild discontent, at which point protest is likely to take a peaceful form, to anger and blind rage where violence becomes the only perceived alternative to prolonged suffering. Gurr summarises: "Discontent will motivate few to violence, anger will push more across the threshold, rage is likely to galvanize large segments of a collectivity into action".[6] Kornhauser provides a good

[5]Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 4 (December) 1968, p. 1104.

[6]Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", World Politics, Vol. XX, no. 2, (January) 1968, pp. 255-56.

example of this. He notes that during the thirties, in those countries where the depression was particularly severe, the lower classes reacted with an extremist response by voting Communist, while where its impact was less disastrous, the Social Democrats did particularly well. In summary: "the more severe the crisis, the greater the extremist response ... When the crisis is relatively less severe the electorate is more inclined to support pragmatic programs of amelioration within the established order",[7] or as Gurr hypothesizes, "the proportion of a collectivity that participates in civil strife ought to vary with the modal intensity of discontent".[8] Unemployment maximizes atomization, increases futility, and consequently results in withdrawal from social relations, while extreme movements step into the vacuum with the promise of a quick solution.

A crisis is accentuated and even surpassed in danger by the existence of deliberately enforced persistent deprivation, such as economic discrimination, "the systematic exclusion of a social group from higher positions on ascriptive bases",[9] and political discrimination, the closure of higher political positions to such a group. In addition, Gurr states that separatism, as one mani-

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[7]Op. cit., p. 161.

[8]Op. cit., p. 1107.

[9]Ibid., p. 1109.

festation of extremism, is particularly encouraged by foreign exploi-

tation, the perceived drain of capital away from the homeland (cf.

English-Canadian nationalism), religious cleavage, such as exists

in Ireland, and lack of educational opportunity for a national group.

Eckstein has shed considerable illumination on the importance

of congruent social authority patterns in the avoidance of civil

strife. He notes that "social authority patterns are congruent,

either if they are very similar, or if similarity to the government

pattern increases significantly as one approaches the governmental

segment itself".[10] In other words, while it is less relevant to

governmental stability if such primary units as the family and the

school are basically non-democratic in form, it is important that

groups close to governmental decision-making, such as political

parties, Trade Unions, and employers' associations, adhere to modes

of conduct and ethical standards similar to those of the government

itself. The concept of mandate, in both pressure groups and govern-

ment in Great Britain is a good example of this. At both levels the

idea of majority will, together with its symbolic embodiment in

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[10]Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, Princeton,
New Jersey: Centre of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1961.
Research Monograph no. 10, p. 10.

constitutions, annual conferences, rules of debate and decision by vote is well-established. This is what Eckstein calls "a pattern of graduated resemblances" in authority norms as one approaches the government level, a conscious imitation by intermediate organizations of the governmental structure and the norms governing its operation. By contrast, in the Weimar Republic, governmental authority patterns were isolated from those of the society as a whole. As a result, in a stable society, governmental norms tend to dominate the collectivity as a whole while in an unstable society the opposite is normally the case, the usual result being the generation of 'anomie' or 'strain', a "breakdown of the normative order governing action".[11] The result is acute anxiety at the personal level and corresponding turmoil in the community. In this situation, the growth of extremism and highly ideological movements is easily facilitated by the clash of authority patterns existing respectively at the primary and governmental levels, unmitigated by a wide variety of democratically structured intermediate organizations (i.e. organizations in which there is a significant degree of member participation in the appointment of officers and the making of decisions).

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[11] Ibid., p.22.

Several more factors of importance should be noted. Gurr points out that "the more intensely people are motivated towards a goal, or committed to an attained level of values, the more sharply is interference resented and the greater is the consequent instigation to aggression".[12] In other words, a strongly held ideology helps both to facilitate and justify extreme responses to grievances. One would therefore expect, for example, that nationalists who are very strongly committed to the preservation of their language would be more willing to accept the legitimacy of extra-legal methods in pursuing their objectives. Such a commitment would seem to indicate a strong perception of cultural deprivation and thus a great degree of frustration and anger. Gurr also emphasizes the importance of a social sanction of violence, such as existed in nineteenth-century Paris, while Kornhauser points out that "free-lance intellectuals" such as writers, artists, and poets have traditionally been more attracted to extremism than those in corporate bodies (lawyers, school teachers, university lecturers etc.), that the former "have manifested a greater affinity for the extreme left, whereas the teacher, for example, has been drawn more to the moderate left".[13] The free-lance intellectual, he notes, is less economically

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[12]Op. cit., pp. 257-58.

[13]Op. cit., pp. 185-86.

secure, more anxious psychologically, has fewer institutional

responsibilities and less certainty of rewards and recognition.

Hence, when established professions are full, and there is a pro-

fusion of free-lance, often alienated intellectuals, lacking job

security, the prospects for social security are ominous, and those

for the growth of extremist, revolutionary and messianic movements

correspondingly good.

John Schwarz, in his study of non-violence in the Scottish

National Party, had tied these strings together in an expert fashion,

and concludes that the low-level existence of some of the above

variables has been sufficient to produce a separatist movement in

Scotland, while their intensity has been insufficient to produce

a violent movement.[14] He emphasizes that surges of nationalist

activity in Scotland, since 1945 have been correlated with adverse

economic conditions, but that these conditions, while being suffi-

ciently bad to cause discontent, have not been so serious as to

bring about destructive anger or rage, and the violence that so

often results therefrom. He notes that the Scottish National Party

officers are generally highly active in intermediate groups where

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[14]John Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Non-violent
Separatism and Theories of Violence", World Politics, vol. XXII,
no. 4 (July) 1970, pp. 496-517.

they are in effect integrated with the opposition, and that they feel their own economic positions to be secure. Regional deprivation in Scotland, he finds, does indeed exist in the form of lower incomes and more unemployment than England, and a considerable emigration rate, but still to a relatively low degree. He finds no evidence in Scotland of the most dangerous persistent forms of deprivation such as economic, political and educational discrimination, while national identity is not vehemently perceived. Few of the S.N.P. respondents he interviewed have any knowledge of, or parental connection with the Gaelic language. He observes that 62 per cent of those he interviewed were originally motivated to join the Scottish National Party by such extra-regional factors as high taxes and cost of living-problems shared with the English-as well as by strictly regional considerations.

A similar technique to that employed by Schwarz, the use of both aggregate and attitudinal data, is utilized in this chapter in order to discover whether his observations in the Scottish situation are equally applicable to Wales. It is hypothesized that on the whole they are; that regional deprivation exists in Wales to a degree sufficient to encourage the emergence of a separatist movement, but that it is not sufficiently high to produce civil violence on a significantly large scale. The other variables suggested by

Schwarz and others as accounting for a high incidence of violence
are, it is proposed, either absent in Wales or lacking in impact,
although it is possible that cultural deprivation is more highly
perceived in Wales, and that this may be partly accountable for the
higher incidence of acts of violence in Wales since the war, parti-
cularly during the last decade, than in Scotland. From October 1963,
when an explosion occured at the Trywerwyn Dam in Mid-Wales, an
important supply of water for the English city of Liverpool, there
had been more than twenty such acts and attempted acts by July 1970.
In the first seven months of 1969 this period was climaxed with nine
such explosions. Scotland has not experienced such a development,
although during the fifties there was a spate of demolitions of
post boxes bearing the inscription E II R [there having been no
previous Elizabeth on the Scottish throne].

Firstly, one must emphasize, social atomization is clearly
minimal in Wales. The vast majority of British organizations from
social clubs to Trade Unions are well represented there. Just as
Schwarz notes that 84 per cent of his Scottish respondents were
members of intermediary, non-party groups, so of the sample of Welsh
nationalists with which this study is concerned, no less than 44
(96 per cent) are members of at least one such group and 59 per cent
belong to more than two. Twenty respondents (43 per cent) hold
office in such organizations and 32 (70 per cent) attend their
meetings quite or very regularly.

There has undoubtedly been a degree of community discontinuity in Wales. In 1960, for example, a total of 42,000 people emigrated, while in 1965 the number was 41,000.[15] However, Wales has had a long history of emigration, without serious dislocation occuring as a result. It has also, despite emigration, had a steady increase in population, though not as high as that of England, and well below the natural increase in some areas such as Mid-Wales.

It is equally true that Wales has experienced a degree of "relative deprivation". Welsh unemployment figures, for example, have consistently been approximately twice as high as those of England. Unfortunately, separate figures for England are unavailable, but comparative unemployment data for Wales and Great Britain as a whole are shown below (Table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1

Comparative Unemployment Figures:
Wales and The United Kingdom. 1967-69

| | Unemployment as Percentage of the Employee Population | | | | | |
	June 1967	Dec. 1967	June 1968	Dec. 1968	June 1969	Dec. 1969
Wales	3.6	3.6	3.6	4.2	4.0	4.1
United Kingdom	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.5

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[15]This information was provided in answer to a Parliamentary question from Mr. Gwynfor Evans, Plaid Cymru M.P. for Carmarthen in July 1967. In answering the question, Mr. Kenneth Robinson, Minister of Health, stated that these were the only two years for which separate emigration figures for Wales were available.

Such economic deprivation however, as can be seen from Table 5.1, while indeed moderate, is by no means acute. This is also indicated by the responses given by the nationalist activists questioned, when asked how far economic factors played a part in their decision to join Plaid Cymru. Only five (12 per cent) of those who responded definitively state that they were strongly motivated to join because of the unemployment problem, while 20 (47 per cent) thought it considerably important. However, almost half this sample placed unemployment low on their list of priorities. Similarly, only 15 (35 per cent) joined Plaid Cymru because of their perception of the economic failures of the other parties, while 13 (30 per cent) say that this was considerably important. One would expect those with a strong sense of regional deprivation to react extremely negatively to the London government, yet only 14 (32 per cent) state that they joined because of strong feelings that the government was over-centralized. It would seem true, therefore, as one newspaper editorial expressed, that "they (the Welsh and Scottish) resent the discrepancy between the comparative poverty of their countries and the comparative wealth of England. They resent unemployment rates which are constantly higher and earnings which are lower. They believe that England has somehow grabbed hold of the honey pot".[16] However, this resentment, though giving rise to discontent, is not experienced with suf-

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[16]The Times November 24, 1967.

ficient intensity either amongst the population as a whole or the nationalists themselves to generate a desire for violent means of redress.

Unfortunately no data were collected on the way in which respondents relate their own economic circumstances to that of the Welsh economy as a whole. However, the majority of respondents are undoubtedly in secure and satisfying employment. Of the local officials, for example, nine respondents (37 per cent) are teachers or lawyers, while none are unskilled labourers, the socio-economic grouping generally affected worst by unemployment. While the sample contains many intellectuals, all are corporate intellectuals, not free-lance. It seems no coincidence that while the President of Plaid Cymru is a well-established market-gardener, the more extreme Welsh language Society is headed by a folk-singer.

More important, there is no evidence in the Welsh situation of persistentdeprivation. Economic advancement is as available to the Welsh as the English, while access to the political elite is open. In October, 1964, for example, two Welshmen were appointed to the Labour Government's Cabinet of 23 members, and a further member, James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, sat for a Welsh constituency. By August 1966, the number of Welsh Cabinet ministers had risen to three, while in the complete period of Labour government from 1964

to 1970 five Welshmen held Cabinet posts.[17] This century one Welsh-
man, David Lloyd George, has been Prime Minister, and several, such as
Aneurin Bevan, have attained political prominence, mainly in the Labour
Party. Since 1965 Wales had had a Secretary of State, even now, under
the Conservatives, a Welsh-speaking Welshman (Peter Thomas), and a Welsh
Office centred in Cardiff. The political elite, therefore, is fully
open to access, particularly through the Labour Party. The educational
system in Wales is the same as that in England, and through the county
grant system equality of opportunity for higher education is main-
tained equally in both regions, while religious cleavage is minimal,
due firstly to the general decline of religion and secondly to the
preponderance of the non-conformist (Non-Anglican) churches in Wales.
The Catholic and Anglican Churches are limited primarily to the coastal
strip of South Wales and even here, with the exception of the City of
Cardiff, they are relatively weak. That virtually no perception of such
deliberately enforced persistent deprivation is perceived by the nation-
alist respondents is demonstrated by the fact that only one respondent
(two per cent) answers that he joined Plaid Cymru through a strong be-
lief that the Welsh and English could never "get along together", while
29 (62 per cent) take the directly opposite point of view. In a situa-
tion where persistent deprivation was present one would expect bitter

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[17]James Griffiths as Secretary of State for Wales, Roy Jenkins as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Cledwyn Hughes as Secretary of State for
Wales and Minister of Agriculture, George Thomas as Secretary of State
for Wales, and Ray Gunter as Minister of Labour.

resentment to be focused on the perceived more wealthy and exploiting group.

Though data cannot easily be collected to substantiate the statement, there is no doubt that social authority patterns of intermediate organizations in Wales are congruent with those of the government. Not only are many Welsh organizations regional parts of all-British associations, but even those which are exclusively Welsh in nature have a structure similar to other British organizations. For example, "Merched y Wawr" (Daughters of the Dawn), a group of Women's Institute Clubs in Wales which broke from the British organization on the question of the use of the Welsh language in its meetings, still retains the same type of organization as existed before links were severed.

More important, Plaid Cymru itself is in many ways a smaller imitation of the major parties. As has been noted in Chapter I, the Party at the lowest level is organized into branches of at least twenty members. Each branch then elects District Committees generally having jurisdiction over a Parliamentary constituency. These District Committees, together with the Annual Conference, elect representatives to Plaid Cymru's National Council, which meets three times a year. Real decision-making power lies with the "inner cabinet" of this Council,

the National Executive Committee, which meets once a month. However, in planning Parliamentary campaigns, for example, each constituency is almost completely autonomous, although the Central Party Office co-ordinates such items as press publicity.[18]

Even at the lowest level, that of the branch, this similarity with larger English parties can be seen. This writer attended two branch meetings early in 1970 and the format was very familiar. The Secretary opened the meeting with a report of Branch affairs and plans for a possible General Election, after which a number of motions, some exclusively concerning the branch, others on wider issues to be sent to the Central Office, were discussed. The standard rules of debate were adhered to and even the jargon was familiar, while all questions from the floor were addressed through the chairman. The entire process was an unconscious imitation of governmental procedure.

The literature suggests that where incongruent social authority patterns pertain, intra-personal tension builds up and alienation results. However, with 27 (59 per cent) of the nationalist respondents

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[18] E. Gwynn Matthews, This is Plaid Cymru. Cardiff: Plaid Cymru 1969, pp. 25-26.

scoring low on efficacy vis-à-vis the government. Nineteen (41 per

cent) still exhibit medium or high levels of efficacy. Efficacy and

alienation are admittedly different concepts, but are sufficiently

causally linked for it to be stated with a reasonable degree of

assurance, that as lack of efficacy does not exist at a dangerous

degree within the group and, while present at a moderate level, is

not all pervasive, neither does alienation.[19] Less than half the

.sample (48per cent) feel that the major parties are the same, and

as has already been stated, relatively few strongly perceive the

existing governmental system to be overcentralized. The majority

are confident, though to varying degrees, of ultimately achieving suc-

cess through the ballot box.

However, there is little doubt that the Welsh respondents do

perceive more cultural deprivation than their Scottish counterparts.

As was observed in Chapter II, cultural motivations are uppermost

within the sample of Welsh Nationalists; while only 15 (35 per cent)

stated that they were strongly motivated by to join Plaid Cymru for

economic reasons, 21 (49 per cent) and 22 (51 per cent) were strongly

motivated for reasons of concern with identity and culture respectively.

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[19]For a detailed analysis of the close connection between political
efficacy and alienation see Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter, New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 70-74.

Sixty-seven of the respondents speak Welsh, while no less than 26 (59 per cent) think that the preservation of the Welsh language is vital to the future of Wales. Thus, though a social sanction of force has not traditionally characterized Welsh society, such relatively strong feelings of cultural deprivation may have led to the adoption of more extreme methods by some groups, and certainly to the use of civil disobedience by the Welsh Language Society.

It is significant to note in light of the above, that those stressing cultural reasons, for example, for joining Plaid Cymru also tend to be conditional pacifists (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3) and tend to be members of the Welsh Language Society (Table 5.4). In addition, those who are members of this society are slightly more likely than those who are not to be only conditional pacifists. The correlation (tau-alpha = .03) is not a strong one however, the indication being that those who believe in the utility of peaceful extra-legal activity are by no means certain to be any more disposed to the morality of violent illegal action. In some ways, it seems their philosophy is more that of Ghandi rather than de Valera (Table 5.5).

TABLE 5.2

Cultural Motivation:
Attitude to violence

View of Violence	Reason for joining – Preserve Culture			
	Not important		Important	
1. Total Pacifist	58%	(7)	35%	(11)
2. Conditional Pacifist	42%	(5)	65%	(20)
Total	100%	(12)	100%	(31)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .04

TABLE 5.3

Reason for joining – Identity:
Attitude to Violence

View of Violence	Reason for joining – Identity			
	Not important		Important	
1. Total Pacifist	62%	(5)	37%	(13)
2. Conditional Pacifist	38%	(3)	63%	(22)
Total	100%	(8)	100%	(35)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .04.

TABLE 5.4

Membership of Welsh Language Society:
Reason for joining — Identity

Reason for Joining	Member of W.L.S.			
Identity	Member		Non-Member	
1. Not Important	12%	(1)	43%	(15)
2. Important	88%	(7)	57%	(20)
Total	100%	(8)	100%	(35)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .06

TABLE 5.5.

Member of W. L. S.:
Attitude to Violence.

Attitude to Violence	Member of W.L.S.			
	Member		Non-Member	
1. Total Pacifist	29%	(5)	48%	(14)
2. Conditional Pacifist	71%	(12)	52%	(15)
Total	100%	(17)	100%	(29)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .03.

Cultural deprivation, then, would seem to be more salient in the case of the Welsh Nationalists and this appears to influence attitudes to the actual or possible use of extra-legal methods. Not surprisingly, the Welsh-speakers are significantly more likely (tau-alpha = .21) to be members of the Welsh Language Society than non-Welsh-speakers. Fifty-six per cent of the Welsh-speakers are members compared with only 11 per cent of non-Welsh-speakers.

The language factor then adds on another element of resent-ment and frustration in the Welsh situation which is not present to a significant degree in Scotland. It is interesting to note that the members of the Welsh sample are more likely to be conditional pacifists than those in the sample of twenty Scottish Nationalist activists from which questionnaire responses were obtained (Table 5.6).

TABLE 5.6

Type of Respondent:
Attitude to Violence

Attitude to Violence	Type of Respondent					
	P.C.Student		P.C.Official		S.N.P.Activist	
1. Total Pacifist	45%	(10)	37%	(9)	65%	(13)
2. Conditional Pacifist	55%	(12)	63%	(15)	35%	(7)
Total	100%	(22)	100%	(24)	100%	(20)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .05.

At the same time, the Scots are less motivated than the Welsh respondents by concern for the preservation of their culture, while there is no significant difference on the economic motivational variables (Table 5.7).

TABLE 5.7

Type of Respondent:
Reason for joining - preserve culture

Reason for joining-Preserv. of Culture	Type of Respondent					
	P.C.Student		P.C.Official		S.N.P.Activist	
1. Not Important	32%	(7)	24%	(5)	53%	(9)
2. Important	68%	(15)	76%	(16)	47%	(8)
Total	100%	(22)	100%	(21)	100%	(17)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .06.

The above findings would tend to substantiate the relationship between perception of cultural deprivation and attitude towards non-legal methods. The Scots, without a relatively prosperous, linguistically differentiated culture (Gaelic being virtually a dead language) which they feel is under strong attack by English culture are less motivated by resentment. In Wales, there is much more of a sense of crisis. Welsh newspaper editorials such as "Last Chance for

Welsh!"[20] and "Saving a Language"[21] are common, while special
committees have been established at governmental and other levels to
enquire into the problem. It is the main differentiating feature be-
tween Welsh and Scottish nationalism, a feature which is central to
the form of development of each movement.

Efficacy is not at all correlated with attitude to violence,
although Welsh Language Society members are generally less efficacious
than non-members (Table 5.8).

TABLE 5.8

Membership of W.L.S.:
Efficacy

Efficacy	Membership of W. L. S.			
	Member		Non-Member	
1. Low	82%	(14)	45%	(13)
2. Medium	12%	(2)	24%	(7)
3. High	6%	(1)	36%	(9)
Total	100%	(17)	100%	(29)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .08.

[20]Western Mail, January 25, 1968, p. 8.

[21]Ibid., April 26, 1967, p.8.

There is a similar such correlation on three of the four efficacy items. Clearly, Welsh Language Society members have less faith in the political process, particularly as far as the welfare of the language is concerned. Their goal is a narrower one than that sought by Plaid Cymru and their attitude therefore perhaps more parochial and inflexible. It can be seen below (Table 5.9) that those respondents who are members of the Welsh Language Society are considerably more reserved about the possibility of future success for Plaid Cymru.

TABLE 5.9

Membership of the W. L. S.:
Plaid Cymru's future growth

Plaid Cymru's future growth	Membership of W.L.S.			
	Member		Non-Member	
1. No more growth	12%	(2)	4%	(1)
2. Changes needed	44%	(7)	15%	(4)
3. Don't know	--	-	7%	(2)
4. Growth certain	44%	(7)	74%	(20)
Total	100%	(16)	100%	(27)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .08.

It is possible that the members of the Welsh Language Society feel that by narrowing their range of goals and restricting themselves to striving for that which is most significant and important for them, and by devoting all their energy, both legally and otherwise, to pursueing this goal, that their most significant source of frustration, the erosion of the language, is in some measure compensated. It is equally significant that there is also a moderate correlation in the sample as a whole between confidence of success and attitude to the use of force (Table 5.10).

TABLE 5.10

Confidence of Success:
Attitude to Violence

Attitude to Violence	Confidence			
	Very Confident		Less Confident	
1. Total Pacifist	48%	(11)	26%	(5)
2. Conditional Pacifist	52%	(12)	74%	(14)
Total	100%	(23)	100%	(19)

Goodman and Kruskal tau-alpha = .05.

It is not surprising that in such a highly idealistic party as Plaid Cymru those less confident of eventual success are likely to be conditionally more favourable towards the use of violence. It is an understandable emotional response to the possible frustration of strongly held beliefs and perhaps helps to compensate for such pessimistic expectations. Many Welsh nationalists already feel that the major parties have used undemocratic methods (as defined by them) to frustrate Welsh aspirations and to undermine public support for their cause and consequently, that the same parties are equally capable of preventing Plaid Cymru's success by any means available.

SUMMARY

The assumption of this chapter has been that certain common
explanatory factors (or at least some of them) have to be present in
a society before a significant degree of civil violence can break
out, and that because little violence has occurred in Wales, despite
the existence of a separatist movement, such factors, while they per-
haps exist to a moderate degree, are not intensely operative on a
scale where widespread violence could result.

These factors can be divided into three categories. Firstly,
extremism can be generated in a society where social atomization
occurs, due to abrupt social change, and where, as a result, there
are few intermediate organizations which can act as safety valves
for discontent, and through which pressure may be exerted on the
government. A similar situation arises if the overcentralization
of government authority makes such groups superfluous. Secondly,
relative deprivation, the gap between desires and expectations, is
often an important prelude to civil disorder and violence. Such
deprivation is usually of an economic kind (e.g. severe depression)
and is much exacerbated by deliberate economic or political discrimin-
ation against a group within society, and by the existence of religious
cleavage. It can also, however, be of a cultural kind if a minority

perceives its own prosperous culture as being under attack. Thirdly,
social and political stability is endangered by the incongruity of
social authority patterns within a collectivity, particularly if such
a clash of behavioural norms occurs in social segments, such as Trade
Unions and political parties, which are close to the governmental seg-
ment. In addition, other researchers have noted that violence often
occurs in a polity, when individuals subscribe intensely to ideologies
and where there is an abundance of free-lance intellectuals less
committed to the status quo.

Indications are, from both the aggregate data available and
the attitudes of the nationalists themselves, that many of Schwarz's
observations in the Scottish situation clearly pertain to Wales and
that some of the causal factors listed in the introduction to this
chapter and summarized above, though present to a degree which can
explain the rise of discontent and a generally peaceful separatist
party, are not in evidence to a degree sufficient to encourage wide-
spread civil violence.

Firstly, social atomization does not exist on a significant
scale in Wales. Not only is there a profusion of intermediate voluntary
organizations, but even the separatists themselves are highly active
in such associations. Although a degree of economic deprivation

exists, this has been long-term and not excessively acute, though sufficiently high compared with England to generate some discontent. Social discontinuity does exist as emigration figures show, but this is by no means a new phenomenon and is also at a level well below critical.

The responses of the Nationalists to the questionnaire items are reflective of the above. As a group they are not extremely concerned with the condition of the Welsh economy, while they themselves are generally employed in secure occupations. They are not rabidly opposed to the central government, and a significantly large minority are reasonably politically efficacious and correspondingly, not alienated from the political system. These factors are in no way intensified by such socially disrupting policies as economic, political or educational discrimination, nor by the existence of widespread religious cleavage. As a result "racial" anomosity towards the English is minimal.

In addition, social authority patterns are congruent. Welsh intermediate organizations, including Plaid Cymru, reflect the same democratic structure as their English counterparts and parent bodies, and even at the lowest level, norms of conduct do not differ.

However, one factor is of significance in Wales - this is
cultural deprivation. Wales still has a very visible, and in many
ways, dynamic but declining culture, whose salience is highly per-
ceived by the Nationalists themselves. Unlike the Scots, they are
generally highly motivated by cultural considerations and most con-
sider the survival of the language to be very important indeed. This,
it is believed, may help to account for the occurrence of low level
violence in Wales, and the emergence of groups such as the Welsh
Language Society, which employ illegal methods.

Finally, it appears that expectations of success also in-
fluence disposition to violence, those who are less confident being
more likely to countenance possible recourse to force (admittedly
in extraordinary circumstances) and to be members of the more ex-
treme, less constitutionally minded Welsh Language Society.

The theories of civil violence expounded by the literature,
therefore, are very much confirmed by this study, which should be
viewed as supplementary to that of Schwarz. The findings suggest
that theories of violence can be employed, not only in the study of
situations where disorder or extremism is widespread, but also in
explaining the rise of third party and separatist movements unaccompa-
nied by a high incidence of violence and extremist activity.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This paper has dealt comprehensively with motivations and attitudes of Plaid Cymru activists and has examined the ways in which these are reflected in active participation in the Welsh Nationalist Party.

The study of Nationalist motivations was approached within the context of Maurice Pinard's theory of the rise of third parties, which attempts to explain the development of support for such parties at both the individual and structural levels. At the individual level, Pinard postulates that short term grievances, usually economic in nature, encourage an individual to support a third party in a situation where he can perceive no traditional alternative to the party in power. The observations made in Chapter II point to the need for the revision of this model in order for it to be of utility in this study of Welsh Nationalist Party activists, and perhaps those in other separatist movements also (see Fig. 6.1).

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FIGURE 6.1

Revised Model of Nationalist
Motivation

Individual Level

```
                                Perception of strong          Switch to
                           ┌──→traditional    ───────────→ traditional
                           │    alternative                  alternative
                           │
Short-term and Long-term   │
      grievances  ─────────┤
   (often economic)
against party in power


Long-term cultural
      grievances
   against central  ───────┐
      government           ├──→Perception of no           Switch to
                           │    traditional  ───────────→ separatist
                           └──→alternative                 party
```

As was observed in Chapter II, the primary motivation of the
Welsh Nationalists as a group is a deep common concern for the pre-
servation of Welsh cultural identity, particularly among those who have
never supported another party, economic grievances being more salient
among those who have at some previous time supported non-nationalist

parties. To revise his model is not to criticize Pinard, whose primary concern has not been with active members, but with those who merely vote for third parties, whose motivations are likely to be very different from those of the party members themselves.

Pinard's structural model needs to be similarly revised for purposes of this study. Credibility, the perception that a third party has a reasonable chance of success is of little importance in motivating individuals to join Plaid Cymru, although it does tend to influence the degree of their involvement in party activities and possibly has an effect on voting support in general. Also, the primacy of cultural considerations among the nationalists tends to indicate that other grievances, particularly those of an economic nature, are intensified by identification with a national group. Before individuals can perceive a group to be economically disadvantaged they must initially think in group terms, whether such a group is based on class, nationality, or religion. In addition, the existence of a disproportionate number of former Labour Party supporters among those who have defected to Plaid Cymru from other parties, and the particularly low defection rate from the alternative major party, the Conservatives, lends credence to Pinard's contention that one party dominance is conducive to the rise of third parties. The revised model is presented in Fig. 6.2.

FIGURE 6.2

Revised Model of Nationalist Motivation

Structural Level

The relative lack of strong parental socialization experienced by two out of every five respondents points to the existence of one explanatory factor which Pinard has not considered and this should perhaps be noted for application to other third party studies, whether of activists or voters.

The majority of those questioned were found to rank low on political efficacy, but more than a third are still highly efficacious. The latter group contains a concentration of those who are more politically knowledgeable, who perceive a strong sense of duty to participate, are members of occupationally based organizations (with those in strictly Welsh-oriented organizations scoring low on the scale) and who often engage in discussing their political views with others whom they attempt to convert to their own point of view.

The number of organizations of which respondents are members was not found to be positively related to efficacy. However, those who are members of three or more organizations tend to be members of exclusively Welsh ones and these individuals, in turn, generally rank low on the efficacy scale. Thus, in discussing the sense of political efficacy of those in this study, type of organizational membership, rather than number of organizations joined, appears to be the more important variable.

Some of the factors mentioned above continue to exert their
influence on the respondents' political behaviour long after they
have joined the party. Those who perceive a strong sense of duty to
participate in politics are more active in party work as well as being
more efficacious, as are members of those Pressure groups, particularly
occupationally-based organizations, which are not purely Welsh in
orientation. Credibility, while not a significant motivating factor
(the majority of respondents joined Plaid Cymru before the rise of
Nationalist fortunes after July 1966), does play a part in encouraging
high activity. Those who believe that their constituents substantially
agree with them on Welsh issues, who are very confident of future
electoral success and of their own ability to influence others tend to
be very active.

It was noted in Chapter II, that cultural considerations cons-
titute the main driving force behind party recruitment and it was
observed that those strongly committed to this central philosophical
outlook, who view the preservation of the Welsh language to be a
vital issue and adhere strongly to the principle of self-government
for all national minorities, are generally highly active. Significantly
the most highly active group is drawn from those who live in areas with
large Welsh-speaking minorities, where the relative lack of anti-
nationalist hostility and highly visible cultural erosion combine to

create a climate favourable to high activity. In such situations, it
seems, the "ideal" blend of ideological commitment, perception of
issue congruence, and confidence of success is most probably found.

Finally, perhaps the most interesting characteristic of
Plaid Cymru was examined - its strong commitment to peaceful consti-
tutional methods. From the aggregate and interview data available,
it was found that only one of the prerequisite conditions for wide-
spread disorder is present to a significant degree in Wales.

Social atomization is minimal. Not only is Wales rich in
democratically-structured intermediate organizations, but almost all
those in the sample have joined at least one non-party association.
A degree of economic deprivation would seem to exist in Wales as a whole,
but it is not excessively severe and it is not a strongly salient issue
among the Plaid Cymru activists questioned, most of whom in addition,
are in secure employment themselves. Social authority patterns,
particularly in societal segments near to the governmental segment, are
congruent, and this can even be seen in the structure of Plaid Cymru
itself. While there is a noticeable lack of a strong sense of poli-
tical efficacy among the respondents, both this feeling and the bitter
antipathy to government by which it is so often accompanied, are by
no means all pervasive or bitterly acute. In addition, such particularly
dangerous precursors of violence, extremism and instability as educational,

political and economic discrimination are not at all in evidence in Wales.

However, it was noted that perceptions of cultural deprivation, though not at a critical level, are strong within the Plaid Cymru sample, and this could be a partial explanation for the higher incidence of sporadic violence in Wales than in Scotland in the last decade, and the emergence of such groups as the Welsh Language Society, which pursues its aims primarily through the use of civil disobedience.

Clearly, a number of suggestions emerge in this study of nationalist activists which have potential for further research; for the study of Quebec separatism for example. Indications are that third party adherents may be more idealistically committed to their party's ideology than members of the major parties. Quite obviously, minor parties offer little prospect of status or career, while there are often social restraints on becoming active in such parties.

The high degree of involvement of those from areas with large minorities of Welsh speakers has implications for other studies of separatism. It may be, for example, that it would help to explain the more conspicuous manifestations of nationalism in linguistically divided areas such as Montreal and Brussels (Belgium) compared with linguistically

homogeneous areas such as Quebec City and Antwerp.

Clearly, in the case of other third party studies, examination of the differences between members who have defected from other parties, and those who have not can reveal much about the nature of the party being studied, its philosophy and attractiveness to potential members. It would seem from this particular study that the defectors are less single-mindedly committed to the party's central ideology (cultural preservation and rejuvination) and are motivated by a wider range of factors. It is possible to postulate a motivational continuum ranging from extremely ideological (the individual who has always supported a third party) to extremely practical, usually economic (voting supporter), with the defector who joins a third party lying somewhere in the centre.

The notion of issue agreement, it is believed, is a useful one. The perception by a third party activist that the local or national public are basically in sympathy with his party's central aims, provides a strong motivation to become deeply involved, or perhaps more correctly, removes a great obstacle to such involvement. Again, this finding could be applied in further research, not only in examination of other third parties and of separatist parties such as Parti Québécois, but also in areas of states such as Canada or Britain where the major party at the national level has very little support. It may be that in the indus-

trialized areas of South Wales, for example, where Conservative electoral support is minimal, such variations in the activity of Conservative Party members may also be found; that among them also high activity is greatly encouraged by perceptions of popular local sympathy (whatever the nature of voting habits) for Conservative views.

Undoubtedly, this study could have been improved. Had resources permitted, a sample drawn from the whole of Wales would obviously have been preferable, but lack of resources made this impossible. However, a wider sample of local, activists, apart from officials, could have been questioned. With such a relatively small sample as forty-six, the influence of such important variables as education could not be properly examined, while it was impossible to control for type of organizational membership in order to guage the influence, if any, of numerical organizational membership on efficacy and activity. It is believed, on reflection, that the use of scales would have been more reliable in judging attitudes to the use of violence and perceptions of citizen duty. The question on violence may still, by virtue of its sensitivity, have elicited a few false responses, and a less direct attitudinal measure could possibly have proved more valuable. In Chapter V, in the study of attitudes to violence, questions directly measuring perceptions of job security

should have been employed. Though it is probable that those in secure employment (by this writer's definition) also perceive their employment to be secure, one cannot be absolutely certain of this without the relevant empirical data. Finally, there is no doubt, in view of Schwarz's success with the approach in his study of Scottish National Party activists, that a great deal more light would have been shed on the motivations and attitudes of Welsh Nationalists if they had been compared with a similar number of activists in the two major parties in Swansea. The observations of this study on such factors as efficacy, motivation and alienation would undoubtedly be more meaningful in such a study.

Basically, however, the study has been of value in three particularly important ways. Firstly, it helps to supplement other studies of third parties, such as those of Pinard, by turning attention to activists rather than voters. It is so easy, without the neccessary empirical data, to mistakenly apply the conclusions of voting studies to all third party supporters, whether active or passive. Secondly, it offers further validation of Schwarz's findings with respect to the near absence of violence in Scotland despite the existence of a significantly large separatist party. Finally, it has generated a number of suggestions enumerated above, which could and should be pursued in further research.

APPENDICES

Scales

A. Sense of Political Efficacy

Four items were employed in order to construct an index
of political efficacy. As is noted in Chapter III, the coefficient
of reproducibility of the items in the particular sample under
study is .89, slightly below that required by Guttman (.90). As
this scale has been successfully used in many other studies and
as the size of the sample is probably responsible for this only
slightly lower coefficient it was decided to employ the scale
nevertheless, particularly in view of the closeness of the coef-
ficient of reproducibility to that neccessary

The items employed are listed below; respondents were
asked to agree strongly or somewhat or disagree strongly or some-
what to each one:

1. I don't think public officials care much what
   people like me think.

2. The way people vote is the main thing that
   decides how things are run in the U.K.

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3. People like me don't have any say about what

    the government does.

4. Sometimes politics and government seem so

    complicated that a person like me can't

    really understand what is going on.

The negative and positive responses were dichotomized and each

positive or efficacious response was given one point. A five

point scale was thus produced ranging from zero, denoting a com-

plete set of negative, inefficacious responses to five, repre-

senting positive responses to all items and showing a high degree

of efficacy. "Disagree" responses to items 1, 3 and 4 were

coded as efficacious, while in the case of item 2 an "agree" res-

ponse was coded as such.

B. Party Activity

It was decided to produce a crude measure of political activity by summing the coded activity rates on a number of items. Respondents were first asked whether they never, sometimes or often engaged in the following activities:

1. Take part in neighbourhood activities.

2. Have a drive to get people to vote during an election.

3. Collect money to finance campaigns.

4. Transport voters to and from the polls.

5. Get others to work for the party.

6. Talk to people in the constituency about public problems.

7. Talk to party officials about public problems.

8. Talk with government officials about public problems.

9. Keep files on the party members in the constituency to aid in campaign activities.

10. Try to get people to take a stand on public issues.

11. Work for other bodies or groups, political or non-political working for Welsh interests.

It was decided to exclude two items from the overall
measure. Firstly, item 4 proved inappropriate due to the relatively
low incidence of car ownership amongst those in the sample. Secondly,
it appears from the responses that it is generally the accepted
responsibility of the branch secretaries to keep membership files -
the fact that other officials do not participate in this activity
is of no relevance for guageing their expenditure of time and
effort in party work. Item 9 was therefore eliminated. In the
case of the other items a response of "sometimes" was coded as
one, "frequently" as two, and the scores summed for each respon-
dent. The resulting scores, ranging from one to nineteen (zero
must be scored as one if the Newx 6400 cross-tabulation programme
is used) were then dichotomized to produce measures of lower and
higher activity, the crudeness being neccessitated by the small-
ness of the sample.

C. Awareness of and support for other separatist causes

This scale was constructed to provide a simple index of commitment to the universal principle of self-government for national minorities. The respondents were asked if they agreed that the following areas have as much right to self-government as Wales:

1. Scotland

2. Angola

3. Brittany

4. Quebec

5. The Basque Country

6. The Ukraine

First of all each positive response was given one point and the scores summed for each respondent to produce a measure of general separatist support. Secondly, one point was allotted for either a negative or positive response as opposed to zero for either "don't know" or "no answer". The result in both cases was a seven point scale ranging from a score of one up to seven. In the case of separatist support, one represents a complete set of negative or "don't know" responses while a score of seven denotes support for the self-government of all six areas. In the other scale, that of separatist issue familiarity, zero represents a complete set of "don't know" or "no answer" responses, while seven is scored if the respondent expresses opinions on all six items.

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D. Issue Congruence

This index, based on three nationalist-oriented opinion questions, was used to measure the extent to which each respondent perceived the opinions of most of his or her fellow constituents to be congruent with his own on issues central to the thinking of Welsh Nationalists. Respondents were asked if they thought that the majority of their fellow constituents agreed with them on the following Welsh issues:

1. Dominion status for Wales

2. Revival of the Welsh Language

3. Limited home rule (devolution).

Four responses were possible: "no", "don't know", "divided" (constituents perceived as being split on issue) and "yes". The first was awarded a score of zero, the second one, the third two and the fourth three, and the scores on all three items were summed, for each respondent, to produce the index. In this case, as no respondent scored zero, the scores were not increased by one and a scale of one to nine was thus produced, one being indicative of extremely low perceived congruence with the opinions of one's constituents and nine showing high congruence. Finally, the respondents' resulting scores were once again dichotomized in order to maximize their utility in this sample.

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E. Questionnaire

Deck 01

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
01 and 02		(Respondent's Identification Number 1-46)
03		(Card Number One. Gang punch one.)
04		Type of Respondent
	48(22)	1. Student Nationalist
	52(24)	2. Local Plaid Cymru Official
05		How long have you participated in politics, i.e. how long have you been more active than just voting? (Get exact number of years.)
	4(2)	1. Under one year
	11(5)	2. One year
	9(4)	3. Two years
	15(7)	4. Three years
	9(4)	5. Four years
	11(5)	6. Five years
	11(5)	7. Six years
	2(1)	8. Seven years
	28(13)	9. Eight or more yars

162

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

06

How long have you been a member of Plaid Cymru?

%N		
4(2)	1.	Under one year
9(4)	2.	One year
9(4)	3.	Two years
9(4)	4.	Three years
15(7)	5.	Four years
9(4)	6.	Five years
9(4)	7.	Six years
4(2)	8.	Seven years
33(15)	9.	Eight or more years

07

When did you first become a member of any political party?

%N		
2(1)	1.	Under one year
9(4)	2.	One year
7(3)	3.	Two years
9(4)	4.	Three years
17(8)	5.	Four years
9(4)	6.	Five years
11(5)	7.	Six years
4(2)	8.	Seven years
33(15)	9.	Eight or more years

08

Why did you first become interested in politics?

%N		
24(11)	1.	Influence of others
22(10)	2.	Influence of environment (school, home)
9(4)	3.	Protest or disillusionment (with other parties/political system)
4(2)	4.	Moral or social concerns
0(0)	5.	Economic
7(3)	6.	General (perceived) condition of Wales
7(3)	7.	Culture, identity
9(4)	8.	Basic nationalist outlook
20(9)	9.	Political inclination

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
09		What first motivated you to join Plaid Cymru?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	11(5)	1. Influence of others
	0(0)	2. Influence of environment
	11(5)	3. Protest, disillusionment
	2(1)	4. Moral or social concerns
	4(2)	5. Economic
	7(3)	6. General (perceived) condition of country
	17(8)	7. Culture, identity
	35(16)	8. Basic nationalist tendency
	9(4)	9. Political inclination
10		Did you ever support a non-nationalist party?
	52(24)	1. Yes
	48(22)	2. No
11		If yes, which Party?
	48(22)	0. None
	30(14)	1. Labour
	4(2)	2. Conservative
	9(4)	3. Liberal
	9(4)	4. Alternated
	0(0)	5. Other
12		How old were you when you changed to/ joined Plaid Cymru?
	2(1)	0. No answer
	74(34)	1. Under twenty-one years
	9(4)	2. Twenty-one to thirty years
	11(5)	3. Thirty-one to forty years
	4(2)	4. Over forty years

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

How far did each of the following factors make you change to or decide to join Plaid Cymru?

13

My former party/the other parties were not really concerned with the economic problems of Wales

7(3)	0. No answer
4(2)	1. Not at all
28(13)	2. A little
28(13)	3. To a considerable degree
33(15)	4. Very much

14

My former party/the other parties were not really concerned with the preservation of our culture

7(3)	0. No answer
9(4)	1. Not at all
17(8)	2. A little
20(9)	3. To a considerable degree
48(22)	4. Very much

15

The United Kingdom is too large a political unit do deal adequately with our problems

7(3)	0. No answer
13(6)	1. Not at all
20(9)	2. A little
30(14)	3. To a considerable degree
30(14)	4. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
16		My former party/the other parties had lost their sense of purpose
	7(3)	0. No answer
	26(12)	1. Not at all
	26(12)	2. A little
	24(11)	3. To a considerable degree
	17(8)	4. Very much
17		Nationalism can give Welshmen something to strive for
	7(3)	0. No answer
	11(5)	1. Not at all
	13(6)	2. A little
	28(13)	3. To a considerable degree
	41(19)	4. Very much
18		The National Party has the right answer to our unemployment problem
	7(3)	0. No answer
	13(6)	1. Not at all
	26(12)	2. A little
	43(20)	3. To a considerable degree
	11(5)	4. Very much
19		Only self-government can save our identity
	7(3)	0. No answer
	2(1)	1. Not at all
	15(7)	2. A little
	30(14)	3. To a considerable degree
	46(21)	4. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

20

The Welsh and English cannot really get along together

7(3)	0. No answer
63 (29)	1. Not at all
20(9)	2. A little
9(4)	3. To a considerable degree
2(1)	4. Very much

21

Can you think of any other reasons other than those above for your decision to join Plaid Cymru?

50 (23)	0. None
0(0)	1. Local issues
4(2)	2. Disillusionment with other parties, political system
11(5)	3. Self-government as an ideology
9(4)	4. National identity
4(2)	5. Economic
9(4)	6. Language
0(0)	7. Perception of Insult
13(6)	8. Other

22

Were any of your close relatives or friends active in politics (local or national) before you became involved?

| 59 (27) | 1. Yes |
| 41 (19) | 2. No |

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
23		Were any of your close relatives involved in politics before you became involved?
	2(1)	0. Don't know
	24(11)	1. Yes
	74(34)	2. No
24		Were any of your close friends involved in politics before you became involved?
	2(1)	0. Don't know
	48(22)	1. Yes
	50(23)	2. No
25		What were your parents' political affiliations?
	0(0)	0. No answer
	33(15)	1. Labour
	7(3)	2. Conservative
	11(5)	3. Liberal
	11(5)	4. Plaid Cymru
	24(11)	5. Divided, floating vote, abstain
	15(7)	6. Don't know
26		When you were growing up, how many discussions about politics were there in your home?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	22(10)	1. None
	28(13)	2. A few
	22(10)	3. Some
	24(11)	4. A great many

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
27		Do you consider that you have in any way influenced the political views of your parents, friends or relatives?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	7(3)	1. Not at all
	41(19)	2. A little
	30(14)	3. Considerable
	17(8)	4. Very much
28		Do you consider that you have in any way influenced the political views of your parents?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	35(16)	1. Not at all
	24(11)	2. A little
	24(11)	3. Considerable
	13(6)	4. Very much
29		Do you consider that you have in any way influenced the political views of your friends?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	20(9)	1. Not at all
	24(11)	2. A little
	28(13)	3. Considerable
	24(11)	4. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
30		Do you consider that you have in any way influenced the political views of your relatives?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	57(26)	1. Not at all
	9(4)	2. A little
	24(11)	3. Considerable
	7(3)	4. Very much
31		What event caused you to enter actively into Nationalist politics?
	50(23)	1. No particular event
	20(9)	2. Elections, Political meetings
	4(2)	3. Perception of insult to nation
	11(5)	4. Perception of economic exploitation
	7(3)	5. Influence of individuals
	0(0)	6. Disillusionment, Protest
	9(4)	7. Other
32		On a very general plane, what quality or qualities in the Welsh people do you most admire?
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	9(4)	1. Nothing in particular
	43(20)	2. Friendliness
	17(8)	3. Preservation of culture, identity
	2(1)	4. Self respect, pride
	13(6)	5. Articulation, intelligence
	0(0)	6. Practical abilities
	9(4)	7. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
33		Equally generally, what quality or qualities do you most admire in the Scots?
	26(12)	0. Don't know, no answer
	9(4)	1. Nothing in particular
	15(7)	2. Friendliness
	15(7)	3. Preservation of culture, identity
	17(8)	4. Self-respect, pride
	7(3)	5. Articulation, intelligence
	7(3)	6. Practical abilities
	4(2)	7. Other
34		What qualities in your own people, if any, do you find annoying or frustrating?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	0(0)	1. Nothing in particular
	17(8)	2. Inferiority complex
	9(4)	3. Intolerance
	20(9)	4. Parochial, slow to change
	15(7)	5. Lack of pride, concern for culture
	9(4)	6. Apathy
	11(5)	7. Lack of self-assertion
	9(4)	8. Language "snobbery" (of (Welsh-speakers)
	7(3)	9. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
35		What quality or qualities do you find annoying in the Scots?
	57(26)	0. Don't know, no answer
	17(8)	1. Nothing in particular
	7(3)	2. Intolerance
	7(3)	3. Lack of national feeling
	4(2)	4. Arrogance
	9(4)	5. Other
36		What quality or qualities do you find most annoying in the English?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	61(28)	1. Superiority complex
	9(4)	2. Antipathy to, lack of sympathy for Welsh problems
	7(3)	3. Overconfidence
	4(2)	4. Vulgarity
	2(1)	5. Hypocricy
	4(2)	6. Unfriendliness
	7(3)	7. Other
	2(1)	8. Nothing
37		What quality or qualities, if any, do you find praiseworthy in the English?
	11(5)	0. Don't know, no answer
	33(15)	1. Nothing in particular
	7(3)	2. National Pride
	9(4)	3. Tolerance
	9(4)	4. Friendliness
	7(3)	5. Practical ability
	9(4)	6. Confidence
	13(6)	7. Stolidity
	4(2)	8. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
38		Should you by any chance be acquainted with the situation, would you in any way equate the position of the people of Quebec in Canada to that of the Welsh people?
	4(2)	0. No answer
	37(17)	1. Don't know
	9(4)	2. No comparison
	35(16)	3. Language
	15(7)	4. Minority struggle

In your opinion, which of the following, if any, have as much right to receive self-government as Wales?

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
39		Scotland
	0(0)	0. No answer
	4(2)	1. No
	0(0)	2. Don't know
	96(44)	3. Yes
40		Angola
	0(0)	0. No answer
	2(1)	1. No
	54(25)	2. Don't know
	44(20)	3. Yes
41		Brittany
	0(0)	0. No answer
	15(7)	1. No
	7(3)	2. Don't know
	78(36)	3. Yes

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
42		Quebec
	0(0)	0. No answer
	11(5)	1. No
	39(18)	2. Don't know
	50(23)	3. Yes
43		The Basque Country
	4(2)	0. No answer
	7(3)	1. No
	28(13)	2. Don't know
	61(28	3. Yes
44		The Ukraine
	4(2)	0. No answer
	9(4)	1. No
	33(15)	2. Don't know
	54(25)	3. Yes
45		Score according to number for whom self-government is supported
	0(0)	1. zero
	7(3)	2. one
	20(9)	3. two
	9(4)	4. three
	33(15)	5. four
	17(8)	6. five
	15(7)	7. six

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
46		Score according to the number of other separatist causes with which respondent is familiar
	0(0)	1. zero
	2(1)	2. one
	9(4)	3. two
	11(5)	4. three
	35(16)	5. four
	26(12)	6. five
	17(8)	7. six
47		What were the circumstances of your first getting a post in Plaid Cymru?
	35(16)	0. Don't know, no answer
	50(23)	1. Was asked
	9(4)	2. Combination of 1. and 3.
	7(3)	3. Volunteered
48		When you joined Plaid Cymru, did you seek to do so of your own accord or where you encouraged
	15(7)	0. Don't know, no answer
	30(14)	1. Encouraged
	4(2)	2. Combination of 1. and 3.
	50(23)	3. Volunteered
49		How long have you held office?
	37(17)	0. Don't know, no answer
	22(10)	1. Zero to two years
	15(7)	2. Three to four years
	17(8)	3. Five to nine years
	9(4)	4. Ten or more years

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
50		What kinds of rewards did you expect when you first became active in Plaid Cymru?
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	13(6)	1. Social rewards
	11(5)	2. Political activity per se
	22(10)	3. Success for the party
	7(3)	4. Expression of Welsh identity
	24(11)	5. Idealism/Helping the cause
	17(8)	6. None
51		Would you say generally speaking, that people who become active in your party differ from people active in the other three parties in the rewards they expect to get out of politics?
	11(5)	0. Don't know, no answer
	65(30)	1. Yes
	24(11)	2. No
52		If yes, what is the difference?
	35(16)	0. Don't know, no answer
	46(21)	1. No material gain
	2(1)	2. No vested interests
	2(1)	3. Personality differences
	15(7)	4. Different cause orientation

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
53		**What do you like about being a party official or active in the party?**
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	13(6)	1. Leadership, influence
	4(2)	2. Duty, self-satisfaction
	9(4)	3. Constructive activity
	13(6)	4. Political activity per se
	28(13)	5. Meeting people
	2(1)	6. Assertion of Welsh identity
	0(0)	7. Concern for, love of country
	11(5)	8. Making progress, getting results
	13(6)	9. Idealism, work for the cause
54		**Alternative code for above**
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	28(13)	1. Personal orientation
	28(13)	2. Social orientation
	13(6)	3. Political orientation
	0(0)	4. Expression of disillusionment
	24(11)	5. Goal orientation
	0(0)	6. Purely nationalistic (emotional)
55		**Why do you think most members or officials in your party become active?**
	0(0)	0. Dont' know, no answer
	11(5)	1. Leadership, influence
	2(1)	2. Self-satisfaction, duty
	4(2)	3. Constructive activity
	7(3)	4. Political activity per se

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
	2(1)	5. Meeting people
	2(1)	6. Assertion of Welsh identity
	15(7)	7. Concern for, love of country
	9(4)	8. Making progress, getting results
	28(22)	9. Idealism, work for the cause

		Alternative code for above
56		
	0(0)	0. Don't know, no answer
	22(10)	1. Personal orientation
	2(1)	2. Social orientation
	2(1)	3. Political orientation
	4(2)	4. Expression of disillusionment
	33(15)	5. Goal orientation
	35(16)	6. Purely nationalistic (emotional)

		Is there anything about being a party official or active in the party that you personally find unpleasant?
57		
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	57(26)	1. Yes
	37(17)	2. No

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
58		**If so, what is it?**
	43(20)	0. Nothing, no answer
	20(9)	1. Party work, routine
	0(0)	2. Standard of party organization
	13(6)	3. Attitude of some members
	9(4)	4. Reception from public
	7(3)	5. Public misinformation, lack of interest
	4(2)	6. Attitude, tactics of other parties
	4(2)	7. Other
59		**Is there anything about campaigning for Plaid Cymru that frustrates or annoys you?**
	13(6)	0. Don't know, no answer
	70(32)	1. Yes
	17(8)	2. No
60		**If so, what is it?**
	30(14)	0. Nothing, don't know, no answer
	13(6)	1. Party policy, organization
	2(1)	2. Attitude of some members
	20(9)	3. Reception from public
	20(9)	4. Public misinformation, lack of interest
	7(3)	5. Attitude, tactics of other parties
	4(2)	6. Lack of success
	4(2)	7. Lack of publicity
	0(0)	8. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
61		Are you thinking of continuing to be about as active politically as you are now, or do you think that your activities will increase or decrease in the future?
	4(2)	0. No answer
	7(3)	1. Decrease
	7(3)	2. Don't know
	33(15)	3. Stay the same
	50(23)	4. Increase
62		Why do you think so?
	35(16)	0. No answer, don't know
	20(9)	1. Time
	7(3)	2. Age
	9(4)	3. Necessity
	11(5)	4. Work
	13(6)	5. More support
	7(3)	6. Other
63		Why are most people not too actively involved in politics?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	28(13)	1. Apathy, laziness
	7(3)	2. Time
	28(13)	3. Lack of interest
	17(8)	4. Lack of effect on themselves
	13(6)	5. Perceived lack of effect on the system
	2(1)	6. Social dissonance

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
64		**Why until recently has the party not succeeded in attracting wider electoral support?**
	7(3)	0. Dont' know, no answer
	17(8)	1. Credibility gap
	17(9)	2. Lack of publicity
	11(5)	3. Poor organization and propaganda
	2(1)	4. Too narrow an appeal
	11(5)	5. Little previous youth appeal
	17(8)	6. Lack of public information and sympathy
	17(8)	7. New sense of disillusionment
	0(0)	8. Other

People enjoy politics for different reasons. How important are the following to you?

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
65		**Fun and excitement of campaigns**
	24(11)	1. Not at all important
	17(8)	2. Not too important
	41(19)	3. Somewhat important
	17(8)	4. Very important
66		**Making social contacts and friends**
	15(7)	1. Not at all important
	13(6)	2. Not too important
	39(18)	3. Somewhat important
	33(15)	4. Very important

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
67		Satisfaction at fulfilling my duty as a citizen
	20(9)	1. Not at all important
	7(3)	2. Not too important
	28(13)	3. Somewhat important
	46(21)	4. Very important
68		Furthering my political ambitions
	76(35)	1. Not at all important
	15(7)	2. Not too important
	7(3)	3. Somewhat important
	2(1)	4. Very important
69		Helping my country
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	2(1)	2. Not too important
	13(6)	3. Somewhat important
	85(39)	4. Very important
70		Helping my party
	2(1)	1. Not at all important
	4(2)	2. Not too important
	13(6)	3. Somewhat important
	80(37)	4. Very important
71		Concern with public issues
	4(2)	1. Not at all important
	4(2)	2. Not too important
	33(15)	3. Somewhat important
	59(27)	4. Very important

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
72		Helping people with non-governmental problems
	15(7)	1. Not at all important
	15(7)	2. Not too important
	41(19)	3. Somewhat important
	28(13)	4. Very important
73		Helping to influence the politics of government
	9(4)	1. Not at all important
	13(6)	2. Not too important
	24(11)	3. Somewhat important
	54 (25)	4. Very important
74		Prestige in my community
	67(31)	1. Not at all important
	15(7)	2. Not too important
	11(5)	3. Somewhat important
	7(3)	4. Very important
75		Approximately how many hours a day do you devote to politics during a campaign?
	2(1)	0. No answer
	33(15)	1. Under three
	65(30)	2. Three or more

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

76

And when no campaign is in progress?

- 2(1)   0. No answer
- 59(27) 1. Very little, none
- 22(10) 2. A few hours each weak
- 13(6) 3. Much of the time
- 4(2) 4. All the time possible

77

Approximately how many votes a day in your constituency do you talk to personally during a campaign?

- (2) 0. Don't know, no answer
- (23) 1. Under fifty
- (14) 2. Fifty to one hundred
- (7) 3. Over one hundred

78

And when no campaign is in progress?

- (1) 0. No answer
- (28) 1. Five or under
- (17) 2. Over five

79

What would you say is the most important party activity?

- (2) 0. Don't know, no answer
- (14) 1. Canvassing
- (9) 2. Organization, propaganda
- (11) 3. Public Relations
- (5) 4. Meetings, campaigns
- (3) 5. Policy formation
- (2) 6. Other

Deck 02

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
01 - 02		Respondent identification number 01 - 46
03		Card number two. Gang punch two.

Do you feel the majority of your constituents would agree with you on the following issues?

04		Dominion status for Wales
	7(3)	0. No answer
	48(22)	1. No
	4(2)	2. Don't know
	9(4)	3. Divided
	30(14)	4. Yes

03		Revival of the Welsh language
	7(3)	0. No answer
	37(17)	1. No
	0(0)	2. Don't know
	2(1)	3. Divided
	54(25)	4. Yes

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
06		Limited home rule
	7(3)	0. No answer
	20(9)	1. No
	2(1)	2. Don't know
	2(1)	3. Divided
	70(32)	4. Yes
07		Extent of government regulation of industry
	11(5)	0. No answer
	30(14)	1. No
	11(5)	2. Don't know
	2(1)	3. Divided
	46(21)	4. Yes
08		International issues
	11(5)	0. No answer
	28(13)	1. No
	15(7)	2. Don't know
	2(1)	3. Divided
	43(20)	4. Yes
09		Score for agreement (congruence) of constituents on nationalist-oriented issues (cols. 04-06)
		Don't know = 1. Divided =2
		Majority agreement=3.
	7(3)	1. zero
	13(6)	2. one
	0(0)	3. two
	22(10)	4. three
	2(1)	5. four

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
	4(2)	6. five
	20(9)	7. six
	2(1)	8. seven
	30(14)	9. eight or nine

10		Have you or would you attempt to play down issues where you think you might be in disagreement with your constituents or those amongst whom you are campaigning?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	50(23)	1. Yes
	46(21)	2. No

11		If yes to above, which issue in particular?
	54(25)	0. None, don't know, no answer
	33(15)	1. Language
	7(3)	2. Monarchy
	7(3)	3. Other

Officials, candidates, and party members often vary in the type of activities they do. Please tell me how often you do the following:

12		Take part in neighbourhood activities
	37(17)	1. Never
	28(13)	2. Sometimes
	35(16)	3. Frequently

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
13		Have a drive to get people to vote during an election
	28(13)	1. Never
	24(11)	2. Sometimes
	48(22)	3. Frequently
14		Collect money to finance campaigns
	37(17)	1. Never
	26(12)	2. Sometimes
	37(17)	3. Frequently
15		Transport voters to and from the polls
	43(20)	1. Never
	15(7)	2. Sometimes
	41(19)	3. Frequently
16		Get people to work for the party
	15(7)	1. Never
	39(18)	2. Sometimes
	46(21)	3. Frequently
17		Talk to people in the constituency about public problems
	15(7)	1. Never
	41(19)	2. Sometimes
	43(20)	3. Frequently

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
18		Talk with party officials about public problems
	20(9)	1. Never
	35(16)	2. Sometimes
	46(21)	3. Frequently
19		Talk with government officials about public problems
	75(35)	1. Never
	15(7)	2. Sometimes
	9(4)	3. Frequently
20		Keep files on the party members in the constituency to aid in campaign activities
	2(1)	0. No answer
	65(30)	1. Never
	7(3)	2. Sometimes
	26(12)	3. Frequently
21		Try to get people to take a stand on public issues
	48(22)	1. Never
	35(16)	2. Sometimes
	17(8)	3. Frequently
22		Work for other bodies or groups, political or non-political, working for Welsh interests
	46(21)	1. Never
	17(8)	2. Sometimes
	37(17)	3. Frequently

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
23		How complete are your branch's membership files?
	48(22)	0. Don't know, no answer
	0(0)	1. Incomplete
	22(10)	2. Fairly complete
	30(14)	3. Very complete
24		If you are an official, why do you think you were selected as such?
	42(11)	1. No one else available
	4(1)	2. Concern with issues
	27(7)	3. Well known or popular
	27(7)	4. Hard work
		How important are the following factors as far as emphasis during a campaign is concerned?
25		National freedom
	0(0)	1. No at all important
	2(1)	2. Not too important
	22(10)	3. Somewhat important
	76(35)	4. Very important
26		The Unemployment problem
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	4(2)	2. Not too important
	9(4)	3. Somewhat important
	87(40)	4. Very important

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
27		Welfare issues
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	2(1)	1. Not at all important
	9(4)	2. Not too important
	35(16)	3. Somewhat important
	50(23)	4. Very important
28		Preservation of our culture
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	20(9)	2. Not too important
	30(14)	3. Somewhat important
	50(23)	4. Very important
29		Maintenance of a Way of Life
	11(5)	1. Not at all important
	20(9)	2. Not too important
	37(17)	3. Somewhat important
	33(15)	4. Very important
30		What other issues would you stress during a campaign?
	38(8)	1. Local
	43(9)	2. Communications (transport etc.).
	5(1)	3. Devolution
	5(1)	4. International issues
	9(2)	5. Aspects of culture

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

I am going to give you a list of
general constituency activities.
Please tell me how important you
think these are to you

31   Election activities

	%N	
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	0(0)	2. Not too important
	9(4)	3. Somewhat important
	91(42)	4. Very important

32   Community leadership

	%N	
	13(6)	1. Not at all important
	9(4)	2. Not too important
	30(14)	3. Somewhat important
	48(22)	4. Very important

33   Educate the voters on public issues

	%N	
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	2(1)	2. Not too important
	24(11)	3. Somewhat important
	76(34)	4. Very important

34   Help to build the party organization

	%N	
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	0(0)	2. Not too important
	11(5)	3. Somewhat important
	89(41)	4. Very important

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
35		**Pressure for the welfare of the voters in your constituency**
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	0(0)	2. Not too important
	11(5)	3. Somewhat important
	89(41)	4. Very important
36		**Help build voter loyalty to you party**
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	0(0)	2. Not too important
	24(11)	3. Somewhat important
	76(35)	4. Very important
37		**Campaign constantly for the amelioration of national grievances**
	0(0)	1. Not at all important
	7(3)	2. Not too important
	20(9)	3. Somewhat important
	74(34)	4. Very important
38		**How strong would you say the local party organization is?**
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	24(11)	1. Weak
	54(25)	2. Fairly strong
	15(7)	3. Very strong

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
39		How strong would you say the national organization is?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	24(11)	1. Weak
	57(26)	2. Fairly strong
	15(7)	3. Very strong
40		Do you consider it advisable at this stage for your party to formulate detailed policies on social and economic issues?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	76(35)	1. Yes
	11(5)	2. To some extent
	9(4)	3. No
41		Do you consider it correct to apply the criterion of political pragmatism before that of principle to policy statements and campaigns, if by doing so you believe that you would help further the attainment of your own party's long-term goals?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	41(19)	1. Yes
	54(25)	2. No

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
		How far do you think that recent successes, if at all, have changed the nature of your party in the following respects?
42		Influx of new members
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	0(0)	1. None
	2(1)	2. A little
	11(5)	3. Some
	46(21)	4. Considerable
	37(17)	5. Very much
42		Production of more detailed policies
	4(2)	0. Don't know
	0(0)	1. None
	2(1)	2. A little
	33(15)	3. Some
	39(18)	4. Considerable
	22(10)	5. Very much
44		The attraction of more people into the party eager for public office
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	24(11)	1. None
	24(11)	2. A little
	28(13)	3. Some
	9(4)	4. Considerable
	11(5)	5. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
45		**More competition for party posts and candidatures**
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	9(4)	1. None
	24(11)	2. A little
	37(17)	3. Some
	17(8)	4. Considerable
	9(4)	5. Very much
46		**Better candidates for parliamentary and local elections**
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	4(2)	1. None
	9(4)	2. A little
	22(10)	3. Some
	26(12)	4. Considerable
	33(15)	5. Very much
47		**Better party organization**
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	0(0)]	1. None
	4(2)	2. A little
	28(13)	3. Some
	35(16)	4. Considerable
	28(13)	5. Very much
48		**Switch in policy emphasis**
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	26(12)	1. None
	9(4)	2. A little
	22(10)	3. Some
	24(11)	4. Considerable
	13(6)	5. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
49		**Nature of switch in policy emphasis (if any perceived)**
	39(18)	0. Don't know, no answer, none
	28(13)	1. More attention to economics
	9(4)	2. Less emphasis on culture
	20(9)	3. More detailed policies
	4(2)	4. More flexible policies
50		**What would you say is the main basis of support for Plaid Cymru in your constituency?**
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	15(7)	1. Economic
	28(13)	2. Protest, disillusionment
	4(2)	3. Combination of factors
	17(8)	4. Belief in more self-government
	24(11)	5. Language
	7(3)	6. Candidate's personality
51		**What would you say is the main basis of support for Plaid Cymru in Wales as a whole?**
	11(5)	0. Don't know, no answer
	11(5)	1. Economic
	22(10)	2. Protest, disillusionment
	22(10)	3. Combination of factors
	30(14)	4. Belief in more self-government
	4(2)	5. Language

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

52

Do you think that there has been a steady growth of nationalism in Wales or do you believe that it has been a sudden phenomenon?

24(11)	0. Don't know, no answer
20(9)	1. Steady
9(4)	2. New manifestation of already existing emotion
22(10)	3. Sudden
26(12)	4. Steady with recent acceleration

53

Will support for your party grow, stay the same, or are changes needed in order for support to increase?

7(3)	0. No answer
7(3)	1. Stay the same
24(11)	2. Changes required
4(2)	3. Don't know
59(27)	4. Grow

54

If changes are required, what are they?

31(5)	1. Organization
6(1)	2. Leadership
44(7)	3. More intense general effort
19(3)	4. Policy change

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
55		What criticisms, if any, do you have of Plaid Cymru?
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	15(7)	1. Organization
	9(4)	2. Leadership
	11(5)	3. Propaganda
	9(4)	4. Parochialism
	33(15)	5. Policy
	15(7)	6. None
	2(1)	7. Other
56		What interests did you or would you stress in your own constituency in a campaign?
	9(4)	0. Don't know, no answer
	50(23)	1. Economic
	13(6)	2. Local
	7(3)	3. Social
	4(2)	4. General neglect
	7(3)	5. Devolution
	11(5)	6. Culture, language
57		How confident are you of gaining self-government?
	9(4)	0. Don't know, no answer
	9(4)	1. Not too hopeful
	41(19)	2. Fairly confident
	41(19)	3. Very confident

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

58

Within what time are you most con-fident of gaining self-government?

2(1)	0. Don't know, no answer
35(16)	1. Within twenty years
22(10)	2. Within fifteen years
35(16)	3. Within ten years
7(3)	4. Within five years

59

What do you consider the main obstacle facing Plaid Cymru's advance?

7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
4(2)	1. Party organization
4(2)	2. Lack of confidence
28(13)	3. Power of other parties
4(2)	4. Concessions by other parties
15(7)	5. Lack of publicity
20(9)	6. People slow to change
7(3)	7. Language division
2(1)	8. Time factor
9(4)	9. Other

60

How much unfluence do you think you have in running the local party organization?

2(1)	0. Don't know, no answer
30(14)	1. None
26(12)	2. A little
17(8)	3. Some
17(8)	4. Considerable
7(3)	5. Very much

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
61		How much influence do you think you have in running the national party organization?
	0(0)	0. Don't know, no answer
	65(30)	1. None
	15(7)	2. A little
	13(6)	3. Some
	4(2)	4. Considerable
	2(1)	5. Very much
62		How much direct contact do you have with the leaders of the party outside of a campaign (how often per month, year)?
	4(2)	0. No answer
	17(8)	1. None
	20(9)	2. A little
	24(11)	3. Some contact
	35(16)	4. Very much
63		What sort of things do you discuss with them?
	22(10)	0. No answer
	17(8)	1. Campaigns
	9(4)	2. General state of party
	13(6)	3. Branch affairs
	13(6)	4. Current issues
	13(6)	5. Policy
	13(6)	6. Social affairs

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
64		Do you think that the other three parties are basically the same or different?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	46(21)	1. Basically the same
	50(23)	2. Different
65		If (2) above, what is the difference?
	52(24)	0. Don't know, no answer
	2(1)	1. Labour better---concern for Wales
	30(14)	2. Labour ideologically more acceptable
	7(3)	3. Liberals---minor party
	9(4)	4. Liberals---devolution policy
66		All in all, does it make any difference to you whether the Labour, Conservative, or Liberal party is in control of the London government?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	28(13)	1. No
	67(31)	2. Yes
67		If so, what difference does is make?
	33(15)	0. Don't know, no answer
	26(12)	1. Prefer Labour party---ideology
	4(2)	2. Prefer Labour party---better policies
	13(6)	3. Prefer Labour party---more done for Wales

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

22(10)   4. Prefer Labour party—better for Plaid Cymru

2(1)   5. Prefer Conservative party—better for Plaid Cymru

68   Alternative code to above

33(15)   0. Don't know, no answer
26(12)   1. Prefer major party—ideological preference
17(8)   2. Prefer major party—better for Wales
24(11)   3. Prefer major party—tactically better for Plaid Cymru

69   Which of the other three parties is most similar to yours in its type of organization, the kind of people attracted to it, its policies, etc.?

4(2)   0. Don't know, no answer
13(6)   1. None
2(1)   2. Communists
52(24)   3. Liberals
4(2)   4. Conservatives
24(11)   5. Labour

70   If you were an Englishman, which party would you vote for?

9(4)   1. Don't know
2(1)   2. None
2(1)   3. Communist
30(14)   4. Liberal

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
	2(1)	5. Party benefitting locality
	9(4)	6. Conservative
	46(21)	7. Labour

71

How would you describe your political viewpoint, apart from being a nationalist?

	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	46(21)	1. Socialist
	26(12)	2. Left of centre
	13(6)	3. Centre
	4(2)	4. Right of centre
	7(3)	5. Politically conservative

72

In an independent Wales or Scotland, would you like to see?

	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	2(1)	1. Total denationalization of industry
	24(11)	2. Some denationalization
	24(11)	3. Same amount as now
	30(14)	4. More nationalization
	15(7)	5. Complete nationalization

73

If there is nationalization what form should it take?

	9(4)	0. Don't know, no answer
	17(8)	1. Plaid Cymru policy (workers' control)
	74(34)	2. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
74		What kind of immigration policy should an independent Wales pursue?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	24(11)	1. Open
	57(26)	2. Some control
	9(4)	3. Strong control
	7(3)	4. Closed
75		How do you feel about Capital Punishment?
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	4(2)	1. Reintroduction for all or most murders
	26(12)	2. Reintroduction for limited types of murder
	63(29)	3. No reintroduction at all
76		Do you agree with the reintroduction of prescription charges?
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	41(19)	1. Yes
	52(24)	2. No
77		If 1. above, should they be increased, decreased, or be kept as they are?
	59(27)	0. Don't know, no answer
	0(0)	1. Increased
	7(3)	2. Decreased
	17(8)	3. Be levied in accordance with means
	17(8)	4. Kept at the present level

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
78		Do you feel that Communism poses a threat to the West?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	20(9)	1. No threat
	33(15)	2. A slight threat
	24(11)	3. Considerable threat
	20(9)	4. Great threat
79		Do you think that the state should intervene directly in Labour disputes?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	13(6)	1. No
	70(32)	2. Intervene to some degree
	13(6)	3. Intervene extensively

Deck 03

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
01 - 02		Respondent identification number 01 - 46.
03		Card number three. Gang punch three
04		Do you believe a means test should be employed in the allocation of old age pensions?
	9(4)	0. Don't know, no answer
	24(11)	1. Yes
	67(31)	2. No
05		What are your personal feelings towards the United States?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	57(26)	1. Negative
	13(6)	2. Indifferent
	22(10)	3. Mixed feelings
	4(2)	4. Favourable
06		Have your expectations of your party's chances of success at the local and national level changed significantly during the last three or four years?
	4(2)	0. No answer
	13(6)	1. None, little
	70(32)	2. More confidence
	13(6)	3. Great increase in confidence

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
07		Welsh people are often very concerned with the preservation of their "way of life". What does this phrase mean as far as you are concerned?
	22(10)	1. Nothing, very little
	39(18)	2. Language, culture
	11(5)	3. Hospitality, community spirit
	4(2)	4. Church, institutions
	15(7)	5. Customs
	2(1)	6. Standards of conduct
	7(3)	7. A certain type of existence
	0(0)	8. Other
08		How important is the preservation of the Welsh language for the future of Wales?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	57(26)	1. Vitally important
	22(10)	2. Considerably important
	13(6)	3. Fairly important
	4(2)	4. Not too important

In your opinion which of the other three parties most closely achieves these goals in Wales?

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
09		Good organization, getting a lot of people involved
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	87(40)	1. Labour
	4(2)	2. Liberal
	2(1)	3. Conservative

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
	0(0)	4. Labour or Conservative
	0(0)	5. None
	0(0)	6. All

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
10		Representative of important interests
	7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
	72(33)	1. Labour
	11(5)	2. Liberal
	9(4)	3. Conservative
	2(1)	4. Labour or Conservative
	(0)	5. None
	(0)	6. All

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
11		Recruits good people, candidates with personal qualities, making good M.P.'s
	13(6)	0. Don't know, no answer
	35(16)	1. Labour
	35(16)	2. Liberal
	13(6)	3. Conservative
	0(0)	4. Labour or Conservative
	4(2)	5. None
	0(0)	6. All

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
12		Provides a clear programme for people to consider.
	4(2)	0. don't know, no answer
	39(18)	1. Labour
	37(17)	2. Liberal
	11(5)	3. Conservative
	0(0)	4. Labour or Conservative
	9(4)	5. None
	0(0)	6. All

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

13 — Responsible and constructive

%N	Code
7(3)	0. Don't know, no answer
39(18)	1. Labour
33(15)	2. Liberal
11(5)	3. Conservative
0(0)	4. Labour or Conservative
9(4)	5. None
2(1)	6. All

14 — How competitive do you expect the Labour Party to be in your own constituency in the next General Election?

%N	Code
4(2)	0. No answer
83(38)	1. Very competitive
11(5)	2. Fairly competitive
2(1)	3. Not sure
0(0)	4. Not very competitive
0(0)	5. Not at all competitive

15 — And the Liberal Party?

%N	Code
4(2)	0. No answer
11(5)	1. Very competitive
15(7)	2. Fairly competitive
0(0)	3. Not sure
4(2)	4. Not very competitive
65(30)	5. Not at all competitive

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

16

And the Conservative Party?

4(2)	0. No answer
26(12)	1. Very competitive
15(7)	2. Fairly competitive
0(0)	3. Not sure
24(11)	4. Not very competitive
30(14)	5. Not at all competitive

17

Under what circumstances would you consider leaving Plaid Cymru?

4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
24(11)	1. None
43(20)	2. Betrayal of policies
11(5)	3. Swing of party to extremes
7(3)	4. Sufficient devolution, better policies from other parties
4(2)	5. Change in personal views
7(3)	6. Lack of effect
0(0)	7. Other

18

Do you watch the political broadcasts of the other three parties?

4(2)	0. No answer
26(12)	1. None, rarely
28(13	2. Sometimes
41(19)	3. Usually, always

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

19   If so, which do you watch?

30(14)	0. No answer, none
67(31)	1. No particular party
0(0)	2. Mainly Conservative
2(1)	3. Mainly Labour
0(0)	4. Mainly Liberal

20   Which newspaper(s) do you read regularly?

4(2)	0. No answer
39(18)	1. Primarily Welsh
37(17)	2. Welsh and English
17(8)	3. Primarily English
2(1)	4. None

21   How do you think the press treats your party?

4(2)	0. No answer
2(1)	1. Well
22(10)	2. Fair
72(33)	3. Poorly

22   Do you feel that the attutude of the press to Plaid Cymru has changed since the last General Election (1966)?

4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
92(42)	1. Yes
4(2)	2. No

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

23 — If yes to above, in what respect?

%N		
9(4)	0.	Don't know, no answer
20(9)	1.	More fearful, aggressive
35(16)	2.	More serious
17(8)	3.	More publicity
9(4)	4.	More tolerant, just
4(2)	5.	More favourable
7(3)	6.	Other

24 — Do you often discuss politics with friends or acquaintances who are not nationalists?

%N		
4(2)	0.	No answer
4(2)	1.	Never
7(3)	2.	Not very often
20(9)	3.	Occasionally
33(15)	4.	Quite often
33(15)	5.	Very often

25 — Under what circumstances would you support the use of violence to gain home rule?

%N		
41(19)	1.	Never
59(27)	2.	If the majority of the Welsh people vote for self-government but are not given it

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
26		If (2) above, what would be the extent of such violence?
	43(20)	0. Don't know, no answer
	13(6)	1. Objects only
	43(20)	2. Objects and selected per= sonnel
27		Do you see a cause for the use of civil disobedience?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	79(36)	1. Yes
	17(8)	2. No
28		If yes to above, in which situation?
	24(11)	0. Don't know, no answer
	35(16)	1. Language
	17(8)	2. Any injustice
	13(6)	3. Lack of effect of other means
	7(3)	4. Publicity
	4(2)	5. Other
29		Some people say that politics is a "dirty game". Do you agree?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	70(32)	1. Yes
	15(7)	2. To some extent
	11(5)	3. No

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
30		Have you ever been really disgusted with the campaign activities of anyone in your own party?
	4(2)	0. No answer
	9(4)	1. Yes
	87(40)	2. No
31		If so, what kind of activities were these?
	93(43)	0. No answer
	4(2)	1. Propaganda
	0(0)	2. Method of campaign
	0(0)	3. Activities within party
	2(1)	4. Other
32		Have you ever been really disgusted with the campaign activities of anyone in an opposition party?
	4(2)	0. Don't know, no answer
	59(27)	1. Yes
	37(17)	2. No
33		If so, what kinds of activities were these?
	43(20)	0. No answer
	9(4)	1. Misrepresentation, distortion
	24(11)	2. Personal attacks, smears etc.
	4(2)	3. Breaches of electoral law
	13(6)	4. General dishonesty
	7(3)	5. Other

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

Tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

34

I don't think public officials care much what people like me think

15(7)	1. Strongly agree
37(17)	2. Agree somewhat
0(0)	3. Don't know, no answer
20(9)	4. Disagree somewhat
28(13)	5. Strongly disagree

35

The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in the United Kingdom

15(7)	1. Strongly disagree
28(13)	2. Disagree somewhat
0(0)	3. Don't know, no answer
28(13)	4. Agree somewhat
28(13)	5. Strongly agree

36

People like me don't have any say about what the government does

20(9)	1. Strongly agree
37(17)	2. Agree somewhat
0(0)	3. Don't know, no answer
9(4)	4. Disagree somewhat
35(16)	5. Strongly disagree

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

37

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on

24(11)	1. Strongly agree
30(14)	2. Agree somewhat
2(1)	3. Don't know, no answer
9(4)	4. Disagree somewhat
35(16)	5. Strongly disagree

38

Politicians only concern themselves with the wishes of the people when they stand to gain personally

13(6)	1. Strongly agree
39(18)	2. Agree somewhat
7(3)	3. Don't know, no answer
33(15)	4. Disagree somewhat
9(4)	5. Strongly disagree

39

Do you Speak Welsh?

| 67(31) | 1. Yes |
| 35(15) | 2. No |

40

If so, is it as?

38(12)	1. First language
41(13)	2. Fully bilingual
6(2)	3. Second language (by birth)
15(5)	4. Second language (self-taught)

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
41		**Is Welsh your natural language?**
	57(27)	1. Yes
	41(19)	2. No
42		**Have you learned Welsh or are you learning it now?**
	59(27)	1. Spoken already
	17(8)	2. Yes
	24(11)	3. No
43		**Where were you born?**
	30(14)	1. Predominantly Welsh-speaking area
	26(12)	2. Linguistically divided area
	20(9)	3. Minority Welsh-speaking area (15-35%)
	22(10)	4. Highly anclicized area (under 15% Welsh-speaking)
	2(1)	5. Outside Wales
44		**In what year were you born?**
	59(27)	1. After 1945
	11(15)	2. 1935-1945
	30(14)	3. before 1935

Column Number	%N	Question and Code

45

Where was your father born?

41(19)	1. Predominantly Welsh-speaking area
39(8)	2. Linguistically divided area
26(12)	3. Minority Welsh-speaking area (15-35%)
13(6)	4. Highly anclicized area (under 15% Welsh-speaking)
2(1)	5. Outside Wales

46

Where was your mother born?

37(17)	1. Predominantly Welsh-speaking area
17(8)	2. Linguistically divided area
34(11)	3. Minority Welsh-speaking area (15-35%)
13(6)	4. Highly anglicized area
9(4)	5. Outside Wales

47

Where are you living now?

13(6)	1. Predominantly Welsh-speaking area
11(5)	2. Linguistically divided area
30(14)	3. Minority Welsh-speaking area (15-35%)
46(21)	4. Highly anglicized area
0(0)	5. Outside Wales

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
48		How long have you lived in your present locality?
	13(6)	1. Under five years
	17(8)	2. Five to ten years
	9(4)	3. Over ten years
	61(28)	4. All or most of life
49		Where did you spend most of your life when you were growing up?
	26(12)	1. Predominantly Welsh-speaking area
	17(8)	2. Linguistically divided area
	24(11)	3. Minority Welsh-speaking area (15-35%)
	26(12)	4. Highly anglicized area (under 15% Welsh-speaking)
	7(3)	5. Outside Wales
50		What is your religious preference?
	22(10)	1. None/Agnostic
	4(2)	2. None but Christian
	57(26)	3. Welsh Nonconformist (i.e. Welsh language church)
	9(4)	4. English nonconformist (i.e. English language church)
	7(3)	5. Church in Wales (Anglican)
	2(1)	6. Other
51		How often do you go to church?
	24(11)	1. Never, rarely
	17(8)	2. Not very often
	24(11)	3. Quite often
	35(16)	4. Very often

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
52		How many professional, social or fraternal organizations do you belong to other than the party?
	4(2)	1. None
	37(17)	2. One or two
	33(15)	3. Three or four
	26(12)	4. More than four
53		What kind of organizations are these?
	7(3)	1. No answer
	35(16)	2. Mainly Welsh
	22(10)	3. Mainly social
	15(7)	4. Variety (Welsh, social, professional etc.)
	22(10)	5. Professional, academic, Trade Union
54		Are you an officer or a member of a committee of one of these?
	9(4)	0. No answer
	43(20)	1. Yes
	48(22)	2. No
55		How often do you attend meetings or gatherings of these organizations?
	9(4)	0. No answer
	9(4)	1. Rarely, never
	13(6)	2. Irregularly
	28(13)	3. Quite regularly
	41(19)	4. Very regularly

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
56		What is your occupation? If retired what was your occupation. If a housewife, what is your husband's occupation?
	0(0)	1. Unskilled manual
	13(6)	2. Skilled manual
	7(3)	3. Unskilled white collar
	2(1)	4. Self-employed
	48(22)	5. Student
	30(14)	6. Skilled white collar
57		What was your occupation when you first went into politics?
	0(0)	1. Unskilled manual
	4(2)	2. Skilled manual
	9(4)	3. Unskilled white collar
	0(0)	4. Self-employed
	76(35)	5. Student
	11(5)	6. Skilled white collar
58		What was your father's occupation when you were growing up?
	2(1)	0. No answer
	7(3)	1. Unskilled manual
	33(15)	2. Skilled manual
	11(5)	3. Unskilled white collar
	17(8)	4. Self-employed
	0(0)	5. Student
	30(14)	6. Skilled white collar

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
59		Where were you educated?
	7(3)	1. Private School
	72(33)	2. Grammar School
	13(6)	3. Comprehensive School
	9(4)	4. Non-grammar, Secondary School
60		Have you received higher education?
	15(7)	1. No
	72(33)	2. Yes (university)
	13(6)	3. Other higher (College of Education; Commerce; Technology)
61		At what level did your father terminate his education?
	2(1)	0. Don't know, no answer
	61(28)	1. Under sixteen years
	13(6)	2. Sixteen to eighteen years
	24(11)	3. Higher educational level
62		At what level did your mother terminate her education?
	2(1)	0. Don't know, no answer
	63(29)	1. Under sixteen years
	17(8)	2. Sixteen to eighteen years
	17(8)	3. Higher educational level

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
63		At what level did you terminate your own education?
	7(3)	1. Under sixteen years
	13(6)	2. Sixteen to eighteen years
	80(37)	3. Higher educational level
64		What is your marital status?
	28(13)	1. Married
	72(33)	2. Single
65		Sex?
	74(34)	1. Male
	26(12)	2. Female
66 - 67		Index of political activity. (Summary of columns 12 - 14, 16 - 19 and 21 - 22, Deck 02-- see Appendix B)
	0(0)	1. Lowest
	2(1)	2.
	0(0)	3.
	7(3)	4.
	9(4)	5.
	7(3)	6.
	9(4)	7.
	15(7)	8.
	13(6)	9.
	13(6)	10.
	4(2)	11.
	9(4)	12.
	2(1)	13.
	4(2)	14.
	0(0)	15.

Column Number	%N	Question and Code
	4(2)	16.
	2(1)	17.
	0(0)	18. Highest
68		(Index of Political efficacy. Summary of Columns 34 - 7).
	11(5)	1. All negative responses. No feelings of efficacy
	48(22)	2. One positive response
	20(9)	3. Two positive responses
	20(9)	4. Three positive responses
	2(1)	5. All positive responses. Strong feelings of efficacy
69		Are you a member of the Welsh Language Society
	37(17)	1. Yes
	63(29)	2. No

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