ON BEING CERTAIN
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By
DALE E. ROY B.A.

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AUTHOR: Dale E. Roy, B.A. ( University of Saskatchewan )

SUPERVISOR: Dr. A. Shalom

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To my wife Kim, who patiently listened to all of the arguments of this thesis (some of them several times), who tolerated a range of moods from excitement to depression, who realized how important this thesis was to me, and finally, who provided all of the moral support I so urgently required — thank you.
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I

INTRODUCTION

(i)

I first met directly with the problem of certainty several years ago when my younger sister expressed the following desire to me: 'If I get to heaven, the first thing I shall do is to ask God to show me something with only one side'. Though I was quite convinced that there did not exist any such place or being, I was even more convinced that her request was, in some other very strong sense, odd. Though I doubted the truth of the religious content of her claim, I could not help but doubt that the specifics of her request would be denied. I could not even conceive of anything that might constitute the granting of her request. Perhaps it was this impossibility that led her to make her request of an omnipotent being.

At any rate, I set out to examine what made her request so peculiar, and, to see if any other similarly peculiar cases existed. This thesis represents the current stage of that endeavour. I had hoped that an analysis of these cases, now expressed in suitable propositions, would be of some philosophical value. Of course, it remains up to the reader to decide if this hope has been in any way fulfilled.

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(ii)

The tradition of western philosophy, especially since Descartes, has been riddled with attempts to discover that which persons can know with certainty. And yet on every occasion, this same tradition has maintained a skeptical attitude towards particular 'pretenders' to this property. A host of candidates for this coveted position have been put forward, only to be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny. I never cease to be amazed at the zeal with which philosophers attack such claims as Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum", Kant's synthetic a priori propositions, or Moore's "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body". One gets the impression that the entire discipline of philosophy hinges upon the successful outcome of these skeptical onslaughts. After all, we must be certain that we are certain (and so on ad nauseum). Consequently, each candidate in turn has succumbed to criticism and been discarded.

The strongest argument against the possibility of human certainty (one cannot be certain since this would involve 'knowing that one knows that one knows, ad infinitum) seems insurmountable. Doubt can always get a foothold. Yet notice that this argument against the possibility of human certainty, even at first glance, can be seen to be too strongly put. In its current form, it poses the same sort of insurmountable difficulties for itself as it does for any other proposition offered as a human certainty. That is, doubt can
always get a foothold as to the truth of the proposition, 'Doubt can always get a foothold'. There is no good reason for us to suspend our skepticism in regard to this proposition since this proposition seems little different from those it was designed to stand against. It would appear, then, that there are at least some propositions that are not susceptible to this argument.

Of course there are exceptions: philosophers do accept a well defined class of propositions as being known with certainty, though apparently these are of little significance, since they have little, if any factual content. The concessions granted to certainty in traditional philosophy are very minor ones. Clearly, these are not the sorts of concessions that are able to generate a satisfactory answer to the skeptic. Philosophers are correct, I think, in leaving the investigation of the members of this class of propositions to the lexicographer.

The tradition of western philosophy, then, has constructed a dilemma to be used in the dismissal of all those factually significant propositions we should like to say are known with certainty. We are asked to recognize that, for any given proposition, one can always either a) doubt the truth of that proposition, and hence deny that that proposition is known with certainty, or b) if, indeed, it is impossible to doubt the truth of that proposition, then that proposition is known with certainty but is without factual
significance. I think that G.E. Moore felt something of the force of the above dilemma when he said:

It is a well known fact in the history of philosophy that necessary truths in general, but especially those of which it is said that the opposite is inconceivable, have been commonly supposed to be analytic ... 1

Two problems are generated by the above, contrived, dilemma. First it suggests that knowledge, or certainty, is beyond the grasp of human beings. Second, it leads us to believe that everything that does qualify as a certainty is trivial. The former is disastrous to epistemology, and astounding (at the very least) to the native speakers of a language. The latter, as we shall see, is simply false.

The task of this thesis is that of exposing the weaknesses of the above dilemma by pointing to a set of cases which are not amenable to it. I shall argue that the propositions to be discussed, though known with certainty, are neither trivially true nor uninformative. There does exist a set of propositions which cannot be doubted, yet which cannot be automatically dismissed as void of factual content. The set of propositions I intend to discuss currently numbers six, but there is no good reason to maintain that the current list is exhaustive. Still, I believe that the current list

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is sufficiently diverse to provide the reader with a strong grasp of the type of informative proposition that can be known with certainty. And when I say that 'these propositions are known with certainty', I do not mean just something like 'it is obvious that persons assume these propositions to be true'; I mean, rather, that we cannot be mistaken in saying that these are true. The second section of this thesis attempts to bring out this difference, and to suggest why it is that we cannot be mistaken here.

If the arguments I advance to achieve this task are good ones, then I think a number of philosophical consequences follow. Probably the most forceful of these is that, "Any philosophical thesis that can be shown to be incompatible with one or more of these six propositions is a false thesis. Further it can be shown to be false by discovering and noting exactly where it contradicts one or more of those six propositions we know, with certainty, to be true." Philosophers have, I think, always acknowledged that any theory which contradicts the facts cannot be a true theory. Unfortunately, however, a great deal of uncertainty about the scope and validity of those facts at once begins to interfere with this procedure for demonstrating a theory's compatibility or incompatibility with the facts. If my arguments are correct, then one need no longer be puzzled about which facts must be considered, nor be puzzled about the validity of those facts.

These consequences aside, our current task is that of
isolating certain basic statements, and arguing for the claim that those basic statements are known to be true with certainty. That endeavour will proceed more fruitfully if the reader is aware, beforehand, of the paths I shall follow. I shall provide, therefore, in the next section of this introduction, a brief map of those paths.

(iii)

The second chapter of this thesis is, for the most part, descriptive. I place the six candidates for certainty in appropriate contexts and invite the reader to observe what happens to both our behaviour and our language when such propositions are denied. I then argue that persons universally judge these propositions to be true, and that they do so independently of any appeal to either analyticity or particular current linguistic conventions. Thus far, then, I am content to a) describe the language and behaviour of persons, b) to describe the judgments persons must agree upon, if the above behaviour and language is to be intelligible, and c) to note the force with which these judgments are held.

The third chapter centers upon three sources of opposition to one of the six candidates for certainty that I have advanced. I there discuss one understanding of modern physics, process philosophy, and the sense-data theory in so far as each appears to invalidate the universality of our judgment 'that the world is composed of material objects'. I then argue that each source of apparent opposition fails (each for a
different reason) to undermine the universality of that judgment. Note again that, thus far, I am arguing only that persons do universally exhibit certain judgments, and have set aside (until chapters V, VI and VII) any discussion of the validity of those judgments. These first descriptive chapters though often tedious and seemingly superficial, are essential to the arguments advanced in chapters V, VI and VII. If, in fact, persons do not agree in these judgments, then the argument I intend to advance cannot be, even for a moment, plausible.

Several philosophers have drawn attention to this set of peculiar propositions, both recently and in the more distant past. Hence, in the fourth chapter, I attempt to bring together this support. The chapter serves several purposes but chief among these is its demonstration that these propositions are noted by a diverse class of philosophers, and thus are not the outgrowths of any one philosophical school or tradition. The chapter is also important in that it points to the need for a unified theory to account for the peculiar properties of these propositions. Each of the philosophers discussed recognizes that one or more of these propositions is odd, yet each can account for this oddity only from within the context of his own system.

As can be seen in the table of contents, chapter V marks a shift in the central argument of the thesis. Whereas, in the first few chapters, I am content to merely isolate
and describe the judgments persons do make, I am now more concerned with the question, 'Are the six judgments we have thus far described correct?'. Hence, in the fifth chapter, I prepare a context for arguing in defense of an affirmative answer to this question, and I do so by means of a discussion centered upon human judgment. I there make a distinction between 'deliberated judgments' and 'implied judgments'. Since the relationship of evidence to the judgment is altogether different in these two cases, the validity of 'implied judgments' must be established in a manner different from that used to establish the validity of 'deliberated judgments'. This distinction is important since the propositions we have isolated and described in the first few chapters make up the content of 'implied judgments' and not 'deliberated judgments'.

In the sixth chapter, I set out a collection of arguments in defense of an affirmative answer to the question; "Are these six 'implied judgments' correct?". Each of the three arguments in that collection has, as an essential premise, some claim about the nature of persons. I argue that the first of those arguments is invalid, but that the second argument overcomes the problems of the first. Still, the success of that second argument remains contingent upon eliminating an apparent ambiguity which seems to emerge in its conclusion. After setting out and criticizing a third argument in defense of the claim that these judgments are correct, I return to the major assumption of the second (and strongest)
argument 'from the nature of persons'. The chapter concludes with a defense of that assumption.

Two further arguments can be advanced in defense of an affirmative answer to our question, and these appear in the seventh chapter. The first (an argument 'from the propositional content of these six particular judgments') attempts to establish a relationship between the content of these six particular 'implied judgments' and our concept of evidence. That is, it might be the case that these particular human judgments must be correct largely because the propositional content of these six special 'implied judgments' asserts what can count as a mistake for any 'implied judgment'. Of all the arguments advanced, I am most disappointed in this one. I am convinced that the objective of this argument is legitimate, but am dissatisfied in that the argument I advance fails to fully achieve that objective. This argument (from propositional content) also suffers from an apparent ambiguity of conclusion. The seventh chapter includes one final argument, the argument from 'the universality of these six particular judgments'. This final argument cannot stand alone as a defense of an affirmative answer to our question, but rather is designed to be conjoined with either the above argument or with the second argument 'from the nature of persons'. By conjoining the latter with the argument 'from universality' I am able to show that the charge of ambiguity of conclusion is misplaced. Hence, the final objection to the second argument
'from the nature of persons' is answered. Since the final conclusion of that argument was that the second central premise of this thesis is true (just in the case of six special substitutions for p) there remains no good reason for doubting the truth of that premise.

In chapter eight, I consider an objector who argues that the ambiguity resolved by the argument 'from universality' is only an effect of a more worrisome ambiguity, and that that ambiguity first appears in the premises of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. He claims that this specific ambiguity is more worrisome since it covers over a basic problem from the philosophy of perception. I then argue that there is a fundamental difference between the sources of that problem, and the sorts of things I argue for in the argument 'from the nature of persons'. Hence, the problem from the philosophy of perception that our objector claims is glossed over, does not even arise for that argument.

The final chapter brings together and states what I believe this thesis has successfully argued for. Since that chapter is short and to the point, I shall not restate it here.
PART A: THE FIRST PREMISE:

"Persons universally agree in their judgments that six particular propositions are true."
II
THE SIX PROPOSITIONS

A. Prefatory Remarks

(i) 'x' cannot be wholly red all over and wholly green all over at the same time.

(ii) The world is composed of material objects.
     a) No two things can exist in the same place at the same time.
     or b) No one thing can exist at two different places at the same time.
     or c) The things that make up the world are extended in three dimensions.

(iii) An event cannot wholly occur both before and after a given time.

(iv) Seven plus five equals twelve.

(v) The world maintains a uniformity over time.

(vi) Every event has a cause.

All of the above are known with certainty but in a way different from the way one might know with certainty that 'Every husband is married'. In order to make this difference clear, and in order to capture as much of the special flavour of certainty these propositions exhibit, it is worthwhile to place each proposition in one or more appropriate contexts.
The contexts serve one other crucial function. My claim is that these propositions are judged to be true by all persons. But to merely assert a set of propositions and make the above claim about them is not sufficient. One might always object that; "Of course you have committed the not uncommon error of universalizing your own particular judgments over the range of all persons. There is always the possibility that the judgments you make are very peculiar and not at all in accordance with the judgments of human beings in general."¹ That is to say, I have offered no reasons for believing that these propositions are judged to be true by all persons.

Wittgenstein offers us a way out of this difficulty. It must be the case that humans agree in their judgments if language is to be a means of communication.² Later we shall find that this agreement in judgment is a prerequisite of any form of communication. At any rate, this agreement in judgment is expressed in and secured by a shared language. Hence to discover those judgments that are universal to all persons, one must begin not with introspection into one’s own judgments, but with an analysis of the judgments expressed in our common language. The objector, then, is adequately answered by the following; "These judgments cannot be peculiar to me


since they are merely derivations from the language that you, I, and other humans employ. If you examine this language we share, you will find that you yourself repeatedly make these same judgments. It is this common language that provides the answer to your objection."

The importance of placing these propositions in proper contexts, then, cannot be overemphasized. Without a study of these propositions at work in our language (without a study of the judgments we do express in our language) there is no means of arriving at the universality of judgment we require.

B. The Propositions in Contexts

(i) 'x' cannot be wholly red all over and wholly green all over at the same time.

Several philosophers\(^1\) have drawn attention to this proposition, but only for its capacity to be a nuisance to the analytic-synthetic distinction. The aim of this thesis is to render suspicious a dilemma and not a distinction. This point is crucial if one is to understand the force of what is to follow. Since this point is so important I think it is worthwhile to digress for a moment in order to explain what I mean.

I am not concerned (as was Quine in "Two Dogmas of

\(^1\)See for example D.F. Pears, "Incompatibilities of Colours" in Logic and Language, ed. A.G.N. Flew (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1966) or Stanley Munsat, The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, (Belmont; Wadsworth, 1971) p.8
Empiricism" about whether or not one can provide a non-circular definition of "analytic." Nor am I concerned (as were Strawson and Grice in "In Defense of a Dogma") about whether or not one could still make that distinction, even if no non-circular definition of "analytic" could be provided. Rather I am concerned with a dilemma that is nearly always conjoined with that distinction.

Suppose, first, that the analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be made. We might still talk about propositions that are factually uninformative and say of them that they can be known to be true with certainty. Think here of the tautological propositions of logic. We might also still talk of factually informative propositions and say of these that they cannot ever be known with certainty to be true. Though the analytic-synthetic distinction is gone, the dilemma — 'Every proposition is either factually uninformative or cannot be known to be true with certainty' — might still remain. Hence even if the distinction cannot be made the dilemma might remain. Hence, even if the distinction cannot be made, it is still important to show that a certain class of propositions suggests that the above dilemma is not exhaustive; the dilemma is false when said of the class of all propositions.

And now suppose that the distinction can be made or at least noticed. Hence when one considers a diverse collection of propositions ranging from 'Husbands are married males' to 'Most typewriters are blue' one has little difficulty in
deciding whether any one of those propositions is analytic or synthetic. That is to say, though one may not be able to provide a non-circular definition of "analytic" one might still be able to make the analytic-synthetic distinction in practice. This result is not in itself worrisome; it only becomes worrisome after this result is conjoined with our original dilemma. As a consequence of this conjunction, we are inclined to say not just that we can sometimes make this distinction in practice, but that we can always do so.

The propositions I intend to discuss do not show that the analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be made; indeed I believe that it can be made in practice for a great many propositions. Rather they suggest that our original dilemma is false. Accordingly, that dilemma cannot be conjoined with the fact that we are sometimes able to make the synthetic-analytic distinction in practice, in an attempt to conclude that we can make that distinction for every proposition. It is one thing to say that we can make a distinction but quite another to say that that distinction is exhaustive. In order to conclude the latter from the former, we require the truth of something like 'Every proposition is either factually uninformative or cannot be known to be true with certainty'. I believe that the six central propositions of this thesis are counter cases to the above dilemma, but in order to show that they are we shall have to examine their use in appropriate contexts.

To return then, suppose we replace 'x' with 'the ball'
in our first proposition. And now imagine a classroom scene immediately following recess. The students return from recess saying such things as "We certainly had fun playing with the red ball" and "That green ball hurts when it hits you on the arm". The teacher, overhearing this dialogue, assumes that the students played different games. She encourages them to play together but they insist that they did. Our teacher is a bit confused, but believes that she now understands and says "You must have played a game that required two balls and in this case one was red and the other was green". And now to complete the scenario, the students claim that everyone played in the same game and that that game involved only one ball.

Clearly there is in the above at least a) a reference to a red ball, b) a reference to a green ball and c) a claim that only one ball is involved. How might the teacher handle this information? She might respond with "Even though you played with only one ball at a time, you probably switched balls at some point in the game" or "Now I understand, if you played with only one ball, then it must have been partially red and partially green" or "Some of you are certainly colour blind" or "If some of the game took place in the shade and the rest took place in the sun, then some of you may have been fooled as to the colour of the ball" or even "I'm tired of your little joke, let's get down to work".

This list of utterances is probably not complete,
though I think it is sufficiently complete for us to notice a trend. The above set of responses illustrates a systematic attempt to exclude a particular interpretation of the recess events, namely 'that only one ball was involved and that that ball was wholly red all over and wholly green all over at the same time'. That is not to say that the above utterance is in any strong sense meaningless. We can and do talk about impossible states of affairs without lapsing into a meaningless babble. Consider our talk of 'squared circles'. We can and do say that no such thing can be produced, and yet none of this talk is nonsense. It must be noted that we are never exactly clear about what might count as a 'squared circle'; the meaning of that term is far from determinate. The dialogue succeeds only so long as it remains loose and inexplicit. The more seriously we entertain the notion of a 'squared circle', that is the more we attempt to rigorously fix the use of this term, the more we approach absurdity.¹

If we now return to the classroom scenario, we find a similar sort of thing going on. The students might sensibly claim that they 'played with a red and green ball'. But as we begin to delimit the ambiguity of their claim, we rapidly approach an unintelligible utterance (or to borrow from P.F.

¹Notice that when I first asked you to "Consider our talk of squared circles" you were not the least confused. It is only after we begin to consider the specifics of such a thing that we discover that 'the definition (a rigorous one) of a circle excludes the possibility of its being a square'.}
Strawson, we approach 'the bounds of sense'). The final reformulation of the student's claim — 'We played with a ball that was wholly red and wholly green simultaneously' — might even still remain within these bounds, yet only because we grant it a loose understanding. Perhaps we might take 'simultaneously' to not exclude the possibility of extremely short intervals. Hence we would then understand the proposition to be about a ball that very rapidly fluctuates in colour from red to green and back again. And should someone demand total rigour the student's claim would indeed exceed the bounds of sense.

Why is it that this proposition becomes unintelligible when we attempt to give it a rigorous interpretation? I shall, at this time, consider only one explanation of this fact and then only to dismiss it as, if not mistaken, then at least misleading.

The most convenient explanation begins by bringing the dilemma we discussed earlier to bear upon this proposition. If a 'red-all-over green-all-over ball' is impossible then it must be the case that your original proposition was not factually informative. Accordingly, the impossibility of such balls is not unlike the impossibility of a 'married bachelor'. Part of the meaning of "bachelor" includes "unmarried" and nothing can be both married and unmarried at the same time. Similarly (?) "red" may be construed to mean at least in part "not green". Hence a green-all-over not-green-all-over ball
is impossible in the same manner as a married unmarried person is impossible.

I am not convinced that the above argument is wholly mistaken, yet still I am suspicious of it. If "red" may be construed to mean, at least in part, "not green" then several oddities must be permitted. Suppose I request you to bring me a pair of red socks from the drawer. Further suppose that you are familiar with the above argument. And now you return with a pair of black socks. I claim that you must have misunderstood my request, or that you do not understand the meaning of the word "red". You explain that were I a more sophisticated user of language, I would know that "red" may be construed to mean in part "not green". And since clearly the black pair of socks you brought me were not green, it follows that you at least partially fulfilled my request. And here it would be appropriate for me to shrug my shoulders and fetch my own socks from the drawer.

The above case suggests that a certain amount of sophistication is required before one is able to notice that the meaning of "red" includes "not green". But surely the impossibility of red-all-over, green-all-over balls is just as apparent to the least sophisticated users of language. The move from red to not green might serve as an after the fact justification of our dismissal of such balls; BUT IT CERTAINLY IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR JUDGING THAT SUCH BALLS CAN NEVER OCCUR.
We are under some compulsion to judge that red-all-over, green-all-over objects cannot occur. Since that compulsion cannot be deduced in any obvious way from the type of necessity attached to analyticity, I think it unwise to automatically reduce that compulsion to analytic necessity.

(ii) The world is composed of material objects. By this is meant (at least) that, of whatever serves to make up the world, it will be true that:

a) no two of these constituents will occupy the same place at the same time, and

b) no one constituent will exist in two places at the same time, and

c) that each constituent will be three-dimensional.

I take the above to be fundamental properties of objects. Hence to show that humans agree in their judgments that a), b) and c) are true is to show that humans agree in their judgment that 'the world is composed of material objects'.

Three objections to these propositions must be set aside but only because they are sufficiently complex to be out of place in the current discussion. Accordingly, the problems raised by this proposition in science (notably physics), in sense-data theory, and in process metaphysics will be reserved for a later, more thorough discussion. Thus far we are concerned only with the universal judgments that humans express in a language, and not with an interpretative theory.
of those facts.

For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history — or none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts, which in their fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the most refined thinking. They are the commonplace of the least refined thinking; and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings.\(^1\)

It is one facet of this indispensable central core (namely the concept of an object) which we now set out to articulate. But before doing so, I must again digress briefly in order to eliminate the possibility of a particular confusion. Whereas Strawson talks of concepts and categories, and I talk of human judgment; still I do not think that we are engaged in radically different enquiries. I think that in order for us to say that any person has a particular concept, that person must exhibit certain judgments, and these judgments are expressed in his language and behaviour. Similarly, if that person fails to exhibit those judgments by means of either his language or behaviour, then we are not entitled to say that he has that concept. Hence, we would be entitled to say of any given concept that it is a part of the 'central core of human thinking' only if there exist certain judgments (expressed in human language and behaviour) that are common to all persons. A discussion of what might make any given

\(^1\)Strawson, *Individuals* (London; Methuen, 1959) p. 10
concept ( or judgment ) indispensable must await the second section of this thesis.

Consider the judgments expressed by a native speaker of the language when he utters such statements as:

1. This is no less futile than banging your head against the wall.
2. I'm awfully sorry about your broken headlight; it never occurred to me that this parking space was too small.
3. Jim and Bob ( simultaneously ), "There is only one key to this door and I have it".
4. Daughter, "I went to the early show"
   Mother, "Father saw you in the pub at eight o'clock"
5. Don't throw that piece of paper out; I've written an important address on the other side of it.
6. I don't know what colour it is on the other side, I have not flipped it over yet.
7. Virtue is its own reward.
8. Let's make a long-distance phone call.

I shall begin with the last of these ( 7 and 8 ) since they are in a class of their own and might generate confusion about the others.

'Virtue is its own reward' ... seems to be on all fours with ... 'Smith has given himself the prize'. So philosophers, taking it that what is meant by such statements as the former is analogous to what is meant by such statements as the latter, have accepted the consequence that the world contains at least two sorts of objects, namely particulars like Jones and Smith and
'universals' like Virtue. 1

Of course, Virtue cannot literally receive a reward any more than one can literally make a long-distance phone call (consider what a curious sort of assembly line one would need — what sort of tools and raw materials would you use?). There are a host of similar utterances which do not mean literally what is said. Everyone has, at some time, taken great delight in holding others responsible, literally, for utterances that were never intended literally. To identify such utterances, we begin by placing them next to utterances of the same grammatical form. Questions that are sensibly asked of these others are then asked of the utterance whose status we are unsure of. If absurdities arise then the utterance in question is metaphorical in the sense that it does not mean what its grammatical form suggests it means.

These metaphorical utterances are not incorrect, nor meaningless, nor even poor English. They are merely misleading, and then, only if we fail to realize that such utterances are grammatical short-hand utterances. We encounter no difficulties with such utterances until we forget that they are just that; until we grant them the same status as all other propositions of the same grammatical form. Were we to avoid this error, we would not find it necessary to think that

the world contains two sorts of objects.

So our original statement was not about 'Virtue' but about good men and the grammatical subject word 'Virtue' meant what is meant by '...is virtuous' and so was, what it pretended not to be, a predicative expression.¹

Similarly, the grammatical object 'a long-distance phone call' becomes the predicative expression 'to call long-distance' as in "Let's call long-distance".

Hence propositions 7. and 8. do not present insurmountable difficulties for our original claim that the world is composed of material objects. It remains our task to now examine the six remaining utterances, seeking out the judgments they express. What sort of things must we judge to be true if each of these utterances is to be meaningful?

Clearly for the proposition "This is no less futile than banging your head against the wall" to be meaningful we must agree that there are such things as heads and walls. These look very much like the objects we seek, but so far they need only be identifiable particulars. The proposition, however, says something else; namely that we judge it to be futile to try and alter one or the other of these particulars by the process of banging. How is it that we agree that such a thing is futile? We agree in our judgment that it is futile since we agree in our judgment that heads and walls are

¹ibid. p.21
the sorts of particulars that are solid. Or again, when one meets the other a collision (and most likely a healthy bruise) results. The futility, and this is important, does not require testing out but is already contained in our shared knowledge about the sorts of objects we are dealing with. Since we all agree in our judgments that heads and walls cannot occupy the same place simultaneously, we all agree that it would be futile to 'bang one's head against the wall'.

The second proposition "I'm awfully sorry about your broken headlight; it never occurred to me that this parking space was too small" makes mention of an error in judgment. It would seem that persons might sometimes be mistaken in their judgments. But it is important to notice at what point a mistake might arise. Here the driver has misjudged either the dimensions of his own car or the dimensions of the space available for parking. At this level we quite often do make mistakes, and the owner of the damaged vehicle might even accept judgment errors of this sort. But suppose the driver now claims that he made no judgment error of this sort and says "I fully realize that my car is eleven feet long and that the parking space is at most eight feet long — yet still I think that I can park in that space". Were the driver to make an error in judgment of this second sort, he would thereby lapse into nonsense. For errors of the first sort he might receive a fine; for an error of the second sort he is liable to be placed in a padded cell. (The padding here is
noteworthy since our driver is likely to be one who would also not recognize the futility of banging his head against the wall.)

The first two cases serve to illustrate our universal agreement in judgment that no two things can exist in one place at the same time. Again, the judgment is arrived at by means of an examination of the common language persons share. With this in mind, let us now examine cases 3, and 4, which serve as expressions of a second judgment about objects, 'that no one object can exist in two places simultaneously'.

We notice immediately a difficulty in case three. Why? — "Well if there is only one key then clearly Jim and Bob cannot both have it; unless a duplicate has been made in which case there are two keys; or unless each is grasping a portion of the same key." Without the above or similar extenuating circumstances, we should say that at least one of the two is mistaken. That we should say this immediately, that is without examining key(s), could only come about if persons agree in their judgments that one and the same key cannot be in two places at once. This judgment refuses falsification (just try to describe the state of affairs that would falsify it). Suppose that two keys are produced and that each is examined and found to fit the lock. But of course this is inadequate, since, here, two keys are mentioned and our original claim concerned only one. Well, suppose then that only one key is produced ... and now it is only a matter
of noticing who produced it ... they cannot both have produced it. We seem to meet up against a barrier here. We shall later discuss the nature of this barrier, but thus far it is sufficient to notice that human dialogue encounters, and at times is a product of, such barriers.

The daughter mother dialogue (numbered case 4.) admits of a similar analysis. Supposes the daughter produces several trusted witnesses who support her claim that she attended the early show, from seven o'clock to nine o'clock. Further suppose that the mother is convinced by these witnesses and says "Yes, I recognize that you went to the show, but still you have not answered my complaint about your being in the pub". The mother might mean here "Still, I wonder how your father was mistaken". But if she means to request evidence that the daughter was not in the pub at eight o'clock, then her request is absurd. Conclusive evidence of that sort has already been provided, since persons concur in their judgments that the daughter could not have been in both places at once. Notice that OUR AGREEMENT IN JUDGMENT HERE DICTATES WHAT WILL COUNT AS EVIDENCE FOR THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF A PARTICULAR CLAIM.

And that is why if Jones can prove that he was some place other than the scene of the murder, then Jones ceases to be a suspect for that murder. We would be wasting our time in attempting to prove that he was also at the scene of the crime. We might view a particular alibi with suspicion,
but it would be nonsensical to question the notion of alibis in general; we all agree that no thing, not even a person, can be in two places at once. Here we can see how human actions, in addition to human language, hinge upon persons agreeing in certain of their fundamental judgments. The expectations of a district attorney, the verdict of a jury, and the endeavours of a police detective all make sense only if there is this agreement in judgment.

We come now to the propositions numbered 5, and 6, which are of the same type as the one mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. Suppose that I have before me a blank piece of paper and I begin to crumple it up. You say to me "Don't throw that piece of paper out — it has an important address on the other side". What I now do with the piece of paper that is in my hands is quite likely altered. Yet this only makes sense if the side of paper you urged me to save is somehow related to the blank side of paper that I began to crumple. You would become confused if I were to continue to crumple saying, "Don't worry, I am only crumpling a plain side of paper and not the side of paper your address is written upon". I am expected to know that a piece of paper has two sides (in addition to its thickness) and that the two are preserved or crumpled together. This behaviour is an expression of our agreement in judgment that the things of the world are three-dimensional. We agree in this judgment inspite of the fact that we do not see directly all three of
Similarly, case 6. makes no sense at all unless we agree in our judgment that the object in question has an opposite side which we can 'flip it over to'. And, as in case 5., we do not say that this flip side ( 'second side', 'other side', 'reverse side' ... notice how we are compelled to choose words that serve to relate the two sides ) is a second particular but rather a second dimension of the first particular. Now suppose we do flip the object over, only now we discover that it? has no other? side! Perhaps we imagined a very thin shape like this

or perhaps this

but the case of a one sided particular cannot be drawn nor sensibly be described in a language whose roots presuppose objects.

[Perception] is always accompanied by so-called 'interpretation'. This 'interpretation does not seem to be necessarily the product of any elaborate train of intellectual cognition. We find ourselves 'accepting' a world of substantial objects

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1Even here we cannot escape our own object latent talk. Any resistance to that compulsion results either in being unable to say what we desire said, or in an utterance whose only sensible understanding excludes what we desire said.
directly presented for our experience. Our habits, our states of mind, our modes of behaviour all presuppose this 'interpretation'.

(iii) An event cannot wholly occur both before and after a given time.

It is important to notice that the above proposition is about one event and not about two events of the same type. Hence the proposition does not include, within the scope of its denial, cases like 'The first game of the double-header was completed by nine o'clock and the second game began shortly thereafter'. Here there is a clear reference to two events (Mets-2; Dodgers-1 and Mets-3; Dodgers-5) of the same type. In fact we might identify each by its particular outcome.

Consider now a more difficult case, 'There are two showings of the same movie; one finishing just before eight o'clock and the other starting shortly thereafter'. Notice first that we do identify two showings of the movie though here we cannot do so by appealing to each showing's particular outcome. Suppose that the events of the movie's showings exactly overlapped in all their particulars (the same people attended both showings, there were no projector

1 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1933) p.217. Whitehead elsewhere states that our language also presupposes substantial objects. He further acknowledges that these considerations are difficult (I should have said 'insurmountable') hurdles for any philosopher who sets out to provide a process metaphysics.
breaks in either showing etc. ) How is it that we can and do talk here of two events? Again, this only comes about if we agree in our judgment that one event cannot have wholly occurred both before and after eight o'clock, there must be two events. We need not explicitly assert this judgment. It is implicitly contained in many of the things we say and do; talking of 'two showings' rather than 'one and the same showing occurring twice' for example. Consider the absurdity in requesting either 'exactly the same showing over again' or 'exactly the same baseball game over again'. We might 'wish' for such things, but this only demonstrates our agreement in judgment that such things cannot happen. To 'wish for something over again' is to admit that 'of course it won't be the same but ...'.

Our overworked dilemma appears once again, however. One might object that "If such events are impossible, then it must be the case that proposition (iii) is factually uninformative. And of course we do have a means of accounting for impossibilities which are factually uninformative. Hence proposition (iii) is true but only because any event must be either past present or future. And once we settle the tense of a particular event, it follows analytically that that same event cannot have some other tense."

"Past", "present" and "future" are interdefined, any one word having for its meaning the denial of the meanings of the other two. So if our third proposition hinged upon one
or more of the above tense words, it would begin to look very much like an analytic truth, that is true by virtue of the linguistic conventions surrounding our use of tense words. I think that this is a mistaken way of describing what this proposition asserts.

Consider an alternative convention that might surround our use of tense words.¹ Suppose we agreed to say of an event that it is "glibem" if it has not yet occurred, and to say of all other events that they are "gloin". Hence of 'to break a window' we could say only, 'to break a window glibem' or 'to break a window gloin'. Further suppose that this linguistic innovation is passed on to all prospective users of the language until it becomes a fully established convention. But there is no a priori reason for those who use this altered tense convention to alter their original judgment that proposition (iii) is true. Inspite of their having different linguistic conventions surrounding the use of their tense words, there is no good reason for thinking that they should now alter their judgment about the truth of proposition (iii).

Let me try to make the same point in another way. Suppose that for proposition (iii), we select as 'a given time' the current moment. Here our proposition does seem to be factually uninformative in that it seems to follow straightforwardly

¹For a similar alternate convention surrounding our use of tense words, see Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1956) p.59
from the linguistic conventions surrounding our use of the words "past", "present" and "future". But now select as 'a given time' some moment in the past. We should still want to say that no one event could wholly occur both before and after that moment yet, at first glance, there does not seem to be a linguistic convention from which this should follow. This is not quite true, however, since philosophers have sometimes been known to talk of the 'past-past', the 'past' and the 'future-past'. Once again our proposition might be said to follow straightforwardly from the linguistic conventions surrounding our use of those tense words. But now select as 'a given time' any moment in the 'past-past'. Though we should still judge it to be true that "No one event could wholly occur both before and after this past-past moment" it is difficult to see how this might follow from a linguistic convention surrounding our use of tense words. This difficulty becomes even more apparent when we select as 'a given moment' some moment in the 'past-past-past-past-past'. So far as I know, no one uses this tense and so there are no conventions surrounding its use; yet even here we should agree in our judgment that no event could both wholly precede and wholly follow that moment.

It is not a conventional fact that we consider time in much the same manner as we consider a set of points arranged in a straight (as opposed to circular) line. Just as no one point on a straight line can occur both to the left and
Right of a given point, so no event can wholly occur both before and after a given time. We continue to judge this to be true even though how we carve up the series (in both cases) may change depending upon the conventions we adopt.

(iv) Seven plus five equals twelve

A mathematical proposition such as 'seven plus five equals twelve'... is incorrigible because no future happenings would ever prove the proposition false, or cause anyone to withdraw it. You can imagine any sort of fantastic chain of events you like, but nothing you could think of would ever, if it happened, disprove 'seven plus five equals twelve'.

Consider a situation where, were the above not true, we should have good grounds for judging 'seven plus five equals twelve' to be false. Suppose I first count out seven pencils, and then count out five more. Now I count the pencils collectively but only get eleven. Clearly this result is incompatible with the truth of 'seven plus five equals twelve'. The most likely course of events would be my recounting of the pencils. But what would you, as a witness of this event, say or do? Would you not pay careful attention to my recounting, anticipating at every step in the process, an error on my part. Or perhaps, if you had a strong faith in my counting abilities, you might begin a thorough search of the floor for the twelfth

pencil. Notice that you might begin your search immediately. But how is it that you know what to do in this case? How is it that you know that you must 'search for the twelfth pencil' or 'perform the process yourself'? I need not ask you to do any of these things; you are quite prepared to carry out these tasks on your own initiative. This can be the case only if we agree in our judgment that something has gone wrong with this case and not with our mathematics in general.

My point then, is that in cases where our suspicion is aroused, that suspicion is always directed towards the particular case and not directed towards the mathematical proposition to which it stands in opposition. There might be a large number of explanations of what went wrong here, but all of these have in common the property of ruling out the particular case thereby permitting the maintenance of our judgment that 'seven plus five equals twelve' is true.

Once again we must confront the dilemma described in the introduction of this thesis. We think that if we judge this proposition to be true and feel certain in this judgment, then it must be the case that this proposition is factually uninformative. And so we are inclined to say "We know that 'seven plus five equals twelve' is true simply because we know what 'seven (7)', 'plus (+)', 'five (5)', 'equals (=)' and 'twelve (12)' mean. Part of what we mean by 'twelve' is the same as what we mean by 'seven plus five', and so our original proposition is merely a statement about the way we
commonly use certain symbols." Gasking is right in pointing out that this view is mistaken.

If '7+5=12' were really a proposition about the common usage of symbols, then it would follow that 7+5 would not equal 12 if people had a different symbolic convention. But even if people did use symbols in a way quite different from the present one, the fact which we express by '7+5=12' would still be true. No change in our language-habits would ever make this false. 1

Suppose that our mathematic conventions developed out of a keen interest in the series '1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41 ...'. We might recognize that something fills the gaps in that series but think of that something as insignificant — just as we ignore fractions when counting. Within this new convention the addition table would be:

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and the fact expressed by '7+5=12' would be '13+7=37'. But even within this new convention, we would agree that '13+7=37' even if we were to count matches and find that on one such occasion '13+7=31'. We judge that the fact '7+5=12' is true,

1ibid. p.209
regardless of the conventions we adopt to express that fact. Once again we find that a) a particular proposition is universally judged to be true, and b) that that same proposition is factually informative.

(v) The world maintains a uniformity over time.
The scope of this assertion is that things don't rapidly alternate between existing and not existing, nor alter abruptly in weight, dimensions or location. It must be noted that no attempt is being made to exclude the possibility of change. However, the proposition makes a claim about change just as it does about the rest of the world. Change then must be of a uniform sort. I urge you as well not to take this proposition under to severe a scrutiny, since it is intended to describe a very general sort of judgment we make and is not intended as a rigourous scientific hypothesis.

Something novel happens when we begin to consider this proposition in the light of our dilemma. Throughout the philosophical tradition to date, no one has argued that this proposition falls victim to the second horn of our dilemma (that the proposition at hand is factually uninformative). But rather than abandoning the dilemma and thereby admitting to a case which is not amenable to it, we find philosophers attempting to gore this proposition on the first horn of the dilemma. Though this proposition is factually informative, we are told that it is not known to be true with certainty.
Accordingly our approach to this proposition must differ from any approach we took previously. Since it is agreed that the second horn of the dilemma does not catch this proposition, our task must be to show that it is not caught by the first horn either. The first step in this endeavour is to show that persons universally agree in their judgment that this proposition is true. Subsequent steps, to be developed in the second section of this thesis, hinge upon this first crucial step.

Let us consider, then, the judgments persons express in both their verbal and non-verbal behaviour to see if there exists a consensus in judgment as to the truth of this proposition.

1. Would you place the plates on the dining room table.
2. You really must read *Lord of the Rings*; it's a superb book.
3. Gasoline has risen in price to seventy-five cents a gallon.
4. There is a connecting flight that departs from Winnipeg at 8:10 in the evening.

In each and every one of the above cases the speaker implicitly ratifies the truth of 'The world maintains a uniformity over time'. We would quite quickly lapse into absurdity were we to both assert one of the above utterances and withhold our assent to the truth of the original proposition. Hence in the first case the statement is nonsensical unless we judge
it to be true that dining-rooms, tables and plates continued to exist and that they continued to have most, if not all, of the properties they have had in the past. The table must continue to be larger than the plates, continue to have a sufficiently solid surface, and so on.

It is not enough here, to say that these utterances are sensible solely because the speaker makes certain judgments. The fact that all of the utterances make sense in our language suggests that all users of the language make these same judgments. Several of our linguistic (and non-linguistic) practices develop parasitically upon the fact of a consensus in these judgments. Hence, the point of 'commending a book' is completely lost if we don't agree in our judgment that books continue to exist in the future, and in a way unaltered from the way they existed in the past. Even the non-linguistic practices of 'pricing commodities per unit' and 'making travel reservations' only have a point if, in the former case, we judge that the quantity of a particular unit remains as it was in the past, and in the latter case, we judge that future planes will fly just as past planes have flown. Surely such philosophers as Bertrand Russell do not mean to deny this when they object to proposition (v).

Russell concedes that in regard to these judgments "none of us feels the slightest doubt". He further recognizes that we do make a "judgment that the sun will rise to-morrow, and many other similar judgments upon which our actions are
based". He even admits that "we are all convinced that the sun will rise to-morrow"¹ or again, we all judge it to be true that 'the sun will rise to-morrow'. So as things turn out, our objector actually concurs with us as to what sort of judgments we do make. Russell's skepticism is focused upon the question of whether or not these judgments are justified. Though our objector agrees that we universally agree in our judgment that 'The world maintains a uniformity over time'; still since he denies that that judgment is justified, he is able to claim that we do not know with certainty that 'The world maintains a uniformity over time' and hence able to maintain the dilemma which we are trying to show false. The task of this first section of the thesis is restricted to that of showing only two things in respect to the six propositions in question; first that they are factually informative and second that they are judged to be true by all persons. Once we have shown that both of these properties obtain for these six propositions, we can then take up ( in the second section of this thesis ) the question of whether or not persons are correct in these judgments.

(vi) Every event has a cause

As in case (v) we are able to safely avoid the second

¹all quotations from Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959) p.33f
horn of the dilemma by careful wording of this proposition. Hence, though 'every effect has a cause' is factually uninformative 'every event has a cause' is not.

As a note of caution, I urge you not to take case (vi) as equivalent to 'every event has a known cause'. To say that one does not know the cause of a particular event is not to say that that particular event does not have a cause. In fact we are quite often called upon to assert the former, while at the same time sensibly denying the latter. Our ignorance of the cause of an event cannot count as a counter case to the claim that we agree in our judgment that 'every event has a cause' is true.

For now, we can only begin to confront the first horn of the dilemma. As on past occasions, we must begin by answering the question; 'Do persons universally judge proposition (vi) to be true?'. Once again we must look to the judgments that persons express in both their language and behaviour. Consider the following case, suggested to me by professor T. Y. Henderson.

Suppose a man has just left his wife, having had lunch with her. He is deeply in love with her and she with him. During lunch they discussed their children, all of whom are doing exceptionally well. He is now returning to work, where just that morning he had signed a major deal, been praised and promoted by his employer, and been honoured as the most congenial member of the staff. Now suppose that
this man, while walking down the street, aims and viciously swings his arm at the throat of a passerby, striking so brutal a blow that the passerby dies.

An existentialist philosopher might suggest that that is all there is to the story. The story is complete; no questions need be answered. But what in fact do we do when confronted with this context? Surely we continue to judge that his action must have had some cause, and so we might pry deeper into his history (perhaps as far back as his toilet training days) in an effort to uncover that cause. Now suppose our research comes up empty-handed. What do we conclude? We have searched for some cause of the man’s action and found nothing.

Two obvious alternatives are available to us. We can say that the cause of his action escapes us, thereby saying something about our own limitations without saying that the man’s action indeed had no cause. Or, and this is more likely, we might judge the man to be insane. In judging the man to be insane, we admit that his action had a cause, but further claim that that cause lies outside the limits of our understanding. The first alternative points to a current shortcoming on our part, the second alternative points to a fundamental shortcoming on our part, but neither alternative suggests that there is no cause of the man’s action.

There is no room for counter cases to proposition (vi) since we alone arbitrate what might count as the cause
of any particular event. Thus the event of a flood might be accounted for by pointing to inadequate water control measures, but it might also be explained by citing the curse of a local witch-doctor, or even by means of a reference to the hand of God. Our habits of demanding and providing causes for events is too entrenched in our history and in the actions of our everyday life for anyone to seriously deny that we judge that 'Every event has a cause' is true.

C Conclusions

We are now in a position to make some general claims about what these six propositions have in common. That is to say, we are now in a position to state several general conclusions which follow from our discussion of these propositions as applied to appropriate contexts.

1. First, we are able to conclude that EACH OF THESE SIX PROPOSITIONS IS FACTUALLY INFORMATIVE. On those occasions where it looked as though these propositions were not factually informative, that is on those occasions where the propositions appeared to be primarily about the current linguistic conventions surrounding our use of certain words, I have argued that even if we employed quite different linguistic conventions, we should still judge the "facts" which we express by these propositions to be true.

Given that we are now able to conclude that each of these propositions is factually informative, we are entitled
to conclude that these propositions cannot be caught on the second horn of our original dilemma. But this outcome alone will not achieve a destruction of that dilemma since (as we saw in propositions v and vi) one need only claim that these propositions cannot be known with certainty to be true. It would then follow that these propositions are caught by the first horn of the dilemma in question, and hence there would be no good reason for being suspicious of that dilemma. In order to bring about the destruction of that dilemma, we must show that these same factually informative propositions can be known and indeed are known to be true with certainty. This brings us to the second claim that we are now entitled to assert of these six propositions.

2. What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities, however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.¹

We have found that all persons say certain specific types of things and perform certain specific types of actions; and that these same utterances and actions suggest that ALL PERSONS AGREE IN THEIR JUDGMENTS THAT THESE SIX PROPOSITIONS ARE TRUE. Our six propositions themselves are not the sorts of propositions one would find being uttered in everyday language. It

is not as if someone on the street says such things as 'The world maintains a uniformity over time' but rather that every man says and does certain things which entitle us to say that he judges the above proposition to be true. That is to say one cannot withhold one's assent to these six propositions and yet continue to perform everyday activities or partake in everyday discussion.

I have further noted that this agreement in judgment as to the truth of these six propositions will not, by itself, allow us to conclude that these propositions escape the first horn of our dilemma. Our agreement in judging these propositions to be true is only the first essential step in that proof. What is required is a full proof which establishes that we are not mistaken in these judgments. The presentation of that proof is the primary objective of section II of this thesis.

3. Finally, we noticed that we seem to be under some 'compulsion' to maintain our judgments that these six propositions are true. If our judgments that these propositions are true was 'compelled' by the world containing certain particular facts (that is if these propositions were inductive generalizations from particular facts), then it would always be possible for the world to admit of possible counter cases. But either a) we cannot speak of the world being a different way here, and hence cannot sensibly describe a possible falsifying case for these propositions, or b) when it appears that
we can point to a falsifying case, we dismiss that case as mistaken and continue to judge the original proposition to be true. In cases of the former type, we exclude the possibility of counter cases indirectly by arbitrating what can sensibly be said within a language. In cases of the latter sort, we exclude the possibility of counter cases directly. So, in either case, our judgment as to the truth of these propositions is not 'compelled' by any particular facts in the world.

It seems that our language is constructed such that, for most of these six propositions, no sensible counter cases can be stated. For the remaining propositions, where conflicting evidence can be stated, we repeatedly arbitrate in favour of the original proposition. Quite simply, this is what we do. That is, where the evidence seems to conflict with one or more of these propositions — regardless of the degree of that evidence — we DO preserve our judgment that the original proposition is true, thereby dismissing the evidence which conflicts with it.

I think that this 'compulsion' is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, there can be no denying that we encountered it in our discussion of these propositions as applied to everyday contexts. (see "bounds of sense" p.18 and "meeting up against a barrier" p.27 ). Second, the same 'compulsion' has been noted by some of those philosophers we shall discuss in chapter IV of this thesis. The third reason follows from the first two. That is, when we come to argue, in
the second section of this thesis, that persons are correct in judging these six propositions to be true, our account shall have to make room for the fact that 'we feel under some compulsion to so judge'. (I believe that the source of this 'compulsion' can be located in the neurophysiological make-up, or parts thereof, which is: common to all persons. However, to argue for this belief here would take us far beyond the confines of our present enquiry.)
III
SOURCES OF OPPOSITION

In the preceding chapter, I spoke as if no one could sensibly oppose any of these six propositions. So long as we consider these propositions as derivatives from common sense we are not misled by this claim. Every human being grants his consent to these propositions merely by performing the everyday activities that are characteristic of the human species. But now can persons, upon moving to a more sophisticated level of understanding, withhold their assent to the truth of these propositions? I think not, but have set aside three particular areas as sources of possible opposition to the proposition 'The world is composed of material objects' in an attempt to show why. Our task then, is first to examine the postulates of each of those areas in turn, and second, to answer the question "Do any of those postulates contradict our claim that 'persons universally agree in their judgments that the world is composed of material objects'?".

A
Science

It is often suggested that science does away with objects. Russell, when considering his infamous table, says, "sober science ... tells us it [the table] is a vast collection of electric charges in violent motion" (Problems of Philosophy, 48.
Hence, if we were to step into the world of the scientist, we would acknowledge the error of our previous judgment that the world is composed of material objects, and acknowledge now that it is made up of charges. In a certain uninteresting way, science does do away with objects — there can be no denying that our familiar table is gone. Yet in another very important sense, the microscopic scientific view of the world differs not at all from that view of the world which maintains material objects.

Protons, neutrons, electrons and mesons are understood as spatially extended particles. No two of these can occupy the same space simultaneously, and no one particle can exist in two different places simultaneously. The particles of modern day physics display remarkable similarities to the atoms postulated by Democritus;

but Democritus left to the atom the quality of 'being', of extension in space, of shape and motion. He left these qualities since it would have been difficult to speak about the atom at all if such qualities had been taken away from it. ¹

Science then, does not abandon or dismiss material objects but rather, through its move to a microscopic understanding of the world, merely reduces their dimensions. Material objects are not, as we mistakenly suspected, analyzed out of a

¹Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1958) p.69
scientific world view.

Even the confusion that is generated when the physicist talks of charges and energy (without mentioning particles) is of a surface sort. He is speaking metaphorically¹ here just as we do in everyday language when we say such things as "Virtue is its own reward". And just as in the Virtue case, we must guard against being misled by the grammar of our own metaphors. Hence, though the grammar of some scientific statements might suggest charges exist, a closer scrutiny reveals that this talk of 'charges' is parasitic upon the predicative expression 'being charged'. The metaphorical utterance remains meaningful only because we can, if required, repeat the utterance in its non-parasitic form; we can always restate talk of 'charges' in terms of 'charged particle' talk. The work of modern day physicists does not endanger the universality of our previous claim that 'all persons judge it to be true that the world is composed of material objects'.

Heisenberg goes a step further and argues that the

¹This claim is defensible only if the reader refers to the criterion for metaphorical utterances as set out on page 23 of this thesis. C.W.K. Kundle (in Perception; Facts and Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) pages 93 to 97) performs the analysis I there recommend on several claims advanced by the modern physicist. Kundle's analysis of "This table has no solidity of substance" for example, results in the generation of those absurdities characteristic of metaphorical utterances. Since Kundle's analysis and arguments parallel my own on this point, and since his arguments are already available in the above published work, I shall refrain from duplicating them here.
concepts of classical physics (one of which is the concept of a material object) are indispensable to modern physics.

The concepts of classical physics are just a refinement of the concepts of daily life and are an essential part of the language which forms the basis of all natural science. Our actual situation in science is such that we do use the classical concepts for the description of the experiments.

... There is no use in discussing what could be done if we were beings other than we are. At this point we have to realize, as von Weizäcker has put it, that "Nature is earlier than man, but man is earlier than natural science". ¹

Heisenberg is not alone in recognizing that natural science relies heavily upon the judgments we express in everyday life. Hempel echoes these sentiments when discussing the highly abstract concepts of science. He argues that rather than eliminating or analyzing away the concepts of everyday life;

Certain connections must obtain between these two classes of concepts; for science is ultimately intended to systematize the data of our experience, and this is possible only if scientific principles, even when couched in the most esoteric terms, have a bearing upon, and thus are conceptually connected with, statements reporting in "experiential terms" available in everyday language what has been established by immediate observation. Consequently there will exist certain connections between the technical terms of empirical science and the experiential vocabulary; in fact, only by virtue of such connections

can the technical terms of science have any empirical content. 1

If our language and actions indicate a universal judgment that the world is composed of material objects, then the "experiential terms" available in our language will be object orientated. Since the purpose of natural science is to systematize that which can be described in these "experiential terms", then natural science can no more do without material objects than Old MacDonald can do without his farm.

Rather than belabour this point unnecessarily within the current context, I shall carry the debate over into the following section. The current context cannot yield the sort of strong conclusions we seek since the field of modern physics is itself split over the very issue we are trying to clarify and analyze.

All of the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation do agree on one point. It would, in their view, be desirable to return to the reality concept of classical physics, or to use a more general philosophical term, to the ontology of materialism. They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist ... it is important to realize that their interpretations cannot be refuted by experiment, since they only repeat the Copenhagen interpretation in a different language. 2


B
Process Philosophy

The themes of most process metaphysics follow very closely upon recent developments in modern physics. However, process philosophy is more philosophically significant since process philosophers offer us a unified system within which metaphysical postulates are conjoined with, for example, epistemological postulates. Since Whitehead has provided us with a completely systematized process metaphysics (especially in his work *Process and Reality*), I shall rely upon his works for a clear account of the intentions and efforts of process philosophy.

Whitehead argues that the primary purpose of his process metaphysics is to provide descriptive generalizations of experience such that even the most recent data provided by the natural sciences can be accounted for. And if some of the more recent work in physics suggests that processes, and not substantial objects, are the basic entities making up the world, then Whitehead's metaphysical system must make provisions for that data. Accordingly, the ultimate constituents of the world, for Whitehead, are actual occasions. And over and over again, he asserts that these actual occasions are not substantial objects but rather processes of 'becoming' and 'perishing'. His task then is a) to develop the thesis that events or processes are the basic constituents of reality (a thesis that we have seen has its origins in atomic physics)
and b) to then provide an account of all other currently available experiential data in terms of this thesis.

Whitehead's work makes it possible for us to now point out accurately the problems generated by a world view purporting to be without the notion of a substantial object. Though science began by "presupposing the general common sense notion of the universe" ¹,

The continuous effort to understand the world has carried us far away from all these obvious ideas. Matter has been identified with energy: the passive substratum composed of self identical enduring bits of matter has been abandoned. ²

It is one thing for Whitehead to make a critical point but quite another for him to provide us with a sensible alternative. A host of difficulties become obvious as Whitehead sets out to describe the world by employing 'becoming' and 'perishing' as basic concepts.

The first thing we must notice is that 'becoming' and 'perishing' language immediately gives way to talk of 'actual occasions'. Whitehead urges us to keep in mind that these 'actual occasions' are (the 'is' of identity and not predication) 'becoming' and 'perishing', yet he himself finds it necessary to ignore this cautionary note. So we soon find Whitehead asserting that 'actual occasions' are the basic

¹Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press, 1938) p.129
²Ibid. p.137
constituents of the world, and that they are (this time the 'is' of predication and not the 'is' of identity) in constant process of becoming and perishing. 'Becoming' and 'perishing' cease to perform the role of primary concepts — they are now properties; or again, their disguise has been lifted since, in fact, they were properties all along.

The more Whitehead tries to talk about these 'actual occasions', the more anomalies he generates. Consider, for example, Whitehead's claims concerning how 'actual occasions' become and perish. Here, in the Whiteheadian spirit, we really ought to say "... how 'becoming and perishing' becomes and perishes". At any rate, 'actual occasions' become by prehending (or grasping) data which is (of identity) itself also 'becoming'. Accordingly, Whitehead's point is most accurately stated as "becoming becomes by grasping becoming". This is not so much awkward as it is misleading. Certainly, 'becoming' cannot 'grasp' any more than 'Virtue' can 'receive rewards'. We are quite clear about what it means to grasp, but not so clear about what Whitehead might here mean by grasping. What would it be like for a process to grasp a process?

Of course, these anomalies are not so blatant in the text of Whitehead's works, but this is only because he starts us off on a more familiar path. When he substitutes "actual occasion" for "becoming and perishing", we are already well on our way to objectifying 'actual occasions'. We begin to think and talk about them in more familiar ways; usually as
very small particles that first become and then perish. And all the while one is misled into thinking that process philosophy supplants the material object as a primary concept.

Whitehead often acknowledges the difficulties we have pointed to (see pages 29 and 30 of this thesis). His mistake is not that he failed to notice these difficulties, but rather, that he failed to appreciate their powerful obstinacy. He admits that we judge the world to be made up of substantial objects, but holds that this judgment can be altered merely by altering the language in which we describe the world. What he has failed to fully appreciate is that the source of our judgment that the world is made up of substantial objects is not merely the linguistic conventions we currently employ. Hence, that judgment might remain and indeed does remain in spite of an alteration in those conventions. THIS JUDGMENT CANNOT BE DISCARDED AS ONE WOULD DISCARD A PAIR OF SPECTACLES WHOSE LENSES WERE PURPORTED TO BE FLAWED.

C

Idealism and the Sense-Data Theory

Our sense-data opponent is a man steeped in the history of British Empiricism. He has probably read Locke on the

\[1\] It is not so surprising to find that everyone who sets out to understand Whiteheadian metaphysics ends up sketching 'actual occasions', usually as small circles. Such a model is inconsistent with the spirit of Whitehead's metaphysics, though quite consistent with the text of that metaphysics.
problem of perception, and appreciated Berkeley's contribution to that problem. Still he is not content with either formulation of the issue, and so sets out once again to tell us what we see; hence, the modern thesis of sense-data. ¹

In spite of a change in terminology, the position remains remarkably unchanged. "In all cases of perception the objects of which one is directly aware are sense-data and not material things". ² Or again in Ayer's words:

[Philosophers] do, in general, allow that our belief in the existence of material things is well founded; some of them, indeed, would say that there were occasions on which we knew for certain such propositions as 'this is a cigarette' or 'this is a pen'. But even so they are not, for the most part, prepared to admit that such objects as pens or cigarettes are ever directly perceived. What, in their opinion, we directly perceive is always an object of a different kind than these; one to which it is now customary to give the name of 'sense-datum'. ³

The first thing to notice is that neither Berkeley nor his modern day counterpart ever tells us what we 'see'. (Keep in mind such anomalies as "Mind that you don't trip over that sense-datum — Oh yes, I see it".) Instead they tell us what the 'objects of our awareness' are; or again,


² J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 87

what we 'directly perceive'. And there is a very sound strategic reason for this shift in terminology. Consider cases, and they are few, where the word "perceive" is at home in our language: "Now I perceive the seriousness of your situation" or "Do you know that I couldn't perceive the solution, even after he pointed it out to me". In these and other similar cases, what we mean by 'perceive' is roughly 'to grasp mentally' or 'to understand'.

It is not surprising, then, that when philosophers make the shift in terminology from talk of seeing to talk of perceiving, they feel coerced into the positing of objects of a different kind from material objects. What is grasped mentally must certainly be something different from a material object. One cannot grasp mentally something that is physical; so what is grasped must be some sort of mental object — sense-data. The philosopher's compulsion to posit mental objects would seem to deny our previous claim that all persons implicitly judge the world to be made up of substantial objects.

It is not just that Ayer [and others] sometimes speak as if only sense-data in fact existed and as if 'material objects' were really just jigsaw constructions of sense-data. It is clear that he is actually taking this to be true. 1

If Austin is correct here, then it will not do for me to suggest

1 J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) p.107
that Ayer is speaking metaphorically when he says that the
ultimate constituents of the world are sense-data. The fam­
iliar answers to opposition must be abandoned here.

The way out lies in Ayer's first description of sense­
data. They are, he suggests, "objects of a different kind"
from material objects. But why describe them as objects at
all? The solution to our problem lies in revealing on exactly
what points these new mental objects differ from our familiar
material objects. What does the sense-data theorist say about
sense-data other than that they are mental objects?
(i) 'Visual sense-data take the form of patches of colour'.
Here I am tempted to ask; 'How thick is the patch?'. Don't we
think and talk of them as having a thickness? To concede that
they are very thin patches is also to concede that they are
extended in three dimensions.
(ii) 'No two persons can have one and the same sense-datum'.
How does one 'have a sense-datum'? And if I have one, where
do I keep it? Do I keep it in my head? And it will not do
for the sense-data theorist to object to this line of question­
ing since he himself makes possible this line of questioning
merely by saying of sense-data that they are had by persons.
In setting out to describe sense-data, he must begin, if he
is to carry out his task in a meaningful way, with the lan­
guage that you and I are conversant in. The anomalies sug­
gested by the above line of questioning are a symptom of the
situation the sense-data theorist places himself in, and are
not contrivances of mine. But even if this hurdle could be overcome, a second worry arises. If sense-data are objects of a different kind from material objects, then the requirement that no one of these new objects can occur simultaneously in two places is unfounded. That is to say, the above requirement originated in our judgment that the world was composed of substantial objects; and since the sense-data theorist claims to have abandoned this judgment, his continued support of the above requirement is without justification. If we judge the world to be composed of substantial objects, then we are entitled to say that no one of these objects can exist in two places at the same time, and that that object will be extended in three dimensions. The sense-data theorist carries over these properties to his new objects — sense-data — yet, at the same time, claims to abandon the very grounds for introducing those properties.

The sense-data theorist commonly fails to notice a crucial discrepancy between what his theory says and how he says his theory. We may conclude, then, that the new objects posited by the sense-data theorist are new in name only, since they continue to enjoy the same basic properties that substantial objects enjoy. On the basis of the above, we may further conclude that the sense-data theorist does not contradict our previous claim that 'persons universally judge the world to be composed of material objects'.
IV

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

At the end of the second chapter, we attempted to bring together and state three general conclusions concerning the status of the six propositions of this thesis. The first conclusion, that these propositions are factually informative, is, I believe, fully justified by the discussion and arguments which occur in that chapter. However, the second conclusion, that persons universally concur in their judgments that these propositions are true, and the third conclusion, that persons are under some 'compulsion' to so judge, were both perhaps hasty. Since I do not think that the arguments advanced in chapter three completely dispell any remaining uncertainty about these latter two conclusions, it will be worthwhile to consider, in this chapter, some sources of support for those two conclusions.

A

Strawson

The opposition discussed in the preceding chapter focused upon our proposition that the world is composed of material objects. Since the problems surrounding this proposition are still fresh in our minds, I shall begin this chapter with Strawson's support of our claim that conclusions two and
three do apply to this proposition.

Strawson, in his book *Individuals*, sets out to describe "the actual structure of our thought about the world" \(^1\) or again, "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure". \(^1\) Since this thesis has, as its starting point, a similar undertaking, it is important that the results of my labours find some overlap with the results obtained by Strawson.

Strawson begins by noting that we think and talk about the world in terms of particulars. But in order for us to be able to talk about these particulars, it must be possible for us to uniquely identify those particulars.

We may agree, then, that we build up our single picture of the world ..., in which every element is thought of as directly or indirectly related to every other, and the framework of the structure, the common unifying system of relations is spatio-temporal. \(^2\)

Given that particulars always occur within a spatio-temporal framework, Strawson finds little difficulty in accounting for our ability to uniquely identify particulars. Still, he argues that there remain problems which are generated by the fragmented nature of our experience. Hence, might we not have a new space-time system for each of the fragments of our


\(^2\) ibid. p. 28-29
experience? And what is even more crucial; if the above could be answered affirmatively, how is it that we are able to re-identify particulars? Strawson argues that since we do re-identify particulars, there can be only one spatio-temporal framework; all the fragments of our experience must participate in one and the same framework.

How is this unification achieved? What is the nature of the particulars we identify and reidentify? Strawson answers both questions at once.

It seems that we can construct an argument from the premise that identification rests ultimately on location in a unitary spatio-temporal framework of four dimensions, to the conclusion that a certain class of particulars is basic in the sense I have explained. For that framework is not something extraneous to the objects in reality of which we speak. If we ask what constitutes the framework, we must look to those objects themselves or some among them. But not every category of particular objects which we recognize is competent to constitute such a framework. The only objects which can constitute it are those which can confer upon it its own fundamental characteristics. That is to say, they must be three dimensional objects with some endurance through time.¹

Strawson, then, does lend support to our claim that persons judge the world to be composed of material objects. In fact, he argues not only that these objects are 'extended' (as did Descartes) or 'solid' (as did Locke) but that

¹ Ibid. p.39
it is a "necessary condition of something being a material body, that it should tend to exhibit some felt resistance to touch". ¹ This further property exceeds our requirements (of extension in three dimensions, solidity, and unique spatio-temporal location), yet it does describe how one might expand upon what could be described as the core of our concept of an object.

In the conclusion of our second chapter, we also spoke about our feeling that we are under some 'compulsion' to maintain our judgments that the six special propositions of this thesis are true. Though a full understanding of that 'compulsion' must await a later discussion, I mention it once again now since it seems that Strawson also noticed it.

We might now ask whether it is inevitable, or necessary, that any scheme which provides for particulars capable of being the subject-matter of discourse in a common language — or at least any such scheme we can envisage — should be a scheme of the kind I have just described. Certainly it does not seem to be a contingent matter about empirical reality that it forms a single spatio-temporal system. ²

or again:

We are dealing here with something that conditions our whole way of talking and thinking, and it is for this reason that we feel it to be non-contingent. ³

¹ibid. p.39
²ibid. p.29 (underlining is my own)
³ibid. p.29 (underlining is my own)
Hence, Strawson, in his essay in descriptive metaphysics, lends some support a) to our claim that persons universally agree in their judgment that the world is composed of material objects, and b) to our claim that we seem under some 'compulsion' to so judge.

B
Hume

The support I seek from Hume is of a very different kind from that provided by Strawson. There is little, if any, overlap between Hume's task in the Treatise and the aims of this present work. Perhaps this is not quite right since Hume is also concerned with the problem of certainty; still, the difference in our approaches to that topic are too diverse to permit the transfer of arguments, and subsequent conclusions, from that work to this. Consequently, this appeal to Hume is directed only towards one or two insights he mentions in the Treatise and not towards any unified portion of that work. I turn now to that part of the Treatise that is centered upon a discussion of our concept of causality.

Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of thought to pass from causes, according to their experienc'd union, ... the necessity of power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from one to the other. The efficacy of energy of causes is neither plac'd in the causes
themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances. 'Tis here that the real power of causes is plac'd, along with their connexion and necessity. 1

My first reaction to Hume's psychologised account of causality was much like the reaction of Hume's spurious critic: What! the efficacy of causes lies in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely independent of the mind, and would not continue their operation even tho' there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may well depend on causes, but not causes on thought. This is to reverse the order of nature ... 2

However, repeated attempts to dismiss Hume's observations have met with little success. As it turns out, Hume's insight is not mistaken, it is merely uncomfortable. He is not providing us with a theory, but instead provides only observations upon our employment of the concept of causality. Accordingly, he points out that we never perceive a causal relation but only the constant conjunction of events or objects. His most exciting observation, at least from our current point of view, was that of noticing that the human mind exhibits a tendency or 'compulsion' to posit causal relations between constantly conjoined events or objects.

2 ibid. p. 167
Some of Hume's critics have failed to make the distinction between an uncomfortable observation and a mistaken one. Consequently, many have attacked his notion of causality, taking his reliance on the 'determination of the mind' to be the weak link in his analysis. The present thesis abandons that criticism and instead makes use of Hume's observations by placing them within the context of a system of human judgments.

Consider Hume's claim that some principles of the mind's operation are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: ... they are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin.

or again, elsewhere

Nothing is more curiously enquir'd after by the mind of man, than the causes of every phenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. We wou'd not willingly stop before we are acquainted with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on its effect; that tie which connects them together; and that efficacious quality, on which the tie depends.

Perhaps Hume overstates the force of our judgment that 'every event has a cause' yet he is, I should argue, correct in asserting that this judgment is universal to all persons, or

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1 ibid. p. 225
2 ibid. p. 266
again, in asserting that this judgment is an essential part of persons as they are currently constituted. Hume's sentiments, then, echo our own when he claims that people universally judge events to have causes, and that they seem to do so under some 'compulsion of the mind'.

C

Kant

I have intentionally avoided any reference to Kant thus far, even though my indebtedness to him is by now apparent. That sources of support for our claims about the six propositions of this thesis are abundant in Kant's works must be obvious so I shall not tax you by itemizing that support. A discussion of Kant has been avoided for a second more fundamental reason. Though there exists a strong overlap between the AIMS of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and my AIMS here, there remains many crucial areas of difference in METHOD between us. Many of these variances in method are employed to escape the difficulties and criticisms that Kant's methods are susceptible to. Three hundred years of criticism and support of Kant's theses, as well as several less directly related advancements, could not help but result in the provision of new methods to achieve Kant's aims.

By way of example, consider the methods that Kant sometimes falls into when confronted with conceptual questions. Sometimes for Kant, to analyse a concept is "to become conscious to myself of the manifold which I always think in that
concept"\(^1\) or again, to decide whether 'all F's are G' is to be construed analytically, is

to think the concept associated with the subject and to note whether in so doing, one also 'thinks the concept' associated with the predicate.\(^2\)

Recent contributions to the philosophy of language make it possible for us to abandon these sorts of methods; the analysis of a concept need no longer rest upon psychological premises.

These differences in methodology aside, we might still look to Kant for support of the basic objectives of this thesis. Kant certainly held that all persons do judge our six propositions to be true. In addition, Kant thought of his investigation

as possible only because he conceived of it also, and primarily, as an investigation into the cognitive capacities of beings such as ourselves. The idiom of the work is throughout a psychological idiom. Whatever necessities Kant found in our conception of experience, he ascribed to the nature of our faculties.\(^3\)

Kant has a difficult time supporting this position since by 'faculties' is meant 'the understanding'; and Kant neglected

\(^1\)Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} translated by Norman Kemp Smith, ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965 ) B-p.11


\(^3\)P.F. Strawson, \textit{The Bounds of Sense} ( London: Methuen and Co., 1966 ) p.19
to include one of these curious objects amongst his heirlooms. Not only is this a great loss of what must be considered a valuable collector's piece; but further this oversight on Kant's part places us at a distinct disadvantage. So much of Kant's thesis depends upon 'the understanding' having certain properties, and, since Kant is the only person to have inspected 'the understanding', we can only trust that he has accurately reported those properties.

Kant is, I think, correct in ascribing the source of necessity to the nature of our faculties; but he generates insurmountable difficulties for himself when he fills out what is to count as a 'human faculty'. To say that our 'compulsion' to think and speak in certain ways is a product of certain essential properties of 'the understanding' is to thereby discard all possibility of empirical verification for that thesis. And;

Kant cannot base his theory on neurophysiology, for he is emphatic that a science of human bodies could yield only aposteriori results ... he denies that any particular scientific hypothesis is apriori. ¹

For now we shall be content to agree with Kant, at least to a point; the 'compulsion' to maintain our judgments that each of the six propositions of this thesis is true might be contingent upon some facts about persons; but in regard to

¹Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) p.18
the nature of those facts, I shall for now remain silent. Unlike Kant, however, I have taken great pains not to exclude any candidates in advance.

D Wittgenstein

We have already noted one of Wittgenstein's observations that proved to be an invaluable contribution to this thesis. Without his insight that humans must agree in some of their judgments, if communication is to be possible, I should not have gotten even to this point. But Wittgenstein's point is a very general one: agreement in judgment is secured (quite obviously since we do communicate) without mention of the content of that judgment. Must humans agree in their judgments of a particular politician's worth? in their judgments that parsnips are more nutritious than popcorn? or even, in their judgments that fire will burn a human hand? Given the sorts of beings we are, which of our judgments both a) meet with a universal consensus, and b) carry with them a certain 'compulsion'? Wittgenstein offers us no clear answer.

This absence of a clear answer makes our search for support more difficult, but not impossible. Wittgenstein's works contain many strong suggestions that certain areas do enjoy the two properties listed above.

Sec. 214. What prevents me from supposing that this table either vanishes or alters its shape and colour when no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it
again changes back to its old condition?
— "But who is going to suppose such a thing!" — one would feel like saying.

Sec. 220. The reasonable man does NOT HAVE certain doubts.¹

Though the 'certain doubts' Wittgenstein speaks of are never listed, section 214 seems to point to an area where human doubt has no place. This case that escapes doubt is on a par with our sixth proposition: 'the world maintains a uniformity over time — things don't abruptly alternate between existing and not existing nor radically change in their basic properties'. Wittgenstein also supports our claim that such propositions escape human doubt because of characteristic human judgments: "Our not doubting ... is simply our manner of judging and therefore of acting".²

The uniformity of nature is a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's works.

Sec. 315. ... the teacher will feel that this is not a legitimate question at all. And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive arguments ...

Sec. 317. This doubt isn't one of the doubts in our game. (But not as if we chose this game!)³

²Ibid. section 232 p.30e
³Ibid. p.40e-41e
1968) especially sections 124, 126, 217, and the footnote on page 54e). In the light of this first trend, Wittgenstein's claim that we don't doubt the uniformity of nature is just a description of current human practices. And to merely describe current human practices is not to exclude the possibility that they might have been different, nor to exclude the possibility that they might easily be altered. As it turns out, Wittgenstein claims that these practices rarely alter, but this is so only because each has a point and any altered practice would quite likely lose that point. I find this addition (of a point to our practices) to be of little benefit since what persons take as a point is equally subject to alteration. This first trend in Wittgenstein leaves no room for the 'compelling' force of some of our current linguistic and non-linguistic practices.

The second trend, equally well represented, seems to stand in opposition to the first. Within this second trend, Wittgenstein argues that some of our current practices might indeed have a foundation.

Sec. 358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hasting-ness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)

Sec. 359. But this means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as something animal. 1

1 Ibid. p. 46e-47e
This Foundation does not take the form of a reasoned justification of induction. In fact, if our judgment as to the uniformity of nature is something animal, the question of a reasoned justification never arises.

The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions. ¹

This latter trend does leave room for the 'compelling' property of our judgment 'that the world maintains a uniformity over time'. Its roots are animal, part of our form of life, and hence may not be subject to certain forms of alteration. Still, Wittgenstein's own lack of confidence in this position — 'This is badly expressed and probably badly thought as well' — renders him an unlikely candidate for strong support of this position. The last philosopher we shall discuss, W.H. Walsh, argues for a similar position but with a great deal more conviction than did Wittgenstein.

E

W.H. Walsh

Walsh, in his book entitled Metaphysics, sets out to articulate the role of the philosopher as a metaphysician, and to defend that role. Though I take both his task and results to be misguided, Walsh does on one particular occasion ²

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¹ ibid. section 287, p.37e
² see W.H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1963) Chapter 10, section 1
suggest a very interesting position. The discussion of that position out of context will not result in an injustice to Walsh's argument since, as far as I am able to discern, he makes no use of that thesis. The specific position I am referring to appears to be an independent and neutral observation on Walsh's part.

Walsh intends to drive a wedge between two recognized types of nonsense. He begins by arguing that the dichotomy of material and formal nonsense is mistakenly held to be exhaustive. All that he requires to make this point is a demonstration of some third form of nonsense such that speaking nonsense of this third sort does not involve a) a violation of the rules of formal logic (formal nonsense) or b) a denial of any obvious facts that persons recognize (material nonsense).

He begins this endeavour, just as we did, by constructing several contexts. I shall quote one of these in its entirety since it bears an uncanny resemblance to one of my own cases.

1. I am being driven by a friend in a motor-car when, without warning, the engine stops and the car comes to a standstill. I ask my friend what has happened; he replies that the car has stopped for no reason at all. I laugh politely at what I take to be his joke and wait for an explanation or for some activity on my friend's part to discover what has gone wrong; he remains in his seat and neither says nor does anything more. Trying not to appear rude, I presently ask my friend whether he knows much about motor-cars, the implication
being that his failure to look for the cause of the breakdown must be explained by his just not knowing how to set about the job. He takes my point at once and tells me that it is not a question of ignorance or knowledge; there just was no reason for the stoppage. Puzzled I ask him if he means that it was a miracle, brought about by the intervention of what eighteenth-century writers called a 'particular Providence'. Being philosophically sophisticated, he replies that to explain something as being due to an act of God is to give a reason, though not a natural one, whereas what he said was that there was no reason for what occurred. At this point I lose my temper and tell him not to talk nonsense, for (I say) 'Things just don't happen for no reason at all'.

The context serves to illustrate a new sort of nonsense; namely the sort of nonsense involved in denying "Things just don't happen for no reason at all". Walsh constructs a second context in order to establish this same claim for "Things do not vanish without a trace". A similarity between these propositions and two of my own ('Every event has a cause' and 'The world maintains a uniformity over time' respectively) must, by now, be obvious. However, thus far this similarity ranges over only the general content of these propositions. To make our agreement more explicit, I must now develop a point that I have neglected discussing for too long.

Walsh's claim is that to deny either of his two propositions is to lapse into a nonsense of a special sort. My

1 W.H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1963) p.155
claim is that we universally judge certain specific propositions to be true, and that this judgment has a peculiar 'compulsion' attached to it. How are these claims related? That is, given that Walsh and I independently arrived at the same peculiar class of propositions, do we also concur as to the manner in which these propositions are peculiar? Here we must keep in mind a distinction between the questions; 'How are these peculiar?' and 'Why are these peculiar?'. Walsh and I may concur in our answers to the former, but I am certain that we should not agree in our answers to the latter.

Walsh argues that these propositions are peculiar in that they are rather presuppositions of empirical truths than empirical truths themselves. The distinguishing mark of such presuppositions ... is that we cannot sensibly make them the subject of further questioning. ¹

And he continues: if it is not sensible for us to question these presuppositions, then, should anyone deny one of these presuppositions, he will end up talking non-sensibly, or again, talking nonsense.

Walsh's claim, then, is that to assert 'p' (where 'p' is a placeholder only for one of the six special propositions of this thesis) is to talk a special sort of nonsense. At the very least, this claim entails that we judge 'p' to be

¹ibid. p.159 (underlining is my own)
true. But something **more** must be going on since the assertion of \( \neg p \) results, not in a charge of error, but rather, in a charge of nonsense. **THIS DIFFERENCE IS CRUCIAL.** Suppose you claim that "Graduate students don't drink beer". Here, it would be appropriate for me to claim that you are in error. Notice that I could achieve the same results by making the more awkward claim "The contradictory of your claim is generally judged to be true, though it might not have been were graduate students slightly different". It is possible for me to dismiss your claim by either alternative since either your claim is true, or its contradictory is true, but not both. Hence, to say that your claim is **mistaken** (or in error) is also to say that given the current state of affairs, the contradictory of your claim is generally judged to be true. Strawson says much the same thing as this when he says:

> The charge of untruth refers beyond the words and sentences the man uses to that in the world about which he talks. We deny his assertion, and, in doing so, make a counter-assertion of our own about the subject of his discourse.¹

or again:

> To deny a statement has the same logical force as to assert its contradictory; the differences are here irrelevant.²


²Ibid. p.20
But now suppose that you are the automobile owner in the context described by Walsh. Now your claim is that "The car stopped for no reason at all". It is not enough here for me to dismiss your claim by saying that you are mistaken. Were I to do so, I should be saying only that 'the contradictory of your claim is generally (?) judged to be true, though it might not have been given that ...?... were slightly different. And now we are at a loss for words; we are not so sure what particular changes in the world would result in an alteration of this judgment. There just are no particular facts such that if they occurred we would now judge as true the claim that "The car stopped for no reason at all". When it comes to one of our six special propositions, neither our own previous analysis, nor Strawson's, is of any benefit. AND THIS IS BECAUSE THE JUDGMENTS INVOLVED IN THESE CASES DO NOT DEPEND UPON ANY PARTICULAR FACTS AT ALL. Consequently, Walsh chooses to dismiss these claims by describing them as 'nonsense of a special sort'. And of course 'special sort' is meant only to exclude both formal and material nonsense.

But if to assert 'p' (where 'p' represents only such propositions as 'The car stopped for no reason at all') is to talk a 'special sort of nonsense'. what can be said about '¬p'? It is clear that whatever could be said about '¬p' in this case must be stronger than what was said about '¬p' where to assert 'p' was only to make a mistake (as in the graduate student case). To say that '¬p' is universally judged to be
true, and that we are under some 'compulsion' to so judge these propositions is consistent with this requirement. It is also consistent with each and every point that Walsh employs to develop his special form of nonsense. This discovery should come as no surprise since I began this thesis with a curious case of nonsense, and made repeated use of the notion of nonsense in several of the contexts I discussed.

Hence, Walsh and I agree that there exists a certain set of propositions which are peculiar. We also agree on the particular propositions that are properly included in this class. This last part is not quite right. We do agree upon the general content of those propositions, but differ as to whether that content is to be considered in the affirmative or in the negative. Accordingly, my discussion centered upon the proposition 'Every event has a cause' whereas Walsh is more concerned with the proposition 'Some event happened for no reason at all'. Hence, I arrived at a 'compelling' agreement in judgment that 'p' is true, whereas Walsh concludes that the assertion of '¬p' results in a special sort of nonsense. About the contradictory of his own claim '¬(¬p)', which of course is equivalent to my claim 'p', Walsh says:

the contradictories of the statements in question are often formulated in terms of necessity ('There must always be a reason for whatever occurs', 'Things cannot vanish without a trace')... Some philosophers... hold that the only statements entitled to the description 'necessary' are those whose truth depends on logical considerations. Of this dogma no more need be said
now than that the statements with which we are concerned seem prima facie to count against it, for there is nothing logically impossible in the notion of an event happening for no reason at all, or of a thing vanishing without trace and passing clean out of existence. Of course we could, if we chose, make it a matter of definition that nothing could be called an event unless we believed it happened for a reason, and similarly in the other case; but it is plain that this would not solve the problem. There is an important difference between saying 'There are no events which happen for no reason at all' and saying, 'There are no "events" which happen for no reason at all'.

This statement, together with our analysis of what Walsh means by 'a special sort of nonsense' entitle us to conclude:

specifically (a) that Walsh and I agree tacitly in our answers to the question 'How (in what way) are these propositions peculiar?'.

and generally (b) FOR THIS PARTICULAR CLASS OF PROPOSITIONS: to say of any one of these propositions that it is judged to be true by all persons, and that persons are under some 'compulsion' to so judge, is also to say that any person who asserts the contradictory of that proposition thereby lapses into talking a special sort of nonsense. Further, to say of someone who asserts the contradictory of one of these propositions that he has thereby lapsed into talking a special sort of

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nonsense, is also to say that the proposition in ques-
tion is judged to be true by all persons, and that
persons are under some "compulsion" to so judge.

Given the above general conclusion, it might seem as though
both methods of developing this peculiar class of propositions
would prove equally fruitful. This is not the case largely
because of a difficulty we have already encountered and over-
come. When I claimed of any given proposition that it was a
member of the class of propositions in question, I was able
to justify that claim by pointing to concrete judgments per-
sons exhibit both by the things they say and by the things
they do. Walsh provides no similar justification — it seems
as if one must merely trust Walsh's intuitions as to which
propositions are properly described as 'a special sort of non-
sense'. Walsh's intuition was extremely keen in respect to
the two propositions he did discuss; still, there is no good
reason to go on trusting his intuitive faculties when a more
objective methodology is available to us.
PART B; THE SECOND PREMISE:

"If persons universally agree in their judgments that six particular propositions are true, then the six particular propositions are true."
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

A Summary of the Argument

Since this thesis undergoes a shift in emphasis at this point, it is worthwhile to now summarize what has gone before and to clarify the major argument of the thesis. By the end of the second chapter we were able to conclude that our six propositions escaped the second horn of our original dilemma in that we found them to be factually informative. By the end of the fourth chapter we were able to conclude that 'persons universally agree in their judgments that these six propositions are true and that they are under some 'compulsion to so judge'. Our task is now to show that persons are correct in judging these six propositions to be true. If we can show these judgments to be correct, then we shall have shown the propositional content of these judgments to be true since a judgment 'that p is true' is correct just in the case where p is true. Consequently, our task can be looked upon as an attempt to defend the truth of the premise 'If persons universally agree in their judgments that p is true, then p is true' for certain substitutions for p. If we could adequately defend this second premise then, by Modus Ponens, it would follow that these six propositions are true. And if we could show that these six propositions are true, and that they
are judged to be true, then we would be entitled to conclude that persons can know these propositions to be true with certainty. But if persons can know these propositions to be true with certainty, then these propositions are not caught by the first horn of the dilemma either. It would follow then, that our original dilemma is not true when said of all propositions; that is to say, as a dilemma it is false.

The second major premise, whose truth is now our primary concern, looks to be the most suspicious. The premise has a prima facie similarity to another premise "Saying it is so, makes it so" whose difficulties are all too familiar. Hence, to substantiate my own second premise I must begin by noting the differences between it and the above problematic premise. These claims are not analogous largely because my own premise is, as yet, incomplete. It can be neither true nor false until a substitution has been made for the propositional placeholder p. My own premise is a contingent proposition which is clearly false for most substitutions for p and, I shall argue, true for certain other specific substitutions for p. Any argument which has a premise "Saying it is so, makes it so" can leave no room for such contingencies. The second crucial reason for not regarding these claims to be asserting the same fact resides in the difference between merely saying that something is the case and the peculiar sort of judging something to be the case that I shall now attempt to elucidate.
B

On the Nature of Judgment

When I say that 'persons universally agree in their judgments as to the truth of our six propositions', I do not mean something like 'the jury unanimously agrees in its verdict'. Judgments of this latter sort involve one sort of relation between a collection of evidence and a judgment. One is faced with two or more courses of action and must choose between them on the basis of a body of evidence already available. The total body of evidence is rarely fixed solely to one alternative, and hence some deliberation is in order. The evidence must be sifted through and arranged according to which alternative action it supports. Finally an active conscious decision is made between those alternatives. In selecting one alternative, however, one thereby tacitly accepts that evidence which is deemed in support of the alternative selected, and tacitly dismisses that evidence which is ranked with the remaining alternatives. THE SENSE OF 'JUDGMENT' USED THROUGHOUT THIS THESIS IS SLIGHTLY MORE PERVERSE SINCE I MAKE NO SIMILAR DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVES, DELIBERATION OR CONSCIOUS DECISION.

The verdict of a jury is, for want of a more appropriate label, a 'deliberated judgment'. Such judgments are explicit in that the person(s) making the judgment quite often declares that judgment. As a consequence of the above, 'deliberated judgments' often have the further property of being datable. The judgments that concern us are not of this
'deliberated' sort.

'Implied judgments', on the other hand, are more like presuppositions than 'deliberated judgments'. Suppose Jones rummages about in his storage closet and returns with an umbrella and a raincoat. He takes both with him as he sets out for work. He needn't assert that "on the basis of the weather forecast and the heavy cloud cover, I judge that it will rain". Jones' judgment that it will rain is tacitly implied by his previous actions. Though it is appropriate to ask of a jury "How do you judge the accused?", it would scarcely be appropriate to ask Jones if he judges the proposition "It will rain" to be true. He has already expressed that judgment merely by carrying on in the manner described.

Since this first example of an 'implied judgment' has a predictive force to it, it would be wise for us to examine a second case. Suppose that I have known you for a good many years, and that you are now driving me home. You begin to switch lanes when I notice a second car alongside of us.

(i) Now I say nothing. My silence here exhibits my judgment that 'you are a careful and observant driver'. Nevertheless, I awake the following morning in the hospital.

or (ii) Now I sound the alarm. That alarm points to my judgment that 'you are not a careful and observant driver'. Now you swerve just in time and we both breathe a sigh of relief.
We uncover 'implied judgments' by asking the question "Given that a particular persons says or does x in a particular situation, what must that person presuppose to be true in in saying or doing x, if that act or utterance is to be intelligible?". So in our first example, for a particular person to search out an umbrella and raincoat, indicates that that person judges 'that it will rain'. Similarly, in the second case, not sounding the alarm indicates that I judge you to be a careful and observant driver, whereas sounding the alarm indicates the opposite.

The examples provided here help to clarify (I hope) what I take to be the difference between a 'deliberated judgment' and an 'implied judgment'. In 'deliberated judgments' the judgment itself comes at the end of a chain of events. It is a consciously made decision that results from the assessment of fixed evidence. By an 'implied judgment' I mean that an action or utterance itself implies certain presuppositions about what the actor or speaker takes the world to be like. These presuppositions can, if necessary, be formulated as judgments yet the actor or speaker need never have consciously entertained those judgments, nor entertained any determinate body of evidence either in favour of or contrary to those judgments. He need never have deliberated concerning alternatives nor made a choice between such alternatives. The person exhibiting an 'implied judgment' need only act or speak; we discern the 'implied judgment' from the behaviour. The
judgment is not something the person thought, said or did. It is not a premise, which once considered by the agent, concludes in an act or utterance. It is rather something that we contribute in order to render intelligible that which a particular person says or does. I am doing nothing more here than providing an analysis of what it means for someone to 'presuppose' or for someone to 'act upon a presupposition'.

What remains to be done is to provide an analysis of the role of evidence in 'implied judgments'. I have argued only that the evidence is not encountered nor consciously assessed prior to the implicit use of such judgments; but this tells us only what role evidence does not play in 'implied judgments'. Suppose for a moment that such a judgment has been explicitly articulated, that we are now aware of the 'implied judgment'. But it is only now, at this point, when the 'implied judgment' has been explicitly articulated, that the question of evidence can be introduced. THIS POINT IS CRUCIAL. In 'deliberated judgments' one has first the evidence and then the judgment. So when one comes TO ASSESS THE CORRECTNESS of a 'deliberated judgment' one already has before oneself a fixed and determinate body of evidence (facts) with which the 'deliberated judgment' must properly accord — if it is to be assessed as correct. IN THE CASE OF AN 'IMPLIED JUDGMENT', ONE HAS FIRST, AND ONLY, THE JUDGMENT. SO WHEN ONE COMES TO ASSESS THE CORRECTNESS OF AN 'IMPLIED JUDGMENT' ONE DOES NOT HAVE BEFORE ONESELF A FIXED AND DETERMINATE BODY OF EVIDENCE
(FACTS) WITH WHICH THE 'IMPLIED JUDGMENT' MUST ACCORD IF IT IS TO BE ASSESSED AS CORRECT. Accordingly, when one comes to assess the correctness of an 'implied judgment', one must first set down the guidelines to determine what might count as evidence either in favour of the judgment or against it. In the case of assessing 'deliberated judgments', all of this has been done for us.

Once these guidelines for confirming and refuting evidence have been set down, there remains only an investigation of the facts in order to discover which body of evidence obtains. So if Jones, by preparing his raincoat and umbrella, exhibits an 'implied judgment' that it will rain, we must first decide what will count as evidence for Jones being right or wrong here, and then check to see which body of evidence obtains in this case. Accordingly, we might decide that any precipitation will count in favour of his 'implied judgment' that it will rain, whereas a sunny sky will count against it. But then again, we might decide that Jones' 'implied judgment' will be correct: only if we get more than .4" of precipitation; or only if it rains and does not snow or hail; or only if there is a heavy threatening cloud cover; or only if it rains between seven o'clock in the morning and ten o'clock in the evening. It is not as if we know beforehand exactly what will count both in favour of Jones' 'implied judgment' and against it. However, once we have overcome this difficulty, it becomes merely a matter of waiting out the day.
All of this becomes critical since, as it turns out, the six propositions of this thesis are the propositional contents of 'implied judgments' and not 'deliberated judgments'. Since our task in this second section of the thesis is to assess these six 'implied judgments' in order to determine whether or not they are correct, we should be in grave error if we should take as our model the assessment procedure which attaches to 'deliberated judgments' and not the assessment procedure that rightly attaches to 'implied judgments'. All of the arguments to follow attempt to establish the conclusion that these six particular 'implied judgments' are correct; all of the arguments to follow take for granted the above assessment procedure for 'implied judgments'; and so it is important to get clear about that procedure before we begin.
VI

DEFENDING THE PREMISE 'FROM THE NATURE OF PERSONS'

In this chapter, and the next, I shall be primarily concerned with defending the truth of the premise "If persons universally agree in their 'implied judgments' that p is true, then p is true". I intend to defend that premise only for certain substitutions for p, namely for the six central propositions of this thesis. All of the arguments advanced in these chapters appear within the context of a general theory for assessing the correctness of 'implied judgments'.

It is obvious that most 'implied judgments' can be, and sometimes are, mistaken. What I must argue then, is that though these six special implied judgments* are 'implied judgments', still they differ from most 'implied judgments'. ¹ We shall see that these six special cases might differ from normal 'implied judgments' in a number of ways, yet the net result of those differences is, in each case, that of rendering these six special implied judgments* immune from error. Once again, if I can show that these six special implied judgments* differ

¹ In order to avoid subsequent confusion, I shall adopt the following convention. When speaking of 'implied judgments' in general, I shall continue to use single quotes. But when referring to the six special implied judgments of this thesis, I shall, to make the contrast clear, employ an asterisk (implied judgment*)
from most, and if that difference results in their being immune from error, then I shall have shown that these six special implied judgments* ( unlike 'implied judgments' in general ) cannot be mistaken. But if these six special implied judgments* cannot be mistaken, then they are correct. Finally, since an 'implied judgment' that \( p \) is correct just in the case where \( p \) is true, it follows that if these six special implied judgments* are correct, then the propositional content of those implied judgments* is true. Hence, to defend the truth of our second premise for six special substitutions for \( p \), we need only show that these six implied judgments* differ from most 'implied judgments' in that they are immune from error.

A Setting up the Argument

Persons have certain expectations as to facts in the world. Each 'implied judgment' is linked to one or more of these expectations by means of a loose bond. Most often the expectation closely correlates to the content of the 'implied judgment', though it need not. For example, correlated with Jones' 'implied judgment' ( that "It will rain" is true ) is the expectation that a certain fact in the world, rain-fall, will occur.

Notice first that so long as the facts do not conflict with a person's expectations, the person's 'implied judgment' remains intact; the notion of a mistake cannot even arise. Consider once again the context discussed on page 87 of this
thesis. Suppose that, again as in part (i), I am acting under the 'implied judgment' that you are a careful and observant driver. Now suppose that you complete the hasty lane change, but this time the driver of the second car skillfully and quietly avoids the collision. I noticed the second car originally, but, since I am comfortable riding with you, I did not see it as a threat. My expectation is that I will arrive home safely, and in this altered case, that expectation is not thwarted. As a result, my 'implied judgment' that you are a careful and observant driver does not, at least on this occasion, come under scrutiny. From outside the context we can, of course, see that this 'implied judgment' is mistaken. But this is of no help at all since human actions and utterances do not normally take place as part of a story. For the participants, the question of a mistake does not even arise. Persons are rarely concerned with why they are right.

On other occasions, the correctness of an 'implied judgment' does come under scrutiny. Recently I read an article in an anthology on Wittgenstein. A friend had lent me the book and I had later returned it. I needed the book once again, but this time I chose to take it out of the library. All that I could remember was that the book was by George Pitcher. I found the book and checked it out along with several others. Much to my surprise, it was not the book that I was looking for: my expectation of finding that particular article in the book was thwarted. Now I have gone wrong and I should like
to know why.

The first step in finding out is one of analysis. The 'implied judgment' that correlates with this expectation must be uncovered. What must I have presupposed to be true if the above actions are to be intelligible? Analysis reveals an 'implied judgment' on my part; that "No one author is responsible for two books with roughly the same title and subject matter" is true.

The following evaluation process can now occur.

(i) I decide what might count as evidence for the judgment and what might count as evidence against the judgment.

(ii) I inspect the facts to determine which class of evidence obtains.

(iii) I either reaffirm the judgment or conclude that that judgment is mistaken.

In the case of nearly all 'implied judgments' that come under scrutiny, the judgment is discarded on the grounds that it is mistaken. Hence, in the case of most 'implied judgments', it is possible for those judgments to be mistaken. But now suppose that THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH CORRELATE TO THOSE IMPLIED JUDGMENTS* ENJOYING A UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT DIFFER FROM THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH ATTACH TO MOST 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS'. Suppose that they differ in that they have an effect upon any investigation or inspection of the facts. The expectation is imposed upon all experience such that all experience is coloured or framed in a way that conforms with the expectation. At first
glance, this move appears to be an arbitrary one, but perhaps it can be made to appear less, so.

Philosophers readily agree that an intervening medium is always capable of altering or colouring our experiences of the world. Hence the wearing of blue tinted lenses results in perceptions of the world which differ from the way the world actually is. But now conceive of these expectations as the sorts of lenses which cannot be removed. This notion is hardly far fetched since we do acknowledge certain parts of the human anatomy, for example, to be essential for the occurrence of any experience. Notice that persons with severed heads are not considered to have experiences of the world (legends and folklore excepted). The notion of a necessary medium between the world and our experience of it, is, at the very least, an intelligible one.

The argument 'from the nature of persons' requires only this assumption in order to make its case. I shall first trace out the implications of that assumption, that is set out the argument 'from the nature of persons', and then argue in defense of the premise itself. The process for evaluating these peculiar implied judgments can, if the above assumption is correct, be interfered with at two distinct stages. Accordingly, the basic argument 'from the nature of persons' must, at this point, be separated off into two subordinate branches.
The First Branch of the Argument

The first branch of the argument runs as follows.

Since all experience is made to conform to the expectations that are bound to these peculiar implied judgments*, it follows that no experience can ever thwart those expectations. And, if those particular expectations can never be thwarted, then it follows that the implied judgments* which correlate to those expectations can never come under review. But if the only possibility of showing 'implied judgments' to be mistaken entails that the 'implied judgment' comes under conscious scrutiny, and, if, by the above argument, these particular implied judgments* can never come under conscious scrutiny, then it follows that these particular implied judgments* can never be shown to be mistaken. However, if these implied judgments* can never be shown to be mistaken, then these implied judgments* are correct. Further, since an 'implied judgment' that p is correct just in the case where p is true, it follows that, since these implied judgments* are correct, the propositional content of these implied judgments* is true.

The first branch of the argument is wrong on two counts. To begin with, a number of its premises are counterfactual. It asserts that these implied judgments* cannot come under conscious scrutiny, but in fact, this thesis is built upon the conscious scrutiny of those implied judgments*. The subject matter of this thesis is by no means novel; it is exactly
these implied judgments* and others like them that have been the focal point of philosophical dispute for centuries. Hence the claim that these implied judgments* can never come under conscious scrutiny flies in the face of the facts.

The second error in the argument is the move from 'persons cannot be shown to be mistaken in their judgment that a particular proposition is true' to the claim that 'that same judgment (that a particular proposition is true) is correct'. One feels inclined to argue that 'being unable to prove an error' does not entail that 'no error exists'. It is at this point that the psychological leanings of the argument prove to be a shortcoming. So long as the first half of this questionable inference is couched in terms of 'persons being unable to show the judgment mistaken' we will have no grounds for distinguishing between 1) persons being unable to show the judgment mistaken because persons are "pigheaded", 2) persons being unable to show the judgment mistaken because of some human shortcoming, or 3) persons being unable to show the judgment mistaken because the judgment, in reality, contains no mistake. We seem to require the third alternative to show the inference valid, yet have no means for separating off the possibility of the first two alternatives obtaining. This second worry is, I believe, not an insurmountable problem. Later we shall discuss a way out of the problem.

I wish to now reconsider the first objection to the argument (that one or more of its premises is counterfactual)
in order to get clear about how such an error could have arisen in the first place. If we can achieve the above understanding, then we will be better equipped to eradicate that error from the second branch of the argument.

The objection runs: one of the premises of the first branch of the argument — these specific implied judgments* can never come under conscious scrutiny — is counterfactual or again, false. And of course, any argument which contains a false premise cannot establish the truth of its conclusion. The false premise is introduced into the argument by means of a prior premise — if these particular expectations can never be thwarted, then it follows that the implied judgments* that correlate with these expectations can never come under review. The error is introduced here because the implied judgments* at issue can be uncovered from two quite different perspectives yet the argument just rehearsed makes room for only one of them. From the perspective of the person acting or speaking under an 'implied judgment', the judgment is discovered, or at least articulated, only after its correlated expectation is thwarted. But from the perspective of a philosopher, an 'implied judgment' can be uncovered, by analysis, any time a particular human action or utterance arouses curiosity. Because the argument ignores this second perspective, it remains open to the counterfactual objection. The second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' avoids this objection as we shall now see.
C

The Second Branch of the Argument

This second branch has, as its starting point, the same central premise as the previous argument and it is for this reason that I refer to it as a branch of the major argument. Hence, we begin with the assumption that THE EXPECTATIONS THAT CORRELATE TO IMPLIED JUDGMENTS* ENJOYING UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT DIFFER FROM THE EXPECTATIONS THAT ATTACH TO MOST 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS'; AND THAT THEY DIFFER IN SO FAR AS THEY TAINT OR COLOUR ANY INVESTIGATION OF FACTS IN THE WORLD. The first branch of the argument had, as its aim, the reduction and ultimate elimination of any possibility of error in these six peculiar implied judgments*. The achievement of this aim is contingent upon interfering successfully in that process which attempts to establish the occurrence of an error in an 'implied judgment'. That aim remains in the second branch of the argument, though the means of accomplishing it are now altered. Accordingly interference with the above process will now occur at a different stage.

The second branch, then, runs as follows. 'Implied judgments' can come under conscious scrutiny in two ways: either the expectation linked to the judgment is thwarted and this sets in motion the process of analysis, or, the process of analysis is directly set in motion as a result of a person's interest in human behaviour or language. In either case, the object of the analysis is the uncovering of an 'implied judgment'.
Once uncovered, the propositional content of that judgment is articulated. The correctness of that 'implied judgment' can now be consciously scrutinized, or again, assessed. Having decided what might count as evidence either for or against the judgment, we must look to the facts to establish the judgment's correctness or mistakenness. But in these particular cases of implied judgments*, the correlated expectation colours or taints our investigation of the facts. Since that expectation is an unavoidable medium between the facts in the world and our experience of them, and since that medium taints the facts in a way that results in their always conforming to evidence in favour of these special implied judgments*, it follows that any investigation of the facts will result only in evidence for the correctness of those special implied judgments*. Everything stands in favour of our six special implied judgments* and nothing stands against them. This is not quite right, however, since, if the medium is an unavoidable one (that is, essential for the occurrence of any human experience) then it follows, not just that no facts stand as counter evidence, but that no facts could stand as counter evidence to these implied judgments*. But if an 'implied judgment' is about the world then that 'implied judgment' can be mistaken only if the world can provide counter evidence to that 'implied judgment'. Since the world can provide no such counter evidence to these six special implied judgments* (by the above argument) and since each of these six special implied judgments*
is about the world (see the second chapter of this thesis) it follows that these six special implied judgments* cannot be mistaken. If these six implied judgments* cannot be mistaken, then these six implied judgments* must be correct. But these six implied judgments* are correct just in the case where their propositional contents are true. Hence, in the case of each of these six special implied judgments*, the propositional content of that judgment is true. The inference from 'persons universally agree in their implied judgments' that a particular proposition is true' to 'that proposition is true', then, is a valid one for CERTAIN SUBSTITUTIONS; that is, in just those cases where the proposition is one of the six central propositions of this thesis.

This second branch of the argument clearly escapes the counterfactual charge that its predecessor fell victim to. It appears to have eluded its predecessor's second difficulty as well. There is no obvious move from 'it is impossible for persons to show that these particular implied judgments* are mistaken' to 'these particular implied judgments* are not mistaken'. One feels hoodwinked here, though quite unable to say exactly in what way the problem remains. The argument continues to have psychological leanings (in the assumed premise) but those leanings no longer result in the difficulties we encountered earlier (see page 98 above).

This suspicion is perhaps best concentrated upon the following premise of the above argument: "Since the world can
provide no such counter evidence to these six special implied judgments*, and since each of these six special implied judgments* is about the world, it follows that these six special implied judgments* cannot be mistaken". What happens to the argument is now clear. The basis of our earlier worry was that 'persons being unable to show these judgments to be mistaken' might have been the product of "pigheadedness" or human shortcoming, and not a result of there really being no mistake present. But in this, the second branch of the argument, it is the world that fails to provide us with counter evidence and not persons. Clearly all talk of "pigheadedness" impeding the provision of counter evidence must now be abandoned.

The argument 'from "pigheadedness"' is often advanced and in fact often taken to be the argument 'from the nature of persons'. Since, as we have shown, it is without foundation, it might be worthwhile to quickly rehearse it now.

Having reminded the reader of the form of that argument, I shall then return to the two remaining loose ends of our main argument: 1) the world's failure to provide counter evidence to these six special implied judgments* and 2) a defense of the central assumption of the main argument.

The argument 'from "pigheadedness"' generally takes on a form similar to the following. 'Implied judgments' exist in a hierarchy; that is to say, certain 'implied judgments' are the cornerstones or building blocks for others. (I am
reminded here of the sort of 'implied judgments' G.E. Moore articulated in his "Defence of Common Sense" which provide a foundation for a great many other 'implied judgments'. Accordingly, if one of these core 'implied judgments' was to be considered mistaken, then a great many other 'implied judgments' would also have to be considered suspect. (Imagine yourself in surgery — the doctor performs an abdominal incision — and then removes a collection of mechanisms and complex wiring! How many other 'implied judgments', in addition to "There exists at present a living human body which is my body." must now be abandoned? ) Since such a shaking of the foundations is psychologically difficult, persons (out of a "pigheadedness" one must assume) refuse to alter or abandon the core 'implied judgments'. Unfortunately, what follows from such an argument is only that persons are "pigheaded" in holding some 'implied judgments' to be immune from mistake, and not that those 'implied judgments' are, in fact, correct.

The counter cases to this inference are too innumerable to even begin listing here. However the problems with the above argument go deeper than just its counter cases. Notice that discomfort can exist in degrees, and hence might easily vary from one person to the next. But now if the 'implied judgments' correctness is dependent upon this discomfort, and if it is possible for each individual to experience a different degree of discomfort, then it follows that one and the same 'implied judgment' might be rendered immune from mistake by
some individuals and not by others. The argument makes possible one and the same 'implied judgment' being correct for some individuals and not for others. Neither difficulty can be remedied by pointing to the degree of discomfort and saying of it that it is nearly unbearable.

We have said enough about bad arguments; let us return to one which has, I believe, a good deal more promise in it. The second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' seems to establish the conclusion we require, yet still we have some reservations. I have attempted to show that these six special implied judgments are immune from mistake by arguing, in part, that "the world cannot provide counter evidence for these six special implied judgments." A quick review of that argument places the problem in clear view: 'the world' as used in the above premise, is ambiguous. Previous premises of the argument in question made use of a distinction between 'the world of facts independent of persons' and 'the world of facts as experienced by persons'. But the premise currently under consideration ignores that distinction.

The similarity between the above ambiguity and the ambiguity encountered by the first branch of the argument (see again page 98 of this thesis) is now apparent. Still, some gains have been realized by the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' — the counterfactual charge has been avoided and the source of these implied judgments correctness can no longer be located in human "pigheadedness".
However the argument is still ambiguous as to whether these six special implied judgments* are not mistaken because 1) the world of facts independent of persons is exactly as these implied judgments* says, or 2) the world as experienced by persons is exactly as these implied judgments* say. At any rate, the problems of the first and second branches of the argument do not exactly overlap and hence the ambiguity above cannot be reduced to, nor subsumed under, the ambiguity we encountered in the first branch of the argument. The ambiguity we have encountered here is crystallized; that is to say, it is centered upon introducing a distinction (between the world independent of persons and the world as experienced) and then ignoring that distinction.

D

A Defence of the Argument's Central Assumption

The argument 'from the nature of persons' can only be set up after the introduction of a very crucial premise. It is the purpose of this section of the paper to both fully explicate that assumption and to argue for its truth.

To begin with, the assumption we introduced is not really a single assumption but rather a cluster of related assumptions. I first assumed that "THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH CORRELATE TO THOSE IMPLIED JUDGMENTS* ENJOYING UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT DIFFER FROM THOSE EXPECTATIONS WHICH ATTACH TO MOST 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS'"; I then postulated the way in which they were to differ: THEY WERE TO HAVE AN EFFECT UPON ALL EXPERIENCE AND HENCE ANY
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS: THAT EFFECT BEING TO TAINT OR COLOUR THE EXPERIENCE (INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS) IN A WAY FAVOURABLE TO THE IMPLIED JUDGMENT* IN QUESTION. I shall discuss each part of the assumption in turn.

This peculiar set of expectations* (once again I shall mark off these specific expectations from those that attach to normal 'implied judgments' with an asterisk) can differ from the expectations that attach to most 'implied judgments' either in their force (quantitative difference) or in their basic properties (qualitative difference). I shall begin by considering the evidence for the former. The expectations of any individual are strengthened on those occasions where the expectation occurs and is not thwarted. If these expectations* (those that correlate with the six special implied judgments* of this thesis) occurred more often than the majority of expectations, and if they were not thwarted, then these expectations* would be stronger than the majority of expectations. And if these expectations* were stronger than the majority of expectations accompanying 'implied judgments', then these peculiar expectations* would differ quantitatively from the expectations which correlate with normal 'implied judgments'.

A required, but suppressed premise in the above argument is that 'these expectations* do occur more often than the expectations which attach to normal 'implied judgments''. But now the above argument runs nearly parallel to the argument...
'from "pigheadedness"'. Compare a) "these expectations* occur more frequently" with "these implied judgments* are core judgments" and b) "these expectations* are stronger in force" with "denial of these implied judgments* results in extreme discomfort" and finally c) the emphasis on the individual in both arguments. Since the same difficulties encountered there count against this argument, we must conclude that this peculiar class of expectations* does not differ from the expectations which attach to normal 'implied judgments' in terms of their force, or again, in terms of their quantity.

The argument 'from "pigheadedness"' and the argument in support of quantitatively differing expectations attaching to 'implied judgments', though both criticized, were criticized in that they misapply when extended to cover the special class of implied judgments* which are central to this thesis. But it does not now follow that those arguments have no application at all. In fact, for normal 'implied judgments' the analysis suggested by both of those arguments has a strong empirical backing. Hence, AT THE LEVEL OF A GENERAL THEORY OF 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS'

1) The force of the expectation correlated with the 'implied judgment' does differ from individual to individual.
2) The expectation is strengthened on each occasion where it occurs and is not thwarted.
3) Different persons do speak and act in accordance with different 'implied judgments'. 
4) It is the case that our expectations are sometimes thwarted and the 'implied judgment' must be discarded as mistaken. A quick review of the normal 'implied judgments' that I have used as examples will corroborate these claims. I leave the actual performance of that review to the reader.

Now if the above describes the basic properties of those expectations attaching to normal 'implied judgments', what can be said about the basic properties of those expectations* attaching to the six peculiar implied judgments* of this thesis? As the reader will recall, a number of those properties surfaced in our discussions in chapters II, III, and IV of this thesis. We found that

1) persons universally agree in six specific implied judgments*;

2) persons are under some compulsion to maintain these six specific implied judgments*;

3) the expectations* attaching to these six special implied judgments* are never taken to be thwarted;

4) on those occasions where the expectation* is apparently thwarted, the implied judgment* is not discarded.

Accordingly, at an empirical level, we must conclude that there does exist a difference between the expectations attaching to normal 'implied judgments' and the expectations* attaching to our six special implied judgments*. This difference is not one of degree but rather one of type. That is to say, expectations* differ from expectations (normal) in some
of their basic properties and not merely in terms of their force.

There is a second good reason for maintaining a difference in kind between the above two types of expectations. The expectations which correlate with normal 'implied judgments' have the properties they do because both the 'implied judgment' and the expectation are generated out of past experience, and are founded upon a principle of induction. In the past, a particular person judged $p$ to be true and $x$ occurred. Now it happens that that person is in a similar situation again; though not now conscious of his judgment that $p$, he never-the-less expects $x$ to occur. This foundation cannot work for the six special implied judgments* of this thesis, since one of those special implied judgments* has as its content a principle of induction. Accordingly, these special implied judgments* must originate in some manner other than by being generated out of past experience, and must be founded on something other than a principle of induction. (If pressed I should argue that these six peculiar implied judgments* are inate and are founded upon the neurophysiological makeup that is common to all members of the species. A defence of this claim, however, would involve a second major work.)

The second part of the assumption must now be examined: that which correlates to these peculiar implied judgments*, that is expectations*, must have 1) AN EFFECT UPON ALL.
EXPERIENCE AND HENCE ANY INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, and 2) Taint or colour that experience in a way favourable to the implied judgment* in question. Clearly 1) is beyond the scope of any empirical verification. Still, one can argue for the intelligibility of that claim.

Few theories of perception, if any, escape using some form of the distinction between the world as experienced and the world independent of human experience. That is to say, only Solipsism denies that distinction and as it turns out the Solipsist cannot sensibly state his case. It follows that any sensible theory of perception requires some form of the above distinction. But that distinction cannot be made without positing some medium between the world and our experience of it. Something must separate off the experience from that which it is an experience of in order for us to understand these as two things as opposed to only one.

There is a second good reason for maintaining this medium, and that reason is that we often require such a medium in order to account for perceptual error. We do make a distinction between correct perceptions and mistaken perceptions; yet we would often be unable to make that distinction if we did not acknowledge the existence of such a medium and its effects upon our perception of the world.

Finally we come to the argument from analogy hinted at earlier ( see page 95 and 96 above ). To get the analogy going, you can imagine yourself looking at the world
through a kaleidoscope. I ask you to now examine something which I place before you. But since the experiences you are having of the object are very distorted, you first remove the end cap of the kaleidoscope. Still, since the eyehole of the kaleidoscope is small and the object is very close, you are unable to view the object in its entirety. Accordingly, you discard the viewing instrument altogether — your field of view expands and the entire object can now be seen. You begin to describe that object to me, but I object and claim that you have not gone far enough back in stripping off the mediums between yourself and the object in question. I might argue that your perception of the object is being altered by this final intervening medium and that, if you are to accurately report about that object, you must strip off this final interfering medium. But now WHAT MORE CAN BE REMOVED — THAT WHICH REMAINS BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND MY EXPERIENCE OF IT CANNOT BE REMOVED WITHOUT ALSO REMOVING MY EXPERIENCE OF THAT OBJECT. This is not quite right, however, since the above analogy only shows that any medium still remaining cannot be stripped off in the same manner as the kaleidoscope was stripped off.

Hence an objector to the above analogy might argue that of course, one cannot pluck the man's eyes out and still ask of him to report what he sees. Still one can imagine what it would be like to do so, that is one can imagine what one's experiences would be like without that medium. I am not so sure that I need be bothered with what someone claims he can
imagine. At any rate, these imaginings will have as their raw data previous experience which itself has already been made subject to the constraints imposed by that inescapable medium between the world as experienced and the world independent of experience. That is to say, the data for that which is imagined has already been made subject to the medium. Imagine a Martian! Imagine him describing his world to you! Don't both the Martian and his world resemble you and your own world (at least in their basic properties). The type of Martian our objector needs here either escapes him or says and does nothing, and as such cannot be a source of concern.

The notion of a necessary or inescapable medium between the world independent of experience and the world as experienced is, I think, an intelligible one. Unfortunately, I can not provide empirical evidence for such a medium. Suggestive evidence, that is non-conclusive evidence, is available to us, but only after a large portion of the causal theory of perception has been adopted. Since I intend to keep this thesis as theory neutral as possible, I shall avoid any discussion of that evidence here.

We come now to the final portion of the assumption: that which correlates to these peculiar implied judgments* (that is expectations*) Taints or colours experience and hence any investigation of the facts in a way favourable to the implied judgment* in question. Clearly, if something adjudicates in the case of these peculiar implied judgments*, then
it adjudicates in a way favourable to the implied judgments* in question since, as a matter of fact, no part of our experience conflicts with those implied judgments*. Consider the following. An empirical investigation of the evidence both for and against these six peculiar implied judgments* is performed. We discover that, for these particular implied judgments*, persons accrue experiential evidence only in favour of these implied judgments*. Clearly then, the medium which taints or colours that experience, taints or colours that experience in a way favourable to the judgments* in question. The question is an empirical one: I can provide nothing other than an empirical answer to it.
VII
FURTHER ARGUMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE PREMISE

A
From the Content of the Judgments

In the fifth chapter we noted that the procedure for assessing the correctness of an 'implied judgment' must differ from the procedure for assessing the correctness of a 'deliberated judgment'. "In the case of an 'implied judgment' one has first, and only, the judgment. So when one comes to assess the correctness of an 'implied judgment' one does not have before oneself a fixed and determinate body of evidence (facts) with which the 'implied judgment' must accord if it is to be assessed as correct." Thus far that difference has been important but not crucial. As we shall see, the argument from the propositional content of these six peculiar implied judgments attempts to put that difference to work in support of the premise 'if persons universally agree in their implied judgments that six particular propositions are true, then those six propositions are true'.

The argument 'from the nature of persons' developed out of a general theory of 'implied judgments'. It sought to achieve two aims. It had as its first task, the provision of a general procedure for establishing the occurrence of mistakes in 'implied judgments', that is, a procedure for assessing
the correctness of 'implied judgments'. Its second task was that of establishing that the six peculiar implied judgments* of this thesis differed from the majority of 'implied judgments' and that as a consequence of that difference, when we come to assess the correctness of these six special implied judgments*, we find them to be immune from error. Success in achieving these objectives entails that these six special implied judgments* cannot be mistaken, and ultimately, that the propositional content of these six implied judgments* is true.

That argument's method of achieving those aims was that of concentrating on certain peculiar properties of persons. The first section of this chapter has exactly the same objectives but, as we shall see, employs considerably different tactics to achieve them. The previous arguments sought to separate off these six peculiar implied judgments* from the majority of 'implied judgments' by noting that, as a consequence of certain properties of persons, these six special implied judgments* fail to have all those properties of normal 'implied judgments', namely that these six peculiar implied judgments* are immune from error. The argument to follow concentrates on the content of these peculiar implied judgments* and attempts to separate them off from the majority by means of that content. That is to say, perhaps there is something about the propositional content of these six special implied judgments* that is not present in the majority of 'implied judgments' and which dictates that the inference we are
interested in supporting follows for these six special cases. In order to make clear the notion I am aiming at here, I shall first use as an example a very specific substitution instance for \( p \) in the premise 'If persons universally agree in their 'implied judgments' that \( p \) is true, then \( p \) is true'.

Consider the following substitution instance for \( p \): universal agreement is the only criterion for truth. This specific substitution instance for \( p \) renders the inference legitimate, but only because the content of the antecedent places sufficient bounds or restrictions upon the consequent. In short, the antecedent both sets out the only criterion for truth and then asserts that that criterion is fulfilled in this case.

The above example is riddled with difficulties. To begin with, an investigation of the 'implied judgments' persons do make reveals that persons do not universally agree in their 'implied judgments' that the only criterion of truth is universal agreement. Hence, the antecedent of the inference is factually false. But if the antecedent is factually false, then we cannot affirm the consequent. It seems that we can demonstrate the truth of the conditional premise, but not the truth of that premise's antecedent. The example also introduces the possibility of two senses of "true"; one which occurs in a meta-language and one which occurs in the object language. These difficulties aside, the example does serve the purpose of illustrating how a restricting relation might
exist between the propositional content of an 'implied judgment' and the consequent of that inference we are attempting to defend. Our task in this section of the paper, then, is to determine if our six special implied judgments exhibit this relation.

The majority of 'implied judgments' do not restrict the consequent of the inference 'If persons universally agree in their 'implied judgments' that a particular proposition is true, then that proposition is true'. Where the propositional content of the 'implied judgment' is "that it is raining", or "that you are a careful and observant driver" or "that no one author is responsible for two books with roughly the same title and subject matter" no restricting relation can be established. Without such a restricting relation, the inference is not a legitimate one.

But now consider the propositional content of the six special implied judgments that we are most interested in. In each case, that propositional content either articulates a boundary or states a restriction. It is not enough however, for these implied judgments to merely articulate boundaries or state restrictions, since a great many normal 'implied judgments' have this property as well. "That all men are over one inch tall" articulates a restriction and might easily be the propositional content of an 'implied judgment'. Still, I do not think that it can be rightly considered a member of the peculiar class of propositions that we are concerned with.
What we require, if the argument from content is to support the inference under discussion, is a demonstration that the propositional content of these six peculiar implied judgments restricts or bounds the consequent of that inference and not something else.

Consider now the procedure we employ to assess the correctness of NORMAL 'implied judgments'. (We might also describe the following as a procedure for demonstrating the occurrence of a mistake in normal 'implied judgments'. Accordingly, I shall alternate between these two terminologies.) The procedure for establishing the occurrence of a mistake in normal 'implied judgments' begins with an articulation of the propositional content of the 'implied judgment' to be assessed. The second step in this procedure is to make clear what might count as evidence. Here we must notice, and perhaps clarify, boundaries or restrictions on all possible facts in reference to their evidence potential to this case. In the first instance, those boundaries will restrict all possible facts into two classes: relevant to the propositional content of this 'implied judgment' and irrelevant to the propositional content of this 'implied judgment'. In the second instance, the boundaries will subdivide the relevant possible facts into two further classes: favourable to the propositional content of the 'implied judgment' in question, and unfavourable to that content. Thus far, our procedure entails only that 'to establish the occurrence of a mistake in any 'implied judgment',...
one must first have a clear understanding of what might count as a mistake for that 'implied judgment'.

If there are any problems with the procedure thus far, then they must be problems of vagueness. A diagram may be of some benefit.

**TO DEMONSTRATE THE OCCURRENCE OF A MISTAKE IN NORMAL 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS'**

**STEP 1:** Uncover the 'implied judgment' and articulate its propositional content.

**STEP 2:** Notice the boundaries of evidence; that is, which possible facts will count for what.

2a **POSSIBLE FACTS**

- **RELEVANT**
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 

- **IRRELEVANT**

2b **FAVOURABLE**

- 
- 
- 
- 

**UNFAVOURABLE**

- 
- 
- 
- 

**STEP 3:** Investigate the facts.

- **ACTUAL RELEVANT FACTS**
  - **FAVOURABLE**
  - **UNFAVOURABLE**

- **ACTUAL IRRELEVANT FACTS**

**STEP 4:** Decision; a mistake occurs / does not occur.

**STEP 5:** Dismissal or reaffirmation of the judgment.

The argument from content begins by suggesting that
for normal 'implied judgments', we do have a clear understanding of what is to count as evidence at every stage of the assessment procedure outlined above. We know, for example, that the possibility of my eating "Snicker Snacks" for breakfast this morning is irrelevant in its evidence potential for Jones' 'implied judgment' "that it will rain". Similarly, we know that the possibility of a sunny sky all day would stand as unfavourable evidence for Jones' 'implied judgment'. Finally, we know that the possibility of a torrential downpour would stand as favourable evidence for that 'implied judgment'. So, in the case of normal 'implied judgments', we need only notice what will count as evidence, and then investigate the facts to determine which body of evidence occurs.

BUT NOW ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT 'FROM THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT OF THESE IMPLIED JUDGMENTS', THE SIX PECULIAR IMPLIED JUDGMENTS* OF THIS THESIS ARE DIFFERENT FROM NORMAL 'IMPLIED JUDGMENTS' IN THAT THEY ARE NOT AMENABLE TO THE

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1 This diagram provides us with an excellent opportunity to review each of the arguments advanced in favour of the inference from 'persons universally agree in their 'implied judgments' that p is true' to 'p is true'. Each of those arguments attempts to support that inference by demonstrating that no mistake can occur in the six special implied judgments* of this thesis. Hence, though all of the arguments strive to interfere with the above procedure, ultimately each interferes at a different stage of that procedure. Thus the first branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' can be seen to interfere with the procedure at STEP 1, the second (and stronger) branch of that argument interferes at STEP 3, the argument 'from "pig-headedness"' interferes at STEP 4, and finally, the argument currently under consideration interferes at STEP 2.
The boundary around possible favourable evidence describes a collection of possible facts in terms of their favourable evidence potential for the 'implied judgment' in question. In the case of normal 'implied judgments', we merely notice (and perhaps clarify) those boundaries before proceeding with the assessment procedure. But notice that the propositional content of the six special implied judgments* of this thesis also assert a boundary. Suppose that the boundary asserted in that propositional content overlaps with the boundary around possible favourable evidence to these six special implied judgments*. This would be a very convenient result; we should no longer have to notice that boundary since it would be articulated by the propositional content of the implied judgment* in question. It would further follow that we should have a clear understanding of what could count as possible evidence in favour of these six special implied judgments*. 

To negate the propositional content of these implied judgments* is to describe the boundary around possible evidence unfavourable to these implied judgments* since, "unfavourable" is only the negation of "favourable". But now recall that the negation of the propositional content of these special implied judgments* results in a special sort of nonsense (see again chapter III part E above). It now follows that the boundary around possible evidence
unfavourable to these implied judgments cannot be sensibly drawn, since that which was to have described that boundary is a nonsense claim. But this means that we cannot have a clear understanding of what might count against these implied judgments. And, as argued previously, such an understanding is essential to the demonstration of the occurrence of a mistake in any 'implied judgment'. But if we cannot sensibly point to the possibility of a mistake in these implied judgments, then these six special implied judgments are correct. These six special implied judgments are correct just in the case where the propositional content of those judgments is true. Hence, the propositional content of these six implied judgments is true; or again, from 'persons universally agree in their implied judgments that p is true' we may conclude FOR THESE SIX SPECIAL SUBSTITUTION INSTANCES that 'p is true'.

The above argument (from the propositional content of these judgments) in favour of the second premise of this thesis is not without its difficulties. To begin, the assumption that it relies upon — "Suppose that the boundary asserted by the propositional content of these six special implied judgments overlaps with the boundary around possible favourable evidence for those implied judgments" — is both vague and without support. What precisely is meant by 'a description of a boundary around evidence overlapping with the propositional content of these implied judgments'? What is required, I think, is a strong relationship between what is asserted in
the propositional content of these implied judgments* and our notion of 'evidence'. Some sort of conceptual bond might do here, though I am at a loss to see how one could argue for such a bond. To argue from an analysis of our concept of 'evidence' seems to be the most likely method of establishing the above relationship. However, such arguments nearly always fall victim to a charge of subjectivism — "Your analysis is nice but of course it merely describes the manner in which you use the word "evidence"". To establish this relation on the basis of the meaning of the phrase "favourable evidence" would generate an analytic relation, this being the strongest sort of relation we could hope for. We shall have to settle for less until such time as the stronger analytic relation can be demonstrated.

We can establish a weaker relation between 'favourable evidence' and the propositional content of these implied judgments* if we note that, on those occasions where evidence is given in favour of a claim, that evidence always conforms to the propositional content of one or more of these six special implied judgments*. Further, persons just do not count as 'evidence' anything which requires the denial of the propositional contents of these six implied judgments*. Several of the contexts that I discussed in chapter II make this claim clear. (Consider again a prosecuting attorney attempting to enter as evidence the following; "The crown acknowledges that the accused was at a movie at the time of the crime, but shall
attempt to prove that he was also at the scene of the crime when it was committed."

Hence, all that is meant by "the boundary asserted in the propositional content of these six special implied judgments* overlaps with the boundary around possible favourable evidence for these judgments*" is that, AS A MATTER OF FACT, persons do not count as 'favourable evidence' anything which entails the denial of the propositional content of any of these six special implied judgments*. The restriction asserted in that propositional content, is also a restriction on what might count as 'favourable evidence' for any claim.

The second difficulty with this argument is, by now, a familiar one. Once again, the argument moves from 'the occurrence of an error in these six special implied judgments* cannot sensibly be demonstrated' to 'no mistake occurs in these six special implied judgments*'. On three different occasions, we were able to establish that persons cannot demonstrate the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments*, yet could not state unequivocally why this was so. None of the arguments advanced permit us to arbitrate between (i) It is impossible for persons to establish the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* because of some specific human shortcoming¹, and (ii) It is impossible for persons

¹In chapter V, that shortcoming was an inability on the part of persons to directly grasp the world. In the current argument, the shortcoming is an inadequacy in the language that persons create and employ.
to establish the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* because, as a matter of fact, these implied judgments* contain no mistake.

The repeated emergence of this problem in various forms is worrisome, since that problem occurs in the context of three quite different arguments. It appears that these arguments have something in common, and that the source of the above problem is quite likely located in that something all three arguments have in common. We need only recall that each of the arguments in support of the second premise of this thesis has a common starting point. Each attempts to support that premise by interfering in the procedure outlined on page 120 of this thesis. And now the source of our problem is clear: each of the arguments is designed only to show that it is impossible for persons to demonstrate the occurrence of an error in these six implied judgments*. Any claim to the effect that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments* would seem to automatically exceed the scope of the argument's frame of reference. Since the final argument in favour of the inference meets directly with the problem under discussion, and since that argument attempts to resolve that problem, we shall now turn to the argument 'from the universality of these six special implied judgments*'.

B

From the Universality of These Judgments*

To begin with, even the possibility of a universally
shared implied judgment* should interest us. To secure an agreement in 'deliberated judgments' (where open manipulation and argument is possible) is often arduous and sometimes impossible. Accordingly, if we should stumble upon 'implied judgments' (where manipulation and argument cannot occur) that enjoy universal agreement, we should be right in considering it a lucky find.

The argument 'from the universal agreement enjoyed by these implied judgments*' is the final argument I shall advance in favour of the second premise of this thesis. This argument does not deny any of the previously advanced arguments. In fact, it requires that at least one of those arguments be sound. It claims of those previous arguments, only that each failed to extract all of the data available in the antecedent of the inference that each was designed to support. That is to say, each of those arguments failed to devote appropriate attention to the universality of agreement mentioned in the antecedent of the inference: "If persons universally agree in their implied judgments* that p is true, then p is true". This lack of appropriate emphasis does not result in a denial of the soundness of those arguments. Rather, it merely generates confusion and ambiguity as to what each of those arguments might prove.

Thus the argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments*' cannot, by itself, stand in support of the inference. Its only objective is that of eliminating the
above ambiguity and confusion in one or more of the previously advanced arguments. It must, therefore, be conjoined with one or more of those arguments.

Two, and only two, of the arguments already rehearsed are capable of establishing the conclusion "It is impossible for persons to demonstrate the occurrence of a mistake in these six special implied judgments*. The first is the argument 'from the nature of persons' (specifically, the second branch of that argument); the second is the argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*'. Both of those arguments were ambiguous in their conclusions, and hence both are equally likely to benefit from the support of the argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments*'.

Still, there remain two good reasons for selecting, as a candidate for support, the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. The first of these reasons is that the argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*' is, as yet, only in its weaker form. The second of these reasons is not so easily stated. The argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*' established its conclusion by noting a particular relation in the language that persons construct and employ. However, the essential nature of persons is logically prior to the language they construct and use. Hence, even though the ambiguity in the conclusion of the argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*' is on a
par with the ambiguity in the conclusion of the argument 'from the nature of persons', if some means of support is available to both of these arguments, then that support is best granted to the argument which is logically prior. Accordingly, the argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments' to follow will be directed in support of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'.

The task of articulating the objective and scope of the argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments' is now complete. I am now in a position to set out that argument. That argument begins (in this case) by presupposing the soundness of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. It further notes the apparent ambiguity in the conclusion of that argument. Hence, when that argument concludes that "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments" on the grounds that "It is impossible for persons to demonstrate the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments", we are not exactly clear about what might be meant by that conclusion. It might mean only that "No person can demonstrate the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments" or again, it might mean that "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments". That argument is designed to establish only the former, yet seems determined to conclude the latter.

The argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments' can now be employed as a source of support. The
second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' lapses into an apparent ambiguity only because it fails to devote sufficient attention to the fact that "NO PERSON can demonstrate the occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments". Without this emphasis, that argument proceeds as if somehow the occurrence of a mistake might still be demonstrated. But since it is persons, and only persons, who might demonstrate the occurrence of mistakes, we can legitimately conclude that "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments cannot be demonstrated".

Given the above emphasis, the conclusion of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' is ambiguous (apparently) in a manner different from that previously supposed. Hence, "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments" might now mean either (i) "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments cannot be demonstrated" or again, it might mean (ii) "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments". I shall argue that it can mean only the former, since for it to mean the latter entails the committment of a fallacy. If I am successful in so arguing, then it would follow that the conclusion of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' is not ambiguous at all.

1. Assumption: If any assertion p means the same as any assertion q, then, at the very least, it must be the case that p implies q, and q implies p.
2. Alternative meaning (i):
If "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" means the same as "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* cannot be demonstrated", then, at the very least, it must be the case that the latter implies the former and the former implies the latter. It is clearly the case that; 1) If "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" then "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* cannot be demonstrated". But it is not obviously the case that; 2) If "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* cannot be demonstrated" then "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*".

3. Alternative meaning (ii):
If "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" means the same as "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments*", then, at the very least, it must be the case that the latter implies the former and the former implies the latter. It is clearly the case that; 3) If "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" then "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*". But it is not obviously the case that; 4) If "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" then "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments*".

4. Discussion:
The following discussion has, as its aim, a defence of the
inference numbered 2). We are suspicious of that inference only because we believe that something extra could be added to the antecedent of that inference. Or again, though we acknowledge that no demonstrable mistake could occur in these implied judgments*, still, WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE SOME FURTHER GUARANTEE AGAINST THE OCCURRENCE OF ANY NON-DEMONSTRALE MISTAKE. So long as we have this belief, the validity of inference 2) remains in question. But if this belief is unjustified, and if we could show it to be unjustified, then there would remain no good reason for denying the validity of inference 2).

Consider the second alternative meaning of "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" namely, "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments*". We can prefix our original claim with "It is the case that ... " without affecting the meaning of that claim. Hence, the only essential difference between our original claim and its second alternate meaning, is the addition of the word "really". Now either the addition of this word contributes nothing to the meaning of our original claim, or it contributes something. If it contributes nothing, then inferences 3) and 4) are both tautologies. That is to say, both are trivially true since both would have, as their logical form, 'p=p'. It would then follow that the second alternative means the same as our original claim but that it does so only trivially; just as "It is raining" means the same as "It is
raining" but only trivially. Since our task is to arrive at a non-trivial meaning of our original claim, we may assume that the addition of the word "really" contributes something to the second alternative meaning of our original claim. I have tried to capture the force of that contribution by noting that our confidence in the validity of inference 3) differs from our confidence in the validity of inference 4).

Now consider inference 3) and notice that, though the consequent of that inference is identical with the consequent of inference 2), we are not at all suspicious of inference 3). If the antecedent of inference 3) says anything more than the antecedent of inference 2), then what it says is that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistakes occur in these implied judgments*. It would appear that our suspicion of inference 2) is well grounded. We believe that some guarantee against the occurrence of NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistakes can be provided, and that guarantee does seem to be provided in the antecedent of inference 3). But if the antecedent of inference 3) provides a guarantee that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistakes occur in these implied judgments*, then it must be the case that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistake occurs in these implied judgments*. And if the antecedent of inference 3) provides a guarantee that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistake occurs in these implied judgments*, then it does so by saying that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistakes occur in these implied judgments*. But saying that no NON-DEMONSTRABLE mistake occurs in these implied judgments* does not, by itself,
entail that no **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistake occurs in these implied judgments*, since *saying* that something is the case does not, by itself, entail that that something *is* the case. Hence, the antecedent of inference 3) does not provide a guarantee against the occurrence of a **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistake in these implied judgments*.

One might object here: 'Surely one can provide a guarantee against the occurrence of a **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistake in these implied judgments* without committing the fallacy of "Saying it is so, makes it so"'. That objection would be unfounded, however, since in order to do anything more than just *saying* that no **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistake occurs in these implied judgments*, one must begin to **demonstrate** that no **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistakes occur in these implied judgments*. If one fails in this demonstration, then one must once again merely rely upon saying that no **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistakes occur in these implied judgments*. But if one succeeds in that demonstration, then, of course, the mistakes thereby guaranteed not to occur in these implied judgments* are demonstrable ones, that is, not **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** ones.

Hence, it follows that one cannot (except by committing a fallacy) provide a guarantee that no **NON-DEMONSTRABLE** mistake occurs in these implied judgments*. Accordingly, our belief that such a guarantee could be provided is unjustified, and thus there remains no good reason for denying the validity of inference 2). Further since inference 1) was never in
question, it now follows that the first alternative meaning of "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" fulfills a necessary condition of meaning the same as "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*". The second alternative meaning fails to fulfill that necessary condition in any non-trivial manner. Hence "The occurrence of a mistake in these implied judgments* cannot be demonstrated" could mean the same as "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" BUT "It really is the case that no mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" cannot mean the same as "No mistake occurs in these implied judgments*" We may conclude, therefore, that the conclusion of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' is not ambiguous as previously thought to be.

Since the above ambiguity was the last of our objections to the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons', and since that ambiguity has been resolved, we are now in a position to assert the conclusion of that argument. The propositional content of each of the six special implied judgments* of this thesis is true. Thus, FOR THESE SIX SPECIAL IMPLIED JUDGMENTS*, or again, WHERE WE SUBSTITUTE THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT OF THESE SIX SPECIAL IMPLIED JUDGMENTS* FOR P, the following inference is a valid one: "If persons universally agree in their implied judgments* that six particular propositions are true, then those six particular propositions are true.
VIII
AN OBJECTION TO THE PREMISE, CONSIDERED

A

The Objection Stated

The Objector:

To say that all objections to the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' have been answered is mistaken, or at least only partly true. I urge you to consider the following. You claim, in the immediately prior section of this paper, to have resolved the apparent ambiguities suggested by the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. Still, you attempted to do so by means of resolving those ambiguities as they appear in the conclusion of that argument. As you will surely recall, you asserted that this worrisome ambiguity first emerged in the following premise of that argument; "The world cannot provide counter evidence to these six special implied judgments". You further claimed that, since the ambiguity was now crystalized, the second branch of the argument marked a significant improvement over the first branch of the same argument. But if the above premise isolates clearly the ambiguity apparently present in that argument, then you ought to have resolved the ambiguity at that point, rather than at the more general level
of the argument's conclusion.

What I am saying amounts to this. In the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons' you isolate and state clearly a specific ambiguity which apparently arises in that argument. Yet, when the time comes to resolve that specific ambiguity, you abandon it and instead resolve a more general sort of ambiguity. Even if that general ambiguity is a consequence of the specific ambiguity, still, you have only resolved the effects of the argument's ambiguity and not that ambiguity itself. Hence, it might still be the case that the argument's (now non-ambiguous) conclusion relies upon an ambiguous premise.

In what follows, I shall argue that that specific ambiguity does remain in the premises of your argument, and that so long as it does so remain, the argument fails to establish the conclusion you intend it to.

"The world cannot provide counter evidence to these six special implied judgments*" is ambiguous since you fail to make clear what is meant by "the world". You previously drew a distinction between "the world as experienced by persons" and 'the world independent of human experience'. But in the above premise of your argument, you fail to distinguish which sense of "the world" is being used.

This remaining ambiguity is fatal to your argument, since it introduces a yet unsolved problem from the philosophy of perception. If you intend to conclude that persons cannot
be mistaken in these implied judgments* since 'the world as experienced' cannot provide counter evidence to these implied judgments*, then your argument has some plausibility. But, if you intend to conclude that persons cannot be mistaken in these implied judgments* since 'the world independent of persons' cannot provide counter evidence to these implied judgments*, then your argument is in error. That is to say, all appearances of the world might repeatedly conform to these implied judgments*, but from that, it does not follow that 'the world independent of persons' conforms to these implied judgments*. Accordingly, a mistake might still occur in the six peculiar implied judgments* of this thesis. But if such a mistake might still occur, then the propositional content of those implied judgments* might be false, and the truth of the second premise of this thesis is still in doubt.

B The Objection Answered

The argument 'from the universality of these implied judgments*' did seek to resolve the ambiguity in the argument 'from the nature of persons' as it appeared in the conclusion of that argument. The objector is correct here; the ambiguity resolved by the argument 'from universality' was of a general sort. I chose to attack that ambiguity at the general level since, at the general level, the same ambiguity also emerges in the argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*'. Hence, if that general ambiguity
is only apparent in the argument 'from the nature of persons' then it is also merely apparent in the argument 'from the propositional content of these implied judgments*'. Still, even if these are the reasons for resolving the ambiguity at a general level, the force of the objection remains. What is required then, is a resolution of the specific ambiguity thought to be contained in the premises of the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'.

Our objector claims that I have failed to adhere to a distinction of my own making. He then claims that my failure to do so results in a very specific ambiguity in one of the premises of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. But his most pressing objection is that this specific ambiguity is not of an innocent sort but rather covers over a fundamental problem from the philosophy of perception. I shall argue that, in fact, this specific ambiguity is innocent and that it in no way overlaps with the problem our objector suggests it does. In order to do so, however, I shall have to say a bit about the nature of that problem. Since Plato describes that problem as well, or better than, any other philosopher that I am familiar with, I turn now to his statement of the problem.

Picture men in an underground cave dwelling, with a long entrance reaching up toward the light ... in this they lie from their childhood, their legs and necks in chains, so that they stay where they are and look only in front of them ... Some way off, and higher up, a fire is burning behind them, and
between the fire and the prisoners is a road on higher ground. Imagine a wall built along this road, like the screen which showmen have in front of the audience, over which they show the puppets ... picture also men carrying along this wall all kinds of articles, which overtop it, statues of men and other creatures in stone and wood ... 'A strange image and strange prisoners'

They are like ourselves ... for in the first place do you think that such men would have seen anything of themselves or of each other except the shadows thrown by the fire on the wall of the cave opposite to them ... Then if they were able to talk with one another, do you not think that they would suppose what they saw to be the real things?

'Necessarily'

Having set up the analogy, Plato invites us to consider what will happen if "one of them [is] released, and forced suddenly to stand up and turn his head, and walk and look towards the light". Plato claims that such a prisoner would still be unconvinced that what he had been seeing before were "mere foolish phantoms".

But ... if someone were to drag him out up the steep and rugged ascent, and did not let go till he had been dragged up to the light of the sun, would not his forced journey be one of pain and annoyance; and when he came to the light, would not his eyes be so full of the glare that he would not be able to see a single one of the objects we now call true.

'Certainly, not all at once.'

Yes, I fancy that he would need time before he could see things in the world above. At first he would most easily see shadows, then the reflections in water of men and
everything else, and, finally, the things themselves.  

The problem Plato sets before us is this. It is possible for the chains to be removed from one or more of the prisoners, and hence possible for them to see 'things themselves'. Similarly (?), it is possible for us to remove our chains (if we are like the prisoners in the cave as Plato suggests) and see that what we judge to be real are 'mere foolish phantoms'. The shadows or appearances we now call real are, in fact, not real at all. So even though we judge these 'shadows' to be real, it is possible for us to be mistaken in these judgments, just as the prisoners in the cave were mistaken. Now I might admit the problem Plato describes and yet still claim that it is not a problem for the second branch of the argument 'from the nature of persons'. And, of course, this is what I shall do.

Plato's analogy mirrors our own human condition, but only in so far as it describes a great many instances of human perceptual error. But from the fact that his analogy is sometimes correct, it does not immediately follow that that analogy is always correct. Hence, on every occasion we, like the prisoners of the cave, do experience constraints on our investigation of the facts. And just like the prisoners in

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1 This entire series of quotations appears in Plato, The Republic (London: Dent and Sons, 1964) translated by A.D. Lindsay, p.207 to 208
the cave, it is possible for us to remove those constraints. By removing the constraints, we are able to discover that what we saw originally were 'mere foolish phantoms' and hence able to discover the 'things themselves'. In this way we overcome our original mistaken way of seeing things and replace it with a correct way of seeing things. Plato has had the opportunity to describe how these constraints might be removed in his analogical case; I should like now to take a moment to describe how those constraints might be removed in our own case. Plato offers us no clear statement of what might (in our own case) be analogous to the prisoner's chains. Still, he later argues that our own chains can be removed by contemplating the forms. Though his analogy arises in the realm of human perception, he attempts to shift its application to a realm much wider than that of human perception. My own analysis of both the nature of our chains and the process of their removal will be an attempt to keep the analogy within its proper frame of reference.

We know that both internal and external constraints can generate errors in perceptual judgment. Now if we are truly like the prisoners in the cave, then of course it is these constraints that the analogy urges us to remove. Before we can see how this might be done, however, we would be well advised to get clear about the nature of those internal and external constraints. The external constraints include

(a) the observer's viewpoint, i.e., the relative positions of
his sense organs and the object perceived;
(b) the relative position and nature of the light-source(s) and the nature of the light(s);
(c) the nature of the [external] medium, or the presence of other things between the observer and the object perceived.

The internal constraints include

(a) the states of the observer's sense organs, nerves and brain;
(b) psychological factors such as the observer's fears hopes or expectations.

What we must do, if we are to see the 'things themselves', is to strip off these interfering constraints. This is easily accomplished for the external constraints. Hence for (a), if this particular viewpoint is an inadequate one, then I merely alter it: that is to say, if off in the distance I see a poorly defined shape, then to avoid error in my reporting about that shape, I must move closer to that shape until it is well defined. Similarly for (b), if the nature or positioning of the light is inadequate and prevents an accurate report, then I must improve either the nature or positioning of that lighting. We have already seen how the constraint of an interfering external medium might be removed ( in the kaleidoscope case ).

We come now to the internal constraints and the question of how it is that they might be removed. There is no possibility of the percipient stripping off these constraints

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since these constraints are internal (that is properties of the percipient and not properties of his environment); they are not the sort of constraints which the percipient can directly manipulate. Still, such constraints can be robbed of their interference powers by the introduction of a second percipient. Hence, if after a blow on the head I begin to see double, then we can eliminate the constraints that my nervous system is placing upon an adequate account of the contents of the world merely by requesting of a second percipient those same accounts. And of course, since this second percipient has not incurred a blow on the head, it is unlikely that he should see double.

In a great many cases then, Plato's analogy is accurate: in order to see 'things themselves', we quite often must strip off any perceptual constraints. In stripping off those constraints, we quickly come to realize that what we sometimes take to be the real things in the world, are in fact often 'mere foolish phantoms'.

But now consider the constraint posited in the argument 'from the nature of persons'. It was to be an unavoidable medium between the world 'as experienced' and the world 'independent of human experience'. I wish, now, to discuss the difference between this type of constraint and the type of constraints suggested by Plato's analogy. If this constraint is an unavoidable medium, and if all persons are subject to this medium, then the removal of this constraint
might not be so easily achieved.

The above sort of constraint provides a major obstacle to Plato's analogy, since in the terms of that analogy, it amounts to a chain which is both universal and cannot be removed. Or again, when Plato's prisoner is released and leaves the cave, he takes with him certain internal chains. And further, since we are all like the prisoners in the cave, there does not exist a third party to whom we could appeal as in the case of normal internal constraints (I must apologize for ruling out — somewhat arbitrarily — the possibility of a benevolent Super-Being being of some aid here.) That is to say, any third party we could appeal to, is also subject to these constraints. Hence the constraint (the unavoidable medium) I posited in the argument 'from the nature of persons' is not analogous to the type of constraints which generate serious problems in the philosophy of perception. Consequently, those problems do not arise for the argument 'from the nature of persons', and thus, the ambiguous premise of that argument cannot be said to gloss over those problems. Since those problems were the only problems our objector suggested might have been glossed over, we can now conclude that the ambiguity of this premise is of an innocent sort. The

1 Once again (as on page 110) I should, if pressed, argue that these constraints are imposed by the neurophysiological structures which are genetically inherited, and hence commonly held by all members of the species.
objector's most pressing criticism has been overcome.

Though the premise "The world cannot provide counter evidence to these six special implied judgments*" remains innocently ambiguous, I do not think that it must remain so. However to remove this final, innocent, ambiguity would entail a very long and involved argument. Accordingly, I shall rest content with the claim that at least no harm results from the ambiguity in that premise.
IX
CONCLUSION

A
Conclusion to Part B

1. Persons universally agree in their implied judgments* that these six particular propositions are true. ( from chapters II, III, and IV )

2. If persons universally agree in their implied judgments* that these six particular propositions are true, then these six particular propositions are true. ( from chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII )

THEREFORE: These six particular propositions are true. ( By Modus Ponens, Q.E.D. )

I cannot stress too much that premise two is true only for a very limited number of propositions. Hence the argument is sound only for a very limited number of propositions, though of course there is no reason why they might not number in excess of six. In order to fill out this class of propositions known to be true, one must a) investigate the 'implied judgments' persons do make and separate off all those and only those which enjoy universal human agreement, and b) argue for the truth of the premise numbered 2. above, for the propositional content of those particular 'implied judgments'.
The first criterion is an empirical one and requires a familiarity with the things that persons say and do. Since philosophers generally do not lack this skill, I think that the first essential step is easily fulfilled. But we have seen several universally agreed upon 'implied judgments' that fail to adequately meet the second criterion. Accordingly, it might be worthwhile to review what is required in order to fulfill that second condition.

I have argued that one can successfully argue for the truth of the second premise in two ways. One can first argue 'from the nature of persons'. One must be careful in so arguing since it is easy for an argument 'from the nature of persons' to take a wrong turn. Such an argument must rely heavily upon some property of persons such that so long as persons have that property, the particular 'implied judgment' cannot be mistaken. An argument of this sort goes astray if it allows this property to attach to some persons but not to others, or if it allows that property to be merely an accidental one. The sort of property the argument requires is a property which is characteristic of persons, a property which anything must have if it is to be considered a person. Further that property must be such that it makes it impossible for persons to investigate the facts and discover the 'implied judgment' in question to be mistaken. These, then, are the major conditions which must be met, if one is to argue 'from the nature of persons' in defence of the second premise.
The second means of support for the second premise, is to argue that the propositional content of the 'implied judgment' in question asserts what might count as favourable evidence for that 'implied judgment', and that that same propositional content renders nonsensical any description of what might count as evidence unfavourable to that 'implied judgment'. That is to say, there must be something peculiar about the propositional content of the 'implied judgment' in question, such that that content excludes the possibility of any sensible counter evidence for that 'implied judgment'. This, then, is the major condition which must be met, if one is to argue 'from the propositional content of a particular 'implied judgment' in support of the second premise.

I have tried to argue that in either case, the essential conditions listed above are fulfilled for the six peculiar implied judgments* that this thesis is centered upon. Hence, I think that, for these six particular implied judgments*, the second premise is defensible. Accordingly, the propositional content of these six implied judgments* is true, and since we judge that propositional content to be true, it follows that we can know the truth of these six particular propositions with certainty.

B

General Conclusion

Given that the six propositions of this thesis are factually informative (defended in Part A) and given that
these same propositions can be known to be true with certainty (defended in Part B), it follows that our original dilemma, as outlined in the introduction of this thesis, is false.
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