SOME DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOUR

IN

POWER SITUATIONS

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by

NARENDRA DIXIT, B.Sc., M.Sc., M.A.

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AUTHOR: NARENDRA DIXIT   B.Sc.   (Udaipur University)
                          M.Sc.   (Phy) (Udaipur University)
                          M.A.   (Psy) (Udaipur University)

SUPERVISOR: Professor D.W. Carment

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Abstract

The main objective of the present study was to investigate sex and cultural differences in the use of power and the way power is affected by personality-traits as well as by expectation about the other person. This investigation was carried out in two parts. The first part utilized a questionnaire and in the second part three laboratory experiments were conducted.

In the first part of the study a 3 x 2 matrix was used which gave the subjects the opportunity to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves or to take for themselves more than, equal to or less than what they could give to the other person. Canadians, especially Canadian males, were found to give the other person more than what they could have for themselves and also to take more for themselves than what they could give to the other person as compared with Canadian females and Indians of both sexes.

In the second part of the study three experiments using a modified Prisoner's Dilemma Game were carried out which involved Canadian Ss (both males and females) only. In the first experiment, Ss denied those in a high power position more than those in a low power position. Females were also more "denying" than males. The second experiment investigated the effect of power reversal under conditions of 'Information' and 'No Information' about the switch. Ss denied more in the 'Information' than in the 'No Information' Condition and 'Information' resulted in more 'denying' responses in the Ss before the switch whereas in 'No Information' Ss 'denying' responses increased

considerably after the switch in power positions. The effects of machiavellianism and empathic tendency on the use of power were not found to be very great but the expectations about the other person's behaviour did affect responding for those in both the high power or low power positions.

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I dedicate this dissertation to my parents who always take pride in my achievements and have been very understanding and supportive even in my ignominious failures.

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I'd rather be a hammer than a nail.

CHAPTER 1

General Introduction

Power and influence are a part of everyday life. We hear about

power in many different contexts, such as individual power, group

power, Black power, economic power, political power, military power and

so on. To the social philosopher Amos H. Hawley "Every social act is

an exercise of power; every social relation is an equation of power and

every social group or system is an organization of power" (cited in

Carey, M. et al., 1974, pp. 58).

Although power has been discussed by philosophers and social

scientists for centuries, there seems to be little agreement among them

as to a definition of power. Most authors have taken pains to define

power but each appears to have been compelled to create one of his own.

The problem may derive from the many terms which have a meaning that is

very close to the meaning of power such as force, authority, control

and influence. This dissertation deals with power as an aspect of

social interaction which is defined, in terms of Thibaut and Kelley's

(1959) social exchange theory, as "the capability one person has of

affecting another's outcome in an interpersonal relationship" (pp.

101). These outcomes may be tangible, intangible or both.

Social scientists have demonstrated that a number of

personality and situational variables affect the use of power. These

variables include: perceived locus of control of reinforcement,

sentiments about power such as authoritarianism, machiavellianism, need

for power, need to control and to be controlled by others, tendency to

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categorize interpersonal relations in terms of power, interpersonal

attraction or liking, role expectations and power positions.

The main objective of the present study was to investigate a)

how people make use of power when they are in a High Power (HP) or Low

Power (LP) position relative to "the other person"; b) sex and cultural

differences in the use of power; c) the effect of 'Information' (or 'No

Information') about the change in power positions (i.e. power reversal)

on the use of power prior to and after the change; d) the relationship

of some personality variables (i.e. machiavellianism and empathic

tendency) to power and e) the effect expectations about the other's

behaviour have on the use of power. This investigation was carried out

in two parts. The first part utilized a questionnaire and in the

second phase three laboratory experiments were conducted.

In the first study, one 3 x 2 matrix was used which gave the

subjects a chance to exercise the power they happened to have to give

more than, equal to, or less than themselves to a hypothetical 'other'

person, but the subjects did not have any control over their own

outcomes. In other words, whether the subjects chose to give more,

equal or less to the other person, they themselves had a fixed outcome.

In another matrix, subjects had a chance to exercise their power in

such a way that they could take more than, equal to, or less than the

other person and had no control over the other's outcomes. In other

words, whether subjects chose to take more, equal or less, the other

person had a fixed outcome. The structure of the matrix was such that

the hypothetical 'other' had no power or control over his or the

other's outcomes in both conditions. This was done to control the

effect of expectations about the behaviour of and a threat of

retaliation by the other person. In addition, these matrices were each separated into three 2 x 2 matrices to study the effect of restrictions on choices one can make. All these matrices were printed on separate sheets of paper and presented in a random order to Ss in the form of a questionnaire. In this study the Ss played against a hypothetical "Mr. P" or "Miss P" for imaginary money. This was an attempt to study behaviour in power situations in something like a one trial game and effect of sex of the S (power holder) and sex of hypothetical 'target' on the response choices in different power situations in two different cultures (India & Canada). Subjects' expectations about 'person in power' were also studied by putting the hypothetical 'other' in the power position and Ss in the position where they had no power or control over their own or the other's outcomes and by asking them to make predictions about the 'other's' response choices.

In the first experiment of the second part of the study, Ss played an asymmetrical Prisoner's Dilemma Game for real money. The situation simulated by the game matrix was such that a person assigned to the High Power (HP) position could affect the outcome of the other person who had been assigned to the Low Power (LP) position to a greater extent and would always get equal or more points (i.e. money) than the latter irrespective of what the LP person did. The independent variables in this experiment were power positions and sex composition of dyads at the following levels:

    a. Male in a high power position - Male in a low power
        position.

    b. Female in a high power position - Female in a low power
        position.

c. Male in a high power position – Female in a low power position.

d. Female in a high power position – Male in a low power position.

This was done to observe how people use power against a member of the same or opposite sex who is in a high or low power position relative to them.

In the second experiment Ss again played the game for 100 trials but in this experiment Ss were required to switch their positions after 50 trials, i.e. a person who was placed in the high power position at the start of the game was put in the low power position after 50 trials and vice versa. This was done under 'Information' and 'No Information' conditions. In the 'Information' conditions Ss were told at the beginning of the game that they would be switching their positions after they had played the game for 50 trials while in the 'No Information' condition the Ss were not told about switching. This was done in order to study how 'Information' or 'No Information' about the change in position would affect the use of power before and after the power reversal. The same compositions of dyads as used in Experiment I were used in this experiment.

In the third experiment, Ss played the game in the same way as in the first experiment and they were also given 'Mach V' (Christie, 196) and 'Empathic tendency' (Mehrabian, 1969) Scales. They were asked to make predictions about the other's choice before making their own choice. This was done in order to examine the effect of machiavellianism, empathic tendency and expectation about the other

person's behaviour on the behaviour (i.e. on the use of power) of persons in HP or LP positions.

Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

Some definitions of Power: There is an extensive literature

pertaining to power at both the theoretical and empirical levels not

only in Psychology but in many other social science disciplines as

well.   Anyone reviewing the literature on power is bound to discover

that there is no generally accepted definition of power.   Most authors

have tried to define power but each has apparently been compelled to

invent one of his own.   The problem may be because there are other

concepts such as force, authority, control, influence which have

meanings that are very close to the meaning of power.   Tedeschi &

Bonoma (1972) and Minton (1972) have attempted to distinguish power

from these other concepts.   According to them force is the use of

punitive methods for non-conformity, authority is formal power due to a

person's legitimate status and norms, control is successful exercise of

power, influence is viewed as one's potential to affect the outcomes of

another and power as the ability to affect the outcomes of another.

Nevertheless these definitions are so interrelated that even after

giving a separate definition for each concept, it is difficult to

discriminate one from the other.   Ross (1967) expresses the view that

there is a direct relationship between the way power is defined to the

way it is studied experimentally.   Kornberg and Perry (1966) suggested

that various definitions and theories of power could be arranged along

a continuum, on one end of which there would be theories that focus on

the process by which power is exercised and on the other end there

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would be the theories that focus on the outcomes of the relationship. Tedeschi & Bonoma (1972) argue that it is not easy to find a "correct" definition of power as "power is not a scientific construct" (p. 8).

However, the most quoted and probably one of the first well conceived definitions of the power is that of Russell (1938) who defined power "as the production of intended effects" (p. 35). Lewin (1951) seem to be the first psychologist who, borrowing the concepts of force and resistance from physics, defined the power of A over B as the quotient of the maximum force that A can induce on B and the maximum resistance that B can offer. Cartwright (1959) modifed the definition of Lewin by defining power as a difference in forces rather than a ratio of these forces. He defined "power of A over B with respect to a given change at a specified time equals the maximum strength of the resultant force which A can set up in that direction at that time. A's act is seen as creating in B both a force to comply and a force to resist; thus the resultant force (power) is given by the difference between these two" (p. 193). Two important factors that determine A's power are the resources of A and the needs of B. A will be able to create a force in B through the use of resources that can affect B's need satisfaction. French (1959) adopted Cartwright's definition and restated it in a slightly simplified and modified form. According to him, 'the power of A over B is equal to the maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize in the opposite direction' (p. 183). French and Raven (1959) gave a detailed discussion of some motive bases involved. They proposed the following five power bases:

1. Reward or coercion: When someone has the ability to provide positive or negative sanction to another, he or she has reward or coercive power.   Promises and threats are reward or coercion respectively.

2. Referent power: is based on the psychological process of identification. If one person sees another as similar or likeable the person may feel a oneness and want to do and believe as the other.

3. Expert power: is based on having superior skill or knowledge.

4. Legitimate power: is the most complex base and relies heavily on prior socialization. For people to use legitimate power, they must feel that they have a right to influence and the influencer must feel obliged to comply.

5. Informational powers: means the ability of one person to provide an explanation for why another person should believe or behave differently. The influencer just does not say he knows best but explains why.

It is obvious that these motive bases are not independent. In fact, all five can be considered in terms of reward or punishment. Rewards and coercion can be taken as having control of rewards and punishments; however, the other four appear to be special cases of reward and coercive power. 'Legitimate power' can be regarded as socially and legally acceptable control of rewards and punishments; 'referent power' as ability to reward or punish deriving from a liking relation; and 'expert power' and 'informational power' as power based upon control of some scarce rewards (or resources).

March (1955), a political scientist, argued that power should be studied in the context of decision making. He defined the power of an actor in terms of the effects he has on the choices (or decisions) of the other person. Dahl (1957) elaborated on March's definition and mentioned that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do" (p. 203). Dahl's contention is that so far as social power is concerned, unless the behaviour of another has been affected, one can not safely infer that power has been involved. Harsanyi (1962), an Economist, has extended this analysis and has applied Weber's (1947) idea that power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship is in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance regardless of the basis on which probability rests. Harsanyi also views most power as bilateral in nature where each person has some control over the behaviour of the other person. He suggests that one party's compliance to the wishes of another constitutes the operational criterion for the successful use of power. Chein (1969) also defined power as "the ease with which an element in a social unit can carry out its will against resistance" (p. 28).

People in interaction often control the flow of valued outcomes to one another and Exchange theories provide such an economic-like analysis of interaction between people. Power, according to Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) social exchange theory is "the capability one person has of affecting another's outcome in an interpersonal relationship" (p. 101). The quantity of disposable resources possessed by an individual which can be used to reward or punish another person

is presumed to be the primary factor for generating the perception of power. The amount of power that can be effectively utilized is termed 'usable power' and is measured by the degree to which its use does not penalize the possessor. There may be several sources of penalties. One source is amount of power possessed by the partner. As B's power increases, A's usable power or relative power decreases because the extent to which he can profit by that power, by giving B a poor as well as a good outcome, is curtailed.

Another kind of restriction stems from the particular patterns of interdependence between A and B which determines the control one person has in assigning an outcome to his partners. Control means that power is activated to affect the other's outcome, causing him to change his behaviour.

If, by varying his behaviour, A can affect B's outcome, regardless of what B does, A has fate control over B. For example, consider the following matrix: A

(Points above the diagonal belong to A and those below the diagnol belong to B)

By changing his behaviour from a_2 to a_1 or from a_1 to a_2, A can increase B's outcome from 0 to 3 or can reduce it from 3 to 0 respectively, and in neither case can B do anything about it. Similarly, B can increase A's outcome from 3 to 4, or decrease it from 4 to 3 and in neither case can A do anything about it. As A can control B's 3 points whereas B can control only 1 point of A, A is

assumed to have more power over $\underline{B}$ than $\underline{B}$ has over $\underline{A}$. Thus person $\underline{A}$ is in a higher power position and person $\underline{B}$ in a lower power position. A very similar definition of power to that of Thibaut and Kelley has been used by Michner and Suchner (1972) into which they incorporate some very important aspects of the power relationship. According to them social power involves the ability of a person to obtain an outcome for himself and his capacity to give or deny others the outcomes they want from him and influence the behaviour of others.

In a nutshell, these various definitions and theories give two alternative views of power. The first view placed more emphasis on the direct exercise of power as a process of influencing others to elicit some behaviour they would not otherwise do and the second view describes power in terms of control over resources which in turn is supposed to provide power holders with the power to influence others.

Situational and personality determinants of use of power:

Formal game theory has emphasized structural and situational determinants of behaviour in game situations to the exclusion of other variables but there is experimental evidence of cultural influence (McClintock & Nuttin, 1969; Carment 1974) on and that personality variables (Deutsch, 1960; Ladkin, 1971) are correlated with behaviour in game situations. According to Terhune (1970) behaviour in game situations may be affected by the following classes of variables: 1) situation factors, e.g., the structure of game matrix, sex of the partner, etc. 2) personality factors brought to the situation by Ss and 3) interaction between personality factors and situational factors.

In the following sections we will review the studies which were
focussed on the relationship between a) Situational factors and
behaviour in power situations; b) Machiavellianism and behaviour in
power situations; c) Empathic tendency and helping behaviour (There are
no studies which have investigated the relationship between empathy and
behaviour in game situations but there are a few experiments which
suggest that empathy gives rise to helping behaviour which is regarded
as reward and keeps people from engaging in aggressive behaviour which
is regarded as coercion, a base of power by Tedeschi, Gues and Rivera
(in press) and d) cross-cultural studies.

a. Situational Determinants of Behaviour in Power Situations

In this section we will review those studies which were
concerned with the effect of situational factors and/or experimental
manipulations on behaviour in power situations. The review will be
restricted to behaviour in power situations as elicited by modified
prisoner's dilemma game matrices.

Soloman (1960), demonstrated a method of manipulating power in
non-zero-sum games by employing asymmetrical matrices. One of his
experiments sought to determine how a player in different positions of
relative power could exercise this power in the form of various game
playing strategies to induce an indivdiualistic subject to adopt a
cooperative orientation. One member of the dyad was a subject while
the other was a programmed experimental "confederate". The
"confederate" interacted with the S in one of the three conditions of
relative power: "confederate" in absolute power, partial power (in
this case S has retaliatory power), and equal power. The confederate

employed one of three strategies in each power condition: conditional cooperation (choices which seems to maximize mutual gain), unconditional cooperation and noncooperation. It was found that Ss were more likely to engage in trusting behaviour (i.e., cooperation followed by cooperation) the greater the power they had relative to the "confederate". There does not seem to have been much done in this area after Soloman's (1960) experiment until Komorita, Sheposh and Braver (1968) employed a 3 x 3 matrix to study the effect of having power to punish the other person in three experimental conditions. The three experimental conditions were as follows:

1) Passive non-use of power.

2) Benevolent condition – subjects' cooperative responses were matched with cooperative responses by E, but non-cooperative responses were punished.

3) Malevolent condition – If S cooperated E did not cooperate and if S did not cooperate, he was punished. A cooperative move was never made.

The results showed that the benevolent condition resulted in the greatest production of cooperative choices whereas the malevolent condition resulted in the fewest cooperative choices. This result suggests that when an individual is confronted with another individual who is perceived to have power to punish he is more willing to share the profit equitably.

In a study by Horia, Lindskold, Gahagan & Tedeschi, (1969) subjects were placed in a weak, strong or equal power role with respect to a simulated player and were the target of promises of cooperation

from the simulated players, which were 10%, 50% or 90% credible. A no promise control condition also was included. After each 10 PD game trials, the Ss received a promise of cooperation on the next 10 trials from the simulated player. S replied each time with one of the three messages available to him:

M_1: I will make a choice 1 on the next trial

M_2: I will make a choice 2 on the next trial

M_3: I do not want to disclose my intentions.

It was found that the equal power Ss were most responsive to the promise of the simulated player. They cooperated on nearly 50% of trials regardless of the credibility of the source's promise. Strong Ss were rigidly uncooperative on message trials regardless of the credibility of the weak S's promises. Weak Ss cooperated more frequently on message trials in response to a strong source whose messages possessed low credibility and less when the source involved highly credible promises. Equal power Ss were more likely to send messages M_1 whereas strong Ss were more likely to send M_2 than either weak or equal subjects. Weak Ss lied more often when the credibility of the strong subjects promises increased. Equal power and strong Ss on the other hand were similar to each other, as truthful in one credibility condition as in another. Strong Ss cooperated less than weak or equal power Ss. In this experiment, role position appears to have been the over-riding determinant of response choice. Weak players tended to cooperate more when the strong source (simulated) sent highly noncredible messages and tended to exploit the source on message trials when the promises were highly credible. They seemed to be attempting

to maximize their absolute gains under each circumstance regardless of the effect on the source's outcomes. Strong targets apparently perceived the weak source as unable to affect outcomes irrespective of credibility related to promises. Thus, strong Ss were impervious to the weak source's promises.

Stevens (1969) manipulated power regulations through changes in PD matrices. Ss were first labeled according to risk-taking ability and then assigned at random to one of the nine PD matrices and paired with a simulated bargaining partner who followed one of two programmed bargaining strategies. The result of the study indicated that the power of the individual in the mixed-motive game situation of this experiment had a significant influence on trust, satisfaction and outcome of interaction. The most significant finding was that Ss played more cooperatively as the power of their opponents increased. A study by Shure, Meeker and Hansford (1965) indicated that a subject's exploitative behaviour increased if the opponent did not use the available power punitively. Swingle (1969, 1970) also observed that unconditionally cooperative opponents (a stooge of the experimenter) were exploited more when they were powerful than when they were weak, and that Ss had a tendency to exploit weak opponents in ethnically heterogeneous dyads. These experiments were designed to test the basic assumption that Ss attempt to maximize their payoffs against an unconditionally cooperative opponent most when the opponent has more power. In the power condition, the S had absolute control over his own outcome and considerable control over the other's outcomes. In the equal power condition, each player had an equal amount of control over

his opponent's payoff. Finally, in the opponent-in-power condition, the opponent had absolute control over his own payoffs and considerable control over the S's payoffs. In another experiment, Swingle exposed Ss to opponents with either equal or greater power and exploitation was either very or slightly profitable. The results showed that, again, Ss were more exploitative against an unconditionally cooperative opponent with greater power than one with equal power. This phenomenon was explained in terms of S's perceiving his opponents' lack of competitive responses as weakness or attempted trickery. Black and Higbee (1973) using the same procedure as had been employed by Swingle (1970) replicated his findings for males but they found that females exploited powerful female opponents less than weak opponents. In a threat condition, that is, when the opponent had a threat to retaliate, males exploited powerful opponents less than weak opponents, and females decreased exploitation of all opponents. Bedell and Sistrunk (1973) tried to examine the effects of opportunity costs and sex of the dyad on cooperative behaviour and on the use of power to reward or punish the other player in a mixed-motive game. The response related to the use of power as defined by the experiment were 'reward' and 'punish'. Use of reward added 4 points to the other player's scores while use of 'punish' substracted 4 points from the other player's score. A third response called 'none' did not affect the other person's score. All three of these responses were available in all experimental conditions. The first dependent variable in the study was opportunity costs, defined in terms of the points that were subtracted from the S's score when he used his power to reward or punish the other

player. The other variable was sex composition of the dyads. The results indicated that male and mixed-sex dyads used their power to reward less frequently. The significant opportunity cost effect also showed that the power to punish was used equally often in the 2-point cost condition and the 4-point cost condition, and more frequently in the 0-point condition. Female dyads used their power less frequently than did the mixed-sex dyads, but no difference was observed for the male and female dyads. Also, as the cost of exercising their power increased, the subjects used the power mechanism less frequently.

Enzel and Morrison (1974) attempted to find the effects of opportunity to communicate intentions and requests and possession of punitive power in a PD game. Their results indicated that availability of power and communication opportunities, with some exceptions, mitigated competition between pairs.

Wahba (1971) defined power as the ability to control the outcomes of others and personal outcomes. He designed two experiments to study the effects of (1) power (2) the magnitude of power, and (3) the power strategy of the other on the frequency of cooperation in non-negotiable, 2-person mixed motive game. Results showed that the base of power (reward or coercive) and the power strategy of the other were significant while the magnitude of power showed no significant effect. Power was not effective in generating cooperation, and unexercised power in this experiment, invited defection or exploitation. Cooperative strategies were found to generate defection under both reward and coercive poewr, whereas a defective strategy generated

defection under reward power but cooperation under coercive power by the other person.

The effect of prior power strategy on behaviour after a shift of power has been studied by McKeown, Gahagan and Tedeschi (1967) and Horai and Tedeschi (1975). McKeown et al., (1967) had their 'weak' S respond to 10%, 50% or 90% cooperative strategy choices by a 'strong' 'dummy'. After each S played 100 trials in the 'weak' position he was shifted to 'strong' position and the 'dummy' played a 50% cooperative strategy from the weak position. It was found that strategy choices of 'dummy' did not affect cooperative choices of Ss in either the 'weak' or 'strong' positions but Ss were observed to be less cooperative following a shift to a power position (i.e., from 'weak' to 'strong') and females cooperated less both in 'weak' and 'strong' power positions.

In another experiment, by Horai and Tedeschi (1975), Ss received either a threat message demanding compliance and making punishment contingent on non-compliance or a promise message requesting compliance and making reward contingent on compliance and were the targets of a simulated source's coercive or reward power in one of the following three conditions before the switch:

Resolutely accommodative: Source cooperates and rewards target compliance as promised;

Irresolutely accommodative: Source cooperates on promise-relevant trials but does not reward target's compliance, and;

Resolutely exploitative: Source does not cooperate and exploit target's compliance response.

Midway through the trials the Ss were given an opportunity to exercise reward or coercive power. After the power reversal, contrary to expectations, Ss did not employ power with the same intention as did the source prior to the power shift. When Ss decided to use power exploitatively, they punished the simulated target's defiance most when they had previously interacted with a resolute source and least when they interacted with the irresolute source.

Results of the studies reviewed show clearly that males and females differ in their behaviour in power situations. In Male and Mixed sex dyads, Ss were found to use the power to reward each other more often than did female dyads. Females were also observed to be less rewarding when in a weak power role especially against females in high power positions. A 'strong' player seems to exploit unconditional cooperation by a 'weak' player but there is also evidence that this tendency to exploit may be stronger in 'weak' players. Subjects exploited opponents who had a power or threat to retaliate less than those who did not have this power to retaliate. Subjects were also observed to exploit 'weak' opponents in ethnically heterogeneous dyads. In general, cooperative strategy and unexercised power were found to initiate non-cooperation or exploitation. In addition, subjects' prior experience with a power holder or a shift in power position (from 'weak' to 'strong') were found to have an effect on their subsequent behaviour in the changed power positions.

In brief, the suggestion from this review is that power positions of the individuals, sex of the other person in the interaction, credibility of source, strategy of the other person, and

prior experiences in a power situation all have an effect on the way people make use of power.

B. Machiavellianism and Power Behaviour:

High machiavellians (Mach) are characterized as guileful, deceitful, manipulative and opportunistic. They are power oriented and value power in self and others. High Machs initiate and control the stucture of bargaining interaction in groups and are unresponsive to personal or ethical concerns of others. By successful manipulation is meant getting someone to do something he would not otherwise have done. It is a process by which the manipulator gets certain rewards and someone else gets less, at least in the immediate context. The findings of various studies subscribe to the above-mentioned characteristics of high Machs and suggest that they have a particular style of exercising power. We will now review some of those studies.

Geis (1964, 1970) classified subjects as high, middle or low Machs on the basis of their scores on the 'Mach IV scale". A 3-man bargaining game known as the 'Con game' was then employed to test the proposition that high Machs would be more willing to practice interpersonal manipulation and whether Mach scores predict scores in interpersonal manipulation. In a conflict-of-interest bargaining situation in which interpersonal manipulation can influence the distribution of rewards, high Machs should obtain more of the rewards. The game could be played individually or through forming a coalition between any two players. Results showed that high Machs out-bargained lows and won more points in the games at the expense of lows rather than middle-Machs, and were more successful when the bargaining

situation was more ammbiguous but they failed to increase their scores more than lows did with an increase in power position in their respective groups. In the unambiguous condition the player's position in the bargaining group appeared to have been the major determinant of the game scores for all subjects: the higher the power position the greater was the average winning.

In another game, the ten-dollar game, Christie (1970) conceived that playing for money stakes would make the game a more serious situation. By 'seriousness' he meant the extent to which the outcome of a situation had further implications. Each triad again consisted of high, middle and low Machs and each was told at the beginning that money would belong to any two of them who could agree with each other as to how to divide $10.00 between them. The results showed that high Machs won overwhelmingly and no high failed to be a member of the winning coalition. It was concluded that real stakes made the situation more serious that it would not have much effect on the behaviour of high Machs but it would put lows at a greater disadvantage in bargaining. High controlled the structure of interaction and of final distribution of money and played more impersonally and opportunistically in contrast to low Machs.

In another experiment, Christie, Gergen and Marlowe (1970) used a PD game which differs from the Con game and the Ten-dollar game in that it deals with a dyadic relationship and more important, is not necessarily face-to-face, and does not allow negotiations.

Subjects were pre-classified as high Machs or low Machs and assigned to various experimental situations. The other variable, i.e.,

the effect of a significant amount of money, was handled by immediate payoff in cash. The first ten trials were played for points only. At the end of the first ten trials Ss were asked to fill out a sheet requesting information about the strategy they were using and about the other's style. After these forms were completed and collected, the experimenter announced that "to make things more interesting" further games would be played for a penny (or dollar) a point and that there would be an immediate payoff after every trial. It was made clear that the money was theirs to keep. No mention was made of how many trials would be played next. The strategy used by high and low Machs did not differ in the first 10 trials for points but high Machs switched to less exploitative strategies after the introduction of money.

Ladkin (1971) had pairs of subjects play an asymmetrical PD game for money in a face-to-face situation where they were also free to communicate with each other. Power was defined in terms of the asymmetry of the game matrix such that players who were assigned to the more powerful game position always won more than their partners for any single play of the game. The results showed high Machs to be more efficient in the use of power for their own benefit and to be involved in more mutually beneficial (co-operative) game choices in the high power game position, whereas the low Machs were observed to be involved more in mutually exploitative game choices with their partners.

On the basis of the studies reviewed, high Machs seem to win more when they are in a higher power position in an ambiguous bargaining situation. High Machs also seem to adjust the amount of manipulation and change their strategy in a subtle way as the situation

demands. When the penny-dollar caper was changed from points to money, high Machs changed their strategy to more cooperative because the supposed opponent could presumably retaliate and they might lose some money. Ladkin (1971) also found that in a power situation, high Machs made use of power for their own benefit and made more mutually beneficial game choices in the high power position. Most of these findings are derived from male high Machs who are in a more powerful position in the game. Not much can be said about the behaviour of female high Machs. High Machs are supposed to be exploitative but the results of the studies reported do not lend credence to this notion, but clearly indicate that high Machs are more rational game players.

As predicted by theory and observed in experimental settings, it is evident that Machiavellianism does affect the behaviour of individuals in power situations.

C. Empathic Tendency and Helping Behavior

Krebs (1970) considered personality correlates and situation deteminants of helping behaviour in a review of literature on altruistic behaviour and concluded that subjects were more likely to help those they liked more, someone who was more similar to themselves and someone who was more dependent on them, particularly when the dependency was externally caused. In contrast to the rather consistent findings for situational determinants no general conclusions could be drawn about personality traits of benefactors.

Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) explored helping behaviour as a function of subjects' empathic tendency. Female college students were paired with confederates who were portrayed as having either similar or

dissimilar attitudes. According to a standardized script, the confederate acted emotionally upset about a personal problem of getting subjects for her experiments, but had no money to pay them, and asked subjects to volunteer time for the participation in experiment for half-an-hour periods totalling to three-hours as many half hours as they could give. A regression analysis revealed that helping behaviour was a significant correlate of empathic tendency. This finding supports the idea that empathic persons are emotionally responsive to the needs of the other person.

In another experiment by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972), subjects acted as the teacher and the 'confederate' acted as the student. Having read a character sketch of a third person, the pupil confederate was supposed to make some predictions about the personality of a 'third person'. As punishment if the "pupil" had erred on some particular trial, the "teacher" had a choice of administering electric shock of varying intensities (one of seven intensities from very mild to intense). Results showed that empathy itself was not a sufficient condition for inhibiting aggression but did make a difference when the victim was only 8 feet from the teacher and was fully visible.

If helping behaviour can be conceived of as giving some 'outcome' of importance to the other person or, in other words, rewarding him, and not helping somebody as witholding the outcomes needed by the other person then a positive relation between empathic tendency and rewarding behaviour in a power situation should be expected. Thus empathic tendency would seem to be an important variable to consider in the study of power.

D. Cross-cultural Studies

It is common knowledge that in similar circumstances, certain behaviours are more desirable in some cultures than in others. For example, there is empirical evidence that there are substantial sub-cultural difference in the way children cooperate or compete in America (Bartos, 1967; Sibley, Senn & Epanchin, 1968; Madson and Shapira, 1970), Israel (Shapira & Madson, 1969), Canada (Swingle, 1969), Mexico (Madson, 1967) and India (Pareek & Banerjee, 1974; Pareek & Dixit, 1974). Some experiments have also been conducted in game behaviour between Mexican and American (Madson, 1971; Kagan & Madson, 1972), Israeli and American (Raven & Leff, 1965), Belgian and American (McClintock & Nuttin, 1969), Danish and American (Rapoport, Guyer and Gordon, 1971), East African and American (Munroe & Munroe, 1977), British and American (Valiant-Dyckoff, 1977) and Indian and Canadian (Alcock, 1974; 1975; Carment, 1974) children or college students.

Alcock (1974) studied the effect of time limitation on bargaining behaviour in India and Canada. He found Candian males react more competitively when a time limit was imposed by one of the bargainers than when the time limits were imposed by the experimenter in which case the same group exhibited more cooperative behaviour. Canadian females and Indians of both sexes were found to be relatively cooperative regardless of the source of the time limit. In another study (Alcock, 1975) Canadian and Indian males played a 2 x 5 pay off matrix in three experimental conditions namely a) 'Equality' condition (condition in which each player had an equal range of possible outcomes); b) 'Top dog' condition (condition in which each player had

larger pay-off range than the other player) and c) 'Under dog' condition (in this condition each player had smaller pay-off range than the other person). Canadian males were found to be more cooperative in the "top-dog" condition whereas the opposite was true for Indian males. Carment (1974) observed the behaviour of Canadians and Indians in an 'MDG' and a 'chicken' game. Indians were found to be more competitive than Canadians and also to have a stronger tendency than the Canadians to maximize the differences in gains in the 'MDG'. In the 'chicken' game as well Canadians were more cooperative than the Indians even though a 'chicken' game is not conducive to cooperative responding.

The results of the foregoing experiments indicate that Canadians and Indians behave differently in bargaining situations and in other game situations. It is expected that Canadians and Indians would show differences in their behaviour in power situations too.

Plan of the Study

A review of literature concerned with the effect of situation factors has clearly established the importance of role positions ('Low', 'High', or 'Equal' power), sex of the participants, and strategy of types of power possessed by a power holder as determinants of behaviour in power situations. In most studies, confederates have been used to control the behaviour or the use of power in one of the power positions. There are many studies that have revealed sex differences in the use of power. Also in most studies, power has been conceived of as the ability to affect another's outcomes neglecting an important aspect of power i.e., ability to affect one's own outcomes or in other words ability to have whatever one wants for oneself. The other aspect

of power which has not received much attention from psychologists is the effect of a power reversal or the possibility of change in power positions on the use of power, perhaps because conceptualizations of the use of power tend to be static (Horai & Tedeschi, 1975). We forget that in the world of affairs it is quite possible that today's power holder may be under the thumb of his target tomorrow. The effect of power reversal has not been investigated in detail and needs more exprimentation: under different experimental conditions such as sudden or expected changes in power positions.

Effect of level of Machiavellianism have been studied mainly in equal power: ambiguous situations except for one study in which Ladkin (1971) attempted to observe the behaviour of High and Low Machiavellians in 'Strong power' positions against a simulated 'weak' other. No one has investigated the behaviour of High or Low Machs when they are in a low power position.

Empathic tendency have been found to elicit helping bheavour. No one has tried to establish the relationship between empathic tendency and behaviour in a power situation, most probably because the word power seems to carry negative connotations, that is, persons in power have been perceived mostly as ruthless and unkind.

The present research has been carried out in two parts. In the first part, behaviour of Ss in the situation in which they had power to affect either other's or one's own outcomes was observed. Subjects made their choices only once in these situations. The effects of expectation about the behaviour of and fear of retaliation by the other person were controlled in this situation by not giving any kind of

control to the 'hypothetical' other person. This situation was simulated by two matrices, one in which subjects had absolute control over their own outcomes but no control whatsoever over the other person's (hypothetical) outcomes, and another in which Ss had absolute control over the other person's outcomes but absolutely no control over their own outcomes. In addition to asking subjects about their choices towards the other person, they were also required to guess what the "other person" would choose if he or she were in power. Note that in these situations Ss had both power to affect the other's as well as their own outcomes. Data were collected on Canadian and East Indian Ss to see if there were cultural differences in the use of power.

The second part consisted of three experiments. In the first experiment subjects' behaviour was studied in 100-trial bilateral power situations vs. a situation in which both persons had the power to affect each other's outcomes though differently, against real 'others' without manipulation of any kind in order to determine the natural occurrence of behaviour in HP or LP positions against a person of the same or the opposite sex. In the second experiment, an attempt was made to determine the effect of Information about change in power positions on behaviour 'before' and 'after' the switch. The subsequent use of power was expected to be affected by the way in which he or she was treated by a former power holder. In the third experiment, an attempt was made to determine how machiavellianism, empathic tendency and expectations affect the use of power in bilateral power situations. Data were collected only on Canadian Ss in this part of the study.

A detailed report of these experiments is given in the Chapters
that follow.

Giving and Taking in India and Canada

This chapter describes a questionnaire study carried out to investigate the behaviour of Ss in power situations in which they had absolute control over another's and their own outcomes and their own expectations about a person in power. The data were collected on East Indian and Canadian males and females to determine if there were any sex or cultural differences in Ss' behaviour.

Paradigm: The dependent variable, power, has been defined "as the capability one person has of affecting the other's outcomes" (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959, p. 101) and as the ability of a person to obtain an outcome for himself (Michner and Suchner, 1972). Here a unilateral power situation has been simulated by means of a 2 x 3 matrix. Unilateral power situations means that the power to affect the other's or one's own outcomes is solely under one person's control. Matrices simulating the following situations were used:

a) Power to give the other person more than, equal to or less than themselves with no control over their own outcomes (capability of affecting the others outcomes).

Figure 3.1

b) Power to take more than, equal to or less than the other person with no control over the other persons outcomes (capability of affecting own outcomes).

Self

Figure 3.2

These matrices were further subdivided into three 2 x 2 matrices to study whether the number and type of alternatives available has some effect on the choices made. Subjects played against a hypothetical 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P' for imaginary money.

Subjects

The subjects consisted of 41 Canadian males (22 paired with 'Mr. P' and 19 with 'Miss P'), 95 Canadian females (50 paired with 'Mr. P' and 45 with 'Miss P'), 39 Indian males (19 paired with 'Mr. P' and 20 paired with 'Miss P') and 67 Indian females (31 paired with 'Mr. P' and 36 with 'Miss P'). The Canadian Ss were day and evening class Social Psychology students at McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada and their Indian counterparts were second year undergraduate students of Saint Xavier College, Ahmedabad, India*.

*Thanks are due to Miss Kirtida N. Surti of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India who collected the data on the Indian Sample.

Procedure

Each matrix was printed on a separate sheet of paper and presented in random order in the form of a questionnaire along with the Instructions (see appendix A). These questionnaires were distributed to the subjects in a classroom setting. The subjects in this study played for imaginary money, the Canadian Ss for dollars ($) and the Indian Ss for Rupees (Rs.)

Results

Sex and cultural differences in response choices were observed in the two power situations.

Subjects' Behaviour:

Matrix A: In the situation in which Ss could take more than, equal to or less than 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P', 86.4% of the Canadian males and 78% of the Canadian females took more than 'Mr. P' whereas only 63.1% of the Indian males and 58.1% of the Indian females took more than him. When the subjects were paired with 'Miss P', all of the Canadian males, 75.5% of the Canadian females, 70% of the Indian males and 77.8% of the Indian females took more than her (see Table 3.1). Although no statistically significant overall sex and cultural differences were found (X^2 = 19.55, df = 14 ns) these results are suggestive that such differences do exist.

Insert Table 3.1 about here

When this matrix was separated into three 2 x 2 matrices Ss then had only two alternatives in each situation. Most of the Ss took more than the other person in the situation in which they could either

TABLE 3.1

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadians S_s in the situation in which S_s could take for themselves more than, equal to or less than what they could give to the other person.

	Choice Pair	Take More	Take Equal	Take Less
INDIAN	$M^+ M^{++}$	12 (63%)	5 (26%)	2 (10.5%)
	MF	14 (70)	5 (25)	1 (5)
	FM	18 (58.1)	10 (32)	3 (9.6)
	FF	28 (78)	8 (22)	0
CANADIAN	M M	19 (86.4)	3 (13.6)	0
	MF	19 (100)	0	0
	FM	39 (78)	8 (16)	3 (6)
	FF	34 (75.5)	10 (22.3)	1 (2.2)

+ Sex of the subject $x^2 = 19.55$, df = 14 ns
++ Sex of the hypothetical person

take more or less than the other person (Table 3.2; x^2=8. 48 df = 7, ns) and took equal to the other person in the situation in which they could take either equal to or less than the other person (Table 3.3, x^2=10.07, df=7, ns) but there were significant differences in the choices of Ss in the condition in which Ss could take more than or equal to the other person (Table 3.4; x^2=80.38, df=7, p<.01). Most of

Insert Tables 3.2 to 3.5 about here

the Canadian Ss and Indian males took more than 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P' whereas Indian females preferred to take equal to 'Mr. P' (77.4%) and 'Miss P' (68.6%). Significant differences also were observed between Indian males (78.9%) and Indian females (22.6%) (x^2=15.19, df=1, p<.01) (Table 3.5) and Indian (22.6%) and Canadian (88%) females (x^2=35.12, df=1, p<.001) (Table 3.6) in their response choices towards 'Mr. P', Indian females more often take equal to 'Mr. P'. Similar trends in response choices were observed when Indian males (65%) and females (31.4%) (Table 3.7, x^2=5.83, df=1, p<.025) and Indian (31.4%) and Canadian (86.7%) females were paired with 'Miss P' (Table 3.8, x^2=25.63, df=1, p<.01), in both cases Indian females again chose to take equal to 'Miss P' more often. Another significant difference was found (Table 3.9, x^2=5.9, df=1, p<.05) between the response choices of Indian and Canadian males toward 'Miss P' with only 65% of the former taking more than her as contrasted with 100% of the latter. In general, Indian females seem to make more equality choices even when taking more for oneself does not cost the other person anything.

Matrix B: In the situation in which Ss could give the other person

TABLE 3.2

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian S_s in the situation in which S_s could take for themselves more or less than what they could give to the other person

	Choice Pair	Take More	Take Less
INDIAN	$M^+ M^{++}$	16 (84.2%)	3 (15.8%)
	MF	20 (100)	0
	FM	28 (90.3)	3 (9.7)
	FF	36 (100)	0
CANADIAN	M M	22 (100)	0
	MF	19 (100)	0
	FM	50 (100)	0
	FF	44 (97.8)	1 (2.2)

$$X^2 = 8.48 \qquad df = 7 \text{ ns}$$

+ Sex of subject.

++ Sex of the hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.3

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian S_s in the situation in which they could take for themselves equal to or less than what they could give to the other person.

	Choice Pair	Take Equal	Take Less
INDIAN	M^+M^{++}	16 (84.2%)	3 (15.8%)
	MF	17 (85)	3 (15)
	FM	24 (77.4)	7 (22.6)
	FF	35 (97.2)	1 (2.8)
CANADIAN	M M	22 (100%)	0
	MF	18 (94.7)	1 (5.3)
	FM	50 (100)	0
	FF	45 (100)	0

$$x^2 = 10.07 \qquad df = 7 \text{ ns}$$

+ Sex of subject

++Sex of the hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.4

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian S_s in the situation in which S_s could take for themselves more than or equal to what they could give to the other person.

	Choice Pair	Take More	Take Equal
INDIAN	M^+M^{++}	15 (78.9%)	4 (21.1%)
	MF	13 (65)	7 (35)
	FM	7 (22.6)	24 (77.4)
	FF	11 (31.4)	24 (68.6)
CANADIAN	M M	18 (81.8)	4 (18.2)
	MF	19 (100)	0
	FM	44 (88)	6 (12)
	FF	39 (86.7)	6 (13.3)

$$x^2 = 80.38 \qquad df = 7 \qquad p < .01$$

+ Sex of the S_s

++ Sex of the hypothetical 'other'.

TABLE 3.5

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_s paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which they could have for themselves more than or equal to what they could give to the other person.

S_s　Choice	Take More	Take Equal
IM	15 (78.9%)	4 (21.1%)
IF	7 (22.6)	24 (77.4)

$$x^2 = 15.19 \qquad df = 1 \qquad p < .01$$

TABLE 3.6

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian females paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could have for themselves more than or equal to what they could give to the other person.

S_s　Choice	Take More	Take Equal
IF	7 (22.6%)	24 (77.4%)
CF	44 (88)	6 (12)

$$x^2 = 35.12 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.7

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_s paired with
'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could have for
themselves more than or equal to what they could give to
the other person.

S_s \ Choice	Take More	Take Equal
IM	13 (65%)	7 (35%)
IF	11 (31.4)	24 (68.6)

$$x^2 = 5.83 \quad df = 1 \quad P < .025$$

TABLE 3.8

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian
females paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which
S_s could have for themselves more than or equal to what
they could give to the other person.

S_s \ Choice	Take More	Take Equal
IF	11 (31.4%)	24 (68.6%)
CF	39 (86.7)	6 (13.3)

$$x^2 = 25.63 \quad df = 1 \quad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.9

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian males paired with "Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could have for themselves more than or equal to what they could give to the other person.

S_s \ Choice	Take More	Take Equal
IM	13 (65%)	7 (35%)
CM	19 (100)	0 (0)

$$x^2 = 5.9 \quad df = 1 \quad P < .05$$

more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves, very clear sex and cultural differences appeared (Table 3.10, X^2=41.07, df=14, p<.01). When paired with 'Miss P', 68.4% of the Canadian males gave more to her as compared to 33.3% of Canadian females (X^2=7.49, df=2, p<.05) (Table 3.11) while 35% of Indian males gave more to 'Miss P' and only 5.5% of Indian females chose to give more to her (X^2=8.58, df=2, p<.025) (Table 3.12). A comparison of the response choices of Indian and Canadian males also revealed significant differences in behaviour towards 'Miss P' (Table 3.13, X^2=6.37, df=2, p<.025) with 35% of Indian males giving more to 'Miss P' as compared to 68.4% Canadian

Insert Tables 3.10 to 3.18 about here

males. When paired with 'Mr. P', only 12.9% of Indian females gave more to him as compared with 36% of Indian males (X^2=7.33, df=2, p<.05) (Table 3.14) while 54.5% of Canadian males and 42% of Canadian females gave more to 'Mr. P' (Table 3.15, X^2=.98, df=2, ns). Indian females were more likely to give less (58.1%) to 'Mr. P' as compared to their Canadian counterparts (32%) (Table 3.16, X^2=8.41, df=2, p<.025) and also to 'Miss P', Indian females were less likely to give more (5.5%) than Canadian females (33.3%) (Table 3.17, X^2=9.42, df=2, p<.01). Canadian males (54.5%) preferred to give more to 'Mr. P' more often than did Indian males (36.8%) but the difference was not statistically significant (Table 3.18, X^2=4.21, df=2, ns).

This matrix also was subdivided into three 2 x 2 matrices giving Ss only two alternatives in each situation. In the condition in which Ss could choose between giving more or equal to the other person,

TABLE 3.10

Frequency response choices of Indian and Canadian S_s in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

	Choice Pair	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
CANADA	M^+M^{++}	12 (54.5%)	3 (15.7%)	7 (31.8)
	MF	13 (68.4)	1 (5.3)	5 (26.3)
	FM	21 (42.0)	13 (26.0)	16 (32.0)
	FF	15 (33.3)	12 (26.7)	18 (40.0)
INDIA	MM	7 (36.8)	8 (42.1)	4 (21.1)
	MF	7 (35.0)	7 (35.0)	6 (30.0)
	FM	4 (12.9)	9 (29.0)	18 (58.1)
	FF	2 (5.5)	15 (41.7)	19 (52.0)

$$x^2 = 41.07 \quad df = 14 \quad P < .01$$

+ Sex of the subject

++ Sex of person in power.

TABLE 3.11

Frequency of response choices of Canadian S_s when paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice / Sex of S	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
CM	13 (68.4%)	1 (5.3%)	5 (26.3%)
CF	15 (33.3)	12 (26.7)	18 (40.0)

$$x^2 = 7.49 \quad df = 2 \quad P<.05$$

TABLE 3.12

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_s when paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice / Sex of S	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IM	7 (35.0%)	7 (35.0%)	6 (30.0%)
IF	2 (5.5)	15 (41.7)	19 (52.8)

$$x^2 = 8.58 \quad df = 1 \quad P<.025$$

TABLE 3.13

Frequencey of response choices of Canadian and Indian males when paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice / Sex of S	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IM	7 (35.0%)	7 (35.0%)	6 (30.0%)
CM	13 (60.4)	1 (5.3)	5 (26.3)

$$x^2 = 6.37 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .025$$

TABLE 3.14

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_s when paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice / S_s	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IM	7 (36.3%)	8 (42.1%)	4 (21.1%)
IF	4 (12.9)	9 (29.0)	18 (58.1)

$$x^2 = 7.33 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .05$$

TABLE 3.15

Frequency of response choices of Canadian S_s when paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

S_s \ Choice	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
CM	12 (54.5%)	3 (15.7%)	7 (31.8%)
CF	21 (42.0)	13 (26.0)	16 (32.0)

$$x^2 = .98 \quad df = 2 \quad ns$$

TABLE 3.16

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian females when paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

S_s \ Choice	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IF	4 (12.9%)	9 (29.0%)	18 (58.1%)
CF	21 (42.0)	13 (26.0)	16 (32.0)

$$x^2 = 8.41 \quad df = 2 \quad P < .025$$

TABLE 3.17

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian females
paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give
the other person more than, equal to or less than what
they could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IF	2 (5.5%)	15 (41.7%)	19 (52.8%)
CF	15 (33.3)	12 (26.7)	18 (40.0)

$$x^2 = 9.42 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.18

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian males
paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give
the other person more than, equal to or less than what
they could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal	Give Less
IM	7 (36.8%)	8 (42.1%)	4 (21.1%)
CM	12 (54.5)	3 (15.7)	7 (31.8)

$$x^2 = 4.21 \qquad df = 2 \qquad ns$$

significant differences in the choices of males and females in the two

cultures were observed (Table 3.19, X^2=25.63, df=7, p<.01). Canadian

males (73.7%) preferred to give more to 'Miss P' more often whereas

most Canadian females (62.2%) gave 'Miss P' equal (Table 3.20, X^2=6.9,

df=1, p<.01). In the Indian sample 60% of the males and 82% of the

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Insert Tables 3.19 to 3.24 about here

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females chose equal (Table 3.21, X^2=3.5, df=1, ns). More Indian

females (77.4%) gave equal to 'Mr. P' as compared to Canadian females

(46%) (Table 3.22, X^2=7.76, df=1, p<.01). Significant differences were

also observed between Canadian males (74%) and Indian males (40%)

(Table 3.23, X^2=45, df=1, p<.05) and Canadian (37.8%) and Indian

(17.1%) females (Table 3.24, X^2=4.86, df=1, p<.05) in their choices to

give more to 'Miss P'.

Significant sex and cultural differences were again observed in

the situation in which Ss could give more or less to the other person

than what they could have for themselves (Table 3.25, X^2=30.79, df=7,

p<.01). Canadian males (70.9%) gave more to 'Miss P' as compared to

Canadian females (42.2%) (Table 3.26, X^2=5.83, df=1, p<.025). Also in

the Indian samples more males (60%) gave more to 'Miss P' than females

(25%) (Table 3.27, X^2=6.72, df=1, p<.01). A significant difference was

also found in the response choices of Canadian females toward 'Miss P'

Insert Tables 3.25 to 3.30 about here

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or 'Mr. P' with 66% of the females giving more to 'Mr. P' compared to

only 42% giving more to 'Miss P' (Table 3.28, X^2=5.4, df=1, p<.025)

TABLE 3.19

Frequency of responses choices of Canadian and Indian S_s in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than or equal to what they could have for themselves.

	Choice Pair	Give More	Give Equal
INDIAN	M^+M^{++}	7 (36.8%)	12 (63.2%)
	MF	8 (40.0)	12 (60.0)
	FM	7 (22.6)	24 (77.4)
	FF	7 (17.1)	29 (82.8)
CANADIAN	MM	11 (50.0)	11 (50.0)
	MF	14 (73.7)	5 (26.3)
	FM	27 (54.0)	23 (46.0)
	FF	17 (37.8)	28 (62.2)

$X^2 = 25.63 \qquad df = 7 \qquad P < .01$

+ Sex of subject

++ Sex of the hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.20

Frequency of response choices of Canadian S_s paired with
'Miss P' in the situation in which the S_s could give
the other person more than or equal to what they could have
for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal
CM	14 (73.7%)	5 (26.3%)
CF	17 (37.8)	28 (62.6)

x^2 = 69   df = 1   P <.01

TABLE 3.21

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_s paired with
'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other
person more than or equal to what they could have for them-
selves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal
IM	8 (40.0%)	12 (60.0%)
IF	6 (17.1)	29 (82.9)

x^2 = 3.5   df = 1   ns   P < 10

TABLE 3.22

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian females paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than or equal to what they could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal
IF	7 (22.6%)	24 (77.4%)
CF	27 (54.0)	23 (46.0)

$$x^2 - 7.76 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.23

Frequency of response choices of Canadian and Indian males paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than or equal to what they could have themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal
IM	8 (40.0%)	12 (60.0%)
CM	14 (73.7)	5 (26.3)

$$x^2 = 4.5 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .05$$

TABLE 3.24

Frequency of response choices of Canadian and Indian females

paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could

give the other person more than or equal to what they

could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give More	Give Equal
IF	6 (17.1%)	29 (82.9%)
CF	17 (37.8)	28 (62.2)

$$X^2 = 4.86 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .05$$

TABLE 3.25

Frequency of response choices of Canadian and Indian S_s in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more than or less than what they could have for themselves.

	Choice / S_s	Give More	Give Less
INDIAN	M^+M^{++}	9 (47.4%)	10 (52.0)
	MF	12 (60.0)	8 (40.0)
	FM	9 (29.0)	22 (71.0)
	FF	9 (25.0)	27 (75.0)
CANADIAN	MM	15 (68.2)	7 (31.8)
	MF	15 (78.9)	4 (21.1)
	FM	33 (66.0)	17 (34.0)
	FF	19 (42.2)	26 (57.8)

$$x^2 = 30.79 \qquad df = 7 \qquad P < .01$$

+ Sex of subject

++ Sex of hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.26

Frequency of response choices of Canadian S_S paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_S could give the other person more than or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice S_S	Give More	Give Less
CM	15 (78.9%)	4 (21.1)
CF	19 (42.2)	26 (57.8)

$$x^2 = 5.83 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .025$$

TABLE 3.27

Frequency of response choices of Indian S_S paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which they could give the other person more than or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice S_S	Give More	Give Less
IM	12 (60.0%)	8 (40.0%)
IF	9 (25.0)	27 (75.0)

$$x^2 = 6.72 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.28

Frequency of response choices of Canadian females paired with 'Miss P' or 'Mr. P' in the situation in which they could give the other person more or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice	Give More	Give Less
Mr. P	33 (66.0%)	17 (34.0%)
Miss P	19 (42.2)	26 (57.8)

$$x^2 = 5.4 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .025$$

TABLE 3.29

Frequency of response choices of Indian females paired with 'Miss P' or 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person more or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice	Give More	Give Less
Miss P	9 (29.0%)	22 (71.0%)
Mr. P	9 (25.0)	27 (75.0)

$$x^2 = 0.14 \qquad df = 1 \quad ns$$

TABLE 3.30

Frequency of response choices of Canadian and Indian

females paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s

could give the other person more or less than what they

could have for themselves.

S_s \ Choice	Give More	Give Less
IF	9 (29.0%)	22 (71.0%)
CF	33 (66.0)	17 (34.0)

$$x^2 = 10.47 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .01$$

while no significant difference was observed in the choices of Indian females towards 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P' (Table 3.29, x^2=14, df=1, ns). A significant difference was also observed in the choices of Indian and Canadian females toward 'Mr. P' with 71% of Indian females giving less to 'Mr. P' as contrasted with 34% of Canadian females (Table 3.30, x^2=10.47, df=1, p<.01).

In the condition in which Ss could give equal or less to the other person than what they could have for themselves, significant sex and cultural differences were also observed (Table 3.31, x^2=15.83, df=7, p<.05). The difference was mainly due to frequent 'give less' response choices by Indian females. Indian females gave less (61.3%)

Insert Tables 3.31 to 3.33 about here

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to 'Mr. P' than did Canadian females (28%) (Table 3.32, x^2=8.78, df=1, p<.01). Also they (Indian females) gave significantly less (55.6%) to 'Miss P' as compared to Canadian females (33.3%) (Table 3.33, x^2=4.02, df=1, p<.05). The other differences were not statistically significant.

Subjects' Expectations about the Person in Power

In this situation hypothetical persons were put in the position where they could have for themselves more than, equal to or less than what they could give to Ss or could give more, equal to or less to subjects than what they could have for themselves. Ss in this condition were asked to anticipate 'Miss P' or 'Mr. P's behaviour or response choices in the two situations respectively.

TABLE 3.31

Frequency of response choices of Canadian and Indian S_s in the situation in which S_s could give the other person equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

	Choice S_s	Give Equal	Give Less
INDIAN	M[+]M[++]	10 (52.6%)	9 (47.4%)
	MF	12 (60.0)	8 (40.0)
	FM	12 (38.7)	19 (61.3)
	FF	16 (44.4)	20 (55.6)
CANADIAN	MM	15 (68.2)	7 (31.8)
	MF	14 (73.7)	5 (26.3)
	FM	36 (72.0)	14 (28.0)
	FF	30 (66.7)	15 (33.3)

$$x^2 = 15.83 \qquad df = 7 \qquad P < .05$$

+ Sex of subject

++ Sex of hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.32

Frequency of response choices of Indian & Canadian females paired with 'Mr. P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give Equal	Give Less
IF	12 (38.7%)	19 (61.3%)
CF	36 (72.0)	14 (28.0)

$$x^2 = 8.78 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.33

Frequency of response choices of Indian and Canadian females paired with 'Miss P' in the situation in which S_s could give the other person equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

Choice S_s	Give Equal	Give Less
IF	16 (44.4%)	20 (55.6%)
CF	30 (66.7)	15 (33.3)

$$x^2 = 4.02 \qquad df = 1 \qquad P < .05$$

In the condition where 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P' could take more than, equal to or less than what they could give to Ss, most Ss in both cultures anticipated that 'Mr. P' or 'Miss P' would take more for himself or herself (Table 3.34, X^2=19.55, df=14 ns). But there were very clear sex and cultural differences in the expectations about the choices 'of Miss P' or 'Mr. P' who had power to give more, equal or less to the subjects than what he or she could have for himself or herself (Table 3.35, X^2=41.48, df=14, p<.01). More Canadian males (68.4%) than females (35.6%) expected 'Miss P' to give them more than

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Insert Tables 3.34 to 3.40 about here

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what she could have for herself (Table 3.36, X^2=7.49, df=2, p<.05) but no significant difference was found in the expectations of Canadian males (50%) and females (50%) in the situation in which 'Mr. P' was in power (X^2=2.42, df=2, ns) (Table 3.37). Indian females predicted that "Mr. P' (63%) and 'Miss P' (71%) would give them less than what he or she was going to have for himself or herself. Indian males (27.8%) and females (3.2%) (Table 3.38, $X^2$6.93, df=2, p<.05) and Canadian (50%) and Indian (3.2%) (Table 3.39, X^2=19.22, df=2, p<.01) females had significantly different expectations about a male in power. It can be inferred that Indian females perceived 'Mr. P' as less generous towards them than did Indian males and Canadian females. Indian females and Canadian females also differed significantly in their expectations concerning 'Miss P's behaviour (X^2=7.06, df=2, p<.05). Most Canadian females expected more (35.6%) or equal (31.15) from 'Miss P' whereas the majority of Indian females (63%) expected less from 'Miss P' (Table 3.40).

TABLE 3.34

Frequency of response choices expected by Indian and Canadian
S_s from 'persons' in power who are in a position to take
for themselves more than, equal to or less than what they
could give to S_s.

Expectation S_s	Will Take More	Will Take Equal	Will Take Less
INDIAN			
M^+M^{++}	12 (63.1%)	7 (36.9%)	0
MF	15 (75.0)	4 (20.0)	1 (5.0)
FM	28 (90.3)	2 (6.4)	1 (3.2)
FF	34 (94.45)	2 (5.55)	0
CANADIAN			
MM	15 (68.2)	7 (31.8)	0
MF	18 (94,7)	1 (5.3)	0
FM	46 (92.0)	4 (8.0)	0
FF	35 (77.8)	9 (20.0)	1 (2.2)

$$x^2 = 8.3 \qquad df = 14 \quad ns$$

+ Sex of subject.

++ Sex of hypothetical person.

TABLE 3.35

Frequency of response choices expected by Indian and Canadian S_s from 'persons' in power ('Miss P' or 'Mr. P') who are in a position to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what they could have for themselves.

	Expectation S_s	Will Give More	Will Give Equal	Will Give Less
INDIAN	M^+M^{++}	5 (27.8%)	5 (27.8%)	8 (44.4%)
	MF	7 (3.50)	4 (20.0)	9 (45.0)
	FM	1 (3.2)	8 (25.8)	22 (71.0)
	FF	6 (17.1)	7 (20.0)	22 (62.9)
CANADIAN	MM	11 (50.0)	4 (18.2)	7 (31.8)
	MF	12 (68.4)	1 (5.3)	5 (26.3)
	FM	25 (50.0)	7 (14.0)	18 (36.0)
	FF	16 (35.5)	14 (31.1)	15 (33.3)

$$x^2 = 41.48 \qquad df = 14 \qquad P < .01$$

+ Sex of subject

++ Sex of person in power.

TABLE 3.36

Frequency of responses choices expected by Canadian S_S from 'Miss P' who is in a position to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what she could have for herself.

Expectation S_S	Will Give More	Will give Equal	Will Give Less
CM	13 (68.4%)	1 (5.3%)	5 (26.3%)
CF	16 (35.5)	14 (31.1)	15 (33.3)

$$x^2 = 7.49 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .05$$

TABLE 3.37

Frequency of response choice expected by Canadian S_S from 'Mr. P' who is in a position to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what he could have for himself.

Expectation S_S	Will Give More	Will Give Equal	Will Give Less
CM	11 (50.0%)	4 (18.2%)	7 (31.8%)
CF	25 (50.0)	7 (14.0)	18 (36.0)

$$x^2 = 0.242 \qquad df = 2 \qquad ns$$

TABLE 3.38

Frequency of response choices expected by Indian S_s from 'Mr. P.' who is in a position to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what he could have for himself.

Expectation S_s	Will Give More	Will Give Equal	Will Give Less
IM	5 (27.8%)	5 (27.8%)	8 (44.4%)
IF	1 (3.2)	8 (25.8)	22 (71.0)

$$x^2 = 6.93 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .05$$

TABLE 3.39

Frequency of response choices expected by Indian and Canadian females from 'Mr. P' who is in a position to give the other person more than, equal to or less than what he could have for himself.

Expectation S_s	Will Give More	Will Give Equal	Will Give Less
IF	1 (3.2%)	8 (25.8%)	22 (71.0%)
CF	25 (50.0)	7 (14.0)	18 (36.0)

$$x^2 = 19.22 \qquad df = 2 \qquad P < .01$$

TABLE 3.40

Frequency of response choices expected by Indian and Canadian

females from 'Miss P' who is in a position to give the

other person more than, equal to or less than what she

could have for herself.

S_s \ Expectation	Will Give More	Will Give Equal	Will Give Less
IF	6 (17.1%)	7 (20.0%)	22 (62.9%)
CF	16 (35.5)	14 (31.1)	15 (33.3)

$x^2 = 7.06$ df = 2   P <.05

Discussion

These results clearly show sex and cultural differences in the use of power. Canadians are more likely to take for themselves more than what they could give to the other person than Indians. Indians of both sexes are more apt to take more for themselves than the other person when paired with a female than when with a male. Indian females chose to take equal to the other person more often even in a situation in which taking more would have been a more rational choice, could be either because they emphasize equality or do not want to be labelled as 'greedy' or somebody who uses power to her own benefit need to be explored.

In the situation in which one could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what one could have for oneself, most Canadian males gave more to the other person whereas Canadian females and Indians of both sexes were more likely to give the other person equal to or less than what they could have for themselves. While considering the responses in the situations in which Ss had choice to give the other person more than or equal to, more or less than, or equal to or less than what they could have for themselves, Indians (especially Indian females) are more likely to give the minimum possible outcomes available in the situations to the other person. Carment (1974) also found a similar result in a 'MDG' or 'Chicken' game situation. Canadian females were more likely to give the minimum possible outcomes availabe in this situation to another female than to males, whereas Canadian males were more likely to give the maximum possible outcomes available in the situations to the other person which

seems to be the most rational choice. On the motivational basis maximizing the joint gains or a tendency to have the best available outcomes for both seems to be characteristics of Canadian males whereas minimizing the differences in gain and/or maximizing own gain seem to be the concern of Canadian females and Indians of both sexes. The other possibility may be that Indians of both sexes and Canadian females do not want to have less than the other person in the interactions and are denying the desirable outcomes to the other as means of showing power. Alcock (1974) also observed Canadian males reacting differently from Canadian females and Indians of both sexes in a bargaining situation. Findings of this and Alcock's (1974) study are suggestive that Canadian males take a different view of a situation and react differently in them than do Canadian females or Indians. As Indians were more likely to take equal to the other person in the situation in which they could also have taken more than the other person suggest that the 'equality norm' is more salient for them. For Canadian males the 'parity norm' (Gamson, 1964) seems to be more important.

Indians, especially Indian females, expected that the persons in power would not give them more than what they would have for themselves. Canadians, on the other hand, expected the person in power to give them more. A comparison of Ss behaviour in power situations (Tables 3.1 and 3.9) and their expectation about the person in power (Tables 3.34 and 3.35) seems to support the notion that there exists a norm of reciprocity governing the exchange processes among people (Gouldner, 1960) in both cultures or we do to others what we expect them to do to us.

In conclusion, Canadian males seem to be very rationale players in the power game, making use of it to their own and their partner's full advantage whereas the behaviour of Indians and Canadian females seem to be guided by some other considerations which obviously need to be investigated in more detail.

Chapter 4

Use of Power in a Bilateral Situation

After studying the behaviour of Ss in a unilateral power
situation (a situation in which the power to affect others or own
outcomes was solely under the subjects' control) it was decided to
study the behaviour of Ss in bilateral power situations (a situation in
which both 'source' and 'target' have some power to affect each other's
outcomes though differently).

The dependent variable power has been defined 'as the
capability one person has of affecting the other's outcomes" (Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959, p. 101) and in this study the power situation has been
simulated by an asymmetric game matrix as shown below:

(Points above the diagonal
belong to A and those
below the diagonal belong
to B)

Figure 4.1

From a_2 to a_1 or from a_1 to a_2, A can increase B's outcomes from 0 to 3
or can reduce it from 3 to 0 respectively and in neither case can B do
anything about it. Similarly, B can increase A's outcomes from 3 to 4,
or decrease it from 4 to 3 and in neither case can A do anything about
it. As A can control B's 3 points, wehrease B can control only 1 point
of A, A is assumed to have more power over B than B has over A. Thus
person A is in the 'High Power' (HP) position and B is in the 'Low
Power' (LP) position. If a person gives the other the best possible
outcome available in the interaction the response choice is called

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'giving' access (a_1 in the case of $\underline{A}$ and b_1 in the case of $\underline{B}$) and if the least possible outcome, then the response choice is called 'denying' access (a_2 in the case of $\underline{A}$ and b_2 in the case of $\underline{B}$).

This chapter reports three experiments designed to investigate a) the behaviour (or use of power) in HP or LP positions, b) the effect of 'Information' about power reversal on the use of power and c) the effect of Machiavellianism, Empathic tendency and expectation about the other person's responses on the subjects' responses. All the experiments were carried out on Canadian Ss and included same-sex and mixed-sex dyads at the following levels:

    Male in HP — Male in LP

    Male in HP — Female in LP

    Female in HP — Male in LP

    Female in HP — Female in LP

Experiment 1

Effect of sex and power positions

A review of the literature concerned with the effect of
situational factors has revealed the importance of power positions
(Tedeschi et al., 1969), sex of the self and opponent, types of power
possessed (Bedell and Sistrunk, 1973; Wahba, 1971), ethnic background
of subject (Swingle, 1969; 1970), strategy (Komorita et al., 1968) etc.
as determinants of behaviour in power situations. In most studies
'confederates' have been used to control the behaviour in one of the
power positions and to study the behaviour in the other power position
as affected by it. In this experiment it was decided to study
behaviour in power situations involving real 'others'.

Design:

The independent variables in this experiment were power
positions (HP or LP), sex of the source and sex of the target. This
experiment thus had a 2 (power positoins) x 2 (sex of the source) x 2
(sex of the target) factorial design.

The dependent variable in this experiment was the number of
'denying' responses made in 100 trials.

Hypotheses: The following effects of independent variables were
expected to occur:

1) Males would choose 'denying' responses less frequently than females.

2) Persons in HP would choose 'denying' responses more frequently than

persons in LP.

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Subjects

Eighty first and second year undergraduates at McMaster University (40 males and 40 females) who volunteered to take part were used as subjects in this study. Ss who had signed for the same time slots were called in pairs after making sure that they did not know each other.

Procedure

Upon arrival for the experiment, Ss were assigned to HP or LP by tossing a coin in their presence. After Ss had taken their seats they were given an instruction sheet (see appendix B1). The instructions consisted of information as to how the game would be played and how they could affect each other's outcomes. After Ss had read the instructions, their questions, if they had any, were answered. Ss were also told not to talk during the experiment. Ss played for 100 trials for money and also kept a record of their earnings and the other's earnings. The interaction matrix was the same as that shown in Figure 1 (see page   ).

Results and Discussion

The analysis of variance (Table 4.1) revealed significant main effects of power position (F_1, $72 = 13.65$, $p < .01$) and sex of the source

Insert Table 4.1 about here

($F_1, 72 = 5.93$, $p < .05$). Main effect of the sex of the target and interaction effects were not found to be significant.

The overall mean 'denying' rate in LP (M=58.175, SD=26.4) was found to be significantly higher ($p < .01$) than the mean 'denying' rate

TABLE 4.1

Summary of Analysis of Variance of Behaviour in Power Position

Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Power Position	10626.05	1	10626.05	13.65	<.05
Sex of Source	4620.8	1	4620.8	5.93	<.05
Sex of Target	105.8	1	105.8	.136	ns
Power Position x Sex of Source	1361.25	1	1361.25	1.75	ns
Power Position x Sex of Target	0.2	1	0.2	0	ns
Sex of Source x Sex of Target	1170.45	1	1170.45	1.5	ns
Power Position x Sex of Source x Sex of Target	1022.45	1	1022.45	1.3	ns
With in	56773.2	72	793.52		
TOTAL	75680.2	79			

FIGURE 4.2: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES IN HIGH POWER AND LOW POWER

FIGURE 4.3: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES BY MALES AND FEMALES

Insert Figure 4.2 about here
---

in HP (M=35.125, SD=29.6) contrary to expectation thus rejecting

hypothesis 2 (Table 4.2).   A significant effect of the sex of the

source was also observed (Table 4.3) with females denying more

(M=54.25, SD=29.43) as compared to males (M=39.05, SD=26.83) supporting

hypothesis one (p<.05).   Other effects were not statistically

siignificant yet some differences in the behaviour of males and females

in different power positions and sex composition of dyads were

observed.   Females in LP were found to deny more (M=69.9, SD=26.23)

Insert Tables 4.2 to 4.5 about here
---

than males in LP (M=46.45, SD=26.66) or Males (M=31.65, SD=26.98) and

females (M=38.6, SD=32.3) in HP (Table 4.4)   Females in LP were found

to deny more to males (M=78.5, SD=22.5) than to females (M=61.3,

SD=29.5).   But if they (females) were in HP, they denied more to

females (M=44.8, SD=39.8) than to males (M=32.4, SD=22.4) (Table 4.5).

Differences in these means were not found to be statistically

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Insert Figure 4.4 about here
---

significant but are still suggestive of sex differences.   Overall,

males did not show any substantial difference in their 'denying'

response towards males or females in both HP or LP positions and

females in LP denied more to persons in HP but when they were in HP

they denied less to persons in LP.

TABLE 4.2

Mean 'Denying' Responses of S_s in HP and LP

Power Position		
	HP	LP
Mean	35.125	58.175
SD	29.76	26.44

$F_{1,72} = 13.65$ P < .01

TABLE 4.3

Overall Mean 'Denying' Responses of Males and Females

	Males	Females
Mean	39.05	54.25
SD	26.85	29.43

$F_{1,72} = 5.93$ P < .025

TABLE 4.4

Mean 'Denying' Responses of Male and Females

In HP and LP Positions

	Power Position			
	HP		LP	
	M	F	M	F
Mean	31.65	38.6	46.45	69.9
SD	26,98	32.3	26.66	26.23

$$F_{1,72} = 1.75 \quad \text{ns}$$

M = males

F = females

TABLE 4.5

Mean 'Denial" responses in HP and LP position for different sex compositions of pairs.

	Power Position							
	HP				LP			
Sex of Source	M		F		M		F	
Sex of Target	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Mean	32.5	30.8	32.4	44.7	47.8	45.1	78.5	61.3
SD	25.6	28.3	22.4	39.8	27.4	25.9	22.5	29.5

$$F_{1,72} = 1.3 \quad ns$$

M = male

F = female

FIG. 4.4: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES BY MALES AND FEMALES IN HIGH POWER & LOW POWER

Support for the notion of Cartwright and Zander (1965) that power may produce compassionate rather than exploitive or punitive behaviour is reflected in the overall mean 'denying' responses in HP which are significantly less than the mean 'denying' responses in LP. Persons in high power should not harm those who are weak since there is apparently a norm against harming the weak person (Taynor & Deaux, 1973) which might have affected the denial rate in HP positions. The higher 'denying' rate in LP may be considered to be an attempt by a person in LP to minimize the differences in the final outcomes whereas low 'denying' responses in HP may be because of the secure position of the person in HP who would be getting either a more or equal outcome than the other person regardless of what the other person in LP does and thus can afford to be generous.

When considering the sex differences in 'denying' responses it seems that maximizing joint gains is of concern to males whereas minimizing the differences in gains seems to be a characteristic of females. The findings of this experiment substantiate the findings of many other experiments on PD and MDG games in which females were also found to be more competitive and less generous than males (Bixenstine, Chambers & Wilson, 1964; Swingle, 1970).

Experiment II

Effect of Power Reversal

In this experiment the effect of power reversal is studied.
Power has been conceptualized and investigated as a static concept and
not much attention has been given to the effects of power reversal on
the subsequent use of power or the effect of 'Information' about power
reversal on the use of power before the change in power positions. The
subsequent use of power by a former target is expected to be affected
by the way in which he was treated by a former power holder and
'Information' about change was also expected to affect the use of power
before change.

Design: The independent variables in this experiment were power
positions (before and after reversal), shift (from HP to LP or LP to
HP), sex composition of dyads M(HP)-M(LP), M(HP)-F(LP) F(HP)-M(LP)
and F(HP)-F(LP) and Information about switch ('Information' - 'No
Information')

This experiment thus had a 2 (power positions x S) x 2 (Shift)
x 4 (Sex composition of dyads) x 2 (Information) factorial design.

Hypothesis: The following effects of the independent variables were
expected:

1) Ss initially in HP position, would 'deny' more when shifted to a LP
   position.

2) Ss initially in LP position would after shift make similar
   responses as made by a person in HP before shift and vice versa.

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3) Ss would 'deny' more in the 'Information' condition than in the 'No
Information' condition about shift before shifting.

Subjects

One hundred and sixty McMaster Undergraduates (80 males and 80
females) who volunteered were used as Ss in this experiment. As in the
previous experiment Ss who signed for the same time slots were called
in pairs after making sure that they were not friends.

Procedure

Upon arrival for the experiments, Ss were assigned to HP or LP
randomly by tossing a coin in their presence. After Ss had taken their
seats, they were given an Instruction Sheet (see Appendix B1). After
they had read the instructions, their questions, if they had any, were
answered. Ss played for points in this experiment and also kept a
record of their own and the other's cumulative points. Half of the Ss
were told at the start that they would be required to switch their
positions after 50 trials ('Information' condition) whereas the other
half of the Ss were not informed about switching positions ('No
Information' condition) although they actually did switch their
positions after 50 trials.

Results and Discussion

The analysis of variance (Table 4.6) carried out on the data
revealed a significant main effect of 'Information' ($F_{1, 144}=10.04$,
$p<.01$) and interaction effects of Power position x Shift ($F_{1, 144}=9.559$,

Insert Table 4.6 about here

$p<.01$), Power position x Shift x Information ($F_{1, 144}=12.558$. $p<.01$) and

TABLE 4.6

Summary of Analysis of Variance of Behaviour

Before and After Change in Power Position

Source	SS	df	E (ms)	F	
Between S$_s$	45170.2000	159			
B (HP- LP) or (LP- HP)	13.6152	1	13.6152	.051 ns	
C (Sex Composition of dyad)	1691.2750	3	563.783	2.131 ns	
D (Information or No Information	2656.5125	1	2656.5125	10.041 P <.01	
BC	1075.1125	3	358.370	1.354 ns	
BD	174.0500	1	1740.05	.658 ns	
CD	483.2625	3	161.0875	.609 ns	
BCD	977.9750	3	325.99	1.232 ns	
Error	38098.4000	144	264.57		
Within S$_s$	23798.0000	160			
A (Power Positions)	285.0125	1	285.0125	2.298 ns	
AB	1185.8000	1	1185.8000	9.559	P <.01
AC	404.3625	3	134.7875	1.086 ns	
AD	352.8	1	352.8	2.84 ns	
ABC	401.425	3	133.81	1.078 ns	
ACD	86.875	3	28.958	0.233 ns	
ABD	1557.6125	1	1557.6125	12.557	P <.01
ABCD	1661.3125	3	553.77	4.464	P <.01
Error	17862.8	144	124.0472		
Total	68968.2	319			

Power position x Shift x Sex composition of dyads x Information ($F_{3,144}$=4.464, p<.05).

Overall, Ss were found to 'deny' more in the 'Information' condition (M=31.95, SD=14.12) than in the "No Information' condition

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Insert Figure 4.5 about here

(M=26.2, SD=14.7). The difference in these means was significant at p<.01 (Table 4.7). As far as the Power Position x Shift interaction is

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Insert Tables 4.7 & 4.8 about here
---

concerned, Ss denied significantly more in LP when they were transferred from HP (M=26.0, SD=13.5) to LP (M=31.74, SD=14.8)(p<.01)

Insert Figure 4.6 about here
---

and less when they were transferred from LP (M=31.01, SD=10.92) to HP (M=28.3, SD=16.6)(ns). 'Denying' responses were also found to be lower in HP (M=26.0, SD=13.5) than in LP(M=31.01, SD=10.92) before shift (Table 4.8).

The other significant interaction effect was Power position x Shift x Information (Table 4.9). The 'denying' responses for first 50 trials in HP were found to be significantly more (p<.01) in the 'Information' condition (M=30.775, SD=12.98) than in the 'No Information' condition (M=21.225, SD=14.05) but no significant difference was observed in 'denying' responses for the first 50 trials in LP between the 'No Information' (M=31.375, SD=22.9) and the 'Information' (M=29.15, SD=11.02) conditions. Also there was no

TABLE 4.7

Overall Mean 'Denying' Responses in the

'No Information' and the 'Information' Condition

	No Inform (N = 40)	Inform (N = 40)
Mean	26.2	31.95
SD	14.7	14.124

$F_{1, 144} = 10.04$ P <.01

TABLE 4.8

Overall Mean 'Denying' Responses of S_s before

and after Power Reversal when Shift is from HP to LP and

LP to HP

		Before Shift	After Shift
HP → LP (N = 40)	M	26.0	31.74
	SD	13.5 [1]	14.8 [3]
Lp → HP (N = 40)	M	31.01	28.3
	SD	10.92 [2]	16.6 [4]

Sifnificantly different groups *

(1) - (3)   P <.01 $F_{1,144} = 9.56$ P <.01

(1) - (2)   P <.05

* Bonferroni t.

FIG.4.5: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES IN 'NO INFORMATION' AND 'INFORMATION' CONDITION

FIG.4.6: MEAN 'DENYING' RESP. BEFORE&AFTER SHIFT

Insert Table 4.9 about here

significant effect of change in power positions on 'denying' responses

in the 'Information' condition but in the 'No Information' condition

the 'denying' rate increased significantly (p<.05) after the shift from

HP (M=21.225, SD=14.05) to LP (M=29.275, SD=15.97) and decreased

Insert Figure 4.7 about here

significantly after change from LP (M=31.375, SD=10.81) to HP (M=22.9,

SD=17.19). A comparison of 'denying' responses before and after the

reversal clearly indicates that subsequent use of power is affected by

the way people responded to each other in first 50 trials in the 'No

Information' condition supporting hypothesis two.

The interaction of Power position x Shift x Sex composition of

dyads x Information was also found to be significant (Table 4.10). In

the 'No Information' condition females paired with males or females did

not show any significant differences in their 'denying' responses after

power reversal but males paired with females showed a significant

decrease in 'denying' responses when they were shifted to HP (M=9.6,

SD=17.6) from LP (M=31.1, SD=14.6). Males paired with males also

Insert Table 4.10 about here

showed a similar decrease in 'denying' responses when shifted from LP

(M=35.3, SD=8.0) to HP (M=25.2, SD=16.8) though not significantly. An

increase (though not statistically significant) in 'denying' responses

was observed when a male paired with a male (M=22.3, SD=16.3) in HP,

TABLE 4.9

Overall Mean 'Denying' Responses of S_s before and after
power reversal when shift was form HP → LP or LP → HP in
the 'No Information' and the 'Information' Condition.

		No Information		Information	
		Before	After	Before	After
HP → LP	M	21.225	19.175	30.775	34.2
	SD	14.05 (1)	15.97 (2)	12.98 (5)	13.57 (6)
LP → HP	M	31.375	22.9	29.15	33.7
	SD	10.81 (3)	17.19 (4)	11.02 (7)	16.1 (8)

$$F_{1,144} = 12.557 \qquad P < .01$$

Significantly different groups.*

     (1) − (2) P < .05

     (1) − (5) P < .05

     (3) − (4) P < .05

     (1) − (3) P < .01

     (4) − (8) P < .01

* Bonferroni t.

FIG. 4.7: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES BEFORE AND AFTER SHIFT IN 'NO INFO'. & 'INFO'. CONDITIONS

TABLE 4.10

Mean 'Denying' responses for different sex composition of

dyeds in the 'No Information' and the 'Information' con-

dition.

			No Information				Information			
			MM	MF	FM	FF	MM	MF	FM	FF
LP ↑ HP	Before	M	32.3	19.4	15.2	28.9	31.1	28.1	34.0	29.9
		SD	16.3 (1)	14.7 (2)	14.5 (3)	9.9 (4)	14.4 (5)	18.4 (6)	7.9 (7)	8.1 (8)
	After	M	32.1	34.3	20.1	30.6	34.5	27.1	35.0	40.2
		SD	12.6 (9)	16.2 (10)	19.2 (11)	15.2 (12)	17.9 (13)	18.2 (14)	7.1 (15)	5.9 (16)
HP ↑ LP	Before	M	35.3	31.1	32.9	26.2	30.1	23.7	33.3	29.5
		SD	8.0 (17)	14.6 (18)	7.3 (19)	11.7 (20)	10.1 (21)	11.6 (22)	13.1 (23)	8.4 (24)
	After	M	25.2	9.6	27.5	29.3	37.4	29.8	33.1	34.5
		SD	16.8 (25)	17.6 (26)	15.4 (27)	18.8 (28)	17.9 (29)	16.7 (30)	15.9 (31)	13.6 (32)

Significantly different groups* $F_{3,144} = 4.464$ $P < .01$

        (18) − (26) $P < .01$ **
        (26) − (30) $P < .01$
        (3) − (7) $P < .05$
        (3) − (9) $P < .05$
  * Bonferroni t.
 ** Comparisons of mean 'denying' responses for similar sex
    composition of dyads before and after the power reversal
    in 'Inform.' and 'No-Inform." condition are only considered

M=32.1, SD=12.6 in LP) or a female (M=19.4, SD=14.7 in HP), M=34.3,

SD=16.2 in LP) when shifted from a LP position to HP position. No

significant differences were observed in before and after shift

'denying' responses in the 'Information' condition for same or mixed

sex dyads. Another significant difference was observed in the

'denying' behaviour of females (in HP) in the 'Information' and the 'No

Information' conditions before switching. Females in HP, paired with

males in LP, tended to 'deny' more in the first 50 trials when they

were informed (M=34.0, SD=7.9) about the shift than when they were not

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Insert Figure 4.8 & 4.9 about here

(M=15.2, SD=14.5)(p<.05). Also the 'denying' rate for the first 50

trials was higher in the 'Information' condition for M(HP) - M(LP)

(M=31.1, SD=14.4) and M(HP)-F(LP) pairs (M=28.1, SD=18.4) than in the

"No Information' condition (M=22.3, SD=16.3 for M(HP)-M(LP) pair and

M=19.4, SD=14.7 for M(HP)-F(LP) pair) though not significantly.

Females in LP paired with males in HP denied (M=32.9, SD=7.3)

significnatly more (p<.05) than they did in HP (M=16.2, SD=14.5) when

paired with males in LP. Similarly males denied more in LP (M=31.1,

SD=14.6) than they did in HP (M=19.4, SD=14.7) when they were paired

with females in HP and LP respectively though not significantly.

In general, the overall denial rate was higher in the

'Information' condition than in the 'No Information' condition thus

supporting hypothesis 3. 'Denying' behaviour was also found to be

affected by a change in position whether it was from HP to LP or from

LP to HP. Denial rate after the switch increased when the switch was

FIG.4.8: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES OF VARIOUS SEX COMPOSITION OF DYADS BEFORE AND AFTER SHIFT FROM HP --> LP IN 'NO INFORMATION' AND 'INFORMATION' CONDITIONS

FIG.4.9: MEAN 'DENYING' RESPONSES OF VARIOUS SEX COMPOSITION OF DYADS BEFORE AND AFTER SHIFT FROM LP --> HP IN 'NO INFORMATION' AND 'INFORMATION' CONDITIONS

from HP to LP supporting hypothesis one and decreased when the change in the positions was from LP to HP contrary to the findings of McKeown, Gahagen and Tedeschi (1967). Prior information about the switch brought about more 'denying' responses from Ss in HP in the first 50 trials than did the absence of this information (The 'No Information' condition). No such effect of 'Information' was found on 'denying' responses in LP. In the 'Information' condition no significant differences were observed in denial responses after the switch from those before the switch. But in the 'No Information' condition shifting from LP to HP reduced the denial rate and switching from HP to LP increased the denial rate after the switch as compared to before the switch. Some sex differences also were observed. Females in HP were found to 'deny' more to males in LP in the 'Information' condition than in the 'No Information' condition. Similarly males in HP denied more both to males and females in LP in the 'Information' condition than in the 'No Information' condition.

Higher 'denying' rate by Ss in HP in the 'Information' condition might be a result of reaction to knowledge that after the switch they would be in LP and not enjoying as much control of the other person's outcomes as they did before the switch. They seem to make use of this opportunity of being in HP to maximize the differences in outcomese so that they could come out even at the end of interaction. It also fits finding by other's and Alcock (1972) that "North American males strive to maximize their own gains while making as much or more than the other player" (p. 212). Increase in denial rate of the person put in LP from HP position without any information

may be his reaction to the sudden unexpected change in his position and capacity to control other's outcomes and thus he reacts by denying more to his partner (who is in HP now) in an attempt to minimize the differences in final outcomes.

Cartwright & Zander's (1968) notion that power may produce compassionate rather than exploitative behaviour again finds support in the findings of this experiment as persons who were put in HP positions from LP invariably became more generous (as inferred from lower denial rate) after the change. It seems reasonable to conclude from this that persons who are in HP will be generous towards those in LP to the extent they feel that their positions and outcomes in the interaction are secure and would be at a higher or equal level irrespective of what the other person in LP does or can do to them. This is not the case when people know that they would soon be in LP and their position and outcomes are not secure. Persons in LP to start with or those who were put in LP from HP seem to emphasize equality or overall equal distribution of outcomes and try to minimize the differences in net gains at the end of the interaction.

In short, 'denying' responses before the switch in power positions seem to depend upon the preinformation about change and 'denying' responses after the change in power positions without any information seem more to be function of change in position from HP to LP or LP to HP and on the response choices of the other person before the switch. Generosity (or low denying rate) by HP persons seem to be dependent upon their perception of the security of their positions and a certainty about the minimal outcomes in the interaction. In the

absence of this security or certainty, those in HP (as in Information condition) are not generous and act more like persons in LP.

Experiment III

The findings of the first two experiments suggest that behaviour in a power situation is dependent on the power positions, sex of the source, and the stability of power positions. Experiment 3, in contrast to the first two experiments, in which the effects of situational variables were studied, examines the effect of two personality variables and the effect of expectation about the other person's behaviour on the responses of Ss in a power situation. The personality variables selected for study were Machiavellianism and Empathic tendency.

Empathic tendency is defined as an observer's reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing, or is about to experience an emotion (Stotland, 1969). In no study has anyone tried to observe the relationship between empathic tendency and behavior in power situations, most probably because the word 'power' carrie a negative connotation. Most studies on empathic tendencies have been concerned with behavior (to be more precise, helping behavior) in emergency situations. But many roles that involve formal social power require helping or giving assistance rather than just control. As McClelland (1974) rightly points out, in many settings persons with power may be helping others to attain both individual and group goals. Affiliative concern for the other persons also seems to be one form of restraint on the negative use of power (used to punish or to deny).

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Machiavellianism is characteristic of the person who manipulates others through guile, deceit, and opportunism (Christie and Geis, 1970). It reflects not only a cluster of attitudes about the nature of man, but also a zest for dominating and controlling others and appears to include sentiments about the nature of power, or power as an aspect of man's nature rather than a disposition to strive for power. Machs have certain beliefs about people and certain beliefs about operating tactics which follow from their belief about people. In their behavior they are likely to be operators, manipulators and successful in detached aggressive bargaining. All of this suggests a particular style of exercising power by Machiavellians.

Design: The independent variables in this experiment were: Machiavellianism as measured by the 'Mach V attitude inventory' scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). Empathic tendency as measured by the 'Empathy Scale' (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and expectation about the other person's responses.

The dependent variable in this experiment was the same as in the preceding experiments. Correlation coefficients were computed to determine relationships among the variables.

Hypothesis: The following hypotheses were formulated:

1) Empathic tendency will be negatively correlated with 'denying' responses in both HP and LP positions.

2) Machiavellianism will be positively correlated with 'denying' responses in both HP and LP positions.

3) There will be a positive relationship between the frequency of

denying responses made by Ss and their expectation about denying responses from the other person.

Subjects

Eighty second-year psychology undergraduates (40 males and 40 females) volunteered as subjects.

Procedure

As in the preceding experiments, Ss who signed for the same time slots were called in pairs for the experiment. After both Ss had arrived for the experient, they were brought to the laboratory and assigned randomly to HP or LP by tossing a coin. Ss were given the Instruction Sheet (see Appendix B2). Half of the pairs were given the 'Mach V' (see Appendix C) and 'Empathy' scales (see Appendix D) before and other half after they had played the game. Prior to making their own choices, Ss were also required on each trial to make a prediction about the choice the other person was going to make. Ss also kept a record of their own and the other's points. The interaction matrix was the same as that used in the preceding experiments.

Results

As expected empathic tendency was found to be negatively related to 'denying' behavior for females in HP. The value of correlation coefficients was -.27 (ns) for first ten trials whereas for last ten and all 50 trials, it was -.61 (p<.01) and -.55 (p<.01) respectively suggesting that empathic tendency influenced the 'denying' behavior at the initiation of interaction and as interaction progressed lessened the 'denying' behavior considerably. The correlation between

Insert Table 4.11 about here

these two variables for females in LP and males in HP were found to be
too small to infer anything. For males in LP, correlations between
these two variables for first ten, last ten and all fifty trials were
found to be -.37, -20, and -.31 respectively indicating that empathic
tendency to certain extent influenced the 'denying' behavior though not
significantly. This finding implies that empathic tendency does affect
behavior in power relationships and that persons who are high on
empathic tendency may be expected to use the power available to them to
reward the other person (Table 4.11).

Machiavellianism does not seem to affect responses in this
situation in significant ways in either the HP or the LP positions but
the expectation about the other person's behaviour does. The 'denying'
responses made by Ss were found to be positively correlated with their
expectations about the other person's behaviour for males and females
in both HP or LP positions. In HP the correlations for first ten, last
ten and all 50 trials were .33, .58 (p<.01) and .41 (ns) respectively
for males while those for females were .30, .63 (p<.01) and .52 (p<.01)
respectively. The other coefficients were not statistically
significant though all of them were positive for first ten, last ten
and all 50 trials. This finding seems to suggest that expectation
about the other person's behavior is a very important determinant of
our behaviour towards them and an increase in the values of correlation
coefficients in last ten trials is suggestive that our behaviour

TABLE 4.11

Correlation coefficients between Machiavellianism (Mach.)

Empathic tendency (Emp.), expectation of 'denying' responses

(EXD) from others and S_s' actual 'denying' responses (D)

γ between	HP						LP					
	Male (N = 20)			Female (N = 20)			Male (N = 20)			Female (N = 20)		
	1st 10 trials (1)	Last 10 trials (2)	All 50 trials (3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mach. D	.34	.3	.32	.12	−.08	−.02	−.03	−.04	−.08	−.02	−.25	−.28
Emp. D	−.01	− .08	−.05	−.27	−.61**	−.55*	−.37	−.02	−.31	−.09	−.03	−.02
Exd. D	.33	.58**	.41	.30	.63**	.52*	.50*	.30	.36	.36	.19	.25

γ = .444   P <.05 (*)   γ = .561   P <.01(**)

towards others becomes more dependent on the expectation about the other's behaviour towards us as interaction progresses.

Correlations between Machiavellianism, empathic tendency and subject's expectation about the other person's behaviour were also computed. No significant correlations were observed in empathic tendency and expectations about others' 'denying' behaviour though most of them were negative suggesting that persons high on empathic tendency expect others to be generous towards them. Subject's machiavellian orientation and their expectation about others' 'denying' behaviour were found to be positively correlated (though not significant) in the HP position suggesting that the higher the Mach

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Insert Table 4.12 about here
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score of someone, the more suspicious he or she will be of the other person in the LP position. The correlation between these two variables for males in LP was very small but for females in LP, it was negative and stastistically significant for first ten trials (=-.60, p<.01) last ten trials (=-.48, p<.05) and all 50 trials (=-.52, p<.05) indicating that High Mach females in LP expect the other person in HP to deny less to them. (Table 4.12).

High Machs have been found to win more when they are in a higher power position in ambiguous situations (Christie & Geis, 1965) and also in PD games for money in a face-to-face situation in which they were free to communicate with the other person (Ladkin, 1971). The failure to obtain any significant relationship between Machiavellianism and behaviour in this kind of power situation used in

TABLE 4.12

Correlation coefficients between Machiavellianism (Mach.), Empathic

tendency (Emp.) and Expectation of denying responses from others (EXD)

Y between	Power Positions											
	HP						LP					
	Males			Females			Males			Females		
	1st 10 trials (1)	Last 10 trials (2)	All 50 trials (3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mach. EXD	.28	.10	.19	.24	.35	.31	-.045	-.05	-.049	-.60**	-.48*	-.52*
Emp. EXD.	-.23	-.34	-.40	-.07	.05	-.003	-.15	-.30	-.24	.13	.01	.02

N = 20 for all groups

γ = .444   P <.05 (*)

γ = .561   P <.01 (**)

this experiment may be attributed to the following factors: 1) the

power situation in this experiment was very structured and not

ambiguous, 2) Ss were neither allowed to see nor to communicate with

each other and 3) Ss played for points only in this experiment.   The

Machs in HP position are more likely to perceive the other person in LP

position as malevolent or to start the interaction and play the game

with suspicious and seem aware that the other person in LP also has

some retaliatory power to harm them.   Only High Mach females expected

the person in the HP to be benevolent and generous to them.   Perhaps

they were more aware of their weak position (both because being in low

power and females which is regarded as a 'weaker' sex) and there is

apparently a norm against harming the so called 'weaker' sex (Taynor &

Deaux, 1973).

        The relationship between empathic tendency of females in HP and

their denying behaviour also suggests that their empathy stops them

from harming the other person or from withholding his or her rewards.

This partially supports hypothesis one.   Males high on empathy, were

also found to expect other persons to be generous to them.   It may be

concluded, with some reservations, that empathy leads a person to

behave generously towards and be trustful of other persons.

        The effect of expectation about the other's behaviour on a

subject's behaviour was also very obvious.   Our actions or behaviour

towards others seem to be guided by the expectation we have about

others behaviour towards us.   According to both exchange and decision

theories (Homans, 1961, & Tedeschi, Bonoma & Schlanker, 1972) the

source should choose that mode of responding that will maximize his own

net gains. A norm of 'expected reciprocity' seem to govern our behaviour in short interactions or in initiating an interaction. This result also lends support to the findings of the first part of the study in which, even in a one-trial game, subjects more often gave to the other person what they expected the other person to give to them.

Conclusions

It can be inferred from the results of these experiments that in a power situation, response choices are affected by power position and sex of the source thus replicating and substantiating the findings of other studies.

The effect of change of power positions on the response choices in a power situation was also obvious. The responses made before and after the power reversal were found to be dependent on the prior Information about the shift in positions, direction of shift (i.e., whether from HP to LP or LP to HP) and sex combination of the pairs.

The effects of level of Machiavellianism and empathic tendency of a person on his behaviour in a power situation were not very systematic and conclusive but still suggestive that these personality variables do influence choices in power situations to certain extent. The expectation about the other person's behaviour was also found to have some effect on responses both in LP and HP positions.

In brief, behaviour in power is situation-specific and depends more on the sex combination of interacting pairs and their expectations rather than on Machiavellianism and empathic tendency of the interacting persons.

Chapter V

Concluding Comments

People in all societies depend on each other for tangible or non-tangible rewards which are supposed to be affected by their coordinated (or uncoordinated) mutual choices and behaviours (Tedeschi, 1972). The outcomes that various parties obtain as a function of their interaction are often different because people are known to have unequal control over outcomes in which some are more desirable than others. The ways in which allocation of these rewards or outcomes take place are usually regulated by complex rules and norms which may be situation-specific, culture-specific or determined by the personality dispositions of those interacting. Most real world interactions are mixed-motive and the modified PD game provides a context in which the use of power can be systematically studied. In a PD game two players simultaneously choose one of two responses available thus dispensing something which is not his or hers but over which he or she has control. A similar approach was used in the present investigation.

Most social scientists have studied the use of power under the assumption that power relations are static, that is a person in HP would remain in HP throughout the interaction. But it is quite probable that today's power holder may be under the thumb of his former target tomorrow. This reversal of power positions may be unexpected or expected. Awareness or unawareness about a change in power positions in the future can also be expected to have some effect on the use of

power, therefore, it is argued that a complete theory of the use of power should not only consider behaviour in fixed power positions with no prospects of change but also the effect of changes or possibilities of changes in positions on the way power is used. There is considerable empirical evidence that culture influences behaviour but there is a serious dearth of studies which have investigated cultural influence on the use of power. An attempt was made in the studies reported here to find answers to some of these questions as well as to examine the effects of two personality variables and expectations about the other's behaviour on the responses of people in a power situation.

In the first part of the study, in which responses of Ss were studied in a situation in which power to affect other's or own outcomes was solely under the subjects' control, very clear sex and cultural differences in the use of power by Ss as well as expectations about the use of power were found. Most Canadian males gave more to the other persons in the situation in which one could give the other person more than, equal to or less than what one could have for himself, whereas Canadian females and Indian Ss of both sexes gave the other person equal to or less than what they could have for theselves. Canadians of both sexes and Indian males more often took more for themselves than what they could give to the other person than did Indian females in the situation in which Ss could take for themselves more than, equal to or less than what they could give to the other person. Indian Ss, especially Indian females, more often preferred to give the other person equal to or less than what they could have for themselves in the situations in which they could give the other person more than or equal

to, or equal to or less than what they could take for themselves respectively. It should be noted that these situations were such that giving more to the other persons would not harm the subjects' own outcomes (no cost to subject) also taking more than the other person was at no cost to the other person. So 'giving more' (giving the maximum possible outcomes) to the other person or 'taking more' (or taking the maximum possible outcomes) for oneself seem to be appropriate and rational choices in these situations. Only Canadian males seem to make their choices in this rational way whereas others (Canadian females and Indians of both sexes) behaviour seemed to be guided by other motives. Whether this is due to an emphasis on equality of final outcomes or on minimizing the difference in gains, needs to be established. Another explanation may be that Indians think that outcomes they are dispensing are their own and they should distribute them carefully as "giving exhausts the giver" (McClelland, 1973, p. 212). McClelland (1973) also points out that in cultures such as India where resources are limited, people think that what one person gains inequitably means that another person loses it. This may be one of the reasons why Indians do not 'give more' to the other person (cost to 'self') or 'take more' than the other person (cost to 'other').

Indians and Canadians also had different perceptions or expectations about the person in power. The former expected the person in power to be less generous towards them than did the latter. How Ss perceive the person in power or in the recipient positions should also be investigated since in this experiment subjects only dealt with a hypothetical person ('Miss P' or 'Mr. P').

Behaviour in the power situation in which Ss played for 100 trials, without the possibility of any future interaction, also was found to be affected by the power position one is in and sex of the person in the power position. Persons in LP were found to deny more to persons in HP than persons in HP were to persons in LP and females, in general, were found to deny other persons more than males. Persons in LP apparently feel the relationship is unequal and there are two ways available to restore equality, one is to get more for himself and the other is to impose costs on the advantaged person. The former possibility is not available to the person in LP in the present experiment therefore the only alternative the person in LP has is to 'deny'. Whether a lower denial rate in HP is because of a secure position and outcome in the interaction regardless of what the other person in LP does or whether it is because of an obligation to a dependent individual needs to be investigated in detail. The explanation of Schopler and Mathews (1965) that a powerful person would give more to someone whose dependence is caused by external (as in this experiment) rather than personal factors may also be a factor. Schopler and Bateson's (1965) notion that at least in some situations females are more responsive to dependent others than males who are supposed to be more aggressive, non-nurturing and competitive does not find support in the findings of this experiment.

The findings of Experiment II are also very important. It is very clear from these results that it is not only a person's power position or sex of the person that determines the use of power but also knowledge about any future change in power positions. Persons in HP,

in this experiment, behaved in the same way as did persons in HP in Experiment I when they did not know that they would be asked to change their position (from HP to LP) after 50 trials but 'denying' responses increased significantly in the first 50 trilas when subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that they would be required to switch their positions after 50 trials. 'Denying' rate was also found to increase when Ss were transferred to LP from HP as contrasted wth the opposite switch. 'Denying' responses during the 50 trials after the reversal were also affected by the presence or absence of prior 'Information' about change. Interestingly, denial during the 50 trials after reversal increased when Ss were switched to LP from HP but decreased significantly when Ss were shifted to HP from LP without any prior information. No effect was observed in their behaviour in the second 50 trials from their first 50 trials when Ss knew that there would be a change in their positions. It seems that behaviour in a power situation is dependent on how secure one feels about one's own positioin and outcomes and whether a change in positoins, if any, is for the better (LP to HP) or worse (HP to LP) as well as their preparedness for the change. Thus both Cartwright & Zander's (1968) theory that power produces compassionate rather than exploitative behaviour and Sampson's (1969) notion that the control of power induces individuals to act in an inequitable and exploiting manner seem to hold good, provided we know the context in which the power-interaction is taking place. These and other explanations need to be explored further before any firm conclusions can be reached.

The effects of the personality variables studied were not very strong or consistent but they were in the expected direction. The results may not be called conclusive by any standard but they are suggestive and can be treated as "hypothesis generating". As expected, empathic tendency and expectation about others' behaviour were found to have some effect on the way people used power in this experiment. Machiavellianism was not found to have as much effect on the use of power as expected, which might be because of the structured power situation (i.e., not much opportunity for manipulations) and their not having any control over their own outcomes. But Machiavellianism and Empathic tendency did affect the expectations of the choices to be made by the person in power.

In conclusion, behaviour in a power situation is mainly situation-specific and culture-specific and affected to some extent by personality traits of the Ss as well as their expectation about the other person. More experimentation on different types of power relationships in different cultures and on other portions of the populations is needed before any conclusive theory about the use of power can be postulated.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

<u>NOTE</u>

IF YOU WISH YOU MAY RESPOND ANONYMOUSLY, BUT IT WOULD BE OF HELP TO

US IF YOU WOULD GIVE YOUR NAME IN CASE WE NEED TO CONTACT YOU ABOUT

SOME FUTURE ASPECT OF THIS STUDY.

NAME _____ SEX _____ TELEPHONE # _____

AGE _____ STUDENT NUMBER _____

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL _____

AGE OF BROTHERS (IF ANY) _____

AGE OF SISTERS (IF ANY) _____

<div align="center">INSTRUCTIONS</div>

This is a study of certain kinds of social interaction. You will be asked to imagine you are in a situation which is similar in many ways to many real life situations, in that what you gain or lose will be determined both by your behaviour and by the behaviour of another person.

Consider the following situations which involve you and another person interacting to obtain a certain amount of money. The amount you obtain will depend on what both of you decide to do. The amounts you can obtain are set out in the following pay-off matrix:

Other

	X	Y
A	$0 ... $1	$1 ... $2
B	$2 ... $3	$3 ... $4

You

In this matrix, the money below the diagonals in each cell can be obtained by you and those above the diagonal by the other person. How much you get depends upon the choices you and the other person make.

In this case, each participant has two possible alternatives. You can choose either A or B and the other persosn can choose either X or Y. Neither of you know before hand the other person's choice.

For example in Matrix I, if you decide to choose A you will get either $0 or $1 (the money below the diagonals in the cells in row A) whereas the other person can get $1 or $2 (the money above the diagonals in the cells in row A) depending on the choice (X or Y) which the other person makes. If the other person chooses X, then you get $0 whehreas the other person gets $1 but if the other person decides on Y, then the other person gets $2 and you get $1. Similarly, if you choose B, you get $2 and the other person $3 if the other person chooses X, but the other person would get $4 and you $3 if the other person chooses Y.

Do not proceed if there is any aspect of the situation which you do not understand. Read the instructions again if necesary.

Remember in each situation, you would interact only once. It would not be repeated.

Consider each situation carefully, keeping in mind both your own and the other person's outcomes and try to estimate as accurately as possible what your choice would be.

Please turn to next page.

MISS P/MR. P

	X	Y
A	$5 / $8	$5 / $8
B	$5 / $5	$5 / $5
C	$5 / $2	$5 / $2

YOU

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. -----------

B. -----------

C. ----------

MISS P/MR.P

YOU

X   Y

A $5 $8 $5 $8

B $5 $2 $5 $2

WHICH ALTERNATIVE^P WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. —————————

B. —————————

MISS P/MR. P

	X	Y
A	$5 / $8	$5 / $8
B	$5 / $5	$5 / $5

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. _____

B. _____

MISS P/MR. P

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. -------------

B. -------------

MISS P/MR. P

X   Y

YOU

A

$8 $8
$5 $5

B

$5 $5
$5 $5

C

$2 $2
$5 $5

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. ----------

B. ----------

C. ----------

MISS P/MR. P

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. ------------

B. ------------

MISS P/MR. P

WHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

A. _____

B. _____

MISS P/MR. P

A^A _AWHICH ALTERNATIVE WOULD YOU CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

    A. _____

    B. _____

MISS P/MR. P

WHICH ALTERNATIVE DO YOU THINK MISS P/MR. P WOULD
CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

X. ----------

Y. ----------

Z. ----------

MISS P/MR. P

WHICH ALTERNATIVE DO YOU THINK MISS P/MR. P WOULD
CHOOSE? (CHECK ONE)

X. ------------

Y. ------------

Z. ------------

APPENDIX B1

INSTRUCTIONS

You are participating in a study of group behavior. You will be involved in a situation that is similar in many ways to many real-life situations in that what you gain or lose will be determined both by your behavior and by the behavior of the other participant. One of you will be known as Yellow and the other will be known as Red. Your colour is indicated on the panel in front of you.

Basic Situation

Both of you have an opportunity to earn some money. The amount you earn will depend on the number of points you accumulate. The number of points you obtain will depend on which of the four cells of the panel in front of you is chosen.

It takes both of you to make this choice. Red, you are to choose whether it will be in the top row of cells or the bottom row of cells. Your buttons are to the left of your panel. The upper button chooses the top row and the lower button chooses the bottom row.

Yellow, you are to choose whether it will be in the right-hand column or the left-hand column. Your buttons are below your panel. The button on the left chooses the left-hand column and the button on the right chooses the right-hand column.

You will notice that each of the four cells in the panel is divided by a diagonal line and contains two numbers. The numbers above the diagonal are the points you will receive, and the numbers below the diagonal are the points the other person will receive. For example, one of the top cells gives Red 3 and Yellow 4 and the other top cell gives Red 0 and Yellow 4. If your colour is yellow then your points are in yellow. If your colour is Red, your points are in red.

You can see, then, that if Red chooses the top row, Red's outcome will be either 0 or 3, depending on which column Yellow chooses. If Yellow chooses the left-hand column, then his outcome would be 4 and if he chooses the right-hand column, then his outcome also would be 4. Remember, it is what both of you do that determines the number of points each of you obtains.

Before each trial the experimenter will say: "Ready", 'Trial number ?', 'Begin'. The machine will light up the chosen cell on the panel in front of you only after both of you have made your choice. You are given time to record your points on the record sheet in front of you. Record the number of points you obtain under the column headed "My points". Record the other person's points in the column headed "Other's points". If, when the experimenter says "Ready" you are still in doubt as to which cell was chosen or have had insufficient time to make a record of the points please say: "One moment please!"

At the end of every 10 trials you will be instructed to stop, where upon you will add up both your points and the other person's points to keep a cumulative record. You will each be given 10¢ for every 20 points you have obtained.

Please consider each choice carefully. You are asked to please not talk during the experiment.

You may now have some practice trials. Be sure to let the experimenter know if you don't understand.

INSTRUCTIONS

You are participating in a study of group behavior. You will be involved in a situation that is similar in many ways to many real-life situations in that what you gain or lose will be determined both by your behavior and by the behavior of the other participant. One of you will be known as Yellow and the other will be known as Red. Your colour is indicated on the panel in front of you.

Basic Situation

Both of you have an opportunity to earn some money. The amount you earn will depend on the number of points you accumulated. The number of points you obtain will depend on which of the four cells of the panel in front of you is chosen.

It takes both of you to make this choice. Red, you are to choose whether it will be in the top row of cells or the bottom row of cells. Your buttons are to the left of your panel. The upper button designated as X, chooses the top row and the lower button designated as Y, chooses the bottom row.

Yellow, you are to choose whether it will be in the right-hand column or the left-hand column. Your buttons are below your panel. The button on the left designated as A, chooses the left-hand column and the button on the right designated as B chooses the right-hand column.

You will notice that each of the four cells in the panel is divided by a diagonal line and contains two numbers. The numbers above the diagonal are the points you will receive, and the numbers below the diagonal are the points the other person will receive. For example, one of the top cells (designated as X) gives Red 3 and Yellow 4 and the other top cell (designated as Y) gives Red 0 and Yellow 4. If your colour is Yellow then your points are in yellow. If your colour is Red, your points are in red.

You can see, then, that if Red chooses the top row, (X), Red's outcome will be either 0 or 3, depending on which column Yellow chooses. If Yellow chooses the left-hand column (A), then his outcome would be 4 and if he chooses the right-hand column (B), then his outcome also would be 4. Remember, it is what both of you do that determines the number of points each of you obtains.

Before each trial the experimenter will say: "Ready", 'Trial number?', 'Begin'. At this time, indicate under the column 'prediction' the choice which you think the other person is going to make (X or Y if you are Yellow and A or B if you are Red) on that particular trial and then make your choice by pressing one of the buttons. The machine will light up the chosen cell on the panel in front of you only after both of you have made your choice. You are given time to record your points on the record sheet in front of you. Record the number of points you obtain under the column headed "My points". Record the other person's points in the column headed "Others points". If, when the experimenter says "Ready" you are still in doubt as to which cell was chosen or have had insufficient time to make a record of the points please say: "One moment please!"

At the end of every 10 trials you will be instructed to stop, where upon you will add up both your points and the other person's points to keep a cu. ulative record. You will each be given 10¢ for every 20 points you have obtained.

Please consider each choice carefully. You are asked to please not talk during the experiment.

You may now have some practice trials. Be sure to let the experimenter know if you don't understand.

APPENDIX C

'MACH V' SCALE

V

You will find 20 groups of statements listed below. Each group is

composed of three statements. Each statement refers to a way of thinking

about people or things in general. They reflect opinions and not matters

of fact -- there are no "right" or "wrong" answers and different people

have been found to agree with different statements.

Please read each of the three statements in each group. Then decide

first which of the statements is most true or comes the closest to describing

your own beliefs. Circle a plus (+) in the space provided on the answer

sheet.

Just decide which of the remaining two statements is most false or

is the farthest from your own beliefs. Circle the minus (-) in the space

provided on the answer sheet.

Here is an example:

		Most True	Most False
A.	It is easy to persuade people but hard to keep them persuaded.	+	-
B.	Theories that run counter to common sense are a waste of time.	(+)	-
C.	It is only common sense to go along with what other people are doing and not to be too different +		(-)

In this case, statement B would be the one you believe in most strongly

and A and C would be ones that are not as characteristic of your opinion.

Statement C would be the one you believe in least strongly and is least

characteristic of your beliefs.

You will find some of the choices easy to make; others will be quite

difficult. Do not fail to make a choice no matter how hard it may be. You

will mark <u>two</u> statements in each group of three -- the one that comes the closest to your own beliefs with a + and the one farthest from your beliefs with a -. The remaining statement should be left unmarked.

<u>Do not omit any groups of statements.</u>

1. A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than a successful business man.
    B. The phrase "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" contains a lot of truth.
    C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the lose of their property.

2. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with the clothes their wives wear.
    B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in children be cultivated.
    C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.

3. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
    B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should be worked for before anything else.
    C. Once a truly intelligent person makes up his mind about the answer to a problem he rarely continues to think about it.

4. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is bad for our country.
    B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
    C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others less fortunate than themselves.

5. A. Most people are basically good and kind.
    B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility--other characteristics are nice but not essential.
    C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should he concern himself with the injustices in the world.

6. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
    B. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting his career above his family.
    C. People would be better off if they were concerned less with how to do things and more with what to do.

7. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions rather than gives explicit answers.
    B. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight.
    C. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of person he is.

8. A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built them.
   B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is best to stick to it.
   C. One should take action only when sure that it is morally right.

9. A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people would let the future take care of itself and concern themselves only with enjoying the present.
   B. It is wise to flatter important people.
   C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing it as new circumstances arise.

10. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things you do because you have no other choice.
    B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
    C. Even the most hardened the vicious criminal has a spark of decency somewhere within him.

11. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.
    B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.
    C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't very important.

12. A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law which he thinks is unreasonable.
    B. Too many criminals are not punished for their crime.
    C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.

13. A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.
    B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he commits a serious mistake.
    C. People who can't make up their minds aren't worth bothering about.

14. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his mother.
    B. Most men are brave.
    C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around.

15. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning oneself about.
    B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
    C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.

16. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can change your mind easily.
    B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone.
    C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

17. A. It is possible to be good in all respects.
    B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better.
    C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life.

18. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at least one sucker born every minute.
    B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some excitement.
    C. Most people would be better off if they controlled their emotions.

19. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than poise in social situations.
    B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place and accepts it.
    C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.

20. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't know what they are talking about.
    B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
    C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that everyone votes.

ANSWER SHEET

		Most True	Most False				Most True	Most False
1.	A.	+	–		14.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
2.	A.	+	–		15.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
3.	A.	+	–		16.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
4.	A.	+	–		17.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
5.	A.	+	–		18.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
6.	A.	+	–		19.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
7.	A.	+	–		20.	A.	+	–
	B.	+	–			B.	+	–
	C.	+	–			C.	+	–
8.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					
9.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					
10.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					
11.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					
12.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					
13.	A.	+	–					
	B.	+	–					
	C.	+	–					

APPENDIX D

EMPATHY SCALE

QUESTIONNAIRE

The following are statements with which some people agree and other people disagree.

Indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each item by entering appropriate numeral (+4 to -4) in the space provided by each item.

> +4 = very strong agreement
> +3 = strong agreement
> +2 = moderate agreement
> +1 = slight agreement
> 0 = neither agreement or disagreement
> -1 = slight disagreement
> -2 = moderate disagreement
> -3 = strong disagreement
> -4 = very strong disagreement

(   ) 1.   It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.

(   ) 2.   People make too much of the feelings and sensitivity of animals.

(   ) 3.   I often find public displays of affection annoying.

(   ) 4.   I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just sorry for themselves.

(   ) 5.   I become nervous if others around me seem to be nervous.

(   ) 6.   I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness.

(   ) 7.   I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems.

(   ) 8.   Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply.

(   ) 9.   I tend to lose control when I am bringing bad news to people.

(   ) 10. The people around me have a great influence on my moods.

(   ) 11. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and unemotional.

(   ) 12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job training center.

(   ) 13. I don't get upset just because a friend is acting upset.

(   ) 14. I like to watch people open presents.

(   ) 15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly.

(   ) 16. Seeing people cry upsets me.

(   ) 17. Some songs make me happy.

(   ) 18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.

(   ) 19. I get very angry when I see someone being ill-treated.

( ) 20. I am able to remain calm even though those around me worry.

( ) 21. When a friends starts to talk about his problems, I try to steer the conversation to something else.

( ) 22. Another's laughter is not catching for me.

( ) 23. Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the amount of crying and sniffling around me.

( ) 24. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people's feelings.

( ) 25. I cannot continue to feel OK if people around me are depressed.

( ) 26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset people so much.

( ) 27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain.

( ) 28. Becoming involved in books or movies is a little silly.

( ) 29. It upsets me to see helpless old people.

( ) 30. I become more irritated than sympathetic when I see someone's tears.

( ) 31. I become very involved when I watch a movie.

( ) 32. I often find that I can remain cool in spite of the excitement around me.

( ) 33. Little children sometimes cry for no apparent reason.