

ŚAIVA ENCOUNTER WITH BUDDHISM IN
ĪŚVARA-PRATYABHĪJÑĀ-VIMARŚINĪ

ŚAIVA ENCOUNTER WITH BUDDHISM IN
ĪŚVARA-PRATYABHĪJÑĀ-VIMARŚINĪ

By

SHARADA RAMASUBRAMANIAN

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

May 1977

MASTER OF ARTS (1977)
(Religious Sciences)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario.

TITLE: Śaiva encounter with Buddhism in Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-
Vimarśinī

AUTHOR: Sharada Ramasubramanian, M.A. (Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi, India)

SUPERVISOR: Professor K. Sivaraman

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 114

SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis attempts to present a critical study of the concept of self in Kāśmīr Śaivism. The setting for this study is the encounter between Kāśmīr Śaivism and Buddhism. However the thesis also proposes to arrive at an understanding of the religious pre-suppositions behind the positions adopted by Kāśmīr Śaivism and Buddhism in their explanations of experience. In conclusion it is briefly noted that the Buddhist critique of the concept of self of Brahmanical systems has, to a certain extent, contributed to shape the distinctive concept of self as understood in Kāśmīr Śaiva thought.

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to present a critical elucidation of the Śaiva understanding of self as it emerges out of the encounter between Śaivism and Buddhism. Thus, in the process of this elucidation, our principal concern is to arrive at an understanding of the religious pre-suppositions behind the Śaiva concept of self. However, not all topics related to the self are discussed in the thesis; only the cognitive activities of memory, recollection, and action are dealt with. The consideration of the Buddhist position is not very extensive and is intentionally limited since the purpose of bringing in Buddhism is to provide a necessary anti-thesis and contrast to the Śaiva position.

Kāśmīr Śaivism is still a relatively uninvestigated area of Indian Thought. This is a little surprising in view of the fact that there is a wealth of published material available on this particular area of Indian Thought, in the form of Sanskrit Texts. The speculations of Kāśmīr Śaivism cover a wide variety of subjects, ranging from mysticism and philosophy of language to Aesthetics. It is the distinctive view of the self conceived by Kāśmīr Śaivism as quite literally the source of both continuity and differentiation which first attracted my attention to this tradition. The concept of Śakti, power or dynamism is very distinctive to the entire

Śaiva tradition; and even here Kāśmīr Śaivism is further distinguished by the fact it represents the only form of Monism in the entire range of the Śaiva tradition. All this promised to be an interesting and fruitful area of enquiry.

All considerations pertaining to the Kāśmīr Śaiva understanding of the self, which are dealt with in this thesis, derive from primary sources, the major source being the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta (with the Kārikās of Utpaladeva). K. C. Pandey's translation of the above mentioned text has been very helpful in construing some of the obscure passages. Wherever possible primary sources have been utilized for reconstructing the Buddhist position. The Buddhist texts which have been considerably drawn upon are the relevant sections of the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita and Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla; these texts are particularly useful in the present context as they are devoted to the refutation of the Brāhmanical schools. The 8th chapter of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa was utilized to reconstruct the internal dispute between the two rival schools of Buddhism, thus, serving to highlight, to a certain extent, the issue between the Śaiva and the Buddhist.

The temptation to draw parallels between Buddhism and Hume and certain aspects of Whitehead's thought was difficult to resist. But for obvious reasons this was not taken up; if the no-self position of Buddhism offers parallels to the thoughts of Hume and Whitehead, deep differences in motivation and outlook discourage one from making

too much of the obvious parallels.

The available secondary sources on Kāśmīr Śaivism (especially works dealing with the philosophical aspect of the Tradition) are limited to a few books. Of these L. N. Sharma's Kashmir Saivism, K. C. Pandey's Abhinavagupta, R. K. Kaw's Doctrine of Recognition, offered insights and clarification of many obscure points of Kāśmīr Śaiva thought. Dr. Sharma's book offered a sweeping survey of the entire system and provided the necessary perspective by comparing the Kashmir Saiva tradition with Advaita Vedānta.

I am deeply grateful to Professor K. Sivaraman for his invaluable guidance, help and advice. He introduced me to Kāśmīr Śaiva thought; suggested the topic of the present thesis and patiently guided me throughout the entire course of the thesis-writing. The thesis would never have been complete without his continued encouragement, patience and understanding of my difficulties. Thanks are also due to Dr. J. G. Arapura for going through the thesis during its earliest stages and offering some very constructive suggestions. I also thank Mrs. Grace Gordon for kindly agreeing to type some parts of the thesis at very short notice. This thesis could be submitted at this time only because my husband has been an unfailing source of encouragement and help, devoting many long, difficult and patient hours to typing the thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Brh. Up.</u>	<u>Brhadāranyaka Upanisad</u>
<u>Īśa Up.</u>	<u>Īśa Upanisad</u>
<u>IPK</u>	<u>Īśvara-Pratyabhiññā-Kārikā</u>
<u>IPV</u>	<u>Īśvara-Pratyabhiññā-Vimarsīni</u>
<u>Kat. Up.</u>	<u>Katha Upanisad</u>
<u>Mān. Up.</u>	<u>Māndūkya Upanisad</u>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I	THE ŚAIVA CONCEPT OF SELF AS RECOGNISER	
	1. A Brief Survey of the Concept of Self in Brāhmanical Tradition	1
	2. A Brief Exposition of the Kāśmīr Śaiva understanding of Self	7
	3. The Buddhist as the Opponent	12
	4. A Brief survey of Kāśmīr Śaiva literature and History	15
	5. Buddhism in Kāśmīr	20
Chapter II	THE BUDDHIST'S CRITIQUE	
	1. The Buddhist Attack of the Concept of self	27
	2. The true nature of "I-awareness" explained	31
	3. Memory Explained Without Self	34
Chapter III	THE STANDPOINT OF BUDDHISM	
	1. The Metaphysical Setting of the Buddhist no-self position	37
	2. A Brief Exposition of the argument for momentariness	41
	3. Some Objections Answered	43
	4. Classification of the Elements of Existence	47
	5. Moral Responsibility Possible within Buddhist Standpoint	51
	6. The Buddhist Critique of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā	54
Chapter IV	THE ŚAIVA RESPONSE	
	1. Purview	58
	2. The Inadequacy of the Buddhist Treatment of Memory Demonstrated	60
	3. The Self-Revelatory Character of every act of Knowledge	62

Chapter IV	THE ŚAIVA RESPONSE (cont'd)	
	4. The Importance of Memory Emphasized	64
	5. Memory Explained in the light of a Lasting Consciousness with three powers of Knowledge, Memory, and Differentiation	65
	6. The Explication of the Three Powers	66
	7. The Principles of Idealism, Established	73
	8. Self as the source of Continuity and Differentiation	77
Chapter V	THE SELF AS ACTIVE AGENT	
	1. Self as the source Action	79
	2. The Nature of Action as involving Unity and Difference	80
	3. The Buddhist Challenge	81
	4. The Śaiva Rebuttal	83
	5. The Co-Existence of Unity and Difference Explicated	85
	6. The Category of Unity and Difference Explicated	88
	7. The Necessity for Freedom and Dynamism Established	92
CONCLUSION		93
GLOSSARY		99
BIBLIOGRAPHY		107

CHAPTER I

THE ŚAIVA CONCEPT OF SELF AS THE RECOGNIZER

It can be a rewarding experience to examine the various ways in which the self is understood and interpreted in the religio-philosophical traditions of India. The Upaniṣadic ideal of the self, the ultimate reality, readily suggests itself to the mind as among the paradigmatic ways of understanding self. The Upaniṣads understand the self as pure. sentience, eternal and immutable with no trace of change or activity in it. The self is described to be "one and motionless".¹

Almost all Upaniṣadic accounts of the self, which is also conceived or rather 'perceived' as the ultimate reality, agree in emphasizing that no becoming or change touches its inner nature. The pure, unsullied nature of self is maintained by refusing to ground change of any kind in its essential nature.² The view of the self that is bequeathed

¹ "Anejadekam.....". Īśa.Up., Verse 4.

² Ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam etad aprameyam dhruvam; Virajah para ākāśad-aja ātmā mahān dhruvaḥ., Erh.Up., Verse 4,4,20

to subsequent thought as philosophical legacy is of a reality that is completely static, placid and calm.¹

The Upaniṣads seem almost unanimous in their efforts to exclude the slightest trace of change from the self. In short the Upaniṣads are siezed with the ideal of the ultimate reality, the self, as inactive and entirely devoid of movement, change and dynamism.² Deriving from the insights of the Upaniṣads, the Brāhmanical schools - Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta - seek in different ways to approximate or appropriate this model in their understanding of the essential nature of self.

Kāśmīr Śaivism³ presents a way of understanding the self which provides within this general tenor of the Upaniṣadic ideal an interesting, alternative picture. The self is not only pure sentience but also possesses an intrinsic dynamism. Far from signifying a lack in the self as sentience, dynamism is the very sign, the very heart of it and it is this quality which serves to distinguish the sentient from the insentient.

¹"..... ekātma pratyayaśāram prapañcopaśamaṃ śāntaṃ śivam advaitam caturtham manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ ". Māṇ.Up., Verse 7.

²Na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścin-nāyam kutaścinna babhūva kaścit. Ajo nityaḥ śāśvatoyam purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre. Kaṭ.Up., 2,18.

³For an account of the history and literature, see infra.

Self, thus, is not a passive reality, an inoperative ground, but involves "life", "mind", "self-consciousness", "determinacy", and "potency". The dynamism of the self, picturesquely described as Vimarsā¹, stands for the capacity of the self to know itself, to be conscious of it-self. In the ultimate analysis, self-awareness implies, the capacity to introduce differentiation into unity and the unification of the diversified. Many different expressions are employed in the Kāśmīr Śaiva literature to describe this inherent dynamism of the self. Thus, sphurattā² (throb), spandana³ (vibration, stirring), svātantrya⁴ (freedom), camatkāra⁵ (bliss of the pure I-consciousness), citi⁶ (the world manifesting power of the self) signify this dynamic aspect of the self. The self is the union of

1

The word vimarsā is derived from the root $\sqrt{\text{mrs}}$ (=to perceive), with the prefix vi (=discrimination). Thus, vimarsā etymologically means, 'discussion', 'investigation', 'reasoning', or 'examination' by reason. See Pandit Kulapati Jibananda Vidyasagar, Śabda Sāgar (Calcutta: Mookerjee and Co, 1900) pp 666. As used in the Kāśmīr Śaiva tradition the word vimarsā would seem to stand for the capacity of the self "to turn back and look upon itself", "to contemplate itself", and "to reflect on itself". See IPV., I, I, 2 and IPK and IPV I, V, 14

2

IPK . I, V, 14

3

IPV . I, III, 17

4

IPV. I, I, 2 and IPK and IPV. I, V, 13

5

IPV. I, V, 13

6

IPK. I, V, 13

sentience and determinacy, of being and becoming.

This picture of self presents a refreshing contrast to the general understanding of selfhood in the different Brahmanical systems. Following the Upanisadic insights, the generality of Brahmanical systems agree, metaphysically speaking, in taking dynamism, movement and change, as extrinsic to the nature of self. The self is conceived as pure, static consciousness, change or movement is traced to a source "outside" consciousness. It would seem to them, that making dynamism inherent to the self, takes away from its reality.

The Sāṃkhya system epitomizes this assumption and rigorously excludes dynamism of any kind from the self (Puruṣa - Kūṭastha Nitya). That the conscious cannot change is one of the basic assumptions of the Sāṃkhya. Thus, it is led to trace back change, movement to a source entirely different from and independent of the self, viz. Prakṛti.¹

It is in the Advaita Vedānta that the "passive-self-approach" reaches its culmination. The other Brahmanical schools, namely

1
'entirely independent of' may be modified by the addition 'except for some teleological purposes'. See Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Verse 21, Trans (with original Sanskrit Texts), John Davis (Calcutta : Susil Gupta Ltd., 1957), pp 34.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika¹ take care only to eschew dynamism from the self and are content to relegate it to a position which is, metaphysically, secondary and derivative. Change and all those aspects of existence in direct relation with change are real but they are not organic to the goal of spiritual endeavour. In the Advaita, change is not only less in value but, in the ultimate analysis, has no reality whatsoever. Lapse in value is commensurate only with lapse in reality. Change therefore co-incides with the sphere of what "appears" (mithyā)²

Now the question remains how to explain something which appears and yet is not real. This is where the doctrine of māyā is utilized.³ It is

1

The Vaiśeṣika, even though it is pluralistic, and does not devalue change, implicitly acknowledges the secondary nature of it and the primary significance of dravya (substance); the qualities and actions are only in a substance or of a substance. The Nyāya description of the soul as an unconscious principle (jada) is particularly relevant here. The Nyāya description of self in the state of mokṣa (freedom) as completely devoid of any trace of consciousness, almost reduced to the state of a stone, would also seem to be supportive of our standpoint. For a discussion of these points, see S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951) pp 234, 149, and 152.

2

The technical expression mithyā is unique to the Advaita importing the sense of what is presented undeniably and yet is not ultimate. See S.Radhakrishnan, ibid., p. 561-564, and also "Tattvānyātvābhyām anirvacanīyā" Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii, 6, 7.

3

For a general account of the pros and cons of the question whether we ought to recognize in this doctrine a secondary speculation only developed in course of time, see Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads (Delhi : Oriental Publishers, 1972), pp 228ff.

not only the Advaita that employs the doctrine of māyā - a doctrine which means that something appears but is not real, i.e., a distinction is made between the apparent and the truly real; indeed all the Brahmanical systems tacitly accord recognition to it in their metaphysics, as for example, this is what lies at the root of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga explanation of how Purusa though unchanging yet appears to be changing.¹

It is the refusal to make dynamism intrinsic to self that is responsible for the non-integral, exclusivistic interpretation of reality, abstracting reality from experience. What underlies the implicit critique of the Advaita doctrine, as embodied in the Śaiva position, is that by refusing to ground the differentiating principle in the heart of the Absolute itself, the Advaitin has failed to establish a continuity between the Absolute and its manifestation. The Advaitin may be able to secure the purity of Brahman but it is only at the expense of the positive immanence of the Absolute in the world-manifestation. It is not that Advaita system does not ground the differentiation in the Absolute. Māyā, says the Advaitin, is what it is qua grounded in Brahman. The issue before him metaphysically speaking, is rather, if the 'ground' can be continuous with the grounded. The Śaiva thesis, at any rate, propounds an alternative position of continuance and immanence.

1

See for the description of sva-svāmi-bhāva relation between purusa and buddhi as one of abheda samāropa bred by ignorance (metaphysically somewhat analogous to the Buddhist concept of Kalpanā) Tattva Vaiśaradī of Vācaspati Mīśra, ed. by Ramsankara Bhattacharya, (Varanasi : Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1963), pp 81-84.

The specific and concrete spheres of the functions of knowledge and memory pose greater threat to the Brahmanical systems which conform metaphysically to the thesis of unchanging self. Knowledge and memory are functions which require not only the unchanging continuity of consciousness, but also differentiation and change. The Sāṃkhya and Vedānta thus are led to distinguish between the functions of the unchanging consciousness and changing mind which is a product of Prakṛti. To preserve the unity of experience they are compelled to assert a 'false' identification (adhyāsa) between them. What is true of the one is mistakenly ascribed to the other.¹

The necessity of all these far-fetched devices arises, the Śaiva would assert, because the self is not viewed as dynamic, as quite literally the source of both unity and differentiation. The Śaiva takes the bold step of grounding dynamism itself in the heart of the self. Our experience of memory provides a concrete illustration of a unity that involves differentiation in its very structure. The phenomenon of memory presupposes a fundamental unity and continuity of consciousness as well as a differentiation of the past from the present. The self differentiates between the past and the present and yet 'mediates' them by holding them together. Thus, for the Śaiva, the dynamic character of the self is attested to, evidenced by and revealed in our experience. The Śaiva in his analysis of the essential

1

The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Verse 20., Op.Cit., pp 34

nature of the self and especially against confronting systems of thought that refuse to admit self's viability as a concept bases himself completely on the evidence of experience, especially of our memory-experience.

It is an aspect of memory-experience, e.g., forgetfulness, that provides for the Śaiva a model for explaining bondage. Bondage is understood in Kāśmīr Śaivism as self-ignorance or, better still, self-oblivion, forgetfulness of the true nature of the self. Self is not unknown in this state, but is known only in a limited or partial form.¹ The concept of forgetfulness serves to bring out the characteristic feature of ignorance as understood by Kāśmīr Śaivism. Ignorance does not signify absence of knowledge but only imperfect knowledge. Self-forgetfulness ~~does~~ not imply that the self is unknown, only that, it is not known in its fulness, to the point of issuing in "recognition".²

1

The light of self is of course immediately known because it is ever-shining but seems to be limited or fragmented due to its own power of limitation, i.e., due to a self-imposed limitation (svātmāvabhāso hi na anañbhūta-pūrvo'vacchinna-prakāśatvāt tasya, sa tu tacchaktyaiva vicchinna iva, vikalpita iva, lakṣyate...., IPV, I, I, 1.

2

The Self-forgetfulness or self-obscuration is a result of the obscuring or veiling power of the self itself. Due to the operation of this veiling power, the self shines only in a limited way. (saiva bhagavato māyā vimohinī nama śaktiḥ, tadvaśāt prakāśatmatayā satatam avabhāsamāne'pi ātmani bhāgena aprakāśana-vaśād 'anupalakṣite' sarvathā hṛdayaṅganībhāvamaprāpte ata eva pūrṇātāv abhāsanasādhyām arthakriyām akurvati)., IPV, I, I, 3. However, an

Theologically speaking, the state of bondage implies that the individual self looks upon himself as different from Śiva, the Lord (Īśvara). The individual self knows himself only as limited, but does not realize that he is, in fact, in the heart of his I-ness identical with Śiva. This constitutes its bondage, its primordial non-intuition of its true reality (svarūpa akhyāti).¹

As bondage is understood in terms of self-ignorance, self-obliviousness, so freedom is understood in terms of self-recognition. The "saving" knowledge that leads to freedom is of the form of "recognition", recognition of the true nature of the self. Ordinary re-cognitive experience provides the model for the understanding of the knowledge that leads to freedom.

explanation of the veiling power or the māyā śakti of Śiva seems necessary here. In order to appreciate the full significance of the Śaiva conception of māyā, we have to contrast it with the doctrine of māyā as found in the Advaita Vedānta. In the Advaita Vedānta, māyā, though the cause of the world-manifestation, is not integral to the ultimate reality, Brahman. The Śaiva understanding of māyā is distinguished by a more positive outlook. Māyā is conceived positively as the self-concealing power of Śiva (tirodhāna śakti) and is seen as involved quite literally within the structure and constitution of the Absolute (Śiva) itself. See IPV., I, I, 3.

1

The non-intuition (svātma-akhyāti) consists in thinking that freedom, perfection and eternality do not shine within oneself while in fact they do shine within oneself. See IPV., II, III, 17.

An analysis of the ordinary re-cognitive experience would show that it consists of a unification of what was known before with what is known now, at present.¹ A case of such recognition would be where we have arrived at some knowledge about a person through descriptions about him, his qualities, etc. When encountering the same person directly, we actively identify the person before our eyes as the same one we had heard about, we in fact recognize him by identifying him with the person of the description.²

A classical example of forgetfulness and recognition that we find in the Pratyabhijñā literature is that of a lady who has fallen in love with a hero on hearing glowing descriptions about his wonderful qualities. Yet she fails to recognize him when he appears in person before her. She pauses and notices some distinguishing feature in the person or she gets a cue from a person known to both, whereupon she immediately realizes the person before her eyes as the object of her love.³ Her heart blooms like a wonderful bud and love is fulfilled.⁴ In the case of the recognition

1
Pratyabhijñā ca bhāta bhāsamāna rūpānusamdhānātmikā, sa evāyam caitra - iti pratisamdhānena abhimukhibhūte vastum jñānam. ,IPV,I,I,1.

2
Loke'pi etat putra, evaṅguṇa, evamrūpaka ity-evam vā, antato'pi sāmānyātmanā vā jñātasya punarabhimukhibhāvāvasare pratisamdhita-prāṇi-tameva jñānam pratyabhijñā - iti vyavahriyate., IPV,I,I,1.

3
Kānto lokasamāna evam-aparijñāto na rantum yathā; Lokasyaiṣa tathānavekṣitagūṇaḥ svātmāpi viśveśvaro naivālaṁ nijavaibhavāya tadyam tat pratyabhijñoditā., IPK., IV,II,2.

4
.... tadā tatkṣaṇam-adbhutaphullanyāyenaiva tāvat kāmapi. pūrṇatām-abhyeti., IPV., IV,II,2.

of the true nature of the self, a similar process is at work. The Lord (Śiva) of the universe is ever shining within as the very self yet this shining of the self does not make the heart full of bliss. The self is not seen, not realized to be the Lord. The self is looked upon like any other object. Yet, when the true nature of the self is recognized and is identified with the Lord, liberation takes place.¹ What is instrumental in leading to liberation is the recognition of the self's identity with the Lord, in other words, the recognition of the true nature and powers of the self?²

Thus recognition becomes the central category in Kāśmīr Śaivism. As recognition constitutes the mode of apprehension through which the self realizes its freedom, the Kāśmīr Śaiva system itself comes to be known by the name "Doctrine of Recognition" (Pratyabhijñā Darśana).³ All aspects of the memory experience, recollection, remembrance, forgetfulness, and above all recognition, assume a great importance in establishing the Śaiva thesis.

1

Tadvadātmani guruvačanājjñānakriyālakṣaṇa-śaktyabhijñānādervā yadā pārameśvāryotkarṣahrdayaṅgamibhāvo jāyate., IPV, IV, II, 2.

2

tadā tatkṣaṇam-eva pūrṇatātṁikā jīvanmuktiḥ.... iti tasya pratyabhijñāiva parāpara siddhipradāyini bhavati., IPV., IV, II, 2.

3

For example, in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha (14th Century) it is under this title that the Kāśmīr Śaiva school is labelled and distinguished from other Śaiva schools. See Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha ed. Mahamahopadhyaya V.S. Abhyankar, (2nd ed.), (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951), pp. 190-201.

However, as so much devolves on the reality of the self and memory, the logical opponent to the Saiva would seem to be the Buddhist with his position of no-self. The Buddhist presents a serious challenge which must be met and silenced effectively. The Buddhist does not accept an enduring, persisting entity underlying our changing mental states. From an analysis of the concept of existence, the Buddhist draws the conclusion that the real can be nothing other than the flux. Change itself is understood in a different way.

It is not the change of something, i.e., a change of the states of an underlying enduring substance, but rather change is entire, it is the total and immediate replacement of one entity by another; there is nothing permanent underlying the changing entities. Becoming does not mean the becoming of or the passing away of one entity into another but rather one entity is substituted by another. There is no substantiality anywhere either in the material sphere or in the mental sphere. This logic of becoming applied to the self means that what is usually taken to be the self can be analysed without residue into several mental states. There is no abiding, persisting consciousness behind the states, in which these are supposed to inhere. These mental states are all that there is, they succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity.

Thus, it may be seen that Buddhism is the earliest among great traditions which argue that "becoming is universal form of reality".¹

The Buddhists explain and give an account of the whole spectrum of our mental life in terms of this philosophy of becoming, where things are different every moment and difference of time implies difference of things. The denial of self does not in any way prevent the Buddhist from having a theory of bondage and freedom.

Bondage for the Buddhist consists in "craving" (trsnā) for worldly pleasures. And it is the belief in something abiding (satkāyadrsti) resisting the ravages of time that leads to the craving. We "crave" for something only when we believe in its permanence and its persisting nature. The denial of self, of anything permanent resisting the passage of time, thus becomes necessary for soteriology. Freedom is the realization of the transient nature of things. Therefore, Buddhism is a religion without self.

Against the Buddhist, the Śaiva demonstrates his thesis - the presence of dynamism in a unity, the union of being and becoming - through

1

Charles Hartshorne in the introduction to Philosophers of Process, ed. D. Browning, (New York : Random House, 1965), pp vii

a phenomenology of memory as it shows itself in one's experience. In answer to the Buddhist challenge the Śaiva appeals to our experience as providing an experiential evidence for his view of the self as a unity that differentiates itself. Our memory-experience discloses the reality and the nature of the self.

If the no-self position of the Buddhist is a challenge to the Śaiva, the Śaiva view of the self - as the abiding unitary consciousness that is also at once involved in diversity and change - is no less of a challenge to the Buddhist himself. Kāśmīr Śaivism presents a very different kind of challenge, different from that posed by the generality of Brahmanical systems. What makes the challenge more formidable is the Śaiva's distinctive view of the self understood not as a simple unity that remains unrelated or loosely related to diversity and change, but as dynamic and single which entails the unification of the diverse and diversification of what is unitary.¹

One of the points of the Buddhist critique against the Brahmanical conception of self is to bring out the impossibility of a meaningful relation between the unchanging static self and changing mental states. It would be interesting to know, therefore, how the Buddhist reacts to a

1

svātantryam ca asya abhede bhedanam bhedite ca antar-anusamdhāneṇa abhedanam - iti. IPV., I,I,2.

self which is not externally related to change, but which is intrinsically dynamic and whose function is to differentiate itself, without surrendering its unity.

It is the aim of the present thesis to make a pointed study of this confrontation between the Buddhist and the Kāśmīr Śaiva by investigating the issues involved in this confrontation. The foregoing introductory sketch, reveals the fact that both the Buddhist and the Kāśmīr Śaiva, at least in their mutual encounter, are likely to offer valuable insights in the form of critical phenomenologies of experience. Both of them attempt to present a phenomenological account of experience with some plausibility and clarity of procedure, and yet both the phenomenologies are illustrative of contrasting positions and each counters the other.

An attempt will be made in the last chapter to arrive at an understanding of the religious pre-suppositions of these two religious-philosophical traditions which impel them to adopt such divergent explanations of experience.

Literature and History : A Postscript

Kāśmīr Śaivism is usually referred to by the name Trika. It is called Trika --- meaning 'pertaining to three' --- because in this way

it refers to the triad of Paṭi, Pāśa and Paśu¹ (the Lord, the fetters and the souls) or to the triad of Śiva, Śakti and Anu.

The Trika is, in distinction from other forms of Śaivism, but in conformity with the general tenor of Vedānta, monistic in its teaching. It is called Kāśmīr Śaivism, because all the writers who enriched its literature belonged to the valley of Kāśmīr in India. The beginnings of Trika can be traced back to the appearance of the Śiva-Sūtras of Vasugupta towards the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th century A.D.²

The literature of Kāśmīr Śaivism is divided into : (i) Āgama Śāstra, (ii) Spanda Śāstra, and (iii) Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, the three phases being taken as roughly, chronologically successive. The Āgama Śāstras or the Āgamas are held, in the Śaiva tradition, to be eternal like the Vedas³. Śiva-Sūtras too occupy a position in the Āgama category as they are believed to have been revealed to Vasugupta by Śiva himself. The Śaiva tradition does not attribute human authorship to the Āgamas ; they are believed to be of divine origin.

1

See Siddhitrayī and the Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā-Vṛtti of Rājānaka Utpaladeva, K.S.T.S., Vol XXXIV, 1921

2

For a history of the three stadia of Trika system, see J.C.Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism, (Srinagar: Research and Publication Department, reprinted in 1962). This is still the classical source.

3 Not in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā sense of eternal but in the modified sense accorded to it in the Vedānta. For the distinction, see S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Op.Cit., Vol II, pp 389-392.

The Spanda-Śāstras consist of commentaries written on the Śiva-Sūtras. The first work to appear in this category was the Spanda-Kārikā of Vasugupta, composed around the first part of the 9th century A.D. In the literature of this branch there is no attempt to provide a logical foundation for the doctrines of the Trika. The Spanda-Kārikās only present a summary and recitation of the Śaiva doctrine with little attempt at "rational" arguments.¹

It is only with the advent of the Pratyabhiññā Śāstra that we arrive at the philosophical foundation of the Trika. At this stage the doctrines of the Trika are systematised and given a philosophical formulation and an attempt is made to establish them primarily on logical, "rational" arguments. Here, for the first time other systems are challenged, subjected to exhaustive criticism and refuted.

The first work to appear in the Pratyabhiññā branch of the Trika is the Śiva Dr̥ṣṭi² of Somānanda. Somānanda is generally believed to have lived around the last part of the 9th century A.D.³ The next work to

1

For a listing of the classical writings under this category, see Bibliography.

2

Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No LIV, (Srinagar: Department of Research., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1934).

3

J.C. Chatterji, Op.Cit., pp 37.

be composed in this branch and, by all accounts, believed to be the most important existing work of the Pratyabhijñā is the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā of Utpaladeva.¹ It has come to occupy a central position in the Pratyabhijñā literature. This philosophical branch of Trika is known as Pratyabhijñā because it is Pratyabhijñā meaning "recognition" which is conceived to be the mode of apprehension that leads to freedom. Often, the entire Trika tradition is referred to by the name Pratyabhijñā.

A whole mass of literature grew around the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā of Utpaladeva. A greater part of the existing literature of the Trika consists of commentaries on the Pratyabhijñā-Kārikās and also works inspired by it.

Of the commentaries on the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikās, the most important is the Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.² It is also known as the Laghvī. There is another commentary written by Abhinavagupta known as the Vivṛti-Vimarśinī³ or the Bṛhatī. But this is a commentary on a gloss which was written on the Kārikās by Utpaladeva. As the gloss of Utpaladeva is available only in a fragmentary form, the Vivṛti-Vimarśinī is not very

1

See Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. XXII, XXIII (Srinagar: Department of Research, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918, 1921 respectively).

2

Ibid., No. XXII.

3

Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. LX, LXII, LXV, 1938, 1941, 1943 respectively.

intelligible. Abhinavagupta is held to have flourished toward the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th century A.D.¹ By all accounts, he is the most important figure belonging to the Trika tradition. His contribution to the field of Aesthetics is noteworthy. Abhinavagupta, is believed to be the author of numerous other works.² A few can be cited here, namely, Tantrāloka³ - really his magnum opus - Dhvanyāloka⁴, Paramārthasāra (in fact only an adaptation of a Sāṃkhya work⁵). The next important work to appear in this branch is the Pratyabhijñā-Hrdayam of Kṣemarāja (11th Century A.D.)⁶

1

J.C.Chatterji, Op.Cit., pp 38.

2

For a list of all the works supposed to have been written by Abhinavagupta, see K.C.Pandey, Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. 1. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1963), pp 27-77.

3

K.S.T.S., No. XXIII, Vol. 1, 1918.

4

Bālapriyā : A Commentary on Dhvanyāloka Locana, (Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1940).

5

L.D. Barnett, trans. The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta (with Sanskrit Text), Jour. Royal Asiatic Soc., Part 3-4., 1910., pp 707-747. For a discussion of the relation between Paramārthasāra and the Adhāra-kārikā which was used as the basis for the adaptation, see S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri, The Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa, (Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House, 1941) , Introduction, pp vii-xxi.

6

K.F.Leidecker, trans., Pratyabhijñāhrdayam (with Sanskrit Text), (Madras: Adyar Library, 1938), and Jaideva Singh, trans., Pratyabhijñāhrdayam, (with Sanskrit Text) (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1963).

The Pratyabhijñā far outweighs in importance and philosophical content the other branches of the religio-philosophical tradition of the Trika. It is only in the Pratyabhijñā that the Trika attains the maturity of a serious philosophical system.

In the present thesis we propose to concern ourselves with the doctrine of self and its powers specially in relation to the cognitive functions of remembrance and recognition, as elucidated in the Pratyabhijñā-Sāstras, more specifically as given in the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikās and Vimarsīnī. In the following pages the Pratyabhijñā philosophy will be referred to as simply Śaivism and the writers on Pratyabhijñā as the Saivas.

Buddhism in Kāśmīr:

One of the main concerns of the present thesis is to recapture and reconstruct the dialogue between the Śaiva and the Buddhist (as recorded in the IPK and IPV)¹; it is therefore, in order to attempt to enquire briefly into the particular form of Buddhism represented here. However, this is not an issue which can be settled with any degree of certainty, because the IPV hardly mentions any names. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many systems of Buddhism flourished in the valley of Kāśmīr.

¹
IPK is the abbreviation for Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā and IPV for Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīnī. For a list of abbreviations, see pp iv (this thesis).

Our attempt will be first to present a brief history of Buddhism in Kāśmīr and then see whether we have enough evidence to hazard a guess as to the particular system of Buddhism presented in the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīni.

Buddhism was probably known in Kāśmīr before the time of Aśoka, but it was during his rule that Buddhism made its influence strongly felt, because Kāśmīr became a part of his empire. Aśoka is said to have built many monasteries in Kāśmīr and given the whole valley itself as a gift to the Saṅgha.¹

The next occasion when the names of Kāśmīr and Buddhism were found to be explicitly associated was during the rule of Kaṇiṣka (first century A.D.). Kaṇiṣka is said to have held the fourth council of Buddhist scholars in Kāśmīr. It was in Kāśmīr that the Vibhāsā texts of the Sarvāstivādins were composed. Thus, Kāśmīr remained for a long time the seat of the Sarvāstivādin School.² Between the period 100-500 A.D. Kāśmīr became a great centre of Buddhist learning, nearly all the great Buddhist scholars (between Aśvaghōṣa and Aśaṅga) were supposed to have resided there at some time or other.³ So, it can not be held that Kāśmīr always

1

E. Conze, A Short History of Buddhism (Bombay : Chetna Ltd, 1960), pp 42.

² Ibid. and see Stefan Anacker, "Vasubandhu : Three Aspects , A Study of A Buddhist Philosopher," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970), pp 18-22.

³ Conze, Op.Cit., pp 42. Also see R.K. Kaw, Doctrine of Recognition (Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranda Research Institute, 1967) pp. 26, for support from authoritative sources (eg. Nilamata Purāna and J.N. Ganhar, P.N. Ganhar, Buddhism in Kashir and Ladakh) for the association of Buddhism and Kāśmīr.

remained a stronghold of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. It is only logical to suppose that Buddhism in Kāśmīr kept in touch with and developed along with its development in the rest of the country.¹

At the beginning of the 6th century Buddhism in Kāśmīr suffered a serious setback due to the invasion of Huns.² After their departure Buddhism was slowly restored to its former position. The Chinese traveller Yuan-Tsang who visited India and Kāśmīr in the 7th century A.D. (631-633) found Buddhism fairly thriving in Kāśmīr. Buddhism was fully revived in Kāśmīr in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., during the rule of Karakota rulers.³

But we have still not solved the problem of determining the particular school of Buddhism which was flourishing at the time of the advent of the Trika philosophy, especially that of Pratyabhijñā, and is quoted and refuted in the Pratyabhijñā works.

1

This contention is further supported by the existence of a Kashmirian school of Buddhism founded by Dharmottara. Dharmottara was a follower of Dharmakīrti's school of Buddhism. Though mainly concerned with logical and epistemological questions, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara would seem to be in agreement with the basic position of Vijnānavāda. See, for an account of the Kashmirian schools of Dharmottara, Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Vol I, (The Hague : Mouton and Co., 1958), pp 40 ff.

2

Conze, A Short History of Buddhism, pp 65.

3

Ibid.

A comparative study of the arguments employed by Santaraksita in the Tattvasamgraha, to refute the soul-theory and the Buddhist arguments as quoted in the IPV might throw some light on the problem. A comparison of both these sets of arguments reveals a striking similarity between them. This similarity might provide a clue towards establishing the identity of the particular school of Buddhism referred to by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. There is a likelihood that it is the system of Buddhism represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla which is referred to and refuted in the IPV. This conclusion follows from the following considerations:

1. Historically, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla flourished earlier than the appearance of even Somānanda's Śiva Drṣṭi. It has been established with conclusive evidence that Śāntarakṣita lived between 705-762 A.D. and Kamalaśīla between 713-763 A.D.¹
2. An examination of the arguments employed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to refute the soul-theory reveals the fact they are noticeably similar to the Buddhist arguments reconstructed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta against the self. The arguments which disprove the grounding of the changing mental states, impressions, cognition etc, in the self is similar to the one quoted in the Vimarsinī, about the difficulty of self being the substratum of memory impressions without forfeiting its eternal character.²

¹ See Tattvasamgraha, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. XXX, Vol I, (Baroda : Central Library, 1926), pp vii ff.

² Compare particularly Tattvasamgraha Verses 171-284 and IPK, IPV, I, II, 1-11

3. Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were certainly, with regard to empirical reality, Vijñānavādins¹ and believed in the sole reality of consciousness. And Abhinavagupta explicitly identifies the Buddhist he is attacking in the second Āhnika of the IPV,² as a Vijñānavādin.² Besides, Abhinavagupta makes pointed references to the doctrine of Vāsanā as accepted by the Vijñānavādins³ to account for the variety in our cognitions.⁴ Abhinavagupta disputes the positing of Vāsanā to account for the variety in our cognitions. In the process of refuting the Vāsanā doctrine he in fact, pits another school of Buddhism namely, Bāhyārthānumeyavādin (Sautrāntika) against the Vijñānavādin.⁵ But at the same time Abhinavagupta takes

1

See the introduction, Tattvasaṃgraha, Op.cit.

2

Tato dvayena prakāśa-bāhyānām-arthānam sadbhāvaṃ vijñānavādupagata-vāsanādūṣaṇena dr̥dhīkṛtam āśaṅkya...., IPV, I, V, Introduction.

3

Karmaṇo vāsanā grāha-dvaya vāsanā saha; Kṣiṇe pūrva-vipāke'nyadvipāke janayanti tat. See Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Vasubandhu, ed. Swami Mahesvarananda 'Pushpa', (Varanasi : Gitadharma Karyalaya, 1962), pp 4.

4

Na vāsanaprabodho'tra vicitro hetutāmiyāt ; Tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kim nibandhanam., IPK, I, V, 5.

5

IPK, IPV., I, V, 4-5.

care to explain that he does not concur with the Bāhyārthānumeyavādins and proves that the variety in cognitions is not due to the existence of external object but is a result of the diversification of consciousness itself.¹

However, these considerations are not conclusive and do not establish our thesis with any degree of finality. But they certainly lend some support in favour of our contention that possibly it is the school of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that is dealt with in the IPV.

One striking feature stands out from this study of the encounter between the Śaiva and the Buddhists viz, the enormous impact Buddhism had on the Pratyabhijñā, both in thought and language.² The choice of the word apohana to describe the differentiating power of Śiva is clearly an instance of Buddhist influence, as the Buddhist theory of language is called the Apoha theory. Apoha is employed in the sense of negating what is other than itself (anyāpoha). This is approximately the function or power of differentiation, i.e., apohana śakti since differentiation also implies the mutuality or reciprocalness of negation. In this way

1
IPK, IPV., I, V, 3 : 6-9.

2
Scholars have suggested that the choice of the word drsti in Somānanda's work clearly shows a Buddhist influence, see J.C. Chatterji, Op.Cit., pp 18. The usual word employed in Brahmanical and Āgamic philosophical literature to denote philosophy is, darśana.

numerous other instances could be found to exhibit the impact of Buddhism on Śaiva thought¹. Besides, we can not also rule out the influence of Śaiva thought on Buddhism, specially, if we keep in mind that the 'scriptural' or canonical writing on which Kāśmīr Śaiva texts are based claim great antiquity. In the absence of clear historical documentation it is not possible to determine who influenced whom.

The vast body of Āgama-Spanda literature which is skimmed through with masterly skill by Abhinavagupta in Tantrāloka belonged to an uncertain age and still remains an open area for research. What stands out clearly underscored in the debate and discussion between the Śaiva and the Buddhist is the impact that Buddhist "idealism" had on the content of Śaivism. While the Śaiva philosophical developments that took place in other parts of India betray a strong realistic predilection in their ontology, the Kāśmīr Śaiva thought stands distinguished by virtue of its bias toward "Idealism"². We will not go far wrong if we credit the Buddhist "idealist" with quickening this drive toward "Idealism" within the corpus of Śaiva writings.

¹However, the Śaiva concept of Apoḥana Śakti is not a straight borrowing of the Buddhist theory of language but is adopted with some modification. For an exhaustive treatment of the other instances of Buddhist influence on Saivism see R.K. Kaw, Op. Cit. p. 37.

²For the exact sense of "Idealism" in the context of Śaiva thought see infra. Idealism means a distinctive philosophical standpoint where everything is traced to awareness, IPK, IPV, I,V, 8-9.

CHAPTER II

THE BUDDHIST'S CRITIQUE

In this chapter, we propose to reconstruct the Buddhist's arguments against the self in the form in which they have been presented in the IPK and IPV.

As we have noted earlier in Chapter I, the reality of self for the Śaiva is evidenced by our experience. Our introspective experience reveals to us a persisting "I-awareness" (aham pratīti). The persisting "I-consciousness" is the experiential evidence for self, for a consciousness that endures spanning the distinctions of time, the interval between the separate cognitions.

More specifically, in the present context, what the Buddhist disputes is the persistence of the "I-consciousness" and the argument, both implied and explicit, that the "I-awareness" is a sufficient proof of a permanent, eternal self. The Buddhist, as will be shown in the next chapter, provides the historic antithesis, doctrinally speaking, to the ātman theory advocated with varying emphases by the generality of "Brāhmanical" schools. The Buddhist exhibits, in his philosophy, the need for a new formal construction, by a critical analysis of the philosophical tradition and of the forms

and categories that are employed by it, showing how these prove inadequate to their function. The analysis, to anticipate what is to follow is undertaken to indicate the locus of this inadequacy viz the postulation of a persisting self in the form of the knowing I or an acting I. Appealing to the same experience as evidence, the Buddhist asserts that a permanent, self-luminous self is never experienced.¹

The Buddhist elaborates this point by saying that a careful analysis of experience reveals to us nothing of a persisting nature; we only find separate cognitions, perceptions, recognitions, doubts, remembrance etc., with their different objects, characterized by different temporal-distinctions².

However, a general distinction among the transitory cognitions is discernible. The cognitions can be divided into two general types: (1) Indeterminate cognitions (nirvikalpaka) and (2) Determinate cognitions (savikalpaka). The distinguishing feature of the indeterminate cognition is that its object, does not have any thing in common with other objects. The features of the objects of indeterminate cognition are

1

Iha ātmā saṃvit svabhāvaḥ sthiraḥ iti-tāvadayuktam, sthirasya, svaparakāśasya aprakāśanāt. IPV., I, II, 1.

2

Nanu svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānamekam param punaḥ; Sābhilāpam vikalpākhyam bahudhā nāpi taddvayam IPK., I, II, 1. and

Tathāhi ghataparakāśo, ghatavikalpo, ghatapratyabhijñā, ghatasmṛtiḥ, ghatotprekṣā - ityādirūpeṇa jñānānyeva prakāśante, bhinna-kālāni, bhinnaviṣayāni, bhinnākārāṇi ca. IPV., I, II, 1.

absolutely "unique" (svalaksana) to it, it has absolutely no similarity whatsoever with other objects. Consequently the indeterminate cognition is ineffable.¹

Determinate cognition, on the other hand is the apprehension not of the "unique" (svalaksana) bare particular but rather of an object that has qualities and is similar to other objects.²

It is not ineffable, but involves expression in words, as the prerequisites of linguistic expression are present in the object : these are a synthetic activity of remembrance, comparison, spanning a variety of places, times and qualities.³ All determinate cognition arises presupposing the indeterminate cognition, the sensible core of the indeterminate cognition.⁴

1

Tatra nīla-prakāśaḥ 'svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānam'. "Svam" anyānanuyāyi svarūpa-sāṃkocabhāgi "lakṣaṇam" deśakālākārarūpam yasya tasya ābhāsaḥ. Tat avikalpakam viśayabhede'pi ekajātiyaṃ svarūpe, tad vaicitrye kāraṇābhāvāt. Vikalpe hi vaicitrya kāraṇam abhilāpaḥ sa ca atra nāsti. IPV., I, II, 1.

2

'Param' iti ca anyarupam sāmānya lakṣaṇam tasya viśayaḥ. IPV., I, II, 1.

3

Vikalpe hi vaicitrya kāraṇam abhilāpaḥ. IPV., I, II, 1.

4

sarvasya vikalpasya sāksāt, pāramparyeṇa vā nirvikalpaka mūlatvāt. IPV., I, II, 1.

The indeterminate cognition acquaints us with the sense-given, the determinate cognition involves construction of an image (according to certain innate patterns) around that core of sense-perception (the indeterminate cognition).

Our examination of experience reveals to us only these two types of cognitions. These two taken together exhaust the whole range of our experience. Apart from perceiving these two kinds of cognitions we do not perceive anything at all.

In particular, we do not perceive a cognizer, i.e., the self either as related to these two cognitions or as their substratum.¹ In whatever direction we look, we fail to perceive a persisting consciousness, an enduring perceiver apart from the perceptions.

The Śaiva, however, is not convinced. He maintains that self shines through all our experiences as is disclosed by statements of the kind : "I know", "I am certain", "I remember this". The Buddhist, in answer, to this challenge raises a counter-question : Is such experience

¹ Syādetat, yallagnāsau paramparā so'pi ābhāti - iti, tanna , yato dvayamapi etad avikalpetararūpaṃ na anyasya ' kasyacid' etadatiriktasya : 'draṣṭuḥ' anubhavituh sambandhi, IPV, I, II, 2.

as is embodied in "I know" sufficient proof to establish the reality of self, of an enduring consciousness? The "I-experience" in such cases, does not indicate a permanent, eternal self that persists as the substratum of cognitions : but rather, this "I-experience" is only a determinate cognition.¹ Being a determinate cognition the "I-experience" at most, stands either for the series of physical-elements as is evident from statements "I am thin", "I am fat", or for the series of psychical events expressed in statements of the kind " I am happy" etc.²

A careful, critical, phenomenological inspection of the "I-experience" does not warrant the admission of a single, persisting, element in our cognitions; the "I" is rather what appears and disappears along with every determinate cognition. Being a mere determinate cognition the "I" is as transitory as any one of them and cannot be invested with the permanence which the Śaiva claims for it.³

1

Nityasya kasyacid draśtustasyatrānavabhāsataḥ; Ahaṁ pratītirapyeṣā śarīrādyavasāyini. IPK., I,II,2. , and Aham-iti śabdānuviddho vikalpa prat-
yayaḥ. IPV., I,II,2.

2

Nanu tathāpi kim anena vikalpyate, śarīrasantāno va kṛśo'ham -
ityādi pratyayāt, jñāna santāno vā sukhyaḥ - ityādi pratīteḥ. Matvarthi-
yaśca santānam eva spṛśati nātiriktam. IPV., I,II,2.

3

Etaduktam bhavati - ahaṁ pratītireva tāvat na ātmā, tasya-api vikalpa
rūpatvat asthairyācca. IPV., I,II,2 and also, Tathāpi saṁvit saṁvedya vyati-
riktasya ātmano na siddhiḥ. IPV., I,II,2.

The foregoing account may be seen as bringing into open the point at issue between the Śaiva and the Buddhist. The problem to which both of them address themselves is : how to account for the "invariant" mode characterising a cognitional series subject to constant variation , how to account for the continuance that is characteristic of a continuous cognitional series? The Śaiva accounts for the continuity by positing a persisting consciousness, i.e., that which continues or endures spanning the distance between cognitions. The Buddhist, however, contends that when either the corporeal series (śarīra-santāna) or the non-corporeal (jñāna-santāna) series would serve the purpose, why posit a self? What then is the necessity for invoking a "continuant" (santāni) in addition to the continuance of the series (santāna)?

The Śaiva is not ready to give in so easily to the Buddhist. The Buddhist may, if he wants, explain the "I-experience" away, but the phenomenon of memory and recognition would be impossible to explain without accepting self. An explanation of how memory takes place would put the Buddhist with his no-self position, in a difficult spot. It is true that the direct experience of the object is particular and perishing. But there is remembrance which accompanies direct experience.¹ This can be

1

Athānubhava-vidhvamse smṛtis tadanurodhini; Kathaṁ bhavenna nityaḥ syādātma yady-anubhāvakaḥ. IPK., I, II, 3.

explained only on the supposition that the perceiving self is permanent and persists spanning the distance between the direct experience and later remembrance.

The very fact that remembrance or recollection takes place goes to prove that there is something that retains and revives the former direct experience, viz the self. It is after all undeniable that remembrance as a phenomenon takes place. How is this intelligible if after the destruction of the former direct experience, something does not continue to exist? And this something is the experiencer (anubhāvakah).¹

The direct experience of the object having perished, asks the Buddhist in reply, how can even the self help in explaining memory? The mere uninvolved, presence of self is of as little assistance to the rise of memory as the existence of space.² Our experience of memory shows that the direct experience of the object is completely lost; so even if the "self" were to persist it cannot help to explain memory. There has to be something more

1

Sarvathā yadi anubhavo dhvastaḥ, tadā tad prakāśarūpā katham° smṛtiḥ-
taddvāreṇa arthaviśayā° syāt tayā ca sarvo vyavahāraḥ kriyamāṇaḥ dr̥ṣṭaḥ ity
asau svarūpeṇa anapahvanīyā, sati anubhavasya nāśe kimcit° avinaṣṭam° ave-
dayati. Tadeva ca anubhāvakarṭṛ anubhavitṛrūpam° ātmā anubhāvako° nityaḥ -
iti iyadeva ātma siddherjīvitam. IPV., I,II,3.

2

Yadi ātmā kaścidasti kim° tena. Etadapi hi vaktavyam° ākāśamapi asti
- iti. IPV., I,II,3.

than the mere uninvolved presence of self to help make memory possible. Memory is possible according to the Buddhist, not because something persists from the earlier experience to the later act of remembrance, but because the direct experience leaves behind certain traces or impressions which, when revived lead to the remembrance of the previously experienced object.¹ It is the residual traces, not the self, which are instrumental in bringing about memory.² If the residual traces or impressions (samskāras) themselves and, indeed, alone are, in the service of making memory possible, why admit a self? The self thus, becomes a superfluous entity.³ The sensible course would be to retain only the impressions which are responsible for memory and do away with the burden of a useless self. So, all the activities of the world can be accounted for very well in terms of the impressions.⁴ As the carrying of a useless thing only spells trouble, so the admission of a permanent self, that has no usefulness only leads to unnecessary speculation.⁵

1

Atha ucyate- na kevalena ātmanā etat siddhyati, apitu anubhava-samskāro^o pi atra upayogi - iti, tarhi sa evastu, kim ātmanā? IPV., I, II, 3.

2

Anubhavana hi samskāro janyate svocitaḥ, samskāraśca prāktanarūpā^m sthiti^m sthāpayati, ākrṣṭa śākhādeścirasamvartitasya vivartyamānasya bhū^r-jādeḥ. IPV., I, II, 4, and Yato hi pūrvānubhava samskārat^ssmṛti^m-sambhavaḥ. IPK., I, II, 5

3

Yadyevam antargaḍunā ko'rthaḥ syāt sthāyinātmanā. IPK., I, II, 5.

4

Sarva^m hi samskārena jagad-vyavahāra-kuṭumbakam kṛtakarāvalambam -iti. IPV., I, II, 5.

5

Evam tarhi 'antargaḍuḥ' yathā āyāsāya param^m, tadvat ātmā sthiraḥ kalpanāyāsa-mātraphalaḥ - iti kim tena. IPV., I, II, 5.

The Śaiva objects here by saying that the impressions (samskāras) may surely be responsible for effecting memory, but the impressions cannot float in a vacuum. They need a resting place, a seat or a substratum (āśraya). And this resting place is self.¹

What good can come, asks the Buddhist in reply, of accepting self as the substratum or support of the impressions? If self, which is the support of impressions is affected by them, then it loses its eternal character. If the impressions reside in the self without affecting it, then the impressions are as good as nothing to the self.²

The dilemma is obvious enough : Either the impressions affect the self in some way or do not affect it at all. If they affect the intrinsic nature of self, then the self is no longer eternal and it becomes a changing thing no different from the impressions themselves. If, on the other hand,

1

Nanu tasyaiva samskārasya āśrayo vaktavyaḥ; sa hi gunatvād āśrayam apeksatē, ya āśrayaḥ sa ātmā syāt. . ., IPV., I, II, 5.

2

Iha samskāre jāyamāne, yadi ātmano viśeṣaḥ, sa tarhi avyatiriktaḥ - iti na nitya ātmā syāt; atha na kaścit asya viśeṣaḥ, tena tarhi kim. IPV., I, II, 6., and

Dharmayoge nityatāhāniḥ, anyathā kim tena. Taduktam : Varṣātapābhyām - kim vyomnaścarmanyasti tayoh phalam; Carmopamaścetso'nityaḥ khatulyaśce- dasatsamah. IPV., I, II, 6.

the impressions subsist in self without modifying it in any way, the self cannot be said to be the remembering agent (smartā) as its original unremembering and unaffected nature remains intact.¹ Thus the conclusion is forced on us that it is the residual traces or impressions (saṃskāras) alone which make memory intelligible.² The supposition of a rememberer apart from the impressions is a fiction.³

The Buddhist objections force us to conclude that the admission of self does not make things easier for the Śaiva. The "I-experience" which was held by the Śaiva to be an enduring awareness and thus a sure proof of self, turns out to be only a species of a determinate cognition, as transitory as any one of them. Nor is the existence of self felt to be necessary to present an intelligible and adequate account of memory. Memory is adequately explained in terms of residual traces (saṃskāras).

The Buddhist's central objection to the Śaiva doctrine of self can be summed up as follows : no self is ever experienced and cognitions can by themselves, without the supposition of an enduring, constant consciousness, explain all experiences including memory.

¹ Ātmano 'bhinneṣu dharmeṣu' aṅgīkriyamāneṣu teṣu satsvapi, ātmanah 'svarūpe' viśeṣābhāvāt sa tāvat ātma smṛtau na vyāpriyeta asmartrrūpa-asamskṛtarūpādi-prācya-rūpanapāyāt - iti. IPV., I, II, 6.

² Iti "saṃskārādeva smṛteḥ siddhiḥ". IPV., I, II, 6.

³ Saṃskārāt smṛtisiddhau syāt smartā draṣṭeva kalpitaḥ. IPK., I, II, 6

CHAPTER III

THE STANDPOINT OF BUDDHISM

The basic issue between the Śaiva and the Buddhist, outlined in the previous chapter may now be seen against the backdrop of the general Buddhist outlook, especially its standpoint of no-self and its metaphysical setting. The Buddhist doctrine of no-self cannot be studied in isolation from the rest of the Buddhist thought. In particular, the doctrine of no-self can be appreciated only in the light of the Buddhist understanding of reality as impermanent, which again in turn implies 'pain' as the pervasive feature of reality.¹ To become aware of pain and its "cause" vis-a-vis impermanence and non-substantiality is the gno-seological counterpart of the Brahmanical thesis about self, knowledge of which is the sole means to freedom.

1

"It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that "all conditioned things" in other words all factors of our normal experience share three features or "marks" (laksana). They are (1) impermanent (anicca), (2) ill, and (3) "not-self". Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, (Ann Arbor Paperbacks : The University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp 34.

Impermanence, which is the basic mark of the real means that everything changes all the time. Things and persons last for an infinitesimally small duration, very much shorter than what we normally suppose. Thus, in its first and most basic formulation, Buddhism is a thorough-going philosophy of becoming. Change is the most pervasive feature of all reality, material as well as mental. Later on, this insight about the impermanence of reality is developed into a rigorous doctrine of momentariness of the real.

The other "mark" of the real that impermanence entails, stresses the non-substantiality of things. Things are not only without duration but they are also devoid of an "inner-core". An analysis of our uncritical view of things would serve to show the significance of the previous statement. Our unreflective view of an object, e.g., chair is that over and above its visible qualities, there is a kind of "core" in it, "a something" which holds the qualities together and which does not change though the qualities may change. It is precisely this "core", this something over and above the qualities which is denied by the notion of non-substantiality. A thing or a person is only what appears, there is no additional "core" or "depth" that holds the appearances. The "appearances" are the only reality. This is true of all aspects of existence, material as well

as mental. In the case of persons this analysis would imply the non-existence of soul or self¹, of an immutable "core" consciousness; the mental states, the feelings alone are real.

We can sum up again the ontological presupposition underlying the Buddhist analysis of experience as clearly enunciated in the early philosophical formulations of Buddhism by stating that reality consists of a series of existents that are momentary and discrete; there is no unity lurking behind the series of impermanent existents (dhammas). This picture one surely gets from the Pali canons². The Pali canons merely declare reality to be impermanent and transitory : it is only in subsequent developments of Buddhism that this basic insight about

1

In this connection the sage Nāgasena's dialogue with King Milinda as recorded in Milindapañho, is extremely relevant. Here, in a series of searching questions Nāgasena demonstrates to Milinda that as the word chariot is only a convenient designation for the aggregate of pole, axle, wheels, etc., so a person too is merely a name for the aggregate of brain, hair, form, sensation, perception; there is nothing apart from these. See, Milindapañho II.i.1., in H.S. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, Harvard Oriental Series 3, sixth issue, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1915), pp 129-133.

2

See, Samyutta Nikāya Chapt. XXII, I, Sut.2 and Chapt. XXXV, I, Suts 1.12, in F.L. Woodward, trans. Samyutta Nikāya, Parts III, IV, Pali Text Society Translation Series No. 13,14, (London: Luzac and co., 1954, 1956), pp 20-24, and 1-14 respectively. See also Samyutta Nikāya, ii, 66, in E.J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), pp 88-89.

impermanence is seen as entailing the momentary nature of existence.¹ In later Buddhism (especially in the Sautrāntika) sustained attempts are made to turn the doctrine of the impermanence of existence into a doctrine of momentariness of things, strictly on the basis of rigorous, a priori arguments.²

As Buddhism itself came to be identified to a great extent, with the doctrine of momentariness and as it is in this form that it is interpreted and criticised in much of later Brahmanical philosophical literature³, it would be desirable to provide here a brief outline of this

1

"Things are impermanent (anicca) in early Buddhism; they are not literally momentary a refinement of later thought". A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1923), pp 92. And also, "This notion of change is carried by the Buddhist to its logical culmination, viz, the momentariness of things. Though Buddha had himself declared every thing to be impermanent, its logic was not adequately elaborated till the advent of the great Sautrāntikas. Buddhism had, from the very outset discerned three pervasive features of all existence (anitya, anātma, dukha). What the Sautrāntika does is not to add anything to this basic insight but to secure a logical foundation for it". A.K.Chatterjee, Facets of Buddhism, (Calcutta : Sanskrit College, 1975), pp 7.

2

For the classical argument for momentariness, see, Ratnakīrti's Kṣanabhāṅgasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, ed. by Haraparasada, Shastri (Bibliotheca Indica, 1910), pp 20-77, and The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntaraksita with the Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, Op.Cit. verses 350-475. For a modern exposition of this argument see, Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, (Calcutta : The Calcutta University Press, 1935) and also Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, (The Hague : Mouton and Co, 1958), pp 79ff.

3

See, E.J. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), pp 165.

doctrine. The momentariness of the real is established by the Sautrāntika Buddhist by drawing out the full implications of the criterion of reality understood as "causal-efficiency" (athakriyākāritva)¹. The capacity to produce effects is the mark of reality. According to the Buddhist, the capacity to produce effects cannot belong to a permanent object. This conclusion follows from the following considerations.

If the permanent which lasts for many moments, is supposed to be productive, then it can be urged that all the moments during which the object is supposed to last must participate in the production of that effect. But this is impossible since the preceding moment cannot overlap with the last moment to participate in producing the effect. As the permanent object cannot conceivably be productive, it is not real.² Further the Buddhist argument demonstrates that productivity not only implies the non-efficiency of the permanent, it also implies the momentariness of the causally efficient object. If an object is efficient or productive, it must be so always.³ A thing cannot remain unproductive for a certain length of time and then suddenly become productive.⁴

1
See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol I, Op.Cit., pp 90.

2
Ibid.

3
Ibid.

4
Ibid.

The object therefore must produce its effect at once or it will never produce it. The common-sense, uncritical view that things remain unproductive and unchanged for a certain length of time then suddenly begin to change, is false. To be productive means to be changing every moment. Every moment is a perishing to be succeeded by a new birth. Perishing is not an accidental character of the moments but is built into the very structure of things.¹ Thus change receives a radically new interpretation. Change or becoming is not the transformation of one moment into another nor the change of something, but rather it is the immediate and complete replacement of one entity by another. Change signifies a succession of discrete moments. Each moment is unique (svalaksana) flashing into existence for a fleeting moment and then perishing, to be replaced by a new one.² In the process of deepening the Buddha's insight about the impermanence and the non-substantiality of existence, later Buddhism (Sautrāntika Buddhism) comes to propound a doctrine of momentary evanescent elements that flash into life for an instant before disappearing into oblivion.

The same logic leads the Buddhist to deny the reality of universal (sāmānya), substance (dravya), and wholes (avayavin). The particulars alone

1

Ibid, pp 94.

2

Ibid, pp 96-98.

are real, the universal is only a thought construct (prajñapti), the qualities alone are real, there is no substance over and above the qualities. All aspects of reality, material as well as mental exhibit these features of momentariness, discreteness and particularity. The real for the Buddhist is "not only an instant lacking duration, but a spatial point lacking all magnitude and diversity as well".¹

However, it might be thought that such a view of reality which cuts up all things, material as well as mental into discrete bits does grave violence to the felt continuity in our thought and action. There is an undeniable continuity in our experience; there is no abrupt break or rupture between the past and the present as the theory of discrete moments would imply. How is the continuity to be squared with the theory of discrete self-contained units of becoming?

The Buddhist would urge that this continuity can very well be explained within the framework of the theory of discrete moments themselves. Though discrete and non-overlapping, i.e. self-contained (unique), the moments are not lawless, haphazard. Their emergence and disappearance are not chaotic. The moments follow an ordered sequence. The order consists in the fact that each arises bearing the "impress" of the immediately preceding moment and the qualities of the present moment in their

1

TR.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2nd ed., (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp 72.

turn will be transmitted to the immediately succeeding one. Thus, it is in terms of such a series of successive transmissions or the inheritance of the legacy of the past by the immediately succeeding moment that continuity is to be understood.¹ The technical Buddhist expression to describe this process of inheriting from the past and bequeathing to the future is Pratītyasamutpāda.² The way the present is due to what the past was. Each moment is born with the heritage of the immediately preceding one.

Thus, the continuity of thought, of action, which is such an unquestioned aspect of our experience, can be explained adequately in terms of a series of discrete, self-contained moments. There would not seem to be any necessity to posit a persisting, eternal consciousness which underlies the changing states. As will be seen soon, the positing of such a consciousness far from solving problems leads to insurmountable difficulties.

It might be urged that perhaps unconscious, blind continuity can be explained with the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda. But what about bondage, freedom and cognitive activities like knowledge, memory and recognition ?

1

See, Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Op.Cit., pp 65 - 68

2

Ibid., pp 65

Can these be explained adequately within a theory of pure flux? All of them call for the conscious, sustained activity of an agent. A theory of flux, of a series of discrete moments would break down in attempting to explain such complex phenomena.

Such observations, however, are only reflective of an uncritical attitude, the Buddhist would say. He proceeds to show that it is the theory of a persisting consciousness that breaks down while explaining bondage, freedom and knowledge. The Buddhist demonstrates that the acceptance of self, in fact cannot be compatible with a satisfactory explanation of bondage and freedom. A little reflection will reveal to us, says the Buddhist, that freedom implies a change of condition, a change from the previous state of being bound. Freedom means the emergence of a novel condition.

Here the question may be asked whether this change in condition belongs to the self or not. If it belongs to the self and is identified with the self, then being a new condition, a change from the previous state, the self too will be modified and thus will lose its eternal character. If freedom is not to be identified with the self but is held "to hang loose from the self" then the self continues to be in its previous bound state and will not be liberated.¹

1

Tattvasaṅgraha and Pañjikā., Op.Cit. Verse 546.

Strange as it may sound, it is the Buddhist theory of flux that can provide a satisfactory explanation of bondage and liberation. Bondage is nothing but the fact of consciousness being in the grip of ignorance and freedom is the dissociation of consciousness from the shackles of avidyā.¹ So what is needed for the understanding of freedom is a theory that allows for change with no loss of the effects of the previously performed action. Both of these are secured by the theories of flux and Pratītyasamutpāda. It may be urged that voluntary action would be impossible of explanation without the supposition of a permanent, intending agent. The Buddhist is quick to point out that it is precisely the soul-theory, a theory of an eternal, unchanging soul-entity that fails to account for voluntary action. For action of any kind pre-supposes change or alteration which is incompatible with the eternal immutable nature of the soul—substance.²

Memory and recognition do not require a self in order to be explained adequately. In order that memory and recognition may take place it is enough if the impressions of the direct experience are retained and kept on being transmitted through the successive moments until they

¹
Ibid., Verse 544.

²
Ibid., Verse 546.

are revived at the appropriate time.¹ It is neither logically nor epistemologically necessary that the remembering moment must be identical with the cognising moment as the identity of the series, the continuum is sufficient to explain memory.² The possibility of the said memory appearing in a different series simply does not arise because the relation of cause and effect (Pratītyasamutpāda) which is the basis for memory, simply does not hold between the moments of two different series.³ Recognition would closely follow remembrance and so the theory of pure flux is not at all at variance with cognitive activities.

Here it will not be out of place to present the Buddhist classification of the ultimate elements of existence (dharmas) into the skandha (heaps or groups), Āyatana (literally doors) and dhātus (elements). The classification is undertaken with the purpose of demonstrating that what appears to our uncritical vision as the "unified being" or individual can be analysed into the several mental states without the residue of a soul

1

"... when any object has been experienced a seed of memory is implanted in the consciousness continuum, and in the course of time, on the ripening of seed, memory comes causally into being without the intervention of any needless entity like a thinker, and so we can explain recognition". See, A.B. Keith., Op.Cit. pp 171

2

Tattvasaṅgraha Pāñjikā, Op. Cit., Verse 543.

3

Ibid.

or of a substance, i.e., a persisting consciousness.¹

The skandha classification represents the attempt to demonstrate that what we call our "personality" is only a conventional grouping of disparate elements. The group of skandhas includes the elements that go into the make-up of a personality. These are matter (rūpa), feelings (vedanā), perceptions (samjñā), impulses (saṃskāra), consciousness (viññāna). Matter, the first skandha to be mentioned in the classification represents the material or physical elements of a personality. The groups of perceptions are six, corresponding to the six sense-organs. Impulses (saṃskāra) are volitions, strivings, and tendencies whether conscious or repressed.

The second classification into the āyatanas is made with a view to a division into the cognitive faculties and their objects. These are the six cognitive faculties and six types of corresponding objects. The word āyatana means door and thus āyatanas would seem to constitute literally the doors for the emergence of consciousness.

The dhātu classification is a further elaboration of the āyatana. It includes six faculties, six kinds of objective elements and six kinds of objective elements and six kinds of consciousness.² Thus, the above

1

For an exhaustive treatment of this subject, see, Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp 6ff.

2

Ibid.

classification brings out the fact that even the sense of personality can be explained entirely in terms of the momentary elements, without positing a self.

Doubts about the adequacy of a theory of a mind-continuum to explain phenomena like memory, recognition, moral responsibility, etc., were expressed not only by the Brahmanical schools but we also find a section of the Buddhists themselves (the Vātsīputriyas) expressing similar doubts and as a result accepting a quasi-permanent self, an individual (pudgala) neither different from the mental states nor identical with them. Thus in expounding the main argument that the Buddhist standpoint entails, a brief reference to this internal dispute may not be out of place. It will serve to highlight how the Buddhist seeks to account for moral responsibility as implied in the theory of karma as well as explain knowledge, memory and other phenomena without the pre-supposition of self.

The Vātsīputriyas are distinguished from other schools of Buddhism by the fact that they believe in the existence of a quasi-permanent self, an individual neither different from the changing mental states nor identical with them. The individual (pudgala), according to the Vātsīputriyas, is not identical with the mental states, for if it were so, then it would lose its oneness and would be split up into a multiplicity of elements.

Nor is it different from the mental states, for if it were so then it would be equal to the eternal principle of the heretical schools. The individual cannot be admitted to be identical with the mental states for if it were admitted to be identical with them then it would be momentary like them and would be subject to extinction like them. In that case, the loss of action (karmā) will follow, violating the teaching of the Buddha. Thus, the individual has to be accepted as an indefinable and inexpressible principle.¹

The other orthodox Buddhists, the upholders of universal momentariness, have no difficulty in demonstrating that such a principle which is neither different from, nor identical with the mental states is an unreal fiction. A thing which cannot be described either as identical with or different from another thing is a fiction. Besides such an 'inexpressible principle' involves a manifest contradiction. For, while describing the individual as not different from the aggregates the Vātsīputriyas by the same statement, implicitly affirm the individual's identity with the aggregates. Because saying 'not different from' is clearly equivalent to saying 'identical with'. Besides, how can the Vātsīputriyas claim that the individual cannot be spoken of as different from the mental states, when the very statement that 'the individual is not the mental states' clearly admits that the individual and the mental states are

¹

See, Tattvasaṅgraha and Pañjikā, O . Cit., Verse 337.

distinct and different from each other. Thus, the individual of the Vātsīputriyas has an existence not in fact, but only in the imagination of the Vātsīputriyas.¹

The other criticisms of the Vātsīputriyas doctrine of the individual emphasize the fact that the supposition of an individual apart from the momentary elements is not necessary to explain moral responsibility and rebirth. The Vātsīputriyas apparently conclude that the Buddha's sermons regarding moral responsibility would not be intelligible without positing a self who enjoys, suffers and reaps the consequences of his actions. Vasubandhu devotes a whole section of the 8th chapter of his Abhidharmakośa to demonstrate the true meaning of Buddha's statements about moral responsibility and also explains how the existence of the self is neither presupposed nor necessitated by the law of karma.

The Vātsīputriyas have interpreted the Buddha's statements of the kind 'O brethren, I will explain to you the burden and the carrier of the burden'² as supporting their position that there exists an

1

Ibid. Verses 340-346.

2

'Bhāraṃ ca vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhāradānaṃ ca bhāraṅkṣepaṇaṃ ca'. Quoted in Abhidharmakośa Chapter VIII in Swami Dwarikadas Shastri ed. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Yaśomitra., Bauddha Bharati Series 9, Part IV (Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 1973), pp 1206.

individual apart from the aggregates of the mental states. But as Vasubandhu explains, the individual spoken of as the carrier of the burden is nothing apart from the aggregates (skandhas) of the mental states, the preceding groups of mental states which lead to the emergence of the succeeding groups of feelings, etc., are called the burden and the latter (i.e., the succeeding states) are called the burden-carriers as they have inherited in their constitution all that has gone before.¹

This is precisely the way in which moral responsibility has to be interpreted. There is no agent that continues to exist and reap the consequences. Once the action is performed, it leaves its effects in the succeeding moments; these effects are continually transmitted through succeeding moments till the consequences of the act are realized. That this is the intended sense of the Buddha's statement is clear from the very expressions employed to denote the alleged individual. Thus, the individual (pudgala) has been spoken of as the subject, bearing such and such a name, such and such a caste, coming from such a family and so on. These adjectives and descriptions are certainly not suited to describe an eternal self having a distinct existence, from the elements of consciousness.² The Vatsiputriyas are not to be convinced so easily. The problem

1
Skandhā eva ca skandhānāmupaghataya saṁvartante pūrvakā uttare-
śāmiti bhāraṁ ca bhārahāraṁ ca kṛtvoktāḥ. Ibid, p 1206-1207.

2
Atrāyaṁ vyavahārah: - ityapi sa āyusmān-evamnamā evaṁ-janya evaṁ-
gotra pratīyasamutpannāḥ. Ibid, p 1202.

is raised here: how memory can be explained in terms of the momentary existents. How can 'detached moments' of consciousness remember objects experienced long ago?¹

Vasubandhu's reply is that memory is a special frame of mind (citta) which when connected with a previous knowledge of the object (smṛtiviṣaya samjñānvaya cittaviśeṣāt) leads to remembrance of the previously experienced object. Memory is a new state of consciousness directed to the same object, conditioned as it is by the previous states.² In remembering, the mental state is in a special condition and this condition lies in the following facts : (i) the remembering mental state is influenced by the previous knowledge of the remembered object, (ii) there is an attention directed toward the remembered object and in addition there is the absence of distracting conditions like pain, etc. Thus, memory requires no agent and can be seen to arise when appropriate conditions of attention, freedom from pain, etc., are present.

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that there is no self; the word is only a conventional name (prajñaptitah) for mental happenings, sensations, perceptions, feelings and so on. The same analysis holds good in the case of material things as well, milk for example

1

Yadi tarhi sarvathāpi nāstyātma, katham kṣanikeṣu citteṣu cirānubhūtasya arthasya smaranam bhavati, pratyabhijñānam vā? Ibid, p 1215.

2

Ibid, pp 1215-1216.

is only a designation given to certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., erroneously unified under the word milk.¹ But it cannot be denied that there is continuity in the individual with the result that the past has a bearing on the present and the present will influence the future.

In this way, we can see that the Buddhist presents his no-self position as a viable alternative to the soul-theory and explains bondage, freedom and cognitive phenomena like memory and recognition with equal plausibility and critical insight. However, it would seem to be quite appropriate here to consider the Buddhist critique of the 'soul-theory' of some of the Brāhmanical schools. As the next chapter is concerned with expounding the Śaiva position regarding the self, the critique of Brāhmanical schools would help us judge whether the Buddhist critique is applicable to the Śaiva position as well.

Here we propose to consider the Buddhist critique of the self theory of two systems of Brāhmanical thought viz, the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems. The Nyāya offers several proofs for the existence of self and all of them purport to prove that the self must be accepted as the support (āśraya) of our mental states and cognitions. The Nyāya

1

Ato yatha rupādīnyeva ksīramudakam vā prajñāpyate samastāni, evam skandhāḥ pudgala itī siddham. Ibid., pp 1196.

argues that our separate cognitions, feelings, etc., would fall asunder, if the self were not there holding them together into a unity. Thus, the preceding consideration alone is enough to demonstrate the reality and existence of self.

The Buddhist critique consists in pointing out that the assumption of self as the support (āśraya) or receptacle of cognition is totally unwarranted. Our cognitions, mental states, etc., are not gravitating objects like plums, etc., which will fall down unless held together by something. Moreover, how can the Nyāya explain the observed sequence in our cognitions? As the cause of the cognitions and their substratum, the self is ever-present, the cognitions too should all arise at once. The sequence in cognitions cannot be squared with the everpresent nature of their (the cognitions') cause, the self.¹ Thus, the Buddhist argues that the acceptance of the self is warranted neither by experience nor by inference.

The Mīmāṃsā system accepts self as a dynamic principle which changes with the changes of mental states yet maintains its identity through all these stages of transition. The co-existence of change and continuity is not seen to be incongruous as we have evidence of this co-existence in the snake; the snake continues to be the same

1

Tattvasaṃgraha and Pañjika, Op.Cit., Verses 171-221.

in spite of changes of its postures. The self too is conceived as a continuity that is subject to changes of moods. The existence of self, of a permanent consciousness is further strengthened by the presence of the "I-awareness"; our "I-awareness denotes a permanent self.

The Buddhist subjects the Mīmāṃsā conception of self to a sustained criticism.¹ The Buddhist points out that diversity and continuity being mutually incompatible cannot exist in one thing. The self is regarded by the Mīmāṃsaka to be variable to the extent that it passes through diverse states of pleasure and pain but does not give up its substantiality; it maintains its identical existence through this change of states. The Buddhist urges that if the mental states are not held to be absolutely different from the self then the self will be subject to emergence and destruction like the states. If, however, birth and death are believed to belong to the states only and not to the self, then the states and the self will be distinct. The self thus, will cease to be dynamic as the Mīmāṃsaka conceives it.² The Mīmāṃsaka conception of self as both uniform and changing is fraught with contradictions.

1

Tattvasaṅgraha and Pañjikā, Op.Cit., Verses 222-284.

2

The similarity here of this particular Buddhist objection and the Buddhist objection as reconstructed in the second Āhnikā of the Jñānādhikāra of IPV is certainly striking.

The Mīmāṃsaka cannot hope to escape this predicament by saying that experience warrants such a supposition. Experience is certainly the court of appeal, says the Buddhist, but not uncritical experience. And no experience can justify a manifest contradiction.

The argument that the "I-awareness" indicates a permanent consciousness, the self, is not conclusive. To ground the "I-awareness" in a permanent consciousness will only lead to troubles. If the persisting consciousness is the cause and ground of the "I-awareness" then the eternal consciousness being always present all the "I-ideas", expressions, etc., should arise all at once. But our experience is never of this kind, we only see our "I-notions" arising at some occasions. Besides the "I-awareness" is not a single uniform fact. The very fact that the "I-awareness" emerges only occasionally, is enough of a proof to exhibit its multiple, diverse nature. We certainly do not have an "I-awareness" during sleep, swoon and in fits of intoxication. It is futile to look for a foundation for the "I-awareness", such a foundation is non-existent.

With this presentation of the Buddhist position the stage is now set to consider the Śaiva response. Let us now turn to the next chapter to see how the Śaiva responds to this barrage of criticism.

CHAPTER IV

THE ŚAIVA RESPONSE

In this chapter we propose to present the Śaiva response to the Buddhist attack on the Self-theory (ātma-vāda). However, it seems desirable to begin with a brief recapitulation of the Buddhist position. This procedure is followed even at the risk of repetition, as it will provide us with the proper perspective to judge the merit of the Śaiva response. Following this brief sketch, we propose to consider the Śaiva response in considerable detail.

Two stages can be easily distinguished in the Śaiva answer :

(i) the first stage consists in demonstrating the inadequacy of the Buddhist treatment of memory, (ii) the second stage consists in pointing out that memory receives an adequate explanation only in terms of a permanent self, which spans and synthesizes the past and the present experiences. Thus, in the second stage of the Śaiva response we are naturally led to consider, at some length, the Śaiva position regarding the nature and function of the self. This stage constitutes what may be termed, as the constructive side of the Śaiva response. This, in brief, is the outline of the present chapter.

The Buddhist does not believe in the existence of a permanent, enduring self. This conclusion follows, as it was observed earlier, from several considerations : no such permanent entity is ever experienced as a datum; if it is a construct it is unnecessary ; all the facts of experience can very well be explained without it. The Buddhist replaces the self-theory by a theory of a mind-continuum, of a series of happenings or cognitions (jñānāni) closely following each other. All the important facts of experience receive a satisfactory explanation in terms of these discrete and separable cognitions.

Even memory does not present a problem. The impressions left behind by the direct experience of the object are all the factors necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory. The past experience and the traces left by it constitute the only conditions for the rise of memory. Since memory is explained by the impressions themselves, accepting the self is seen by the Buddhist as the carrying of an unnecessary burden.¹

The Saiva accepts this challenge to his position and proceeds to demonstrate effectively the untenability of the Buddhist

1

Yadyevam antargadunā kōrthaḥ syāt sthayinātmanā., IPK, I, II, 5

explanation of memory. The Buddhist account of memory fails to take notice of the synthesis of the past and the present which is the most distinguishing feature of memory. The Buddhist account tries to explain memory entirely in terms of past experience and consequently fails.

There are many more difficulties in the Buddhist treatment of Memory. Of these, the Śaiva focuses only on a few as these are enough to expose the weakness of the Buddhist stand. The Śaiva opens his critique of the Buddhist position by stating that he accepts the role assigned, by the Buddhist, for memory impressions.¹ It cannot be denied that the impressions left by the former direct experience (pūrvānubhava) are significant and have some responsibility in leading to the rise of memory. But the role of the memory-impressions has been exaggerated out of all proportion to their function by the Buddhist. They can at most account for the content of memory (i.e., the remembered object) but they cannot by themselves alone explain the entire process of memory. In short, they cannot explain the 'that' of memory.²

¹ Satyaṃ kintu smṛtijñānaṃ pūrvānubhava saṃskṛteḥ., IPK, I, III, 1.

² Iha smṛtau viṣayamātrasya prakāśo na samarthanīyo vartate yah saṃskārādeva siddhyet, kintu anubhavaprakāśena vinā 'tat' ityevam rūpā kathāṃ smṛtiḥ syāt. IPV., I, III, 1.

In his explanation of the phenomenon of memory the Buddhist places the previous direct experience (of the object) in a position which cannot be properly assigned to it. While explaining the occurrence of memory from the impressions or residual traces (samskāra) the Buddhist states that the impressions are revived in the act of remembering. This revival of impressions leads to the restoration of the former direct experience which was the cause of the impressions. This past direct experience restored to its original shape now, with the help of the impressions, becomes the object of the act of remembering. And, thus, remembrance follows¹. Since memory arises from the former impressions of the direct experience, is it not logical to suppose that memory has, in this way the previous direct experience itself as its object?

According to the Śaiva this explanation of the dynamics of memory has an inherent weakness. The weakness lies in the fact that the previous direct experience itself is made to be an object of the later act of remembrance. Such an explanation ignores the difficulty in making one act of knowledge an object of another one. This conclusion follows from the following considerations.

¹ Anubhavaena hi samskāro janyate svocitah; samskārasca prāktanarūpām sthitim sthāpayati.... Tena atrāpi samskārah tām smṛtim pūrvānubhāvānukariniṁ karoti - iti tadviṣaya eva smṛterviṣayaḥ. IPV., I, II, 5. and Nanu samskārajatvādeva prācyaanubhavamapi viṣayikurutām smṛtiḥ ., IPV., I, III, 1.

First of all, every act of knowledge is self-revealing (svābhāsa).¹ Self-revelation is the ever-present quality of every act of knowledge.² This self-revelatory character is what distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.³ The essential nature of every act of knowledge is to reveal itself (svasya ca ābhāsanam rūpam yasyāh).

Of course it is true that an act of knowledge (drk or jñāna) also reveals the object, but a mere revealing of the external object is not the essential nature of knowledge.⁴ In fact, it is only while revealing itself that an act of knowledge also reveals the external object. The purpose, however, of bringing in this self-revealing character is to show that being essentially self-revealed an act of knowledge cannot be objectified by another act of knowledge.⁵ If it were to be so objectified then it would lose its self-revealing character and finally even the object will not get revealed.

1

Drk svābhāsaiva nānyena vedyā rūpadreśeva drk. IPK, I,III,2.

2

Tena drk 'svābhāsā' ābhāsaḥ prakāśamānatā sā svaṁ rūpamavyabhicāri yasyāh. IPV, I,III,2.

3

'drk' jñānam, tacca jaḍāt vibhidiate svaprakāśaikaikarūpatayā jaḍo hi prakāśāt pṛthagbhūto vaktavyah. IPV, I,III,2.

4

Paraprakāśanātmaka nijarūpa prakāśanameva hi svaprakāśatvam bhāṅyate. IPV, I,III,2.

5

Paratra yadi drk bhāseta tarhi na svābhāsā, idameva hi svaprakāśasya lakṣaṇam. IPV, I,II,2.

Moreover, to say the previous direct experience is the object of the later act of remembrance is equal to saying that knowledge of taste can be had by the eye.¹ The modality in which the past experience is had is different from the modality of the later act of remembrance just as the modality of colour-perception is different from the modality of taste-perception. Consequently, the previous direct experience cannot appear as an object in the later act of remembrance.

Thus, the Buddhist contention² that remembrance occurs having the previous direct experience itself as its object, is reduced to absurdity.

1

Tathā ca rūpajñānena 'rase drk' rasa viṣaya jñānam na vedyate, evam hi cakṣuṣaiva rasaḥ phalato grhīta eva syāt. IPV, I, III, 2.

2

It should be noted here that the Śaiva reconstruction of the Buddhist position as involving the objectification of a previous act of knowledge by a later one, amounts to an almost total (perhaps even deliberate) misreading of the Buddhist position. The Vijnānavāda Buddhist position (which is the one most probably represented here) clearly and emphatically maintains that all cognitions are ipso facto self-cognised; they are "phosphorescent", self-revealing. In fact, it is the Nyāya system that maintains that cognition is cognised by an after cognition, and the Buddhist critique of the Nyāya position is exactly identical to the Śaiva critique of the alleged Buddhist position. This can be seen clearly from Dharmakīrti's statement "Perception of an object is impossible if perception itself is unperceived" ('apratyakṣopālabhasya nā'rthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati). Quoted in Satkari Mookerjee, Op.Cit., pp 325. See also Tattvasaṅgraha and Pāñjikā, Verses 190-193. In the light of this fact it is difficult to understand the Śaiva's almost deliberate distortion of the Buddhist position. Perhaps, this is done to assert the greater merit of the Śaiva position.

However, the act of remembrance and the former direct experience of the object may be similar to each other since memory arises from the impressions left by the direct experience. But this fact of resemblance between the two does not make the past direct experience an object of the later act of remembering.¹

So far the Śaiva has attempted to bring into open the major difficulties in the Buddhist explanation of memory. The Buddhist might retort here, as he actually does, by saying "what if memory is not explained?", i.e., explained with the due distinction allegedly belonging to it? It is in anticipation of such response, that the Śaiva stresses the important place memory occupies in life. That memory is a felt fact of experience cannot be denied and it will not cease to exist by a mere emphatic curse.² All the activities of life presuppose memory, even the most basic activity of perception presupposes it.³ One may pause

1

Yato hi asau tatsamskārasamskr̥tāt samantarapratyayāt utthitah smṛtibodhah, tena tatsadṛśo bhavatu śākhāsanniveśa iva pūrvasāmniveśatulyah, na tu yo yatsamskārāt jātaḥ sa tasya vedana-svabhāvo bhavati. IPV, I, III, 2.

2

Tathā hi - smaraṇanibandhanah sarvo vyavahārah ... Na ca 'dhvam̐ santām' iti bhavadabhīṣṭa śāpamātrāt te dhvam̐sante, prakāśante yataḥ tat etat āpadyate. IPV, I, III, 6.

3

Prathamapi hi pratyakṣajñānam 'aham' iti pūrvāpara-rūpānusādhānena smaraṇānuprānitena vinā na ghatate.... IPV, I, III, 6.

here and see how the sense of importance divides the metaphysical predilections of the two camps, one interpreting memory in the light of cognitions and the other interpreting cognition itself on the pattern of memory. Therefore, memory requires an adequate explanation.¹

Two facts emerge clearly from the Śaiva critique of the Buddhist position : the Buddhist's insistence on the memory-impression being solely responsible for the rise of remembrance miserably fails to explain the sense of the 'that' in memory. The 'that' of memory cannot be explained entirely in terms of past experiences. This special sense of the 'that' consists in a synthesis of the past and the present. This synthesis cannot be effected by the disparate acts of cognitions themselves, non-overlapping and uniquely self-confined as they are. The synthetic nature of remembrance clearly calls for and involves the synthesizing activity of a remembering agent who brings together in one act the past and the present experiences.

The difficulties inherent in the Buddhist position follow from the failure to recognize that the self-confined cognitions (jñānāni) are called on to perform a function which can be performed only by a lasting (satataṃ samvit), all pervasive consciousness, which exists spanning from the past to the present and possesses the three powers of knowledge (Jñāna

1

... etadeva samarthayitum udyantavyam - iti. IPV, I, III, 6.

Sakti), memory (Smṛti Sakti) and differentiation (Aphohana Sakti).¹ The failure to realize the existence and the activity of the conscious synthesizing agent lands the Buddhist in all kind of troubles. The existence of self is attested to by our innermost introspective experience. The only way open to provide a satisfying account for all the facets of experience, memory included, is to recognize the obvious, i.e., the conscious self, the lasting consciousness. An adequate explanation of memory can be provided only by accepting the Śaiva thesis of a consciousness, of a self that unifies cognitions with the help of its three powers of memory, knowledge and differentiation.²

Now the Śaiva proceeds to explain the powers and characteristics of the self that are fundamental for memory. One of the characteristics of consciousness that has been emphasized often enough is its lasting character. Consciousness would be unable to reveal its object if it were self-confined. Memory presupposes a prior knowledge or perception of the object. But if the object were absolutely 'alien' to the revealing consciousness then knowledge would not arise.

¹
Na cedantaḥkṛtānanta, viśvarūpo maheśvaraḥ, syādekaścidvapurnāna smṛtyapohana-śaktimān. IPK, I, III, 7.

²
Tacca asmadabhimataprakāreṇa vinā vidherapī śakyasamarthanam iti darśayati. IPV, I, III, 6.

Knowledge is not so much an apprehension by the consciousness of an utterly alien object, as a manifestation of the object. Knowledge would not arise if the subject, i.e., the consciousness and what is manifested by it viz. the object, were not essentially one in nature.¹ The very possibility of knowledge depends on the ultimate oneness of the subject consciousness and the 'object'. The 'object' is manifested, i.e., objectified as outward by the subject. The whole mass of objects lie immersed in the subject, the objects are not ever (satatam) shining as only a few of them are selected for manifestation at a particular time.² This is the power of knowledge presupposed in and fundamental to every act of remembering. What is characteristic of the function of knowledge is the fact that the object is manifested outward as the "other" (bahirmukha) and as if different from consciousness.

Following (logically) the function of knowledge, the remembering function represents the inwardisation of the outward manifestation, i.e.,

1

Ato'rtha-prakāśa-rūpām samvidam icchatā balādeva artho'pi tad-rupāntargata eva āṅgikartavyaḥ; sa ca arthaprakāśo yadi anyaśca anyaśca, tat na smaranam upapannam - iti eka eva asau - iti ekatvāt sarvo vedyar-āsiḥ tena kroḍīkṛtaḥ. IPV, I, III, 7.

2

Evamapi satatameva unmagnena nimagnena vā viśvātmanā prakāśeta, tathā-svabhāvatvāt. Na caivam, ataḥ svarūpāntar-bruḍitam artharāśim aparamapi bhinnākāram ātmani pariḡṛhya, kamcideva artham svarūpāt unmagnam ābhāsayati iti āpatitam. Saiṣā jñānaśaktiḥ, IPV, I, III, 7.

of the 'other', the object. This aspect is usually expressed by the term memory-impression. This also implies its complementary aspect, the awareness of the past state of outward manifestation. This is the power of remembering of self, requisite for memory.

However, what is basically presupposed in all functions of the self is the operation of differentiation. Without an initial differentiation there would be no possibility of manifestation of the object (ābhāsa) as distinct from consciousness (saṁvit). The very possibility of any kind of functioning or acting upon the part of consciousness (saṁvit) rests upon the initial awakening of the differentiating principle. Thus, the differentiating function emerges as the most basic and fundamental of all the characteristics of the self. The Śaiva describes this aspect of consciousness as its power of differentiation (apohana Śakti).

What makes memory possible is not merely the existence of the self, but the three distinct and related functions of knowledge

1

The Śaiva conception of Apohana Śakti appears to be a modification of the Buddhist term apoha which means the exclusion or differentiation of one thing from other things, used primarily in the context of word and its meaning. See, Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. 1, pp 461 ff. The sense of negating the otherness of the other is common to both. The Śaiva utilizes it in the more general sense of exclusion or differentiation (apa + ūha) of one thing from another and vice versa which is intrinsic to the function of consciousness.

(Jñāna Śakti), remembering (smṛti Śakti) and differentiation (Apoḥana Śakti).¹ And these functions do not simply pertain to the self but are intrinsic to its structure as its powers (śaktayah).² Now it remains to be seen how these three powers of the self operate in the rise of memory. Of course, one of the things absolutely necessary in the rise of memory is the self, the lasting consciousness which exists spanning from the time of the past experience to the present time of remembering. But something more is required to explain the sense of the "that" in memory. Since the self in its purity does not involve any spatial and temporal distinctions, the "that" of memory is not due to the formal, pure self.³ Nor is the "that" of memory something entirely disconnected from the form of self. This is where the functions - function as distinct from form - of differentiation, knowledge and remembering are operative.

¹ Anena śaktitrayeṇa viśve vyavahārāḥ. IPV, I, III, 7.

² The word Śakti literally means power or capacity. In Kāśmīr Śaiva thought Śakti is an integral inseparable aspect or part of the self and is the power of self-expression of the self. It is the inherent dynamism of the self and is involved in its very structure. It takes on many forms, jñāna, smarāna and apohana being among them.

³ 'Sa' iti vimśāsanasya ca iyadrūpam - yat sarvathā-akālakalita-svarūpa-parāmarśanam-eva na, nāpi atyanta bhedaparāmarśanammeva. IPV, I, IV, 1.

The experience of the 'that' involves reference to the spatial and temporal determinations associated with the object at the instant of the first manifestation. The powers of differentiation and knowledge are operative at this stage. But for memory to be possible the prior manifestation of the object is required. However, the object once literally taken out and lost its formlessness and manifested along with certain spatial and temporal distinctions cannot revert back to its previous state of formlessness. If it were to do so memory would not take place.

A manifestation having once acquired certain spatial and temporal distinctions does not lose them, once the process of manifestation is completed.¹ Once the manifestation has been expressed as the 'other' as if different from self, it is not again merged into the distinctionless self. But, the manifestation along with the distinctions that characterized it first remains now in a potential form waiting to be awakened into life. In this state of potentiality the manifestation is known as memory-impression. Since it is not in actuality shining but only has the potential to shine, the Śaiva describes it, in this state, as if it were covered by the veil of darkness.² This preservation of

1
 Apitu yo bhāvaḥ purvamanubhava-kāle taddeśa-kālapramātrantar-
 asācivyaena pṛthakṛto na ca ahantāyāmeva vilīnīkṛtaḥ. IPV, I, IV, 1.

2
 Sa tādṛgameva tamaseva āchhādyā avasthāpitaḥ saṃskāra-sabda-
 vācyah. IPV, I, IV, 1.

the past outward manifestation in a potential form is the work of the power of remembering (smṛti śakti). The smṛti śakti represents an "inwardisation of sorts" (antarmukhatvam) of the previous manifestation. At the moment of remembering the manifestation which was held in potential form is manifested again, the darkness that was veiling it is removed.¹ And the manifestation is known as before as if separate from the subject. However, though shining now, the manifestation, the drk does not have the form "this" because it shines with the distinctions that characterized at the past experience.² The awareness of the past of course, is there but the awareness of the present too is not lost.³

Memory contains within itself an awareness of the past direct experience associated with the present time and act of remembrance. However, the awareness of the present serves as a background for memory⁴. Thus, the "that" of memory which the Śaiva holds to be the essential feature of memory is found, upon analysis, to consist of a unique blending

1
Tasya tamācchādakam apahastayati, tatra apahastite sa pūrvavat, prthakkṛta iva ābhāti IPV, I, IV, 1.

2
Nanu ca idantayā avabhāseta pūrvavadeva, naivam. Tadidanāntanāvabhāšana-prthakkṛta-śarīrādi-sambandhamanavadhūyaiva hi tatprakāśaḥ. IPV, I, IV, 1.

3
Tataśca idanāntana-avabhāšana-kāla-parāmarśo'pi na nīlāti. IPV, I, IV, 1.

4
Iti etat-parāmarśa-bhitti-prādhānyena pūrvakāla-parāmarśaḥ. IPV, I, IV, 1.

of the past and the present, two contrary experiences.¹

We can elaborate upon this explanation of memory in a more intelligible language. In the remembering process, the significant fact is that not only are we able to recall to mind the past experience but we have also the added awareness of the remembering act itself, i.e., a self-awareness of the remembering activity itself.² This self awareness is some thing that cannot be explained entirely in terms of the past. For such an awareness to arise the past has to be related to and distinguished from the present. It is the contact with the present which is chiefly responsible for consciousness of the remembering activity itself.

It is the triple functions of knowledge, memory and differentiation (jñāna, smṛti, and apohana) that make possible all the subtleties involved in the memory-phenomenon. Of these three powers the working of the power of differentiation is the most basic one. It is the Apohana Śakti that introduces differentiation, distinction and exteriorisation presupposed in any act or experience. Even before the Jñāna Śakti can begin its

1

Iti viruddha pūrvāpara parāmarśa svabhāva eva "sa" it parāmarśa ucyate. IPV, I, IV 1.

2

This mode of explanation, typical of the Śaiva philosopher, is applied in the case of awareness itself of which 'memory' is only one instance. Our 'awareness of objects' is itself a blend or fusion of awareness of self and of the object, the simultaneous knowing of myself as knowing something and the knowing of that something. This is what is described by the terms like cit, pratyavamarśa, etc.

operation an initial differentiation has to be introduced in the distinctionless pure self. No manifestation can take place without presupposing the prior diversification of the self.

The primacy of differentiation is obvious enough by now. The fact that memory is not the experiencing of a new object but is the recollection of a previously known one is expressed here by declaring the function of memory to consist in "inwardising" the previous manifestation. The absence of novelty from memory is shown from this account. And thus, the implication is that knowledge (jñāna) is more basic and primary than memory and is even said to constitute the very life of memory.¹

So a deeper exploration of the nature of knowledge would seem to be desirable. It is likely to throw some light on the Śaiva position itself. As we have seen above, a consideration of the true nature of knowledge leads the Śaiva to conclude that the very possibility of knowledge hinges on the oneness of the subject and the object. In considering the nature of knowledge the Śaiva attempts to refute the positions which maintain that oneness of the subject and the object is not a necessary condition for knowledge. The Śaiva attempts to show that manifestedness

1

Evam tāvat smṛti-śakteḥ svarūpaṃ pratipāditam adhunā tadupa-
jivaniya jñānaśakti parāmarśa nirṇayam vitatya...IPV, I, V, Introduction.

(prakāśatva) is an essential property of the object as it is of the subject. If the object were not admitted to be of the nature of luminosity (prakāśatva) it would remain "unknown at the time of the rise of knowledge no less than as it was before that time".¹

The Śaiva contention with regard to knowledge is that knowledge is not a passive apprehension of an entirely alien object. On the contrary consciousness is one with the object. Knowledge merely consists in the external manifestation of what is essentially one with consciousness. This view of knowledge follows from the basic principles of Idealism maintained by Kāśmīr Śaivism, which consist in asserting that the object does not enjoy an independent status but is essentially a manifestation (ābhāsa) of the Subject.

Here we can pause and note that the Śaiva position of 'idealism', of the sole reality of consciousness, the oneness in essentials of the subject and the object, is closely similar to the "Idealism" of Vijñānavāda. The Vijñānavādin establishes his position by demonstrating that the object and its knowledge are always perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama) and are therefore identical. The Vijñānavādin challenges the realist

¹Tato yadi na prakāśatma sa bhavet 'prāgiva' jñānodayāt pūrvam yathā so'prakāśah, tathā jñānodaye'pi syāt. IPV., I, V, 2.

to find a case where the object and cognition are ever available in separation. The nonavailability of the object and cognition in separation establishes the Vijñānavāda thesis of "Idealism", i.e., oneness of the subject and object.¹

However, with the collapse of the separateness of the subject and the object there also follows the collapse of the distinctions among several subjects. Monism follows from the basic thesis of the Śaiva, i.e., the oneness of the subject and the object. There is only one Subject, Śiva, or Parameśvara who limits Himself freely and manifests Himself in the forms of both the sentient, the limited subjects (Māyā-Pramātr, Śūnya-Pramātr) and the insentient objects, i.e., the objects in the universe. All are expressions of His free nature.

The manifesting activity itself is the outcome of the determinative, dynamic aspect of the Supreme Subject. The capacity, the potency to determine itself is the ever-present character of the Supreme Subject and is expressed in manifold ways in the forms of cognition (jñāna), thought (saṅkalpa), decision (anuvyavasāya). Thus, knowledge is only one of the functions of the self-determinative (vimarśa) part of the Absolute Śiva. Being inseparable from the Absolute it is present even in the allegedly

1

See "Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi and Pramānavārttika" in A.K.Chatterjee., Edited. and collected, Readings on Yogacara Buddhism, (Varanasi : Centre of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, 1971), pp 3-24.

indeterminate experiences. If it were not present in a subtle form even in the supposedly ideterminate experiences, it could not emerge at all later. Thus, the possibility of determinateness is never absent even from the most rudimentary experiences. A consideration of the nature of knowledge inevitably leads us to concentrate on the nature of the object, its relation to the subject and finally to the nature of the Subject itself which is found to be the source of all.

However, the very possibility of knowledge pre-supposes the functioning of a much more basic category. For, in order to be manifested the object has to be differentiated from the Subject. Thus, differentiation (apohana) emerges as even more primary than knowledge and remembrance. It is the foundation of all determinative activities and upholds them. It is only by virtue of this power that the subject (pramatr) is able to determine one object as different from another. The process of differentiation is applicable only to things which are of the nature of diversity (māya) and to that which is capable of being expressed in speech.

Now, the nature of self which is the substratum of all these three powers must be seen in some detail. That the base in which such conscious powers subsist can only be a sentient being is obvious.¹ As

¹
Yā caiṣā pratibhā tat-tat-padārtha krama-rūṣitā; Akramānanta cidrūpaḥ pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ. IPK., I, VII, 1.

the Supreme Subject, the whole mass of objects lie merged within Him.¹
Being the source of all, He is beyond spatial and temporal limitations.²

What is remarkable in the Śaiva account of memory is the effort to analyze memory precisely the way it happens in our experience. A careful look at our memory-experience will reveal to us that what is perhaps most characteristic here is the self-awareness of the remembering activity itself. It is an invariable and unmistakable aspect of every remembering activity. The merit of the Śaiva analysis lies precisely in exhibiting how this self-awareness arises. The Śaiva explains this as a synthesis of the past and the present. But the mere presence of the self cannot take care of all the complexities involved in memory. The self being eternal has no sense of the temporal distinctions that are involved in a synthesis of the past and the present. The powers of knowledge, memory and differentiation thus help in bringing about these temporal distinctions and effecting the synthesis necessary for memory. The powers of differentiation, knowledge and memory ensure the fact that the eternal and distinctionless nature of the self does not militate against the awareness of distinctions, a fact absolutely essential for the possibility of memory. Finally, the three powers themselves are only expressions

1

Ittham-atyārtha bhinnārthavabhāsakhacite vibhau; Samalo vimalo vāpi vṛavahāro'nubhūyate. IPK., I, VII, 14.

2

Yat vibhau deśa kālānavacchinne....., IPV., I, VII, 14.

of the dynamism of the self.

And so we are led to consider the most important fact to emerge out of the entire discussion, viz. the dynamic potency of the self. The dynamic (vimarsā) aspect of the self answers the more basic objection to the self posed by the Buddhist: How can change or difference be made relevant to an eternal, immutable self? Thus in the memory experience even if the self be taken to be present, yet being eternal and impassive, it cannot explain the synthesis of the past and the present which is requisite for memory.

The Śaiva overcomes this difficulty by showing that the self though eternal is also the source of dynamism, determinacy, and differentiation. The greatest advantage of the Śaiva analysis lies in demonstrating that the self provides not only continuity (from the past to the present) but also differentiation in life.

CHAPTER V

THE SELF AS ACTIVE AGENT

The self in Kāśmīr Śaivism is the source not only of cognitive experience but also of action. In addition to being a cognizer, the self is also an "active" agent, a doer (kartā). The self not only has the freedom to know but also has the freedom to do, to act. It may be noted that the Grammatical concept of the nominative as the svatantrah kartā (the free agent) is also relevant here. Thus, Vimarśa which was understood as the basis for the cognitional nature of the self, is also the basis for the active nature of the self. The Kriyā Śakti or the power of action is the expression of the nature of the self as the agent.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the distinguishing feature of the sentient is its determination, the capacity to know itself and manifest itself. The sentient is distinguished by holding within itself the possibility for determination. With the explication of the Kriyā Śakti (power of action), we also get to know with greater clarity the functioning of the dynamic aspect of the self. We thus, get to know what Vimarśa signifies.

The Saiva begins with a general analysis of action. The attempt is to find the basic features of any action, what is involved in the concept of action. Any action like, running, walking, etc., is found to consist of a succession of closely similar movements. Thus, the very notion of action involves manyness (anekatvam) since movement itself is nothing but a succession of moments (ksanāh). In addition to the succession of moments, action is also apprehended as one; any action like running, in spite of the diversity of moments, - is grasped as one act, as there is one agent who moves and acts. The representation of action involves unity as well. A close examination of action reveals it to be involving both difference (in the case of the movement) as well as unity. The characteristic feature of action turns out to be unity and difference - bhedābheda.

The challenge to the Śaiva view of action, as involving both unity and difference, comes from the Buddhist. The Buddhist opens his challenge by questioning first the representation of action as a unity. The Buddhist asserts that action cannot be represented as involving a unity. The notion of action does not involve a unity as action is nothing more than a series of moments; it is a rapid succession of closely similar moments. This succession is all that is observed in any instance of action,¹

¹
Kriyāpyarthasya kāyādestattaddeśādirjātātā, nānyādr̥ṣṭeḥ; Na sāpyekā kramikaikasya cocitā. IPK., I, II, 9.

and is all that is necessary to explain the notion of action. Nothing else in addition to these rapidly succeeding moments is ever observed in any given case of action.¹ Unity and difference being totally opposed in nature, i.e., unity being what is not difference and 'difference' being precisely what excludes unity, cannot co-exist, characterize one thing. That which partakes of two such contradictory characteristics as unity and difference cannot be spoken of as one. A sequence is shot through and through with difference and succession and cannot cogently be represented as unity, which admittedly is the counterpositive of difference.²

Action cannot be represented as a unity by conceiving that the different moments reside in one underlying substratum. Such a substratum, in distinction from the moments, is never experienced.³ And even if such a substratum were there, it would not make action a unity. Because such a substratum being presumably affected by various moments with their spatial and temporal differences could hardly be spoken of as one.⁴

1

Natu tatsvarūpātiriktaṃ kaścit anyāṃ kriyāṃ pratīmah. IPV, I, II, 9.

2

Kramo hi bhedena vyāptaḥ abhinne tadabhāvāt, bhedasya viruddham aikyam -- iti katham kramikā ekā ca iti syāt? IPV, I, II, 9.

3

Atra ekatra asraye 'vasthānāt ekā. Tatrāpi tatkṣanātirikto 'na kaścit āśrayo 'nubhūyate. IPV., I, II, 9.

4

Kimca tathābhūtair abhinna deśa kālākāraih kriyākṣaṇairāviṣṭa āśrayaḥ kathamekaḥ syāt. IPV., I, II, 9.

This, as one may see, is an ' empirical ' argument of the same genre as the one used earlier against a cognising agent. It can be seen that this argument is logical and semantical in nature and is very typically Buddhist, representing the upshot of his critique of the notion of being as such. These considerations lead the Buddhist to conclude that action is only a sequence, it is a series of moments coming in rapid succession.

The objections as we noted have a familiar ring about them since they attempt to show that as in the case of the cognitional series, so in the case of the movement series, the continuance can be explained in terms of the succession of moments itself. There is no need to posit a unifying agent in addition to the series themselves. All the other objections are only an elaboration of this basic pre-supposition. So the objections against the Śaiva who maintains that the explanation of action cannot be fully accomplished in terms merely of the series but need over and above a unifying basis -- and one that 'unifies' in a transitive sense as in the case of a first-person singular -- resolve themselves into a basic one of asserting : How can action be both one and many? How can action be both instantaneous and successive? Will not unity be jeopardised by the fact of succession?

The Śaiva reply to this line of objection consists in showing that difference itself is but a freely assumed manifestation of the unitary subject. Since the diverse forms (the successive stages in action) are the manifestations of the subject and are the freely assumed limitations of the sentient (cit-svabhāva), they do not affect its (the cit's) oneness; they in no way take away from its reality as a unity (ekatāna-pabādhana). Since the unity is a conscious subject who assumes a role of diversity consciously, the unified nature of the subject is not affected in any way. Difference ceases to be contradictory to unity. Unity and difference are consequently not contradictories but are simply different like red and blue, where one is surely different from the other but is not defined by the denial of it. An example is furnished here to make this point clear. The functioning of a mirror shows how unity and difference can exist in one thing.¹ The reflections in a mirror though being many and diverse do not affect its oneness; the mirror is one and yet allows the reflections of many and diverse objects with no loss to its oneness (ekatā).

1

Tatra ca uktam cit-svabhāvasya darpaṇasyeva ekatānapabādhana-
 ābhāsa-bheda-sambhava ka iva virodha iti, tasmāt pratyabhijñānabalāt.
 eko'pi asau padārthātmā svabhāva-bhedān viruddhān yāvat āṅgikurute tāvat
 te virodhādeva kramarūpatayā nir-bhāsamānāḥ tamekaṁ kriyāśrayaṁ sampāda
 yanti iti, tatasca sambandhādīnāmapī upapattirīti. IPV., II, I, 1.

However, this is only a very general and rough statement of the Saiva position and in order to appreciate its cogency and its insight into the nature of action, we need to consider it in greater detail. Before we proceed to a detailed consideration of the Śaiva approach and analysis of action, a distinction between the cosmic power of action (Kartrtva Śakti) and empirical action (kriyā) must be made clear. The Kartrtva Śakti represents the svātantrya (freedom) of Śiva or Parameśvara, the freedom to express and manifest Himself in any way He chooses. In this cosmic dimension the Kartrtva Śakti, representing the freedom of Śiva, is eternal like Siva himself, and is devoid of succession. But the empirical action (laukikyāḥ kriyāyāḥ) which is an expression of the Kartrtva Śakti is successive (sakramā). It is under the influence of the power of time (Kāla Śakti).¹ Kāla Śakti itself is one of the means employed by the Kartrtva Śakti in the act of manifestation of empirical action. It is due to the functioning of the Kāla Śakti that the action which we perceive appears successive, each moment of it appearing as cut-off (ābhāsavicchēdana) from the rest.² The counter part of the power of Time (Kāla Śakti) in the

1

Sakramatvaṁ ca laukikyāḥ, kriyāyāḥ kālaśaktiḥ; Ghatate na tu śāśvatyāḥ, prābhavyāḥ syātprabhoriva. IPK., II, I, 2.

2

Iti laukikyāḥ kriyāyāḥ sakramatvaṁ kālaśakteḥ ābhāsa-vicchēdana-pradarśana-sāmarthyā-rūpat pārameśvarāt śaktiviśeṣāt ghatate upapadyate, yā tu prabhoḥ sambandhinī tadvyatiriktā kriyāśaktiḥ śāśvatī kālena asprṣtā tasyāḥ sakramatvam - iti sambhāvanāpi nāsti, yathā prabhoḥ sakramatvam-asambhāvyaṁ tathā tasyā api. IPV., II, I, 2.

field of Jñāna, is the power of differentiation (Apoḥana Śakti). When we speak of an action being successive it is the action taking place in the world which is referred to, not the cosmic power of action of Siva.

Now we come to the consideration of that act of manifestation which the Śaiva thinks demonstrates that unity (ekam) and difference (anekam) are not contradictories and so can be present in one. The assumption of the characters of unity and difference is not the assumption of contradictory characters but is only the assuming of different roles. In answer to the problem raised by the Buddhist that how can one become many, the Śaiva poses a counter-question : how can a thing, a seed for example, that is a cause at one place (in fertile soil it sprouts) ceases to be cause in another place (e.g., in a barren place)? These two are apparently contradictory characteristics and cannot be assigned to the same thing, following the logic of the Buddhist. But we see this happen. Nor can the Buddhist try to explain the same thing being both cause and non-cause, by saying that it is the difference in the field (viśaya) which makes it possible. For if two things are contradictory then they are contradictories forever, the difference of place should not matter.¹ If it is maintained that it is experience that justifies a thing

1

Ekameva katham anekam bhavati iti, tatra ucyate- iha kāraṇameva katham akāraṇam bhavati, atha ucyate viśayabhedāt tathā, -----
----- iti tadviśayabhede etat na virudhyate, iti kena ayam vitirno, varah?
IPV., II, II, 2.

being both productive (a seed when sown in fertile soil) and non-productive (a seed in barren soil) so the same experience is to be appealed to in the case of action as well.¹

If, on the other hand, it is maintained by the Buddhist that the contradiction in a thing being both productive and non-productive is not effective if the two contradictory features have separate fields (visaya-bheda) of operation, then the same would be true in the case of action as well.² It can be easily demonstrated that the unity in action has one sphere of operation and difference another, unity is inward and difference is external. And so the process by which action is called both a unity and multiplicity is explained. When a manifestation, e.g., of the kind of a limited subject (sūnya pramātā) is not in association with other manifestations and is consequently independent of other manifestations, it is inward (antarāṅgatvāt). It is also described as inward because this manifestation is known only through the internal sense, i.e., the mind. The name tattva too is given to it as its nature never changes (svarūpāparicyute). Thus, this manifestation is known as "one" (ekam iti pratiyate).³

1

Saṃvedanena iti cet "calati" ityadau saṃvedanameva asamābhiḥ pramāṇikṛtaṃ kimiti na sahyate. IPV., II, II, 2.

2

Viṣayabhedo'pi ca atra vaktum na na śakyate. IPV., II, II, 2.

3

Tathāhi-ābhāsānatāreṇa asambhedane tadekābhāsamātram, ata eva anyāpekṣāvīyogāt antarāṅgatvāt āntaram anuvartamānaṃ tathābhūta-ābhāsamātra-grahaṇocita-antaḥkaraṇa-vedyatayā ca āntaram tathā svarūpa-aparicyuteḥ tattvaṃ ābhāsa-antara-yogena tananasaḥṣṇutvācca tattvam 'ekam' iti pratiyate. IPV., II, II, 2.

This same one manifestation (ekam, āntaram) when it is in conjunction with other manifestations (ābhāsas) such as the temporal distinctions of the kind "now", and "then" and with manifestations of spatial distinctions of the kind "fat", "lean", etc., and consequently, becomes the object of external sense, is seen as many (anekamiti bāhyendriya-vedyatāyām pratiyate). In this way the whole universe is seen to be a manifestation (ābhāsa) of Śiva and unity in difference can be seen in the case of the world-manifestation itself. The universe before it is manifested by Śiva is one with Him and as no differentiation has taken place, the universe is seen as unity.¹ The same universe when it is manifested in association with other manifestations of space, etc., and when becomes an object of the senses, is known as many (indriya-vedyatāyām-anekam-deśādyābhāsa-miśraṇāt iti). The universe in its state of oneness with Him, prior to its association with the manifestations of temporal and spatial distinctions is a unity and is the object of the internal sense only. This same universe is known as a multiplicity, when it is manifested as different from the Cit (cidatiriktatā-ābhāsane) and is characterized by other manifestations and is known by both the internal and external senses (anekatvaṁ punar-ābhāsāntara-miśratāyām-ubhaya-karāṇa-vedyatve cidatiriktatābhāsane ca iti).² The fact that there are

1

Viśvameva āntarām sat ekam, tadeva sāntar-viparivartinaḥ ubhayendriya-vedyatvam, iti vakṣyamāṇakāryakāraṇa-bhāva-tattva-dṛṣṭyā indriya-vedyatāyām-anekam-deśādyābhāsamiśraṇāt iti. IPV., II, II, 2.

2

IPV., II, II, 2.

different spheres for unity and difference is clear.¹

The purpose, however, of this illustration is to show how unity itself manifests itself as difference and so, in fact, they are not contradictories but only different states of the same. And if it is further maintained by the Buddhist that it is only for practical purposes (vyavahāra) that a thing is represented to have contrary features, e.g., cause and not-cause then the Saiva would readily agree. For him too, the manifestation of one as many is for practical purposes only. And so, is everything for practical purposes (vyavahāra) only in the realm of māyā.² So the contrary natures of unity and difference cannot disprove the reality of action.³

The purpose of the discussion has been to illustrate the extent and depth of the relation of unity and difference (bhedābheda). It is found active not only at the concrete level, e.g., in action and other

1
iti - sphuto viṣayabhēdaḥ. IPV., II, II, 2.

2
Māyā for the Śaiva is the self-limiting, self-veiling power of Śiva. Ultimately, Śiva as the unity alone is real, since difference follows from the self-veiling power of Śiva Himself, which is integral to Him, difference is not nothing, though it is less in value. This is precisely the way māyā is viewed in Śaivism, māyā though obscuring the fullness of Śiva, is obviously less in value, but at the same time being "a part of" Śiva Himself, is not nothing. This is the way the empirical world is viewed too.

3
Tasmāt ekatvānekatvavirodha na bādhakaḥ tadetat eva kāraṇamevam uktam. IPV., II, II, 2.

categories like Universal, causal relation, the relation of pramāna and prameya, etc.. But also at the highest level it seems to be the way Vimarsā itself functions. Action, universal, and other categories are only the specific illustrations of the general law of unity in difference (bhedābheda) which now appears to be very central to the functioning of Vimarsā itself. It is by relying on the category of bhedābheda (unity in difference) that the manifestation of the world-phenomena from Vimarsā is possible. No category other than that of 'unity in difference' expresses better the relation of the world to Śiva.

Now the Śaiva proceeds to show how at the level of concrete experience, i.e., the experience of objects, the category of unity-in-difference operates. If we only care to analyse our experience of an object like a jar, we find that though ordinarily it is supposed to be one manifestation, it is in reality made up of many. It is in fact a collection of as many manifestations as we have words to describe it. What the object will signify to a person is due to the interest, purpose or the intellectual capacity of the perceiver.¹ The causal efficiency of an object too differs depending upon the way it is looked at. Thus, even in our ordinary experience object shows itself to be not unitary in nature in an exclusivist sense or univocally in respect of meaning.

1

Yathāruci yathārthitvaṃ, yathāvyutpatti bhidyate;
 Ābhāso'pyartha ekasminnanusāndhāna-sādhite. IPK, II, III, 3.

The category of unity in difference also sheds some light on the Śaiva view of relation. Relation along with the two terms related, i.e., the related are real. This contrasts with the Buddhist position where relation is not real since of the two terms related only one is real.¹ As a specific illustration we can take the case of substance and attributes. For the Śaiva both of them being real the relation between the two is real too. The relation is one of unity and difference. For the Buddhist, however, the attributes alone are the sole existents and the substance is a complete fiction. So there being only one term relation is not real. With the collapse of one of the terms sustaining the relation, relation itself falls down and crumbles to pieces.

Thus the category of unity in difference is also significant in a wider context as it serves to explicate the relation between the world-manifestation and Śiva. Since manifestation of the world occurs by means of unity in difference (bhedābheda) the same means is to be employed in reaching Śiva. To see non-difference in the difference of manifestations is the only way to follow for those desirous of becoming one with Him.² Ābhāsavāda is not simply an illustration of the process of the

1

Tattvasaṅgraha and Pāñjikā, Op. cit., Verses 823 to 866.

2

Sarvathā tāvadata prameye bhagavata eva bhedane ca abhedane ca svātantryam, ghata-gata-ābhāsa-bheda-abheda-dṛṣṭi-reva ca paramārtha-advaya-dṛṣṭi-praveśe upāyaḥ samavalambanīyaḥ., IPV., II, III, 13.

manifestation of the world from Parameśvara, it is significant in a much more specific and deeper sense. Its significance consists in providing us the insight that the world being a manifestation of the Lord is not be viewed as an obstruction on the way to Him.¹

The relation of the cause and the effect receives a detailed treatment and it is shown that the relation of the cause and the effect is nothing other than the relation of the creator and the created. And creativity can belong only to the sentient. Ultimately pure consciousness alone is found to be the cause. Causality consists in making manifest, what was within, to both the internal and external senses.² Thus, the causal relation rests on the relation of unity and difference (bhedābheda). Unity in difference which is the characteristic feature of relation cannot be possible in the case of the insentient. It is only the sentient (cit) that has the capacity to assume various forms without disturbing its oneness.³

1

Na tu vyavahāro'pi ayam parameśvara-svarūpānupraveśa-virodhī.,
IPV., II, III, 13.

2

Sāntar-viparivartinah; ubhayendriya-vedyatvaṁ tasya-kasyāpi
śaktitah. IPK., II, IV, 4.

3

Na ca yuktam jadasyaivam, bhedābheda-virodhataḥ; Ābhāsabhedād-
ekatra cidātmani ty yujyate. IPK., II, IV, 9.

But the sentient without determinacy or dynamism cannot evolve the world-manifestation. A purely sentient Being (cit) such as the Brahman of the Advaitin devoid of will or parāmarśa or freedom (svātantrya) lacks the equipment necessary to be an effective doer (kartā).¹

Paramaśiva with his parāmarśa, freedom and will power is readily an agent. In essence it is the will power of the Īśvara Himself that is the cause, agent and action.² It is the svātantrya śakti variously called, Vimarśa, Parāmarśa, Icchā Śakti that is the very heart of action.

1

Tasmāt vāstavam cidekatvam-abhyupagamyā-api tasya kartṛtva-lakṣaṇa-abhinna-rūpa-samāveśātmikā kriyā nopapadyate; parāmarśalakṣaṇam tu svātantryam yadi bhavati tadopapadyate sarvam. IPV., II, IV, 20.

2

Ittham tathā ghata-patādy-ābhāsa-jagadātmanā; Tiṣṭhāso-revam-icchaiva hetuḥ kartṛtākriyā. IPK., II, IV, 21.

CONCLUSION

If a generalisation were to be attempted about the Indian religious-philosophical tradition, one can unhesitatingly isolate the soteriological motivation as the driving force behind the philosophical enquiry. The whole philosophical endeavour is geared to the achievement of freedom, to the transformation of un-freedom into freedom. The realization of one's true state is what is meant by the achievement of freedom. This concern with freedom serves to distinguish the Indian philosophical tradition from other philosophical traditions, where philosophy is simply an intellectual pursuit with no special concern to press it into service for a higher goal, viz realization of freedom.

The question now is : what position does the self occupy in this soteriological scheme. For the Brahmanical schools and Śaivism self is a very central category as the entire doctrine of freedom is developed with self in mind, it is the self that is involved in phenomena, in samsāra and it is the self that 'becomes rid' of the phenomenal world, thus achieving its true state. The descriptions and understanding of that true state vary from system to system but all of them would seem to be in agreement as to the existence and primacy of such a state.

This total pre-occupation with the problem and achievement of freedom is something that Buddhism too shares in common with Brahmanical systems and Śaivism. Whatever may be other differences between the Brahmanical schools, Śaivism and Buddhism, they converge in their concern for a total involvement with the questions of Karma, Karma-Vipāka and freedom. Though Buddhism would seem to stand distinguished by its denial of self, nay, of anything permanent resisting the movement of time, yet a place is reserved for some stability within this universal flux, by the doctrine of the karma bearer. The karma bearer would seem to retain, from one form of existence to all the following ones, its psychic predisposition. Thus, in the fluctuating reality, there is one constant factor in the form of the karma bearer.

However, though sharing in a common concern for the freedom of man, for finding out a path leading to freedom, the differences between Buddhism and other systems of Indian thought, namely the Brahmanical schools, and Saivism, run very deep. Of the differences, one that comes to mind most immediately, is the Buddhist's insistence on change and denial to accept anything that stands behind the change and the process, spanning the distinctions of time. So complete is the acceptance of change that Buddhism develops a formidable and plausible explanation of the whole range of our experience in terms of its basic standpoint of universal becoming. With the articulation of its basic pre-supposition of change

and the complementary explanation of experience, Buddhism can be seen as complete in itself, as entirely self-satisfying and would not seem to stand in need of anything external to itself.

This decided preference for the dynamic, the changing has to be seen as stemming from the Buddhist's conviction that "the moral law" takes precedence over everything else. In his approach to religion, the Buddhist is seized with the question of moral life. The most fundamental and basic truth for the Buddhist is the moral law which can be effective only within a framework of change and dynamism.

The contemplation of the moral law is seen to lead directly to the possibility of betterment, progress and improvement. However, this attempt at betterment does not stop at the empirical level but the Buddhist interprets the religious life itself as encompassed within this process of improvement. As improvement is impossible of attainment without the possibility of change, the Buddhist dutifully discards anything that does not allow for the translation of this ideology of change into a religious framework. The Buddhist's refusal to accept self and above all anything that smacks of the static are reflective of this basic pre-supposition. And, thus it comes as no surprise when we find an absence of cosmological speculation in the whole range of Buddhist thought.

Kāsmīr Śaivism shares the Buddhist's concern for the dynamic and this is most noticeable in the Śaiva insistence on understanding the self, as involved with both sentience (prakāśa) and dynamic activity (vimarśa). Dynamism is the distinguishing feature of the conscious being. But for the Buddhist, there is nothing behind the discrete bits of experience; for the Śaiva on the contrary, there is not only a unity behind the discrete units but the discrete units themselves are a result of a self-imposed diversification of the unity. The unity holds the several discrete "units" together by mediating through them. Thus, dynamism is accepted by the Śaiva but with a serious modification which makes dynamism itself expressive of the fulness of the unity of self.

The Śaiva, thus, in his turn provides an interpretation and explanation of experience in the light of this novel way of conceptualizing the self. It is not difficult to find instances from our experience which bear out and convincingly illustrate the Śaiva conception of self. The most vivid illustration of this novel understanding of self is memory, which requires both the unification and differentiation of the past and the present. The entire structure of experience is capable of adequate explanation within the framework of Śaiva position. The Śaiva position would appear to be, thus, complete in itself and does not seem to gain anything from the criticism of either the Buddhist or the Brāhmanical systems. The only purpose served by criticism is to differentiate one position from the other.

The Śaiva also shares in the Buddhist's concern for and involvement with soteriological questions. But the Śaiva's understanding of the question is coloured by his bias in favour of perfection. Imperfection and limitation are characteristic of the state of bondage, un-freedom. Freedom is the realization of perfection, of the recognition of one's true state. This bias in favour of perfection gets expressed in the religious understanding, by the Śaiva's concern for omnipotence - the freedom to do even the impossible. The Śaiva thus refuses to have anything to do with a concept of self that leaves no room for the cosmic and dynamic activity requisite for the fulfilment of the ideal of omnipotence. (This is what is implied in the Śaiva critique of the Advaita). To be omnipotent, self must be structurally continuous with dynamism, it cannot put it on as a cloak and throw it away when its work is over.

What emerges clearly from a study of the encounter between the Śaiva and the Buddhist is that the Śaiva presents a complete re-orientation to the ideology of self and in this process he has been helped somewhere along the way by the Buddhist critique of the Ātman ideology of the Brahmanical systems. The Śaiva, in attempting to translate his ideal of perfection into the religious setting, has deepened our understanding of self by adding a new dimension to it - self is no longer seen as a passive ground or resting place for externally produced differences, but rather the over-arching, unity that generates differences and mediates through them by encompassing them. What has probably facilitated this

reinterpretation of the concept of self is the Śaiva's successful interiorisation of the Buddhist objections. With the successful assimilation of the points of the Buddhist objections, the entire Buddhist critique of the self-ideology does not quite apply to the Śaiva position.

GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS

- ābhāsa derived from the root /bhās meaning to shine, with the prefix a. Literally the term means to shine or to appear, to look like. In Kāśmīr Saivism the term is employed to describe the manifestation from Śiva.
- ābhāsavāda the Kāśmīr Śaiva theory of the manifestation of phenomenal world from the Absolute Śiva. Contrasts with both vivartavāda (the theory of unreal appearance) and parināmvāda (the theory of real transformation), being modelled on the pattern of reflection, the reflection of the world-manifestation on the background of Śiva.
- abheda literally non-difference, identity or identical.
- aḥam-pratīti 'I-awareness' the persisting, immediate awareness of oneself that every person has, most vividly present in introspective moments, taken by the Śaiva as the direct proof for self.
- abhiñjāna derived from the root /jñā meaning to know, with the prefix abhi, the term means recognition, a synonym of Pratyabhiñjāna.
- ākāśa space, ether.
- āmarśa derived from the root /mrś, meaning to advise, stands for the dynamic, phenomenolising aspect of Śiva, a synonym for Vimarśa.
- akhyāti, svātma or svarūpa-akhyāti 'non-intuition', non-recognition of one's true nature as Śiva, which is the cause of bondage.
- anātma (Pāli anattā) literally, means non-self, no permanent reality.
- anātmavāda the doctrine that all things lack substance or permanent reality.

<u>anitya</u> (Pāli <u>anicca</u>)	impermanent, changing, transitory,
<u>antarmukha</u>	inward, internal, used as a characteristic of the memory impressions.
<u>anubhava</u>	experience, direct, immediate experience of objects stands in contrast to mediate function of memory.
<u>anubhāvakah</u>	literally the experiencer, one who has experiences, the self in its role as the experiencing agent.
<u>anubhavitr</u>	the agent of experience, same as above.
<u>anusāṃdhāna</u>	the relating or connecting together of two or more things, characteristic of memory as it joins together the past and the present.
<u>Apohana-Śakti</u>	the power of differentiation of Śiva presupposed in the possibility of manifestation.
<u>artha</u>	object
<u>arthakriyākāri</u>	useful, efficient, productive. The criterion of the real as efficient.
<u>āśraya</u>	support, substratum, resting place, self as the support of qualities and memory impressions.
<u>Ātman</u>	eternal self, the permanent everlasting consciousness.
<u>ātmanistha</u>	self-contained, non-overlapping.
<u>āyatana</u>	literally the 'door'; that which brings about the emergence of consciousness; sense-organs, e.g., the eye, nose, etc., and sense-data, e.g., colour, smell, etc.; the twelve bases of sensation and sense-data as accepted in Buddhist thought.
<u>bahirmukha</u>	external, outward, the term is used to refer to the manifestation of objects as external or outward.
<u>Bāhyārthānumeyavādin</u>	a particular school of Buddhism which believed that the external object could only be inferred.
<u>bheda</u>	literally, difference.

<u>bhedābheda</u>	unity in difference, the relation that is characteristic of the process of manifestation.
<u>Brahman</u>	the Absolute of the Vedānta, the ultimate reality.
<u>Citta</u>	mind, consciousness.
<u>citi</u>	the world manifesting power of the self, another synonym for the dynamic aspect of self.
<u>camatkāra</u>	bliss of the pure I-consciousness, denotes the dynamic aspect of Self.
<u>dharma</u>	the ultimate element of existence a meaning special to Buddhism.
<u>dhātu</u>	literally the 'root' or ultimate element. In Buddhist thought, this term is used for the eighteen elements of existence, viz., the six sense-data, the six sense-organs of cognition and the six resulting cognitions or sensations.
<u>drastā</u>	literally the 'seer', the term is used in Śaiva thought to refer to self in the role of the seeing, perceiving agent.
<u>drk</u>	derived from the root <i>drś</i> meaning to see. A term special to Śaiva thought, refers to the entire range of cognitive elements, every case of knowledge or perception.
<u>duḥkha</u>	pain, suffering, one of the three pervasive features of existence as understood in Buddhist Thought.
<u>Jñāna</u>	derived from the root <i>jñā</i> meaning to know, in Śaiva thought refers to each and every cognitive element, all mental contents.
<u>Jñāna Śakti</u>	the power of knowledge of the Absolute Śiva, the power responsible for the manifestation of objects.
<u>kāraṇa</u>	cause, reason.
<u>karma</u>	action, past deeds and their results.
<u>kārya</u>	effect, result

<u>Kriyā Śakti</u>	the power of action. One of the first five powers to be manifested from the dynamic, creative aspect (also called Vimarśa or Svātantrya) of Śiva. The other four powers to be manifested from the Svātantrya Śakti are (i) Cit Śakti (the power of creative consciousness, (ii) Ānanda Śakti (the power of bliss or joy; (iii) Icchā Śakti (the power of will), (iv) Jñāna Śakti (the power of knowledge).
<u>ksana</u>	literally, the moment, instant.
<u>Ksanabhaṅgavāda</u>	the Buddhist doctrine that all things last only for a moment.
<u>moha</u>	forgetfulness of one's true nature which is the cause of bondage.
<u>Nirvāṇa</u>	the Buddhist term that describes the state of freedom, liberation.
<u>nirvikalpaka</u>	literally, that which is free from all constructive activity, indeterminate.
<u>Nitya</u>	eternal, everlasting, the term that refers to the kind of reality the Self is.
<u>Paramaśiva</u>	Supreme Lord Śiva, the supreme, ultimate reality recognized by Śaiva thought.
<u>phala</u>	result, consequence, literally, fruit.
<u>prajñapti-sat</u>	literally, real in thought only, subjective, unreal.
<u>prakāśa</u>	derived from the root/kāś meaning to shine. Literally the shining light. In Śaiva thought refers to the pure sentience aspect of self.
<u>Prakṛti</u>	the dynamic, evolving material cause of the world, as accepted by Sāṅkhya thought.
<u>pramā</u>	valid knowledge. Knowledge exempt from all error.
<u>pramāṇa</u>	the instrument of valid knowledge, e.g., perception, inference, etc. Their number, nature and function differ from school to school.

<u>pramātr</u>	literally the knower, the self as the knowing agent.
<u>prameya</u>	the object of valid knowledge, that which is known.
<u>Pratyabhijñā</u>	literally, recognition, recollection. In Śaiva thought the term refers to the apprehension that leads to freedom and is understood to be recognitive in nature, consists in the realization of one's true identity with Śiva, the Supreme Lord.
<u>pratyavamaśā</u>	another synonym for the dynamic, phenomenalisng aspect of Śiva.
<u>pūrnatva</u>	literally fulness, perfection. A term often employed to refer to the entire Kāśmīr Śaiva tradition, as Kāśmīr Śaivism aims at the realization of one's true, full, perfect nature.
<u>Puruṣa</u>	the self, the pure consciousness of the Sāṃkhya system.
<u>Śakti</u>	literally power, capacity. In Śaiva thought it refers to the dynamic phenomenalisng aspect of the ultimate reality, Śiva. It is the inherent dynamism of the Absolute, the potency to express itself, manifest itself.
<u>santāna</u>	the series. In Buddhist thought, the term is used to refer to the series of elements that bring about the sense of continuity, permanence, when in fact there is no permanence. The series could be of two kinds, either the bodily series, (śarīra santāna), or the cognitional series (jñāna santāna).
<u>sāmānya</u>	universal, e.g., cowness, potness, accepted as a real in its own right by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and to a certain extent by Śaivism.
<u>samskāra</u>	impressions, residual traces that lead to recollection and recognition later on.
<u>Sarvāstivāda</u>	a particular school of Buddhism that believed in the existence of the elements of reality in all the three times of past, present and future.
<u>Sautrāntika</u>	A school of Buddhism that based itself directly on the sayings (sūtrānta) of the Buddha.

- Śiva The Absolute, the ultimate reality as conceived by the Trika.
- skandha the five groups of elements into which early Buddhism classifies all dharmas or existences. These include Rūpa (matter), vedanā (feeling, Samjñā (ideation), Saṃskāra (forces or drives), Vijñāna (pure consciousness).
- Smṛti or Smarana Śakti The power of remembrance. The power that is responsible in keeping the experience of the object in the potential form of the memory-impression and later leads to its revival at the time of recollection and remembrance.
- svalaksana the unique momentary particular recognised as the only reality by early Buddhism. It is grasped only in pure indeterminate perception.
- svaprakāśatva literally self-luminous, self-revealed. The term describes the nature of knowledge which stands self-revealed, self-cognised and does not stand in need of anything else to reveal itself or to cognise itself.
- Svātantrya Śakti literally, the power of freedom or autonomous power. This power stands for the capacity of self-expression of Śiva and is synonymous with the Vimarśa (the dynamic-creativity) of Śiva. Svātantrya Śakti is the principal power of Śiva and is the origin and source of all other powers.
- tattva reality. In Kāśmīra Śaivism it is used in a specific sense as indicating the successive manifestations from Paramaśiva. These manifestations are held to be thirty-six in number.
- Tirodhāna Śakti the self-veiling, self-limiting power of Śiva. In the process of manifesting himself Śiva simultaneously veils and limits himself. Thus the śakti of Śiva is at one and the same time his creative self-expression and his self-veiling (tirodhāna śakti).

Trika

literally means threefold. A term used to refer to the monistic tradition of Kāśmīr Śaivism because it deals with the triad of Śiva, Śakti and Anu or Pati (Lord), Paśu (the soul), and Pāśa (the bonds).

trsnā

literally, thirst, the craving for pleasures, the root cause of suffering and embodiment in the phenomenal world.

Vaibhāsika

A particular school of Buddhism which based itself on the commentaries (vibhāṣās) written on the Abhidharma works like the Jñānaprasthāna, etc.

vasanā

literally, perfuming. In the Yogācāra it is understood as the driving force leading to the evolution and diversification of consciousness.

Vijñānavāda

A school of Buddhism that upholds the sole reality of consciousness, reducing the empirical world to a system of ideas.

Vikalpaka

determinate. The cognition that involves the conceptual constructive activity of the mind.

vyavahāra

phenomena, phenomenal world.

Abbreviations Used In The Bibliography

- K. S. T. S. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
- P. I. C. I. Publication de l'Institut de civilisation
Indiennes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Abhinavagupta. Bālapriyā: A commentary on Dhvanyāloka Locana.
Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1940.

_____. Bodhapāñcadasīkā. Kashmir Series of Texts and
Studies, No. XIV. Srinagar: Research and Publications
Dept. Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918.

_____. Commentary on Parātrīṃśikā. K.S.T.S., No. XVII.
Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept. Govt of Jammu
and Kashmir, 1918.

_____. Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīnī. (with the Karikas
of Utpaladeva). K.S.T.S., No. XXII. Srinagar: Research
and Publications Dept., Govt of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918.

_____. Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīnī. (with the Karikas
of Utpaladeva). K.S.T.S., No. XXXIII, Vol. II. Srinagar:
Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and
Kashmir, 1921.

_____. Malinī-Vijaya-Vārttikam. K.S.T.S., No. XXXI. Srinagar:
Research and Publications Dept., Govt of Jammu and Kashmir,
1921.

_____. Tantra-Sāra. K.S.T.S., No. XVII. Srinagar: Research
and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918.

_____. Vivṛti-Vimarsīnī. K.S.T.S., Vols. 1-3, Nos. LX, LXII,
LXV respectively. Srinagar: Research and Publications
Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1938, 1941, 1943,
respectively.

Abhyankar, V. S., ed. Sarvadarśanasamgraha. Poona: Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, 1951.

Ādyānāth, Anuttara-Prakāśa-Pāñcāsīkā. K.S.T.S., No. XI. Srinagar:
Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and
Kashmir, 1918.

Ānanda, Rājānaka. Commentary on Sat-Trīṃśa-Tattva-Sandoha. K.S.T.S.,
No. XIII. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept.,
Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918.

Barnett, L. D., trans. "The Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta".
(with Sanskrit Text). Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
Part 3-4, 1910, p. 707-747.

Bhāskara. Bhāskari: A Commentary on the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-
Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta. The Princess of Wales
Saraswati Bhavana Texts, No. 70, Vol. I. Allahabad:
Superintendent, Printing and Stationary, United Provinces,
India, 1938.

. Bhāskari: A Commentary on the Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-
Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta. The Princess of Wales
Saraswati Bhavan Texts, No. 83. Vol. II. Allahabad:
Superintendent, Printing and Stationary, U. P. (India)
1950.

. Śiva-Sūtras with Vārttika. K.S.T.S., No. IV. Srinagar:
Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and
Kashmir, 1916.

Bhattacharya, Ramasankara, ed. Pātāñjala-Yoga-Sūtras with the
Tattva-Vaiśārādī of Vācaspati Miśra. Varanasi:
Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, 1963.

Chatterjee, A. K., Collected. Readings on Yogācāra Buddhism.
Varanasi: Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy.
Banaras Hindu University, 1971.

Davies, John, trans. The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. (with
Sanskrit Text). 2nd Edition. Calcutta: Susil Gupta
Ltd., 1957.

Jayaratha, Rājānaka. Commentary on the Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta.
K.S.T.S., No. XXXVI, Vol. IV. Srinagar: Research and
Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1922.

Jha, Ganganath, trans. The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntaraksita with the
Commentary of Kamalāśīla. Vols. 1 and 2. Gaekwad's
Oriental Series, Nos. LXXX and LXXXIII resp. Baroda:
Central Library, 1937 and 1939 respectively.

Kallaṭa. Vṛtti with Spanda Kārikas. K.S.T.S., No. not known.
Srinagar: Research and Publication Dept., Govt. of
Jammu and Kashmir, Year not known.

Kanṭha, Nārāyaṇa. Commentary on Śrī Mrgendra Tantram. K.S.T.S.,
No. L. Srinagar: Research and Publication Dept.,
Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1930.

- Kaviraj, Gopinath, ed. Yoginī-Hrdaya-Dīpikā. Saraswati Bhavan Granthamala, Vol. 7 (Ind. ed.) Varanasi: Vāraṇaseya Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya, 1963.
- Krishnamacarya, Embar, ed. Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. Vols. 1 and 2. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXX and XXXI respectively. Baroda: Central Library, 1926.
- Kṣemarāja and Shivopādya. Commentary on Sri Vijnānabhairava. K.S.T.S., No. VIII. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1918.
- Kṣemarāja. Commentary on Swacchanda Tantra. K.S.T.S., Nos. XXXI, XXXVIII. XLIV, 48, LI, LIII, LVI. Vols. 1,2,3,4,5(a), 5(b), 6, respectively. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1926, 1927, 1930, 1933, 1935 respectively.
- _____. Spanda Sandoha. K.S.T.S., No. XVI. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1917.
- _____. Vimarsīnī on Śiva-Sūtras. K.S.T.S., No. 1. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1911.
- La Vallée Poussin, Louis de, trans. L'Abhidarmakosa de Vasubandhu. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1931.
- Law, Narendra Nath, ed. Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra. Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 31, Vol. I. London: Luzac and Co., 1949.
- Law, Narendra Nath, and Dutt, Nalinaksa, ed. Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra. Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 31, Vol. II. Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency, 1957.
- Leidecker, K. F., trans. Pratyabhijñāhrdayam. (with Sanskrit text). Madras: Adyar Library, 1938.
- Pandey, K. C., trans. Bhāskari (Vol. III): English Trans. of Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīnī in the light of the Bhāskari. The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts, No. 84. Lucknow: Superintendent, Printing and Stationary, U.P. (India), 1954.

- Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, Charles A., ed. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Ramakantha. Commentary on Spanda-Kārikās. (with the text of Spanda Kārikās). K.S.T.S., Vol. VI. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt of Jammu and Kashmir, 1913.
- Rhys-Davids, Mrs. C. A. F., trans. Samyutta Nikāya (The Book of Kindred Sayings). Parts I and II. Pali Text Society Translation Series, No. 7 and 10 resp. London: Luzac and Co. 1950, 1952, resp.
- Śaktipāda, Ananta. Vṛtti with Vātūlanātha Sūtras. K.S.T.S., No. 39. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt of Jammu and Kashmir, 1923.
- Śaṅkara. Commentary on the Brahma Sūtras. Works of Śaṅkarācārya in original Sanskrit, Vol. III. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964.
- Shastri, Haraprasada, ed. Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910.
- Shastri, Jagaddhara Zadoo, ed. Parātrīśikā-Laghuvṛtti and Parātrīśikā-Vivṛtti. K.S.T.S., Nos. 68 and 69. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1947.
- Shastri, Swami Dwarikadas, ed. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Yaśomitra. Part IV, Kosasthana VII and VIII. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1973.
- Silburn, Lilian, trans. La Bhakti (Le Stavacintāmaṇi) (with Sanskrit Text). P.I.C.I., fas 19. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1964.
- _____, trans. Le Mahārthamañjarī. (with Sanskrit Text). P.I.C.I., fas 29. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1968.
- _____, trans. Le Paramārthasāra. (with Sanskrit Text). P.I.C.I., fas 5. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1957.
- _____, trans. Vātūlanātha Sūtras. (with Sanskrit Text). P.I.C.I., fas 8. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1961.

- Silburn, Lilian, trans. Le Vijnānabhairava. (with Sanskrit text). P.I.C.I., fas 15. Paris: E. De Boccard, 1961.
- Singh, Jaideva, trans. Pratyabhijñāhrdayam. (with Sanskrit text). Delhi: Motilal Banarasidāss, 1963.
- Sri Malinīvijayottara-Tantram. K.S.T.S., No. XXXVII. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1922.
- Thakur, A., ed. Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvalī. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna, 1957.
- The Pandits of Adyar Library, ed. Daśopanisads with the Commentary of Śrī Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Vol. 1, Madras: Adyar Library, 1935.
- _____, ed. Daśopanisads with the Commentary of Sri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Vol. 2. Madras: Adyar Library, 1936.
- Thomas, E. J. The Life of Buddha as Legend and History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.
- Utpaladeva. Commentary on Śivadrsti. (with the text of Sivadrsti). K.S.T.S., No. LIV. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1934.
- _____. Siddhitrayī and the Pratyabhijñā-Kārikāvṛtti. K.S.T.S., Vol. XXXIV. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1921.
- Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhī of Vasubandhu, ed. by Maheswarananda 'Pushpa'. Varanasi: Gitadharma Karyalaya, 1962.
- Warren, H. C. Buddhism in Translations. Harvard Oriental Series 3, sixth issue. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1915.
- Woodward, F. L., trans. Samyutta Nikāya (The Book of Kindred Sayings) Parts III-V. Pali Text Society Translation Series, Nos. 13, 14, 16, respectively. London: Luzac and Co., 1954, 1956, 1965, respectively.

Secondary Sources:

- Anacker, Stefan. "Vasubandhu: Three Aspects Study of a Buddhist Philosopher." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1970.
- Bapat, P. V., ed. 2500 Years of Buddhism. Delhi: Publications Division, Govt. of India, 1956.
- Basu, Aravind. "Kashmir Saivism", Cultural Heritage of India. Vol. IV. Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission, 1956. p. 79-97.
- Bhandarkar, R. G. Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and minor Religious systems. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1928.
- Browning, Douglas, ed. Philosophers of Process. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Chatterjee, A. K. Yogācāra Buddhism. Banaras Hindu University Darsana Series, No. 3. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1962.
- _____. Facets of Buddhism. Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1975.
- Chatterji, J. C. Kashmir Shaivism. Srinagar: Research and Publications Dept., Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, 1962.
- Conze, Edward. A Short History of Buddhism. Bombay: Chetna Ltd., 1960.
- _____. Buddhist Thought in India. Ann Arbor Paperbacks: The University of Michigan Press, 1970.
- Coomaraswamy, Ananda. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism. Harper and Row, 1964.
- Das, S. K. Sakti or Divine Power. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1934.
- Dasgupta, Surama. Development of Moral Philosophy in India. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961.
- Deussen, Paul. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1972.

- Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932.
- Joshi, Lalmani. Studies in the Buddhist Culture of India. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
- Kaw, R. K. Doctrine of Recognition. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvarananda Institute, 1967.
- Keith, A. B. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.
- Khosla, Sarla. History of Buddhism in Kashmir. New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1972.
- Lama Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, Alaka, trans. Tāranath's History of Buddhism in India. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970.
- McDermott, A. C. Senape, ed. with trans. and notes. An Eleventh Century Buddhist Logic of exists: Ratnakīrti's Kṣana bhāṅgasiddhi-Vyatirekātīkā. Foundations of Language Supplementary Series, Vol. 11. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1970.
- Mookerjee, Satkari. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1935.
- Murti, R. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. 2nd Ed. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960.
- Pandey, K. C. Abhinavagupta. The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. 1. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1963.
- Radhakrishnan, S., ed. History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western. Vol. 1. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952.
- _____. Indian Philosophy. 2nd Ed. 2 Vols. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929.
- Sastri, Gaurinath. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959.
- Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana., trans. The Paramārthasāra of Ādiśeṣa. Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House, 1941.

- Schilpp, P. A., ed. The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.
Library of Living Philosophers. New York: Tudor
Publishing Company, 1952.
- Saunders, K. J. Epochs in Buddhist History. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1924.
- Sharma, Dharendra. The Differentiation - Theory of Meaning in
Indian Logic. Studies in Philosophy 23. The Hague:
Mouton and Co., 1969.
- Shastri, K. A. Nilakantha. "An Historical Sketch of Śaivism"
Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. IV. Calcutta:
Ramakrishna Mission, 1956. p. 63-78.
- Sharma, L. N. Kashmir Śaivism. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan,
1972.
- Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic. 2 Vols. The Hague: Mouton and
Co., 1958.
- _____. The Soul Theory of the Buddhists. Varanasi:
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1970.
- _____. The Central Conception of Buddhism. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
- Thomas, E. J. The History of Buddhist Thought. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963.
- Zimmer, Heinrich. Philosophies of India. Princeton: The Princeton
University Press, 1971.