RYLE'S CONCEPT OF IMAGINATION
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ABSTRACT

This work is an attempt to provide an understanding of the nature of what we call 'having a mental image', 'visualising', 'seeing in the mind's eye' or, more technically, 'imaging'. It does so by analysing the concept of imaging and its relation to other concepts. My analysis is centred around Gilbert Ryle's discussion of imagination in 'The Concept of Mind'.

Perhaps the most important single factor in an analysis of imaging is to understand the relation between imaging or seeing in the mind's eye and actually seeing. I have argued along with Ryle that this relation is not such that when we see something in the mind's eye we are actually seeing a mental image. This I have called Ryle's negative thesis. I am concerned to show that mental images are not existing entities along similar lines to pictures, snapshots or even after-images. I have argued in support of Ryle's position on the basis that mental images do not have representational qualities and cannot be identified independently of what they are mental images of.

Chapters 2 and 5 try to establish the relation between seeing in the mind's eye and seeing itself. Both involve the utilisation of our knowledge or belief as to what the thing seen or imagined looks like.

As regards Ryle's positive thesis, I have examined his claim that having a mental image of Helvellyn is equivalent to imagining that one is seeing Helvellyn in front of one's nose.
dividing the concept of imagination into six senses. I have shown
that Ryle's arguments can be seen as treating imaging as falling
under the propositional entertainment sense, and this is untenable.
The explanation of imaging in terms of a sophisticated operation
similar to pretending which Ryle gives is adequate only up to the
point when we wish to ask, what activity is the person who is
having a mental image engaged in? Imaging often involves doing
something and Ryle's explanation that it is an achievement verb
is not adequate here. If there is an activity it must be a mental
activity.
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INTRODUCTION

'Imagination' and the related terms 'imagining', 'imagine', 'imaginative' etc. have a wide and divergent range of application. However, my main concern in this work is with one particular area of imagination. There are a number of different expressions which are employed when discussing this area, 'seeing in the mind's eye', 'having a mental image', 'picturing' etc. The common thread we might say is that all are related to what we might call 'mental imagery', though some of the terms such as 'visualising' and 'picturing' have applications beyond the field of mental imagery. Some of these expressions may be used synonymously on occasions, but others suggest subtle distinctions. Terms such as 'visualising' and 'picturing' when used to refer to mental imagery tend to be restricted to cases when one deliberately imagines. 'Seeing in the mind's eye' or 'having a mental image' carry no such implication. At various times throughout this work I have employed all these expressions, though I have often preferred to use the term 'imaging'. This term I take to refer exclusively to the field of mental imagery and to carry no implications as to whether one is imagining deliberately. In many instances the term 'visualising' has been used when the question of intention has not arisen, but where it does carry this implication the context makes this clear. The expression 'seeing a mental image' I have treated
as impermissible in talking of mental imagery, because for the purpose of this discussion I treat it as implying that mental images are existing entities which are actually seen. However, this is not to disallow an inverted commas use of 'see' which has an established usage in this area of imagination. "I 'see' a chocolate eclair" can often be equivalent to "I am having a mental image of a chocolate eclair".

That people visualise, see in the mind's eye or have mental images is a fact neither I nor Ryle set out to deny. That mental images are existing entities which are actually seen when we visualise, I do wish to deny. From a positive point of view I hope that an analysis of the concept of imaging will yield information as to what imaging is and how it is related to various other concepts, particularly important being its relationship to the ideas of intentional seeing and seeing an aspect, and trying to establish a relationship between these concepts and the concept of imaging. The discussion of course is centred on Ryle's treatment of imaging in 'The Concept of Mind'. I have divided Ryle's treatment of imaging into what I have called his negative and positive thesis. The former, which I support in this work, though for different reasons, is that imaging does not involve seeing mental images. The latter, which attempts to explain imaging in terms of a sophisticated operation similar to pretending, I maintain to be inadequate, particularly in the denial that imaging is a mental activity. However, a thorough analysis of his argument will be seen to be beneficial in that many of the points he raises, along
with a appreciation of the mistakes he made, can point us in the right direction.
Chapter I  IMAGING AS SEEING

If for the present we confine our discussion to the question of visual mental imagery, seeing in the mind's eye as opposed to hearing in the mind's ear, etc., we can ask what is the relationship between the concepts of imaging and seeing. My purpose in this chapter is negative in that I wish to show what this relationship is not. That is, imaging need not involve actually seeing and hence the existence of some object, a mental image, which is seen. This negative claim I call Ryle's negative thesis. What I shall do is examine Ryle's arguments in support of this claim, many of which are inadequate as they stand, and try to provide more conclusive arguments in favour of this position.

As I have noted, Ryle is not denying that people visualise or have mental images, so we should not approach his arguments in the way we might approach the problem of Achilles and the tortoise; that is, we know Achilles will always beat the tortoise, so what is the flaw in the argument? Ryle would allow that we can talk of seeing in the mind's eye and having a mental image, etc., but that (1) this does not involve the existence of anything seen or (2) any actual seeing.

The expression 'having a mental image' perhaps sounds confusing in this context, in that it may seem to imply the existence of mental images. To say "I have a red pen" implies that a
red pen exists, so does the same not follow when I say "I have a mental image"? It is the reification of mental images that Ryle wishes to avoid and for this end 'having a mental image' is a misleading expression. Ryle's position is that imaging goes on but that mental images are not existing entities. In a similar way we might argue that I can have a thought, but does this require that the thought is an existing entity? All this need imply is that thinking is going on. I have the need to utilise the expression 'having a mental image' because it is an expression which is commonly used when talking of mental imagery. This expression leaves it open whether or not mental images can be considered existing entities, whereas I have chosen to treat the expression 'to see a mental image' as implying that mental images exist and can be seen.

At the outset we should draw distinctions between the various uses of "see" (in inverted commas). We talk of 'seeing' the home of our childhood when we are imaging, of Macbeth 'seeing' the dagger or of 'seeing' a conjurer producing rabbits from a hat. Ryle fails to make these distinctions and his lumping together of hallucinations and illusions with imaging only helps to confuse. As we are not at present in a position to give a full description of imaging we cannot fully elucidate the differences between imaging and hallucinations, etc., but we can notice that some of the things that can be said of hallucinations, etc., cannot be said of imaging and vice versa. The fact that this is so gives us a reason for keeping them distinct. We cannot deliberately hall-
ucinate (although we can take hallucinatory drugs, but even here we cannot control what we see), whereas we can often deliberately have a mental image. The case of illusions is not so clear on this point and I think we can deliberately have an illusion. Also hallucinations usually involve being taken in, although arguably this need not be the case. Illusions do not necessarily involve being taken in; I may be aware that the conjurer is not really sawing the lady in half even if he creates the illusion of doing so. It is likely that on some occasions I can be taken in when I am imaging; I may believe that I am actually seeing what I am having a mental image of. Though when I am deliberately having a mental image it seems un plausible to say that I can be taken in. Of course one may try to incorporate various psychological theories which would make it intelligible to say that a person deliberately took himself in. However, one may get so involved in one’s imaging that one gets caught up in the fantasy, but this is a different thing. Finally, we should notice that illusions and usually hallucinations occur when the eyes are open. Further differences exist but it is inappropriate to go into them at this point. Chapter 2 should provide a sufficient survey of the various inverted commas uses of ‘see’. However there are two important points that will be discussed in this chapter. What one believes one sees in hallucinations and illusions is located in public space, but if imaging involves seeing mental images where are these images? Do we have to locate them in private space? Also, we can continue to notice features of our hallucinations and illusions, can we do this when
we have a mental image?

There are obvious ways in which imaging is different from seeing, one can see only when one's eyes are open, when there is light and only what is there to be seen. These restrictions clearly do not apply to imaging or seeing in the mind's eye. Anyone who would hold that seeing in the mind's eye involves seeing must realise that it is different from ordinary cases of seeing, but the question to be tackled here is how far is there a similarity between the two that would justify our talk of 'seeing a mental image'. Ryle says that when a person says he 'sees' something he knows he is doing something totally different from seeing because the verb is in inverted commas. (In this argument Ryle confuses matters by using the example of a person suffering from delirium tremens who is described as 'seeing' snakes, rather than restricting his examples to cases of imaging.) When we make statements such as "I am imagining the home of my childhood" (imagining used here in the sense of imaging) or "I see (non-inverted commas use) the Statue of Liberty" we should notice that both verbs take the same sort of objects, i.e., physical objects. The object of the former verb is not a mental image. Someone who says he 'sees' the home of his childhood (imaging) is clearly aware that he is not seeing the home of his childhood (or at least he believes he is not seeing it). The fact that 'see' is used in inverted commas need not, as Ryle says, indicate that someone making such a statement knows he is doing something different from seeing, but may indicate that he knows he is not seeing the object of the verb,
in this case the home of his childhood. This does say that he is not seeing anything else. If I am looking at one of Van Gogh's self-portraits I think it would be permissible to say that I 'see' Van Gogh. The use of inverted commas here would only indicate that I am aware or believe that I am not actually seeing Van Gogh, and certainly not to deny that I am seeing anything at all.

Ryle's second point is that: "a person who says that he 'sees' the home of his childhood is often prepared to describe his vision as 'vivid', 'faithful' or 'lifelike', adjectives which he would never apply to the sight of what is in front of his nose".\(^1\) Taken out of context this is clearly wrong. We do talk of lifelike portraits and faithful recordings of bird songs, etc. These adjectives can be applied to what is in front of our nose. Ryle's point is that we would not say "I see the Statue of Liberty vividly", but one might say "I 'see' the Statue of Liberty vividly! This is correct but it does not show that there is no seeing going on. All it might indicate is that if there is any seeing going on it is not the Statue of Liberty which is being seen. Looking at a Van Gogh self-portrait I can say "I 'see' Van Gogh vividly", and this clearly does not indicate that I am not seeing anything, but only that I am not actually seeing Van Gogh.

So Ryle's two arguments here have not shown that when we are imaging we are doing something different from seeing, but only the obvious point that when, for example, I have a mental image of

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Julius Caesar. I am doing something different from seeing Julius Caesar. He has not shown that I am not seeing something else. However, if when I am 'seeing' Julius Caesar, I am not seeing Julius Caesar then what am I doing? If I am still seeing I must be seeing something, hence we end up talking of the existence of special objects which we do see, that is, mental images.

Ryle's description of 'seeing' Julius Caesar is that I seem to be seeing Julius Caesar. This is undoubtedly true. We would be prepared to say that if I am having a mental image of X then I seem to be seeing X. But this does not mean that I cannot be seeing some other visible object and so does not show that when I am having a mental image there is no seeing going on, nor anything which is seen. After all, when I look at a portrait of Van Gogh I seem to see Van Gogh. The only way that Ryle could possibly make his point here is to say that we cannot both seem to see something and see the same thing at the same time. Sartre claims this to be so. He thinks that when I see an actor as the person he is mimicking I cannot really be perceiving the actor. However I do not think much can be made out of this claim, as should become clear when I discuss intentional seeing in Chapter 2.

It should be obvious from the moves I have made to show these arguments of Ryle to be inadequate that the position he is attacking is one which holds that having a mental image of X is

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1: Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Imaginaire: psychologie phenomenologique de l'imagination. (Gallimard 1940), p.156.
rather like looking at a ghostly snapshot or picture of X. To evaluate this position and consider Ryle's possible line of attack it is worthwhile to consider what Ryle takes seeing or observing to entail. Ryle in his treatment of perception concentrates upon the verb 'to observe' rather than 'to perceive' or 'to see'. His reason for this is that these latter verbs cover only achievements, whereas the word 'observe' "can be used as well to signify discovery as to signify search". Lest some sleight of hand should be suspected in contrasting what Ryle has to say about observing with the idea of seeing a mental image, it should be sufficient to point out that if one has observed X one must also have seen X, and also if one has seen X one must also have observed X. (Perhaps using the word 'observe' suggests that the object in question is being carefully scrutinised, in which case the latter would not be true, though this need not be so. Observation as Ryle points out can be described as careful or careless, methodical or haphazard etc.) A major point in Ryle's argument is that observing involves having sensations. If we treat words such as 'whiff' or 'glimpse' as standing for sensations then it is clear that "a man could not be described as watching a robin who had not got a single glimpse of it, or as smelling a cheese who had not caught a whiff." It follows from this that it is nonsense to talk of observing our sensations, because then this observing would involve

2. Ibid., p. 197.
having another sensation, which in turn could be observed leading to an infinite regress. This fact is important in showing that mental images cannot be sensations, because if this was so then we could not talk of seeing a mental image.

As I have suggested above, if we are to talk of seeing mental images it follows that we should be able to talk of observing our mental images. However, as Ryle says: "observation is accordingly describeable as careful or careless, cursory or sustained, methodical or haphazard, accurate or inaccurate, expert or amature." Are any of these descriptions appropriate to cases of seeing in the mind's eye? Imaging, as we noted earlier, is often done deliberately. In these cases it is linked with intention. Here the only features we could ascribe to mental images are those we intend there to be. It makes no sense to talk about observing our mental images carefully or carelessly in such cases as if there were additional features which we might discover or overlook. The same applies to the other mentioned adverbs. However, not all cases of imaging are like this, often we not deliberately have a mental image, they may be unpleasant and very unwelcome. But even here the idea of noticing or failing to notice other details does not seem to arise. Mental images are unlike physical objects, and in particular unlike snapshots and pictures in that they may overlook many features altogether. If I draw a picture of a man I must either draw him wearing footwear, barefoot, or his

1. Ibid., p.194.
feet so obscured by shadow or something else that it is impossible to tell. This need not be the case if I have a mental image of a man. I may picture him as wearing footwear or his feet being in the shadow, but I need not. The question of his footwear need not come up. There is no question of saying "Hold on I'll have another look. Oh yes, he's wearing sneakers." We cannot observe mental images and notice details that we failed to notice earlier, in the way we could with a snapshot. If this was the whole story we could conclude that having a mental image does not involve seeing or observing anything, but unfortunately it is not. There are cases of eidetic imagery where people report having mental images which persist for minutes at a time and from which they claim to notice more and more details. How we should best describe having a mental image in these cases I propose to deal with later in the chapter.

As we have seen, Ryle's analysis of perception renders the conclusion that observation entails having sensations (at least one). Thus if having a mental image is to involve seeing, it will have to follow that having a mental image involves having sensations. However, as Ryle has pointed out, having a mental image does not appear to require having sensations at all. "An imagined shriek is not earsplitting, nor yet is it a soothing murmur, and an imagined shriek is neither louder or fainter than a heard murmur; It neither drowns it nor is drown by it."¹ This is true, though we do mistake, for example, hearing in the mind's ear for

¹. Ibid., p. 237.
actually hearing a sound. But this does not blur the distinction. For having a mental image to involve having sensations it would have to be possible to talk of the mental image itself being ear-splitting, bright, dazzling, etc., as opposed to saying these things of whatever it is one is having a mental image of. This raises the crucial question of whether we can talk of mental images having non-representational qualities which I shall presently be discussing.

It can justifiably be pointed out that in this attempt to show that imaging need not actually involve seeing or observing I have been forced to implicitly acknowledge the existence of mental images. I have had to talk of the impossibility of noticing other features of mental images, and so on. Is this not damaging to Ryle's contention that, although we visualise, have mental images and see in the mind's eye, there do not exist images? Obviously we can sensibly talk of mental images and we must consider whether use of such an expression commits us to acknowledge the existence of a certain kind of object. I believe that it need not do so and I subsequently hope to show this, but it should be sufficient at present to point out that use of the term 'mental image' need not imply the existence of an object.

For the moment however, I want to consider another argument which Ryle puts forward against the view that imaging involves seeing some special status pictures. The plausibility of the view, he claims, cannot be sustained when we move from seeing in the mind's eye and hearing in the mind's ear to the other senses,
taste, smell and touch. Now it true that to talk, as we would have to, of tasting in the mind's mouth sounds odd, and feeling with the mind's body sounds ridiculous, but this is not Ryle's reason for introducing them. He says: "it makes no sense to apply words like 'copy', 'likeness', and 'dummy' to smells, tastes and feelings."\(^1\) We have visible things and visible copies of things, that is, pictures, snapshots, etc., and so with sounds, but Ryle claims, not in the cases of smell, taste and touch. This being so, there is no temptation to suppose that when I have a mental image of carbon monoxide or 'smell' a singed hoof there is any actual smelling going on or anything which is smelled. In the case of seeing in the mind's eye we are prepared to treat the mental image as some sort of picture bearing a resemblance to what we are having a mental image of, but as we do not have smell copies, etc., we are not equipped to posit the existence of a mental image in the case of smelling. The absence of a mental image in the case of smelling does not prevent us from being able to 'smell' a singed hoof, so why should we have to posit the existence of mental images to explain cases such as 'seeing' the Eiffel Tower?

Is it true that the language of copies and originals does not apply to smells, tastes and feelings? Why we might ask are various perfumes not capable of being considered copies of various scents, or various foodstuffs, for example, spun protein, not capable of being considered copies of various tastes? What we are actually

\(^1\) Ibid., p.240.
smelling or tasting here is something different from apple blossom or steak but then what we are actually seeing in the case of pictures is something different from mountains and trees. It does not help to posit any causal relation between copy and original, because, although there may be a causal relationship between Frank Sinatra singing and a recording of his voice, there need be no such relationship between Frank Sinatra singing and someone mimicking him. I am sure we could establish a case for talking of copies of feelings, indeed we have only to look to Huxley's "Brave New World" where people went to the 'feelies' instead of the 'movies' to see that we can sensibly talk in this way. It is probably true that certain words such as 'copy', 'likeness', and 'dummy' cannot be applied to smells, tastes and feelings but this does not mean that the language of copies and originals cannot be applied to them. G.B. Matthews has pointed out: "To be sure, the words 'replica', 'copy', 'echo', 'facsimalie', and so forth have points of overlapping application. But I suspect that no two of them would be appropriately applied to just the same range of things. So to say that words like these apply to visible objects, but not to (for example) tastes seems a misleading way of putting things."\(^1\)

So if talking about a dummy smell or a lifelike taste sounds odd this is no reason to draw sweeping conclusions, because it would sound equally odd to talk of the recording of an orchestra as a dummy orchestra. We can sensibly apply the language of copies and

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originals to smells, tastes and feelings, so we could easily hold that when, for example, I 'smell' a singed hoof there exists some sort of copy of this smell which I actually do smell.

However, when we talk of 'smelling' the singed hoof or 'tasting' the sour milk we do not, I believe, tend to think that there is anything that is being smelled or tasted. But I do not think this is because, as Ryle suggests, we have no analogies for tasting, smelling and feeling to the pictures, snapshots, echoes and recordings which serve as models for 'seeing' and 'hearing'. This fact is to be explained by comparing the location of what is seen and heard with what is tasted, smelled and felt. What is heard or seen is talked of, at least by non-philosophers, as being out there, beyond the organs of sight or hearing. This is clearly not so in the cases of tasting and feeling; whatever is tasted is in the mouth and whatever is felt is touching the body. The case of smell could go either way, we sometimes talk of whatever is smelled being in the nose or of smelling the filthy dog in the corner. These I think are relevant factors when we try to talk of the location of what is posited as being seen, heard, tasted, etc. during imaging. When I 'see' the Statue of Liberty I am unlikely to consider that I am seeing anything corresponding to the Statue of Liberty as being located in public space. So if I want to think of some object existing somewhere when I 'see' the Statue of Liberty then I have to locate it in my head, in some private space. The fact that I can 'see' the Statue of Liberty when my eyes are closed is probably an encouragement to this way of thinking. When
one 'feels' a spider, for example, it would seem that we are more likely to envisage the spider as being in public space — crawling up my leg. We can then show that there is no spider or spider-like object on my leg, and so we are not about to posit the existence of some object which is felt, only felt with the mind's body. In such cases we are more prepared to say, as Ryle would wish us to do in all cases, "I seem to feel a spider", without going on to posit the existence of some object which I actually do feel.

My suggestion that these factors rather than our supposed inability to talk of smell, taste and feeling copies, explain why we do not think that there is any smelling, etc., going on or the existence of anything smelled, etc., when we, for example, 'smell' the singed hoof, is I think backed up by one of Ryle's examples in another context. In dealing with the question of the location of the mental image which we are supposed to see when we see something in the mind's eye, he cites the example of writing down a word which we know. We write down the first few letters and we visualise the other letters just to the right of the nib. Here I visualise the letters in a certain place on the page. But there is no ghostly picture of the letters suspended just above the page, nor is there any real letter. All I can say is that I seem to see the letters on the page. In this case as with the above case of 'feeling' the spider, what is 'seen' is located in public space, so there is no tendency to think that there exists anything which is seen corresponding to these letters. The problem of whether there
exists anything which is actually being seen when we see something in the mind's eye would only seem to arise when we do not locate what we 'see' in public space. H.D. Lewis claims that mental images are located in public space. When we 'see' something, he claims, we seem to see it in front of our faces, etc. However, I do not think this need be so; the question of location in many occasions just does not arise. (I should point out that when I talk of locating whatever we 'see' I mean locating within our visual field. As such I do not mean to locate the Eiffel Tower as being in Paris if I am in Canada when I 'see' the Eiffel Tower.)

I have been discussing so far the question of whether it is appropriate to describe seeing in the mind's eye as involving actually seeing something. The last discussion has led us to the question of the location of mental images if we are to talk of seeing them. Ryle of course is concerned to show that mental images do not exist anywhere and this he tries to do by way of two examples. The first one is the case of the child imagining her doll is smiling. Ryle thinks that anyone who holds that mental images are existing entities would have to say that the child is seeing a picture of a smile. Clearly this picture is not suspended in front of the doll's lips or we could all see it, so where is it? It is nowhere Ryle concludes, the child only "fancies she sees a smile on the doll's lips in front of her face, though she does not see one there and would be greatly frightened if she did."

This example is more a case of illusion than what we would consider a case of imaging. From what we can gather it appears that the child is taken in. Thus the use of the word 'imagine' here is used to show that the child is taken in and not to suggest that she is having a mental image (these different senses of 'imagining' will be analysed in Chapter 3). It would be difficult to envisage anyone suggesting that there was a mental image involved here. Furthermore, we should notice that there is actual seeing going on here, the child sees one thing which she takes to be another. If it were to be pointed out to the child that her doll is not in fact smiling she would undoubtedly withdraw her claim to see the doll smiling, she would not claim that she is still seeing some mental picture of a smile. Apart from this, a detached smile is hardly a candidate in anyone's book for a mental image.

Ryle's plan is to describe all cases of imaging X as seeming to see X. As was mentioned previously, there is no reason why one should not accept this description and still claim that one is seeing a mental image, but Ryle's task is made much simpler in the above example by his ambiguous use of the word 'imagine'. As 'imagine' in "she imagines her doll smiling" is used in the sense of being under an illusion, or taken in, it is a short step to describing the situation as the child seeming to see a smile on the doll's lips.

Ryle's other example is the case of spelling a word, already referred to. When I imagine the letters on the page to the right of the nib I see no picture or ghost of the letters on the
page or anywhere else. I merely seem to see the letters on the page. So as we can visualise something in this case without the existence of a mental image why should we think we are actually seeing mental images when we visualise something on other occasions? This argument, however, has not proven as much as Ryle supposes it does. Arthur Danto tries to write this case off as another illusion, "one of those common semi-illusions familiar I am sure to most of us, where habits of perception conflict with what we conceptually know to be the fact," and that "this again fails to tally with what I mean by mental pictures." However, it is unnecessary to sweep it under the rug like this, because it is not at all damaging for the proponents of the mental image. It is true that in such a case we might be reluctant to talk of the existence of letters, or dummy or substitute letters which we actually see, and this ties up with what we said before regarding 'smelling', 'tasting' and 'feeling' -- when we locate what we see in the mind's eye as existing in public space we are less likely to talk about seeing a mental image. It is clear that if we were to say that mental images exist in public space we could all theoretically see them and verify their existence. Clearly we cannot, so our alternatives are to relegate them to some sort of private space in the mind or deny that they exist at all.

Before analysing why Ryle's example fails to do away with mental images we should notice that he is not the only one who

thinks we can throw mental images into the public arena and watch them disintegrate. H.D.Lewis appears to believe that we always locate our mental images in public space: "I should say, for example, that the image I have of the College is before me, while I picture the pier somewhere behind me."\(^1\) Perhaps it is possible to describe situations such as 'seeing' Helvellyn as picturing Helvellyn in front of my face, though I think this would be an attempt, albeit an abortive attempt as I hope to show, to load the dice in favour of those who wish to do away with mental images. Where what is pictured appears to be often never enters into the case. In cases where I deliberately have a mental image we have noticed that it is often correct to say that a description of the mental image will only contain what I intended it to be. So, just as I need not imagine the hair of the man I am imagining to be any specific colour, why should I have to imagine him in any specific location?

In Ryle's example he appears to believe that if I imagine I see the letters on the page or 'see' the letters on the page, then if there is anything corresponding to the letters, which I actually do see, this must be located on or suspended above the page. Thus the mental image, should it exist, must be in public space. But it clearly is not, so it does not exist. However, let us consider for a second the fact that the idea that when we see something in the mind's eye we are actually seeing a mental image

\(^1\) Lewis, op.cit, p.84.
is largely based on the model of pictures, snapshots, etc. If I look at a picture of Paris I may say that I 'see' the Eiffel Tower, the Arc de Triomphe, etc. ('see' is not in this case being used to mean visualise). I may have the picture in my hand, but the picture may be such that I seem to see the Eiffel Tower as being several miles away. What I actually see is of course several inches from my eyes, but when I consider the picture from its representational aspect I may 'see' various objects as being at a much greater distance. The notion of 'private space' is at best an awkward one and I am not sure if an intelligible account could be given of it. However, as for the purpose of this argument Ryle does not feel it necessary to challenge this notion, I feel justified in using it, if only because the proponent of the mental image seems forced into doing so. Having said this, let us consider the possibility that when I imagine the letters on the page I am seeing a mental image of the letters in some private space. Might I not say that the mental image I see is representational, that I see the letters as being some distance away on the page to the right of the nib. What I actually see, my mental image, is not on the page but in my private space. Just as in the case of the picture of Paris, what I actually see, the picture, is a short distance from my face and not several miles away. Also we can easily describe this situation as Ryle wishes us to do, as seeming to see the letters on the page. This does not exclude the possibility that we are seeing some letters or letter-like phenomena, just as the fact that saying we seem to see the Eiffel Tower several miles away does not exclude the poss-
ibility that we are seeing a copy or picture of the Eiffel Tower.

This explanation seems to me to be the one the proponent of the mental image would offer for Ryle's example, and the least it shows is that Ryle has not proved that imagining that one sees letters on the page does not involve the seeing of a mental image. Some awkwardness may be felt over this explanation. It involves both seeing the page, etc., and seeing a mental image at the same time. We can visualise or 'see' when our eyes are open which bear no relation to what is in our visual field. Whilst sitting in my room I can visualise the Eiffel Tower even though my eyes are still open; it is merely that we often find it easier to visualise if we close our eyes and so cut out distractions. Nevertheless, we might argue that when I am visualising the Eiffel Tower when my eyes are open (without visualising it as being located in my immediate surroundings), I am not actually seeing what is in my visual field, in the sense that I am not really conscious of it. In the case of 'seeing' the word I would have to be conscious of what is in my visual field, that is, the page, as well as, as the explanation goes, seeing my mental image. However, there seems to be no logical impossibility in this being the case. It might even be argued that we are not conscious of seeing anything on the space on the page where we see the letters as being located, and so in this sense we are not seeing two things.

All that has been shown here is not that mental images exist and are seen, but that Ryle has failed in his arguments to show that it is nonsense to talk of mental images existing any-
where. The boot, however, I believe is on the other foot. It is really up to the proponents of the mental image to show how mental images measure up to the physical objects that are exemplars of images, for example, pictures and snapshots. Can we sensibly ask the same sort of questions about mental images as we can about pictures and photographs? J.M. Shorter writes: "It is a fact about the non-linguistic world that it is not of such a nature that it would be convenient to give a use to the expression 'see a mental image'... The same applies to other questions such as 'Do mental images exist?', 'Are they in a space of their own?' and so on. We have no use for such expressions as 'Such and such a mental image is no longer in existence.' Such expressions have no use because we do not do anything that it is natural to describe in these terms."¹ Shorter suggests that if, for example, any image we had stayed put until we imagined it being rubbed out, or if we were to visualise things very small we could get more images on our mental screen, etc., then it might be convenient to ask questions such as "Where is a mental image?" But the fact is that these type of occurrences do not take place, and so there is no point in talking about the location of mental images, the seeing of mental images or even the existence of mental images. Shorter is clearly attacking the view that mental images exist and are seen by assuming that, if they were to, then they would have to be similar kinds of objects to pictures, but that in fact they fall very short of

this comparison.

It is true that mental images when compared to pictures, etc., do fall short in many respects. The only time we can answer the question "Where is such and such a mental image?" is in cases where we locate what we 'see' in public space, such as in Ryle's example of 'seeing' the letters on the page. But we have seen that even here we cannot locate the image as being on the page, but only as being seen as on the page. To say that the image is in my mind, as Ryle points out, is simply to make a factual disclaimer, that is, to say it is not located anywhere. D.C. Dennett writes: "An image is a representation of something, what sets it aside from other representations is that an image represents something else in virtue of having at least one quality or characteristic of shape, form or colour in common with what it represents..... they must resemble what they represent and not merely represent it by playing a role — symbolic, conventional or functional — in some system."¹

It is clear that if an image is to meet Dennett's test it must first of all make sense to talk about the qualities or characteristics of a mental image. Taking a picture as the exemplar of an image we can notice that there are two ways of considering the qualities or characteristics of a picture. We can talk about its representational and non-representational aspects. If we are talking about the painting, the 'Mona Lisa', we can point out features such as the woman's smile, the colour of the hair,

or the folds of the dress. These are all representational qualities of the painting. However, we can also point out features such as the texture of the canvas, its size, or the pigmentation in the left hand corner. The image, in this case a painting, can be considered as representing some other thing, or it can be considered as an object in its own right. If mental images are to be considered as images, moreover as existing entities which can be seen, then it seems fair to require that they can be shown to have both representational and non-representational qualities. Much of the credibility of the view that we can see a mental image comes through the analogy with pictures, so it sensible to demand that this view show that mental images and pictures are similar in this important respect. It it clear that mental images can easily be attributed representational qualities. If asked to describe a particular mental image which I have I can say things like; "it was of a man with blond hair, spectacles and a beard." Do they also have non-representational qualities? Well can we not say that a particular mental image is vague, vivid, realistic etc.? Are these not qualities of the image itself, not what it is an image of? It makes perfect sense to talk of having a vivid image or an incomplete one; however qualities like vivid and incomplete do not give us the type of qualities we require. These, as J.E.R. Squires has pointed out, "contain oblique reference to the thing visualised. Thus, we talk of an incomplete description or portrait, where the original is incompletely characterised or represented. Yet the means of describing, certain sentences for example, or the means of portraying,
say the bold charcoal outline, need be in no way incomplete. The sentences are not vague, sketchy, lifelike, though the description may be. The charcoal shapes or patches of colour are not detailed or unrealistic, though the portrait may be. Just as a vague description of X or a vivid portrait of Y tells us how X or Y have been described or drawn, we can say that to talk of a vivid or vague mental image of X is to tell us how X has been visualised. To say, for example, that a person has a vivid mental image of X is just to say that he visualised X vividly. We have not found what we are looking for in these qualities; what we want are qualities of the image which do not refer to what we are having the mental image of. However, could I not have a black and white image of Churchill? Can I not describe my image as being black and white, in the same way that if I paint a black and white Churchill the canvas is black and white. There are two ways of talking about this, I can say that I am having an image of a black and white Churchill, or that I am having a black and white image of Churchill. Does the latter description give us a non-representational quality of the image? I think not, once again we are being told how Churchill is being visualised, I am visualising Churchill as black and white. When we talk of the non-representational qualities of a portrait we can say that the canvas is black and white or that it is covered with black and white paint, but when we try to talk of the non-representational qualities of a mental image there is

nothing corresponding to the canvas which can be black and white. Qualities such as black and white can thus have reference only to what we are having a mental image of, in this case Churchill.

We can have paintings which are non-representational, abstract paintings. Could we have non-representational mental images? We might describe a particular abstract painting as a painting of three blue triangles on top of an orange circle and four green stripes, but this is to see it as representational — as a picture of three blue triangles, etc. The abstract painting may just be an attempt to create a beautiful object in itself, in the way that one might discover a coloured stone on the beach and find it beautiful. This, I think, illustrates the difference between mental images and paintings. A mental image is always an image of something (and this is not just because of the meaning of the word image), though this something need not be something definite in the world. In the case of mental images we would have to say we were having a mental image of three blue triangles on top of an orange circle. Here there is nothing we can identify which could correspond to the canvas or stone.

As mental images cannot be shown to have non-representational qualities then to this extent they fail to match up to pictures and photographs, on which analogy the idea of seeing mental images is based. Just as we can describe something and draw something differently from what it is actually like, we can also visualise a thing differently. When I say that I have a black and white mental image of Churchill I can describe this as visualis-
ing Churchill as black and white. This says how I visualise Churchill. Thus I can have a vivid, vague, realistic or black and white mental image of X and these words tell how I visualise X. Now although mental images do not exist as objects it still makes sense to talk of them and describe them. If I am asked to describe my mental image of X I will not be simply describing X, but rather describing how I visualised X.

Throughout this chapter I have been discussing imaging by referring to the type of imaging which I myself experience and which I believe from their comments to be the type which the philosophers mentioned are referring to. However, there are, we are told, types of imaging which are experienced by a small number of people. Reynold Lawrie tells us that: "Eidetic" imagery is experienced by approximately 60% of children and 7% of adults. According to N. L. Munn "The most common test of eidetic imagery is to present some very detailed picture...then to remove it and ask the child to describe what he sees....." A characteristic exposure period for the sighting for the sighting of the original picture is thirty seconds, not nearly enough to commit the many details to memory. 'The eidetic child' says Munn 'seems to project the picture on any convenient surface and describe what he sees.' Even a completely strange and complicated word like 'Gartenwirthshaft' appearing above a shop window in the original picture may be spelled out forwards or backwards. 1 Lawrie's point is that

of us visualise something by contemplating a mental picture of it.¹

"As regards localisation, the eidetic image is seen as situated in outer space. It is never localised 'within the head', as the visual memory image so often is, but 'out there', attached to the mat or wall or some other surface. .... the image is so strong and clear that it tends to obscure the background against which it is projected."² The eidetic image might be describable as an after image if it were not for several factors. The eidetic image, unlike the after image, can be revived voluntarily on a later occasion. Neither is it described by the subjects as an exact reproduction of the original, but then neither is an after image. However, unlike after images the eidetic image is not outside of the subjects control. "The child may change the position or character of some of the details or even add an item entirely lacking in the original. These distortions and added details are also vividly seen in the image and there is nothing to distinguish them as innovations."³

This information, though very interesting, I do not find sufficient to conclude that there exist mental images and that they can be contemplated. Presumably Lawrie views these mental images on the lines of a picture. Thus we can inquire how these mental images measure up to their exemplars, where are they located (as opposed to where they seem to be located), do they have non-representational qualities? That is, all the questions that have

¹. Ibid., p. 254.
³. Ibid., p. 199.
been asked above. In these respects eidetic images seem to fare no better than any other mental images, but perhaps in their case we might be prepared to describe visualising as at least metaphorical seeing. Eidetic images persist for some time, and it is suggested that we can notice new features of the image. Should this fact not justify our talking of seeing a mental image in such cases? However, how can it be shown that we notice new features of the eidetic image? There is no means of showing that when a child describing his eidetic images tells us about, for example, a door of a shop which he claims to have noticed, and then seconds later some other feature of the shop, that he is having the same mental image. If the child only 'notices' the second feature at a later time how can he know it was part of his image when he did not notice it? When he 'notices' the later feature the mental image can have changed or he may be having a different mental image. There is no criterion for saying that, for example, the door is part of our mental image when we are not aware of the door, in the way that there is for saying that a door is in a photograph when we are not aware of it. There is no criterion of identity in the case of mental images which is independent of what it is the mental image is of. I can only really say that I am having the same mental image that I had some time ago if it is a mental image of the same thing. This is one reason why the question of mental images having non-representational qualities is so important. If this were established we would be able to establish a criterion of identity for mental images which was not dependent upon the
content of the mental image. We can say that we are having the same mental image as we had some time ago if we are having a mental image of the same thing and if we visualise that thing in the same way, though the latter need not always be necessary. In the example of eidetic imagery given above we may say that the children are having the same mental image when they visualise the door, then later the shopwindow, etc., because in these cases they are, in a sense, visualising the same thing, the picture they are shown. This is not to say that they are noticing new features of their image, but that they are continually able to recall and visualise additional features of the picture. We could just as easily treat the child's subsequent visualising of new features as reason to say that he is having a different image. We have no way of showing that there can be unnoticed features of a mental image. The case of eidetic images is an extraordinary feat of memory. So much detail can be recalled that we may call it photographic memory, but this does not mean that we are seeing some mental picture. This recall occurs in the form of having mental images, and this is turn may stimulate further recall. Whatever the explanation of this phenomena I cannot see it as being damaging to my position.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, my aim is to show that, whereas there is an activity or experience which we call visualising, imaging or having a mental image, it is false to say that there exist objects called mental images which are actually seen. In the process of doing this I have analysed Ryle's
attempts to establish a similar conclusion and I hope I have shown them to be inadequate. Three things have emerged from this: (1) that imaging does not involve actually seeing images, particularly because this implies that there could be features of the image which we are unaware of; (2) Mental images are not objects like paintings and photographs, as the only qualities they possess have reference to what they are an image of. That is, they do not have non-representational qualities. In particular the criterion of identity of mental images is given in terms of what an image is an image of; and (3) that although mental images are not existing objects we can still sensibly talk of and describe mental images, because they refer to how they have visualised a particular thing.
Chapter 2  IMAGING AS INTENTIONAL SEEING

Chapter 1 has shown that, when considering visual imagery, the relationship between imaging and seeing is not such that imaging can be described as actually seeing a mental image. This chapter will provide a groundwork for the account I give of the relationship between imaging and seeing in Chapter 5. For this purpose it will be necessary to elucidate the notions of intentional seeing and seeing-as, and also to show that these should be acceptable to Ryle given his treatment of observation in 'The Concept of Mind'. Much of the chapter will centre around the recent argument by Alastair Hannay by which he tries to show that having a mental image involves actually seeing and the existence of something which is seen. 1 His claim is that imaging can be described as intentional seeing, but that for something to be seen intentionally there must also be something which is seen materially.

Hannay takes up the notion introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe, that the verb 'to see' can be treated as an intentional verb. Anscombe lists three features which characterise intentional verbs. Propositions which contain intentional verbs (1) will be true regardless of the possible non-existence of the object; (2) will not permit the substitution of different descriptions of the object where it does exist; and (3) allow for the possible indeterminacy

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of the object. The examples Anscombe gives gives of intentional verbs are 'to think of', 'to worship' and 'to shoot at', and using these we can illustrate the above features. (1) I can think of Pickwick or worship Zeus without it having to be the case that there exists a Mr. Pickwick or a Zeus. (2) If I am thinking about the burglar who broke into my house last night, and unknown to me the burglar is my next door neighbour, we cannot conclude that I am therefore thinking of my next door neighbour. (3) Anscombe illustrates this feature by saying that "I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height; I cannot hit a man without hitting a man of some particular height." 1 In treating the verb 'to see' she makes a distinction between the material and intentional use of 'to see'. "The material use of 'see' is a use which demands a material object of the verb, 'You cannot have seen a unicorn because unicorns do not exist.' "2 In the material use of the verb the non-existence of the object is an objection to the truth of the statement, but in the intentional use the non-existence of the object is not. Anscombe gives examples to illustrate that although the material sense of the verb is more commonly used the intentional sense is also in common usage. 'When you screw up your eyes looking at a light you see rays shooting out from it.' 'I see the print very blurred, is it blurred or is it my eyes?' In these cases the non-existence of any material object which could be correctly described as 'rays

2. Ibid., p. 171.
shooting out from the light' or as 'a blurred print' does not make us inclined to withdraw our claim to have seen these things in either case. One point which should be emphasised is that the object of an intentional verb, what might be called the intentional object, is not to be understood as an existing entity.

Anscombe writes: "While there must be an intentional object of seeing, there need not always be a material object. That is to say 'X saw A' where 'saw' is used materially, implies some proposition 'X saw ∼'; where 'saw' is used intentionally, but the converse does not hold."¹ Thus we are to understand that propositions in which the verb 'to see' is used intentionally do not imply propositions in which it is used materially. But we are also told that any proposition in which the verb is used materially implies a proposition in which it is used intentionally. How are we to understand this? Hannay is illuminating on this point. First he points out that it is a "misconception that intentional seeing and material seeing must be distinguishable in experience as well as logically in regard to Anscombe's three features of intentionality."² Second, that 'what one sees' can mean 'what thing one sees' but also 'how one sees it'. When one talks about what thing it is that one sees the verb will be being used materially, when one talks of how one sees it the verb will be being used intentionally. When we talk of how we see something the second and third

¹. Ibid., p.176.
². Hannay, op.cit, p.172.
features of intentional verbs are applicable. If I am looking at a plate I may describe what I see as a circular plate, in the sense of how I see it. Now if this object, the circular plate, does in fact exist, I cannot substitute another description of the material object and say that I therefore see a plate with 'Made in Hong Kong' stamped on the bottom. Also, if I am talking about how I see a tiger I do not have to describe it as having a particular number of stripes. With regard to the first feature, the possible non-existence of the object, we might say that in a case where I say that I see an elliptical plate (how I see it) there need not exist anything perceptibly present which can be described as an elliptical plate. Hannay uses the example of a picture to show the possible non-existence of the object. When I look at a picture and talk of how I see it, I may say that I see Peter. (There need be no question of being deceived. Indeed if I am deceived and thought that Peter was perceivable I would be using 'see' in a material sense—what thing one sees). Peter need not be present or exist at all. This example, although it does illustrate a relation between the material and intentional uses of the verb 'to see', is not really adequate. Anscombe was pointing out that every proposition containing the material use of the verb implies a proposition containing an intentional use of the verb, and thus the intentional use need not be restricted to special cases such as illusions and hallucinations. Hannay's example of a picture does not show this as it is itself a special case. I believe my example of the plate illustrates better the point Anscombe is making. Whenever one sees
something in the material sense it is always possible to ask how one sees it, and this is what Anscombe is saying when she tells us that any proposition containing the material use of the verb 'to see' implies a proposition containing the intentional use. As Hannay has pointed out, intentional and material seeing need not be distinguishable in experience. When I describe what thing I see and how I see it I may well give the same description, and thus the two would only be logically distinguishable.

At this point it is convenient to introduce Wittgenstein's notion of seeing-as and try to see if it differs from the notion of intentional seeing. This notion of seeing-as is illustrated most clearly in the case of pictures, where I can be said to see a stretch of canvas as, for example, the 'Mona Lisa'. But it is not confined to this. I can see a cloud as a goat, or burning coal as a grinning face. All these can be treated as cases of seeing X as Y. However, in regard to what I have written above about the distinction between 'what thing one sees' and 'how one sees it', we will have to make a case for being able to say that we can see X as X. If we can only talk of seeing-as in cases of seeing X as Y then seeing-as will only be applicable to special cases of seeing, such as illusions or seeing pictures. If for the present we treat intentional seeing and seeing-as as the same, we must consider the truth of Anscombe's claim that every proposition containing a material use of the verb 'to see' implies a proposition containing an intentional use of the verb. In trying to explain how this is so I have said that what thing one sees and
how one sees it may only be logically distinguishable, and so when I describe what thing I see and also how I see it I may give the same description. Thus, if when I say I see X as Y, X is what thing I see and Y is how I see it, then it will have to be shown that it is intelligible to say that I see X as X. Wittgenstein rejects this: 'It would have made as little sense for me to say "Now I am seeing it as....." as to say at the sight of a knife and fork "Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork." This expression would not be understood. Any more than: "Now its a fork" or "It can be a fork too." One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery;'¹ According to Wittgenstein then, I cannot see as X something which is X. Seeing-as is characterised as noticing an aspect. "An aspect, according to Wittgenstein, is something that can dawn on one, in a change of aspects, during perception of something. One sees a drawing (Jastrow) now as a rabbit now as a duck."² One may look at the Jastrow duck-rabbit and first see it as a duck, then as a rabbit. The fact that one should at one time see it as a duck rather than a rabbit does not mean that one has a different visual experience from when one sees it as a rabbit. If asked to draw what I see I may simply draw the duck-rabbit. "Hence the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought."³

Regarding observation Ryle writes: "Certainly a person who

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espies the thimble is recognising what he sees, and this certainly entails not only that he has a visual sensation, but also that he has learned and not forgotten what thimbles look like. He has learned enough of the recipe for the looks of thimbles to recognise thimbles, when he sees them in ordinary lights and positions at ordinary distances and from ordinary angles. When he espies the thimble on this occasion he is applying his lesson; he is actually doing what he has learned to do. Knowing how thimbles look he is ready to anticipate, though he need not actually anticipate how it will look, if he approaches it, or moves away from it.\(^1\) Usually when I say that I see a thimble this will entail that I have recognised the object as a thimble. Recognising implies (1) that it is a thimble, and (2) that I know it is a thimble. However, with regard to (2) it cannot simply be that I know it is a thimble because I am told at the time that it is —— I could not be said to recognise Mr. Jones if, never having seen or heard of him before, a friend introduces Mr. Jones to me. I now know it is Mr. Jones and the person in fact is Mr. Jones, but I did not recognise him as Mr. Jones. Recognising involves seeing the object as a thimble or seeing Mr. Jones as Mr. Jones, as opposed to perhaps being told at the time. If we accept Wittgenstein's account of seeing-as then the distinction between recognising and seeing-as is that when one recognises something as X it must be X, whereas if one sees something as X it must not be X. The

\(^1\) Ryle, \textit{op. cit.}, p.218.
same distinction that can be made between recognising and merely knowing at the time can be made between seeing-as and merely knowing at the time. If when looking at the duck-rabbit picture one has merely been told that it is a picture of a rabbit while merely being able to see the duck, then one cannot be said to see it as a rabbit.

The criteria for saying that a person has recognised something as X and for saying that a person has seen something as X are similar, that is, the reaction or attitude the person has to it. The criteria will differ to the extent that one will react differently depending upon whether or not a person believes X is in front of him. Discussing a silhouette of an animal transfixed by an arrow Wittgenstein writes: 'To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow'. That is what I treat it as; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of 'seeing'...... You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) have in our lives. This role is by no means a uniform one......... If you see the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely know what it is meant to be. ¹ This can be compared with the above quotation from Ryle when discussing recognising what one sees: "he is ready to anticipate, though he need not actually anticipate, how it will look, if he approaches it or moves away from it; and when, without having

executed any such anticipations, he does approach it or move away from it, it looks as he was prepared for it to look. 1 The conclusion that we need to establish here is that to recognise something as Y is to see that thing as Y, and to correctly believe it is Y. If we can show this, then, since seeing something as Y does not imply the existence of an object Y, we will have shown that when I say that I materially see X this implies a proposition containing a verb which meets Anscombe's criteria for intentionality.

The point therefore hinges on whether I can see as X something which is X. It is not difficult to envisage situations when this would be so. When lying in bed I open my eyes and think that I see a large red patch on the wall several yards away, when in fact it is one of my books with a red cover which is sitting on my dresser about a foot away. I may say that I saw the book as a patch on the wall, but might I not also say, when I recognise it as my book, that now I see it as a book? Wittgenstein should allow this, for seeing the book as a book is an aspect which has dawned upon me in this case. But it might be claimed that this is a special case, because an error has previously been made. In the usual cases of recognising something there is no question of a change of aspects, one sees a book. However, it is logically possible to imagine that in every case of perceiving there could be a person who makes such an error. "As long as we admit that perceptual

error of this kind can be made, it seems reasonable to commemorate 
perceptual success by using the sentence 'Now I see the knife and 
fork as a knife and fork.' Since we have established that we 
can talk of seeing X as X, then we can say that recognising X 
involves seeing X as X. We can thus talk of seeing-as in all cases 
of perception. If I say that I materially see a table this implies 
the proposition that I see the table as a table. This proves 
Anscombe's point, but what is more important for our subsequent 
discussion of having mental images in Chapters 4 and 5 is that 
Ryle's and Wittgenstein's views can be shown to be similar. Ryle 
claims that one who espies a thimble recognises what he sees, 
since this recognition involves seeing it as a thimble Ryle 
should accept Anscombe's point. He tells us that: "perceiving 
entails both having sensations and something else which can be 
called, in a strained sense, 'thinking'." What this 'thinking' 
involves is explained in the passage quoted above, but it can be 
seen that this is exactly what Wittgenstein says when he tells us 
that: "the flashing of an aspect seems half-visual experience, half 
thought." These factors will be crucial when we come to assess 
Ryle's claim that having a mental image of Helvellyn is like see-
ing Helvellyn.

Returning to Hannay, we must ask, given these features of 
the intentional use of the verb 'to see', should we feel any more

inclined to describe imaging as involving seeing. Hannay clearly thinks so. "Now if an intentional use of 'see' is available whenever the word can be used materially, and the former differs from the latter in not presupposing the perceptible presence (or existence absolutely) of an object corresponding to the object phrase following 'see', then nothing should prevent the application of the same intentional use in contexts where, as in imaging, no object at all need be perceptibly present." What is happening is that those cases that Ryle treated as the inverted commas use of 'see' are now to be treated as intentional seeing. Thus cases which we previously described as 'seeing' snakes, 'seeing' the conjuror saw the lady in half, and, as we shall notice later, 'seeing' the Mona Lisa when we are looking at the painting, can all be correctly described as seeing these objects. It is exactly these cases which Anscombe is dealing with, but Hannay wishes to push her argument further and show that 'seeing' Helvellyn, that is, having a mental image of Helvellyn, can be correctly described as seeing Helvellyn. When I am having a mental image of X and describe this by saying "I 'see' X" the verb in this case can be seen to exhibit the three features Anscombe lists as characterising intentional verbs. (1) I can 'see' the abominable snowman without being in a position to see (materially) the abominable snowman, or without the abominable snowman even having to exist. (2) I can be said to 'see' the burglar, but if he is in fact my neighbour, I am still not 'seeing' my neighbour. (3) As noted in Chapter 1, I can 'see' a

1. Hannay, op.cit., p.163.
person without having to 'see' him as having blue eyes, a particular colour of hair, etc. As the presence of these characteristics was sufficient to justify treating the other inverted commas uses of 'see' as cases of intentional seeing, why should we hold back in the case of imaging? However, before we accept this suggestion we should be clear as to what, if anything, we are giving away.

I have agreed with Anscombe's claim that a proposition "X saw A" where 'saw' is used materially implies some proposition "X saw ——" where 'saw' is used intentionally. But she has also said that the converse does not hold. That is, a proposition in which the verb 'to see' is used intentionally does not imply a proposition in which it is used materially. Hannay wishes to deny this. How we decide this is going to be crucial to our proposed description of imaging as intentional seeing. Hannay's claim is that when we see something intentionally we must also see something materially, and of course what is seen materially must exist and be perceptibly present. If this is so then, if we describe imaging as intentional seeing, something must also be seen materially. The only candidate for what is seen materially is mental images. Thus we would be back at the position that we set out to refute in Chapter 1, that imaging involves both seeing and the existence of things which are seen, that is, mental images.

Before examining Hannay's reasons for concluding that intentional seeing involves seeing something else materially, we can show that, even if this is so, his argument regarding imaging cannot be thus proven. Hannay writes: "nothing should prevent the
application of the same intentional use where, as in imagining, no object at all need be perceptibly present. Or if it is thought impossible in principle to see something merely intentionally unless something else is perceptibly present, hence seen materially, then because we do have the ability to seem to see even when our eyes are shut we should be inclined to take this principle to show, counter to all reason and experience, that mental images too are perceptibly present, rather than that imaging is not intentional seeing. 1 Our answer to these remarks could either be that we are not so inclined to accept the principle that it is impossible to see something intentionally unless something is seen materially, or if we accept this principle we should be wary of describing imaging as intentional seeing.

It does not take much examination to see that Hannay throughout puts his cart before his horse. His line of argument is as follows. Imaging can be described as intentional seeing because there is an intentional use of the verb 'to see', displaying the three features of intentional verbs, and there is nothing about the intentional use of 'see' which would make it inappropriate to describe imaging as intentional seeing. However, we cannot see something intentionally without seeing something else materially. Therefore, as imaging is intentional seeing, imaging must involve seeing something materially. What can this something which is seen materially be except a mental image. So when I have a mental image of Helvellyn I can be said to see (intentionally)

1. Ibid., p.162.
Helvellyn and to see (materially) a mental image. This argument is fallacious. Before deciding whether it is appropriate to describe imaging as intentional seeing it is necessary to take into consideration all the features of intentional seeing. If it is indeed the case that we cannot see something intentionally without seeing something else materially, then we should consider how appropriate it is to describe imaging as intentional seeing in the light of this. Thus to show that it is appropriate to describe imaging as intentional seeing we would first have to show that imaging involves seeing something materially. This is to show that mental images exist and are seen. Hannay would require that the conclusion of his argument be proven before he begins. The only way to understand Hannay's argument is to see it as an argument from analogy. Intentional seeing has features a, b, c and d, imaging has features a, b and c, therefore by analogy we conclude that imaging has feature d ('d' being that something is seen materially). My retort to this is that the analogy falls down simply because imaging does not involve seeing something materially, as Chapter 1 has endeavoured to establish.

Given the above it would seem impossible for Hannay to prove that there exist these mental images which are seen materially by showing that imaging can be described as intentional seeing. We can still consider whether it is correct to describe imaging as intentional seeing. There are two ways we could approach this; (1) if we were to establish that Hannay is correct in his conclusion that we cannot see something intentionally
without seeing something else materially, then we would have to establish that mental images do exist and are seen materially. Then we could argue that we are also seeing something intentionally. (2) On the other hand if we were to refute Hannay's conclusion what would stand in the way of describing imaging as intentional seeing? I have argued that (1) cannot be established so we must consider (2). Hannay's reason for saying that intentional seeing must involve seeing something materially is, though he never makes this explicit, based on his assumption that intentional seeing must be treated on a seeing-as model. This can be seen by considering some remarks he makes regarding Ishiguro's paper 'Imagination'.¹ He writes: "The seeing-as model points the way to an answer, initially by way of a misapplication of it in a recent paper by Ishiguro. ... Ishiguro concedes our first point that visualising is intentional seeing.² His reason for saying that Ishiguro concedes that visualising is intentional seeing is that she treats visualising on the seeing-as model.

I previously introduced the notion of seeing-as when discussing the distinction between what thing one sees and how one sees it. There we talked of seeing X as Y or seeing X as X. In these cases there is clearly something which is seen materially. If I see X as Y then X is seen materially, whereas Y is the object of intentional seeing. Clearly if we view all cases of intenti-

² Hannay, op.cit., p.50.
ional seeing on the model of seeing X as Y we will have to concede that we cannot see something intentionally without seeing something materially. Ishiguro, however, claims that the seeing-as model does not require that anything is seen materially: "when we picture things to ourselves it is tempting to think that we are describing a picture in our mind which happens to have certain qualities, i.e. that it resembles a sun or that it is an orange. But when I picture the sun, I neither discover nor draw (in my mind) a second object which is also orange and round (as I might do when I draw a painting on canvas) nor cause a second object to appear (as when I take a photograph) which I see as a representation of the sun..... The representations we have considered up to now were described by the expression: Y's been as X's. In the case of mental images the Y's disappear, as it were, and we are just left with activities of 'seeing as X'.”¹ It is difficult to see how this can be maintained. Seeing-as is a relational verb, it is necessary that we talk of seeing something as X. Thus to enable us to describe imaging as intentional seeing we must distinguish it from the seeing-as model. The notion of seeing-as is surely applicable to cases of illusions and representations, such as pictures, but what of the case of hallucinations? Hallucinations and delusions are considered both by Anscombe and Hannay as cases of intentional seeing. But surely it is a condition of calling something an hallucination that there is nothing perceptibly

¹ Ishiguro, op.cit., p.50.
present which we take to be or see as the object of hallucination. If there is something present which we see as something else we are liable to call this an illusion. We might claim that we at least see the surroundings of the hallucinated object, as for example, Macbeth having an hallucination of Banquo at the far end of the banquet table. However, we need not see anything at all, because we can hallucinate our complete visual field (This is common in experiments in sensory deprivation). Of course, even if the question of hallucinations does indicate that intentional seeing does not involve seeing anything materially it can be pointed out that cases of illusions, hallucinations etc. all differ from imaging in that they involve sense experience (various sensations we are told are involved in having hallucinations). I have argued in Chapter 1 that Ryle is correct in saying that having a mental image is quite compatible with having no sense experience. Thus, although imaging does satisfy Anscombe's criteria, perhaps this should make us wary of describing it as intentional seeing.

If we do not treat sense-experience as essential to intentional seeing we may thus describe imaging as intentional seeing, and we can consider how Ryle would react to this conclusion. We have already argued that these notions of 'seeing-as' and 'intentional seeing' can be shown to be quite compatible with what Ryle says about the concept of observation. As regards Ryle's negative theses which was explicated in Chapter 1 it is difficult to see why he should object. He was only concerned to show that imaging does not involve material seeing or the existence of anything
seen, that is, mental images. Indeed Ryle should find it advantageous to describe imaging as intentional seeing. He says throughout that imaging is like seeing. "A person picturing his nursery is, in a certain way, like that person seeing his nursery, but the similarity does not consist in his really looking at a real likeness of his nursery, but in his really seeming to see his nursery itself, when he is not seeing it. He is not being a spectator of a resemblance of his nursery, but he is resembling a spectator of his nursery."¹ This is all very well, but what is it to resemble a spectator of a nursery? Once we describe imaging as intentional seeing however, we can perhaps make sense of this. We have seen that any proposition containing the material use of 'to see' implies a proposition containing an intentional use. In the case of imaging there is unlikely to be any material seeing and so we only have an intentional use of 'see'. Thus a person picturing his nursery resembles a spectator of his nursery in that he is intentionally seeing his nursery. How exactly the concepts of imaging and intentional seeing are related will be dealt with in Chapter 5, and so at the present all we can do is to indicate the direction that we can go in and try to see if Ryle's position lies in that direction. Ryle writes: "We speak of 'seeing' as if it were a seeing of pictures, because the familiar experience of seeing snapshots of things and persons so often induces the 'seeing' of those things and persons. This is what snapshots are for. When

¹ Ryle, op.cit., p.234.
a visible likeness of a person is in front of my nose I often seem to be seeing the person himself in front of my nose, though he is not there and may be long since dead. I should not keep the portrait if it did not perform this function ..... The genus is seeming to perceive, and of this genus one very familiar species is that of seeming to see something when looking at an ordinary snapshot of it.¹ It would be as feasible for Ryle to call the genus 'intentional seeing', one species of which is intentionally seeing someone when one is materially seeing a snapshot of him, another is intentionally seeing someone when one is having a mental image of him.

This chapter, though it may not have yielded anything positive about the nature of imaging, will I hope have provided a groundwork on which a positive account of imaging can be built in Chapter 5.

¹. Ibid., p. 254.
Chapter 3 PRETENDING AND THE CONCEPT OF IMAGINATION

Chapter 1 has dealt with Ryle's negative theses, telling us that imaging does not involve actually seeing mental images. We now turn to his positive theses. At this point Ryle is concerned to show that imaging is what he calls a sophisticated operation. It is a sophisticated operation in that a description of the operation will incorporate the mention of an operation or activity of a less complex description. Pretending is a sophisticated operation in this sense. Thus if I am pretending to eat, a description of what I am doing will mention a task which would not involve any pretence, or, to use Ryle's word, would be ingenuous. That is, actually eating. How Ryle establishes that imaging is a sophisticated operation is another matter. He spends a great deal of time elucidating how pretending is a sophisticated operation. His argument could be that imaging is a brand of make-believe or pretending and therefore it is also a sophisticated operation. On the other hand he may only intend that explaining how pretending can be viewed as a sophisticated operation may shed light upon imaging.

With regard to this the first question that requires to be asked is: how is imaging like pretending? To answer this it is necessary to consider what, at this point in his discussion, Ryle...
has to say positively about imaging. Immediately following his refutation of the view that imaging involves seeing mental images, he tells us that:

"I hope I have now shown that what people commonly describe as 'having a mental picture of Helvellyn' or 'having Helvellyn before the mind's eye' is actually a special case of imagining, namely imagining that we see Helvellyn in front of our noses, and that having a tune running in one's head is imagining that one has the tune being played in one's hearing, maybe in a concert hall. If successful, then I have also shown that the notion that the mind is a 'place', where mental pictures are seen and reproductions of voices and tunes are heard is also wrong."

What are we to understand by this claim that having a mental picture of Helvellyn is the same as imagining that we see Helvellyn in front of our noses? There are three ways of understanding this. Firstly, that this is a vacuous statement, in that 'imagining one sees Helvellyn' is simply another way of saying that one is having a mental image of Helvellyn. I doubt that this is what he means as clearly he believes he is explaining something here. Second, that this is a factual disclaimer. By 'imagining one sees Helvellyn' we are told that when we have a mental image of Helvellyn we are not seeing Helvellyn. This, however, is perfectly acceptable to the view that we actually see mental images, and we can see from the above quote that Ryle believes his statement to be unacceptable to this view. The only other explanation is that he is saying that imagining, in the sense of imaging, is actually a special case of another sense of imagining. What sense

1. Ibid., p.242.
can he have in mind? Ryle states:

"There are hosts of widely divergent sorts of behaviour in the conduct of which we should ordinarily and correctly be described as imaginative. The mendacious witness in the witness-box, the inventor thinking out a new machine, the constructor of a romance, the child playing bears, and Henry Irving are all exercising their imaginations; but so too, are the judge listening to the lies of the witness, the colleague giving his opinion on the new invention, the novel reader, the nurse who refrains from admonishing the 'bears' for their subhuman noises, the dramatic critic, and the theatre goers. Nor do we say that they are all exercising their imaginations because we think that, embedded in a variety of often widely different operations, there is one common nuclear operation which both do in exactly the same way."

It is true that there is no nuclear operation involved in all cases where we describe conduct as imaginative, and that such terms can be applied to hosts of widely divergent sorts of behaviour. However, it is still possible to roughly outline a number of different senses of the words in question, in order that we may see if imaging can be treated as a special case of one of the other senses.

I propose to analyse the concept of imagination under six different senses. In four of these senses (1, 3, 4 and 5) I am largely following John King-Farlow's analysis of the concept in "Mine and the Family of Human Imaginings." Even with these six senses of the term we do not exhaust the possible uses. King-Farlow cites cases such as "Well, imagine that!" which is usually taken as an expression of surprise or such like; or where 'imagining'

1. Ibid., p.243.
can mean remembering or recalling. "Holmes: 'Surely you remember whether he had a shotgun or a rifle? Surely you recollect that much — you were his prisoner for over an hour.' Watson: I rather imagine ( = 'seem to remember' — a guarded memory claim ) that it was a rifle, but I was a trifle distracted at the time." 

(1) Imaging: This is the sense which we have been dealing with more or less exclusively until now, where imagination is used in the sense of imaging or having a mental image. In such cases 'I am imagining X' can be taken as meaning 'I am having a mental image of X'. In the previous chapters I have dealt only with cases of imaging which are related to sensations and sense-experience, but imaging need not be so restricted. In this sense I can imagine various feelings and emotions.

(2) Seeing-as: If I am travelling in a train I may imagine that the rattle of the train which I hear is the tune 'Rule Britannia'. I do not actually believe that the rattle is 'Rule Britannia', I am not having an illusion. Like the case of imaging I may deliberately imagine in this sense or it may simply occur to me. One might say that I am hearing the rattle as 'Rule Britannia', and thus we have a case of 'hearing-as'. Or, when dealing with visual examples of this sense of imagining, 'seeing-as'.

(3) Outer representation: When we say that a child is imagining he is a bear this need not mean that he is having mental images. There are various ways this could be taken. One way we could under-

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1. Ibid., p.235.
stand this is that the child is crawling around on all fours, snarling and growling etc. That is, behaving in the way that bears behave. This sense is most like pretending or acting. I shall be attempting to analyse the relation between the concepts of imagination and pretending below, but for the purpose of explaining this sense of imagination we may accept Ryle's suggestion that "we use words like 'play', 'pretend', and 'act the part', when we think of spectators finding the performance more or less convincing, whereas we use words like 'fancy' and 'imagine' when we are thinking of the actor himself being half-convinced."¹ It should be noted that the various different senses of imagination are not exclusive. A child who is described correctly as imagining he is a bear may not only be crawling, growling or snarling, etc., but also visualising 'his furry paws', or seeing his hands as furry paws. Also in cases noted in (1) of imagining various feelings and emotions it is likely that in many instances this will involve outer representation. Often in our daydreams when we visualise ourselves in various situations we find ourselves smiling or scowling, etc., at the appropriate moment.

(4) Propositional Entertainment: In this sense if we say 'I imagine P' then we might be said to be entertaining the proposition in question. The types of context where we employ this use are varied and so is the appropriate response. If I see a child swinging a cat by its tail I might say 'Imagine that I were to swing you round by your hair.' The child is unlikely to have a

¹ Ryle, op.cit., p.250.
mental image of being swung by the hair, as in (1), imaging, or to physically roll in circles on the grass, as in (3), outer representation. Neither of these are what I am requesting him to do. We assume that the appropriate response is for the child to release the cat. 'Imagine that your wife went off with another man.' 'I'd kill them both.' 'Let us imagine that the world is composed of ideas.' As we can see from these examples any appropriate paraphrase of the request 'Imagine P' will depend upon the context. King-Farlow lists a number of possible ways that the request can be taken:

"Consider seriously the practical/logical possibility that P. Think how you would respond if you knew that P. Think what would be the effect on all humans behaviour if P were found to be true. Ask what it would be like to believe that P is true."¹

I have thus far used the word as an imperative in this sense, but clearly it can be used otherwise — 'I am imagining that P.' In most cases of this sense it can be seen that the words 'suppose' or 'supposing' may be substituted for 'imagine' and 'imagining' without altering the meaning of the statement or request. In this sense of imagination we are usually being asked to treat some proposition as being the case. The appropriate response will be dependent upon the context in which we are requested to do this. In many cases it could be said that I am

¹ King-Farlow, op. cit., p.232.
carrying on on the assumption that P is true, or to be acting as if P were true. There is no question of actually believing P is true here, we are still in the realm of the hypothetical. Ryle does in fact touch upon this notion of propositional entertain­ment in his chapter on imagination, but he does not fully apprec­iate that it is one sense of the concept of imagining. Although he does say it has an "intimate connection with the concept of imagining", he calls it a variety of pretending. "The sentences in which the proposition entertained are expressed are not being ingenuously used; they are being mock used. There are, metaphorically speaking, inverted commas around them... Supposing is a more sophisticated operation than ingenuous thinking. We learn to give verdicts before we can learn to operate with suspended judg­ments." ¹

(5) Perhaps mistaken thinking: I have called this sense the 'perhaps mistaken thinking' sense for brevity, although King­Farlow suggests a title which is more exact — the 'falsely/ groundlessly/perhaps mistakenly: believing/assuming/acting as if' sense. The following examples will I hope make this sense clear:

"I still can't help imagining (falsely believing) she hates me, doctor, though I know its not true." ²

"I still always imagine (groundlessly believe) I'll win each time I play chess with Fischer. Its a compulsive sort of imagining

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without any rational basis."¹

"I imagined they were relying on some secret guarantees!(assuming)²

It is this sense of imagination that is being used in Ryle's example of a child imagining that her doll is smiling. This is why the word 'imagining' is used here and not because the child is having a mental image. This sense is rather close to (4), propositional entertainment, in that both involves acceptance of propositions, though, as we have said, (4) remains in the realm of the hypothetical. We can notice that whereas the earlier senses will be relevant only to occurrences, (4) and (5) will also be dispositional. I need not be entertaining the relevant proposition, in the sense of thinking or saying it, at the time when it can be said of me that I am imagining P (propositional entertainment sense). I may have begun my theorising by supposing that P is the case but am now considering completely different propositions. But I can still be said to be imagining P. Similarly, with (5), the 'perhaps mistaken thinking' sense, I may be said to imagine that women are fatally attracted to me (groundless belief again unfortunately) even if I am not presently going through this proposition out loud or in my head, or even if this belief is not relevant to my present behaviour. It may simply say something about the way I am likely to behave given certain circumstances.

(6) Creatively: It is in this sense that we describe people,

¹ Ibid., p.233.
books, excuses etc. as imaginative. It may involve the other senses at times but they are inessential. We do not describe a person as imaginative because he has a strong tendency for imaging or outer representations. The person may have the same dull old images or a child may simply growl and snarl in the way that he has seen his brother imagining he was a bear. We have only to notice that a painting or sculpture may be imaginative to see that propositional entertainment need not be involved.

Having given this analysis of the different senses of imagining we can now ask which of the other senses Ryle sees sense (1), imaging, falling under when he tells us that having a mental image of Helvellyn is the same as imagining one sees Helvellyn in front of one's nose? It is clear that when Ryle says that having a mental image of Helvellyn is a special kind of imagining he cannot have (3), outer representation, in mind. (3) involves overt behaviour and this is clearly not involved as an essential feature of imaging. We can also rule out (6), creatively imaginative, because it is not essential to having a mental image that it be someway original or inventive. Let us therefore consider (5), the 'perhaps mistaken thinking' sense. To say that having a mental image of Helvellyn is the same as imagining that one sees Helvellyn in front of one's nose, where 'imagining' is used in the sense of falsely believing, is surely wrong. This says that when I have a mental image of Helvellyn I believe that I am seeing Helvellyn in front of my nose, that is, I am taken in. I may believe that I am actually seeing what I am having a mental image of in
some cases, but this clearly does not apply to all cases and is not an essential feature of imaging. In fact all the descriptions in (5), falsely/groundlessly/perhaps mistakenly: believing/assuming/acting as if, involve believing that one is actually seeing Helvellyn, and must be rejected for this reason. Sense (2), seeing-as, has already been considered in Chapter 2, where I discussed whether imaging can be understood as a kind of seeing-as. The problem of saying that imaging can be subsumed under this sense is the one already noted. Imagining, in the seeing-as sense, requires that something is actually seen and this need not be the case with imaging. We are therefore left with (4), propositional entertainment.

At first glance this seems to be obviously wrong, having a mental image is not the same as entertaining a proposition. For a start propositions are given in the form of language, whereas my having a mental image of Helvellyn need not involve any language. However, if we refer back to this sense of imagining we can see that describing having a mental image of Helvellyn as imagining that one is seeing Helvellyn in front of one's nose, need not be dismissed for this reason. I have said that in this sense we are usually treating or being asked to treat some proposition as being the case. It need not involve articulating the proposition, in this case, 'I see Helvellyn in front of my nose', or going through it in one's head. What is appropriate for deciding whether a person is entertaining a proposition or imagining P in this sense is, as we have pointed out, the appropriate response — what
thoughts he then has or how he behaves. 'Imagining' in this sense can often be translated as 'assuming' or 'acting as if' the proposition is true. This of course is distinguished from the 'assuming' and 'acting as if' cases in (5), the 'perhaps mistaken thinking' sense, where the proposition was either explicitly or implicitly accepted as true. In (4) we are merely entertaining the proposition. Thus to say that having a mental image of Helvellyn is equivalent to imagining that one's sees Helvellyn in front of one's nose, where 'imagining' is used in the propositional entertainment sense, is to say that a person responds in the way he might do if he were actually seeing Helvellyn. Of course we do not respond in exactly the same way we would if we were actually seeing Helvellyn because we are normally aware that we are only assuming. Under this description, however, how would cases of having a mental image differ from other cases in the propositional entertainment sense of imagining? Just as I can imagine the British economy collapsing (in the sense of propositional entertainment), why can I not have a mental image of the British economy collapsing? The obvious answer is that the realm of mental images is related to sensations and sense-experience, and perhaps other cases such as various feelings and emotions. If I could have a sense-experience of the British economy collapsing then undoubtedly I could have a mental image of it.

This account of imaging is clearly inadequate. First, if we were to accept this it would follow that no distinction could be made between, for example, merely entertaining the proposition
that I am seeing Helvellyn and having a mental image of Helvellyn. But surely I can imagine (propositional entertainment) that I am seeing Helvellyn without having a mental image of Helvellyn. That is, I could respond as I might do if Helvellyn were in front of my nose without bringing in the question of mental images at all. Secondly, surely I may have a mental image of Helvellyn in the absence of any other occurrences — thoughts, feelings, behaviour, etc.

The conclusion therefore seems to be that imaging cannot be subsumed under any of the other senses of imagining. Ryle's claim that having a mental image of Helvellyn is the same as imagining one sees Helvellyn in front of one's nose therefore appears to be false. From this analysis, however, we are no nearer discovering which sense of imagining is being used in the expression 'imagining one sees Helvellyn in front of one's nose'. However, I shall show that if we wish to establish that imaging is a brand of pretending, then we can only do this if we treat it as falling under sense (4), the propositional entertainment sense of imagining.

Regarding pretending, Ryle writes: "To describe someone as pretending is to say that he is playing a part, and to play a part is to play a part, normally, of someone who is not playing a part, but doing or being something ingenuously or naturally." Moreover, "Pretending to growl like a bear or lie still like a corpse is a sophisticated operation, whereas the bear's growling and the corpse's immobility are naive." In a case such as spar-
ring, which might be described as pretending to fight, the boxers need not be both punching and pulling their punches; both laying traps and betraying the traps they lay; and both plying their fists and also plying propositions. They may be going through only one set of movements yet, they are making these in a hypothetical not a categorical manner. Ryle then argues that there is not much difference between a child playing at being a pirate, that is, pretending to be a pirate, and one fancying, that is, imagining, he is a pirate. As we have just been discussing, Ryle considers having a mental image of X to be equivalent to imagining that one sees X. So as imagining is not very different from pretending, then imaging is not very different from pretending.

With regard to this argument there are two important questions to be asked. (A) Is Ryle correct when he says that to describe someone as pretending is to describe him as playing a part? (B) How and in what senses is imagining like pretending?

With regard to (A) we should notice, that Ryle mostly uses examples of the 'pretend to be X' form — pretend to be a pirate, pretend to be a bear, corpse, etc. Clearly the verb 'pretend' occurs in other forms, 'pretending to be X-ing', 'pretend that X'. In the former, 'pretend to be X' cases, it is true that someone who is pretending is playing a part, but how true is this of the latter cases? We might say that someone who is pretending to be eating or pretending to be sweeping the floor is playing the part of a

person who is actually eating or sweeping the floor. However, it is difficult to see how cases such as pretending that Shakespeare wrote 'The Canterbury Tales' or that Hitler was Mussolini's stepbrother can be interpreted in terms of playing a part. What is essential to all instances of pretending is that some reality is disguised. As it happens Ryle's analysis of pretending as involving playing a part is not essential to his argument; all he wishes to show is that pretending is a sophisticated operation. What he could do is to consider those cases of pretending which do involve playing a part and not to bicker over the fact that we can produce cases of pretending which cannot be so interpreted. That is, ignore cases of 'pretending that'. This I believe would be a mistake. The cases of pretending which we would be disregarding are just those cases which are closest to sense (4), the propositional entertainment sense of imagining. Further Ryle does talk of this variety of pretending as a sophisticated operation without realising that it does not quite fit his description of pretending as playing a part.

Pretending is a sophisticated operation in the sense that a description of the activity involved will incorporate the mention of another activity of a less complex description. As I said at the begining of this chapter, if I am pretending to eat a description of what I am doing will mention a task which would not involve any pretence, or, to use Ryle's word, would be ingenuous, in this case actually eating. I am not therefore performing two series of actions which correspond to the eating and the pretend-
ing, but one series of actions which has a complex description. Similarly in cases such as pretending to be a bear, a description of this will mention how a bear actually behaves. Here there is no temptation to say that I am actually performing two series of actions, because although I can pretend and also eat, I cannot pretend to be a bear and also be a bear (This has nothing to do with the question of whether one can pretend to be something and be it at the same time, which Austin raises\(^1\), but with the mere fact that being a man I am excluded from being numerous other things). With regard to 'pretending that' Ryle says: "the sentences in which the propositions entertained are expressed are not being ingenuously used; they are being mock used... Their employer is wielding them in a hypothetical, not a categorical manner."\(^2\) In cases of 'pretending that' the person is not both entertaining the proposition and also affirming the proposition. Entertaining a proposition is thus a sophisticated operation in that a description of the activity involved will mention another activity of a less complex description, that is, affirming the proposition.

I shall turn to (B), how and in what senses is imaging like pretending? Ryle has told us that "there is not much difference between a child playing at being a pirate and one fancying he is a pirate."\(^3\) Insofar as we are considering whether Ryle's argument

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3. Ibid., p.250.
treats imaging as a kind of pretending, the above statement perhaps suggests that this is not the case. There may not be much difference but this suggests that Ryle considers that they are different.

"So far as there is a difference, it seems to come to this, that we use words like 'play', 'pretend', and 'act the part', when we think of spectators finding the performance more or less convincing, whereas we use words like 'fancy' and 'imagine' when we are thinking of the actor himself being half-convinced; and we use words like 'play' and 'pretend' for deliberate, concerted, and rehearsed performances, whereas we are more ready to use words like 'fancy' and 'imagine' for those activities of make-believe into which people casually and even involuntarily drift. Underlying these two differences there is, perhaps, this more radical difference, that we apply the words 'pretend' and 'act the part', where an overt and muscular representation is given of whatever deed or condition is being put on, while we tend, with plenty of exceptions, to reserve 'imagine' and 'fancy' for some things that people do inaudibly and invisibly because 'in their heads', i.e., for their fancied perceptions and not for their mock-actions."

This is certainly true, but Ryle seems determined to make light of these factors. His next sentence reads: "It is with this special brand of make-believe that we are here chiefly concerned, namely what we call 'imagining', 'visualising', 'seeing in the mind's eye', and 'going through in one's head.' The fact that he believes imaging to be a brand of make-believe does suggest that he considers it to be a kind of pretending. Is there any way this could be established? If we consider the various senses of imagination given above we can examine the relationship between the concepts. In sense (3), outer representation, it would appear

1. Ibid., p.250.
2. Ibid., p.250.
that the words 'pretend' and 'imagine' are more or less interchangeable. There is a well established usage of the word 'imagining' where an overt muscular representation is given, so we cannot draw the distinction here. It is true, however, that if, for example, a child is behaving in a bear-like manner for the benefit of spectators then we would say that he is pretending to be a bear rather than that he is imagining he is a bear. Though this is not to say that we might not describe the activity of a child alone in his nursery as pretending to be a bear. Ryle's point regarding using 'imagining' rather than 'pretending' when the actor is himself half-convinced is well taken. This is because of sense (5) of imagining, the 'perhaps mistaken thinking' sense, which involves being taken in or falsely believing. Regarding 'pretending' and 'imagining' we can specify various factors which make one appropriate and not the other, but when these factors are absent the concepts become blurred and indistinguishable. However, the general points regarding the concepts need not worry us, as our concern here is with imaging or having a mental image. The relevant question here is, can imaging be described as a variety of pretending?

Initially it seems we should give a negative answer, because, although, as I have said, there are many occasions when the concepts of 'pretending' and 'imagining' blur into one another, there is no temptation to introduce the word 'pretend' when we are having a mental image. As I have suggested earlier, there appears to me to be only one way in which the conclusion that
imaging is a brand of pretending could be established, by treating imaging as being subsumed under the propositional entertainment sense of imagining. As I have mentioned previously, this sense of imagining is very closely related to the notion of 'pretending that'. It will often be possible to substitute 'pretend that' for 'imagine' in requests of the form 'Imagine P', although perhaps 'Pretend that P' sounds peculiar to light-hearted activities. Also 'pretend that' will be used in situations where we make a second person believe that P is the case. It does therefore seem admissible to call (4), propositional entertainment, a variety of pretending. Thus if we treat imaging as falling under the propositional entertainment sense of imagining, it will also be a variety of pretending and thus a sophisticated operation.

I have of course already argued that imaging cannot be subsumed under the propositional entertainment sense, but it appears that this is the only way that imaging can be treated as a brand of pretending. This interpretation of what Ryle is trying to do may be strengthened when, in chapter 4, we analyse Ryle's account of having a tune running in one's head, and find that we are left with the same account as we would arrive at by treating imaging as falling under propositional entertainment.

There is perhaps insufficient evidence to conclude that Ryle's argument that imaging is a sophisticated operation includes the premise that imaging is a kind of pretending. However, we find that a coherent account of Ryle's positive account of imaging can be given if we see him as implicitly treating imaging
as falling under the propositional entertainment sense of imagining. If this is so then it would be possible for Ryle to treat imaging as a kind of pretending, that is, 'pretending that'. However, it is not my intention to refute Ryle's positive account on the grounds that I believe that he is treating imaging as a kind of pretending. We can consider whether imaging can be treated as a sophisticated operation without having to view imaging as a kind of pretending, as I shall do in the next chapter.
As I have suggested in Chapter 3, showing that imaging is a kind of pretence need not be necessary for Ryle's analysis of imaging. He may only intend that pretending should act as a model by which we may be better able to understand what imaging involves. We have said that pretending is a sophisticated operation in the sense that a description of what someone is doing when he is pretending will involve mentioning an activity which is done ingeniously. Thus if I am pretending to eat, a description of what I am doing will involve mentioning the activity of actually eating. Pretending to do something involves having and utilising knowledge, the knowledge of how the activity mentioned is actually performed. We might thus show that imaging is also a sophisticated operation in that it involves the utilisation of knowledge in a similar way.

In order to pretend to be A, or to be A-ing, or to pretend that P is the case, it is required that the actor should have some knowledge of what A or the act of A-ing is like, or what it would be like for P to be the case. In order to pretend to be a bear I must have some idea of how a bear behaves, in order to pretend to be sawing wood I must have some idea of how someone actually sawing wood behaves. I can of course pretend to be a Martian, but even in
such cases where I do not know how Martians behave I am likely to utilise knowledge — how I have seen Martians portrayed in comics, etc., or exhibit behaviour stemming from conjectures based on knowledge we have of the planet Mars. It seems to be a similar situation in the case of imaging. Having a mental image of something involves the having and utilisation of a person’s knowledge of that thing. If I wish to have a mental image of Helvellyn I must have some knowledge of what Helvellyn looks like, that is, of what it would be like to see Helvellyn. Of course this applies to a case where I deliberately set out to visualise a particular thing, but does this apply to cases where I involuntarily have a mental image of something? Do we not on many occasions 'see' a face without being able to say whose face it is, or 'hear' a piece of music without being able to give its name, recall its name or any other information about it? How does the question of knowledge come in here? Following Ryle, there are two points to be made in regard to this. Ryle points out that: "it would be absurd for someone to say 'I vividly see something in the mind's eye, but I cannot even make out what sort of thing it is.'"¹ That is, although I can have a mental image of a face without being able to say whose face it is, or what sort of face it is, I might see something and be unable to make out what sort of thing it is, but I cannot have a mental image of something without being aware of what sort of thing it is I am having a mental image of. This

¹. Ibid., p.251.
refers to the point made in Chapter 1, that we do not observe mental images in the way that we might do a picture, and perhaps after some time make out what it is a mental image of. When I have a mental image of a face I can then say that I know what that face is like. This knowledge is not acquired through present perception in the way that it might be if I were observing a picture, but is knowledge that I already possess. We can notice this difference between having a mental image and observing a picture if we consider the case of identical twins John and James. I could look at a picture of John without knowing whether it was a picture of John or James, but could I have a mental image of James without knowing whether it was a mental image of James or John?

However, with regard to seeing we must consider what was brought out in Chapter 2 regarding recognising and seeing-as. It was said that all seeing involved seeing-as, seeing X as X or seeing X as Y. If I see X as Y then I must know what kind or kinds of things Ys are. Similarly, if I see X as X I must also have this knowledge of X. This is not knowledge gained through present perception. Even if I am unable to make out what it is that I see I am likely to see it as something. Seeing also, therefore, involves the utilisation of knowledge. Nevertheless, a distinction can still be made here between seeing and imaging, because when I claim to see something (in the material sense of the verb) I may find out by subsequent perception that I was mistaken. The verb 'seeing-as' is like 'imaging' in this respect, in that if I see
something as Y I cannot subsequently be mistaken. If I say that I see a face with a hooked nose I may be mistaken, but not if I say I have a mental image of a face with a hooked nose, or if I see a shadow on the wall as a face with a hooked nose.

The second point is that knowledge need not be put in propositional form. "We concede that a person knows what the publican's temper is like if, though he is unable to give to himself, or to us, even a lame verbal description of it, he can yet play the part to the life; and if he does so, he cannot then say he is unable to think how the publican behaves when annoyed."¹ The fact that we may not, if asked, be able to describe a face does not necessarily mean that we do not know what a particular face is like. Thus, if we can have a mental image of a face but are unable to give a verbal description of it, we are not debarred from saying that having a mental image involves the possession and use of knowledge. "Seeing the face in my mind's eye is one of the things my knowledge of the face enables me to do; describing it in words is another and rarer ability; recognising it at sight in the flesh is the commonest of all."² The knowledge involved in having a mental image of something is the knowledge of what that thing looks like (in the case of visual imagery), and it seems fair to describe this as the knowledge of what it would be like to actually see that thing. If I do not have this knowledge then I could not have a mental image of the thing in question. An important

¹. Ibid., p.248.  ². Ibid., p.251.
point is that knowledge of what it would be like to see something
need not have to be acquired by actually having seen that thing
at some time, as clearly we can have mental images of things which
have never existed. We can be creative in our imaging, but in
these cases we likely build upon the knowledge we have already
acquired through seeing things to form an idea of what it would
be like to see these various non-existing entities. This is a
position not unlike Hume's, though it does not admit the except-
ions which Hume found to his theory, such as the missing shade of
blue. I may very well be able to have a mental image of something
which is a shade of blue which I have never actually seen, but
this creates no problem as we can say that the knowledge is of what
it is like to see articles of different shades of blue. In the
final analysis we can always point out, as Hudson does, that "The
flow of auditory and visual imagery would not be possible unless
we had learned certain perceptual lessons about the use of our
eyes and ears, such as the fixation of objects, estimation of their
distance in terms of reaching and walking etc. and so acquired
various observational skills of which the characteristic percept-
ual successes or achievements are the outcome."\(^1\)

We have said that someone pretending to be sawing wood
must possess and be using his knowledge of what it would be like
to actually saw wood. Our analysis of imaging has led us to the
similar conclusion that someone who is having a mental image of

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Helvellyn must also possess and be using his knowledge of what it would be like to actually see Helvellyn. In both cases the fact that there is knowledge involved does not mean that there are two things going on, that is pretending/imaging and some act of theorising. Rather the pretending/imaging is the utilisation of the knowledge. Ryle has argued that pretending is a sophisticated operation in that a description of it will incorporate the mention of another activity. If imaging is a sophisticated operation then a description of it must also incorporate the mention of another activity. Thus, for example, if I am visualising Helvellyn, it seems that the only candidate for the other activity which will be incorporated in the description of visualising Helvellyn is actually seeing Helvellyn. That is, visualising Helvellyn is the sophisticated operation, actually seeing Helvellyn is the ingenuous activity mentioned.

I have suggested that the analysis of pretending should only perhaps be seen as a model, by comparing the logic of which with imaging we may hope to throw some light on imaging. I think it would be a mistake to regard Ryle's argument as standing or falling upon whether imaging is a brand of pretending. If we do insist that imaging is a kind of pretending then we would have to say that visualising Helvellyn is the same as pretending that one is seeing Helvellyn. However, I doubt if we would be understood to be visualising if we described ourselves as pretending to see. Perhaps I would pretend to see something by shading my eyes, looking intently in a certain direction and giving a nod of rec-
ognition.\textsuperscript{1} This points to the reason why imaging, although similar to pretending in many ways, cannot be treated as a kind of pretence. Austin points out: "One of the conditions that must be satisfied whenever I am pretending — there must be something, and something public, that I am actually doing, some action I actually am performing, in pretending and in order to pretend."\textsuperscript{2} Clearly imaging can be done without any public behaviour. I have also previously said that if we are to treat imaging on the model of pretending then having a mental image of Helvellyn will be the sophisticated operation while actually seeing Helvellyn will be the ingenuous activity mentioned. However, as Ryle has been at pains to point out throughout 'The Concept of Mind', seeing is not an activity. 'To see' is what he calls an achievement verb. This according to him shows us the crucial difference between pretending and imaging. A sailor who has no cord might pretend to tie a particular knot by moving his hands and fingers in the way that he would do if he had cord and actually was making the knot. What, we might be tempted to ask, corresponds to the movement of the hands in the case of imaging? There is no publically observable behaviour so are we engaged in some private activity 'in our head'? Ryle, of course, wishes to deny this. 'Imaging', he argues, is not a performance verb, but like 'seeing' is an achievement verb.

"The difference between the two varieties of make-believe is, however, nothing but a consequence of the difference between bringing something about privily bringing something about overtly, for perceiving is

\textsuperscript{1} J. Squires, Visualising. Mind, 1968. p. 63.
\textsuperscript{2} Austin, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 103-4.
not bringing anything about. It is getting something or, sometimes keeping something; but it is not effecting anything."

Before examining whether 'imaging' is an achievement verb we can point out that this does not follow from the fact that 'seeing' is an achievement verb. That is, because the ingenuous operation mentioned in the description of a sophisticated operation records an achievement. We have only to refer to the example given above, of pretending to see something, to realise that this is so. If I pretend to see X by shading my eyes, looking intently in a certain direction and giving a nod of recognition, then, although the ingenuous operation mentioned, actually seeing X, records an achievement and not an activity, clearly the sophisticated operation, pretending to see X, does record an activity. The question to discuss therefore, is whether we can independently establish that imaging is an achievement verb.

Achievement words, Ryle tells us, ordinarily express gettings and keepings, examples of which are 'win', 'find', 'cure', 'prove', 'unlock' etc. Usually these achievement words have corresponding task activities. Thus we may run and win, search and find, treat and cure, etc. "One big difference between the logical force of a task verb and that of a corresponding achievement verb is that in applying an achievement verb we are asserting that some state of affairs obtains over and above that which consists in the performance, if any, of the subservient task activity." In

applying an achievement verb we are not saying that some other activity has gone on on top of the corresponding task activity. We may run and win, but winning is not another activity performed as well as running. One wins by running, and running such that one crosses the line ahead of others. "Adverbs proper to task verbs are not generally proper to achievement verbs; in particular, heed adverbs like 'carefully', 'attentively', 'studiously', 'vigilantly', 'conscientiously', and 'pertinaciously' cannot be used to qualify such cognitive verbs as 'discover', 'prove', 'solve', 'detect' or 'see'."¹ 'See', 'hear', 'taste' etc. are achievement verbs, whereas 'look', 'listen' etc. are not. One may look attentively, listen carefully etc. but one cannot see attentively or hear carefully. As Ryle also points out: "there are achievements which are prefaced by no task performances. We sometimes find things without searching, secure appointments without applying, and arrive at true conclusions without weighing the evidence."² Similarly, we can see without having been looking and hear without having been listening. As these achievement words do not stand for performances we cannot order someone to do them in the way that we could order them to do a task, though the situation is clouded by the fact that we sometimes use the achievement words to refer to their corresponding task performance. We cannot order someone to win, score or see in the way that we can order him to try to win, score or see.

In the light of this does 'imaging' or 'visualising'

¹ Ibid., p.145. ² Ibid., p.144.
qualify as an achievement verb? We can surely order someone to 'see' the Eiffel Tower, but are we ordering him to do this in the way that we could order a person to run, or are we ordering him to try to visualise, as we might order a person to try to win. Visualising seems to be in a peculiar position in that it makes perfect sense to qualify the verb with many of the adverbs which Ryle claims cannot qualify achievement verbs. On the other hand it is difficult to come down and say that it makes sense to say that one can visualise unsuccessfully or in vain. If I want to have a mental image of my mother's face and fail in my attempt to do this, should I describe this by saying that I failed to visualise my mother's face or that I visualised unsuccessfully? The fact that we often describe visualising Helvellyn as 'seeing' Helvellyn does perhaps indicate that 'visualise' tends to be treated as an achievement verb.

These facts about visualising may be explained when we consider the partial parallel between the concepts of visualising and depicting, which has been brought out by J.M. Shorter. Firstly, "visualising is doing something in a way that seeing is not doing something. One can be ordered to depict or visualise something, one cannot be ordered to see it." 1 Secondly, "saying that visualising Helvellyn is the same thing as seeing an image of that mountain..... is wrong for the same reason that it is wrong to say that drawing a picture of Helvellyn is drawing a picture of a

picture of Helvellyn. When I depict Helvellyn it is Helvellyn itself I depict, not a picture I make while Helvellyn.\footnote{1} We can qualify the verb 'depict' with many of the words that can be used to qualify 'visualising' but not to qualify 'seeing'. I can depict something carefully, vividly, deliberately etc. and also, of more importance, I can depict in more or less detail. Using this parallel we can perhaps explain whether we can be said to visualise unsuccessfully or in vain. If I intend to depict Churchill and produce a circular shape with a line coming out of it, have I depicted Churchill? As N. Richards has pointed out\footnote{2}, there are alternative ways of describing this. I can say either that I have tried and failed to depict Churchill, or that I have depicted Churchill as a circle with a line protruding from it. According to the latter it would seem that all that is required for me to say that I have depicted Churchill is that I should have drawn with the intention of depicting Churchill. If we accept this then can we say that we have depicted unsuccessfully? Surely we want to say that not anything could be a depiction of Churchill. Have I not been unsuccessful if others cannot see or learn to see Churchill in my drawing? However, Picasso produces very strange drawings and calls them drawings of people, horses etc. Why is this any different from my circle and line Churchill? The answer to this problem will probably lie in the rules of projection that are adopted in drawing. In which case drawing with the intention of depicting X

\footnote{1. Ibid., p.156.} \footnote{2. N. Richards, Depicting and Visualising. Mind, 1973.}
is not sufficient to depict X; one must have the skill to produce what one wants. Picasso's drawings are an exercise of his skill, using his own rules of projection.

We have said that achievement verbs often have corresponding task activities. If we treat 'depicting' as an achievement verb we can say that the corresponding task activity is drawing. I may thus be said to have drawn and failed to depict Churchill, just as I can be said to have searched and failed to find, or treated and failed to cure. I may draw carefully, badly, unsuccessfully etc. but here I cannot apply these adverbs to 'depict'. It is when 'depict' is employed as referring to the task activity that we can apply such adverbs. As we have already noted: "we very often borrow achievement verbs to signify the performance of the corresponding task activity, where the hopes of success are good. A runner may be described as winning the race from the start despite the fact that he may not win it in the end; and a doctor may boast that he is curing his patient's pneumonia, when his treatment does not in fact result in the patient's recovery." \(^1\)

However, one point which should be stressed here is that when 'depict' is used as an achievement verb we cannot do away with the corresponding task activity. That is, although we may find something without having searched, we could not depict something without having drawn.

The distinction between having drawn and having depicted,

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where 'depict' is used as an achievement verb, I have suggested, lies in whether one could learn to see what is intended to be depicted in the drawing. This claim may well be open to question, but for my purposes I propose to let it stand. How then is this to help us when we come to visualising? Here no one is to see or learn to see anything in a picture or drawing. However, we may note that depicting, like visualising, requires the use of knowledge. If I want to depict someone I must have some knowledge of what he looks like in order to do this. If I do not have this knowledge, or I am unable to recall it, I am unlikely to be able to draw anything at all. Also I may make a mistake and think that a person has a particular type of face when in fact he has another. In such circumstances, using 'depict' as an achievement verb, I will say that I have failed to depict. These factors, lack of knowledge, inability to recall, etc., apply just as much to visualising. The question is, do we describe such cases as failing to visualise or as visualising unsuccessfully? I have argued in Chapter 1 that when we talk of, for example, a vague or vivid mental image we are not describing an object, but rather saying how one has visualised a particular thing. It is like saying that one has visualised vaguely, vividly, etc. The fact that these adverbs, along with adverbs such as 'carefully', 'badly', 'attentively' etc. can be used with 'visualising' indicates that it can function as a task verb. However, 'visualise' is in a peculiar position in that it covers both the achievement verb and the corresponding task activity. One can say 'I have drawn and failed to depict' but what
can we say in the case of visualising? 'I have visualised and
failed to ——' or 'I have —— and failed to visualise'? We do
not have two verbs here.

We may talk of visualising badly if, for example, we visualise
someone as having some features which he does not have, or are
only able to visualise a few of his features. If I visualise him
as being x, y, z when in fact he is a, b, c, then it seems open to
describe this as either visualising him unsuccessfully or as having
failed to visualise him, depending on whether one is employing
'visualise' as a task or as an achievement verb. 'Visualise', as
I have noted, however, is a verb which suggests something which one
deliberately sets out to do. When we have a mental image without
deliberately setting out to do so there seems less likelihood of
treating the verb as a task verb and more of treating it as an
achievement verb. However, whether or not we treat visualising,
imaging, etc., as achievement verbs will not help Ryle's case. Al-
though 'see' is an achievement verb which need not have a corres-
dponding task activity — one can see without having looked — can
this be the case if 'visualising', 'imaging', etc., are treated as
achievement verbs? Perhaps this is so when imaging is involun-
tary, but clearly when we deliberately visualise we do something. In
such cases either 'visualising', 'imaging', etc., refer to the task
activity, or, if they are achievement verbs, there must be some cor-
responding task activity. It is not good enough for Ryle to tell
us that imaging is not bringing anything about and think that
imaging, unlike pretending, does not involve any activity. It is
significant that when Ryle tries to explain what is involved in having a tune running in one’s head he describes what the person is doing by using task verbs. "A person going through a tune entirely in his head is in a partially similar case. He, too

listens for something which he does not get..."¹ 'Listening', Ryle has told us, is not an achievement verb. Ryle wants to avoid saying that imaging is a mental activity by showing that it is not an activity at all. What I hope I have shown is that, in many cases, imaging, if it is not itself an activity, involves an activity.

Just how far this parallel between depicting and visualising can be followed must now be considered. Depicting is something which is done intentionally, it is subject to the will. This is so in many cases of having a mental image, but clearly not in all. We may have mental images without wanting them, and we may continue to have them when we wish we did not. In such cases it is inappropriate to draw a parallel with depicting. "In such spontaneous cases the word 'see' would be appropriate and 'visualise', 'picture', or 'depict' would be inappropriate: precisely inasmuch and insofar as it does not, whereas the others do, suggest doing."²

Of course for Shorter having a mental image is not literally depicting. "The analogue of 'seeing' and picturing is not seeing, but depicting. Second, seeing in the mind's eye or picturing, what might best be called 'depicting', is not the same as depicting. It

¹ Ryle, op.cit., p.254.
is depicting only in a metaphorical sense and is not even metaphorical seeing."¹ What then is this 'depicting' and how does it differ from depicting? If anything is different it must be the fact that when one depicts something one produces an object, for example, a drawing, whereas this does not happen in having a mental image. If we say that having a mental image is mock depicting and say that visualising Helvellyn is as if one were depicting Helvellyn, then we have the same problem as when we suggest that visualising Helvellyn is as if one were seeing Helvellyn. What would we understand by mock depicting? Perhaps tracing an outline with one's finger on a page or in the air. But there is no behaviour that is essentially involved in having a mental image. To talk of having a mental image as 'depicting' does not give us any real advantage. It is appropriate to talk of having a mental image of Helvellyn as depicting Helvellyn in some instances, but this only serves to bring out that here having a mental image was dependent upon the will. Also it shows that visualising, like depicting, involves the utilisation of knowledge of how a thing looks, sounds, etc. However, in cases where having a mental image is involuntary, to call it depicting can only be confusing.

What is left is to analyse Ryle's description of what imaging actually involves. After having read his positive account of imaging I find myself left with the impression that imaging has completely disappeared. Not only has Ryle done away with the idea

¹ Shorter, op.cit., p.156.
that imaging involves actually seeing mental images, but he has eliminated the whole experience of having a mental image. We are left with nothing. It will be necessary to quote extensively from 'The Concept of Mind' in order to appreciate fully what Ryle is saying:

"Following a known tune involves not only hearing the notes, but also much more than that. It involves, so to speak, having the proper niche ready for each note as it comes. Each note comes as and when it was expected to come; what is heard is what was listened for. This listening for the due notes entails having learned and not forgotten the tune and is therefore a product of training and is not a mere function of aural sensitiveness. A deafish person may follow a tune better than one who hears it better.

A person listening to a moderately familiar tune may on some occasions describe himself as having got the tune wrong, meaning by this that, though he was not himself playing or humming the tune, but only listening for it, yet here or there he listened for notes other than those which were really due to come; and was taken by surprise to hear a particular movement beginning when it did, though he also recognised that it was his mistake to be surprised."

"To expect a tune to take one course, when it is actually taking another, is already to suppose, fancy or imagine. When what is heard is not what was listened for, what was listened for can only be described as notes which might have been heard, and the frame of mind in which they were listened for was therefore one of erroneous expectancy. The listener is disappointed or abashed by what he actually hears. A person going through a tune in his head is in a partially similar case. He, too, listens for something which he does not get, though he is well aware all the time that he is not going to get it. . . . But the purely imaginative exercise is more sophisticated than that of following a tune, when heard, or that of humming it; since it involves the thought of following or producing the tune, in the way in which sparring involves the thought of fighting in earnest. . . .

Fancying one is listening to a known tune involves 'listening for' the notes which would be due to be heard, were the tune really being performed. It is to

listen to those notes in a hypothetical manner. Similarly, fancying one is humming a known tune involves ‘making ready’ for the notes which would be due to be hummed, were the tune actually to be hummed. It is to make ready for those notes in a hypothetical manner. . . . . We might say that imagining oneself talking or humming is a series of abstentions from producing the noises which would be due to be the due words or notes to produce, if one were talking or humming aloud."

In the case of having a mental image of Helvellyn, this involves:

"the thought of having a view of Helvellyn. . . . . The expectations which are fulfilled in the recognition at sight of Helvellyn are not indeed fulfilled in picturing it, but the picturing of it is something like a rehearsal of getting them fulfilled."

Let us first of all examine Ryle's contention that expecting a tune to take one course when it takes another is already to suppose or imagine. What sense of imagine is being used here? The answer appears to be sense (5), since the person mistakenly believes. As Ryle also says, the error in the course of the tune need not have been formulated in a false statement. The situation is describable by saying that the person has a disposition to believe that the tune went a particular way. No thoughts occur before the occasion when the music takes its strange direction which we can say are now shown to be false. The person has a disposition to believe that when certain notes occurred in a tune certain others would follow. All that characterises this belief is the surprise expressed when the other notes were played. There is nothing corresponding to the notes that the person believed

1. Ibid., p.254-5.  
2. Ibid., p.255.
should have been played. The person, we are told, was in the frame of mind of erroneous expectancy. Frames of mind are, in Ryle's book, short term dispositions, they tell us nothing about actual occurrences, but only how a person might act in certain circumstances. Also there is no feeling which we might call a feeling of expectancy which is felt by the person before he hears the notes. As Ryle says regarding the gardener who is expecting rain, "He is all the afternoon in the frame of mind to say certain things in the future tense in certain contingencies, as well as to conduct his gardening-operations in certain ways, to keep his coat handy and so on."¹ Let us consider the case where I follow a known tune and I do not go wrong. What does this mean that I do? Are the notes accompanied by some feeling of familiarity? I would say no, though the way the tune goes is certainly familiar. This fact may be characterised by my being able to tap time with my fingers, move my head slightly with the music, my not having to concentrate so hard on what I am hearing, or perhaps merely my lack of surprise or awkwardness as the tune proceeds. There does not appear to be anything other than this that we can make out of Ryle's claim that we 'make ready' for the notes to come, or have the proper niche ready for them.

The situation, Ryle has told us, is similar in the case of a person going through a tune entirely in his head. He is 'listening for', expecting certain notes, only he is doing so in a hypothetical

¹. Ibid., p.168.
manner because he knows he is not going to get them. In this case a person cannot be said to be imagining in the sense we said he was when he was listening to a tune and got it wrong. A person going through a tune in his head cannot be said to be mistakenly believing that he is going to actually hear certain notes. However, the clue lies in the fact that Ryle tells us that having a tune running in one's head is a sophisticated operation which involves the thought of following or producing a tune. This takes us back to our sense (4) of imagining, propositional entertainment. In this sense we saw that we could be said to imagine when we were treating a certain proposition as though it were true or acting as if it were true. In this case of going through a tune in one's head we would be assuming that the proposition that we are hearing such and such a tune was true. The question of believing it to be true does not come in here, nor need a person formulate these propositions in propositional form. Imagining in this sense can similarly be dispositional. It appears that when I have a tune running in my head Ryle wishes us to understand that we are also in a particular frame of mind. It is clearly not one of erroneous expectancy in this case. Is it of expectancy at all? It is difficult to see how we can be said to expect something when we know that it will not occur, unless we toy with some psychoanalytic theory. Even assuming this to be a sensible notion, can we say that when I have a tune running in my head I am in a particular frame of mind? As we have just noted, to be in a frame of mind is not to say that any occurrence is taking place, but only to say that if such and such happens
a person is then likely to behave in such and such a manner. In the first case, that of expecting a tune to go in a different way from the way it actually went, we do have occurrences, and, in accordance with his present frame of mind, the person reacts to them in particular ways. Various notes are played and he expresses surprise. However, according to Ryle's explanation of what happens when a person has a tune running in his head, we have occurrence to which the person can react in the particular manner indicated by the frame of mind we say he is in. All we have is a frame of mind, and this is not an occurrence. So having a tune running in one's head is not an occurrence. This conclusion, of course, is clearly false.

The trouble is that Ryle has left us hanging and failed to push his argument to its conclusion. Had he done so the objections to it would have been obvious. We noted in Chapter 3 that Ryle said that having a mental image of Helvellyn was the same as imagining that one was seeing Helvellyn. We also said that he was possibly using 'imagining' in sense (4), the propositional entertainment sense. We said that to be entertaining a proposition need not be saying or thinking it, but rather acting as if the proposition in question were true (This being distinguished from sense (5), where we actually believed the proposition to be true). Thus, if having a mental image of Helvellyn is the same as imagining one is seeing Helvellyn, then when one has a mental image of Helvellyn one must be behaving as one might if he were actually seeing Helvellyn. In the case of having a tune running in one's
head, a person would be behaving as he might do if he were actually hearing the tune. Ryle does say in the above quoted passage, that having a mental image of Helvellyn "does involve the thought of having a view of Helvellyn." He also says that "the expectations which are fulfilled in the recognition at sight of Helvellyn are not indeed fulfilled in picturing it, but the picturing it is something like a rehearsal of getting them fulfilled." Having a mental image is thus described as the mock fulfilling of expectations, or, as in the case of the tune, having the niche ready for each note. We have already said that to say that someone is expecting something does not mean that he is having a certain feeling of expectancy, but could mean he is behaving or apt to behave in certain ways, or to have various feelings, these being dependent upon the circumstances. We have also said that having a niche ready or making ready is also characterised by various behaviour or other reactions. A person's having a niche ready for each note is characterised by his reactions when the tune is played. Thus, if we describe having a mental image in terms of expectations and having a niche ready, then one describes it in terms of various reactions. One behaves as one might if one were actually seeing Helvellyn or hearing the tune.

Hence we come to the same conclusion that we arrived at in Chapter 3, when I suggested that when Ryle said that having a mental image of X was equivalent to imagining that one was seeing

1. Ibid., p.256.  
2. Ibid., p.255.
X in front of one's nose, he was using 'imagining' in the propositional entertainment sense. As I pointed out in Chapter 3 there are obvious objections to this. First, I can surely act as if I were seeing X without having a mental image of X. What, according to Ryle, would constitute the difference between these cases? Second, can I not have a mental image without reacting in any way?
From the analysis of Ryle's positive thesis on imaging given in the last two chapters it has emerged that imaging cannot be explained in terms of short-term dispositions, frames of mind and behaviour. Having a mental image is an occurrence and is not necessarily linked with any particular behaviour. Throughout this investigation we have found various attempts to enhance our understanding of imaging by assimilating it to other concepts. I have argued that both Ryle's attempt to do this in terms of pretending and Shorter's attempt to explain it in terms of depicting are inadequate, although they do throw light upon the concept. What I intend to do in this chapter is examine the claim that imaging and seeing-as are analogous concepts, and to consider the relationship between them.

"The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it as....' is akin to 'I am now having this image.'"¹

I shall treat the notion of 'seeing an aspect' as being the same as 'seeing-as' here, although in our everyday usage it is often used differently from this. I have made it clear in Chapter 2 that I find Wittgenstein's application of seeing-as unnecess-

¹ Wittgenstein, op.cit., p.213.
arily limited, particularly in his claim that we cannot be said to see as X something which is X. My analysis of seeing-as here will be in terms of this broader interpretation. We can bring out the relevant features of seeing-as if we consider the following example. If when lying in bed I look up I may see a red book on my dresser as a red patch on the wall several yards away. In one sense of 'see' I may say that I see the book on the dresser. In another sense I may say that I see a red patch on the wall. Here I may explain this by saying that I see the book as a red patch on the wall. The sense of 'see' in the statement 'I see a red patch on the wall' is what we have called intentional seeing or seeing-as, as opposed to the material sense of the verb. There are several features of this notion of seeing-as which are important from the point of view of imaging. In the material sense of 'see' I can see X without knowing that it is X, but this cannot be so in the case of seeing-as. "It makes no sense in the second sense, where seeing Y means seeing something as Y, to say that I saw Y but did not know it was Y. And no one can correct me and say 'no you see a desolate Olga.' "

1. Also an aspect can only be identified via my thoughts of other objects. If I see something in the material sense others may identify what I see, and verify or correct my claim of what I see materially. However, when 'see' is used in the sense of seeing-as what I see can only be identified in terms of an object or possible object that is not being seen

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1. Ishiguro, *op.cit.*, p.44-5.
materially, for example, in the case mentioned above, the red patch on the wall. Similarities can thus be noticed between the concepts of seeing-as and having a mental image. I cannot have a mental image of something without knowing what it is a mental image of, as was established in Chapter 4. Also the image can only be identified via my thoughts of other objects, thus I say that I am having a mental image of, for example, a patch of red. This refers back to what was said regarding the criterion of identity of mental images in Chapter 1. When I look at a red book and see it as a red patch on the wall, it is thus a red patch on the wall which I am described as seeing in this sense, not the book, although the latter is seen in the material sense. Similarly, when I say, for example, that I see Van Gogh in the mind's eye it is Van Gogh which I may be described as seeing, not some kind of picture which I see as Van Gogh.

Wittgenstein claims that:

"Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as 'Imagine this', and also: 'Now see the figure like this.'"¹

To appreciate this point we must understand that for Wittgenstein seeing-as involves the possibility of a change of aspect.

"If you say 'Now its a face for me' we can ask 'What change are you alluding to?'"²

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2. Ibid., p.195.
It is for this reason that he denies that we can see as X something which is X. I cannot see the knives and forks as knives and forks because we always see them as knives and forks. I am unlikely to see them in any other way.

"Now I see it as....' goes with 'I am trying to see it as....' or 'I can't see it as a.... yet'. But I cannot try to see a conventional picture of a lion as a lion, any more than an F as that letter. (Though I may well try to see it as a gallows, for example) "1

I have argued in Chapter 2 that it does make sense to say that I see something as X which is X. If this is so then it does allow for the possibility of a change of aspect when looking at a conventional picture of a lion. I may either see the picture as a coloured canvas or as a lion. Clearly these are not the only possibilities. I might also see it as a map, the different areas of colour representing various densities of population. It it true that I am unlikely to have to make an effort to see a conventional picture of a lion as a lion whereas I would have to in order to see it as a map. However, I do not necessarily have to make an effort to see the Jastrow duck-rabbit as a rabbit and perhaps another time as a duck. It might just strike me as being a duck. I see a conventional picture of a lion as a lion because usually it strikes me as a lion. This is because I have learned to see it in this way, but the possibility of seeing it as something else is

1. Ibid., p.206.
always there.

If we wish to show that the concepts of seeing-as and having a mental image are analogous these factors will aid us. It is certainly true that having a mental image is often subject to the will. We can, as Wittgenstein says, order someone to have a mental image of X just as we might order him to see a particular figure as X. Just as there are cases when a person is unable to have such a mental image, he might similarly be unable to see the figure in this way. However, having a mental image is not always subject to the will. They may just strike us and regardless of our efforts to banish them, may remain or keep coming back to us. Both seeing-as and having a mental image are therefore subject to the will to the same extent. As regards this factor seeing-as is a more satisfactory analogy to having a mental image than depicting.

The most important thing in showing that two concepts are analogous for any Wittgensteinian analysis is clearly the criterion for the use of the words involved.

"To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow. That is what I treat it as; that is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning of calling it a case of 'seeing'... You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) have in our lives. This role is by no means a uniform one.... If you see the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely know what it is meant to be.

Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we regard the photograph, the picture on the wall, as the object itself (the man, landscape, and so on) depicted there."¹

¹ Ibid., p. 205.
The criterion is thus given in terms of an attitude, that is a tendency to react in certain ways in certain circumstances. When you see something as Y I expect you to react in a similar way to what you might do if you were actually seeing Y. ("we regard the photograph... as the object itself depicted there.") I believe that the criterion for saying that a person is having a mental image of something will be on similar lines to this. If you are seeing X in your mind's eye I may also expect you to react as you might do if you were actually seeing X. It is clear that we may now appreciate the position that I said Ryle was forced to hold when we analysed his positive account of imaging, that is, that having a mental image of X is reacting as one might do if one were actually seeing X. What Ryle has given us is the criterion for saying that someone is having a mental image of X. The criterion for saying that someone is in pain is given in terms of his behaviour, but to describe these reactions is not to describe his experience of being in pain. Similarly, the criterion we have given for saying that a person sees something as Y does not describe the experience of seeing it as Y.

As was noted in Chapter 3 there is a sense of imagination, what I called the 'seeing-as' sense, where the concepts of imagining and seeing-as are equivalent. If I am travelling on a train I may imagine (not in the sense of falsely believe) that the rattle of the train is the tune 'Rule Britannia'. We might describe this as hearing the rattle as the tune 'Rule Britannia', that is, a case of 'hearing-as.' Wittgenstein writes:
It is possible to take the duck-rabbit simply for the picture of a rabbit... but not to take the bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has fallen over. To see this aspect of the triangle demands imagination."

As regards the concepts of seeing-as and imaging being analogous it seems more feasible to take cases such as seeing a triangular figure as an object which has fallen over, rather than cases such as the duck-rabbit, as the former does seem to be more subject to the will. The case of the train rattling 'Rule Britannia' is closer to the triangle case. If we can show the relationship between imagining that one hears 'Rule Britannia' when the train is rattling and imagining that one is hearing it without hearing any sound (hearing in the mind's ear), or imagining that one sees a mountain when one is actually seeing a triangular figure and imagining one sees it without actually seeing anything, then we should be able to see the relationship between the concepts of imaging and seeing-as.

If I look at a triangular figure and see it as a mountain I have not superimposed mental rocks and goats onto the drawing. When we see the drawing as a triangle, an object fallen over, or a mountain, we do not have different visual experiences. If I am asked to draw the triangle, the fallen object or the mountain that I see the figure as I may produce the same result in all cases. Seeing X as Y at one moment and then X as Z at the next does not mean we are having different visual experiences:

1. Ibid., p.207.
"Someone suddenly sees an appearance which he does not recognize; .... the lack of recognition perhaps lasts a few seconds. Is it correct to say he has a different visual experience from someone who knew the object at once?"

When I see the triangular figure as a mountain there is no mental picture corresponding to a snapshot of a mountain which I actually see. If I rub out one side of the triangle, then another side, yet possibly still 'see' a mountain, what happens when we remove the final side? Why do I suddenly now need a mental image to enable me to say that I 'see' the mountain when up until the final dot which I actually see I did not need one? Ishiguro writes: "The representations we have considered up to now were described by the expression 'X's seen as Y's'. In the case of mental images the X's disappear, as it were, and we are just left with activities of 'seeing as Y'. (This might seem like a verbal trick)." It does seem very much like a verbal trick. 'Seeing as Y' sounds nonsensical because we justifiably feel the need to ask 'seeing what as Y?' Imaging is distinct from seeing-as in that there is no sense-experience, and this is how it differs from the cases we described as intentional seeing in Chapter 2. This was the reason why I said there that we should be wary of describing imaging as intentional seeing or seeing-as. However, how do we account for the similarity of the two concepts, imaging and seeing-as? Are we to say that, as seeing an aspect is described by Wittgenstein as half visual experience, half thought, imaging

1. Ibid., p.197.  
2. Ishiguro, op.cit., p.50.
corresponds to the element of thought?

Having a mental image cannot be treated as an experience in the sense that an after-image is an experience. If I have a mental image of X then I must be thinking of X. This is so because, as we previously noted, my mental image can only be identified via the object that I see it as, that is, X. So in this case, to see something as X is to think of X. "Both the image and the photograph have the same internal relation to my friend. If I see my friend in the photograph then I must have grasped this relation. The seeing here is logically dependent on such a grasp. So just as having a mental image of my friend is thinking of him, seeing him in a photograph is also thinking of him — though certainly, it is not just that. It is also a visual experience."

This indicates the difference between mental images and after-images. After-images are not identified in terms of other objects. If I have an after-image which I describe as blue and triangular shaped, I may say that I am having an experience which is like the experience one has if one were seeing a blue triangular patch (on a wall perhaps). But an after-image is not representational. It is not an image of something, though its properties may be causally related to physical objects. It is not an image of a blue triangular patch. The image itself may be described as blue and triangular shaped, the above description being

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used to remind us that we are not looking for a physical object with these properties. The after-image does not need to be identified in terms of other objects.

As was shown in Chapter 1, one can talk about or describe a mental image of $X$. This does not mean that there exists a mental image in the way that pictures or even after-images may be said to exist, but rather tells us how one has visualised $X$. Just as I may think of $X$ differently from what $X$ is actually like, I may also visualise $X$ differently from what $X$ is actually like. I have said in Chapter 4 that having a mental image involves having and utilising knowledge. Having a mental image of $X$ requires that one knows what $X$ looks like. But we need not talk about knowledge of what $X$ looks like, because we may have a mental image of $X$ when we merely believe or posit that $X$ looks a certain way. I thus must have some ideas as to what $X$ looks like. My having a mental image of $X$ utilises my ideas or thoughts of what $X$ looks like. I could describe this by saying that my visualising $X$ is an expression of what I believe $X$ to be like, or how I choose to see $X$. It is not the only expression of my thoughts of $X$ in this sense. I may express my thoughts of $X$ by depicting $X$ or giving a verbal description of $X$ — engaging in either of these activities requires the utilisation of my ideas or thoughts of $X$.

Having a mental image of $X$ is a way of expressing one's thoughts of $X$, but so also we can argue is seeing something as $X$. My seeing something as $X$, as we have already noted, involves my knowing or having an idea of what $Y$ is like. My being able to see
or choosing to see a triangular figure as the mountain Helvellyn is dependent upon my thoughts of Helvellyn, and thus seeing a triangular figure can be considered an expression of my thoughts of Helvellyn. However, as Dilman has observed, it is also a visual experience. Having a mental image of X and seeing something as X are both therefore ways of expressing one's thoughts of X. Ryle writes:

"In what sense is 'seeing' (seeing in the mind's eye) so like seeing that the victim often cannot...tell which he is doing? Now if we divest these questions of associations with any 'wires and pulleys' questions, we can see that they are simply questions about the concept of imagining." ¹

In this chapter I have attempted to conclude the investigation which I began in Chapter 1, to explain the relationship between the concepts of imaging or seeing in the mind's eye and seeing itself. Whenever we see something it is always possible to ask how one sees it. I may see something which is a book as a book (seeing X as X), or I may see it as a brown patch on the wall (seeing X as Y). Seeing-as is thus involved in all cases of seeing. Seeing something as X and seeing X in the mind's eye are both ways of expressing one's thoughts of X, and thus to this extent the concept of imaging or seeing in the mind's eye is like that of seeing.

There are a number of ways of expressing one's thoughts of X. One may depict X, give a behavioural representation of X, give a verbal description of X, or see something as X. From this

list we can see that all the explanations of imaging that have been offered have tried to do the same thing, to treat having a mental image of X as a particular case of one of the other ways of expressing one's thoughts of X. Shorter tried to explain it in terms of depicting, various others in terms of seeing-as, and Ryle in terms of a sophisticated operation similar to pretending. It is possible that imaging cannot be explained in terms of any other phenomena and that such a strategy is doomed to fail. However, all I have been able to do in this work is to show that the various attempts are inadequate.
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