THE "ARCHAIC" IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUNG
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the use of the word "archaic" in the psychology of Carl G. Jung. Through the study of the use of this word and various related words, e.g., "primitive," the reader may begin to appreciate more fully Jung's perspective on time. Though the paper is primarily descriptive, it does attempt to offer some insight into one particular facet of Jung's use of "archaic" and "primitive," that is, how these words relate to Jung's relationship toward religion. Finally, Jung's positions toward time and toward religion are compared with those of Sigmund Freud, so that a better understanding of both may be gained through contrast.
PREFACE:

"I consider my contribution to psychology to be my subjective confession."

C.G. Jung

This thesis examines the importance of a conception of the archaic in the psychology of C.G. Jung. A dual process is employed in this examination: 1) in the three central sections, Jung's psychology is partially dissected to reveal how his perspective on the past functions within the body of his work; 2) in the final chapter, Jung's position is juxtaposed with Freud's so that through contrast certain characteristics of each mode of thought may be observed in relief. Though the bulk of the thesis is devoted to Jung, it was necessary to include a chapter briefly outlining Freud's view of the past so that the juxtaposition of the final chapter would be more intelligible to the reader. Given the importance of Freud to the growth of depth psychology in general and to Jung's thought in particular, this inclusion, which comprises the opening chapter, should not seem out of place.

The primary intention of this paper is to offer an accurate description but this is not its sole intent. In describing how a conception of the archaic functions within Jung's or Freud's thought we are led also to the discovery of what we may regard as the possibilities or limitations of such thought. That is, we are led from description (which may be more or less accurate) to opinion. In particular, this paper indicates the importance that a view of the archaic might have in forming an attitude
toward religion. However, the thesis also amply indicates that though Jung and Freud were highly interested in religion, their primary interest was in the health and illnesses of the psyche; for the most part, it is to the extent that religion is an interesting psychological phenomenon that it interests Jung and Freud.

But the risks threatening this movement from description to opinion have been confronted deliberately so that through the intellectual gamble some insight may be won. The above warnings should not be allowed to conceal the real importance of religion in these two theories, both as it relates to their perspectives on the primitive and as it relates to these psychologies as a whole. Moreover, the relationship of religion to the archaic, the Past, is not limited to the perview of depth psychology. Mircea Eliade, among others in the sphere of comparative religion, has indicated the importance of the longing for origins, that is, the longing for time past, to the religious sense and has written that the "nostalgia for origins is equivalent to a religious nostalgia."¹ It is hoped that this thesis may contribute to the study of the relationship of religion to the archaic.

At best, though, this paper may be only suggestive, working only on the level of the metaphorical. If so, this study will have achieved some success, for a metaphor is a means toward understanding.

The research for this thesis was conducted through the libraries of McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, and Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York. I am grateful to Dr. Louis Roberts of the Humanities

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CHAPTER ONE

The Child and the Savage:

Freud's Attitude toward the Archaic

Struggle is at the heart of Freudian psycho-analysis. In Freud's terms, it is conflict which shapes and, in some sense, gives meaning to human existence. This conflict is, as we shall see, historical, intimately connected to the passage of time. More than this, conflict is "historical" in the sense that it is "normal," it is "the way things are": when Norman O. Brown speaks of the "neurosis of history" he is describing man's normal condition of living within conflict and the state of unhappiness caused by the denial of satisfaction to an un-ending stream of wishes, a denial that increases in breadth and depth through the passage of time. This denial is, to some degree, "normal," even necessary; it is as normal and as necessary as the wishes, and thus unhappiness to some degree is also normal. Freud does not say that it is the analyst's task to remove unhappiness from the patient but rather that the patient should be led to discard the burden of unnecessary unhappiness in order to engage in the normal conflict of life. The metamorphosis of Freud's thought can be seen as a search for the correct set of adversaries in the struggle that shapes existence.

For whether the antagonism, or as Freud calls it the ambivalence, is between sex and self-preservation, or between sex and aggression, or between life and death, in every case Freud
postulates an ultimate duality grounded in the very nature of life itself.  

Moreover, the struggle is historical both in the sense that it takes place within and throughout history and in that it takes place because of history. This is to say that the struggle, no matter what the particular features, is not only operative through history but also intensifies through history, through the historical tendency to make ever-increasing cultural demands upon the individual. Historical, too, in the sense that the struggle is both a cultural and an individual one, that the epochal struggle of mankind is repeated microscopically in the life-long struggle of the individual.

As analysis seeks to allow the individual to assume the real burdens of his or her situation, it seeks to place the individual in the present and to prevent the past from distorting the perception of that "present." As psycho-analysis developed, it became clear that the analyst plays the role of advocate of the present against a past which seeks to impose itself on the patient's contemporary reality. Perhaps the basic conflict emphasized by Freud is the temporal conflict, the clash between a persistent past and an impinging present. Even if the typical human conflict is seen as Eros vs. Thanatos, the impetus toward death is an impulse toward an earlier, simpler mode of being, that is, the repetition of a past existence.

The cultural and personal past interested Freud both personally and professionally. He maintained an avid interest in antiquities;

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his consulting room was a small museum of Greek, Roman and Egyptian statues, some he collected himself, others contributed by acquaintances. Freud makes frequent references to his interest in antiquity in his letters, as well as comparing his own work with that of archaeologists:

In the face of the incompleteness of my analytic results I had no choice but to follow the example of those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of an antiquity. I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses; but, like a conscientious archaeologist, I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my constructions begin.

As Jones points out, Freud's analogy here between his own work and that of the archaeologist is not wholly inaccurate. Like archaeology, Freud's method "consisted also in a constant process of resuscitation, a bringing to light submerged memories and impulses of the past which had somehow preserved their force and even their life despite their seemingly final disappearance from all ken." There is an important dissimilarity here, however, in the objects of each study. The fragments which

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5Ibid., p. 318.
command the archaeologist's interest are the remnants of a past effect-
ively transcended. The archaic fragments the psycho-analyst seeks are
important because they have not been transcended, because these psychic
contents do not "recognize" the passage of time and continue to press
for recognition. Moreover, in the case of psychoanalysis, the "archaic"
refers to both the personal and cultural past; that is, the adult is or
can be affected both by his own childhood and by the residues of the
childhood of the race.

Psycho-analysis has been obliged to derive the mental life of
adults from that of children, and has to take seriously the old
saying that the child is father to the man. It has traced the
continuity between the infantile and adult mind, and has also
noted the transformations and re-arrangements that occur in the
process. In most of us there is a gap in our memories covering
the first years of our childhood, of which only a few fragmen-
tary recollections survive. Psycho-analysis may be said to have
filled in this gap and to have abolished man's infantile amnesia.

It would more accurately be said that the child remains the father
to the man, for the perceptions and experiences that shape the child
remain to shape the perceptions of the man, though the strength of these
childhood experiences varies with individuals.

Another and far more surprising discovery has been that, in spite
of all the later development that occurs in the adult, none of the
infantile mental formations perish. All the wishes, instinctual
impulses, modes of reaction and attitudes of childhood are still
demonstrably present in maturity and in appropriate circumstances can

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6Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (herein-
after referred to as NIL), trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1964), p. 74

7Sigmund Freud, "The Claims of Psycho-analysis to Scientific
Interest" (1913) in Totem and Taboo and Other Works (1913-1914) (herein-
after referred to as TT), Vol. XIII of The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, Anna
emerge once more. They are not destroyed but merely overlaid -- to use the spatial mode of description which psycho-analytic psychology has been obliged to adopt. Thus it is part of the mental past that, unlike the historic past, it is not absorbed by its derivatives, it persists (whether or only potentially) alongside what has proceeded from it.8

The continuing presence of infantile material is noticeable first in the symptoms and delusions of neurotics and psychotics. Indeed, Freud notes that the intensity of the residues is indicative of the "disposition to illness."9 But he is also forced to acknowledge another and more archaic infantilism at work in the neurotic, an infantilism whose basis is the infancy of the race itself. Freud found a resemblance between the delusion symptoms of neurotics and the superstitious beliefs of primitive peoples, between "compulsion neuroses" and "taboo disease."10 This concurrence of the personal and the cultural past in neurotics can no better be seen than in the workings of the Oedipus complex, which "habitually" forms the nucleus of their neurosis but which, if mastered, leads to the cultural development of the individual.11

Religion, morality, and a social sense -- the chief elements in the higher side of man -- were originally one and the same thing. According to the hypothesis which I put forward in Totem and Taboo they were acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex:

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8 Ibid., p. 184.


religion and moral restraint through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation.  

But the persistent past cannot be limited to neurotic behaviour only, for Freud noted that the healthy individual regresses to the infantile regularly -- in his or her dreams.  

Dreams provide the opportunity for repressed infantile wishes to manifest themselves with the denial of motility and a never-completely-sleeping censor checking too strong or too vivid wishes. Dreams are particularly significant in the study of the archaic, for in dreams we have clear evidence of the persistence of both types of archaic material in the healthy individual. Not only do dreams allow infantile wishes to manifest themselves, but also the manner of their expression suggests the effects of a history older than the individual, a history that supplies the store of symbolism that cannot be attributable to individual acquisition alone. Infantile desires construct the syntax of dreams; symbolism provides the vocabulary. In his use of symbolism, the dreamer participates in "an ancient but obsolete mode of expression," much of which the dreamer has not acquired but seem to possess, a priori -- that is, a form of "uncounscious knowledge."  

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13 EI, p. 221.

14 To say "infantile" here is not to say "childish". There is little that is simple or impotent about these desires; they are infantile in that they are the first unrefined wishes of the individual and the race.
Thus it is that at the end of the Schreber analysis, Freud can write that not only does the analyst come upon the child in his procedure, but also encounters "the savage" as well, "as he stands revealed to us in the light of the researches of archaeology and of ethnology."  

Ernest Jones points out that Freud saw the archaic remnants left in the psyche as of two types, both inherited predispositions and specific contents. By this he means, for example, that there is inherent in human nature a structure that leads to the creation of the Oedipal situation, that the structure of the family or perhaps more simply the infant's necessity to fit himself into any on-going societal structure, leads inevitably to an Oedipal conflict. To use Margaret Meade's explanation, "the Oedipal situation, in its widest meaning, is a way of describing what any given society does with the fact that children and adults are involved in the growing child's sexual attitudes, especially toward the parent of the opposite sex." But Freud asserted more than this situational heritage. There is, in addition, the symbol language.


16GI, pp. 173, 174.


This essay may also be found in The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique, and Other Works (1911-1913) (hereinafter referred to as SE XII), Vol. XII of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, Anna Freud, et. al. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1954 -- ), p. 82.

18LW, III, pp. 327-328.
encountered in dreams and folklore; beyond this, analysis reveals that patients have fantasies that are not derived from their own experience, but seem to be part of the phylogenetic inheritance of the race, that is, they possess a set of "primal phantasies" which fill in the gaps, as it were, in personal experience.²⁰

Jones suggests that Freud was hesitant toward affirming the historical transmission of specific contents, and cites remarks Freud makes in 1911 as typical of this hesitancy. In November of that year, Freud stated, "The inference of a phylogenetic, inborn store of memories is not justified so long as we have the possibility of explaining these things through an analysis of the psychical situations. What remains over after this analysis of the psychical phenomena of regression could then be conceived of as a phylogenetic memory." Again, in 1915, Freud stated, "I have never taken the view that phantasies are inherited as such."²¹

But mentioning only these statements is to emphasize Freud's caution at the expense of his imagination. Other of his remarks, including those noted above regarding "primal phantasies," point to a belief in the inheritance of ideas as well as dispositions. There is some reason for doubting that the statements noted by Jones are definitive of Freud's position on inherited phantasies, for in roughly the same period as these remarks -- 1911-1915 -- we also find those previously cited comments on

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²⁰GI, p. 380; also SE XVII, p. 97.

²¹LW, III, p. 308.
primal phantasies. These previously cited statements are from comments on the case of the "Wolf Man" written and published in the period 1914-1918, and from the 1915-1917 lectures that form the text of the General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Remarks made subsequent to this period suggest that Freud became more confident in the inheritability of ideas and fantasies; for example, the remarks on the formation of the super-ego found in The Ego and the Id (1923) and in the New Introductory Lectures (1932-1936). In 1937, Freud wrote in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable":

Our first account of libidinal development was that an original oral phase was succeeded by a sadistic-anal, and this in its turn by a phallic-genital phase. Later investigation has not contradicted this view, but we must now qualify our statement by saying that the one phase does not succeed the other suddenly but gradually, so that part of the earlier organization always persists side by side with the later and that even in normal development the transformation is never complete, the final structure often containing vestiges of earlier libidinal fixations. We see the same thing in quite different connections. There is not one of the erroneous and superstitious beliefs of mankind that are supposed to have been superseded but has left vestiges at the present day in the lower strata of civilized peoples or even in the highest strata of cultivated society. All that has once lived clings tenaciously to life. Sometimes one feels inclined to doubt whether the dragons of primaeval ages are really extinct.

The caution urged in the earlier writings cannot be supposed to have been disregarded by the time of these late remarks. We can expect that Freud in his private practice with individual patients was still first concerned with the patient's personal history. But the sense

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23NIL, p. 66-67.
evident here in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" is of the later socially and politically minded Freud, the Freud of *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1918) and *The Future of an Illusion* (1927). This is the later Freud whose perception of the importance of cultural history is acute, who recognizes that individual neurosis exists in the matrix of the neurosis of history. Though indications occur very early in his work, as early as the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud seems to have grown into an awareness of the importance and the depth of the relationship between individual history and cultural history.

Neither history owes its structure to a super-mundane schema, but to the residues of the psycho-drama of the struggle for maturity. Whether the terms of the struggle are seen as id impulses pushing against a cultural reality pushing in or as Eros striving to avoid the strangulation of Thanatos, the struggle is simply the one to be, the human struggle to establish identity within a cultural milieu. This struggle is critical enough in itself to leave "precipitates" in the psyche that can be passed on as both inherited dispositions and inherited phantasies.

In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud wrote,

> Moreover, one must not take the difference between the ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense, nor forget that the ego is a specially differentiated part of the id. The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existences of countless egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection.  

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25 *EII*, p. 28.
Freud was a Lamarckian in his views on heredity; that is, he believed in the transmission of acquired characteristics despite the fact that such a position was generally held in low regard by the rest of the scientific community. But the Lamarckism goes hand-in-hand with a basic analytic tenet, that the symptoms of a patient or a society are "reasonable" in the sense that they are the products of a process, of reality or what is perceived as reality. If the phantasies of his patients cannot be traced to their own personal experience, Freud is forced to assume the existence of some form of inherited, archaic phantasies -- and these, he believed, were derived from actual events. He wrote in Totem and Taboo:

But the neurotic is above all inhibited in his actions; with him the thought is a complete substitute for the deed. Primitive man is not inhibited, the thought is directly converted into the deed, the deed is for him, so to speak, rather a substitute for the thought, and for that reason I think we may well assume in the case we are discussing, though without vouching for the absolute certainty of the decision, that "In the beginning was the deed."

Speaking of the primal patricide and cannibalistic feast, Jones writes, "Freud had, in fact, believed that the gruesome deeds had really happened."

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26 Ernest Jones describes Lamarckism as maintaining that "some unusual experience or some effort on an animal's part would modify its body in such a way as to transmit that modification to its offspring; these in turn would make a further effort -- the giraffe stretching his neck to reach higher is the familiar example -- and the total results would be cumulative in the successive generations." Jones, writing in 1957, adds, "This doctrine has been completely discredited for more than a half century." (LV, III, p. 310.)

In another context, Jones observes that Freud regarded mythology as the "ordinary" motives and desires of man writ large, "though often in very disguised form."

Thus, for example, he regarded the curious stories about the relations between Uranus, Cronos and Zeus not in terms of fears about the sun being swallowed, but as representing the inevitable conflicts between successive generations. That Zeus should castrate his father was not astonishing to someone who had discovered the same wish in every male patient. The topics of birth, love and death Freud therefore placed, or replaced, at the center of human preoccupations in every age. It was a humanization of mythology.30

The "humanization of mythology," both the myths of nations and the phantasies of individual patients, means the discovery of the "real" events that lead to the abstractions perceived as symptoms or myth. It might be argued that this is a "devaluation" of myth to a gross experiential level. On the other hand, it seems clear that for the classical and religious myths and the phantasies of patients, Freud substitutes a myth of this own, a belief in the importance of struggle in the shaping of historical reality. For Freud, this belief is not only correct, it is enough.

And now, I think, the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore by simply described as the struggle for life of the human species. And it is this battle of the giants that our nurse-maids try to appease with their lullaby about Heaven.31

Psychology as a science and an intellectual tool did not begin with Freud. He is, however, the initiator of the psycho-analytic school of psychology and as such leads the way, in spirit if not always in theory, for the later developments in analytically-oriented trends of psychology. In speaking of analytic psychologies, Freud's thought provides a starting place and point of comparison; it is for these reasons that his views on the archaic are used as an introduction to the thought of C.G. Jung.
CHAPTER TWO

The Struggle for Wholeness:
A Brief Outline of Jungian Psychology

The connections between Jung and Freud are stronger than the only theoretical juxtaposition employed in the last chapter, however. For a period, the two had a close working relationship. But of this short but intense direct association only the most basic of facts are held in agreement by both parties. What would be expected to be the most important material, that is, the psychological origins of their dispute, is clouded in the re-tellings of the events. We can only guess as to the "real" reasons for the separation, but perhaps the best explanation lies in saying simply that the "town" of psycho-analysis simply wasn't big enough for the two of them, that the force of their geniuses caused them to fly apart. Unfortunately, it is clear that each psychology suffered from the lack of influence from the other.¹

Ernest Jones, Freud's chief biographer, places the origins of the direct relationship between Freud and Jung in 1906, when a regular correspondence began between the two therapists which would last almost until

¹The Bollingen Foundation has very recently published in one volume all of the extant correspondence between Jung and Freud, some 360 letters in all. Excerpts from this volume can be found in "The Freud/Jung Letters: 'You have not been injured by my neurosis,'" Psychology Today, February, 1974, pp. 37-42, 86-94. For all of the remaining letters, see The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, ed. William McGuire (Princeton: Princeton University Press for Bollingen Foundation, 1974).
1913.² Jung had since 1900 been a practicing therapist at the Burgholzli Mental Hospital in Zurich. In 1906, he published Diagnostic Studies in Association, to be followed the next year by The Psychology of Dementia Praecox. Jones reports that both books caused a favorable stir in Vienna, Freud purchasing a copy of the first book before Jung's complimentary copy arrived from Zurich. The correspondence began with the receipt of this first book.

The first meeting between the two occurred on February 27, 1907, when Jung visited Freud in Vienna. From the first, the relationship was lively.³ Why they were so attracted to each other is uncertain. Jones suggests that Freud was attracted by Jung's "vitality, liveliness and . . . unrestrained imagination."⁴ It is clear that Freud intended Jung to take over the leadership of the psycho-analytic movement once Freud gave up the position; Freud even had planned to transfer the center of the movement from Vienna to Zurich. Writing in "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," Freud points out that Jung's youth and his "exceptional talents" had made him a logical choice as successor. Moreover, choosing a Swiss Christian as leader would tend to dull any criticism of the movement based on a dislike of Freud himself.⁵


⁴Jones, LW, II, p. 33.

For his part, Jung found Freud at first meeting to be "extremely intelligent, shrewd and altogether remarkable." But writing years later, Jung says that the indications from Freud that he was to be the "successor to the throne" embarrassed him, as he was not prepared to fully defend all of Freud's views, having from the beginning of the relationship reservations on the place of sexuality in the aetiology of neurosis. In addition, Jung did not feel himself inclined by disposition to take the lead in such a movement.

The origins of the break between the two are no more clear than the origins of their attraction. Jung attributes the first serious strain in the relationship to an event that occurred during the trip he and Freud made to Clark University, Worchester, Massachusetts in 1909. During a session of mutual dream analysis, Jung requested of Freud some additional information in order to complete an analysis. This request, Jung reports, Freud denied, saying, "But I cannot risk my authority!" "At that moment," comments Jung, "he lost it (his authority) altogether." This event was followed in Jung by a series of dreams which for him clearly symbolized his basic disagreement and coming break with Freud. The publishing of Symbols of Transformation (1911/1912) and its suggestion of the symbolic nature of sexuality were only a

7 Ibid., p. 147 and pp. 157-158.  
8 Ibid., p. 158.  
9 First published in German as Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, in English in 1916 as Psychology of the Unconscious.
reification, as it were, of a long-extant philosophical dispute with Freud.\textsuperscript{10} Jones also maintains that the publishing of \textit{Symbols of Transformation} was an important indication of the break but makes no mention of the dream analysis incident. Freud's biographer does point, however, to other possible causes of which Jung is silent. Jones notes, for example: a series of social slights Jung inflicted on Freud in the manner of a declining responsiveness to Freud's letters (Freud was a very conscientious correspondent and was sensitive to the trait in others) and slips of memory that led to an increase of tensions; Jung's apparently flippant attitude toward the Presidency of the International Psychoanalytical Association (he had been elected its first president in 1910); the pressure on Jung from fellow Swiss to abandon the "wickedness from Vienna."\textsuperscript{11} In 1913, Jung resigned as editor of the \textit{Jahrbuch fur psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen} and in the next year resigned as President of the Association, thus ending both professionally and personally his relationship with Freud.

Certainly the foregoing should not be taken as an exhaustive study of the Freud/Jung relationship, but is offered instead as an outline of the "factual" connections between the two. What, perhaps, destroyed the relationship, besides the usual difficulty of any two strong-willed innovators in cooperating, was that the "theoretical" connections between the two were never exceptionally strong. We will examine some of the

\textsuperscript{10}For Freud's view of this interpretation of libido, cf. HPM, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{11}Jones, LW, II, p. 141; Jones' full study of Jung's relationship with Freud can be found in LW, II, pp. 30-104 and pp. 137-151.
theoretical similarities and dissimilarities in the last chapter of this
thesis; at this point, however, we will move to a study of certain facets
of Jung's psychology.

An extensive presentation of Jungian psychology is unnecessary for
the progress of this study. As in Chapter one with regard to Freud, the body of the thesis will be concerned with those Jungian conceptions that have a relationship to history, particularly, though not exclusively, the history of the race as opposed to the history of an individual. This chapter is concerned with describing the psyche as perceived by Jung and with indicating where in that schema we might begin our investigation of the relationship between Jungian psychology and the concept of the past. 12

Jung perceives the psyche as composed of three areas or depths: conscious, personal unconscious and collective unconscious. 13 The conscious is that part of the psyche with which we feel most familiar, it being the focal point of reception of and response to stimuli from the external environment and from internal pressure. "We should expect consciousness to react and adapt itself to the present," writes Jung, "because it is that part of the psyche which is concerned chiefly with events of the moment." 14 Characteristic of this area are processes of recognition, evaluation and intuition. It is through the conscious


14 Ibid., p. 152.
that both volitional and instinctual reactions respond to stimulation.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 141-142. By "intuition" here Jung refers to "perception of possibilities inherent in a situation." Additionally, though there is no denial that the seat of the instincts is in some area other than consciousness, there also can be no denial that it is through the conscious that the instincts see the light of day, if at all.}

The personal unconscious stands in a mirror relationship to the conscious in the Jungian framework, consisting

firstly of all those contents that became unconscious either because they lost their intensity and were forgotten or because consciousness was withdrawn from them (repression), and secondly of contents some of them sense-impressions, which never had sufficient intensity to reach consciousness but have somehow entered the psyche.\footnote{Ibid., p. 152.}

In the conscious and personal unconscious we have to do with the day-to-day experience of the individual; even if it were possible for one to remember all the events of one's life and to experience all the sensations of the moment, that anamnesis and those perceptions would be limited to the lifetime. Against these boundaries of an individual's birth and death stands the collective unconscious, the creative memory, as it were, not of the individual but of the race. The frontier between the personal and the collective is more than a boundary dividing scope of experience and acuity of memory. That frontier is the limit of the tyranny of time and of history, for it is the collective unconscious, in Jung's view, which is the parent to history and, insofar as time is the movement of events, the collective unconscious gives birth to it also.

In the collective unconscious of the individual, history prepares itself; and when the archetypes are activated in a number of individuals and come to the surface, we are in the midst of history, as we are at present . . . . our personal psychology is just a thin skin, a ripple upon the ocean of collective psychology. The powerful factor, the factor which changes our whole life, which changes the surface of our known world, which makes history, is collective
psychology, and collective psychology moves according to laws entirely different from those of our consciousness.\textsuperscript{17}

The collective unconscious is less a possession than a participation, a connection between the individual and the psyche of the race. Unlike the personal unconscious, the collective unconscious is not limited to personal experience but "appears to consist of mythological motifs or primordial images,"\textsuperscript{18} the "pre-existent forms" which Jung refers to as "archetypes."\textsuperscript{19} The concept of the archetype will be examined in the following chapter. Here it is important to note only that by "archetype" Jung does not mean inherited ideas or images but rather inherited dispositions to form certain sets of images. Moreover, it is somewhat misleading to think of the archetypes as being "acquired," that is, gradually added to the psyche through the passing of time. The collective unconscious is an a priori of human nature and if its origins must be dated they should be placed at the same time as the origin of the species.

It is through the study of "non-rational" psychological activity that Jung reaches his conclusions regarding the existence and character of the collective unconscious. This activity includes the myths of primitive civilizations, the delusions of the insane and, most importantly,


\textsuperscript{18}Jung, "The Structure of the Psyche," SDP, p. 152.

the dreams of both the sane and insane.\textsuperscript{20}

The relationship between the conscious and the collective unconscious should not be seen as a simple relationship of part to whole nor of child to parent. It is true that "consciousness is a late-born descendent of the unconscious psyche,"\textsuperscript{21} but this is not to say that the conscious is passive toward its birth. The unconscious does not have sole control of the conscious, for that would mean, literally, madness.

If the conscious personality is destroyed, or even crippled, there is no one left to do the assimilating. When we recognize the importance of the unconscious we are not embarking upon a Bolshevist experiment which puts the lowest on top. This would only bring about a return of the situation we are trying to correct. We must see to it that the conscious personality remains intact, for we can only turn the unconscious compensations to good account when the conscious personality cooperates in the venture.\textsuperscript{22}

Though the collective unconscious should not be accorded more than its rightful importance, it nonetheless holds a unique and powerful station in psychological health and development. In the collective unconscious Jung perceives the presence of the past in modern man's psychological construction. This means here not the past of the individual but the past of the race: the collective unconscious consists of the deeply unconscious forces that shaped primitive thought and behaviour and

\textsuperscript{20}The term "non-rational" must be used with caution; it should not be thought to imply "unthinking" since, for example, primitive myths are frequently found to be complex, sensitive responses to experience. By "non-rational" I mean "pre-scientific."


\textsuperscript{22}C.G. Jung, "The Practical Use of Dream Analysis" (1931/1933), MMSS, pp. 20-21.
that remain to influence modern thinking and behaviour. The personality of the new-born child is not a blank tablet, for it has characteristics both of family history (eye color, height, physiognomy) and of racial history (the archetypes). As the body has shown a development so has, in its own way, the mind, so that "a study of the structure of the unconscious collective mind would reveal the same discoveries as you make in comparative anatomy."23

This whole psychic organism corresponds exactly to the body, which, though individually varied, is in all essential features the specifically human body which all men have. In its development and structure, it still preserves elements that connect it with the invertebrates and ultimately with the protozoa. Theoretically it should be possible to "peel" the collective unconscious, layer by layer, until we came to the psychology of the worm, and even of the amoeba.24

These connections with the past, the archetypes, which form the substance of the collective unconscious are more than relics of the past; they are forces with which the modern psyche must contend. We must bear in mind that in speaking of the collective unconscious and the archetypes we are not speaking of inherited ideas but of inherited psychological dispositions. It is true that these dispositions have frequently assumed certain recurring forms or motifs, but these forms should not be confused with the archetype proper.25 What the word "relic" lacks is a sense of the power of the collective unconscious, the ability of the collective

23 Jung, APTP, p. 44.

24 Jung, "The Structure of the Psyche," SDP, p. 152. This is a puzzling statement given what has and will be said regarding the a priori status of archetypes. But the archetypes show themselves through motifs (otherwise they would be "invisible") of symbol or action, and these motifs show similarities to earlier motifs and thus we "peel" away a modern motif to discover an earlier and similar one.

25 Comments Jacobi: "Since 1946 Jung has distinguished (though not always explicitly) between the 'archetype per se' that is, the nonpercep-
unconscious to "break out" of the deep psyche to affect the conscious situation. At first inspection, these archaic forces seem to be little more than "an unceasing stream or perhaps an ocean of images and figures which drift into consciousness in our dreams or in abnormal states of mind." But a closer examination of this flow of images reveals that it is more than mere drift, that it is a purposeful flow from the collective unconscious that is the compensatory reaction of the unconscious to the conscious situation.

If Jung's psychology of the individual could be summarized in a few words perhaps the best general description would be "the recognition of the struggle of opposing parts to unite in the formation of an integrated whole." This "recognition" begins with the belief in the "self-regulating" character of the psyche, that the psyche (always including the conscious and unconscious spheres) "maintains its equilibrium just as the body does." The word "equilibrium" here implies both the notion of opposing forces and the possibility -- in the case of Jung's psychology, we might substitute "goal" for "possibility" -- of a balance that would have as its result a form of unification of opposites.

The actualized archetype which is present only potentially in every psychic structure, and the actualized archetype which has become perceptible and already entered into the field of consciousness. This actualized archetype appears as an archetypal image, representation, or process, and its form may change according to the constellation in which it occurs." She adds that the activity of the archetype is not limited to the creation of images but may include modes of action, reactions and attitudes. The Psychology of Jung, p. 40. Jung also suggested that it is the archetypes which form the basis of "meaningful coincidence," i.e. "synchronicity"; see SDP, p. 440.


opposites such as "present" and "past."

The collective unconscious is the continuing, dynamic presence of the primitive in the contemporary psychological situation. We will say "primitive" here rather than "the past" to underscore how the conception of definable time melts with respect to the collective unconscious. We say "primitive" because "past" could mislead through connotation: in the collective unconscious we are not speaking of "time gone by" or an historical period previous to this one, but rather a perception which somehow precedes this one, "this one" here referring to the rational mode of thought and "precedes" implying "before" both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. We are not speaking here of the "slow return of the repressed" for the contents of the collective unconscious were never repressed, never forcibly driven to the deepest recesses of the unconscious by a terrified conscious, but rather are the basic "stuff" of the psyche, the material from which consciousness grew. The compensatory reactions of the collective unconscious, broadly speaking, can be recognized as an attempt to remind a too-rationalistic ("too modern") conscious of its roots, roots which still support it and give it life. But note what these reactions imply by way of a critique of the conception of time. Instead of a definable past consisting of experiences that one transcends through time there are instead in the collective unconscious forces which are not determined by location in time but are the foundation of human nature. It is certainly no accident that these forces are more easily seen as active in, and therefore typified by, primitive man and in this sense figuratively can be spoken of as "out of the past."

Yet we can see, too, how arbitrary the distinction of past and present
can be since those primitive forces remain active in modern man. The
confrontation with reality means here not only acknowledging the presence
of the past (as, for example, in instinct) but also acknowledging the
rightfully continuing existence of the past and perceiving that the
primitive is not to be "overcome" -- an impossibility given its charac-
teristics in the Jungian framework -- but is to be recognized as a
partner with the present/conscious in working toward total psychological
development.

The recognition of the collective unconscious implies to some
degree the unification of those temporal opposites, the past and the
present. More than this, to the extent that the personal and collec-
tive contents are synchronized, to that extent is the notion of
temporality itself transcended, for in this unification one can perceive
how he/she shares in the nature of man through time, a nature which in
Jung includes not only a physical and instinctual sphere but also a
definite spiritual creative sphere.

Two points should be stressed at this time: one, we must re-affirm
the importance of the conscious as a partner in psychological development;
two, we must make clear that this process of unifying the collective and
the personal is not a task confined to the neurotic or psychotic, for
Jung is describing here the general framework of the human psyche and the
psychological task of man as a whole. In this framework of a purposeful
psyche operating on a principle of compensation the symptomatology of
neurosis is regarded as an "attempt at healing," the effort of the psyche
to right or to balance itself.28

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28Jung, "The Structure of the Psyche," SDP, p. 149. Freud saw a
The appearance of collective material within a conscious situation can be seen as the reaction of the collective unconscious to the efforts of the conscious. Typically, the conscious is sensitive only to the immediacy of the situation, the collective unconscious on the other hand supplying a reaction "arising from the experience of mankind and consonant with the necessities and laws of man's inner life." The reaction of the collective unconscious, then, frequently appears as the intervention of an opposite to the conscious reaction, as a compensation for it. The attainment of balance through the union of opposites, that is, through compensatory reaction, is a central theorem of Jungian psychology. The collective unconscious, as the dynamic storehouse of primitive motifs, acts not only as a "temporal" balance as the unifier of past and present as noted above but also functions in other ways to supply the means and/or the force that the unconscious uses to influence a conscious situation.

One general characteristic is true of all these attempts at balance: the means of achieving balance are always present within the psyche. Though it may take an analyst to point out the signs from the unconscious and to help to interpret these signs in light of the conscious situation, the responsibility for and the means of achieving balance or wholeness rest with the analysand.

similar purpose in neurosis; see Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoïa (Dementia Paranoïdes)" (1911) (The Case of Schreber) in The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, SE, XII (1911-1913), p. 71.

29Jacobi, Psychology of Jung, p. 10; it must be emphasized again that the conscious is a partner in interpreting the collective response, that that response of itself is quite possibly not the best one for the conscious situation.
The notion of balance through the union of opposites is easily seen in the confrontation with the archetype of the shadow. The shadow is the "dark underside" of our psychological composition. Jung isolates four characteristic functions of consciousness evident in such compositions, one of which is the predominant mode of behaviour for an individual. These four types are thinking, sensation, intuition and feeling.

... thinking is the function which seeks to apprehend the world and adjust to it by way of thought or cognition, i.e. logical inferences. The function of feeling, on the other hand, apprehends the world through an evaluation based on the feelings of 'pleasant or unpleasant, acceptance or rejection.' Both these functions are termed rational, because both work with evaluations and judgments...

Jung calls the other two functions, sensation and intuition, the irrational functions, because they circumvent the ratio and operate not with judgments but with mere perceptions which are not evaluated or interpreted. Sensation perceives things as they are and not otherwise .... Intuition also 'perceives,' but less through the conscious apparatus of the senses than through its capacity for an unconscious 'inner perception' of the inherent potentialities of things.

Jung's schema of types is constructed to show that these types are pairs of opposites. Thus when thinking, for example, is the dominant function, feeling is relegated to the unconscious, while sensation and intuition are possible temporary alternatives or additions to the general method of reacting to the world. The distinction of these four types developed through Jung's experience, the four being chosen because "they


31 Jacobi, Psychology of Jung, p. 11; cf. Jacobi, pp. 10-18 for an examination of the function types.

32 Ibid., p. 12.
are neither mutually relatable nor mutually reducible." All men and women possess all four of these types, though in the case of the healthy individual one type is differentiated over the others as the chief type and its opposite is pushed into the unconscious.

The undifferentiated function that is pushed into the unconscious forms the core of one of two possible origins of the shadow, that is, the personal shadow. In this case, the function which for one reason or another the individual chooses to "discard" into the unconscious, returns to "haunt" that individual as a symbolic figure, as what appears in a dream, or as a real person on whom we have placed -- "projected" -- our own unconscious qualities. These hidden qualities besides including the "discarded" function might also include other dispositions or inclinations of a personal nature which the individual does not choose to exhibit and finds so repulsive as to "forget" them into the unconscious. Thus the personal shadow may not be wholly evil, since it may possess also or instead those qualities which are not so much "evil" as only not chosen for conscious expression. The meeting with the personal shadow is the confrontation with the hidden qualities of the self and constitutes a possibly shattering experience of personal evil.

Besides this personal darkness, there is also within every individual a collective darkness, the collective shadow. It is the collective opposite to the conscious orientation and can represent our share not in a personal -- and thereby relatively manageable or

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understandable -- evil but in absolute evil, in the darkness of human nature. Overwhelming though such a confrontation with personal and collective darkness may be, it is nonetheless a necessary confrontation if the individual is to gain a complete view of the psyche, that is, the psyche "with the warts on", so to speak. Indeed, it is this confrontation with the personal and collective shadows that is the first step in the process of the discovery of the "self," the wholeness of person Jung sees resulting from the integration of the conscious and unconscious contents. This realization of self is the goal of working with psychic contents, collective or personal, for it is the creation of the person synchronized within himself/herself both personally and racially.

The meeting with oneself is, at first, the meeting with one's own shadow. The shadow is a tight passage, a narrow door, whose painful constriction no one is spared who goes down to the deep well. But one must learn to know oneself in order to know who one is. For what comes after the door is, surprisingly enough a boundless expanse full of unprecedented uncertainty, with apparently no inside and no outside, no above and no below, no here and no there, no mine and no thine, no good and no bad. It is a world of water, where all life floats in suspension; where the realm of the sympathetic system, the soul of everything living begins; where I am indivisibly this and that; where I experience the other in myself and the other-than-myself experiences me.34

Related to the concept of the shadow is another set of psychic opposites, the "soul images" of the animus or anima.35 The animus is the deep unconscious male compensation to a woman's conscious feminine


attitude, while the anima is the feminine compensation for a man's conscious masculine attitude. As with the shadow, manifestations of the anima or animus may occur "internally," that is, in a dream or "externally" when the characteristics of the animus or anima are projected on to another individual. These two soul images can become tied with the shadow; for example, in the case of a man, his anima figure may be shown in a dream as married or otherwise united to a figure representing his shadow. This sort of union of shadow with anima/animus is particularly likely if the qualities of the shadow are rigidly denied acknowledgment. The anima/animus is related to the shadow by its dual personal and collective nature also; a woman's animus may reflect not only a male counterpoint to her conscious situation but also the Eternal Masculine and a man's anima may represent both a personal femininity and the Eternal Feminine.

The animus corresponds to the paternal Logos just as the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros. It is far from my intention to give these two intuitive concepts too specific a definition. I use Eros and Logos merely as conceptual aids to describe the fact that a woman's consciousness is characterized more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos. In men, Eros, the function of relationship is usually less developed than Logos. In women, on the other hand, Eros is an expression of their true nature, while their Logos is often only a regrettable accident.36

The anima/animus is in some way a mediator between the unconscious and conscious situations.37 As such, it is another set of oppositions that strive toward unity: through the collective unconscious, there is the attempted unity of time, through the shadow the unity of good and

37 Jacobi, Psychology of Jung, p. 119.
evil, through the anima/animus the unity of male and female. Much, if not all, of the force of the latter two sets is owing to the force of the collective unconscious, to the ocean of images and associations that is able to reach into consciousness from the unconscious. The goal of the intervention of opposites, psychic wholeness or the emergence of the "self," is itself not only an abstract principle but also a dynamic image held by the collective unconscious, the conscious being confronted with a primordial image of psychic totality or wholeness that results from the union of opposites in a third. "Results" may be an improper description, however, for there is a strong sense that the union of opposites permits the self to "emerge" -- not at once certainly, since the unity does not result in a static definition of the self but in a dynamic sense of the self, a self that in some sense "always existed."

The goal of the individuation process is the synthesis of the self. From another point of view the term "entelechy" might be preferable to "synthesis." There is an empirical reason why "entelechy" is, in certain conditions, more fitting: the symbols of wholeness frequently occur at the beginning of the individuation process, indeed they can often be observed in the first dreams of early infancy. This observation says much for the a priori existence of potential wholeness, and on this account the idea of entelechy instantly recommends itself. But insofar as the individuation process occurs, empirically speaking, as a synthesis, it looks, paradoxically enough, as if something already existent were being put together. From this point of view, the term "synthesis" is also applicable. 39

Images of wholeness will be examined in a later chapter but their special importance should be indicated. "Unity and totality," says Jung,

38Ibid., p. 135.

"stand at the highest point on the scale of the objective values because their symbols can no longer be distinguished from the imago Dei. Hence, all statements about the God-image apply also to the empirical symbols of totality." 40

Again, this chapter is not intended to give a full exposition of Jung's psychology, but only to give a brief indication of the importance of the past in Jungian thought. The "past" we have seen is perhaps better referred to as "the primitive" to indicate that its importance is not as a definable location in "time before," but rather as a disposition, a set of perceptions and reactions that persist into the present, dispositions that seem to be impervious to any arbitrary distinctions of "now" and "then." It is this temporal unity of personal and collective that in some way underlies all of the attempts at unity/wholeness that are central to Jungian thought. Moreover, we have noted, and will develop in a later chapter, the relationship of this psychological conception of time with the "image of God," that is with the religious sense.

Having an understanding of the relevant portions of Jung's psychology, we now may look directly at the most important facet of his theory regarding the archaic, the archetypes.

CHAPTER THREE

The Creative Memory:

The Character of the Archetypes

It is somewhat misleading to refer to archetypes as "contents," since the term implies that they are somehow contained, in this case, in the collective unconscious, and that they are objects or artifacts that can be deposited or contained. These are misleading impressions since Jung makes clear that archetypes are fully capable of "breaking out," as it were, of the collective unconscious, of forcing themselves upon conscious activity without conscious consent. Moreover, it is critical to the appreciation of archetypes that they are seen not as objects catalogued in an encyclopedia of art or literary types, but as the motivation to form the objects in these catalogues. Properly speaking, "the whore of Babylon" of which I shall speak in the next chapter, is not itself an archetype but one of many products or representations of a motivation to form a certain type of image, and it is this motivation that is the archetype. Seeing the archetype as quasi-instinctual motivations and not as products should help us to see why Jung can say that we can sketch the products of an archetype but we cannot define what the archetype is absolutely: like the wind, the archetype rustles leaves and bends branches but is itself never seen. The archetype is capable of being felt but not known.

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as
To find the origins of the archetypes we must return to a description offered above, that they are "quasi-instinctual." Ira Progoff points out that Jung "starts with an inherently social definition of man," that he begins with the view that society is "the primary reality and therefore the primary datum in the study of man," and that this sociological view in addition "assumes history," that is, "the continuity of time." "Instinctual," then, in Jung's terms will include some influence, perhaps even major influence, from the social and the historical. Instinct is more here than "man fighting for survival," it is also "man among men and women fighting for survival"; whereas the former is almost exclusively concerned with method, the latter is often complicated by problems of meaning. Jung, like Freud, was Lamarkian in his view, at least insofar as he believed in the inheritability of modes of thought, that is, archetypal thought. It should not be surprising, given what has been said regarding his necessarily social and historical predisposition that the instincts as Jung perceives them, include not only inherited methods of action but also inherited methods of understanding or finding meaning.

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4 Ibid., p. 162.

5 This is not to say that action is ever "meaningless." Instinct here is to be regarded as including an inherent social condition: for Jung as for Aristotle, man is by nature an animal intended to live in the polis. Man, then, is by nature communal and thus the symbols men form are frequently modified by this political nature. The community
It is in my view a great mistake to suppose that the psyche of a new-born child is a tabula rasa in the sense that there is absolutely nothing in it. Insofar as the child is born with a differentiated brain that is predetermined by heredity and therefore individualized, it meets sensory stimuli coming from outside not with any aptitudes, but with specific ones, and this necessarily results in a particular, individual choice and pattern of apperception. These aptitudes can be shown to be inherited instincts and preformed patterns, the latter being the a priori and formal conditions of apperception that are based on instinct. Their presence gives the world of the child and the dreamer its anthropomorphic stamp. They are the archetypes, which direct all fantasy activity into its appointed paths and in this way produce ... astonishing mythological parallels such as can also be found, though in a lesser degree, in the dreams of normal persons and neurotics.6

We are speaking of two types of instinct: the one is physiological -- what constitutes the typical behaviour of man -- the other is spiritual or psychological -- what constitutes the typical human patterns of perception, feeling and thought. The physiological and the psychological instincts pose a similar question in their origins: how are we to suppose they developed? The origins of both elude precise explanation7; we must extend Jung's remarks on the psychological instincts to cover both types, that "if they ever 'originated' their origin must have coincided at least

thus regarded is not the brutish society of Hobbes but the polis of Plato and Aristotle; the former finds its meaning in survival and shapes its actions accordingly, while the latter aims toward the creation of space -- both physically and intellectually -- for introspection on the struggle of life.

6C.G. Jung, "Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept" (1936, revised 1954), ACU, p. 66.

7See chapter two of A.T.W. Simeons, Man's Presumptuous Brain (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1960) for an examination of the
with the beginning of the species."\(^8\) The origins of the "human modes" of behaviour, however, they are defined in both the psychological and the physiological realms, Jung thus asserts, must begin when it is decided that the creature with which we are dealing is to be called "Man," the latter being a decision made through religious faith and/or anthropological investigation. Though Jung asserts that neither of the types of instinct, the physical and the spiritual, "is derivable from the other,"\(^9\) this is not to say that they do not affect each other.

The physiological urges must work not only to achieve satisfaction but also to overcome an internal resistance that may be established by the "numinous primordial images," the archetypes.\(^10\) On the other hand, no small amount of misinterpretation is owing to the effect the physiological urges have on the psychological, that is, the archetypes. The action of the physiological -- and in this we must remember that sociological as well as strictly biological urges are meant -- on the spiritual is in the way of shaping, though not finally, the form in which the archetypes manifest themselves. To paraphrase what was said above, what is studied in mythology or the fantasies of psychotics is not the archetypes proper but the archetypal motifs or images often confusingly referred to as "archetypes." Thus when Jung writes that "the archetypes are simply the

\(^8\)Jung, "Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype," ACU, p. 78.


\(^{10}\)C.G. Jung, Symbols of Transformation, (hereinafter referred to as...
forms which the instincts assume," he is not saying that the spiritual instincts owe their existence to the physical instincts but that to a certain extent, they do owe their shape or manifestations to the exigencies of living in the material world.

Here I must clarify the relation between instincts and archetypes: what we properly call instincts are physiological urges, and are perceived by the senses. But at the same time, they also manifest themselves in fantasies and often reveal their presence only by symbolic images. These manifestations are what I call the archetypes. They are without known origin; and they reproduce themselves in any time or in any part of the world -- even where transmission by direct descent or "cross fertilization" through migration must be ruled out.12

Jung suggests that dangerous situations, "be they dangers to the body or to the soul," leave behind "affect-laden fantasies, and, insofar as such situations typically repeat themselves, they give rise to the archetypes".13 Both racially and individually, humans develop from the "dark confines of the earth" -- the metaphors and the archetypal images of the mother and the cave -- and the forms that effected the emergence to light "became archetypes, and it is these primordial images which influence us most directly, and therefore seem to be the most powerful."14

The archetypes, then, are instinctual motivations to form sets of images, the form and time of appearance of such images affected greatly
by the physiological and sociological history and condition of mankind, the essential archetypal core, however, always escaping physiological influence. The origins of the archetypes, like the origins of the biological instincts, are matters of uncertainty, but we can expect that the origins coincide with the origins of the race. These "sets of images," finally, include "images" not only in the sense of "ideas" but also "images" as "patterns of action" or modes of behaviour; the archetypes include not only pictures perceived in the mind's eye but also roles acted out in the conscious life and methods of perceiving the life that is acted out around the individual. The form of the archetype is, to some extent, shaped by the demands of the conscious situation, but, as we shall see, the archetype is fully capable of forcing on the conscious mode an archetypal method of acting or reacting, and this ability is both helpful and problematic.

Keeping the essential formlessness of the archetype in mind, the interrelationship of the biological instincts with the spiritual is best seen through examples. There is a need in the study of instinctive behaviour to pierce through the layers of elaboration and embellishment that have accumulated if one wishes to perceive the "unadorned" instinct. Thus, in the study of the family there is a great interest in the family

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15Jacobi, Psychology of Jung, p. 40. Ms. Jacobi's section on archetypes (pp. 39-51) is useful for the examination here.

16It is important here to recall that though we might speak of, for example, "the archetype of the Mother," the more precise method would be to write "the archetypal motif of the Mother." Despite his
life of primitive tribes, partially in the belief (perhaps mistaken) that one can perceive the true human motivation towards families in the primitive situation as opposed to the contemporary. Similarly, if one wishes, as Jung does, to view the psyche in its most basic, uncomplicated form, the study centers on those examples of psychic activity which are least overlaid by conscious activity, again, in the possibly erroneous belief that in the "pre-rational" man we have the "basic" man. Thus, if we are interested in the basic or instinctual psyche, we must look to the psychological artifacts of pre-rational man, the myths, and to the contemporary evidence of the non-rational, dreams and the delusions of the insane.

An archetype means a typo (imprint), a definite grouping of archaic character containing, in form as well as in meaning, mythological motifs. Mythological motifs appear in pure form in fairytales, myths, legends, and folklore. Some of the well-known motifs are: the figures of the Hero, the Redeemer, the Dragon (always connected with the Hero, who has to overcome him), the Whale or the Monster who swallows the Hero. Another variation of the motif of the Hero and Dragon is the Katabasis, the Descent into the Cave, the Nekyia. You remember the Odyssey where Ulysses descends ad infernos to consult Tiresias, the seer. This motif of the Nekyia is found everywhere in antiquity and practically all over the world. 17

Jung does not wish to attribute mythology to primitive attempts at explaining the physical world. Myths, though perhaps partially attempts at pre-scientific explanation, are better seen as manifestations of inherent archetypes that appear in a form relevant to pre-scientific

complaints of being misunderstood, Jung occasionally contributes to the confusion by using the former method rather than the latter, thus encouraging the reader to forget the all-important relationship of archetype to archetypal motif. We may speak of motifs but an archetype itself is not definable; the archetype properly speaking is the impulse which leads to and supports the motif.

17 Jung, APTP, p. 41.
understanding. Though they may not be important as scientific explanations, the myths are important for the archetypal patterns they evince. Myths are important not because they establish ideas or modes but because they are typical of such modes, because they supply historically familiar and referable incidents of the manifestations of the archetypes, and these references help to sketch the shape of the archetype by giving the manifestations a name. Myths are important for Jung because they supply historical manifestations of themes and motifs he observes in his work with patients. "Although the changing situations of life must appear infinitely various to our way of thinking," Jung writes,

their possible number never exceeds certain natural limits; they fall into more or less typical patterns that repeat themselves over and over again. The archetypal structure of the unconscious corresponds to the average run of events. The changes that may befall a man are not infinitely variable; they are variations of certain typical occurrences which are limited in number. When therefore a distressing situation arises, the corresponding archetype will be constellated in the unconscious.  

It is significant that the images or motifs that Jung discovers in the fantasies of psychotics have observable relationships to the myths of antiquity. Within the characteristics of the recurring images that Jung perceives in his study of psychotic delusions, he sees the origins of all known mythological formations, though extremely abstracted. These characteristics are "chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of light and dark, upper and lower, right and left; the union of

19Jung, ST, p. 293.
opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross); rotation (circle, sphere); and finally the centring process and a radial arrangement that usually follows some quaternary system.  

Despite their vividness and variety, psychotic delusions have the practical disadvantage of being associated with mental illness and thus might require a limitation in applicability of the theory of archetypes to psychotics. However, Jung's main source for evidence of archetypal behaviour in modern individuals is not psychotic delusions but dreams. Dreams have the advantage of being "involuntary, spontaneous products of nature not falsified by any conscious purpose." Moreover, the utility of dreams in demonstrating archetypal manifestations does not depend upon their being the dreams of psychotics; the dreams of normal people at various times in their lives clearly display archetypal characteristics. Jung found that variations on the ancient figures of the shadow, the wise old man, the child, the mother and the maiden as a counterpart of the mother are typical of the dreams of both the acutely psychologically.

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21 Ibid.


23 It should be noted here that Jung, like Freud, perceives how close dreaming is to psychosis, the difference being that "one occurs normally under conditions of sleep, while the other upsets the waking or conscious state." See, C.G. Jung, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, Vol. III of The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, trans. R.F.C. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., for Bollingen Foundation, 1961), p. 241. This affinity between the dream and psychosis should be regarded, at least theoretically, as an asset since it tends to indicate the proximity and occasional
disturbed and those persons usually thought "normal."24

This process of finding a correlation between primitive myths and modern dreams demands more than simple juxtapositioning of phenomena; its validity is dependent upon a depth knowledge of the "functional meaning of the individual symbol" and then an investigation to determine if the more primitive motif had a similar functional meaning.25 To insure that the motifs to be examined are owing only to archetypal activity and not to conscious acquisition, those mythic motifs that the subject has acquired or is likely to have acquired must be eliminated from archetypal interest when they appear.26 "We must look for motifs which could not possibly be known to the dreamer and yet behave functionally in his dream in such a manner as to coincide with the functioning of the archetypes known from historical sources."27 Ironically, dreams and psychotic fantasies are important and useful because they are a "generally unintelligible, irrational, not to say delirious sequence of images" as opposed to the more ordered and apparently intelligible fairy tales and myths. Dreams and fantasies point to the persistence and the forcefulness of the pre-rational, pre-scientific modes of thought and experience in man while the myths and fairy tales testify to the process of conscious ordering that the

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24 C.G. Jung, "The Psychological Aspects of the Kore" (1941, revised 1963), ACU, p. 183.


26 This is not to say that such motifs may hold no therapeutic interest or potential, but only that they are not sure products of the archetypes.

archetypal images have undergone.  

This investigation into the connection between modern dreams and phantasies with the myths of antiquity led Jung to tap another possible source of archetypal material, "the active imagination," the stream of fantasy produced by "deliberate concentration." The results of studying this source lead to an important, and possibly unsettling, conclusion: Jung observes that the verbalization, the making conscious of these fantasies has a significant effect on that patient's dreams, the dreams becoming less vivid and less frequent. "From this," he writes, "I have drawn the conclusion that dreams often contain fantasies which 'want' to become conscious." This is to say that there are unconscious desires of the spiritual/psychological instincts which press outward, as it were, to gain expression in the conscious sphere. We are led to accept the fact of an "intentionality" or "purposefulness" in the unconscious, a characteristic we may have before considered only with reference to the conscious mind. The examination of the archetypes leads us to see that intentionality is not a characteristic of consciousness alone but is typical of the psyche as a whole, that both the conscious and unconscious can and do have the goals and the will to reach them.

This willfulness on the part of the archetypes should not be surprising, since we have referred to them as "quasi-instinctual" and the comparison to instincts should suggest to mind a drive, a willfulness,

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That the concept of intentionality as applied to the archetype should strike us as odd or unsettling is probably owing to their origin in the unconscious; we are more familiar and more comfortable with a sense of intentionality that is confined to the conscious, what we like to call "the rational." But the physiological instincts are frequently placed beyond the pale of rationality and signify a perhaps frightening part of the man or woman which is not quite human -- i.e., "the animal instincts." Though both in the case of the physiological instincts and the case of the archetypes our fear of them may be somewhat warranted and our sense of strangeness toward them understandable, they are nonetheless not foreign, not other-than-human, but comprise the core of what is oldest in man. "Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human modes."  

These modes are the basic, archaic forms of human activity, forms which man, despite the subsequent growth of rationality and civilization, never, in Jung's view, outgrows. Any later additions, for example, the development of science, no matter how valuable are, in this view, steps away from this basic "natural man," though the instinctual, both psychological and physiological, are never really transcended or left behind. Speaking specifically of the archetypes, they are "that portion through which the psyche is attached to nature, or in which its link with

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30 C.G. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919), SDP, p. 133.
the earth and the world appears at its most tangible."31

Archetypes, then, are ancient motivations which demand to be dealt with in the present. The necessity of coming to terms with the past carries with it both assets and liabilities. As the archetypes are living connections with the past — motivations not relics of past action -- they force men and women in every age, despite whatever later, conscious developments they have undergone, to confront their roots, to deal with what they are at their most basic level. Thus the archetypes are regulators of the psychic disposition, balancing the modernity of consciousness with the primitiveness of the unconscious. The possible impetuosity caused by a heedlessness towards one's instinctual, psychological needs and dispositions is met full in the face by the actions of the archetypes in their affirmation of the primitive and the past. The "objective intervention of the archetype . . . checks the purely affective reactions with a chain of inner confrontations and realizations."32

Progress and development are ideals not lightly to be rejected, but they lose all meaning if man only arrives at his new state as a fragment of himself, having left his essential hinterland behind him in the shadow of the unconscious, in a state or primitiveness, or, indeed, barbarism. The conscious mind, split off from its origins, incapable of realizing the meaning of the new state, then relapses all too easily into a situation far worse than the one from which the innovation was intended to free it — *exempla sunt odiosa*;33

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We are first conscious of the presence of the archetypes when they are observable in dreams or fantasies; their effect, however, is not limited to these manifestations. The appearance of the archetypes is the sign that the unconscious is somehow reacting to the conscious situation and is the symptom of this reaction. The reaction frequently is not limited to the unconscious nor to the simple appearance of the archetypes, but moves into affecting the conscious situation. The archetypes possess a power that can be the match of any conscious organization. Because they possess their own motility and energy, "they function like complexes; they come and go as they please, and often they obstruct or modify the conscious situations in an embarrassing way." This ability to affect the conscious sphere, the ability to force the conscious to deal with the archetype and the unconscious, besides slowing down a somehow impetuous conscious disposition can also threaten that conscious situation in a serious way. The utter strangeness of the archetypes, a strangeness that can be taken as "holiness" -- or in Jung's words, "numenosity" -- can give to the archetype, and thereby to the unconscious, a disproportionate share in the setting of the psychic disposition. As modern man can be oblivious to his unconscious, "spiritual" life, so, too, under certain conditions, can he be "swallowed up" by the mysterious Leviathan, the white whale, of the unconscious.

When one studies the archetypal personalities and their behaviour with the help of the dreams, fantasies and delusions of patients, one is profoundly impressed by their manifold and unmistakable connections with mythological ideas completely unknown to the layman.

34Jung, MHS, p. 67.
They form a species of singular beings whom one would like to endow with ego-consciousness; indeed, they almost seem capable of it. And yet this idea is not borne out by the facts. There is nothing in their behaviour to suggest that they have an ego-consciousness as we know it. They show, on the contrary, all the marks of fragmentary personalities. They are masklike, wraithlike, without problems, lacking self-reflections, with no conflicts, no doubts, no sufferings; ... Unlike other contents, they always remain strangers in the world of consciousness, unwelcome intruders saturating the atmosphere with uncanny forebodings or even with the fear of madness. 35

The archetypes are capable of "breaking out" and affecting conscious perception or of imposing imperceptibly an archaic pattern of behaviour on conscious activity. The unconscious is sensitive to the conscious situation but only in a blind manner; the events of the conscious life call forth a reaction from the unconscious, a reaction as likely based on pure instinctual history and demands as on the intricacies of the conscious situation. The key word in dealing with the archetypes is "balance."

The archetypes are used to advantage only when their archaic messages are successfully interpreted by a consciousness sensitive to the many facets, archaic and otherwise, of the contemporary situation. It is a "psychic catastrophe" whenever the conscious is engulfed for any length of time by the unconscious, since the person lives in and must deal with the present, something he or she cannot do if enveloped by the "psychically relative space-time continuum" of the unconscious. 36

Jung suggests that the "numenosity" of the archetype, besides the problems and advantages already discussed, possibly can lead to another

35 C. G. Jung, "Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation" (1939), ACU, p. 286.

phenomena: "Experience of the archetype is not only impressive, it 
seizes and possesses the whole personality, and is naturally productive 
of faith."\(^3^7\) That is, of religious faith. The power and mysterious 
appearance of the archetype, coupled with their mode of acting in a com-
mensatory relationship to the conscious, lead to the attribution of 
intelligence and personality to the archetypal appearances. "Experiences 
like these," Jung writes of confrontations with the archetype, "make it 
immediately understandable why the God-image is so often regarded as a 
personal being."\(^3^8\)

It is a psychological fact that an archetype can seize hold of the 
ego and even compel it to act as it -- the archetype -- wills. A 
man can then take on archetypal dimensions and exercise correspond-
ing effects; he can appear in the place of God, so that it is not 
only possible, but quite sensible, for other men to act towards him 
as they act towards God. We know that, in the Catholic Church, this 
possibility has become an institution whose psychological efficacy 
cannot be doubted.\(^3^9\)

Religious archetypes will be discussed in the next chapter. Here 
it is sufficient to say that an examination or an experience of the 
archetypes may lead inevitably to the employment of at least the language 
of faith. Having to come to terms with the hidden, powerful and personal 
force of archetypes is at least in language and in form similar to deal-
ing with the unseen God, the Unnamable.

The archetypes are the active presence of the archaic in contemporary 


\(^3^9\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 66. Jung refers here to the sacrament of Penance wherein 
the priest offers absolution for the sins confessed. Theologically, Jung 
is on shaky ground here since the priest does not "become" God but acts 
as the intermediary between sinful man and forgiving God and exercises a 
power to absolve that is granted, according to Catholic tradition, by God.
man. By their re-appearance throughout history they force the evolving race continually to come to terms with its origins, origins which it has not transcended despite great scientific or other rational conscious development.
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CHAPTER FOUR

The Painted Lady and the Healing God:
A Discussion of Two Archetypes

The woman was dressed in purple and scarlet, and glittered with gold and jewels and pearls, and she was holding a gold winecup filled with the disgusting filth of her fornication; on her forehead was written a name, a cryptic name: "Babylon the Great, the mother of all the prostitutes and all the filthy practices on the earth." I saw that she was drunk, drunk with the blood of the saints, and the blood of the martyrs of Jesus; and when I saw her, I was completely mystified. The angel said to me, "Don't you understand? Now I will tell you the meaning of this woman..."
Revelation 17:4-7

A rich symbolism laces throughout Revelation's twenty-two chapters, filling the book with a substance that gives the visions a truly prophetic character, that is, a critical foreknowledge firmly grounded in the truth of the tradition. The symbolism of Revelation is built upon an application of Old Testament themes, a pattern that the believing Christian must see as more than simple repetition but rather as the fulfillment of the earlier images from Isaiah, Daniel, or Ezekiel: the promise of Revelation is the flowering of the prophetic visions.

Chapters sixteen through nineteen of Revelation describe the destruction of a city, Rome, and the triumph that destruction represents for the righteous. Our interest here is with the image used to describe the doomed Rome, the powerful vision of Babylon the whore. The prostitute and the city are linked in an identity relationship here, the crime for which the city is to be punished is the whore's crime of a gross and unlawful intimacy. This woman is seen as the mother of evil, the woman
who brings forth prostitutes, and who flaunts her licentiousness in her purple and scarlet attire and a cup filled with "the disgusting filth of her fornication."¹ This city is indeed a harlot who has been paid for her lust but from whom an equal charge will now be exacted.² She is, however, more than this, for in her spawning of whores she is an origin of evil, a destroyer of hope, and thus a mockery of women in general and mothers in particular with whom any chance of hope must originate. Though the people of the world, the whore's lovers and customers, cry out in despair at her destruction, the woman cannot be saved. She is more than temporary pleasure, she is the matrix of evil, she is the context of a way of life, of dissolution and awful luxury. As she is the mother of prostitutes, her lovers are her sons; the woman is the city and she is a mother to her citizens, breeding them in evil.

The image of the licentious mother/woman/city becomes more telling when compared to other images of women in Revelation. The mother in chapter twelve brings forth a son who is threatened by the dragon, that is, the devil, but who escapes by being taken "straight up to God and to his throne" while the woman is saved by the earth itself when endangered by the dragon.³ A more direct comparison with the whore, however, is the Bride of the Lamb⁴ who, instead of the scarlet of the whore, "has been able to dress herself in dazzling white linen, because her linen is made of the good deeds of the saints." Later, in chapter twenty-one, it is the

¹Revelation 17:4-6  ²Revelation 18:5-6  ³Revelation 12:15-17
⁴Revelation 19:7-8  ⁵Revelation 21:1-2
new Jerusalem, a city of promise and holiness that is shown to be the
Bride of the Lamb.

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth; the first heaven and the
first earth had disappeared now, and there was no longer any sea.
I saw the holy city, and the new Jerusalem, coming down from God
out of heaven, as beautiful as a bride dressed for her husband.
One of the seven angels that had the seven bowls full of the
seven last plagues came to speak to me, and said, "Come here and I
will show you the bride that the Lamb has married." In the spirit,
he took me to the top of an enormous high mountain and showed me
Jerusalem, the holy city, coming down from God out of heaven.6

As Babylon was filthy with the corruption of an illicit intimacy,
the new Jerusalem offers hope as the bride and intimate of God to her
children, her citizens.

Then I heard a loud voice call from the throne,"You see this city?
Here God lives among men. He will make his home among them; they
shall be his people, and he will be their God; his name is God-with­
them. He will wipe away all tears from their eyes; there will be
no more death, and no more mourning or sadness. The world of the
past has gone."7

The woman and mother imagery thus described is only one of many
images developed through Revelation, but as I have attempted to show, it
is a particularly rich and powerful set of images. This power is owing
partly to the relevant descriptions ("purple and scarlet" of the whore,
the "dazzling white" of the Lamb's bride), partly to the juxtapositioning
of contrasting images, but most importantly, I think, to the "base" on
which the descriptions are made, that is, on the reader's conceptions of
woman and mother. This is to say that as is frequently true in the use
of symbolism, the author of Revelation works within a commonly held
framework of meaning and thus the impact of the images of whore and bride

6Revelation 21:9-10 7Revelation 21:3-4
are particularly strong because the associations with these terms held by readers are particularly strong.

We began with the question of what are the most immediate archetypes. The most immediate is the primordial image of the mother; she is in every way the nearest and most powerful experience, and the one which occurs during the most impressionable period of a man's life. . . . the mother is an archetypal experience; she is experienced by the more or less unconscious child not as a definite, individual feminine personality but as the mother, an archetype charged with an immensity of possible meanings. As life proceeds the primordial image fades and is replaced by a conscious, relatively individual image, which is assumed to be the only mother-image we have. But in the unconscious the mother always remains a powerful primordial image, colouring and even determining throughout life our relations to women, to society, to the world of feeling and fact, yet in so subtle a way that, as a rule, there is no conscious perception of the process. 8

In Symbols of Transformation, Jung points out that the city has often been seen as a "maternal symbol, a woman who harbours the inhabitants in herself like children." 9 As examples of this maternal, feminine characteristic, he cites Old Testament references in Isaiah (1:21; 23:16; 47:1ff) and Jeremiah (50:12) 10 and later shifts to the New Testament to include passages in Galatians (4:26ff and 5:1) and the good and evil mothers in Revelation noted above. 11 The citations point out textual similarity within the Bible, that is, a cycle of associations. But Jung notes that this cycle is not confined to the Bible but also can be found in literature and myth that have no apparent connection to scripture. Thus the woman-city and woman-land connection is found in the Egyptian myth of Ogyges, in the Hindu myth of Indra and Urvara ("fertile land") and in the Chinese custom of having an ascending emperor plow a furrow. 12 In addition,

8 Jung, "Mind and Earth," CT, pp. 34-35.  
9 Jung, ST, p. 208.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., pp. 212-218.  
12 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
Jung points out that the water associations made with both the whore and the bride in Revelation\(^{13}\) have correspondences with the fertility associations made with water in Persian and Vedic (the waters are "matritamah," that is "most maternal") mythology and the baptismal ceremony of Christianity.\(^{14}\) Both in the case of the city and the land, the feminine, maternal associations are based upon the sense that the city and the land contain, give birth to, and support the child, the citizen.

This juxtapositioning of different mythological similarities is little more than the cataloguing of a set of phenomena if one is willing to believe that coincidence is its own explanation, that there is no significance to the use of very similar imagery within different cultures at different times apart from the bald fact that the similarity occurs. But in recognizing an undeniable pattern, Jung also perceives an underlying truth: though there may be incidental differences in different occurrences, the demonstrable existence of a mythological pattern points to an underlying trans-historical motivation to choose such symbols. In the case described above, this motivation is the archetype of the mother. By positing the archetypes, Jung implies that the myth-makers of various cultures and traditions participate in a system of meaning they perceive but dimly if at all, and, moreover, that this system is more than a fund of images to be drawn upon at will but has a power of its own to shape a mythology.

If one chooses not to give any archetypal significance to this

\(^{13}\)Revelation 17:1 and 22:1-2 respectively.

repetition of themes, his or her case would be strengthened if it could be shown that these images occur only in antiquity, that is, before the "scientific age," and have no connections with modern experience. The structure of Jung's *Symbols of Transformation* will not allow this temporal limitation of archetypal experience, however, for the study is an explanation of and extrapolation from a series of visions of a young American schizophrenic, a Miss Miller, which occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The examination of the maternal connection of the city, for example, was initiated by a vision of a "dream city." It should be noted here that Jung examines a series of visions, not isolated images, and thus his interpretation is built upon consistency and logicality of application to the Miller case. The application of an archetypal interpretation for the Miller fantasies is useful for at least two reasons: one, such an interpretation is a method of understanding an otherwise possibly unintelligible series of visions; two, instead of confining the patient within his or her own visions and thus isolating that experience, the archetypal interpretation points the way toward a re-involvement with "normal" humanity, the visions being interpreted as a more acute or compelling form of a set of 

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15*Ibid.*, p. xxviii-xxix. This study of itself does not, of course, constitute "proof" of Jung's contentions regarding the archetypes, but is especially useful for our interests here because of the type and the extent of the study. For other examples of the appearance of the archetypes in modern patients, consult Jung's *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, the chapters entitled "A Study in the Process of Individuation" and "Concerning Mandala Symbolism"; also, see Jung's long introduction to *Man and His Symbols*.


17Note here that the interpretive method is one that does somewhat presuppose the existence of the archetypes. Yet the visions do "speak
associations made by men throughout history.

Today there are countless neurotics who are neurotic simply because they do not know why they cannot be happy in their own way -- they do not even know that the fault lies with them. Besides these neurotics there are many more normal people, men and women of the better kind who feel restricted and discontented because they have no symbol which would act as an outlet for their libido. For all these people a reductive analysis down to the primal facts should be undertaken, so that they can become acquainted with their primitive personality and learn how to take due account of it. 18

The symbol can be too powerful, of course, and distort, instead of contributing to, the shape of a life. Thus in the case of a too-powerful mother-image, the "child" (in this case, we must recognize that "mother" and "child" may be employed metaphorically, the "mother may be any person for themselves" in bearing this archetypal approach by the juxtapositions that occur within them regardless of the method of interpretation.

18Jung, ST, p. 230. The importance of this attempt at unification and identification with other human experience is born out in at least one instance, the work of Anton Boisen. Boisen was a minister who suffered a series of mental breakdowns; contrary to the advice of his doctors, he recollected in his lucid periods the fantasies and visions he perceived while mad and noticed a peculiar religious significance to them. This apparent meaningfulness in delusions led him to write The Exploration of the Inner World, an examination of the relationship of psychic disorder and religious experience. In the Introduction to that book, Boisen writes,

Religious experience as well as mental disorder may involve severe emotional upheaval, and mental disorder as well as religious experience may represent the operation of the healing forces of nature. The conclusion follows that certain types of mental disorders and certain types of religious experience are alike attempts at reorganization. The difference lies in the outcome. Where the attempt is successful and some degree of victory is won, it is commonly recognized as religious experience. Where it is unsuccessful or indeterminate it is commonly spoken of as "insanity." In those constructive transformations of the personality which we recognize as religious experience, the individual is relieved of his sense of isolation and is brought into harmony with that which is supreme in his hierarchy of loyalties. He succeeds in effecting a synthesis between the crisis experience and his subsequent life which enables him to grow in the direction of inner unification and social adaptation on a basis conceived as universal. In most of those cases of
or thing that has a maternal function\textsuperscript{19} is hampered in normal maturation by a longing for and satisfaction in an enveloping maternal love — "the imperfections of real life, with its laborious adaptations and manifold disappointments, naturally cannot compete with such a state of indescribable fulfillment."\textsuperscript{20}

If religion by definition is a system of right ordering based upon a proper reverence, that is, a knowledge of one's place, then an inherent religiosity can be seen in the realm of the archetypes, in the archetype's compelling, "numinous," quality and its ability to order or to distort a life. But to refer to the archetypes \textit{per se} as religious is very problematic, since it may require a broadening of the definition to the point where a clear delineation between the religious and non-religious is not possible.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus, the most important relationship of childhood, the relation to the mother, will be compensated by the mother archetype as soon as detachment from the childhood state is indicated. One such successful interpretation has been, for instance, Mother Church, but once this form begins to show signs of age and decay a new interpretation becomes inevitable.\textsuperscript{22}

The mother archetype can, then, move into and out of what is which we speak as "mental illness," no such synthesis is achieved.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{19}Jung, "Aion," \textit{PS}, p. 10n.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{21}The general question of whether the religious and non-religious are clearly definable anyway is worthy of a thesis in itself and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. I will, however, discuss the implications of the question with regard to Jung's work later in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{22}Jung, \textit{ST}, p. 236.
conventionally considered by definition religious, but this shifting
occurs only within particular individual circumstances and is not nec-
essarily typical of the "religious" in Jung's thought. There is a God-
archetype in the psychology of Jung, but like all archetypes its contents
may be limned but not absolutely defined.

Ira Progoff writes that the "symbol of God (in Jungian psychology)
is the expression of life-energy in the psyche and therefore has the
greatest degree of energy attached to it." Progoff adds that this
"symbol" as it arises from the unconscious, "constellating the greatest
intensities of libido around it, takes 'possession' of consciousness as
an autonomous complex." To this point, we might say that Jung indi-
cates the chief characteristic of religion to be "subjectivity." Even
in the case of a world-wide creed, we may expect Jung to observe that
the religion is a compromise unification of individuals who have similar
but separate psychological projections. "That the gods die from time
to time," writes Jung, "is due to man's sudden discovery that they do
not mean anything, that they are made by human hands, useless idols of
wood and stone."26

I am therefore of the opinion that, in general, psychic energy or
libido creates the God-image by making use of archetypal patterns,
and that man in consequence worships the psychic force active

24 Ibid., p. 213.
25 Though it is not strictly precise to speak of religion and the God-
image as synonymous, the two are usually so directly related that to equate
them for the sake of general exposition or hypothesis does not seem mis-
leading.
26 Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious" (1934/1954), ACU,
within him as something divine. We thus arrive at the objectionable conclusion that, from the psychological point of view, the God-image is a real but subjective phenomenon. . . . To anyone who understands libido merely as the psychic energy over which he has conscious control, the religious relationship, as we have defined it, is bound to appear as a ridiculous game of hide-and-seek with oneself. But it is rather a question of the energy which belongs to the archetype, to the unconscious, and which is therefore not his to dispose of. This "game with oneself" is anything but ridiculous; on the contrary, it is extremely important. To carry a god around in yourself means a great deal; it is a guarantee of happiness, of power, and even of omnipotence, insofar as these are attributes of divinity. To carry a god within oneself is practically the same as being God oneself.27

Jung here mirrors Frederich Schelling's comment on the history of the gods of antiquity, that that history did not develop outside the poets, but "takes place in the poets themselves," that is, the gods owe their existence to the creative mind of man.28

But there is a difference between the two also, for Schelling is writing about a time in which there is no final difference between soul and psyche, while Jung is writing in a time in which such a split is not only accepted but also presupposed in any "scientific" inquiry. This contemporary division may cause problems in the understanding of Jung's view of god archetypes. Jung labors both to establish the scientific credibility of a psychological study of religion and to protect religion from a frontal assault by reductionists who would say religion is "only" one stimulus-response or another. The problem is to establish the integrity of psychological investigation in general and investigation of religious

27Jung, ST, p. 86.

phenomena in particular. "Whenever the Westerner hears the word 'psychological,'" Jung writes, "it always sounds to him like 'only psychological.' For him the 'soul' is something pitifully small, unworthy, personal, subjective, and a lot more besides."29

But in attempting to be fair both to psychology and to religion, Jung at times obscures his intentions. The remarks quoted immediately above are from the "Commentary on the Tibetan Book of the Dead," first appearing in 1935. A few lines above these observations in the same essay he notes, "Metaphysical assertions, however, are statements of the psyche, and are therefore psychological."30 (italicized "psychological" my own.) In roughly the same period -- 1938 -- Jung writes in Psychology and Religion:

It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should understand my observations to be a kind of proof of the existence of God. They prove only the existence of an archetypal image of the Deity, which to my mind is the most we can assert psychologically about God.31

On the one hand, he asserts that metaphysical statements are psychological and seems to use "soul" and "psyche" interchangeably, while on the other hand he denies any pretentions at making metaphysical statements. There is a possible confusion here, the solution of which leads us to the heart of Jung's view of the religious archetypes. The relationship of metaphysical to psychological is not "metaphysical equals psychological" (the equality relationship being the cause of confusion when the terms are reversed, i.e., "therefore psychological equals metaphysical") but rather "the metaphysical is part of the psychological." Jung proposes


to speak only scientifically and psychologically, relying on data from patients and research into antiquity; speaking thus, the relationship of metaphysics to psychology is of part to the whole.

This proposition (the God-image) as representing a sum of psychic energy has caused much offence, because people have failed to see that it is a psychological view and not a metaphysical statement. The psychic fact "God" is a typical autonomism, a collective archetype, as I later called it. It is therefore characteristic not only of all higher forms of religion, but appears spontaneously in the dreams of individuals. The archetype is, as such, an unconscious psychic image, but it has a reality independent of the attitude of the conscious mind. It is a psychic existent which should not in itself be confused with the idea of a metaphysical God. The existence of the archetype neither postulates God, nor does it deny that He exists.\(^{32}\)

A metaphysical entity "God" is not demonstrated by Jung's psychology, but a set of representations referred to as the God archetype is demonstrated as living in the psyche. Though Jung maintains that the description "archetype" presupposes the "imprinting" of the type\(^{33}\) it is beyond the psychologist's field to speculate on any causes of the imprinting beyond what may be found in cultural or personal history. But as with the archetype of the Mother described earlier, the purpose of an examination of the racial myths and fantasies about God or gods is to throw light on the symbolism employed by a current patient and not to speculate idly on historical or religious phenomena.

Jung identifies what might be called two "sets" of God-imagery. One set is of the most obvious, common sort -- as, for example, the Trinity

\(^{32}\)Jung, ST, V, p. 56n.

or Jahweh or Allah. Speaking of the religions associated with these images, Jung notes, "In most of the existing religions, it seems that the formative factor which creates the attributes of divinity is the father-image, while in the older religions it was the mother-image." The father or mother images are "formative" in the sense that they give shape to projections of psychic energy Progoff has referred to as "life energy." This designation of formative does not explain the archetype in the sense of "explain away." The energy that goes into the making of a God-image is not "handled" by saying that the shape of that image is influenced by a personal or archetypal sense of the Mother or the Father. The meaning of the images of god has a power and depth that is not contained within particular historical manifestations nor answered by a reductive analysis of the manifestations.

There are many symbols, however (among them the most important), that are not individual but collective in their nature and origin. These are chiefly religious images. The believer assumes that they are of divine origin -- that they have been revealed to man. The skeptic says flatly that they have been invented. Both are wrong. It is true, as the skeptic notes, that religious symbols and concepts have for centuries been the object of careful and quite conscious elaboration. It is equally true, as the believer implies, that their origin is so far buried in the mystery of the past that they seem to have no human source. But they are in fact "collective representations," emanating from primeval dreams and creative fantasies. As such, these images are involuntary, spontaneous manifestations and by no means intentional inventions.  

One important modern image in this category is that of Christ, "the Primordial Man, the mystic Adam." Christ is the image of man united

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34Jung, ST, p. 56.
35Jung, MHS, p. 41.
36Jung, "Aion," PS, p. 36.
with God, fully man yet fully God. The sin of the first Adam resulted in a series of radical separations: man and nature were made enemies, man was given dominion over woman, the pain of childbirth was made the result of woman's natural longing, and most importantly, man's intimate relationship with God was dissolved. By the sin, man's "natural" first world is shattered, he is set at odds with his nature — a condition mirrored in the split between the conscious and unconscious functions of the psyche and between man's passion and his reason. The epiphany of Christ offers the possibility of healing these lesions, of at least a reunification of God and man — and, psychologically, of a unification of man's "higher and lower" functions. As the perfection of this union of God with man, Christ embodies for Christians the archetype of wholeness, and as that, he is also the symbol of the self, the unity of the conscious and unconscious factors of man. Thus Christ is a symbol of personal psychic wholeness, but such images, says Jung, "cannot in practice be distinguished from a God-image." Whether Christ actually lived, whether if he lived he was in fact God and man, cannot be considered psychologically, but the Christ-image as the union of opposites in one person stands, nonetheless, as an image produced by the psychic "wish" for the unified self of conscious and unconscious. Christ is an image employed by the modern Western psyche to "imagine" God, God psychologically being the wholeness of the self which is the psyche's highest aspiration. The "life energy" of Progoff is better seen as the energy of the psyche that strives for wholeness, and this latter energy

37Cf. Jung, "Aion," PS, pp. 36-37  
38Ibid., p. 38.
produces the image of wholeness, God.

These associations with the God-image -- wholeness, the image of the self -- lead us to the second set of God-images, those that are more abstract, more likely to occur only in visions, in dreams or in shadowy associations with more common views of God. From the above discussion of Christ it is seen that what is psychologically prior is not the image of Christ nor any image of God but rather the need to express the concept of or desire for psychic wholeness. This concept or desire is very frequently pictured by way of common God-image, but it need not be so. For example, Jung points out that the image of wholeness that is Christ can be associated with another "a priori archetype," the mandala. 39

The mandala symbol is most commonly known for its associations with Eastern religions as an aid toward focussing attention in mediation. 40 However, variations of the mandala can occur spontaneously in the dreams of Western people, particularly at certain times.

As a rule a mandala occurs in conditions of psychic dissociation or disorientation, for instance in the case of children between the ages of eight and eleven whose parents are about to be divorced, or in adults who, as the result of a neurosis and its treatment, are confronted with the problem of opposites in human nature and are consequently disoriented; or again in schizophrenics whose view of the world has become confused, owing to the invasion of incomprehensible contents from the unconscious. In such cases it is easy to see how the severe pattern imposed by a circular image of this kind compensates the disorder and confusion of the psychic state -- namely, through the construction of a central point to which everything is related, or by a concentric arrangement of the disordered multiplicity and of contradictory and irreconcilable elements. This is evidently an attempt at self-healing on the part of Nature, which

39 Ibid.

40 For a brief discussion of mandala symbolism and examples of mandalas, consult Jung, "Concerning Mandala Symbolism" (1950) and "Mandalas" (1955) in ACU, pp. 355-390.
does not spring from conscious reflection but from an instinctive impulse.\textsuperscript{41}

An examination of the manifestations of mandalas leads us, in turn, to another archetype of wholeness. The examples of mandalas seen in individuals, though of great variety, are typically characterized by a relating of the circle with a quaternity,\textsuperscript{42} the latter seen, for example, as a square or the appearance of four figures or images in association with the circle. The image of the quaternity joins the mandala as one of the more abstract symbols of wholeness.

The "squaring of the circle" is one of the many archetypal motifs which form the basic patterns of our dreams and fantasies. But it is distinguished by the fact that it is one of the most important of them from the functional point of view. Indeed, it could even be called the archetype of wholeness. Because of this significance, the "quaternity of the One" is the schema for all images of God, as depicted in the visions of Ezekiel, Daniel, and Enoch, and as the representation of Horus with his four sons also shows.\textsuperscript{43}

The form of the quaternity in Ezekiel to which Jung refers is very striking:

As I looked a stormwind came from the North, a huge cloud with flashing fire, from the midst of which something gleamed like electrum. Within it were figures resembling four living creatures that looked like this: their form was human, but each had four faces and four wings, and their legs went straight down; the soles of their feet were round. They sparkled with a gleam like burnished bronze.\textsuperscript{44}

In Ezekiel we see the direct association of the quaternity with the Deity; Jung points out that a similar modern quaternity is the creation of the divine Four from the Trinity in Catholic theology by the addition of a fourth female element through the dogma of the Assumption of the

\textsuperscript{41}Jung, "Mandalas," ACU, pp. 386-387. \textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 388.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p. 389. \textsuperscript{44}Ezekiel 1:4-7
Virgin Mary. In addition to these directly religious examples, the quaternity appears within classical Greek references, e.g., the *Timaeus*, and within medieval literature as an important alchemical symbol. After a comparison with quaternity symbolism used in antiquity, Jung feels he can assert that "the symbol, spontaneously produced in the dreams of modern people, means the same thing (as it did in antiquity) — the God within." After this discussion of the meaning of the God-image, it is necessary to return to a point made earlier, that Jung does not see his examination of symbolism as an attempt at "explaining away" its significance. "If in physics, one seeks to explain the nature of light," he writes, "nobody expects that as a result there will be no light. But in the case of psychology everybody believes that what is explained is explained away." More than this, Jung affirms that his approach to the symbolism of the psyche is an appreciation of it that hopefully will lead to more sympathy for and recognition of the truth and power of symbolic thought and the finally irreducible and not fully explicable motivations that form symbols.

The medical psychotherapist today must make clear to his more educated patients the foundations of religious experience, and set them on the road to where such an experience becomes possible. If, therefore, as a doctor and a scientist, I analyse abstruse religious symbols and trace them back to their origins, my sole purpose is to

45 "Mandalas," ACU, p. 389n. In addition, the Assumption adds a psychologically compensating female/maternal aspect to the Trinity.

46 Ibid., p. 388; see the quaternity symbolism noted in Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 70-71.


conserve, through understanding, the values they represent, and to enable people to think symbolically once more, as the early thinkers of the Church were still able to do.49

Jung does not deify the reductive power of reason, for when man discovers that the gods are made by human hands, he does so "with the help of what he calls 'reason' -- which in point of fact is nothing more than the sum total of all his prejudices and myopic views."50

The manifestations of an archetype always point to a reality much larger than any one symbol can contain, as the mandala, quaternity or mother image should certainly suggest. Jung chooses not to speculate on any metaphysical origins of such symbolism, confining himself to psychological connections within the psyche of individual patients. It is in the interests of treating patients that Jung searches through the myths and symbols of antiquity in order to deduce the archetypes that have motivated man through history. The apprehension that an archetype is alive within him and affecting his life can allow a patient to perceive the shape of his life and to find a place and an order within what would otherwise be thought a hopeless chaos of events.

49Jung, ST, p. 229.

50Jung, ACU, p. 13.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Keys to the Cell:
Two Differing Views of The Archaic

We now return to our starting point, our point of reference -- the historical dialectics postulated by Freud.\(^1\) Those dialectics, whether "between sex and self-preservation, or between sex and aggression, or between life and death" we saw to be multiply historical: "historical" in that for Freud the struggle has its origins in time with specific (though perhaps not "real") events\(^2\); "historical" in that the struggle grows throughout history; "historical" in the sense of a case history of both an individual's and a culture's condition; "historical" in that not only the shape but also the meaning of civilization and human events is imparted by the struggle of the dialectic.

As this multiplicity should indicate, for Freud the dialectic is unavoidable, it is the human condition. The psycho-analytic saving knowledge begins with the belief in the ability of a persistent past to mold the perception of the present; that is, for all men, neurotic or not, the "real" too often is defined by that which no longer exists or may have existed only in fantasy. It would be, then, not only futile

\(^1\)Cf., Supra, pp. 1-12.

\(^2\)Important psychic contents may be produced, Freud discovered, by events that did not actually take place in the individual's life but seem to be part of an inheritance of the race. Cf. Supra, pp. 10-11; also IT, p. 188.
but also positively toxic for an analyst to aid a patient in denying, i.e., ignoring, his/her history (meaning especially here the patient's personal history but including as well cultural history). It is the task of the analyst to restore in the patient a proper sense of reality, which includes a proper respect for history. "Balanced" may be substituted for "proper" in both cases here. The analyst and ultimately the patient must recognize that the patient's history, though powerful, must be made subject to the patient's present, thus allowing the patient to see reality without the shadow or mirage of the past to obstruct the inspection. This scheme makes clear that the past and Freud as analyst are adversaries in a struggle to determine time. Philip Rieff's analogy is vivid in this regard:

If for Marx the past is pregnant with the future, with the proletariat as the midwife of history, for Freud the future is pregnant with the past, with the psychoanalyst as the abortionist of history.3

The danger with this metaphor, as well as with the portrayal of Freud and the past as adversaries, is the possible obscuring of the reality of the problem in a mist of abstraction. Freud, after all, developed his theoretical position against the past after experience with the neuroses of individual patients. This animus toward a persistent past is a composite of experience and imagination that succeeds in bringing within one scheme the neuroses of individuals and of history. Perhaps the best example of this diversified yet integrated account is Freud's remarks on the Oedipus complex.

The Oedipus complex, the "habitual" nucleus of a neurosis, is formed within a crucible of familial and societal responsibility which is fired by individual desire. The recognition of the Oedipal situation, in addition to its position at the cutting edge of Freud's psychology,\(^4\) is crucial to our discussion here of the relationship of Freud to the archaic. The Oedipal situation, as distinguished from the complex, is characteristic -- in a sense, symptomatic -- of the human condition. For Freud, it is unavoidable that there should be a rivalry between the infant son and his father for the affection of the mother, a rivalry evident in a more complex form in the young girl,\(^5\) and that the child is rightfully doomed to failure in this his/her first love object. All persons are in one way or another bound to settle this conflict which if left unresolved or imperfectly resolved develops into an Oedipus complex. Freud believed that the failure to resolve or the only partial resolution of this basic, infantile situation creates a wound which is not healed by time but instead develops into a festering abscess which can and does return to infect the life of the mature


\(^5\)Cf. Freud, _NIL_, pp. 118-120. Special note should be made here of Freud's observations of the efficacy of fantasy in the creation of a neurosis.
Psycho-analysis has taught us that the first object selection of the boy is of an incestuous nature and that it is directed to the forbidden objects, the mother and the sister; psycho-analysis has taught us also the methods through which the maturing individual frees himself from these incestuous attractions. The neurotic, however, regularly presents to us a piece of psychic infantilism; he has either not been able to free himself from the childlike conditions of psycho-sexuality, or else he has returned to them (inhibited development and regression). Hence, the incestuous fixations of the libido still play or are playing the main role in his unconscious psychic life. We have gone so far as to declare that the relation to the parents instigated by incestuous longings is the central complex of the neurosis. 6

The possibly pathogenic effects on the individual from the Oedipal situation are enough to warrant an analyst's concern. Freud, though, was not only an analyst but also a political philosopher of sorts 7 and believed that a crisis which affected all persons individually could not be supposed to have effects limited to individuals. The repetition of certain situations, we noted earlier, 8 is enough to cut these events into the psyche of all the individuals of the species and, what is more, to find embodiment in institutions or social structures. Put into simpler terms, we find it reasonable to assert that the wishes and perceptions of a society or culture find an embodiment in the structures


7 In an 1896 letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud writes, I see that you are using the circuitous route of medicine to attain your first ideal, the physiological understanding of man, while I secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same route at my own original objective, philosophy. For that was my original ambition, before I knew what I was intended to do in the world. (Origins, p. 141)

8 Supra, pp. 8-10.
and institutions of the society or cultures, admitting always that the structures or institutions through use may well alter those wishes and perceptions. If we can agree to this cause and effect relationship we should also agree that the Oedipal situation, insofar as it affects perceptions and wishes, must also ultimately affect institutions and structures. Freud would say that we are not two separate persons when we are framing our laws or following our customs as opposed to when we are not so engaged.

But how do those "persons" overlap; how does the Oedipus complex reach out from the individual psyche to shape "religion, morality, and a social sense"? Part of the difficulty in answering this question is the common belief, noted by Jung, that "psychological" means "only psychological," that a psychological fact is not a "real" fact. Despite Freud's discovery that a patient's fantasies may not be owing to "real" events and yet be very powerful, efficacious and therefore, as "real" as memories, the belief persists that we can choose to avoid the effects of our own neurosis, as if we can always perceive the neurosis and always singlehandedly overcome it. The power of the neurosis alone is enough to affect our social behaviour. But Freud's point is that social structures, in particular religion, are more than affected by neurosis but owe their existence to neurotic behaviour. To substantiate this belief in their origins, Freud turns not to potent fantasies but to the deed.

The clue to the relationship between the deed and its results is found in the similarity between types of neurosis and the ordinary
behaviour of primitive man with respect to totemism and taboo restriction. The "oldest and most important taboo prohibitions," Freud notes, "being the two basic laws of totemism: namely, not to kill the totem animal, and to avoid sexual intercourse with totem companions of the other sex." The psycho-analyst examining compulsion neurosis finds that were this term not used for this behaviour, "taboo disease" would be quite appropriate. This being the case, the desire is strong to seek a psycho-analytic explanation for the practice of taboo as such an answer is sought in the case of compulsion neurosis. Such investigation offers one clue to an "explanation" of totemism: following the lead of his experience, Freud would substitute for the totem animal the image of the father and thus make totemism a working out of a primal Oedipal wish. This suggestion is strengthened by a difference that exists between the neurotic and the primitive, that while the neurotic is inhibited in his actions, the primitive man is not and thus for the latter we can expect the thought or desire to be converted into action. Speaking of the primitive situation, Freud observes, "I think we may well assume in the case we are discussing, though without vouching for the absolute certainty of the decision, that 'In the beginning was the deed.'"
The deed is the violent result of a primitive sociology postulated by Freud involving a powerful father standing in opposition to the desires of the sons for the free access to the females of the group. The brothers, frustrated by the domination of the father, joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. Together they dared and accomplished what would have remained impossible for them singly. Perhaps some advance in culture, like the use of a new weapon, had given them the feeling of superiority. Of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of this strength. The totem feast, which is perhaps mankind's first celebration, would be the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions and religion.

The move from this crime to the creation of an institution requires an additional step: the manifestation of the remorse of the patricidal brothers. When this guilt emerges, it manifests itself in taboo prohibitions, the prohibition against the killing of the totem animal -- as substitute for the father -- and the creation of the incest prohibition to prevent the use of the women so sanguinely won. But a note of ambivalence remains within this remorse, for the totem animal is ritually slain at different times while in general the prohibition remains in effect; within this ambivalence, in the prohibitions and institution of ritual, Freud finds the origins of religion.

Features were thus brought into existence which continued thenceforward to have a determining influence on the nature of religion. Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by

13 Ibid., pp. 915-916
14 Ibid., pp. 916-917.
deferred obedience to him. All later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem. They vary according to the stage of civilization at which they arise and according to the methods which they adopt; but all have the same end in view and are reactions to the same great event with which civilization began and which, since it occurred, has not allowed mankind a moment's rest.15

It is difficult to insist that Freud is being wholly objective in these remarks on the origin of religion. Aside from whatever psychological impulse to which Freud surrenders himself at this point,16 there are at least two instances of unevenness of argument as suggested by Paul Ricouer in *Freud and Philosophy*. The first instance is Freud's overvaluation of the crime of patricide to the detriment of the fraternal covenant which ends such killings; "why not link the destiny of faith with this fraternal conciliation," suggests Ricoeur, "rather than with the perpetual repetition of the parricide?"17 In addition to this suggestion, Ricoeur points out that in insisting upon an actual Oedipal event, Freud abandons the hard-won analytic principle that wishes or fantasies are of themselves strong enough to activate behaviour. 18 Freud suggests in the concluding paragraphs of *Totem and Taboo* that since the behaviour of compulsion neurotics is based partly upon historical truth, that is, upon "actual evil impulses pure and simple," and not

15 *Freud, "Totem and Taboo" (1913), II, p. 141.*

16 This is not to say that there is no truth in Freud's observations but only that there is no good analytical reason to believe him always immune to the neurotic slips he perceived in his patients and against which he labored his adult life.


18 *Ibid., p. 537*
fantasy alone we should also suppose that primitive taboo customs were initially based upon historical truth, that is, an actual deed, especially since, as already pointed out, primitive men are much less inhibited in their actions than neurotics. It should be clear, however, that Freud's statements here do not answer Ricoeur's objections: to say that primitive men are less inhibited can not convince us that it had to be an act that led to taboo restrictions rather than following more closely the lead of neurosis to say it could have been wishes or desires alone. Given what Freud says regarding the "omnipotence of thoughts" in primitives and neurotics, this latter alternative seems at least possible. There is, perhaps, a more general criticism of Freud's approach within these remarks by Ernst Cassirer on the scientific explanation of myth:

To be sure all attempts to intellectualize myth -- to explain it as an allegorical expression of a theoretical or moral truth -- have completely failed. They ignored the fundamental facts of mythical experience. The real substratum of myth is not a substratum of thought but of feeling. Myth and primitive religion are by no means entirely incoherent, they are not bereft of sense or reason. But their coherence depends much more upon unity of feeling than upon logical rules. This unity is one of the strongest and most profound impulses of primitive thought. If scientific thought wishes to describe and explain reality it is bound to use its general method, which is that of classification and systematization. Life is divided into separate provinces that are sharply distinguished from each other. . . . But the primitive mind ignores and rejects them all. Its view of life is a synthetic, not an analytical one. Life is not divided into classes and


20Ibid., pp. 85-88. We must develop this suggestion at a later point; here we should be able to perceive how important it would be to shift the origin of religion from remorse for a bloody primal deed to remorse for wishes or inclinations.
subclasses. It is felt as an unbroken continuous whole which does not admit of any clean-cut and trenchant distinctions. The limits between the different spheres are not insurmountable barriers; they are fluent and fluctuating. There is no specific difference between the various realms of life. Nothing has a definite, invariable, static shape.21

Cassirer's remarks seem to challenge all forms of scientific investigation of myth and, in particular, seem directed against that attitude which through explanation would seek to "explain away." This particular opposition for the most part falls short of criticizing Freud, however. Though there may be problems with the scientific study of myth per se, Freud is not one to insist that by offering an explanation of the origin of myth he has ended the power of myth. Nor would Freud be likely to force easy categorizations on myths which are, like neuroses, complex phenomena. Riceour's remarks here following probably form a more telling critique of Freud's analytic method. Writes Riceour,

Analysis does indeed throw some light on what we have called the birth of idols; but it has no way of deciding whether that is all that faith is; whether ritual is originally, in its primordial function, obsessional ritual; whether faith is merely consolation on the childhood pattern. Analysis can reveal to the religious man his caricature, but it leaves him the task of meditating on the possibility of not resembling his distorted double.22

But a critique of Freud for his sins of omission or commission in the study of religion is not of primary importance here. We are most concerned with what Freud says about the origins of religion and how these remarks pertain to his relationship with the archaic. It is not enough to say that Freud sees in religion a link with the past; in religion, Freud sees the past living on, sees a stage of human development that should

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22Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 533.
have been but has not been "outgrown." Religion for Freud is a product and the maintenance of an infantile age in man's history, an age of the son's uncontrollable envy and unassuagable guilt, an age of ambivalent dependence upon the parents rather than an independence brought by cool intellectual effort. In these characteristics, religion represents the childhood of mankind. As Freud notes in "Totem and Taboo," the religious phase stands midway as a time of dependence on the parents between an earlier time of the narcissism of the animistic phase of development and the following scientific period in which the individual and civilization renounce past attachments and live by their reason.

It should not be too surprising that Freud should urge the rejection of religion, since as an analyst he must work to overcome the psychic infantilism, the pathological attachments to the past which form the basis of neurosis. The analyst would be inclined to be wary of religion as it is the presence of the past, a presence which interferes with the individual's ability to meet the present. The present is not met by the mature individual through reliance on a pleasure principle or the strength of the father but through a dependence on one's own intelligence and power of logic.

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23 Mircea Eliade makes a similar observation in The Sacred and the Profane: "... this desire on the part of religious man to travel back periodically, his effort to reintegrate a mythological situation (the situation as it was in the beginning) may appear intolerable and humiliating to modern eyes.... From one point of view it may even be said that religious man -- especially the religious man of primitive societies -- is above all a man paralyzed by the myth of the eternal return. A modern psychologist would be tempted to interpret such an attitude as anxiety before the danger of the new, refusal to assume responsibility for a genuine historical existence, nostalgia for a situation that is paradisal precisely because it is embryonic, insufficiently
This text leaves no doubt; reality has the same meaning at the end of Freud's life as it had at the beginning: reality is the world shorn of God. Its final meaning does not contradict but rather extends the concept of utility, long since opposed to the fictions created by desire. 25

But what does this position toward religion tell us about Freud's conception of time? It should be clear that the two are related, the former being a prime example of the results of the latter. Rieff points out,

Beginning with the concept of man as time-bound, Freud's major scientific achievement is his systematic insight into the life-history of the individual and the social process in history. Particularly at the end of his life, he was preoccupied with the problem of time-bindedness in man and society as it expressed itself in the most interesting of neuroses — indeed, the primal neurosis — religion. 26

Within this article Rieff points out Freud's opposition to the past and asserts that Freud had a belief that history is circular, "a closed system." 27 Though there is truth in Rieff's observation regarding Freud's opposition toward the past, coupling this first observation with the second — that Freud held a belief in the circularity of history — should lead us to a conclusion different from the one drawn by Rieff.

For Reiff, these two are definitive descriptions. For us, the two observations — that Freud opposed the past and that he believed history to be circular — should form only a partial conclusion that must be developed. From the example of religion, it should be clear that Freud

detached from Nature.”


Freud would point out that he has admitted that psycho-analysis cannot pretend to trace so complicated a phenomenon as religion to a single source (cf. II, p. 100). Yet remarks already noted in Totem and Taboo and others in works such as The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest (1913) (II, p. 106) and Civilization and Its Discontents (p. 19) strongly indicate that as far as Freud is concerned there can be only two
is not only an enemy of the past but also an enemy of the circularity --
the going back to a previous situation which creates both neurosis and
religion -- that makes the past a problem for the individual and for
civilization. For Freud to urge the discarding of religion and the
departing from the religious phase is for him to urge man in a linear
direction, to argue the benefits and "rightness" of linear as opposed
to circular time. What is wrong with men is their stagnation at one
point in the line of animistic-religious-scientific continuity, that
while the world surrounding them demands a scientific orientation, men
persist in returning to the religious. We should be able to see more
clearly now why Freud must insist on an act or a definite period of
physical or cultural development as the basis of religion: such an in-
sistence is necessary to maintain a linear form; that is, there was a
time before the act/period, there is a time -- now -- after the act/
period. If the source of religion is allowed to be less definitely in a
past time or event, they and religion are less vulnerable to Freud's
arguments.

interrelated reasons for the existence of religion: the protracted
period of dependence upon the parents and its characteristic love-hate
ambivalence exemplified by the Oedipus situation.

27 Ibid., p. 119. Rieff writes of Freud's perspective toward the
future: Freud possessed an almost total disdain for the future.
His well-known pessimism as a social thinker must be understood
in terms of his model of recurrent time against the openness and
opportunity of a qualitatively different future. (p. 119)
These remarks should be compared to those of Ernest Jones:
He [Freud] displayed but little interest in the future of mankind,
and only occasionally expressed a few speculations about it.

Freud was primarily a discoverer, and his interest always turned
So it is that Freud must emphasize that the killing of the father took place in the infancy of the race, that the sons who performed the Oedipal deed, no matter what their chronological age, were essentially children living in a period of ambivalent dependence on the father. Freud cannot speak of "mature" men, either in primitive times or now, having religious inclinations, for to do so would be to grant that religion is not a phenomenon of a clearly defined archaic time but is instead characteristic -- "natural" -- of men's time at all stages of his growth.

Freud's views of religion form only a part, though an important part, of his entire works. Of this entire work we will repeat only what was said above, that the study of Freud's view of religion leads us to perceive that, in general, the therapeutic for Freud consists in somehow substituting linear time in place of circular time.

How, then, does Freud's perspective on time differ from Jung's and why is that difference important?

In our examination of Jung to this point we have seen described a relationship with time, especially the archaic, which hints at a subtle but critical difference between Freud and Jung. There are times when this difference seems so faint as to be non-existent, as, for example, when Jung insists on the importance of the ego in the process of therapy or when he styles himself the adversary of the "monster of the past" and the "problem of Christianity."

to problems that offered some promising opening for investigation. Where none was visible, as with the problems of the future his interest soon waned; it was a waste of time and thought to speculate about the unknown. (LW, II, pp. 315-316.) Thus both Rieff and Jones agree that Freud disliked to study the future
My problem is to wrestle with the big monster of the historical past, the great snake of the centuries, the burden of the human mind, the problem of Christianity. It would be so much simpler if I knew nothing; but I know too much, through my ancestors and my own education. Other people are not worried by such problems, they do not care about the historical burdens Christianity has heaped upon us. But there are people who are concerned with the great battle between the present and the past or the future.29

The outline of Jung's thought sketched in the three previous chapters should make us uneasy with this exercise in self-description. What we have seen of Jung so far would not tend to make us regard him as a crusader against the past or the "problem" of Christianity. Jung's remarks here seem off the mark, especially so if we bear Freud's theoretical position in mind as a comparison. Though Jung and Freud share some theoretical positions, they hold essentially quite different views toward the past.

As we have noted, the past for Jung exists not only as a residue of events -- against which one might or might not crusade -- but also as the creative memory of the race, that is as the collective unconscious and its contents the archetypes. The archetypes were defined as motivations to form certain sets of images; these motivations should not be confused with the images -- the archetypal motifs -- which they produce. Though the different motivations cannot be precisely defined, the motifs each produces do allow for a general isolation of different archetypes. It is through a comparative study of the myths and fairy tales of

but the former argues this is so because Freud knew the future too well while the latter argues this is so because Freud couldn't know the future at all!

28Supra, pp. 20-21.
29Jung, APF, pp. 142-43.
primitive peoples with the dreams and fantasies of contemporary individuals, both those diagnosed neurotic and those not, that Jung derives his justification for affirming the existence of these instinctual psychological motivations. For Jung, the archetypes are no more "mystical" and at least as characteristically human as are the physical instincts. "Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence," writes Jung, "so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human modes." 30

The word "force" should be noted in these remarks, for the archetypes tend to manifest themselves in a compensatory response to the conscious situation, thus offering a critique of a possibly too-rationalistic, too immediacy-bound conscious by a more primitive, trans-historical instinct within the psyche. This is to say that Jung believes the collective unconscious to be fully capable of "breaking out" into the conscious situation through the activity of the archetypes to fill not only an individual's dreams with puzzling and possibly ominous images but also to affect that person's perceptions of and reactions to the "real" world. The power of the archetypes is a force to be respected and the overwhelming of the conscious by the collective unconscious is a "psychic disaster" against which Jung warns strongly. Ideally, the activity of the collective unconscious is a guide to the person's real condition, a condition that includes both the demands and exigencies of the present and the active responses of his/her more primitive psychological instincts.

30 Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," SDP, p. 133.
It is this compensatory function which gives the archetypes their role as representatives of the past, though it would be more accurate to say "the primitive" or "the archaic" rather than "the past" in order to eliminate any confusion in associating the archetypes with specific events of an earlier time. The archetypes represent not so much events -- though they do reflect the human situation -- as an attitude: the attitude is primitive insofar as it is "pre-scientific," "non-logical" in the contemporary sense of logic and therefore shares a mode of expression with a time in history in which this mode was more typically the conscious mode. They do not, however, represent the past as a "relic," as vestigial remain of previous times but as a continuation of a mode that was more evident in those earlier historical periods. Once we assert the presence of the collective unconscious, we must broaden our sense of time, in particular, we must broaden our conception of "the present" to include not only our own "scientific," "rational" era but also the continuing presence of the primitive and mythical within our own lifetime.

In the preceding chapter we examined two archetypes in detail, the archetype of the Mother and the archetype of the God-image including of the latter both the common manifestations and the more abstract. The particular importance of the imago Dei -- as the symbol of wholeness or the highest expression of the life energy of the psyche -- has been noted.31 We should point out here that Jung's assertions about the origin of religious phenomena indicate a reliance on a particular theory of time. Religious myth and ceremony is for Jung the manifestation of

31 Supra, pp. 60-65.
archetypal forms, those instinctual psychic forces which existed in man alongside the physical instincts from his nascence both individually and racially. It is true that Jung perceives that from time to time "the gods die", but this is the demise of symbols or myths which no longer speak to a people's spiritual needs and not the death of religion or a religious sense.

Religion, insofar as it is a manifestation of the archetypes, is a natural, spontaneous human creation for Jung. Furthermore, the religious sense is not a product of outside forces working on man's psyche, though the various forms of religious worship very possibly would reflect the political, geographical, sociological, etc., conditions of a people. To say "natural" here is to say "recurring"; if Jung's studies show anything, they show the repetition of certain types of imagery and myths among peoples that seems to be slightly affected if at all by time or place. Writes Jung,

Although the changing situations of life must appear infinitely various to our way of thinking, their possible number never exceeds certain natural limits; they fall into more or less typical patterns that repeat themselves over and over again. The archetypal structure of the unconscious corresponds to the average run of events. The changes that may befall a man are not infinitely variable; they are variations of certain typical occurrences which are limited in number. When therefore a distressing situation arises, the corresponding archetype will be constellated in the unconscious. Since this archetype is numinous, i.e., possesses a specific energy, it will attract to itself the contents of consciousness -- conscious ideas that render it perceptible and hence capable of conscious realization. Its passing over into consciousness is felt as an illumination, a revelation, or a "saving idea."33

32 Supra, p. 35-38

33 Jung, ST, p. 293.
There is at least one problem with this notion of the "saving idea." Though Jung's defense of an innate religious sense does seem to save religion from the reductionists' grasp ("religion is nothing more than . . ."), it does allow for a different sort of transformation of religion into other terms. Writing in "General Aspects of Dream Psychology" Jung makes these observations:

I always think of psychology as encompassing the whole of the psyche, and that includes philosophy and theology and many other things besides. For underlying all philosophies and all religions are the facts of the human soul, which may ultimately be the arbiters of truth and error. 34

I find I must emphasize over and over again that neither the moral order, nor the idea of God, nor any religion has dropped into man's lap from outside, straight down from heaven, as it were, but that he contains all this in nuce within himself, and for this reason can produce it all out of himself. 35

It would be grossly unfair to Jung to pull these remarks alone out of context as an indication of a Jungian type of reductionism, but caution can be fairly suggested, at least to the theologian who would adopt a Jungian perspective. That theologian should bear in mind that Jung neither denies nor affirms the existence of a God apart from the God-image he recognizes as so important in every individual. It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the God-image is "enough" for Jung, that is, whether or not the psychological need for wholeness is enough of an explanation for the production of the various religious motifs. At times, as in the remarks above, Jung seems more than willing to allow the psychological explanation to be the only explanation; at other times, such as when he speaks of an "imprinter" of the archetypes, 36 he seems

34 "General Aspects of Dream Psychology" (1916/1948), SDP, p. 276.
35 Ibid., p. 278.
36 Cf., Supra, p. 60.
more open to the possibility of a reality apart from the human psyche. There is little doubt, however, that Jung's observations on the religious sense open more avenues for investigation and argument, both theological and psychological, than they close. But such avenues are habitually pitted with ambiguity. The student of comparative religions or the person of more liberal faith might be heartened by Jung's work in the field of myth and its relationship to modern patients as showing a continuity of belief throughout time and across continents; those of more orthodox faith might take offense at these comparative findings as representing an affront to their confidence in their membership in an "elect" or "chosen people." The resolution of this and other such disputes is extraneous to this paper, however. As with the mention of Ricoeur's and Cassirer's remarks in comparison with Freud's, these problems with Jung's thought are offered only to give some sense of the limitations to his arguments. For Jung, and thus for our interest here, there is no doubt that a related set of religious images occur throughout human history, indicating for him an inherent religious sense within man.

That the primitive reappears in the dreams or religious practices of modern man is a matter of concern for Jung not because the primitive, that is, the archetypes, obstruct psychological growth but because it can aid that growth if properly employed. Indeed, for Jung psychological

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37 Jung like Freud would recognize that there are other "primitive" drives in man, what Freud would call the id impulses, but these are less important for Jung both in his overall psychology and in his relationship to the archaic.
wholeness cannot be achieved without recognition of and some cooperation with the collective unconscious. The analyst, then, is not, at least not necessarily, the opponent of the past but rather acts as the advocate of psychic health which means helping the patient to find some reconciliation between the primitive and the present.

How arbitrary these terms "primitive" and "present" now seem in application to Jung's thought! What we might term the "primitive" is as relevant to the maintenance of psychological health in an individual's modern situation as is that person's possibly overly-rationalistic conscious orientation. Like Augustine lamenting that he knows what time is until someone asks him to define it, we may have known what "the present" was until Jung explains it. In Jung's thought, a clearly-differentiated "then" and "now" become less clear and, more importantly, less meaningful. Certainly it is true that Jung maintains that the conscious must be protected against a powerful collective unconscious, but the conscious conversely is subject to a myopia which is remedied through a careful interpretation of the responses of the collective unconscious.

We must guard against overstating the point, but it is fair to assert that for Jung any therapeutic mode which employs linear movement in time as an ideal is not only not therapeutic but also self-deluding; insofar as the archetypes break into personal and cultural history, the individual and the race do not move "forward" along the time line to a new point but instead reproduce in new garb the images that have always existed within man. Again, it is not the duty of the Jungian analyst to
steadfastly oppose this synchronous flow of time but instead to recognize its existence and to aid the analysand in learning from it.

In conclusion, we will examine the thought of Freud and Jung more closely juxtaposed. Freud saw the past, to the degree that it forced itself through one means or another on the present, to be the enemy of psychic health. The neurotic is the prisoner of his/her memories, analysis being the key the analyst/liberator employs to free the prisoner to the light of a reality which, though stern is not darkened (nor, one might add, "ameliorated") by illusion. Religion is among the chief of these illusions that must be burned out by the light of psycho-analytic science, for religion is based upon and recreates the past in its maintenance of the condition of the child's dependence and of the taboo restrictions of the repentant patricidal brothers. The tragedy of human history, its neurosis, is the situation created by necessity: the necessity of the child's dependence, the necessity of the confrontation with the primitive impulses of the id, the necessity of living within civilization and adapting to ever-increasing societal restrictions; all these necessities somehow help the past to persist. This tragedy can be softened somewhat; the illusions -- principally religion -- can be dispelled

38 By "synchronous" I mean "characteristically moving at the same rate of and occurring at the same point of time." The words "linear" and "cyclic" both imply a "before and after." I wish to characterize Jung's conception of time as "synchronous" to indicate that in his conception of time there are no essential differences among past, present and future. For Jung, the individual carries the essentials of human history, both the shape of the past and the shape of the future, complete within himself or herself through the presence of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. What might be labelled the most "primitive" images might be spun out by the collective unconscious in contemporary or future time with apparently complete disregard for the
and man might then begin to live more rationally. Instead of the cyclical return of the repressed, a linear time scheme could be substituted to enable man to confront the present as it is and to move into the future.

Such changes, though, seem to be little more than cosmetic, adding some youth to the visage of history but not repairing its dessicated internal organs. The therapeutic scheme established by Freud offers a certain dignity to man but little in terms of hope. The id impulses cannot be completely suppressed, the clock cannot be turned back to allow for an essential reshaping of civilization. Man's existence and perceptions are so shaped by time that ultimately history is a penitentiary from which there is no exit.

Jung, too, recognizes a certain inevitably cyclic character to human history, but for him these repetitions provide an opportunity not an opponent. These repetitions point to the activity of the collective unconscious, the creative memory of the race, whose responses properly understood can provide an invaluable critique by the primitive spirit of man of the conscious, contemporary situation. The linear conception of time, from this point of view, is both an error theoretically and an antithesis to psychic health. The past, as represented by the collective unconscious, cannot be wished or analysed away and it is through an attention to the compensatory reactions of the archetypes that a perspective can be achieved to balance the rationalism of consciousness. In Jung, the synchronous is affirmed against the linear conception of passage of the arbitrary distinctions of decade and century. So it is that these images "move at the same rate" and "occur at the same time" as these arbitrary distinctions and thus indicate for Jung that time is one indivisible whole.
time as being both more accurate description and more psychologically therapeutic. In this context, religion is not regarded as an illusion but, to the degree it represents the working out of the God archetype, is one of the most important manifestations of the collective unconscious.

But one must ask if Jung any more than Freud provides a real escape from the tyranny of time. As a tool for understanding the failures of the past or for calming the fears for the future, Jung can offer the wisdom of the collective unconscious. The question must then be asked if this wisdom is more than a plunging into time, into the past and the human condition -- which is to beg the question of whether more should exist.

What Jung and Freud both seem to offer is not "exit" but "creative acceptance." To say this is to make all the more acute the differences between the two, for the differences are in the ways one encounters and ultimately accepts time.

This thesis has examined the work of C.G. Jung with the intention of ascertaining how a view of the archaic is operative in this psychology, and, to a lesser degree, how a view of the archaic is operative in Jung's perception of religion. Jung's conception of the psyche, man's possession of both a personal and collective mental life, and the activity of the archetypes have been discussed in order to indicate how a sense of recurrence is important in Jung's thought, for example, in the way such a view of time is evident in his approach toward religion. By way of comparison, Freud's conceptions have been juxtaposed to Jung's, offering a more linear view of time as an alternative to Jung's more synchronous; in the examination of Freud, it was noted how this desire for an end to the cycle of return is evinced in
Freud's reaction against religion. In the cases of both Freud's and Jung's thought, though religion holds an important place, in neither case does religion hold a dominant position. What is of fundamental importance to both is an attitude, an attitude which is evident in both the mode and goals of both therapies, an attitude which one may begin to understand by first appreciating how each man views the archaic, views time.
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