ADICKES AND KANT'S THING-IN-ITSELF
TITLE: Adickes and Kant's Thing-in-Itself: A Preliminary Investigation

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The purpose of this thesis was to investigate Erich Adickes' view of the problem of the existence of the thing-in-itself and of the question of whether or not some of the categorial concepts, including that of existence, apply to the things-in-themselves in Kant's philosophy. In chapter one I dealt with the former of these two questions and I concluded, in agreement with Adickes, that Kant held the view that the things-in-themselves do exist in some sense of the term 'to be'. In chapter two I came to the tentative conclusion, this time disagreeing with Adickes, that the categories were not meant by Kant to apply to the in-itself. In the third chapter I briefly discussed George Schrader's views of the above outlined problems as well as some other possible alternate accounts of the matter at hand.
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INTRODUCTION

No one would dispute the fact that Kant considered the notion of the thing-in-itself to play a central role in his philosophy. However, what many people would and in the past did often dispute is the precise status which should be attributed to the thing-in-itself. Thus the first question which is commonly asked has to do with the problem of whether or not the thing-in-itself is anything more than a mere concept, whether or not it is something extra-mental, trans-subjective and real. A second question which then naturally follows concerns the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves. Now neither of these questions can be answered in any simple fashion, for though there are many passages in Kant which point in one direction, there are also numerous other places which indicate that the truth may lie in exactly the opposite direction.

In this paper, it is my intention to discuss one possible set of answers to the above two questions, a set of answers which was proposed by Erich Adickes in his influential work Kant und das Ding an sich. My first chapter will focus on Adickes' contention that the think-in-itself was something which was, for Kant, unquestionably real and I will indicate why I consider such a view defensible in spite of passages where Kant seems to be taking a contrary stance. In the second chapter I will deal with Adickes' answer to the second of the above two questions and there I will attempt to show that Adickes' strongly realist interpretation
can at this point no longer withstand the pressure of careful scrutiny. And this will take us to the third chapter, where I will consider some possible alternatives to Adickes' claim that the categories do apply to the things-in-themselves. I will first present George Schrader's recent attempt to explain the apparent discrepancies in Kant's statements about the thing-in-itself, show why such a view is not easily tenable and finally I will suggest some other possible accounts of the matter.

Because of the limited scope of this paper I will concentrate primarily on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, this does not mean that I will not be dealing with the whole of Kantian philosophy, for the problem of the thing-in-itself is central both to the first *Critique* and to Kant's whole system. Thus working towards resolving the puzzle of the thing-in-itself in the *Critique of Pure Reason* will shed much light on Kant's ethical and other philosophical views as well.
Chapter One

EXISTENCE OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF

Adickes' defense of a realist interpretation, as far as the existence of the thing-in-itself is concerned, is very convincing and it may prove helpful to start out by following Adickes' arguments quite closely. He begins by admitting that Kant did occasionally talk of the thing-in-itself as a problematic and limiting concept but he stresses that this should not be allowed to overshadow all those other places where Kant takes it for granted that the thing-in-itself is not just a concept but that there exists a multitude of extra-mental things-in-themselves which affect us. Moreover, adds Adickes, Kant held such a view throughout his so-called critical period, that is, from 1781 until 1800. Thus we find Kant saying already in the first edition version of the Critique of Pure Reason:

sensibility and its field, that is, the field of appearances is itself limited through the understanding: so that it applies not to things-in-themselves, but only to the manner in which things appear to us (thanks to our subjective manner)...it follows even from the concept of appearance in general that something must correspond to the appearance, something which is not in itself an appearance, because appearance is nothing in itself and can be nothing outside our manner of representation...the word appearance already indicates a relation to something...which must be an object independent of sensibility. (A 251f.)

There are two things about this passage which merit our attention.
First, we should observe that when Kant talks about something having to correspond to the appearance, he does not say that it is the concept of the thing-in-itself, rather he uses the expression 'something'. And, secondly, it is important to note that in the sentences which immediately follow this passage, Kant very clearly imposes restrictions on the knowability of the thing-in-itself. That is, we have no intuition of the thing-in-itself and can, therefore, have no possibility of knowledge and cannot, furthermore, talk about the concept of the noumenon in a positive sense. This second point will be seen to assume great importance later on.

Kant makes similar remarks to those quoted above in a celebrated passage in the Preface to the second edition version of the Critique of Pure Reason. He there again limits speculative knowledge to objects of experience, adding, however, that "we must be able at least to think the things-in-themselves, even if we cannot know them, for otherwise the absurd sentence would follow, that there could be appearance without anything which appears." (B xxvif.) Now this assertion is even more emphatic than the preceding one, for here Kant talks of the 'absurdity' of denying the trans-subjective reality of the things-in-themselves. Furthermore, this passage (B xxvif.) has added significance in that it is to be seen as sketching a program for the whole of Kant's philosophy.

But there are also numerous other places in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant expresses the same view. Thus, for instance, in A 536f. = B 564f. he talks about a necessary ground of appearances: "if appearances are taken for no more than they actually are; that is, if they are not taken as things-in-themselves but are taken only as
representations which are connected by empirical laws, then they must have grounds which are not appearances." Similarly a little later: "appearances, because they are not things-in-themselves, must rest upon a transcendental object, which determines them as mere representations." (A 538=B 566) Now both of these statements are taken from Kant's discussion of the Third Antinomy where he deals with the problem of human freedom. I will return to Kant's treatment of this topic in Chapter Three, where we will have the occasion to note the crucial role played by the thing-in-itself not only as a concept, but as something which is in some sense also quite real.

Kant explains the whole situation regarding appearances and things-in-themselves in A 38=B 55, where he says that everything has two sides:

first, it can be considered as an object-in-itself (regardless of the manner in which it is intuited and whose nature for that reason remains problematic) and secondly, considered from the point of view of the form of intuition of the object - but this form of intuition must be sought not in the object-in-itself, but rather, it must be sought in the subject to whom it appears.

The trans-subjective existence of the thing-in-itself is also here being taken for granted; it is given along with the appearance as its one side, where one completely abstracts from our sensible manner of apprehension. The necessity of the existence of the thing-in-itself is always already implicit in the concept of appearance.

But let us now, for a moment, leave aside our quest into what Kant was actually saying and let us turn to consider whether he was not opening himself to a serious objection. For it seems that one
could argue, as for instance Paton did, that Kant's claim that it would be absurd that there should be appearance without something which appears is unconvincing, because "it depends on the term 'appearance', which may be inappropriate." Another commentator, Walsh, even claims that the whole contrast between phenomena and noumena does not make much sense except in connection with the epistemological theories of the old metaphysics. And, according to Walsh, since Kant gave up the old metaphysics, he had no reason to retain the phenomena-noumena distinction and kept it only for the sake of his morality. But is Kant really so vulnerable and is it really the case that the term appearance is an arbitrary invention? I think it is obvious that the answer here must be negative, that Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction plays an infinitely more significant role than that of rendering possible Kant's ethical teachings. Before looking at some of the reasons why the thing-in-itself is indispensable to Kant, we should ask ourselves why it is that many commentators have attempted at least to play down the role of the thing-in-itself? For we should keep in mind that Adickes' book has come mainly as a reaction against the prevailing trend of strongly anti-realist interpretations of Kant. In fact, the ink was barely dry on Kant's manuscripts when prominent philosophers, such as Maimon, Beck and Fichte were already dismissing the thing-in-itself as nothing but a mere concept. But what is it about the thing-in-itself which has prompted people to interpret it along strongly idealist lines? The answer here is quite simple. No one, it would seem, was prepared to accept the existence of something which is in principle unknowable.
For if we can know nothing about the thing-in-itself, what right do we have to talk about its existence. We can view the situation with things analogously to that with coins. Things, just as coins have two sides, and in the case of things the one side is the appearance, the other is the realm of the in-itself. But whereas in the case of a coin we know that it has another side than the one we are just looking at, we have problems asserting something similar about the other side of a Kantian appearance.

There are other oddities about the thing-in-itself. Adickes rightly stresses at a number of points in his book that Kant never attempts to find his way to the things-in-themselves starting from appearances by using causality. What is rather the case is that Kant takes the things-in-themselves for granted, that they serve as a starting point for his philosophy and that this is the reason why he never really attempts to prove their existence. What is odd about such a situation is the fact that Kant does often say that the things-in-themselves determine appearances as mere representations (e.g. A 538=B 566) and yet regards the relationship between appearances and things-in-themselves as being in some way quite distinct from a straight causal relation. I will return to this point in the next two chapters when I discuss causality and the categories in general.

Before dealing with another oddity about the thing-in-itself, namely, Kant's doctrine of the concept of noumenon in a negative sense, it may help if we briefly return to the flow of Adickes' argument, take stock of what has been said of the thing-in-itself so far and
start considering the relation of the thing-in-itself to some other Kantian notions. First we can ponder how the \textit{a priori} - \textit{a posteriori} dichotomy relates to our problem. Adickes claims, correctly in my view, that "all that is \textit{a priori} is for Kant of subjective origin and as far as sensibility is concerned, the \textit{a priori} is certain only from a subjectively valid point of view."\(^{12}\) Now we should note here that by 'subjective' Adickes means the same as Kant does throughout the Aesthetic, namely, something which pertains to all humans and which is to be contrasted not so much with objective as with absolute.\(^{13}\) So then in line with Kant's general principles all that which has apodeictic certainty has it because we ourselves, we as human subjects, have put it into things. What Adickes says about the \textit{a posteriori} must be taken with a great deal of caution, for it is easy to misinterpret. He cites among that which is knowable \textit{a posteriori} "the way in which things are, the empirically grounded laws of nature, the divisions of space, specific differences and strengths of the moving forces (of the causes of perception), the intercausality and interrelation of these forces, the whole great manifold and yet also the regularity in the appearances, processes and relations, the peculiarity of the organic world."\(^{14}\) Now Adickes does not here mean, that Kant held the view that we know that nature is governed by causal laws only \textit{a posteriori}. This is something which we certainly know \textit{a priori}. But, at least in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, what we do know \textit{a posteriori} are the particular empirical laws, etc. which are nevertheless based on the \textit{a priori} causal principle. And so Adickes is quite justified in claiming, that the realist tendency in Kant was quite prominent, that Kant did take it for granted that all
that was not a priori was a witness to something transcendent. All
a posteriori could be grasped only thanks to something which was given
in-itself, although, of course, it could not be taken to be the tran-
scendent itself, that being impossible because the a posteriori is
given only in a priori forms from which it can not be separated. The
a posteriori can thus be regarded as an immediate manifestation of
the transcendent. And this is also the reason why Kant so vehemently
opposed Berkelean Idealism and why he without doubt would have stood
in opposition not only to Fichte but also to all extreme forms of
idealism.

On the basis of what has been said it will not be surprising
to hear that it would be mistaken to regard the thing-in-itself and
the appearance as two different beings, both equally real, even if
each in its own manner, standing to each other in much the same way
as an original painting and a reproduction stand to one another.
Rather, as has already been indicated, there is only something which
on the one hand is given to us in experience but only as an appearance
through our forms of intuition, while on the other hand it is quite
independent of our forms of intuition and as such is in no wise know-
able, though perhaps it could be knowable for an understanding which
is differently constituted than ours. In addition, Adickes remarks
that the thing-in-itself is not synonymous with the inner nature of
the object of appearance, for even if we pushed to these inner natures,
we would still be dealing with the spatio-temporal properties of the
object and thus still be at the level of appearances. In order to
reach the thing-in-itself one would first have to free oneself of all
the human forms of apprehension and then, so as to have some material
for knowledge, we would still require intellectual intuition.\textsuperscript{18}

Kant's remarks about the self run along much the same lines
as these. Thus the contrast between the I-in-itself, that is, the
intelligible I, or the transcendental subject and the empirical I, or
the I as appearance is also not the contrast between two different
subjects. Rather, there is only one I, which on the one hand is in-
itself, timeless and thus knowable, while on the other hand it is in
my empirical consciousness and its alterations occurring in time are
experienced and known as appearance by me, that is, by itself.\textsuperscript{19} For
Kant it was a certainty which he took for granted that the I-in-itself
lies at the bottom of the appearances of our conscious lives. And,
as we shall see in Chapter Three, the reality of the I-in-itself is
the \textit{conditio sine qua non} for Kant's teaching of double affection as
well as for his doctrine of human freedom. But we should also keep
in mind that no more than some sort of existence of the I-in-itself
is ever given for we again have no intuition of the I-in-itself and
consequently also no knowledge.\textsuperscript{20} Thus Kant says: "our inner sense
places us in time to our consciousness only as we appear to ourselves,
not as we are in ourselves" (B 152), or a little later:

\begin{quote}
since we do not have an intellectual intuition,
I as intelligence and thinking subject know my-
self as an object of thought insofar as I am
given to myself in intuition - just as other
phenomena, not as I am to the understanding but
only as I appear to myself. (B 155)
\end{quote}

Or yet again: "the inner and sensible intuition of our mind gives
not ourself as it exists in-itself but only the appearance." (B 520)
We are now in a position to start inquiring about the kind of reality or existence which is at stake when we talk about the things-in-themselves. Most of the English-language commentators are given to maintaining the dichotomy of appearance - reality, which would seem to imply that the things-in-themselves are somehow more real than the appearances. But Kant himself never uses the word 'reality' in contrast to the term 'appearance', rather, reality is something which falls on the side of the appearances and is to be contrasted with illusion. Typical of Kant's use of 'reality' is the following: "Our discussions show the reality (i.e. the objective validity) of space in respect of everything which can outwardly come in front of us, but at the same time the ideality of space in respect to things when these are taken through reason in themselves, that is, without view to the nature of our sensibility." (A 28=B 44) And for the distinction between reality and illusion:

We commonly distinguish in appearances that which is essentially inherent in their intuition and holds for sense in all human beings, from that which belongs to their intuition accidentally only, and is valid not in relation to sensibility in general but only in relation to a particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense. The former kind of knowledge is then declared to represent the object in itself, the latter its appearance [i.e. illusion] only. But this distinction is merely empirical. (A 45 = B 65)

So then if one particular sense (for instance eyesight) perceives an object in a certain manner (for instance a stick immersed in water as bent) and we maintain that this is only an illusion and that in reality, the object (the stick) may actually be different (straight), we would
still be talking about appearances and not about things-in-themselves. Now in all fairness to the English-language commentators I must admit that they do seem quite aware of the significance of the two quotations immediately above and that they can be criticized only for choosing their terminology rather carelessly. Nevertheless, this whole digression into Kantian scholarship in English serves the very useful purpose of alerting us to the fact that reality on the empirical level and existence on the level of the things-in-themselves are perhaps not to be equated. And this suspicion is further confirmed when we turn to consider the already mentioned problem of the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense.

We may perhaps first of all ask ourselves the very general question whether it is consistent both to talk about something as existing and also to use it as a concept. The answer here must obviously be in the affirmative, for it is quite possible to have a concept of something without our bothering with whether or not there exists something which corresponds to the concept. And I may also add, that this idea is one which was perfectly familiar to Kant, for thinkers in his as well as in preceding eras made use of the distinction between nominal and real definition. Thus we can provide a nominal definition of, for instance, a circle, without having to worry, whether or not there actually do exist any circles at all in reality. Now the upshot of this paragraph is simply the observation that there is nothing which would prima facie lead us to think that Kant was contradicting himself when he talked both of the concept of the thing-in-itself and the thing-in-itself as an existing entity.
However, though there is no contradiction so far, the situation starts looking a little less promising once we realize what exactly Kant meant by the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense.

Here we may again rejoin Adickes and follow his arguments for a little while. Kant's discussion of the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense is closely linked up with his notion of a problematic concept of which the concept of a noumenon is one instance. According to Kant a problematic concept is "a concept which contains no contradiction, which is connected with other knowledge by limiting given concepts, but whose objective reality can not in any way be known."

(A 254f=B 310f) Now, as Adickes points out, a noumenon fulfills all of these requirements, for the concept of a noumenon is not self-contradictory, it is necessary in order that sensible intuition not be extended to things-in-themselves and so that the objective validity of sensible knowledge be limited and, finally, the real possibility of a noumenon cannot be shown. Therefore, the concept of a noumenon is a limiting concept. 23 But once we realize that noumena in the negative sense are the same as things-in-themselves 24 we will surely start wondering about the last of the three characterizing marks of a problematic concept, namely, about the impossibility of our knowing its objective reality. Adickes does not weaken in his realist convictions even at this stage and continues claiming that Kant does not put any doubt on the existence of the thing-in-itself, and that, in fact, he even takes its existence for granted. His reasoning may seem somewhat strange, however, when closely examined it will be seen to be reasonable and it will serve to point us in the right
direction. Adickes argues that the definition of the problematic concept does not conflict with the existence of the things-in-themselves, for what is at stake in the case of a limiting concept is not existence or non-existence, rather it is our insight into the objective reality or into the real possibility of the things-in-themselves. Now at first sight this will clearly strike the reader as nonsensical, for surely the objective reality of something and its existence must be one and the same thing. However, we need only remember that reality for Kant comes on the side of the appearances and never in the realm of the things-in-themselves and we will then perhaps be able to admit, that reality and existence are, indeed, not one and the same thing. Whereas the term 'reality' is to be reserved for phenomena, the term 'existence' may be used for either phenomena or for the things-in-themselves. Furthermore, it seems clear, that when we talk of the existence on the empirical level, we mean something quite different than when we speak of the existence of transcendent beings. And this must, indeed, be the one conclusion which we can draw from this chapter. Kant did believe that the things-in-themselves existed, but he also conceived of such an existence along radically different lines than of the existence of phenomena. For Kant, the chief characteristic of the things-in-themselves was their unknowability, an unknowability which could not be corrected by any concept, not matter how clear and distinct it would be: "however clearly conscious we may be of our representations of these things, it is still far from certain that, if the representation exists, there exists also the object corresponding to it." (A 371)
What we should note here is the fact that the difficulties with the concept of existence raise the more general question of the dual meaning of the other categorial concepts. And this in turn leads us to the problem of the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves, a problem which I will be discussing in the next two chapters. In chapter two I will deal with Adickes' attempted solution and then, in chapter three I will again return to the problem of the double meaning of concepts.
Chapter Two

THE CATEGORIES AND THE THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES:

ADICKES' VIEW

Throughout his book Adickes defends the contention that the categories apply to the things-in-themselves. I think that he presents three sets of arguments which, though they are intertwined in his text, are more or less independent of one another and I will therefore deal with each of them separately in sections i-iii. I will present some specific objections to Adickes' three arguments as I deal with each of them in turn but I will save my main, general case against his thesis for section iv.

(i) The first argument, which is really the only of the three which is fully positive in nature, is based on Kant's own usage of the concept of the thing-in-itself. Thus Adickes maintains that Kant applied the categories of reality (existence), unity, plurality, inherence-subsistence and causality to the things-in-themselves. In the previous chapter I have already discussed at length the contention that the things-in-themselves are existent and I have concluded that the existence of the in-itself must be distinguished from the existence of appearances. Now I think that whether or not the kind of existence which we can attribute to the things-in-themselves falls
under the categorial concept of existence is still an open question and I do not think that it can be resolved by fiat as Adickes does. I will return to this point later, but at the present moment, we can wonder why Adickes thinks that the category of reality should apply beyond the phenomenal level, when, as we have seen above, Kant otherwise always used the word reality only in connection with appearances.

If we find Adickes neither convincing nor clear in the case of the category of reality we will hardly find him any more convincing in respect to the other categories. Thus he claims that since each thing-in-itself is different from the other things-in-themselves, it must for that reason, have its own unity. But Kant himself did not talk of the things-in-themselves as having their own unity and we can only accuse Adickes of fabricating support for his case at a point where he does not even have a case. But even if we were to allow his conjecture to stand, it would still not prove his general contention that the categories apply to the things-in-themselves, because, just as with the notion of existence, it would still be possible to debate whether or not we were making use of the categorial concept of unity.

The situation with the category of plurality is open to the same objection as the situation with the previous two (and also the next two) categories, that is, we can always ask whether it is the categorial concept which is being employed. Now with plurality Adickes' views seem a little better justified than in the previous case, for Kant does use the plural expression: 'things-in-themselves' as well as the singular: 'thing-in-itself'. However, aside from
asking the above question, we could perhaps also suggest against Adickes, that Kant used the singular and plural only as figures of speech not really meaning to imply anything at all about the in-itself.

Adickes' claim that the category of inherence-subsistence also applies to the things-in-themselves is the weakest one of them all, for it is based on a blatant misrepresentation of Kant. Adickes holds that Kant implied that the things-in-themselves must have some accidental properties, citing as an example Kant's teaching of freedom to prove his case. He refers us to B xxviii, where Kant allegedly attributes the property of free will to the things-in-themselves. However, this is simply mistaken, for Kant did not consider freedom to be a property at all, rather he regarded freedom as the absence of the subjection to the law of nature (B xxviii).

Aside from the problem of the existence of the thing-in-itself, the only really significant question concerning the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves revolves around the category of causality. We have already seen in the previous chapter that it would be misconceived to claim that the appearance and the thing-in-itself are related by a direct causal link, for it is impossible for us to derive any knowledge of the things-in-themselves starting from appearances. Yet Kant does talk about things-in-themselves affecting us as well as about an unknown cause of appearances. And here Adickes seems to be correct in pointing out that Kant took this affecting as much for granted as he did the existence of the things-in-themselves. In order to clarify Kant's usage of the notions of affection and the unknown cause of appearances it may prove helpful
to present some lengthy excerpts from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

First the notion of affection:

> the representation of a body in intuition contains nothing that can belong to an object in-itself, but only the appearance of something, and the manner in which we are affected by that something; and this receptivity of our faculty of knowledge is called sensibility and is quite different from the knowledge of the object in-itself. (A 44=B 61)

This passage requires no comment, however, in the next quotation, what is worthy of our notice is the mention of another possible kind of intuition, a topic to which I will return in the next section.

> space and time are the subjective forms of our outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is not original; i.e. it is not such as can itself give us the existence of its objects (such intuition, as far as we can see can belong only to the primordial being). Rather, our intuition is dependent on the being of the object and is possible only because the subject's faculty of representation is affected by the object. (B 72)

And, finally, Kant explains the whole situation in regard to affecting and the unknown cause of appearance in a passage where he also says quite clearly that the things-in-themselves precede experience. Adickes, rightly in my view, takes this as convincing proof that strongly idealist interpretations of Kant are unjustifiable.

> the faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity to be affected by representations in a certain way...the non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us and can not therefore be intuited by us as an object. For such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time, without which conditions we can not think any intuition. We can, however, call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, only so that we can have something to correspond to sensibility as a receptivity. We can ascribe
to this transcendental object the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions and we can say that it is given in-itself prior to all experience. (A 494f=B 5224)

So there can be no doubt that Kant thought of the things-in-themselves as affecting us. The only question which now remains is the same one which I asked in connection with the other categories, and that is the question of whether or not it is the category of causality which Kant is here applying to the things-in-themselves. It seems clear to me, that the whole issue of the extension of the categories beyond phenomena cannot be considered as having been decided in this section and that our preliminary verdict against Adickes must be: case not proven.

(ii) Those of Adickes' arguments with which I will deal in the present section seem to be intended not only for proving his point but also for the purpose of forestalling possible objections. And, therefore, I will first be presenting arguments which Adickes uses to support his position and then, subsequently, further arguments with which he seeks to discount or to play down those passages in Kant which rule out the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves. Adickes does admit that there are passages which seem to counter his thesis, but he says that "we should not stress these few places at the expense of those other places where Kant does, in fact, apply the categories to the in-itself." 32 Here we may, first of all, observe that Adickes does not say 'at the expense of those other places where Kant does admit the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves', for Kant only seldom makes such an admission. This fact
alone should make us very suspicious of Adickes' contention, for there are enough places where Kant discusses the scope of the categories and if Adickes were right, we should surely expect much clearer and much more frequent assurances from Kant that the categories do apply beyond the realm of the appearances. Secondly, we may object to Adickes' claim that the places where Kant rules out the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves are relatively few. He himself deals with dozens of such cases in his book and I will present many of those passages here as well. But let us now leave these minor quibbles aside and let us turn to Adickes' major arguments.

The arguments which I am presenting in this section all revolve around the difference between knowing and thinking. In fact, Adickes is so confident about the significance of this distinction to his thesis, that at one point he even says that "provided that one does justice to the difference between knowing and thinking, there is no problem with the application of the categories to things-in-themselves." Now we could not deny that Kant does make such a distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason and that it plays a very prominent role in his philosophy. He introduces these two notions and the relation between them in the Preface to the second edition (B xxvi) and he explains the situation fully in the second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction:

To think an object and to know an object are not one and the same thing. To knowledge, there belong two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and, secondly, the intuition through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would
be a thought according to its form, but without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible through such a concept. (B 146)

Important here is the fact that the categories are concepts and that no concept itself, without connection with intuition can ever lead to knowledge, i.e. to determinate, concrete representations which relate to real objects. Kant expresses this point in a passage which appears not too long after the preceding quote:

the categories with the aid of intuition do not afford us any knowledge of things, except through their possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge and this we call experience. And thus the categories have no other use for the knowledge of things except in so far as these are taken as objects of possible experience. (B 147)

In short, the categories without intuition, would be only "empty" concepts of objects, mere forms of thought without objective reality" (B 148) and would, just by themselves, be of no use to us as far as our quest for knowledge was concerned.

But if Kant says that the categories alone are of no use to us for the knowledge of things, he also seems to indicate that they may be of use for thinking things. He does not say this at a great number of places, however, even these few passages do much to strengthen Adickes' case and present headaches to the person who is attempting to show that the categories do not apply to the things-in-themselves. By far the most clear, complete and convincing instance occurs at B 166n.:

...the categories, for thought, are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the knowledge of that which we think, the determining of the object,
that requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, the thought of the object may still have its true and useful consequences, as regards the subject's employment of reason. The use of reason is not always directed to the determination of the object, that is, to knowledge, but also to the determination of the subject and of its volition - a use which can therefore not be dealt with here.

There are two other places where Kant clearly hints at the applicability of the categories beyond appearances:

the pure concepts of the understanding relate to all objects universally, i.e. apart from all conditions of sensibility. (A 88=B 120)
the categories are the only concepts which relate to objects in general (problematic and without having decided whether it is something or nothing) (A 290=B 346)

Now on the basis of these last few quotations one may be led to think that we could safely conclude that Adickes' thesis is not only very clever but that it is also quite convincing. However, this whole situation rapidly changes once we start considering some other passages, which run contrary to Adickes' claims. There Adickes is reduced to various bizarre manipulations, such as, for instance, inserting some extra words or even some whole phrases into the text at certain places or deleting other words and phrases in different passages. He also at one point claims that though Kant used one word he really must have meant to use another, which, however, would diametrically alter the meaning of the whole passage. Now when Adickes says that Kant 'must have meant something else...' what he is of course saying is that Kant must have meant something else if the Adickes thesis is to be fully consistent. But unless one is convinced prior to textual examination that Adickes is right, one is
hardly bound to be favourably impressed by all these magician's tricks. I will present one such instance now, which, because it is as yet isolated, will likely look perfectly innocuous. It will only be later in this section and also in the next one when I present further such cases that we will gather good grounds for wanting to abandon Adickes' thesis.

In B 149 Kant again entertains the possibility of an intellectual intuition but after some brief remarks about what an object of such an intuition would be like, he quickly points out, that we could not have knowledge of such an object-in-itself:

> If we take an object of a non-sensible intuition to be given, we can represent it through all the predicates which lie already in the presupposition that it has nothing which belongs to sensible intuition; that is, we can say, that it is not extended, that it is space-less, without temporal duration and change. But all this is still not proper knowledge, because I can not represent the real possibility of an object corresponding to my concept of pure reason without any intuition.

Now all of this is, of course, in perfect accord with Adickes' thesis. However, what follows is not:

> But the most important point here is, that no category can ever be supplied to such a something: e.g. the concept of a substance, i.e. of something which could exist as a subject but never as a mere predicate. For, unless empirical intuition provides me the case of application, I do not at all know, whether there could be anything which would correspond to this thought-determination.

Adickes has the following to say here. He admits that this passage seems to contradict B 166n (quoted above) but he adds that this is only an illusion, that Kant is only being imprecise in his terminology. According to Adickes, only one explanation is possible, namely, that Kant meant in the last sentence the expression 'applied' to read:
"application for the purpose of knowledge and of objective determination." In that case, Kant would certainly have been quite right in denying the applicability of the categories, but he would still have been able to admit the applicability of the categories to merely undetermined thought of supersensible things. But despite what Adickes says, this is surely not the only possible explanation. One could just as well engineer B 166n. to read that the categories do not have an unlimited field or one could attempt to explain away the apparent contradiction in some other manner as I hope to do in the next chapter.

Before moving on to the next section, there remains one thorny issue to be dealt with here, and that is the question of intellectual intuition. It may already have been gathered from some of the above quotes, that intellectual intuition would give its possessor the knowledge of things not as they appear but as they are in-themselves. But since we, humans, do not have intellectual intuition, we can not know things-in-themselves, we can only think them. Now the question which concerns us is the following. If we had intellectual intuition, would the categories apply to its objects. For if the answer to this hypothetical question were to be in the affirmative, this would provide strong evidence for Adickes' thesis, that the categories apply beyond the realm of phenomena. Unfortunately, Kant is here also not perfectly clear, though it does seem to me that the evidence tends to weigh more against Adickes than in his favour.

Adickes naturally claims that the categories are valid for objects of intellectual intuition but I think that he supports his case rather feebly and I will therefore strengthen it somewhat.
is a passage in the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena where Kant is suggesting something which would seem to support Adickes, but which Adickes never quotes in full. I will do so for him:

the categories have meaning only in relation to the unity of intuition of space and time... Where this unity of time is not to be found, and that is in the case of the noumenon, all employment, and indeed, the whole meaning of the categories entirely ceases. The possibility of a thing can never be proved merely from the fact that its concept is not self-contradictory, but only through its being supported by some corresponding intuition. If, therefore, we should attempt to apply the categories to objects which are not regarded as appearances, we would have to postulate an intuition other than the sensible and the object would then be a noumenon in a positive sense. But since such an intuition, namely the intellectual, lies outside our cognitive capacities, it follows, that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience. (B 308)

Now whether Kant is really saying here that if we had intellectual intuition the categories would apply to its objects is not perfectly clear, for it could be suggested that Kant was not really concerned with our hypothetical question, precisely because of the fact that it is merely hypothetical. In other words, there are two conditions which would have to be fulfilled if the categories were to apply to the objects of intellectual intuition. First, the categories would have to be such concepts that they could be applied beyond the realm of sensibility and secondly, we would have to possess intellectual intuition. But since this latter condition is not fulfilled, Kant may have considered it redundant to express himself with caution in regard to the former condition, for this is something which he had ample opportunity to do elsewhere (as we shall soon see). However,
be this as it may, this passage would still have provided better
evidence for Adickes' case than another passage which he uses, which
is perhaps less favourable to him, but which he 'edits' to suit his
own needs. This second passage is also from the chapter on Phenomena
and Noumena and follows closely the last one.

If I leave out of empirical knowledge all intuition, the form of thought still remains - i.e. the way of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. For this reason the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think objects in general, without regard to the special way in which they may be given. But they do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects... 

Here I will briefly interrupt the flow of Kant's text, for it is at this point that Adickes inserts in square brackets: 'for the purposes of knowledge'. Now we may think that this addition can not be justified, for starting with the word 'since' Kant ceases to talk about empirical knowledge and starts talking about objects in general and suggests that the objects could be given in different ways, that is, either through sensible or through intellectual intuition and we may therefore think that Adickes' note must be out of place. But still, is Kant here not talking perhaps of knowledge gained through intellectual intuition, rather than empirical knowledge? This possibility may seem plausible if we read on a little further:

...For such objects can not be given, unless we presuppose another kind of intuition than the sensible, and this we are in no way justified in doing. (A 235f=B 309)

So it would seem that perhaps it could be argued with Adickes, that all that Kant is denying here is that the categories could be used
for the knowledge of things-in-themselves and this not because the categories are limited to appearances, but because we do not have intellectual intuition. However, this explanation will lose much of its plausibility if we read yet further on. For immediately following the above passage, Kant starts talking about the concept of a noumenon and says that our understanding extends further only problematically (A 255=B 310), that is, it extends only in order to limit sensibility:

What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things-in-themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it can not know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something. (A 256=B 312)

Here Kant clearly does not say that we can think this unknown something through the categories and in fact a little later, towards the close of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena he emphatically denies that the understanding could be of transcendental employment (A 257=B 313). And since the categories are the pure concepts of the understanding, it seems most reasonable to believe that they do not apply to the things-in-themselves.

(iii) The real Achilles' heel of Adickes' thesis comes in connection with those of his arguments which I will present in this section. I will here largely deal with a distinction which Adickes introduces into Kant's terminology, namely his claim that the word 'category'
was used by Kant in two different senses. Thus, according to Adickes, the expression 'categories' is used first of all to designate the synthetic functions of our transcendent unity of apperception, functions thanks to which we are able to unite our perceptual data and form objects out of them. And secondly, the term 'categories' is also used when we deal with the results of these synthetic activities, when we talk of the properties, connections and relations in things, such as unity, plurality, size of the objects, their causal relations, etc. Now in the first case, we can use the categories only when supplied with sensible intuitions on which we can then carry out the synthetic functions. But in the second instance, there does not seem to be anything which, according to Adickes, would prevent us from applying those universal properties, connections and relations to things-in-themselves, for there is no need here to look back to the synthetic functions. 38 Directly corresponding to this distinction is another distinction which Adickes draws, namely, that between the absolute and the relative inapplicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves. Thus in the first case, as mere concepts of the synthetic functions, when the categories only apply and have meaning in connection with sensible intuition, they are absolutely inapplicable to the things-in-themselves. However, in the second case, they apply to things in general, that is, to things either as appearances or as they are in-themselves and though they still can not be used for knowing things-in-themselves, they can yet be used, according to Adickes, to think the in-itself. 39

What are we to think of this distinction? We could first ask,
whether or not it makes any sense at all, whether or not it is a
distinction which could have been carried out by Kant himself. I 
think that the answer here would likely tend to be in the negative,
for it seems clear, that if we have used the categories once to deter-
mine our perceptual data, a second application would be redundant. 40
But be this as it may, there is a second question which we must ask,
and which, for the purposes of this paper, is even more crucial be-
cause it is concerned with what Kant actually did think and write.
And this is, of course, the question of whether or not there is any
evidence in the text that Kant really made such a distinction. Now
the answer here must again be in the negative, only this time it is
possible to be considerably more emphatic and certain in the answer
than the last time. But if this distinction which Adickes draws is
regarded as fanciful, the use he makes of it will be thought of even
less favourably.

I will here present one example of how Adickes uses this dis-
tinction (which he uses along with other, even more dubious, means)
when he attempts to dismiss the literal meaning of a passage where
Kant clearly denies the applicability of the categories to the things-
in-themselves. The passage at stake is once more a part of the chapter
on Phenomena and Noumena and runs from A 246=B 303 to A 248=B 305. It
starts in the following manner:

From all this it undeniably follows that the pure
concepts of the understanding can never be of
transcendental but always only of empirical employ-
ment, and that the principles of the understanding
can apply only to objects of the senses under the
universal conditions of a possible experience,
ever to things in general (regardless of the
manner in which we may intuit them).
Adickes comments here that this passage clearly deals with only the relative and not the absolute inapplicability of the categories to things-in-themselves. He contends that 'from all this' refers to the preceding passage (both in A and B) where mere thinking of the things-in-themselves through the categories is explicitly allowed. Now if this really be so we may well wonder why Kant emphasized the words 'never' and 'always' in the above excerpt. But secondly and more significantly, we should inquire whether it is really true that Kant allowed for the applicability of the categories to the in-itself in what precedes this quote. What we will discover, is that Kant is far less clear than Adickes would need and that, in fact, he even seems to suggest the opposite than Adickes claims. Here is the relevant excerpt from the longer of the two versions, from A:

> apart from their application to sensibility in general, the categories are not concepts through which an object is known and distinguished from others, but only so many modes of thinking an object of possible intuitions...the pure categories are nothing but representations of things in general, so far as the manifold of their intuition must be thought through one or another of these functions. (A 245)

Now Adickes must have known that he was not being convincing for he adds the following hypothesis. He says that in order that Kant's true meaning in A 246=B 303 be clear, there would have to be inserted, after the expression 'the concepts of the understanding' the additional phrase: 'when they are supposed to lead to knowledge'. And Adickes claims, that Kant did, in fact, add those words in his manuscript, but, unfortunately, that he inserted them in the wrong place. Adickes attributes this to an oversight on Kant's part, arguing that
Kant most likely re-read the manuscript only in a cursory fashion.\textsuperscript{42} Now as if this whole speculation was not wild enough, Adickes adds another one, even more implausible, just a little later. He comments on Kant's statement that "the categories are the pure form of the employment of the understanding in respect to objects in general and to thought; but through them no object can be thought or determined" (A 248=B 305). Here it seems that Kant is specifically denying that the categories can be used to think objects-in-themselves, so Adickes claims that Kant made another oversight, writing 'no object can be thought' for 'no object can be known'. And so from a passage which evidently contradicts Adickes' thesis, we all of a sudden have a passage which supports him.

Thus when Adickes comments on the whole of A 246-8=B 303-5 he says that Kant talks of both the relative and the absolute inapplicability of the categories to the in-itself, only he is not careful enough in maintaining this distinction and so many commentators are misled into thinking that Kant denied that the categories apply beyond the realm of appearances.\textsuperscript{43}

Here Adickes again must have realized that his manipulations were not likely to be accepted by serious scholars, for he added another note of explanation, to the extent that Kant here carried things a little too far, because he was at this particular point concerned with combatting the old metaphysics.\textsuperscript{44} I think that it should be clear by now that Adickes' whole case, though it does have some support, is by and large rather shaky. I will now present a number of important passages where Kant provides fairly exhaustive explanations
of why the categories do not apply beyond appearances.

(iv) First there are some additional places where Kant limits the categories to objects of sensible intuition, denying that they could extend to objects of intellectual intuition. The first two quotes are from the second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction:

the pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation and extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours, provided only it is sensible and not intellectual. But this further extension of the concepts, over the bounds of our sensible intuition, is of no help to us. (B 148)

And similarly a little later:

the pure concepts of the understanding relate, through the mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, regardless of whether it is our intuition or another one, provided only it is sensible. (B 150)

The next passage is from the last chapter of the Analytic, from the Amphiboly, and must, therefore, be taken very seriously, for it is in this chapter that Kant makes numerous concluding remarks to the whole of the first division of the Transcendental Logic.

For the condition of the objective use of all our concepts of the understanding is merely the manner of our sensible intuition through which objects are given to us; and when we abstract from the objects, the concepts have no relation to any object. Even if we were willing to accept another kind of intuition than is our sensible, our functions of thought would still have no meaning at all in regard to it. If we have in mind here only objects of a non-sensible intuition, in respect of which our categories are admittedly not valid and of which we can therefore have no knowledge... (A 286=B 342)

The next passages which I will quote all deny that the categories
could apply to the things-in-themselves. The first one serves as the conclusion to the chapter on Schematism.

It is evident, that although the schemata of sensibility first of all realize the categories, they at the same time restrict them, i.e., limit them to conditions which lie outside of the understanding (namely in sensibility)... When we leave out a restricting condition, it would seem that we extend the scope of a previously limited concept. And the categories should, in their pure meaning, without all conditions of sensibility, be valid for all things in general, as they are, instead of representing them, as their schemata do, as they appear. They should then have a meaning independent of all schemata which would be extended much wider. In fact, there does remain to the pure concepts of the understanding a meaning even after the elimination of all sensible conditions. But this meaning is only a logical one of the pure unity of the representations and no object and along with it no such meaning can be assigned to it which could yield a concept of an object...the categories without schemata are only functions of the understanding for concepts but represent no object. This meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding while restricting it as well.

(A 146–7=B 185–6)

There are two things about this passage which are worthy of our notice, if only because I will return to them in my next chapter. First, Kant here emphasizes the importance the schemata have for the categories, making it sufficiently clear, that the categories without the schemata would not apply to anything, be it appearances or things-in-themselves (viz ch. III, section ii). Secondly, he also talks about meaning and he seems to be saying that the categories without sensibility would only be empty functions with no more than a logical meaning. He says something similar in a passage in the Postulates of Empirical Thought in General:

the principles of modality...restrict all categories
to their merely empirical employment and do not approve or allow their transcendental employment. For if they are not to have a purely logical significance, analytically expressing the form of thought, but are to refer to the possibility, actuality, or necessity of things, they must concern possible experience and its synthetic unity, in which alone objects of knowledge can be given. (A 219=B 266-7)

I will return to this question of meaning in the last section of the next chapter. The last of the long quotes in this sections is again taken from the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena and can be taken as a conclusion to the explanation of Kant's celebrated statement from the opening pages of the Transcendental Logic, that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (A 51=B 75)

the transcendental employment of a concept in any principle is its application to things in general and in-themselves; the empirical employment is its application merely to appearances; i.e. to objects of possible experience. But that only the latter application of concepts is possible can be seen from the following. Each concept requires, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility, to provide it with an object to which it relates. Without the object, the concept has no meaning and is fully devoid of content, even though it may still contain the logical function which is required in order to make a concept out of any data that may be presented. Now the object can not be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition. And though a pure intuition can indeed precede the object a priori, even this intuition can acquire its object, and along with it also objective validity, only through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form. (A 238-9=B 298)

It may also be of interest to remark here, that Adickes, when commenting on this passage, claims that the categories require empirical intuition only for the purpose of knowledge, but that this leaves it
open for the categories to apply to the things-in-themselves in thought. However, this is unjustified, for Kant rules out any such application to the in-itself in the first two sentences of this passage. What allows Adickes to maintain what he does is the fact that he conveniently leaves out the first two sentences when quoting this passage.45

Before leaving this chapter, we should ask ourselves one more question. We should ask, whether there any such special reasons why we should attempt to interpret Kant as either affirming or as denying the applicability of the categories to the things-in-themselves. For if either of these interpretations should turn out to cause problems for Kant's philosophy, while the other would not, we should naturally attempt to be charitable to our philosopher and try to read him along the more favourable lines. This question can, of course, be raised only if the original text leaves the issue undecided, as is the case with our problem.

I think that here, for once, it is clear which way we should opt. For the contention that we can think the things-in-themselves through the categories is riddled with nothing but serious problems. First, there is the relatively minor problem of the difference between the understanding and reason. Before Kant, thinkers generally used these two notions as synonymous, and Kant was the first one to draw a distinction between them. Now the difference consists simply in this. The understanding is tied up with sensibility, while reason is not. So while with reason we can move into the realm of the in-itself, with the understanding we are bound to appearances. But if
this be so, then claiming that the pure concepts of the understanding apply to the things-in-themselves will only tend to make nonsense of the distinction between reason and understanding. Now it could perhaps be objected that Kant used the word 'reason' in more than one sense and that this whole distinction is valid for only one of the usages of the term 'reason'. Nevertheless, if we were to accept Adickes' thesis, we would still be contradicting this one usage, a usage which, moreover, is very significant in Kantian philosophy.

But I think that there is an even more serious reason why we should attempt to deny that Kant meant the categories to apply to the things-in-themselves. And this is the problem of what can possibly be meant by saying that we can think something indeterminate through the categories. For it seems to me that we may end up running in a sort of a vicious circle in the following manner. First, there is nothing concrete in-itself given in any intuition, since our sensible intuition can not give us but appearances and intellectual intuition, which could give us things-in-themselves is not the kind of an intuition which we possess. Secondly, we are faced with the problem of to what we are applying the categories, since nothing is given. And thirdly, we could claim, that since it is difficult for us to apply the categories, then the something which we are talking about can not be determinate. So we start with nothing determinate and we also finish with nothing determinate. Walsh provides a fitting illustration of this problem in connection with the category of existence.

According to Walsh, we can say that the 'something' might exist, but it would not exist in the manner that physical objects or minds or
even numbers exist. Of course, it may exist in the minimal sense represented by the logical symbol \( \exists x \), but this does not say anything determinate at all. And, adds Walsh, we will get the same result if we try to use the other categories in connection with the in-itself. Our something will be only 'a something we know not what' and we can hardly count it as a coherent idea.⁴⁶ And so unless we are willing to enmesh ourselves in obscurities, we should attempt to interpret Kant as saying that the categories do not apply to the things-in-themselves.
Chapter Three

THE CATEGORIES AND THE THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES:

ALTERNATIVES TO ADICKES

The previous chapter has demonstrated quite clearly that there appear to be various problems with Adickes' thesis. In situations such as our present one there exist basically two possible alternatives. One can either attempt to radically re-interpret the given philosopher or one may attempt to present alternative solutions of the subject matter at hand. If we re-interpret Adickes, it is quite conceivable that we would come to a significantly more positive assessment of his thesis than the one which I presented in the previous chapter. However, I have decided to defer a re-interpretation of Adickes in favour of examining some alternative approaches to Kant's philosophy. A more definitive evaluation of Adickes' work, as well as a comparison of my proposal with that of Adickes would require a much more extensive project which would necessarily have to include a considerably more detailed examination of Kant's theory of meaning than the one which I will present in this chapter.

For the sake of convenience Chapter Three is divided into three sections. In section (i) I will present and deal with George Schrader's thesis, in section (ii) I will consider the possibility of resolving the apparent inconsistencies in Kant by making use of the distinction between schematized and pure categories and, finally,
in section (iii) I will ponder the possibility of claiming that Kant may have thought that there was a group of concepts other than the categories, but in some ways parallel to the categories, which he had meant to use beyond appearances.

(i) In his article "The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy" Schrader makes the claim that there are two readily identifiable strands in Kant's thought, two strands which had caused Kant to contradict himself at a number of points in the Critique of Pure Reason. The one trend in Kant was, according to Schrader, Kant's critical philosophy, while the other tendency led him to make dogmatic assertions. Now I should mention here, for the sake of completeness, that Adickes, throughout his book, also talks of two conflicting orientations in Kant, the transcendental and the realist. Only Adickes, unlike Schrader, does not make very much of this alleged split in Kant.

Schrader concerns himself primarily with two issues in his article, the existence of the thing-in-itself and the applicability of the categories in general to the in-itself. It may be of help to first return to our first chapter topic and present Schrader's views on the problem of the existence of the things-in-themselves. Schrader's understanding of Kant's critical employment of the notion of the in-itself starts out along lines which are already familiar to us. Thus he says that the thing-in-itself is not a second object, that rather, it is the object which appears and that all that we are dealing with is one object considered from two different perspectives. But then
Schrader becomes somewhat more radical and makes the strong claim that the thing-in-itself is nothing but a purely limiting concept. What this means is that we consider objects from a limited perspective, for instance, from the point of view of science, or art, or morality. In this way, we are always talking about public objects and not subjective data. Furthermore, in Kant's critical teachings the thing-in-itself is not a cause of appearances and so there occurs no extension of the category of causality beyond appearances, nor is it the case that an unknown object is given the attribute of existence. Thus in short, "to say that we know only appearances and not things-in-themselves is to state an obvious tautology, namely that objects are known only as they are known."^{48}

But according to Schrader, Kant the realist unfortunately also lurks in the background and comes through at a number of points when we see him refer to the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances. In this case the appearances are taken as subjective sense data and things-in-themselves as independent objects with no primary and secondary qualities.^{49}

Schrader's explanation for this split in Kant is that Kant was a realist in his private views and that "apparently he could not resist the temptation to offer a defence of realism, and employed the concept of the thing-in-itself to that end."^{50} But now we must ask ourselves, whether Schrader presents a plausible portrait of Kant. What we must realize, is that such a picture is one which is highly unfavourable to Kant, for it shows him as an inconsistent thinker who was not even aware of the inconsistencies in his own position. So
what we should attempt to do, that is, if we wish to remain sympathetic
to our philosopher, is to try to demonstrate that this alleged gap is
not as enormous as Schrader claims and that it is bridgeable by some
other means. Now in those of Schrader's views which I have presented
above, we can point to two considerations which are likely to lessen
the split to quite an extent. First, we can ask a question about Kant's
critical stance. We can ask with what right we are allowed to talk of
considering an object from the point of view of that object as it is
in-itself, when we know nothing at all about this side of things. For
even claiming that there exists this unknowable aspect of things is
tantamount to ascribing existence to some unknown object. In other
words, since we know nothing about things as they are in-themselves,
strictly speaking, we have no right to claim that there is any such
in-itself. But we have already seen in chapter one, that this kind
of thinking was far from Kant's line of thought and that we can neither
banish the in-itself, nor play down its role in the way that Schrader
does. That is to say, Kant's supposed 'critical' position is full of
'realist' overtones from which it can not be separated.

But there is another question we can ask about Schrader's
claims. We can ask, whether, when Kant talks about the unknown cause
of things, he is in fact really extending the category of causality
beyond appearances and whether it would perhaps not be possible to
interpret these passages in Kant in such manner that they be more in
accord with his 'critical' position. To this problem I will again
return in section iii.

Now if Schrader's exposition of the problem of the existence
of the thing-in-itself is found defective, his remarks about the applicability of the categories in general to the things-in-themselves are likely to be received even less favourably. Schrader starts by pointing out something which cannot be doubted, namely the fact that Kant sometimes denied that we could apply the categories beyond the realm of sensibility, while at other times he admitted that we can think the things-in-themselves through the categories. Schrader's footnotes, unfortunately, do not seem to be in perfect order, however, for the most part, he refers to passages which I have already quoted in this paper. But the real difficulties commence only with Schrader's explanation of why Kant contradicted himself. He, of course, again says that Kant was torn between his critical stance and his private, realist views, but now his explanation goes deeper than before, for he discusses Kant's deduction of space and time and of the categories. Schrader claims that Kant offered two deductions, the objective and the psychological, one critical, the other realist and dogmatic. The categories derived from the objective deduction are the necessary a priori conditions of mathematics and of any mathematical science of nature. No application of these categories beyond mathematical knowledge can be claimed, that is, these categories can never apply to the things-in-themselves. However, the categories derived from the psychological deduction are the only possible forms of judgement and may, therefore, apply to the things-in-themselves.

Now it must first of all be admitted that Kant does draw a rather obscure distinction between the objective and the subjective deductions (A xvi-xvii) and that presumably it is this distinction
to which Schrader is referring us. But secondly, we should note, that
the difference between the two deductions is not of the kind that
Schrader would have us believe. Both of the deductions start out by
stressing the importance of time and they both conclude that the cate-
gories are the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience.
Now since the subjective deduction emphasizes time, it seems to me
that Schrader is quite wrong in claiming that it could produce cate-
gories which do not require temporalization through the schemata. 53
That is to say, the categories coming out of the subjective deduction
would seem to be totally inapplicable to the things-in-themselves.

And so we are led to conclude, that Schrader's thesis, aside
from attempting to lessen our esteem of Kant's powers as a thinker,
cannot be taken as a serious scholarly effort which could help us
with our problem. Schrader does present a neat picture of Kant, but,
unfortunately, the picture can not be made to reconcile with the facts.
Thus we are forced to look elsewhere.

(ii) I am not overly hopeful about the possibility which I am about
to present in this section, however, since some of the commentators
seem to suggest it without really dealing with it, 54 it may be worth
our time if we explore it a little. Our present thesis runs very
simply as follows. Kant meant the schematized categories to apply
only to appearances, while the pure, unschematized categories could
be applied to the things-in-themselves. Now such an explanation again
has the advantage of being neat, and if it worked, it would certainly
make it clear why Kant sometimes clearly denied, while at other times
admitted the applicability of the categories to the in-itself. And we could even pick out some passage such as the following to claim support for this thesis:

we do, in the principle itself, make use of the category, however, in applying it to appearances, we substitute the schema in its place, or rather, we set it alongside the category as its restricting condition under the title of a formula.

(A 181=B 224)

Now this passage does not clearly expound or even explicitly support our thesis, but it would at least seem to leave an open door for it. Unfortunately, this is about all the positive evidence there is for our present proposal, for there are other places where Kant seems to rule out this possibility. We can consider all those passages where Kant denies the applicability of the categories beyond the bounds of sensibility without even mentioning the schemata, or better yet, we can again examine the already quoted A 146-7=B 185-6. There Kant clearly says that the unschematized categories could not be of any use at all, that they possess no more than only a logical meaning. The simple fact is, that Kant had meant the categories to apply only along with the schemata and that our present thesis is no better than Adickes' or Schrader's claims.

(iii) The proposal which I am about to expound in this section is one which I regard as the most promising of them all. One of the disadvantages which it has is the fact that it is not nearly as neat and clean-cut as the previous three theses but this disadvantage is balanced by the more important consideration that it fits the text
reasonably well and that it does not make a mediocre thinker out of Kant, though it does accuse Kant of having been somewhat careless at times.

Our present interpretation runs as follows. The categories do not apply beyond sensibility, but Kant realized that he needed some sort of concepts like the categories, but which themselves were not the categories, for dealing with the in-itself. Now these extra concepts, some of which are ideas of reason, are in many respects very similar to the categories and Kant occasionally talked about them as if they were, in fact, the categories. This would explain the above quoted B 166n where Kant says that the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition but have an unlimited field and can be used for the practical employment of reason.

According to our present thesis, Kant did not here mean strictly the categories, rather what he was talking about were these additional concepts which are to an extent parallel to the categories.

Now there is some textual support for this interpretation. Kant sometimes suggests that there could be alternate categories. So, for instance, he says:

we can never even know whether such a transcendental or exceptional knowledge is possible under any conditions - at least not if it is to be the same kind of knowledge as that which stands under our ordinary categories. (A 258=B 314)

So perhaps these other, non-ordinary categories, could be used in connection with the things-in-themselves.

When Kant talks about the unknown cause of appearances it often seems that he is talking about some other kind of causality
than the empirical. I had already alluded to this fact in the first chapter when I was pointing out that it is impossible to obtain knowledge of the things-in-themselves by starting from appearances. And there are places in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant does, indeed, seem to be suggesting that this causality is of a different nature from the categorial concept of causality. So, for instance, in A 288=B 344 he says that the transcendental object is the cause of appearances, adding however, that the transcendental object can be thought neither as quantity, nor as reality, nor as substance. Hence it is obvious, that the kind of causality which is at stake here is something different from the quantity, reality and substance, that is to say, it is not a category like the other three concepts. It is interesting to note here that Adickes claims that causality is taken in this excerpt as a pure category, while the other three concepts are taken as schematized categories. Now aside from the fact that there is not the slightest sign of evidence anywhere for such a reading of this passage, the phrase 'the transcendental object can be thought neither as quantity...' does not fit in with Adickes' claim. So Adickes once more resorts to his 'slip of the pen theory' and maintains that Kant, by mistake, wrote the word 'thought' when he had meant to write 'known'.

The problem which confronts us now is that of clarifying what is meant by the notions of affection and the unknown cause of appearances. We must ask what can be meant by saying that a thing-in-itself affects me or is the unknown cause of appearances, while keeping in mind that the thing-in-itself is nothing but the other side of
appearances and not an additional object. And this brings us to the doctrine of double affection (B 66-8), according to which the thing-in-itself is not the direct cause of our perceptions but rather, it affects only our I-in-itself, whereas the object of appearance, which is the other side of the thing-in-itself, effects our empirical I, which is, of course, the other side of the I-in-itself. This whole situation can be illustrated pictorially by a rectangle whose upper corners can be labeled, from left to right, the thing-in-itself and the I-in-itself, while the lower two corners can be marked, also from left to right, the object of appearance and the empirical I. The vertical lines represent some sort of identity between the thing-in-itself and its appearance and between the I-in-itself and the empirical I, while the horizontal lines represent causal relations. Or rather, to be precise, only the lower horizontal line represents a causal relation (empirical causality) while the upper line represents some sort of a relationship which is unknown to us. And when we therefore say that a thing-in-itself affects us, what we mean is that it somehow acts on our I-in-itself, which then reacts by presenting the non-spatio-temporal things-in-themselves as objects in space and time. From all this, it should be sufficiently clear, that the notions of affection and the unknown cause of appearances are radically distinct from empirical causation and that, if we are to hold that the categories are limited to the realm of appearances, these two notions must fall among the group of concepts which resemble the categories but which themselves are not the categories.

But Kant used the notion of causality in yet another sense,
necessarily, for his teaching of freedom. He explained the situation in the Antinomy of Pure Reason:

Whatever in an object of the senses is not appearance, I call **intelligible**. When that, which in the world of the senses must be regarded as an appearance, has in-itself also a capacity which is not an object of sensible intution but through which it can yet be the cause of appearances, the **causality** of this being can be considered from two points of view: as **intelligible** in its action (as the causality of a thing-in-itself) and as sensible in its effects (as an appearance in the world of senses). (A 538=B 566)

And so freedom in the cosmological sense is the capacity to bring about, from itself, an event, and along with it a chain of further events which follow from this first event. It is a spontaneity, acting from itself and so it does not proceed from a preceding cause which would determine it according to causal laws. The freely acting subject stands as noumenon under no time-determination and is, therefore, not under the domination of the natural law of appearances which governs all time determinations, that is, it is not under the domination of the causal law. In the subject no alteration takes place and intelligible causality does not act at a certain time in order to bring about an effect.

Another term which I have already shown to have been used by Kant in two different senses is that of 'existence'. We have already seen throughout Chapter One, that Kant thought of the existence of appearances along radically different lines than he thought of the existence of the things-in-themselves.

And so, in short, what I am claiming is that words such as causality and existence are used by Kant in a number of different
senses and that of these, there is always only one which falls under the scope of the categories. Kant himself seems to be suggesting something of this sort when he says:

if I took all things not as phenomena but as things-in-themselves and as objects of mere understanding, then, although they are substances, they could be regarded as depending on a foreign cause in respect of their existence. But the words would then carry different meanings and would not apply to appearances as possible objects of our experience. (A 206 = B 252)

And this also accords well with what we saw Kant say in the previous chapter about meaning, where he maintained that without sensible intuition, the pure concepts of the understanding would have only a logical meaning. That is, the categories apply to appearances and if we wish to deal with the in-itself, we have to employ words which are perhaps similar, but which have a different meaning.

Finally, in order to be thorough, I should admit that my proposal is not without its problems. First it is clear that the textual support, though not overly deficient, is still not what one would like it to be. But secondly, and more significantly, we are in danger of falling, with our extra concepts, into the same kind of a trap as one falls into, when one attempts to claim that it is possible to think indeterminate things-in-themselves through the categories (viz. ch. II, section iv). Now there are some possible ways of avoiding this problem. First we will probably have no great difficulties applying the notion of intelligible causality, for there we are talking about something determinate, namely, human actions. Secondly, we can see how ideas such as absolute totality, which do not apply to appearances
(A 506=B 534) can apply to the in-itself as some sort of limiting concepts. Thirdly, we will possibly have to deny, that many of the categorial concepts can be assigned more than their one, categorial meaning. That is to say, the extra concepts will most likely not form anything like a complete set of concepts in the way that the categories do. And finally, we will have to admit, that we are going to be embarrassed by the notion of existence when it is applied to the things-in-themselves. For not only will this be a source of all kinds of obscurities, but worse yet, it will be something of which we will not be able to rid ourselves if we are to stay with Kant.

Nevertheless, what must be realized, is that with my proposal, I do not seem to be forced to distort Kant in numerous bizarre ways as Adickes appears to distort him and I do not have to claim that Kant was inconsistent without even being aware of this fact as Schrader claims. And perhaps this is the best one can do when interpreting a thinker as complex as Kant was.
FOOTNOTES

1. E. Adickes, Kant und das Ding an sich, p. 3. All translations from this work are my own.

2. All translations from the Critique of Pure Reason are my own. It is hoped that they are something of an improvement over N.K. Smith's translation.

3. E. Adickes, op. cit., p. 5n.

4. Ibid., p. 5.

5. Ibid., p. 6.

6. Ibid., p. 8.


10. Ibid., p. 10-12.

11. Ibid., p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 13.

13. By absolute I mean that which pertains to all creatures and not just to humans.


17. Ibid., p. 20.


19. Ibid., p. 24-5.
20. Ibid., p. 25.


22. For a similar view viz. D.P. Dryer, Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, p. 499. Only Dryer fails to be as lenient to Smith and Paton as I am later on in the text.


24. Ibid., p. 114.

25. Ibid., p. 115.


27. Ibid., p. 38.


29. Ibid., p. 39.

30. Ibid., p. 35.

31. Ibid., p. 33n.

32. Ibid., p. 42.

33. Ibid., p. 49.

34. Ibid., p. 70.

35. Ibid., p. 53n.

36. Ibid., p. 72.

37. Ibid., p. 62-3.

38. Ibid., p. 57-8.

39. Ibid., p. 84.

40. I owe this point to Mr. Ajzenstat.

41. E. Adickes, op. cit., p. 86.

42. Loc. cit.
43. Ibid., p. 84, 88.
44. Ibid., p. 92-5.
45. Ibid., p. 76, 82.
47. in R.P. Wolff, ed., Kant, pp. 172-88.
48. Ibid., p. 172-3.
49. Ibid., p. 173-4.
50. Ibid., p. 174.
51. Ibid., p. 176.
52. Ibid., p. 177.
53. Viz., e.g. N.K. Smith, op. cit., p. 234-70.
   E. Adickes, op. cit., p. 145.
55. E. Adickes, op. cit., p. 145.
56. I owe the suggestion of a graphic representation to Mr. Ajzenstat.
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