

ART AS CREATIVE PROCESS

ART AS CREATIVE PROCESS: AESTHETIC VALUE

AND ITS

EMERGENCE WITHIN A WHITEHEADIAN ONTOLOGY

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENT:

The attempt is herein made to put forth a comprehensive analysis and explication of the art process and its aim at value based on and backed by Whitehead's metaphysics and scattered comments on the general notions of truth and beauty and on art as truthful beauty. The procedure and discussion is Whiteheadian. Value in general is seen to permeate all of reality. This value can be shown to arise in the explicit example of the art processes of creation and re-creation. The emergence of aesthetic value, as such, can be seen to be the result of two factors: the aesthetic object and the aesthetic experience. Thus a discussion of the object of the experience and the subject experiencing the object is put forth.

Integral to this discussion is the notion that the work of art and the aesthetic object are distinct. The aesthetic object occurs only within an aesthetic experience. The work of art is a potential aesthetic object and within the experience becomes the raw data.

Furthermore works of art are shown to have an inherent rather than an intrinsic value. Also, as a result of this and of the analysis of aesthetic experience it will be seen that there exists a mutual effect between art and society such that the one influences the other. The results of this lead one to conclude that art should be for life's sake rather than for its own.

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List of Abbreviations

All page references to Whitehead's works are to the Free Press paperback editions with the exception of Modes of Thought which is from the G.P. Putman edition, 1958; and Religion in the Making, Meridian Press, 1969.

AI	Adventures of Ideas, 1967.
MT	Modes of Thought, 1958.
PR	Process and Reality, 1967.
RM	Religion in the Making, 1969.
SMW	Science and the Modern World, 1967.

Other Abbreviations

WA	A Whiteheadian Aesthetic
A Key etc.	A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality.

Introduction

Any viable theory of aesthetics must not only be able to account for the cause of aesthetic experience and the relationships that exist because of this cause between the artist, the work of art, and the participator in an adequate manner; but must also be able to show the effect which both the work of art and the aesthetic experience have on the individual and on the society. Thus any aesthetic theory which is viable must account for both creative urge and creative response.

Whitehead's theory of art can be developed to encompass such interrelations between the individual creative process and society. The creative process encompasses both experiential feelings (which are aroused by response) and the creative impulse within individuals. Art, then, as Whitehead conceives it, is an ever-rejuvenating source of new experience - a search for novelty. In its fundamental function of shaping a person's experience until that person has incorporated it into the whole structure or texture of his being; Art is not only compatible with Whitehead's metaphysical system; but is integral in the providing of a basis for creative impulse - the "lure for feeling" and the desire for an ever increasing enhancement of value within the individual as well as within society (as a group of individuals).

This creative impulse extends to society where it acts as a civilizing force advancing, changing and developing (as well as being developed along with it). Whitehead says, even in his earlier works such as Science and the Modern World that Art is not

only a "requisite" for social progress but the requisite. (Cf. SMW 193-208) Art here has an extended meaning and includes "any selection by which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are realisable by them". (SMW 200) It is precisely this broader notion of art which lends sustenance to the more specific term of "the arts". In the course of this thesis, the discussion will be focussed on art in its narrower sense without neglecting the fact that the broadened definition is the link up between a specific Whiteheadian aesthetic theory and a Whiteheadian cosmology.[⌘] In his later works, then, art in the narrower sense is also an attempt to elicit certain values but of a more specified nature.

Any viable theory of value must also have its concerns. Such a theory must be concerned both with the grounds for the determination of value (i.e. "how" value arises) and with the implications, effects, and importance of the proposed theory. This holds true in any discussion of a specific type of value such as moral or aesthetic value.

In the following thesis an attempt will be made to explicate the emergence of aesthetic value within the framework of the art process. If a thesis such as the one proposed here attempts to do this by a process of assimilation and interpretation of a specific philosopher (especially a metaphysician such as Whitehead) then the relatedness of the aesthetic theory as well as the theory of

[⌘] In fact, the very implication that the individual creative process is connected to the broadened social process is a combining of the specific with the general - of D.W. Sherburne's theory with J.L. Smith's.

value must be shown. A ground must be given for certain claims and statements. The ground upon which this thesis is based is precisely Whitehead's ontology.

The purpose of this thesis is not merely a gathering of Whiteheadian comments on art and value but a comprehensive interpretation and formulation of a theory of the emergence of aesthetic value in the art process within a Whiteheadian framework.

In Science and the Modern World one finds such perceptive general comments on art and its relation to value as follows, "Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide the soul[⌘] vivid but transient values". (SMW 202) This "transient value" is what Whitehead later terms "novelty". Art, in this case, includes the drawing out of "habits of aesthetic apprehension" so as to increase the depth of individuality. "The analysis of reality indicates the two factors, activity emerging into individualized aesthetic value". (SMW 199) Thus there is, in fact a link between the arts and general aesthetics for the arts enhance the whole aesthetic complex and this aesthetic order.

From the standpoint of Whitehead's ontology value is the end result of process. All things strive for the attainment of value through interaction. In the specific case of human advance there is a need to discuss the emergence of the "creative act" for the creative act has lead so effectively to the advancement of civilization. Art as an "artifact" or symbol of man's own creativity is a reminder to other men both of achievement and failure. More importantly it is a "focus of attention" for further creative acts. Art by its very nature, then leads to the emergence of aesthetic value. And

[⌘] The "soul" in this context is that creative part of man.

art by enhancing aesthetic value gives meaning to value in the broader sense.

On the other hand it takes more than a value theory to show and attempt to solve the difficulties in aesthetics. It requires a value theory based upon and backed up by a cosmological framework in which value itself is seen to arise because of certain conditions. Such is Whitehead's theory of the emergence of value within process. This theory can be adequately applied to explain the emergence of aesthetic value in aesthetic experience and consequently can provide a novel approach to considerations and questions of traditional art theory.

Chapter I

Whitehead's Theory of Value

(i)

The Emergence of Value

The understanding of Whitehead's theory of value as a first step toward an aesthetics of process can be greatly facilitated by a brief examination of that process by which all entities attempt to achieve a final or complete satisfaction. As a preliminary remark it would be no exaggeration to say that one of the characteristics which distinguish Whitehead's whole philosophy of process is the claim that "value is inherent in [all] actuality" (RM97) and is basic to all actual entities. "Actual entities (which are specific occasions of experience) are analyzable into feelings both on a physical and a conceptual level. Whitehead terms these physical and conceptual prehensions. Actual entities, then, are the ultimate realities constituted of prehensions. These prehensions, in turn, are related in a unity of experiences which form the actual occasion.¹ Furthermore, this unity of experiences occurs within a temporal span allowing for a completion of unity in concrescence. During concrescence there is a "growing together of the elements of the persistent

¹For Whitehead an actual entity is (and except for minor qualifications can be called) "an actual occasion of experience". Actual entities are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find any thing more real. They differ among themselves. God is an actual entity and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space... they are drops of experience complex and interdependent. They are what Locke termed "substances in his Essay (BK.II Ch.XXIII sec.7) and are analyzable into prehensions (feelings)." (PR 23)

past into the vibrant immediacy of a novel present unity".²

Value permeates the actual world. To be an actual entity is to have self-interest:

This self-interest is a feeling of self-valuation; It is an emotional tone. The value of other things, not one's self, is the derivative value of being elements contributing to this ultimate self-interest. This self-interest is the interest of what one's existence, as in that epochal occasion, comes to.* It is the ultimate enjoyment of being actual.

But the actuality is the enjoyment and this enjoyment is the experiencing of value. For an epochal occasion is a microcosm inclusive of the whole universe. The unification of the universe, whereby its various elements are combined into aspects of each other, is an atomic unit within the real world. (RM 97-8)

This self-interest results from the fact that all things strive for completion. This is their ultimate aim. It is a completion which will give satisfaction; and in doing so will also provide potential value for future occasions. This whole process is neatly summarized by Mary Wyman:

The whole business of process which for Whitehead as for Bergson is the essence of reality, is the actualizing of potentiality as an ingredient in something real through the guidance of the lure [for feeling]. The potentiality of the past is the inflow of the material world, or the experience of a

²D.W. Sherburne A Key to W's Process and Reality, (New York, 1966) p.206.

*that is the anticipation of the future.

subject, into process, as well as that subject's possession of inherent qualities; new potential factors are added into the present, involving the conception of eternal objects or ideals, some being contrasting elements; but elements concerned with the physical world and derivative ideas must grow together in harmony following the lure until satisfaction is attained. Through this achievement of value the experience then leaves its imprint as a public fact or as objective immortality.³

To illustrate this, at the level of human creative thought, Wyman uses the process involved in the invention of the flying glider by Lilienthal. The process of that individual's creation of the glider will be seen to be similar to what goes on in both the process of creation and aesthetic creation.

In the beginning Lilienthal may have been merely interested in the flight of birds; the way they glided in their flight. As raw data the birds and their flight had been admitted into Lilienthal's experience and a specific aspect of that perception of them was brought to a further stage of awareness. Lilienthal's perception was heightened maybe by the fact that he had past experience with mechanical technology or maybe just inherited ability. Various other factors and experiences from the past were brought forward to the present experience, combined with it, and, through a lure for feeling which guided these associated experiences, a novel feeling or a novel belief was developed - that there was a "superiority of a curved rather than a flat surface for the flight of machines heavier than air".⁴ Lilienthal's initial idea, then would be the concept of the ideal or what Whitehead terms the "eternal object" brought to the stage of a propositional lure for feeling

³Mary Wyman, The Lure for Feeling, (New York, 1960) p.23.

⁴Mary Wyman, The Lure for Feeling, op. cit. p.24

(i.e. "that there could exist and fly a glider with a curved surface") and then to a state of actuality when the glider is actually completed. Finally, this completed glider becomes "immortalized" or conceptually "eternalized" as a prototype for the development of aircraft.

Wyman's discussion of the emergence of value can be elaborated upon by a discussion of the relationships between fact; value in experience (particularly human experience); the notion of event in which fact can not be separated from value; and finally the special case of human aesthetic values and their development from Whitehead's cosmological view of process.

(ii)

Fact, Value, and Event

The world is the subject matter for qualitative discrimination by an experiencing subject who experiences not bare or isolated facts but facts within events and facts related to value. Value lends importance to facts for "mere facts are worthless except by reference to some understanding of value".⁵ This means that bare facts are not worthy of attention for "Worth" itself, indicates an accompanying value system. For some one thing to be "worthy of attention" and not some other one thing, a basic value system - however primitive - must be actively present in an entity's judgement. Thus, facts, in themselves, need some sort of value - criterion which is based, not within a given temporal experience (i.e. the given temporal experience of that event in which the fact occurs), but exterior to it. Without such a criterion on which experience can be based facts become mere truths or falsities.

⁵ N. Lawrence, "Time Value and the Self" in The Relevance of Whitehead (New York, 1961) p.149

Why Whitehead would give such emphasis to value rather than to fact becomes apparent when one realizes that Whitehead is concerned, not merely with the emergence of value, but with the emergence of peculiarly human value and "that a fact would play any role in our lives depends upon its value as a certain sort of fact".⁶

It is no wonder, then, that Whitehead says that value is "inherent in actuality" for each actuality is, not simply a grouping of facts but, the relating and assessing of these in view of its aim or purpose.

Whitehead says: "value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event" (SMW 93). Human value is a restricted but complicated form of value. Whitehead's interpretation of human value is given significance within the framework of events as transitions and as realizations of value. Whitehead is fully aware both of the transitions - and the place of value in the scheme of things:

The general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary expansiveness. These unities, which I call events, are the emergence into actuality of something. How are we to characterize the something which thus emerges? The name 'event' given to such a unity, draws attention to the inherent transitoriness, combined with the actual entity. But this abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterize what the fact of the reality of an event is in itself. A moment's thought shows us that no one idea can, in itself, be sufficient. For every idea which finds its significance in each event must represent something which contributes to what realization is in itself. Thus no one word can be adequate. But conversely, nothing must be left out. Remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete

⁶Ibid., p.156

experience, we see at once that the element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end in itself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something. "Value" is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. Value is an element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature. We have only to transfer to the very texture of realisation in itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of human life. (SMW 93)

Thus, we have seen that Whitehead's cosmological scheme breaks down the world into a series of events or occasions of experience. Events and actual entities participating in events constitute the existing world. There is no such thing as fact in isolation. Furthermore, all facts are ultimately experienced in relation to a value system whether complicated or crude.

This explains why value is fundamental in the process of realization of every actual entity in its search for selfhood. An actual entity, if it assimilates facts, is concerned with the worth or value of these facts to itself. This self-interest is the basis of existence for "at the basis of our existence is the sense of worth. Now worth [itself] essentially presupposes that which is worthy." (MP 109) for and in its own sake or by its own justification. "Worth" or "importance", for Whitehead, are, at times, used interchangeably with the concept "value". Worth or value proceeds not simply from the individual subject to the object in the environment because the environment itself has intrinsic worth "which must be allowed its weight in any consideration of final ends" (SMW 196). Value arises out of the discrimination - the rejection or acceptance of data - from an experienced world.

Value and fact both call for discrimination in experience. In fact, experience itself is a value experience since our experiencing of actual occasions is a

... realization of worth good or bad.
It is a value experience. Its basic expression is - Have a care, here is something that matters. Yes - that is the best phrase - the primary glimmering of consciousness reveals something that matters. (MT 116)


Value discrimination, then, is inherent in all experience, including conscious experience even though primitive or vague.

Value in the sense of "worth" is involved in concrescence even at the first stage - the acceptance or rejection of data (see figure 1.). When an entity accepts raw data at the first stage of concrescence (i.e. without further assimilation); it has already made a value discrimination. How this would occur in human experience has already been shown by the example given by Wyman about the glider. The raw data were the actual facts within the experience or event - seeing the birds, seeing their wings and their motion in flight. Making the choice to accept this datum and to assimilate it was based on a value discrimination by Lilienthal.

This brings us to two crucial points to note in discussing the assimilation of data by an experiencing subject. One is that Whitehead would want to distinguish between usual theories and his own theory regarding the perception of the datum or "object" and the perceiver of the datum or "subject":

The word 'object' ... means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling [prehension] and the word 'subject' means the entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process. The

Figure 1

PHASES OF CONCRESCENCE

In aesthetic experience this would be the work of art.

In aesthetic experience this would be the "objective content" or "aesthetic object".

In aesthetic experience, later phases pertain to the "subjective form" of response. The proposition is primarily entertained as a lure for feeling. Its logical subject in aesthetic experience is the object as conformally felt in A while its "predicative pattern" is the set of feelings or "eternal objects" at B and B'.

Reality ————— Appearance

feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data. The data are the potentials for feeling, that is to say, they are objects. The process is the elimination of indeterminateness from the unity of one subjective experience. (PR. 136)

This process involves the attainment of satisfaction by the prehending subject. In turn, this attainment depends upon the final aim, goal or purpose (Whitehead calls this the subjective aim) of the subject. This is the search for value feelings. The second point is that a full analysis of value would include references to factors contributing to the intensity of degree of value. Among such factors are triviality, vagueness, narrowness, and width. These are value conditions for they are the means by which value is either enhanced or decreased.

Triviality arises from lack of coordination in the factors of the datum so that no feeling arising from one factor is reinforced by any feeling arising from another factor. (PR 131-2)

Thus no depth of feelings arising from contrasts is present. Triviality lacks the narrowness which is the basis for Harmony (i.e. both narrowness and width). An aesthetic example could suffice here. If someone were to exclaim upon seeing an obviously beautiful sunset "Oh how beautiful!" the result would not be an enhancing of the experience but a detracting from it or at least a pointless and trivial statement about the obvious.

On the other hand 'vagueness' is due to excess of identification. In the datum the objectifications of various actual entities are replicas with faint coordinations of perspective contrast. Under these conditions, the contrasts

between the various objectifications are faint, and there is deficiency in supplementary feeling discriminating the objects from each other. (PR 132)

Ultimately real satisfaction (and value attainment) results from a harmony of relevant background detail:

There is first the relevant background providing a massive systematic uniformity. This background is the presupposed world to which all ordinary propositions refer. Secondly, there is the more remote chaotic background which has merely irrelevant triviality, so far as concerns direct objectification in the actual entity in question. This background represents those entities in the actual world with such perspective remoteness that there is even a chaos of diverse epochs. In the background there is triviality, vagueness and massive uniformity; in the foreground discrimination and contrasts, but always negative prehensions [feelings eliminated] of irrelevant diversities. (PR 133).

Eventually those factors present in all levels of value become of outstanding importance in the analysis of beauty in human experience. This will be seen in the next chapter.

To complete the consideration of value in this section it should be remembered that the subject is not only a subject prehending data but also a superject i.e. the subject is not only a "subject presiding over its own immediacy of becoming" but also "a superject which is the atomic creature exercising its function of objective immortality" (PR 71). This subject-superject, by virtue of the superjective aspect, introduces anticipations of the future into the present concreting activity and acts accordingly.

The anticipation of value for what is yet to be determined is one phase of feeling, a word used in a technical sense that covers many aspects of perception between subject and object. In expressing a subject's concern for a selected portion of the universe, the term feeling is synonymous with positive prehension or the appropriation of data to serve as components of a subject's concrecence, the growing together of its formative elements in the process of becoming. Important too is a negative prehension that eliminates incompatible elements from feeling.⁷

Moreover, on reaching its satisfaction by concrecence, an actual entity becomes a datum or "object" to be prehended by other actual entities or by other subject-superjects.

This idea is carried over into value theory by the fact that, for Whitehead, the very act of becoming is an attainment of value, significance or worth. So, too, every actual entity which achieves its concrecence attains its final value and becomes a condition for value for what follows in the process.

(iii)

Human Values

Human value involves more than a mere acceptance of significant data. Human value results from a complicated discriminatory process involving conscious acceptance or rejection of data. Here the supplemental phases of concrecence play an important role by introducing "propositional feelings" and "intellectual feelings" or judgements. (see diagram fig. 1)

Generalization is also one of the main constituents of

⁷ Mary Wyman, *The Lure for Feeling*, op. cit., p.27.

human value-experience. The ability to make these generalizations is a main constituent of civilized man:

The hermit thrush and the nightingale can produce sound of utmost beauty but they are not civilized beings. They lack ideas of adequate generality respecting their own actions and the world about them. Without doubt the higher animals entertain notions, hopes, and fears. And yet they lack civilization by reason of their mental functionings. Their love, their devotion, their beauty of performance rightly claim our love and tenderness in return. Civilization is more than all these; and in moral worth it can be less than all these. Civilized beings are those who survey the world with some large generality of understanding. (MT 4-5)

In discussing the lure for feeling, previous mention has been made of the fact that value permeates all of reality. Since both human value and aesthetic value are values arising out of creativity⁸ (in the sense of creative appreciation as well) the question now is how the lure effects value in human creativity.

In human creativity the lure obviously awakens a sense of value for what is beyond. When conscious, it represents both aim and goal, the one through the various stages of process transformed into the other.

Consciousness is present when intellectual feelings or judgements occur:

Consciousness comes with intensity of feeling, with a comparison of what may be with what is not, or with a yes or no judgement on a proposition. The union of

⁸Mary Wyman, op. cit., p.27.

^{8E}creativity, itself, seems to be aided by man's ability to generalize.

physical and conceptual prehensions is seen in comparative feelings where the datum to be entertained as a lure for feeling may be a theory or a proposition. Feelings or prehensions of whatever type are subject to the persuasive power of the lure, and are causal links in the successive phases of concrecence that should end in satisfaction.⁹

Propositional feelings and judgements function to make the elements of aesthetic experience explicit and to relate them by way of contrast. As Wyman again puts it: "aesthetic experience is an evocation of intensities from a realization of contrast under identity".¹⁰ This leads to a consideration of aesthetic value.

(iv)

Aesthetic Value

Whitehead says that "the habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values" (SMW 200). It is more than mere awareness. It arises through a value-awareness. Value-awareness is possible only if the values themselves are vivid. But such vividness is, in part, due to transience.

A static value, however serious and important becomes unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release into change. (SMW 202)

Thus art to be of value must have a transience which prevents it from becoming stagnant:

This element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness exhibited in

⁹Ibid., p.28

¹⁰Ibid., p.39

its history. An epoch gets saturated by the masterpieces of any one style; something new must be discovered. The human being wanders on. Yet there is a balance in things. Mere change before the attainment of adequacy of achievement, either in quality or output, is destructive of greatness. But the importance of a living art which moves on and yet leaves its permanent mark can hardly be exaggerated. (SMW 202)

A living art thrives on generality just as man thrives on it. Generality as a basis of civilization is also important in the promotion of aesthetic value. In aesthetic experience, for example, our first thoughts are generalities: "This is beautiful!"; "lovely"; "ugly"; "good"; "bad"; "mediocre"; or what have you. The use of generality, then, is involved in an aesthetic value-judgment. Yet even this generality to have meaning and importance must not be so vague as to become unmentionable or so common as to trivialize the whole aesthetic experience (cf. MT 5). If, for instance, a group of people gaze at a majestic mountain scene and one exclaims "How pretty!" this remark "lets down the whole vividness of the scene" (MT 5) because of its obviousness.

In all human experience there are limitations of values brought about by contraries, grades and opposites. Value in the sense of importance must be thought of from the standpoint of grades of relevance of feeling both in everyday experience and in aesthetic experience attained when interacting with a work of art which has become an aesthetic object:

Perspective is gradation of relevance that is to say it is gradation of importance. Feeling is the agent which reduces the universe to its perspective for fact. Apart from gradations of feeling the infinitude of detail produce an infinitude of effect in the

constitution of each fact and that is all to be said when we omit feeling. (MT 10)

Aesthetic feeling, then, is just one aspect of the total "aspect of feeling" "whereby a perspective is imposed upon the universe of things felt" (MT 10).

(v)

Aesthetic Value and the Mental Processes

Whitehead's categoreal obligations, with their explication of the mental processes are of great importance to both his and this aesthetic theory. Whitehead wants to account mainly for the principle of value; and his analysis of this principle takes into account the fact that most high grade value is achieved in mental processes. There is both a physical and a mental process involved in high grade experience which corresponds to the functioning of the physical and mental poles in consciousness.

Apart from the "physical underpinning," the art-process has no significance for a man as a person within a culture. Apart from this process, creativity is meaningless. And apart from this unity value is frustrated and concrescence unrealized.¹¹

The functioning of the mental pole, at times, involves conscious patterning or ordering toward value. It is by the process of patterning that Whitehead's concept of aesthetic value becomes pertinent; for both value and aesthetic value may arise from just such a process of patterned contrasts.

¹¹Bertram Morris, "The Art Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy" in Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Vol. 3 of The Library of Living Philosophers ed. Schilpp) (Evanston, 1941) p.468.

However, patterned contrasts alone are not wholly adequate in the attainment of value. Massiveness, that is to say, variety of detail (cf. AI 253) adds strength to such value experience. Moreover, interaction between mental and physical poles allows for the increasing of value by the "growth of ideas" and novelty of experience. In Modes of Thought (P. 104) and Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead says that it is peculiarly from a modification of pattern that novelty arises. This intentional modification is what Whitehead terms conceptual reversion; and it occurs in the second phase of concrescence (see figure 1). Conceptual feelings arising in the second phase of concrescence are derived from physical feelings. In reversion:

there is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase ... (PR 31)

Reversion gives rise to novelty which, in turn, enhances value. (cf. MT 104).

In conclusion, one could say that aesthetic value in its broadest sense is a patterned value feeling which, in special cases can be exemplified in human experience and especially the experience aroused by the appreciation or creation of a work of art which has become an aesthetic object in the aesthetic experience. How this is so will entail an analysis both of Whitehead's concepts of beauty and truth - their function within the art work and within art theory. It also requires an analysis of aesthetic experience (by which the work of art - a potential aesthetic object - becomes an aesthetic object) and the creative process itself. This analysis should reveal how various factors in an experience present themselves as lures for value feeling in artistic creation and respondent re-creation (i.e. through aesthetic experience).

Thus it is both the process by which the work of art becomes an aesthetic object and the processes of creation and recreation which will be the concern of the next two chapters.

Chapter II

The Work of Art and Artistic Concepts

Introduction

In order to clarify Whitehead's interpretation it may be helpful to spell out his terminology and his answers to traditional or more usual questions. One important feature is that the term "beauty" is used by Whitehead to refer to the aesthetic experience itself rather than to a property of the work of art or the aesthetic object. This beauty is present when the components of experience are related in terms of contrasts or other features in a unity or harmony yielding intensity of feeling. This is really Whitehead's view of value in its general form as described in chapter one; so that aesthetic value in the narrower sense, and especially as related to works of art, is a special and usually intensified instance of value in the generic sense. Whitehead does not use the word "intrinsic" with respect to value but if the term were applied it would always refer to the value-experience of some actual entity.

With regard to the traditional question as to whether the value "resides" in the subject or object, Whitehead would answer that the only intrinsic value in the full sense resides in the subject or "percipient occasion". Yet there is a sense in which the art object may be said to have its own value. Whitehead prefers the adjective "beautiful" when referring to the object and this term means "inherent capability for the promotion of Beauty when

functioning as a datum in a percipient occasion".¹² (AI 256) The beautiful object then has inherent value.¹³ The value of a painting is regarded as inherent because the components and structures constituting the value are the very ones which enter as sense data into the aesthetic experience. They constitute the "objective content" of the aesthetic experience yet the work of art which they characterize has its own independent existence and importance. In this sense the value is "there" whether anyone is experiencing it or not and such value is not determined by the arbitrariness of a particular person.

In addition to the "objective content" of an aesthetic experience there is also what Whitehead calls the "subjective form" which is due to the response of the subject. But these two aspects are to be regarded as integrally related for "... in the analysis of an occasion, some parts of its objective content may be termed Beautiful by reason of their conformal contribution to the perfection of the subjective form of the complete occasion". (AI 255) These objective and subjective aspects of aesthetic experience will be treated respectively in chapters two and three.

(i)

The Whiteheadian Concept of Beauty and
its Relation to Art

Beauty for Whitehead has its existence within the actual entity or occasion as a form of adaptations within the complexity of prehensions (feelings). Whitehead's definition of Beauty as the

¹²Also "when Beauty is ascribed to a component in a datum it is in this secondary sense".

¹³Paul W. Taylor employs the same meaning when he says "The inherent goodness of a thing is its capacity to produce intrinsic goodness in the experience of anyone who responds to it". Normative Discourse (Prentice-Hall, 1961) p.27.

"mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience" (AI 252) means that Beauty is a "quality" which "finds its exemplification in actual occasions" or in which "such occasions can severally participate". (AI 252) In this interaction there is an absence of interference between prehensions (feelings). As such, there is what Whitehead terms "adaptation" and this is one type of Beauty. Yet, since Whitehead allows for gradations of Beauty (AI 252), when this goal of adaptation is achieved, absolute or Perfect Beauty is not achieved.¹⁴ What is achieved in this interaction towards adaptation is, merely, the "absence of painful clash, the absence of vulgarity" (AI 252) a minor type of Beauty.

This seems to be an integral distinction which lends substantial clarity to any art theory for without gradations of Beauty there would be only one fixed standard by which to judge whether a work is beautiful or not. This, in turn, would eliminate comparative studies between beauty in the experience of one object and beauty in the experience of another. This theory of gradations can be illustrated by figure two (p.20a). This diagram depicts what is involved in the major form of Beauty. In contrast to this, in the minor form of Beauty there is simply a lack of mutual interference or clash among the various prehensions. However, the major form is such that "patterned contrasts" of prehensions (feelings) are introduced in addition which heighten the intensity of the experience! (Cf. AI 252-3) This is achieved by an interweaving of these various prehensions so that a "unity of parts contribute to the massive feelings of the whole and reciprocally "the whole contributes to the intensity of the feelings of the parts". (AI 252) A valuation, which is the "subjective form" or how of feeling, which in its decisions (purposeful or otherwise) may increase or diminish intensity, is involved in this case. Thus the "Subjective forms of these prehensions are severally and jointly


¹⁴With respect to art itself, it must be noted that absolute perfection in art (through absolute Beauty) has not been achieved as yet. (Cf. MF. p.165-166)

interwoven into patterned contrasts". (AI 252) The example of the orchestra can be used advantageously. In the orchestra, not only do the individual pieces contribute to form the unity known as the "orchestra" but the orchestra as a unit helps to enhance the pieces. The piano and the trumpets effectively work together with the violins and the other instruments to give a harmonious effect while the orchestra as a whole enhances the sound given off by the trumpets and the piano and the violins. This pattern of mutual enhancement by interweaving is basic in Whitehead's theory of value and shows the interconnections in Whitehead's whole theory. Whitehead's own example from aesthetics depicts, in yet another way, the extent to which a work of art and the feelings which the work invokes are enhanced by the individual parts of the work of art and the parts by the whole. This is because a work of art to be a work of art must exhibit a patterned interweaving which may be termed Harmony:

It is one property of a beautiful system of objects that as entertained in a succession of occasions adapted for its enjoyment, it quickly builds up a system of apparent objects with vigorous characters. The sculptures on the famous porch of the Cathedral at Chartres at once assume individual importance with definite character while performing their office as details in the whole. There is not a mere pattern of qualitative beauty. There are those statues, each with its individual beauty and all lending themselves to the beauty of the whole. (AI 264)¹⁵

Harmony, then, lends value to an art work and enhances our experience of it as an aesthetic object. In a great work of art, however,

¹⁵As Whitehead says: "mere qualitative Harmony within an experience comparatively barren of objects of high significance is a debased type of Harmony; tame, vague, deficient in outline or intention". (AI 264)

Figure 2.Whitehead's Notion of Beauty

there exists also massiveness and intensity. It is the interweaving of all three of these that produces the greatest beauty. Without massiveness and intensity (as well as harmony) a lack of significance results. Without significance to aim at, vagueness, lack of novelty, and incompleteness result. A good example is in the sonnet form in poetry. The sonnet consists, usually, of fourteen lines and two sections. The first section is eight lines and the second is six. The first eight lines set the theme and the last six reiterate it in a novel way. Consequently, a specified rhyme scheme is necessitated. If all of these ingredients occur so will a sonnet. However, what must also occur is an aim at significance within the poem itself. This involves creative imagination and an attempt at communication. If one, merely, describes a worm or a clot of dirt and writes a sonnet to it this would seem ludicrous. The aim must be towards some higher experience. Wordsworth in his Ode to Daffodils saves his poem from triviality by concentrating on a subject within a subject. His aim is not merely to write on flowers but to discuss poetry and the creation of poems. His aim is to depict beauty not only in nature but in his own art.

One must keep in mind, at this stage, the distinction in aesthetics between "Beauty" as a quality which is, in the primary sense, "realized in actual occasions which are the completely real things in the universe" (AI 255) and "beautiful" which is a term which refers to "the objective content from which the occasion originates" (AI 255) i.e. a particular object experienced on an occasion by a perceiver. "Beautiful" is a qualifying term applied by the perceiver to an object when he, himself, enjoys the experience of Beauty. (Cf. AI 255) The inherent value of a work of art is, in part its ability to invoke this feeling of beauty in the subjective experience.

The concept of Beauty, for Whitehead, is understood in relation to his metaphysical world system in three ways:

(a) there is a relation between the "objective content of a prehension and the subjective form of that prehension" (AI 253). This means that there must be some conformation between our feelings and the object prehended; for "the qualitative content of the object enters into the qualities exemplified in the subjective form of that prehension". (AI 253). The conformal feelings originate in the "conformal phase" of the concrescence which is the process of the interweaving of feelings. Conformal feelings "transform the objective content into subjective feelings". (PR 191) Whitehead says that conformal feelings are "'vectors' for they feel what is there and transform it into what is here". (PR 105)

(b) The concept of Beauty for Whitehead also involves a "unity of the immediate occasion in process of formation". (AI 254) This is what Whitehead means by the mutual relation "between the subjective forms of various prehensions in the same occasion". (AI 253) To see an object as beautiful on a particular occasion is the result of a unity of prehensions and experience from the past acting and combining with the present experience.

(c) For an object to possess Beauty there must also exist a relationship "between the subjective form of a prehension and the spontaneity involved in the subjective aim of the preheating occasion" (AI 253) or what Whitehead calls the "synthesis of subjective forms derived conformally" (AI 255) by means of a regulative principle which, itself, is derived from a "novel unity" imposed by the novel entity in its process of concrescence. This involves the operation of the mental pole with its potentiality for freedom or self-causation and imagination. It is also related to the principle that the enhancement of the self is the ultimate aim

of an aesthetic experience.

So far the discussion has centered around Beauty in relation to an harmonious pattern; but Whitehead does not wish to rule out cases in which discord or imperfection exemplify the form of Beauty. In fact, Beauty, at times, may be more the result of discord than of Harmony. If this is the case then there would seem to be a contradiction. If the "perfection of Beauty is the perfection of Harmony" (AI 252) then how could discord or ugliness exemplify the form of Beauty? Discord has always been associated with ugliness but should it be? The answer which is possible is that discord and ugliness may not be the same thing. Discord, is, at times, more preferable because of the rare occasions when "perfection would be deadening" and discord would be turned into good or have value. In these cases discord would avoid monotony.¹⁶ For example, if discord within a painting proved unique to the extent that it avoided the monotony of the type involved within the paintings of the conventional school in Ancient Greece (where repetition leads to boredom) or in the eighteenth century with the pastoral convention in poetry; then discord would, indeed, prove a viable element in the attainment of value. This means that freshness and novelty are as important in respect to the promotion of the beautiful within an art object as is harmony; and if discord provides this novelty where harmony and perfection do not then discord is to be preferred in such cases.*

¹⁶This is further stated by Lucien Price in the Dialogues where he quotes a conversation he had with Whitehead about art. Whitehead here says that "Art flourishes when there is a sense of adventure, a sense of nothing having been done before, of complete freedom to experiment; but when caution comes in you get repetition and repetition is the death of art." (Dialogues, 142-3)

*Discord may be the opposite of Harmony but the point is that in some cases total Harmony is more deadening and less conducive to an attainment of value.

Intensities of all sense qualities, such as colours, are also important in enhancing beauty. An example is the aesthetic beauty which is either present or lacking when enjoying a work of art such as a painting. This aesthetic beauty, if present, may be enhanced by such qualities as colour and texture (Cf. MP 81-82). Whitehead says once again that

the qualitative content of the object pre-
hended enters into the qualities exempli-
fied in the subjective form of that prehen-
sion. (AI 255)

In the case of the work of art, it can be seen that man has an advantage over other creatures in nature which can not experience colour. Some highly developed creatures (eg. dogs) do not even experience colour; and yet, as Whitehead seems to imply, aesthetic enjoyment is to some extent dependent on it. A colour blind man or animal can perceive beauty, but, neither, can perceive beauty (other factors being equal) to as great an extent as someone who can perceive colour. The addition of such qualities as colour would then seem to aid in the attainment of a higher grade of value through the provision of a more vivid picture of things. Pictorial art, for example, is related to an effective use of colour producing a higher grade of beauty.

From the above there is no implication that the quality of Beauty is solely dependent on the perceiver for the perceiver only perceives the objective content provided by the beautiful object. As Whitehead puts it,

There is a unity in the universe enjoying
value and (by immanence) sharing value.
For example take the subtle beauty of a
flower in some isolated glade of a primeval
forest. No animal has ever had the subtlety
of experience to enjoy its full beauty. And
yet this beauty is a grand fact of nature. (MP 164)

This means that the beauty which the object promotes is somehow inherent. It is inherent in that while it takes a perceiver to interact with the object - the flower - to produce the experience of Beauty; there is, nevertheless, a quality inhering in the object. Yet it is only through the participating, as well as the observing subject-superject that intrinsic beauty is produced. The flower, itself, is not aware of its "beauty" as aesthetic. It is through Man who brings along with him his capacity for aesthetic enjoyment as well as his past experiences, values, and notions of "things beautiful" that intrinsic beauty emerges. The subject-superject, in some sense, as an active participater, is needed not only to be able to perceive the "beautiful" but also (through the act of creativity) to enhance his own experience of it - to make this experience of beauty greater than what is provided for by the inherent value of the art object.

Three related considerations are of further concern in this discussion of beauty. The first is that, for Whitehead, "spontaneity and originality of decision belongs to the essence of each actual occasion" (AI 253); and this includes the occasion experiencing beauty. This is so because of the functioning of the conceptual pole in creative imagination which enhances the experience of beauty and of what is beautiful. The second consideration is that the highest enjoyment, rather than perfection per se, is the key aim, for even "perfection at a low level ranks below imperfection with a higher aim". (AI 264) Of course, Harmony when it tends toward higher goals, as previously noted (p. 20) is better than discord. This is the case when Harmony seeks the ultimate aim of enjoyment by use of novelty and freshness of prehensions. Finally, the enjoyment of Harmony is the result of the fact that conscious experience "derives its strength from the concurrence of significant individual objects and its own existence adds to the significance of those objects". (AI 263) (This will be elaborated upon in Chapter Three.)

The attainment of such a goal involves the notion of spontaneity as a way of eliminating discordant elements in our individual experiences. It also involves a conscious interpretation which allows for variety and novelty and an application of meaning or significance by concentrating on and imaginatively enhancing specific areas of Reality through the purposeful selection of data and conceptual reversion.

For Whitehead, however, Truth as well as Beauty is important for aesthetic values.

Beauty so far as it concerns its exemplification in Appearance alone, does not necessarily involve the attainment of truth. Appearance is beautiful when the qualitative objects which compose it are interwoven in patterned contrasts so that the prehensions of the whole of its parts produces the fullest harmony of mutual support ... It is evident that when appearance has obtained truth in addition to beauty, harmony in a wider sense has been produced. For in this sense, it also involves the relation of appearance to reality. Thus when the adaptation of appearance to reality has obtained truthful Beauty, there is a perfection of art. (AI 267-268)

Since the prime function of Beauty is to enrich our lives, if this capacity for its promotion is within a work of art, then this is, at times, possible. Yet, as noted above, beauty alone is not what makes a work of art a work of art. Nor is beauty the only ingredient by which a work of art becomes an aesthetic object within the aesthetic situation. Truth is also important in achieving harmony in a wider sense.

(ii)

The Importance of Truth

"All great art (and for that matter every human order stabilized by tradition) rests on a fundamentally fixed correspondence between the impact of external experience on man and man's articulate answers." 17

From a non-Whiteheadian viewpoint, it might seem that the concept of truth is of relative unimportance in art theory or that truth is seen merely in its historic function as "historic truth". It would seem, also, that man has a bad habit of introducing "pat" one-phrase generalities to expound the nature of this or to disclose the properties of that. Thus "philosophy" is termed "the pursuit of wisdom"; science "the pursuit of knowledge" and art "the pursuit of beauty". All of these definitions are fine up to a point but they are not wholly accurate - especially the last. From the standpoint of the last definition it would seem that truth or the concept of truth plays a minimal role in aesthetics. If one were to ask: "Is this painting true?" the response would likely be "Do you mean true to life? If so what a naive doctrine to hold; that a painting should be true to life. Imagine!" Still others, not wholly convinced that the notion "true" could be applied to aesthetics at all would dismiss the question as nonsense.

Indeed there seems to be some difficult problems raised when one tries to introduce truth into art theory. Santayana,

¹⁷Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind, (Cambridge, Bowes & Bowes, 1952) p. 136

for example, wants to limit art to the sense of beauty. Yet, truth is an important element in any art theory; for contrary to Santayana, truth contributes greatly to aesthetic experience. It is the very discovery of the meaning contained in works of art that lends to their value, and artistic truth involves the meaning of that symbol or group of symbols which is the work of art. Artistic truth which is "all significance, expressiveness, articulateness has degrees; therefore, works of art may be good or bad, and each must be judged on our experience of its revelations".¹⁸

To conclude this preliminary discussion on the importance of truth in art there is one final question posed by Arnold Isenberg whose answer lies both within itself and in the next part of this section:

What is so glorious about Truth?
Why should a quality which all except
the demented commonly attain in greater
number of their ideas be considered so
precious as to increase the stature of
a Milton or a Beethoven if it can be as-
cribed to him? ¹⁹

What indeed?

Truth, for Whitehead is the "conformation of appearance to reality" (AI 241). "Reality, as one side of a two-sided coin, refers to the prehension . . . of raw data²⁰ of actual entities

¹⁸S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, (Mentor, New York, 1951) p.222

¹⁹Cf. Arnold Isenberg, JAAC xiii (March, 1955) 3, 400.

²⁰The distinction between "appearance and reality" is grounded upon the process of self-formation of each actual occasion. The objective content of the initial phase of reception is the real antecedent world, as given for that occasion. This is the 'reality' from which the creative advance starts. (AI 210)

by other actual entities. This constitutes only one aspect of the objective content for

the objective content of an occasion of experience sorts itself out under two contrasted characters - Appearance and Reality ... the division between appearance and reality does not cover the whole of experience. It only concerns the objective content and omits the subjective form of the immediate occasion in question. (AI 209)

Appearance, then, is the other side of the coin. This follows the prehension of raw data at the first phase of concrecence and the subsequent conceptual valuation or reversion) which arises from the use of this raw data (because of the subjective aim of the prehending actual entity). It must be noted, in addition, that Appearance as Whitehead conceives it is "a product of Mentality". (AI 212)

By way of illustration it is helpful to recall the phases of concrecence. As depicted in diagram fig. 1, it is only at the fourth stage of concrecence that appearance comes out; for as Whitehead says:

The unconscious entertainment of propositions is a stage in the transition from the Reality of the initial phase of experience to the Appearance of the final phase. (AI 313)

During the second and third phases the physical feelings conforming to the object (the reality) have gone through a process by which the components of physical feelings in the first stage are conceptually entertained as derivative feelings in the second stage or else they are reverted into novel feelings. When these conceptual

feelings function as the "predicative pattern" of the original physical feelings a proposition emerges. Propositional feelings involving comparisons of propositions with the original elements may occur at the third stage. Ultimately intellectual feelings or judgements which involve more complicated comparisons, analyses and judgements may occur at the fourth stage of concrescence. It is at this final discriminatory stage that appearance enters.

It must be noted, as an important point in passing, that there is a difference between intellectual and emotional experience in aesthetic experiences; for there are both higher and lower types of aesthetic experience. Intellectual experience always involves conscious critical judgement at the peak of the experience. This includes critical appreciation and the understanding of the parts of the work of art related to the whole. At a still higher level knowledge of art is needed - a knowledge of form, structure, styles etc. On the other hand, some aestheticians claim that the only way to have a true aesthetic experience is from the emotional level and that the intellectual experience is what depreciates the aesthetic enjoyment. However, both are necessary. Without emotional aspects, the result would be sheer feats of intellectual abstraction; and without the intellectual process, aesthetic enjoyment is not complete.

Previously, it was noted that, for Whitehead, Truth is the "conformation of Appearance to Reality" (AI 241) that is to say the "appearance" is true if "it provides an accurate report of the data to which it refers".²¹ A truth relation is a conformation involving modes of perception.²²

²¹A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization (New York, 1962) p.6. Hereafter abbreviated to WPC.

²²A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (Boston 1952) pp.110ff. Hereafter abbreviated to WTR.

For Whitehead perception, itself, has both a pure and a mixed mode. The former involves two notions: presentational immediacy and causal efficacy. Perception in the mode of causal efficacy is the basic mode in which we inherit prehensions (feelings) from past data. These are significantly functioning in all actual entities but they are "vague, massive, inarticulate and felt as the efficaciousness of the past".²³ This is a crude type of perception whereas perception in the mode of presentational immediacy is highly sophisticated for it involves a clear notion in the consciousness of the perceiver of a relation or number of relations in the external world. For example, in the case of a flash of light, the perception in the mode of presentational immediacy is seeing the flash of light; while in the mode of causal efficacy the person "feels that the experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash are causal in the blink." (PR 203). Thus, the flash makes the blink. Whitehead's view is that causal efficacy is experienced as an actual mode of perception.

In the mode of presentational immediacy, however, the contemporary world is consciously prehended as a continuum of external relations. (Cf. PR 145) Presentational Immediacy, unlike Causal Efficacy which transmits data of the past into the present that are vague, but concrete in quality; transmits clear, sharp, concise data which are "spatially located but cut off, self-contained temporally".²⁴ Presentational immediacy in its pure form is not the perception of "Reality" of the real world. For example, no actual entity can prehend contemporaneous actual entities purely but must rely on

²³D.W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality op. cit. p.209. Note: Hereafter simply abbreviated to "A Key etc."

²⁴Op. Cit. p.237

historical routes,²⁵ perception in the mode of presentational immediacy when it is perception of contemporary "images" is "an 'impure prehension'". (PR 79) Another example is the perception of a red flower. The immediate perception is a perception similar to what Russell would call "Flower there now". However, the flower's "nowness" that the perceiving-superject sees is the

²⁵The whole notion of historical routes and how and why we do not directly perceive contemporaries is better explicated by Whitehead in Process and Reality p.79. The subject-superject (which is called this because it is not only the subject of experiences but also superjects experiences to other occasions) receives data, even in presentational immediacy, from the immediate past of its contemporaries. If one wants to talk about nature and "real" things in nature - such as a chair - Whitehead says:

external nature has an indirect relevance by the transmission through it of analogous prehensions. In this way, there are in it various historical routes of intermediate objectifications. Such relevant historical routes lead up to various parts of the animal body, and transmit into it prehensions which form the physical influence of the external environment on the animal body. But this external environment which is in the past of the concretescent subject is also, with negligible exceptions, in the past of the nexus which is the objectified chair-image. If there be a 'real chair', there will be another historical route of objectifications from nexus to nexus in this environment. The members of each nexus will be mutually contemporaries. Also the historical route will lead up to the nexus which is the chair-image. The complete nexus, composed of this historical route and the chair-image, will form a 'corpuscular' society. This society is the 'real chair'.... The animal body is so constructed that, with rough accuracy and in the normal conditions, important emphasis is thus laid upon those regions in the contemporary world which are particularly relevant for the future existence of the enduring object of which the immediate percipient is one occasion. (PR 79)

This, too, would help explain the first three phases of concrecence seen in the diagram on p.7a of this thesis; for error can enter when mistakes in perception of the raw data are made on the conceptual level.

contemporary image and not its own real contemporary in the historical route of the flower.

Besides these two modes of perception, there is also a combined or mixed mode of perception in which both abstractness and symbolic reference make their appearance. Moreover, it is this mixed mode of perception which "characterizes the fully alert human perception".²⁶ This involves an awareness that when we see this red flower, there is a past associated with it and probably a future. (Cf. note on p. 30) For, we perceive the flower as located in a particular spatial region and also as an entity in itself with a past and a future. The ability to perceive in this mixed mode of perception, then, means the awareness of historic routes of actual entities which are contemporaries. It means that both presentational immediacy and causal efficacy, working together, integrated and interplaying with each other, are needed in order for both consciousness and complete awareness to arise. This, too, is why Hume was right in exposing the limitations of perceptions in the mode of presentational immediacy alone; since his analysis failed to adequately account for the causal influence. Whitehead "holds that there is a causal influence that permeates ordinary perception"²⁷ and that "the mixed mode of symbolic reference perceives the stone both as clearly located in a contemporary region of space and yet as also a persisting entity with a past and an efficacy in the future".²⁸

Our concept of symbolic reference is linked to presentational immediacy and to causal efficacy in yet another way. From the standpoint of immediacy, the notion of truth is that of a relation

²⁶ D.W. Sherburne, A Key etc. p.247

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

between what we perceive as "appearance" and what actually is the case. However, in casual efficacy the truth relation functions in comparatively determining or actually verifying that the appearance of a thing on a particular given occasion does, in fact, conform to previous prehensions of that thing and to other relevant past data (as well as to future perceptions) in the mode of casual efficacy.

In our experience of these past data, conceptual reversion as imaginative abstraction sometimes comes into play. Conceptual reversion, as we have already stated, is involved in the conscious alteration or adaptation of a real prehension. (Cf. p.29) In this sense truth remains but is purposefully minimized. This can be done only as long as one is consciously aware of the relation between appearance and reality and between presentational immediacy and causal efficacy in perception. In abstract art, for example, one knows the reality or truth of what a woman looks like; but, by abstracting from the reality of the subject, (i.e. the woman) one comes up with novelty (eg. Picasso's Weeping Woman).^{xx} Thus there is a higher level of feeling going on as a result of a higher, directed, abstracting from reality.

Truth is then seen as a "qualification which applies to Appearance alone" (AI 241) for "appearance is one product of our mentality. (AI 212) As such it is only "in high-grade occasions of experience which are the components in ... animal life" (AI 211) that appearance is considered at all. Furthermore, it is in the peculiar society of actual entities which becomes consciously aware of its own personal society of occasions that appearance is "sufficiently co-ordinated to be effective." (AI 211)

Thus, it would seem that in the higher animals the discovery of the notions of appearance and reality (and the very conscious connection which enables this distinction to occur) leads one to the

^{xx}This is also true of such schools of sculpture and art as cubism - such as that of Henri Laurens or Ramond Duchamp-Villon.

conclusion that Whitehead is not simply referring to that higher animal called man. He is also implying that man, because he has consciousness and enjoys these high-grade experiences, depends predominantly on appearance for "in our conscious perception appearance is dominant." (AI 212)

For Whitehead however, mental functioning is not a complicated, complex, subtle activity which in some way adds

subtlety to the content of experience.
The exact opposite is the case. Mentality is an agent of simplification; and for this reason appearance is an incredibly simplified edition of reality. (AI 213)

Questions about truth and falsity can thus be asked only about Appearance. Thus our mental functions, too, seem to simplify our experience - to conglomerate our experience, as it were, of a group of occasions into a single entity; forgetting that this nexus is, in fact, a group of entities. A concrete example makes clear what Whitehead has in mind. When someone is listening to an orchestra, there is a "transference of the characteristic from the individuals to the group as one." (AI 213) This orchestra is called loud "in virtue of the perceived loudness of the individual members with their musical instruments". (AI 213) All this is a product of mental engineering; of the feeling of the unity of the whole which comes through concrescence. Examples can be drawn from other media such as the dance where the aesthetic feeling derived comes through my judgement of the whole dance; and the parts again tend to enhance the whole (and become whole). Thus, in the first example, one does not when asked "what is this group of instruments called?" proceed to give a list of the different instruments and distinguish their function; but proceeds to define the conglomerate itself as "orchestra".

Truth, has a "variety of degrees and modes" (AI 241) and one can never say for certain that a thing is absolutely true. For example, a realist painting put in place of a glass in a window frame and observed at the distance of another room, may look real and may be mistaken for reality; but it is only an imitation of reality and its "truthfulness then amounts to deception". (AI 241) In this case error occurs in judgement in the fourth phrase of concrescence,²⁸ other phases may help to produce error, but judgement occurs only in the fourth phase.

If the truth value on a given occasion can be questioned; then, in that case, truth must be placed in its proper perspective as a relation which when concerned with propositions, for example, are neither wholly true or false; for "few propositions are entirely true or false".²⁹ Furthermore, "it is more important that a proposition be interesting than true" (AI 244) and even a false proposition, can still perform an important function or value: "the value of an occasional vacation from the world of reality by entry into the world of 'make believe'".³⁰ This is what most fiction does; for it transports us into its own world. However, both Whitehead and Johnson (as he is quoted above) would agree that there are degrees of interest and "a true proposition is more apt to be interesting than a false one".³¹ This can be illustrated more readily by an aesthetic example and will be discussed shortly.

However, it should be noted, once again, that in respect to objects of experience themselves; we do not know Truth itself but only truth relations, and truth relations are concerned not only with

²⁹A.H. Johnson, WTR, p.101.

³⁰Op. Cit., p.103

³¹Ibid.

abstract patterns but also with concrete realities:

a truth relation³² will be said to connect the objective contents of two prehensions when one and the same identical partial pattern can be abstracted from both of them. (AI 242)

In a certain sense this is similar to Plato's relation between participating particulars since the relation is one "of composite fact to some partial pattern it illustrates." (AI 242) However, Whitehead's notion differs from Plato's in that it deals not only with "abstract patterns of qualitative elements" (AI 242) as does Plato's but with their relation to "concrete particular realities". The question now arises as to how the notion of a truth-relation applies in art.

(iii)

Truth and Art

Art, for the most part, involves truth in a symbolic sense:

The relation of Appearance to Reality when there is a symbolic truth is that for certain sets of percipients the prehension of the Appearance leads to the prehension of the Reality, such that the subjective forms of the two prehensions are conformal. (AI 248)

There is, however, no causal effect in art; i.e. "in no direct sense is the Appearance the cause of the Reality, or the Reality the cause of the Appearance." (AI 248) It just happened that a connection between Appearance and Reality arose and was "prehended in the

³²Our experience, for example of the red flower as "Flower-there-now" is true in so far as we relate this present experience to past experiences of "Flower-there-now" and also relate our idea of "flower", based on these past prehensions, to the present situation; in order to arrive at the truth of the statement or observation that "there is a flower there now". This is what is meant by truth relation.

experience of those percipients. In their own natures, the Appearances throw no light upon the Realities nor do the Realities throw any light upon the Appearances except in the experience of a set of peculiarly conditioned percipients." (AI 248) Whitehead gives us the example of language and its meaning. Concerning the aesthetics of literature he says that "language not only conveys objective meaning but also involves a conveyance of subjective form" (AI 249): that is to say, not only is the objective meaning conveyed; but also some expression of the feelings is brought in by the past and present prehensions and experiences of the reader.

Music, as an example of one of the arts, has "symbolic" truth or falsehood. This involves the concept of art as providing meaning. In the case of music Whitehead would say that the "conveyance of objective meaning is at a minimum" and the "conveyance of suitable form is at its height." (AI 249) If music is misunderstood, then, it is because one's own conception of what that music "is" or "is about" does not conform to what it really is and we have error occurring. For example I may misinterpret the meaning behind a piece such as one of Mozart's and think that in general the notion of the symbolic relation of this music to human feelings seems to imply that the piece is a happy one whereas Mozart meant it to convey serenity. The "symbolic relation" of music to human feelings has a further implication with respect to music as a civilizing art.

Music as a civilizing art, is supposed to interpret the sentiments and feelings of man and provide a means of emotional release in which feelings are expressed and given meaning in a concrete form:

Music elicits some confused feelings into distinct apprehension. It performs this service (or disservice) by introducing an emotional clothing which changes the dim objective reality into a clear Appearance matching the subjective form provided for its prehension. (AI 249)

Thus the truth relation between music and Reality is in the "community of subjective form" (AI 249) that is to say, it is related to Man as perceiver; as creator of music itself; and as emotive expressor.

Music, then, illustrates the "truth relation" between Appearance and Reality. (cf. AI 249) For example, music may set forth the struggle of nations; expressing in abstract form (the music itself) this concrete event.

The above discussion also applies to the other arts such as fine art, poetry et cetera. However, it can be noted, that art need not have a truth relation to actual fact. For example a painting does not have to be true in the sense of "true to life" nor does it have to express what is in fact true. This, too, is what is meant by "symbolic". Fiction, for example, while it may stress general truths (i.e. it may take place in the U.S.A. or represent some historical character who really lived) more often than not takes for granted that we know that the main characters in the plot or else the events themselves are not real and did not actually - in reality - take place. Why this is so will be discussed in greater detail later on. For the present, suffice it to say that Whitehead's theory would admit this. As Johnson says: You don't go through Shakespeare or a detective story and at the end of each sentence say 'true' or 'false'." ³³ As Wallace Stevens

³³ A.H. Johnson, WTR p.103.

Cf. also John Hospers's article "Implied Truth in Literature" p.201 of Philosophy Looks at the Arts (Margolis ed. New York, 1962); where he says something similar:

To be sure, the sentences in poetry are richer in suggestion than most of the sentences we utter, but this does not make them "mean" in a different way; it only shows that we respond to them somewhat differently... We are moved but not (usually) to action when we read that "Poor Tom's a bit cold", we

says "Fictive things wink as they will". Thus, in the context of a play, the truth of the particular portion lies in relation to the rest of the play (i.e. to the world created by the play) and not to actual fact. This point will be illustrated in the discussion of psychological distance in chapter three. Whitehead states concisely the role of truth and falsehood in saying that

the complex fusion of truth relations with their falsehoods intermixed, constitutes the indirect interpretative power of Art to express the truth about the nature of things. (AI 249)

Whitehead says on one occasion that we all want the "blunt truth" (AI 250) where Appearance conforms to Reality "clearly" and "distinctly" in such a way that there is little difference between the two; for "it is this that makes Art possible." (AI 251) Examples would be seeing blue skies "bluely" or green leaves "greenly". It is this that "procures the glory of perceived nature". (AI 250) However, "blunt" truth does not seem to be the complete notion of truth which we have in mind when we talk about art; for in art the notion of "falsehoods" is of great importance. This means that we can and do abstract from reality in such things as paintings.

do not go out to fetch a blanket nor do we gather flowers to put on Cordelia's casket. (p.201)

Sherburne, however, would refuse to admit that one could achieve aesthetic experience in reading adventure stories or mystery novels. Quoting Ducasse, he says that the enjoyment derived from adventure fiction (i.e. the illusion of living through the adventures) is "no more aesthetic than the precisely similar pleasure of watching a football game, a thrilling rescue or a dramatic escape" (A Whiteheadian Aesthetic Yale, New Haven, 1961) p.149. (Hereafter referred to as WA). Yet this analogy is not only faulty but unbecoming of an aesthetician; since the novelist's attempt is precisely to create this very illusion within the reader. If he succeeds, then aesthetic experience and response should follow.

Through conceptual reversion we can purposefully alter the truth and paint grass purple or a sky blood red to evoke some feeling in the observer; where an ordinary sky or ordinary grass would have resulted not in an increase of value or a novelty of experience; but a loss of value and a step towards boredom. We can do this as long as we remember that all grass is not blue or that skies are blue and not red.

This notion can be extended to show that Whitehead would be right at home, as it were, with impressionistic, abstractionistic and Dalian forms of painting as well as the more conventional realist and neoclassicist. Yet, Whitehead would probably add, that if it were the case that what we normally saw in perception did not conform in some way, to what things were really like; then "the values of the percept would be at the mercy of the chance makeup of the other components of experience." (AI 251) That is to say, if man did not normally experience sense as indicative of the real world; no subjective pattern or form could be applied to anything. For example, in the case of mathematics, Whitehead wants to say that numbers or mathematical relations are "merely a condition regulating some pattern of effective components" (AI 251); and, therefore, "mere triplicacy can dictate no subjective form for its prehension. And there lies the difference between the *sensa* and the abstract mathematical forms" (AI 251); for the "*sensa* themselves enter into the subjective forms of their physical prehensions". (AI 251) There is, then, in this case, a "universality of truth because of the universality of interrelations between actual entities".³⁴ This is how one can answer the question: Is there any grounds for belief that *sensa* and their related subjective forms are indicative of Reality?

But, before this section is concluded, it must be noted

³⁴A.H. Johnson, WTR p.104.

that truths in art are "dim massive truths"³⁵ whose dim elements

provide for art that final background of tone apart from which its effects fade. The type of Truth art seeks lies in the eliciting of this background to haunt the object presented for clear consciousness. This concept of aesthetic truth has important consequences for the theory of beauty and lifts it from its one dimensional character provided by appearance alone. ³⁶

In these last three sections it has become evident that the concept of Beauty, for Whitehead, is a broader and more basic one than that of truth. This is so for the following reasons: Where truth is merely concerned with the "conformation of Appearance to Reality" or, in other words, with the "relations of Appearance to Reality" (AI 265); Beauty is

... the internal³⁷ conformation of the various items of experience with each other, for the production of maximum effectiveness. Beauty thus concerns the inter-relations of the various components of Reality, and also the inter-relations of the various components of Appearance, and also the relations of Appearance to Reality. (AI 265)

Moreover, Truth involves a truth-relation but a truth relation is not important in itself. It is important in its relation to other factors. On the other hand "Beauty is left as the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying". (AI 266)

This is not to say, however, that Truth is of negligible value in the promotion of Beauty for as Whitehead says: "... the

³⁵ D.W. Sherburne, WA p.188.

³⁶ Ibid., p.189.

³⁷ my underlining for emphasis.

truth-relation remains the simple, direct mode of realizing Harmony, There is a blunt force about Truth which in the subjective form of its prehension is akin to cleanliness - namely, the removal of dirt, which is unwanted irrelevance". (AI 266)

For these various reasons there is a mutual effect between Truth and Beauty which appears as a lucid illustration in Art.

(iv)

Whitehead's Theory of Art

Whitehead has said in his Remarks that his own belief is that "at present the most fruitful because the most neglected starting point is that section of value-theory which we term aesthetics".³⁸ There seems to be a general trend, too, in Whitehead's ontology towards a broadened notion of value as ultimately leading into aesthetic value. Moreover, if there is, as Whitehead wants to claim, an indisputable link between Truth and Beauty such that "the general importance of Truth for the promotion of Beauty is overwhelming" (AI 266) and if Truth, as we have just seen, is "the conformation of Appearance to Reality" (AI 241); whereas Beauty is the "mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience" (AI 252); one may very well expect Art to be related to Truth and Beauty i.e. there is a mutual relation between the objective content of the prehension (feeling) and the subjective form of that prehension. This would mean that all art as Whitehead defines art is the "purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality". (AI 267) Art is, therefore, an internal activity of changing and creating things (effected by the subjective aim of its creator) for the purpose of achieving a unity, integration and enhancement of value-experience through Harmony.

³⁸ A.N. Whitehead, "Remarks" in Philosophy Review XLVI (March 1937) also in The Interpretation of Science (ed. by Johnson) (New York 1961) pp.204-213.

This is where the functioning of the mental pole comes in. The mental pole with the aid of conceptual reversion and transmutation (i.e. a funnelling of past perceptions unto the contemporary occasion) abstracts from reality and the various experiences. Abstract art is, again, a useful example. In abstract art the artist effects, by means of conceptual reversion, a purposeful change in Reality to heighten some particular part. This is done in order to give the painting, as a whole, a greater ability to be an enhancing means for the perceiver in his aim at novelty and enjoyment. It serves also to communicate the feelings of the artist.

One would also suspect that "purposeful adaptation" implies an end. This concept of end is brought in from Whitehead's metaphysics into his aesthetics. Thus the subjective aim (or "final causation" if one is permitted to use Aristotle's terminology) is brought into play. This end which may be called the purpose of art "is twofold - namely Truth and Beauty". (AI 267) ³⁹

Art is dependant on both of these qualities. The lack of one or the other is harmful for "in the absence of Truth, Beauty is on a lower level with a defect of massiveness. In the absence of Beauty, Truth sinks to triviality. Truth matters because of Beauty". (AI 267) Most works of art express Beauty (if they are good works of art), but unless some truth is also expressed the beholder of the work of art can not have a strong reaction to it in

³⁹ In line with this is the notion that all art is a striving for perfection. Whitehead says that "perfection of art has only one end, which is Truthful Beauty." (AI 267) He also points out that no art, even great art has achieved such a goal (MP 62); nevertheless it is the striving for it that is important.

any positive way.⁴⁰

A work of art "turns the abstract into the concrete and the concrete into the abstract" for "if values are already present in a situation then art consists of arranging the facts so that attention may be directed to the enshrined values".⁴¹ Thus, as stated previously (and soon to be elaborated upon) a great symphony (eg. "1812 Overture") can express the concreteness of the rise and fall of nations in abstract notations or a great work of art such as Picasso's "Guernica" can express the abstract totality of war in a concrete form by concentrating on one aspect of it - the horror of war. Art can focus on a trivial thing (eg. Wordsworth's "To a Daffodil") and bring it into our awareness, and can express abstract notions such as loyalty eg. in Shakespeare's Henry V or concrete emotions such as hate (Hamlet), love (Romeo and Juliet), or even jealousy (Othello).

Whitehead's account does not eliminate the concept of "ugliness" in the aesthetic object. Ugliness is a type of discord which

⁴⁰ A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (op.cit.)p.106.

Whitehead also says that:

Beauty so far as it concerns its exemplification in Appearance alone, does not necessarily involve the attainment of truth. Appearance is beautiful when the qualitative objects which compose it are interwoven in patterned contrasts so that the prehensions of the whole of its parts produce the fullest harmony of mutual support.... It is evident that when appearance has obtained truth in addition to beauty, harmony in a wider sense has been produced. For in this sense, it also involves the relation between appearance and reality. Thus when the adaptation of appearance to reality has obtained truthful Beauty, there is a perfection of art. (AI 267-268)

⁴¹ A.H. Johnson, WTR p.106.

can induce aesthetic response. If the form of a painting is ugly in the sense of not arousing a sense of the beautiful within the respondent it may still arouse interest and thereby increase value because of some novel aspect. Ugliness can also imply a non-harmonious relationship of form within a painting eg. a clashing. In fact, this is true in the painting just mentioned - Guernica - which is neither beautiful in subject matter nor harmonious but which leads to an aesthetic response because of its novelty of subject and theme - the ability to vividly depict the horror of war. Our attention is focused precisely upon the clash of the parts and this is what is of interest. Through ugliness then, one may have just as valid an aesthetic response as through the beautiful. Both experiences tend to show the possibilities and tend to enhance (though in diverse ways) the aesthetic response since both are ultimately concerned with truth.⁴²

For Whitehead one purpose of art is that it has a "currative function in human experience when it reveals as in a flash intimate absolute truth regarding the nature of things". (AI 272) Thus, the necessity for both truth and beauty in art (along with other elements which might achieve the ultimate goal of higher experience and attainment of value feeling) has become apparent. The purpose of both is the same; for both aid in the attainment of aesthetic value.

⁴² Of course, when one says that it is just as valid an experience as that achieved when beauty is present this does not mean that it is preferable at all times. Beauty, and especially truthful beauty, is more preferable, if possible, than discord and ugliness. This raises another side question, but one which is pertinent in aesthetic theory. If a painting depicts ugliness in such a way that an aesthetic response is achieved does this painting then possess some "artistically" beautiful qualities. The answer must be a positive one for there seems to be a difference between an ugly painting (aesthetically ugly) and the depiction of ugliness in a painting of aesthetic merit.

Nevertheless it still remains to be shown how the artistic process, works within the individual such that the qualities possessed by an art object - truth and beauty - may result in the creation of an aesthetic object within the aesthetic experience.

Chapter III

Art and the Individual

(i)

The Conscious Self and the Conscious

Aim at Value

Basic to any discussion of the arousal of aesthetic experience is an analysis of the creative process within the individual. For this purpose I am obliged to Whitehead for his lucid introspections on consciousness. The background for this chapter was laid in the first and second chapters. The implications of Whitehead's theory of consciousness for aesthetics are drawn out and elaborated upon within this chapter.

The notion of self-consciousness is that of unity of a route of occasions of experience involving the conscious awareness of a persistent identity from past to present. Memory seems to be the link-up between past and present. If, as Douglas Browning says, everything that exists is composed of actual entities which "exist only in the sense in which they are objectified in live ones";⁴³ then it is also true that memory is the awareness of the objectification of the efficacious past in present actuality. (i.e. the awareness of the already experienced past on the present situation.) "Memory" in this case, is of short term duration for our "awareness" of personal identity is governed by the link up between immediate past and the present:

⁴³ Douglas Browning, "Whitehead's Theory of Human Agency" in Dialogue March 1964, p.426.

... our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and the present immediate fact. Roughly speaking, it is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and a half a second ago. It is gone, and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self, the foundation of our present existence.... The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other into that self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate past with the immediacy of the present. (AI 181)

The result of this is threefold. Firstly, our memory (which Whitehead would probably say is composed of "repeated patterns which are recollected") is never quite the same as the actual occasion of the immediate past since our memory is "coloured" by other events, experience and situations. These tend to cause the difference between what actually was the case and what the unified self of the present consciousness thinks is the case. What does occur is the retention of significance in order to advance toward the ultimate aim of value feeling:

All consciousness rests on memory, and memory bridges physical time, drawing together in one present consciousness the significance of past events. The significance of past events is indeed grounded in their completeness, their having subsided; but their significance also depends just as firmly on what use present consciousness puts them to. 44

The second result follows from the first; namely that "the self is always defined in terms of values"⁴⁵ and as such

⁴⁴Nathaniel Lawrence, "Time, Value and the Self" from The Relevance of Whitehead edited by Ivor LeClerc, chapter 5 p.162.

⁴⁵Op. Cit. p.159

if the values be transient so is the self.
 If the values be intransient so is the self.
 If the values be dispersed and incoherent so
 is the self. If they are organized and in-
 tegrated so is the self. In the former case,
 the person is analyzable with little or no
 loss into the small and disorganized values
 which comprise his life. He lends himself
 to a deterministic theory of human nature, and
 the psychoanalyst rightly presumes him to be
 the product of his past. In the latter case,
the exact converse holds. The unified self
 by definition can not be understood in terms
 of his constituent parts as dissected away from
 one another. Instead of his being understood
 exclusively as the outcome of his environment,
 the environment can only be understood in terms
 of him. His very capacity to organize what
 might otherwise be discordant values puts him
 in a position of causal primacy.⁴⁶

The third result follows from the second and involves the
 idea of aims and process. This is that the self is self-determining
 in terms of the values according to which it subordinates and inte-
 grates the rest of its values. Two "objections" to this may arise:

It is claimed by Douglas Browning that "process" involves
 change and, as such, processes are not performances (Cf. p.436 of
 Browning's article cited on p.48.) He wants to claim, further,
 that "acts can not be objects of experience"⁴⁷ nor objectifiable;
 and that we perform conscious acts as human agents. However,
 Browning misinterprets Whitehead's concept of process for with White-
 head man is acting in the process of self-formation and process IS
 action. Therefore, Browning's main objection that Whitehead's
 "human beings do not act"⁴⁸ is unfounded.

⁴⁶ Nathaniel Lawrence, op. cit., p.159

⁴⁷ Douglas Browning, op. cit., p.436

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.437

Browning also objects to the fact that, for Whitehead unity is merely a "strand of actual entities with personal order"⁴⁹ and if so, then there is no unity to the self but only

a sort of family resemblance between momentary selves ... The self that keeps a promise today is not a mere sameness of pattern of the self of yesterday. Nor is the self that continues a conversation only a new member of a rather prolific family. I converse with one individual which remains throughout, not with some family at large or with successive members of a family.⁵⁰

Yet this criticism, too, does not hold, for in the second result above (pp.49-50) we saw that the self, if defined in terms of its values, was a unity based on intransient values. Browning is wrong:

Since values define the self, it simply will not do to try to divide an intransient self, shaped in terms of its intransient values, into its transient subordinate elements, for these subordinate elements are determined by it not vice versa. If the only way in which I can explain the individual units of a man's consciousness and behaviour is in terms of the abiding purpose which dominates them, then that purpose does not arise exclusively from them. They have their being, their value status in it. To ignore this fact is to commit a fallacy, either the fallacy of composition or the fallacy of division. If a series of actual occasions composing the conscious life of a person exhibits a purposive value collectively, it simply does not follow that this purpose can invariably be understood in terms of the values which the individual members of the series exhibit. The result is failure. It is a failure of a certain method of analytic procedure to do the job that it sets out to do, namely to expose the nature of the thing that it investigated.⁵¹

49 Ibid., p.438

50 Ibid.

51 N. Lawrence, op. cit., pp.159-160

In summary, in the discussion of the self and consciousness one finds that memory acts as the integrator of the various diverse occasions; that an integrated self results in unity and value and a specific aim towards value feelings. It must now be shown how self-consciousness and memory result in an aesthetic experience and how within this experience the work of art is transformed on that occasion into an aesthetic object by the conscious workings within the perceiving subject.

(ii)

Consciousness and the Art Process

In the human individual, value is connected (as has been shown in the first half of this paper) with beauty. The creative process, itself, involves a gathering of experiences in order to promote beauty; and this is one purpose of art. Consciousness, then, is integrally related with Whitehead's concept of aesthetic experience because of the way in which it gathers and integrates various occasions of aesthetic experience into the present. What Mary Wyman has to say about the role consciousness plays in aesthetic experience is indeed pertinent; justifying the following lengthy quotation:

Let us imagine an artist watching the sunrise from a rocky point on the seacoast. Before are the dark green spruce trees silhouetted against the crimson sky and the deep blue of the sea; gray rocks of myriad shapes take on from the heavens a rosy hue; and tree-fringed islands emerge here and there from the expanse of waters between the point and the distant horizon. Into the artist's mind comes a feeling of unrest, a zest to achieve "what is not and yet may be" through the drawing power of the lure. Out of this appetition, as termed by Whitehead, emerges a subjective aim, to be followed by a determined subjective form, or how of feeling, in the painting of a picture, in the the transforming in the mind of the artist what

is before him. As the subjective aim gains intensity, it becomes absorbed awareness involving consciousness. In this process God as the principle of limitation may be functioning. A satisfying transformation of what the artist sees will come through the weighing and balancing of eternal objects derived from the scene before him, in their transcendent potentiality. Not only colors and shapes, but conceptual or emotional qualities must enter into the picture. Is it tranquility of sensation, charm or majesty that he should emphasize? The process of composition is a part of the artist himself, and when completed perishes, enduring only if it has value by reaching perfection as a painting. The elements to be represented on canvas co-alesce in harmony. Colors and shapes may contrast or blend, but the unifying eternal objects, the emotional impact of the scene, its possible glory and majesty, bring together as one sky and sea, trees and rocks and tiny islands against the far horizon, the rim of the world. Thus the painting, if it catches this ideal beauty, achieves objective immortality and from subject in the making becomes object to serve in further enriching of experience.⁵²

I can perhaps illustrate what Miss Wyman says here by giving an example of a poem of mine which depicts a poet who has seen just such a painting which, in turn, has created within him the need to express his feeling. However, unlike the painter he fails (or so he thinks) to achieve the exact feeling he wanted to express:

On a Painting by Barlo

The sun never sets in that village
 Its hidden red eye claims a diffuse
 Yellow tinge to the mountains.
 Stones and trees, mountains and sky
 All are one
 Immersed in a flow of Aztec blood.
 There lies somewhere within that scene
 Of adobe huts and faceless women
 A drunken poet
 Laughingly toying
 With the ineptitude of his colleague.

⁵² Mary Wyman, The Lure for Feeling (New York, 1960) pp.39-40

This whole co-hesive framework in which the art object is created and the way in which this creation is dependent upon the conscious creator is very similar to what Sherburne terms "horizontal transmutation" and what Whitehead himself would claim is the result of "vertical" transmutation and conceptual reversion.

(iii)

Propositions, the Art Process and the Transformation
of the Work of Art into an Aesthetic Object

Up to this point, the discussion has centered on various aspects of consciousness and the self as important in the emergence of value. Consciousness and the self are also important in enriching and enhancing the value which occurs in the art process. The question of how this is so leads now into a question of whether or not we can describe the creative act more fully than Miss Wyman does in the above quotation? The creative act seems so inseparably linked to all the conscious functioning within the artist's mind that perhaps no analysis is fully adequate.

The whole idea of "creative act" if based, as it is here, on a Whiteheadian framework can be shown to be essentially what Whitehead himself believes goes on in consciousness. If one recalls the stages of concrescence,^{*} it will be seen that at the initial phase there is an influx of raw data which is received or rejected more or less on a non-conscious level. At a more advanced stage this data enters into the conscious awareness of the creator. Here a number of things occur: The data is assimilated or collected and, then, through conceptual reversion and transmutation is purposefully altered and patterned to suit the artist's desired aim. What occurs if the result is the creation of a novel work of art is the end of appetition and the goal of satisfaction within the artist.

^{*} p.7a of this thesis.

Once created a work of art has the properties of a real "enduring object" capable of entering an occasion of experience to constitute the aesthetic object; but just this potentiality for becoming an aesthetic object or not becoming one (i.e. becoming so actualized or not) also means that the work of art possesses the characteristics of an eternal object, since its exemplification is not limited to one occasion only; but to numerous occasions. This means that a work of art can become an aesthetic object on different occasions of experience by different people even though it still remains a work of art and real.

This whole concept of the distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object can be seen to derive from Whitehead's philosophy. The work of art never achieves its full potentiality until it is an aesthetic object within the occasion of the aesthetic experience. Once this experience is over the enduring object which was the work of art and was transformed into the aesthetic object is simply a work of art again (it perishes as an aesthetic object) and becomes potential raw data (eg. a painting) for the next aesthetic experience.

As to the processes of artistic creation and recreation these involve a process combining conceptual reversion and transmutation. As a result of conceptual reversion (which occurs at the second phase of concrescence and continues to the fourth phase) conceptual feelings of the novel occasions of experience arise. Conceptual reversion is "secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole"⁵³ (subphase of phase two of concrescence). The role conceptual reversion plays along with transmutation in the artistic creation (and the re-creation by the receptive perceiver) will be

⁵³ D.W. Sherburne, A Key etc. op. cit., p.211.

discussed in greater detail shortly, but, now, one problem is apparent.

Bertram Morris has criticized Whitehead for a failure to: "consider the aesthetic process as the potential becoming the actual that is the indeterminate becoming determinate";⁵⁴ but to offer a solution to this criticism requires an elaboration and re-discussion of propositions as well as a discussion of the aesthetic object involved in a proposition. Then, perhaps, the role of transmutation and that of reversion will become clearer.

Morris is right, indeed, when he says that "pure potentiality never created anything".⁵⁵ As such, an eternal object can never, of itself, account for an actual occasion of experience. However, for Whitehead there is something which is an "impure potential" or proposition. This includes physical feelings derived from a real object (eg. the work of art) and eternal objects or conceptual feelings constituting the "predicative pattern". How propositions function in the aesthetic experience will be discussed in section (iv) while the lace of transmutation will be presented in section (v).

(iv)

The Aesthetic Object as a Whiteheadian
Proposition

A proposition is a hybrid between an actual entity and an eternal object. As such it possesses some of the qualities of both. As related to a group of actual entities called a nexus[‡] it possesses the ability to become objectified in a given occasion of

⁵⁴ B. Morris, op. cit. p.480.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

[‡] The "logical subjects" of a proposition are a nexus or grouping of occasions.

experience and to act as an "abstract possibility of some specific nexus (grouping of occasions) of actualities realizing some eternal object which may either be simple, or may be a complex pattern of simpler objects". (AI 243) As it is similar to an eternal object it can become enduring and act as a potential (although an impure one) for actualization i.e. it acts as a potential lure for feelings and its truth value is less important than its ability to act as a lure (cf. AI 244).

Sherburne's contention that the aesthetic object has the ontological status of a Whiteheadian proposition rests on two of the above factors. One is that the aesthetic object is a lure for feeling and the other is that the work of art or aesthetic object, like the proposition, has a potentiality for actualization or objectification. This actualization consists in the performance of or the involvement with a work of art by one or more people. This means that the aesthetic object or work of art has the ability to be recreated in the receptive perceiver. "Recreation" here implies that the person or persons to whom the work of art is directed re-create the emotive feelings which were objectified in the artistic work in the first instance. This is where the work of art has its "eternalness". Sherburne's claim is that all art forms (from singing to painting) are just an expression of emotive feeling.⁵⁶ Art springs from propositional feelings and is, itself, a lure for further feelings. The work of art is not wholly actual, then, for

An actual occasion is what it is; it does not persist, change or reappear. Propositions can and do reappear in different performances because they are not actualities.⁵⁷

But if an aesthetic object is a proposition, it becomes objectified

⁵⁶ This notion, if unqualified, is mistaken: for Art expresses meaning through emotive feeling.

⁵⁷ D.W. Sherburne, WA op cit., p.112.

by actualities nonetheless. For example, in a play, Sherburne wants to claim that the performers or actors are the exemplifiers of the proposition which is the work of art. They are the intermediaries between the art object and the percipient subject and between the artist and the individuals who make up society.

Feeling, then, arises with the experiencing person and, indeed, in some cases, that experiencing person - you - are the subject of the work of art. All this lends some substance to the theory put forth in this thesis of the relation between the individual and art (although Sherburne can be criticised extensively); for the individual subject in this case, is the subject of the proposition. However, it is not the case that the subject of all propositions (and in Sherburne's specific examples - cf. pp.112ff - all music) is "you". Sherburne is wrong if he claims this for it is only true if applied to non-referential music. The subject of the proposition which we shall label "martial music", for example, is not "you" in the primary sense but rather the strife of nations. (eg. War of 1812) Another illustration is that of the sunset and the sky and the feelings most apt to dominate. The sky, in this case, is the logical subject and the artistic proposition is what characterizes emotional tone. Of course, in a play such as Julius Caesar the events expressed in it are the logical subjects of the proposition (given expression in the play); and the "how" it happened and the feelings would be the predicate of the proposition. The intermediary, is thus seen as fulfilling the role of the agent of actualization for a proposition whose logical subject may or may not be the "you" of the respondent; but this does not negate the fact that the respondent is the ultimate referent of the artistic work of art.

The respondent, as the ultimate referent, provides another reason why the work of art, in one important sense, is not an instance of reality. A play, for instance, is not a real or actual series

of events because there exists an aloofness on the part of the perceiver of the play. This is what Bulloch terms "psychical distance". In the play Julius Caesar, to use an already familiar example, there is an aloofness with respect to the play as a play.

There is a difference between a street-knifing in Chicago and what happens in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. One does not run onto the stage of a theater and rescue the heroine from the villain. Of course there is something actual about a performance of a play; the proposition which is the play is objectified by a concrete performatum medium, which is actual. But the crucial point made by the doctrine of Psychological Distance is that it is catastrophic for aesthetic experience to identify the performatum medium with the aesthetic object. ⁵⁸

If you recall, this is why Whitehead stressed the "Carmen" incident in Modes of Thought. It was not that Whitehead did not believe in morality and its fundamental role in art - i.e. in both deciding the final outcome and in influencing others (both artist and respondent) - but that we should always keep in mind that a work of art no matter how realistic (how much the appearance conforms to the reality) is still a work of art, an artificial creation.

There is, nevertheless, a sense in which the proposition expressed in a work of art significantly reveals reality. The proposition, as in the play Julius Caesar, becomes objectified by performance of that play by those actualities called "actors". The "actors" exemplify the propositional feeling which is expressed in the work of art:

But the actualities of the performatum medium are not all that we apprehend. What makes Julius Caesar a play and not a meaningless conglomeration of actualities is the proposition objectified

⁵⁸ D.W. Sherburne, WA op. cit., p.109. Sherburne also notes that it is because the work of art has the characteristics of a proposition that it has "distance" (in Bulloch's sense of the word).

in the personal medium. The point here
 is that we know what it is to experience
Julius Caesar..... 59

Of course, we do know that this is a fictive murder which we are perceiving, but to attain an aesthetic experience in the fullest magnitude the question of fact or fiction is secondary (though not unimportant) to the involvement by the respondent in the illusion created by the proposition. Why, also, are we struck with horror and shock when Caesar or the king in MacBeth is murdered? We have become involved to some extent in the action. It is true, however, that what Bulloch and Sherburne say is right for we do not jump on stage and shout "Stop, murder!!" If we did this we would be ridiculed for taking the illusion (i.e. the appearance which is the exemplified aesthetic proposition) as reality; and (as with the illiterate crowds of the early west who booed the villain qua villain and thought the actor a real villain) it would be said of us that we "got carried away by the play".

Yet there is a sense, too, in which the proposition as an aesthetic object would function as the appearance which discloses the reality (or nature of real life). This was seen when the notion of proposition was discussed. There it was said that the proposition was an exemplification of what Whitehead meant by Appearance. For example, in fine art there is the school of realists and surrealists whose aim it is to depict on canvas the reality of the things around them. That is, they wish to capture things the way they appear to the perceiver. These artists then are working at the perfection of the conformation of the appearance (what they draw or paint) to what they really see. They take for granted then that reality is the way we perceive it and by this art they intend to disclose it to the fullest degree. The closer the proposition's resemblance to reality, means the greater amount of truth the work of art has. Reality in this

59 D.W. Sherburne, WA op. cit., p.111

case is used with an extended meaning as that which is related to "real life". The "actualness" of a play, such as the above mentioned one, occurs only in so far as it depicts a scene or number of scenes (an incident or number of incidents) which either is happening, has (or could have) happened, or potentially could happen in the "real world". It is the actualizable potency in the proposition at work.⁶⁰

The main criticism that can be levelled at Sherburne is that he fails in his discussion of aesthetic object as proposition to distinguish between the work of art and the aesthetic object. It seems that what he says about the aesthetic object as a proposition (in the sense of a propositional lure for feeling) is true enough. The aesthetic object acts as a potential lure for aesthetic feeling within experience. A work of art, on the other hand may or may not become an aesthetic object. It may or it may not provoke an aesthetic response. Yet, as a work of art, it possesses the characteristics for becoming an aesthetic object within an aesthetic experience. As objectified either in a performal media or a non performal media (i.e. either through the performing arts such as music or the dance or non-performing arts such as sculpture or art) the proposition which is the aesthetic object acts as a focus for an aesthetic experience. If such an experience occurs a work of art is transformed by an intensity of feelings into an aesthetic object which provides a propositional lure. This does not exclude things which aren't works of art from becoming aesthetic objects but it simply means that a work of art is a potential object capable of arousing a proposition which focuses or can focus our attention on the artist's feelings, or furthers our own feelings. In the former case re-creation of the

⁶⁰ That is to say, it is the possibility of this fictive thing coming close to events which could occur at some time or in some place in our everyday world off the stage which lends to the credulity of (and aesthetic response to) this work of art (which, itself, is "not a physical entity it is an ideal entity" Sherburne, WA p.112).

artist's imagined proposition occurs. In the latter case a novel creation of feelings occurs within us. The difference between the work of art and the aesthetic object is crucial indeed. The aesthetic object is the impure potential which doesn't exist outside of the aesthetic experience. The work of art can and does. The work of art may or may not be exemplified in any given occasion, just like a proposition in the ordinary sense. However, it should be stressed that the aesthetic object only exists within an aesthetic situation - an aesthetic experience. As such, it too acts as a lure for value feeling. But unlike the work of art, which is merely a condition for a lure, as yet unrealized and perhaps never realized; the aesthetic object (to be an aesthetic object) presupposes both the aesthetic experience and the arousal of aesthetic value. It is a lure which does arouse aesthetic feeling. However, I do agree with Sherburne, in part, that the aesthetic object may arise in the performance of a work of art. Performances may be called "objectified propositions". (p.107)

However, Sherburne seems to make another fundamental error in categorizing the arts into two sections (a) performing arts - literature, music, the dance, and architecture and (b) non-performing arts - sculpture and painting. He does this because he feels that the former are peculiar in that they "permit an artist to set down in permanent form a set of rules" (p.107) for objectification. Thus music, he argues, is not the notes on the page; for these are merely rules (notations) which the interpreters or players use to objectify the proposition. (Likewise with the dance). Yet why he chooses to put literature in this pigeon hole is beyond my comprehension. He says that what differentiates the performing from the non-performing arts is that the non-performing arts can't be objectified more than once (p.128), that is they can't be performed or become an objectified proposition more than once. Of course, if this were really the only thing which could differentiate them then it would

seem Sherburne is right; for a play can be performed more than once. One judges the performers who are not the play but who interpret the play. The play is objectively reproducible in that it has this ability to be played and replayed like a record. Yet, like this record, where the record is not the music but the instrument by which the music is conveyed; the play becomes, in fact, an objectified proposition. So, too, in the performer arts; in general the performance is not the art object but an instance of objectification. eg. a row of "row houses" is merely the architect's design put to life. (WA p.128) Now, he would argue that painting and sculpture can be objectified only once. This seems true, as I said, until one raises the question of copies or replicas. Of course, one may object that these are not the real work of art - the original painted by the original painter - but at worst "cheap imitations" and at best what everyone would call "forgeries". Yet, is this true about artists who make prints without any original except the plate? Would one want to argue that the plate is the original? If so, then if the artist destroyed the plate; there would no longer be an objectification (according to Sherburne). But, in this case, would not the plate be the same thing as the score on which Beethoven wrote his 5th? If the score was destroyed then there would be no more 5th on that analogy (even if other copies of the score existed).

My contention is that a copy is, in fact, another objectification, with a second, third or fourth artist acting out the role of performer or mediator between the artist and the perceiver.⁶¹ The

⁶¹ Of course, Sherburne might argue that the crucial distinction is between the using of a rule (eg. musical notation) to guide a performance (the orchestra playing) where the rule and the performance are quite different things; and using a painting to guide a reproduction (another painting) where these are the same type of thing. But is not a reproduction a performance in that it is re-creating the original painting by using it as a sort of guide or rule?

rule or guideline used in this case is not the score but the first objectification. This would in some respects solve the problems which Sherburne's theory runs into.

Secondly, in the performer arts, as already shown, one needs a performer. Yet, it can be said that a poem or a work of literature does not need a mediator. I read a poem and I interpret it. If Sherburne wants to say that a critic is necessary in such things as drama or poetry (cf. WA p.122), one could easily argue the same for sculpture and painting which (according to him) are labelled "non-performing arts". Yet, however one may criticize Sherburne on niceties, it still remains that his aesthetic theory is important for it does show, as we have seen, that art objects may have the status of objectified propositions in their performances; and his results do come from a development of Whitehead's theory of art. He is to be criticized only in his generalizing of distinctions applying to performing and non-performing parts. The criticism is supported by Suzanne Langer who says:

It is a constant temptation to say things about "Art" in this general sense that are only true in one special domain or to assume that what holds for one art must hold for another. For instance, the fact that music is made for performance, for presentation to the ear and is simply not the same when it is given only to the tonal imagination of a reader silently perusing the score has made some aestheticians pass straight to the conclusion that literature, too, must be physically fully experienced because words are originally spoken and not written; an obvious parallel but a careless and I think an invalid one. It is dangerous to set up principles by analogy and generalize from a single consideration.⁶²

This is Sherburne's major error when he discusses the aesthetic object; and it pervades and detracts from his sound purpose which is to

⁶² Suzanne Langer, Problem of Art (New York, 1957) p.13

continue where Whitehead left off in aesthetic theory.

In this present chapter the significant role of the individual or subject is mainly stressed. Both in the case of the creative artist and the respondent, the propositional feeling is part of the subjective process of concrescence. The proposition, strictly speaking, has no full actuality apart from a prehending subject.⁶³ The proposition as it is thus entertained concerns the possibility of some nexus (or "logical subjects" being characterized by a pattern of eternal objects -- the "predicative pattern"). The creative artist entertains such a proposition and attempts to embody or objectify it in the work of art. The work of art has the potentiality to provide data and to arouse a corresponding proposition in the aesthetic experience of the respondent. This involves the functioning of the work of art as an aesthetic object in the experience of the respondent providing those forms of feeling which become the predicative pattern of the propositional lure.

For this reason, the work of art is not itself, a proposition. Sherburne cannot justifiably call it so except in some derived or secondary sense.⁶⁴ The work of art does possess a form calculated to express and awaken the proposition and in this sense possesses the "inherent" value mentioned earlier in this thesis. When a work of

⁶³ PR. 216, 218, 301, 302; also AI 245 "Propositions, like everything else except experience in its own immediacy, only exist as entertained in experience!" This would be the experience of the prehending subject.

⁶⁴ "A proposition in abstraction from any particular actual entity which may be realizing it in feeling is a manner of germaneness of a certain set of eternal objects to a certain set of entities." (PR 218) The work of art intended to express such an abstraction might derivatively, though not equivalently, be identified with it. Whitehead distinguishes clearly between a nexus (or logical subject of a proposition such as the work of art) and the proposition as a theory about the nexus: "The nexus includes the eternal object in the mode of realization. Whereas in the true proposition the togetherness of the nexus and the eternal object belongs to the mode of abstract possibility. The

art is perceived, providing the data in experience which form the aesthetic object, then the proposition normally emerges as the lure for actualizing the aesthetic value. The aesthetic object becomes an active ingredient basic to the further distinctions introduced by the proposition.

But the propositional or "simple" comparative feeling is not the necessary finale of the concrescent process. Further comparative feelings may enter in the form of detailed analyses, appreciations of novelties introduced by reversions, valuations and enjoyments. Thus Whitehead gives full play and significance to "subjectivity" in the respondent as well as in the creative imagination of the artist. Moreover, the importance of subjectivity is further revealed in what Sherburne calls "horizontal transmutation" to which we now turn.

(v)

The Creative Process and Transmutation as
a Factor Within This Process

In any discussion of artistic creation one must naturally revert back to the process of the emergence of a novel idea through its stages to completion (its aim at value). In the last section, it was shown how the art object is related to a proposition (in the Whiteheadian sense). In this section the discussion will center around the process by which the propositional feeling is given expression in the art object.

eternal object is then united to the nexus as mere "predicate". Thus a nexus and a proposition belong to different categories of being. (Italics mine) "Their identification is mere nonsense." (AI 244-255) See also p.244 "A proposition is a notion about actualities, a suggestion, a theory, a supposition about things.... It is an extreme case of appearance." (AI 244)

All art is novel expression of an accumulation of sense data or other experience (together with accompanying subjective forms of feeling). This means that art depicts, in a unique mode, not only what is seen; but also what is felt, and imagined. Whitehead has already shown that the novelty inherent in the process creative of a work of art emerges through conceptual reversion (which occurs, as we noted, during the second phase of concrescence). Conceptual reversion, is then, the process as a result of which

the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms both in qualitative pattern and in intensity through contrast is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.... (Conceptual Reversion) is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. (PR 291)

While "conceptual feelings" are those concerned with eternal objects; conceptual reversion does not merely reiterate eternal objects but makes them relevant by introducing new relevant alternatives. It is this relevance in novelty (determined by aim) which makes for the enhancement of aesthetic value.

In artistic creation (as in all instances of conceptual reversion) God is the storehouse of novelty. Thus, "in the last analysis a conceptual reversion depends upon the hybrid physical feeling of God that is part of phase 1 of every concrescence."⁶⁵ God is aesthetically involved in every creative process and in the introduction of novelty by the fact that he acts as the ultimate lure for feeling, and as an entity who retains items of importance for future reference.

But, what about the artist's own expression of these feelings; how does this work? Does consciousness play a role here?

⁶⁵ D.W. Sherburne, WA op. cit. p.181

Consciousness enters with the more complex intellectual feelings (fourth phase). One aspect would be the more complex, detailed and discriminatory intellectual feelings which focus upon and elaborate the elements arising in conceptual reversion (phase two). Consciousness here, introduces vividness and intensity.

Another aspect of creativity and expression is related to the process of transmutation. Whitehead introduces this notion in his theory of perception and defines it as:

the operation whereby macrocosmic perceptions arise out of microscopic prehensions eg. where-
by perception of a table supercedes the prehen-
sion of the welter of individual actual entities
constitutive of the whole. ⁶⁶

What Sherburne wants to do is to take this notion of vertical transmutation and expand on it to give two types of transmutation. The second type is what he calls horizontal transmutation. We need now to explain why, for Sherburne, a supplemental transmutation is required.

Vertical transmutation integrates "microscopic entities" into "macroscopic perceptions"; but horizontal transmutation "is a category to concentrate macroscopic perceptions into one focal point of experience. ⁶⁷ It brings things into significance; for

It is via vertical transmutation that the welter of actual occasions constitutive of a man are prehended as a unity; but it is in virtue of horizontal transmutation that signifi-
cance is attached to the concept "man". ⁶⁸

Moreover vertical transmutation is not enough for

⁶⁶ D.W. Sherburne, A Key etc., op. cit., p.247

⁶⁷ D.W. Sherburne, WA, op. cit., p.162

⁶⁸ D.W. Sherburne, WA, op. cit., p.162

even when vertical transmutation has occurred at the second phase of concrecence, the concrecing subject does not yet encounter experience as fully significant....⁶⁹

That is to say, it is only through conscious awareness that a full and a rich experience takes place. How does this clarify aesthetically the theory of expression? It does so in the following way: Horizontal transmutation is concerned with intellectual feelings not physical feelings (as in vertical transmutation). Expression is the result of a conscious process which involves these intellectual feelings. These intellectual feelings, in turn, involve horizontal transmutation as the process by which they fully arise. If a poet, for example, sees the pine trees outside, the snow on the ground, and the sound of bells from a church; artistic creation would result from an expression of the high intensity of vague feelings which are aroused by what Sherburne has aptly called "horizontal transmutation".⁷⁰ The experience of the senses on the poet - the church bells on his ears; the sight of snow outside; the scent of fresh pine cones all strike with such a high intensity as to capture that moment, reinforce it and give significance to it. Then, by discovering a theme which would recapture this feeling; and which would reveal it to others, the poet gives expression to this entertained proposition in a poem.

(vi)

Sherburne's Notion of Aesthetic
Experience

For Sherburne, aesthetic experience in the respondent depends

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.163

⁷⁰ The vagueness concerns the added dimension and background of emotional tones associated with previous related experiences dimly felt, but pertinent and important for the present significances. The "Expression is the discovery of a proposition which articulates the rich, yet irritatingly vague feelings arising from horizontal transmutation". Ibid., p.169

on the ability to re-create the experience expressed in the art object. In aesthetic experience

the normal goal and aims of everyday living are suspended; in grasping the subjective aim of one who experiences it aesthetically, the art object insists that it be experienced as an end in itself. (p.144)

This seems to smack of an "art for art's sake" view which Sherburne is hard pressed to reconcile with Whitehead's art for life's sake view. When Sherburne discussed the objectifying of the art work and the prehension of this "objectified proposition" this was all done supposedly to show the objectified proposition was the "datum for the subjective aim of that experience" (p.144-145) - the lure for further feeling-so that, ultimately, the subjective aim in the aesthetic experience is to "recreate in that process of self-creation in that concreting experience the proposition which is objectified in the prehended performance". (p.144) This is what differentiates aesthetic from non-aesthetic experience. The "art dealer" for example, sees a painting as a commodity - a thing to buy and sell for a profit and not as an aesthetic object; the bourgeois collector as an investment; the art historian as an actuality to be studied-as a piece of history et cetera. (Cf. p.147)

An interesting differentiation between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience is that of Sherburne's example of a dirty old man prehending (as it were) the ballerina's figure to the exclusion of the ballet.

It is true that he may have been enthralled, spellbound but this intransitive attention is not aesthetic. He has prehended an actuality with the subjective forms, say, of delight and desire but he has missed completely the proposition objectified in the performance and his attention is non aesthetic. (p.147)

One could argue, however, that in so far as this lecherous old man saw beauty in the luscious "actuality" his experience was of aesthetic

beauty. "No!" Sherburne would reply. Beauty is not limited to aesthetic beauty. In this case he may have seen a beautiful thing but not an aesthetic one. But are there other types of beauty besides aesthetic beauty? Isn't all beauty basically aesthetic?

Now in discussing the old lecher-ballerina incident Sherburne wants to show that beauty is a broader notion and aesthetic beauty is part of it. The old lecher may have experienced beauty in the ballerina but couldn't have experienced it aesthetically since he failed to see her as anything other than an object of desire. He failed, then, to gain an aesthetic experience by perceiving her as a performer of an art -- the ballet. He also failed to enhance his feeling by using the performer as an interpreter of the art form represented. In a sense this is all true enough, but how much simpler it would have been to say that the lecher saw her merely as an object of desire, so that his experience of beauty was limited to this narrower focus. This could still be a genuinely aesthetic experience and it could contain one element of truth insofar as the ballerina is appreciated as illustrating womankind. What the lecher lacked was the ability to perceive the proposition expressed in the total ballet with its full measure of beauty and truth.

(vii)

Art and the Self or Subject

I will conclude this discussion of the theory of the individual and the art process by considering the importance of art for the individual subject or self. Both Whitehead and Sherburne rightly hold that the view that "art is for art's sake" is inadequate. It seems obvious by now what the main concern of art is. It is with life. This involves an active participation of the subject in the art process. Sherburne rightly claims that the listener in relation to a piece of music, for example; or the observer of a piece of fine

art or drama (as well as the reader of a piece of literature or poetry) all "must provide the feeling",⁷¹ in order for there to be an aesthetic experience. Sherburne wants to say that in music, much more than in any other art, "the very nature of the art object is a function of the contemplator since he provides the subject of the proposition which is the art object".⁷² It has already been noted that this is an error for there are times when "you" are not subject of the proposition (eg. in martial music. Cf. p.57-58). However, the "art for life's sake" view stems from Whitehead's own metaphysic which envisions the perceiver as bringing along with him all his built up or past experiences in viewing a thing. (In this case a work of art.).

Thus, if one were to ask the question whose view is best that a work of art is, in fact, a work of art (or is a good work of art); that is to say if one were to ask who would be able to make the best critical value judgement (for Value is essential in any discussion of art), Whitehead would answer that it would tend to be the person who has the highest intensity of feeling or response because of that person's past experiences with art. This person would also see art in the light of the whole and not only the parts. Furthermore, Whitehead would recognize the importance of what Pepper has called "funding" of experiences. This means that the basis of our enjoyment of the experience of the art object is the fact that we have come back to it over and over again together with the fact that we have picked up new detail every time. (Cf. AI 262-263) Then we have a built-up effect occurring in our experience.

But, the work of art not only gains its merit or value from how it affects me, but how it also affects many people. There is a mutual corroboration in discussions of value in art and how the work

⁷¹ D.W. Sherburne, WA, op. cit. p.114

⁷² Ibid.

of art affected each participant which, itself, enhances value. This is what I term the "mutual effectiveness" of a work of art. Mutual effectiveness is ability of an art object to effect not only one individual but a vast number of individuals and even society as a whole. The art object becomes a "public domain" and calls for a public response. The mutual effect of art relates this public domain back to the individual participating on his own with the art object. Simply put, art not only affects the individual but may also affect the society. Conversely the society may have an effect on both the artist and what he produces. This interaction between the work of art and society also links up the artist with the participant. For example, the artist is able to create his work of art in such a way that its meaning gives it social relevance and social value because of the mutual influence it generates among people. If this is the case, the work of art is deemed good or bad with respect, not to artistic value, but to social value.⁷³

Thus, the sensitivity and responsiveness of the subject is of utmost importance in appreciation as well as in artistic creation. In the processes of conceptual reversion and transmutation and in the play of intellectual feelings which yield significance, vividness, and intensity, the agency of a person is paramount.

Perhaps the best footnote to this discussion of human agency in producing and appreciating the work of art is given by the American poet, Wallace Stevens in his poem The Idea of Order at Key West. In this poem he gives an example of a recurring theme which could be used as a summary of this thesis' position regarding the creative act:

She sang beyond the genius of the sea
The water never formed to mind or voice
Like a body, wholly body fluttering
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry,
That was not ours although we understood

⁷³ This notion will be discussed further in Ch.IV

Inhuman, of the veritable ocean.

The sea was not a mask. No more was she.
 The song and water were not medleyed sound
 Even if what she sang was what she heard
 Since what she sang was uttered word by word.
 It may be that in all her phrases stirred
 The grinding water and the gasping wind;⁷⁴
But it was she and not the sea we heard.

For she was the maker of the song she sang
 The ever-hooded, tragic sea
 Was merely a place by which she walked to sing.
 Whose spirit is this? we said, because we knew
 It was the spirit that we sought and knew
 That we should ask this often as she sang.

If it was only the dark voice of the sea
 That rose, or even colored by many waves;
 If it was only the outer voice of sky
 And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled,
 However clear, it would have been deep air,
 The heaving speech of air, a summer sound
 Repeated in a summer without end
 And sound alone. But it was more than that,
More even than her voice, and ours, among
The meaningless plungings of water and the wind,
 Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped
 On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres
 Of sky and sea.

It was her voice that made
 The sky acutest at its vanishing.
 She was the single artificer of the world
 In which she sang. And as she sang, the sea,
 Whatever self it had became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we
 As we behold her striding there alone,
 Knew that there never was a world for her
 Except the one she sang and, singing, made.

Raymond Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
 Why, when the singing ended and we turned
 Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights
 The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,
 As the night descended, tilting in the air,
 Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
 Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
 Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.

Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
 The maker's rage to order words of the sea
 Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred
 And of ourselves and of our origins,
 In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds. 75

In Whiteheadian terminology, there exists besides creation within the poet through conceptual reversion and the two types of transmutation, a further enhancement of value. Then the feeling and meaning are apprehended by the receptive listeners. Stevens' poetry thus embodies a proposition which in turn presents and elicits emotion and insight. Stevens, like Whitehead, considers the importance of reality in art and in life.

Reality is the beginning not the end
 Naked Alpha, not the hierophant Omega,
 Of dense investiture, with luminous vassals. 76
 (from "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven")

or again "We seek/the poem or pure reality/ untouched by the trope of deviation". Another similarity between Stevens and Whitehead is the view of art as making the concrete abstract and the abstract concrete; for as Stevens says:

(Reality) ... is the philosopher's search
 For an interior made exterior
 And the poet's search for the same exterior made
 Interior. 77

To conclude this discussion it must be restated that the self is highly important in the emergence of value and the enhancement of such value as is achieved in the art-process. The self, however, in a genuine sense, is, as Morris says, "unknown except as the process of

75 Wallace Stevens, Poems by Wallace Stevens selected and with an introduction by Samuel French Morse (New York, 1947, 1954, 1957, 1959) pp.54-56.

76 W. Stevens, Poems by Wallace Stevens (op. cit.)p.146, ll.19-21

77 Ibid., p.149

Both quotes are from the poem "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"

satisfaction comes to an adequate conclusion".⁷⁸

(viii)

Smith's View of Art

According to J.L. Smith, there is, indeed, an importance in Sherburne's assertions that the aesthetic object is a Whiteheadian proposition in the sense that it is a potential lure for feeling where propositional feeling does not necessarily involve conscious judgement. Smith does not completely rule out consciousness as a consideration and as a necessary element in the assessing of a proposition for to do so would be to neglect the later phases of concrescence. As a potentiality, the proposition relates eternal objects to a framework of definite actuality in an occasion of experience - for example in the experience of a work of art. Yet it, (the proposition), itself IS indeterminate for it may or may not be realized:

as with eternal objects or pure possibilities
so with each proposition in itself, there is
a complete indeterminateness regarding its re-
alization and its truth.⁷⁹

A work of art is similar in the sense that it may or may not become an aesthetic object. Another similarity is that of consideration. As with a work of art which exemplifies Whitehead's idea of a proposition, the proposition has to be considered before it can be judged good or bad. So too, non-artistic propositions "have to be considered before they can be considered true or false. The interest or lure would be operative prior to actual expression!"⁸⁰ Neither

⁷⁸ B. Morris, "The Art Process and Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy" (op. cit.) p.477.

⁷⁹ J.L. Smith, Aesthetics and Art within a Whiteheadian Cosmology. (Tulane, 1969) p.109.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.110

with works of art as exemplifying propositions, or with propositions themselves, they can we place truth or falsehood before aim or lure.

For Smith, as for Sherburne and Whitehead "the aesthetic content is both basic to and operative in all consciousness".⁸¹ As was noted earlier in this paper, all art is symbolic. If this is the case, then consciousness does play a major role in all aesthetic experience for consciousness "is the feeling of the contrast prevailing in symbolic reference".⁸² This "feeling of contrast" when applied to art becomes an awareness of patterns within the object itself. Yet, art, as such, is not the fine arts alone. Art for Smith is a general term applied to a "selection whereby facts are arranged so as to give attention to vivid values which they realize".⁸³

In emphasizing this capturing of attention, Smith is in accord with both Whitehead and Sherburne when they say that the work of art functions as a lure to give rise to further experience for others. As such, it is not an end in itself but a means to an end for the "fine art work is instrumental but not an end in itself ... its function is instrumental".⁸⁴ The fine art work exists as a material object of some kind but its status is that of an instrument - an instrument for the re-creation of the artist's own feelings and experiences in the appreciator.⁸⁵

81

J.L. Smith, op. cit., p.141

82

Ibid., p.140

83

Ibid., p.160

84

Ibid., p.265

85

However, both Smith and Whitehead try to say that art is for life's sake because art is not merely a social function. Only in the disclosing of its own value does art function as an end in itself. Thus art for art's sake view is assimilated also and broadened:

This disclosure involves not only beauty, but also the self, the recollected, the sublime, the tragic, the comic and the ugly. It is the disclosure of the value aspects whereby fine art can be said to function as an end in itself: the disclosure of the value aspects are ends in themselves. (Smith, op. cit. p.267)

Smith's view of aesthetics, however, is much broader than Sherburne's. In fact, Smith criticized Sherburne's narrowness in limiting aesthetics to fine arts. One must begin with life, and a cosmology and fit art into it; for to begin with a philosophy of art is "to begin in the middle".⁸⁶ Art in the general sense of the term is any selection of concrete facts which arouse selective attention from the participators in order to achieve and to enhance their own particular values. It is, moreover, the enjoyment of "vivid value" which, in itself, is the ultimate aim of this selective process of consciousness. Yet, is this not too general? Would this refer to the creation of a work of art or the viewing of it or both? It seems that it would refer to both for

Consciousness allows art in the emergent sense
of human art as the selection, attending to,
and enjoying of vivid values. 87

and this refers to both processes of creation and perception. Yet, in fact, it is art, itself, which "evoke(s) into consciousness the finite perfections which lie ready for human achievement". (AI 271)

The emergence of value, as we have seen, allows for the transfer of ideas, feelings and emotive values from the artist to the participant. It is just this transfer which Smith has lead us up to and which is important in any aesthetic theory and in any view of art and society.⁸⁸ This transfer has influenced both artist and audience in peculiar ways.

⁸⁶ J.L. Smith, op. cit., p.155

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.164

⁸⁸ As Whitehead says "consciousness is the weapon which strengthens the artificiality of an occasion of experience. (AI 270) Moreover as Whitehead says in Symbolism: "The whole question of the symbolic transfer of emotion lies at the basis of any theory of aesthetics of art". (p.85)

Chapter IV

Art and Society

Comme chez Santayana (cf. Sense of Beauty 24) valeurs morales et valeurs esthétiques sont toutes proches.⁸⁹

Introduction

In the last two chapters some attempt has been made at an explication of the emergence of value within the aesthetic situation. This involved a discursive analysis of the concepts of beauty and truth pertaining to the work of art and our perception of it. This also involved both a disclosure of the process by which a peculiarly "aesthetic" experience occurs within the individual and the process by which a work of art emerges as an aesthetic object within concreteness. Up to this point much use has been made of Whiteheadian principles and Whiteheadian interpretation to show the relationship between the "objective content" or aesthetic object and the percipient occasion or subjective form of experience within the individual. Ultimately, however, one must expand this relationship to include society. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to show the mutual influence between art and society, as developed from Whiteheadian aesthetic theory. Furthermore, the function of art as a means of increasing the novelty and value within a society and as a civilizing force on society will be elaborated upon.

⁸⁹ F. Cesselin, La Philosophie Organique de Whitehead (Paris, 1950), p.85.

(i)

Art as a Civilizing Influence on
Society

Much great art seems to be the result of a rebellion against the staleness of convention and of a striving for a novelty and perfection. Convention, although it may inspire some great art -- eg. the English pastoral convention of the eighteenth century -- ultimately leads to monotony and the death of art. Convention stripped of all innovation is the womb of triviality. It is an art of decay. This theory will be illustrated by specific reference to poetry and the fallacy of art for art's sake as opposed to art for life's sake. This will also encompass the connection between art and morality and poetry and morality in the next two sections as illustrative of the inability to divorce art from life.

A.C. Bradley is one of the greatest exponents of the intrinsic worth of poetry. In his essay Poetry for Poetry's Sake he fights for the autonomy of art and, like Clive Bell, he does not want to allow for any function other than the aesthetic. He wants us to look at a poem without any preconceived references or judgements. This does not exclude looking at poetry in respect to its metrical form et cetera. It also means that we must look at a poem as a succession of experiences, sounds, images, thoughts, and so on and with the view that the readers and successive readings of poems differ. This is fine, up to a point, but it doesn't go far enough. The last notion is important; for we do learn something new from a poem each time we re-read it and many readers differ as to what a particular poem is.

Bradley wants to say, along with this, that poetry must be taken to be an end in itself. Its poetic value is this intrinsic worth alone. Secondary or ulterior values are not excluded by him but are considered as a means to culture or religion because they

convey instruction or "softening of passions" or poetic fame, the quest for money et cetera. However, the poetic worth is not these things. It is, for Bradley, to be judged from within. If a poet or reader tries to consider these ulterior or secondary ends in the act of experiencing this would tend to lower poetic value since it goes against the nature of poetry (eg. Bradley's notion of poetry) which is a world unto itself and not an imitation of life. Poetry, for him, should not moralize for poetry is one kind of human good and "one must not determine the intrinsic value of this kind of good by reference to another." However, if what Bradley says is true it is only a part of the truth. Bradley's view, it could be argued cuts poetry off from life (and if we extend his views to other arts it would cut all art off from life). Bradley would probably reply, that the connection is still there but "hidden". Yet to be hidden implies a secondary or unobtrusive connection exists. It is my contention, on the other hand, that to be a work of art in the true sense of the word and to function fully is to function "for life's sake" and to be symbolic with reference to man. This involves man as the ultimate referent and the creation of value within man as its ultimate aim.

It is my contention that poetry is more than simply an end in itself for its main purpose is, indeed, to express and communicate (through meaning) feelings which are related to and rooted in our world. Poetry is an expression of meaning and ideas through feeling. Of course, the inherent value of a work of art, such as a poem, is that work's ability to invoke an intensity of feelings (or an aesthetic response) within the individual. A person who is insensitve would not be able to respond to a poem at all. Contrary to Bradley, it should be noted, that the aesthetic experience is not absolutely guaranteed by an art object alone. This has already been seen in the last chapter. As a further example one can note the worker in an art gallery whose job it is to hang up paintings and who may see the work of art as a work of art or, merely, as a "painting" with colours,

and so forth; but whose lack of attentiveness fails to arouse within him an aesthetic response. The Eskimo and the Central American looking at a winter scene depict yet different responses to the art object. The Eskimo who has lived all his life with snow may not be as fascinated with it as the Central American. Thus art affects man in diverse ways. Its service to man "lies in its artificiality and its finiteness" (AI 270) and this "artificiality", as previously noted, is strengthened by consciousness. Art's artificiality exhibits the ability and achievement of mankind for it is mankind's effort to express his feeling and to seek a means of perfection. This, too, is an obvious result of the effects of art upon individual (developed in the third chapter) and its applicability to society in general.

All art (i.e. all good art), seeks perfection in that it expresses an idealization of human emotions and human values (as well as human faults) in such a way that it "heightens the sense of humanity" (AI 271); for it "requires art to evoke into consciousness the finite perfections which lie ready for human achievement". (AI 271) This is the greatest achievement of art; for these ideals though they may never be achieved, in actuality, are expressed as potentialities within works of art. It must be noted, however, that even if perfection, in the finite sense of the term (if, indeed, there is a finite sense of the term), is not reached in a work of art the attempt at perfection is there. It seems, too, that Whitehead would have agreed with the maxim that man satisfied and perfection attained is man tamed and man bored, (cf. note on convention and repetition in chapter two). Whitehead would have preferred the striving for perfection than the perfection itself - the action and novelty which are inherent in his notion of process rather than completion and stagnation.

Whitehead does say that perfection in the arts even in the greatest works of art can not really be achieved; for art gives man something to strive for and towards. This is exemplified in science

fiction as a literary art form. In this art form there is a constant flux and constant seeking of novelty in both aims and ideals which man may never achieve but which he can imagine (eg. space-flight to the stars; or meeting beings on other worlds and learning from them). At the same time, science fiction expresses a direction and a harmony of form.

Art should also function in order to enhance civilization by stressing "the principle of harmony of individuals."⁸⁹ As Whitehead says "art is the education of nature. Thus in its broadest sense art is civilization. For civilization is nothing other than the unremitting aim of the major perfections of harmony." (AI 271) Although the individual characteristics are important in art; for an understanding of the whole it is interesting to state once again that

we are overwhelmed by the beauty of the building...
the whole precedes the details. We then pass to
discrimination.

for there is in aesthetics "a totality disclosing its component parts. (MT 85-86) However, insofar as it involves consciousness, art is such that it expresses eternal truths which "haunt the object presented for clear consciousness". (AI 270) This implies that first there is the emotion and then the discrimination. Similarly, with regard to the social function of art, the initial intuition is of the perfection of harmony.

The art process also aids the merging of past experiences and future possibilities; for "art takes care of the immediate fruition here and now." (AI 269) As Betram Morris adds

The "here and now" constitutes the real world
in which anticipation and purposefulness in
immediate enjoyment overcome the fallacious
abstraction of completely passive contemplation.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ A.H. Johnson, WPC p.9.

⁹⁰ B. Morris, op. cit., p.446

When one asks "why should art provide enjoyment and purpose at all?" and "what is the secret of art such that it has enthralled, excited and moved so many people and advanced so many civilizations?" one would perhaps express mild surprise if the answer was stated that "the secret of art lies in its freedom". (AI 272) However, this should not come as any surprise at all, for it is the ultimate conclusion - in fact the only conclusion - which we could have arrived at in this thesis. This "freedom" includes the freedom of expression (and self-expression which is a process of imagination grounded in the data of our world leading to true understanding) and freedom from the bounds of reality as we have seen. This is so because art has not only a physical origin but also an imaginative one. This has a back reference to Whitehead's metaphysical view of the interaction of the mental and physical poles which are a part of consciousness - the mental pole envisioning the possibilities and the physical pole having reference to the actualities or actualizations of these various possibilities.

This freedom is also expressed by a work of art as a freedom from morality. "Freedom from morality" here means that although a work of art may, in one sense, be concerned with morals, yet morality vanishes in the presence of art. A work of art, for Whitehead at least, is not primarily concerned with moral good or evil as its aim. "For Goodness is a qualification belonging to the constitution of reality... Good and Evil lie in depths and distances below and beyond appearance." (AI 268) In yet another sense, the effects of art works on morality (and their own creation being influenced by morality) is so important as to question the divorce of art and morality which Whitehead advocates. This will be illustrated by a discussion of the mutual influence of morality and poetry as a specifically individual example and then some general comments and conclusions will be brought forward as a result.

(ii)

Poetry and Morality

Bradley's view, which we have already seen, expresses one half of a complete view of art. It is the part which is concerned with the autonomous nature of art. Therefore, it isn't surprising that he would say something similar to Whitehead about morality and poetry and morality and art. Bradley's view doesn't rule out the possibility that morality and poetry are associated or that one can have morality in poetry; but he does say that it is a secondary consideration. However, there is the social side of art to consider. This is the extrinsic view of art which is also incorporated into our theory. In fact, I consider it to be the more fundamental of the two; for the extrinsic value of art is involved in the whole notion that art is a civilizing force within society. Because art is an artifact, and since morality, politics, religion and social value are all expressions of man's aims and are the civilizing aspects related to him; they may be a more important element in art than the mere intrinsic value. The first thing to note is that Dewey says:

When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and operation in experience a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their general significance with which aesthetic theory deals. Art is remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from that very association with the materials and aims of every other human effort, undergoing and achievement.⁹¹

Thus

the moral office and function of art can be intelligently discussed only in the context of culture. A particular work of art may have a definite effect upon a particular person or upon a number of persons.⁹²

⁹¹ John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York, 1958) p.3

⁹² Op. cit. p.344

The social effect and the social value of art, then, is far from negligible. Examples are numerous from Dryden or Pope or even in the art of Picasso. Milton's "Paradise Lost", for example, tells the individual how he should act and Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales" amusingly does the same by showing how people shouldn't act. Dewey goes on to say that there is even greater social change or "adjustment of experience" as he calls it "created from the collected art of a time"; and that art can not do without this moral backing. As Cesselin has said (and this could apply equally to a comparison between Dewey and Whitehead) "Comme chez Santayana (cf. Sense of Beauty 24) valeurs morales et valeurs esthétiques sont toutes proches".⁹³ Thus, if poetry is influential, it does, indeed, shape attitudes as well as being influenced by them.

The latter statement implies that one could argue that social attitudes have shaped the content of much poetry. "Absalom and Achitophel" for example, is a reaction against the society of the period and advocates a new set of standards by which people of the time should return to the ways of the period before the Hanoverian era.

This leads us to the point of view which I shall be advocating in this and the next section. In this section I shall show that poetry is influenced by morality and ethical considerations such that a great deal of poetry is either a reaction against existing systems or in favour of them and a reaction against dissenters. This view is one which considers cultural and epochal attitudes. Furthermore, this view of poetry agrees with and supplements the other arts and is what Whitehead truly terms "art for life's sake". It does not rule out the aesthetic value on a work of art but says that this isn't the only consideration. Chaucer wrote his "Canterbury Tales", for example, as a reaction against the declining and corrupt priesthood and moral life of the day. Milton was influenced by the Civil War in

⁹³ F. Cesselin, op. cit. p.85

England; and the Restoration was the influence for Donne, Dryden and Herbert.

Donne's poetry exhibits the new upheaval and freedom as well as doubt of the day and the new inward approach to religious belief which was to become (through the influence of his poetry) a predominant type of Puritanism. Herbert also reflects this but shows in his poetry a deeper inner communication with God.

Even in the Eighteenth Century it is the same. The political satires of Pope had a great influence on the satires of Swift and the whole society of the time. Shelley did not exaggerate when he said that moral science only "arranges the elements that poetry has created"; if we extend poetry to include all products of imaginative experience. But even Shelley stopped too soon; for he failed to note that existing systems in turn influence poetry and the other arts. One must remember that poetical values are values in human life and, therefore, you can not mark them off from other values as though the nature of man were built on bulkheads.

Whitehead, in Science and the Modern World, affirms what I have said: (and shows the influence of non-influence of science on poetry)

Milton, though he is writing after the Restoration, voices his theological aspect of the earlier portion of his century; untouched by the influence of scientific materialism. Pope's poem (Essay on Man) represents the effect on popular thought of the intervening sixty years which includes the first period of assured triumph for the scientific movement. Wordsworth in his whole being expresses a conscious reaction against the mentality of the eighteenth century. This mentality means nothing else than the acceptance of the scientific ideas at their full face value. Wordsworth was not bothered by any intellectual antagonism. What moved him was a moral repulsion. He felt that something had been left out, and that what had been left out comprised everything that was most important. Tennyson is the mouthpiece of the attempts

of the waning romantic movement in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to come to terms with science. (SMW 77)

(iii)

Art and Morality

It is now with a degree of caution that I wish to draw some conclusions about the connection between art and morality from what has been said about the mutual influence of poetry and morality. This is justified if we are to remain within a Whiteheadian scheme.

On the one hand, as we have previously noted, Whitehead would deny that aesthetics and ethics belong within the same "realm" and that one is a form of the other (cf. Dialogues p.235). Of course Whitehead would never deny the fact that morality and moral considerations do play a part in the aesthetic process; but his Carmen episode in Modes of Thought and the fact that he criticizes Price in the Dialogues for trying to conjoin morality and art shows us that there is something individual and intrinsic about a work of art which lets it be isolated from such moral considerations.

On the other hand, art and morality, as we have seen, are very close. In fact, moral considerations often result from and play a part in works of art and aesthetic experiences. This does not mean to say that there is no distinction between morally good and the morally bad on the one hand, and the aesthetically good and the aesthetically bad on the other. The former has to do with meritorious behaviour whereas the latter has to do with intensity of feeling. We have seen in the preceding few sections, however the connection between art and morality and the influence of one on the other. This is so simply because both stem from and are parts of civilized man. You can not divorce one from the other.

Sherburne has an interesting view which also stems from this and from a Whiteheadian view of "art for life's sake".

It just is not true that to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions as Clive Bell seems to think. 94

This means that autonomous theories of art are inadequate. Art interacts with the rest of culture and this interaction is given its place and explanation in the metaphysical grounds which Whitehead has provided and which I have elaborated upon and extended. Of course, it may be claimed, as Sherburne does, that when a man experiences a work of art he "enters an autonomous realm of art but that encounter with the object of art remains with him as a part of the inheritance that conditions his aims".⁹⁵ This means that in the discussion of poetry and morality, in the last section, the morality may never be finally divorced from the poetry just as art is never finally divorced from life or society. It is only after entering this "autonomous realm" of poetry and relating the experience to other experiences that moral implications may come into play, and moral value may arise. This, too, follows Whitehead's general framework and is an outcome of it.

Since an art object exerts a dynamic impact on consciousness (which emerges with great intensity in aesthetic experience as an element in the subjective form of a prehension which involves a proposition) it follows that the aesthetic experience can be of great significance in the formulation of overall aims eg. a college senior might read Death of a Salesman and Point of No Return in an English seminar and shortly thereafter abandon his intention of going to a business school in favour of a teaching career, and this largely as a result of aesthetic experiences which at their

⁹⁴ D.W. Sherburne, WA op. cit., p.116

⁹⁵ D.W. Sherburne, WA op. cit., p.202

occurrence had cut off his everyday aims and transported him into the autonomous realm of art. 98

Sherburne is of course right (in his quote) in the sense that the aesthetic experience is brought forward to influence future experience both aesthetic and non-aesthetic. But the whole claim of the autonomy of art seems to me to rest on shaky foundations. If autonomy means non-dependence in the sense of not being dependent on conditions, experiences and the like exterior to the given aesthetic experience then this whole thesis and the whole philosophy of process through interaction is in violent disagreement. If, however, autonomy within the aesthetic experience means a "concentration of attention" on some one thing rather than another perhaps there is a valid argument for it: i.e. when viewing a painting I concentrate upon the painting and not the surroundings (the chairs, the gallery, the people passing) my experience and the resulting value comes from such a concentrated focus of attention and results from an interaction between the painting and myself. However, it must be noted again, that when I see the painting my prior experiences and social conditioning influence my reaction to it.

If "autonomous" means, not simply, an "isolation from society and past experiences"; but the fact that, if used with regard to a work of art, it means the "potential ability of a work to promote an aesthetic response and value no matter who the participator"; then this would be in accord too with the art for life's sake view. There are

98 IBID.

As Whitehead says "Art has a curative function in human experience when it reveals as in a flash intimate, absolute Truth regarding the Nature of things." (AI 272) It is "for life's sake" since it recreates the passion, feelings, and emotions of the whole history of man: "Art can be described as a psychological reaction of a race to the stresses of its existence" (AI 272) Art is therefore a symbol in the true sense of the word.

as we have noted in chapter one inherent capabilities in the work of art for the promotion of beauty on a given occasion of experience.

There is, then no real conflict between art for art's sake and art for life's sake; the former is a part of the latter. The "art objects that grasp one aesthetically and unplug one's experiences" exert a powerful influence "upon the reformation of practical aims".

Conclusion

In this thesis an attempt was made to discuss the processes involved in artistic creation as a "creative process" aiming at value. As a creative process, similarities were to be seen between the process of artistic creation and respondent re-creation. Both involved consciousness and conscious alteration brought about by the two types of transmutation and conceptual reversion. Moreover, individual effects (i.e. how art effects response in individuals) seemed to be similar to the effect that art had on that group of individuals called a society. It was discovered that the person who attained the greatest aesthetic response through arousal of feeling was best able to judge the merits of works of art. This, of course, does not mean simply raw emotional feeling, but overall feeling inspired by the various factors such as awareness of truth and beauty, experience etc.

In chapter one, the foundation was laid on which we could approach the theory. The sharp distinction that was presumed to exist between general value and aesthetic value was shown, in fact, to be non-existent. Aesthetic value is a restricted but complicated case of human value which in turn can be analyzed into the attainment of value on a cosmological scale.

In chapter two, the significance of truth was brought forth. We found out how truth was related to what in art, and that art is at its greatest a combination of truthful beauty. Truth in the symbolic sense was defined as the conveyance of objective meaning at a maximum and the conveyance of subjective form at a minimum. Here, too, the notion was first put forward that art interprets the sentiments

and feelings of man and aids in the provision of an emotional outlet for feelings to be expressed in a concrete form. This is one reason for the symbolic significance of art. "True to life" is not a prerequisite in the arts nor is "factuality" always significant; for falsehood is also important at times as a relief from boredom. It is this striving for novelty which is a main purpose of art.

We saw too that beauty is an adaptation involving patterned contrasts and the avoidance of painful clash. Moreover, the gradations with which beauty is involved lead to the individual differences in aesthetic experience. Thus the foundation was laid for understanding the nature and value of the work of art.

In the third chapter we depicted the notion of consciousness and the conscious self with its aim at value as integral to aesthetic experience. The unity of the self, if defined in terms of its values, is a unity involving a funding of values. Memory integrates the diverse past occasions which issue in such a unified self -- unified in value and aim towards value feeling. Finally, in this chapter we saw that consciousness is integrally related to the aesthetic process in that consciousness shapes and enhances creativity through the two factors of conceptual reversion and transmutation.

In the fourth chapter the centre of attention was not the individualized experience of the third chapter but the view of aesthetics as involving a relationship between art and society. Here it was shown that a reciprocal relationship obtained in that art is a civilizing force within society and society significantly influences the arts. Moreover this view of art leads us to take up Whitehead's own view that art is art for life's sake not for art's sake.

On the whole we found that a work of art can have some sort of truth within itself in that when the art object, as expressing a

proposition, refers to "fictive things", we do not even have to ask whether this or that really occurred - whether Alice really went through the looking glass. Truth plays, in these cases, a minimal function. However, the fact is that the author of a piece of fiction - Lewis Carol or Shakespeare - intends to say, by our very common sense definition of "fiction", that "This is not in the real world. It is not happening and never did happen in our world; but it may happen or something like this could conceivably happen. This is what I'm trying to tell you. Furthermore, within its own world (i.e. within itself as a self-contained piece of fiction) this is, indeed, true and things did happen and may have happened this way." Then the point is raised that the fiction as an instance of mere appearance may in some way convey insights of life, morality and value.

In the process of civilization, then, art is an adventure aiming at greater novelty and intensity of beauty and at a more penetrating truth. Its purpose is indeed the blending of beauty and truth. But these aims cannot be separated from society, and art is also an attempt to inspire man to greater heights and greater achievements by stressing the harmony of individuals as well as the ideals.

Living in a vast universe, surrounded by overwhelming natural beauties, men need to be reminded of the impressive creative power of their own species. The beauty of a sunset overpowers by its magnificence. The sight or sound, of a human work of art inspires men to further advances along the road to civilization. 97

This is the power of art.

97 A.H. Johnson, WPC op. cit., p.9.

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