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Introduction.

In this essay I am concerned with the question of whether the relation between an emotion and the object of that emotion is a causal one. A good deal of interest has developed recently in the way in which concepts in the philosophy of mind and the theory of knowledge, such as ‘reason’, ‘desire’, ‘belief’, ‘object’ and even ‘knowledge’, might be susceptible to analyses which make reference to the concept of causality. The interest has three major points of focus: on the question of whether the antecedents of actions, in the form of desires, beliefs and reasons, are causally effective in the production of action, in the wake of Davidson’s work in the area; on the question of whether the concept of ‘knowledge’ has a causal component, following the refutation of the traditional tripartite analysis by such philosophers as Gettier; and on the question with which I am preoccupied in this essay. The general stimulus behind these enquiries is the fundamental philosophical problem of how it is that man, so free of nature that he confronts himself with it, can nevertheless play his part within it. The precise form of the relation between mankind and the world is to be philosophically clarified by conceptual analyses which show the human position in the causal order. Philosophical issues keep abreast of fashions in philosophical method.

Because philosophical difficulties can be both creative and clouded by the concepts in which they find expression, I devote much time here to the analysis of the two concepts central to
the problem I (see), the concept of 'emotion', and the object of an emotion', as well as giving some attention to a concept of rather more general importance, that of causation. The analysis of the concept of an object is a vexed issue which has been accorded much attention, while that of the concept of an emotion is a vexing one which has not. Nevertheless, if the position which I articulate here is the correct one, it is clear that attention to the latter is at least as important to the solution of the problem as is attention to the former.

In my first chapter I offer an analysis of emotion according to which the orthodox dichotomy between thought and feeling is shown to be untenable: emotions must be understood as essentially cognitive states, constituted at least in part by judgements. It is in the light of this analysis that I go on to elaborate the ways in which causality is involved in the relation between emotion and object, or, the ways in which the concept of causality is to invoked in the analysis of this relation. In order that the later chapters of the essay should seem plausible, then, it is imperative that the conclusions of the first should be assimilated.

In the second chapter I provide a treatment of the concept of 'the object of an emotion' which also depends on the conclusions of the first chapter: in essence the object of an emotion is that item in the world with which the individual is concerned in his emotional thought: emotions only have objects in so far as thoughts do. The suggestion is that if it is not allowed that emotions are cognitive
states then it is a complete mystery that our feelings should be
directed towards items in the world. In this chapter I delineate the
concept of 'the object of a mental state', in accordance with what I
take the meaning of the phrase to be, so that the object of an
individual's mental state is an item in the world.

Having clarified these two concepts I turn on to conclusions
that I have reached in going on to argue, in my third chapter, that
there is a way in which the analysis of the relation between emotion
and object must make reference to the concept of causality, since
feeling an emotion towards an item presupposes thinking about that
item, and, I argue, for two items A and B to be related so that A is
thinking about B they must stand in a form of causal relationship.
It follows that, in one very good sense, the relation between emotion
and object is a causal one.

However, it might be thought that this very good sense is in
fact a peculiarly attenuated one, and indeed, discussion of the
question of whether emotion and object are causally related has
usually been directed towards a sense of this question which is far
more obvious, though the arguments forwarded pro and con have been
no less subtle. The question has been raised as to whether the
object of an emotion, or some characteristic of that object, or
perception of the object or its characteristics, might not be the
cause of the emotion felt towards it in the quite straightforward
sense that a general law might relate one of the forms to the
latter. In my final chapter, again presupposing the results of
the account of the concept of emotion given in the first chapter
I argue against the possibility of an affirmative answer to this question.

It is unfortunate that the hypnotic figure of Wittgenstein looms so large, for his alarming presence, if not in the foreground, then at least in the middle distance, seems destined to result in a loss of focus on the problems. There tends to be a debilitating polarisation; one either argues in favour of, or in opposition to, not what it is clear that Wittgenstein said, but rather what it is hoped or feared that he might have been saying. In an attempt to avoid this sort of interference I have endeavoured as far as possible to make explicit or implicit reference to the texts, although I may seem to rank with those pitched against, I do not subscribe to the axiom that whoever is not for him is against him.
1. Emotion.

In this chapter I argue that emotions are psychological states which have a cognitive structure; in particular that they are in part constituted by thoughts, beliefs or judgements. This central thesis will be counterpointed by an analysis of the concept of emotion which distinguishes emotions from other mental states which I term moods, reactions and attitudes, and by a discussion of the possible application of causal terminology in the context of the mental life. If at times these secondary themes assume undue prominence, it should be remembered that my primary purpose is the proper development of the first.

1.1. Thoughts.

If we use a psychological predicate to characterise an individual we can pose the question: in order for this predicate to be true of this individual, does it have to be the case that he has any thoughts or beliefs? In other words, is being constituted, either in part or in its entirety, by thinking that p or believing that q? And for the different possible values of p there are different answers. In order for it to be true of me that I am asleep it does not have to be true of me that I have any thoughts or beliefs, and it has even been suggested that my having any thoughts is actually incompatible with my being asleep. Likewise, if I am being described as generous, shy, honest or confident, it does not have to be the case that I think that p or q or r.

On the other hand, first trivially, if it is to be true of me
that I think that p, it is ipso facto true of me that I think something, namely p. Further, if it is to be true of me that T am angry with an individual, then I must have certain thoughts about that individual, and if I admire him then I think certain thoughts about him. Often, we can express the sort of thought that is correlated with the psychological predicate by the use of a correlative term: if I pity a man then I think him pitiful; if I despise him then I think him desppicable; if I am depressed then I find something or everything depressing; if I am amused then I regard something as amusing. I do not go so far as to say that I must silently rehearse these propositions, and in fact I think such mute assertion wholly irregular. I will call the distinction between states which are wholly or in part constituted by thoughts and states which are not so constituted the distinction between propositional and non-propositional psychological states. I am not more interested in pursuing the classification of mental states and predicates for any distance; I want simply to maintain that emotions are, in this sense, propositional states.

Emotions are not, of course, alone in being propositional states. Trivially, as I pointed out, thinking that p or believing that q are also in this class. But further, and more important at this juncture, attitudes, moods, and reactions count as propositional states. If I have a particular attitude towards another, such as an attitude of trust, or of respect, or of contempt, I am thereby, as it were, logically bound to think about the object of my attitude.
in a certain way. It is in this that "having the attitude that..." does not fully capture. If I am in a certain mood, such as one of nostalgia, or of ennui, or of wistfulness, what is implied by this is that I think of or think in a certain way. In characteristic of the mood and if I react to something, or learn of some event, with astonishment, helplessness, or despair, it follows that I regard the event as salutary, or delightful, or dismaying.

There may of course be cases which could, with some justification, be termed emotions or reactions of whatever, although they did not, according to the distinction drawn here, count as propositional states. Thus psychologists, in their investigations into the emotions, often seem to treat emotions as states whose criteria of identity are articulated exhaustively in terms of physiological processes or events, either at a behavioural or at a neurological level. Fear, say, is identified as an organism's pattern of visceral responses, and the question of whether two organisms are in the same emotional state - fear - is settled conclusively by reference to the set of visceral responses evidenced. Yet, without citing the procedures of scientists, it may be that there are systems of response in human behaviour that could be classified as reactions independently of any reference to thought. In this way a section of an individual's behaviour could be termed "shock", say, no matter what his thoughts and beliefs, if he had any at all, according to this definition of these states their criteria of identity would be solely behaviourally determined.
However, if we are to use these concepts to denote propositional states, it does not follow that any other three terms—emotion, mood, attitude, and reaction—to denote propositional states. We must be able to specify what thoughts the individual in that state is prone to, or what beliefs he has. In a particular case we may be able to detail these thoughts, but we cannot be confident of this in every case. For instance, it is often claimed that from the fact that I am afraid it follows that I believe myself to be in some danger. But fear is possible not only in the face of danger, but also, less specifically, in the face of an ordeal. I may fear a visit to the dentist, or a confrontation with an estranged spouse, or even an interview, because these are the sorts of occasion that can result in mental or physical pain, and pain is a worthy object of fear. It seems that, for the most part, the furthest that we can go in the claims we make, a priori, about the thoughts that occupy the mind of an individual in a particular psychological state in virtue of the fact that he is in that state, is that he will have the sorts of thoughts that characterize all do occupy the minds of men in that state.

Thus, if I am moved, say by a flood of tenderness towards my wife, my mind will be the mind of a man in love. I may be struck by my wife's grace, or her fineness of temperament; by her evident purity of feeling for myself and our children; by the beauty of her eyes, the gentleness of her features, the delicacy of her frame, the exquisite uniqueness and subtlety of her
perception. If I am overwhelmed by feelings of contentment for another man, my thoughts will be directed toward him. I may recoil from unpleasant or repulsive situations, or from the incapacity for feeling, or from the intellect of weakness or naivety in direction. I may even try to remind that a man's life is a series of empty tombs, that there is no fulness within that he has allowed his spirit to be dimmed by the tedious, the monotonous, the heartless and the cruel so that there is no longer any space in his soul for the spontaneous, the sensitive, the beneficent and the noble.

Of course, feeling an emotion is not merely thinking such things; thoughts such as these may be had, strange though it might sound, though no emotion is felt. But it does not follow from this that feeling an emotion is something other than having such thoughts. Rather, what is involved in feeling an emotion is that the constitutive thoughts should present themselves in a certain way. By feeling contentment is a function of the way in which I think the thoughts that I do, when I am moved by emotions, grip me, monopolize my attention, strike me forcibly, prevent my mind from ranging freely over unrelated matters, intrude repeatedly into my consciousness, aspert and impede themselves. We might say:

feeling is a mode of thought.

Emotion, then, is not something other than thought, but a manner of thinking. Emotional thought is insistent, magnetic, and in its forcefulness, dysfunctional. And emotion is more violent, more profound, more intense, as the constitutive thoughts are more
1.2. The Justification of Emotion.

The complex structure of the emotions, and the way in which they are constituted by thoughts, is revealed in the ways in which we are open to criticism in our emotional lives. There are a variety of ways in which our feelings can be misplaced, or at fault, and these ways highlight the cognitive nature of emotion. In this section, in order to elaborate more fully the relation of emotion to thought, I consider the nature of emotional inadequacy.

An instance of emotion, for instance the elder son's resentment at the return of the prodigal, may be either reasonable or unreasonable. This distinction is made in terms of what it would be reasonable to feel, given the beliefs that an individual has, or what a normal, rational man, would feel given those beliefs. Although in many cases we will be able to say categorically whether the emotion that an individual feels is reasonable or unreasonable, it is inevitable that there should in some cases be no clear answer, for the distinction is predicated on a norm, and norms are not necessarily clearly, defined or unanimously accepted. Some will find the son's resentment reasonable, thinking that this case is paradigmatic of justified indignation, while others, perhaps more susceptible to the point of the parable, will think that it has no justification.

The distinction between the reasonable and the unreasonable should not be mistaken for the distinction between the intelligible and the unintelligible. It may be that a particular instance of...
an not on intelligible and not unreasonable. This distinction exists in the lay mind, but it may seem that the division between on the one hand the reasonable and the unreasonable and on the other hand the intelligible and the unintelligible, has been made more clearly through the advance of child psychology in the twentieth century, and the consequent increasing comprehensibility of pathological behaviour. In the 'Little Hans' case history, Freud describes how Hans acquired a pathological fear, or phobia, of horses, through the displacement of the fear which he felt for his father onto the figure of a horse. If this explanation of Hans' fear is intelligible, as it seems to me that it is, then it follows that the fear is intelligible though unreasonable, for its being a pathological fear lies in its irrationality. It may be thought that the explanation which Freud offers is wrong, either because it is an explanation of the wrong sort, or else because, although of the right sort, it is inadequate for some other reason, but neither of these objections impugns the possibility of the explanation of pathological emotion, and it is this latter which is required if doubt is to be cast on the distinction between the intelligible and the reasonable.

Although they are separate distinctions, they are not logically independent, however, for from the fact that an instance of emotion is either reasonable or unreasonable it follows that the emotion is intelligible. In this way the intelligibility of an emotion is presupposed by its reasonableness: it is a logical
precondition of an emotion is either reasonable or unreasonable that it be intelligible, just as it is a logical precondition of the King of France's being either bald or not bald that he exist.

The elder son's resentment is reasonable if the belief that the behaviour of his brother and his father constitutes an affront, or an intrusion on his rights, is justified, and unreasonable if this belief does not have adequate support. In this way his resentment consists in part in the beliefs that he has.

Again, this distinction between the reasonable and the unreasonable should not be confused with another distinction which can be made and I will turn the distinction between the warranted and the unwarranted. It may be that an instance of an emotion is reasonable, and yet unwarranted. The question of whether an instance of an emotion is warranted is the question of whether the emotion is excessive or not, we might agree that the elder son's resentment is reasonable, for the state of affairs might be seen as good cause, but still disagree as to whether the extent of his resentment was warranted. Whereas the distinction between the reasonable and the unreasonable concerns the type of emotion that is felt, that between the warranted and the unwarranted concerns the degree of emotion.

Now estimations of the warrantedness or unwarrantedness of emotion presuppose judgements about the quantity of emotion, and these judgements concern, once again, the thoughts that are constitutive of the emotion, and this in two ways. Firstly, the extent of the elder son's resentment is in part a function of the
gravity with which he views the situation. His resenting his brother consists partly in seeing him as having violated his rights, and his resentment will be the greater if he thinks the violation a very serious one, and the lesser as he feels it less important. Secondly, as before, the vehemence of his resentment is determined by the way he is affected by hostile thoughts. If he is assailed mercilessly, by the injustice of his father's behaviour towards his sister, and, without re-iteration, is overcome by such reflections, his resentment is intense.

In these ways, we identify the feelings that can have a much greater influence on their thoughts: once we know what another thinks about the object of his emotion, and we know how much his thoughts preoccupy him, we know what it is that he feels, and with what intensity he feels it.

1.3. Direction.

I have argued that emotions are at least partly comprised by thoughts. But in this, I have only said, emotions are not distinguished from moods, attitudes or reactions. These distinction remain to be brought out in order that the nature of the relation between emotion and object can be examined. There can be no presupposition that the relation between emotion and object will not differ from that between, say, mood and object. This will become clearer as I bring out the distinctions I require. Also, the way of making the first of these distinctions, between the concept of an emotion and the concept of a mood, allows me to say something further about the
nature of the thought constitutive of emotion. The distinction is
drawn in terms of the concept of direction.

The term "direction", at least in the sense in which I intend
to use it, is not a term of ordinary language, and I introduce it
as a technical term. It has been used by other philosophers, but I
know of none whose usage corresponds to my own, and so I will not
confuse matters by referring to any of these other usages. I shall
use the word in the following way: a thought has direction if and
only if it is a thought concerning a particular item, and a mental
state has direction if and only if it is comprised, at least in part,
by thought about one particular item. So an individual is in a
directed mental state if, when he is in that state, his thoughts
concern a particular item.

Moods differ from emotions in that they are not essentially
directed states. It does not follow from the fact that I am bored
that I am bored about something in particular, for I may be bored
about nothing specific, and simply unable to muster any interest in
anything whatever. On the other hand it does follow from the fact
that I am feeling anxious that I envy someone in particular, even
if it transpires that I am anxious of quite a large number of people.
Again, although I may be depressed about something in particular,
say, by failing marriage, I may equally well be depressed about
everything I turn my mind to, that is to say, not in particular,
but I cannot similarly mourn nothing in particular, mourn everything
I turn my mind to, for from the fact that I am mourning it follows.
that I am mourning some specific item.

I do not wish to claim that we distinguish between instances of states of mind such as emotion on the grounds that some of them have direction while others do not, and in this way distinguish the moods from the emotions. An instance of a mental state's having direction is not enough to mark it out as an instance of an emotion rather than a mood. What is required is that the mental state should necessarily have direction. Moods, unlike moods, cannot have undirected instances. (Of course, because moods are defined as those mental states which possibly lack direction, if any instance of a mental state actually is undirected then it follows that it is an instance of a mood and not of an emotion, for p implies possibly p.)

There is a fairly strong tradition according to which the term 'object' correlates strictly with the term 'direction': the object of a mental act or psychological state is that item towards which the act or state is directed. My reasons for not following in this tradition will become more fully apparent in my next chapter, in which I present a detailed account of the concept of 'the object of an emotion'. Instead of using the term 'object' then, in this context, I employ the notion of the 'subject' of a thought or mental state: the subject of a mental state is that item towards which the state is directed. This terminological decision ensures as far as possible that the term 'object' will not appear in my essay in different senses. The relation between the concept of the 'subject' and that of the 'object' of a mental state will be fully
explained in the following chapter.

The distinction between mood and emotion, in terms of the concept of duration, is supplemented by two other distinctions, between on the one hand emotion and reaction, in terms of the concept of reaction, and on the other hand emotion and attitude, in terms of the concept of attention, which together provide a definition of the concept of emotion. These distinctions occupy my next section.

Reactions and Attitudes.

An event, something which happens, differs from a state, something which obtains. An event takes place at some specific time, a state lasts for a length of time. An event is a matter of a moment, a state of a period. While not wanting to say that events are very short-lived states, I want to say that the difference between events and states is one of duration. In fact, states endure while events do not.

Psychological reactions differ from emotions (and also from moods and attitudes) in that they lack duration. That is, strictly speaking, they are events, and not states, of mind. If I am shocked, astonished, startled, awed, surprised or struck dumb by some event then in general it makes sense to ask at what moment this occurred. But if I feel animosity, grief or love it does not make sense to pose this question. I use the phrase 'in general' in making this claim, however, for things are not quite so simple. Some terms, such as 'embarrassment', 'amazement', 'dismay', are used equivocally to range over both events and states, and the conclusion that I draw
from this might appear somewhat strange. It might be thought, that is, that from the fact that terms such as 'dismay' range over both events and states, it follows that there is no clear distinction to be made between them and the psychological reactions, and this on the grounds of the apparently compelling principle that if dismay, say, is not clearly either a reaction or an emotion, then the distinction between emotion and reaction must be unclear.

It is possible, however, for the distinction between emotion and reaction to remain invisibly clear although dismay can be classed as neither. What is required is that instead of understanding terms such as 'dismay', 'disappointment' and 'ameusement' to denote items which are essentially either motion or reactions, to understand them in such a way that they range over both motions and reactions. In this way we shall not feel we have to accept it is an emotion or a reaction, but will rather have to say that some instances of disappointment are emotions while others are reactions. Terms such as 'emotion' and 'reaction' are less closely tied to terms such as 'ameusement' and 'ameusement' than at first sight they appear. The terms to which they are closely tied are, respectively, the terms 'state' and 'event'.

If this appears implausible, some support might come from a consideration of the analogous situation which arises in the attempt to distinguish the emotions from the attitudes. In many cases we would feel no doubt in saying, of a particular term, whether it denoted an emotion or an attitude. Trust, reverence and disdain,
we should say, are obvious attitudes; hate, anger, and fear are just as obvious emotions, but there are some cases in which we should not be so sure. Would it amount to an emotion or an attitude? And what is the difference? and we are quite free to countenance a dispositional sense of 'fear.' Even that thin a stand like this, I think that the situation is best understood if we see it as follows.

Some predicates are applicable to individuals on the basis of their personalities and characters, i.e., the type of thing that they are liable to do, and the sorts of way in which they are inclined to behave, while others are applied on the basis of their states of consciousness, i.e., the way in which their minds are oriented and their thoughts are oriented. I call predicates which categorise the thoughts and feelings of individuals attentional predicates; they are used to describe the way in which an individual's attention is disposed. If I say of a man that he is depressed, I say that he is in a certain frame of mind, whereas if I say of him that he is irascible I say something about the sort of frame of mind he is liable to be in. If someone is angry, he is thinking about things in a certain way, while if he is irascible he is inclined to think about things in that way. I will call a predicate which is not attentional a dispositional predicate.

Some emotions are attentional states whereas attitudes are dispositions. But we cannot say, tout court, of contempt or fear, that it is either an emotion or an attitude; for fear has both attentional and dispositional instances, we tend to mark whether...
the instance of contempt or that we attribute to an individual is an emotion or an attitude by the use of the word 'to feel': Being contemptuous of another is having a certain attitude towards him, while feeling contemptuous is being in a certain emotional state. An excellent indication of whether a particular use of a predicate is attentional or dispositional is to be found in the answer to the question 'Is it possible that the same thing which is now being said of the individual could be said of him if he were asleep or unconscious? This is because during sleep one has no thoughts — one's attention is neither occupied nor vacant.

Motions, then, are distinguished from reactions in that the latter are events, and from attitudes in that the latter are dispositional. These two distinctions are instantial, in the sense that they operate at the level of instances of such things as amusement, pity, and disdain. That is, these latter terms are formally equivocal. They range over events and states, or over both attentional and dispositional states. In this way the distinctions between emotion and attitude and emotion and reaction contrast with the distinction between emotion and mood, which is non-instantial.

1.5. Subjects.

In articulating the contention that emotions contain thoughts I have introduced the notion of direction; and used this notion to characterise one feature of emotional thought, thus contrasting emotion with mood. I have further correlated the notion of direction with that of the 'subject' of a thought or mental state. In this
section I discuss the notion, in order to throw some more light on the nature of emotional thought, and with the subsidiary purpose of bringing the notion into relation with the concept of causality.

The subject of my thought is the item about which I think, as the subject of a book is what the book is about. The subject of my reaction is the item to which I react. A question which has provoked some discussion, and which clarifies the notion of the 'subject' of a thought, is: 'Is it possible to re-mistaken in the subject of one's thoughts and reactions?' (Of course, this question is not everywhere raised in the same terminology.)

Miss Anscombe's contribution to this topic is by now a classic. She introduces the class of items of knowledge known without observation, and includes in this class the class of items to which she refers as 'mental causes'. For instance, if the bark of a crocodile makes me jump, then, according to Miss Anscombe, I know without observation that it was the bark of the crocodile that made me jump. Of course, she admits that my knowledge that the crocodile barked is derived from my observation of the world. On the other hand, my knowledge that I jumped is not acquired through any such observation, nor the knowledge that it was the bark of the crocodile that made me do so. In this example, the bark of the crocodile is the mental cause of my reaction.

The logical status of these items of knowledge is purported to confound the human view of causation, for knowledge of a
mental cause is all only incorrect, i.e., it is supposed that the
individual who experiences a shock cannot be mistaken in that it
is that has caused this shock. This is not yet quite fair to Miss
Anscoghe, for, as she herself points out, claims such as that to the
effect that it was the shark of the crocodile that made the waves,
in art, existential claims, and that one might be logically immune
from arraignment in the making of existential claims (with a certain
Hobbesian caveat) is surely coherent. In the face of this, Miss
Anscoghe actually holds only that, for the example in the case, it
is my being to hear the crocodile's bark that constitutes the
mental cause; it is this that causes my reaction and this about
which I cannot be mistaken.

The difference from Miss Anscoghe on this point is that I cannot
accept that there should be such a thing as a causal claim that is
incorrectly known to be true. It is the defining characteristic of
causal claims that, logically, they are open to falsification in
the light of parallel negative instances. Because of this I must
reject the concept of a 'mental cause' as she use it. This concept
relates to the set of causal relations that are incorrectly known
to obtain, and by, according to my understanding of causal
relations, includes a contradiction. I will come to a fuller
discussion of the way in which causality has a place in the relation
of thought to object in the second half of this essay, but for the
present I address myself to the refutation of Miss Anscoghe's
causality and the clarification of the concept of the 'subject' of
Consider the commonplace of an hypnotic suggestion. If under hypnotism I am instructed to "be surprised" the first remark that I make after awakening, and, when brought out of the trance, I say "I was surprised", the first is in my fact surprised by the first mark; yet there is nothing surprising in it, it is great that the cause of my surprise is not the remark but rather what had gone on under hypnosis. Another possible case is one in which I am instructed to find interesting whatever is being said on the stroke of three o'clock. Here is the central explanation of my interest: all to go back through the chimes of the clock to the "hypnotistic" activities during my trance, and what is actually being said at three o'clock is irrelevant.

In this last example the cause of my interest will be the strokes of the clock or the hypnotist's muttering, whereas the subject of my interest, in the sense in which I use the term, remains whatever is being talked about at three o'clock; it is that which I have an interest in, and that towards which my thoughts are directed. In this way there is a radical split between the two notions of the subject of a response and its cause, which is disguised in the notion of a "mental cause" which Miss Anascombe introduces. The split is peopled over in such questions as "what made him jump?". To return to the Anascombe example: my push at seeming to hear the bark of a crocodile had the hearing of the bark as its subject. However it may or it may not have been the
that the bar was causally involved in the accident. If my shock:
I may have been under post-hypnotic suggestion. Questions such as
'What am I interested in?' and 'What am I surprised by?' are
ambiguous in that they may seek an answer in terms of either the
cause or the subject of the interest or surprise.

Given this distinction between the causes and the subjects of
mental states we can see that the incorrigibility attributes to our
knowledge of mental causes actually attaches to our knowledge of
their subjects, while claims about the causes of our thoughts and
feelings remain open to the possibility of falsification in the
light of parallel negative instances.

A possible objection to the argument here might be that if,
under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, I am ever to be
surprised by something, or appear to take an interest in something,
it does not follow that I am surprised by anything, or that I am
interested in anything. The import of this reply would be to
confound the argument from post-hypnotic suggestion, thus making it
necessary to produce another argument to demonstrate the wedge
between the two notions of subject and cause. For if the argument
for the logical division fails, there might be no such
division, and the idea of a 'mental cause' might be coherent. The
concept of a mental cause might indeed confound the human view of
causation.

But although there are indeed other arguments to be adduced at
this point, there is no need for them, for the objection is in
ucer, for the distinction in this is drawn between appearing to be shocked or interested by something and actually being shocked or interested by that thing is obvious. Of course, there is indeed a distinction to be drawn between a person being shocked by some-thing and actually being shocked by that thing, but this distinction is not the one that is required if the objection’s argument is to work. The valid distinction lies between appearing to others that one is shocked, on the one hand, and actually being shocked, on the other. There can be in error about my mental states. But the objection requires that there be a distinction between actually being shocked and only appearing to myself that I am shocked. And this is incorrect.

Motions are propositional states, as are mood, attitudes and reactions. The subjects of these mental states are the it as towards which one’s thoughts are directed when one is in them. In order for the objection here considered to go through it would have to be the case that we could make a distinction quite generally between thinking about some item and only seeming to oneself to be thinking about that item, between one’s thoughts being directed towards some item while one imagined that they were directed towards some altogether different item. It is this that does not make sense. For if we were to countenance this distinction, the distinction between thinking about x and thinking that one was thinking about x, so that it would be possible to succeed in the latter and fail in the former, an infinite regress is produced: we should also have to distinguish
In thinking that one is thinking about x, and merely thinking about x, one was thinking about x, and one was thinking about x. And so on.

There is then a distinction between the subject of a thought and the cause of that thought, though it is, of course, possible that the same entity could, in a particular instance, fall under both concepts. The subject of a thought is that which the thought is about, and I have incorrigible knowledge of what it is that I am thinking about, in the sense that there is no distinction to be drawn between my actually thinking about an item and merely saying to myself to be thinking about that item.

This concludes my first chapter. I have presented a conceptual analysis of the concept of an emotion according to which emotions are essentially directed, enduring, attentional, propositional states of mind. In being essentially directed, they are to be distinguished from moods; in being genuine emotions, they are to be distinguished from psychological reactions; in being attentional states, they are to be distinguished from attitudes. However, with all these other items the emotions share the important property of being propositional states, and it is their propositional character that we find the explanation for the validity of invalidity of instances of emotion. Our emotions can be criticized through the assessment of their constitutive thoughts. I have further elaborated on the way in which emotions are propositional states by examination of the correlative notions of direction and the 'subject' of a mental state.

In my next chapter I will present an analysis of the concept of
the object of emotion. This will be done partly on the concept
of the 'subject' of a mental state that I have introduced in this
chapter, having clarified these two concepts, of emotion and object,
I will, in my third and fourth chapters, turn to the question of
whether the relation between emotion and object is a causal one.
By arguments in these chapters, I think that in one way the
relation between emotion and object is a causal one and that in
another it is not, will result logically from the conclusion
established in this chapter, that emotions are propositional states.
... OBJECTS.

As in my first chapter, I am here, in the last resort, concerned to present an analysis of a concept from either standpoint. If we are
given to take the question 'Is the relation between emotion and
object causal?' seriously, then we must be clear about its meaning,
and its meaning is something that it has within the language, not in
virtue of some philosophers' fiat. Hopefully, then, my notion of 'the
object of an emotion' will be the everyday notion. However, it is
not easy to be dogmatic about this, for the term 'object' has become
something of a term of philosophical art, and acquired, true to the
tradition, a variety of senses.

Thus A.N. Prior distinguishes two senses of the term 'object':
objects in the sense of what we think and objects in the sense of
what we think about. If I think that Rebecca is stout, then, accord-
ing to Prior, in the first sense of 'object', the object of my
thought is (the proposition) 'that Rebecca is stout', while in the
second sense of the word, the object of my thought is (the
individual) Rebecca. Against this sort of claim it is hardly
adequate for me to say that I am interested only in objects in the
second of these two senses, and to give no consideration to the
first of the two senses he outlines, for this would leave me open
to the objection that I have not given a complete account of the
notion of an object, but only, at most, an account of half of that
notion.

Rather, I must claim that the first sense that Prior claims for
the term is not a sense of the term at all, which is in fact the
same unless someone was specifically told doing Prior in, we suppose
that in abstract, no hot dog by be well understand the object of
thought to be a proposition rather than the item thought about.
Very clearly still, and more crucially, no one could take the object
of an emotion to be anything other than the item towards which the
emotion was felt. If I feel pity for an orphan child, thinking it
in turn that it should be orphaned, the object of my pity is the
child, not, say, the proposition "that the child is orphaned".

In fact this makes things appear too simple, for the concept
of 'the object of an emotion' is by no means so clear as will
become apparent, it has not been beyond even generally sober
philosophers to think in such ways as the above in connection with
'the acts'. However, my point here, to reiterate, is that the concept
of 'the object of an emotion' which I attempt to make explicit in
this chapter will not be a purely technical notion. Though other
philosophers have used the term for other purposes (as has Prior),
I take my own use to conform to that which it actually has.

Another prefatory point should be made. In this chapter and to
some extent again in the last chapter I will deal severely, though
not, I hope, to the point of heavy-handedness, with positions
maintained by J.R.S. ilson in his recent book 'emotion and Object.'
This book is interesting and challenging even when it is error
(which is not for too much of the time), and there is no doubt
that it is the finest book-length contribution to the problem.
with which I am concerned in this essay. It is likely to be an influential book in this area and for this reason I which the claims that I make amount the views that are found in it. This has the dual advantage of allowing my distinction a full and spirited development, and bringing them into contact with the related literature.

**Emotions in discourse.**

A lucid distinction is that between the things that people feel, and the ways in which they express those emotions and the ways in which they, and others, refer to those emotions and describe them. Although it hardly seems possible to confuse these two very different sorts of thing, I think it is a failure to observe just this distinction which leads, I am afraid, to a distinction between two sorts of emotion (which I will argue is erroneous), and, hence, to a claim about the concept of 'the object of an emotion' (which I want to refute).

I can be angry with someone, or angry that he should have come late; sorry for him, or sorry that he should have been delayed; grateful to him, or grateful that he should have managed to put in an appearance. I may thus in expressing or discussing the emotions that I feel use a variety of grammatical constructions. Archetypically, I can either follow the emotion term with a preposition and a noun phrase, or also with a 'that' clause. What I want to stress at
This point is that there are variations in the discourse about emotions do not pertain to the level of reality; whenever location I use
in referring to the emotion it makes no difference to the emotion itself.

Characteristically, in this concern it is my fear, do not say every similitude can be said about the items that occur in our
language, much less in unknown, and even in left unmentioned. I can say
that I am angry, I cannot name my anger, nor indicate its
extent, nor say which unfortunate in the object of my wrath. But this
similarity of communication does not entail that every emotion is
stereotyped, but only that the information that others have
about my feelings from my emotions is unusually sparse. The consequence of this fact is that we will often be unable to tell
very much about a given instance of emotion, but for the way in which it is
referred to specifically, we will not be able. All another an emotion has on object that it is by merely the emotion mentioned.

The sense until at least is to some of these fears that items
are items that nothing will come to pass, then reasserting
the same and reasserting that a state of affairs would exist. My fear
of resentment will not itself solely through being described in
these diverging eyes, and if I fully articulate my emotion it is
probable that my fear of an item as a fear that it would bring
something about, and that my resentment of an individual was
resentment at his having brought something about. There is a
distinction, and an important one, to be brought out here, and
but in the distinction between the object of an individual’s action and the present that we are for feeling what action, and I will come to this in more detail. But for the present, I want to make a distinction between two sorts of motion on the one hand, that are referred to situations, phrases, constructions, while the other is referred to intentional states.

This distinction is based on the distinction between the non-propositional emotions and an one in the case of this distinction that non-propositional emotions have objects, this distinction between the propositional and the non-propositional emotions is made as follows:

There is a second class of emotions that lack objects. This class might be called the class of propositional emotions, and includes emotions which relate to future events. Taking the example of fear, one can be afraid of a particular person or thing, in which case one’s fear has an object, but one can also be afraid that something terrible is going to happen... (p. 57)

How from the fact that my fear is described as feared of a particular person or thing it follows that my fear has an object, but from the fact that my fear is described as a fear that something terrible is going to happen, it does not follow, as ilicon claims, that my fear lacks an object. For, paradigmatically, my fear of a person or thing might equally well be described as a fear that something terrible is going to happen - the person that I fear might be a psychopath whom I believe is about to kill me. How there will be cases of emotions that lack objects, and their lack of objects will become apparent through a detailed articulation of the emotion, but the emotion will never lack an object simply because it is a propositional emotion, in Wilson’s sense, for as far as this...
Propositional emotions are isolated in terms of the way in which they are referred to, and differences in the ways in which we talk about things are not necessarily differences in things.

Wilson argues that all propositional emotions are objectless. If I am indignant that someone should insult me, or worried that my son is becoming an alcoholic, simply because my emotions are expressed or referred to in these ways they lack objects. That reason does he have for holding this bizarre view? He thinks that the use of object terminology in this area would commit one to the introduction into one's ontology of propositions, in a fairly strong sense. This 'unbearable cry' should not scare us, for Wilson thinks that the only job that the concept of an 'object' could do in the context of emotions that are propositionally expressed would be that of denoting the proposition that occurs in the position following the 'that' in the sentence describing the emotion.

He thinks that the only possible candidate for the role of 'object' in the case of emotions which are propositionally expressed would be the proposition itself. It is for this reason that he concludes that if we talk about objects in connection with the propositional emotions:

...the term 'the object of Smith's fear' could refer and refer in the same way, either to a person or to a proposition. This seems to be objectionably, could we be happy to talk of someone as fearing a proposition, just as someone might fear a person? (p.57)

The error here is clearly that there are other possible ways in
which 'object' terminology might be applied in the context of the
class of so-called propositional emotions. In particular, we might
use the term 'object' in the analysis of the propositional emotions
in precisely the same way in which we so far have turned to the analysis
of the non-propositional emotions. Of course, as yet, I have not
given an analysis of this use.

There is about as much reason to say that in the case of the
propositional emotions the object of the emotion is the proposition
which follows the 'that' as there is to say that in the case of the
non-propositional emotions the object of the emotion is the noun
phrase which follows the preposition. And of course there is no
reason to say this. The presence of a 'that' clause, or of a noun
phrase, is entirely a function of the way in which the emotion is
conceived.

However, as I have said, there are distinctions to be made in
this vicinity according to which it transpires that some emotions
lack objects. It is by examining the ways in which objects can
fail to accrue to emotions that we will become clear about the
concept of 'the object of an emotion.' One of the distinctions that
is of primary importance in this connection is that between the
object of an emotion and the reason that an individual has for
feeling that emotion, and it is to this distinction that I turn in
my next section.

2. Objects and Reasons

I take it that, if I am envious of another individual because
e as a matter of fact, and I, as an individual, is the object of my love and my feelings, a letter to whom I am the reason that I have for thinking of him.

Confusion between these two concepts is naturally likely, but in some circumstances the difference is obscured grammatically by the fact that some emotion terms take two direct objects: envy, for example. It's not clear why it is not possible to explain the concept of the object of an emotion by direct reference to the notion of the object of a sentence containing a transitive verb. In the case in point, I take the object of my envy to be Forsyth and not his job. Again, I can dislike a person or loathe his manner — that is to say that both these constructions are permissible. Nevertheless, I take the object of my loathing to be the person and the reason which I have for loathing him — that is, the way he conducts himself.

I do not say that these grammatical notions are responsible for the confusion in William's mind between the object of an emotion and the reason for feeling it, but confusion there is. And the dissertation results in what I take to be an extravagant expansion of the concept of the object of an emotion, which I think wrong — and I am arguing against it. I should like to have William explain it in his own words:

On p. 53 of his book, he writes:

I wish to use the term 'object' to apply to items in the world of any category, and not just to particular persons or things. That is, I wish to apply it to such items as the following:

1. events: a person can be overjoyed by the return of his son, or horrified by a catastrophe;
Attitudes of emotions in persons or things a person can
react to by the emotions of the person or person
about his other continued illness;
attitudes of emotion in things; a person can be over-
actively some one's intellect, or outward of someone's
behavior;
attitudes of relationships; a person can be jealous of his other's
friendship with another;
attitudes of behavior; a person can be given of the way
he treated in the world or impressed by someone's bad
manner.

It is clear that Von Schnitzel only obliterates the distinction
between the object of an emotion and the reason that an individual
may for feeling that emotion. Events cannot be the objects of
emotions - if I am overjoyed at the return of my son the reason
that I am overjoyed is that my son has returned, but my son's return
is not the object of my joy, for the object of my joy is my son
himself. No more can conditions of persons constitute the objects
of emotions - they are simply not objects at all. If I am worried
about my wife's continued illness, the object of my worry is my
wife, while my reason for being worried about her is that she
continued to be ill.

Attitudes of people cannot be the objects of emotions - in
enjoying another individual's happiness I envy no one and I do so
because he is so happy. As it were, it is not his happiness that
would like to be, but his relationships; if I am jealous of my
wife's friendship with another man, what is meant is either that
I am jealous of him, because of his friendship with her, or that
I am jealous of her, because of her friendship with him. But in
each case the object of my jealousy is the individual, while the
Relationship involved functions, or the reason for my jealousy.
Finally, if I am asked of the thing which I have against my
parents than the things that they long and set for me.
they are the reasons that I say for looking at "do not the
impact of my shame is my own person."

How it might be possible to this point that I simply offer
from Alison in the vocabulary that I choose to apply in the
expression of the objects of emotion, and that I do not have
adequate grounds for criticism of the way in which Alison selects
to speak. He himself in the quoted essay claims to be doing no
more than explaining the way in which he intends to use the term
"project," and it may be that there is nothing to choose between
the way and my own. If this were so then the points I have made
above in reaction to the quotation. I present or reduct to
myself that various elaborations of terminological variation.

But there is a rational reason for my use of the term "project"
form for the preference of my use of the concept over Alison's.

and this is not only, as I incidentally believe to be the case,
that his own use does not accord with the usual. It is that
according to Alison's terminology, there is no clear concept of
the object of an emotion at all. For consider if I am worried
about my wife's continued illness. It seems likely that I am in
this situation, also worried about the continuation of my wife's
illness, my wife's illness and my wife. But which is to be the
object of my emotion? The continuation? The illness? My wife?
In the first place, we could hold that to the extent that each emotion has only one object, it could generate a whole of emotions. For emotion that is the about my sun in the sky, would be, on this account, not the emotion that is about the continued lines. This path might be attractive to it, organizing as it gives with the obscure view of propositional emotion; against which I argued in the last section, however, to set no further point on it, it seems to me absurd.

On the other hand, as I earlier held that each emotion had a number of objects, in this way we could turn the basis on the concept of the object of an emotion. But this would be a desperate step to take. For if we did allow objects to correlate with emotions on a one to one basis, we would find great difficulty in the analysis of the relation between emotion and object, for a number of different items will not count as the object of an emotion. It is not only the threat of difficulties that is a deterrent, however, for I think it is clear that the impulse to proliferate objects is surely another symptom of the failure to acknowledge the distinction between items in the world and the things that we say about those items, a failure which I exposed in my last section. So the distinction between object and reason is not just a difference between Wilson and myself at the level of vocabulary; it is a
In fact, I may not argue that 'each emotion can have only one object.' I reject the possibility of the multiplication of the objects of an emotion simply in virtue of the way it is described, but it may, as yet, be the case that an emotion should take more than one object. I will consider this possibility at the end of next section.

2.3. Generalized emotions.

In the last two sections, I have argued against Sillmon over the concept of 'the object of an emotion.' The distinction between an emotion and the way in which the emotion is caused to like the
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the object of an emotion is to partly constitute and excite that overt or mental act which has a specific or general application. It is a necessary condition, that is to say, of an emotion as the object of emotion, that it is an object in the consciousness in which the dimensional fillers of space are energized.

Thus it may be that I am anxious about the price of sterling. I may feel that the devaluation of sterling, particularly in the face of the strength of the dollar, the Deutschmark and the yen, is extremely disquieting, and a major cause for alarm for the bitter people. In this case, I am not merely driven into some mood by the trend that financial events are taken, by my thoughts as solitary, directed towards a particular item. I am worried about something specific, and it is that particular which excites my attention. There is no reason to say, then, that my state is not a bona fide emotion. Though it is only an anxiety that I am and concern himself about this sort of thing, no doubt men lose sleep and hair over less than this.

But although this state is an emotion, the emotion lacks an object. It contrasts with the more normal instances of anxiety, in which, say, I am anxious that my son is becoming an alcoholic, or of anger, in which, say, I am angry with my daughter for keeping the house in a mess. These latter are the paradigm cases of emotions with objects, and the case above is to be contrasted with them. If a term is required to denote the item with which the individual who feels the emotion is concerned, then the term 'topic' can be
As I have already said at the outset of this chapter, I propose to present what I term a 'trivial notion' or 'the object of an emotion' which is to be found in the language in which we normally utter it, but here, as is often the case, we can point not only to the truisms, but can discern some rationale in the way we speak. For, in the paradigm case of an individual who feels an emotion towards an object, there is no hesitation in saying that the situation consists of an individual and an object and a relation which obtains between the two or them. If I am in joy with my daughter or two human beings stand together in a relation, however, if I
as worried about the devaluation of the round, or the possibility of a third world war, or the myopia of the human race, things are rather different: it does not seem even prima facie plausible to suggest that I stand in any relationship to these problematic items.

I will argue in my next chapter that the relation between an emotion and the object of that emotion is causal. in a sense that, in order to count as the object of a emotion, an item must stand to me in a complicated causal relation. This is because in order to be thinking about an item, thinker and thought about must satisfy certain causal conditions, and, as I argued in my first chapter, feeling an emotion towards something is not merely, say, having certain sensations, but also having thoughts about that thing. The analysis of the emotion-object relation, then, demonstrates the existence of causal links between emotion and object, and this lies behind the fact that emotions such as my concern over the myopia of the human race are objectless.

There is a second way in which emotions can fail to have objects. Some emotions, I have argued, are directed towards items at are of the wrong category, and are consequently objectless. Other emotions, although directed towards items of the requisite type, yet lack objects in that the items towards which they are directed do not exist. In holding this thesis I quite comfortably follow Wilson, who appears to have got this dead right. He gives some examples, which I reproduce with some abbreviation.

(a) Smith, a soft-hearted fellow, is approached by a beggar, who
The principle of these examples is unproblematic. Slightly often, or if we are fortunate, slightly seldom, we acquire, through whatever currents, mistaken existential beliefs. We have attitudes towards objects which we suppose to exist, even though they do not exist, just as we have attitudes towards other objects which we actually to exist. I have thoughts and feelings about these objects, yet the emotions with which I feel towards items which do not exist are emotions which do not have objects. 'Objects' of emotions must be actually existing entities - entities which appear in the catalogue of the furniture of the universe.

There are, then, two ways in which emotions can fail to have objects: they can be directed towards items of the wrong logical type, or they can be directed towards items of the correct category which do not exist. Like the first possibility of failure, the second points to a difference between the concept of 'the subject of a thought' and the concept of 'the object of an emotion'. It might be said that the concept of the 'object' of an emotion is constructed from the notion of the 'subject' of a thought, which is introduced in my first chapter. I defined the subject of a mental state as the item towards which it was directed. It is a necessary
A necessary condition is that the object of the emotion be of the right nature; it must be something that is to be found physically in the world. A final necessary condition is that the object must actually exist, or objects of emotion are a stock in trade of the domain of mental states, not the successions of external events.

Finally, I would give some brief consideration to a suggestion at the end of the last section, that an emotion might have more than one object. It seems possible that, even within the traditional view of emotion, the object of an emotion might have more than one object. I do not see, however, how one can argue from mental principles on this issue, or by an examination of a proposed counterexample. I hope to indicate that, in fact, each emotion will have only one object.

In the case of my continued ill-in, there is no other act all existing three-fifths normal entity in the office other than my wife. There is no doubt that she is the object of my emotion, but what if a parent were concerned about his children's behavior? If he has two children, is there any reason not to say that his concern has two objects? The most important point here, and in all negative counterexamples, is that the case should be fully articulated.

Until the emotion is fully understood, we will not be able to answer questions such as 'Does the emotion have two objects?'.
at the parental, it seems, and at one extreme are the extremes
of petty bickering, bickering that is likely to spread any-
other Sullivan "who's right here, the cut and cut of
suffocating, smothering, and choking, is". I foresee that they are
also bored. The constant concern, the constant and cut and
cut and suffocating and the petty atmosphere. And through the mum-
coo to me two or three, I think that this is, in all probability,
ally concerned, on both of them, and the concern might vary imp-
licitly, even quite. It is correct a way of him that he is worried
about both of his children, it is almost certain that differences
in the nature of his worries and years for each would come to light
under closer examination. Male worries over a son and not worries
over a daughter, and worries over a lack of sensitivity are not
worries over a surplus of it.

Perhaps the father might claim to be concerned about the
bickering not because he sees either of them as suffering, but
because, simply, the bickering is seen as cause for concern. If this
were intelligible emotional behaviour, it would be emotion without
an object - mere topical emotion - but I do not see how it can be
intelligible. Is what is meant that the bickering is seen as a
projection of his fancied inadequacy as a father. Perhaps we see
the squabbling as a possible indication of his shortcomings as a
man. In this case the emotion takes his own person as its object.

In this way, it seems that a full consideration of the emotion
under consideration will lead to the conclusion that each emotion

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in only one object.

Conclusi

In this chapter, I have attempted to articulate the concept of motion. The concept of motion is that
which fills the space through which the things which are in
motion are directed. I have, articulated the concept by an examination of the various possibilities for motion to fail short of moving objects, and argued for the
prioritiy of my analysis over that suggested by Gibson in motion
and object. In fact, the concept of motion has been not to
be discussed on the analysis of the concept of motion. The
concept is that of the analysis. In other words, the analysis of
the concept of motion is not the concept of motion. The
concept of motion is the concept of analysis. The concept of
motion is the concept of analysis. The concept of motion is
the concept of analysis.

With this I conclude my analysis of the concept of 'the object
of an emotion'. I also conclude the first half of my essay. In it
I have been primarily concerned to indicate and make explicit two
concepts of ordinary language. It will become obvious that clarity
about the sort of thing that 'emotion' and 'object' are is a
pre-requisite for the explication of the relation that we
have seen them. It is to the explication of this relation that I
shall turn in the second half of the essay, in the following two chapters.
It is preliminary ground cover, then, I can not list them yet.
that is involved in feeling, an emotion towards an object. I hold that emotions have direction similar as they are in part constituted by thoughts; to the extent that an individual is apt to think about him in a certain way, to think in a sort of thoughts in that characteristic of the concrete entity, and I have further maintained that for an emotion to have an object the tendency which the constitutive thoughts are directed must be an existing entity. The vital nexus, then, of the relation between emotion and object, is found in the relation between an individual and an entity in the world when the former is thinking about the latter. We might make the point by saying that emotions have objects only because they include thoughts, and, however mysterious it might seem, thoughts can connect with the world. It follows from this that the vital difficulty in the analysis of the relation between emotion and object is that of saying what is involved in a thought's being about something in the world. The solution of my particular problem with the emotions depends on the resolution of a more general puzzle: what is the relation between a thinker and the object of his thought?

How although the relation of thought to language is not the most transparent of subjects, I have no compunction in suggesting that the proper grasp of what thinking about something consists in can only be achieved through an understanding of what it is to talk about something. The structure of the relation between a thinker
the object of his thought will be exposed through detailing the relation between a speaker and the object of his discourse. Consequently, in this chapter I will give some hints about what the latter relation amounts to.

Moreover, I will not of course elaborate a complete analysis of the relation, for there is an axe to be ground. Because I am less interested in the way in which concepts in the philosophy of mind and epistemology might be susceptible to causal analyses, and in particular preoccupied by the way in which the relation between emotion and object might be a causal relation, I will almost exclusively discuss the issue of whether the relation between speaker and spoken about is a causal one. I maintain that there is indeed a sense in which the relation between receiver and event is causal, and, hence, the relations between thought and emotion and object of motion are also causal.

During this chapter I will work with the notion of a causal relation without giving any explicit account of what I understand such a thing to be. I do this because I have already spent a great deal of time on preliminary clarification, and I feel that there is enough clear land to allow forward movement. I will, though, pay attention to the concept of a causal relation in the next chapter, and unclarities which arise in the course of this one will be dispelled, hopefully, there. But I should say that I am not going to be occupied with an analysis of causal relations except in the
The relation of referents and of the referent to the concept, the notion of causality, is the same way. In the first place, it should be understood that the notion of causality should not be extended beyond that of reference, to which no

I will take the first of these two cases first. The reason is that there are apparent cases of reference in which no causal link can be traced between referent and referent, but before squarely facing the difficulty, I take a brief detour, which in fact takes us close to the solution. The road leads via the distinction between the attributive and the referential.
In an influential article, a speaker has argued that he was not 'unit' in the sense of referring to a specific individual. The speaker noted that the term 'unit' is often used in a general sense to refer to an amount of something, regardless of its nature. He suggested that this general sense of the term is more appropriate in the context of the discussion, as it is often used to refer to a concept or idea that can be applied to various situations.

The speaker then went on to explain that the use of a specific example is important in order to clarify the meaning of the term. He mentioned that when he stated "the millionth customer," he was referring to a specific individual who would receive a free washing machine. This example was used to illustrate how the term "unit" could be applied in a more specific context, rather than just a general sense.
In the natural sense, it is in that connexion as in accepting
the notion as a formal case of the total absence of a definite
mention. As I understand, it is to mark the use of
it as a new form, and, in so far as the not mention
is not to be in a particular context at all. Mine, I do
not so claim it at all. But it is at least certain
that the not mention tells, whatever particular case it is,
purely a case. I do not think, I do not claim
literally, it is not mention, though the convention in other
words is adequate, in writing, and it is not a
mention about.

Consistent andit can be put in that the
the not mention tells me not the convention,
that the not mention tells, I do not wish to say.
I do not, however, consent for
consistent to say: "my mother, whoever she was, not mention, in 1948.
It is quite correct for
the proper to say: "my mother, whoever she was, not mention in 1948."
The point of this discussion is that connection in this way is that, although it seems plausible that there should have to be a certain causal link existing between the concepts when the reference is in the attributive mode, it need not be seen as an absolute or absolute, the existence of any such words, for in the attributive mode I make use of descriptions which pick out individuals from whom I am totally strictly insulated. I can make clear about the first regard to be born at sea, the man who was made at an inn, the proprietors of the public house in Italy, the first British citizen to visit Italy in 127 etc., etc.

It is given in this consideration, clearly crucial for any pronouncement of the causal view that there is a distinction which connexion draws on a genuine one. If is a distinction which connection indicates is not a substantial logical distinction, but instead, say, a difference in the amount of knowledge that the referent has of the object of his intended reference, and it is accepted that what have been introduced as cases of reference in the attributive mode do not do and for their success on the existence of causal links between referent and referent, then it could not be the case that the concept of reference and any significant causal core. It could not, as the case that any analysis of the notion of reference would have to proceed via the introduction of the concept of causality.
If, however, the distinction between an allusion and a substantial reference is a prominent one at all, although we may have to "do away with" all of which people talk in an important area.

In fact, that is, according to persistent, the restrictive phrase does not require analysis with reference to concept, but maintains the distinction in the potential concept analysis in general terms. This, almost, is that I will argue. In fact, I will go further than this in the refinement of the causalist's position.

I will show that康奈尔的区分为参考。在非攻击性的世界是通过一定条件，康奈尔在这一事实中得到的支持，即非事实性的表达，由于这一事实的细节，是根本的。因此，这是这一事实的基础，也是这一事实的一个要点。因此，认为这一区分为参考，是必要的条件。因此，区分在逻辑上是不一致的。

2.1. The distinction reformulated.

There are two obvious reasons why the distinction which 康奈尔 localization, or whether the criterion for making it which he forwards, should be reconsidered. Firstly, the use of the phrase "whenever/whatever he/she/it is" is not restricted to the type of situation which I have outlined above. If I pick out, on an identity paradigm,
in whom I have nothing to say, by saying, 'The color of the hair of the man at the end of the line is brown.' Its usage in this sense, for me to say, 'The color of the hair is brown,' is at the 'end of the line.' In this way, we see that the first, or the possibility of its use, need not constitute a valid story criter-
ion, for the hair appears to have been brown.

Secondly, and more importantly, even if the possibility of the
improbability of the use of a certain location were to introduce a
sentential logical implication, we have seen that whether the sen-
tence is relevant to an attractive use, or not, we shall find,
only when the image whatever it is, if it can simply be used, we should
still not know when the use of the term 'attractive' was correct.
But we would not know the rationale behind the use of the phrase
'attractive' before the sentence. In order to distinguish between
the referential and the attractive modes of reference, one more
reasoning tools.

Connellan locates a difference between the two in a distinction
in their truth conditions. In particular, he states that in the use
of a description in the referential mode, the referent might say
something that was true of the object of the description reference even
though the description that he used to pick out the object was not
The problem is that Connellan is confused here as to what the referent is, succeeded in communication, or his saying, said something that is true. It is not necessary that everything that one says be true in order for communication to be achieved, just as it is not necessary for me to say everything that I mean in order that another could understand what it is that I mean. Then I say that the man drinking champagne is the murderer, I will have managed to put my point across, even though what I have said will not be true, if and only if the man whom I am assuming to be talking about is identical with the man whom I am in fact talking about. Nevertheless, what I have said will not be true. (Which is not to say that it will be false; the description is not satisfied by any particular.) I do not, then, wish to follow Connellan in drawing the distinction between the referential and the attributive modes on the grounds of a difference in the truth conditions of the references in each mode.

The line of attack for the justification of the distinction must lie in the articulation of the intuitive notion of knowing the identity of an individual. For what the use of the phrase 'whoever/whichever he/she/it is' reflects is the lack of identifying knowledge.
the object which the definiteness description denotes, that of a man, is involved in knowing which item it is that satisfies a certain description, or in knowing generally (for it is easy to know that the referential and attributive mode distinction can also be made in the context of other referring expressions, such as proper names), which item it is that a referring expression denotes. It seems to me that the notion must have a causal constituent - that my knowing the identity of an item, or knowing which particular it is that satisfies a referring expression, must resolve into my being in some way causally related to that item. That is, that is lacken. In the case of the attributive uses of referring expression, there is no causal involving, as little as the first dog to be born at sea to the particular dog which answers to this description.

If this is correct, as seems intuitively the case, and as I argue in the next section, then the differentiation of the attributive use of referring expressions from the referential ones is properly to be made on the grounds that the latter, unlike the former, are instances of a resource in which the speaker stands in a specific form of causal relation to the item which is picked out by the referring expression which he uses. And if this is the ground of the differentiation, then the important question of whether the notion of reference has a causal component is settled. Of course, it will still remain for me to elaborate precisely, or as precisely as possible, the nature of the causal bond linking referent to referent, and I will come to this in section 4.
The attributive to.

I want to draw in this section that consciouneces are not just attributive in the sense that there is a sense of attribution at all. That is to say that these are, in general, not a description of some other fact. Expression does not know which item it is that satisfies an attribution or referring expression. It is not an act requiring us to put item. In this way the notion of reference is integrated.

Some of the limits of the referer's knowledge: just as, so far as we can say, to his being to be thinking about an item and knowing what it is that one is thinking about, so that it is logically impossible to be mistaken in what one is thinking about, so there is no sense to be given between referring to an item and knowing which item it is to which one is referring, so that it is logically impossible to be mistaken in the item to which one is referring.

The reason why conceives are attributive cases of referring expressions to constitute wishes referencers to that he clur over the distinction between the relation of denoting - a relation which holds between an expression and an item in the world - and the relation of referring - a relation which holds between an individual and an item in the world. How do these concepts relate to each other? A referring expression denotes an item in the world if, if it is a definite description, it is uniquely satisfied by that object, or, if it is an indefinite description, it is satisfied by that object, or, if it is a proper name, it is a name of that object.
the individual refers to a man in the middle of a room and notes
a region to pick out that or not.

The important point here is that it is not logically true that
man to refer to in the one is limited, in great choice of
programming extensions, that every line which actually denotes the
extent of one's intended extension. Let us take the case of grant
hence, I may want to take to refer to a line of a Caullie
perhaps I am suffering from some gross distortion, or I am a
man, and I am an incident that is present. In these cases I am
universally in a situation that we know; I may think that the
theory from statements of existing physical is not the reason
lying-nasal entanglement. As on the other case, perhaps I am
not a measure of the name ‘Charles de Gaulle’, one, in other
mathematical precepts, and realize, that people extraneous will
true in a change of a position, however not, we the exam-
ple. We perfectly, I will to it as an enon.

I have genuine for an interest of the skills, I
think for the rest, yet I do not believe for what it
is a really complex names which are complex but I am not bound
to restrain myself in this way. This claim should not be mistaken
for a distinctly similar thesis which it concerns, not unusually, one
involved against. I am not able to use a work which it would be
logically impossible for another to understand or, rather, there is
no content to the idea of a rule which it is only logically possible
for one individual to understand. In such a case there could be no
...for the crucial distinction, common sense, is not a rule we actually obey, and while we may not be inclined to admit that it is absolutely followed, it is, of course, of practical, and the next four case... not a matter of the absolute, but of the relative;... and we ought to do. In the present case, the distinction is to re... itself, largely a matter of convention, and the... myself incorrectly, then there is no correct use of the name, i.e.,... as we all...


But in calling myself Charles de Gaulle there is no logical... the public adoption of the innovation. It is not, of course... a name as calling: I may, despite the attractions the name has for me, consistently forget my decision and revert to the use of my... previous name: my friends may ridicule me and refuse to condone the change, but this is all by the way. That is... obvious. In a name's... the name of an item, or a name of that item, is that there... should be a convention whereby the name is used as the... of referring to that item, and it is only... thus names and conventions can be established, and are not laid down forever, once and... for all, that I have the freedom which I...

The other side of this argument, the argument that the choice of... expression is not limited to the range of expressions which... in fact denote the item of one's intended reference, is that reference... to an item is not simply achieved by the utterance of a name, or
referring expression, which does denote that it. In the case of proper names this is already a part of the phenomenon of ambiguity: many names, if not most, are names of more than one item. Reference to an item is not achieved effortlessly, or, rather, indiscriminately by the use of a phrase which denotes that item: over and above this it is necessary that I intend that in this case the phrase will denote that item.

But what is involved in intending that the name should be used as a name of that item on this particular occasion? It is a necessary condition of having such an intention that one know which item it is to which one intends to refer through the use of the name, and it this which eliminates the possibility that attributive uses of referring expressions are true references. In order to have the intention that in my present use of a referring expression I am referring to the item which is usually denoted by that expression, I must have some other means of identifying the object of my intended reference than simply the expression that I use; I must know which item it is that I intend to refer to. Thus it is only what Connellan terms reference in the referential mode that is genuine reference.

If I use a referring expression in the attributive mode, without knowing which item it is that the expression denotes, then I am not talking about the item which the expression does denote, although what I have said will be about that item, in the case of unambiguous proper names and definite descriptions. This will be so in the sense that the expression that I use will denote the item, and the state-
I have maintained, then, that the distinction to which attention is a genuine distinction, and one that it to be made in terms of whether the user of a referring expression has identifying knowledge of the object of his intended reference. Further, uses of referring expressions in which the referent does not have this knowledge are not cases of reference. Finally, what is involved in having such knowledge is standing in a causal relation to the object of one's intended reference. The first two claims form my answer to the first question which I posed myself at the start of this chapter. The third, as yet schematic, will, in elaborated form, be the reply to the second. It is the subject of my next section.

4. Reference and Causality

The distinction between the referential and the nomitive modes of reference is best illustrated by that between referring and denoting, in such a way that knowledge of the identity of the object of one's intended reference is a necessary condition of successful

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sense. However, in the case of the names, it might sometimes be that I can refer to an actual object having the requisite character, for, if I am in a group of people discussing someone called 'John', even if I do not know who 'John' is, I can make a remark about him. I might, although I cannot offer any information about him, chime in, in response to some anecdote, with a comment on his character. I have said that unless I am personally in referring to him, no fact of what I say, but is this not totally arbitrary?

Let us say that in this group situation I use the name 'John' potentially, without knowing the name 'John'. I use the name with the overruling intention that it name whoever the group are using it to name, what I have in mind. It seems to me that the situation is not different in substance from that in which, as a member of a group which is using a word which I do not understand, I use the word, with the intention that it should have the same meaning in my own mouth as it has in everyone else's; this is because of the way in which 'giving the reference' and 'giving the sense' of an expression relate to each other in a Fregean antise. Loosely, to know the reference of an expression it is necessary to know its sense, and knowing the expression's sense is having the ability to apply or withhold the expression in an instance. To know the sense of a particular term is to have a means of recognising, for that term, whether it applies to a particular object or not.
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I would agree with Kripke in his position that the concept of a name directly identifies a person and is not a property of a person. This concept is, however, isolated causally from the person's identity. The name is, in a sense, a self-contained property of the person, and the name does not store or transmit the identity of the person. I think this is important for several reasons. First, it is not necessary for the name to be the same as the person's identity. Second, it is not necessary for the name to be the same as the person's name. Finally, it is not necessary for the name to be the same as the person's name. These are the reasons why I think this is important.

The idea of the states and beliefs is related to the speaker's information by the supposed causal link. Even if the source of the speaker's information, beliefs or knowledge, is not a sufficient condition of what it is for an item to be the source of a belief, i.e., what the
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In the last chapter I have dealt with a particular category of emotional reactions and emotions. I have shown that the relation between emotion and object is a complex one, involving not only individual emotions but also the social and cultural context in which they are formed. For example, when I was a child, I had certain emotions associated with my parents, which are quite different from those I have now. The acceptance of this claim leads to the conclusion that the satisfaction of a cause-emotion is not merely a function of the claim that objects of emotion cause emotions. And it is the latter relation which has often been neglected in connection with the problem of whether the relation between emotion and object can be given a causal analysis. The difference between a cause and an object in this case can be highlighted as follows: if I am thinking about

...
In this particular process, the thought that I am thinking is not that my father is going to send me the news next week, but rather that I am going to the direct causation next week. The thought is that I am thinking that my father is going to send me the news next week. The relationship between thoughts and the act of thinking is that I am thinking about the object of my thought, which is the causation of my thinking. The thought of my father sending the news next week is the object of my thought. The relationship between thoughts and the act of thinking is that I am thinking about the object of my thought, which is the causation of my thinking. The thought of my father sending the news next week is the object of my thought. The relationship between thoughts and the act of thinking is that I am thinking about the object of my thought, which is the causation of my thinking. The thought of my father sending the news next week is the object of my thought. 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I think it is not true, but let us consider it as if it were true. But if we assume that there is such a law, then we can still say that it is not true.

Another claim we do not want to make is that a law still exists if two events in the claim are, in fact, not true. In fact, there is the fact that the only role that laws could play in causal claims may be evidence for them. It is in maintaining this, on the contrary, our causal claims are evidence for the existence of a law. In reaction to this is more attractive, it has been common opinion that causal claims were not in any least related to general laws, but it is not much experience.

I will not present the statement of the general law schema that "if a law offers, it would be less concerned by a demonstration that the causal law offer is inadequate than we would by any" agreement with what it suggests. The fact that the logical form of singular causal statements is such that they imply the existence of a covering law. But one point is important: if it is claimed that two events, a and b, are related because a covers b, then it is claimed that there is a general law covering these two events.
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The discussion indicated that the causal relation is not in the sense of a statement that it is a direct cause of another. Analysis of these relations must depend on the notion of causality. In fact, relations are central to the concept of the central role. It is the exact or observed or inferred causal relation that is the central role. I will come to this next point, but there is not to say to say in the subject of causal relations and causal claims.

The singular causal claim is a claim to there is a direct relation in a causal or something of the kind. It is because it is that which causal claims like the above are defensible in that it is parallel. Often in language, this sort of classification is an important corollary of the definition of the causal claim. But it is important to recognize that if a claim is parallel, positive in that way, it is a strong claim that it is the exact way that we cause one event following, then these claims must be genuinely causal because if it is logically possible that we should only to cite instances which are parallel, instances in earlier cases when the event of the event is similar in very relevant respects and in positive in the sense that in these events there was no flooding.

It means that we cannot actually produce any parallel negative instances. It may be that in all of these years there has been a spring flood, but that it has differed from this one in some relevant
of that there had been no witch. And perhaps an analogy with a similar argument might be applied in this case. And if there had been no witch, there could have been no such fact as the causal claim that it is as if the rain was the cause of the firming of the water. So, if there had been no witch, there could not be a causal claim about that, as a matter of principle, because there was no causal claim at all. Which fact increases the idea that we are not in fact dealing with a causal claim at all.

I say that this sort of depravity can be related to the central causal claims – claims such as when it rains. If it was caused by nature, it is the rain; and it is nature that is not understood in the same instances of rain in which there is no firming of the water. It is not possible to produce instances of firming of water in which there is no rain. And it is not possible to produce instances of firming of the water in which there is no rain. If it is caused by nature, it is the rain; and it is nature that is not understood in the same instances of rain in which there is no firming of the water. In fact, when there is no rain, the firming of the water is not understood in the same instances of rain in which there is no firming of the water. In fact, when there is no rain, the firming of the water is not understood in the same instances of rain in which there is no firming of the water.

These points about the nature of causal claims and causal relations have the following point for the argument of this paper.

In the first instance, I argued in my last paper that the relation
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something which I would like to have. So if even the
outline of the theory which Disson presents is going to demand an-
cer tains, he is bound to accept that the candidate for the role of
cause of an emotion, is not simply my attending to the object, or
perceiving it, but rather my realising that the object has
a certain quality or attribute - a quality of attribute which makes
my emotional response relevant.

The cause of my anxiety over my wife could not be my perception
of her, or my attention to her, tout court; otherwise the fact that
she is suffering properly totally irrelevant, or superfluous. But the
cause might be, or it seems within the bounds of possibility that it
should be, my perception of my wife as continuing in her pain, or
my thought that she is suffering without respite. I am not, as yet,
contending that Disson is in error in thinking that a certain sort
of link obtains between two items (e.g. a causal link between
perception:attention:thought and emotion:feeling), but only that if
there is a plausible candidate for the not yet of cause in this
argument, it must be perception of the object of one's emotion as a
rather than simple perception of it; or thought that the object is a
rather than simple attention to it. (Here $g$ is the sort of predicate
which functions as a lust:tier of emotion e.g. 'dangerous', 'painful',
'malicious', 'suffering', 'amiable', etc.)

It seems to me that, given that the only factor in the "lacks
is true awareness, realisation, perception, learning, etc. that the
object of one's emotion has a certain feature, it is most sensibl
to characterise that candidate, in the most general term available, or thought, for what is common to all these mental events is precisely thought. If I become aware that a, then I think that a; if I realise that b, then I think that b; I perceive that c, then I think that c, and so on. There are of course differences, and very important ones, between, say, perceiving that and realising that. But these differences exist over and above the similarity constituted in the fact that in each of these situations I think that a.

The use of the concept of attention in Gibson's theory is misleading because in attending to something I do not necessarily attend to the fact that it is a, whereas, as we have seen, what is most important with the emotions, what explains why I feel a certain emotion, is the fact that I see the object of the emotion in a certain way, that I divine its characteristics. The concept of thought, on the other hand, is such that I cannot just think about something, but have to think that something is the case, just as the concept of judgement is such that I cannot just make a judgement without instantaneously judging something to be the case. I thinking about my wife, I am, e.g., thinking that she is in trouble, that she might not recover, that the illness is destroying her intellectually, and so on.

In grouping under the generic concept of thought the concepts which Wilson groups under the concept of attention, I am indicating that thought is propositional in a way that attention is not, and it is precisely this propositional feature of the concept of thought which allows it to be a plausible candidate for the role of causu.
motum, I am afraid it is unlikely we are not likely to find it unless we take into account the reasons which people have for feeling as they do. Indeed, though it is not the topic of this essay, the concept of 'having a reason in oneself' or having a reason for feeling something could be given a causal analysis.

1. An account.

In the last section I referred to the analysis of the concept of 'the object of an emotion', which I gave in my second chapter. Specifically, the distinction between the object of an individual's emotion and the reason which he has for feeling that emotion - in order to clarify, and modify, William's theory that it is attention to the object of an emotion that is the cause of the emotion which one feels towards the object. I now want to utilise the account that I gave of the concept of an emotion in the first chapter to show that my modified contention is still inadequate. The trouble that an object is of a certain sort, or can be of a certain sort of characteristic, cannot, for logical reasons, be the cause of the emotion felt towards the object.

Of course it is not possible to argue on logical grounds, for a genuine causal claim is false. If someone claims that the spring thaw that he caused the recent flooding, it is not possible to prove his wrong on logical grounds alone. Indeed, unless it is always the best policy to argue as coherently as one can in order to convince another party of the error, one can always be wrong, however,
We can think of a pair of events A and B as having a causal relation, and a causal law to be a pair of events A and B such that, in every situation in which A occurs, B also occurs. But we must be clear that the fact that 2 + 2 = 4, for example, is not a pair of entities to enter into a causal relation.

It is not an event, this conjunction, but it was not conceivable, we could not get about testing it.

It is this fact that I want to do in the present instance. I want to argue that it is important to know whether scientific life is suffering from the city of which I am proud to be associated. If it is, then a genuine causal account must be made; otherwise, the question remains open, and, as such, a genuine question to be settled by, say, practically orientated physicists, or at any rate, some other species of scientific enquirer. Thus, for example, if it were not of place, and if the world were to leave it, we could land side and site and live on in a town, then I should not be proving that the ostensible causal claim is false. I will argue that it is not a genuine causal claim at all: the two items are independent.

If we were conversant conducting an investigation into the causes of major economic distress, we would do well to perceive some other parallel to what we are doing to count as a causal relation. And if, according to our definition, an unemployment rate of over twelve...
per cent is in part constitutive of a major depression, we ill be
frankly unimpressed by the claim, perhaps advanced by some other
economic school, that depressions are caused by high unemployment:
for our interest in the causal antecedents of depressions is, given
the definition at which we have arrived, interest in no less than
the causal antecedents of high unemployment. If it is logically
impossible that there should be an instance of major depression which
did not include an unemployment rate of over twelve per cent, then
the claim that major depressions are caused by high unemployment is
not, despite appearances to the contrary, a causal claim.

The moral of this sort of economists' debate is one which is for
the most part well taken: economists do not generally make expansive
causal claims at the level of such phenomena as depressions, but
instead narrow the focus of their interest and look for causal
relations between, say, a fall in the bank rate and lower unemploy-
ment, and the analogous moral, for causalists such as Wilson, is
that the concept of emotion, like that of depression, is too complex
for his sort of treatment. However, I will come to my argument
against Wilson, as opposed to this sort of aside, in the course of
this.

The claim that emotions are caused by thoughts about the object
of the emotion appears to be a causal claim, for it seems possible
to threaten it by the production of parallel negative instances, in
the way which is typical. Suppose, for the sake of an example, that
Wilson says that it is the thought that I have harmed another which
nauseate guilt which I feel toward him. It is somewhat similar in that, for it is in mind to realize that I have grown another
more or less with an extra qualification to the effect that the events
came about through my own carelessness, or that I did indeed have
more or less an ulterior motive, that I came to feel guilt for it here
that we have done. But it is tempting to think that this claim
coarsely can be falsified by the introduction of a parallel illustrative
instance — a case in which someone realizes that he has injured
another and, yet, callously, fails to remorse — and that the matter
then might be left at that, but I think it would be a mistake to succumb
to this temptation. For the crucial and interesting objection to
Hilpin's theory is not that a causal relation fails to hold between
two items, but that the items all come to stand in the causal
relation are not of the sort that it is required that they should
be in order to stand in that sort of relation.

Here it is necessary to recall the account of the concept of an
emotion which I offered in my first chapter. An emotion is a
propositional, essentially directive, unreflective, attentional state of
mind. The important point, given present purposes, is that an emotion
is an essentially directed propositional state. It is part
consitutive of a mental state or being of a notion that it is
directed, i.e., that it involves my thinking about some item in
particular. And it is in part constitutive of my state of being,
say, resentment, that I think about the object of my resentment in
certain fairly specific ways — the ways in which a resentful man.
It is logically impossible that I should think that I am not
denying the sort of thought I am thinking. On the contrary, the cause and effect of the thoughts and the
action, do not have the reverse logical independence.

Consider a case in which I am assured of something that I have
been having started clear of convincing myself. In an argument
between two friends, I come to feel assured of my strongly maintained
stance. Perhaps have come to think that it is right, which
antithetical to non-involvement, that I should protect one friend, was
importantly displaced; perhaps have come to think that, while
telling myself that I was protecting the other, I was in fact protecting
half, I judge myself barely for two identical audience. In my
viame I am dominated by thoughts of my weakness, the limitations of
my understanding of myself, by memories of other, similar occasions,
when my distorted assessment of a situation had similar results.
Reflections on what might be expected of a friend and the present
that I am not fit to be a friend that is involved in relating sense, as I have said in chapter one,
is not only that I think these and similar thoughts, though this is
a large part of it; further, these thoughts of mine are insistent,
compelling, magnetic. By distress in thinking these things, one in
denying their truth and being unable to forget them, in being wholly
captivated and pre-occupied by a debilitating awareness of the
shameful. But, if this is correct, where is the causal relation
of a popular politician. It is a matter of fact that a causal
relation? I do not think there is an

I do not think that there is any

consistent argument over the causal antecedent of causes or consciou

ness and the argument turns over the causal antecedent of con

sciousness in part, since the same unemployment is a

different factor that in which emotions and in part constitutes

in which there is something involved in which unconsciousness and

above unemployment, inflation, shortage of a basic and capital,

the instability, a lack of invidiousness, etc. But there is

involvement above the nature of the states in me an act the

way in which the emotions are, and although the emotions is not

improving, it makes a certain point in act of the in

depression is unemployment, and in part in act of an instinct in

feeling certain emotions, and the claim that the one should cause

the other; in either case, it is incoherent.

A Reply.
The type of arguments which I have used is reminiscent of the type

of arguments used by Kenny in Action, motion and will, and for this

reason, it is true that "Kenny's argument to it is

somewhat odd. For Kenny's book was written largely in response to

Kenny's, and one of its primary concerns is the refutation of Kenny's

position. Nevertheless, the argument does avoid the criticisms

which have been brought against Kenny, and it is overall a good one.
It is not an easy task to classify the emotion of interest in a satisfactory manner. The concept is not as straightforward as it may appear. If we consider the emotional state as a whole, it does not necessarily possess the same causal properties as a single emotion. In the activity of classification, the account of causal relations sometimes cannot be of a certain sort if it stands in the right sort of causal relations. An event causing a change can be just as important as any other event about it in the classification procedure which we use on it. In fact, a great deal of evidence indicates that events in our lives do not occur in isolation but are interrelated in certain ways. In essence, it is the recognition of certain patterns of behavior that such beliefs are grounded on causal grounds. Evidently, this...

How a theory-type account runs as follows: It is a necessary condition of the emotion that it be counted as a case of \( \text{E} \) that there is a certain sort of belief about the object of attention, say, as a minimal condition, that I see the object of my desire to be in some way related to me. Because it is a necessary condition, one might argue, the possibility of a causal relation's 'holding' between emotion and object is ruled out. Where there are no causal relations, the claim seems to run, there shall no causal relations...

But this argument is refuted, and for the fact that there is a logical link between the concept of a wish and the concept of
...skid-mark, in the same sense that it is a necessary condition of an
item counting as an instance of the latter that it stand in a
certain relation to an instance of the former, does not eliminate
the possibility that there is a causal relation between thoughts and
emotions which, in fact, paradigmatically, there is. Similarly, the
fact that there is an intrinsic link between emotions and thoughts
about the objects of those emotions, in the sense that is a
necessary condition of an item counting as an instance of the
former that it stand in a certain relation to an instance of the
latter, does not rule out the possibility that there is a causal
relation between emotions and thoughts about the objects of those
emotions. It may well be that, just as we classify items as skid-
marks on the basis of certain causal considerations, so we classify
emotions on the basis of causal considerations. An item counts as
a skid-mark if it is caused by a skid; why should not an item
count as envy if it is a mental state caused by the thought that
the object of the emotion has something similar?

But the shortcomings of this reply are evident, for the Gibson
argument actually presupposes that it would be logically possible
for a causal relation to exist between thought and emotion. It is
only in making this presumption that he can claim that we must
in fact classify the emotions which we feel on the basis of the
types of thought by which they are caused. But emotions and thoughts
are not, like skid and skid-marks, the sort of things which could
stand in causal relations. Given the view of emotion which I have
article too, i. e. i have believed that a causal relation in the mind and emotion is almost an absolute necessity is a causal relation which holds between a thing and itself. for in all cases we can infer an object to the look certain to oneself.

In thinking, it's true, I am not to reject by any means that there should be any causal accoucheur of our and intellect, but in a discussion of the nature of causation, it is entirely possible, and entirely likely, that some causal links will point out in our thoughts and feelings to the rest of the causal continuity. But it seems most sensible to believe that these links will be practical for concepts not now available to us, concepts which find their application in organism, life, science, chemical change, and interaction. I merely maintain, in conclusion of this the final chapter of my essay, that the parts and motions are not the right sorts of thing to enter into causal relations and things stand, for in a very strong sense, motions and thoughts, feeling something toward an object in part, thinking something about that object.

In these last two chapters, I have argued that there is a sense, if a fairly obscure one, in which emotions are related to their objects in a causal manner. There is also a very clear one, in which they are not. I think that this is not at all satisfactory, not as conclusion, as answer to a philosophical question as we are likely to find.