

THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

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By

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I

INTRODUCTION

It is exceedingly difficult to discuss problems of political and social philosophy in a comprehensive, concise and clear manner. The nature of this material does not lend itself to a simple analysis, unless one is willing to simplify the profound and complex nature of this material. Unlike studies in natural science, social and political issues are open to a greater spectrum of interpretation. In many instances this spectrum of disparity is understandable, since a study of political issues deals not only with agreement upon what data exists but it also must consider the influence of individual choice and human values.

Another type of difficulty that arises, in the study of social and political issues, is the impossibility of isolating these issues for analysis from other areas of inquiry. This impediment, however, is probably a fortunate circumstance since political issues are most fully understood by considering the entire context of which they are a part. By considering such elements as the social, moral and metaphysical implications of a social issue, one is able to establish a context for understanding the issue. This context enables an individual to understand the

elements and situations which generated an issue and also those which will occur as a consequence of its existence.

The difficulty of studying political issues is further complicated when one tries to comment upon contemporary political and social occurrences. This task requires a vantage point for viewing the situation, since most people are unable to remain in the dynamic and diverse flow of society and still maintain a critical view.

The many problems impeding the critical examination of political issues suggest that some method of study or unit of analysis is necessary for handling this type of material. This essay has, therefore, chosen the political and moral writings of Kant as an approach to the study of certain political problems of contemporary society.

Kant's works were chosen for several reasons. The most important of these is the fact that his style of thought addresses political problems with regard for their complexity and far-reaching consequences. He addresses these political problems in a comprehensive and competent fashion and expresses the many interrelationships of these problems in a vast perspective.

His works are highly acceptable today, since they are sympathetic to political problems in the contemporary situation. This empathy on Kant's part probably results from witnessing conflicts which were similar to those occurring today. The highly polar political extremism, exhibited by

radical French revolutionaries and monarchists, is analogous to the polarity which presently exists between radical leftist groups and the advocates of control by central authority.

Similar examples could be drawn upon to demonstrate the basis of Kant's empathy for problems which are presently occurring in social and political situations. But Kant's significance for the understanding of present-day political situations might best be approached by considering his works in a different light.

Kant's work is significant in that it has greatly contributed to the thought which has influenced the present structure of contemporary society. Kant is therefore responsible, in an intellectual manner, for many of the good as well as undesirable aspects of the present society.

This essay places Kant's thoughts in a peculiar role. Discussion of his works is presented as a frame of reference for viewing important aspects of the current political-social situation. But Kant's position must also, at the same time, be critically appraised, since he has greatly influenced the present state of society which is being studied. Kant is undoubtedly responsible, in part, for articulating some of the many political and social ideals of western democracies. But the nature of Kant's works allow a third role to be ascribed to his thoughts. These works contain many viewpoints and principles which could be usefully applied to the

problems of modern society. The principal discussion of this essay, therefore, centers about three tasks. First, it hopes to present a few problems which are confronting contemporary society and to view them as fundamental difficulties which Kant envisaged as essential in man's relationship to society. Second, through critical discussion, this essay hopes to point out how thought like Kant's has influenced modern society in an undesirable fashion, or might do this. The third task of this essay is to discuss how Kant's insight into political problems might help modern man to cope with his situation.

A major factor in choosing Kant as a frame of reference for this discussion is that much of his position is in agreement with the general outlook of this essay. This essay interprets Kant as stating that men's ability to live together in a satisfactory fashion hinges on concern for freedom, reason and respect. The fundamental role of these concepts is an assumption to be verified. But most assuredly the verification of these assumptions is a precarious task. The type of discussion that can be carried on in an essay of this type may serve as justification for these assumptions, but this type of verification is only a groundwork for what must be proven in practice.

Much of Kant's work may be viewed as a discussion of the function of freedom, reason and respect in establishing a harmonious existence for man. In his works, Kant has

considered various impediments to this process. But in order to apply Kant's discussion to the present, his discussion of various impediments must be updated. It appears that the present age has developed not only its own threats to the goal which Kant envisaged, but also various means of adulterating or destroying the fundamental concepts which would make this goal possible. Since Kant would have been unable to foresee these various obstacles to humanity, several contemporary thinkers are called upon to describe the nature of these impediments. Men such as Nietzsche, Marcuse, Ellul and Weber have been enlisted to carry out this mission.

The admonitions of these contemporary¹ thinkers will be briefly presented at this point, so that the reader may keep them in mind while Kant's political philosophy is discussed. The insertion of these comments might appear as a needless digression. However, since contemporary criticism of this sort is one of the major matrices of this essay it might be helpful for the reader to begin considering them in relation to the discussion of Kant.

Weber is concerned with an attitude that he sees becoming more prevalent in modern man. He characterizes this

¹The terms "modern", "contemporary" and "present" have taken on slightly uncommon usage in this essay. For the most part, they refer to the technological era in the western hemisphere. The birth date of this era, for this essay, might be demarcated as 1900 but in some instances this date recedes further into history.

attitude as wordly asceticism.. This attitude has been adopted by many men who are working toward the establishment of a material condition free from deprivation. This modern strategy entails a new form of slavery in which men subdue their spontaneous natures to wills that act with precision, method, system and rationality. Establishing a condition of material abundance has required that men sacrifice spontaneity and the freedom of pursuing those things which an unfettered consciousness regards with reverence for the new god of material abundance.²

Jacques Ellul sees this attitude for establishing material abundance formalized in the institutional structures of technology. Under the rule of technology, Ellul believes that men are unable to establish goals and objectives, but rather, they are granted them according to the needs of technology. Men do not choose occupations or professions but are assigned roles according to the demands of technological development.

Ellul finds technology totally repressive in that even ideas are unable to transcend their culture with the purpose of establishing novel or more adequate rules of conduct or judgments of value. Cognitive efforts are used instead to further technological developments. Since efforts are not

²Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1958).

expended in these areas, technology itself must be consulted to resolve these problems. Thus human interests, problems and even mysteries are structured and resolved by the methods and vision of technology.³

In Marcuse's opinion, modern society has not only adopted this outlook as an approach to the problems it encounters but it may also be unable to overcome this outlook. He feels that modern society may not evolve past its stagnant culture of material security because it has done irreparable damage to those potential elements capable of producing evolution. He feels this situation has developed because modern society has brought about material freedom by an extreme exercise of repression.⁴

Marcuse acknowledges that a certain amount of sacrifice and repression are necessary for securing the material scarcities of a community. But he does not condone continued repression where these needs have been met. Even more distressing to him is the fact that men have been motivated to secure an even more extensive material security. This motivation has been so subtle that most men have not recognized that this extended security is an alternative. They have taken for granted that this condition extends their

³Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage, 1967).

⁴Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (New York: Vintage, 1955).

freedom, without considering whether it is the type of freedom that they wish developed.

The desire for luxury and comfort has seduced modern man into accepting laws which exalt property rather than human lives. The depersonalizing effects of production lines, mass media, and computer programming have been accepted with little resistance for the same reason. Marcuse believes that the excessive nature of this repression is demonstrated in the fact that it has been able to produce highly dependent personalities with excessive material needs. Autonomy and self-reliance have been completely undermined by the manipulative powers of repression. Marcuse believes that reason no longer establishes goals and dreams, but instead, it is used as a tool by which men coordinate their lives with the system of which they are a part.

Although Nietzsche does not chronologically enter into the discussion of the "incarceration" and "castration" of modern man, his comments are most appropriate at this point in considering the effect of dehumanizing influences on man. Nietzsche makes the discussion a little more depressing by presenting the accusation that modern society has done very little to revitalize those human instincts which lie dormant as a result of repression and technological standardization. He sees a castrated, modern man, happy to fit in and accept his role. Nietzsche believes that this attitude of resignation is propagated by acceptance of a historic view in

which man sees himself as the product of hundreds of years of struggle. Man sees himself as the apex and achievement of this process. Where this view is prevalent in modern society, Nietzsche can see little reason for modern man to be other than clever in this system and find his own position in this scheme of things. Persons of this school of thought would hardly be inclined to rally ideas, illusions or even instinct to inspect the present condition. Nietzsche feels that unless this condition is overcome, human freedom will be perpetuated as mere meaningless mythology.⁵

Although this discussion appears to have drifted from the former direction of thought, it is actually quite important that these notions should be brought up at this point. These ideas are most significant to this essay, since they are a primary source of criticism for much of Kant's political thinking. It might be stated that such criticism is unfair to Kant's position, since these issues are developments of a different period of time. But it is the contention of this essay that criticism, of just this type, is a true test of Kant's thinking. A political philosophy which claims to deal with the essential relationships of man to society in a comprehensive, historical fashion must be able to stand up to unforeseen objections

⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, "Use and Abuse of History" Thoughts Out of Season, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964).

if it is to retain its claim of validity. Although some of the less critical aspects of a philosophical position may change with time the more essential issues should remain constant. Thus if Kant's position is unable to withstand the accusations of more recent thinkers, less stock should be placed in his position.

At this point, it is probably apparent that the essential problem of this paper is one that has intrigued and plagued philosophers for centuries. The fundamental issue of this paper is an inquiry into the problem of "what is the good life and how is it to be realized?"

The selection of material that has been chosen to approach this problem leads one to conclude that this paper seeks an answer to this question in the notions of individual happiness, dignity and freedom. The most prominent obstacles to this solution are apparent by considering the social critics that have been chosen as commentators on the issues of Kant's thought. This essay regards standardization, repression, manipulation and the limiting of our world view by science and technology as the greatest threats to modern man's vision of the good life and its realization.

There are a few other issues that might be considered broad philosophical topics, which should also be noted at this point. The reason for drawing attention to them is that they will not be manifestly discussed in the following, immediate

presentation. But since they are the type of questions and problems that contribute to the basic framework of this paper, it might be worthwhile to point them out at this point.

One of the more profound issues of this type is the question of whether man's freedom is unlimited and in what sense might there be certain natural and social boundaries that must be respected. This issue is categorized as being most profound, since its reply requires extensive thought on questions of man's relationship to nature and to other men.

Another metaphysical issue is concerned with the influence of ideas on political and moral affairs. Some people might prefer to classify this issue as epistemological or psychological, but because of Kant's treatment and special view of this relationship, this essay will look upon this issue as a metaphysical issue.

This thesis also addresses more concrete issues. One of these is the question of whether morality is necessary to politics and law. This discussion will be directed to the question of whether men should formulate political positions and laws because they are effective and efficient or whether other motivations should also be involved. This issue is closely related to an issue which people face in adopting a political position. Political positions are established with regard to the crucial issue of whether men should be allowed freedom or even alternatives without restraint or should

restraint be enforced without alternatives or freedom. This issue takes many forms in modern society. It is the basis for national ideals but it also comes into play on smaller scales. This issue is evident in student confrontations with school and civil authorities. It is evident in individual and government confrontations such as those over taxes and military conscription, and even in confrontations between labor and management.

The interrelatedness of all of these issues is illustrated by the nature of the next issue which this essay addresses. This is the question of what type of government is best for a people at any specific stage of economic, political, and intellectual development. It also involves the question of whether one type of government is suitable for all people.

The complexity, interrelatedness and often profound nature of these issues and similar issues in this essay are such that they cannot be individually treated. The reader is alerted in advance that these issues are objects of investigation for this essay. The purpose of this warning is to arouse the awareness of the reader so that he might develop these issues in his own mind and relate them to the essay where they are not overtly brought out. Often when a person addresses comprehensive and complex issues the discussion becomes somewhat chaotic. It is hoped that this opening discussion will reduce some of this confusion and indicate the direction that this essay intends to pursue.

The final comment of this introduction should be made with regard to the direction of this essay. Some readers may not immediately apprehend the overlying relationship between the various sections discussed in this essay. In order to avoid this oversight the reader is warned that this essay has assumed its present order on the assumption that a political system develops its particular nature in accordance with the total dialectical development of its people. Therefore, in order to study a political system and the effect that it presently has on its people, it appears most appropriate to consider those elements which have greatly influenced the development of a social-political order. This rather basic comment may be of great help in alerting the reader to why such topics as nature, self-awareness, freedom, reason, dignity, and law have been discussed in the manner that they have.

II

NATURE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE HUMAN CONDITION

A. The Development of Reason and Human Capabilities

The direction and range of a political philosophy, as well as the issues that are of central importance to its thought, become evident in the examination of the basic assumptions of a political viewpoint. For Kant, as well as many other political philosophers, the appearance of a great number of fundamental assumptions results from an inquiry into the question of man's relation to nature. It is, therefore, appropriate that this discussion should begin with an examination of Kant's thoughts on this relationship.

Such a discussion must consider whether man is a subject in the natural kingdom or whether he exercises authority over nature. If nature absolutely dominates this relationship, man would be highly determined by natural powers and there would be little reason for discussing moral or political philosophy. If, however, man has some type of power in this relationship, to what extent can he exercise his authority? This is an important question, since there may be certain natural boundaries that cannot be violated without

incurring the wrath of nature.

The general attitude of an individual's political philosophy is a result of the manner in which he views this fundamental relationship. Where the relationship of nature to man is perceived as benevolent, a political philosophy would regard nature as a mother to be thanked and respected. Perceiving this relationship as parasitic may result in an attitude of devouring and expending the resources of earth. A hostile relationship would entail an attitude of struggle and tragedy. From these few examples it becomes apparent how perceptions of this relationship can influence an individual's outlook of the world and his corresponding philosophy. These basic attitudes tend to influence the fashion in which people view their relationship to other people. Persons who see themselves living in a hostile world may view all other people as their natural enemies or possibly in an opposite fashion, as people with whom they must ally themselves to face a hostile environment. Although the influence these basic perceptions have may be varied, it is evident that they set a certain tone or attitude for a political philosophy. A sincere consideration of a political viewpoint, therefore, demands a close examination of these essential relations in order to reveal these assumptions and attitudes in a meaningful fashion.

Kant views man's relation to nature in a unique fashion. "Reason" and "freedom" play central roles in his

inquiry into this fundamental relationship. The exact nature of these concepts is ambiguous and impossible to define in a straightforward fashion. These concepts seem to mean many things to Kant. Sometimes they are used as qualities and at other times as ideas or powers. In the same fashion that these concepts take on meaning in the different contexts of Kant's thought, it is hoped that these terms will become meaningful in the different contexts of the course of this discussion.

Much of Kant's thinking implies that the human condition is a situation in which man is a part of nature and, yet, in some fashion, independent of it. Man has needs and functions similar to those of the other natural creatures and yet he is able to modify these needs and functions according to his own design. Nature supplies man with the means essential for satisfying his needs, yet often man in accepting these means alters and reconstructs them in such a fashion that they become alien to nature.

Kant sees man primarily motivated by instinct and desire, according to "natural" patterns of behavior; but, unlike the other natural creatures he has traditionally held himself responsible for his actions. Man is happy in a natural environment, attending to his needs as nature has devised but at the same time, he is unhappy with his situation and feels a compulsion from within to change this

structure according to the design of his own reason.¹ Thus, according to Kant, man's condition is a paradox. He is a creature of nature, subject to its laws and dependent upon its provision. Yet man is independent of nature and capable of mastering it, in the sense that he alters its elements and reshapes its apparent structure in accordance with his own design.

Much of this paradoxical position is attributable to reason. But as Kant warns, it is not reason itself which distinguishes men from other creatures but a special function of reason.² Each animal has a particular means of adapting to his environment. Reason is man's adaptive power for securing provisions and an acceptable environment. But aside from indicating to man the best fashion of fitting into his environment, reason has another power. Through the use of reason man is able to assemble a catalogue of alternatives and choose between them. This special power of reason is not limited to a choice based on what is most useful or most suitable to a situation. This choice may also be affected by a judgment of what is good and evil.³ This type of choice appears to Kant as characteristic of rational creatures alone.

¹Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. C. Meredith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), Part II "Critique of Teleological Judgment", p. 93.

²Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 53.

³Ibid., p. 64.

In this type of activity men are not aiding instinct and sensuous desire with the tool of rationality but are performing an activity according to their own judgment and rational design.⁴ As this power is exercised, men become alerted to possibilities and activities which make them even more independent of their natural surroundings. Since other creatures remain within the limits of their natural surroundings, it appears that this special power of reason is man's distinctive characteristic. This power has placed man at greatest variance from his natural habitat. If there were other creatures with this distinctive power, Kant believes "they would act in the same fashion that men do since we would have the right only to assume them to be of the same nature as we know ourselves to be..."⁵

⁴Kant makes a useful distinction between the mental powers. Understanding is the term which Kant often reserves for the mental power which deals with interpreting sense data into meaningful patterns. Reason is the mental power which generates ideas that go beyond the organization of sense data. Kant goes into an extensive explanation of these powers in the Critique of Pure Reason. In his political and moral writings these concepts are used in a less precise fashion. In these latter works he often forces the reader to distinguish between the types of mental powers from the context of the material which he is discussing. Often this distinction cannot be clearly made. But those experiences which tend to be regarded as "natural" processes are more or less a function of understanding whereas those more human experiences related to value judgments tend to be a function of reason.

⁵Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 13.

This process of liberation from the power of nature can be seen to occur at three different levels. Each individual man struggles to exert his personal abilities against the forces of nature. At a second level, men unite their efforts into political groups such as states and countries to reap the harvest of consolidated struggle against the forces of nature. From a third perspective, the efforts of generations of men can be seen as consolidated forces producing a civilization.

It is often difficult to determine whether men are exerting their efforts for the realization of individual, group, or cultural goals. There are several factors which make this type of distinction most difficult. The first factor is the nature of the men themselves. Men develop their powers of rationality and physical abilities at different rates. Therefore, different men are engaged in widely varied projects. A second major factor is confrontation with obstacles and stimulating experiences. Certain men may have the abilities to confront certain tasks but the encounter may never occur. Other, less gifted men may be challenged beyond their ability and also be unable to make their contribution to the development of rationality and human ability. This model greatly overemphasizes the process of struggle and human development which Kant implies in his political writings, but it does illustrate the dynamic and multifarious nature of this process. Kant sees nature subtly

and sometimes deceptively prodding mankind to its higher capabilities. His thoughts on man's basic relation to man more clearly indicate his position with regard to the development of human capability.

Kant accepts the position that men, in a natural state, are in basic conflict. Where man is under the tutelage of nature, he is basically hostile to his fellow creatures and prone to war. This state of conflict is due to an environmental condition, in which there is a limited quantity of resources, and survival demands that men must compete for these resources. Where men are able to supply their needs in an adequate fashion, they still maintain a fierce competition for resources. This condition leads Kant to believe that men compete for the more sophisticated motive of competition itself.⁶ Where these more sophisticated forms of competition are not limited, they reveal themselves in ingenious design.

Kant's analysis of the natural state of man should not be mistaken as an acceptance of the position that only the strong and most aggressive survive. There are other mechanisms and motivations which bring men together. A primary motivation of this type is where men seek the

⁶Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in On History, (later referred to as O.H.), trans. L. W. Beck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 15-18.

companionship of other men and their hostility is tempered by an unsocial sociability.

Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than man, i. e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities. But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish.⁷

As men find both of these types of characteristics in their nature, they impute them to other men. Men come to look upon each other in an ambivalent fashion. Men expect not only opposition from other men but also sociability. Kant sees this ambivalent motivation as a subtle maneuver of nature to develop the capabilities of men and mankind.

This it is which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer his inclination to laziness and propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he can not tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw.⁸

It is now apparent that there are several factors responsible for the hostility in a state of nature.⁹ Men

⁷Ibid., p. 15.

⁸Ibid., p. 15.

⁹It is interesting to note that Kant does not contribute much to clear up the nurture-nature controversy. For example, is competition in itself something that men are born with or is it learned in competing for necessary scarcities and then transferred to other objects? Is sociability something that men "naturally" feel toward one another or is it learned at a mother's knee? This type of question does not

are in conflict not only because of competition for limited reserves of raw materials and because of a natural competitive spirit, but also because they anticipate conflict. Even where hostility is not overt, men sense opposition in the mere presence of other men. In response to this threat, they prepare for hostility and war as if it were a constant possibility.¹⁰ Where men do not recognize the wasteful nature of this pursuit they devote extensive energy and resources to maintaining the natural balance of fear.

In an ironic fashion this state of hostility with its constant perturbations is advantageous to man in terms of developing human potential and natural resources. Kant maintains that reason alerts men to the hostility of their natural situation and forces them to develop their capabilities to confront this situation. In doing this man discovers his human or rational nature.

Nature has willed that man should, by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should partake of no other happiness or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own reason.¹¹

detract from Kant's discussion of how human capabilities develop through conflict. But it does point out certain ambiguities for those who are concerned, psychologically, with developing character and capabilities, since they need to know whether the source material needed for development was natural or humanly constructed.

¹⁰Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H. pp. 88, 92.

¹¹Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H. p. 13.

Nature supplies men with continuous opportunity for developing their rational natures by placing trials such as disease, hunger, and inclement weather before them. In a more sophisticated fashion, she has placed man in conflict with his fellow creatures for the development of reason. Thus men are confronted with strife at several points. But these trials seem to be in keeping with a natural plan for developing reason, enabling it to widen.

...the rules and purposes of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct; it acknowledges no limits to its projects. Reason itself does not work instinctively, but requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from one level of insight to another.¹²

As man becomes independent of his natural situation as an instinctive creature, he is unable to rest contentedly within one mode of existence. His reason constantly prods him to greater achievement and insight.¹³ Kant sees man as having an aptitude for setting purposes for himself and as these are fulfilled, new purposes are projected to take the place of former projects. Man is constantly driven to a higher purpose, partly by nature and partly by his own selfishness.¹⁴ As man conquers one phase of a problem, nature offers him another project. Man accepts with hungry,

¹²Ibid., p. 13.

¹³Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 93.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 96,97.

almost greedy, enthusiasm. The cure of one disease opens paths to the recognition and cure of another disease. Mastery of one problem in aerospace leads to the formulation of another. Through such struggle, man comes to know his ability.¹⁵

In order to combat the provocations of nature men find it necessary to consolidate their energy and insight. They need an environment that is secure and abundant in resources if they are to accomplish their projects. Men, therefore, come together as a harmonious force to establish this situation. Nature forces man to abandon his rudeness and hostility by confronting him with crudeness and hostility.¹⁶ Kant sees nature promoting harmony by offering men a choice between two alternatives. Men may either struggle discordantly with nature's continuous attacks of inclemencies and war, at the possible cost of annihilation, or recognize that they may avoid discord and inclemency by uniting their efforts and developed reason. Kant feels that once men have recognized the mechanism of nature, they can work through peaceful means for each other's advantage. By using human potential for the benefit of men, the unpleasant consequences of nature can be avoided.¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 94, 95.

¹⁶Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O.H., pp. 111, 112.

¹⁷Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O.H., p. 18.

Before continuing this discussion it might be appropriate to stop and ask what Kant means by "nature" as it has been discussed in this paper. Kant seems to mean two different types of things. First, nature is a state where all things including people act according to established patterns of activity. The second meaning which Kant gives to nature is that of a tutor. "Mother nature" points out that the natural state is really not the most satisfactory situation. She prods man to use powers unknown to the natural state to improve its condition. Kant implies that "mother nature" is working toward a new natural state that would be a combination of the best that man has to offer, from his newly recognized capabilities, and the best of the original natural state. Kant, in using nature to signify these two basic ideas and others, if one wanted to make such distinctions, forwards a rather confusing discussion. But a most important problem that results from this type of argument is a question with regard to the present situation. Is "mother nature" still tutoring man so that he can make the best of this situation or has man rebelled against his mentor? A glance at the fashion in which men have intensified the hostility and lethal aspects of the natural situation may indicate "mother nature" is no longer in control. World wars between men and wars of pollution against the natural.

state may indicate that man is beyond the discipline of his tutor. The best of the natural elements, in men as well as in other natural things, might be disappearing.¹⁸

B. Freedom and Its Disclosure in Law :

The first part of this chapter pursued Kant's thoughts on the manner in which man discovered that he is a creature independent of nature as well as a subject of the natural realm. This realization, facilitated by the use and development of reason, led man to discover powers and capabilities which he has come to regard as distinctly human. Among the more prominent discoveries which occurred with the development of reason was the awareness of freedom as a most distinctive power of human nature.

Kant realizes the impossibility of defining, in a straightforward fashion, the exact nature of freedom. He realizes that it means many things to many people. He, therefore, tries to exhibit the meanings of this concept in various contexts of discussion. In Kant's thought, on the different notions of law, there is a sizable amount of

¹⁸Kant considers this very problem in a long footnote of his own in his essay "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (in O. H., pp. 61,62). From this footnote it might be conjectured that Kant would view the present situation as one of man's "abortive attempts" to reconcile the guidance of "mother nature" with man's "rational" endeavors. Kant appears optimistic in this note and implies that these "abortive attempts" will be eventually rectified but only after man has experienced the hardship which inexperience inflicts.

material on the notion of freedom. This area of Kant's thought would, therefore, be an excellent source to investigate in order to discover some of Kant's ideas on the concept of freedom.

Three types of law can be readily categorized in Kant's works. The most restrictive, of these types, is juridical law. This type of law is most restrictive in the sense that it is the most concrete. Its intention and purpose are most readily known. Moral law is less restrictive in the sense that it is abstract and less directly informative as to how a person is to act. The third type of law is the most abstract and is more easily understood as an attitude rather than as a rule or principle for action. This paper will classify this third type of law as cultural law. These three categories of law readily lend themselves as frameworks for discussing freedom. Just how this is true should become apparent in the course of this chapter.

A major source of influence for Kant's political and social philosophy is his intense preoccupation with nature's development of man's humanity in the form of developed human powers and capabilities. Since he is highly concerned with this process, it is quite understandable that he should devote a good deal of effort to studying the fashion in which men contribute to this process through rational guides, principles, and rules.

The notion of cultural law is a good notion to initiate a consideration of the fashion in which Kant saw law as preserving and developing man's human nature. Kant discussed cultural law under his discussion of the positive aspects of moral law. He saw this attitude or guide as essential to the preservation and development of civilization. What Kant means by the development of civilization is not clear, but the implication is present that this development has to do with the perfecting of human capabilities. Kant admits that it seems strange to even talk of a particular purpose for men since they are "...creatures who have no plan of their own".¹⁹ In fact, it is most difficult to single out this purpose since it is indefinite. Man's rationality is responsible for the indefinite nature of this project, since rationality is not restricted to a limited set of goals or projects but is capable of an ever increasing vision and range of problems.²⁰ Philosophy is assigned the task of interpreting the direction this process has taken and the type of accomplishments that have been achieved in pursuing the development of civilization.

It is apparent that this goal or purpose cannot be realized by any single person, but can only be realized by human cooperation. Kant sees several reasons for this.

¹⁹Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., p. 12.

²⁰Ibid., p. 13.

First, no man can realize his fullest capabilities while disregarding the condition of his fellow men. The achievement of one man is related to the success and condition of other men. Second, no one man lives long enough to develop his own capacities or those of humanity. The realization of human potential requires not only the cooperation of individuals and even generations but the cooperated efforts and insights of the entire race.²¹

These insights and efforts are passed from one generation to the next as a body of knowledge. Other men look to this knowledge as insight for similar problems and projects which they are facing or as a catalyst for a new structure of thought.²² But only a certain type of individual is able to use this material in a satisfactory fashion. A man constantly at the beck and call of his emotions and obsessions is unaware of any other projects.²³ Men are able to attend to the ends that their reason forwards, only when they are able to rise above the agitations of their existence. Men need some type of guide or attitude which can deliver them from this situation. Kant

²¹Ibid., p. 19.

²²Immanuel Kant, On Education, trans. A. Charton, (Ann Arbor: Michigan Press, 1960), p. 11.

²³Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, trans. M. J. Gregor, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 69.

characterizes this attitude as a "moral apathy" to the obtrusions of rational tranquility. This apathy is not a lack of concern but an ability or freedom to rise above sensuous agitation.²⁴ In following out the general dictates of this cultural law men develop a discipline and consequently, freedom to pursue activities which result in the realization of human capabilities.

Kant sees certain nobility and bravery in exercising a will according to the highest demands of reason. This nobility and bravery is unique in that it is not related to the savageness of violence.²⁵ But Kant is also wary of the servitude which might develop as a result of overly strict adherence to this cultural law. He recognizes total absorption in such projects as a type of fanaticism. Where individual virtues become a habit or demanding demon, freedom is lost. Men completely fettered, in every action, by the motivation of their particular duty to a personal end, have misused discipline. The ends become tyrants, blinding them to other possibilities, and the pursuit of perfection becomes curtailed.²⁶

Kant feels that men develop respect for other men who are capable of projecting ends and goals and who are

²⁴Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 71.

²⁵Kant, On Education, p. 96.

²⁶Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 71-72.

able to accomplish these goals through fortitude and self-discipline. This regard for the noble capabilities of mankind fosters a certain harmony among men. This is evident in the fact that even when a man feels a strong aversion for another man, he continues his respect for this man out of an awareness that all men are capable of acting in a noble fashion.^{27, 28}

Since this high regard for noble actions promotes harmony among men, it follows that each man has an obligation to uphold the dignity of humanity by acting in a noble fashion. Kant admonishes that each man should, "be no man's lackey". "Bowling and scraping before a man seems beneath man's dignity." "One who makes himself a worm cannot complain if people step on him."²⁹ Kant becomes quite vindictive against those ignoble men who would destroy the nobility of the human creature or the harmony which exists among noble men as a result of their noble activities. He feels that each man should contribute to the development of rationality and the perfecting of other human abilities in

²⁷Ibid., p. 133

²⁸Although Kant's observation is true in many instances everyone, including Kant, can think of cases which would contradict this observation. This opinion like so many of Kant's "observations" is confusing. Positions which appear as descriptions often dissolve into prescriptions or imperatives. This type of confusion is evident in the sequence to the argument.

²⁹Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 101-103.

order to maintain the nobility of the species. This task is most imposing since it is impossible to know if the task is proceeding properly. It is, therefore, man's duty as a noble and free creature to continuously pursue and develop his capacities.³⁰ "We have a duty with regard to what lies beyond the limits of our experience but is yet encountered, according to its possibilities, in our Ideas..."³¹

It is difficult to clearly define the exact nature of the freedom which the cultural law preserves and encourages. A general description of this freedom is that it is an attitude which liberates men from the everyday trials of existence. For some men, the trials and tribulations of life act as a catalyst spurring them on to the performance of great deeds. But for other men, these trials are an impediment in the pursuit of more lofty endeavors. In either case, men need some type of conveyance to bring them from their immediate situation so that they might participate in the more lasting project of developing human nature. Cultural law acts as this guide, freeing men from the trials of life, so that they may proceed with the project of developing civilization.

In Kant's discussion of juridical law he is concerned

³⁰Ibid., pp. 110-114.

³¹Ibid., p. 110.

with a different type of freedom, or set of freedoms. The laws which deal with these freedoms are concerned with the social and political interactions of people. These laws are classified as juridical, legal or political laws.

In general the situation which Kant describes, when he refers to a primitive state of nature, is that of constant hostility and anticipation of evil doings. As human reason developed, men realized that cooperation and some form of harmony could alleviate this condition. According to Kant, this juridical condition became possible through recognition of the rational principle of justice. This insight made men aware that the selfish interest of one man could be pitted against the selfish interest of another. The establishment of this harmonious condition is not morally motivated but is purely prudential since it is inspired by reason.³²

"The problem of organizing a [juridical] state, however, hard as it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent."³³

In a juridical state, according to Kant, the concept of justice comes to be exemplified as "...the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a Universal law of freedom".³⁴ What Kant might be taken to

³²Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H. p. 114.

³³Ibid., p. 112.

³⁴Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. J. Ladd, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 34.

mean by this statement is that within a harmonious situation, a rational person will understand that he is free to act in certain ways as long as he does not impose his will upon others in such a fashion that he might impede their freedom. Freedom, from hostility and the anticipation of revenge or hostility, is possible only where men agree to refrain from certain activities. Men agree to limit their activities in order to maintain harmony. Men, that recognize the value of such a state, adopt for themselves the Universal law of Justice: "...act externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a Universal law."³⁵

Where a person disregards this understanding other persons in that group will act to curtail the activities of the offender. This reaction is, in a sense, natural since the harmony of the group has been disturbed. But the members of the juridical condition should also look upon this curtailment of the acts of the offender as a duty. Men enter social compacts for the common end of establishing a juridical condition and assume, as a privilege of membership in the compact, that others will not impede their freedom.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., p. 35.

³⁶Immanuel Kant, "Theory and Practice" in C. J. Friedrich, ed., Philosophy of Kant, (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 412.

Thus, the members of a juridical condition are justified and even obliged to overcome injustice where it is a hindrance to freedom. Kant believes that coercion is a just and necessary measure for promoting freedom where justice has been opposed.³⁷ He justifies this on the basis that "...strict justice can also be represented as the possibility of a general reciprocal use of coercion that is consistent with the freedom of everyone in accordance with his Universal laws."³⁸

Kant's position makes good sense if it is assumed that everyone has agreed to become a member of the juridical state. But is this situation binding upon those who are born into this condition or upon those people who are members in name but are unaware of the compact and unconcerned with its proceedings? This type of question may have prompted Kant to place great emphasis on the importance of educating people to the proceedings of the state and the individual's responsibilities.

Kant maintains that in order that everyone might know what his responsibilities are, in a juridical condition, it is necessary that all citizens should be aware of the laws. Therefore, the laws must be public.³⁹ Where they are not

³⁷Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 36.

³⁸Ibid., p. 36.

³⁹Ibid., p. 75.

public, justice is impossible. "All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity."⁴⁰ Where men have joined a compact established on the basis of equal freedoms or rights for each member, a valid law must be universally acceptable. A law not acceptable to all is an unjust law. A law passed privately might not meet with the approval of all members of the compact. Thus, laws must be publicly known if they are to be accepted as just. Kant recognizes that it is impossible, in practice, to fully carry out this requirement. But legislators must attempt to construct laws to which all persons could give their consent, if these laws are to be just.⁴¹

It is apparent that political laws are concerned with freedoms that men agree to respect. Kant maintains that men are usually willing and should be willing to allow other men freedom to act in any manner which is not injurious to the freedom of the other members of the juridical condition. Using this guide, the amount of freedom that is actually present, for any group of people, appears to be a function of the group. Members of the compact may see many things as injurious to their freedom and thus place many restrictions

⁴⁰Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., p. 129.

⁴¹Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Philosophy of Kant, p. 421.

upon each other. They may, however, see little need to establish large bodies of law and place few restrictions upon each other. They thus allow the group greater freedom in the sense that they impose fewer restrictions. But this brings up the troublesome question of whether there is more freedom with few or with many laws. This might be a question best decided by the group of people themselves depending upon their situation and condition.

Kant is concerned with a different type of freedom when he discusses moral law. Although many of these thoughts on moral freedom are independent, they are not unrelated to the other types of freedom discussed. The effects of these various types of freedom upon each other and their interrelatedness will be discussed after viewing some of Kant's position on moral law and the type of freedom it is concerned with.

The notion of moral law has its origin in a particular human awareness. In order to understand how Kant conceived that this law originated, it is necessary to pursue the development of this awareness. Kant maintains that men gradually became aware of the fact that they could perform particular functions because of reason. In part, this awareness developed through the recognition that men initiate ideas as well as receive them. Kant states that as this ability of initiating or asserting ideas developed, men recognized that this function can be performed independent of

sensuous motivation or instinct.⁴² Decisions can be made on a rational basis alone. As men awaken to this fact, they become aware of possessing a freedom which makes them independent of the laws of nature. In that men are capable of producing ideas and principles independent of the laws of nature, they come to think of themselves as autonomous from nature. This feeling of autonomy becomes even more meaningful when men realize that they can act in a fashion independent of nature because of these principles which they have constructed themselves. This insight motivates men to think of themselves as ends in themselves.⁴³ As this paper interprets Kant, it is not reason alone that distinguishes man with this particular quality of humaneness; but man's awareness, through reason, that he is capable of being an end in himself independent of nature.⁴⁴

Kant appears to see this awareness as the basis of human dignity.⁴⁵ As men act upon this awareness, they accomplish activities which they regard as independent of natural determinism. They recognize a certain dignity in the fact that these works have been performed as a result of

⁴²Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 96.

⁴³Ibid., p. 95.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 96.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 103.

their own rational design. They develop a genuine sense of pride for their own efforts and for the efforts of other men who perform activities independent of the dictates of nature. This sense of pride motivates men to see themselves as members of a kingdom outside the realm of nature. The members of this realm might be described as citizens of a rational kingdom in which each man has dignity because he is an end in himself, free to project and accomplish projects of his own design.

It might appear to the skeptical reader that Kant is maintaining that men are free creatures because they poetically assert that reason grants them freedom. Kant's motivation for holding this belief goes beyond maintaining a pious wish. Kant feels that the grounds for maintaining this position are available by closely examining man's relation to nature. The nature of this investigation might be more specifically stated as a question in the problem of man's duality. How is it possible, that man is a creature of nature and subject to its necessary laws, which maintain all things according to a deterministic pattern; and at the same time is a rational creature, free to form laws and independently determine his own actions? How is it possible for man to be a subject of two entirely different kingdoms at the same time?

Kant maintains that this is not a paradoxical condition but one that can be understood by recognizing the complexity of man's nature. By investigating this nature, one comes to see how it is possible for man to act against naturally determined habits and instincts and act according to the dictates of his own reason. A few thoughts from Kant's discussion on the relation of the intelligible and sensual world might show how this is possible.⁴⁶

The paradoxical condition which is here being discussed is crucial to the problem of morality. This condition may be viewed as an aspect of the problem of man's duality. This problem takes on various forms but appears to remain a traditional labyrinth for philosophers. Although there is much disagreement as to where Kant stands with regard to this

⁴⁶This aspect of Kant's doctrine is of great importance for social critics such as Marcuse, Ellul and others. For if man were a creature lacking duality, and was completely determined by natural instincts, there would be no point in discussing morality. If, however, men are completely free, they will be capable of transcending the detrimental effects of the bureaucratic, technological society. The crucial aspect of Kant's doctrine, that renders the thoughts of these men most significant, is the idea that man has a dual nature; provided that he is instructed to recognize that he can act as if he is free, as well as determined. Consequently the manner in which a society influences its citizens to view themselves is crucial to how the citizens actually develop. It is apparent that this consequence entrusts an important role to the social critic, since it is his position to point out whether society is developing its citizens with consideration for their complete nature as persons. This idea will be discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter.

puzzle, this paper hopes to point out a few of the insights which Kant offers on this problem. The first insight is basically a recognition of the internal logic of language, if I may be allowed to phrase this insight in this manner. Kant points out that concepts can only have meaning when we think of them in particular contexts. We must think of words with regard for their appropriate usage if they are to make sense. A sentence such as, "The ice cream cone was sad because it was being eaten." or "The mountain was proud because it was taller than the hill." can lead to certain problems in communication. This type of usage is incompatible with the fashion in which language is used. In a similar fashion, Kant emphasizes that many people have found the concepts of freedom and necessity contradictory because they have placed them in improper contexts of language.

Most people agree that concepts such as freedom and necessity are not directly derived from experience but that they are abstract concepts which structure the events of experience in a less immediate fashion. However, although these concepts are alike in that they are abstract, they are meaningful with reference to two separate types of experience. Kant explicates this point in the Groundwork where he discusses that people face a contradiction when they think of themselves as free but also determined.

From this contradiction it would be impossible to escape if the subject who believes himself

free were to conceive himself in the same sense, or in precisely the same relationship, when he calls himself free as when he holds himself subject to the law of nature in respect to the same action.⁴⁷

This distinction enables Kant to avoid a typical mistake of speculative metaphysics. He is able to avoid what Ryle in the Concept of Mind refers to as talking nonsense; to "present the facts of one category in the idioms appropriate to another". Kant's contribution at this point to the freedom-necessity problem is that he does not force two different concepts into the same sets of reference.

In order to relate concepts to their proper contexts of thought Kant established two realms. Concepts such as freedom were applicable to the noumenal realm; concepts such as necessity, which refer to empirical sequences, were applicable to the phenomenal realm. Although this procedure distinguishes between various types of experience there are certain drawbacks. A major disadvantage in this procedure is that it is often difficult to distinguish whether certain things are phenomena or noumena.

A primary factor which motivated Kant to distinguish phenomenal concepts from noumenal concepts is their relation to nature. In a sense, phenomenal concepts can be thought of as reflections of natural occurrences or as necessary

⁴⁷Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,

conditions of phenomenal experience. Noumenal concepts, however, are independent of natural influence. Kant makes this division between concepts even more pronounced by maintaining that there are separate powers of reason which deal with each type of concept. The "power" of reason which relates and examines phenomenal concepts by means of a priori categories is the understanding. The other power which Kant calls reason, in the narrow sense, deals solely with non-sensuous noumenal concepts.

Another very important motivating factor for Kant in establishing the phenomena-noumena distinction is pointed out in this passage where he describes his idea of the noumenal realm.

My Idea signifies only a "something" that remains over when I have excluded from the grounds determining my will everything that belongs to the world of sense: its sole purpose is to restrict the principle that all motives come from the field of sensibility, by setting bounds to this field and by showing that it does not comprise all in all within itself, but that there is still more beyond it; yet with this 'more' I have no further acquaintance.⁴⁸

But to state that he has no further acquaintance with this realm is misleading. Although it is true that we can not apprehend knowledge of the noumenal realm with the certainty that we can know mathematical or scientific truths, the influence of this noumenal realm is evident.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 130.

Many men adopt principles or laws which they believe are independent of sensual influence. When they act according to these principles they act according to a motivation which is outside the phenomenal realm of natural necessity. It is apparent, at this point, that Kant recognizes a very significant element in the complex structure of human nature. Men are capable of giving practical existence to ideas that are unknown from a natural standpoint. By believing in ideas such as freedom, men are motivated to act in a fashion that demonstrates the existence of such an idea. Thus, when men believe that they are capable of acting in a fashion which is independent of natural determination, they are actually able to demonstrate this freedom by their actions.⁴⁹

...the same subject...conscious also of his own existence as a thing-in-itself... views his existence...as determinable only by laws which he gives to himself through reason...nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will...even the entire history of his existence as a sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as only a consequence, not as a determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.⁵⁰

I strongly suspect that the confusion surrounding interpretations of Kant's discussion of noumena and phenomena is due to the standpoints from which Kant himself viewed these concepts. In discussing this material from

⁴⁹Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 45-49.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 49-50

an epistemological standpoint he was unable to recognize noumenal elements as entities of which we have knowledge.

...behind appearance we must admit and assume something else which is not appearance - namely, things in themselves - although, since we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves.⁵¹

But this passage, and many others, suggest that by studying the effects of noumena we might acquire a better understanding of their nature. This course of investigation is closed to Kant by the First Critique.

Since this essay is basically a political study, I do not intend to pursue this issue any further. I would like, however, to point out a notion for further studies outside this paper.

The Critique of Pure Reason suggests to many people that Kant maintained an undynamic or inflexible system of knowledge. According to this interpretation, men approach the given data of the world with established categories for interpreting the things that exist. Because of these pre-ordained categories, man's knowledge is limited to an understanding of empirical and categorical concepts. But because of the structure of the human mind noumenal concepts remain unknowable.

⁵¹Kant, Groundwork, p. 119.

However, when Kant discusses the development of human potentiality through the instruction of nature, in his practical works, a different outlook on epistemology is implied. Nature seems to affect man in a dialectical fashion. There appear to be various levels of human consciousness and as they develop they interact with nature producing a different type of consciousness. For the purpose of illustrating this point consider man in one of his earlier stages. At this level he interacts with nature in order to supply his most basic needs. But as he learns from nature how to satisfy these needs through primitive agriculture he finds time to discover his own autonomy. This discovery leads to various forms of self-awareness and different kinds of awareness of others as exemplified by the notions of love and respect.

These notions in turn direct man to establishing a different type of society in which these notions may become founding principles for erecting the society. But the point to be made is this, man's consciousness develops in a dynamic, dialectal fashion as it interacts with nature and human achievements. If this is the case, does it not seem possible that man is able to go beyond the knowledge which his original categories of understanding have permitted, since the nature of his consciousness has been greatly altered by his dynamic experience with the world which surrounds him? In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant

establishes the fundamental fashion in which man interprets the nature of his world. However, in his practical works it seems quite probable that Kant is suggesting that man's practical experience is able to supplement this basic knowledge in a way that is not open to discussion in the First Critique. The First Critique is a discussion of knowledge obtainable through the fundamental human categories of understanding. The practical works, however, suggest the type of "knowledge" which is possible to a consciousness which is continually developing through praxis.⁵²

This passage suggests several implications and consequences which may have motivated Kant to discover this elaborate system of distinctions between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. A major motive that has yet to be mentioned is that Kant believes man is capable of choosing the standpoint from which he will view himself. If man develops his reason he is able to see himself as a noumenal creature; a creature that can transform intention into actual achievement. In choosing to uphold noumenal principles an individual is able to transcend the realm of natural necessity. Reason, not instinct or inclination, will determine his actions.⁵³ On the other hand, a person with undeveloped

⁵²This supposition has greatly influenced the interpretation that this thesis gives to Kant's works. It may explain to various readers why this paper takes on tendencies which seem to be refuted by Kant's main critique. Obviously, this supposition could prove disastrous if it is most definitely false. However, if it is a valid position to assume, Kant receives credit for many other insights into the human situation which he brings out in his practical works.

⁵³ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 108-110.

rational powers or a person who chooses to view himself as solely a phenomenal creature, will act according to the patterns of natural necessity. His habits and actions will be formed according to natural inclination and not his own reason.⁵⁴

It is important to note that Kant does not claim that people are either phenomenal or noumenal creatures, but that they are both types of creature at the same time. Kant's important contribution is the fact that men are capable of accomplishing intentions which they have formulated themselves, when they consider that it is in their best interest to realize these intentions. Men perform the natural functions of eating, sleeping, and breeding to maintain their well-being as natural creatures. But they are able to abstain from these activities or modify them if they recognize that it is more satisfactory to do so. This new freedom presents man with a different type of problem. He must now decide when it is better to view himself as a phenomenal creature or as a noumenal creature.

⁵⁴One might question whether these men acting according to the patterns of natural necessity would be morally responsible for their actions. Kant's position would seem to indicate that the unenlightened man would not be responsible since he had not developed his reason to the point where he could know that he was free. The other gentleman, however, would be guilty of immorality since he was aware of his duty as a rational creature and had chosen to throw away his moral freedom and dignity.

This choice is complicated by the fact that he is living with other men and that his choice affects the way they are able to function and view themselves.

Kant maintains that man is able to confront this problem with the use of rational principles or moral laws. The construction and implementation of these laws is a much more difficult process than that concerned with juridical or political laws, however. The distinctions between these two types of laws will be considered at the end of this discussion. It is important to note at this point, that man's recognition of himself as a noumenal creature is a fundamental point of difference for these two types of law. In political law, recognition of man's freedom as an end in himself may or may not be a crucial issue in determining the nature of a law. But this same issue is most fundamental to Kant's conception of a moral law, however. The significance of this distinction should become more evident as this topic is discussed.

It would be extremely difficult to discover the factors which prompted Kant's concern for moral law. It does appear, however, that his position was assumed in order to preserve what might be viewed as a unique type of freedom. This moral freedom might be described as a right to have and maintain dignity or human worth. In keeping with this argument, the purpose of moral law might then be viewed

as a means by which an individual is restricted from debasing that dignity which he or another possesses. But this argument is much too sketchy and in order to understand the position that it is forwarding, it is important to look to some of Kant's thoughts which influenced its formulation.

Human dignity or moral freedom is dependent upon another type of freedom which this essay has previously addressed. In discussing man's liberation from the deterministic patterns of natural necessity, it was stated that man developed a certain sense of pride when he realized that he could act according to the dictates of his own reason. When man realized that he was an end in himself, he looked upon himself as having a certain worth or dignity. This self esteem resulted as man acted according to principles independent of sensuous determination.⁵⁵ It could, therefore, be assumed that the first condition of morality is liberation from sensuous determination. It would follow from this that a moral principle must be free from empirical influence. According to Kant, a principle of this nature must be arrived at through rational means. It can be known a priori and is not dependent upon empirical contingencies.⁵⁶ Kant believes that there are certain advantages to principles of this nature. He maintains that there is a certain

⁵⁵Kant, Groundwork, p. 79.

⁵⁶Kant, Elements of Justice , p. 20.

homogeneity to such principles. When they are comprehended by people they are understood, more or less, in about the same manner. This similar apprehension is due to the fact that people have similar intellects. If these principles were empirical, Kant feels, they would be known by different people in diverse manners. The reasoning on this is that people experience similar things in very different fashions. Thus, in a sense, a priori principles have a certain universality in that they can be known in a similar fashion by all people that become acquainted with them.

Of course, this discussion creates the illusion that the universality and necessity of moral principles is a very simple awareness that people realize. Even if one assumes that human intellects are similar, the question arises, as to how each individual is to be brought to an intellectual level where the awareness of moral principles has an important influence on his life. Obviously there are many other weighty questions related to this issue but in order to continue this explication it is necessary to move on to the question of how these principles are implemented.

In that man is both a creature of the sensuous and rational world, he must possess an ability that facilitates his acting according to rational principles rather than the laws of nature if he is to act in a moral fashion. According to Kant, this function is carried out by the will,

which is conceived "...as a power of determining oneself to action in accordance with the ideas of certain laws."⁵⁷

"The will, which does not look to anything beyond the law itself, cannot be called either free or unfree, it does not look to actions but rather, in an immediate way, to legislating for the maxims of actions."⁵⁸ The will is not concerned with particular actions, but the law-like form in which a person should view actions. The will establishes whether maxims can become laws. A pure will, independent of sensuous inclination, legislates maxims that are laws of reason. These laws exhibit the qualities of objectivity and universality. They are objective in that they are free from empirical influence and they are universal in that they are understandable to any rational person. But this is merely Kant's hypothetical case on the fashion in which an absolutely moral man would function. Most wills are imperfect and they legislate maxims that are influenced by personal desires.

But obviously, this imperfection is only one factor which impedes moral action. There are many other obstacles which obstruct achieving the lawful dictates of a good will. Man is also a creature of the phenomenal world and constantly encounters natural obstacles which prevent his acting in

⁵⁷Kant, Groundwork, p. 95.

⁵⁸Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 25.

a moral fashion.⁵⁹ This does not mean that rational laws are without significance in the phenomenal world or that they are irrelevant to the practical dealings of people. There are numerous examples of persons motivated by rational principles who have effected their purposes in the phenomenal world. But the problem does arise as to how rational principles influence phenomenal activities. Kant, however, does not view this as a problem that can be resolved and states

...how a law in itself can be the direct determining ground of the will is an insoluble problem for the human reason. Therefore, we shall not have to show a priori why the moral law supplies an incentive but rather what it effects...⁶⁰

In some respects, Kant leaves us in a precarious position. He leads us to believe that the noumenal realm influences the phenomenal realm, but he then states that it is impossible to know how this occurs. But this condition has important practical consequences, since in effect it advocates that people should not be concerned with the fashion in which morality has its effect but rather that they should be occupied with moral intentions. Kant's position on this situation might best be noted in the statement that "...the highest worth in which human beings

⁵⁹Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 70.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 75.

can and should procure for themselves lies in intentions and not in actions only."⁶¹ Kant might be severely criticized for holding this attitude on the grounds that it is consequences and not intentions that are important. But it appears that Kant has wisely recognized the limitations of the imperfect human creature. He recognizes the many elements which interfere with even the best intentions of men. He does not advocate that moral conditions will arise through wishful thinking but he advises men to have patience and bring about a better situation through sincere moral intentions.

It is appropriate to ask at this point why men should be concerned with moral intentions and why they should act according to the dictates of reason. Kant believes that this concern is fostered by an awareness of duty. Men first learn of duty through various forms of education. They are introduced to these notions by mothers, priests, and teachers.⁶² But the development of this awareness requires contemplation. Although some people are able to conform to the notion of duty in a mechanical fashion, the actual adoption of this notion requires that an individual understand the significance of this concept.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 74.

⁶²Adapted from the various discussions in the Metaphysics of Morals, Part II.

A part of this significance becomes apparent in Kant's definition of duty as the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.⁶³ The previous discussion suggested two primary functions of moral law. First, moral law frees men of their deterministic bondage to nature and allows them to act according to the dictates of their own reason. The second function of moral law is to advocate activities which maintain and exercise human worth and dignity. Thus if a man is concerned with promoting the dignity and worth of persons, he holds all law in high regard and adopts as his duty, reverence for law. Such men realize that the moral freedom of all men is dependent upon rational laws and the continuance of their freedom necessitates that they act according to law. An awareness of duty designates which actions are moral and serves as a criterion of right and wrong. When an individual is aware of a particular duty and acts according to it, he acts rightly; when he acts in a fashion contradictory to duty he acts wrongly.⁶⁴

The force of the necessity of duty might become even more apparent by considering this concept in another fashion. Kant asserts that every individual is capable of

⁶³Kant, Groundwork, p. 68.

⁶⁴Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 22.

asserting maxims with which he wishes his actions to conform. But where every man formulates his own maxims according to his own interest there is a good chance that conflict will result between individuals.⁶⁵ This conflict arises for several reasons. First, men tend to want similar objects and where a man attempts to attain an object which is desired by another man there is an obvious conflict. Men often share similar goals. If this goal is open to only one man and several men desire the same goal there is once again conflict. Even where men hold goals which are not in direct conflict with other men, pursuing the means or materials for fulfilling these goals may produce conflict.

Kant is not advocating that men should give up competition or the struggle for personal goals but he is advocating that they should adopt methods and means that are not injurious to each other. When men establish maxims that can not be fulfilled without destroying the maxims of others they have placed an impediment upon their own purpose as well as the purpose of others. In this sense their maxims are no longer free. To avoid this contradiction of purpose, Kant proposes that every man, "so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing Universal law."⁶⁶ Kant believes that where all men observe this principle, conflicts of

⁶⁵Ibid., p.25.

⁶⁶Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 30.

maxims are eliminated and that there is no infringement upon each other's activities. This might lead some critics to conclude that Kant is not concerned with moral freedom but merely with group conformity. At this point it is important to recall the interpretation that was given to Kant's notion of moral law. The immediate function of moral law is to free an individual from obstructions which would prevent his acting according to the best dictates of his reason. Kant's request for universality, in the sense that men should harmonize their maxims to avoid infringement on each other's goals, is merely for promoting the immediate function of a moral law. This regard for harmony and freedom from infringement allows men to exercise the second aspect of moral law.

This aspect of moral law is concerned with the promoting of human dignity and requires reverence for every man as an end in himself. This attitude is fostered by the fact that the development of human dignity is a continuous process. Every man is capable of contributing to the development of humanity. Thus every man's insights into this development must be considered if this process is to benefit from the diverse outlooks of different men. The insight of each man must be considered as an end in itself. Kant has formulated this condition in the form of a practical imperative. "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,

whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."⁶⁷

These two imperatives might be used as the fundamental premises of Kant's moral position. They state the supreme limiting conditions of every man's activities but at the same time establish Kant's view as to the purpose of morality. These imperatives request that every man should coordinate his personal maxims with the moral insights of other men. But these insights should always reflect that which is best for humanity and with regard for every individual person.

Kant's moral position might be summarized in this fashion: a moral man is concerned with maintaining his dignity as a person. Those things which contribute to his dignity might result from the insight of any man. A moral man must, therefore, treat every other man as an end in himself and never as a means. By adopting this imperative, as a law, a moral man establishes a condition in which the development of human dignity may flourish. Such men realize that the development of human dignity promotes their own dignity as a person and adopt as a duty, reverence for this law and all laws which contribute to human dignity.

⁶⁷Kant, Groundwork, p. 96.

In the course of this discussion three different types of law have been considered. In order to complete this discussion of the types of freedom these laws are associated with, it might be of interest to point out the distinctions and interrelations of these types of law.

Cultural law has been described as an attitude by which men free themselves from the immediate activities of life for the purpose of developing the more profound issues and aspects of humanity. For the purposes of this paper this limited discussion need not be continued. The distinction between political and moral law, however, is of a greater concern to this discussion.

Kant's basic distinction between these types of law is that moral law is concerned with internal situations, whereas political law is concerned with external situations. This might be a crude distinction but it points out the fact that moral freedom is dependent upon recognizing the distinction between rational and natural principles. Political freedom, however, does not require this distinction but may result merely from harmonious conditions.

This difference might be more adequately stated by considering the distinction between the type of duty which is required by legal justice and that type of duty required by morality. This statement from Kant should point out this distinction:

...the objective determining ground must at the same time be the exclusive and subjectively sufficient determining ground of action if the latter is to fulfill not merely the letter of the law but also its spirit.⁶⁸

In this statement Kant implies that there are two types of law and that they may be interrelated. If "letter of the law" is interpreted as referring to juridical law, Kant implies that a legal conception of duty obligates one, only to assure that his acts conform to the law. This Kant recognizes, as acting according to law.⁶⁹ In accepting a moral duty, however, it is not enough that one acts according to the law, but one must also accept the law as the motive for acting in this fashion.⁷⁰ Conforming to a law, because it is in agreement with inclinations or interest, is only acting according to duty and not because of duty; so that although an action may appear to be moral, it remains merely legal.⁷¹

Legal and moral laws also differ with regard to their jurisdiction. Juridical laws are concerned with particular situations. Juridical laws stipulate the types of activities they are concerned with. The jurisdiction of

⁶⁸Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 74-75

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 84.

⁷⁰Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 16.

⁷¹Kant, Groundwork, p. 65.

moral laws are wider.⁷¹ They are concerned with maxims for actions and not the actions themselves.⁷² Moral laws, as rational laws, are not concerned with each empirical situation that might arise.⁷³ Moral laws act only as general limiting conditions for preserving the moral freedom of persons and do not specify the exact action one must take in every circumstance.⁷⁴

Juridical laws also differ from moral laws in the manner in which they are enforced.⁷⁵ Individuals can be coerced to accept juridical laws.⁷⁶ Having people accept moral laws is a more subtle process.⁷⁷ Moral laws are foisted upon society through education. This education may take the form of personal example, religious instruction or thorough study of the moral deeds of historic figures.⁷⁸ But even in cases where people are indoctrinated into the morality of a society, Kant remarks that this person has not accepted a moral law but has merely adopted a convention of society.⁷⁹ According to Kant, the morality of an act hinges upon an individual's freely accepting that law which guides the person to act in a moral fashion.⁸⁰ Reverence for the moral law must be the person's motive for acting in a moral fashion.⁸¹ Thus in a moral situation the individual's intention or subjective end will be in agreement with the objective end stipulated by a moral law.⁸² When a group of people bring their

⁷²Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 38.

⁷³Ibid., p. 48.

subjective intentions into agreement with the objective intentions, specified by rationality, a group of people will then share a universal situation of morality.

Kant is most adamant in stating the importance of internalizing moral law and not merely conforming to it:

...respect for the law is not incentive to morality: it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an incentive, in as much as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the rival claims of self love, gives authority and absolute sovereignty to the law.⁷⁴

One must not be too hasty and regard this statement as advocating a blind acceptance of the duties a law might prescribe. The value of this statement is more readily conceived by considering Kant's extreme concern that moral men should disregard their own selfish interests and respect the insights of reason, formulated as law, which promotes the dignity of humanity.

Many critics might raise objections to the fact that reason is capable of indicating an objective basis for founding a moral code. But even assuming that this is possible, it might be then suggested that Kant is still faced with the problem of resolving potential conflicts between moral and political laws. Kant, however, does not believe that this should be a problem. Although he maintains

⁷⁴Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 78.

that moral and juridical laws are distinct he believes they are not at odds: "...there can be no conflict of politics as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right..."⁷⁵ since objectively, "...morality is in itself practical, being the totality of unconditionally mandatory laws according to which we ought to act. It would obviously be absurd, after granting authority to the concept of duty, to pretend that we cannot do our duty, for in that case this concept would itself drop out of morality..."⁷⁶

This is a crucial statement of Kant's view of the relation of moral and political laws. Kant sees these laws as distinct and each safeguarding its own particular sets of freedom. But at this point he indicates that moral law should act as a guide for political laws. Men allow each other such political freedoms as the right to speak, work, worship, etc: because they fear that if they deprive other men of these freedoms, these same men will try to deprive them of these freedoms also. Kant advocates that this notion of reciprocity is acceptable to a political situation but the fundamental basis of these political laws should be moral insight. These freedoms should be granted to men out of respect for all humanity. Morality is not a study of the impossible but what can be effected. It should, therefore, serve as a guide for politics.

⁷⁵Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O.H., p. 117.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 117.

This is a very important point since it is so very obvious that freedoms which are maintained on the basis of reciprocity and justice are subject to violation.⁷⁷ Where men are truly motivated by a respect for humanity, these violations of freedoms would be less frequent. Politicians might do well to construe one of Kant's more poetic thoughts in this fashion. "The business of politics, being "Wise as Serpents" would do well to subject itself to the constraints of morality and act with the guilelessness of doves".⁷⁷

Another criticism that might be raised against Kant is the fact that he is concerned solely with the form of law and the fashion in which people should regard it.

It might further be claimed that this is interesting in an abstract fashion but that Kant has little to say in a concrete fashion with regard to the aspects of human dignity that the moral law promotes.

In one sense this accusation is false since Kant advocates many things in the Metaphysics of Morals which a man concerned with human dignity should pursue. In another sense this accusation is true and in keeping with Kant's intention. Kant views the development of human dignity as a continuous process. When men advocate that the basis of this sense of dignity is a restricted idea or specific dogma, brutality and atrocity often result. The

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 117.

Inquisitions of the Church or the doctrines of Nazi Germany are perfectly good evidence of this phenomenon. Conceptions of human dignity, based upon state principles, are often in danger of not expressing the developing insight of people.⁷⁸ Such restrictions may either result in tyranny or in limiting the vision and view point of a group of people.⁷⁹

In order to express the great significance that the concept of human dignity and its development held for Kant, it might be advantageous to cast this notion in a different perspective. It would probably be safe to conclude that Kant's thoughts on human dignity resulted from grappling with the problem of what is the highest good for man. In approaching this problem Kant immediately denied that happiness of itself could be the highest good. Happiness was rejected on the basis that it was subjective, contingent and ever subject to change.⁸⁰ This rejection of happiness as the basis of the highest good seems to indicate that Kant had knowledge of the nature of the highest good. This is a troublesome situation since this discussion has interpreted Kant to maintain that man's highest purpose is indefinable and constantly subject to revision.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 125, 126.

⁷⁹Kant, "Theory and Practice" in Phil. of Kant, p. 417.

⁸⁰Kant, Elements of Justice, pp. 12-13.

But although Kant maintains that we cannot know the nature of this highest good and that it is mankind's ever lasting occupation to pursue this elusive notion, he does believe that we have sufficient knowledge for establishing a condition in which the highest good can be realized.

...the supreme good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality and ~~that~~ happiness though it indeed constitutes the second element of the highest good, does so only as the morally conditioned but necessary consequence of the former...⁸¹

It is apparent from this statement that the pursuit of the highest good is possible only where a moral condition prevails. A person can not be happy; or he can not pursue the finest things in life, if he is not moral or lives in a situation where immorality clouds his pursuit of the highest good.*

The discussion in this section has considered the development and relationship of reason and freedom. It has discussed the manner in which these activities are preserved and developed by various types of law in order to promote human dignity.* The discussion, that follows, will consider many of the main themes of this discussion and relate them to the practical aspects of effecting political theory.

⁸¹Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 123.

III

THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN THE HUMAN SITUATION: THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPUBLIC

The fundamental objective of this paper, up to this point, has been to establish a total outlook or comprehensive context for viewing situations and phenomena of a political nature. This task was necessitated by an assumption, which this paper supports, that a person's total outlook greatly influences the manner in which he views any particular area of contemplation. Therefore, in order to discuss Kant's insights into political theory and practice, it has been necessary to discuss major elements which constitute the total outlook of Kant's notion of the human condition. The previous chapter, therefore, discussed such elements as Kant's view of nature's influence on the human situation, such as the manner in which nature develops reason and other human capacities by trial and example. It also considered how men discover various modes of freedom and establish laws to protect and nurture the diverse modes of this unique power.

Having established this context, the present chapter sets out to investigate how men utilize the capacities and insights which nature has enabled them to recognize and develop. In particular it examines the political use of

these powers and the effect they have on men and their ability to live together.

The fundamental objective of this chapter might be viewed as a discussion of the influence of reason, freedom, and respect in political situations. In that Kant feels that a republican form of government is founded upon these notions and functions with regard to them, the overt discussion of this chapter will be concerned with the theories and practices of a republic.

It is the interpretation of this paper, that Kant views man as a creature constantly subject to problems and perplexing situations, some of which appear paradoxical. In searching for resolutions to the things which confront him, man comes to various significant realizations.

A realization of this type results from the recognition that man is similar to other natural creatures but that he is also distinct from them. The characteristics which set off man as different are not always radically different from those of other creatures. For example, animals such as beavers or bees show forms of intelligence and the ability to accomplish goals. But in reflecting upon these characteristics which distinguish various creatures, man not only views his own capacities as a basis of difference but also realizes that they are the means for dominating other creatures. Thus man comes to see himself not only as a distinct member of the natural realm but also as one of its potentates.

This realization leads man to another problem. Since every man has the capability of acting as a ruler, each man uses his human capacities to this end. This situation, however, does not result in a condition where every man uses his power to improve the human condition. Men often blindly use their powers to promote their own position, without regard for the condition of others. This negligence may ultimately result in hardship for everyone even to the point of a massive cataclysm.

In order to resolve this paradox men must face the problem of gaining knowledge with regard to the nature of their powers and learn to restrain them where necessary. It would appear that Kant believes that men have gained some insight into this problem, as indicated in the practice of law. Theories and practices of law have indicated that human powers and malpractices may be restrained to the advantage of a group of men. This point suggests another fundamental objective of this chapter; the discussion of how a large group of people implement and give authority to law for the purpose of their own welfare.

Kant adopts the theory that in a state of nature men would be in constant conflict either because of animosity or through the incitement of competition. Even where open hostility does not exist, the ever present threat of possible hostility still remains.¹ Kant suggests that men surrendered

¹Kant, Elements of Justice, pp. 72, 76, 77.

their external unbridled freedom to a civil union, in order to be free from this state of constant hostility. Unions of this type establish a condition of harmony among a group of men and grant them freedom from overt hostility. Kant recognizes the establishment of social orders of this nature as the basis of civil unions and states.²

Kant maintains that a state does not create freedom and then authorize it to its subjects. But rather, it recognizes the original freedom of its citizens, and harmonizes it with the freedom of other men who are united in the civil union.³ The state then regrants this restricted freedom to each of its citizens.

There are three political aspects of human freedom, which Kant feels, the state must recognize. First, each individual is recognized as a free man, who is his own master, and who owes his existence and support to no other man but maintains it by his own rights and powers. Secondly, an individual who is his own master is free to do anything to others, to which they would subject themselves or which does

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Often in Kant's writing it is difficult to discern whether Kant thinks he is describing an actual situation or whether he is imperatively stating what an individual or a group ought to do. In this case it might be safe to conjecture that Kant is addressing this material to the emperor. In offering this "description", Kant might well be implying that the emperor ought to do as he "describes". (See "Idea for a Universal History," in C. H., p. 26.)

not detract from their person. Third, in that each individual is a free man, he has no superior and may influence another's activities only as much as that other person can influence his activities.⁴

Kant believes that a just state must recognize these elements of freedom and establish a juridical condition in which this freedom can be maintained and protected. Where a state embraced these elements of freedom and proclaimed them in its constitution, it would seem that such a situation would highly motivate men to join or maintain membership in such a union if these men were desirous of the freedom that it afforded. In this relationship one cannot be bound without binding others. In a similar fashion any duties that are imposed upon another, are also in effect imposed upon one's self.⁵ Thus in principle there is a reciprocal coercion among the members of such a union.

The particular aspects of this reciprocal coercion are legislated by a general will. Kant maintains that this type of legislation is preferable to unilateral legislation; since an individual's freedom would be violated where legislation was passed by an individual not necessarily responsible to the citizens of a state. In this type of juridical condition not only is there mutual coercion but every citizen is

⁴Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 416.

⁵Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., p. 93.

also able to contribute his insights on the best way to maintain the juridical condition. When all the other citizens approve these insights, they are accepted as practice. Kant points out that legislation constituted by a general will of this type is composed with regard for every man's freedom.⁶ Kant's theoretical recommendation for the general will is stated in a simple syllogism. When a group of men wish to be free and all the members of the group are in a position where they make their own laws, they will make laws which grant themselves freedom.

This syllogism of the general will is used to advantage by Kant in that he implies that the general will is inherent to the functioning of a republic. The republican form of government can then be defined as that form of government most representative of every man's freedom. These statements by no means reveal a truth difficult to apprehend, their significance, however, lies in the fact that they may serve as an ideal, for imitation, to those states that claim to be republics. By making a skillful distinction, Kant is even able to lend this ideal to countries that are ruled by a monarch. He distinguishes this form of government from other forms by pointing out that it is the mode of administering government and not the form of

⁶Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 64.

sovereignty which determines whether a government is a republic. Sovereignty can be possessed by one man -- an autocracy, a group of men -- an aristocracy or by all men -- a democracy. But no one form of sovereignty guarantees that the government will be administered in a republican fashion. Kant notes that a government is administered in only two fashions. Either it is concerned, more or less, with the will of the people or it is despotic. Any form of sovereignty can be despotic. The mark of a government concerned with the will of the people, however, is that there is a separation of legislative and executive powers. Where these powers are not separated, a government has a greater opportunity to act without the consent of its populace.⁷

Although Kant recognizes a republic as the best form of government, he also realizes that it is the most difficult form to put into practice.⁸ Probably its greatest difficulty is truly representing the general will of its people. This obstacle has two aspects. First, it is extremely difficult to determine the wants of a people. But even when these wants are determined with some degree of accuracy, an even more difficult problem arises. A republic not only represents the desires of its populace, but it must bring about the

⁷Ibid., pp. 95-96.

⁸Ibid., p. 112.

realization of these wishes in such a fashion that they do not infringe upon the freedoms of other citizens. Thus a representative government must constantly be aware of the desires of its citizens but also maintain a situation of compromise between these desires if individual freedoms are to remain in harmony.⁹

In order to assure that these functions occur simultaneously, Kant advocates that these functions be delegated to distinct government branches. The legislative branch would be primarily concerned with representing the wants of the people. The executive branch would insure that these wants are realized in a fashion that does not extensively infringe upon the rights and wants of other citizens.

In theory Kant feels that a republican government, which is truly representative, cannot act unjustly. This conclusion is based on the assumption that an individual might act unjustly toward another by prescribing unjust

⁹It might appear that Kant glosses over several difficult aspects of representation, aside from those mentioned. At this point it might have been significant to discuss Kant's opinion of whether people know what they want or know what is good for themselves or the country. Kant also assumes that legislators are concerned with ascertaining public opinion and truly representing it.

Even more distressing is the fact that a representative government functions upon the idea of compromise. This often entails that an individual's desires are not satisfied but compromised. Thus not only are the worse demands ameliorated but so also are the best recommendations adulterated. At this point, Kant does not consider these elements. Attention is directed to them later in the discussion.

activities for that individual, but that an individual would not prescribe an injustice for himself.¹⁰ Thus, republican governments, in which individuals govern themselves, cannot act unjustly.

Kant's conception of a republic is unambiguously concerned with the representation of every citizen. But Kant is not implying that every citizen should administer the activities of a state. In fact he finds democracies despotic in that every individual is concerned with his own interests and not that of the general will. Kant feels that governments administered by small autonomous bodies are the most just, since they tend to consider the welfare of the group rather than individual interests.¹¹ This autonomous body would, of course, be a select group of individuals. Kant is not advocating rule by a group of tyrants but possibly a group of "philosopher" legislators responsible to the people for the common good of the state.¹²

But again the question arises as to how legislators are to determine what the people believe is the best course for the state. The success of a republic is based on the very

¹⁰Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹Ibid., p. 110.

¹²In this instance, I take the liberty to use "philosoph^{er}" in a casual fashion to imply that such men are wise and unselfishly concerned with the common good of the state. This idea is suggested by Kant's discussion on "Public Law" in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 109-- 114.

fact that each citizen subjects himself to laws which he has made. This point, therefore, cannot be discarded. But at the same time legislation must consider the consent of the general will. Legislators must establish social conditions that do not infringe upon the rights of any one citizen but must also consider the welfare of all citizens. Kant is confronted with the problem of how to represent a group of particular individuals by using a general law or policy. Kant suggests that it is possible to act justly in face of this situation where legislators act according to the following assumption.

If a law were such that it was impossible for an entire people to give consent to it...then such a law is unjust. On the other hand, if there is a mere possibility that a people might consent to a law, then it is a duty to consider that the law is just, even though at the moment the people might be in such a position or have a point of view that would result in their refusing to give their consent to it if asked.¹³

This principle for establishing just legislation places legislators in a precarious position. Kant does not feel that these men are an elite body but that they should represent the insights and wants of their people. They cannot be concerned with their own interests or those of select groups of people. But at the same time these men must have the courage to promote activities that they feel are in keeping

¹³Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 422.

with the best interests of the general will, even when these activities are unpopular with many individuals. Kant implies that it is healthy for citizens to be at odds with representatives and for representatives to be wary of each other. This type of adversity prompts citizens to be aware of the activity of representatives and confront it, if necessary. A republic also gains vitality and endurance, from this type of diversity; since it is a means of educating citizens as well as representatives to various viewpoints. Kant believes that the decay and stagnation of a republic is prevented where government administration is carried on by competitive representatives who establish a social equilibrium of variant interests.^{14, 15}

At this point, it might be a good idea to consider the manner in which legislators become familiar with various outlooks and ideas to present to the legislature for consideration. In many cases these proposals are a questioning of the adequacy of established laws or policies. Often these attempts at reform kindle hostile opposition and create a situation of conflict. But Kant regards this as a healthy situation, since

¹⁴Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., p. 113, 114.

¹⁵To some people it may seem somewhat strange to suggest at one point that legislators should be wise men and then at another point state that these wise men are at odds in trying to establish their own personal viewpoint. This situation, however, is quite plausible if one considers the fashion in which men gain insights into the truth. Medical research or theories on the nature of light exemplify the fashion in which men dialectically struggle to bring forward their insights of true knowledge.

a juridical condition is merely a balancing of interests. Kant regards political peace and stability as only appearance. Men are constantly on watch for their interests to be challenged and they are prepared to defend their own positions.¹⁶

Human inequality is a basic element responsible for this conflict. Men with different capabilities develop different interests and needs. The greatest evil that Kant finds in this situation is a lack of tolerance for the various interests of others. This conflict can be healthy in that it educates individuals to the views of others. But where an individual is unable to restrain himself with regard to the views of another, especially when that other view is in keeping with the welfare of the general will, then an individual is at serious fault. Kant maintains that reason should be the guide for establishing harmony in these situations and that everyone should abide by the objective dictates of reason.¹⁷

In a sense this might appear as a rather naive position to hold. Some thinkers may suggest that it is not man's purpose or duty to establish a condition of harmony. They might suggest that it is through conflict, strife, or hostility that men are able to demonstrate their real qualities as

¹⁶Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., pp. 15-16.

¹⁷Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History", in O. H., p. 68.

men. In one sense, this decision is a matter of individual judgment. But from the context of Kant's view of things, there is little doubt that it is man's duty to promote harmony. Kant maintains throughout his political writings that competition and conflict incite men to develop their individual abilities but it is only through cooperation that men can fully develop their capacities. The cruelties and hardships of existence can be avoided only where men take it upon themselves to develop harmony and establish toleration for each other as individuals.¹⁸

Obviously, a condition of harmony is not easily effected, since men are unwilling to give up their unrestricted activities in order to respond to what must be done. Despotisms are highly successful in coordinating the powers and capabilities of its citizens by presenting unified sets of goals for their achievement. But Kant feels subjects of these sovereigns lack a vitality that comes about when a subject has an awareness of the problems involved in establishing political goals. This vitality is maintained best by an equilibrium of competition where individuals forward their insights into particular problems.¹⁹

These individuals, however, are confronted with an

¹⁸Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., pp. 106-107.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 113, 114.

extremely perplexing problem.²⁰ In order to satisfactorily use the insights of various individuals, some type of guide or method of evaluation is required for considering these insights. As men gradually develop an awareness of the social and political problems that confront their community, they realize the importance of having a structure or context from which they may observe the condition of the community. Such a structure is necessary in order to indicate the accomplishments of a community as well as anticipate the problems which it will encounter. Kant sees history as a structure that is able to fulfill this purpose. It might be worthwhile, at this point, to consider how history is able to fulfill this role assigned by Kant.

History is faced with a formidable task; it must objectively portray the complex and diverse elements of human events. The problem then arises as to how one man writing history could perceive all the elements of these events. An individual's subjective evaluation must in some sense represent what might be regarded as the objective viewpoint of all men.

It is apparent that an individual makes note of those

²⁰Undoubtedly, this problem also confronts any thoughtful despot who is concerned with coordinating the activities of his citizens for the purposes of accomplishing particular goals. The despot's plans, however, do appear easier to execute once they have been established, since a strong despot has more effective means of combating resistance than do leaders in a democracy.

events which he considers most significant.²¹ Each individual, in formulating history in this fashion, not only organizes events according to his own conception of what is important but he also indicates patterns of events which he feels will be fulfilled in the future. This anticipation has two grounds. The first ground results from what a person thinks will occur as the logical consequence of those events noted as significant. The second ground is concerned with a moral purpose that the historian has in his own mind which he would like to see fulfilled at a future date.²² Kant maintains that an individual that unites history and moral purposes in this fashion creates hope for those who have been deprived of moral treatment and stimulates individuals to fulfill the idea which he has recognized. When such ideas are greeted and fulfilled in a spirit of genuine enthusiasm by groups of people, history becomes objectively grounded. Such ideas are not the product of self interest but are the expression of common desires and indicate the objective goals and actions of a people.²³

²¹Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., pp. 25, 26.

²²Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again", in O. H., p. 137.

²³Ibid., pp. 144, 145.

The manner in which an individual's subjective evaluation of history becomes an objective representation is evident in another fashion. This might be understood by considering the process of writing history as analogous to the activities that an individual engages in when establishing a particular type of idea. The particular notion of idea referred to, is generated from Kant's definition that "...an idea is nothing else than the conception of a perfection which has not yet been experienced."²⁴ Ideas of this nature are concerned with that which is possible and not necessarily with that which has occurred. As formulations of insights into perfection, they are not based on what does exist but on that which could come into being. Ethical duties, for example, are not determined according to the abilities of men to carry them out, but rather, establish a goal for men to accomplish. The duties are established,

on the basis of what men should be in keeping with the idea of humanity not on the basis of our empirical knowledge of men as they are...²⁵

The ability to create this type of idea does not result from some type of mystical process, as Kant understands the process. These ideas are the product of diligent contemplation upon experience with which an individual is familiar. In forming an idea, a person looks to a complex of

²⁴Kant, On Education, p. 8.

²⁵Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 66.

implications of a condition, considers it as a whole, and then establishes the interrelations of its parts.²⁶

Observation of experience and analysis of this material is the basis of an idea. If an individual forwards an idea on insufficient evidence or without certainty, he is constructing a conjecture. But even conclusions of this sort are important for they at least ambiguously indicate a direction or end. This type of conjecture is sometimes all that is possible. An insight into perfection is a type of idea not readily proved or rejected.²⁷

Fuller elucidation and understanding of this type of idea requires that an individual or group of people continue their pursuit of the idea with open minds. This attitude is necessary so that new insights or modifications may be assimilated for the clarification of the idea, since this type of idea is, oftentimes, only vaguely apprehended. This problem is compounded when a group of people attempt to realize an idea that will improve a social situation. This difficulty is due in part to the fact that various individuals have diverse insights. These insights also range over a wide spectrum of realizability. The insights of some individuals are immediately realizable while others are of a more distant nature. Kant, recognizing the diversity of the insights of

²⁶Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 10.

²⁷Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 127.

different persons, advocates that ideas should be carried out in a gradual manner according to fixed principles if harmony is to be maintained.²⁸ By upholding certain restrictive principles, with regard to the rights of persons, individuals are prevented from infringing upon the rights and ideas of others. This slow process of recognition, realization or reform of ideas enables them to be subject to correction. Thus in a dialectical fashion people present ideas but correct one another's positions and conceptions. Any ideas based on improper evidence are open to detection and could be either corrected or destroyed. This process applies to historic interpretations, to the formulation of scientific principles or to establishing political laws or policies. Open confrontation enables people to determine whether an idea is merely unusual, and a candidate for acceptance or whether it is actually something which is impermissible. This type of confrontation is especially important to political or moral laws since it prevents people from falling into blind imitation. There is then less chance of that which has customarily been accepted, assuming the status of law.²⁹ In a very general fashion this digression indicates the fashion in which subjective ideas or historic interpretations may become laws, policies and even outlooks of large groups

²⁸Ibid., p. 129.

²⁹Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 133-134.

of people.

The significance of the present discussion is that Kant maintains that this is the type of process in which legislators and citizens should be involved. Legislators and citizens forward their insights into what is best for their people. The insights are then the subject of study for legislators who accept, reject, or revise them. But a legislator is not free to act in any fashion that he chooses, since he is responsible for his views and activities to the citizens of the state. Should a legislator trespass upon what is just by recommending unjust legislation it is the duty of every citizen to compel him to desist from these activities.³¹ The means open to citizens for resisting the unjust practices of legislators are the lawful established methods of the civil union. But the question then arises as to what citizens may do if these methods fail. Kant's reply to this problem has been deemed inadequate by many thinkers. His response, however, is logically in keeping with his "prescriptive description" of the functioning of a "rational Republic". Kant states that force or revolution is unacceptable as a means of redressing grievances. The only lawful procedure is to advise officials of their errors.³² There is no lawful means

³¹Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 417.

³²Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O.H., p. 120.

to bring a verdict against these officials, since they are acting in accordance with legal procedure. Since there is no head above the government to determine whether its actions are lawful, these officials cannot be charged with acting in an illegal fashion.³³ In order to avoid confusion it should probably be pointed out that Kant is here referring to a special type of activity. Kant is obviously not discussing a case of embezzlement or murder, since in this type of crime a legislator is open to judgment and conviction. Kant is here undoubtedly concerned with a different type of problem. He is concerned with a case in which there is not legal means for judging an action, since the action is beyond the judgment of any court in a given land.

But even in considering a problem of this momentous importance, Kant maintains a steadfast approach. He prohibits resistance of a revolutionary type. Even if carrying out a revolution would create less evil than an existing government produces, a revolution is still considered an illegal manner of effecting reform. Kant insists that "...a legal constitution, even though it be right to only a low degree, is better than none at all...". Kant's primary reason is that the imperfect harmony and freedom, granted by a legal constitution, establish a much better situation than would exist in a lawless state of nature.³⁴

³³Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 424.

³⁴Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., p. 120

This argument might seem to indicate that Kant opposes revolution on a utilitarian or pragmatic basis. But in considering the interpretation which has been given to Kant's moral and political outlook, it is apparent that his objection is supported by other grounds also. The first ground is a logical one and should be considered with respect to governments which consider themselves as republics. A republican form of government entails that citizens are represented in the functions of government. Thus, in effect, every action of a republican government is an action of the people. It is, therefore, contradictory that people should revolt against the actions of a government, since they would be opposing their own actions.

The second ground of opposition to a revolution may be considered with regard to republican and non-republican forms of government. The nature of this objection arises from a moral ground. It is impossible to suggest that a universal law could be established in which people are allowed to resort to violent chaos and all forms of evils for the purpose of resisting the activities of a government. On utilitarian grounds this type of activity might be approved. But in the context of Kant's moral outlook, there is no justification for this type of activity.

Although Kant forbids violent revolution, he ambiguously implies the permissibility of certain types of resistance. One of the ideas that suggests a need for resistance is Kant's

general outlook on entities such as government. From a metaphysical viewpoint, government is similar to other entities of the phenomenal world, in that it is a temporal and imperfect manifestation of principles and insights of a more perfect nature. Since government structures are imperfect forms, individuals must strive to bring about the more perfect forms dictated by reason, if they wish to live in a more perfect society. It might be somewhat misleading to talk of perfect principles and insights as the motivation for resistance. Although utopian visions and other esoteric forms of insight prompt men to resistance other ideas of perfection are readily available to any conscious individual. The consideration of whether a government's action is just is an example of this more immediate type of motivation.

But in entertaining this critical outlook, an individual is constantly faced with a conflict between obeying the law, and upholding that which grants men freedom, or resisting it, for the purpose of bringing about its more perfect form.

Many people assert that this strain of thought is missing in Kant's outlook and that the essential nature of his political outlook may be categorized with those advocating the common place clichés of "Law and Order". But a closer consideration of his position might reveal the breadth of dissimilarity from these latter political positions. For Kant, "Law and Order" is founded upon a double commitment. Citizens commit themselves to obeying the law of the land, as

their duty, because the law is established by their representatives for the sake of preserving the people's freedom. Kant does not request citizens to obey the sovereigns of a nation in a servile fashion but to dutifully carry out those principles to which they have all given consent in order that they might be free to pursue a better life. But when people are committed to upholding laws which are not truly representative of their own positions they are deprived of the second commitment of this notion of law. "Law and Order" is not a cliché, only when people are committed to the construction of laws, as well as obedience to them.

This kind of thinking demonstrates why an event such as a revolution is so repulsive to Kant. It is a revolution of the people against themselves. A revolution undermines the supreme authority of law, destroying the very principle that grants men freedom.³⁵ It is important to recognize that when Kant speaks of reverence for law, he is referring to the form of law which reason suggests. He is referring to the idea of law and not necessarily any particular law which exists in practice. In forbidding revolution, Kant is advocating that men should not establish revolution as a principle that would contradict the principle of law. Establishing such a principle would release men into the savagery of the natural state, in which there is no

³⁵Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 425.

freedom or peace.³⁶ In such a condition there is no longer "...mention of right but only of force, then people may also try their own power and thus endanger every legal constitution..."³⁷ Kant is convinced that it is impossible to obtain freedom without a juridical condition based upon such principles as right, justice, and law. He believes that this condition can only be implemented by government. He is, therefore, willing to tolerate any form of government, which attempts to maintain this condition, rather than accept a state of anarchy. He even recognizes that a government which attains power after a revolution, is as valid as that government which had power prior to the revolution, in order that some form of government might always be in power. A juridical condition under the auspices of a government insures that men will not resort to force and a savage state of nature. Thus the reform, of a constitution or of the administration of a government, can only be brought about through lawful established procedures.

The discussion thus far has considered Kant's general position on how an individual should relate himself to the state. The basic principle of this relationship is the logical

³⁶Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 140.

³⁷Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 429.

ordering of men's wills into a harmonious pattern. But since Kant also maintains that every man is his own master it is evident that an individual is still faced with the decision of whether to obey or resist specific laws.³⁸

Men, by their nature, according to Kant, have an inclination to establish the condition of their own happiness and well being. Legislators are, therefore, in a very precarious position and must try to act with regard for this human propensity. Governments which act in a paternalistic fashion and dictate that which they recognize as best for their subjects, trespass upon the freedom of their subjects. Kant feels that men should not be expected to placidly accept these dictates.³⁹ He feels that men have a duty to cultivate a conciliatory spirit toward ideas which conflict with their own but where these ideas create an actual impediment to an individual's freedom or moral conceptions

³⁸From the discussion it is evident that every man must accept government by law if he wishes to protect his own freedom and to respect that of his fellow citizens. However, this paper believes that Kant implies that men must constantly retain a critical attitude toward every specific law in order to insure that the laws are truly representative. If a man feels that a specific law forces him to suffer an injustice, an individual must resist this law to bring about its repeal. The course of action that a man takes will be warranted by the degree of injustice which the law promotes. The first course of action is obviously to communicate the nature of the injustice to legislators. Serious cases of injustice may be confronted with stiffer forms of resistance. Parts of the discussion which follow address this latter case.

³⁹Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, pp. 417, 419.

he must resist.⁴⁰ "Obey the suzerain (in everything that does not conflict with internal morality) who has authority over you."⁴¹ Therefore, although Kant professes the essential necessity of citizens cooperating with the state he does not advocate that citizens should surrender their wills to the state or that they should become subservient to its every dictate.⁴²

This attitude is necessary since even sovereigns are capable of conceiving ideas for government which are not perfect and it is the duty of each citizen to alert the sovereign of his errors. Kant admonishes that these errors cannot be corrected in a violent fashion if the people wish to maintain the spirit of a constitution.

A limited constitution permits only a negative resistance, that is, a refusal by the people (in parliament) to accede always to the demands of the executive authority with regard to what the latter alleges to be required for the administration of the state.⁴³

⁴⁰Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 130.

⁴¹Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 139.

⁴²The very fact that Kant is unable to overtly come to grips with the notion of nonviolent resistance and other forms of civil disobedience suggest to this paper, not that this problem was insoluble in his mind, but that he was politically unable to express his thoughts. It seems inconceivable that a man, so greatly concerned with human dignity and freedom, should subordinate these concerns to political stability and order. Kant might very well work his readers to a feverish pitch with regard to human dignity and then frustrate it with a concern for order, in order to lay this dilemma on his reader's conscience.

⁴³Ibid., p. 89.

The positive fashion open to the people, in which they act as their own masters and evaluate the actions of the state, is the activity in which the "...freedom of the pen is the sole shield of the rights of the people..."⁴⁴ In this activity men and government engage in a dialectic in which ideas and the refinement of ideas act as a cause for social change. Before considering some of the "less positive" ways of communicating ideas; it might be of importance, at this point, to consider some of the ways in which ideas influence social conditions.

Men arrive at more comprehensive and clearer conceptions of an idea by pursuing the truest form of that idea.⁴⁵ Where men are concerned with reconciling practice and theory, new awareness of an idea often prompts a change in practice and promotes a different course of action. This process is evident in the legislating of law. When men come to know of more humane and moral fashions of treating men, they often change the law to reflect these insights. According to this manner of thinking, law may be recognized as a concrete prescription, for practice, of that which has been recognized as a moral idea.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 427.

⁴⁵The term "idea" is not meant in a technical sense.

⁴⁶Kant, Elements of Justice, pp. 111-112.

A republican government which formed its policies and laws on the best insights and ideas of its citizens, rather than with regard to political strategy or self interest, could make momentous strides in perfecting the nature of its society. The greatest impediment to this process, however, is man's inability to disengage himself from the immediate and the habitual. Men tend to act with little regard for their rational powers and confront the concrete and everyday situation in an immediate fashion. Rather than considering the implications of the immediate and the possibilities for coping with this situation, they act in a nearsighted fashion. But by engaging in theory, men can be liberated from the immediate to engage in considering the possible alternatives for coping with a situation. By theorizing men are often able to recognize a better or more humane fashion of acting which they were unaware of in the immediate condition.⁴⁷ Reason's use of ideas enable men to reflect upon their situation and gain awareness into how it can be other than it is. Ideas demonstrate the possibilities which could be effected, if men were to resolve to bring them about.

But in order to make use of this capacity men must develop a willingness to rely upon their own reason and the insights of other individuals. For this reason, Kant admonishes men to: "Have courage to use your own reason."⁴⁸ He

⁴⁷Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 46-49, 69.

⁴⁸Kant, "What is Enlightenment", in O. H., p. 3.

feels that men too easily accept the guardianship of a few individuals. Men neglect the responsibilities of conducting their own affairs out of laziness and cowardice. These decisions are taken over by experts or specialists and eventually people stop thinking for themselves.

Kant recognizes that it is often difficult to make decisions successfully but that through a process of trial and error, men can develop this ability. This ability develops as men are able to disengage themselves from the decisions and established views of others. One has to be able to evaluate these views and discoveries and disregard or destroy those which are found unsatisfactory. This is especially important where the accomplishments of one generation have the germs of destruction for another generation within its accomplishments, "...one generation may have to pull down what another had built up."⁴⁹

The task of evaluating human endeavors and accomplishments is extremely difficult. The difficulty is intensified by the distorting influences of self interest and inclination. This evaluation can become objective as the distortions are gradually removed through the reciprocal exchange of ideas between individuals. Since social development is dependent upon the exchange of insights and capabilities of many different people, the environment of social change, must be

⁴⁹Kant, On Education, p. 14.

one of tolerance and patience. Kant maintains that this type of moral development is greatly enhanced where people strive for its creation with a disinterested attitude. This is an attitude in which men are concerned with the welfare of humanity and not personal gains or interests.⁵⁰

Although much of Kant's thought has been concerned with the formal aspects of reform, he recognizes that the construction of ideals is only a part of this process. The implementation of ideas for reform require that people possess the ability of judgment. Judgment, according to Kant, is a characteristic possessed by people of wide knowledge. These people are not only familiar with theory but also the experience from which the theory was derived. An individual, possessing judgment, is capable of taking a universal rule and adapting it to application in a particular concrete situation. The final activities necessary for enacting this judgment are that the individual must intend to carry out his judgment and then act according to his intention.⁵¹

Another aspect of judgment is the fact that people do not adopt every idea or theory which they construct. Since people deliberate on the worth of their theories before enacting them, it appears that people only choose theories that have a certain fitness or sufficiency. Various aspects of

⁵⁰Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp. 95, 96.

⁵¹Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., p. 18.

Kant's writing suggest that reason tries to establish ends that are most appropriate to a given situation. These ends are reached only after reason has undergone a vigorous process of self examination. If this process of self reflection does not proceed far enough, individuals act upon knowledge which is inadequate or incorrect. In this case, the apparent becomes confused with that which is real. Kant maintains that the apparent becomes distinct from the real, only with the development of reason.⁵² This development requires trial, practice, and instruction. It does not work instinctively but rises from one level of insight to another by diligent effort.⁵³ As individuals become aware of the fallibility of their own thoughts they become more critical. This critical attitude forces them to question even positions that are considered certain. This attitude promotes the investigation of reason in order

...to acquire information and precise instruction about the source of its own principle, and about the correct function of this principle...in order that it may escape from the embarrassment of antagonistic claims...⁵⁴

But even where the claims of reason have been critically appraised they can never be accepted with absolute certitude. Kant assumes that the nature of human reason is limited and that man has to reconcile himself to never reaching

⁵²Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 111-112.

⁵³Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., p. 13.

⁵⁴Kant, Groundwork, p. 73.

an "ultimate purpose on the path of perpetual changes". Human reason is only capable of visualizing "...a variation that progresses into the infinite (in time) within the perpetual progression toward the ultimate purpose...".⁵⁵

Some thinkers, such as Hegel, have stated that the course of history reveals the purpose of humanity and records the progress which is made in accomplishing this purpose.⁵⁶ The discussion of this paper implies that Kant would not hold this position. History indicates the direction of the human purpose but it is fettered by the very limitations which beset human rationality. History as a product of rationality must also be redefined and perfected in the same fashion that ideas or any other human institutions are elucidated. History must be reinterpreted from generation to generation as the mass of human knowledge increases through the development of humanity. This outlook suggests that as reason develops and defines the truths of history, then the purpose of humanity will become more evident. But this process requires that each individual's insight should be considered as knowledge and correction to guide the insight of another. No one is isolated from this process.

The significance of this discussion for political

⁵⁵Kant, "End of All Things", in O. H., p. 77.

⁵⁶This diversion into a discussion of history should be of value, since in previous discussions certain important similarities between the concepts "idea" and "history" proved worthy of consideration.

philosophy is that every citizen has a duty to inform his sovereign of that which is just and to correct the sovereign in any acts of injustice.⁵⁷ In fact Kant considers it a crime against humanity to forbid a society to participate in this process, since it would curtail moral progress.⁵⁸

The significance of this discussion with regard to moral progress is that every citizen has not only a right but a moral obligation to state that which is true and that which is just. But this position also implies that citizens have a right and moral obligation to resist that which is untrue and that which is unjust.

Although Kant will not condone revolution, he does seem to advocate a form of resistance other than free expression. This paper interprets Kant to imply that where people feel that the government is blatantly acting in a manner which is injurious to morality or to justice in its broadest sense, they need not comply with the law.⁵⁹

For reasons previously mentioned, Kant does not make this statement directly. But his constant implication, that people should never accept that which they find outrageous

⁵⁷Kant, "Theory and Practice", in Phil. of Kant, p. 427.

⁵⁸Kant, "What is Enlightenment", in O. H., p. 7.

⁵⁹This statement rests upon the distinction that all laws are just in a legal or narrow sense if they have been established according to the approved procedures of legislating; whereas justice in a broad sense is that which an individual is aware of by the dictates of conscience.

to their conception of morality, makes it difficult to believe that he would comply with a law which was seriously immoral or overly harsh. Without diverging into a barrage of speculation it is probably safe to state that Kant would not enforce a law which required the death penalty for stealing a loaf of bread. Kant would not approve active violation of the law, such as allowing an increase of bread thefts, since this would contradict the spirit of a republican constitution. But it seems he would approve impeding the law, by not complying with it, in order that law makers might seek a truer form of that law. By not supporting the inferior elements of a law or government, these elements will die and only the better aspects shall remain in practice. The better elements of a republic cannot be jeopardized but its inferior aspects can also not be supported by men of conscience.⁶⁰

⁶⁰In order to state this position more explicitly, it might be worthwhile to speculate upon Kant's position by using a hypothetical situation. The essential aspect of this situation is to confront Kant with the problem of whether an unjust law is still a law. It asks that he should explain how a person is to act when confronted by a law which he recognizes as unjust or immoral.

In considering Kant's concern for justice and morality, this paper takes the position that Kant would maintain that a person subject to an immoral or unjust law should not be liable to the punishment that the law would entail and that the person need not conform his actions to that law since it is immoral or unjust. However, if a person were tried and convicted the person should tolerate the punishment, unless there were other possible alternatives which would not jeopardize the reverence for law. This discussion is, therefore, suggesting that Kant would maintain that a person must always maintain reverence for the law in general but that particular laws may be rejected if they are recognized as immoral or unjust. A crucial question at this point is whether this

This problem of non-compliance with an inferior or unjust law is illustrated by Kant's discussion on whether it is justifiable for a state to order its subjects to war. Kant considers the argument, that since a state has opened opportunities to its citizens for realizing their potentials and for developing the resources of the country, it has in doing so, in a sense, given them life. But in response to this he still maintains that this argument is not grounds for the state's disposing of life in military pursuits.⁶¹ "To pay men to kill or to be killed seems to entail using them as mere machines and tools in the hand of another (the state), and this is hardly compatible with the rights of mankind in

type of position is possible.

In order to evaluate the possibility of maintaining this position, let us consider that Kant was drafted into a war which he viewed as immoral. Kant would be opposed to this war on two grounds. From other parts of this paper we know that he views conscription as unjust. His second ground of opposition would be the immorality of the war. But although Kant has good reason to oppose the war he would probably comply with his conscription in order to maintain reverence for law in general. His compliance, however, would take on a negative form. While carrying out his duties as a soldier he would work against the war effort through discussions and other forms of communication in the hopes that people would realize the immorality of the war and bring it to an end. He would probably also seek other alternatives such as applying for conscientious objector status or becoming a medic or finding other non-combatant roles. But more than likely Kant's hindering of the war activities would never resort to illegal actions. He would always maintain reverence for the spirit of law while he was working for the repeal of this specific law.

⁶¹Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 117.

our own person."⁶² It might appear that this reasoning is directed only to the employment of mercenaries and that it does not apply to the conscription of citizens. But by considering the colegislative rights of citizens this position is clarified. Kant states that a citizen as a colegislative member of a state

...must give his free consent through his representatives, not only to the waging of war in general, but also to any particular declaration of war. It is only under this limiting condition that the state may demand and dispose of a citizen's services if they involve being exposed to danger.⁶³

It is only where a citizen is truly represented, and thus, in effect, has given his consent to war, that he can be asked to kill or be killed. Where a state overlooks a citizen's position with regard to an issue, it trespasses not only upon the political rights of the citizen but also upon his moral integrity.

Where people resist laws which they feel are unjust, moral politicians recognize this resistance as an indication that reform is necessary.⁶⁴ They recognize that the

⁶²Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., p. 87.

⁶³Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 117.

⁶⁴Not only moral politicians must recognize resistance as an indication for reform but any politician that wants to remain in office.

...forms of the state are, as it were, only the letter of the original legislation in civil society...However, the spirit of that original contract entails the obligation of the constituted authority to make the type of government conform to this idea and, accordingly, to change the government gradually and continually...

in accordance with the idea of a legislative constitution, that of a true republic.⁶⁵ Kant maintains that where legislation and the administering of government are brought into harmony with the

idea...(of a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others)...the rarer would punishments become, and it is therefore, quite rational to maintain, as Plato does, that in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required.⁶⁶

This appraisal is a bit simplistic in that it attributes all crime to political misrepresentation. It fails to consider crimes which are not the result of political or economic situations. It should, however, be respected in the sense that it diagnoses political injustice as a major cause of crime.

The lack of hostility between citizens and legislators is merely a negative indication of progress toward a more perfect state. Kant states that this progress will also be

⁶⁵Ibid., 112.

⁶⁶Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martins, 1965), p. 312.

indicated in a positive manner. The quantity of individual moral intentions will increase but more important is the fact that these intentions will be manifest in the good deeds of men.⁶⁷ It would be unfair to accuse Kant of merely speculating in the world of optimistic idealism, since his appraisal of the grounds for this position appear quite correct.

To a high degree we are, through art, and science, cultured. We are civilized--perhaps too much for our own good in all sorts of social grace and decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached morality--for that, much is lacking.⁶⁸

A major indication of our lack of moral progress is that nations settle their differences through war. Peace is a major criterion for judging moral success. Kant maintains that men are continuously confronted by this criterion since the "...moral-practical reason within us voices its irresistible veto: 'There shall be no war'"⁶⁹

Peace, is the highest political good for Kant. In a condition of Peace men are able to cultivate their own capacities and abilities and contribute to the goal of humanity. As the highest political good, individuals must work to establish Peace and the constitution which is most able to bring it about.⁷⁰ Kant maintains that a Republican constitution

⁶⁷Kant, "An Old Question", in O. H., p. 151.

⁶⁸Kant, "Idea for a Universal History", in O. H., p. 21.

⁶⁹Kant, Elements of Justice, p. 128.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 128, 129.

has the greatest possibility of promoting peace since its success requires just representation of citizens. Where citizens must be consulted to engage in war there is nothing

...more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant war in the future.⁷¹

At the time Kant was formulating these thoughts the condition of peace appeared necessary to man's survival as a creature working toward the perfection of the human race. In the next part of this discussion, this paper will consider the adequacy of Kant's thought for modern society.

⁷¹Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in O. H., pp. 94, 95.

IV

THOUGHTS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S INSIGHT FOR MODERN SOCIETY

This discussion should probably begin with prefatory remarks on the difficulty of identifying and evaluating the influence of a great thinker. I will not, however, become involved in that type of consideration. It is not because I think it unimportant but rather because I wish to begin immediately with the discussion of how the insights of Kant are important in influencing our society.

It is evident, to anyone who has reflected on the political and moral works of Kant, that his type of outlook is a most prominent influence in our society. In this last chapter, I should like to discuss three different aspects of this influence.

Kant is a prominent representative of those thinkers who have articulated respectable and significant ideals for modern society. In order to consider this aspect of Kant's influence, the discussion will begin with a summary of the positive interpretation this paper has constructed from Kant's thought. In conjunction with this discussion there will also be a consideration of why this outlook has not been enthusiastically accepted by a greater number of people.

The discussion will then consider how Kant's outlook

has influenced the inception of various problems in the modern situation. It will also suggest how Kant's outlook has influenced, in part, the very nature of this society.

The paper will then conclude with a discussion of how Kant's insight might be of value in overcoming the essential problem of the modern situation. Having described the direction of the discussion, let us begin immediately with the ideals and positions present in Kant's political and moral outlook.

The central elements of Kant's outlook, as previously discussed, are that man is a creature of nobility and dignity. He arrives at this conclusion by considering man's unique position in the natural realm and the part which the human power of reason contributes to this position. Reason enables man to comprehend the limitations which nature imposes on its subjects but it also enables man to recognize the manner in which man can cooperate with and even dominate nature in order to improve human existence. Activities of the latter sort bring man to realize that he is capable of initiating his own activities and goals in an independent fashion. This awareness is seen by Kant as a primary indication of human freedom. As men become more aware of this freedom, it becomes a source of pride and dignity but at the same time it presents a threat to personal tranquility. As men become aware of their own autonomy and ability to establish goals and purposes, they recognize that other men have these same powers. This source of anxiety manifests itself as actual hostility

when men attempt to procure the same resources or when their individual purposes come in conflict. But with the further development of reason, men recognize that tranquility can be restored by maintaining self-discipline and conformity to reason's dictate for preserving harmony. These rational principles for social intercourse dictate respect for the autonomy of others. The political outgrowth of these principles is the republic in which every man's autonomy is respected and his desires are represented in the activities of the government. This attitude is formalized in the body of laws which all men must abide by, but which all men design.

In a very brief fashion, this sketch represents Kant's political outlook. Although Kant would maintain that with a firm political structure men can be guaranteed their own rights in relation to other people, he suggests that this is only one type of relationship between men. The spirit of Kant's works suggest that this political relationship secures only a minimal amount of satisfaction in the pursuit of the good life. The implication often arises that personal fulfillment is not possible where one lives an independent existence exclusive of comradeship, brotherhood, and the friendly intercourse of people. Although it often appears that Kant's ethics are not concerned with things of this sort, the very existence of these ethical works are evidence that Kant believed men needed guidance for personal and intimate activities which political laws should not and in many cases could not provide.⁰ In order to promote this

spiritual harmony among men, Kant established his ethical works on the idea that one should never treat another as a means but always award that person the dignity that is due every rational individual. Kant's recognition of this ethical guide as a duty for all men indicates his awareness that men need not only the cooperative efforts of other men, but also the intellectual and spiritual enlightenment which results from intercourse with other people.

Kant's moral and political writings stimulate the insight that the good society will not only respect the autonomy of free individuals out of deference to social harmony but will also maintain solidarity and vitality by instilling in every citizen respect for the dignity of every individual.¹ Independent and self-reliant individuals would stimulate this attitude of respect as a result of exercising a full range of powers and capacities. Individuals would feel pride in the exercise of these abilities since they would be an indication of human dignity. But no individual would experience a false pride or haughtiness since he would recognize that every other man is capable of the exercise of various abilities, given the proper opportunities to realize these capacities.

In speculating upon the values and characteristics of this society it is impossible not to be caught up in a

¹The term "instill" refers to the various ways that people may be instructed, without being coerced, to accept a position or idea.

surge of romantic enthusiasm. Kant's society would promote conditions in which men were free from forces that would hinder the development of rational and creative powers. It would encourage men to act with individuality promoting unique activities and insights. All citizens would remain open to this individuality since they would recognize that this was the basis of the vitality of their society and that it encouraged the pursuit of perfection. The achievements and accomplishments of the members of this society would promote pride and respect for the society. This society would be founded upon process and activity rather than possession and consumption. Individuality and competence would replace conformity and mediocre performances. Productivity, in its fullest sense, would replace wastefulness. For these people, existence would be meaningful and fulfilling. The establishment of bureaucratic and institutionalized forms of government, morality or even life styles would be impossible in this society; since these people would recognize one another as free and creative individuals, rather than as objects for manipulation or disrespect.

One may then ask why Kant has been overlooked if his outlook on man and its corresponding structures for human relationships could have such a beneficial effect to those people who are looking for guidance. A very basic reason why the more profound insights of Kant's work have had little effect on modern society is that few people have devoted

extensive study to his works. The length, complexity, and difficult nature of his work have made his thoughts unknown to many. But this reason does not fully satisfy the previous question, since there is a good sized body of people who are able to read Kant and there are also many popularized versions of his thought.

Many objections to Kant have their basis in the criticism that his supposedly "universal outlook" is really a product of the assumptions of his society. This type of claim would suggest that Kant's insights, resulting from limited experiences, are of little value to our age. Kant's thoughts on family relationships, private property, friendship, and other notions discussed in the Doctrine of Virtue could be referred to as indications of this antiquated outlook. But it seems unfair to damn an entire position on the basis of material which is intended for a particular historic situation. But even this type of information may be adapted to another historic situation. Kant's discussion of a republic is a good example of an idea which was used in a particular historical situation but maintains its validity outside of that situation. Kant discusses the principles of a republic with regard to their application for a monarchy and yet these principles are still of value for the functioning of a democracy. The attitude between a government and its people, which these principles for conducting a republic entail, remains intact regardless of the historic situation. This type of evidence decreases the

severity of the claim that Kant is not expressing a "universal outlook". It is probably a sound position, however, to regard, with skepticism, any claim that professes to express a universal outlook. For even though principles may be satisfactorily applied in various situations, it is misleading to claim that they are universal principles.

There are, however, rather damaging criticisms which may be brought against Kant. In order to consider this criticism, one must first consider the attitude which Kant instills with regard to knowledge. This attitude is often described as the critical or skeptical outlook but this description implies various pejorative connotations. It would probably be better to describe this epistemological stance as a cautious but open one, since it encourages people to pursue independent investigation and then cooperatively compile their results. In this outlook the results or evidence of various inquiries are never granted the standing of absolute truth but are continuously subject to revision and refinement. New evidence is always capable of unseating a position formerly regarded as true, should the new evidence or theory prove more appropriate.²

This dynamic attitude toward knowledge, which Kant professes, encourages criticism of his notion of duty, for they seem highly incompatible, almost to the point of

²This statement does not, of course, apply to those truths which are concerned with apriori knowledge.

contradiction. One might speculate that his dogmatic and unbending conception of duty is a reminiscence of his religious upbringing. This apparent incompatibility, between Kant's epistemological outlook and his grounds for a concept of duty, suggest to many people an unresolvable tension in Kant's philosophy. Kant's unswerving outlook on duty might be explained by asserting that he wished to inspire people with the notion that they must remain steadfast to that which is right. It might also have been politically motivated in that it is a concept which maintains the sovereignty of law and government when the threat of anarchy or revolution is present. But these explanations do not indicate the compatibility of these outlooks which exist at a more profound level.

People, however, unaware of the compatibility of these positions reject Kant on his inability to resolve this tension in a more satisfactory manner. But this is not the only area of contention for Kant's notion of duty. It is also rejected on the basis that it gives rise to a repugnant personality. This idea of duty often manifests itself in a martyr syndrome in various people. There is nothing that they enjoy doing, they take action in various situations solely because it is their duty.

This conception of duty also encourages depersonalized and bureaucratic relationships. A person "just doing his

duty" is often apathetic and irresponsible. He does not need to evaluate a situation and consider his own responsibility for that situation. In fact authority will not hold him accountable for actions that were performed in the line of duty. The soldier who kills civilians because he is commanded or the government employee who is unable to bend regulations and relieve undue hardship are glaring examples of how the concept of duty is unacceptably exercised.

Kant's epistemological distinction between noumena and phenomena is undoubtedly the greatest source of misunderstanding for his works and also one of the major obstacles to his acceptance as a significant thinker. This paper has intentionally overlooked this area in order to discuss the many worthwhile political insights Kant evokes. Without a complete discussion of the epistemological groundwork which is inherent in this distinction, there are some distressing consequences of interpretations of this doctrine that should be mentioned. There is little reason to specifically cite the authors of these interpretations, since there has been much recourse to this type of thinking in the past and undoubtedly it will continue in the future. Much of this misuse centers about the notion of noumenon. This idea is open to diverse interpretation. For the most part, various interpretations agree that noumena are more or less unknowable.

But this very ambiguous, although fundamental distinction, has been the stimulant for various modes of political fanaticism.

One might assume that, although noumena are for the most part unknowable, certain gifted people have insight into this unknowable reality or are capable of apprehending the influence of unknowable forces. A person gifted with these strange powers should undoubtedly lead people less informed and should be granted total allegiance and loyalty.

This doctrine might also provoke the line of thought that if reality is unknowable it is up to man to create reality. A man with enough determination and fortitude to create reality is definitely a leader and worthy of support. It is apparent that an individual, with an above average imagination, could easily use this distinction as justification for assuming political leadership.

Political fanaticism is not the only bad effect of this doctrine. The unknowability of reality which is suggested by the concept of noumenon may also be responsible for psychological malignancies. A person might be prompted to a nihilistic or pessimistic position by this doctrine. They might cease in their pursuit for a meaning or purpose in life. This attitude might then result in various forms of escapism ranging from the trivial to that which is detrimental.

Although there is no one force in society which is responsible for a particular problem, it is highly probable that the various interpretations that have arisen from the phenomenon-noumenon distinction may be credited with creating several major problems for modern society.

In Kant's philosophy nature is a predominant aspect of the reality that man recognizes. It is through interaction with this force that man becomes a rational person possessing dignity. But strangely enough, Kant's philosophy may be seen as having given rise to claims that there is no reality. Various types of confusion over the relationship of phenomena and noumena and especially thoughts on the unknowability of noumena are responsible for this trend.³

These positions are identified by basic premises. The first premise is that nature is unseated from its position as a primary aspect of reality. This notion is accompanied by the idea that there are no limits or restraints upon man. Eventually the void that has been created, by accepting these premises, is permeated by an irrational

³It would be most interesting to discuss the nature of these interpretations and how they were derived but this would undoubtedly entail another essay. It is probably sufficient to recognize that these interpretations are evident in such modern strains of philosophy as existentialism, nihilism and the popular varieties of thought present on recordings and in popular novels.

conception of freedom⁴ and an idolatry of human ability.⁴ Human freedom and action become the essence or core of existence, they become reality. This type of attitude is encouraged and nurtured by the successes of science and technology.

The type of society that results when men adopt this philosophical position, by disregarding their relationship to nature, is very real to us. It is a society that has been described in the works of such men as Marcuse, Ellul and other social critics.

This society is characterized by a tendency to respect only the pursuits, goals, higher technicians and executives who maintain the abstract activities of the technocracy.⁵ The citizens of this society are fixated with a passion for procuring those things that are artificial and man made. Few of these people are aware of the coming into being, development and death or sacrifice of those natural entities which make human life possible.. In fact, these men lose sight of the natural cycle of which they are

⁴The idea that is intended in the term "irrational freedom" is that men are subject to no restrictions or limitations. From a Kantian perspective this idea is recognized as blind, careless and destructive, not to mention that it is also somewhat naive.

⁵The term technocracy is meant to suggest the entire structure of government, education and industry, its managers, employees and activities, engaged in maintaining and advancing the technological society.

a part. This lack of knowledge is accompanied by a lack of respect for natural surroundings. This attitude is demonstrated by the destructive and wasteful manner in which natural elements are mined and harvested. It is also evident in the various forms of pollution.

Without an essential discussion of works that describe how this position has arisen, I should like to draw this conclusion.⁶ The environment of the technocracy may be viewed as one in which all phases of human activity, including abilities, insights, attitudes, purposes, and systems of value, conform to technological outlooks and control. But the center of this control is unknown and impossible to locate, since it is a system without a particular spatial existence. Allowing the reference, this attitude of conformity to the technocracy might more accurately be considered the spirit of modern man. It is a spirit that rejects reverence for the natural world and scorns the full development of human potential and dignity. The invocation of this spirit summons men to the abstract and artificial world of technology. It encourages men to intensely develop particular aspects of human ability and further curtails full development by encouraging participation in the trivial and highly domesticated activities which have been granted technological approval.

⁶The discussion that might have been carried on at this point is omitted in order to avoid redundancy. The groundwork for the conclusion under discussion is handled in the introduction to this paper. It is suggested that reference be made to the criticisms of Marcuse, Ellul and others in that section.

By using the type of speculation that Kant employs in tracing the development of human reason, it might be possible to indicate how modern man has placed himself under this present state of tyranny.

In the first phase of human development, Kant discusses man's enslavement as a creature of nature. At that point, man lacked autonomy and functioned at the level of a beast, an obedient subject of the natural realm.

In the second phase, men attained a sense of autonomy and dignity as a result of struggling against nature. Through developed powers of reason men recognized that they were capable of freedom by acting as if they were free. Men awarded themselves dignity as a result of realizing their own purposes and reflecting upon their abilities, potential and position in the world.

Unfortunately Kant did not envision phase three in which men are enslaved by the illusion that they are completely free in the irrational sense discussed. He did not envision the construction of an artificial and abstract culture which would produce trivial and unbalanced people. He did not foresee that autonomy could lead to a notion of freedom that would not be accompanied by human dignity and a reverence for the world.

If it is possible for modern society to reflect upon its present status, a fourth phase of development may replace that which is presently being established. In the

fourth phase authentic men will replace "modern man". These individuals will recognize that the basis of their freedom is the recognition that human potential is developed through interaction with the natural world as well as the human world. These men would recognize the limitation these worlds impose upon men, their harshness, but also their value for human existence.

The catalyst for this recognition might come about by reflecting on the works of Kant. These works would serve as a comparison to point out that scientific technology succeeds by limiting man's conception of himself. It influences man to conceive of himself as a thing, machine or phenomenal creature that conforms to the goals and insights of the technocracy. A reconsideration of Kant would point out that what a person is results from how they think of themselves. These men then might reappraise their situation and conclude that they are free persons with great potential, but also recognize that they exist within the limits of a natural world.

Possibly these men will again undertake development of the full range of human capacities. This type of development would promote pride in individual accomplishments and respect for other individuals who had again assumed the task of becoming fully developed individuals. These people

would be concerned with the course and purpose of their lives and the development of meaningful political and moral structures would again flourish.

The fourth phase incorporates the romantic notions which Kant leaves as his legacy. But a romanticism that promotes human dignity and calls forth men to exert their best efforts in a community of friendship and peace is a romanticism that modern society could do well to consider.

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