THE PROBLEM OF BEING

IN

HEIDEGGER
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By
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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The thesis is an attempt to a critical exegesis of Heidegger's problem of Being. It is "critical" in so far as it seeks to situate the question of Being with critical awareness of the positivistic and empirical ontology where a this is said "to be" only if it is pointable out there in physical space and time. It attempts to show that for Heidegger Being is not a this but a meaning-giving (Sinngebung) question - a question which becomes concrete from the fact of man's being "there" (da) in the world. Man's being-there (da-Sein) makes the question of the meaning of Being possible. In so far as the thesis attempts to clarify the horizon within which Heidegger's questioning makes its intended sense, it is "exegetical". A critical exegesis of a philosophical view requires a proper mapping of the conceptual framework within which a certain philosophical thinking grows, moves and has its being. Without "a proper mapping of the
conceptual framework", and boundary-setting philosophies look upon one another with fear and suspicion. A felt necessity of "boundary-setting" guides Heidegger to lay the foundation of fundamental phenomenological ontology where "Being" itself becomes a "matter of thinking" (die Sache des Denkens).

Heidegger's question is not "What is Being?" but how to question, think and speak what Being is. The what of Being in other words is a matter of how to understand the question of Being and speak what it is. It is the question of thinking and speaking that Being is (es gibt Sein). Since philosophy here is concerned equally with the method and with the subject-matter, the problem of Being necessarily brings about the problem of the logos of Being. The method and the theme of philosophy intercede and constitute the unity of Heidegger's thought. The central theme of Heidegger's thought - the problem of Being - underlies, grows and culminates like a dialectical process through phenomenology, thinking and language.

The exegesis of the inner dialectic of the theme and method requires its treatment in two parts. The first part of the thesis is concerned with the clarification of basic philosophical categories aimed to clarify the question about the meaning of Being. Its aim is to clarify Heidegger's fundamental philosophical approach. A discussion of these categories - like "the problem of ontological
difference", "forgetfulness of Being" and "clearing-ground" forms the subject-matter of the first part. The second part deals with the problem of the method, or the how "what Being is" can be said or shown. An understanding of "what is the question about the meaning of Being" thus requires an understanding of what Heidegger means by phenomenology, thinking and language. It is our aim to reconcile the question of phenomenology, thinking and language with Heidegger's basic question about the meaning of Being. The thesis however does not claim to say the last word on the problem. It is rather a synoptic attempt to point out the fundamental horizon of Heidegger's basic question - the question about the meaning of Being.
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Dedicated to
the love of my parents
and
my wife Savitri
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It is necessary to say and think that Being is.

--Parmenides, Fragments, 6

For manifestly you have been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.

--Plato, Sophistes 244a

We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun is man.

* * * * *

We may venture the step back out of philosophy into the thinking of Being as soon as we have grown familiar with the provenance of thinking.

--Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens
I

THE PROBLEM OF BEING

1. Introduction

Philosophy for Heidegger is the clarification of what does it mean to ask about "Being". Questioning has its own logic. It determines the possibility of meaning and keeps thinking on the way. The danger, which Heidegger sees to be threatening man and philosophy today, consists in not that "Being" has lost its meaning but in the loss of questioning. The question of the meaning requires man's authentic engagement in the act of questioning and thinking. "Only questioningly"¹ does both Being and its meaning show itself. The question of Being requires man "to ask the question, that is, to bring it about, to raise it, to feel its inevitability."²

Heidegger's is not the philosophy of category-formation, or detection of category-mistakes. He rather calls man to question his historical being-in-the-world, to disclose his authentic potentiality to be the da (there)


²Ibid., p. 1.
of Being (Sein). The question of Being must be. For by "the hidden power of this question" says Heidegger" each of us is grazed at least once." This is not to say that it is a question with which man is "proximately" and "for the most part" is concerned. The question of Being is not something that lies open on the surface of everyday existence. It is rather the "ground" or "depth" question.

The meaning of Being mediates the history of being there (da-sein) in the act of questioning. The logic of questioning represents the possibility of intuiting the meaning of Being. Heidegger's basic question "why are there beings rather than nothing" is another way of asking about the meaning of Being. "To ask this question is to philosophise." It is the way to understand or participate into the "understanding of Being" (Seinsverständnis) which primordially belongs to man. But questions, says Heidegger, are not "ready-made like shoes and clothes and books." To question is to "leap" which "opens up its own source", the "finding of one's own ground."
To be able to question for Heidegger is to be able to be authentic. His whole thinking is directed towards the disclosure of hidden power and possibility of questioning. He is conscious of the contradiction which "everyday" and "pragmatic" mode of being presents to the possibility of authentic being and questioning. Modern age "regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched with hands looks on questioning as 'remote from reality'". And it is from this deeprooted phenomenon of modern age arises the logic of "logical positivism" which throws the question of "Being" into the region of metaphysical "nonsense", a something unspeakable for philosophy.

Our attempt is to show that logical empiricism, psychologism and behaviouristic analysis of modern philosophy and science do not constitute the whole of philosophy and its method. Heidegger has consistently shown, as we will see later on, that metaphysics is possible and "Being" is something thinkable and speakable. That "Being is speakable" however requires a different sort of philosophical investigation, not logico-positivistic analysis of language but phenomenological analysis of thinking and speech. Phenomenology of the ontological or existential structures of Dasein shows that "meaning is

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8Ibid., p. 172.

9An elaborate discussion of the idea of "existence"
Meanings here are constitutive of the apriori structures of Dasein. Meaning is not a "free-floating" property of propositions conceived as the logical picture of the world that is the case. The problem of meaning is much deeper problem to allow for psychoanalysis and empirical verification. Meaning is given in the very act of phenomenological disclosure (A-letheia) of the existential structures of Dasein. Dasein or "being-in-the-world" represents the sole possibility of the disclosure of meaning and truth of Being.

The question about the meaning of Being is a question distinct from historical and empirical questions about man and the entities alongside being-in-the-world. Meaning of Being "enters into the intelligibility of Dasein." But everyday mode of being-in-the-world and everyday mode of using language keeps the question of the meaning of Being concealed or forgotten. The phenomenon of everydayness of man's being and speech conceals or lets man remain forgetful of the question of Being. And from

\[\text{an existentiale of Dasein}.^{10}\]

It is however necessary to note that "Dasein" is term desig-native of the possibility of the question of Being, and the category of "existence" unlike traditional metaphysics is exclusively used for Dasein. Dasein alone "exists" or stands out in the mode of questioning.


\[11\text{Ibid., p. 193.}\]
this phenomenon of forgetfulness arises the need for 
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis or disclosure of 
the possibility of the questioning about the meaning of 
Being.

The logic of Heidegger's questioning, it is 
necessary to note, consists in his subtle distinction 
between the "ontic" and the "ontological", "everyday" or 
inauthentic and authentic concern of thinking and speech. 
The question of Being belongs to the latter dimension, the 
authentic and "depth" dimension of thinking and speech. 
Heidegger further maintains the methological distinction 
between the empirical and "natural standpoint" that 
maintains the subject/object duality and fosters realist/
idealist controversy for its sustenance and "phenomenolo-
gical standpoint" which seeks to go beyond the muddle of 
natural standpoint. The question of Being is asked from 
the standpoint of fundamental "phenomenological ontology." 12

A word is needed to clarify the idea of "critical 
exegesis" our basic methodological stance. It is 
tantological to say "critical exegesis". For "exegesis" is 
"critical" in so far as it is understood to be the herme-
neutic way of letting be the true intentionality or 
meaning of something it is an exegesis of. By "critical"

12 B. T., p. 62, for further clarification of 
Heidegger's phenomenological standpoint see Part II on 
Phenomenology.
we do not mean a constructive or destructive assessment but a reflective exegesis which lets open the standpoint of the author to speak for itself. A fundamentally objective approach we take to be the standpoint of "critical exegesis". An objective critical exegesis requires furthermore a reflective suspension of all other standpoints to uncover the logical meaning of a particular philosophical system.

Our aim therefore is to offer an objective critique or explication of Heidegger's basic question - the question of the meaning of Being. We aim to point out, wherever necessary, the areas of concealment and distortion in current mode of interpretation. The thematic unity of the problem of Being remains concealed and the fundamental phenomenological standpoint remains distorted for the most part in current interpretation of Heidegger's thought. The phenomenological question of Sein und Zeit is often represented to be disparate or something "reversed" in the later questions of thinking and language.

Herbert Spiegelberg in The Phenomenological Movement only represents the current mode of interpretation which maintains the Kehre theory in Heidegger's thought. He holds the view that Heidegger of Sein und Zeit who avers phenomenological standpoint "breaks off" and he "ceased to
talk phenomenology."\textsuperscript{13} Spiegelberg goes on to say that not only Heidegger "drifted away from his original conception of phenomenology" but that phenomenology "never was an integral part of his philosophy."\textsuperscript{14} There are others who go still further to say that the metaphysics of \textit{Sein und Zeit} is "not what Heidegger means today."\textsuperscript{15} The later Heidegger surprisingly enough comes to be misunderstood by others as the "mystic poet and godless theologian" with "prophetic-kerygmatic" form of thinking.\textsuperscript{16}

Our attempt in the following pages is to present an \textit{alternative reading} of Heidegger's thought. Our analytic of the central question of Heidegger's thought aims to explicate the underlying unity of his system or philosophical method. The question of Being not only begins with the clarity of phenomenological standpoint but that latter grows and endures as purified and authentic possibility of thinking (Möglichkeit des Denkens) and language. That is, from no criterion whatsoever can one


\textsuperscript{14} Herbert Spiegelberg, \textit{ibid.}, p. 348.


maintain that Heidegger's conception of thinking and language is different from his phenomenological question of Sein und Zeit, or that his later thinking represents a "reversal" from phenomenological form of thinking.

Before turning on to the later discussion we may say by way of envisagement of the central position of the thesis: (1) that the question about the meaning of Being is the first and the foremost question since Sein und Zeit and remains constant along Heidegger's path of thinking, (2) that phenomenology constitutes the "standard method of philosophy" (die massgebende Methode der Philosophie) of Being, and (3) that "the groundless, endless prattle about the reversal" arises from a deliberate misunderstanding on the part of his critics and for which Heidegger seen from the difficult nature of his thinking is least responsible. His questioning and thinking rather than being empirical is of the nature of pure phenomenology which demands an understanding that knows how to question and "wait even a whole lifetime".


18 Ibid., p. xvii.

2. Centrality, Necessity and Structure of the Being-Question

To say that the question of Being is central question of Heidegger's thought is not to say that it is something that is not in the beginning or in the end but only appears in the centre. The meaning of centrality rather denotes the conceptual or thematic unity of his thought. That is, the question of Being is the one central theme that runs throughout his thinking. Heidegger begins with the question of Being, and keeps asking the same question in the developing forms of later questionings about thinking and language. The question of Being is so central to his thought, so closely related to later questionings that without it Heidegger's later questionings and thinking do not make much sense. We can talk of earlier and later Heidegger only in relation to development of his thought in time but not as "earlier" and "later" in relation to his central thought for the earlier and later are bound together in the central unity of the question of Being. "Only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II."20

The notion of centrality of the question of Being

20William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xxii.
once clarified shall also shed light on the hitherto ignored centrality of the phenomenological method in Heidegger's thought. The idea of phenomenology regulates and determines both early and later thinking of Heidegger with only difference that later Heidegger does not talk phenomenology but does it, he cares phenomenology more than the movement.

The question about the meaning of Being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein) constitutes the leading question which determines Heidegger's path of thinking. Sein und Zeit begins with the claim of raising anew the question of Being:

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression "Being"? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely.  

The idea of the centrality of the phenomenological method is elaborately envisaged and discussed in Part II of this thesis. Heidegger's own notion of phenomenology explains the nature of his questions about Being, thinking and language-phenomenology understood as the disclosive phenomenon of thinking that lets the object of thinking be. See William Richardson, ibid., p. xiv.


In preface to the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger reaffirms that the phenomenological ontology of the existential structures of Dasein is necessary "road" "if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being."24 A careful inquiry into Heidegger's thought shall show that the entity (in extended sense of the term) called "Dasein" has a unique belonging togetherness with the question of Being. "Being" is so closely related to the Da, There or the possibility of its disclosedness (da-sein) that the relatedness constitutes a hermeneutic circle - the circle of being-there (Da-sein) and "Being" that is da (there) from Dasein's being-in-the-world. The circle is not a vicious one. It does not constitute the weakness of thought. It rather clarifies the philosophical position of Heidegger, namely the question of Being is not an abstract but concrete question for Dasein's being-in-the-world constitutes the historical and temporal nucleus for the asking of the question. The real problem of philosophy for Heidegger is not to transcend the "Circle" but how "to come into it in the right way."25 The question is not to say that the question of Being is meaningful but to radicalize and pinpoint the existential context which not only makes the question meaningful but also makes the raising of

24 Ibid., p. v.

25 Ibid., p. 195.
the question possible and "concrete".

The existential analytic shows that Dasein is "the structure of meaning". Dasein, as we shall later on see, is not an anthropocentric concept but constitutes the possibility of the logos of Being. It is ontologically prior to all entities in the question of Being for to it belongs a constitutive understanding of Being. "The analytic of Dasein is not aimed at laying an ontological basis for anthropology; its purpose is one of fundamental ontology." The question of Being thus constitutes the all-pervading sense of delight that runs through the general drama of the existential analytic of the da of Being (Da-sein) in the world not as "everyday" but "authentic" potentiality of being, thinking and language.

Not only Being is the central object of questioning but it is also the necessary question for thinking. Heidegger, it is necessary to note, is not attracted by the question of Being for the mere joy of metaphysical indulgence. Philosophy for him is not a bloodless dance of categories, or detecting category-mistakes but a way that

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 244. Heidegger calls his existential phenomenology as "fundamental ontology" to distinguish it from the history of past ontologies or empirical and conceptual ontologies where Being is represented as beings, as a this, or a hypokeimenon rather than as Being, the authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the world, the authentic potentiality for thinking and language.
listens to the call of authentic questioning and thinking and goes back into the ground of categories -- the fundamental ground of Being which is the primordial basis of metaphysical categories. The question of Being constitutes the genesis of Philosophy. "To ask the question signifies: a daring attempt to fathom this unfathomable question by disclosing what it summons to ask, to push our questioning to the very end. Where such attempt occurs there is philosophy."\textsuperscript{28}

Heidegger grounds philosophy in the structure of man's being-there in the world. It is not a language-game or game of thinking that one chooses to play or not play. It is rather "autonomous creative" possibility and necessity of "man's historical being-there."\textsuperscript{29} Philosophical thinking is "l'engagement by and for the truth of Being", and it determines the truth of every human situation.\textsuperscript{30}

What Heidegger seems to say is this: that there is something compelling in the constitution of man's historical being that calls forth or lets both philosophy and the question of Being be. The question of Being that calls forth philosophical thinking is autonomous creative possibility and necessity.

\textsuperscript{28}Martin Heidegger, \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 8.

sibility and necessity of man's history of being-in-the-world. That is, to man's being-there there already belongs a vague average understanding of Being." 31

The question of Being is necessary and inevitable by the very constitution of man. It may remain forgotten, unheeded, unasked but the fact is that it is there and possible:

Each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes blurred.... It is present in moments of rejoicing.... The question is upon us in boredom.... When everything about us seems so hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not. 32

Furthermore the question of Being is not only necessary thing for questioning because man's existential constitution so demands but also because it is a question that remains "trivialized" or questioned from the wrong way in the history of metaphysics from Plato to the logic of Hegel. 33 The Being-question remains continually "disturbing" but it is conceived to be "the most universal and emptiest of concepts", something "self-evident", "obscure", and

31 B.T., p. 25.

32 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 1-2. (Underlines are mine.)

33 B.T. p. 2.
"hidden". The notion of metaphysical forgetfulness of the question of Being constitutes the notion of necessity apart from existential necessity which springs from the constitutive nature of man. The raison d'être of the notion of necessity for asking anew the question of Being is thus built upon the notion of twofold necessity springing from the existential context of Dasein and historical context of metaphysical forgetfulness of Being. Philosophical thinking is constrained to undergo a Copernican revolution. It is faced by historical necessity to make a leap into the clearing of Being. A backtrack from traditional metaphysical thinking -- the thinking which, says Heidegger,

always thinks only of beings as such and never of Being as such.... Philosophy, even when critical, as in Descartes and Kant, always follows the procedure of metaphysical representation. It thinks from beings to beings with a glance in passing at Being. For the light of Being already implies each departure from beings and each return to them.

34Ibid.

35The notion central to Heidegger's thought is separately treated in the following sections. It holds that there has been a general forgetfulness of the question of Being in the history of metaphysics which represents Being as beings.

36We deliberately use the phrase "Copernical revolution" to represent Heidegger's bold enterprise to effect a revolutionary turn into the course of metaphysical thinking -- a way back into the ground of metaphysics through letting Being be.

The nature of "what is sought" determines the nature of every seeking and inquiry\(^{38}\) and vice versa. That is, the nature of inquiry into the meaning of Being is determined by what is meant by Being. The question of Being does not seek to uncover the meaning of some noetic heaven of ideas beyond time and history but to uncover the meaning of Being in historical being-there (Da-sein) in time. Being is not some "spirit", "God" or absolute of the dialectical space but the question of a "factual" "vague average understanding of Being" that always belongs to man being-in-the world. For

out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards that conception. We do not know what 'Being' means. But even if we ask 'What is "Being"?', we keep within an understanding of 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact.\(^{39}\)

Since a "vague understanding of Being is still a fact" phenomenological fundamental ontology or metaphysics of Being is not only possible but inevitable.\(^{40}\) And it is

\(^{38}\)B. T. p. 24.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 25; underlines are my own.

\(^{40}\)"Metaphysics is a name for the pivotal point and core of all philosophy." Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 14.
possible in the concrete way. For everything we talk about...everything we comport ourselves in any way is being; what we are is being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is in Reality, in presence-at-hand, in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the 'there is.'

Heidegger, it is necessary to note, is not interested in "many senses" of Being which according to him results in the forgetfulness of traditional metaphysics or failure to ask the question about the meaning of Being. The question of Being rather aims at the "radicalization" of "an entity's mode of Being" for which Being itself is an issue and "inquiry" and "questioning" is "one of the possibilities of its Being." The question of Being is asked not from the empirical context of beings nor from the ideal and transcendental context of absolute Being. It is rather asked from a factual and concrete context of man's historical being-there and his possibility to ask the question.

We ask the questions "How does it stand with being?" "What is the meaning of Being"? Not in order to set up an ontology on the traditional style, much less to criticise the past mistakes of ontology. We are concerned with something different: to restore man's historical being-there....

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42 B.T. p. 27.

43 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 34.
The bold question "What is Being" by itself, it is necessary to note, is both ambiguous and elliptical in linguistic form. "Ambiguous" because it gives the notion that the what of "Being" as it were a this alongside other entities to be "baptised by a name" (Wittgenstein). "Elliptical" because it presupposes the intuition of understanding (vague average understanding of Being which belongs to the constitution of Dasein) and requires further edition, analysis and clarification, in other words it makes the language-game inevitable.

The right and clear way of asking the question then is to ask about "the meaning of Being" (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein), or about the Being of beings (das Sein der Seinden). The right aim is to clarify "why at all does or should man ask the question of Being?" And lastly the right way of approaching the question is to clarify and radicalize the entity who stands in asking the question, the Da (there of Being (das Sein) in the act of asking the question. For central to all these different modes of asking the question is the problem of the truth or disclosure (A-letheia) of Being. These different modes of questioning shall now on be separately taken up as the problem of ontological difference, the forgetfulness of Being and the clearing-ground of Being.
3. The Ontological Difference

The nature of "what is thought", as noted before, determines the nature of philosophical inquiry. That is, the object of thinking calls forth a definite philosophical standpoint - phenomenological or empirical. A philosophical standpoint commensurates or accords with the object of inquiry. The relationship between philosophical standpoint and the object of inquiry is so intimate and inseparable that only in reference to that nexus the critique of philosophy makes any sense whatsoever. The phenomenological époque or the bracketing of the natural standpoint presupposes or demands the époque of the naturalistic and positivistic critique of philosophy. Philosophy, that is to say rather than being guided by the critique, must guide it. The critique of philosophy is not an autonomous activity, it is determined by what philosophy is about.

What philosophy needs is not so much the critique of philosophy as philosophy of critique or hermeneutics. Philosophy of critique or hermeneutics is fundamental presupposition of philosophy. Philosophy of critique (metaphilosophy or philosophy of the critique of philosophy)

The phenomenological for Heidegger is what is ontological or existential. It fundamentally differs from the "natural standpoint" of empirical ontology, for the object of Phenomenology - The Truth of Being is not of the nature of specifiable, verifiable, nameable or psycho-analysable beings. Being is ontologically different from beings. Ontology proceeds from man's special mode of being or existing as the da (there) of Being (Da-Sein).
is the method of inter-bracketing. It is the method through which philosophy seeks to clarify the conflict and confusion between the phenomenological and the empirical standpoint - the method of bracketing the empirical-for-phenomenological and phenomenological-for-the-empirical critique of language and thinking. It is through which philosophy must critically and reflectively detach itself from being reduced to a mere critique of "nonsense". The critique of philosophy is doomed to failure if it fails to recognise the necessity of inter-bracketing, and continues to confuse the phenomenological with what is empirically reducible or desirable. Boundary-setting is not the weakness of philosophy but necessary for the expression and clarification of different possible philosophical standpoints. Problems of philosophy thus arise from imposing or super-imposing the criteria of one philosophical method on the other. The full-blooded scepticism of empirical epistemology, and the notion of the world as the concrete totality of facts need differentiation and bracketing from and for the phenomenological reduction of the language of Being.

The concept of ontological difference proceeds from a conscious realization of the limitation of the method of empirical epistemology and metaphysics. The notion of ontological difference therefore is to Heidegger's phenomenological ontology what the phenomenolo-
gical epoché is to Husserl's phenomenological philosophy of the Lebenswelt. It is the key-concept to the understanding of the question of Being. It seeks to avoid the confusion between Being and beings. As the phenomenological epoché (Husserl) seeks to avoid the confusion between the "natural standpoint" and the Lebenswelt ("life-world"), between "transcendental intentionality" and the natural, psychological or Psychopathological states, the concept of ontological difference puts all notions of representable beings out of action from the inquiry about the meaning of Being. That is, Being is the "matter of thinking" (die Sache des Denkens), it is itself not a being (seiende).\textsuperscript{45} Heidegger does not say "Being is" but that it is.\textsuperscript{46} Being is conceived to be something fundamentally different from literal, representational and determinate signification of beings or entities deciferable in physical time and space.

Hence Being as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered. According, what is to be found by the asking - the meaning of Being - also demands that it be conceived "in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with


\textsuperscript{46}Ibid. Wir sagen nicht: Sein ist,...sondern: es gibt sein". P. 22.
the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification.\textsuperscript{47}

The notion of ontological difference (ontologische Differenz), not only does it clarify the confusion of the difference between Being and being by representing "Being" as a this or a being, but also avoids the fact/value distinction of empirical epistemology. Being is neither an "is" nor a value in the process of transvaluation, a creature of cultural evolution. Being rather belongs to the fundamental structure of human existence which makes the uncovering of meaning or the asking of the question of Being possible.

The notion of ontological difference furthermore implies the notion of an essential difference between phenomenological ontology or disclosure of Being and empirical epistemology of beings - the distinction between the totality of existential structures of Dasein and the "totality of facts" (Wittgenstein). It would be clear in our later discussion that the confusion of Being and beings result from the confusion of phenomenology and empirical epistemology.

The meaning of Being cannot be grasped or clarified by an empirical analysis of entities present-at-hand (vorhandenheit). Rather than solving the problem, empirical analysis tends to dissolve the problem itself. The logic

\textsuperscript{47}B. T., p. 26.
of empiricism fails to find a "sensuous intuition" of Being as such. Either "Being" is what we do not know or it belongs to the meaningless quandary of metaphysical construction. The "clear-cut division" between the two realms - phenomenological and empirical - thus remains for the most part blurred in the history of past ontology. "The meaning of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being."48

The notion of ontological difference is basic to the fundamental distinction of phenomenology ontology that shows the thing as it in itself and literal language of empirical ontology. In so far as the notion of ontological difference arises from the notion of fundamental phenomenology it aims to avoid the idealist/realist controversy. The difference of Being from beings does not mean that "Being" is some "wholly other" being inhabiting the noetic or dialectic space, nor does it mean that its meaning can be shown in the language of common sense realism. Neither Being is completely different or "wholly other", nor is it identifiable as one or the other sort of beings present-at-hand. "Being is always the Being of an entity"49 does not mean that Being is a similar or an identifiable this. It rather means that "Being" is not an


49 Ibid., p. 29.
ideal but something concrete phenomenon of human thinking and speech.

The concept of "ontological difference", it is necessary to note, is something we can think and speak about, but we cannot represent it, for Being is not a representable this. Despite its unrepresentability, the "thinking of difference we meet", says Heidegger, "at the beginning of the history of metaphysics, runs through its periods and yet remains hidden, and hence forgotten, as an issue in an oblivion which escapes even us."⁵⁰

The concept of ontological difference, in so far as it is a way of avoiding and combating the notion of "wholly otherness" of metaphysical ideas and the common sense realism of positivistic and empirical ontology, comes very close to Husserl's idea of phenomenological epoche (bracketing).⁵¹ But the notion of ontological difference


⁵¹ The phenomenological epoche or bracketing of the natural standpoint is fundamentally necessary for all authentic thinking and speech. It is the conditio sine qua non for any philosophical reduction or critique of pure intuitions or meanings. Kant's critique of pure reason failed to be the critique of pure cognition of things themselves (to things themselves is the aim of phenomenology) because it did not have the proper method of phenomenological epoche. That is, he failed to suspend the phenomenal realm of sensibility and understanding. It is necessary for philosophy which aims to go back into the ground of metaphysics. It is that which makes Heidegger's thought succeed where Kant miserably failed. To bracket is not to
differs from the notion of phenomenological *epoché* in so far as it allows for the existential analytic of Dasein's natural standpoints or everyday structures of being-in-the-world. The "thing itself" of Heidegger's phenomenological reduction of being-in-the-world is Being itself (sein selbst) rather than "transcendental intentionality" (Husserl). The ground of phenomenological reduction for Heidegger is not the actuality of the *ego-cogito*, but the full-blooded possibility of the *sum*.\(^{52}\)

The ontological difference presupposes a "bi-furcation" of the essence of truth into the "ontic" and the "ontological", or the difference between Being and beings. The ground of ontological difference is the "Transcendence of Dasein".\(^{53}\) For over against all beings Dasein has the possibility to stand in the openness of Being. The meaning of Being is "thought of as emerging from difference."\(^{54}\) Since Dasein has the possibility to

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\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{54}\) Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, p. 58.
stand in the clearing of Being, "Being" is not something thought-provoking for authentic thinking and metaphysics, but also pervades in the history of Dasein's being-in-the-world. It is something most questionable thing for man's possibility of asking the question.

Although Being provokes human thinking, yet it does not mean that it can be represented as a this. For "no-where in existence is there an example of Being, presumably because the essence of Being is the play itself."^55 Like the ideas, says Heidegger, of "physis Logos, En, Idea, Energeia, substantiality; objectivity, subjectivity, will, will to power, will to will" Being does not allow of being "neatly arranged like apples, pears, and peaches, displayed on the counter of historical ideas."^56 Demand for literal translation and representation of "Being" is misguided. It fails to listen to the voice of signifying word (Phone semanticae). It represents, what Prof. Paul Ricoeur aptly says, "a crisis of language" which on its deeper level represents the "crisis of reflection"^57 or "thinking" (das Denkens) itself. For Heidegger, to understand the signification of the word requires the disclosure of

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^56 Ibid., p. 59.

authentic thinking which prepares the genesis of the language of Being. The crisis of language, thinking and phenomenological interpretation of Dasein's being-in-the-world represent, in other words, the loss of the logic of ontological difference in philosophy. It is only in paying attention to the logic of ontological difference the crisis of language and phenomenological thinking can be overcome.

The logic of ontological difference shows that the meaning of "Being" is not swallowed up by the empirical structure of language. "Being" cannot be represented by one among "many senses of beings". It is not a particular this, nor a universal abstracted from the similarities and differences of this or that class of beings. To put in linguistic form: "Being is not a being or a this." The "Not" (Das Nicht) between "Being" and "beings" represents the logic of ontological difference (die ontologische Differenz ist das Nicht zwischen Seienden und Sein). The Not (das Nicht) does not signify an empty nihil (nihil negativum), nor is it an intellectual distinction. It rather clarifies the logic and language of ontological difference, that is, "the what of Being is not a being". The what of "Being" is to be thought of and disclosed in

58 Heidegger, Essence of Reason, Preface, p. 3.

59 Ibid.
the clearing of the logic of ontological difference which sees "the Difference as Difference", and not something altogether "Different". The ontological difference thus represents "the presence (die Anwesenheit) of what is present" in the difference between Being and beings. For Being is not a thing (Sein aber ist kein Ding).\textsuperscript{60} Being as "presence" (als Anwesenheit) is the "unconcealedness, the rising from the unconcealedness, the entry into the unconcealedness, the radiance, the rest, the hidden suddenness of possible absenting."\textsuperscript{61}

Being as die Anwesenheit or event (das Ereignis),\textsuperscript{62} it is necessary to note, is the concept fundamental to Heidegger's thought. For it signifies the historical and temporal character of "Being", and it distinguishes "Being" from the metaphysico-theological notion of everlasting presence. The notions of "possible absenting", concealing or being in state of forgetfulness distinguishes Heidegger's conception of Being from that of scholastic metaphysics and theology. Being for Heidegger is not a creature inhabiting the noetic space conceived by conceptual metaphysics. Nor does Being represent the mystical limit of speech. It is rather something always present in language as the hidden

\textsuperscript{60}Martin Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein", L'endurance de la Pensee, p. 18.


\textsuperscript{62}op. cit., p. 58.
power of the signifying word - a something language is called upon to express or speak. Language that speaks about the meaning of Being is the language which discloses the logic of ontological difference. That is, "when we say 'Being', it means 'Being of beings'. When we say 'beings', it means 'beings in respect of Being'. We are always speaking within the duality."63

The language of ontological difference has a double-edged logic. On the one hand it shows the ambiguity of everyday language which conceives "to be" to be something demonstratable or representable as a this (horse, chair, man etc.), on the other hand it combats against the Platonic notion of an altogether different universe of being - an ideal realm as against the empirical realm of the particulars or beings (Seienden). "Plato means to say: beings and Being are in different places... Thus when Plato gives thought to the different location of beings and Being, he is asking for the totally different place of Being as against the place of beings."64 Ontology, whether it is Platonic or empirical, is not the fundamental ontology (Heidegger) which seeks the disclosure of the truth of Being in the fundamental disclosure of the ontological difference.


64 Ibid., p. 227.
"Being" can be spoken of only through the possessive case ("Being of beings), for the genitive case not only shows the relatedness but also conceals the genitive difference between Being and beings. To understand the phenomenological implication of the "genitive case" in the expression "Being of beings". For "we always meet existence (Seiende) and Being (Sein) in their difference". The terms "beings" and "Being" presuppose one another through the hidden power of the infinitive "to be", and the question "what does it mean 'to be' a being" brings us back to the question of "Being" which is "the Being or to be of beings" and itself a being. In our everyday commercium or concourse with beings (Seienden) man however is not free to pay any particular attention to the ontological difference between "beings" and beings in regard to their "Being".

Yet this liberty does not hold for all cases. By chance it may occur that thought will find itself called upon to answer the question: What is the meaning of this oft-mentioned Being? If under these conditions Being exhibits itself as a being of..., in the genitive difference, then the question just asked would be more to the point if rephrased: What in your opinion is the difference if both Being as Existence (Seiendes) each in their own way appear through the difference.65

The question "what does it mean to ask 'what is Being'" brings us back to the question "how does 'Being'
stand with 'beings'?" or the question "is Being itself a being"? If "Being" is a this or a being, then the question of capitalized "Being" a la Aristotle should be rejected as the question about pure universal. But if "Being" is not a this, then we are brought back to the question of ontological difference, namely "how is 'Being' different from 'beings' if it is said 'to be'?" In any case the problem of ontological difference becomes inescapable when a phenomenological thinking is provoked to bracket the natural standpoint of human way "to be" and seek its authentic self-expression in the clearing (Das Ereignis) of authentic being and speaking. For, Aristotle's saying, "a being becomes manifest (with regard to its Being) in many ways" (To 'on legetai pollaxos), according to Heidegger latently presupposes the question about the meaning of "Being". Aristotle's above statement, says Heidegger, provokes the question "what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?"
Furthermore, "What, then does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined?"66

What has gone wrong with Aristotelian conception

66 William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. x.
of the "many senses" of Being determines the history of metaphysics, namely, the forgetfulness of ontological difference. Being as "property", as "possibility and actuality", as "truth" and as "the schema of categories" bypasses the question of ontological difference. It fails to raise the question, "what sense of Being comes to expression in these four heading? How can they be brought into comprehensible accord?" or "what does the "to be" itself mean? What does the "to be" of beings mean?"

Aristotle seems to have solved the problem of Being by avoiding to think and clarify the problem of ontological difference which is co-implicate of our being, thinking and speaking. Being conceived as ousia or "presence" of the Being of beings (ousia, des Seins des Seienden erkannt: die Anwesenheit) is the concept of "the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings", and which cannot be represented as beings but only as the "Being of beings." The Aristotelian conception of ousia finds its most comprehensible expression in Heidegger's thought. Aristotle could not work out because of his literalism and nominalism which brackets the phenomenological question of Being in order to clarify the language of this or empirical entities in objective time and

67 Ibid., p. xii.
space. Aristotle seems to be unaware of the logical implication of the conception of ousia in bracketing the question of ontological difference between Being and beings, or not looking into the implication (phenomenological) of the genitive case ("Being of beings") which drives human thinking and speech as its fundamental co-implicate.

Philosophy, in forgetfulness of the logic of ontological difference, degenerates either into absolute idealism or naive or commonsense realism and empiricism. In either case it falls away from the clarity of the phenomenological method, the very possibility of fundamental ontology or the question about the meaning of Being. Heidegger's phenomenological fundamental ontology avoids the crisis of philosophical thinking and language which results from the conceptual and representative thinking of traditional metaphysics which thinks of "beings" (Seienden) without paying attention to "Being" as such, or thinks of "Being" as "different" from "beings" "without paying attention to difference as difference" (die Differenz als Differenz). 68 When philosophy fails to resolve the tension of idealism and common sense realism, it relapses in the fateful conflict of phenomenology and empirical epistemology. The cogito leaves the ground of the sum and relapses either in idealism or in the mystical, and the sum

68 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 63.
desperately confronts the brute facticity of everyday existence and forgets its authentic possibilities whereby the highest possibilities of the cogito and the sum get reconciled in the unconcealment of the truth of Being.

Closely tied with the concept of ontological difference and equally significant for the understanding of the question of Being is the notion of the forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). And it is this concept that we shall take up next in our analysis of the question of Being.

4. The Forgetfulness of Being

The forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), it is necessary to note, is one of the basic concepts which help to explain Heidegger's question of Being. For it represents man's average and everyday relationship to the world which tends towards a general loss of the questioning about Being, and in a more deeper way it tends to conceal Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being. Man's everyday comportment towards beings-present-at-hand, or everyday history of man's being-in-the-world oriented towards beings brings about the forgetfulness of the ontological difference between Being and beings. And as a result of this forgetfulness of the ontological difference there results a deeper forgetfulness of Being which pervades both the history of being-in-the-world and the history of metaphysics. Metaphysics forgets the question of Being either by
representing "Being" as beings, by conceiving Being as something supersensible. In either case metaphysical thinking remains either literal and nominalistic that is, empirical and naively realistic or idealistic and conceptual, and it fails to work out the problem of phenomenological disclosure of the ontological difference between Being and beings. The forgetfulness of Being thus represents the failure of philosophy to work out the problem of Being, a question of phenomenological ontology rather than empirical ontology and behaviouristic psychology which reduces metaphysics to the level of emotive speech and meaningless for all questions of facts.

Philosophy therefore requires a "back track" from conceptual metaphysics to the question about the "essence of metaphysics" which lets Being itself (sein selbst) be. A thinking and language of Being, as we shall see later on, becomes necessary to bring the mystery of ontological difference into the clarity (phenomenological or pure) of thinking and speech. An authentic thinking which "signifies memory, thanks" and "recalls" is necessary, for "Being" remains something like "an umbrella", says Heidegger, "which the forgetfulness of a philosopher has left somewhere."71


In the long history of philosophy the question of Being is represented as the question about "being as being" (die Frage nach dem Seienden als Seienden) and "Being" as such "remains as yet unquestioned."72

The forgetfulness of Being, it is necessary to note, is not a modern antithesis to the Platonic doctrine of Anamnesis, for Heidegger does not mean to hypostatize a pre-natal memory of the ideal realm of forms. The forgetfulness of Being has nothing to do with a whether-or-not question of a pre-natal existence. The question of Being is a question within time and history of man's being-in-the-world. And the forgetfulness of Being represents the existential relation of historical being-there (Da-Sein) in state of average everydayness or "lostness" to the fundamental question of Being. However, not only does it represent a misrelation of everyday Dasein to the Being-question, but it also represents the forgetfulness of the history of metaphysics in asking the question of Being without paying attention to the ontological difference.

The nominalism and conceptualism are equally opposed by Heidegger's fundamental phenomenological ontology. For both equally bring about the forgetfulness of Being.73

72 Ibid., p. 33; see also B.T., p. 487.

73 Seen from Heidegger's point of view, not only does the metaphysical tradition of nominalism and conceptualism represent the forgetfulness of Being, but the descriptive metaphysics of Strawson and others is also fraught with the same weakness - namely - the forgetfulness of ontological difference.
Both seek to represent Being as a "name" or a this or a concept (sensible or supersensible), whereas "Being" is neither a this nor a concept of a this. In either case the what of Being remains ungrasped or forgotten. "Being" (das sein) is a substantivised infinitive (sein = to be). It is not a concept of a substance or "primary ground" (Prote arché). Being misrepresented as "ground" is variously conceived as "Logos, a Hypokeimenon, as substance, as subject."74 None of these terms express the meaning of ontological difference, or grasp what is thought about in the question of Being. The language of traditional metaphysics is conceptual to the core. Being is not something to be filled in the narrow stretch of concepts. The question of Being demands an existential language which discloses what is questioned in the very mode of Dasein's act of questioning. In absence of the disclosure of Being as the authentic potentiality-for-being in the act of questioning, "these novel terms (Logos, Hypokeimenon, Substance, and Subject) which we have been using" says Heidegger, "...no longer suffice. For whatever these terms designate, whatever is represented by the mode of thinking stimulated by them, stems as that which is different."75

The conceptual thinking of metaphysics "stems from

74Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 53.
75Ibid., p. 64; underline is mine.
that which is different", it drives language away from thinking of the "difference". And the language bewitched by concepts fails to unconceal the thing-itself of thought - the truth of Being. Concepts themselves parade as the things themselves of conceptual metaphysics. The ontological difference "the ground-plan in the essential structure of metaphysics"\(^76\) becomes forgotten. The difficulty of language (metaphysical or conceptual) and thinking constitutes the difficulty of the question of Being.\(^77\) For when we say "This is a book", "This is a man, a tree etc.," we pay little attention to what is concealed and revealed in the little word "is". We take the structure of language for granted and do not care to see as to what does it mean to say that a thing is what it is. It is what it is, the question about the "is" does not seem to puzzle us. The question of Being does not occur to us in everyday use of language.

(Although) The little word "is" which is met everyday in our language and tells of Being even where it does not come to the fore, harbours the entire fate of Being, from the estin gar einai of Parmenides to the "is" of the speculative principle of Hegel and still further to the dissolution of the "is" in the positing of a will to power by Nietzsche.\(^78\)

\(^76\)Ibid.

\(^77\)Ibid., p. 66.

\(^78\)Ibid., p. 66.
From the inattention to the telling word "is" results the fallacy of **literalism** which represents Being as beings. The question of the **difference** between Being and beings is "never even been asked in the history of thought."\(^7^9\) The forgetfulness of Being thus results from the forgetfulness of the ontological difference.\(^8^0\) The notion of the forgetfulness of Being is not something Heidegger constructs to destroy metaphysics, but as he says it results from a patient and "decade-long attention paid to what has been, as evidenced in the metaphysical thinking of the west."\(^8^1\)

Reflecting upon the destructive critique of his question Heidegger says that his critics "do their best to show that this inquiry about Being brings only confusion, that its effect is destructive, that it is nihilism", and that criticism gets further accentuated "since the appearance of existentialism,"\(^8^2\) and logical positivism. The positivistic critique even goes so far

\(^7^9\)Ibid., p. 43.
\(^8^0\)Ibid.
\(^8^1\)Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, p. 91.

Heidegger seems to distinguish his view from the popular form of "existentialism". His concept of "existence" assumes an altogether different signification in *The Letter on Humanism*. By breaking the word as "ex-sistence", which we shall discuss later on, he attributes it to the meaning of Man as being the Da of Sein, the possibility to stand in the clearing ground of Being.
as to say that the question of "Being" is a misleading use of the term. "Being" becomes a thing of question from a metaphysical "superstition", it is a misleading expression of "a superficial grammatical feature" of language, which on its face is deceptive for the "sentences which express existential propositions and sentences which express attributive propositions may be of the same grammatical form." And to this A. J. Ayer further adds:

To this error must be attributed, not only the utterances of a Heidegger, who bases his metaphysic on the assumption that "Nothing" is a name which is used to denote something peculiarly mysterious, but also the prevalence of such problems as those concerning the reality of propositions and universals whose senselessness, though less obvious, is no less complete.

Heidegger, it is curious to note, along with positivism, is a harsh critic of traditional metaphysics. His critique of language-game, however, is directed at showing the inadequacy of the representative and conceptual language

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84 I think Ayer's critique results from a misreading of Heidegger, for no where does he confuse the ontological difference and involves the fallacious assumptions attributed to him. Besides Ayer needs to have read Heidegger's own theory of naming which treats names as expressing the "call" of thinking rather than denoting a this by draping language over a thing. See What Is Called Thinking?, p. 120.

of metaphysics. Unlike positivists, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is not a destructive one. By pointing out the ambiguities of metaphysical language, he shows the possibility of grounding metaphysics itself. His is not a reductionist method of "elimination of metaphysics" through a "logical analysis" of the "working" of language. He is not unaware of the "difficulty" of language ("das schwierige liegt in der sprache"). But that does not mean that the possibility of metaphysics is a closed issue of a nonsensical game of language. The inadequacy of "the 'abstractions' of formal logic", and "the language of metaphysics" only shows the insurmountable difficulty of the question of Being and not its absolute impossibility or senselessness. The expression "Being of beings" and "nothing" is not "a mere sequence of word", a mere metaphysical hypostatization of a "grammatical subject"

86 Ibid., p. 45.
87 Identity and Difference, p. 66. For German text see Identität und Differenz, p. 72.
88 B.T. p. 487.
90 Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language", Logical Positivism, p. 72.
or "following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense", as Carnap and Ayer would have us believe. The language of Being is the expression of the existential structures of being-in-the-world. The positivistic analysis of language, rather than succeeding in showing the meaninglessness of metaphysics, itself becomes meaningless in crossing beyond its empirical realm and trying to explain away that which it cannot speak about and where of it must have passed over in silence.

"Being" is not a metaphysical or "grammatical subject" hypostatized in a sentence or a slice of language; it is rather "something" which "pervades" the existential structures of Dasein, the modes of its being-in-the-world, its states-of-mind, understanding and speech. It is "already there". Nor is Being a metaphysical category subsisting in some noetic or dialectic space beyond the objective world of space and time, it is rather that which is identically present over against all beings. But it is not the "same" as beings; it can only be expressed as "Being of beings". It is neither an "attribute", nor a "name" of a this or a that; nor is it representable by any of the dichotomous categories of traditional metaphysics - subject/object, universal/particular. "Being", furthermore is not an empty word, nor the question about its meaning a mere poetic exercise of language. It is rather "the
worthiest of all questions", 92 and that, "which looks at the start as an empty word must therefore, contrary to this appearance, have a determinate meaning." 93 However, "Being and the understanding of being is not a given fact" 94 to be logically analysed and empirically verified as an entity among the "totality of facts." The traditional definition of Being as "permanent, always identical, already-there, given - all mean fundamentally the same: enduring presence, 'on as ousia'" 95 did not arise out of an accident. Heidegger says:

This definition of being is not accidental, it has grown out of the determination which dominates our historical being-there by virtue of its great beginning among the Greeks. If being has determinateness it is not because we have delimited a mere word meaning. The determinateness of being is the power which still sustains and dominates all our relations to the essent as a whole, to becoming, to appearance, to thinking, and to the ought. 96

To talk of the "determinateness" of Being is not to imply that Being is a representable "fact" or entity (seiende), or something of which proximally and for the most part man has a "clear and distinct idea", a something "demonstrable"

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., p. 169.
96 Ibid.
in the language of metaphysics. It is rather something which remains for the most part forgotten in historical being-in-the-world and the history of metaphysics. The obviousness and brute appearance of entities "present-at-hand" (vorhandenheit), and entities "ready-to-hand" (zuhandenheit),\(^97\) tempts language and thinking to "cultivate" the "familiar essents and suppose that it suffices to go on taking essent as essent." And from this cultivation of "essent as essent" arises the notion of Being as an empty Nihil ("das sein wie ein Nichts"),\(^98\) or the positivistic notion of "Pseudo-concept." "Nihilism" and "the forget-

\(^97\) Heidegger's idea of the world differs from Wittgenstein's idea of the world that is the case" or "totality of facts." Heidegger groups and analyses the factual world into two distinct categories, i.e., (a) entities "present-at-hand", (b) entities "ready-to-hand". Entities which have pragmatic use relationship to Dasein like a "hammer", "Book" and "the pathways" are the entities "ready-to-hand", and entities other than the range of Dasein's comportments" and "circumspection: are entities "present-at-hand". The meaning and distinction of entities depend upon Dasein's being-in-the-world. An entity present-at-hand, however, may pass over into an entity ready-to-hand and vice versa. That is, an entity present-at-hand like "a lump of clay", or a "log of wood" may turn into a "pot" or a "boat" or an entity ready-to-hand, and also they, when tossed into deformation, turn into present-at-hand.

It is not possible to talk of the world that is the case prior to historical being-there in the world. Entities are what they are, a mass of distinctionless ontic presence. The problem of language, meaning and truth has its origin in historical being-there-in-the-world. See B.T., division one Part one and Section III.

\(^98\) Ibid., p. 169; see for German expression, Einführung in die Metaphysic, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1966), p. 155.
fulness of Being" both result from cultivating "only the
essent" ("In der vergessenheit des Seins nur das Seiende
betreiben - das ist Mihilismus").\textsuperscript{99} So much so that
language pays little heed to the phenomenological sense of
the copula. Once the phenomenological sense of the "is" is
grasped, "it is mistake to talk about the indeterminateness
and emptiness of being."\textsuperscript{100}

The question about the meaning of Being is the
question about the unconcealment of what remains otherwise
hidden in forgetfulness.\textsuperscript{101} The forgetfulness of Being so
heavily takes possession of historical being-in-the-world and
speech, that the question of Being does not remain something
"obvious" and "ready-made". The forgetfulness of Being
results from the forgetfulness of the ontological difference.
The latter cannot be avoided due to the everyday structure
of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Dasein encounters for the
most part "beings" and not "Being" as such. Man uses the
copula "is" to connect a particular this of the entities
present-at and ready-to-hand (a tree, a man, a book and a
hammer) with a designative sign of language. The sign of
language replaces the thisness by a name and shows a this
to be "a book", "a tree" or a "man". But what does the

\textsuperscript{99}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid., p. 168.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., p. 16.
little word "is" points to never becomes a thing for question. "Is" provokes no question, it simply dangles between a subject and the predicate. "Being" for the most part thus raises no question at all. And there is no reason why should one attend to the phenomenological sense of a grammatical term when common usage does not seem to suggest any mystery concealed into it. Everything that is is and can be said clearly to be so. Therefore, it is often thought that "to go further and introduce being as distinct from it (Seiende) is artificial and leads to nothing."\textsuperscript{102} The empirical language despairs language by arbitrary setting limits to its expressibility. The positivistic critique of language ends in setting up "limits" to speech in accordance with its pseudonotion of "clarity" and "meaning". Rather than solving the problem, it dissolves the problem itself. Whereas if we look into possibility of a signifying speech (Phône semanticae) no such limit to the sayability of language can be set. What looks meaningless literally\textsuperscript{103} is meaningful from the meaning-giving (Singebung) structures of Dasein's being-in-the-world. In every case even

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p. 26.

\textsuperscript{103}"Our charge against the metaphysician is...that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. No statement that refers to a reality transcending the limits of possible sense-experience can be literally significant." A. J. Ayer, \textit{Language, Truth and Logic}, p. 17.
when the language of everyday or empirical metaphysics remains forgetful of Being, it is "fundamentally" asking about Being. 104

The idea of the forgetfulness of Being, it should be noted, is not a negative conception; it presupposes the possibility of a recollection of Being in thinking and speech. Heidegger says that the "oblivion" of Being preserves "untouched treasures", it is the "promise of a find," and only waiting for its "search". "Remembrance applies to this concealment in which unconcealment (Aletheia) is based." 105

There emerge two main points from the foregoing discussions: (1) the question of Being is neither a metaphysical construction nor a pseudo-concept, but is something basic and implicit in the "vague average understanding of Being" which already belongs to Dasein's being-in-the-world, and which even in the state of the forgetfulness of Being preserves the possibility of disclosure (Aletheia), (2) the question of Being is not only the "closest" (as part of the totality of existential structures of being-in-the-world) and the "farthest" (as something which remain forgotten in everyday being-in-the-world), but is also the foremost question that determines the fateful history of metaphysics "from the estin gar einai of Parmenides" to


105 Heidegger, The Question of Being, p. 91.
Nietzsche’s will to power. The metaphysical thinking in seeking to represent Being as beings represents a long history of the forgetfulness of Being, the forgetfulness of ontological difference. Like some Hume, metaphysics always "stumbles" on beings, represents Being as beings, always questions and seeks beings or something as the value of its bound variables rather than Being itself. At its best, it represents Being as Idea of noetic or dialectic space. The ontological difference thus remains forgotten.

A phenomenological analysis of the word "forgetfulness" (vergessenheit) reveals its Greek sense as "withdrawal into concealment". The counter-phenomenon to "forgetfulness" or "withdrawal into concealment" is "recollec-

tion" or bringing into un-concealment. This counter-

phenomenon of "recollec-

tion" or "bringing into un-concealment" is the implied sense of Plato's doctrine of 'anamnesis.

That is, "catching-sight-once-again, (hence) the revealing, of beings, sc. in that by which they sign-forth." (das wieder-zu-gesicht-Bekommen, das Entbergen, nämlich des Seienden in seinem Aussehen).106 If thus the truth of Being rests in oblivion as "the promise of a find", and Being remains the most unclear and forgotten in everyday being-in-the-world and in the representative thinking of metaphysics,

106 Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, Preface, pp. xii-xiii.
then the question about the meaning of Being is the question about the "clearing", "unconcealment", and "recollection" itself. And from this arises the question about the "way", the "process" of making manifest the what or thing itself, Being itself, which is the problem phenomenology, thinking and language. But before proceeding to take up the problem of the way and the method of unconcealing, that is, of phenomenology, thinking and language, it is necessary to take a look at the "clearing-ground" of Being, the "Da-sein" itself.

5. The Clearing-ground

"Da-sein" is the clearing-ground of Being. It is the fundamental presupposition of the question about the meaning and truth of Being. The word "Da-sein" signifies the possibility of a "there" or "openness" (da) of Being (Sein) in the world. Da-sein alone, of all entities, has the possibility of standing out in the openness of Being. It does not merely happen to be or "occur" among or alongside other entities. Ontically, it is distinguishable from entities other than itself in so far as Being itself is "an issue for it."107 To Da-sein's understanding

107 B. T., p. 32.
belongs "a disclosive potentiality-for-Being." 108 It is peculiar", says Heidegger, "to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological." 109

To say that Dasein is "ontological" means that it has its mode of "being in such a way" that "an understanding of Being" already belongs to it. 110 It is however, not possible to define "Dasein" in terms of empirical conception of man. Nor does "Dasein" represent a sociological or psychological view of man. It rather signifies the existential mode of being-in-the-world which constitutes the essence of man. The "what" of Dasein is "existence." 111 "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence" ('Das 'wesen' des Dasein liegt in seiner Existenz'). 112 The word "existence" (Existenz") must be distinguished from its traditional identification with "existential" which only signifies "Being-present-at-hand" (vorhandenheit), a kind of Being which is inappropriate to Dasein's character." 113

108 Ibid., p. 183.
109 Ibid., p. 32.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. 67
113 Ibid.
The term "existence" is sole significative of Dasein alone.\textsuperscript{114}

It is necessary to understand the meaning of the word "existence", for it constitutes the essence of Dasein's being-there-in-the world as "disclosive potentiality-for-Being". Its phenomenological sense must be distinguished from the sense attributed to it "in the language of metaphysics", where it is referred to "the reality of anything at all that is real, from God to a grain of sand."\textsuperscript{115} The meaning of the word "existence" points to the fundamental meaning of Dasein as the "clearing-ground" of Being. "In Being and Time the term existence is used exclusively for the being of man. Once 'existence' is understood rightly, the 'essence' of being-there can be recalled in its openness."\textsuperscript{116} The word "existence" denotes "a mode of Being", and "specifically, the Being of those beings who stand open for the openness of Being in which they stand, by standing it."\textsuperscript{117} Dasein as "existence" consists "in standing in the 'out' and 'there' of un-concealedness in which Being itself is present."\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., pp. 212-13.
To understand the meaning of the exclusive and constitutive essence of Dasein as "existence", let us read Heidegger's own words:

The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist. The proposition "man alone exists" does not mean by any means that man alone is a real being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human ideas. The proposition "man exists" means: man is that being whose Being is distinguished by the open-standing standing-in the unconcealeness of Being, from Being, in Being. 119

Dasein, thus, represents "the open-standing-in the unconcealeness of Being, from Being, in Being." The question of "existence" and "Dasein", however, is "subservient" to the question about the "meaning" and "truth" of Being. That is why "the treatise", says Heidegger, "which sought to point the way back into the ground of metaphysics did not bear the title 'Existence and Time', nor 'Consciousness and Time', but Being and Time." 120 "Dasein" understood as the clearing-ground of Being, "the open-standing-in the unconcealeness of Being, from Being, in Being" and "existence" as "ex-sistence" or the possibility to "dwell" and stand out in the openness and "clearing of Being" 121 clarifies the fallacy involved in anthropo-

119 Ibid., p. 213. 120 Ibid.
121 "Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism", ibid., p. 286.
The existential analytic of Dasein is the way that leads into the "ground of metaphysics", into the "clearing of Being", for Dasein as "ex-sisting" dwells in the truth of Being, and this "dwelling" is the essence of its "being-in-the-world." The unique meaning of "existence" and "Dasein" as the clearing-ground of Being defines the nature of Heidegger's philosophy which conceives "Being", as "the shelter that in view of its own truth shelters man in his ex-sisting essence in such a way that it lodges ex-sistence in language", which conceives "existence", as "ex-sistence" that "inhabits as it thinks the house of Being." His philosophy is the philosophy of Being, it is the phenomenology of Being rather than the so-called "existential philosophy". His philosophy differs from the existential philosophy of Sartre where man is "condemned" to be, to be "free". Whereas, man is "of Being, from Being, in Being" in Heidegger's thought; he is not a simulation of "Transcendental ego". Man is essentially a "being-in-the-world." The "world" is "the openness of Being. Man is and is man in so far as he alone of all being is said to be existing. He stands exposed to the openness of Being.

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122 Ibid., p. 298.
123 Ibid., p. 300.
124 Ibid.
an openness which is Being itself."  

Man is not a self-assertive "subject", his essence as "ex-sistence" lies "in the openness of Being." Man is not value-oriented being toward-God; he "brings" "the clearing of the truth of Being before thought." Heidegger's is not the philosophy of "atheistic humanism", nor is it "theistic humanism", about the "relationship between God and Dasein", it remains "indifferent."  

The idea of the essence of man as "existence" brackets the question of "consciousness", "subjectivity" and "rationality" and shows the phenomenon of "being-in-the-world" or the "ex-sistence of man" as "the standing in the clearing of Being", or "emerging into the truth of Being." Heidegger, thus, aims at avoiding the conflicting views of man which proceed from "Psychologism", "biologism" and "anthropologism." The essence of man lies in the existential structures of "being-in-the-world" and its immanent "understanding of Being." The "existential

\[125\text{Ibid.}, p. 293.\]
\[126\text{Ibid.}\]
\[127\text{Ibid.}\]
\[128\text{Ibid.}, p. 294.\]
\[129\text{Ibid.}, p. 277.\]
\[130\text{Ibid.}, p. 279.\]
analytic" of "being-in-the-world" in Sein und Zeit aims at opening the ecstatic relation to the clearing of Being. "131 Man is the "shepherd", the "neighbour" of Being, his essence as "ex-sistence consists of dwelling in the nearness of Being."132

The "existentiality" of Dasein is not the "actuality of the ego-cogito",133 nor is it an idea of "transcendental subjectivity", "soul" or "substance", it is "the ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being. It is the guardianship, i.e. the concern of Being",134 it is that which constitutes Dasein's "being-in-the-world", both its everyday actuality or inauthenticity, and its authentic possibility-for-Being.

To understand the meaning of "existentiality" of Dasein, "we must leap in order that we may experience in our own person the belonging-together of man and Being."135 The idea of "belonging-together of man and Being" means "an intertwining" of man and Being.136 It is, however, necessary to note, that Dasein's "everyday" being-in-the-world for the most part remains absorbed into the "they (Das Man).

131Ibid.
132Ibid., p. 288.
133Ibid., p. 289.
134Ibid.
135Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 23.
136Ibid., p. 22.
Dasein as "being-with-others" remains for the most part "inauthentic" and forgetful of its existentiality, its possibility of standing out into the openness and clearing of Being. His unique "mineness" 137 remains for the most part and "proximally" "undifferentiated." 138 Phenomenologically the "who" of "Being-in-the-world" proximally and for the most consists of "the mode of Dasein's average everydayness." 139 The everyday "world" of Dasein is a "with-world" (Mitwelt). "Being-in is Being-with others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with (Mit-Dasein). 140 The "who" or "self" of everyday Dasein is the "they" (Das Man), 141 or the "they-self" (das Man-selbst). 142

Howsoever forgetful and far dispersed Dasein may be in its everyday mode of existence, its possibility of recollecting the truth of Being, its "potentiality-for-Being", and its possibility of standing out in the "clearing of Being" is still constitutive of it. This is what further

137 B.T. pp., 67, 68.
138 Ibid., p. 69.
139 Ibid., p. 79.
140 Ibid., p. 155.
141 Ibid., p. 164.
142 Ibid., p. 167.
constitutes the ontico-ontological priority of Dasein in the question of Being, and its difference as "Being-in-the-world" from "Being-present-at-hand". Since "the involvement of Being in human nature is an essential feature of Being", the term "Dasein" is chosen to characterize in "a single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ("there") of Being as such." The existential analytic of Dasein thus aims at explicating "Dasein" as the clearing-ground of Being, the "sphere of Being in which man stands as man", which makes the question about the meaning of Being both possible and meaningful. It is, however, necessary to note that the meaning and truth of Being does not depend upon or "exhausts itself in being there, nor can it by any means simply be identified with it after the fashion of the metaphysical proposition: all objectivity is also subjectivity." Nor does the idea of "the involvement of Being in human nature" mean that the truth and meaning of Being is a solipsistic truth of "Being-

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143 "Martin Heidegger: The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 211.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid., p. 212.
in-the-world." Being is the phenomenological truth or "thing itself" of Dasein's being-in-the-world, the truth of thinking and speech. Dasein is the clearing-ground or "the location of the truth of Being", it can not be replaced by any other metaphysical terms "consciousness", "subjectivity", "objectivity", or "soul". It is the possibility of the disclosedness of Being-itself. Dasein is "cast" by Being itself to let itself be. It is subservient to Being.

Let us listen to Heidegger's own words:

Man is rather "cast" by Being itself into the truth of Being, in order that he, ex-sitting thus, may guard the truth of Being; in order that in the light of Being, being as beings may appear as what it is... Man is the guardian of Being. The thinking in Sein und Zeit proceeds towards this, when ecstatic existence only is experienced as "cave".\footnote{\textcopyright{Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism}, \textit{ibid.}, p. 281.}

Our foregoing discussion has tried to show (1) that Being is something ontologically different from all beings, and disguised in all predicates of "is", (2) that Being for the most part is no question at all in the history of Dasein's everyday being-in-world and the history of metaphysics (since it is either idealistic or empirical), (3) that Dasein is the clearing-ground or the possibility of the clearing of Being, (4) that Being is not a reified "consciousness", "spirit", "god" or "absolute Being" beyond time and history, but has its "involvement" and

\footnote{\textcopyright{Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism}, \textit{ibid.}, p. 281.}
"belonging togetherness" with "human nature" and speech. Since the question about the meaning of Being is essentially the question about the Logos or clearing of Being, our further discussion will be concerned with the question of how to say and show what Being is? or in other words, what is the way of phenomenology, thinking and language? Our aim is to show that phenomenology, thinking, and language constitute but one triadic path or hermeneutic possibility of the meaning and truth of Being.
II

THE PROBLEM OF THE LOGOS OF BEING

The question of Being in other words is the question about the logos of Being. The real problem is not that "Being is" (es gibt sein) but how to show and say that it is. Unlike Wittgenstein, for Heidegger what can be shown can also be said (was gezeigt werden kann, kann gesagt werden).1 The problem really is: "how is one to give a name to what he is still searching for"? (wie soll einer nennen, was er erst sucht?)2 The problem of how to show and say "what Being is" brings about the problem of phenomenology, thinking, and language. These three paths constitute but one triological path of "letting Being be" in Heidegger's thought - the hermeneutic path of the dis-

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. T. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 4-1212. Only by omitting the term "Nicht" from "was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden" is it possible for the Wittgensteinian critique of language to pass over Heidegger's notion of language where das sagen (saying) is the necessary presupposition of all possible showing (das zeigen). That is, critique of language is the fundamental presupposition of phenomenology which is a way back into the ground of fundamental ontology.

closure or truth of Being. For thinking and language belong together in the logos of Being. The saying of Parmenides: "one should both say and think that Being is" (χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ ὤν ἐστίν) clearly implies the togetherness of thinking and language, and according to Heidegger it stands as "the unspoken call that points to the beginning of western thinking." In the following discussions we shall attempt to show how the question of Being remains seated in the heart of his problems of phenomenology, thinking and language.

1. Phenomenology

Phenomenology for Heidegger is the way of giving a "demonstrative precision" to the fundamental theme of ontology - the question about the meaning of Being. "Only as phenomenology is ontology is possible."

Phenomenology, it is necessary to note, is the way that goes back to the thing itself (die Sache Selbst). The nature of the thing itself determines the nature of different phenomenological philosophies. As for example the different conceptions of the thing itself between Husserl and Heidegger constitutes the difference between the former's notion of transcendental phenomenology - the

4 B.T., p. 60.
phenomenology of the transcendental ego and universal phenomenological ontology of the latter - the phenomenology of the meaning and the truth of Being. The phenomenological truth or the thing itself of Husserl is transcendental subjectivity, for Heidegger it is the truth of Being as "transcendens pure and simple" (veritas transcendentalis).\(^5\) Both thus differ fundamentally in their notions of the thing itself, in their adherence to the phenomenological method. It is further necessary to note that for Heidegger the phenomenological method is not limited to the phenomenological movement. Phenomenology for him is the only remaining possibility of thinking (nur dadurch blubende Möglichkeit des Denkens), even though it might disappear as a school in favour of the concern of thinking (dann Kann sie (die Phänomenologie) als Titel verschwinden zugunsten der Sache des Denkens).\(^6\) The word "Phenomenology", unlike other words with the combination of the word logos like "Theology", "biology" and others, does not designate the "subject-matter", or "the object of researches". It is rather primarily concerned with the how of "any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself."\(^7\) Phenomenology is thus the "possibility" of the disclosure of Being. It is

\(^{5}\text{Ibid., p. 62.}\)


\(^{7}\text{Heidegger, op. cit., p. 59.}\)
the science in its own way (unlike the natural sciences) of "describing" the phenomenon or the thinghood (die Sachheit) of what is to be described, exhibited or demonstrated "directly" or "phenomenally."³

Both for Husserl and Heidegger phenomenology signifies a way back "to the things themselves" (zu den Sachen selbst)⁹ "to the things themselves" is the implied meaning of the Greek combination of the word "Phenomenology". The word "phenomenology" reformulated in its original Greek form, — ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ ψευδόμενα — means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself" (αποφαίνεσθαι τὰ ψευδόμενα)¹⁰

Phenomenology conceived as the way of α-λήθεια (unverborgenheit, or unconcealment) or letting the thing itself which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself, is pregnant with serious philosophical implications. The notion of phenomenological disclosure of the thing itself makes it possible for philosophy to go beyond the antinomical structure of Kant's critical philosophy. The phenomenological function of philosophy is not a may-pole dance between the antinomical structure of knowledge - which conceives the antino-

³Ibid.
⁹Ibid., p. 58. For German see Sein und Zeit, p. 34.
¹⁰Ibid.
my of the thing itself and the **symbolic** to be the limit of all possible knowledge.\(^{11}\) For Kant "an intuition can never directly correspond" to the thing itself. He further says that all our metaphysical knowledge is "merely symbolical" of the things themselves.\(^{12}\) The implication of Kant's critical philosophy is that the phenomenology as a way back to the things themselves (zu den Sachen Selbst) is impossible. Philosophy can only be a critique of symbolic forms.\(^{13}\) The chief aim of Phenomenology on the other hand is to transcend the Kantian antinomy of the empirical and the ideal, and go back into the ground of the things themselves (die Sachen selbst). Heidegger's notion of the phenomenological disclosure of the truth of Being (die Unverborgenheit der Wahrheit des Seins) is the notion of the


\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 198.

\(^{13}\)"All knowledge of whatever kind is bound up with... an element of symbolism. We may therefore speak of a philosophy of symbolic forms". Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Language and Reality*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1939), p. 683. Ernst Cassirer envisages a similar philosophical "system of symbolic forms" in which each particular "form" and "symbol" of culture would be absolute and "take its meaning solely from the place in which it stands, a system in which the content and significance of each form... stands with other spiritual energies and ultimately with totality." The *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. I, trans. by Ralph manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 82.
e-vent (das Ereignis or die Anwesenheit) of the truth of Being - the thing itself free from all conceptualizations, representations, free from all symbols - empirical and ideal, natural or everyday and supernatural. It is the genesis of the Enfachheit (simplicity or authenticity) of thinking and speech. Phenomenology is desymbolization. The phenomenological showing of the things themselves is the vanishing point of symbolism.14

The idea of phenomenology as a way back "to the things themselves remains constant on Heidegger's path of thinking. The meaning of the Greek words λόγος (to make manifest) and φανερόν (to show oneself) determines his conception of phenomenology from the very beginning of his thought. Heidegger in his Preface to Richardson's book re-affirms his indebtedness to his teacher that his path to phenomenology was first prepared by his "dialogues with Husserl."15 Heidegger offers a very telling explanation of his method or his path of thinking (Denkwege). He says

14 Philosophy understood as the way of the disclosure of Being is phenomenology which makes fundamental ontology possible. Phenomenology understood as the way of fundamental ontology is the way of the disclosure of Being. And phenomenology so understood is the transcendental critique of philosophy which seeks to resolve the Kantian antinomy of the symbolic and thing itself through the hermeneutic method of reflection and desymbolization - the way of the free-giving (Freigebung) of the Truth of Being.

15 Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. x. See also B.T., p. 62.
that a threefold insight underlies his question about the meaning of Being: (1) the insight into phenomenology, the way back to "things themselves", or the method which shows the thing itself as it is in itself; (2) the insight into "\( \chi-\lambda\eta \varnothing \varepsilon \varphi \)" or truth as "unconcealment"; and lastly (3) the insight into Plato's doctrine of "\( \Upsilon \nu \mu \Upsilon \eta \zeta \lambda \varsigma \varsigma \)" of ideas as "catching-sight-once-again, (hence) the revealing, of beings, sc. in that by which they shine-forth." With the insight into "\( \chi-\lambda\eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \varsigma \)" as "un-concealment", the fundamental trait of "\( \Upsilon \varsigma \lambda \varsigma \alpha \)" or "The Being of beings" as "Presence" (die Anversenheit), he says, come to light. And it is only after the clarification of the meaning of "\( \chi-\lambda\eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \varsigma \)" and "\( \Upsilon \varsigma \lambda \varsigma \alpha \)" that "the meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology, 'to the things themselves' became clear."\(^{16}\)

The fundamental point of difference between Heidegger and Husserl is not a matter of the former's departure from phenomenological method, but rather the difference between the two lies in their conception of the nature of "the thing itself" ("die sache selbst"). Heidegger's so-called "later" method does not consist in a deviation from phenomenology to the thinking of Being. Heidegger follows the phenomenological method in his analytic of Dasein and in his conception of thinking. But he differs

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. xii.
from Husserl in his conception of the "thing itself". His "thing itself" is the truth of Being, and his analysis of Dasein's modes of being-in-the-world, his asking the question about the way of thinking and language is the way of following the method of phenomenology in a more "originary way". Phenomenology, both for Heidegger and Husserl is "the standard method of philosophy" ("die massgebende Methode der Philosophie").17 Whereas for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the way back to "transcendental intentionality" or "transcendental ego", for Heidegger it is a way back to the ground of metaphysics—the truth of Being-itself.18 Phenomenology, for both Husserl and Heidegger is the method of "description" of "essences". To say "phenomenology is 'descriptive'" is tantological.19 But the notion of "essences" differs in their thought. For Husserl the notion of "essences" are the apriori structures of "consciousness" and proceeds from the analytic of ego cogito; for Heidegger, "essences" are the apriori structures of existence or being-in-the-world. The sum precedes the cogito. However, for both, phenomenology shows philosophy a way out from "Psychologism", empirical epistemology, and common sense realism on the one hand, and metaphysical

17 Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.
18 Ibid.
19 B.T., p. 59.
idealism or Platonism on the other. Unlike Husserl, the Lebenswelt of Heidegger is the totality of the existential structures of Dasein.

To understand the difference between Husserl and Heidegger as a difference in method shows a mistaken understanding of phenomenology itself. It results from a mistaken understanding of Heidegger's idea of phenomenology which is the possibility of fundamental ontology. Phenomenology for Heidegger is the method of showing the truth of Being. It is the method of making manifest the "Being of entities, its meaning, its modification and derivatives." It is "the most proper concern of thought." The "first and last thing-itsel of thought" of Heidegger's phenomenology, the "standard method of philosophy" is "Being" itself. Phenomenology "in its essence" is not confined to a particular "movement"; it is the "only possibility of thinking corresponding to the demands of that which is to be thought of." Let us read Heidegger's own words to this point from the closing lines of the Zur Sache des Denkens:

And today? The era of phenomenological philosophy appears to have been passed. This philosophy is considered as something of the past, something only mentioned historically among other

\[20\text{B.T., p. 60.}\]
\[21\text{Richardson, op. cit., p. xvi.}\]
\[22\text{Ibid., p. xiv.}\]
schools of philosophy. However, phenomenology is in its essence not a school (movement). It changes with the times and hence remains the only possibility of thinking corresponding to the demands of thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, then as a movement in favour of the concern of thinking, whose obviousness remains a secret.23

The difference between Heidegger and Husserl's thought, consists then in their "philosophical positions", and not in their "philosophical method." The phenomenology of Heidegger, unlike that of Husserl, is not modelled after "a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte."24 That is, phenomenology is not a reduction of the sum of ego cogito and the "synthetic unity of apperception" of Descartes and Kant, its "guide-question" is the "question about the Being of beings", which is "the first and last


24 Richardson, op. cit., p. xiv.
thing-itself of thought." And it is "on the basis of what to this day", Heidegger claims to maintain "a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology". Referring to the title of Richardson's book (Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought), Heidegger further observes that if phenomenology is understood to be the "philosophical position" of Husserl ("elaborated into distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte"), "then the title is to the point, in so far as the Being-question as posed by me (Heidegger) is something completely different from that position." But if phenomenology is understood as the ownmost concern of thinking of that which is "most thought-provoking", most worthy of thought, the question about the meaning and truth of Being, if it is understood as "the most proper concern of thought to show itself", then Heidegger would and does claim "a more faithful adherence to the principles of phenomenology", which is nothing but a "process of letting things manifest themselves", a way back "to the things themselves" ("zu den sachen

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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. xvi.
29 Ibid., p. xiv.
"selbst") is what defines the "meaning and scope of the principles of phenomenology."\(^{30}\)

If phenomenology is "experienced", not as the so-called Husserlian "phenomenological movement", a method of founding philosophy "as a rigorous science", but as "the concern of thinking" and "the only possibility of thinking corresponding to the demands of that which is to be thought of",\(^{31}\) then the nature and scope of phenomenology would determine the nature and scope of thinking and language itself. It would point out the way back to originative thinking and language. In Heidegger's thought, as we shall see further on, phenomenology, thinking and language are put into the service of showing "what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination" of the truth of Being. The question of Being runs as the unitive cord through Heidegger's triological path of phenomenology, thinking and language.

Phenomenology is thus the way back to the thinking and language of Being; it takes its departure not from the representative thinking of metaphysics which remains in forgetfulness of Being and the difference between Being and beings, but from the thinking which builds the "house" of Being and "brings" the "unspoken world of Being" into language. The phenomenological reduction does not depend

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. xii.

\(^{31}\) Heidegger, op. cit., p. 90.
upon the empirical analysability and verifiability of the phenomena or existential structures of being-in-the-world; it is the apriori method of bringing into un-concealment the existential structures of Dasein which proximally and for the most part remain covered-up. "Hermeneutic phenomenology" in the primordial signification of the word "Hermeneutics" signifies the "business of interpreting." Heidegger tries to "think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary manner, so as to fit it in this way back into the place that is properly its own within western philosophy." The word "hermeneutics" in has a "broader" meaning. It is not a "theory of art", and "interpretation". It is "in keeping with that vastness which springs from originary being", it is "rather the attempt to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds." 

Heidegger, rather than turning away from the phenomenological method as his critics are prone to portray, repeatedly claims "to think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary manner", and follow the method of "authentic phenomenology" ("die eigentliche Phänomenologie").

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34 Ibid., p. 11; see B.T., p. 62.
Heidegger further remarks, "without this basic phenomenological method the question of Being would not have been possible" ("in der tat wäre ohne die phänomenologische Grundhaltung die Seinsfrage nicht möglich gewesen"), 35 Heidegger's "authentic phenomenology" rather than separating "essences" from "existence", puts the "essences" themselves in "existence". Rather than "bracketing" the natural standpoint of everyday "being-in-the-world", the phenomenological method consists in its "existential analytic" to "radicalize" the truth of Being, the essence itself of existence. Merleau-Ponty aptly observes: "Far from being as has been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phenomenological reduction belongs to existential philosophy: Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world' appears only against the background of the phenomenological reduction." 36 Or again as he says that Phenomenology "puts essences back into existence". 37 The phenomenological analytic of the essences of existence or the totality of the existential structures of being-in-the-world shows Dasein to be the clearing-ground of Being. That is, the essence of Being has to be seized from the essence of existence.


37 Ibid., p. vii.
The phenomenological reduction clarifies the difference between Being and beings. In Heidegger's analytic Dasein as being-in-the-world has an ontico-ontological priority. The analytic of Dasein precedes the empirical analysis of the "totality of facts" or "beings-present-at-hand" in Heidegger's phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction aims at the existence-world of Dasein's being-in-the-world, its everyday modes and moods, its basic comportments, its everyday "being-with" the "they", its "thrownness", its state of "anxiety" and "care", its authentic and ownmost "potentiality-for-Being". The possibility of "any ontological investigation" depends upon "uncovering the meaning of Being and the structures of Dasein in general."\(^{38}\) Phenomenology is "the science of the Being of entities"\(^ {39}\) and "hermeneutic" ontology of "what-is-the-case"\(^ {40}\) or the truth of Being.

Phenomenological bracketing, for Heidegger, is the recognition of difference between "Being-in-the-world" and "Being-present-at-hand"; it is the method of choosing the right kind of entity which is "ontologically-ontically distinctive" and for which Being itself (sein selbst) is

\(^{38}\) B.T., p. 62.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 61.

\(^{40}\) Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 11.
the issue. The phenomenological reduction is not the method of seeking the "essences" of "consciousness", but the "radicalization" of the pre-ontological understanding of Being which belongs to Dasein, a description of its existential structures. Phenomenology as the process of making manifest the "things themselves" is the process of recollection, unconcealment or clearing of the clearing-ground of Being itself. Phenomenology is the question of a "need", because the phenomena of "ex-sistence" are "proximally and for the most part not given."

Phenomenology as the hermeneutic process or "the logos of the phenomenology of Dasein" is the way back to "the authentic meaning of Being", the "structure of Being" which already belongs to Dasein. Its "very point of departure" is the question of Being, it is the "proper method" and "access (zugang) to the phenomenon" or the "passage" that leads into the ground of the cave of covering-up or forgetfulness of Being. Phenomenology is the process of "original" and "intuitive" (originären und "intuitiven") grasping of the phenomena or "wresting" it out of the sheath of concealment, the everyday way to be

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41 B. T., p. 60.
42 Ibid., p. 62.
43 Ibid., p. 61.
44 Ibid.
in the world, and everyday mode of speech. The process of making manifest presupposes a "covered-up-ness" as "the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'." 45

The concept of "covered-up-ness" is related to Heidegger's key-concept of the "forgetfulness of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit). The phenomenon of "covered-up-ness" is the very pre-supposition of phenomenology as a way or a process of un-covering or making manifest what remains "proximally and for the most part" covered up. The "covered-up-ness" may be of various natures, of "still quite undiscovered", "neither known nor unknown" (such as "Being is") or "buried over" what was once discovered but now visible only as "semblance". Being is so much as "semblance" is. 46 The authentic phenomenon of being-in-the-world remains veiled as "semblance" in the form of in-authentic phenomenon of everyday being-in-the-world-with-one-another. The analytic of everyday being-in-the-world reveals the authentic potentiality of Dasein for Being. Phenomenologically, phenomena are what "make up Being". And since Being is always the Being of some entity, the process of letting-be of Being requires the entities to "show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely

45 Ibid., p. 60.

46 Ibid.
belongs to them. 47 It is this that makes Dasein the radical entity of the clearing-process, since it alone has a pre-ontological access to its being and potentiality for Being.

The hermeneutic of Dasein is the way to philosophy as "universal phenomenological ontology". 48 Phenomenology for Heidegger is the method of ontology which shows the world that is the case as being-in-the-world. As "an analytic of existence", 49 it signifies the possibility of standing out in the openness of Being. It is however necessary to note here that the conception of the world, which Heidegger aims to describe "appears only against the background of phenomenological reduction", (M. Ponty) and cannot be represented by the logical and empirical analysis of the language of "facts". The phenomenological notion of the "world" as the totality of the existential structures of "being-in-the-world", as we shall see later on, essentially differs from the Wittgensteinian notion of the "world" that is "the totality of facts". 50 The difference in the notion of the world gives rise to a corresponding difference in the notion of the "way" which seeks to "describe" it - the way

47 Ibid., p. 61.
48 Ibid., p. 62.
49 Ibid.
50 Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 1.1.
of "descriptive" epistemology and phenomenology. The nature of philosophy as the method of "describing" the "world" that is the case depends upon the conception of the nature of the "world", the nature of "totality" of "facts" or of "meanings". Phenomenology, unlike descriptive epistemology deals with the totality of the "Life-world" or "being-in-the-world", not with the "totality of facts". "Being-in-the-world" which phenomenology aims to describe is the world of meaning. It is, to borrow Merleau-Ponti's expression, "meaning giving" or "condemned to meaning". Phenomenology is the genetic act of "meaning", a "disclosure" of the truth of Being qua Being. Not only does the conception of the "world" determine the nature of philosophical method, but it also determines the nature and function of thinking and language-game, the nature of "meaning" and "truth" - its empirical or phenomenological form. The nature of philosophical method, (empirical or phenomenological) determines the nature of thinking and language-game, (its forms of empirical or phenomenological), and vice-versa. Our further discussion is concerned with Heidegger's question about "thinking" and "language", in order to show the relatedness of the question about the meaning of Being, thinking and language.

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2. Thinking

Philosophy as fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of the meaning of Being. It represents a backtrack from empirical epistemology to universal phenomenological ontology. It aims at the disclosure of the totality of the existential structure of meaning which is "an existentiale of Dasein", and not of facts. "The totality of facts" with which empirical or descriptive epistemology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, is concerned, seen from Heidegger's conception of phenomenological ontology, is the world of "unmeaning" (unsinniges). Only the "life-world" or the existential constitution of being-in-the world has the apriori structure of meaning. Meaning is not "a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'". Dasein alone can be "meaningful (sinnvoll) or meaningless (sinnlos)". The totality of facts in itself is "absurd" (widersinnig). The world of "facts" or entities "present-at-hand" gathers meaning only in the mode of Dasein's Circumspective Concern. The totality of

52 B.T., p. 193.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
the structures of meaning is rooted in the "existential constitution of Dasein",⁵⁷ in its state of mind and understanding, which constitute the possibility of all phenomenological reduction and "interpretation". "Being-in-the-world", as the totality of the existential structure of meaning ontologically different from the totality of facts or entities present-at-hand is the possibility of fundamental ontology or the question of the meaning of Being. Hence the necessity of a "backtrack" from empirical or descriptive epistemology to phenomenology is the necessity of philosophical thinking.

Not only does the logos and truth of Being require a back-track from empirical epistemology to phenomenology, but also necessitates and calls for "overcoming" of metaphysical thinking. It requires a way back from "representative", "conceptual" and "calculative" thinking to a "meditative" (besinnliches), "originative" (anfangliche), "essential" (wesentliche) and "authentic thinking" (eigentliche Denken), which goes back into the ground of metaphysics. Just as phenomenology, as was shown before, presupposes the phenomenon of "covered-up-ness", so does thinking, which aims to backtrack from the metaphysical oblivion of Being to the thinking which attempts "to recall the truth of Being", presuppose a counter-phenomenon of the

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 195.
"forgetfulness of Being." Just as phenomenology makes fundamental ontology possible, so does originative thinking make essential metaphysics possible. Both ways, - of phenomenology and thinking (Denkwege), - are corresponding attempts to recall the truth of Being. The two ways intersect into one single way, the way to the disclosure of the truth of Being. Just as the "destruction" of the history of former ontology in Sein und Zeit is the way to phenomenological ontology so is the way of "thinking" a way of "overcoming metaphysics", and which goes "back into the ground of metaphysics", or "recalling Being itself".

The truth of Being is the "ground" of metaphysics. The metaphysical thinking, however, which "represents" Being as beings remains "forgetful" of Being and "leaves its ground." The "overcoming" of metaphysics is not a positivistic move, as observed before, of condemning metaphysics as "meaningless" or "nonsensical". Heidegger is not a destructive positivist who takes his stand on the

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59 Ibid., p. 208.

60 Ibid., p. 209.

61 Ibid., p. 208.

62 Ibid.
ground of empirical ontology or empirical epistemology and seeks to vindicate the verification criterion of meaning. For positivistic ontology other than what is empirically verifiable, or other than the proposition which pictures or depicts a state of affairs, is metaphysical nonsense. For it, thus, anything that is can be said clearly and the "said clearly" is what is verifiable. Heidegger, unlike the positivist, starts from positive phenomenology or "authentic phenomenology", and aims at the disclosure of the truth of Being. He aims to bring thinking back into the ground of metaphysics. The other side of "bracketing" is the world of "facts", not "meaning"; it is what is "absurd" (windersinnig). Heidegger is against the kind of metaphysics whose propositions only seek to represent Being as beings, the metaphysics which confuses the ontological difference and "lands us in utter error". From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a "persistent confusion of beings and Being".

The "representational thinking of metaphysics" says Heidegger, "must be supplanted by a different kind of thinking which is brought to pass by Being itself and therefore responsive to Being". He further says:

64 Ibid.
All attempts are futile which seek to make representational thinking, which remains metaphysical, and only metaphysical, effective and useful for immediate action in everyday public life. The more thoughtful our thinking becomes and the more adequate it is to the involvement of Being in it, the purer our thinking will stand eo ipso in the one action appropriate to it: recalling what is meant for it and thus, in a sense, what is already meant.65

A transformation of metaphysics will bring about a simultaneous change in human nature. Heidegger calls for a purification of the representational thinking of metaphysics through reflective thinking which goes back "into the ground of metaphysics", which "rouses" and "stirs" man's thinking, "to rise from Being itself to respond and correspond to Being as such".66 Such thinking makes the "utterance" of Being possible,67 the thinking of the "essential man" whose truth "no 'logic' can grasp",68 which is "mindful of the truth of Being",69 which "guards the word", listens "to the soundless voice of Being",70 a "self-surrender" of man which pays "homage" and "thanks" to Being.71

65 Ibid., p. 211.
66 Ibid., p. 209.
68 Ibid., p. 389.
69 Ibid., p. 391.
70 Ibid., p. 391.
71 Ibid., p. 389.
Thinking "frees" language from "grammar" and places it "in more original or essential framework." It is "l'engagement by and for the truth of Being." It "lets itself be called into the service of Being", "speaks" the truth of Being and calls forth Being in language. Thinking is the "recollection of Being"; it "lets Being-be"; it "builds" the house of Being by bringing into language "the unspoken word of Being". Thinking "traces insignificant furrows in language" and "gathers language in simple speech." Such thinking represents the other side of representative thinking of metaphysics which leads into the ground of metaphysics itself. What is needful is that there be "less philosophy" and more "thinking". If representational thinking of metaphysics represents absenting and forgetting of Being; thinking represents the "advent", or "the recollection of Being" (das Andenken an das Sein).

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 298.
76 Ibid., p. 301.
77 Ibid., p. 302.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 301.
Such thinking is pre-theoretical or meta-theoretical rather than theoretical"; "meditative" rather than "practical"; pre-logical or meta-logical or phenomenological rather than "logical"; it is pre-scientific or meta-scientific rather than scientific. It is thinking which speaks the truth of Being. "The act of thinking is neither theoretical nor practical, nor is it the coupling together of both ways or behaviour."\(^80\)

Heidegger further says about such thinking:

Such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It occurs before such differentiation. This thinking is, in so far as it is, the recollection of Being and nothing else. Belonging to Being, because it is thrown by being into the trueness of its truth and claims for it, it thinks Being. Such thinking results in nothing. It has no effect. It suffices its own essence, in that it is. But in that it expresses its matter.... Its material relevance is essentially superior to the validity of science, because it is freer. For it lets Being-be.\(^81\)

Such thinking represents the possibility of the belonging-togetherness of Being and thinking (die Möglichkeit des zusammengehörrens von Sein und Denken).\(^82\)

It is unlike a "fish" which is "dragged on the dry sand", (by formalized or representational way of thinking), fated only "to wriggle, twitch and die"; it rather swims free in

\(^80\) Ibid.

\(^81\) Ibid., p. 298.

\(^82\) Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 75.
its elemental simplicity into the "depths and expanses of its waters, the currents and quiet pools, warm and cold layers."\(^83\) Heidegger, thus, maintains an "ontological difference" between metaphysical mode of representational and conceptual thinking; scientific mode of calculative, theoretical and practical thinking, and the "authentic", "originative" and "meditative" thinking which thinks Being itself and which is a legein of the logos or which lets Being be.

The fundamental presupposition of "authentic" or "meditative" thinking is that man "is a meditative being". Therefore to save "the essential nature of man", and bring man back to his "rootedness", "the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive".\(^84\) It "dwells in closeness to poetry, grows out of Being (seyn) and probes into its truth."\(^85\) "The poetic character of thinking", says Heidegger, "is still concealed", and wherever it shows forth it resembles for a long time "the utopia of a half-poetic understanding".\(^86\)

Heidegger speaks about the "closeness" and

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\(^83\)Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 71.


\(^86\)Ibid., p. 23.
"neighbourhood of poetry and thinking". It is, however, necessary to note that Heidegger does not mean to glorify poetic irrationalism. He does not mean to suggest that philosophical thinking is poetry. Thinking so would be an absurd reading of Heidegger. He is not confusing the difference between poetry and thinking. Nor does he speak about poetry in the literal sense of a rhymed word-picture. He is rather alluding to its elemental simplicity, its spontaneity, its freedom and depth of expression, its natural sense of un-concealment, and the act of giving out of poet's whole being; the phenomenological essence is equally shared by poetry and thinking, both recollect Being and call "Being in spoken word". Poetry for Heidegger is "no aimless imagining of the arbitrary and no flight of mere ideation and imagination into the unreal". 87 It is, rather "the saga of the unconcealment of what is (die dichtung ist die sage der unverborgenheit des Seienden)." 88 "All reflective thinking is poetic, and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking". 89 Heidegger's own word on the significant relation of reflective poetry and thinking are worth noting:

88 Ibid., p. 61.
We must discard the view that the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking is nothing more than a garrulous cloudy mixture of two kinds of saying in which each makes clumsy borrowings from the other. Here and there it may seem that way. But in truth, poetry and thinking are in virtue of their nature held apart by a delicate yet luminous difference, each held in its own darkness: two parallels...by one another, against one another, transcending, surpassing one another each in its own fashion. Poetry and thinking are not separated if separation is to mean cut off into a relational void. The parallels intersect in the infinite. There they intersect with a section that they themselves do not make.... The neighbourhood of poetry and thinking is not the result of a process by which poetry and thinking - no one knows from where first draw near to each other and thus establish a nearness, a neighbourhood. The nearness that draws them near is itself the occurrence of appropriation by which poetry and thinking are directed into their proper nature.90

If poetry and thinking move in hand and glove in the same element of "saying", 91 and bring the "unspoken" word of Being into language, then the proper question is to ask "what is the nature and essence of language itself?" Not only does a reflection into the nature and essence of poetry and thinking give rise to the question about the nature and essence of language, but it also conceals and reveals the secret clue to the seeking and finding the answer to the question about the nature and essence of language. A reflection into the nature and essence of language is not only necessitated by a reflection into the

90 Ibid., p. 90.
91 Ibid., p. 83.
nature and essence of poetry and thinking, but it will also show that the answer to the question about the nature and essence of "forgetfulness of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit) depends upon and calls forth the question about the "forgetfulness of speech" ("Logosvergessenheit") in the history of metaphysics. Only by reflecting upon the nature and essence of "hermeneutic language" (Sprachhermeneutik) it is possible to answer the pregnant question of Karl Otto Apel: "Has Heidegger, who has recognized the 'Seinsvergessenheit' of the occidental metaphysics, and especially of the modern science which emerged from it, escaped the 'Logosvergessenheit'?"92 A reflection on Heidegger's philosophy or "critique" of hermeneutic language shall show the systematically misleading character of "logical", "empirical", "epistemic", "psychologistic" and "pragmatic" analysis of the nature and function of language-game. Like "Seinsvergessenheit", a reflection into the question of "Logosvergessenheit" conceals the possibility of the recollection of the language of Being. Why does Heidegger say that the difficulty of the question of Being is the "difficulty of

of language,"93 language is the "house of Being",94 "all paths of thinking" (alle Denkewege) lead through language?95 What does he mean by saying, "language is the service of thinking",96 "language is attuned to the Being of being",97 and "without a sufficient consideration of language, we never truly know what philosophy is as the distinguished co-responsence, nor what philosophy is as a distinctive manner of language"?98 A reflection into the above questions shall show what language means for Heidegger and how the question of Being necessarily calls forth a consideration of what language is. All philosophical problems must have to pass through language. Philosophy is necessarily intersubjective. It is basically the problem of communication and speech. It requires a world of communication and speech, and only in such a world philosophy grows, moves and has its being. Philosophy is not a speechless mysticism or wordless contemplation. Philosophy is the free-giving of language - (die Freigebung der Sprache). A

93 Identity and Difference, p. 66.
94 Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 271.
96 What is Called Philosophy?, p. 92.
97 Ibid., p. 77.
98 Ibid., p. 95.
reflection into the nature of philosophy brings us back into the reflection of the nature of language itself. The Proté philosophia, the fundamental ontology of Being is possible only as the phenomenological critique of language. Heidegger's fundamental question of Being gives birth to the questions of fundamental phenomenology, thinking and language. Since the fundamental problems of philosophy - of Being and thinking - are fundamentally the problem of the legein of the logos or how to say what Being is (as gibt Sein), our further discussion shall concern with the problem of language, the basic problem in Heidegger's question about the meaning of Being.

3. **Language**

Not only does Heidegger's authentic phenomenology point out the possibility of fundamental ontology, his originative thinking leads into the ground (Grund) of metaphysics, but his conception of philosophy also shows the possibility of bringing the unspoken word of Being into speech. Central to Heidegger's triological path of phenomenology, thinking and language is the basic presupposition of the difference between Being and being, between the phenomenon of "forgetfulness" and "covered-up-ness" of Being in everyday being-in-the-world, or between everyday "calculative", "technological", and "representational"
thinking of metaphysics and the authentic possibility of the thinking which "recollects" the Truth of Being, and between "everyday", logical-empirical structure of language and authentic speech or language of Being. Heidegger's problem of philosophy is not how to transcend the ontological difference, but how to approach it in the right way. And it is from this clear re-cognition of the ontological difference between the nature of everyday language and authentic speech proceeds the most momentous contribution of Heidegger to the philosophy of language.

The fundamental question of philosophy as the question of fundamental ontology, the question about "the authentic meaning of Being", brings about the question of "authentic phenomenology and language. Phenomenology as the process of showing and making manifest the "thing itself" cannot but stumble on the difficulty of language, "the inelegance of expression", and the "lack" of "words" and grammar". The problem of phenomenology, in other words, unites with and gives rise to the problem of language itself. Prof. Karl-Otto Apel therefore rightly observes: "Indeed Heidegger himself has already tied the phenomenological method to the red thread of a "hermeneutic

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99 B.T., p. 62.

100 Ibid., p. 63.
of language" in Sein und Zeit. Not only the phenomenological method gets tied with the "red thread" of a "hermeneutic of language" (Sprachhermeutik), but also the "originative thinking", as stated earlier, brings the truth of Being into "simple speech", or "unspoken word of language": works for "building the house of Being", where man may "dwell" and "possess" language. Phenomenology and thinking come back to the essential problem of language.

The way to phenomenology and thinking runs into the way of language itself. Heidegger makes the three paths intersect into one hermeneutic question about the meaning and truth of Being. The "disclosedness of the truth is as is the "phenomenological truth". As the "phenomenological truth" is the "disclosedness of Being", and the truth of thinking the "recollection" of the truth of Being, so is language "the language of Being as the clouds are the clouds of sky". As phenomenology is the "hermeneutic" of Being

101 Otto Pöggeler, (ed.), Heidegger: "und in der Tat hat Heidegger selbst die phänomenologische Methode schon in 'Sein und Zeit' an den Leitfaden einer Sprachhermeutik Gebunden". P. 388. (Translation is mine.)

102 "Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism". Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 298.

103 Ibid., p. 283.

104 B.T. p. 62.

and Dasein, and essential thinking the hermeneutic of the
truth of Being and man; so is "the essence of language the
language of Being and "the essence of man". "Dasein has
language" (Das Dasein hat sprache).106 The phenomenon of
language "has its roots in the existential constitution of
Dasein's disclosedness".107 Phenomenology, thinking, and
language not only have their roots in the "existential
constitution of Dasein's disclosedness", they are equip-
rimordially concerned with the truth of Being. The three
paths thus constitute one single process of clearing or
letting Being be. The problem of philosophy concerned with
the problem of the meaning and truth of Being is the prob-
lem of phenomenology; it is the problem of ex-sisting,
thinking and language.

Heidegger's language, like his phenomenology and
thinking, "says", "shows" and "names" Being. It points out
the opacity and vagueness of the everyday speech as Frege
and Wittgenstein's critique of language also try to show.108
But, as we shall see later on, Heidegger's conception of
language greatly differs from Frege's "formula language" or

106 B.T. p. 208; see, Sein und Zeit, p. 165.

107 Ibid., p. 203.

108 See, Jean Van Heijenoort, (ed.), Frege and Gødel,
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3323, 4002,
55563.
"ideography" ("Begriffsschrift"),\textsuperscript{109} and Wittgenstein's "critique of language";\textsuperscript{110} it avoids the rigour of logical and mathematical language, and shows their pointlessness to the question about the meaning of Being. His conception of phenomenology, thinking and language stems from and points to the original Greek experience of the word "\textit{Logos}", which represents Being as a "gathering together" in speech (Das Sein ist die Versammlung \(-\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\)).\textsuperscript{111} It is almost impossible to conceive and speak about the nature and essence of language as something different from the nature and essence of phenomenology and thinking. Phenomenology as the process of making manifest the "things themselves" does presuppose language the process of "speaking" and "saying", - the possibility of making manifest or phenomenology itself. Otherwise (in want of language), how is it possible for phenomenology to be a process of un-concealing the "things themselves"? Language to be the \textit{Logos}-condition of the phenomena is the possibility of phenomenology, or calls for it. Language, furthermore, as "the house of Being (die Sprache ist Haus des Seins)\textsuperscript{112} is inconceivable without a

\textsuperscript{109}Jean Van Heijenoort, (ed.), F"{r}ege and G"{o}del, pp. 5-7.

\textsuperscript{110}Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{Ibid.}, 40031.


\textsuperscript{112}"Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism", \textit{Philosophy in the Twentieth Century}, p. 271; for German see \textit{PH}, p. 53.
further conception of the essential nature of thinking which takes up Being itself in language, "frees" language from "grammar", and "places" it (language) in its "original framework". Poetry and thinking "intercede" in the "service" of language. Language is the moving expression of authentic thinking.

The language of thinking is ontologically different from both everyday speech and the language of metaphysics; both represent the forgetfulness of the ontological difference; both represent and conceive Being as beings. Language, for Heidegger, is not only a means of "communication" in "audible" and "written" forms, not only an "ontical" model as something "present-at-hand" for common use, but it brings what is as something that is into the open for the first time. Language authentically speaks under the "guardianship" of authentic thinking, the "utterance of the thinker", which listens to "the voice of Being".

Like thinking, language also has ontic (everyday, empirical) and ontological (authentic or phenomenological) structure. The ontic structure of language is represented

\[113\] Ibid.

\[114\] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 95.


by the language of everyday speech, pragmatic, empirical, logical and metaphysical (conceptual and representative); whereas the ontological structure of language is represented by the "language of thinking" (die sprache des Denkens), which illuminates the limitation of "metaphysical language".\(^{117}\) By recognizing the difference between the two structures of language use everyday and authentic - Heidegger opens the possibility and meaningfulness of metaphysical statements. The authentic use of language is the possibility of metaphysics, for it shows the thing itself. The problems of philosophy arise not so much from language transgressing the "limit" of speakability, as from not recognizing the nature of "saying" and "speaking" - empirical or phenomenological. Language expresses the "infinite possibilities"\(^{118}\) of "life"\(^{119}\) and thinking. Language is the moving expression of the authentic possibilities of Dasein's being-in-the-world. To imagine the possibilities of language is to imagine possibilities of the Lebenswelt or "Being-in-the-world" itself. The phenomenon of language

\(^{117}\)Heidegger, Zur Sache Des Denkens, p. 55.


\(^{119}\)Later Wittgenstein, no doubt, allows a broader scope for language-game, loosens the restrictions put upon the language use by conceiving language to correspond with "forms of life" (Philosophical Investigations, 1.43). But his idea of the "forms of life" knows no phenomenological "bracketing", therefore remains under the sway of psychologism, relativism and common sense realism. He lacks the idea of a "thing itself" which remains dispersed in everyday speech and modes of life as Heidegger does.
is the expression of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world; it is "rooted" in the phenomenon of "Dasein" as the possibility of standing out in the openness of Being.

The authentic phenomenon of language, its "essence" and "nature", however, remains veiled in everyday speech. It for the most part remains under the "dictatorship" of the "they".\(^{120}\) The genesis of the meaning of speech is not dependent upon the sense-giving act of the intersubjective world of "being-with-other" and the "they". The "commonness" of the language-game rather lets "our speech drift away into more obvious meaning of words."\(^{121}\) The meaning of speech requires a "backtrack" from everyday, formal, empirical or pragmatic speech to a "thinking experience with language"\(^{122}\) in order to "live properly with language".\(^{123}\)

An inquiry into the nature and essence of language requires the "philosophical research" to "ask what kind of Being goes with language in general", and "dispense with the philosophy of language".\(^{124}\) The necessity to "dispense"

\(^{120}\) Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism", Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 273.

\(^{121}\) Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 118.

\(^{122}\) Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 83.


\(^{124}\) B.T., p. 209.
with the "philosophy" of language arises from the recognition of the limit of formal, logical and empirical analysis of language. It points out the way to authentic speech or speech which is phenomenological in its nature. The idea of the possibility of "authentic" speech, or cultivating "a thinking experience with language" does not only require the "task of liberating grammar from logic\(^{125}\) (empirical logic), but also "the freeing of language from grammar\(^{126}\) (the surface grammar which conceals the ontological difference). The "language meaning of language\(^{127}\) to use Merleau-Ponti's expression, slips off the rigid framework of "surface grammar". The surface grammar obscures the ontological difference between Being and beings. The grammatical similarities of the propositions: "Being is" and the "Book is" obscure the ontological difference between the two. The word "is" in the first proposition expresses the ex-sistential possibility of Dasein's being-in-the-world. It would be systematically misleading to ask the pointability or reference to a this. The "is" in the first proposition is a matter of phenomenological analysis of language, whereas the "is" of the second pro-

\(^{125}\)Ibid.

\(^{126}\)"Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism", op. cit., p. 271.

\(^{127}\)Merleau-Ponti, Signs., p. 88.
position a matter of empirical and logical analysis of language. The meaning of authentic language-game expresses the meaning-structure of "being-in-the-world". It cannot be psycho-analysed, nor empirically verified. The meaning of authentic language-game depends upon the unconcealment of the authentic "potentiality-for-Being itself", the possibility of Dasein's being-in-the-world. It can be understood only when "the truth of Being has become memorable to thought." The "essence of language", then, shall show itself as it is in itself. The essence of language shall show itself not by psycho-analysing the concepts and terms, but through a phenomenology of speech. The phenomenology of speech is not "a mere philosophy of language", whose "system of reference" is the "common behaviour of mankind", as Wittgenstein takes it to be. For, the "scientific and philosophical information about language is one thing; an experience we undergo with language is another." Unlike Wittgenstein Heidegger does not aim at bringing "words back from their metaphysical to ordinary use," but brings "us face to face with a pos-

128 Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 274.
129 Ibid.
sibility of undergoing an experience with language",\textsuperscript{133} and take language back from its forgetful plunge in "everyday speaking language"\textsuperscript{134} into the ground of metaphysics, the co-responsiveness of language and Being.

Heidegger's conception of the nature and essence of the language of Being, of course, does not yeild its meaning and sense to Psychological, empirical, logical and formal exercise of detecting the category-mistakes. The logical empiricism puzzled by Heidegger's use of language might retort: "I do not see anything, or any corresponding "X" out there which by the logic of implication your questioning about "Being" implies and seems to maintain. How does your question of Being differ from other misleading uses of language, i.e. the "round square cupola on Berkeley College is polished in gold", "Pegasus is ferocious", or "dagon in Hamilton bay are carnivorous"? No where does "Being" have a point of reference except in grammatical structure of language. Nowhere in sensible experience can "Being" be located. "Being" is not a name, it is a meaningless term found only in the universe of metaphysical discourse." Like Frege's "mathematician" Heidegger can only reply: "No wonder, for it is not where you are looking for it",\textsuperscript{135} or "of

\textsuperscript{133}Heidegger, op. cit., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{134}Ibid.

course, Being is a meaningless term, a metaphysical chewing gum for you do not know how to use it, and why to use it, you do not know the metaphysical points of reference (the structures of being-in-the-world) which make metaphysics possible and meaningful, and lead metaphysics into its ground - the truth of 'Being'." The problems of philosophy reflect the crisis of language. And Heidegger is deeply aware of the crisis of philosophical language. He says:

To undergo an experience with language, is something else again than to gather information about language. Such information - linguists and philologists of the most diverse languages, psychologists and analytic philosophers supply it to us, and constantly increase the supply ad infinitum. Of late, the scientific and philosophical investigation of languages is aiming ever more resolutely at the production of what is called "metalanguage". Analytical philosophy, which is set on producing this super-language, is thus quite consistent when it considers metalinguistics. That sounds like metaphysics - not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics. Metalinguistics is the metaphysics of the thoroughgoing technicization of all languages into the sole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, metalanguage and rocketry are the same.136

Various approaches to language, i.e. linguistics, the origin and morphology of syntax and grammar, the logical and empirical analysis of language, and the construction of meta-language or "ideal" language fail to represent the way

Heidegger is looking for. He is on the way to language qua language which is the "very foundation of human being," and without which "man could not be man".\textsuperscript{137} The "reality" and "essence" of language can show itself only through a reflection into the "neighbourhood of poetry and thinking".\textsuperscript{138} "Saying" that "moves all things",\textsuperscript{139} clears the way to "speech qua speech",\textsuperscript{140} and which through "entering the web" of language itself lets "language from within, speak to us in language, of itself, saying its nature".\textsuperscript{141} The "essence" of language, however, denies itself. The languagely" meaning of language remains veiled in the state of "decadence" resulting from "the modern metaphysics of subjectivity".\textsuperscript{142} Heidegger points out an essential "closeness" of the essence of Being and language to man, and it is this thought that \textit{Sein und Zeit}, attempts to express, wants to achieve."\textsuperscript{143} Heidegger thus further says:

\begin{quote}
Language is not merely language, in so far as we imagine it at the most as the unity of sound-form (script), melody and rhythm and
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{137}] Ibid., p. 112.
\item[\textsuperscript{138}] Ibid., p. 95.
\item[\textsuperscript{139}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{140}] Ibid., p. 113.
\item[\textsuperscript{141}] Ibid., p. 85.
\item[\textsuperscript{142}] "Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism", \textit{op. cit.}, p. 274.
\item[\textsuperscript{143}] Ibid., p. 283.
\end{enumerate}
meaning. We think of sound-form and script as the body of the word; of melody and rhythm as the soul and of meaning as the mind of language.... Language is the house of Being, owned and pervaded by Being. Therefore the point is to think the essence of language in its correspondence to Being and, what is more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling of man's essence.

Man, however, is not only a living being, who besides other faculties possesses language. Language is rather the house of being, wherein living, man exists, while he, guarding it, belongs to the truth of Being.

Heidegger returns again and again to expressions such as: "Language is the house of Being"; "Language is the language of Being"; and "the being of language: the language of Being", for they represent the most moving expressions of his reflection on the nature and essence of language. For they lay bare the foundation of the phenomenology of speech which lets Being be, and prepare a "transformed" relationship with language itself, or undergo a thinking experience with it. The question about the nature and essence of language is another way of putting the hermeneutic question about the meaning of Being itself.

144 See also for such expression, ibid., pp., 271, 274, 300; On the Way to Language, pp. 21, 22, 135.

145 Ibid., p. 283.

146 Ibid., p. 302.

147 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 94.
Heidegger's reflective or hermeneutic philosophy of language illuminates the "neighbourhood of poetry and thinking" whereby the nature and essence of language itself shows itself. "Poetry and thinking are modes of saying (das Sagen). The nearness that brings poetry and thinking together into the neighbourhood we call saying. Here, we assume is the essential nature of language". That is, poetry and thinking dwell in the nearness of letting Being be which in other words is the authentic self-disclosure of saying or speech (das Sagen oder Sprechen). Saying is showing speech. Saying essentially is phenomenological. 

Saying as the essence of language points into the neighbourhood of thinking and poetry where Being dwells as the essence of saying. The idea of the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking as the mode of saying points into the direction of the phenomenology of speech, for it means "to show, to make appear, set free, that is to offer and extend what we call world, lighting and concealing". As "saying" "language grants its essential nature to us." Heidegger says that language as "saying" "moves all things."

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148 Ibid., p. 95.  
149 Ibid., p. 93.  
150 Ibid., p. 93.  
151 Ibid., p. 90.  
152 Ibid., p. 95.
He further says:

Language, saying of the world's fourfold, is no longer only such that we human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Language is, as world-moving saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world's regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself - saying - in reserve.

Heidegger's question of the nature of language reflects on language as an ontological reality which "relates and maintains", "moves all" things as the "relation of all relations" where Being "dwells" in the "guardianship" of ex-sisting, thinking and speaking man. It is not merely a by-product of cultural development, a conventional tool to signify and refer to a thing in place of a pre-linguistic pointing-gesture. It is not merely an item of the productive, inventive and pragmatic nature of the world of man. Language is the expression of his whole being, its very possibility. Speaking reflects and defines the ex-sisting, thinking man and differentiates him from things that merely are like a this or a that, and defines Dasein's being-in-the-world as the "clearing-ground of Being".

Heidegger says:

Language is the "house of Being". It is the keeper of being present, in that its coming to light remains entrusted to the appropriating

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153 Ibid., "Earth and sky, God and man - the world-play", p. 106.

154 Ibid., p. 107.
show of saying. Language is the house of Being, because language as saying, is the mode of appropriation. 155

To say that "language is the house of Being" is not a "mere gilding of thought", it rather shows the essence of "dwelling" or "being-in-the-world" which characterizes the nature and essence of man in Sein und Zeit. 156 Man speaks (der Mensch spricht), 157 and through his speaking and being-in-the-world Being shows itself. Language is the "house of Being", because it is the sole possibility of bringing the unspoken word of Being into speech, or letting Being be. It is this nature of language which constitutes the possibility of authentic phenomenology and thinking.

The language-world as the "house of Being" represents the totality of meaning-structures of Dasein in the mode of "saying". Dasein's "disclosive" potentiality-for-Being becomes "concrete" through its incarnation in authentic speech.

Heidegger's philosophy of hermeneutic speech can only be appraised in contra-distinction to logical-empiricism, and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. It is however, necessary to note that the analysis of language-

155 Ibid., p. 135.


The question about the nature and the "what" of philosophy calls forth the question about the "how" to 'say' what it is. The 'what' of philosophy requires a co-responsive method or the "how". Since the question of the "what" of philosophy presupposes the question about the "how", the problem of philosophy becomes a problem of philosophical method. The problem of the "how" of philosophy is the problem of "how to say clearly what can be said". The problem of "how to say clearly what can be said" brings us back to the problem of language, and it is rightly, therefore, that both Heidegger and Wittgenstein hold philosophy to be a critique of language. Philosophy for both shows the "world" that is the case. But in the conception of the nature of the "world", they differ greatly. For one "the world is the totality of facts", for the other, it is the "totality of the meaning structures of being-in-the-world". Philosophy for one is bringing language back to everyday use, for the other it is taking language from everyday use and its vagueness to the authentic speech of Being. The one follows the method of empirical ontology and descriptive epistemology whose "system" of reference is
the "common" behaviour of mankind, for the other it is phenomenology and fundamental ontology whose essential point of reference is the question about the meaning of Being.

The conception of the nature of the "world" determines the nature of philosophy, its method, the nature of language, its theory of meaning and truth. It is the difference in the conception of the nature of the "world" which determines the nature of philosophy as empirical epistemology or logical empiricism and phenomenology. Philosophy is a "two-way" activity of empirical epistemology and phenomenology: it can be both, but not both at the same time. To follow the one way, however, should not give reason to suppose that the other way is the way to nonsense. But unfortunately, this seems to have been a tragic conclusion among philosophers of the day.

From this one-sided emphasis arises the basic presupposition of all logical and positivistic analysis of language. Language is conceived to be conceptual and empirical or nominalistic to the core. From this presupposition arises the claim of logical positivism that it is possible to show the "Pseudo-hood" and "meaninghood" of propositions through a logical analysis of language. It is into the service of showing the "Pseudo-hood" and "meaninghood" of propositions and terms that Russell's "theory of description" and Wittgenstein's "critique of
language" is put. So much so that the school of logical and empirical analysis of language cherishes the hope of showing the misleadingness of a philosophical "category" by analysing the surface structure of grammar and language. It hopes to evolve a "language shunning names". It is that the "ontological questions under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science". The confused claim of "logicism" and logical positivism boils down to a confusion between meaning and naming, and which culminates further into the confusion between naming and referring. The meaning of language is said to depend upon its empirical variables, or the meaning of proposition is its logical and empirical verifiability. From this empirical and logical checkmating of the language-game results a complete forgetfulness of the phenomenological nature of language, co-responsive to the "voice of Being". Heidegger's philosophy shows that the "forgetfulness of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit) results from the "forgetfulness of speech" (Logosvergessenheit).

Philosophy may take a look at the "world", through a two-coloured glass-look either through the glass of empirical epistemology or phenomenology. The nature of the


159 Ibid., p. 62.
"world", "objects", "things" appear to be different in looking through the different looking-glasses. But there is no reason why one "picture" should drive the other into a realm of "silence" and "nonsense". Such a conclusion rather than solving the problem and giving a comprehensive view of the language-game embroils philosophy in a high degree of absurdity. The critique of philosophy and language must explain and clarify the nature of the "world", describe the difference between the "pictures" corresponding to the different natures of the "world" pictured-phenomenological or empirical. Philosophy must explain and account for the question: why do the logistic, positivistic, empirical, pragmatic and psychologistic critique of language-game stumble on a bump of nonsense in face of the question of Being? And why does a critique of language-game from the standpoint of universal and authentic phenomenology or fundamental phenomenological ontology bring us back to the question of Being as the ground-question of all meaning and metaphysics?

The one possible answer to the above question which


161 Merleau-Ponti, *Signs*. "If phenomenology did not really already involve our conception of being and our philosophy, when we arrived at the philosophical problem we would find ourselves confronted again with the very difficulties which gave rise to phenomenology to begin with". p. 94.
Heidegger's philosophy can be interpreted to offer is the way to a re-cognition of the difference between Being and beings. It is through a method of inter-bracketing between the world as the "totality of facts" and "the totality of the existential structures of being-in-the-world" that it is possible to approach the question of the meaning of Being in the right way, and only then it is possible for philosophy to analyse the nature of language phenomenon, its meaning and truth. The nature and essence of language with which Heidegger is concerned is of a phenomenological nature. Language speaks or shows the existential meaning-structure of being-in-the-world whose possibilities are greater far than any verifiable expressions of language. The phenomenological nature of language is co-responsive to the voice of Being and intimates the infinite possibilities of ex-sistence in speech. It proceeds from an apriori intuition of essences or existential structures of meanings rather than from "sensuous intuitions", and given "sense-impressions"; a phenomenological proposition cannot be put to empirical, logical, and psycho-behaviouristic analysis of language.

Heidegger's "phenomenological ontology" proceeds, as observed before, from a method of bracketing through the ontological difference between the totality of "facts" and "meaning". The philosophical method of inter-bracketing is Heidegger's way of recognizing the difference between
Being and beings, between being-in-the-world and beings present-at-hand, or the difference between the "life-world" (Lebenswelt) and the "natural standpoint world". The method of inter-bracketing is the way of setting the limit and boundary between empirical epistemology and phenomenology. It aims at avoiding the sound and fury that rages between the questions of "sense" and "nonsense" in philosophy. It also aims at avoiding the method of psychologism, common sense realism, and metaphysical idealism or conceptualism.

The difference between Heidegger and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language represents a basic difference of philosophical method - the difference of phenomenological method and the method of empirical epistemology. The "objects and "things" of Heidegger's phenomenology consist of the a priori structures of Dasein's being-in-the-world, whereas Wittgenstein's empirical analysis of language-game proceeds from the analysis of a posteriori structure of the world of facts which can be "pictured" in proposition, or logically and empirically analysed, or even psycho-analysed to show their use and meaning in a language-game.

Heidegger's philosophy as "authentic phenomenology, through the method of inter-bracketing, avoids the extremes of metaphysical idealism on the one hand and psychologistic and behavioristic reductionism on the other."162

162 It is necessary to see that both Frege and Husserl, who respectively provided the philosophical impetus
Philosophy, prior to any analysis of language-game and adjudicating whether a statement is "pseudo" or a category "mistaken", must make sure of the nature of the method of analysis corresponding to the nature of the "world" or "totality" (of "facts" or of "meanings") which remains a basic presupposition determining the nature of language-game. The problems of philosophy arise to a degree greater than ever recognised from a deep-rooted methodological error, or as Wittgenstein would call it, the fallacy of "aspect-blindness". That is, the problems of philosophy arise from a confusion between empirical, logical and psychologistic epistemology and phenomenology, the science of pure essences and meanings.

Heidegger's analytic of the existential structures of being-in-the-world, like Husserl's is a matter of "phenomenological interpretation" which lets "Dasein interpret itself", and upon it "even the phenomenological

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163 Philosophical Investigations, IXI.
164 B.T., p. 179.
'intuition of essences' ("Wessenschau") is grounded". Phenomenology cannot be satisfied by a therapeutic reductionism of philosophical psycho-analysis of concepts. Merleau-Ponty rightly observes: the proper function of a phenomenological philosophy seems to us to be to establish itself definitively in the order of instructive spontaneity that is inaccessible to psychologism and historicism no less than to dogmatic metaphysics". Wittgenstein and Heidegger's conception of language and philosophy considerably differ because of their fundamental difference in methodological standpoints and the problems of philosophy. Despite their agreement as to the aim of philosophy which consists in letting "the fly the way out of the fly bottle", that is, in letting the things itself of philosophical problem be shown to the analytic eye, despite their agreement as to showing the "complicated" nature of "everyday language", or trying to situate the "critique of language" in the heart of philosophy, both philosophers immensely differ in their fundamental philosophical views and conclusions about the nature of the "world" and the nature and function of

165 Ibid., p. 187.
166 Signs, p. 97.
"language-game" (das Sprachespiel). Whereas Heidegger starts from phenomenology and keeps it on the way, Wittgenstein remains under the sway of logical and empirical epistemology or "philosophy of psychology" and which he could never forego, and therefore even though realizing the "risk" he remains subject to relativism, psychologism and common sense realism. Methodologically both represent the diverse poles of doing philosophy. The later Wittgenstein, even in seeking for the open-ending of the texture of language and conceiving the language-game to be embracing the "forms of life", lacks the hermeneutic purity of Heidegger's phenomenology of thinking and speech. Wittgenstein never escapes the fateful matrix of empirical epistemology or realistic ontology which characterizes the Seinsvergessenheit and Logosvergessenheit of philosophical thinking. Unlike Wittgenstein, Heidegger shows "the reflective use of language", and aims to uncover "the hidden riches that language holds in store for us, so that these riches may summon us for the saying of language." Heidegger's critique of language-game discloses the truth of Being and leads thinking back into the ground of metaphysics rather than bringing language

169 Ibid., 4.1121.
170 Ibid.
back from metaphysical to its everyday use. Heidegger would ask all logical positivists who speak about the impossibility of metaphysical propositions: "why is there such a language-game rather than 'silence'? And why are there constant attempts to bring 'silence' into speech rather than passing over in 'silence'? Why is there an existential dialectic of thinking which takes the words back from the ordinariness of language use to metaphysical?" Only in the answer to these questions lies the secret key to a proper appraisal of Heidegger's critique of language-game, and the meaning of his question about the meaning of Being.

Before passing over to the final conclusion, it is necessary to observe that there is no "silence" of speech, or the realm of "non-sense" on the other side of the "totality of facts", nor there is such a meridian point of logic from where the "limit" of language can be set. The otherside of the totality of "facts" is the Lebenswelt, the totality of the apriori structures of being-in-the-world and meanings. The limit of language is the legein of the logos, or the disclosure of the truth of Being itself. The complexity of philosophy arises not so much from what is the state of affairs, or the "thing itself", but how to state it. The true state of affairs of Heidegger's thought, as has been discussed so far, is the "meaning of Being", and the question of how to state it brings about the problem of phenomenology, thinking and language. The meaning of language
as "saying" co-responds to the meaning of Being. Language shows and makes manifest the truth of Being by saying. The "being of language" is thus "the language of Being". Language is "the house of Being", despite "the great sorrow of the philosophers who in their disgruntlement see in such phrases no more than a mere decay of thinking".\footnote{Ibid., p. 22.}

When Heidegger speaks about the "voice" and "language" of Being, let us note however, he does not mean that it is something which we can tape and listen to everywhere, and let everyone listen to it whenever we so desire. Being speaks in the quiet of "meditative" thinking, and listening to it is the "authentic" possibility of "being-in-the-world". When Heidegger says "language is the house of Being", he does not mean that everyone and at everywhere can erect the "house of Being" from the scattered slices and signs of language current in everyday use. Language as the "house of Being" points in the direction of a "thinking experience" with language. Heidegger's thinking about the meaning of Being represents a moving \textit{crescendo} of phenomenology, thinking and language, a rhythmic succession and intersection of notes wherein each note shows the beauty of music, and is required to let the "languagely" meaning and music of Being be. Phenomenology, thinking and language point out the ex-sistingly, thinkingly and languagely meaning of Being.
It is in this sense that Heidegger's hermeneutic language can be said to be an "ex-sistential" and thinking language of Being; or that the being of language can be said to be the language of Being, the house of Being. Language is the essence of "ex-sistence", the possibility of standing-in the openness of Being. It requires not discursive, logical, empirical, representative and conceptual (metaphysical) thinking, but thinking that is the sole possibility of originating the unspoken "word" of Being in language, not empirical and logical epistemology and ontology, but phenomenology which authenticates both language and the thinking of Being. Since Seinsvergessenheit and Logosvergessenheit constitute the state of metaphysics staggering away from its ground in the representative and conceptual thinking of beings (Seienden), or in empirical and logical conception of language Heidegger's thinking into the nature and essence of the language of Being is of great significance for he prepares the way for the recollection of the essence of Being and language, and brings both metaphysics and language to their authentic essence and originative nature.
In conclusion, we hope to have clarified the following points about Heidegger's problem of Being:

1. That the question about the meaning of Being is the central question of Heidegger's thought, and that it remains constant along his path since *Sein und Zeit*;

2. That the question of Being is asked from a fundamental phenomenological standpoint, and therefore it seeks to avoid the standpoint of idealism and common sense realism;

3. That the question about Being is neither a question about universals or particulars but is a question about the phenomenological disclosure of the existential structures of being-in-the-world;

4. That Being is something identically present in all entities, for Being is always the Being of an entity, but Being itself is not an entity;

5. That Being is ontologically different from beings, but it is not something existing in an altogether different noetic or dialectical space;

6. That fundamental to the question of Being is the concept of ontological difference - the difference between Being...
and beings:

7. that from the fateful forgetfulness of the ontological difference between Being and beings in the long tradition of metaphysics results the forgetfulness of the question of Being itself. That is in the fateful conflict of idealism and realism, supersensible and sensible, the question of the phenomenological disclosure of the truth of Being remains long suspended, bracketed or forgotten;

8. that the forgetfulness of Being does not only belong to the history of metaphysics, but also belongs to the existential structures of everyday being-in-the-world where the da (there) of Being for the most part remains with the they (das Man) rather than for Being (für-das Sein);

9. that howsoever forgetful of Being Dasein may be inauthentically, but it is an authentic potentiality-for-Being and its being-in-the-world constitutes the very possibility of Being itself being the question at issue. The possible clearing and disclosedness of Being in time and history is possible because Dasein is a being who exists in the question of Being for entities other than it do not so exist but are or happen to be;

10. that the question of Being is neither a question about a supersensible and absolute Being or God, nor a question about a this or that entity present-at-hand, but it is a question of the radicalization of the constitutive
understanding of Being which belongs to Dasein's being-in-the-world. That is, the question of Being has a factual and concrete ground in the meaning-giving structures of being-in-the-world;

11. that the question of Being is not only the question of what Being is but also the question about how to say and show that it is. That is, the question of Being fundamentally and necessarily brings about the question of phenomenology, thinking, and language. In other words, the question of Being in deeper way is the question of the logos of Being;

12. That the question of Being ties together the question of phenomenology, thinking and language so close and fast in Heidegger's thought, that the notion of the Kehre or reversal in later thinking of Heidegger does not make any sense. That is, the later Heidegger is the full-blooded disclosure of the main thesis of the early Heidegger;

13. that phenomenology as the way of disclosing the thing itself determines Heidegger's question about the truth of Being, thinking, and language;

14. that the hermeneutic or phenomenological way of showing the fundamental structures of being-in-the-world, thinking and language leads philosophy back into the ground or the thing itself of metaphysics - the truth of Being;
15. that Heidegger's philosophy of hermeneutic or phenomenological disclosure shows philosophical thinking and speech a way out from the limits imposed by positivistic thinking;

16. that the question of Being is the question of fundamental phenomenology - the process of making manifest the thing itself, of showing and saying that Being is, and it is not a question of empirical epistemology or empirical determination and verification;

17. that the limits of thinking and speech set up by positivistic thinking are pseudo-limits for the analytic of meaning-giving structures of being-in-the-world requires that such limits be broken or suspended for the disclosure of Being, the thing itself of thinking and speech. That is, the analytic of meaning-giving structures of being-in-the-world requires philosophy to pass over in phenomenology;

18. that fundamental ontology presupposes phenomenology and vice-versa.

In summary statements as such Heidegger's comprehensive thinking about Being, thinking and language cannot be set. The implications of Heidegger's questionings about thinking, language and Being are far reaching to be summarily compressed. His questionings provoke thinking and speech and clarify the phenomenological or hermeneutic structures and possibilities of being-in-the-world. Even
though the far reaching implications of Heidegger's thinking escape any such summary treatment, nevertheless it will be quite enough and encouraging if we have been successful in identifying and clarifying some of the basic issues involved in his question of Being. Furthermore it will be rewarding enough if we have been successful in offering an alternative reading of Heidegger, namely, Heidegger the phenomenologist who rather than talking phenomenology continues to do it even in later reflections on thinking and language. In conclusion we will humbly like to submit that Being cannot be shown as a thing for it is the thing itself of things (die Sache selbst der Sachen). Moreover in closing and listening to Heidegger we need to remember that "we are too late for the Gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun is man."¹

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected Books


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**Selected Articles**


