

**THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN CANADIAN POLITICAL LIFE:
AN APPLICATION OF REFERENCE GROUP THEORY**

By

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THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN CANADIAN POLITICAL LIFE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis endeavours to assess the significance of religion to the shaping of political attitudes and behaviour in contemporary Canadian society. Positing a value-additive theoretical model, based on an extension of the reference group concept to preference and deference dimensions, the study links religious identity anchorage to comparative, normative and perspectival reference functions. Utilizing the 1984 Canadian National Election Study data, empirical propositions derived from the value-additive model are tested. The findings indicate that, generally, religion as operationalized by nominal religious preference is a stronger predictor of political values than religious reference group attendance and self-perceived religious identity. Moreover, a value-additive model incorporating a number of the religious dimensions, has limited applicability to the explanation of religion's role in the development of political attitudes and behavioural configurations. However, the findings suggest that nominal religious affiliation tends to function as an organizing perspective, through which the political world is viewed. The persistence of religious affiliation after controls for attendance and self-perceived religiosity,

tends to indicate that the perspectival function of affiliation is as much an issue of socio-religious heritage, as it is of present religious engagement. The Weberian assumption of religious preference types that breed distinct orientations to the social world is confirmed in this research. Additionally, the variation on political life matters for religious affiliate types is considered by the group's position of dominance or nondominance in the Canadian social system. Also, a theory of the Religious None as reflective of noninstitutionalized identity is developed, in accord with the findings.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In 1961, American sociologist Gerhard Lenski contributed an outstanding work of theoretical and empirical importance to the understanding of the relationship of religion and politics. Lenski's publication, entitled The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life, is an extension of the Weberian assumption that specific religions develop distinctive orientations toward the institutions of society (Lenski, 1961:357). Indeed, Lenski finds ample empirical support for Protestant, Catholic and Jewish differences on many of the measures incorporated in the study. These differences by religious affiliation lead Lenski to

think of contemporary American religious groups not only as associations, but as subcommunities as well; not merely as carriers of religious norms in any narrow sense, but as the carriers of complex subcultures relevant to almost all phases of human existence (Lenski, 1961:344).

Although Lenski does not specifically use the term "reference group", it is apparent that his explanation of why differences persist between diverse religious orientations falls within the purview of the reference group concept. It is this concept that instructs the

theoretical development of this dissertation, that is, the view that the religious reference group serves as a point of individual identity anchorage.

While Lenski's study is significant for revealing religious differences at a specific historical time in a particular community (Detroit, Michigan), the apparent lack of generalizability, grossness of religious categories and low level of statistical sophistication, indicate the need for further research into the relation of religion and political life. That many of the studies since Lenski's ground-breaking piece, particularly in Canadian research, are confined to simple Catholic-nonCatholic differences or to a limited representation of the political life, such as vote or party preference, further calls for a thorough analysis of the relationship of religion and a variety of political variables. Moreover, the need to cast such research in a relevant theoretical perspective and against the backdrop of classical theory is obvious from a review of the literature.

The progression of this theoretical and empirical research endeavor begins by positing a classical theoretical backdrop from which expectations regarding the association of religion and politics can be deduced. This backdrop, presented in Chapter two, is comprised of a review of the works of Comte, Durkheim, Toennies, Weber and Sorokin. A second component of the theoretical orientation

chapter is to conduct a review of the relevance of the reference group concept to religious associations. Following this review, a preliminary model elaborating the concept of reference group, in terms of preference, reference, and deference dimensions, is developed. Then, using this concept, the association of the religious factor and the political life is empirically assessed.

Presented in Chapter three is a review of literature relevant to the theme of the association between religion and politics. Each research piece included in the review is consigned to its corresponding dimension in the preliminary model.

In Chapter four, general research issues relating to the conceptual model are stated with view to empirical testing, via the data in the 1984 Canadian National Election study. The operationalizations for the religious preference, reference and deference dimensions are specified, as are the control variables to be employed in the empirical analysis. Moreover, the distribution for each religious measure and the crosstabulation of each measure by the control variables are displayed.

Chapters five through nine share a similar format, each consisting of: operationalization of dependent political variables; display of results; and, discussion of findings relative to the theoretical model for specific dimensions of the Canadian political life. In Chapter

five political efficacy and trust, reflecting attitudes that, potentially, condition the extent of involvement in the political process, are considered. Chapter six assesses a battery of behavioural items that includes: election attention and interest; awareness and exposure to political stimuli; and campaign activity. The seventh chapter presents an analysis of respondent's attitudes toward specific political issues. Primarily, the issues reflect either social and economic concerns or moral matters. In Chapter eight, attitudes on: the extent of power wielded by specific social institutions; aspects of social class; and, left-right placement, are displayed and discussed. Chapter nine concludes the empirical assessment of political matters, examining respondent affect toward groups and elites in Canadian society.

The tenth chapter of the dissertation reflects upon the general applicability of the theoretical model to the results and the overall pattern of findings. Refinements to the conceptual model are suggested and discussed in relation to other substantive research and the classical theoretical backdrop. Finally, suggestions for future research into the religious factor and political life are discussed, and potential for extension of the reference concept to other substantive research areas is highlighted.

Chapter II

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

2.1 CLASSICAL THEORETICAL BACKDROP: RELIGION AND POLITICS

Characteristic of a number of classical sociological theories is the attempt to explain social change in terms of the movement between constructed types that reflect variation on a configuration of societal dimensions. The works of Comte, Durkheim, Toennies and Weber, generally, display the progressive development of society from one type to another, recognizing that the forms are often of mixed composition, but tend to one direction. One of the central features of these classical explanations of social change is a general consensus that the role of religion either experiences a decline with the shift to scientific understanding and rational explanation, or that alternative religious expressions compatible with the shifting social climate develop.

In contradistinction to the classical statements of Comte, Durkheim, Toennies and Weber, the perspective of oscillating cultural supersystems, as developed by Sorokin, serves to provide an alternative expectation concerning religion's explanatory potential in contemporary society. The theoretical treatment of religion, by the

aforementioned theorists, has significant value for anticipating the results of an analysis into the association of religion and politics. To the extent that the Canadian social system reflects one of the ideal-typical constructs of a given theorist, implications may be deduced concerning the salience of religion to the formation of political attitudes and its instructiveness to political behaviour. These implications, derivative from the substantive work of each theorist, are the subject of the review that follows.

2.1.1 Comte: The Religion of Humanity

In the work of Auguste Comte, three stages of intellectual evolution and a corresponding affinity to form of social organization is delineated in the transition from the primitive theological stage through the transitional metaphysical, culminating in the final positive state (Comte, 1961:1332). The domination of society by scientific rationale is seen to correlate with the decline of religious explanation and philosophical speculation. However, as Comte uses the term 'religion', the abandonment of the theological is not equivalent to the absence of religion. In fact, the religion of humanity, that is, social science, is viewed by Comte as fulfillment of the requisite function of an eternal power to which life is submitted, and secondly, the inspiration of the internal moral nature (Comte, 1975:395). It is religion that

reduces life to its unity by bringing the three aspects of human nature - thought, feeling and action, into a coherent relation. The religion of humanity represents the completed expression of the "entirety of man's real existence and is equally scientific, aesthetic, and practical" (Comte, 1975:398). Hence, Comte's view of religion in the positive stage may be considered as definitionally functional, lacking the substantive supernatural referent characteristic of the primitive theological stage. The evolutionary development of human intelligence, thus, can be viewed as a movement from a supernatural (theological) to natural (positive) explanation of life and, definitionally, religion is changed from a substantive to functional term.

The importance of Comte's perception of religion and the changes in human intelligence to research on religion and politics is, at least, two-fold. First, we would expect little, if any, significant correlation between vestiges of theological religion and political life in contemporary society, if Comte's analysis of the shift from theological reason to a pervasive positivism is correct. Of course, the evidence against the abandonment of theological religion in contemporary society is considerable, and perhaps, it is because we have not attained the positive stage that it persists. However, an equally plausible explanation is that religion,

substantively defined, has adapted to the social context of contemporary society by either limiting its influence to moral questions, or by attempting to influence the policy directions and applications of scientific advance.

A second observation from Comte's treatment of religion is that the shift to a functional definition in the positive stage, from a substantive definition in the theological stage, reflects an attempt to grapple with the artificiality of the typology of stages. Recognizing the requisite function of religion in providing a unified meaning system, Comte retains its form but changes its contents. The religion of humanity subsumes the philosophical and the political, encasing the ultimate form of social integration. Religion conceived in this manner, must obviously have consequences for political participation and attitudes. Empirically, however, the facts of contemporary society simply do not correspond to the religion of humanity and the theological meaning system remains dominant (Bibby, 1983:116). This raises the issue for those who define religion functionally of finding substitute religious forms, such as, family, feminism, socialism, ecology, profession, sports and any other cause that one derives ultimate meaning from. The result of such a search is to render religion as inclusivist, and ultimately, a term that is scientifically untenable for research into the relation between dimensions of

religiosity and political issues/participation.

2.1.2 Durkheim: Science As Religion

Durkheim's specification of the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity through the development of the division of labour and the concomitant decline of collective conscience, has significant ramifications for the exercise of religious authority in a given society.

According to Durkheim, in a society characterized by mechanical solidarity, religion corresponds to a common consciousness among individuals living together (Durkheim, 1984:119). However, with the elaboration of the division of labour a greater heterogeneity of consciousness is manifest, attenuating the intensity of shared religious beliefs and collective sentiments. The political, economic and scientific functions are gradually seen to separate from the religious function and take on characteristics of a temporal nature (Durkheim, 1984:119). The capacity of religion is greatly diminished with the advance of science and Durkheim concludes, that

if there is one truth that history has incontrovertibly settled, it is that religion extends over an ever diminishing area of social life (Durkheim, 1984:119).

The decline of religion, however, is not, according to Durkheim, its end. Religion is as eternal as society itself, reflecting in its sacred conceptions the ideals of society (Durkheim, 1965:468-469). Hence, with the death of old gods, others are born to fulfill the moral function of

social integration through the stirring of collective sentiments (Durkheim, 1965:475). Indeed, there are many substitutes for the religion of the old gods, such as the commemoration of great events in national life and the celebration of science itself. Humankind is entirely capable of inventing new symbols of faith to replace those which pass away (Durkheim, 1965:476). In technological society the functions of religion are usurped by scientific explanation, but men still live by faith, faith in science that does not differ in any essential way from religious faith. Thus, Durkheim asserts, "scientific thought is only a more perfect form of religious thought" (Durkheim, 1965:477).

Discernible in Durkheim's treatment of transempirical religion as integrative to mechanical society and its subsequent decline with the elaboration of the division of labour, is a shift in terminology that echoes Comte. The increasingly diminished capacity of religion to speak authoritatively in a heterogeneous and complex society, along with the isolation of the religious function from the political and economic, are suggestive of the secularization thesis. However, Durkheim, wishing to retain the religious as a socially functional integrative mechanism in modern society, proposes that it is the corporative organisation that comes to predominate in defining the moral environment and functions as a

"collegiate religious body" (Durkheim, 1984:xl). Durkheim views the corporation of the future as subsuming many of the functions exercised by private associations, and furthermore,

the corporation will be called upon to become the foundation, or one of the essential foundations, of our political organisation (Durkheim, 1984:liii).

This view of the persistence of religious qualities in organized forms of social life, apart from those with a supernatural referent, and the increased influence of the corporation as one such form, has an important implication for the role of traditional religious subcollectivities in modern society. The assumption of communal, educational and assistive activities by the corporate organisation will significantly erode the importance of identification with the religious community that sustains supernatural beliefs. The conjoining of work and religion in the context of the corporative body, may in itself be sufficient to the provision of an integrative meaning system. This supplantation of the traditional religious community by a functional alternative will relegate religion with a supernatural referent to, either, the supplementary role of reinforcing personal morality, or, to that of a merchant of the rites of passage, that is, marriage and death. In either case, little or no association of traditional religion and the political sphere would be anticipated from this perspective.

Durkheim's analysis of social change from mechanical to organic society and the role of religion in this shift, raises several issues. First, if religion has social origins and tends to mirror the culture of a historically specific period, then isn't it plausible that traditional religion will adapt to changes in the social context and not be replaced by a substitute with an empirical referent? Secondly, is the functional separation of religion from the political as pervasive as Durkheim indicates, and further, is the separation at the institutional level incorporated at the individual level? Thirdly, if the corporative association is seen as foundational to political organisation, then is it possible that religious community as a context of interaction and instruction can serve as a reference group for political ideals also. Indeed, evidence linking occupational background and religious group participation could be suggestive of an alternate thesis to that of Durkheim, that is, the failure of the corporative association to provide satisfactory moral, social and financial benefits has resulted in the retention of the religious association as functional to contemporary society.

2.1.3 Toennies: From Religion to Public Opinion

Ferdinand Toennies' typological designation of two great cultural periods - *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or

community and society, and the shift from the first to the latter, also, has significant implications for anticipating the effects of the religious factor in contemporary society. For Toennies the religious dimension achieves its prominence as a social cohesive in the Gemeinschaft period of collective life. It is during this period that

religion assumes authority over
commonwealth; public opinion, over the
state (Toennies, 1957:219).

The pervasiveness of religion in Gemeinschaft culture is evidenced in the totalistic participation of self in the life of the community. Confined to the geography of town life, the dictates of ecclesiastical authority are received as natural will and all issues of belief and action are religious matters. However, with the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, a corresponding displacement takes place in individual and collective consciousness. At the level of the individual the form of will known as faith during the Gemeinschaft period becomes theory in Gesellschaft, and, at the collective level, religion is supplanted by public opinion as an expression of the rational general will (Toennies, 1957:218-221). Despite this movement from natural to rational will, Toennies maintains that "the powers of Gesellschaft retain a certain resemblance to the commands of religion ... " (Toennies, 1957:222). Hence, we observe again, as in the cases of Comte and Durkheim, a shift from a substantive to

functional definition of religion, corresponding to the movement between the typological dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. However, for Toennies, while the religious dimension is functional to the stability of Gesellschaft it is not a requirement, as self-interest alone should be sufficient as a binding moral force (Toennies, 1957:222).

Utilizing Toennies theoretical conceptualization, an interesting research problem is implicated in the perceived shift from religion to public opinion in modern society. If Toennies is correct, a weak association between religion and opinions on matters of a political nature should be found. On the other hand, public opinion may be more reflective of religious faith than it is of theory. The fact that religious groups are seen to exist in the presumably Gesellschaft context of modern life, that definitionally tend to correspond with what Toennies refers to as Gemeinschaft by spiritual friendship (Toennies, 1957:43), indicates a potential source of attitude formation, apart from special interest groups and associations. Therefore, religion may demonstrate a significance effect to the explanation of political attitudes and behaviour in contemporary society. Additionally, Toennies' recognition that Gemeinschaft by spiritual friendship must be maintained by frequent meetings, indicates the relevance of the frequency of

religious group attendance to the formation of a common faith. Hence, we might expect that intensity of religious involvement is more important to the examination of the relation of religion and the political life, than nominal religious affiliation.

2.1.4 Weber: Religion and Rationalization

Of the classical theoretical statements that conceptualize social change in terms of a movement between types, none is more relevant to assessing the association between politics and religion than that of Max Weber. While the correspondence between Weber's traditional, affectual and value-rational action types bear a striking resemblance to Toennies' *Gemeinschaft*, Durkheim's mechanical solidarity and Comte's theological stage; and, similarly, Weber's purposive rational action (*zweckrationale Handeln*) approximates Toennies' *Gesellschaft*, Durkheim's organic solidarity and Comte's positive stage; the substantive incongruence by far outweighs the typological commonalities. Unlike Comte, Durkheim and Toennies, Weber's useage of the term religion is invariably substantive, that is, in correspondence to a transempirical or divine referent, regardless of the degree to which rationalization has proceeded.

Concerning the understanding of religious behaviour, Weber asserts that this can only be achieved

from the viewpoint of the subjective experiences, ideas, and purposes of the

individuals concerned - in short, from the viewpoint of the religious behavior's "meaning" (Weber, 1963:1).

Hence, religious behaviour or belief cannot be separated from everyday conduct, thus, preserving the totality of actor and social context. For example, the affinity between religion and class is recognized by Weber, in that,

the tendency toward affiliation with an ethical, rational, congregational religion is more apt to be found the closer one gets to those classes which have been carriers of modern rational productive economic activity (Weber, 1963:94).

Moreover, Weber proposes that privileged classes are unlikely candidates for evolving the idea of salvation, but instead, their religion primarily functions as legitimation of their life pattern (Weber, 1963:107). Contrariwise, Weber employs the concept "theodicy of disprivilege" to denote the manner in which the non-privileged classes adhere to salvation religion as a source of esteem, replacing what they cannot claim in the here and now with what they will become in the hereafter (Weber, 1963:106,113). A further, and perhaps, the most familiar expression of this affinity between lived experience and religious belief is realized in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, wherein, Weber attempts to demonstrate the relationship between Protestant worldly asceticism and the advance of the rational capitalistic ethic (Weber, 1958). Once again, by treating religion substantively and delineating types of religious

affiliation, Weber is able to offer a partial explanation of the association of religious adherence and the development of an economic ethic.

Instructive from Weber's treatment of religion is the attention given to the general variation in religious expression and the specific concern with the role of the religious community. Freed of the idea of evolutionary progression between dichotomous types, Weber is able to examine the function of religion with a supernatural referent in both primitive and modern, oriental and occidental societies. Although, the master process of rationalization is seen to advance, it does not necessarily entail the abandonment of religious belief and practice, but religion's modification to the lived experiences of adherents.

Central to the understanding of the retention of a religious worldview is the role of the religious association and its socialization functions. With reference to the Puritans and Protestant sects, Weber notes that church discipline was vested,

first, at least in part and often wholly, in the hands of laymen. Secondly, it worked through the necessity of one's having to hold one's own; and, thirdly, it bred or, if one wishes, selected qualities (Weber, 1946:320).

Weber posits this recognition of the social control and socialization aspects of the sectarian religious community in contrast to the compulsory organization of the Catholic

Church, which through the confession of sins and the power of absolution could alleviate the internal pressure that served as a lever to sectarian conformity (Weber, 1946:320).

While Weber noted the differentiation between religious groups for the purpose of explaining the association of Puritanism with the spirit of capitalism, it is not unreasonable to assume that religious group variation in terms of belief, organization, and socialization practices, also corresponds to variation in political attitudes and participation. According to Weber,

Every religiously grounded unworldly love and indeed every ethical religion must, in similar measure and for similar reasons, experience tensions with the sphere of political behavior (Weber, 1963:223).

It is the working out of these tensions through the expression of political opinions, interest in politics, and political activity that is the focus of the subsequent empirical analysis. If Weber is correct in his appraisal of differences in religious belief and practice, as expressed in religious groups, and if religiosity is significant to the everyday lived experience of the individual, then we may anticipate a certain affinity between affiliation with religious group types and political expressions. For example, Weber posits the "affinity between inner-worldly asceticism and the advocacy of the minimization of state control" (Weber, 1963:227).

This is suggestive of the general research expectation that Protestant NonMainline adherents may demonstrate more minimalist state attitudes, than Protestant Mainline and Catholic affiliates.

That some religious communities are more successful than others at inculcating values and exercising social control, especially in the context of a pluralistic society, has implications for the association of religion to politics. Minimally, we might assume that frequency of attendance at religious group meetings, as well as the perceived importance of religion to the individual's life, will be significant factors to the defining of a distinct religious worldview that includes political attitudes, interest and participation.

2.1.5 Sorokin: Religion as the Truth of Faith

Positing a classification of cultural supersystems, consisting of ideational, idealistic and sensate mentalities, Pitirim Sorokin notes the corresponding basis of truth and knowledge for each dominant type. The distinguishing of truth systems, along with the relative importance of each in a period where one cultural system dominates, has important implications to anticipating the effect of the religious factor on the issues of contemporary society.

The ideational system of culture is seen to be based on the principle of a supersensory and superrational

God (Sorokin, 1957:19). Hence, it is the revealed truth of religion, that is, the truth of faith, which is foundational to the reality of the ideational culture in its manifold aspects. Juxtaposed to the ideational, at the opposite end of the cultural spectrum, is a mentality that takes as its principle value the knowledge gleaned through sensory perception. This truth of the senses, according to Sorokin, exhibits either a complete denial of supersensory reality or, minimally, an attitude of indifference (Sorokin, 1957:86). The systematization of empirical reality, assessed through the application of scientific principles, is the agenda of the sensate cultural mentality in its pure form. Finally, a mixed type, consisting of a synthesis of ideational and sensate aspects, provides a third dominant cultural mentality type, that is, the idealistic (Sorokin, 1957:81,82). In the idealistic cultural supersystem it is human reason that becomes the basis of truth, affirming the distinctiveness of the supersensory (the truth of faith - ideational); the sensory (the truth of the senses - sensate); and, logical propositions or speculative thought (the truth of reason-idealistic). However, the affirmation of each truth principle is welded by human reason into an organic whole.

As comprehensive cultural supersystems, each mentality type penetrates all other cultural dimensions, that is: truth and knowledge, ethics and law, family,

government, economy, and, the fine arts. While a degree of affinity is anticipated between the dominant system and the actual mentality and conduct of the society, at no point does the pervasiveness reach a totalistic level. Sorokin affirms that:

... in concrete social reality no one of the types designated above is often found in pure form, unmixed with others, either in an individual or in a group or culture. On the other hand, these types and their characteristics are not distributed identically among individuals, groups, or cultures (Sorokin, 1937, I:78).

The relevance of the foregoing qualification to a study of the religious factor in contemporary society is that while the dominant system of truth may correspond to that of a sensate mentality, religious individuals, groups or subcultures, bearing some fascimile to the ideational system of truth, may still be found. That the truth of faith as defined substantively, that is, divinely revealed religious truth, is diminishing in the face of sensory truth is an acknowledged point (Sorokin, 1957:281). However, Sorokin's observation that:

No single system comprises the whole of truth; nor is it, on the other hand, entirely false (Sorokin, 1957:104),

and, moreover, that each form of truth may fulfill a significant and necessary function in the "psychosocial life" of humankind (Sorokin, 1937, II:55), tends to indicate that a vestige of transempirical religion may be found in all cultural systems. Indeed, unlike Comte,

Sorokin repudiates the notion of a progressive linear trend of the sensate mentality throughout history and proposes that historical evidence supports a theory of oscillation between dominant cultural systems (Sorokin, 1957:103,104). The overripeness of the sensate cultural system with its weighted emphasis on sensory truth would lead, according to Sorokin, to:

a progressively increasing defection of this population from sensate culture, with its values, and a shift of its allegiance to other forms of culture, ideational or idealistic (Sorokin, 1957:298).

If, as Sorokin proposes, the cultural pendulum has reached or is nearing the height of its swing in the sensate sphere, then, with its subsequent motion we might anticipate an increasing emphasis on values of a religious nature and their reflection in social, moral and political choices. If, on the other hand, we are yet anchored in the sensate cultural system, perhaps, exemplifying an "all-pervading syncretism" or "vast cultural dumping place" (Sorokin, 1957:250), then little or no consistency between religion and political attitudes can be expected. These expectations, however, must be tempered with the recognition of some, potentially, distinct attitudinal formations existing by religious denomination. According to Sorokin, sensate culture has produced a mutilation of the Christian ethical system, in part through the production of hundreds of different sects (Sorokin,

1957:260,261). Moreover, in the sensate cultural mentality:

Religion, as a revelation of God, degenerates into a second-hand "social gospel"- a sort of political creed (Sorokin, 1957:100).

Implicitly, then, even in the supersystem of sensory values, we may find some correspondence between instruction in the religious group and political attitudes.

As a final consideration of Sorokin's theoretical significance to the backdrop of the present endeavor, a tacit notion of reference group can be discerned in his treatment of systems of interaction. Among the dimensions of social interaction, specified by Sorokin, are: extensity, intensity, duration and continuity, direction, and degree of organization. The extensity of interaction is determined by

the proportion of the activities and psychological experiences involved in the interaction out of the total sum of the activities and psychological experiences of which the person's whole life process consists (Sorokin, 1937 III:6).

Apparently, Sorokin understood that extensity of interaction varies among individuals and is dependent upon involvement in multiple reference groups. This individual complexity is exemplified in his description that:

Socially, each of us is a pole attached by a multitude of "wires" to several and diverse social and cultural systems, as a member of State, of a religious organization, of the family, of a political party, or an occupational union, of a

certain territorial community (village or city), and of a number of various educational (sport, art, scientific, philanthropic) associations, different from one another (Sorokin, 1937 IV:11)

A second dimension of social group interaction is the intensity of devotion. Employing the example of religious instruction, Sorokin notes that the probability of influencing the pupil to accept and follow religious teaching will be conditioned by the intensity of interaction between the teacher and student (Sorokin, 1937 III:9). Overall, the more extensive and intensive social interaction becomes,

the more conditioned and bound together (for good or bad) are the life, behavior, and psychology of the interacting parties (Sorokin, 1937 III:11).

Concerning the remaining dimensions of interaction, specified by Sorokin, each can be perceived to effect the outcome of social interaction, both, individually, and in combination with each other. Whether an interaction, in terms of duration, is continuous or intermittent (Sorokin, 1937 III:11), or whether the direction of the interaction process is toward solidary, antagonistic, or mixed goals (Sorokin, 1937: III:15), are important to the individual's identification with a social group.

A final factor to be considered in assessing types and systems of interaction is the extent to which the interaction is organized. In the organized form, relationships and values crystallize into a definite system

and values are classified into: lawful, recommended, and prohibited (Sorokin, 1937 III:19). Obviously, then, the degree to which an individual will defer to the normative standards of an interaction system is conditioned by the degree of organization of the system, working in conjunction with the other aspects of the interaction process. With specific regard to religious groups, Sorokin proposes that free associations with a voluntary membership based on religious devotion, constitute an organized-solidary system of interaction. However, generally, the organized Church is of a mixed variety, displaying a solidary-antagonistic system of interaction maintained by both compulsory enforcement and voluntary support (Sorokin, 1937 III:21,22).

While never using the term "reference group", Sorokin does discuss interaction dimensions appropriate to the study of reference groups, and, moreover, recognizes that each individual is cross-cut by multiple group involvements. Furthermore, the elaboration of interaction variables, by Sorokin, is suggestive of a value-additive approach, a matter to be addressed in a future section.

2.2 RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AS REFERENCE GROUPS

Reference group theory, potentially, has significant explanatory power for the association of religious participation and political matters. That the

context of religious community is an arena of normative socialization and value formation has been alluded to in the classical theory section, particularly, as exemplified in Weber and Sorokin. However, a more explicit elaboration of aspects of reference group theory is pertinent to the development of the research problem, that is, the assessment of the association of religion and politics, operationalized with a number of different measures.

Although, the concept "reference group" was first employed by Hyman in 1942 in a study of the psychology of status (Schmitt, 1972:1), the embryonic seed is firmly rooted in the works of Cooley and Mead. Indeed, Robert Merton in developing his conceptualization of reference groups pays homage to Cooley's work, especially on the function of emulation (Merton, 1957:359). However, the clearest statement underpinning reference group theory can be found in Mead's contention that

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs (Mead, 1934:138).

Accordingly, it is this seminal idea that is elaborated in the reference group literature.

Reference groups, for want of a more precise definition, are simply,

those groups to which the individual relates himself as a part or to which he

aspires to relate himself psychologically
(Sherif, 1956:175).

Hence, the reference group extends an influence over ego, serving as a point of anchorage for one's identity. Consequently, the norms of the reference group or groups with which one identifies are cherished by the individual, and one's lived experience, including social attitudes, is regulated in accord with the reference group values (Sherif, 1956:491). Used in this sense, reference group may refer to either primary groups, such as, family, or to secondary groups like religious associations (Schmitt, 1972:53). Therefore, the religious reference group may exert a powerful influence on the individual in the shaping of attitudes, if the individual takes the group as his/her point of reference. However, in the event that the individual participates in a group, such as a religious organization, but does not value the group as a source of identity, then the group may be considered as only a membership group (Eisenstadt, 1954:178). Obviously, membership group and reference group are at many times one and the same.

A further distinction of value made in reference group theory is between comparative and normative functions. When a reference group is utilized as a standard for making judgements and evaluations, a comparative function is noted. However, when behavioural conformity is expected with reference to group norms and

the power to reward conformity or punish nonconformity resides with the group, then the normative function is operative (Kelly, 1952:412-413). A further distinction, relevant to the linkage of religious group and political choices, is that of reference group as perspective. In this instance, perspective is defined as

an ordered view of one's world - what is taken for granted about the attributes of various objects, events, and human nature (Shibutani, 1955:564).

The group with which the individual identifies in gaining perspective, or a frame of reference in the organization of one's perceptual field, is considered as a reference group (Shibutani, 1955:565). That common culture, a product of communication, is emphasized as central to the reaffirmation of norms and perspective (Shibutani, 1955:564), points to the importance of research into the frequency of association with a reference group as a predictor of value formation.

Given the compartmentalization of modern life, the potential for multiple reference groups corresponding to the various segments of one's social world seems highly probable. Pluralistic society appears to place high value on associational life as intermediary between the individual and collectivity. The function of associations may be described as providing

patterns of organization within which individuals cooperatively operate in order to realize certain values. They provide

the agencies by means of which social persons achieve their purposes and through which they perform their social roles (DeGré, 1943:96).

Recognizing the plurality of patterns that may exist in one society, the limiting feature of an inquiry into the association of religion and political issues is that only one potential source of identity is being tapped. However, if after controls for other social background variables, such as education, age, gender, and voluntary association involvement, the effect of religious identification is seen to persist, then the probability of the anchoring of identity in a religious reference group may be viewed as considerable.

Instructive to the present research is Kaplan's employment of the concept of reference group as central to the development of a theory of voting (Kaplan, 1955). Kaplan specifically examines the relationship between religious affiliation and voting behaviour, noting that a comparison of the categories "Catholic" and "Protestant" does demonstrate "some tendency for people to adopt the category as a direct point of reference" (Kaplan, 1968:469). However, Kaplan qualifies this by observing that while both category and intimate subgroup may serve as points of reference, it is the intimate subgroup within the religious category that is, generally, more important to voting behavior. This distinction by Kaplan is valuable, in that it signals the potential for distinguishing between

levels of religious identification in empirical research, and further, indicates the need to elaborate reference group theory according to levels of identity anchorage. The specification of the reference group concept into appropriate dimensions may be central to its retention as a useful term in the social sciences (Schmitt, 1972:39). It is to this task of model specification that we now turn.

2.3 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL: THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN POLITICAL LIFE

The effect of the religious factor in political life can be assessed at a number of religious identification levels. Diagram 1 reflects a preliminary attempt at specifying religious identity through the extension of reference group theory. Religion is conceptualized at three levels - preference, reference, and deference - with each successive level corresponding to a presumed increase in intensity of religious identity anchorage, when the specified condition is present (See Appendix A, Diagram 1). Hence, the model is implicitly value-additive and allows for the assessment of the presence and absence of each subsequent dimension, as well as an evaluation based on the degree to which each factor is present. Moreover, an explicit incorporation of value-additivity is represented in the summing of the individual religious dimensions into composite religious indices.

2.3.1 Religious Preference Group

Religious preference group is a nominal measure presumably signifying an individual's identification of a specific religious context in which one is presently an affiliate, has been an affiliate in the past, or will be in the future. Past affiliation may, in its most remote form, include: citation of a parent's religious orientation; the place of an infantile rite of passage, such as, baptism or christening; or, perhaps, the religious orientation of the officiating figure at one's marriage ceremony. On the other hand, religious affiliation may be a present and highly significant relation to a religious congregation from which one draws meaning for everyday lived experience. Furthermore, a preference group may be a future orientation, in that it reflects the actor's intentions and desire for a particular religious orientation. Hence, affiliation or religious preference group can mean a variety of things and, minimally, corresponds to what has been referred to in reference group research as a comparative function (Kelly, 1952:413).

One of the options open to an individual, when requested to name a religious affiliation or preference group, is to state that he or she has none. This is the most basic distinction that can be secured at the preference level, that is, those who exhibit the

characteristic of naming a preferred religious group and those who choose not to. In the first instance, this is the presence of the religious preference condition, and in the second case, the absence of the condition.

The dichotomization of affiliation has important implications for anticipating and explaining the effect of religious preference on political issues. If, for example, it is found that the religious, here substantively defined by an affiliation with a religious group organized around a supernatural referent, do not differ significantly in their political attitudes and participation from the nonreligious, then the previous extrapolation from Durkheim's theory of religion may be correct. In other words, lack of difference may either indicate the irrelevance of the 'old gods' or traditional religion to the political issues of organic society, or that, the nonreligious, as defined substantively, have engaged a functional substitute for a traditional religious orientation.

Apart from the dichotomous measurement of religious preference, a nominal measure attending to specific type of affiliation is central to the assessment of religion at the preference level. Presumably, affiliate types that reflect homogeneous religious subcultures, will exhibit variation on political life matters as great as that displayed between the nonaffiliated and affiliated. If

this presumption is borne out in the findings, then a Weberian interpretation that considers the distinct ethos of religious types, may be warranted.

2.3.2 Religious Reference Group

Qualitatively distinct from naming a religious affiliation or preference is the actual attendance by the individual at religious group meetings. This behavioural indicator of reference group involvement, presumably, corresponds to a higher intensity of identity anchorage. Those who value the influence of the religious community and are physically capable of attendance, theoretically, should reflect a greater commitment of ego to the group's normative standards. Hence, in addition to the religious group functioning as a comparison point for a nominal identity, it will also serve as a normative standard for behavioural and attitudinal formation and maintenance. While the religious group in pluralistic society may be constrained, to some extent, from the delivery of reward and punishment for conformity or nonconformity to group standards, the act of attendance itself may represent a criterion by which the group evaluates the actor's commitment.

Not only is the act of attendance at religious group meetings a signal of the individual's commitment to the normative standards of the group, but, moreover, represents the opportunity to assimilate any contextual

effects peculiar to the group. Two basic requirements of a contextual effect are:

- (1) the communication of political messages
- and (2) opportunities for members to observe the reactions of fellow members to these messages and to bring their own behavior into conformity with them (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988:532).

Obviously, the fulfillment of these requirements is best served by attendance at religious group meetings. Acknowledgeably, the first condition may also be satisfied at the level of preference group, for example, the reception of religious organization mailings that contain politically oriented articles. Also, we must consider the possibility of satisfying both requirements of context at the preference group level, through television viewing of religious broadcasts. However, this is qualitatively distinct from actual participation through attendance, in that, audience response is limited to the formal expression selected by the television cameras for the viewing public. This selected response is both limited and immediate with no opportunity for participation in the subsequent informal interactions between audience members. Hence, we must conclude that religious reference group is qualitatively distinct and more intense to self-identity than religious preference group, and at the same time, implicitly presupposes preference.

Frequency of attendance is an ordinal measure of involvement in the reference group and can either be

classified dichotomously or more distinctly. As a dichotomous measure attendance is considered simply as being present or absent. However, as a more refined measure we may think of reference group participation in terms of extent, ranging from regular attendance to no attendance. Theoretically, at the dichotomous level, a qualitative difference might be anticipated between attenders and nonattenders of religious services. If a significant difference exists between the two, after appropriate controls, then we may tentatively determine that religious context is an operative source of differentiation in political attitudes and participation. However, if no significant differences are found, then, once again, we are led to consider a functionalist explanation of religion's decline, that is, compartmentalization or religious functional alternatives.

At the more refined level of degree of attendance, we would expect that regular exposure to religious reference group breeds a homogeneity of attitude that translates into the lived experience of political life. Individuals who refer themselves to the group only occasionally may evidence a closer congruity to nonattenders than to regular or frequent attenders, in their political attitudes and behaviour.

Naturally, an important control variable to assessing the association of religious reference group and

political issues is specific preference group type. Recent U.S. research finds a strong correlation between the theological milieu of a congregation and the political perceptions of its members (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988:545). This tends to correspond to the implications of Weber's treatment of religion, wherein, specific religious ethics with political consequences are cultivated within particular religious communities. Indeed, Lenski's study, The Religious Factor, underscores Weber's basic assumption that religion develops a distinctive orientation toward other phases of human activity. Analyzing four major socio-religious groups, Lenski concludes that:

To understand the power of socio-religious groups it is essential to recognize their capacity to absorb primary groups as subunits in their organizational system. Because of this, the norms of socio-religious groups are constantly reinforced in these intimate, highly valued social relationships which are so crucial in the shaping of personality (Lenski, 1961:344).

Hence, we observe the importance of the religious reference group, associationally in a secondary role and communally in a primary function, to the shaping of political attitudes and behaviour. Also, at the reference group level we might suspect that disjuncture between a religious organization's structuring of authority relations and the patterning of relations in the wider social system, may lead to feelings of citizen ineffectiveness at the political level.

2.3.3 Religious Deference Group

In accord with the theoretical model presented in Diagram 1, the highest level of religious identity anchorage is achieved by individuals who subjectively consider themselves as being religious. It is this dimension of personal religiosity that may be most important to the shaping of an identity or perspective that constitutes the frame of reference for the individual (Shibutani, 1955:563). There is a qualitative difference between referring oneself to a group for normative input and deferring to the group norms in one's behaviour. Deference to the values of the religious group is, presumably, greatest when the actor's self-perception is that of being religious. Hence, there is, in an implicit sense, the incorporation of religious group preference and reference at the deference level of religious identity. In other words, to self-designate oneself as being religious or not religious, may involve identifying some point of comparison and normative system by which to evaluate one's religiosity.

Personal religiosity, like frequency of attendance, is an ordinal measure that may be considered as a matter of degree. We might anticipate that if the religious factor is central to the explanation of political life matters, that a directional correspondence may be found between these matters and increases in religiosity. While the

deference dimension may be considered in either its dichotomous or expanded form, and to some extent reflect the embodiment of the preference and reference functions, explicit tests of the value-additive model can proceed through the creation of composite religious indices. These indices will incorporate the summation of the religious dimensions, considered in their dichotomous or extended forms.

Theoretically, in terms of the value-additive model, religious orientation is: in the preference dimension - comparative; in the reference dimension-comparative and normative; and in the deference dimension-comparative, normative and integrated into an organized perspective. Therefore, at the dichotomous level, the greatest difference in political attitudes and behaviours should be found between those displaying the presence of all three religious dimensions and those in whom all three conditions are absent or minimal. Moreover, when the refined attendance and identity measures are incorporated into a value-additive index, we would anticipate that those regularly exposed to the religious group context and high in religious self-perception will exhibit the largest difference from those who infrequently attend religious services and have a low religious self-perception. If political norms and values are communicated in the religious group, either formally or informally, then this

should be displayed by those to whom religion is most central. However, the magnitude and direction of differences may vary according to the specific religious group that the respondent affiliates with.

Chapter III

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Having specified a theoretical model that delineates religion in terms of three dimensions—preference, reference, and deference—a review of literature pertinent to the association of religion and political life is here presented. Studies included in the review will be discussed under the dimension of the conceptual model to which they most closely correspond.

3.1 PREFERENCE LEVEL: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND POLITICS

Research corresponding to the preference level of the theoretical model is subdivided into three sections: the Religious None; religious affiliate types of a broad nature, such as, Protestant and Catholic; and, research that attends to more refined affiliate distinctions.

3.1.1 The Religious None

As previously indicated in the model specification section, the most basic distinction to be made at the level of religious preference is between those who indicate an affiliation and those who do not. This latter group has been variously termed in the literature as "religious independents" (Vernon, 1968); "religious nones" (Condran

and Tamney, 1985; Tamney, Powell and Johnson, 1989; Bibby, 1985); "heathen" (Veevers and Cousineau); "religious unaffiliates" or "non-affiliates" (Welch, 1978; Veevers, 1990), and as constituting "irreligion" (Nock, 1987). Whatever label one chooses to apply, the significant observation drawn from existing literature is that much of the research utilizing the nonaffiliated, particularly in Canada, has been limited to specifying their demographic characteristics (Veever and Cousineau, 1980; Veevers, 1990), examining ratios of cult and sect growth in regions of high irreligion (Bainbridge and Stark, 1982; Nock, 1987), or refuting that the irreligious are drawn more to cults than conventional religious forms (Bibby and Weaver, 1985; Bibby, 1985). While this literature is interesting and relevant to the specification of control variables when assessing the religiously nonaffiliated, it does nothing to diminish Vernon's charge that the religious independents are a neglected, yet promising, category for substantive research (Vernon, 1968:220). Vernon's contention invites comparative research into religious affiliation and nonaffiliation, as well as the exploration of similarities and dissimilarities between religious affiliates and nonaffiliates in political orientations.

Despite the general lack of attention to the political values, attitudes and practices of the Religious None, Bibby's recent publication Fragmented Gods: The

Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada (1987), represents a major research contribution to the study of political attitudes and participation by affiliation and nonaffiliate type. Bibby concludes that, although some variation by religious groups exist,

Canadians, including the religious Nones, exhibit no such consistent "liberal-conservative" patterns in their attitudes towards a variety of social issues (Bibby, 1987:195).

This claim, however, is impossible to verify from the data that Bibby displays. For example, on a number of issues—such as attitudes toward communism, death penalty, legalization of marijuana, justification of war, and women's employment—the Religious None are seen to define one of the poles of the spectrum of variation (Bibby, 1987:195-204). Bibby offers no significance tests or controlled assessments to determine if the effect is actually attributable to affiliate categories. Hence, while this research is significant to the preference dimension of religion, the lack of sophistication in the statistical analysis reflects negatively on the conclusions drawn and leaves other potential sources of variation unaccounted for.

3.1.2 Religious Affiliate Types

At the level of least refinement, attempts to specify the religious basis of Canadian partisan identity have proceeded with the distinctions of Catholic/non-

Catholic (Irvine, 1974), Catholic/Protestant (Meisel, 1975) and Catholic, Protestant and Jew (Mishler, 1985; LaPonce, 1988).

Irvine employs a political socialization model to suggest that religious differences, as defined by the Catholic/non-Catholic dichotomy, persist through the inheritance of both religious and partisan identity from the family, with no necessary connection between them (Irvine, 1974:562, 563).

Meisel's study of voting behavior displays only a minimal association with religion, although Catholic preference for the Liberal party and a more balanced split of Protestant vote between Liberal and Conservative, is seen to attain (Meisel, 1975:267). Additionally, Meisel does extend the analysis to political culture variables, election issues and party aspects, noting that Catholics and Protestants do display different views on areas of public policy and private morality (Meisel, 1975:264). Meisel concludes that

differences between Catholics and Protestants are less evident among those who enjoy a high level of efficacy and trust, among those who take liberal or progressive positions on attitudes to the polity, and among those who report that leaders are particularly important to their voting decision (Meisel, 1975:266).

LaPonce's empirical test of the theory that the Jewish electorate prefers parties of the left, offers verification of the expected relationship, when union

membership and education are taken into account (LaPonce, 1988:711). LaPonce concludes that Jews are more inclined to support the left, defined as NDP or NDP and Liberal, than Protestants or Catholics. However, the high level of Liberal support bears greatest political resemblance to the Catholic electorate (LaPonce, 1988:712). Finally, Mishler's research indicates that

Protestants are more likely to vote, work in the community, and contact public officials, but Catholics are more active in political campaigns. Jewish citizens, however, are most active in all these areas (Mishler, 1985:162).

Hence, we observe from this succinct review of political research that utilizes gross categories of religious preference, the differential effects of religion on voting, issues and political participation.

3.1.3 Refined Religious Affiliation Types

The refinement of religious categories to correspond more closely to homogeneous religious groupings is requisite, if we are to assess differential political effects that, potentially, flow from specific religious preferences.

The utilization of broad religious categories not only may conceal such significant differences, but it may also suggest that religious variables are insignificant politically when such "insignificance" is merely an artifact of the relatively crude measurement employed (Smidt, 1988:618).

In addition to the previous citation of Bibby's

research, which finds little consistent social attitude variation across religious affiliate types (Roman Catholic-Quebec and Outside of Quebec, United Church, Anglican, Conservative Protestants, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Other and None), exploration into the association of homogeneous religious types and Canadian political life is virtually nonexistent. Excepting Grace Anderson's study of voting behaviour in Hamilton, Ontario (Anderson, 1966), reviewed in the section that follows, the other research piece to take seriously denominational differences is a recent paper by Forbes and Sniderman (1988). Examining the relationship between religion and partisanship in Canada between 1965 and 1984, Forbes and Sniderman code religious affiliation into the categories of Anglican, United, Other Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Other and None. Limiting the analysis to the dependent variable of party identification, Forbes and Sniderman conclude that

The crucial consideration ... is not religion at all, but is instead group identity. ... The bond between group and party, we are suggesting, is formed and maintained by "ideological" considerations having to do with protection and recognition (Forbes and Sniderman, 1988:17,18).

They go on to indicate that the political socialization model, as evidenced in Irvine's work (Irvine, 1974), does not account for the on-going existence of religious cleavage in Canadian politics (Forbes and Sniderman, 1988:19).

Instructive from the work of Forbes and Sniderman is the recognition that party identification is mediated through secondary group processes, particularly, ideological functions. This raises the possibility that, at the level of preference group identity, a correlation between religious beliefs and political ideology may exist. For example, theologically liberal Protestants, such as the United Church of Canada, may demonstrate a positive association with liberal political views, whereas conservative Protestants, such as Baptists, may show a positive correlation with conservative political beliefs. On the other hand, U.S. research into political attitudes among liberal and conservative Protestants, concludes that

lower levels of abstract political conceptualization and belief system consistency of conservative Protestants indicate that the group remains less likely to link issues to the left/right political ideology in which political conflicts are framed (Kiecolt and Nelson, 1988:57).

If this is the case, then we might expect that conservative Protestants will demonstrate greater belief consistency on items of a moral nature than on economic issues.

A further dimension added to the assessment of the religion and political life, when religious affiliation is more strictly defined, is that the polity of denominations varies in terms of autonomy and to some extent religious group preference may itself reflect preference for a particular mode of decision-making. That the extent of

hierarchical organization of denominations can be utilized as an index of denominational differences, has been noted by Anderson (Anderson, 1966:31). Moreover, Westhues observes that in Canadian religious life three major denominations have a centralized polity, the United Church being far more democratic than either the Anglican or Roman Catholic. Furthermore, Presbyterian and Lutheran are viewed as having fairly strong central polities, whereas Baptist groups are decentralized and relatively autonomous (Westhues, 1976:211). Apart from the potential for laity participation, a matter to be considered in the following section, type of religious organizational form may have implications for political efficacy and trust, as well as views of institutions and elites. For example, those who express preference for religious groups that place a high value on congregational decision-making may display greater distrust and feelings of ineffectiveness in the broader political culture, as well as a negative evaluation of elites who control institutions. Although, we do not have the data to specifically evaluate form of organization as distinct from religious belief in a specific group, the specification of religious affiliate types will allow for fruitful speculation as to sources of difference if, in fact, significant variation on political items is found.

3.2 REFERENCE LEVEL: AFFILIATION, ATTENDANCE AND POLITICS

Research involving both affiliation type and frequency of religious group attendance has predominantly been limited to the dependent variable of voting behaviour. The development of this section involves, first, a review of several Canadian studies of voting behaviour, and secondly, two U.S. research pieces that examine the association between religious participation and political efficacy, involvement, and political tolerance. Finally, the third group of studies examines the relation of social participation to political participation.

3.2.1 Religious Reference Level and Voting Behaviour

Irvine's research into the persistence of religion as the basis of party identification (Irvine, 1974), was cast solely at the level of religious preference or affiliation. Since Irvine's study, a number of other research pieces have examined this same issue, employing measures of affiliation and frequency of attendance at religious group meetings. Irvine and Gold, as a follow-up to Irvine's earlier study, propose that two competing explanations for the persistence of cleavages are group socialization and family transmission. Of group socialization, it is stated that

Partisanship may be socially rooted with commitments powerfully shaped by membership in a particularly vibrant sub-culture that effectively structures the communication patterns of its members and thereby influences their attitudes and behaviour

(Irvine and Gold, 1980:189).

As a competing explanation, family transmission involves the shaping of partisan identity by more direct family cues. In adjudicating between these two explanations, Irvine and Gold examine level of church attendance within the categories of Catholic and Other, concluding that for Canada,

Religion, the best predictor of the direction of a person's vote, does not relate in any statistically or practically significant way to voting fidelity over time (Irvine and Gold, 1980:212).

Hence, the bottom line of this research is that family transmission has the strongest effect on voting consistency, not religious group socialization as measured by attendance at religious group meetings. The finding that church affiliation is a stronger predictor of the vote than is church attendance has also been confirmed in the Canadian case by Lijphart (Lijphart, 1979:447).

The aforementioned findings have not gone uncontested. Johnston contends that it is group influences outside of the family that account for differences in partisan direction, that is, influences which reinforce family socialization (Johnston, 1985:108). Reiterating the work of Wald, Johnston suggests that

First, religious denominations are interest groups which demand policy concessions in education and other areas. Second, denominations may define the boundaries of subcultures. The definition will be sharper the more self contained the group is.

Third, a religious group may represent a distinct ethos. Fourth, a religious denomination may be a surrogate for other, more directly politicized characteristics (Johnston, 1985:109).

Johnston's conclusions are obviously more reflective of the reference group interpretation, than are the findings of Irvine and Gold, and Lijphart. Limited support for participation in religious community as a predictor of voting behaviour is also offered by McDonald, who concludes that the

dimension of religiosity having the strongest association with voting proved to be social involvement in the religious community (McDonald, 1969:143).

Finally, Anderson's study of voting behaviour in Hamilton, Ontario, indicates that both nominal religious affiliation and degree of church attendance are associated with voting preference (Anderson, 1966:33,34). However, Anderson concludes that the religious influence is rooted at the religious subcommunity level of homogeneous groupings, rather than at the associational level. Furthermore, religious affiliation is found to be of greater importance to voting preference than ethnicity (Anderson, 1966:34).

3.2.2 Religious Reference Level and Political Attitudes

In the previous section, literature addressing the religious factor in Canadian voting behaviour was cited and reviewed. The employment of religious measures as predictors of the vote only, is a limiting feature of the

majority of the studies. In light of the religious reference group concept that is central to the present project, searching for religious effects in political attitudes, interest and other forms of participation, may be more relevant than voting behavior to the particular orientation of a religious group. That political attitudes intervene between religion and voting behaviour and that such attitudes are shaped in the religious context, seem to be plausible assertions. However, in and of themselves, political attitudes, interest, efficacy and trust may be treated as dependent variables, without specifying a direct causal relation to voting preference. As Nie, Powell and Prewett suggest,

many citizens whose organizational involvement propels them into political life are not more politically informed, politically efficacious, or politically attentive than the non-participants (Nie, Powell, Prewett, 1969:813).

Houglund and Christenson, in a U.S. study, examine the relationship of frequency of religious group attendance to attitudes of political efficacy, voting, political contributions and working for candidates. Their findings indicate that church attendance is related to political efficacy and voting, but not direct political involvement, such as financial contributions and working for a candidate (Houglund and Christenson, 1983:416). However, being a member of a liberal denomination does increase the probability of direct political involvement (Houglund and

Christenson, 1983:417).

In another U.S. study, Beatty and Walter evaluate religious preference and practice on measures of political tolerance, finding that Protestant denominations are less tolerant of target groups than Jews and Catholics. However, within Protestantism, mainline affiliates exhibit higher tolerance levels than fundamentalist adherents (Beatty and Walter, 1984:323). Regarding frequency of attendance, Beatty and Walter find that for every religious denomination those who attend most frequently are the most intolerant of the specified groups (Beatty and Walter, 1984:325). These results are seen to persist with controls for education and occupational prestige, and hence, are not attributable to socio-economic status differences.

The implication of the two studies above for reference group theory, is that, in the case of intolerance, religious group participation may solidify an identity anchorage both positively and negatively for the frequent attender. Positively, in that the norms of the group may be taken as comparative standards to evaluate other groups, and negatively, in that the perceived deviation from the in-group normative standards leads to an assessment of out-groups as negative reference groups. Concerning the lower level of direct political involvement by frequent church attenders, it may be that higher religious group integration leaves less time, energy and

interest for other sources of personality commitment. This, of course, runs counter to the literature that suggests social participation correlates positively with political participation. It is to this issue that we now turn our focus.

3.2.3 Social Participation and Political Participation

Social participation theory as an explanation of voter turnout, contends that

active involvement in voluntary, special-interest, nonpolitical organizations--including voluntary associations, community activities, and churches - tends to bring individuals in contact with political issues, actors, and affairs, and provides them with information and skills necessary for voting and other kinds of political participation (Olsen, 1972:331).

It is obvious from Olsen's explanation that religious group participation should be positively related to involvement in political life. Similar to Cooley's primary group as the nursery of human nature, voluntary associations such as religious groups are the nursery of the political nature, that is, a place where the skills and interests for active citizenship are developed. Accordingly, Olsen finds that participation in church activities does mobilize people to vote (Olsen, 1972:329). Similarly, Verba and Nie observe that those who are active in organizations have a higher political participation score, than those who are inactive (Verba and Nie, 1972:186). Verba and Nie propose that

When the organization provides explicit political stimuli - as indicated either by exposure to political discussions or to communally oriented activity within the organization - the individual so exposed is more active in politics than the one who is not (Verba and Nie, 1972:188,189).

This proposition has interesting implications for the polity of religious associations. As previously mentioned, denominational groups may be characterized on the basis of organizational form, such as, autonomy in decision-making. Yet, Olsen's finding that "liberal Protestants tend to be as active as Catholics, while both conservative Protestants and persons with no religious preference vote much less often" (Olsen, 1972:326) seems to contradict the notion that level of organizational involvement opportunity is positively related to political participation. Perhaps, it is that underlying cultural norms are of more explanatory value, than the form of organization in which one participates.

3.3 DEFERENCE LEVEL: AFFILIATION, ATTENDANCE, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND POLITICS

Studies of religiosity at the deference level are virtually nonexistent or limited to one dependent political variable. That the 1988 Canadian National Election Study did not follow the pattern of the 1984 CNES, choosing to exclude this important dimension of religion, is indicative of the neglect of self-perceived religiosity as an explanatory variable.

One exception to the general disregard of the personal religiosity variable is Rinehart and Okraku's study of class consciousness, who include in their analysis both affiliation and respondent's evaluation of the importance of religion. Rinehart and Okraku find that those reporting religion as unimportant are more likely to choose a Marxist, rather than pluralist, perspective of power and feel ignored by politicians, even with occupation controlled (Rinehart and Okraku, 1974:209). However, the relationship between religious affiliation and subjective class identification is virtually eliminated when occupation is controlled (Rinehart and Okraku, 1974:208). Unfortunately, the effect of self-perceived religiosity within affiliation types is not addressed in this study, nor is the contribution of frequency of attendance.

A promising avenue of study in terms of the religious-political linkage at the deference level is offered by MacIver's attempt to explore the relationship directly, across ten nations of the European community (MacIver, 1989). MacIver's analysis includes a question to tap any conscious linkage between religious conviction and political beliefs. Using the question "Do your religious convictions play a role in your political preferences?", MacIver analyses variation between the religiously and non-religiously politicized, finding that

When the primary predictor of religious politicization, religiosity, is held

constant, the influence of membership in a religious organization becomes predominant, though education plays a secondary role (MacIver, 1989:129).

The continuing importance of religious organizational membership to the politicization of religious individuals is attributed, by MacIver, to the teaching of the clergy and political discussions with others in the religious context (MacIver, 1989:129). That a significant correlation between the religiously directed and non-religiously directed attains for party preference and self-placement on the left-right scale, but not on specific political attitudes traditionally linked to the left-right dimensions, is instructive to the expectations of this study at the deference level (MacIver, 1989:121).

While the data utilized in the present research project do not include the measure of religious politicization mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is possible to consider the religious factor at the deference level through a measure of self-perceived religiosity. The respondent's perception of his or her level of religiosity is assumed to underlie the extent to which identity is anchored in religious belief and may be deferred to in behaviour, interests, and attitudes.

Chapter IV

RESEARCH ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH ISSUES

The exploratory research propositions stated in this section, reflect a testing of the value-additive theoretical model developed in the preceding sections. Essentially, the set of propositions are derivative from the assumption of increased intensity of religious identity anchorage, as depicted in Diagram 1. While it is also possible to posit substantive hypotheses from both the classical theoretical backdrop and the review of contemporary literature, this would only serve to confound the subsequent analysis. As already observed, contradictory expectations can be drawn from the classical statements and, furthermore, conflicting findings exist in the research literature. Moreover, the fact that the research literature tends to focus on the vote, a matter which, at best, is peripheral to the present analysis, supports the limitation of this study to research issues flowing from the conceptual model. The classical theories and the contemporary research literature will be summoned for explanatory and/or comparative purposes in the concluding section.

The basic assumption as developed in the value-additive model is that as intensity of religious identity anchorage increases, the strength of association between religion and political indicators will also increase. However, the actual direction of the religious effect, when present, may vary by religious affiliate type. Moreover, as each measure is entered in its refined form, significant variation between categories will result. Therefore, to adequately test the theoretical model, each battery of dependent political life variables must be assessed at the religious preference, reference, and deference level. Research propositions cast at their appropriate conceptual level are specified below. Whether the propositions are appropriate for all aspects of the Canadian federal political life, or are limited to certain political life dimensions, is a matter for empirical investigation.

4.1.1 Preference Level Propositions

1. Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not.
2. The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types will display significant variation between the types.
3. The religious preference dimension in its refined form of specific affiliate types, will show greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

4.1.2 Reference Level Propositions

1. Those attending religious group meetings will differ significantly from those who do not.

2. The refining of religious group attendance into levels will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels.

3. The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

4.1.3. Deference Level Propositions

1. Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not.

2. The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels.

3. The religious deference dimension in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high deference dichotomy.

4. When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference or reference dimensions.

5. A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

6. A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity.

7. The value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor than

the index of religious dichotomies.

8. The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of the refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type.

9. When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

10. Relative to other social background variables, the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure, will show significant predictive value.

4.2 DATA SOURCE AND STATISTICAL PROCEDURE

The data from the 1984 Canadian National Election Study were derived from face-to-face interviews with 3,377 Canadian adults between October 1985 and February 1986. The weighted sample size is 3,380 cases, making it nationally representative in terms of age, gender, region and urban-rural composition (Lambert et al., 1986).

The data will be analysed primarily through the use of Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) (Andrews et al., 1973). This multivariate technique allows for the assessment of the effects of the categorical religious measures on each of the political indicators/indices, with (beta) and without (eta) adjustments for the effects of

social background controls. MCA allows for the comparison of each category of the independent measure in terms of the deviation from the grand mean of the dependent variable. Furthermore, an F-test of statistical significance and multiple r are provided.

4.3 OPERATIONALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS FACTOR MEASURES AND CONTROL VARIABLES

Having derived research propositions from the value-additive schematic of religious identity anchorage, corresponding to three religious dimensions, the actual measurement of each dimension is now specified. Each measure's frequency distribution in the 1984 Canadian National Election Study data is displayed, as are crosstabulations, and, where appropriate, correlation coefficients between the religious dimensions and selected social background variables. These social background variables, subsequently, serve as controls in the multivariate analysis.

4.3.1 Religious Preference Group Measure

Beginning at the most basic level of religious identity, according to the conceptual model, responses to the question - "What is your religious affiliation?", serve as the sole indicator of the religious preference dimension. The probing of specific religious affiliation by the interviewers, yielded a listing of thirty-one denominations, religions and other responses. This nominal

listing in its collapsed form results in six distinct religious preference types, expanded to seven through the segmentation of Catholic into English and French, based on the language of interview.¹

Generally, each preference type is presumed to reflect a certain degree of belief homogeneity, shared symbolism and ritual practice and, to a limited extent, congruence of organizational form. The obvious exceptions to this presumption are the Other and Religious None types. The Other religion category is a veritable religious montage, the only apparent similarity being that the constituent affiliations are either of nonChristian or fringe Christian stock. Nonetheless, the retention of the cases in the Other category is deemed as preferable to assigning them as missing data. In the case of the Religious None, it is the absence of a nominal identification that constitutes the rationale of its inclusion as a preference type. Moreover, the recoding of

¹As a cultural product, working language is believed to reflect an objective indicator of French/non-French identification. The apparent confluence of French culture and Catholic affiliation makes it necessary to distinguish between French and English Catholics. Indeed, a crosstabulation of religious affiliation by ethnic origin of male ancestor reveals that 88.5% of the Catholic French, as determined by language of interview, claim a French ancestry. While, it is acknowledged that the positing of the French Catholic category does not unravel the intermingled effect of language group and religion, it does provide an opportunity to assess differences in the experience of the political process by French Catholics, compared to English Catholics and other non-French religious categories.

all explicit religious affiliation responses into one category and the nonaffiliates into another, yields a second preference group variable, that is, those who identify with a religious affiliation and those who do not². The religious preference types, specific responses constituting each type, and their frequency distribution in the sample, are as follows.

Religious None: 9.5% (n=319) No religious affiliation.

Catholic: 48.5% (n=1,625) Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic, Greek Orthodox.

 i. English Catholic: 25.3% (n=845)

 ii. French Catholic: 23.3% (n=780)

United Church of Canada: 14.2% (n=476)

Protestant Conservative Mainline: 16% (n=534) Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Christian Reformed.

²While it is generally desirable to have cases fairly evenly distributed across the predictor categories, fewer cases in a category causes little difficulty (Andrews et al. 1973:11). Clearly, the distribution of the three dichotomous variables, wherein the bulk of the cases reside in the religious category, will exhibit the religious as either defining or situated close to the grand mean. However, this does not invalidate the direction of deviation for the category with fewer cases, nor the magnitude of difference between the substantive categories. Furthermore, as the frequency distribution for religious affiliation reveals, the number of cases involved in the 1984 Canadian National Election study (n=3,380) allows for a substantial distribution of cases into each of the predictor categories.

Additionally, it should also be noted that the number of categories in the religious affiliation measure (six) does not create a greater effect for this religious variable. In fact, subsequent analysis will demonstrate that on many of the dependent political variables the religious dichotomies are good predictors, as are the composite indices, all of which have fewer categories than the refined religious preference measure.

Protestant NonMainline: 6.8% (n=228)
 Baptist, Pentecostal, Salvation Army,
 Mennonite, Evangelical, Christian, Church
 of Christ, Christian Alliance.

Other: 5.1% (n=172) Jewish, Muslim, Hindu,
 Sikh, Buddhist, Jehovah Witness, Mormon,
 Seven Day Adventist, Christian Science,
 Unspecified or Other Protestant.

4.3.2 Religious Reference Group Measure

Exposure to religious reference group is tapped by the question - "About how often do you go to church (synagogue)? At least once a week, two or three times a month, once a month, a few times a year or less, or never?" This ordinal measure of extent of attendance at religious services was recoded into four categories, yielding a distribution of: never - 18% (n=600), yearly - 37% (n=1244), monthly - 15% (n=512), and, weekly - 29% (n=975). The further collapsing of yearly, monthly and weekly into a single attendance category, results in the creation of a second measure, representing the purest instance of absence or presence of exposure opportunity to religious reference group stimuli. The actual distribution of this dichotomous variable is: never attend 18% (n=600) and attend 82% (n=2,731).

The frequency of religious service attendance is seen to vary across religious affiliation types, as displayed in Table 1 (See Appendix B, Table 1). Consistent with the Religious None type, 76.8% never attend religious services and only 2.9% attend either monthly or more

frequently. However, among the religious types proper, the crosstable shows that the Protestant NonMainline outdistance all other types, attaining a high of 54% weekly religious group attendance. This is the only Protestant group to achieve a high weekly attendance figure, with the Protestant Conservative Mainline at 21% and the United Church lagging behind at 16.7%. Perhaps, high attendance figures for Protestant NonMainline affiliates is indicative of a vestige of sectarian social control and socialization practice, or on the other hand, may simply be a function of the offering of more weekly religious services than those available to other preference type adherents. Interestingly, the United Church is the only religious type, apart from the Religious None, who have more affiliates never attending (17.6%) than attending weekly. Catholic respondents, both French and English, display fairly high rates of weekly attendance relative to other religious types, 34.9% and 38.4% respectively. In the Other religious category, 37.2% are found to frequent weekly services, while 16.1% never attend.

4.3.3 Religious Deference Group Measure

A subjective indicator of religiosity, included in the 1984 Canadian National Election study, is - "Do you consider yourself a very religious person, a fairly religious person, or not a very religious person?" The distribution of respondents, across the three response

categories, is as follows: not very - 29.5% (n=985), fairly - 50.1% (n=1,673), and very - 20.4% (n=679). This measure taps a religious dimension that is neither nominal nor ritualistic, but, presumably, reflective of the extent to which religion is a primary source of personal identity. As such, it is assumed that the probability of the fairly religious or very religious respondent deferring to religious group norms is greater than that of the not very religious.

Apart from the three category response format, a reclassification of the very and fairly responses into one grouping, yields a dichotomous variable of subjective religiosity. This variable, unlike the dichotomies created for religious preference (affiliation/no affiliation) and reference (attend/never attend), does not reflect the complete absence of the condition being considered, but, rather, a low/high religiosity distinction. The actual distribution is: low, 29.5% (n=985); and, high, 70.5% (n=2,352).

Variation of the religious deference measure across religious preference types is exhibited in Table 2 (See Appendix B, Table 2). As might be anticipated the Religious None tend to cluster in the not very religious category (74%), as only 5.7% view themselves as very religious. A large incongruence between English and French Catholics is observed in the very religious response

option, with English Catholics at 12.7% and French Catholics 43.6%, a net difference of approximately 31%. Potentially, this difference may be attributable to the overlap of ethnic and religious identity for French Canadian Catholics.

The distribution of self-perceived religiosity across the three Protestant categories follows the same pattern displayed in Table 1 for religious service attendance. By far, Protestant NonMainliners are most likely to exhibit very religious identities (38%), followed by the Conservative Mainline (11.5%) and United (6.3%). The net difference between Protestant affiliate types (31.7%) is similar to the net variation between the two Catholic groups, implicating the importance of refining affiliation measures beyond a simple Catholic/Protestant dichotomy. Finally, the residual category of Other religious preferences, displays an over-representation in the not very religious category of approximately 8%.

An examination of the distribution of the subjective religiosity dimension by the objective indicator of religious service attendance in Table 3, confirms what might be anticipated (See Appendix B, Table 3). We find that weekly attenders are most likely to consider themselves as very religious (41.1%) or fairly religious (55.7%), while those who never attend, predominantly, view themselves as being not very religious (63.3%). Also, the

yearly attenders display a not very religious self-designation (41.6%) that exceeds by over 30% the monthly attenders residing in the not very religious category (10.9%). A Pearson correlation coefficient of .496 (signif.=.01), attests to the substantial positive association between the two religious dimensions of attendance and identity.

4.3.4 Religious Indices

Indices of religiosity were computed as composite measures to facilitate assessment of overall variance between the religious and nonreligious, and between degrees of religiosity, on the dependent political measures.

The first index is simply the sum of the three dichotomous measures referred to in each section above (preference, reference, and deference), resulting in a numeric range of 0 through 3. This index corresponds to the deference dimension of the value-additive model, wherein the presence of all three religious dimensions represents the highest probability of deference to religious group norms. A score of 0 reflects the absence of a positive religiosity score on any dimension and, presumably, contains the most secularized respondents (5%). Those who scored high or yes on at least one indicator constitute a category of approximately 9%. Respondents scoring high or yes on two indicators of religiosity form the second largest grouping of 22%, and those giving

evidence of religiosity on all measures constitute a category of 63%.

The second index, considerably more refined than the dichotomous summation represented in the first, is based on only the reference and deference measures. Obviously, the expanded religious preference group measure is nominal and, hence, cannot be combined with the ordinal variables. In order to keep the relative weight of each dimension included in this index equal, frequency of religious service attendance was collapsed into the three categories of: never, 18% (n=600); infrequent, 44% (n=1,467); and, frequent, 38% (n=1,264). The frequent category consists of those who attend services weekly and 2-3 times a month, while the infrequent is comprised of once a month or a few times a year (or less) attenders. Summed with the recategorized attendance variable is the three category religious deference variable of self-perceived religiosity. The result of this computation is an index ranging from 0 through 4, with a distribution of: none, 11.2% (n=371); low, 21.7% (n=716); fair, 25.3% (n=835); quite high, 28.3% (n=934); and, high, 13.6% (448).

4.3.5 Profile of Religious Measures by Social Background Variables

Seven social background variables were selected for inclusion in the multivariate analysis. Obviously, this selection is, to some extent, arbitrary and influenced by

the specific research interest. There are, however, also practical constraints, such as, the number of variables that can be entered on an ANOVA analysis list, computational space, avoidance of significant interactions, and availability of computer time. Primarily, the criteria used for selection of social background controls were twofold.

First, previous research into dimensions of political life was considered. Milbrath's examination of political participation as a function of social position, includes a review of studies detailing the significant effects of SES or class, income, education, occupation, rural-urban differences, community size, identification with community, age, marital status, sex, religion and ethnicity (Milbrath, 1965:110-141). Similarly, Mishler's consideration of political participation in Canada employs many of the variables listed by Milbrath (Mishler, 1979). Moreover, the multivariate analysis of Canadian voting behaviour conducted by Clarke, Leduc, Jenson and Pammett, incorporates social cleavages reflected in region, religious affiliation, ethnicity, social class, community size, sex and age (Clarke, et al., 1979:93-131). Several Canadian studies, have focused on the association of one primary social variable with political activity measures, such as, gender (Kay, Lambert, Brown and Curtis, 1987) or immigrant background (Chui, Curtis and Lambert, 1991).

Potentially, then, there are many social background variables that could be desirable for inclusion in a multivariate analysis.

The second criterion for narrowing the list of social variables, generated from a review of previous studies, is the identification of those which may serve as a source of personal identity anchorage. While a case can be made for most variables of a social nature using this criterion, the ones selected as most relevant to the present research interest were: gender, age, education, size of community while growing up, present community size, region, and voluntary associational involvement.

4.3.5.1 Gender

Gender based differences in political participation and interest are well documented in the literature. Whether this differential can be traced to cultural socialization, role constraints, socio-demographic factors or gender-based issue appeal, is a point of considerable discussion (Kay, et al. 1987). For the purpose of this research it is assumed that gender may serve as a reference category. The distribution in the sample is: female 51.1% (n=1727) and male 48.9% (n=1653).

The only noticeable deviation from the national frequency for religious affiliation types is in the Religious None category, wherein, an under-representation of females and over-representation of males by

approximately 2% is noticeable (See Appendix B, Table 4). Also, displayed in Table 4 is an over-representation of males at the never and yearly attendance level by approximately 3% and the over-representation of females in the weekly attendance category by 4%. The largest female/male differential, however, is reserved for the "not religious" self-designation, wherein, males are over-represented by nearly 7% and females under-represented by 6.5%.

4.3.5.2 Age

Age cohorts are likely to share distinct political impressions and levels of activity, based on past and present lived experience. Respondent age was collapsed into five categories resulting in a distribution of: 18-29, 31% (n=1030); 30-39, 21.4% (n=710); 40-49, 14.8% (n=490); 50-64, 21.4% (n=710); and, 65 and over, 11.4% (n=379).

The profile of the religious measures according to age category shows that the Religious None are over-represented in the younger age categories (See Appendix B, Table 5). The two Catholic types display similar age distribution patterns, both being over-represented in the 18-29 group and under-represented by approximately 7% in the 65 and over category. Among Protestant types, United and Conservative Mainline are under-represented, relative to their national percentages, in the 18-29 age classification, and over-represented in the 65 and over

category. No large deviation from their national percentage is evident for the the Protestant NonMainline. However, the Other religious type does exhibit an over-representation in the 65 and over category of 3.7%.

Table 5 reveals that religious service attendance does vary considerably by age group with those under the age of 39 concentrated in the yearly or never attendance level. Moreover, a clear over-representation in weekly church attendance is observed for those 50 or more years of age, 13% over for the 50-64 grouping and 11.8% for the 65 and over. A similar pattern is observed for religious self-perception, in that, the not very religious are over-represented at the 18-29 age level by 7.5% and the very religious are over-represented in the 50-64 group by 6.5%.

4.3.5.3 Education

Education as a social source of individual identity, strongly related to political participation and attitudes, is well documented in empirical research. While income and occupation also represent potential explanatory power, education is causally prior and, generally, a good predictor of income level and occupation type²⁹. Utilizing

²⁹A crosstabulation of religious affiliation by occupation, generally reveals the same pattern for occupation as that displayed for education. For example, in the professional/excecutive category, the Religious None (15.3%) and Other religion category (7.8%) continue to display the largest over-representation. Furthermore, as in the case of education, French Catholics (16.4%) and Protestant NonMainline (4.6%) exhibit considerable under-representation in the professional/executive category, relative to their

the survey item, "What is the highest grade or level of school you reached?", responses were recoded into a four category variable - elementary or less, 13.6% (n=459); high school, 46.8% (n=1,580); technical, 17.8% (n=602); and, university, 21.8% (n=737).

In Table 6 level of education is exhibited across the religious measures, displaying a clear over-representation of the Religious None and Other religion category at the university level (See Appendix B, Table 6).

Also, discernible is an under-representation of French Catholics in university education by nearly 10%. However, this is offset by a French Catholic over-representation in technical education. The over-representation of French Catholics by approximately 8% and Protestant NonMainline by 4% at the elementary level is, also, noteworthy.

With reference to religious service attendance, Table 6 reveals that respondents with an elementary education or less attend church most frequently (40%), and that levels of education beyond elementary show considerable uniformity to the national norm for weekly attendance of 29%. The largest percentage of never attenders is found among the university educated, 4.8% higher than the national figure. Apparently, this tendency

national percentages (23.3% and 6.8% respectively).

Additionally, it should be noted that subjective class location is considered in the subsequent analysis as a dependent variable.

also carries over into the dimension of religious self-perception, as the university educated have an over-representation in the not very religious category of 8.4%. This compares to an under-representation of those with elementary level education by a full 10% in the not very religious category, which translates into the 9% over-representation in the very religious response option.

4.3.5.4 Community Size During Formative Years

Community size while growing up may be related to political participation and attitudes to the extent that primary group socialization has a lasting effect, and that, this effect differs according to the size of community in which the formative years were lived. Response to the interview question, "When you were growing up, where did you live--mostly in a city or suburb, mostly in a village or small town, or mostly on a farm or in a rural area?", yields a distribution of: rural 25.8% (n=873), village or small town 27.9% (n=944), suburb 9% (n=303), and city 37.3% (n=1261).

Table 7 reveals an over-representation of the Religious None in the suburb and city, and, also, the over-representation of the Other religion type in the city, during the formative years (See Appendix B, Table 7). Both English and French Catholics are under-represented by approximately 6% in the suburbs, with the French Catholics being over-represented in villages/small towns by 8.6% and

English Catholics slightly over-represented in cities. The United Church and Protestant NonMainline respondents show a considerable over-representation in rural areas during childhood years, 5.5% and 3% respectively. The Conservative Mainline are over-represented in the suburbs by 8.2% and under-represented in villages/small towns by 3.2%.

Community size while growing up by religious service attendance has a gamma of $-.162$ (signif.=.000), indicating a tendency for present frequency of attendance to decline with increases in past community size. This is exemplified in the 8.6% over-representation of weekly attenders in the rural background category and the 3.4% over-representation of never attenders who grew up in cities. However, it is those respondents that were raised in suburbs that display the greatest weekly attendance under-representation (8.8%). Table 7 also shows that it is the village/small town category which displays the largest over-representation of the very religious (approx. 3%), and that the not very religious are over-represented in the suburbs by nearly 17%.

4.3.5.5 Present Community Size

Community size where the respondent presently resides is presumed to be related to both opportunities for political participation and the reception of political stimuli. Community size was recorded by the interviewer

and for the present project has been collapsed into: rural, 23.6% (n=797); 1,000-29,999 14.9% (n=504); 30,000-500,000 18.6% (n=628); and, over 500,000 43% (n=1452).

As displayed in Table 8, the religious preference types in each community size category does vary considerably from their national percentage (See Appendix B, Table 8). The Religious None is over-represented by nearly 3% in the 500,000+ category, as is the Other religion type. English Catholics show an under-representation in rural areas of 5.5% and an over-representation in cities of 30,000-500,000 by 5.6%. Unlike the English Catholics, the French Catholics are under-represented in the 30,000-500,000 community size level by 6.6%. They are also over-represented in smaller communities, 1,000-29,999 by about 4%. All Protestant types are over-represented in rural locales, and the United Church and Protestant NonMainline exhibit an under-representation in the largest community size category by approximately 3%.

The $-.120$ gamma for community size by religious service attendance, suggests a slight tendency for regularity of attendance to decline with increased community size. However, the highest incidence of weekly attendance occurs in the 1,000-29,999 community size level (34.8%). Table 8 confirms a similar pattern for religious self-perception, with the largest community size displaying

an over-representation of the not religious response option by 4.7%.

4.3.5.6 Region

Region is viewed as incorporating the general social and economic climate of a geographical and politically defined area. The reinforcement of region as an identity reference point in political matters is probable, perhaps, through media coverage of regional affairs.

The actual variable consists of a recoding of the province of interview into five regions: Maritime 8.7% (n=295) [Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick], Quebec 26.8% (n=906), Ontario 35.9% (n=1213), Prairie 17% (n=576) [Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta] and British Columbia 11.5% (n=390).

A profile of the religious measures by the region variable is displayed in Table 9 (See Appendix B, Table 9). Of particular interest from the religious affiliation panel is the under-representation of the Religious None in the Maritime region and the over-representation of the Protestant NonMainline. The predominance of French Catholicism in Quebec (82.3%) is to be expected, as is the high percentage of English Catholicism in Ontario (35.8%) and the over-representation of the Protestant Conservative Mainline and the United Church. The religious topography of the Prairie region is characterized by over-representation

in all Protestant types, as well as English Catholic. The unique features of the British Columbia region are the high incidence of the Religious None (24.1), an over-representation of 14.6%, and, also, the high percentage of Other religions (11.4%).

Regarding religious service attendance, the two most noticeable findings by region are the high weekly attendance figure for the Maritimes (40.6%) and the high never attend percentage for British Columbia (36.5%). In the first case, the over-representation of Protestant NonMainline may correspond with the high attendance figure, as observed in Table 1. In the latter instance, a high incidence of Religious None in B.C. is undoubtedly associated with the high occurrence of never attending religious services. Likewise, as observed from the religious self-perception panel of Table 4, the not religious category in British Columbia (47.8%) is, by far, the highest of any region. However, contrary to the attendance pattern, it is not the Maritimes (16.1%) whose respondents have the highest percentage of the very religious, but Quebec (39.5%). Again, this returns us to a consideration of the confluence of Catholicism with French Canadian culture in the shaping of religious identity in Quebec.

4.3.5.7 Voluntary Association Involvement

Voluntary association involvement has been

documented as being an important correlate of political participation. Whether people who participate in voluntary associations acquire necessary skills to engage in politics, or whether they participate in both voluntary associations and political activities because they are participation prone, is a point of debate. However, voluntary association involvement may function as one of several reference groups in which the individual participates and draws upon as a source of identity in political attitude formation.

To assess the effect of voluntary association involvement on the dependent political life measures as a control variable, seventeen types of organizational involvement were summed with reference to membership and level of activity. A composite index of organizational involvement was created on the basis of the distribution, ranging from 0-26, yielded by the summing of the organizational types. It should be noted that the religious organization type was excluded to avoid confounding the effect of the religious measures. A score of 0 reflects no organizational memberships and is constituted by 34% of the sample (n=1,145). A score of 1 is designated as inactivity, typical of 8.5% (n=284). Little organizational activity is reflected in a score of 2, a category occupied by 13.3% (n=445). The range of 3-5 was collapsed into a single category, denoting a fair

amount of organizational activity and displayed by 23.1% (n=775). The final category is designated as most active and contains those who score 6 through 26 on the overall distribution. The most active represent 21% of the sample (n=710).

Exhibiting the voluntary association involvement index by the religious measures in Table 10, the most interesting deviation from a national religious affiliation percentage is the over-representation by 8% in the none category of the involvement index for French Catholics (See Appendix B, Table 10). This translates into an under-involvement of 7.5% in the highly active category. Those religious types representing an over-involvement in the high activity category are: Religious None (1.3%), English Catholic (.8%), United (3%), Conservative Mainline (2%) and Other (1.3%).

Table 10 also shows that those who attend church either monthly or weekly are over-represented in the high activity category by 3.6% and 4.7% respectively. Those who never attend are under-represented in the high category by 4.7%.

Finally, the not very religious are seen to be under-represented in the high activity category by 4.5%, while the fairly religious are over-represented by 5.7%, and the very religious under-represented by approximately 1%.

Chapter V

POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST

5.1 OPERATIONALIZATION

As a dimension of political process, efficacy is designed to capture differences between individuals in a basic sense of control over the workings of the political system (Campbell et al., 1960:516).

Recent findings suggest that many Canadians perceive themselves as "confined to the political bleachers" (Clarke, 1991:41), powerless to influence the direction of Canadian political life. This apparent trend toward political disaffection can be conceptualized as having two dimensions: internal and external (Balch, 1974:24).

Internal efficacy, a personal sense of competence in political participation, is measured by the three interview items: 1) "Sometimes, Federal politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on"; 2) "People like me don't have any say about what the government in Ottawa does"; and, 3) "So many other people vote in Federal elections that it does not matter very much whether I vote or not."

External efficacy, on the other hand, reflecting a valuation of the political system, is measured by the two

items: 1) "Generally, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people"; and, 2) "I don't think the Federal Government cares much about what people like me think."

In both cases of political efficacy, internal and external, the response format to the statements consist of strongly agree, agree, disagree somewhat, and strongly disagree. In some instances the respondent will neither agree nor disagree, or else express no opinion. For this research, a neither agree nor disagree response was entered into a neutral category, defining the scale midpoint. A no opinion response was treated as missing data.

Methodologically, the utility of the political efficacy items has been debated on the grounds of low inter-item correlations over time (MacDermid, 1989), and variation of inter-item correlations between English and French Canadians (LeDuc, 1976). Given these concerns the value of summing internal and external dimensions of efficacy is questionable. An examination of Pearson correlation coefficients between items in the 1984 Canadian National Election study, reveals that of the internal efficacy items (as listed above): items #1 and #2 = .402; items #1 and #3 = .223; and, items #2 and #3 = .242. Although, all correlations are significant at the .01 level, it appears that only items #1 and #2 should be incorporated in an index of internal efficacy. Regarding external efficacy, the two items display a correlation of

.439, significant at the .01 level, indicating that their summation into an external efficacy index may be justifiable.

If measures of efficacy can be thought of as indicators of political powerlessness leading to a sense of alienation, then so too can measures of political distrust (Wright, 1981:2). The extent to which a respondent trusts the federal government is measured by the four items: 1) "Many people in the Federal Government are dishonest"; 2) "People in the Federal Government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes"; 3) "Most of the time we can trust people in the Federal Government to do what is right"; and 4) "Most of the people running the Federal Government are smart people who usually know what they are doing." Once again, the response format is a Likert scale and those indicating neither agreement nor disagreement were recoded into a neutral category at the scale midpoint.

As in the case of the efficacy items, the intention, initially, was to sum all trust measures into an index for summary purposes. However, the correlation coefficients for the pairs of items indicate that this is not justified. Although all item combinations attain statistical significance at the .01 level, the only one to reach a correlation of .40 is the pair of items #3 and #4. Items #1 and #4 show the lowest level of association, exhibiting a coefficient of only .16. Hence, the attempt

to construct an overall trust index was abandoned and each indicator is presented separately in the analysis¹.

5.2 FINDINGS

The organization of this section incorporates the presentation and elaboration of findings for each research proposition. The empirical analysis progresses from the absence or presence of a specific religious dimension, followed by a consideration of the dimension's refined form, to a consideration of the relative impact of each religious measure when entered simultaneously. Subsequently, the effects of the two value-additive religiosity indices are assessed, as is the magnitude of association between the most refined value-additive religious index and the political efficacy and trust indicators, according to religious preference type. Finally, the relative weight of the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure is compared to the effect of the seven social background variables.

¹Item #3 - TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING and item #4-SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T, were directionally recoded from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This was done to provide constancy of direction in the political trust index. However, the items were left in this response format, for the remainder of the analysis, even after abandoning the construction of an index due to low inter-item correlations.

5.2.1 Religious Preference Dimension

Beginning with the dimension of religious preference, operationalized through a simple dichotomy of the absence or presence of a religious affiliation, and, secondly, in an expanded measure that attends to the affiliation specified, three preference level propositions are here assessed.

5.2.1.1 Proposition One

In accord with the first research proposition for the religious preference dimension:

Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not;

Table 11 displays the results for the absence (None) and presence (Yes) of a religious preference, as a predictor of political efficacy and trust (See Appendix B, Table 11).

One of the two external efficacy items, that is, GOV'T DOESN'T CARE, achieves statistical significance at below the .05 level ($p=.037$). Directionally, a $-.16$ deviation from the grand mean for the None category, after controls for the seven social background variables, indicates that those respondents with no religious preference display stronger agreement with the efficacy item than does the religious affiliate category. Hence, on the only significant external efficacy item, the Religious None are less efficacious than the religious respondents.

Regarding the items attributed to internal political efficacy, the findings indicate that only the third item, VOTE DOESN'T MATTER, achieves significance at or below the .05 level. As in the case of the significant external efficacy item, it is the deviation of $-.17$ for the nonaffiliate category that produces the variation on the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER variable. This indicates a stronger agreement, or less efficacious attitude, for religious nonaffiliates. However, it should be noted that for the two internal efficacy items that did not attain the .05 level of significance, POLITICS COMPLEX and NO SAY, the direction is reversed, as the unaffiliated category displays a higher level of efficacy than religious affiliates. Hence, the results are somewhat confounding, but, nonetheless, when only the items achieving a .05 level of significance are considered for both external and internal efficacy, the unaffiliated are found to be less efficacious than the religious affiliates. However, that only one of the two external efficacy indicators and one of three internal efficacy items attain an acceptable significance level, indicates only minimal support for the research proposition.

Turning to the items of political trust, only one of four, SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T, is found to be statistically significant ($p=.007$). The $-.18$ difference from the grand mean for the Religious None category,

reflects, in this instance, a stronger disagreement with the statement than that exhibited by the religious category (.02). Directionally, two of the three non-significant political trust items, FEDS DISHONEST and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING, also reflect greater distrust of government in the unaffiliated category. However, the unaffiliated are more charitable than religious affiliates in their disagreement with the statement FEDS WASTE MONEY. Overall, on the items of political trust, with only one of four achieving significance, the support is limited for the proposition that those indicating a religious preference will be significantly different from those without a preference, even though the religiously unaffiliated tend to be slightly more distrusting of government.

5.2.1.2 Proposition Two

Attending to the research proposition that:

The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types will display significant variation between types;

the panel on the right side of Table 11 facilitates evaluation of this proposition for matters of political efficacy and trust.

Table 11 reveals that the external efficacy items and index do not achieve statistical significance for the expanded religious affiliation measure. However, two internal efficacy items, POLITICS COMPLEX ($p=.049$) and VOTE DOESN'T MATTER ($p=.009$), are found to be significant at the

.05 level. Examining the actual direction and magnitude of deviations from the grand mean for specific preference types, after controls for the social background variables, reveals that for the POLITICS COMPLEX item the least efficacious preference types are the Protestant NonMainline (-.16) and English Catholic (-.12). On the other hand, the French Catholic display the highest positive deviation from the grand mean (.18), followed by the Religious None (.07), indicating a greater feeling of comprehension in Federal political matters. However, the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER item shows a reversal of direction from that exhibited on the POLITICS COMPLEX variable for the Protestant NonMainline, who now are the most efficacious of the religious types (.19), and for the Religious None (-.16), now tending toward inefficacy. While substantial difference exists between the English and French Catholics on the POLITICS COMPLEX variable (-.12/.18), virtually no difference is found on the second item VOTE DOESN'T MATTER (-.04/-.06). Although, the item reflecting lack of input into federal government decisions (NO SAY) does not display an acceptable level of significance, it is interesting to observe that a substantial deviation for French Catholics (-.22) toward stronger agreement, reflecting a lower level of efficacy, is present. Furthermore, a considerably higher than average degree of efficacy is displayed for the religious nonaffiliates (.18) and Protestant Conservative

Mainline (.12).

On matters of political trust, all items, excepting SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T, show statistical significance at the .01 level or less. The FEDS DISHONEST item shows the United Church (.27) and Protestant Conservative Mainline (.15) as most trusting, while the Protestant NonMainline tend to the highest level of agreement with the statement that people in federal government are dishonest (-.17). Despite a French Catholic deviation of -.11 on the FEDS DISHONEST item, indicating distrust of federal government, the French Catholic category exhibits the greatest disagreement (.41) on the FEDS WASTE MONEY item. This reflects a strong negative evaluation of the view that the federal government wastes tax revenue, and, in fact, the French Catholic are the only religious affiliate category to demonstrate above average trust in federal finances. All other preference types tend toward greater agreement, with the Conservative Mainline and Protestant NonMainline leading the way (-.18). On the third item to attain significance, TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING, the French Catholic (-.17) and Protestant NonMainline (-.14) demonstrate the least trust of federal government, tending toward disagreement, while the English Catholic (.13) and United Church (.12) tend to the opposite direction.

Generally, with three of four political trust measures and two of three internal efficacy items achieving

significance at .05 or less, the proposition concerning the existence of significant variation between religious affiliate types is confirmed. However, the proposition does not stand for the two matters of external efficacy.

5.2.1.3 Proposition Three

A final proposition to be assessed from the results displayed in Table 11 is that:

The religious preference dimension in its refined form of specific affiliate types, will display greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

An inspection of the betas for each efficacy and trust item confirms this proposition. The internal variation of the religious affiliate category is seen to be substantial, even after controls for seven social background variables. On all items the betas for the refined affiliation measure are higher than those displayed for the nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy. Significance at the .05 level or below is achieved for the refined religious affiliation measure on two internal efficacy and three political trust items. This compares to the dichotomous preference measure which shows significance for only one item in each of the efficacy and trust batteries. A scan of the direction and magnitude of deviations from the grand mean for the six religious affiliation categories displayed in the right-hand panel of Table 11, reveals that considerable difference does exist

between religious preference groupings. Furthermore, that these differences are concealed when collapsed into a single religious affiliation category, can be observed in the column labelled "Yes" in the left-hand panel of Table 11.

5.2.2 Religious Reference Dimension

Shifting the focus to the religious reference dimension, operationalized through frequency of religious group attendance, we now consider three reference level propositions with respect to political efficacy and trust.

5.2.2.1 Proposition One

Beginning with the dichotomous measure of the religious reference dimension, comprised of never attend and attend categories, the research proposition that:

Those attending religious group meetings
will differ significantly from those who do
not;

is here assessed on matters of political efficacy and trust.

As in the case of the preference dimension, it is observed from Table 12 (See Appendix B, Table 12) that the GOV'T DOESN'T CARE what respondent thinks item, a measure of external efficacy, achieves significance ($p=.015$). Directionally, never attenders are below the grand mean by $-.12$ and attenders slightly above $(.03)$, indicating that nonattenders are less efficacious than those who attend religious group meetings.

Of the internal efficacy measures, one of three, that is, VOTE DOESN'T MATTER, is significant ($p=.046$), as nonattenders tend to the direction of agreement with the item, indicating greater skepticism toward the importance of voting. One of the nonsignificant indicators of internal efficacy, POLITICS COMPLEX, demonstrates that those who never attend religious group meetings are slightly more prone to disagree with federal politics as incomprehensible, than are attenders. Overall, then, on the five efficacy items, with neither index achieving significance, the two items GOV'T DOESN'T CARE and VOTE DOESN'T MATTER are seen to show significant difference between nonattenders and attenders, and, directionally, indicate the nonattender category is less efficacious.

Two of the four political trust variables are found to exhibit significant differences between nonattenders and attenders, FEDS DISHONEST ($p=.003$) and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING ($p=.048$). Recalling that the TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING item was recoded for uniformity of direction, both TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING and FEDS DISHONEST show a below the grand mean difference for the nonattender category. This indicates that the never attenders are, in both instances, less trusting of federal government than religious group attenders. Although not significant at the .05 level, the variable SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T also demonstrates concordance of direction with the two

significant political trust indicators. Generally, then, those respondents never attending religious group meetings are found to be more distrustful of federal politics than those who do attend. While some support for the research proposition is noted in matters of political trust and external efficacy, the same cannot be concluded for internal efficacy, as only one of three items is found to be significant at an acceptable level.

5.2.2.2 Proposition Two

The right-hand panel of Table 12 displays findings for the levels of religious service attendance, facilitating evaluation of the proposition that:

The refining of religious group attendance into levels will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels.

The refining of the religious reference dimension into four attendance levels: never, yearly, monthly and weekly, yields significance at below .01 for both external efficacy items and the external efficacy index. Clearly, in each instance, it is the weekly attenders that display the highest level of external efficacy and the greatest distance from the never attend category. The external efficacy index shows a linear pattern across levels of attendance, as degree of efficacy increases with extent of attendance. This marshalls considerable support for the research proposition of intercategory variation in the religious reference dimension. This trend is, however, not

repeated for the items dealing with internal political efficacy, although, weekly attenders still display positive signs in their differences from the sample mean. Only the item NO SAY is found to be significant among the battery of internal efficacy items, and, here, the weekly attenders exhibit highest disagreement (.11) and the yearly religious service attenders greatest agreement (-.08), sustaining the direction observed on the matters of external efficacy. However, with only one of three indicators attaining significance at the .05 level, support for the proposition is limited, although, the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER ($p=.055$) item does come near the .05 level and does display some internal variation between categories.

Three of four political trust variables are significant for the refined religious reference group attendance measure. As in the case of the dichotomous measure, it is the -.16 deviation by the never attenders that provides for the greatest category variation on the item FEDS DISHONEST. However, for the trust item FEDS WASTE MONEY, the deviation toward disagreement by the weekly attenders (.10) and toward agreement at the yearly attendance level (-.07), provides the largest intercategory difference. Hence, it is the most frequent attenders that are most attitudinally charitable toward the feds use of tax revenue, and yearly attenders are most critical. On the third trust item, TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING, coded

directionally from strongly disagree to strongly agree, it is the never attenders who display the lowest level of trust (-.10) and the weekly attenders the highest degree of trust (.10). In sum, then, the weekly attenders are most trusting on matters of federal government doing the right thing and expenditure of tax revenue. On the otherhand, never attenders are more inclined to view people in federal government as dishonest and are less trusting of federal government to do the right thing. In terms of the research proposition that posited significant variation between attendance categories, at least three of four political trust items prove supportive.

5.2.2.3 Proposition Three

Attending to the findings displayed in Table 12, a third proposition to be evaluated is that:

The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

An inspection of the two panels in Table 12 reveals that both external efficacy items, one of three internal efficacy issues and three of four political trust matters, are significant at the .05 level or less for the expanded attendance measure. This compares to one of two external efficacy items, one of three internal efficacy variables and two of four trust issues, for the dichotomous measure. Moreover, the beta coefficients are higher in all instances

for the refined reference measure than for the dichotomous measure, excepting FEDS DISHONEST, where both display a beta of .06.

The existence of substantial variation within religious group attendance is observed by examining the direction of deviation and magnitude of difference between the yearly, monthly and weekly attender categories. Of the five political efficacy matters, all are seen to have a positive deviation for the weekly attendance group, indicating a pattern of higher than average efficacy. Comparatively, three of five indicators for the monthly attenders have negative direction, and all five are toward agreement or less than average efficacy for the yearly attenders. A less consistent pattern of variation among attendance categories is evident for the political trust variables, as weekly and monthly attenders are above the mean on three of five items, and yearly attenders display a negative sign on three of four. While the trust items do not show the same pattern of linearity noted for matters of efficacy, there is, nonetheless, considerable variation across categories. Overall, the proposition concerning the greater predictive value of the refined reference measure is confirmed.

5.2.3 Religious Deference Dimension

Moving to the religious deference dimension, operationalized, first, through a single measure of self-

perceived religiosity, and, secondly, through the construction of two value-additive indices, a total of ten research propositions are here considered.

5.2.3.1 Proposition One

The measure of religious deference as a dictomous variable is displayed in Table 13 (See Appendix B, Table 13), enabling the assessment of the research proposition that:

Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not².

The left-hand panel of Table 13 indicates that both external efficacy variables, MP'S LOSE TOUCH ($p=.018$) and GOV'T DOESN'T CARE ($p=.016$), are significant, as is the external efficacy index ($p=.009$). Consistent direction of deviation for each category of the dichotomous religious measure is observed. The not very religious respondents exhibit lower efficacy scores on the two internal items than do those in the religious category, resulting in a net difference of .13 between the two categories on the external efficacy index.

Only one of the three internal efficacy indicators, VOTE DOESN'T MATTER, reveals a significant difference between the not very religious and religious grouping

²Strictly speaking this measure does not correspond directly to the complete absence and presence of the deference dimension. Low deference is comprised of the not very religious response category, and high reflects the combining of fairly and very religious responses.

($p=.007$). The difference of $-.10$ from the grand mean for the not very religious category is consistent with the direction exhibited for the external efficacy items. This same pattern of direction is also maintained for the two nonsignificant internal efficacy items. Interestingly, the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER variable has shown significance across all three religious measures, the highest beta ($.05$) occurring at the deference level. Overall, the two efficacy batteries produce a mixed conclusion on the proposition of significant difference for the dichotomous deference measure, providing confirmation for external items and lack of consistent support on matters of internal efficacy.

Concerning the political trust items, the not very religious/religious dichotomy is significant on one of four, that is, TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING ($p=.027$). A lesser level of agreement with the statement is shown by the not very religious ($-.08$), than for the religious category ($.03$). However, support is scant for the research proposition of significant difference on the political trust measures and, therefore, must be rejected for the trust items.

5.2.3.2 Proposition Two

The proposition that:

The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels;

can be assessed through an examination of the right-hand panel in Table 13.

The expanded self-perceived religiosity measure presented in Table 13, and, conceptually, thought to reflect the deference dimension, exhibits significance on all efficacy items and indices, excluding the internal efficacy item NO SAY. For the first external efficacy item, MP'S LOSE TOUCH, a curvilinear relationship is observed across the three categories as the fairly religious score the highest deviation from the grand mean (.05) in the disagree direction. However, the second item, as well as the external efficacy index, show: the not very religious with the only negative deviations toward agreement (-.09/-.09); the fairly religious defining the middle (.02/.03); and, the very religious being the most efficacious (.10/.06). Of the internal efficacy items and index, only the NO SAY variable and internal efficacy index presents a generally linear pattern. The internal efficacy index displays a net difference between the very and not very religious of .17, the very religious category residing .11 above the mean and the not very religious .06 below, revealing a greater level of efficacy for the very religious respondents. The item POLITICS COMPLEX shows only a difference of .01 between the not very and fairly religious, while the very religious are distinguished with a deviation of .17, again, indicating greater political

efficacy. Generally, it appears that respondents who perceive themselves as very religious tend to feel less alienated toward the political process, than do the not very religious. Support for the research proposition is evident in both efficacy batteries.

Turning to matters of political trust, the only significant item is FEDS WASTE MONEY. Here we see that the very religious respondents are more trusting (.12) than the fairly (-.03) and not very religious (-.04) categories. The other trust items display little variation between the categories of self-perceived religiosity, garnering no support for the research proposition.

5.2.3.3 Proposition Three

A comparison of betas for each panel displayed in Table 13, along with the direction and magnitude of deviations in the right-hand panel, reveals only slight support for the proposition that:

The religious deference dimension in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high deference dichotomy.

With all matters of external efficacy achieving significance at .05 or below for each of the deference measures, the difference in beta coefficients is only slight. Greatest divergence between categories of religiosity is displayed by the not very religious as compared to either the fairly or very religious, or both

considered as a single category. However, of the internal efficacy variables, POLITICS COMPLEX and the internal efficacy index, both show higher betas for the expanded deference measure. In the case of POLITICS COMPLEX, what was nonsignificant for the dichotomy achieves significance at the .001 level for the refined measure. This demonstrates the variation that does exist between the fairly and very religious on the issue dealing with the complexity of federal politics.

While some variation does exist between self-perceived religiosity categories for the matters of political trust, only the FEDS WASTE MONEY item, displaying greater disagreement for the very religious respondents, is statistically significant. Therefore, there is little support for the proposition that the refined deference measure will be a better predictor of political trust issues than a simple low/high religiosity dichotomy.

5.2.3.4 Proposition Four

Having assessed for each dichotomous religious dimension the direction and magnitude of deviations, the proposition that:

When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference of reference dimensions;

is here evaluated.

Table 14 exhibits the relative strength for each religious measure in predicting political efficacy and trust scores, with and without controls for each religious dichotomy (See Appendix B, Table 14).

For the external efficacy items it is only the deference measure of self-perceived religiosity that attains significance, displaying a beta of .05 ($p=.010$) on the variable MP'S LOSE TOUCH. Subsequently, this is reflected in the significance of the external efficacy index for the religious deference dichotomy ($p=.012$). Similarly, on the first item of internal efficacy, POLITICS COMPLEX, only the subjective identity measure is significant at the .05 level ($p=.047$), exhibiting a beta of .04. However, for the internal efficacy index both religious preference and subjective identity are significant, the preference dichotomy showing the highest beta (.05). On issues of political trust, only the attendance measure achieves significance on the item FEDS DISHONEST ($p=.005$), showing a beta of .06.

The overall trend regarding the relative importance of the dichotomous measures, once the effects of each dimension are controlled for, is that the subjective religiosity measure appears to be of most value in predicting political efficacy scores, followed by the religious preference dimension. The never attend/attend

religious services dichotomy is not a good predictor of any efficacy item, but is the only measure attaining significance on a political trust variable. Hence, support for the proposition is qualified by the nature of the dependent political item.

5.2.3.5 Proposition Five

To this point, consideration of the religious deference dimension has focused on the single indicator of self-perceived religiosity displayed in two forms: a low/high dichotomy and the not very, fairly, very religious trichotomy. However, an adequate test of the value-additive model requires the summation of all religious dimensions into a composite index. The first value-additive index, referred to in Table 15 as an index of three dichotomies (See Appendix B, Table 15), enables an evaluation of the research proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

Inspection of the first panel in Table 15 shows that a value-additive index of the three dichotomous measures yields statistically significant results for all efficacy items and indices, excluding the variable POLITICS COMPLEX. However, only one of the four political trust variables, TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING ($p=.003$), obtains

an acceptable level of significance.

A comparison of the differentials between the four categories of the composite index, reveals that the greatest spread is not between respondents manifesting no religiosity (0) and those displaying high religiosity (3). Indeed, the external efficacy index demonstrates that those scoring 1 on the index, that is, possessing only one of the three religiosity conditions, have an adjusted deviation from the grand mean of $-.19$. Those lacking the presence of any religiosity are closest ($.01$), in terms of deviation from the mean and direction of deviation, to the highly religious ($.05$). In fact, on one of the items reflected in the external efficacy index, MP'S LOSE TOUCH, it is those with no religiosity that show the highest efficacy ($.09$), followed by the highly religious ($.04$). It is those who exhibit the presence of one religious dimension who are the least efficacious ($-.19$).

The external efficacy index also proves revealing, as those lacking any religious feature are most efficacious ($.11$), and those displaying the presence of two religious dimensions are least efficacious ($-.09$). The VOTE DOESN'T MATTER item, however, shows the high religiosity respondents ($.06$) set apart in their score from all other categories.

Excepting the item SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T, the items reflecting political trust all show that the category

comprised of respondents with one dimension of religiosity have the highest negative deviations. This indicates that the one dimension category is the least trusting of all. The results as to which category is most trusting vary according to the item, the highly religious displaying a greater degree of trust on the items FEDS DISHONEST and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING. However, on the item FEDS WASTE MONEY, it is the no religion category that is most trustful, whereas, on the matter of SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOV'T, the nonreligious category exhibits the highest level of distrust. Hence, the pattern of findings is not consistent across the political variables, although, the highly religious display greater than average trust for all items. Generally, given the significant variation across religiosity categories, the research proposition is confirmed.

5.2.3.6 Proposition Six

As developed in the value-additive model, the summing of frequency of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity dimensions constitutes the finest measure in assessing the probability of deference to religious group norms. The final panel in Table 15 displays the results of this measure by the political efficacy and trust variables, allowing assessment of the proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group

attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

Without exception the category tending most toward efficacy, on the items and indices that attain significance at the .05 level, is the high religiosity group. Moreover, it is those most lacking in religiosity, that is, displaying no religious service attendance and a not very religious self-identity, who consistently score toward the agreement or inefficacious direction on external efficacy items. However, this tendency does not persist for the low religious category on the matters of internal efficacy.

On the two items of political trust that achieve significance, FEDS WASTE MONEY ($p=.000$) and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING ($p=.041$), the highly religious category displays most trust in the financial management of federal government (.23) and in trusting the federal government to do the right thing (.06). Conversely, on three of four political trust matters, the low religious category exhibits the lowest level of trust.

With one of two external efficacy items, two of three internal efficacy issues and two of four political trust matters achieving significant variation across the categories of the value-additive deference index, support for the research proposition is present, albeit, not overwhelming.

5.2.3.7 Proposition Seven

A comparison of the two panels presented in Table 15, facilitates an evaluation of the proposition that:

The value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor than the index of religious dichotomies.

Support for this proposition on the issues of political efficacy and trust is scant. The index of dichotomies proves significant on only the two efficacy indices and one of four trust items. The index of two trichotomies shares the same result, plus one other trust item (FEDS WASTE MONEY). The deference index of two trichotomies does display higher betas than the composite index of three dichotomous measures for the external (.09/.07) and internal efficacy indices (.07/.05). However, on the item TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING, the index of two trichotomies has a lower beta than the dichotomous religious index (.06/.07). Moreover, the religious index that incorporates the three dichotomous measures achieves significance at the .05 level on two efficacy items where the index composed of two trichotomies does not, that is, MP'S LOSE TOUCH ($p=.011$) and VOTE DOESN'T MATTER ($p=.012$). Hence, the findings are mixed concerning the proposition and, overall, do not offer confirmation.

5.2.3.8 Proposition Eight

An outstanding issue with regard to the use of the composite religious deference index is: whether or not variation within specific religious preference types exists on the political life items. We already know from the findings presented on the expanded religious affiliation measure (Table 11) that significant differences do exist between religious preference types. To assess the proposition that:

The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of the refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type;

Table 16 exhibits product-moment correlation coefficients and levels of significance for affiliate types, as well as, the entire sample (See Appendix B, Table 16).

The findings presented in Table 16 show that for the French Catholic affiliates, a positive, albeit, weak association, exists between degree of religiosity and feelings of external efficacy. This association is seen to carry over into matters of political trust, as heightened religiosity corresponds to increased trust. Only on two items do English Catholics display significant associations, FEDS DISHONEST (.0738) and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING (.1278), in both instances showing the same

direction as noted for French Catholics.

For the United Church affiliate category, the strongest significant correlation is between religiosity and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING (.1278). Additionally, two other correlations are significant at .05 for the United Church group, MP'S LOSE TOUCH (.1119) and VOTE DOESN'T MATTER (.1035). Comparatively, the Protestant Conservative Mainline exhibits significant associations for both efficacy indices and one item in each efficacy battery. Again, the direction is for increasing religiosity to be positively related to increased efficacy. None of the political trust items are significant for the Conservative Mainline. This result is repeated for the Protestant NonMainline on the political trust variables, with all internal efficacy items attaining significance and displaying levels of association higher than any other religious type. The strongest association is .2257 on the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER item, indicating a moderate positive association between degree of religiosity and internal efficacy for Protestant NonMainliners. Finally, the Other religion category exhibits one significant association between the religiosity index and the political life indicators, that is, FEDS DISHONEST (-.3363). This moderately strong negative association, indicating that as religiosity increases there is a tendency for trust to decrease, is one of the few anomalies in the association of

religiosity and level of political trust.

Generally, the pattern for the five substantive religious types, when significant, is for a slight to fair positive association between degree of religiosity and feelings of political trust and efficacy. However, that neither significance nor strength of association nears equivalence across the religious affiliate types, indicates support for the proposition of variation by religious preference type.

5.2.3.9 Proposition Nine

Recognizing that the value-additive religious deference index, constructed from the refined reference and deference dimensions, does not take into account the nominal preference dimension, we consider the proposition that:

When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

The results of the simultaneous entry of the refined religious preference measure and religious deference index, controlling for each measure and the seven background variables, are displayed in Table 17 (See Appendix B, Table 17).

Concerning matters of external efficacy, the religious deference index attains significance at .05 level

or below on both external efficacy items, exhibiting a beta of .07 on each item and .10 on the additive external efficacy index. Comparatively, the nominal identification of a religious affiliation, displayed in the first column of Table 17, shows significance on only the MP'S LOSE TOUCH item, exhibiting a beta of .07. Therefore, the proposition is supported from the results for items of external efficacy.

On matters pertaining to internal efficacy, the expanded religious preference measure displays larger betas on POLITICS COMPLEX (.08) and NO SAY (.11) than the deference index (.06/.08 respectively). Moreover, VOTE DOESN'T MATTER is seen to achieve significance for the religious preference measure ($p=.019$) showing a beta of .07, but not for the religious deference index ($p=.070$). Hence, the findings for the individual internal efficacy items do not offer support to the research proposition.

Finally, on issues of political trust, both preference type and deference index display significance on the same three items. In each instance, however, the betas for the religious preference measure are much stronger than those for the deference index, indicating rejection of the empirical proposition. Overall, the nominal refined religious preference measure is a better predictor of political life aspects than the ordinal religious deference index.

5.2.3.10 Proposition Ten

The evaluation of the final proposition, that:

Relative to other social background variables, the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure, will show significant predictive value;

is facilitated by the findings exhibited in Table 18 (See Appendix B, Table 18).

On matters of external political efficacy, it is clear that religion is an important factor relative to other social background variables, showing a significant beta of .07 for the religious index of dichotomies and .08 for the deference index of two refined trichotomies on the external efficacy index. Only education (.20) outdistances the religious indices on the external efficacy index, the university educated (.38) exhibiting greater efficacy than other education categories. Age, region, and organizational involvement, also achieve significance at the .05 level for the index of external efficacy.

The effect of the religious factor, relative to other social variables, is not as pronounced on the internal efficacy items as that observed for the external index. Despite the three religious measures achieving significance at the .05 level on two of three internal efficacy indicators each, the highest of the religious betas on POLITICS COMPLEX (.08) ranks behind education (.32), gender (.11), organizational involvement (.10) and

the size of community the respondent resides in (.09). On the item NO SAY the highest significant religious beta (.07) trails education (.19), organizational involvement (.11) and community size (.11). Finally, on the VOTE DOESN'T MATTER item, the beta for religious preference (.07) ranks behind education (.15), organizational involvement (.14) and age (.12). Overall, religion, operationalized by three different measures, does prove to be a valuable predictor of internal efficacy scores.

The strongest religious beta on the three matters of political trust, attaining significance for any religious measure, consistently belongs to the religious preference variable. On the FEDS DISHONEST item, only education has a higher beta (.21) than the preference measure (.11). Even stronger support for the relative predictive value of the religious factor is marshalled on the two trust items, FEDS WASTE MONEY and TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING. In both cases, the religious preference measure outdistances all other social background variables. Displaying a beta of .20 for the item FEDS WASTE MONEY, the next strongest beta is for region (.17), with Quebec exhibiting the highest level of trust. On the TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING item, religious preference (.10) leads the field, followed by the age variable (.08) that shows the 65 and over category as most trusting.

Generally, for items and indices of political

efficacy and trust, the proposition concerning the predictive value of religion is confirmed. While the particular measure of religion to attain significance varies to some degree across the items, the relative importance of the religious factor compared to other social variables is clearly substantial.

5.3 DISCUSSION

While determining the specific patterns that the findings demonstrate is an important aspect of this study, the greater value is seen to reside in the relation of the empirical tendencies to the conceptual model and substantive theoretical considerations. Examination of the three dimensional value-additive model with reference to the general findings should provide an adequate interpretation, if the model has some degree of theoretical utility. The flow of the discussion is organized according to the model's dimensions, that is, preference, reference and deference.

5.3.1 Preference Dimension

The simple presence or absence of a religious preference corresponds, according to the conceptual model, to the lowest intensity of identity anchorage. Nonetheless the indication of a religious preference is a potential source of identity not found in the lived experience of those indicating no affiliation. The findings do indicate

the tendency of the nonaffiliated category to be less efficacious and trusting than the affiliated, suggesting that the presence of a comparative religious identity function tempers one's experience of the political process.

That specific religious affiliate types, each assumed to reflect a certain degree of theological and normative homogeneity, prove significant to the prediction of internal efficacy and trust scores, but not external efficacy, is substantively interesting. Recalling that external efficacy reflects a valuation of the political system, lack of significant findings may demonstrate the integrative function of religion in society. While acceptable to blame oneself for feelings of ineffectiveness in the political process, the religious identity does not sanction cynicism toward the political system itself.³

Findings for religious affiliate types, pertaining to internal efficacy and political trust, are theoretically inviting. The two affiliate types displaying the largest deviations from the mean on the items achieving significance, excepting one, are the French Catholic and Protestant NonMainline. For the efficacy items, one is left to ponder the greater than average level displayed in the understanding of the political process by French

³The New Testament scriptures, central to the vast majority of religious expressions in Canada, exhort on a number of occasions that governing authorities are established by God, and the appropriate response is one of subjection (Romans 13:1; 1 Peter 2:13).

Catholics, but their lesser sense of efficacy for voting, as well as having a voice in government. The Protestant NonMainline show the inverse situation, that is, less sense of efficacy in understanding and greater sense of the value of the vote. Moreover, on matters of trust, French Catholics display greatest trust of federal expenditures and least trust of federal government action, while the Protestant NonMainline exhibit greatest distrust in both matters, along with greatest agreement with perceiving the federal government as being dishonest.

The pronounced effects for these two affiliate types may be attributable to a similar cause, that is, identification as a cultural minority. In the case of French Canadians, it is not a matter of incompetence in understanding politics that proves the greatest impediment to political participation, but the fact of being a statistical and cultural minority. While federal expenditure in the promotion of French-Canadian culture may be appreciated, it does not correspond to a trust of federal politicians and their political actions. However, for the Protestant NonMainline, who are most likely to exemplify a world-rejecting sectarian category, politicians who compromise ethical standards in their accomodation of moral pluralism are not to be trusted. Perhaps, to the Protestant NonMainline affiliates, the complexity of politics is difficult to comprehend because the simplicity

of the solution is so obvious. Yet, the Protestant NonMainline, as a subcultural religious expression, value the vote more than any other religious category. While this may be perceived as an avenue to make an evil world slightly better, it may also reflect a commitment to the democratic process, one that is adhered to in the congregational polity of most NonMainline churches. Hence, both French Catholic and Protestant NonMainline categories may be viewed as two distinct cultural groups.

Regardless of what interpretation is used to explain the findings, the effect of refining religious preference into affiliate types is of demonstrable utility on internal efficacy and political trust matters. The employment of a religious affiliation measure that attends to belief homogeneity, shared symbolism and organizational form, or simply, religious culture, is critical to an accurate assessment of the religious factor in the political life. Clearly, the findings indicate the value of more specific affiliate types, over the gross absence/presence dichotomy, as central to religious identity anchorage.

5.3.2 Reference Dimension

The presence or absence of religious group attendance, as developed in the conceptual model, is considered as having a higher intensity to the religious identity than a simple preference identification.

Attendees, potentially, are presented with the opportunity to take as a point of reference the normative standards of the religious group and receive the communication of political messages. However, as previously observed for the religious affiliate dichotomy, it is the never attendees who deviate from the mean toward inefficacy and political distrust. Hence, again, after holding constant the effects of social control variables, it is never attending religious group activities that is central to the impact of the religious factor on political life.

The evaluation of political efficacy and trust by degree of religious group attendance is revealing, especially on the external efficacy items. External efficacy, as a reflection of effectiveness in the political system, is seen in the findings to be highest for those who attend religious group meetings on a weekly basis. This is consistent with what one would anticipate from a theory of regular reference to group norms. As indicated previously, the sacred authority of the dominant religious expression in Canada, Christianity, includes exhortations to submit to government. Therefore, it would be expected that those who are frequently subject to norms of submission, will perceive the governing system in a more favourable light. Subsequently, this same principle may be applied to matters of political trust. With two of the three significant trust items displaying the highest trust level for weekly

attenders, and on the other item defining the mean, support for a normative reference interpretation can be sustained.

Attending to levels of religious group exposure, clearly, is important to the effect of the religious reference dimension on political efficacy and trust matters. As expected the lumping of categories as diverse as yearly, monthly and weekly into one, tends to conceal and diminish the normative potential of the reference group. This is explicitly supported where a linear pattern across reference group attendance levels is observed.

5.3.3 Deference Dimension

As observed in the finding section, the subjective deference dimension, considered in its singular form, does not show large deviations from the mean on any item. While the deference dimension is posited as most important to the shaping of the religious identity into a functioning perspective, the conceptual model specifies that this will occur in conjunction with the presence of a religious preference and reference group attendance. However, in its simple dichotomous form of self-perceived religiosity, despite showing above average efficacy and trust on every item for the highly religious category, consistent significant variation is not observed.

As for the case of the dichotomous deference measure, a lack of consistent direction for the very

religious category of the refined deference measure does not necessarily reflect the inappropriateness of the value-additive model. In its present consideration, the deference dimension has not been operationalized in an explicit value-additive form. There is no question that the not very religious are less efficacious and less trusting, than the other two categories. However, the interchanging of the fairly and very religious, depending on the particular item, is difficult to explain. Basically, the bottom line, as displayed in the two efficacy indices and the one significant trust item, is that the very religious are still more efficacious and trusting than the fairly religious.

A comparison of the dichotomous and refined measure of religious self-perception does not provide conclusive evidence that one is significantly better than the other. In fact, the general pattern of findings for both measures, fuels consideration of the value of predicting subjective attitudes with a subjective independent variable. Yet, when the subjective identity measure is considered concurrently with the dichotomous preference and reference dimensions it is found to be the better predictor, indicating a considerable independent deference effect.

The most important test of the value-additive model occurs with the assessment of the effect of two composite indices on the political efficacy and trust items.

Theoretically, it is when the presence of each dimension: preference, reference and deference; is affirmed by the respondent that ego is most likely to be organized into a religious perspective and will show a pronounced difference from the other categories. While the results indicate a deviation toward greater efficacy and trust on all items for the highly religious category, they are not consistently the highest, nor is the secular category the lowest. In fact, it is the one dimensional religious category that proves to be most politically skeptical. However, that this is, to some degree, a methodological by-product created through the combining of gross categories, is displayed with the composite index consisting of two refined ordinal measures.

The refined composite index provides confirmation of the theoretical model, as the highly religious category demonstrates the greatest deviation from the sample mean on the significant items. The presence of at least weekly exposure to the religious reference group, coupled with a very religious self-perception, corresponds to the highest levels of efficacy and trust. However, that the association of religiosity to political efficacy and trust is not linear, qualifies the model on this aspect of the political life.

The importance of the religious collectivity and its potential for the nurturing or maintaining of attitudes

toward the political process is affirmed, to some degree, by the findings. The strongest significant correspondence between degree of religiosity and the dependent political items, occurs for the two groups to which a cultural explanation was previously attributed, the French Catholic and Protestant NonMainline. Overall, as a refined nominal measure, religious preference does retain a significant independent effect for most items, after controlling for degree of religiosity. Hence, the identification with a religious group, even nominally, tends to function as a social-psychological category with considerable predictive strength.

Finally, the significance of the religious factor, reflected in a number of different measures, is remarkable when compared to other social variables. With at least one measure of religiosity showing significance on all but one trust item, a compelling case for continued research into the association of religion and political values can be made.

Chapter VI

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

6.1 OPERATIONALIZATION

Conceptually, political participation has evolved from a unidimensional mode, focusing on the vote, to a multi-dimensional perspective that distinguishes between voting, campaign activity, particularized contacting of officials, and political communications (Milbrath and Gael, 1977:11,12). Generally, political participation in Canada, beyond those activities requiring a minimum expenditure of time and energy, is limited (Clarke, et al. 1984:36,37). While possible to hierarchically order political participation activity, the focus of this research is to investigate the effect of religious measures on specific items of political participation. However, to organize the analysis, political participation variables are classified into four categories: election attention and interest, political stimuli, political activity and other matters.

The election attention and interest category is comprised of two items. The first taps respondent interest in the 1984 federal election and has been recoded directionally from not at all interested (0) to very interested (3). The second item, attention to politics,

refers to politics in general, "that is, from day to day, when there isn't a big election campaign going on." This variable has also been recoded from not much at all (0) to very closely (2).

The political stimuli category contains three types of activity that the respondent may engage in. The three items are: 1) "How often do you read about politics in the newspapers and magazines?"; 2) "Watch programs about politics on T.V.?"; and, 3) "Discuss politics with other people?". The response format utilized in the analysis, proceeds from never (0) to often (3). Additionally, a political stimuli index was computed to gauge the overall participation level of this dimension.¹

Political activity consists of five variables, sharing the response format of: never (0), seldom (1), sometimes (2), and, often (3). Specifically, respondents were questioned concerning the extent to which they: 1) "Try to convince friends to vote the same as you?"; 2) "Attend a political meeting or rally?"; 3) Spend time working for a political party?"; 4) "Contribute money to a political party or candidate?"; and, 5) "Contact public officials or politicians?". A campaign activity index was constructed by summing the first four measures that reflect

¹The political stimuli index was recoded into four categories from low (1) to high (4) by collapsing the distribution as follows: (0-3=1) 19.2%; (4,5=2) 23.2%; (6,7=3) 32.4%; and, (8,9=4) 25.2%.

most directly election activities.² The fifth item, while certainly a measure of political participation, is not of the same substantive dimension as the other four, and, hence, is excluded from the index.

The other category of political participation includes four measures, three of which deal with the vote. The non-vote item, intensity of party identification, reflects the respondent's strength of commitment to the federal party that the respondent identifies with. This variable has been coded from not very strongly (0) to very strongly (2). The first vote measure is a simple no(0)/yes(1) dichotomy, indicating whether the respondent didn't or did vote in the 1984 federal election. The vote index assesses the absence or presence of voting in the past three federal elections, again, with a no(0)/yes(1) dichotomy. Finally, the vote consistency index reflects the number of times that those who have voted in the past three elections have voted for the same party.³ Those who voted for two or three different parties were considered as flexible (0) and those voting for the same party as being durable partisans (1).

²The campaign activity index ranges from low (0) to high (2). Actual recoding of the additive distribution is: (0=0) 43.5%; (1,2=1) 28.1%; and, (3 thru 12=2) 28.4%.

³For both the vote index and vote consistency index, the age control variable is recoded so as to exclude voters ineligible for all three elections.

6.2 FINDINGS

To assess the relationship of religion to political participation, the pattern of this section is to consider findings for each religious dimension, first, in the dichotomous form that reflects the absence and presence of the dimension, and second, as refined measures that attend to discrete variation within the religious condition. Subsequently, propositions concerning two value-additive indices are also considered: individually, relative to each other and the refined preference measure, and finally, compared to the social background variables.

6.2.1 Religious Preference Dimension

Three research propositions shape the presentation of findings for the preference dimension. The first assesses the absence and presence of a religious preference on political participation matters, while the second examines the effects of a more refined preference measure. The third proposition pertains to a comparison of the two measures.

6.2.1.1 Proposition One

The findings presented in the left-hand panel of Table 19 (See Appendix B, Table 19), facilitates an assessment of the proposition that:

Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not.

Only one of the two election attention and interest items achieves significance at the .05 level or below, that is, ATTENTION TO POLITICS (.001). Here the findings indicate that it is the religious unaffiliates who pay above average attention to politics in general (.13).

Moving to the political stimuli battery of items one of three is found to be significant, READ ABOUT POLITICS ($p=.023$), along with the political stimuli index ($p=.039$). Clearly, on all stimuli items the Religious None tend to the direction of more frequent exposure. A comparison of the unadjusted (.21) and adjusted (.11) deviations from the grand mean on the political stimuli index for the unaffiliated category, reveals the importance of the social control variables in assessing the independent effect of not having a religious affiliation.

On matters of political activity, two of five variables, ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY ($p=.008$) and WORK FOR PARTY ($p=.031$), display an acceptable significance level. In both cases, as for the nonsignificant items, the Religious None have an above average activity level. Finally, only one of the items in the Other category, VOTE INDEX ($p=.012$), is seen to be significant. Here it is the unaffiliated who are below the mean (-.11) for exercising their vote in all of the past three federal elections.

Overall, the proposition of significant difference between the unaffiliated and religious affiliates, garners

only slight support. Yet, the complete consistency of direction for political stimuli and political activity indicators, whether statistically significant or not, does provide some evidence for the proposition. Substantively, the general trend is for the nonreligious to have greater exposure to political stimuli and greater political involvement, than the religious affiliate category.

6.2.1.2 Proposition Two

Consideration of the research proposition that:

The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types, will display significant variation between types;

is facilitated by the right-hand panel of Table 19.

The two election attention and interest matters are both seen to be significant. The lowest level of interest in the 1984 federal election is exhibited by the French Catholic category (-.13), followed by Other religions (-.09) and the Religious None (-.05). The category displaying greatest election interest is the English Catholic (.06). The ATTENTION TO POLITICS item demonstrates French Catholic consistency with the election attention variable, as the French Catholic are least attentive of all religious categories(-.17). However, the Religious None show the opposite direction from the item regarding the federal election (-.05), and now have the highest level of attention to politics in general (.16).

READ ABOUT POLITICS (p=.000) is the only measure to

attain significance of the three political stimuli indicators, for the refined religious preference dimension. Considerable variation by religious affiliate type is evident in the READ ABOUT POLITICS item, with the French Catholic (-.24) displaying the lowest level of participation and the Protestant Conservative Mainline (.19) the highest. The Religious None (.17) and the United Church of Canada (.10) also display higher than average exposure to politics through the reading of newspapers.

Clearly, on matters of overt political activity, the proposition of significant variation between affiliate types is confirmed, as all five items achieve significance. The first item, CONVINCING FRIENDS TO VOTE ($p=.013$), demonstrates that the French Catholics (.14) have the highest level of participation, followed by the Protestant NonMainline (.08). Conversely, the United Church of Canada affiliates (-.13) have the lowest activity score, followed by the Protestant Conservative Mainline (-.07). On the activity ATTENDING POLITICAL RALLY ($p=.046$), it is the religious nonaffiliate category (.10) that shows the highest involvement, followed by the French Catholic (.06). Below average involvement is exhibited by the Conservative Mainline, NonMainline and Other religion category. Continuing the trend for French Catholic affiliates shown on the first two activity items, this affiliate type displays highest involvement for both WORK FOR PARTY (.17)

and GIVE \$ TO PARTY (.12). The English Catholic exhibit the least activity in working for a political party (-.13), while the Protestant NonMainline are least disposed to give money to a political party (-.16). On the fifth political item, CONTACT POLITICIANS ($p=.027$), it is the Other religion category (-.16) and Protestant NonMainline (-.12) that show the greatest deviation from the mean toward noninvolvement.

Of the four items composing the other category of political participation, three are found to be significant. The Other religion category demonstrates the least likelihood to have voted in the 1984 federal election (-.12) and, by far, the largest deviation toward not voting in three consecutive elections (-.43). Also, less likely to have voted in three federal elections are the Religious None (-.15) and Protestant NonMainline (-.12). However, the most likely to have voted in three consecutive federal elections are those residing in the French Catholic category (.13). Finally, of those who did vote in the last three federal elections, the Protestant NonMainline exhibit the greatest consistency in voting for the same party (.11), while the French Catholic are the least consistent (-.08).

Generally, the foregoing review of the findings substantiates the research proposition that specific affiliate types will display significant variation on

matters of political participation.

6.2.1.3 Proposition Three

A comparison of the results presented in the two panels of Table 19 overwhelmingly confirms the proposition that:

The religious preference dimension in its refined form of specific affiliate types, will show greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

Indeed, with the refined preference measure displaying significance on eleven of fourteen political participation variables, compared to five of fourteen for the less discrete dichotomy, the proposition is supported. Moreover, the expanded preference measure that distinguishes between affiliate types, consistently exhibits higher betas than the simple nonaffiliate/affiliate measure.

6.2.2 Religious Reference Dimension

Focusing on attendance at religious group meetings, three propositions are examined in this section. The first relates to the operationalization of religious reference group attendance with a simple never attend/attend dichotomy. The second considers the effect of expanding the attendance measure into never, yearly, monthly, and weekly levels. Finally, a comparison of the strength and significance of two measures on matters of political participation is presented.

6.2.2.1 Proposition One

The first reference dimension research proposition that:

Those attending religious group meetings will differ significantly from those who do not;

is evaluated on the basis of the results presented in the left-hand panel of Table 20 (See Appendix B, Table 20).

According to the findings, with the exception of the three items: '84 ELECTION INTEREST ($p=.000$), VOTE '84 ($p=.000$), and, VOTE INDEX ($p=.002$), the research proposition is not confirmed. Not only are the vast majority of the participation items nonsignificant, but there is no consistent direction of deviation from the mean on these items. However, it is interesting to note that the three items achieving significance at below the .05 level all relate to the election or vote. Moreover, all three are directionally consistent, the never attenders exhibiting less interest in the 1984 federal election ($-.15$), slightly less likely to have voted ($-.06$), and less likely to have voted in three consecutive federal elections ($-.09$).

6.2.2.2 Proposition Two

A second research proposition to be assessed from an examination of findings in the right-hand panel of Table 20 is that:

The refining of religious group attendance into levels will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels.

This proposition fares considerably better than the first, as seven of fourteen items display significance at the .05 level or less. Both election attention and interest items are significant, with the never attend category showing least election interest (-.15) and the weekly attenders highest interest (.06). However, this pattern does not hold for the ATTENTION TO POLITICS in general item, as yearly attenders (-.04) display greatest deviation from the mean in the less attentive direction and never attenders the greatest attentiveness (.04).

The one significant political stimuli item, WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS ($p=.005$), reveals that it is the monthly attenders who are most likely to engage this form of political participation. Interestingly, this tendency for greater participation by monthly attenders is sustained through the entire battery of political activity indicators. On the one significant activity item, CONTACT POLITICIANS ($p=.04$), not only does the monthly category show the greater likelihood of this participation mode (.04), but the weekly attender category is least likely to engage in the contacting of officials (-.06).

While support is scant for the research proposition on the political stimuli and political activity dimensions of participation, three of four indicators do achieve

significance in the Other category. The INTENSITY OF PARTY ID variable ($p=.051$) indicates that the weekly attenders have the highest above the mean commitment to a political identification (.05), and never attenders the lowest (-.05). Regarding the VOTE '84 item ($p=.000$) the most distinguished score in the refined attendance measure is attained by the never attenders (-.06). On the VOTE INDEX ($p=.008$) that evaluates the presence of voting in the past three federal elections, the monthly attender category exhibits a higher than average score (.06), and the never attenders are least likely to have voted in all three (-.09). While the VOTE CONSISTENCY measure ($p=.092$) does not achieve an acceptable level of significance, it is interesting to observe that the monthly attender category shows the highest propensity toward durability in partisan voting behaviour (.07).

Overall, one must conclude that the research proposition of significant variation between attendance levels is confirmed for election attention, interest, and the other miscellaneous matters, but not for items reflecting political participation through either stimuli or overt activity.

6.2.2.3 Proposition Three

Comparison of the two panels in Table 20 enables an evaluation of the third research proposition, that:

The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance

levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

The performance of this proposition receives a mixed review from the findings. While it is true that the refined measure attains significance on three items, where the dichotomous measure does not, it is also the case that when both achieve significance the betas are relatively equivalent. The two attendance measures each show a beta of .08 for '84 ELECTION INTEREST and VOTE '84, and betas of .07 (dichotomous) and .08 (refined) for VOTE INDEX. Hence, the proposition receives qualified support, in that, the refined reference measure does show significance on more items but not stronger betas when the dichotomous measure is also found to be significant.

6.2.3 Religious Deference Dimension

Considered in this section is the effect of self-perceived religiosity on political participation items. A total of ten research propositions are evaluated, primarily, stemming from four different measures that operationalize the deference dimension. We begin by assessing propositions relating to a dichotomous measure of subjective religiosity and then move to an evaluation of the more refined religiosity variable. This is followed by a consideration of the effects of two value-additive indices on political participation items.

6.2.3.1 Proposition One

Beginning with the most basic distinction that can be made with the self-perceived religiosity item, that is, a low/high dichotomy, the research proposition that:

Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not;

is here evaluated. The findings that pertain to this assessment are found in the left-hand panel of Table 21 (See Appendix B, Table 21).

One of two election attention and interest items is found to be statistically significant, that is, '84 ELECTION INTEREST ($p=.006$). The variation on this item shows that the low religious self-perception category is less interested in the 1984 federal election ($-.07$) than the high religiosity category ($.03$). This same effect is seen to persist for the two political stimuli variables that achieve significance below the $.05$ level. Consequently, this is reflected in the POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX ($p=.025$), wherein, directionally, the low religiosity category has less frequent exposure to political stimuli ($-.06$) than the highly religious ($.03$). Therefore, some support for the research proposition is found in the first two dimensions of political participation. However, for the two remaining participation sections, support for the proposition is meagre. Only one of five political activity indicators achieves significance, as does one of four

miscellaneous items. The low category of self-perceived religiosity for the GIVE \$ TO PARTY item ($p=.051$), exhibits a slight tendency toward less frequent financial giving to a political party ($-.04$). Moreover, the low category is also slightly less likely to have voted in the 1984 federal election ($-.04$). However, in both instances, the intercategory difference is only .06, indeed little to make much of.

6.2.3.2 Proposition Two

The second proposition that:

The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels;

can be evaluated with the empirical evidence displayed in the right-hand panel of Table 21.

Both '84 ELECTION INTEREST ($p=.016$) and ATTENTION TO POLITICS ($p=.005$) are statistically significant, and demonstrate the very religious are the most interested in the federal election (.05) and attentive to politics in general (.08). However, the not very religious exhibit least interest in the 1984 federal election ($-.07$) and are slightly less than average in their attention to politics ($-.02$).

The political stimuli battery shows two significant items and, consequently, the POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (.043) is also significant. While the not very religious define the lowest frequency of exposure to political television

programs (-.07) and discussion of politics (-.07), it is the fairly religious category that exemplifies highest exposure to political stimuli (.04). Hence, considerable significant variation is found on political stimuli items, as well as election attention and interest. Although, substantively difficult to interpret for the political stimuli dimension of political participation, the research proposition is confirmed. This, however, does not hold for more overt forms of political participation, as none of the political activity indicators achieve significance.

The Other category of political participation does provide mixed support for the proposition, as two of four indicators are significant, INTENSITY OF PARTY ID (.001) and VOTE '84 (.000). The greatest intercategory variation is observed in the variable assessing strength of commitment to a federal party, wherein the very religious are inclined toward a strong identification (.10) and the not very religious exhibit a slightly less than average intensity score (-.04).

6.2.3.3 Proposition Three

The results displayed in Table 21 provide little support for the proposition that:

The religious deference dimension in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high deference dichotomy.

The low/high subjective religiosity measure is seen

to attain significance on five items and two indices. Of the five items, GIVE \$ TO PARTY does not demonstrate significance for the more refined measure. Moreover, when both measures achieve significance on the same item, there is virtually no difference in the size of the betas. Only on one item, ATTENTION TO POLITICS, does the expanded deference measure attain significance where the dichotomous measure does not. Generally, then, the refined self-perceived religiosity measure is not a better predictor of political participation than the simple low/high categorization.

6.2.3.4 Proposition Four

Desiring to determine the overall strength of each religious dimension on the political participation items, Table 22 (See Appendix B, Table 22) facilitates assessment of the proposition that:

When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference or reference dimensions.

Clearly this proposition is not confirmed by the two items: 84 ELECTION INTEREST and ATTENTION TO POLITICS. On the first matter, it is the religious attendance dichotomy that is significant showing a beta of .06, and on the latter item, religious preference is the only significant measure, also with a beta of .06.

On the three political stimuli matters, religious preference displays significance on READ ABOUT POLITICS and WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS, as well as the POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX, each with a beta of .05. However, the self-perceived identity measure is also significant on WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS and the POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX and like the preference measure exhibits a beta of .05. Additionally, it is the sole measure to attain significance for the variable DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS. However, both the preference and deference (identity) measures appear to be equally good predictors of the political stimuli dimension of participation and, therefore, the proposition is not confirmed.

Concerning the political activity items, both the preference and deference measures, after controls for each other, along with the reference dimension and seven social background variables, are each significant on two indicators. Again, this provides no support for the proposition that the identity indicator would be a stronger predictor.

Finally, VOTE '84 is found to show significant betas for the religious attendance (.07) and identity (.06) measures, with a slightly higher beta for attendance. Hence, the proposition is rejected on all counts.

6.2.3.5 Proposition Five

Shifting focus from the unidimensional religious

indicators to the value-additive indices, the left-hand panel of Table 23 (See Appendix B, Table 23) allows an evaluation of the research proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity.

An examination of the index of three dichotomies in Table 23 shows that both '84 ELECTION INTEREST ($p=.000$) and ATTENTION TO POLITICS ($.001$) are significant. Directionally, the high religiosity category displays most interest in the election of 1984 ($.05$), while the one dimension religious respondents are least interested ($-.19$). However, it is the low religiosity category that demonstrates highest general interest in politics ($.16$), and the two dimension religious respondents that pay the lowest attention to politics ($-.06$). Consistent, in terms of direction with the ATTENTION TO POLITICS item are the political stimuli items and index, revealing that those who have no religiosity (0) are most politically engaged and those who have the presence of two religious dimensions are least exposed to political stimuli. With all but one of the political stimuli items, READ ABOUT POLITICS ($p=.611$), achieving significance at below $.05$, the research proposition for the first two batteries of political participation is confirmed for the index of three

dichotomies. However, that the variation is not linear across the categories of the value-additive index is problematic to a substantive interpretation.

On the political activity measures, three of five are found to be significant and, subsequently, the CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX also is significant ($p=.000$). For the three significant items: CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE ($p=.044$), ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY ($p=.048$), and GIVE \$ TO PARTY ($p=.000$), the consistent direction is for the nonreligious to display the highest level of activity and the one dimensional respondents the lowest. Generally, the highly religious reside near the mean activity level. Again, confirmation of the research proposition is evident, but the relationship of degree of religiosity to extent of involvement in political activities is not linear.

Concerning the other political participation items, VOTE '84 ($p=.000$) and VOTE INDEX ($p=.041$), significant variation is displayed. The highly religious category exhibits a slightly higher than average likelihood of having voted in the 1984 federal election, as well as in all of the three past elections. The no religion category is least likely to have voted in three consecutive federal elections ($-.12$).

Overall, the research proposition regarding significant variation of the value-additive index on matters of political participation is confirmed, even

though the direction across the index categories is not linear.

6.2.3.6 Proposition Six

Turning to a consideration of the index of two trichotomies, displayed in the left-hand panel of Table 23, the research proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity;

is now assessed for matters of political participation.

The index of two trichotomies, believed to constitute the finest measure for assessing the likelihood of deference to the values of the religious reference group, displays significance on the election attention and interest items. It is the high religiosity category that shows the highest level of interest in the 1984 election (.12) and in politics in general (.12). The Religious None category demonstrates the least interest in the 1984 federal election (-.14), but is second to the highly religious in general attention to politics (.07).

Only one of three political stimuli indicators achieves an acceptable level of significance, that is, WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS (.018). Again, it is the highly religious who are most likely to participate (.07), whereas the one dimension religious respondent category is least likely to view political programs (-.10). In terms of more

overt political activities, only one of five items in the political activity battery is found to be significant, suggesting lack of confirmation for the research proposition in both political stimuli and activity matters. The one significant activity item is CONVINCING FRIENDS TO VOTE ($p=.011$), which shows the highly religious as most prone to engage this aspect of participation (.10), followed by the low religious category (.06).

Three of four Other political participation items give evidence of significant variation for the index of two trichotomies. INTENSITY OF PARTY ID (.008) shows that the category composed of weekly religious group attenders who perceive themselves as very religious (4), have the strongest commitment to a federal political party identity (.11). Conversely, the no religion and single dimension respondents have the lowest level of federal party identification intensity (-.05). The low religiosity category is also most likely to not have voted in 1984 federal election (-.06) and in three consecutive elections (-.10).

The bottom line for the research proposition of significant variation for the value-additive deference index on matters of political participation, is that it is rejected for the political stimuli and political activity batteries, but confirmed for election attention and interest, as well as three of four other participation

variables.

6.2.3.7 Proposition Seven

Comparing the two panels displayed in Table 23, enables evaluation of the proposition that:

The value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor than the index of religious dichotomies.

The research proposition, as assessed by the evidence in Table 23, fails on the political participation items. Clearly, the index of the three religious dichotomies is a better predictor of political participation scores than the value-additive two dimensional index. Displaying nine of fourteen indicators as significant at the .05 level, compared to seven of fourteen for the index of two refined measures, the value-additive index of dichotomies demonstrates the most intercategory variation. Moreover, on items where both value-additive indices are significant, the betas are virtually equivalent. It is obvious from these findings that the variation produced by the summing of religious dichotomies has more explanatory power than the summing of refined attendance and self-perceived religiosity measures, for matters of political participation. Hence, the proposition is lost.

6.2.3.8 Proposition Eight

Noting from the previous section, a lack of

supportive evidence for the composite deference index composed of two refined measures, the issue remains as to whether this apparently weak relationship to political participation matters is manifest in all religious affiliate types. This issue is addressed by the research proposition stating that:

The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of the refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type.

Findings presented in Table 24 offer considerable support for the research proposition (See Appendix B, Table 24). For the items '84 ELECTION INTEREST and ATTENTION TO POLITICS, significant correlation with the deference index is demonstrated for English Catholic, French Catholic, Protestant Conservative Mainline and Protestant NonMainline. The positive correlation reflects the tendency for election interest and political attention to rise with increases in the deference index, for these religious preference types.

Although, the only political stimuli item showing a significant correlation with the deference index for the entire sample is WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS (.0713), significant correlations do exist for each stimuli item in specific religious preference types. In particular, the United Church of Canada and the Protestant Conservative

Mainline consistently exhibit the strongest association between the stimuli items and the deference index. Overall, the association of the political stimuli index to the value-additive deference index is .1977 for the United Church and .1647 for the Conservative Mainline. Hence, the proposition of variation by preference type is confirmed.

The five political activity items and the CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX display considerable significant variation by affiliate type, in spite of only one, GIVE \$ TO PARTY, achieving significance for the entire sample. The strongest positive association between the deference index and the activity measures is found for the English Catholic and Protestant Conservative Mainline preference types. Within in these categories a significant association between religiosity and participation is observed, that is, as religious intensity increases, political activity also heightens.

Finally, for the other political participation items, three of four variables are seen to be significant in association with the deference index for all the respondents. Interestingly, while the English Catholic exhibit the highest positive association between intensity of religiosity and voting in the federal election of 1984, as well as three consecutive elections, the Other religion category shows a significant negative association.

An assessment of the correlations displayed in

Table 24, yields a strong endorsement of the research proposition. Evidently, many of the significant associations between the value-additive deference index and political participation items for particular religious preference types are concealed when the entire sample is considered as a whole.

6.2.3.9 Proposition Nine

Having determined that considerable variation exists by religious preference type for the value-additive deference index on matters of political participation, an outstanding issue is whether:

When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

The results displayed in Table 25 offer little support for this proposition (See Appendix B, Table 25). The religious preference measure is seen to attain significance on nine of fourteen separate political participation items, compared to seven of fourteen for the deference index, after controlling for each measure. On the election attention and interest items both measures are significant, but religious preference (.12/.16) has considerably stronger betas than the composite deference index (.09/.09). On the political stimuli variables each religious measure attains significance on one, where the

other does not. However, overall, the POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX is only significant for religious preference (.003), displaying a beta of .10.

Three of five political activity indicators are significant for the religious preference variable compared to only one, CONVINCING FRIENDS VOTE, for the value-additive deference index. On this one item, religious preference is seen to have a higher beta (.10) than the deference measure (.06). However, the CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX, significant only for the deference measure, shows that when the individual activities are summed the intercategory variation for preference type decreases and increases for the deference index.

The miscellaneous items of political participation, VOTE INDEX and VOTE CONSISTENCY, do not support the research proposition as they show significant and large betas for religious preference type (.21/.17). However, INTENSITY OF PARTY ID is only significant for the deference index, and moreover, on the VOTE '84 item, the deference measure has a slightly larger beta (.11) than the preference variable (.10). Hence, the results in Table 25, considered over the entire range of political participation dimensions, does not provide much support for the proposition that the value-additive deference index will show greater predictive strength than the nominal preference measure, after controls for each other and seven

background variables.

6.2.3.10 Proposition Ten

Findings presented in Table 26 (See Appendix B, Table 26) facilitate evaluation of the proposition that:

Relative to other social background variables, the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure will show significant predictive strength.

As presented in Table 26 the refined measure of religious affiliation displays significance on ten of fourteen political participation variables, and on the other four significance at .05 or less is achieved by at least one of the value-additive indices. From this observation alone the importance of the religious factor to political participation, after controls for other social background variables, is obvious.

Relative to the social background variables, the size of the beta for significant religious measures varies from item to item. On the first of two election attention items, the religious preference measure (.09) is seen to lag behind age (.25), education (.22), organizational involvement (.14) and gender (.10). Directionally, higher age categories, advanced education, high organizational involvement and being male, correspond to a greater attention to the 1984 Canadian federal election. Virtually the same ordering by betas is sustained for the second item

concerning attention to politics in general.

On matters constituting political participation through exposure to political cues, as observed in the political stimuli index, religious preference (.07) trails age (.27), education (.23), organizational involvement (.18) and gender (.16), but outdistances size of community respondent grew up in (.04), present community size (.03) and region (.06). Substantively, residing in a higher age category, possessing an advanced education, engaging in voluntary organizations and being male, relates positively to a higher political stimuli level. Additionally, the variables included in this analysis, together explain 19% of the variation in the political stimuli index.

An inspection of the political activity index, as a summary measure for the first four activity items, reveals that the value-additive religious index (.08) ranks behind the betas for organizational involvement (.23), age (.17), education (.15) and gender (.06). Essentially, the substantive direction of the deviations from the grand mean remains the same as that evidenced for the political stimuli index. On the political activity item not included in the index, that is, contacting a public official, the beta for religious preference (.07) is the same as that for region. Regionally, Quebec (.05) and British Columbia (.05) have higher than average contacts with officials, while the Maritimes is considerably below the mean (-.12).

Both religious preference and region follow organizational involvement (.20), age (.18) and education (.14), in terms of the strength of the betas.

Finally, it is on the items that fall into the Other category of political participation, where the religious factor becomes most distinguished. On the matter of voting in the 1984 federal election (Item 2 in Table 26), all three religious measures (.11/.10/.10) are outdistanced by only age (.22), organizational involvement (.14) and education (.12). However, on the item tapping the respondents' frequency of vote over the past three elections, religious preference (.22) leads all other variables, including, organizational involvement (.18), age (.13) and size of community respondent grew up in (.08). On the last item, VOTE CONSISTENCY, religious preference (.14) ranks only behind region (.20), and leads other significant background variables, that is, education (.10) and present community size (.09).

Generally, religion, operationalized as either religious preference or a value-additive index of three religious dimensions, demonstrates significant betas for items of political participation, confirming the research hypothesis. However, it is the items in the Other category, dealing with voting behaviour, that show the strongest effect of the religious factor on political participation.

6.3 DISCUSSION

The foregoing finding section, reveals some interesting trends in the data concerning the relationship of religion to political participation. Our interest in the discussion section is to relate the general trends to the theoretical model from which the research propositions are deduced. To accomplish this end, the discussion that follows is organized according to the three religious dimensions, referred to in the model as: preference, reference and deference.

6.3.1 Preference Dimension

Beginning at the lowest level of religious identity anchorage, the absence or presence of a religious affiliation, findings showing the nonaffiliated to be more attentive to politics in general, more exposed to political stimuli, and more overtly active in forms of political participation than those expressing a religious affiliation, require an explanation. That this trend is reversed on election interest and voting behaviour, leads one to consider an interpretation that focuses on the extent to which identity is institutionalized.

According to the conceptual model, the preference dimension of religious identity offers the potential for a comparative function to develop. In other words, the identification with a religious institution, even if nominal, may potentially serve as a point of reference in

the formation of beliefs, values, and attitudes to the political process. Conversely, lack of affiliation may increase the likelihood that a respondent's political identity is derived from secular sources. Hence, the greater propensity of the nonaffiliates to attend to politics and sources of information may be indicative of an alternate source of political identity formation, an identity that is more given to overt expression in activity than that of the religiously affiliated. However, that this active political participation by the nonaffiliated does not translate to election interest and voting behaviour is, potentially, attributable to a lesser involvement of ego in an institutionalized identity, such as, the nominal expression of a religious preference. Alternatively, the lower level of political participation for the religious affiliates, excepting election interest and the vote, may reflect the conservatizing effect of religious affiliation.

Recognizing that religious affiliates are not a homogeneous category, the subdivision of the affiliates into preference types, yields, as expected, significant variation. The variation by religious type serves to condition the foregoing explanation. Apparently, religious preference types, even though nominal, invoke a homogeneity of direction on political participation matters, initially concealed in the lumping of all types into one.

Specifically, the French Catholic, Protestant NonMainline and Other religion categories, tend to exhibit the largest deviations from the grand mean. What is common to these three religious categories is that they represent nondominant cultural expressions in the Canadian social system, and therefore, one would expect religious affiliation to fulfill a comparative function. High levels of overt political participation by French Catholics may be construed as an attempt to correct a perceived imbalance in the federal political system. Moreover, it is possible that the French Catholic church leadership reflects a greater politicization than English Catholic counterparts, and, therefore, are more prone to encourage and mobilize parishoners to vote. The general under-involvement by the Protestant NonMainline in political activities, potentially, reflects a subcultural normative system that emphasizes the personal employment of resources for the advance of the spiritual kingdom and, perhaps, the shunning of secular involvement. This other-worldly religious orientation, coupled with beliefs concerning the inevitability of this-worldly tribulation and the imminent return of Christ, may serve to lessen the desire for political involvement. Finally, low levels of involvement by the Other religious affiliate category could be attributable to a lack of political participation skills or

a reluctance to participate.* Regardless of what explanation is invoked to explain the pattern of results, it is clear that variation within the religious affiliate category is considerably more important to the explaining of political participation, than is the collapsing of all preferences into one and no preference into another.

6.3.2 Reference Dimension

At the religious reference level, operationalized through religious group attendance, the logic of the theoretical model is that attendance indicates greater potential for ego to be socialized into religious group norms, than does the nominal identification of a religious preference. However, religious group attendance assumes that the individual does have a preference and, in fact, the group attended is the actualization of that preference.

As noted in the finding section, the dichotomization of religious group attendance into never attender and attenders explains nothing with regard to political participation, except election interest and voting behaviour. A lower level of interest in the 1984 federal election and less likelihood to have voted for never attender respondents than attenders, does support an

*The Other religion category displays a large deviation from the mean on the vote index (-.43), despite the fact that ineligible voters in all three elections were excluded on the basis of age. It is likely that this category contains a large proportion of immigrants who were not available to vote in all three elections, and, hence, the reason for the large deviation.

interpretation that perceives the nonreligious as less institutionally involved. While never attenders do not differ significantly from attenders in terms of campaign activities, they are less prone to formal institutional expression, that is, the vote.

Examining the variation within the religious group attendance category, generally, demonstrates the monthly attenders to be more politically active than weekly attenders. At first glance, this may seem to diminish the normative function of the religious reference group, if it is assumed that political participation is a religious norm. However, if exposure to religious teaching leads to the affirmation of the status quo, then those most exposed to it may have least reason to engage in political activity. Moreover, attending religious group services once or more a week, consumes resources that may be channelled by the monthly attender into various forms of political participation. Of course the normative function of the religious reference group not only assumes the communication of norms relevant to political activity, but, also, deference to norms in the behaviour of those exposed to them. It is this matter that constitutes the third aspect of the theoretical model, that is, the deference dimension.

6.3.3 Deference Dimension

Religious deference, as measured by self-perceived

religiosity, assumes that if ego perceives itself as being religious then it is more likely to defer to the normative standards of the religious group to which it is attached. The anchoring of religious identity is greatest at the deference level and a perspective grounded in the religious group is likely to develop, serving to organize diverse areas of life, including the political.

The findings indicate that those with a low religious self-perception are less likely to be exposed to, or active in, the various political participation aspects. However, the more detailed assessment of levels of self-perceived religiosity, indicates that it is those who consider themselves as fairly religious that are most politically engaged with reference to stimuli and overt activity. This tends to indicate that the religious identity that is anchored, but not saturated by a religious perspective, finds most room for expression in political participation. On the other hand, those dominated by a religious perspective may be less indisposed toward political involvement than the not very religious. This does not mean that the highly religious respondents are not interested in the nation's affairs, as evident from highest level of involvement in election interest and attention to politics in general. Moreover, that those with the highest religious identity display the strongest intensity of federal party identification, is supportive of the

theoretical model's location of the perspective function at the deference level.

The religious deference dimension as a value-additive concept is operationalized by two indices in the analysis, with differing results. The first index, tapping the absence or presence of each religious dimension in a single measure, generally demonstrates that one or two dimensional respondents have the lowest level of political participation, while those without any religious dimension have the highest. The three dimensional or high religiosity respondents, tend to either define the mean or be slightly higher and display the highest level of participation on items pertaining to the most institutionalized expression of political activity, that is, election interest and voting behaviour. Here, again, there is some support for the view that formal religious institutional involvement, physically via attendance and psychologically through self-perceived religiosity, corresponds to formal political institutional engagement, physically through voting and psychologically in the intensity of party attachment. Conversely, the higher involvement for the nonreligious in the diverse forms of political stimuli and activity require greater expenditure of resources over a longer time frame.

When the second value-additive index is considered, embracing the expanded measures of religious group

attendance and self-perceived religiosity, believed to be the most refined deference measure, the results are considerably different. Those whose intensity of identity anchorage is seen to be highest, now show the highest level of participation in terms of interest and access to political information, as well as intensity of identification with a federal party. Yet, this high level of knowledge involvement does not translate into overt political action for the highly religious group, excepting, attempts to convince friends to vote the same. This indicates a general hesitancy toward political party involvement, even though, intensity of party identity is strongest for the highly religious. Therefore, while the intensity component of the religious identity appears to transfer to a political party, the objective behavioural aspect of religious group involvement does not.

The assessment of religious deference on political participation via the value-additive model, as considered in the previous paragraph, is needfully qualified by specific religious affiliation types. Essentially, the findings indicate that it is the English Catholic and Protestant Conservative Mainline who show the most significant positive correlations between degree of religiosity and extent of political participation. The United Church of Canada also exhibits this association for political stimuli measures. The common thread that unites these three

religious preference types is that they are the numerically dominant religious expressions in Canadian society, apart from Quebec. Residing in this position of dominance with no apparent cultural threat to their identity, a natural consequence might be that of complacency in the political process. Hence, it is those who most often receive normative reinforcement through attendance at religious group services and who perceive themselves as most religious, that show the greatest predisposition to political involvement. It appears that in culturally dominant religious affiliations, high religiosity functions as a catalyst to political participation.

Generally, classification of nominal religious affiliation into preference types demonstrates the strongest independent effect of any religious measure, for the modes of political participation. Indeed, it is respondent identification with a religious preference that proves most valuable compared to alternate explanations of political activity. However, the value-additive deference index also shows significant independent effects on a number of the political participation items, indicating that in their refined forms, both nominal preference and an ordinal index of deference are valuable predictors. Apparently, the comparative function of religious identity outweighs the organization of ego into a perspective based on normative group standards for matters of political

behaviour, although, each working independently serves to instruct participation in politics.

Chapter VII
POLITICAL ISSUES

7.1 OPERATIONALIZATION

Political issues, as a dimension of political life, reflect respondent attitudes toward a variety of concerns that fall within the purview of federal government policy. These concerns may be organized into an attitude structure,

when two or more beliefs or opinions held by an individual are in some way or another functionally related (Campbell et al., 1960:189).

Moreover, ideology may function to weave together into an encompassing attitudinal structure, various strands of social political and economic experience (Campbell et al., 1960:192). While concern about specific issues may change from election to election, giving the appearance of an "issue shuffle" where, "as if from the proverbial horn of plenty, political issues pour forth in profusion" (Clarke, et al., 1991:69), attitude structures, whether ideological or religious, are relatively durable.

Theoretically, religion should be of vital importance to the prediction of specific federal political issues, functioning to organize diverse attitudes. Whether or not an attitude structure grounded in religious affiliation, attendance and self-perceived religiosity

will prove important on all political issues, is a matter to be determined empirically. As an organizing principle of the analysis to follow, political issues have been subclassified into: social and economic inequality, moral, and, other.

Seven individual items constitute the social and economic inequality category. The specific statements that respondents were asked to indicate their level of disagreement or agreement with, are as follows: "The government should see that everyone has adequate housing" (GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING); "Doctors and hospitals should not be allowed to extra bill or charge patients more than what the government health plans pay them" (OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING); "The difference between rich and poor is too great in Canada" (RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG); "It is not the responsibility of government to assure jobs for unemployed Canadians" (GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED); "People with high incomes should pay a greater share of the taxes than they do now" (MORE TAXES FOR RICH); "The government should see to it that older and retired people have enough money to live on" (GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED); and, "The government should increase the employment opportunities available to women" (GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS). For all items a "neither agree or disagree" response was recoded to the scale midpoint, facilitating a five point scale ranging from 1 - strongly disagree to 5 - strongly agree.

Respondents with no opinion were treated as missing data.¹

The moral battery of political issues is composed of responses to four specific items, recoded according to the procedure described in the previous paragraph. The four item statements and their truncated labels, are: "There should be capital punishment for anyone convicted of murder" (SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT); "Pornographic magazines and movies should be censored" (CENSOR PORN); "The decision to have an abortion should be the responsibility of the pregnant woman" (ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT); and, "People who are homosexuals should be permitted to teach school" (PERMIT GAY TEACHERS).²

Comprising the other or miscellaneous subdivision of the political issues are four items, two dealing with labour matters, and, two with national security. Specifically, the respondent evaluated the statements: "Government employees should not have the right to strike" (OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES); "During a strike, management should not be allowed to hire workers to take the place of strikers" (OPPOSE HIRING SCABS): "Canada

¹Initially, the intent was to create a social welfare scale, sensitive to degree of State intervention. However, an inspection of inter-item correlations demonstrated a range of association from .109 to .274, and the scale construction project was abandoned.

²Again, originally, the intention was to create a summary scale of moral items, reflecting conservative and liberal dimensions. Correlations between items, however, range from -.032 to .227.

should increase its military contributions to NATO" (INCREASE NATO SUPPORT); and, "The U.S. and its allies should aim for superiority in nuclear weapons" (SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR.). The recoding procedure for these items, is the same as that employed in the previous two batteries.

7.2 FINDINGS

Following the format of the previous findings sections, sixteen research propositions are evaluated according to preference, reference and deference levels of religiosity, for political attitudes.

7.2.1 Religious Preference Dimension

Guided by three research propositions, the religious preference dimension is first assessed in its dichotomous form, reflecting the absence or presence of a religious affiliation, and, second, as a refined measure of specific affiliate types. Following the individual assessment of each measure, a comparison of the dichotomous and more refined affiliate variable is presented.

7.2.1.1 Proposition One

On specific political issues, the left-hand panel of Table 27 (See Appendix B, Table 27) enables an evaluation of the proposition that:

Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not.

According to the findings displayed in Table 27, the preference dimension as a dichotomous measure, does not show significance at the .05 level for any of the seven items dealing with social and economic inequality. Nevertheless, the two items closest to an acceptable level of statistical significance, OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING ($p=.070$) and GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.083$), do demonstrate substantial deviations from the grand mean for the Religious None category. The direction of deviation indicates that those who do not indicate a religious preference are slightly more likely to disagree with opposition to extra billing (-.12) and somewhat more disposed to agree with government increasing employment opportunities for women (.12), than are the religious affiliates.

The lack of significance shown for the items comprising the social and economic inequality category is not sustained for the moral and other issue categories, as all items in each battery are found to be significant. Results for the four moral issues clearly indicate support for the research proposition, as the Religious None displays large mean deviations. On the issue of capital punishment for murderers, SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, the nonaffiliate respondents tend toward disagreement (-.27). This same tendency is observed for the CENSOR PORN item, the nonaffiliated showing a substantial deviation toward

disagreement with censorship (-.47). Concerning the item dealing with abortion, ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT, the Religious None are in strong agreement (.63), while the religious affiliates tend toward disagreement (-.07), yielding a difference between the unaffiliated and affiliated of .70. A similar finding is shown for the PERMIT GAY TEACHERS item, as the nonaffiliates show a large deviation toward agreement (.57) and the religious affiliates display a less than average level of agreement (-.06).

The Other issue category also displays substantial differences between the Religious None and affiliates, generating support for the research proposition. The Religious None tend toward disagreement on the items: OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES (-.37), INCREASE NATO SUPPORT (-.32), and, SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY (-.30). The None also shows a higher level of agreement with opposition to the use of scab labour during a strike (.21), than do the religious affiliates.

7.2.1.2 Proposition Two

Assessment of the research proposition that:

The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types will display significant variation between the types;

is facilitated by the findings presented in the right-hand panel of Table 27.

Confirmation of the research hypothesis is

overwhelming, as all individual items in each battery: social and economic inequality, moral, and, other, achieve significance at below the .05 level. The magnitude and direction of deviations from the grand mean are substantively interesting, as specific religious affiliate types display larger deviations than those of the Religious None. The social and economic inequality items demonstrate a remarkable divergence of direction between the English and French Catholic affiliates. Excepting the item GOV'T ENSURE ADEQUATE HOUSING, the English Catholic and French Catholic show opposite direction of deviation from the mean, with the French Catholic tending toward stronger than average disagreement on: OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING (-.23), RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG (-.10), MORE TAXES FOR RICH (-.37), GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED (-.09), and, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS (-.27). On the other hand, the English Catholic, on these same items, display substantial deviations from the mean toward agreement, suggesting that English Catholics have a higher level of agreement with state intervention in social and economic matters than do French Catholics. This same trend is observed for the item GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED, where the French Catholics exhibit a large above mean agreement (.32) and the English Catholic a strong level of disagreement (-.19).

Apart from English and French Catholic divergence on social and economic inequality issues, another affiliate

type displaying substantial deviation from the mean on five of seven indicators is the Protestant NonMainline. Succinctly, the Protestant NonMainline display above average disagreement with GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING (-.10), GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED (-.26), and, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS (-.15). However, the Protestant NonMainline also indicate an above average level of agreement on RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG (.08) and MORE TAXES FOR RICH (.21). What is interesting about the results for this affiliate group is the lack of a pattern showing consistency along a state interventionist dimension, as noted previously for the English and French Catholics. A final aspect of the affiliation distribution on items of a social and economic nature that warrants notation, is the agreement with OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING (.11) and GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS (.11) for the Other religion category, along with their strong disagreement with RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG (-.23).

Findings for the items constituting the moral issue battery, presented in Table 27 by affiliate type, are substantively revealing. If the Protestant NonMainline lacked a uniform pattern for the social and economic inequality items, the same cannot be claimed for the moral items. The Protestant NonMainline agreement with SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (.12) and CENSOR PORN (.29), coupled with large deviations toward strong disagreement on

ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (-.80) and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS (-.54), defines the conservative moral pole of a conservative/liberal moral continuum. Conversely, those lacking any religious affiliation define the liberal end of the moral spectrum, exhibiting huge deviations from the mean in a direction opposite to that displayed by the Protestant NonMainline. Interestingly, on the moral items, it is the French Catholic that display the greatest inconsistency on the conservative/liberal moral continuum, with above average disagreement on support for the capital punishment of murderers (-.21), censorship of pornographic literature (-.19), abortion as a decision of the pregnant woman (-.13), and, permitting homosexuals to teach in schools (-.10). However, for the English Catholic affiliate category, a conservative moral consistency is displayed as respondents indicate disagreement with ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (-.24) and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS (-.05), and, above average agreement with SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (.04) and CENSOR PORN (.15). The United Church of Canada and Protestant Conservative Mainline affiliates, both tend toward an above average agreement on all moral indicators, excepting CENSOR PORN for the Conservative Mainline (-.05), indicating a lack of consistent direction on a conservative/liberal moral spectrum. Finally, the Other religion category exhibits the exact pattern of the Protestant NonMainline, displaying large deviations

consistent with a conservative moral stance.

Attending to the remaining items, substantial deviations are displayed for specific religious affiliate types. On the two labour items, OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES and OPPOSE HIRING SCABS, the Religious None category affirms the strongest pro-labour position, showing greater than average disagreement on the first item (-.37) and above average agreement on the second (.13). Demonstrating consistency with an anti-labour position, that is, above average agreement with opposition to public sector strikes and disagreement with opposition to hiring scabs during a strike, are: United (.21/- .33), Conservative Mainline (.06/- .16), and, Other (.23/- .35) affiliate types. The French Catholic display the highest agreement with the OPPOSE HIRING SCABS item (.31), of any of the affiliate categories.

Finally, the two items dealing with defense also confirm the research proposition. The French Catholic and Religious None lead the way in disagreement to INCREASE NATO SUPPORT and SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, while the three Protestant affiliate categories show large deviations toward agreement on INCREASE NATO SUPPORT. Moreover, the Protestant Conservative Mainline and Protestant NonMainline, also, exhibit substantial above mean deviations toward strong agreement with SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

7.2.1.3 Proposition Three

A comparison of the left and right-hand panels in Table 27, reveals unqualified support for the research proposition, that:

The religious preference dimension in its refined form of specific affiliate types, will show greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

Achieving an acceptable level of significance on every political issue, including all seven social and economic inequality items, the refined religious preference measure is clearly a better predictor than a simple no preference/preference dichotomy. It is apparent from the variation within the affiliate category that substantial differences in magnitude and direction are concealed, when all affiliates are lumped into a single category. Even where both preference measures display significance, that is, the moral and other items, the strongest betas are, without exception, those that pertain to the more specific affiliate variable. Hence, while the absence of a religious preference yields significant deviations from the mean, defined by religious affiliate scores, the decomposition of the affiliate category into more homogeneous groupings, coupled with the Religious None category, is the best predictor of political issue responses.

7.2.2 Religious Reference Dimension

Moving to the reference dimension of the religious

factor, operationalized by attendance at religious group meetings, three propositions concerning the effect of this dimension on attitudes toward specific political issues are here considered.

7.2.2.1 Proposition One

Beginning with the research proposition that:

Those attending religious group meetings
will differ significantly from those who do
not;

the left-hand panel of Table 28 presents findings that demonstrate qualified support (See Appendix B, Table 28).

On the two social and economic inequality items that achieve significance: RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG ($p=.037$) and GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.018$), it is the never attenders who are inclined to the strongest agreement. This reflects a slight tendency, on significant items, towards support for state interventionist policies. However, the differences are minimal between the never attenders and attenders, even when significant (.12 and .13). Overall, the research proposition receives scant support on social and economic indicators.

Three of four moral issue items demonstrate acceptable levels of significance for the never attend/attend dichotomy. CENSOR PORN, ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS, show that those never attending religious group meetings are directionally

opposite from those who do. Nonattenders are consistently more liberal, disagreeing with the censorship of porn (-.26), and tending toward strong agreement with abortion as a pregnant woman's decision (.58) and permitting homosexuals to teach school (.51). The research proposition of significant difference between never attenders and attenders is, generally, confirmed for the moral issue battery.

Only two of four miscellaneous items achieve significance for the dichotomous reference measure, OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES ($p=.029$) and INCREASE NATO SUPPORT ($p=.001$). In each instance, the direction is for the never attend category to tend toward strong disagreement. Taken together, the significant and nonsignificant items do display uniformity of direction for both never attender and attender categories, the never attenders being more pro-labour and anti-military than the religious group attenders. However, support for the research proposition is statistically limited to the two significant items.

7.2.2.2 Proposition Two

An inspection of the right-hand panel in Table 28, enables evaluation of the second reference proposition, that:

The refining of religious group attendance into levels will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels.

Little support for this proposition is found for

the items on social and economic inequality. Only one of seven items displays the acceptable level of significance, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.000$). However, the relationship on this item is one of general linearity, as increases in religious reference group attendance correspond to increases in disagreement with the policy that government should increase employment opportunities for women.

The distribution of religious group attendance on issues of a moral nature, generates support for the research proposition. Each of the four items achieves significance, and, three of four - CENSOR PORN, ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT, and, PERMIT GAY TEACHERS, demonstrate a general linear pattern. Substantively, the pattern indicates that increased religious group attendance results in deviations toward a more conservative moral position, that is, agreement with censorship, disagreement with abortion as a woman's right, and, disagreement with allowing homosexuals to teach school.

Finally, on the Other policy items, two of four, OPPOSE HIRING SCABS ($p=.021$) and INCREASE NATO SUPPORT ($p=.008$), are significant. The first item, OPPOSE HIRING SCABS, exhibits the never attenders as defining the highest level of agreement (.12) and the weekly attenders the lowest agreement level (-.13). Findings for INCREASE NATO SUPPORT reveal that the never attenders are highest in

deviation toward disagreement and yearly attenders are highest in level of agreement. Only a minimum level of support is indicated for the research proposition on the miscellaneous items, and, overall, strong support is limited to moral policy items.

7.2.2.3 Proposition Three

A comparative analysis of the significant items and betas in the two panels of Table 28, enables evaluation of the proposition, that:

The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

Essentially, support for the research proposition is limited to the battery of moral indicators. All four items demonstrate significance for the refined reference measure, compared to three of four for the never attend/attend dichotomy. Furthermore, when an item is significant for both religious reference group measures, it is the refined measure that shows the largest beta. On the other two sets of political issues, the refined attendance measure does not fare well, showing significance on only one of seven social and economic inequality items, and two of four miscellaneous items. This compares to the dichotomous measure that achieves significance on three of seven inequality items and two of four other items. Hence, there is no support for the research proposition on these

policy matters, and, overall, support is restricted to the moral items.

7.2.3 Religious Deference Dimension

Ten research propositions pertaining to religious deference, as defined by either a singular measure of self-perceived religiosity or two value-additive indices, are considered in this section. The first four propositions examine the value of subjective religiosity to the assessment of political issues. The remainder of the propositions deal with various aspects pertaining to two value-additive religiosity indices.

7.2.3.1 Proposition One

The first research proposition, employing the subjective religiosity measure, states that:

Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not.

Evaluation of this proposition proceeds from an inspection of the data presented in the left-hand panel of Table 29 (See Appendix B, Table 29).

Clearly, support for the proposition is meagre among the social and economic inequality policy issues. Only GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.007$) displays acceptable significance, as those with a low subjective religious identity are slightly more likely to agree (.09), than those with high self-perceived religiosity (-.04).

Only on the moral items is significant support for

the proposition found. Three of four items show significance at .000, reflecting in the deviations from the mean strong disagreement with pornography censorship (-.27) and strong agreement with ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (.55) and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS (.30) for the low religiosity category. Conversely, high religiosity respondents are in disagreement with abortion as a woman's right (-.24) and permitting gay teachers (-.13), and in agreement with censorship of pornography (.12).

Finally, with none of the items in the Other category showing significance, the research proposition is limited in appropriateness to items of a moral nature.

6.2.3.2 Proposition Two

Evaluation of the second deference proposition, that:

The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels;

is facilitated through the findings displayed in the right-hand panel of Table 29.

The social and economic inequality battery, reveals that only one item, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.000$) is significant. However, a second item, OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING ($p=.052$), nears significance, and like the variable GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS, displays a pattern of findings that is linear. For these two items, the not very religious are found as most agreeable to opposing extra billing by

doctors (.07) and supporting government policy to increase employment opportunities for women (.10). The respondents with a very religious self-perception have the strongest disagreement with these two items, $-.09$ and $-.26$ respectively. Despite these two substantively interesting findings, the proposition is not confirmed overall for the social and inequality items.

Unqualified support for the research proposition of significant variation across levels of religiosity is offered by the four moral items. Each achieves significance and three of the four display a general linear pattern. The only exception to the general tendency of increasing moral conservatism corresponding with increased strength of subjective religiosity, is the SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT item. On this item, the very religious are seen to have the strongest amount of disagreement ($-.16$), while the fairly and not very religious are slightly above average in agreement.

Of the other items, only OPPOSE HIRING SCABS is significant (.026) and the largest deviation is observed for the very religious respondents ($-.16$), the category most likely to disagree. Overall, support is scarce for the research proposition in the miscellaneous issue category, as is it in the social and economic inequality battery. Therefore, support for the proposition is restricted to moral issues.

7.2.3.3 Proposition Three

Results displayed in the two panels of Table 29, offer qualified support for the proposition that:

The religious deference dimension in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high deference dichotomy.

Generally, the applicability of the above proposition is limited to the moral policy items. All four achieve significance for the refined deference measure, compared to three of four for the deference dichotomy. Furthermore, the beta coefficients on all four items are largest for the deference measure most sensitive to degree of religiosity. In addition, this same measure does achieve significance on two other items, where the dichotomy fails to do so.

7.2.3.4 Proposition Four

Table 30 (See Appendix B, Table 30) presents findings that enables evaluation of the proposition, that:

When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference or reference dimensions.

This proposition is not confirmed by the results presented in Table 30, as significance is achieved on only four political issues for the deference measure (identity),

compared to six items for the preference dichotomy and three for the reference group attendance dichotomy. However, on three of the four items significant for the self-perceived religious identity dichotomy - OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING, CENSOR PORN and ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT, the deference measure does display the highest beta coefficient, after controls for the other religious measures and seven background variables.

7.2.3.5 Proposition Five

Turning to the multi-dimensional religious indices, the first research proposition to be assessed from the findings presented in Table 31 (See Appendix B, Table 31), states that:

A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

The results appropriate to this proposition are displayed in the left-hand panel of Table 31.

The proposition does not fare well for policy items pertaining to social and economic inequality. Indeed, only one of seven, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.017$), is significant, and on this item the high religiosity respondents show a below the mean level of agreement ($-.05$), while all other categories tend toward greater than average agreement.

Continuing the trend established when each

dichotomous religious measure was considered separately, the value-additive religiosity index shows strong support for the research proposition on the moral policy items. All four items have a .000 level of significance and three of the four demonstrate a general pattern of linearity. Directionally, the moral items: CENSOR PORN, ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS, reveal that increases in moral conservatism correspond to increases in religiosity. Hence, it is the low religiosity category that displays strongest disagreement with pornography censorship (-.43) and strongest agreement with a woman's right to abortion (.85) and allowing homosexuals to teach school (.80). Conversely, the highly religious exhibit greatest agreement with censorship (.15), and greatest disagreement with abortion as a woman's decision (-.32) and permitting gay teachers (-.17). Interestingly, the two mid-level religiosity categories fall to the direction from the mean displayed by the low religiosity respondents, on all three items. Therefore, those in the sample who give evidence of religious preference, religious group attendance and religious identity, stand apart on moral items from those with a total or partial absence of the religious dimensions. The only item that does not follow suit is SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, wherein the findings show the two dimensional religious category as having above the grand mean agreement (.19), and all others are slightly

below the mean, or, in the case of the low religiosity respondents, substantially tending toward disagreement (-.37).

Mixed support for the research proposition of significant variation in the value-additive index is found in the Other issue category. Two of four items, OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES ($p=.001$) and INCREASE NATO SUPPORT ($p=.004$), are statistically significant. The NATO item demonstrates a linear pattern, with the low religiosity respondents disagreeing (-.40) and the high religiosity category showing above average agreement with increased support (.05). The item OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES, displays a substantial deviation toward disagreement for the low religiosity (-.36) and one dimensional category (-.22), whereas, the two-dimensional (.06) and highly religious respondents (.04) have a slight above the mean deviation toward agreement.

Overall, the research proposition receives a mixed review, as support is sparse on social and economic matters, mixed on miscellaneous issues, and strong on the moral policy items.

7.2.3.6 Proposition Six

The research proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity;

is assessed through an inspection of the right-hand panel of Table 31.

With only two of seven items achieving significance in the social and economic inequality battery, RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG ($p=.013$) and GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS ($p=.000$), support for the proposition is scant. Substantively, these two items reveal that the highly religious are in greatest disagreement, while it is the response category scoring three on the religiosity index who are in strongest agreement that the gap between rich and poor is too great in Canada (.09), and, the low religiosity respondents who most strongly favour government intervention in increasing employment opportunities for women (.17).

Findings on the policy issues of a moral nature, demonstrate overwhelming support for the research proposition of significant variation across the degrees of religiosity. All four moral issues show significance at the .000 level and three of the four have a general linear pattern across the five categories of the value-additive index. The CENSOR PORN, ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT, and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS items, exhibit an association of increased moral conservatism as degree of religious identity anchorage strengthens. It is not only the direction of the deviations from the grand mean that are interesting, but the magnitude as well. For the CENSOR PORN item, the net

difference between the lowest degree of religiosity (-.36) and the highest (.43) is .75 of one unit on the likert scale, indeed, a substantial difference. However, the difference for CENSOR PORN pales in the light of the difference exhibited for ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT. On the abortion item, the low religiosity category has a deviation toward agreement of .76, while the high religiosity respondents have a deviation from the mean toward disagreement of -1.22. Hence, the net difference between the low and high categories of religiosity is almost two full scale units (1.98). This is the largest difference of any variable, including the social controls, for any one dependent item in this entire study. Moreover, the tendency toward large magnitudes of deviation between low and high religiosity categories is also displayed for the PERMIT GAY TEACHERS item, wherein, the net difference is 1.29 scale units. The only item that does not follow suit in the moral battery is the item SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Interestingly, for the capital punishment issue the relationship between religiosity and extent of agreement is curvilinear, as the low (-.28) and high religiosity (-.17) categories exhibit strongest disagreement.

Finally, the Other category of political issues, displays mixed support for the general proposition. Both of the labour issues are found to be significant, as the

low religious respondents exhibit the highest level of disagreement with denying government employees the right to strike (-.20) and the high religious category with barring management from hiring workers to replace strikers (-.25).

7.2.3.7 Proposition Seven

A simultaneous inspection of the two panels displayed in Table 31, facilitates assessment of the proposition that:

The value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor, than the index of religious dichotomies.

Support for this proposition is, primarily, limited to the moral battery of political issues. Although, each index is seen to be significant on all moral items, the refined deference index consistently displays the highest beta coefficients.

Apart from the moral items, evidence for the proposition is scant, although, the index of two trichotomies does achieve significance on two of seven items for the social and economic issues, compared to one of seven for the index of three dichotomies. Also, where both show significance on the same item, GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS, it is the more refined index that displays the largest beta. Basically, the Other political issue category, does not support the proposition.

7.2.3.8 Proposition Eight

Finding evidence of a strong relationship between degree of religious deference and moral conservatism in the previous sections, the issue arises as to whether this relationship is spread across all religious affiliate types, or is specific to certain types. Table 32 (See Appendix B, Table 32) provides findings to evaluate the proposition that:

The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of the refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type.

Significant variation within religious preference types is confirmed for at least five of seven social and economic inequality items. With the exception of GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED and GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED, at least one affiliate type per item shows a significant association between degree of religiosity and level of agreement or disagreement. The most interesting of the seven social and economic items is the one pertaining to government policy to increase employment opportunities for women. On this item, a significant association is observed for French Catholic ($r = -.1413$), Protestant NonMainline ($r = -.2539$), and, Other religion ($r = -.2281$) respondents. The direction of association is that increased religiosity correlates with increased disagreement for GOVT INCREASE

WOMEN'S JOBS.

Once again, it is the moral policy indicators that prove most interesting to the evaluation of the research proposition. For two items, CENSOR PORN and ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT, all of the religious affiliate types proper (not Religious None), achieve significant associations in a uniform direction. While this might be interpreted as lack of support for the proposition of variation between types, the differences in magnitude of association confirm the proposition. On the CENSOR PORN variable, the entire sample exhibits a significant correlation between degree of religiosity and agreement with censorship ($r=.2444$). Three affiliate types display stronger significant correlations: Other ($r=.4567$), Protestant NonMainline ($r=.2647$) and French Catholic ($r=.2663$); while three types display weaker associations: English Catholic ($r=.1972$), United ($r=.1881$) and Protestant Conservative Mainline ($r=.2340$). Similarly, on the ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT item, two preference types, Other ($r=-.5017$) and Protestant NonMainline ($r=-.4643$), display correlation coefficients stronger than that of the entire sample ($r=-.3463$), while the other four affiliate categories show weaker associations. For the PERMIT GAY TEACHERS item, only one, the United Church, does not display a significant level of association. Of those affiliate types that are significant, two have a stronger association between degree of religiosity and level of

agreement, Other ($r = -.3471$) and French Catholic ($r = -.2439$), than that displayed for the entire sample ($r = -.2339$). The other religious types display weaker association levels. Finally, with four of six religious affiliate types displaying significance on SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, variation by religious type is also confirmed on this item.

The Other category of political issues also marshalls some support for the research proposition, as at least one affiliate type shows a significant correlation between degree of religiosity and level of agreement on three of four items.

Generally, the research proposition is confirmed. Despite a clear association between degree of religiosity and moral conservatism on moral items for all religious affiliate types, the magnitude of the association is seen to vary considerably.

7.2.3.9 Proposition Nine

With confirmation of variation by religious preference type established, a remaining issue is whether:

When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

Generally, this research proposition is rejected by the findings displayed in Table 33 (See Appendix B, Table 33). On the seven items of social and economic inequality,

the religious preference measure is significant on all seven, compared to two for the deference index. However, some support for the proposition is found in the moral battery of political issues, as all four items are significant for the deference index, compared to three of four for the refined preference group measure. Moreover, on the three items where both religious measures achieve significance, the deference index displays a substantially larger beta coefficient. Hence, the research proposition does hold for the moral items.

The miscellaneous policy items do not provide support for the proposition, as all four are highly significant for the religious preference variable (.000), and only one is significant for the deference index. On the one item showing significance for both religious preference and the deference index, OPPOSE HIRING SCABS, the beta is substantially larger for the preference dimension.

7.2.3.10 Proposition Ten

Evaluation of the final research proposition, that:

Relative to other social background variables, the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure will show significant predictive strength;

is facilitated by the findings presented in Table 34 (See Appendix B, Table 34).

Overall, the religious preference measure composed of seven affiliate types, shows significance for all political issues, a feat unreplicated by any of the social background variables. By itself, this fact demonstrates the valence of the religious factor to the explanation of political policy issue responses, pointing to the importance of a preference measure attuned to the variation that exists among the religious affiliates. Other measures of religion, after controls for the seven background variables, are also important to political policy issues, but, primarily, only those with an overt moral dimension.

The actual effect for the religious factor, relative to the social background variables, can be determined through a comparison of the beta coefficients, on an item by item basis. A quick overview of the seven social and economic inequality indicators, reveals that religious preference proves to be the single strongest predictor for OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING (.12), GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED (.14) and GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS (.14). Additionally, religious preference shares the largest beta for two other items. On the issue of MORE TAXES FOR RICH, both religious preference and region display beta coefficients of .16, with Quebec exhibiting greatest disagreement (-.34) and Ontario strongest agreement (.16). For the GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED policy item, the religious preference measure ties the education

variable for the largest beta (.09). Education is seen to display a linear pattern for this item, as it does for all social and economic matters, with increased education corresponding to less government intervention. On the two items where religious preference does not hold or share the number one rank, either region or education assumes this position. The GOV'T ENSURE ADEQUATE HOUSING variable shows religious preference (.08) trailing region (.16), age (.14), education (.12) and community size (.09). The other item, RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG, indicates that education is the strongest predictor (.19), followed by community size (.10) and religious preference (.08).

Concerning the policy items involving an apparent moral dimension, the value-additive religious deference index proves to be the best predictor of the ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT and PERMIT GAY TEACHERS respondent scores. On the abortion issue, the deference index (.40) is followed by region (.16), size of community respondent grew up in (.07) and gender (.07). Regionally, it is Quebec that exhibits strongest agreement (.37), and the Maritimes (-.29) and B.C. (-.25) greatest disagreement with abortion as a woman's decision. Also, respondents who grew up in a rural community (-.17) and males (-.11) display stronger disagreement with the abortion item. For the item, PERMIT GAY TEACHERS, the religious deference index (.21) leads gender (.15), age (.15), education (.14),

community size (.11) and organizational involvement (.08). Most likely to show below the mean deviations toward disagreement with allowing homosexual teachers are: males (-.24), those 65 years of age and over (-.46), respondents with an elementary education (-.29), rural residents (-.22), and those with no activity in voluntary associations (-.14).

The largest betas for the two moral items, where the deference index is not the strongest predictor, SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT and CENSOR PORN, belong to education and gender, respectively. On the capital punishment matter, education (.23) is followed by: the religious deference index (.12), size of community respondent grew up in (.07), organizational involvement (.07), and region (.06). In terms of direction, disagreement with capital punishment increases with education and being raised in the suburbs(-.29), while agreement corresponds to no voluntary organizational involvement (.09) and residing in the Prairie region (.15). For the CENSOR PORN item, gender (.23) is the best predictor, outdistancing: age (.21), religious deference (.18), region (.09), size of community respondent grew up in (.07) and education (.06). A profile of disagreement with pornography censorship shows strongest levels for: males (-.32), age 30 and under (-.37), Quebecers (-.20), growing up in the city (-.11) and a university education (-.10).

On the final set of political issues comprising the Other category, religious preference is observed to share the largest beta for the OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES and OPPOSE HIRING SCABS items. In the case of opposition to strikes by government employees, religious preference (.11) and age (.11) outdistance region (.10), community size (.07) and organizational involvement (.07). Those tending to higher than average agreement with opposing public sector strikes are those: 65 years of age and over (.34), rural (.12), residing in Quebec (.22) and organizationally uninvolved (.10). For the OPPOSE HIRING SCAB item, religious preference (.14) and region (.14) lead age (.07) and education (.06), in beta strength. Substantively, it is respondents living in the Prairies (-.34) or B.C. (-.25), those aged 65 and over (-.27) and those with a technical (-.12) or university (-.10) education, that demonstrate strongest agreement with hiring replacement workers. For the remaining items dealing with matters of defense, religious preference (.22) trails only region (.26) on the INCREASE NATO SUPPORT ITEM, and region (.14) and age (.13) for the U.S. SUPPORT NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY policy matter.

Considered as a whole or as separate items, the political policy matters provide convincing support for the research proposition. Indeed, religion has proven to be a valuable predictor of political issues, after controls for

seven social background variables, and relative to the independent effects of these variables.

7.3 DISCUSSION

In the finding section, specific results were presented with regard to the effect of religious dimensions on attitudes toward political policy issues. The focus of the present section is to relate the general data trends to the conceptual model and provide a substantive elaboration based on religious identity anchorage. Again, we proceed according to the three dimensions of the religious factor.

7.3.1 Preference Dimension

At the lowest level of religious identity anchorage, that is, the absence or presence of a nominal religious affiliation, it is assumed that a comparative function may be invoked by the religiously affiliated in the assessment of political issues. This potential source of identity, not found in the repertoire of the unaffiliated, is seen to be of explanatory value on moral, labour and military issues, but not for matters of social and economic inequality. That those who do not express a religious affiliation are consistently more: morally liberal, pro-labour and anti-militaristic than those with a religious affiliation, after controls for other potential identity sources, indicates that the absence or presence of a nominal religious preference is an important social-

psychological variable. Apparently, religious identity measured in this manner, does have a conservatizing effect on the structuring of certain attitudes.

The general impression from the absence/presence preference dichotomy for social and economic inequality items, is that a basic level of support for state interventionist measures is so pervasive in Canadian society, that religious identification makes no difference. However, an examination of the specific preference types dispels this notion, as the measure attuned to religious subcollectivity homogeneity proves significant on all political issues, including social and economic matters. Two revealing trends for the social and economic battery, are: divergence between English and French Catholic affiliates, as English Catholics tend to be consistently more inclined to state interventionism than French Catholics; and, inconsistency of direction for the Protestant NonMainline. In the latter instance, inconsistency in attitude structure on the state intervention dimension may indicate the operation of some other assessment factor, employed for issue evaluation by Protestant sectarian groups.

Evaluated on a conservative/liberal moral continuum, the battery of moral items clearly displays consistency in the attitude structures of the: Religious None, English Catholic, Protestant NonMainline and Other

religion affiliates. For the latter three a pronounced moral conservatism on all items is discernible, while the Religious None display a consistent pattern of moral liberalism. Interestingly, it is the religious affiliate type most prone to emphasize the conversion of ego and expound a literalist interpretation of the biblical record, that is, the Protestant NonMainline, who exhibit the greatest moral conservatism. Clearly, a more totalistic involvement of personality in a religious preference type, may entail a greater homogeneity in one's political attitude structure, at least on items of morality. However, that above average liberalism is shown by the Protestant Mainline and the United Church affiliates toward matters of abortion and gay teachers, and the greater liberalism on capital punishment and pornography by French Catholic affiliates, suggests that religious preference group identification does not invariably result in a morally conservative position. Nevertheless, a comparison of the morally liberal religious preference groups to the unaffiliated, reveals that generally they do not come near the degree of liberalism exhibited by the secular respondents. As anticipated from the conceptual model, a more discriminating religious preference measure than a simple absence/presence dichotomy, does yield significant and substantial divergence among the religiously affiliated.

The pattern of findings for the refined religious preference measure on labour issues, also confirms the variation that exists by specific affiliate types. The general consistency of the two largest Protestant types, United and Conservative Mainline, toward an anti-labour position, compared to the English Catholic pro-labour direction, suggests that differences may be attributable to religious preference.

7.3.2 Reference Dimension

The religious reference dimension, as defined by religious group attendance, is, theoretically, more central to the development of a religious identity than the presence or absence of a nominal religious affiliation. However, the findings generally indicate that a never attend/attend dichotomy is of little value to the explanation of political attitudes, apart from moral issues. As might be expected the greater moral liberalism of the never attenders than attenders, may be a function of the normative socialization provided by the religious group. The qualification of this normative direction to moral issues only, could indicate either a lack of political cues in religious meetings on matters pertaining to social and economic inequality, labour and defense, or else a general consensus in the overall attitude structure of Canadian society.

The findings for a more discrete measure of

religious group attendance, attuned to frequency, reveals essentially the same pattern as that noted for the dichotomous reference measure. This indicates a limiting condition to the applicability of the conceptual model, as only moral matters show significant variation by level of religious group attendance in a generally linear direction. That moral conservatism increases with level of reference group attendance for three of four items, indicates that regularity of exposure to a religious reference group does facilitate conservative moral attitude development and maintenance. Hence, it appears by implication, that religious institutions in Canadian society, presumably, in the face of secularization, are still effectively propounding distinct normative standards to those who attend regularly. However, as attendance decreases, moral liberalism advances.

7.3.3 Deference Dimension

Self-perceived religiosity as a single measure of religious deference, primarily shows significant variation on items of a moral nature in both its dichotomous and expanded form. If this measure in fact taps the notion of attitudinally deferring to religious group norms, then on the basis of the previous section we might expect applicability to be limited to the moral items. Indeed, we might also anticipate the findings for the expanded religiosity measure that display a generally linear pattern

for three of four moral concerns. Apparently, a moral conservative perspective function does correspond to the subjective identification of a religiously anchored personality. Moreover, when all three of the religious dichotomies are simultaneously included in the assessment of the moral items, it is the identity measure of self-perceived religiosity that proves to be significant on three of four, as well as being the strongest religious predictor of abortion and gay teacher attitudes. Therefore, the theoretical model, as assessed by individual dichotomous measures, has a utility for the explanation of moral policy items.

Central to the testing of the value-additive model is the assessment of effect for the two composite religious measures. The first incorporates three dichotomous religious variables and, according to the model, it is assumed that as degree of religiosity increases, the probability of securing one's identity in an organized religious perspective also advances. Similarly, the more refined value-additive model, embracing the extended reference and deference dimensions, is expected to demonstrate a general linearity on items significant to the religious identity. Apparently, the functioning of an organized religious perspective is limited to policy items specifically dealing with issues of morality. Both value-additive indices prove significant on the moral matters,

and further, display a general linear pattern for all moral items, excluding capital punishment.³ The composite indices clearly provide the most meaningful assessment of the effect of the religious factor, as advances in moral conservatism are associated with increases in religiosity. Moreover, the more refined of the two indices, does demonstrate the largest intercategory variation. Those who attend religious group meetings frequently and perceive themselves as very religious tend to have, by far, the strongest conservative attitudes.

When the deference index is pitted against the expanded religious preference measure, it is without qualification the strongest predictor of all moral items, indicating the uniformity of direction between increasing religiosity and advances in moral conservatism for every religious preference type. However, on all other items: social and economic, labour and defense; the religious preference measure assumes the role of the primary religious predictor. This informs us that the variation occurring by preference type is substantially larger than

³The capital punishment item is difficult to assess in terms of religious group beliefs, and in a sense, is not of the same dimension as the other moral items. Within the Christian tradition, attitudes may vary according to biblical interpretation. Those in favour of capital punishment cite the levitical law that if one takes the life of another human being, death of the murderer is required (Leviticus 24:17). However, others argue that the law of punishment is fulfilled in Christ, who exemplifies the law of love, and hence, rehabilitation of the guilty party is the God-honouring response.

that evidenced across levels of religiosity. Hence, the performance of a comparative function through nominal religious preference, serves as a contributing factor in the formation of political attitudes.

In conclusion, the religious factor more than holds its own in explaining the variance in the dependent political policy issues, when compared to seven social background variables. The religious preference measure is one of the most consistent predictors, showing significance on all political issues, and displaying or equalling the strongest predictive value on the majority of the non-moral policy items. Moreover, for two of four moral items, it is the religious deference index that proves to be the best predictor of all social background variables.

Chapter VIII

POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING

8.1 OPERATIONALIZATION

In previous chapters, respondent feelings toward the political process, forms of political participation, and, attitudes toward political issues, have been the primary focus. However, broader ideological orientations, such as, perception of power, class and left-right thinking, are also matters of the political life. Indeed, the pluralist version of elite theory argues that a variety of social, cultural and economic power groups are in competition with each other for control of specific policy areas (Mishler, 1979:9). The extent to which this is the actual case is immaterial to the perceptions that Canadians may hold of different groups, potentially, vying for political power. Moreover, the notion of left-right thinking, frequently used to define the political spectrum, may be an important dependent political dimension for assessing the significance of religion in Canadian political life. Finally, matters pertaining to class perception and conflict may also relate to religion, particularly, if religion functions as a conservatizing social force.

Items pertaining to the power of groups in Canadian society include a general perception of the number of groups believed to influence political decisions, and, more specifically, the extent of power exercised by individual groups. The first dimension, # OF POWER GROUPS, has a response format of one, two or three, or many groups.¹ The second dimension, EXTENT OF POWER, has been coded directionally from not enough (1), about right (2), to too much (3), and is utilized for evaluating respondent perceptions of: labour unions, federal government, large corporations, provincial government, newspapers, television, churches and schools.²

Three matters of social class have been selected from the election study data for analysis. The first item, SENSE BELONG, taps whether or not the respondents think of

¹Specifically, the item states: "People have different ideas about who has the most power in this country, who really has the greatest say in the important decisions about how Canada is run. Some people say there is only one group that has the most power; other people say, no, there are two or three different groups that have the most power; and still other people say, no, there are lots of different groups that have power. What do you think?" Missing data on this question due to "don't know" responses or refusals is 15%.

²Exact item wording is: "Some people say there are certain groups that have too much power in Canada and that other groups don't have enough power. What is your opinion? Do you think that the following groups of people have too much power, about the right amount of power, or not enough power?". Missing data for each group is: labour unions, 7%; federal government, 8%; large corporations, 10%; provincial government, 8%; newspapers, 11%; television, 10%; churches, 12%; and, school systems, 12%.

themselves as belonging to a social class. The categories of response are: no (0) and yes (1). The second issue, SUBJECTIVE LOCATION, combines responses, volunteered and forced, to the question: "Which of the following social classes would you say you were in?". This subjective class variable is distributed across the categories: low (1); working (2); middle (3); upper middle (4); and, upper (5).³ The final social class item, included in the analysis, reflects responses to the issue of whether class conflict is inevitable. Respondents indicating that classes can get along together, are considered as reflecting a "no" (0) to the issue of the inevitability of conflict, while those who affirm that there is bound to be conflict constitute the "yes" (1) category.⁴

The final battery of items, measure various aspects of left-right thinking. For the items: SELF-LOCATION; LIB. PARTY; P.C. PARTY; and N.D.P.; the scales move from left to right, "1" being most to the left and "7" most to the right. This original scale was collapsed into

³Only 49% volunteered an immediate response to the question of social class self-placement. Subsequently, the other respondents were asked: "Well, if you had to make a choice, which of these social classes would you say you were in?" When, the volunteered and forced responses are combined, only 5% remain in the missing category.

⁴The precise wording of this question is: "On the whole, do you think that there is bound to be conflict between different social classes, or do you think they can get along without any conflict?"

the three categories: leftist (1=1-3); centrist (2=4); and rightist (3=5-7). Responses to the question: "When you think of your own political opinions, where would you put yourself on this scale?", constitute the variable SELF-LOCATION. Subsequently, respondents were asked to place the federal Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties on the left-right scale.³ The final left-right thinking item, PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY, was computed with reference to a party placement ideal-type.⁴ Respondents recognizing that the New Democratic Party is left of the Liberal Party and that the Progressive Conservative Party is to the right of the Liberal Party, were determined to be consistent with the ideal-typical understanding (1). Those, however, who misplaced one or several of the parties on the left-right scale, were designated as inconsistent (0).

8.2 FINDINGS

Organized according to the three religious dimensions - preference, reference and deference - this

³The missing data for the left-right questions is very high and, therefore, results must be interpreted with caution. Specifically, missing data figures are: SELF-LOCATION, 41%; LIB. PARTY, 43%; P.C. PARTY, 44%; N.D.P., 45%; and, PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY, 47%.

⁴The ideal-typical party placement is considered to involve the perception of N.D.P, Liberal, and, Progressive Conservative, as moving from left to right on the placement scale. Only 43% of the sample showed consistency in this placement.

section evaluates sixteen research propositions derived from the conceptual model. Substantively, the focus is an empirical assessment of the association of religion to the political life aspects of power, class, and left-right thinking.

8.2.1 Religious Preference Dimension

The nominal religious preference dimension contains three empirical propositions. The first assesses the effect of a preference dichotomy, that is, the absence or presence of a religious affiliation, on the power, class and left-right dimension of the political life. Following this, the presence category is expanded into specific affiliate types, facilitating an evaluation across preference categories. Finally, we are interested in determining whether the dichotomous measure or the more refined affiliate type measure, is the best predictor of the dependent political life indicators.

8.2.1.1 Proposition One

Beginning with the proposition that:

Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not;

the findings presented in Table 35 (See Appendix B, Table 35) provide the basis of an empirical assessment for issues of power, class and left-right thinking.

The left-hand panel of Table 35 reveals that only

three of eight potential power groups have a significant difference between the unaffiliated and the religious affiliates. For two of the significant institutions: LAB. UNIONS ($p=.001$) and NEWSPAPERS ($p=.039$), the Religious None display below the mean deviations, indicating a perception of not enough power. However, on the item concerning the power of churches, the nonaffiliated exhibit a large above mean deviation (.30), yielding a net difference from the affiliate category of .33. Clearly, the nonaffiliates view churches as having too much power. With five of eight power groups and the item indicating the number of power groups not achieving significance at the .05 level, little support for the research proposition is garnered from matters of political power.

The proposition finds no support from items pertaining to social class, as none of the three are found to be significant. However, the left-right thinking dimension yields strong support, as four of five items show significant differences between the nonaffiliated and affiliated at the .05 level. According to the item measuring self-location on the left-right scale, the Religious None show a substantial deviation from the mean toward the political left (-.31). Interestingly, the None category perceives the P.C. PARTY to be right (.11) of the mean perception, while the N.D.P. are seen to reside considerably to the left (-.19). Overall, as indicated by

the item PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY, it is the Religious None who display above average cognizance of party placement with reference to left-right ideology.

8.2.1.2 Proposition Two

Findings displayed in the right-hand panel of Table 35 enable an evaluation of the research hypothesis that:

The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types will display significant variation between the types.

Indeed, this proposition is confirmed by the results, as all but two items, # OF POWER GROUPS and FED. GOV'T, achieve an acceptable level of statistical significance. For the seven significant items dealing with perceptions of group power, a number of substantively interesting findings are observed. First, for the French Catholic affiliate category, five institutions: labour unions (-.05), large corporations (-.15), provincial government (-.26), television (-.03), and, churches (-.13), show negative deviations toward not enough power, while schools (.08) and newspapers (.06) are perceived as having too much power. For the LARGE CORP. and PROV. GOVT items, the French Catholic sample has the strongest sense of not having enough power, while on these same issues the English Catholic tend to the opposite direction. On the item concerning the power of churches, the French Catholic place second in perceptions of too little power, overshadowed by the Protestant NonMainliners (-.21).

Interestingly, it is the United Church affiliates (.09) and Other category (.07), that share the perception of too much church power with the Religious None (.33). The Protestant NonMainline affiliate category is also seen to exhibit the largest deviations toward too much power for the cultural institutions of newspapers (.10) and television (.16).

Shifting to matters of social class, confirmation of the research proposition is observed for all three items. Substantively, it is the French Catholics who have the strongest sense of class belonging (.15) and highest subjective class location (.17). However, it is also the French Catholic category that is least likely to view class conflict as inevitable (-.18). On all three items, the French Catholic affiliate type diverges in direction from all other types. For SENSE BELONG, it is the Religious None (-.06), United (-.05) and Protestant Conservative Mainline (-.05), that exhibit the largest below the mean awareness of class belonging, while it is the Protestant NonMainline that demonstrate the lowest subjective class placement (-.12). Affiliates most likely to see class conflict as inevitable are the Religious None (.07), United (.07) and English Catholic (.07).

The left-right thinking variables all show acceptable significance levels and provide verification of the research proposition. Obviously, it is the Religious None who are most leftist (-.30) on the political spectrum,

while the Conservative Mainline (.09) and Other religion affiliates (.12) are farthest to the right. Greatest variation on the placement of the Liberal Party on a left-right dimension occurs between the French Catholic (.14), who tend to view the Liberals as rightist, and the Protestant Conservative Mainline (-.15) who perceive the Liberal Party as left-leaning. The findings pertaining to perceptions of the Progressive Conservative Party, shows that the Religious None (.13) and Protestant NonMainline (.11) view it as more rightist than average Canadians, while the French Catholics place it more to the left (-.13). Interestingly, the French Catholics display the largest deviation to the right of average for the N.D.P, while the Religious None place them furthest to the left (-.21). The large deviations from the grand mean for the French Catholics and Religious None are captured in the party placement consistency measure, wherein, the French Catholic show the lowest degree of consistency with ideal-typical party placement (-.20) and the Religious None exhibit above average placement ability (.17).

8.2.1.3 Proposition Three

A comparative examination of the two panels presented in Table 35, demonstrates strong support for the research proposition that:

The religious preference dimension, in its refined form of specific affiliate types, will show greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

Not only does the refined affiliate measure demonstrate significance on fifteen of seventeen items, compared to seven for the dichotomous preference variable, but on all items, excepting one where both achieve significance, the refined preference measure shows substantially larger betas. For the one left-right item SELF-LOCATION, both preference measures display a beta of .15. Plainly, an examination of the variance among religious affiliate types, demonstrates that many of the noneffects for the dichotomous variable can be attributed to the concealment of affiliation differences that results from collapsing them into a simple presence of affiliation category. Greatest predictive strength results when preference types are attended to, and hence, the research proposition finds robust support.

8.2.2 Religious Reference Dimension

Shifting focus to the reference dimension of religion, three propositions are examined with regard to indicators of power, class and left-right thinking. First, the effect of a never attend/attend religious group meeting dichotomy is considered, followed by an evaluation of the refined attendance measure that is attuned to attendance level. The final proposition facilitates a comparison of the reference group measure, in both forms, with view to determining the better predictor.

8.2.1.1 Proposition One

The findings presented in the left-hand panel of Table 36 (See Appendix B, Table 36), provide the necessary information to assess the research proposition, that:

Those attending religious group meetings will differ significantly from those who do not.

This proposition is not supported from the findings, as only two of nine variables dealing with group power, none of the aspects of social class and two of five left-right thinking items, show significance at the .05 level. Of the items that are significant, the power of CHURCHES ($p=.000$) and SELF-LOCATION on a left-right scale ($p=.000$), show the greatest magnitude of difference between never attender and attender categories. On the CHURCH item, as might be anticipated, never attenders perceive that churches have too much power (.24), while attenders are more inclined toward the view of not enough power (-.05). On the left-right SELF-LOCATION measure, never attenders are substantially more leftist (-.22) than attenders (.05).

8.2.1.2 Proposition Two

The proposition that:

The refining of religious group attendance into levels will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels;

is assessed via the results displayed in the right-hand

panel of Table 36.

A minimal level of support is found for the research proposition on matters of institutional power. Of the eight groups considered, four are found to be significant. One observation of interest on three of the power group items - LAB. UNIONS, FED. GOV'T and LARGE CORP. - is that in all three the weekly attender category is distinguished in its direction of deviation from the other responses. Substantively, the weekly attenders view labour unions as too powerful (.06), and federal government (-.05) and large corporations (-.06) as having too little power. On the fourth item, the power of CHURCHES, the association between frequency of attendance and perception of power is linear. As religious group attendance increases, so does the view that churches do not have enough power. The magnitude of difference between never attenders (.26) and weekly attenders (-.21) is .47, indeed, a substantial difference on a scale of three units.

Apart from the four power items, support is meagre for the research proposition on the social class and left-right thinking items. None of the social class matters show an acceptable level of significance and only two of five left-right thinking items meet the criterion of acceptance. The variation on the SELF-LOCATION item is interesting, in that, the never attender category exhibits the largest deviation to the left (-.22) and the weekly

attenders the largest deviation to the right (.14), while yearly and monthly attenders define the mean (.00).

8.2.2.3 Proposition Three

An inspection of the two panels in Table 36, provides assessment for the proposition that:

The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

With six of seventeen power, class, and, left-right thinking indicators showing significance for the refined attendance measure, compared to four for the dichotomous reference variable, only qualified support for the proposition is found. The power items FED. GOV'T and LARGE CORP. are the only two where the more discriminating religious group attendance measure achieves significance, while the never attend/attend dichotomy does not. However, on the two items where both measures are significant, LAB. UNIONS and CHURCHES, it is apparent that the collapsing of attenders into one category diminishes variation. This is reflected in the larger beta coefficients for the refined measure on both items, but is particularly pronounced for the power of churches. Also, the pattern of variation for the left-right SELF-LOCATION item, as reflected in the more refined attendance measure, is an important recognition obscured by the simple dichotomy.

8.2.3 Religious Deference Dimension

The religious deference dimension, constituted by either a single measure of self-perceived religiosity or two value-additive indices, is assessed in this section of findings. A total of ten research propositions, derived from the theoretical model, are here evaluated for the political matters of power, class and left-right thinking.

8.2.3.1 Proposition One

Our first proposition pertaining to the deference dimension is based on the single subjective religiosity measure. It states, that:

Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not.

The evaluation of this proposition proceeds from the findings presented in the left-hand panel of Table 37 (See Appendix B, Table 37).

Three of eight group power issues are found to achieve significance for the dichotomous measure of self-perceived religiosity. Two of these items, LAB. UNIONS ($p=.011$) and T.V. ($p=.030$), while statistically significant, are substantively uninteresting, demonstrating net category differences of only .06 and .04 respectively. However, the item pertaining to church power ($p=.000$) shows the low religiosity respondents to be substantially above the mean (.18) in viewing churches as having too much power, while the high religiosity category is considerably

below the mean (-.08), perceiving church power as being too little. Generally, support is scant for the research proposition from the power items.

Although, two of three social class items show acceptable significance, SUBJECTIVE LOCATION ($p=.033$) and CONFLICT INEVITABLE ($p=.004$), a net difference between low and high religiosity categories of .06, reflects a minimal effect for the dichotomous measure. Stronger effects are observed for the three significant left-right thinking variables. On the matter of self-location on the left-right spectrum, the low religiosity category is left of average (-.14), while the high category is to the right (.07). Also, the low religious identity respondents tend to view the N.D.P. to the left of the grand mean (-.06), but are more consistent (.08) than the highly religious identity category (-.04) in recognizing the location of all three federal political parties on the left-right spectrum.

Generally, there is slight support for the proposition of difference between low and high religiosity respondents. However, an inspection of the variation shows the support to be more statistical, than substantive.

8.2.3.2 Proposition Two

The second deference proposition states that:

The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels.

This research proposition is assessed from the findings in

the right-hand panel of Table 37.

Confirmation of this proposition is found for four of the eight institutional power items. On these items, the refined religiosity measure proves to be substantively revealing on three. In the case of large corporations ($p=.001$), it is the very religious respondents who deviate from the mean ($-.08$) toward too little power and cause significant variation. Furthermore, for the items T.V. ($p=.001$) and CHURCHES ($p=.000$), a generally linear pattern is displayed, that is, as the importance of religious identity increases, respondents perceive the power of television as too much and the power of churches as not enough.

On aspects of social class, two of three achieve significance for the refined deference measure, confirming the proposition. In both cases a linear pattern is observed, the very religious tending to place themselves higher in subjective class location (.07) than the fairly religious (.00) and not very religious ($-.04$) respondents. However, the not very religious are more inclined to see class conflict as inevitable (.04) than are the fairly (.00) and very religious ($-.06$).

The left-right thinking items reveal significance at the .05 level for the refined deference variable on three items: SELF-LOCATION ($p=.000$), N.D.P. ($p=.019$) and PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY ($p=.000$). Both SELF-LOCATION

and N.D.P. placement on the left-right scale, show that a linear pattern exists across degrees of religiosity. The not very religious are left of the mean (-.14) on the self-placement variable, while the very religious are almost an equal increment to the right (.17). Moreover, the placement of the N.D.P. is to the left of the average score for the not very religious category (-.07) and an equal amount to the right of the mean (.07) for the very religious. Finally, the not very religious have a slightly higher level of consistency in placing the three federal parties correctly on the left-right spectrum (.08), than do the fairly (-.04) and very religious (-.05).

Overall, items in each section of the findings do show some support for the research proposition, even though it is not comprehensive.

8.2.3.3 Proposition Three

An inspection of both panels in Table 37 enables the assessment of the proposition, that:

The religious deference dimension in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high dichotomy.

This proposition is not confirmed by the number of statistically significant items, as the refined deference measure attains significance on only one item, LARGE CORP., where the dichotomous measure does not. However, with slightly larger beta coefficients on six of the items

where both measures achieve significance, the refined variable of self-perceived religiosity does prove valuable. The linear relationships exposed in the refined measure for the six items, across degrees of religiosity, warrants confirmation of the proposition on a substantive basis.

8.2.3.4 Proposition Four

The research proposition that:

When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference or reference dimensions;

is assessed by the findings presented in Table 38 (See Appendix B, Table 38).

A count of the number of times each dichotomous variable attains significance, reveals that the religious preference dimension, overall, is the most significant predictor of power and left-right thinking. The preference dichotomy and attendance measure are significant on two of eight power group items, while identity or deference achieves significance on only one. However, on the CHURCHES power item where all three achieve significance after controls for each other, it is the deference measure of religious identity that displays the largest beta (.14). Moreover, this same measure is the only one to show an acceptable level of significance on any aspect of social class (CONFLICT INEVITABLE). Yet, it is clear that the

preference dimension is a better predictor of left-right thinking, in that, four of five items are observed to be significant, and on three of the four the preference measure has the largest beta coefficient. Only on PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY does the deference measure of identity (.10) outrank the preference dichotomy (.08). Hence, with the exception of three items: CHURCHES, CONFLICT INEVITABLE and PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY, the research proposition is not confirmed.

8.2.3.5 Proposition Five

Attending to the multi-dimensional deference indices, the left-hand panel of Table 39 (See Appendix B, Table 39) provides opportunity to assess the proposition, that:

A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

It is apparent from the findings presented in Table 39 that the research proposition is confirmed for only the social class and left-right thinking dimensions of political life. On the power items, only two of the eight dealing with extent of institutional power prove to be significant for the index of three dichotomies. The item reflecting perception of labour union power indicates that the two low religiosity categories tend to view labour unions as not having enough power, compared to the sample

mean (-.14/-.09). However, on the power item CHURCHES, a general linear relationship between degree of religiosity and perception of church power is exhibited, as the low religiosity respondents view church power as too great (.38) and the highly religious category reflect the outlook of church power being too little (-.10). The two middle categories on the church item both fall on the power too much side of the mean (.27/.11), but as religiosity increases this view decreases.

Two of the three social class items confirm the proposition of significant intercategory variation, however, the relationship is not linear. For SUBJECTIVE LOCATION ($p=.011$), the mid categories (1 and 2) show the greatest deviation from the mean, both tending to a lower than average class placement (-.09/-.05). On the matter of the inevitability of class conflict, the low religiosity category (.07) and two dimensional grouping (.04) display the largest mean deviations. Directionally, this indicates that these two categories are more likely to view class conflict as inevitable, than the one dimensional (-.01) and high religiosity respondents (-.02).

Regarding matters of left-right thinking, the deference index of dichotomies demonstrates a general linear pattern for the variable SELF-LOCATION ($p=.000$). The less the degree of religiosity displayed, the greater the deviation from the grand mean toward leftist political

thought. Only the highly religious respondents demonstrate a positive or rightist deviation (.09), reflecting a net difference from the low religiosity respondents (-.33) of .42. Interestingly, the low religiosity category displays the largest mean deviation on the two other significant items pertaining to specific parties, P.C. PARTY (.12) and N.D.P. (-.18). This indicates that the category most to the left on SELF-LOCATION, places the Progressive Conservatives farthest to the right of average and the New Democratic Party farthest to the left of the grand mean. Finally, the PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY item ($p=.000$) reveals a linear pattern, as the low religiosity category has an above average consistency score (.21) in placing the three federal parties on the left-right scale, while the high religiosity respondents are slight below average (-.04).

8.2.3.6 Proposition Six

An inspection of the right-hand side of Table 39, that is, the findings pertaining to the deference index of two trichotomies, enables assessment of the research proposition that:

A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity.

A minimum level of support for the proposition is found on items pertaining to extent of power, as four of

eight show an acceptable level of significance. Of the four significant power items, only one, CHURCHES ($p=.000$), exhibits a linear pattern of association between degree of religiosity and power perception. The net difference between the low religiosity respondents who perceive church power as too great (.31) and the high religiosity category that views church power as too little (-.27) is .58, a substantial difference on a three point item. The highly religious respondents also display deviations toward the views that: labour union power is too great (.06); power of large corporations is not enough (-.09); and, television has too much power (.05).

Two of three social class indicators, SUBJECTIVE LOCATION ($p=.000$) and CONFLICT INEVITABLE ($p=.013$), reveal significant variation between categories of religiosity. Substantively, it is the high religiosity level that shows the highest subjective class location (.08) and the lowest perception of class conflict as inevitable (-.06).

The items constituting the left-right thinking section of the findings, overall, do not support the research proposition. However, on two items, SELF-LOCATION ($p=.000$) and PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY ($p=.000$), significance is achieved. On the self-placement item a linear relationship is demonstrated, as the low religiosity level has the strongest leftist deviation (-.28) and the high religiosity category displays the largest rightist

deviation from the mean (.22). The middle category is seen to approximate the mean (-.01), while the levels of religiosity on the two sides, tend to opposite directions. For the PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY item, it is the low religiosity level that proves most able to identify the placement of the three federal parties on the left-right scale (.14), while it is the three dimensional religiosity respondents who show the largest deviation toward inconsistent identification (-.07).

Generally, support for the proposition of significant difference across the categories of religiosity receives a minimum level of confirmation, particularly, for the extent of group power items and matters pertaining to social class.

8.2.3.7 Proposition Seven

Comparison of the two panels displayed in Table 39, reveals virtually no support for the research proposition that:

The value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor than the index of religious dichotomies.

Table 39 indicates that both indices achieve significance on eight of seventeen variables, of which six are the same. On the six where both indices exhibit significant variation, for only one item - CHURCHES - is the difference between the beta coefficients above .02

(.24/.27). Clearly, the deference index comprised of the two refined measures does not prove to be a significantly better predictor than the index of the three religious dichotomies.

8.2.3.8 Proposition Eight

Desiring to evaluate the relative significance and strength of association between the composite deference index and the power, class and left-right political items within each religious affiliate group, we posit the research proposition, that:

The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type.

Assessment of the proposition is facilitated through inspection of the correlation coefficients displayed in Table 40. Significant variation and differing magnitudes of association are found in Table 40, providing general support for the research proposition (See Appendix B, Table 40).

On matters pertaining to power perceptions, only one of the religious affiliate types, that is, Other religions, exhibits a significant correlation for the # OF POWER GROUPS ITEM (-.1942). Interestingly, this is the only affiliate type, apart from the Religious None, that shows a negative correlation, indicating that as the

religious deference level increases there is a tendency to believe that fewer groups wield political power. On items concerning the extent of power that various institutions in Canadian society have, significant association between the deference index and power level is exhibited on all but two of the eight items, PROV. GOV'T and SCHOOLS. The power of labour unions item shows that while the association between the composite deference index and degree of power is significant for the entire sample (.0749), only two specific preference groups display significant correlations, the Protestant Conservative Mainline (.0977) and the Protestant NonMainline (.2169). Substantively, for these two affiliate types there is a slight association between increases in religiosity and perceiving labour union power as too much. For the matter of FED. GOV'T power, two affiliate types, French Catholic (-.1290) and Conservative Mainline (-.0967), manifest significant associations, as greater religiosity is seen to correlate with perceptions in the direction of not enough federal government power. On two group power items, LARGE CORP. and NEWSPAPERS, only one affiliate type shows a significant correlation for each. For LARGE CORP. it is the French Catholic affiliates that display a negative association between religiosity and perceptions of corporate power, whereas, for the power of NEWSPAPERS, the Protestant Conservative Mainline exhibit a positive

correlation. The two remaining significant items, T.V. and CHURCHES, show the largest number of affiliate types achieving significance. Indeed, for the power of CHURCHES variable, all preference groups exhibit a significant negative relationship between degree of deference and degree of church power. Interestingly, it is two of the Protestant groups, Conservative Mainline (-.2976) and NonMainline (-.3713), that show magnitudes of association above the correlation for the entire sample (-.2946). Clearly, as religiosity increases, the perception of church power being too much decreases, in all affiliate types. Finally, on the issue of the power of television, again, it is the Protestant NonMainline that exhibit the strongest association between increasing level of religiosity and the perception of television's power being too much (.2408). Only the French Catholic category is seen to display a negative association on the T.V. power item (-.0773).

On matters of left-right thinking, the research proposition is confirmed as, on all but P.C. PARTY placement, significant correlations are displayed for at least one item, but not by all affiliate types. For SELF-LOCATION, it is the English (.1624) and French Catholic (.2984) preference groups that exhibit significant positive correlations between increases in religiosity and increases in political right self-identification. Achieving significance on the association between religiosity and

Liberal Party placement, are the English Catholic (.0964) and Protestant NonMainline (-.2283). Apparently, those with highest religiosity among the Protestant NonMainline tend to view the Liberals as being further to the left, than do the lower religiosity respondents. However, for the placement of the N.D.P., it is the higher religiosity United Church affiliates that tend to view the N.D.P. as being more right leaning, than do those with lower religiosity.

Overall, the research proposition is confirmed, as in each battery of items the significance and magnitude of association between the value-additive deference index and specific political indicators varies considerably by religious preference type.

8.2.3.9 Proposition Nine

Having confirmed the existence of significant variation in the correlations between the deference index and the political items, by religious preference type, the outstanding issue is whether:

When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

This proposition is not confirmed by the results presented in Table 41 (See Appendix B, Table 41). After controlling for the composite religious deference index and

seven social background variables, the religious preference measure is significant on fifteen of seventeen items. However, the deference index, after controls for religious preference and the background variables, is significant on only six of the seventeen power, class and left-right thinking variables. Moreover, only on two of these six items where both achieve significance, CHURCHES and SELF-LOCATION, does the value-additive deference index display a higher beta than the refined preference measure.

8.2.3.10 Proposition Ten

Presented in Table 42 (See Appendix B, Table 42) are findings that enable the assessment of the final research proposition, that:

Relative to other social background variables, the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure, will show significant predictive strength.

General confirmation of the research proposition is provided in Table 42, as at least one religious measure displays significance on fifteen of seventeen items. On the two items where a religious measure does not achieve significance, # OF POWER GROUPS and FED. GOV'T, only two of the other seven social background variables prove significant. Of the remaining power items, the refined religious preference measure demonstrates the largest beta on the extent of power for large corporations (.15) and

provincial governments (.22), in each case, followed by the beta coefficients for region (.14/.12) and age (.10/.07). The age variable also proves to be the best predictor of the perception of power for SCHOOLS (.13) and NEWSPAPERS (.10), and, in the latter case, is equalled by the organizational involvement index (.10). Directionally, findings regarding the power of schools and newspapers for the age variable, show the thirty-nine and under respondents as seeing too little power, whereas, the age forty and over perceive each as having too much power. After age, it is the religious preference measure that displays the largest beta coefficient for SCHOOLS (.10) and NEWSPAPERS (.09). As might be anticipated the religious factor is the best predictor of attitudes toward the power of CHURCHES. In this instance, the religious deference index (.27) is seen to outdistance region (.12), age (.09) and community size (.06). It is of interest to note that there exists a general linear association between increasing regional Westernness and perceptions of church power being too much. Also, it is the CHURCHES item that displays the largest amount of explained variance by the variables in the analysis (11.3%), of any of the matters pertaining to extent of institutional power. Finally, it can be observed that religious preference (.09) is the third best predictor of scores on the T.V. power item, ranking behind education (.13) and region (.10).

For items of social class the research proposition is also confirmed, as the religious preference measure ranks second on SENSE BELONGING (.17), third on SUBJECTIVE LOCATION (.14), and first on explaining variance in CONFLICT INEVITABLE (.20). On the item tapping whether the respondent senses a class identification, the region variable is the best predictor (.21) with Quebec respondents affirming an above the mean sense of belonging to a class (.17), and all others a below the sample average. Regarding subjective class location, both education (.29) and region (.17) have higher betas than religious preference (.14). Clearly, it is the highly educated that show the greatest deviation toward higher social class placement (.34) than other education levels, and, also, it is the region of Quebec (.18) that leads all others in level of class placement. The items showing significance on the CONFLICT INEVITABLE item, behind the best predictor, religious preference (.20), are education (.15) and age (.14).

As a concluding consideration, the left-right thinking items garner support for the research proposition, as on three of the five items a measure of the religious factor exhibits betas equal to or larger than those displayed by the social background variables. For SELF-LOCATION on the left-right scale, the religious factor, operationalized by the two value-additive indices, show

betas of .18, trailed by region (.11), gender (.10) and education (.08). Substantively, it is the Western regions, males, and those with elementary or technical education, that show deviations toward the right. On the three party placement items: region has the strongest beta (.22) for LIB. PARTY, followed by religious preference (.12), gender (.08) and education (.08)); while, religious preference (.12) ties education (.12) on P.C. PARTY; and, education (.16) leads religious preference (.13) and region (.13) in predictive strength of N.D.P. placement. Lastly, religious preference is the best predictor (.22) of PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY, followed by region (.16), education (.16), community size (.14), age (.10) and gender (.09). Directionally, it is the university educated, those living in B.C., respondents residing in cities of over 500,000, the fifty and over age categories, and, males, who demonstrate highest cognitive awareness of federal party placement on the left-right spectrum.

8.3 DISCUSSION

Desiring to relate the general data trends on power, class and left-right thinking to the conceptual model from which the research propositions were derived, the discussion proceeds according to the three dimensions of religiosity - preference, reference and deference.

8.3.1 Preference Dimension

The religious preference dimension operationalized through affiliation, corresponds, according to the theoretical model, to the lowest level of religious identity anchorage. Presumably, the specification of a religious preference may serve a comparative function through which issues relevant to the religious identity can be evaluated. Accordingly, the findings for the preference variable that incorporates affiliation as either absent or present, demonstrates most relevance to left-right thinking, limited appropriateness to institutional power perceptions, and, virtually no connection to matters of social class.

On matters of left-right thinking, the Religious None clearly display a leftist orientation. Interestingly, the unaffiliated also perceive the Progressive Conservative Party as being further right than most Canadians, while the New Democratic Party is viewed as being left of the mean perception. Taken together, these findings tend to indicate that one's perception of self-location significantly influences beliefs regarding party ideology, that is, both the parties closest to and furthest from one's self-location will be perceived as more directionally separated, than average. Given the leftist self-placement of the Religious None, it is not surprising that labour unions are seen to have too little power,

compared to the perception of the affiliated category. Moreover, the Religious None have a strong above the mean sense of the church having too much power. Generally, then, it appears that a certain affinity exists between one's political ideological orientation, the absence/presence of a religious preference, and perceptions of labour union and church power.

The expanded preference measure, attending to the separation of affiliations into presumably homogeneous types, proves to be of considerably more value than the simple dichotomous measure. Here the significant variation by preference, obscured in the collapsing of all affiliations into one, is found to be substantively insightful. On matters of institutional power, the French Catholic, Protestant NonMainline and Religious None, exhibit substantial mean deviations. Where the French Catholic view large corporations and provincial government as possessing too little power, the Religious None perceive too great a power. However, for the cultural institutions, that is, newspapers and T.V., the Protestant NonMainliners display the largest deviations toward perceptions of too much power. Futhermore, it is the Protestant NonMainline and French Catholics that believe the power of churches is too limited, while, as noted previously, the unaffiliated view church power as too much. Generally, this pattern of findings tends to correspond with the notion, introduced in

an earlier chapter, that the French Catholics and Protestant NonMainline essentially reflect nondominant Canadian culture. The French Catholics may desire to strengthen the power of provincial government and large corporations to affirm political autonomy and economic independence. On the other hand, the Protestant NonMainline, in essence a distinct society of moral dimension, wish to limit the power of cultural industries that portray liberal morality as acceptable. Finally, the Religious None may also reflect an intellectual fundamentalism that is left-leaning, pro-labour and anti-church. The Religious None appear to be a group alienated from the dominant institutions, excepting labour unions and newspapers.

The greater leftist orientation of the religiously unaffiliated and their perceptions of political parties has already been documented. However, an additional aspect of the Religious None configuration is their above mean belief that class conflict is inevitable. This compares to the French Catholic, who are least prone to view class conflict as inevitable, indicating, perhaps, that the cultural cleavage of ethnicity and language group is a more powerful identification for the French Catholic, than that of class.

Interestingly, the French Catholic also tend to perceive themselves as slightly left and view the Liberal Party and N.D.P. as being considerably right of the sample average,

while the Conservatives are seen to be left of the mean. Hence, it appears that, perceptually, the French Catholic move the right party left (P.C.) and the left (N.D.P.) and the centre (Liberal) to the right, to accommodate their own slightly left self-location. Perhaps, this facilitates a cognitive consistency in French Catholic support of the Progressive Conservatives.

8.3.2 Reference Dimension

The religious reference dimension, measured by attendance at religious group meetings, is believed to correspond to the potential for normative socialization. Clearly, if the religious identity involves particular perceptions of social institutions, class and political ideology, then exposure to the communication of political cues in the context of the religious collectivity should be central to identity formation and maintenance.

It appears from the findings for the dichotomous reference measure that little significant difference exists between those who never attend religious services and those who attend yearly or more frequently. For the four variables where a substantial difference is demonstrated, the never attenders are found to perceive: the power of labour unions as too little, the power of churches as too much, reflect a left of the mean self-location, and an above average party placement consistency score. That the religious group attenders are more likely to perceive

church power as being too little and, also, demonstrate a politically rightward direction, becomes more meaningful when it is recognized that the pattern across attendance categories is generally linear. Hence, for the matter of church power, the more one attends a religious group, the more likely that too little power will be perceived. Indeed this is consonant with the theoretical model that posits the religious collectivity as a reference group. Those most frequently exposed to religious teaching come to view the group as in need of greater power to impress its norms and values on the larger society. Moreover, that a rightist orientation of weekly attenders contrasts to a mean position for monthly and yearly attenders, as well as a leftist direction for nonattenders, indicate that regularity of attendance is associated with ideological conservatism. Politically this may be expressed in the weekly attender category perceiving labour unions as too powerful, while federal government and large corporations are viewed as having too little power.

8.3.3 Deference Dimension

The religious deference dimension is operationalized with a single measure of self-perceived religiosity and two value-additive indices. The assumption concerning the single indicator is that those who perceive themselves as religious will reflect a greater potential for deference to religious group norms, leading

to an organized perspective that may include the political life.

Findings for the dichotomous deference measure, categorized into low and high, indicate that those respondents who do not view religion as very important to their life, tend to see the power of labour unions and television as being too little, while churches are seen as having too much power. Moreover, the low religiosity category: has a lower subjective class placement, tends to an above average view that class conflict is inevitable, and is more leftist in political orientation, than the high religiosity respondents. While the highly religious category does display slight deviations in the opposite direction on these variables, the full impact of the self-perceived religiosity measure is revealed when assessed in its extended form. Indeed, this was expected from the conceptual model. Particularly noteworthy are the findings showing that the very religious perceive church power as too limited, and, also, are situated furthest to the right on left-right ideological location. This tends to confirm an association between religious identity and right-wing political thought.

As a value-additive concept, religious deference is operationalized by two indices, the first embracing the dichotomous summation of all three religious dimensions, and the second incorporating the refined attendance and

self-perceived religiosity measures. Accordingly, both indices demonstrate a linear pattern for the power of churches and left-right self location items. This provides further verification for the intermeshing of religiosity with political ideology, as increases in rightward ideological placement correspond to increases in religiosity. Clearly, then, there is something about the anchoring of one's identity in a religious perspective that serves to conservatize ideological location. Perhaps, it is a shared perception by the highly religious that the left perceive the power of churches as too great and, therefore, represent a threat to the relative standing of the religious reference group in the social order. Moreover, this rightist ideology is seen to transfer to two significant items of institutional power perception, labour unions and large corporations. Indeed, if there is any formal vestige of class conflict in Canadian society, its most overt expression is between workers' collectives and corporate management. Perceptions of labour union power as too great and corporate power too little by the highly religious, provides attitudinal expression of the rightist ideology. Conversely, the same case can be made for the lowest religiosity respondents, but in the opposite direction, that is, favouring more power for labour unions.

Discussion of the value-additive deference index for power, class and left-right thinking items, must be

tempered by the consideration of specific preference types. For the power items, three affiliate types surface as interesting, based on the number of significant correlations between deference and power perception: the French Catholic, Protestant Conservative Mainline and Protestant NonMainline. For the French Catholic, the strongest correlations of all religious types is displayed for federal government and large corporations. Evidently, it is not just being Catholic, nor French, that leads to perceptions of too little power for the federal government and large corporations, but attending religious group services and perceiving oneself as religious. Likewise, the Protestant NonMainline exhibit substantial above sample correlations, indicating the importance of religious group exposure and religious perception to an organized perspective that views labour union and television power as too much, and, church power as too little. Interestingly, on the matter of social class belonging, the strong positive association displayed by the Protestant NonMainline reveals that as religious identity anchorage increases, so too does class belonging. Finally, for left-right self-location, the discovery that only the English and French Catholic preference types display significant association between increased religiosity and tending toward rightist political orientation, indicates that there must be an aspect peculiar to the Catholic

religious culture that contributes to this relationship.

Overall, the nominal preference measure proves to be the best independent religious predictor of class, power and left-right thinking items. Moreover, when compared to seven social background variables, the value of the religious factor as a significant predictor of political items is verified. As in previous chapters, we once again must conclude that the comparative function of religious identity, when specified in preference types, generally outranks the importance of the deference indices. However, the exceptions, that is, views of church power and left-right self-location, both showing greater predictive strength for the deference index, are noteworthy, as they are central to the linkage of the religious identity with political ideology.

Chapter IX

AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES

9.1 OPERATIONALIZATION

Feelings toward social groups and elites in Canadian society represent the final aspect of political life, examined in this study. While affect toward various groups may be a matter of private values, these values may have consequences for many social issues faced in a heterogeneous society (Meisel, 1975:149). Indeed, the images that individuals may hold of certain social groups or elites may be fostered in the perspective of the subgroups in which they associate. As observed by Lenski,

Some measure of intergroup conflict and tension seems inevitable so long as divisions remain, though these are not necessarily a threat to the stability of the social system and its chances for survival (Lenksi, 1961:60).

While the sources of division in society may be multiple, the religious group may be one point of identity anchorage, facilitating the development of a group consciousness. Group consciousness may become politically relevant through the operation of "polar affect", defined as:

a positive feeling toward members of one's own group, and negative feelings toward members of visible "out-groups" (Jelen,

1990:209).

For the purposes of the present research, this definition is extended to nonvisible outgroups as well, such as, left and right-wingers, French and English Canadians, and various institutional elites.

The measurement of affect toward groups and elites is accomplished in the 1984 Canadian National Election Study via a feeling thermometer format, ranging from zero to one hundred degrees. Scores between zero and fifty indicate a less favourable or cool feeling toward the specific group, while those between fifty and one hundred reveal a more favourable or warmer feeling.¹ The feeling thermometer was used to assess respondent affect toward specific social groups and institutional elites. The social groups included are: left-wingers, right-wingers, French-Canadians, English Canadians, Jews, Whites, Non-Whites and the Women's Movement. The elite questions focus on those who run: churches, schools, unions, federal government, big corporations, provincial government,

¹The exact wording for the feeling thermometer issues is as follows. "Here is a drawing of a thermometer. It is called a feeling thermometer because it helps us to measure feeling toward various groups of people. Here is how it works. Scores between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favourable and warm toward a group of people-- the higher the score, the warmer and more favourable your feelings. Scores between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favourable and are cool toward a group of people -- the lower the score, the cooler and less favourable your feelings. If you don't have any feelings at all toward a group of people, just say so and we'll go on to the next one."

newspapers, and television.

Methodologically, the thermometer items are extremely difficult to work with. First, there may be a positivity bias for respondents who tend to rate all groups on the warmer end of the thermometer. Hence, a rating of 55 degrees for a certain group may in fact be the expression of negative affect, if other groups are rated at 90 degrees. Yet, 55 is a favourable response and for analytical reasons is usually coded with other favourable responses (Knight, 1984:318,319). A second problematic aspect of feeling thermometers, related to the first, is that of socially desirable responses that do not actually reflect the individual's attitudes and values. A third problem, most central to the present study, is the matter of coding responses into standardized categories. It is virtually impossible to develop a collapsing scheme that can be used across all group and elite item responses, due to the variation in frequency distributions. For the purpose of this research, the collapsing points for the breaking of the feeling thermometer into four useable categories, ranging from cool (1) to warm (4), is based on the sample mean for each item. Essentially, the criteria for the recoding of the feeling thermometer is two-fold. First, the sample mean is employed as the point of division

between the expression of negative and positive affect.² Treated in this manner, the feeling thermometers represent respondent affect relative to the average affect of a sample of Canadians. Hence, for many of the thermometers, a score somewhat above 50 becomes the expression of cooler than average sentiment toward a target group. A second criterion for the recoding of the thermometer items was to attempt a generally equitable distribution of the useable cases across the four categories, thereby, approximating a relatively normal distribution for each item.³ Respondents expressing mixed feelings, no feelings, or don't know, were assigned as missing cases and excluded from the analysis.⁴

²The sample mean for each group and elite item is as follows: left-wingers, 37; right-wingers, 50; French-Cdns, 66; English Cdns., 73; Jews, 65; whites, 77; nonwhites, 69; women's movement, 60; church, 64; school, 61; unions, 42; fed. gov't, 59; big corp., 51; prov. gov't, 54; news, 55; and, T.V., 56.

³Based on the valid cases and moving across the four scale categories from cool to warm, the actual recoding of each item is as follows: left-wingers, 0-9=1 10-36=2 37-64=3 65-100=4; right-wingers, 0-20=1 21-50=2 51-79=3 80-100=4; French-Cdns., 0-44=1 45-66=2 67-94=3 95-100=4; English Cdns., 0-50=1 51-72=2 73-94=3 95-100=4; Jews, 0-49=1 50-64=2 65-94=3 95-100=4; whites, 0-59=1 60-76=2 77-89=3 90-100=4; nonwhite, 0-49=1 50-68=2 69-90=3 91-100=4; women's movement, 0-39=1 40-59=2 60-84=3 85-100=4; church, 0-49=1 50-63=2 64-84=3 85-100=4; school, 0-39=1 40-60=2 61-84=3 85-100=4; union, 0-19=1 20-41=2 42-64=3 65-100=4; fed. gov't, 0-44=1 45-58=2 59-79=3 80-100=4; big corp., 0-34=1 35-57=2 58-74=3 75-100=4; prov. gov't, 0-29=1 30-53=2 54-79=3 80 thru 100=4; news, 0-39=1 40-54=2 55-74=3 75-100=4; and, T.V., 0-39=1 40-55=2 56-79=3 80-100=4.

⁴Missing cases for each item are: left-wingers, 52%; right-wingers, 50.7%; French Cdns., 12.4%; English Cdns., 10.5%; Jews, 20.7%; whites, 13.6%; nonwhites, 15.4%; women's movement, 14.9%; church, 16.5%; school, 13.2%;

Needfully, care should be exercised in interpreting the findings pertaining to left-wingers and right-wingers, as the proportion of missing cases is extremely high.

As a cautionary note, it should be recognized that the expression of cooler affect toward a social group or elite does not entail that people will act upon this feeling, nor does it imply intolerance and prejudice. It simply means that when presented with a battery of group and elite perception items, some are viewed more warmly or favourably than others.

9.2 FINDINGS

The findings section on items of affect toward groups and institutional elites follows the format of previous chapters, wherein, each religious dimension serves to organize the presentation. The sixteen research propositions, derived from the conceptual model, are assessed separately under the rubric of the appropriate religious dimension.

9.2.1 Religious Preference Dimension

Three research propositions pertaining to respondent religious preference are here considered with regard to matters of group and elite affect. The first proposition facilitates an assessment of the effect of a no

union, 12.4%; fed. gov't, 12.7%; big corp., 16.7%; prov. gov't, 12.5%; news, 14.9%; and, T.V., 13.7%.

preference/preference dichotomy. This is followed by an evaluation of a measure that discriminates between preference types, and finally, a comparison of the dichotomous and refined preference measures is engaged.

9.2.1.1 Proposition One

We begin with the research proposition that:

Those specifying a religious affiliation will differ significantly from those who do not.

The evaluation of this proposition proceeds according to the findings presented in the left-hand panel of Table 43 (See Appendix B, Table 43).

Four of eight group affect items support the proposition, displaying significance at .05 or better. The item LEFT-WINGERS ($p=.016$) reveals that the respondents having no religious preference express above average affect toward this ideological group (.16). However, on the matter of affect toward RIGHT-WINGERS ($p=.000$), the Religious None display a below the mean level of affect or warmth (-.31). On the other two significant group affect items, JEWS ($p=.045$) and the women's movement ($p=.015$), the nonaffiliated demonstrate more warmth than the religious affiliates.

The battery of items concerning affect toward elites clearly supports the research proposition, as all but one of eight, UNION ($p=.989$), achieves an acceptable significance level. Interestingly, the direction of

deviation for the Religious None on all elite affect items is toward coolness, while the affiliates tend to define the mean or be slightly warmer than it. The largest net difference between the Religious None and the religious (.79), not surprisingly, occurs on the item assessing affect toward those who run churches. However, a significant degree of below average warmth is sustained by the Religious None for those who run: SCHOOL (-.27), FED. GOV'T (-.24), BIG CORP. (-.17), PROV. GOV'T (-.14), NEWS (-.19) and T.V. (-.28).

9.2.1.2 Proposition Two

The results displayed in the right-side panel of Table 43 allow for the assessment of the research proposition, that:

The refinement of religious affiliation into specific affiliate types will display significant variation between the types.

This proposition finds confirmation for both group and elite affect. Six of eight group affect variables demonstrate that significant differences exist between affiliate types. Only LEFT-WINGERS ($p=.108$) and NONWHITES ($p=.149$) do not show an acceptable significance level. However, substantively, some interesting differences between affiliate types do exist on these two affect items. The largest differences occur for the Religious None and Protestant NonMainline. On the LEFT-WINGER item the None exhibit the most warmth (.15), while the Protestant

NonMainline the greatest coolness (-.19), but on the NONWHITES variable both show above average warmth (.09 and .12 respectively).

On the six group affect variables that achieve significance, a number of substantively interesting findings are observed. Feelings toward RIGHT-WINGERS are coolest for the Religious None (-.31) and warmest for English Catholics (.10) and Protestant NonMainliners (.06). However, when the target group is the FRENCH-CDNS., the Other religion category exhibits greatest coolness (-.34), followed by the Conservative Mainline (-.24) and United Church (-.24) affiliates. As might be expected, the French Catholics show greatest warmth toward French Canadians (.30). On the ENGLISH CDNS. item, French Catholic affect is coolest (-.28) followed by the cooler than average feeling displayed by the Other religion group (-.19). English Catholics (.14) and Protestant Conservative Mainline (.11) are most favourable toward English Canadians. On the matter of affect toward JEWS, greatest warmth is shown by the Other religion category (.21), Religious None (.19) and Protestant NonMainline (.18), while the coolest response belongs to French Catholics (-.32). Warm feeling toward WHITES is highest for the French Catholic (.12) and lowest for the Other religion category (-.23). Finally, the women's movement is evaluated most coolly by French Catholics (-.28) and the Protestant

NonMainline (-.16), while the English Catholics (.21) and None (.21) display greatest above average warmth.

The institutional elite affect items all achieve acceptable significance levels, providing unconditional support for the research proposition. Directionally, an interesting aspect of the findings displayed for affect toward elites is that the Religious None, United Church and Conservative Mainline affiliates, share the commonality of negative deviations on every item, indicating coolness toward those running all institutions. Furthermore, with the exception of FED. GOV'T and BIG CORP., the Other religion category follows the same trend. Juxtaposed to the tendency toward coolness, the French Catholics exhibit substantial positive deviations toward warmth on all elite variables, and, with the exception of BIG CORP. and PROV. GOV'T, the English Catholics tend to the warmth direction as well. No consistent direction is displayed by the Protestant NonMainline, although, substantial coolness is shown toward NEWS (-.19) and T.V. (-.19).

Overall, the findings show overwhelming support for the research proposition.

9.2.1.3 Proposition Three

A comparative inspection of the two panels of findings presented in Table 43 demonstrate confirmation of the research proposition, that:

The religious preference dimension in its refined form of specific affiliate types,

will show greater predictive strength than a simple nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy.

Showing significance on sixteen of eighteen affect items, compared to eleven for the dichotomous preference variable, the refined affiliate measure is found to be the better predictor. Moreover, on the ten items where both measures of religious preference achieve significance, the one attending to affiliate types consistently exhibits the largest beta coefficients.

9.2.2 Religious Reference Dimension

Moving to the religious reference level, three research propositions are assessed in this section for the group and elite affect items. The first deals with the dichotomization of religious group attendance into never attend and attend categories. Following this evaluation, findings enabling a consideration of a more discriminating attendance measure are reviewed. Finally, the relative predictive value of the two religious reference measures is considered.

9.2.1.1 Proposition One

The first proposition to be evaluated at the reference level is, that:

Those attending religious group meetings will differ significantly from those who do not.

Findings displayed in the left-side panel of Table 44, provide opportunity for assessing this proposition (See Appendix B, Table 44).

The results shown for the group affect items indicate unqualified rejection of the research proposition, as not one item achieves the .05 level of significance. However, this tendency is not sustained for items of elite affect, as six of eight demonstrate significant intercategory variation. Only the UNION ($p=.728$) and NEWS ($p=.109$) items do not meet the acceptable standard of confirmation for the research proposition. On the six significant elite feeling items, the never attender category deviates, in each instance, toward the coolness side of the thermometer. The largest net difference between never attenders and attenders is displayed on the variable measuring affect toward those who run churches (.71).

Support for the research proposition is restricted to items concerning respondent affect toward institutional elites. For all matters regarding feeling toward groups, the proposition is rejected.

9.2.1.2 Proposition Two

The findings shown in the right-hand panel of Table 44, allow for an empirical assessment of the proposition, that:

The refining of religious group attendance into levels, will demonstrate significant variation between the attendance levels.

Only minimal support for this proposition is marshalled from the findings on group affect, as three of

eight items achieve significance. On two of the three significant items, LEFT-WINGERS ($p=.023$) and WOMEN ($p=.014$), the weekly attender category exhibit the largest deviation toward cooler expressions of affect. Indeed, for the item assessing affect toward the women's movement the relationship is linear, as deviations from the mean toward coolness advance by increasing level of attendance.

Stronger support for the research proposition is found on items of affect toward elites, as six of eight variables prove significant. Only UNION ($p=.580$) and NEWS ($p=.329$) do not achieve acceptable significance. Directionally, four of the six statistically significant items: CHURCH, SCHOOL, FED. GOV'T and PROV. GOV'T, exhibit a generally linear relationship between affect and attendance. In each instance, as attendance increases the degree of warmth also rises. The largest net warmth difference between the polar categories, never attend (-.62) and attend weekly (.46), is observed on expression of affect toward those who run churches. For the two nonlinear significant items, BIG CORP. and T.V., it is still the never attenders who show least warmth and the weekly attenders display most warmth to those running big corporations (.12). However, the most favourable expression of affect toward T.V. management resides in the monthly attender category (.05).

9.2.2.3 Proposition Three

Comparison of the two panels in Table 44, confirms the research proposition, that:

The religious reference dimension, as specified in its refined form of attendance levels, will display greater predictive strength than the simple dichotomy of never attend/attend.

For the refined religious group attendance measure, nine of sixteen affect items are significant compared to six of sixteen for the dichotomous reference variable. On the six elite affect items, where both show significance at the .05 level or better, the refined reference measure consistently exhibits the larger betas.

9.2.3 Religious Deference Dimension

Religious deference, operationalized with a single self-perceived religiosity measure and two value-additive indices, is evaluated in this section of findings on group and elite affect through a series of ten research propositions.

9.2.3.1 Proposition One

The first proposition is that:

Those who perceive themselves to be religious will differ significantly from those who do not.

Assessment of this proposition is facilitated by the findings in the left panel of Table 45 (See Appendix B, Table 45).

Generally, the proposition of significant variation

is confirmed, as five of eight group affect items and six of eight elite variables prove to be significant at the .05 level. On four of the five significant group affect items: RIGHT-WINGERS, FRENCH CDNS., WHITES, and NONWHITES; the low religious identity respondents express cooler than average feelings, while the highly religious category exhibits above average warmth. This trend, however, is reversed for the item LEFT-WINGERS, as low religiosity respondents express more warmth (.12) than those with high religious self-identity (-.06).

The only two variables not achieving significance in the elite affect battery are: NEWS ($p=.409$) and T.V. ($p=.701$). On the six other items the low self-perceived religiosity respondents show deviations from the mean toward coolness, while the high religiosity category exhibit above average warmth. The greatest net difference is on the variable concerning those who run churches (.67). Overall, then the research proposition is confirmed for the lion's share of the elite affect items.

9.2.3.2 Proposition Two

An inspection of the right panel in Table 45 provides opportunity to consider the research proposition, that:

The refinement of self-perceived religiosity into several levels will result in significant variation across the levels.

Clearly, this proposition is confirmed for both the

group and elite affect items. On matters pertaining to feelings expressed toward specific target groups, the refined religiosity measure is significant on all items. Furthermore, for six of the group affect items, the relationship between self-perceived religiosity and warmth is observed to be generally linear. For the five group items: RIGHT-WINGERS, FRENCH CDNS., JEWS, WHITES, and NONWHITES, advances in affective warmth correspond with increases in religious identity. However, for the item tapping affect toward LEFT-WINGERS, the inverse is found to exist as the not very religious show greatest warmth (.12) and the very religious are most cool (-.18). The ENGLISH CDNS. item displays the very religious as most warm (.15), while the fairly religious tend toward greatest coolness (-.06). On the other significant item pertaining to the women's movement, the very religious exhibit least warmth (-.17) and the fairly and not very religious most warmth (.04 and .05 respectively).

For the six significant variables that measure feeling toward those running social institutions, all but one - UNION - are essentially linear. The UNION item is basically curvilinear, as the not very religious (-.06) and very religious (-.03) deviate slightly from the mean toward coolness, while the fairly religious exhibit most warmth (.05). On the five significant linear items consistent direction across categories is shown, as the not very

religious are coolest, the fairly religious roughly define the mean, and the very religious display the greatest warmth. Again it is the item reflecting feeling toward those who run churches that has the largest variation between poles (.91).

9.2.3.3 Proposition Three

A comparative glance at the two panels in Table 45, generally, reveals confirmation of the research proposition, that:

The religious deference dimension, in its refined form of degrees of self-perceived religiosity, will display more predictive strength than the simple low/high dichotomy.

The refined deference measure proves to be a significant predictor on fourteen of sixteen affect items, compared to eleven for the dichotomous deference variable. Moreover, on the eleven where both religious deference measures show acceptable significance levels, the refined variable exhibits the largest beta on all but one. On the elite affect item SCHOOL, both deference variables have beta coefficients of .15. Further confirmation of the research hypothesis is provided by the substantive patterns displayed across the refined measure's categories, formerly concealed by the dichotomous variable.

9.2.3.4 Proposition Four

Having determined the effect of each of the dichotomous religious measures, Table 46 allows for an

evaluation of their relative effect (See Appendix B, Table 46). The specific research proposition states, that:

When the three dichotomous measures of religiosity are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the religious deference dimension will demonstrate more predictive strength than the preference or reference dimensions.

Indeed, religious deference measured by degree of self-perceived religious identity, does prove to be significant more times than any other dichotomous measure. Overall, identity is significant at .05 or better on eight of sixteen affect items, compared to four for both the preference and reference dimensions. However, this apparent verification of the research proposition is diminished considerably by a comparison of the beta coefficients on the four items where the deference dichotomy shares significance with either one or both of the other religious dimensions. Only on the elite affect item CHURCH, does the religious identity measure demonstrate the largest beta (.23). On two other elite items, SCHOOL and FED. GOV'T, the attendance dichotomy exhibits a beta of same size (.11) as displayed for religious deference. Moreover, on the group affect item RIGHT-WINGERS, the preference measure (.13) proves to be a considerably better predictor than the identity variable (.07). Hence, while the deference variable does show significance on the most affect items, it is not the best

predictor when other religious dimensions are significant.

9.2.3.5 Proposition Five

Shifting attention to the multi-dimensional deference indices, Table 47 facilitates assessment of three research propositions (See Appendix B, Table 47). The first proposition, evaluated by inspection of the left panel, states that:

A value-additive index, consisting of the simple absence or presence of religious affiliation, attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate considerable variation across the degrees of religiosity.

While this proposition is confirmed for the group affect matters with five of eight showing acceptable significance, the strongest support is observed in the elite affect battery where all items are significant.

Directionally, none of the group affect items exhibit a linear relationship between degree of warmth and extent of religiosity. The LEFT-WINGER item confirms the low religiosity category as displaying the most warmth (.21) and the high religiosity respondents show the only below average degree of warmth (-.06). The opposite is true for the RIGHT-WINGER variable, as the low group demonstrates greatest coolness (-.37) and the high religiosity category greatest warmth (.08). Interestingly, it is the two dimensional respondents that show most coolness toward the: FRENCH (-.14), JEWS (-.09) and

NONWHITES (-.11), while the Religious None show greatest warmth.

Substantively, for matters of elite affect, SCHOOL, BIG CORP. and PROV. GOV'T, prove to be generally linear. As degree of religiosity increases, so too does the degree of warmth. For all three items only the high religiosity category is seen to have an above average deviation toward greater warmth. This tendency of most warmth for the highly religious is replicated on the items: CHURCH (.26), UNION (.04) and FED. GOV'T (.08). In addition to the items displaying a linear pattern, the low religiosity respondents also exhibit greatest coolness toward those running the institutions of CHURCH (-.79), NEWS (-.25) and T.V. (-.34).

9.2.3.6 Proposition Six

Findings presented in the right-hand panel of Table 47 enable empirical assessment of the proposition, that:

A value-additive index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perception, will demonstrate significant variation across the degrees of religiosity.

Generally, the research proposition is confirmed, as seven of eight group affect items and six of eight elite variables achieve an acceptable significance level. Only the items: ENGLISH ($p=.063$), UNION ($p=.267$) and NEWS ($p=.090$), fail to meet the .05 significance standard.

One of the observable trends for the group affect

items, is that the high religiosity category displays either greatest warmth or coolness for all variables. On the items LEFT-WINGERS and WOMEN the high religiosity respondents exhibit the least warmth, showing greatest negative deviations from the mean (-.20/-.21). However, for RIGHT-WINGERS (.17), FRENCH (.16), ENGLISH (.13), JEWS (.14), WHITES (.15) and NONWHITES (.15), the high religiosity category has consistently warmer feelings than all other levels of religiosity. Essentially, the most coolness on these items is exhibited by either the low or one dimensional religiosity respondents.

Three of the six significant items in the elite affect battery: CHURCH, SCHOOL and FED. GOV'T, display a generally linear relationship, as increases in religiosity are associated with advances in degree of warmth. On these items, substantial net differences between the polar categories are observed: CHURCH (1.42), SCHOOL (.64) and FED. GOV'T (.48). This same tendency is discernible for feeling toward big corporations, as the low religiosity respondents are significantly cooler (-.16) than the high category (.22), a net difference of .38. For the other two significant items, PROV. GOV'T ($p=.000$) and T.V. ($p=.050$), the coolest scores fall at the low end of the religiosity spectrum. Also, the highly religious respondents have greatest warmth toward those who run provincial government (.22).

9.2.3.7 Proposition Seven

A comparison of the two panels juxtaposed in Table 47, allows for an evaluation of the research proposition, that:

The value-additive index, consisting of the refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, will prove to be a better predictor than the index of religious dichotomies.

On the basis of the number of significant items observed for each composite religious index, that is, thirteen for each, the proposition can not be confirmed. However, slight support is mustered from a comparison of beta coefficients, where both value-additive indices achieve significance. On nine of these eleven items the index consisting of two refined religious measures does show slightly larger beta coefficients.

9.2.3.8 Proposition Eight

The correlation coefficients presented in Table 48 for each religious preference type (See Appendix B, Table 48), enables us to assess the proposition, that:

The significance and strength of association between the value-additive deference index, consisting of refined measures of religious group attendance and self-perceived religiosity, and the dependent political life indicators, will vary considerably by religious preference type.

Overall, the research proposition is confirmed, as the magnitude and significance of association between the

deference index and the affect items shows substantial variation across the religious affiliate types. For the one item where significance is observed across all affiliate types, that is, feelings toward those who run churches, the magnitude of association varies from a low correlation of .1570 for the Protestant NonMainline to a high correlation coefficient of .4270 for the French Catholic. Hence, the strength of association differs greatly by religious preference group, even when significant for all types.

Concerning specific group affect items, correlations for the variable LEFT-WINGERS demonstrates that the English Catholic category has the only significant association (-.2138), apart from the entire sample (-.1216). The negative association indicates that as religiosity increases, the degree of warmth toward left-wingers decreases. However, for the affect toward RIGHT-WINGERS item the results show two significant correlations, one positive and one negative. The positive correlation for French Catholic (.1346) demonstrates a slight association between increasing religiosity and advance in degree of warmth toward right-wingers, while the opposite is true for the United Church affiliates (-.1440). For the items measuring affect toward FRENCH CDNS., ENGLISH CDNS., JEWS, WHITES and NONWHITES, all significant associations are positive, that is, as religiosity increases so does

warmth. The strongest significant correlation for FRENCH CDNS. occurs in the Protestant NonMainline affiliate type (.2651), while the French Catholic exhibit the only significant coefficient (.1735) for ENGLISH CDNS. Two significant correlations are shown for the item JEWS, as French Catholic (.1213) and Conservative Mainline affiliates (.1249) display positive associations. Interestingly, the feeling toward JEWS item is the only one that does not achieve a significant correlation for the entire sample, suggesting that level of affect does not show a substantial relation to degree of religious deference. For the WHITES and NONWHITES variables it is the French Catholic that display the highest positive correlations, .1525 and .1478 respectively. Finally, for the expression of affect toward the women's movement, the Protestant NonMainline exhibit the only significant association (-.2810), apart from the entire sample (-.0525). Here we observe from the negative association that increases in religiosity correspond to decreases in warmth toward the women's movement.

A perusal of the elite affect items, other than the CHURCH variable previously mentioned, reveals significant positive correlations for SCHOOL, FED. GOV'T, BIG CORP. and PROV. GOV'T. The strongest associations toward those who run schools is displayed for the Conservative Mainline (.2601) and Other religion category (.2859). However, it

is the French Catholic who demonstrate strongest correlation between degree of religiosity and warmth toward FED. GOV'T (.2460) and those who run big corporations (.2208). It is the Conservative Mainline that exhibit highest association for PROV. GOV'T (.1906). The three remaining items: UNION, NEWS and T.V., reveal either a mixed direction of significant correlations, or in the case of unions, only one significant association. Interestingly, for all three items it is the Protestant NonMainline who show the strongest negative correlation between degree of religiosity and extent of warmth. The Protestant NonMainline exhibit a correlation of $-.1945$ on the UNION item, along with $-.1821$ for NEWS and $-.2117$ for T.V. However, the French Catholic affiliates demonstrate the opposite direction, as increasing religiosity corresponds to advances in warmth on the affect toward NEWS (.1133) and T.V. (.1096) items.

9.2.3.9 Proposition Nine

Recognizing the existence of variation in the strength and significance of association between the deference index and the affect items according to religious preference type, a further research interest is, whether:

When the refined religious preference measure and value-additive deference index are simultaneously controlled, along with seven social background variables, the deference index will display more predictive strength than the religious preference measure.

This proposition is evaluated from the results presented in Table 49 (See Appendix B, Table 49).

The achievement of significance on thirteen of sixteen items by the religious preference measure, compared to eleven for the deference index, discredits the research proposition. Moreover, that on six of the eight items where both attain significance: FRENCH CDNS., ENGLISH CDNS., JEWS, WOMEN, UNION, BIG CORP. and PROV. GOV'T, the beta coefficient for religious preference exceeds that of the deference index by at least .09, provides further evidence for rejection of the proposition. However, the deference index does prove to be a better predictor of feeling expressed toward those who run churches and schools. Furthermore, that the deference index also attains significance on two items where the preference measure does not, LEFT-WINGERS and NONWHITES, serves to qualify the research proposition's rejection.

9.2.3.10 Proposition Ten

Findings displayed in Table 50 facilitate assessment of the final research proposition (See Appendix B, Table 50), that:

Relative to other social background variables the two value-additive religiosity indices and the refined religious preference measure, will show significant predictive strength.

Evidence of strong support for the research

proposition is found in Table 50, as at least one measure of religion achieves significance for each group and elite affect item. However, it is not only that the religious factor simply attains a minimum level of significance that qualifies it as an important predictor, but that the beta coefficients exhibited for the religious dimension exceed the largest magnitude of any social control variable on eleven of sixteen affect items. Furthermore, on one other item, FED GOV'T, the religious deference index ties region as the strongest predictor of respondent scores. On the four remaining affect variables: RIGHT-WINGERS, FRENCH CDNS., WHITES and NONWHITES, the religious factor is the second best predictor. Hence, support is robust for the research proposition.

In terms of rank order, the religious deference index (.11) leads the field for the group affect item LEFT-WINGERS, followed by: organizational involvement (.10), region (.09), community size (.11), education (.09) and gender (.08). Substantively, those showing greatest warmth toward left-wingers are: the organizationally uninvolved (.12), those residing in B.C. (.14), respondents living in a city with a population over 500,000 (.07), the university educated (.11) and females (.08). For the RIGHT-WINGERS item, it is region (.13) and size of community respondent grew up in (.13) that lead the religious factor (.12), education (.10) and gender (.07) in size of beta.

Directionally, the Maritime region is most cool toward right-wingers (-.37) while the Prairies are warmest (.21), as are those who grew up in rural areas (.10). Furthermore, it is those with a technical education (.10) and males (.06) that exhibit greatest warmth toward right-wingers.

Regarding affect toward French and English Canadians it is region that proves to be the best predictor for French feeling (.39), followed by the religious preference measure (.24). The FRENCH CDNS. item has the largest explained variance of any group affect item at 20.7%, a large portion of which undoubtedly is attributable to regional differences between Quebec (.55) and the Prairies (-.38). For ENGLISH CDNS. affect, the religious preference factor (.17) reverses roles with the region variable (.13), and Quebec is seen to display greatest coolness (-.18).

The religious preference measure (.21) on the group affect item JEWS substantially outdistances education (.11), region (.10) and other significant effects. This large difference for religious preference (.19) is also displayed for affect toward the women's movement, as region (.09), gender (.07) and size of community respondent grew up in (.06) all trail far behind. On the two remaining group affect matters, WHITES and NONWHITES, region (.12) is found to be the best predictor of feelings toward WHITES,

while gender predicts best to affect toward NONWHITES and, in each instance, is followed by religion (.09/.09). Regionally, British Columbia is coolest to whites (-.25) and Quebec is warmest (.15). Concerning gender as a predictor of affect scores toward nonwhites, females exhibit more warmth (.08) than males (-.08).

The elite affect items, all proving the religious factor as the best predictor of feeling scores, generally show that region has the second largest beta. The only exception is the CHURCH item, wherein, education (.10) is the runner-up to the religious deference index (.40), showing a generally linear pattern between increases in education and decrease in warmth. The CHURCH elite variable attains the highest explained variance of all elite affect items at 21.7%. A quick review of the region variable for the remaining elite affect items shows that for affect toward those who run schools: B.C. is coolest (-.19) and Quebec warmest (.15); and furthermore, this same pattern holds for those who run: unions, federal government, big corporations and television. However, B.C. (-.32) and Quebec (-.18) both reflect coolness toward provincial government, while Ontario (.18) exhibits greatest warmth. Finally, B.C. (-.15) and the Prairies (-.11) demonstrate greatest coolness toward the news elite and the Maritimes the most warmth (.17).

9.3 DISCUSSION

In the foregoing section, specific findings pertaining to group and elite affect were highlighted according to the three dimensions of religion. The purpose of the discussion section is to consider the general findings in relation to the value-additive model and provide substantive theoretical elaboration. Organizationally, the discussion proceeds from the preference to the deference dimensions, corresponding to the theoretical presumption of increasing intensity of religious identity anchorage.

9.3.1 Preference Dimension

In accord with the conceptual model, the weakest anchorage of the religious identity should occur at the preference level. Operationalized by religious affiliation, a comparative function may be fulfilled, wherein, respondents potentially assess group and elite affect items in accordance with their respective nominal affiliations. Moreover, the consideration of all affiliates versus nonaffiliated respondents, provides the grossest measure of the effect of the religious preference dimension.

Results showing that the nonaffiliate/affiliate dichotomy achieves significance on only one-half of the group affect items, suggests that this religious measure is of minimal importance to assessing feelings toward social

groups. However, when significant, the Religious None do show the warmest feelings, excepting affect toward right-wingers. Generally, there does appear to be some credibility to the view that the religious are more rightist than the nonreligious.

Evidence from the institutional elite items indicates that the Religious None are cooler than the affiliated on all seven significant items, reinforcing the apparent affinity between left-winger warmth and institutional coolness. Conversely, those indicating potential for religious identity anchorage through the citing of an affiliation, display greatest warmth to dominant institutional leadership. This may suggest that religious affiliation serves a conservatizing identity function, absent from the unaffiliated identity repertoire.

The refinement of the religious affiliation measure into specific preference types is, clearly, confirmed as the better predictor of group and elite affect. The specification of a denomination or religious affiliate group is most central to the relationship of the individual and religious collectivity, with respect to a potential point of comparison on political matters. The variation across religious affiliate types shows the significant effect of distinctive homogeneous religious cultures to the assessment of feeling toward social groups and elites. For the significant group affect items, support for a cultural

interpretation along dimensions of dominant and minority groups, appears to be warranted. French Catholic coolness toward English Canadians, Jews and the women's movement, suggests a lower regard for both the dominant Canadian social group and competing minorities, by a group that may perceive itself as restricted in political expression and distinct in cultural identity. Reciprocally, the dominant religious expressions in Canadian society as a whole, that is, the Protestant Conservative Mainline and United Church of Canada, exhibit coolness toward French Canadians, perhaps, reflecting the perception of eroding privilege that accompanies the extension of favour to French Canada. The Other religion category composed of a variety of nondominant faiths, exhibits a coolness to what may be viewed as the two founding cultures, both embodied in white society. When considered together, the findings on group affect tend to support a cultural interpretation drawn along religious and ethnic group lines.

The institutional elite items reveal several interesting patterns that require interpretation. First, the Religious None and United Church affiliate group share the distinction of greatest elite coolness, indicating perhaps a greater level of anti-institutional sentiment, even borne out for the United Church affiliates on affect toward those who run churches. While an explanation of less institutional identity anchorage for the Religious

None can easily be extended to include affect toward institutional elites, it is possible that liberal Protestantism, as exemplified in the United Church, functions as a religious catalyst to anti-institutional feelings. A second noteworthy tendency is that the French and English Catholics exhibit most warmth toward those who run institutions. However, it is the French Catholic who consistently display the greatest degree of warmth on all elite items, perhaps, an indication that affect toward the hierarchy of the French Catholic church generalizes to other elites. Finally, the Protestant NonMainline prove interesting on the two items that might be thought of as constituting cultural elites, that is, news and television. Considerable coolness toward the mass media may represent an oppositional posture toward those who select media content that is often inconsonant with the normative culture of Protestant NonMainline belief.

9.3.2 Reference Dimension

The religious reference dimension, operationalized by attendance at religious group meetings, is assumed to relate to the potential for normative socialization, including, the communication of feeling toward specific target groups and/or institutional elites. According to the findings there is no support for different levels of affect toward social groups by a never attend/attend dichotomy. Apparently, the results for the attend category

that includes yearly, monthly and weekly attenders, is not distinct from the nonattender group for these items. However, three-fourths of the elite perception battery proves to be significant for this never attend/attend variable, with the never attenders showing consistently less warmth. Hence, we again return to the explanation that those less institutionally involved, value least the leadership of dominant institutions.

When the reference measure is extended to include specific frequency of religious group attendance, the results are more revealing and confirm the expectations of the theoretical model. Clearly, affect toward institutional elites is dependent on frequency of exposure to a religious reference group. On the six significant elite items, four have a generally linear pattern and the poles of the other two are defined by the never and weekly attenders. In each instance, it is the never attenders who are coolest toward elites and the weekly attenders that exhibit most warmth, indicating that religious group attendance is associated with affect toward elites. Theoretically, this is to be expected if we recognize that institutional involvement promotes respect for institutional authority, particularly for religious groups who may emphasize submission to governing bodies as a normative standard of spiritual life. The more one is exposed to the communication of these ideas in the

religious reference group, the more central they may become to the religious identity.

That this same pattern is not sustained on group affect items, qualifies the importance of the religious reference dimension. Yet, that weekly attenders are the only category expressing coolness toward left-wingers and that the association of attendance to affect toward the women's movement is linear, suggests that some specific reference groups may be targeted for the expression of negative affect by religious communities. For example, in the case of the women's movement, a potential threat to a traditional interpretation of the biblical record may be perceived.⁵ If the religious community does emphasize a traditionalist view of women, it is likely those most regularly attending its functions will incorporate it as a normative regulation, and, hence, the linear pattern observed in the findings.

9.3.3 Deference Dimension

The potential for deference to an organized religious perspective that may include political life concerns, such as, group and elite affect, is believed to be highest when one's self-perceived identity is religious.

⁵Illustrative of this view is Ephesians 5:22: "Wives be subject to your own husbands, as to the Lord". However, it should be noted that this injunction is counterbalanced with the command: "Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church and gave Himself up for her" (Eph. 5:25).

Indeed, the findings do display a significant effect for the dichotomous measure, constituted by a low/high categorization of the importance of religion, on the majority of the group and elite feeling thermometers. Results showing that the low religiosity respondents are cooler than those scoring high on the subjective importance of religion for all significant group and elite items, excepting affect toward left-wingers, is suggestive of an explanation that seriously considers the function of religious self-perception to the formation and expression of attitudinal warmth. It is possible that the personality anchored in a religious perspective breeds greater charity and positivity toward social groups and those who run institutions, than the identity that lacks a religious self-perception. This interpretation is sustained by the fact that when self-perceived religiosity is considered in its most discrete form, a linear pattern between increases in religious identification and warmth toward groups and elites is exhibited for two-thirds of the significant items. Hence, generally, as religiosity increases a corresponding increase in favourable affect occurs. However, that this pattern is reversed for feeling toward left-wingers and the women's movement may indicate that warmth is narrowed for the religious identity to those target groups that do not pose a significant normative threat, via the promotion of alternative perspectives.

When the three religious dimensions in their dichotomous forms are simultaneously controlled, the results indicate some support for the contention that the deference dimension is of a higher intensity to religious identity. This is confirmed by the fact that the deference dimension is significant for twice the number of items as either the preference or reference dimensions. Moreover, that the deference dimension is found to be significant on three less items when preference and reference dichotomies are controlled, than when not controlled, indicates the importance of a value-additive model to the prediction of affect scores. This is further confirmed through assessing the multi-dimensional measures, involving either the summing of three dichotomous variables or the religiosity index based on the refined attendance and self-perception measures. In either case, both are considered as most sensitive to degree of religious identity anchorage, and, therefore, should be strong predictors of political life dimensions. Indeed, this assertion is borne out for a large majority of the affect items, even though most of the significant items are not related to degree of religiosity in a linear fashion. Nonetheless, the polar categories of the religiosity measures tend to define the boundaries of the affect thermometer range. The low religiosity category tends to coolness, while the high religiosity respondents exhibit greatest warmth. Once again, the

exceptions to this general trend include the social groups that potentially reflect an ideological challenge to the religious perspective, that is, left-wingers and the women's movement.

Overall, some support for the view that the best predictor of group and elite affect would be the measure which incorporates the expanded subjective religiosity dimension and the refined objective attendance element is found, as the deference index is seen to have slightly higher betas than the index of three dichotomies. However, as discerned in previous chapters, it is the nominal preference measure, not the deference indices, that is the best predictor of political items. This indicates the necessity of attending to homogeneous religious culture units and the apparent distinctiveness these units have to the assessment of political culture concerns. In some way, the individual's religious preference serves to instruct one's evaluation of social groups and elites to an extent beyond that shown for the value-additive deference measures. According to the model, the comparative function of religious identity must be operating at the level of a perspective function, providing a window through which the political world is viewed.

Finally, there is no doubt from the evidence presented that the religious factor, when compared to other social background variables, is a strong predictor of group

and elite affect items. Clearly, if the truth of religious faith has run its course, now relegated to a diminished authority and isolated sphere, one could never discern this supposed insignificance from the findings at hand.

Chapter X

CONCLUSIONS

In the previous five chapters, a detailed analysis of the relationship of religion to several political life dimensions has been presented. To this point, attempts to relate the findings to the theoretical model based on the reference group concept have been limited to the consideration of one political dimension at a time, without reference to the substantive literature and classical theoretical backdrop. While it is less than desirable to combine the political life variables into one summary table, losing the distinctiveness of the diverse political life dimensions, this is unavoidable if a general impression of the appropriateness of the theoretical model is to be gleaned. Hence, the initial task of the concluding chapter is to succinctly consider the general findings and offer an evaluation of the value-additive model. This is accomplished through elaboration of summary tables (Tables 51-53). Subsequently, the reference group concept, contemporary literature and classical backdrop are reassessed in light of the substantive findings. Concurrent with the progression of the reassessment is the specification of potential future research into the

association of religion and political life.

10.1 THE GENERAL FINDINGS AND THE THEORETICAL MODEL

Evaluation of the summary findings, as presented in Table 51, must proceed along two avenues, intradimensional and interdimensional variation (See Appendix B, Table 51).

10.1.1 Intradimensional Considerations

The issue of intradimensional variation involves the expectation, derived from the theoretical model, that the refined measures in each of the religious dimensions would prove to be more valuable to the explanation of political attitudes and behaviour than the simple dichotomous variables that tap the absence or presence of the religious condition. Evidence presented in Table 51 does support this general expectation.

For the preference measure, the specification of religious affiliate types is significant for 85% of the political life indicators, compared to only 48% for the Religious None/religious dichotomy. Substantively, this means that specific religious affiliation is more central to the shaping of political identity, than simply being religious or not. Intuitively, this suggests the breeding of a distinct ethos within religious associations, and, hence, confirms denominational types as reference categories that affect attitudinal and behavioural

engagement in the political process. Obviously, this is not to suggest that having a religious orientation versus the absence of one is not important to the shaping of political identity, but, that specific affiliate type is more central. In fact, for all political life dimensions, the preference measure attuned to affiliation has more significant items than the dichotomous measure reflecting the absence or presence of a religious identification.

At the reference level, the anticipated effect that a discrete measure of religious group attendance would prove more valuable to the explanation of political values than a never attend/attend dichotomy, is sustained by the empirical evidence exhibited in Table 51. Attendance considered by degree, that is, weekly, monthly, yearly or never, is significant for 49% of the political variables, compared to 35% for the absence/presence of attendance dichotomy. The only exception to this general tendency is found in the political issues battery, where the dichotomy is a slightly better predictor than the expanded measure. Overall, the confirmation of the expected tendency offers support to the notion that frequency of attendance at a religious group does correspond to normative socialization, significant to some forms of political participation and attitudes. Hence, religious associations may function as reference groups relevant to the development of political values through regular exposure. Whether these values

result from the assimilation of formal political cues, or communal network interactions between those of like mind, is beyond the scope of the present data, pointing to an area of future research.

Considered within the religious deference dimension, the measures based solely on subjective religious identity, also, confirm the general direction anticipated by the model. For the more refined measure attending to degree of self-perceived religiosity, 58% of all political items achieve significance. However, for the dichotomous measure, reflecting a low/high presence of religious self-perception, 46% of the political life indicators are significant. For all dimensions of the political life, the more refined measure proves significant on more items than the dichotomy. Substantively, then, the extent to which one's self-definition is religious proves to be a more important factor to the prediction of political values and participation than a low/high consideration. This reflects that substantial differences do exist between the fairly and very religious, who in the dichotomous measure are lumped into a single category.

A final aspect of the general consideration of intradimensional variation is the recognition from Table 51 that the value-additive indices, subsumed in the model under the deference rubric, do not act as anticipated by the theoretical model. The composite index of religious

dichotomies is found to be significant on 59% of the political life matters, while the more refined measure, constituted by the summing of expanded religious group attendance and religious self-perception, attains significance on only 55% of the items. The reason for this apparent failure of the theoretical model is tied to its generally dismal value-additive performance, a matter considered in subsequent elaboration dealing with interdimensional variation.

3.1.2 Interdimensional Considerations

The general success of the theoretical model in anticipating intradimensional variation is overshadowed by the failure of the model's expectations concerning the relationships between dimensions. The matter of interdimensional variation can be assessed through a comparison of the percentages across the dimensions, as presented in Table 51, and also, through the simultaneous control of each measure exhibited in Table 52 (See Appendix B, Table 52).

Recalling that the value-additive model, displayed earlier in Diagram 1, situated religious preference at the lowest level of identity anchorage, attendance at religious reference group meetings as a higher intensity than a nominal preference, and, finally, the deference dimension based on subjective religiosity as the highest point of identity anchorage, results in Table 51 reveal the model's

general inappropriateness. In fact, it is religious preference that outdistances both deference and reference dimensions, in terms of the number of items that achieve significance.

First, at the dichotomous level, that is, the simple absence or presence of each religious condition, Table 51 demonstrates that preference has a slightly better record than the deference dimension (48% and 46% respectively), and that the never attend/attend reference dichotomy trails with only 35% of all political indicators showing significance. When the affect of each dichotomous measure is held constant through simultaneous controlling, religious deference is seen to have a slightly stronger independent effect (33%) than the no preference/preference dichotomy (30%). Again, the attendance dichotomy lags far behind (18%) in independent effect, based on the percentage of significant political life items. Generally, the results taken together for the religious dichotomies, reflect the failure of the model to specify correctly the intensity of religious identity anchorage to matters of the political life.

Secondly, evaluation of the effects of the more refined religious measures on political life aspects, further supports the rejection of the direction of identity anchorage specified by the value-additive model. Clearly, that nominal religious preference (85%) outpredicts the

reference measure of attendance (49%) by 26% and the deference variable based on self-perceived religiosity (58%) by 17% (Table 51), reinforces the inadequacy of this value-additive approach to modelling the effect of the religious factor on political life. Moreover, the independent effect of the religious affiliate measure is substantially greater than that shown by the value-additive deference index, as displayed in Table 52.

Despite the apparent failure of the value-additive model to capture the direction, and, perhaps, appropriate function of the specified religious dimensions, conclusive evidence for the effect of the religious factor on Canadian political participation and attitudes, has been presented throughout the analysis. Table 53 provides an overview of the religious factor's performance on political matters, relative to the seven social background variables controlled throughout (See Appendix B, Table 53). If every instance, where at least one measure of the religious factor achieving significance is counted, then significant variation is shown for 96% of the political life indicators. By far, this outdistances the next most prominent predictor, that is, region, which attains an acceptable significance level on 80% of the political items. Even if the religious factor is considered solely on the basis of its best predictor, religious preference type (84%), it still leads all other social background

variables in terms of the number of times significance is achieved. This finding alone has some relevant implications to the expectations of the classical theorists regarding the role of religion in modern society, a matter to be discussed in a subsequent section.

The presentation of general findings, coupled with emergent interpretations offered in the specific finding chapters, do not lead to the abandonment of the reference group concept as an important explanation of the association between religion and politics. Indeed, we have repeatedly viewed evidence that indicates religious association types function as points of reference in explaining matters of the political life. Given the apparent failure of the conceptual model in its present operationalization and the findings at hand, we are faced with the question: How is it possible that a nominal religious affiliation, after controlling for attendance and religious self-perception, exerts such a powerful independent effect on the political identity? This issue is the subject matter of the following section.

10.2 RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE AS A FUNCTIONING PERSPECTIVE

In an earlier chapter of this study, reference group literature was reviewed and the specification of corresponding functions with the three dimensions of religion was attempted. Nominal affiliation with a

religious association was assumed to reflect a comparative function, wherein, individuals invoke a religious reference category for making appropriate judgements and evaluations of everyday matters, including the political life. Distinct from the comparative function, presumed to correspond to religious preference, the operation of a normative function was also considered. The normative function, operative when behavioural and attitudinal conformity to group norms is expected (Kelly, 1952:412,413), was perceived as appropriate to religious reference group attendance and referred to throughout the study as the reference dimension. Finally, a perspectival function was posited in correspondence with a religious deference dimension, based on a measure of subjective religious identity. Deference, so conceived, involves the organization of the individual's perceptual field into a frame of reference or perspective (Shibutani, 1955:565). This identity function, viewed as qualitatively distinct from comparative and normative functions, provides more to the individual than a point of comparison to be invoked when needed, or a set of group norms. The perspectival function reflects the assimilation of group norms that are meaningful to the individual, forming one's subjective self-definition. Hence, it was assumed that a functioning perspective was the highest point of religious identity anchorage to the explanation of political values and

behaviour.

General findings showing the inappropriateness of the interdimensional value-additive aspect of the theoretical model, do not negatively reflect on the extension of the reference group concept into preference, reference and deference dimensions. However, the value ordering of the dimensions and the functions believed to correspond to each dimension, needs to be reconsidered. Indeed, this is not the first value-additive theoretical attempt that has shown limited fruitfulness. For example, Smelser's endeavor to specify value-additive determinants of collective episodes has, apparently, never been successfully applied to a single empirical case (Smelser, 1962). Hence, failure to order the dimensions correctly, in a value-additive sense, does not preclude their independent consideration in either this or future research, nor does it invalidate the reference concept. Certainly, the religious dimensions that are specified in the value-additive model have proven valuable to the organization of previous research pertaining to the association of the religious factor and the political life, and, moreover, point to the need for further research, particularly at the deference level. Indeed, it may be the case that the problem lies not with the conceptual model, but rather with the operationalization of the dimensions.


In view of the lack of empirical confirmation for the value-additive model, one is led to reconsider the functions believed to correspond to each dimension, especially nominal religious preference. Possibly, it is religious affiliation that serves to function as a perspective or frame to the meaningful interpretation of political process and engagement. The persistence of one's religious affiliation, irrespective of attendance level at religious group meetings or degree of self-perceived religiosity, summons support for its functioning as a frame of reference. However, the actual mechanism by which religious preference remains vital to the shaping of political identity is a matter of debate.

Lenski has proposed in The Religious Factor, that since socio-religious groups

involve communal as well as associational elements, we would expect these differences to manifest themselves in the patterns of thought and action of the many millions of persons who are not highly active in church or synagogue (Lenski, 1961:344, 345).

Certainly, this explanation is logically feasible and would account for the significant explanatory power of nominal religious preference, as well as the lesser role of the reference dimension, that is, religious group attendance. Additionally, Kaplan's research into voting behaviour, showing that religious affiliation and intimate subgroups may serve as a point of reference (Kaplan, 1968:469), appears to generalize to other forms of political

DIAGRAM 2: THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AS A FUNCTIONING PERSPECTIVE



participation, as well as more subjective political values and attitudes.

Problematic to Lenski's perspective, as well as Kaplan's findings, is the issue of how intimate subgroups come to exhibit the norms of socio-religious groups. Lenski argues that:

the norms of socio-religious groups are constantly reinforced in these intimate, highly valued social relationships which are so crucial in the shaping of personality (Lenski, 1961:344).

Yet, how is it that norm acquisition is facilitated for reinforcement, if, as our findings reveal, attendance at religious group meetings is a relatively weak predictor, and, further, that when the effect of attendance is removed, the predictive value of nominal affiliation remains strong. An adequate explanation, given the findings for nominal religious affiliation, may involve the element of transmitting religious heritage. The socialization of offspring in the values of a particular religious subculture, potentially, makes sense of the strong affiliation effect. Hence, attending to the role of the family in the transmission of religious and political values may be crucial to our understanding of religious affiliation as a perspective. This tends to correspond with the research literature that indicates family transmission has the strongest effect on voting fidelity (Irvine and Gold, 1980:212).

An explanation involving the transmission of socio-religious heritage through the family, does not of necessity rule out the effect of the religious reference group to the shaping of political identity. That the family context involves the communication of intertwined political, religious and other cues, reflects that as an arena of socialization the home cannot be subdivided into compartments, as a house into rooms. The family transmission of values means that distinct effects of religious culture through formal religious association is mediated by primary networks, such as, the family unit. Religious denominations may reflect specific interests, subcultural boundaries and a distinct posture toward the interpretation of lived experience (Johnston, 1985:109). In this sense, religious affiliation functions as a perspective, filtered by the family or other primary social units, and tailored to the meaningful interpretation of one's life situation, including, political matters.

Attenuation of the role of primary socialization to the shaping of current political values is revealed by findings that show the general weakness of the size of community the respondent grew up in, as an explanatory factor. Indeed, only 25% of the political life indicators prove to be significant for this social background variable, the fewest of all control variables (Table 53). Moreover, that community size while growing up is

significant to approximately 10% fewer political items than size of community now, tends to confirm the importance of immediate environment to the shaping of political responses. Obviously, one may not lose the values of religious heritage as readily as whatever contextual effects are attributable to size of community in the formative years. However, for many, values inculcated in the primary unit may be adjusted to conform to present realities, unless nurtured through identification with networks that share these same values. Theoretically, this may be a function of the maintenance of family ties, indirect exposure to religious values through networks of friends and acquaintances, or the rekindling of religious faith through some level of direct attendance at religious group meetings. In any event, religious affiliation, past or present, may come to serve as a functioning perspective, or, perhaps, value structure, through which political issues are evaluated.

Diagram 2 represents an attempt to map the manner in which the religious factor may function as a perspective, relevant to the formation and maintenance of a value structure that informs political life dimensions (See Appendix A, Diagram 2). Recognizing the difficulty of dissecting human identity, the diagram distinguishes the influence of value context in one's formative years from ego's present value structure, geared to the meaningful

interpretation of lived experience. Admittedly, Diagram 2 is somewhat speculative, but, nonetheless, reflects an attempt to integrate the general pattern of findings and indicate relations to attend to in future research.

Beginning with arrow #1, the influence of religious group values to the formative value context, or family socialization, is recognized. Moreover, arrow #2 displays the effect of other value sources, such as, ethnicity, regional consciousness, parental political values, etc., to the formative value context. Clearly, the formative value context is as subject to the influence of multiple reference groups, as is the individual's present value structure. Hence, the family may be a context that assimilates and inculcates values from a variety of sources.

The relationship between formative value context and present religious preference has been specified in Diagram 2, as interactively related to either a manifest (4), latent (5) or no religious preference category (6). The association is interactive in the sense that ego's formative value context may still be reinforced in lived experience through contact with significant others (e.g. family), or, perhaps, memories of the formative context. When this reinforcement of the religious values, derivative from the formative value context, is recognized and

positive, religious preference may be viewed as manifest. However, when interaction with symbols of the formative context occurs, but at a subconscious level, a latent religious preference may be denoted. Finally, interaction for the Religious None with the formative value context may either be manifest or latent, positive or negative, depending on whether religious values were present or absent in the value heritage.

Focusing on the context of present lived experience, the role of nonreligious reference groups, that is, other value sources, is considered as directly related to one's value structure (6), or interactively associated through religious preference (7). Undoubtedly, other value sources may be exclusive to the formation of a functioning perspective for the nonreligious identity. Moreover, the confluence of other value sources and religious preference may either be latent or manifest, depending on one's cognitive awareness. For example, the intertwining of religious affiliation and ethnicity may, for some, be a manifest connection, while for others, it is latent.

The independent contributions of religious preference (8), reference group attendance (10) and self-perceived religious identity (9) to the individual's present value structure, are exhibited in Diagram 2. Arrow #8, displaying the independent effect of religious affiliation, can be considered in either a manifest or

latent manner. In a latent sense, religious preference may be the biographical survival of the formative value context, or, perhaps, in the case where preference and ethnicity are intertwined, the persistence of a collective, albeit, latent memory. However, when religious affiliation involves an immediate value recognition, religious preference may be considered as manifest. Taken together, manifest and latent religious preference prove to be a significant value source to present identity, and, ultimately, expression of political attitudes and behaviour.

Attending a religious reference group (10) and perceiving oneself as religious (9), does prove valuable to the explanation of political life scores. However, we must recognize that all religious group attendance involves a specific affiliate type and that the shaping of religious identity may also be bound to a particular collective experience. As denoted by arrows #11 and #12, a manifest religious preference may influence one's value structure through the interaction of religious self-perception and religious group attendance. Hence, religious preference is most central to political value formation, exerting a stronger independent effect on the organization of a political perspective, and, also, a stronger association to political life, than the composite effect of self-perception and religious group attendance.

A final consideration from the model presented in Diagram 2, is that the political life may be reciprocally related to the value structure and religious factor. In this study, the political dimensions were considered to be dependent variables, as it is most probable that religion is causally prior to political values. However, in some instances, a religious affiliation may be selected because of the values it is perceived to represent. Moreover, in the case of the Religious None, it is possible that a functional alternative to religion defined with a transempirical referent, may be a particular political ideology. This matter will be further addressed in a subsequent section that considers the Religious None as reflecting noninstitutionalized identity.

10.3 EMERGENT THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

At least two significant theoretical contributions have emerged from the empirical findings of this study. Both can be viewed as reflecting on the issue of religious affiliation types as functioning perspectives, and are considered separately in the subsequent discussion.

10.3.1 NonDominant Affiliate Types As Cultural Subgroups

A remarkable degree of homogeneity has been displayed by a number of specific affiliate types on the political life indicators, fuelling the extension of a theory of socio-religious cultural distinction along the

lines of dominant versus nondominant expression in the Canadian social system. Observable for a number of the political life dimensions is the tendency of the French Catholic, Protestant NonMainline and Other religion category to cluster a considerable distance from the average sample response. The recognition that each of these three religious affiliate types, represents to some extent a position of nondominance in Canadian society, proves useful to the interpretation of the findings.

For the French Catholic affiliate type, it is apparent that the confluence of French culture and the Catholic religion serve as a powerful determinant of political values and participation in the Canadian political process. Clearly, the divergence of French Catholics and English Catholics on many of the political life matters, indicates that Catholicism is one important element of French cultural expression. Exhibiting, perhaps, the shared perception of an equal founding partner dominated by the political consensus of non-French Canada, the French Catholic reflect considerable homogeneity in political attitude and behaviour.

Specifically, the French Catholic affiliate type has been observed to exhibit: below average trust and efficacy in federal matters; above mean levels of overt political participation; and, attitudinally are less inclined to state interventionism than other affiliate

types. Furthermore, the French Catholic perceive the power of large corporations, provincial government and churches as too little; display above average warmth to French Canadians, whites, and all elites, but coolness toward English Canadians, Jews and the women's movement. Generally, these findings tend to suggest a frame of reference that affirms nondominant cultural interests via less favourable expressions toward the English majority, federal political system, and other nondominant groups competing for social power. Apparently, the realization of a desirable position in Canadian society is linked to an increased power for churches, provincial government and corporations. In the latter case, this may yield an increased economic independence. Also, it appears that direct political involvement in campaign activities is seen as vehicle of change. Hence, the regard of French Catholicism as a functioning perspective is clearly sustained in lived experience, regardless of level of church attendance or religious self-perception.

A second religious affiliate type that warrants consideration as a nondominant group is the Other religion category. While this category is constituted by an admixture of many different religious traditions, predominantly, other than Christian, all reflect a religious minority status. However, as in the case of the French Catholics, the Other religion category is also a

point of ethnic identification. Whether Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist, some affinity between religious affiliation and minority ethnic group status is highly probable. Therefore, the homogeneity of direction on a considerable number of the political life matters, by a category reflecting diverse religious traditions, may be as much a matter of minority experience as it is of religious belief.

We have found that the Other religion category is: least likely to engage in overt political activities; morally conservative; strongly anti-labour; affectively cool toward English and French Canadians, as well as those who run churches, unions and provincial governments. However, warmth is indicated toward the federal government and big corporations. This configuration of attitudes and behaviour is most likely consistent with a nondominant location in Canadian society. However, unlike the French Catholic category, the Other religion adherents do not converge under the umbrella of a specific provincial government, and, hence, tend to favour a stronger federalism and a weakening of provincial powers. Consonant with their location as a religious minority, the Other religion group exhibits coolness toward those running churches, and also is most inclined to view the power of schools as being too little. Once again, we observe how the persistence of a religious category may serve a

perspective function through the promotion of subcultural interests, irrespective of religious group attendance and subjective perception of identity.

The third affiliate category demonstrating large deviations from the sample mean on many political items, presumably, reflecting religious subcultural homogeneity, is that of the Protestant NonMainline. The Protestant NonMainline category has displayed: low levels of overt political involvement, despite a high valuation of the vote; a high level of voting consistency; and a strong moral conservatism, unrivalled by any other affiliate type. Moreover, the Protestant NonMainliners demonstrate cool affection toward left-wingers, women's movement, and those who run news, television and unions. Warm affect is expressed toward Jews, nonwhites, English Canadians and churches.

Distinct from the previous two nondominant categories, that is, the French Catholic and Other religion, the Protestant NonMainline do not reflect a nondominant ethnic group identification¹. However, as a religious preference category, the Protestant NonMainline likely display a more sectarian emphasis than other religious affiliate types. This being the case, the

¹A crosstabulation of the Protestant NonMainline category with ethnic origin of male ancestor reveals that 55.6% of respondents are of British background. The next largest ethnic background grouping is Western European (German, Swiss) at 16.4%.

distinctiveness of this category is, perhaps, attributable more to an ethnic identity, than an ethnic one. Indeed, the strong moral conservatism, perception of too little church power and coolness toward cultural elites, women's movement and left-wingers, may reflect a minority status group protest against the decline of preferred normative standards in the larger social system. This interpretation is further strengthened with the findings that exhibit Protestant NonMainline warmth toward Jews and nonwhites, who, potentially, could represent competing minority groups to an affiliate type expressing a nondominant ethnic identity.

That many of the religious denominations that constitute the Protestant NonMainline affiliate category, advocate the conversion of ego to a specific type of religious identity, would explain how religious affiliation could persist for significant political items, even after holding constant the effects of religious reference group attendance and self-perceived religiosity. Also, the lower level of involvement by the Protestant NonMainline in campaign activities may indicate a more other-worldly religious orientation.

The sharing of a nondominant cultural status by the French Catholic, Other religion and Protestant NonMainline affiliate categories, proves to be a valuable theoretical tool for interpreting substantive directions on political

life matters. Conversely, the dominant socio-religious groups in our study, English Catholic, United Church and Protestant Conservative Mainline, generally, do not exhibit the same tendency toward large deviations from the mean. In fact, in many instances, one or all of these groups, serve to define the average perception, reflecting, perhaps, their status as dominant religious expressions in the Canadian context. It is possible that the persistence of privilege corresponds to some extent with religious affiliation for dominant groups, and, hence, religious preference remains relevant to lived experience, despite level of religious group attendance or the degree to which identity is religiously anchored.

The theoretical consideration of religious affiliation types as cultural groups is not foreign to sociological research. Lenski contends that:

There seems little doubt that socio-religious groups are rapidly replacing ethnic groups as the basic units in the system of status groups in American society (Lenski, 1961:363).

While this statement is likely more representative of a melting pot society than one which advocates multiculturalism, there is little doubt that group experience of ethnicity and religion are often intertwined, and, as in the case of the Protestant NonMainline, religion may come to function in a manner similar to ethnic group identity. It appears from our consideration of nondominant groups in

the Canadian social system that religion may function as vehicle of ethnic expression for some (French Catholic and Other religions), while for others (Protestant NonMainliners) religion is a more direct expression of a moral distinctiveness. Clearly, this is a matter that further research into the association of religion and political values should address.

The results of the present study do raise some interesting issues for proponents of multi-culturalism, as well as those pressing for the recognition of select groups as distinct societies. If the notion of distinct society is extended beyond self-determination, via control of the political decision making apparatus, to the realm of a shared experience of the Canadian political process, then, the Protestant NonMainline and Other religion category appear as reflective of a distinct attitudinal and behavioural configuration, as the French Catholics. Obviously, the consequences of such an interpretation are far reaching, and include the present debate regarding the right of religious cultural minorities to provide education for their young in a value context that is consonant with their socio-religious heritage.

10.3.2 The Religious None As NonInstitutionalized Identity

This study has facilitated an opportunity to assess the Religious None, operationalized in a number of ways, on matters of the political life. While previous research

into the Religious None, cast at the level of nonaffiliation, has predominantly focused on the demographics of the None (Veever and Cousineau, 1980; Veevers, 1990), this endeavour has provided an in-depth attitudinal and behavioural profile. The contention that the religious independents are a promising category for substantive research (Vernon, 1968:220) is substantiated by the findings.

On many of the political attitude and participation indicators, the findings provide conclusive evidence that the Religious None are substantively distinct from the religious. Furthermore, when specific religious affiliation types are attended to, the Religious None define a polar position more often than any other religious type. Considered across the five political dimensions, the Religious None have been observed to be: less efficacious and trusting of government; less interested in institutional expressions of political involvement; more morally liberal, prolabour and antimilitaristic; more leftist in political orientation; and, more affectively cool toward institutions and elites, than any religious affiliate type. Clearly, Bibby's claim that:

the Religious Nones, exhibit no such consistent "liberal-conservative" patterns in their attitudes towards a variety of social issues (Bibby, 1987:195),

is not sustained in the findings of this study.

The theoretical interpretation that seems to

provide a meaningful and adequate explanation of the Religious None political indicator configuration is that of noninstitutionalized identity. In a sense, the Religious None share a nondominant subcultural position with the French Catholic, Other religion and Protestant NonMainline affiliate types. However, the basis of their minority position apparently stems from their exclusion in the institutional expression of social power. Distrust of government, feelings of ineffectiveness, less likelihood of voting and a general coolness toward institutions and elites, all tend to reflect an identity that does not take the existing institutional arrangement as a point of positive political reference. Yet, clearly, the findings show that the Religious None are more likely to engage in noninstitutionalized political behaviour, than are the religious. This indicates that the absence of an institutional identity does not preclude the desire to ascend to a position of institutional inclusion. The fact that, by definition, the Religious None lack in their identity repertoire a condition that corresponds to the social institution of religion, coupled with the findings that demonstrate a noninstitutional posture, after controls for other identity sources such as education, age, and gender, lead one to speculate about potential sources of Religious None identity. Although a matter of further research, one must consider that it is not what has been

posited as social background characteristics that serve to shape a functioning perspective, but, perhaps, the political configuration itself. In other words, it may be a political orientation toward social change, that is, an ideological commitment, which proves significant to the shaping of identity. If this is the case, then, in a sense, a secular fundamentalism may be as important to the identity and value structure of the Religious None, as religious fundamentalism is to the Protestant NonMainline.

Consonant with a theory of noninstitutionalized identity is the idea of a shift in the value structure of post-industrial society. Inglehart argues that those who hold post-materialist values tend to be more globalist, less conservative, more change-oriented, more politically left, and over-represented in the knowledge industry than materialists (Inglehart, 1977:60-71). The source of the shift from materialist to post-materialist values is seen to reside in both cohort experience and educational level (Inglehart, 1977:97). Indeed, we have observed in a previous chapter that the Religious None are over-represented in the younger age categories (Table 5) and at the university level of education (Table 6)². Hence, our findings for the Religious None and the interpretation of

²The Religious None are also over-represented in the professional/executive occupation category by 5.8%. Inglehart indicates support for the thesis that professionals are more likely to have post-material values than other occupational groups (Inglehart, 1977:97).

the None as reflecting noninstitutionalized identity, appears to converge with the post-materialist explanation.

10.4 CLASSICAL THEORY REAPPRAISED

The general findings of this study enable us to reappraise the theories of Comte, Durkheim, Toennies, Weber and Sorokin, considered earlier in the classical theoretical backdrop. In a strict methodological sense, a sample drawn at one point in time does not allow us to consider change in either the direction or intensity of the religious factor to political life. However, in another sense, the employment of ideal-types that are products of a specific socio-historical period, introduces the possibility of comparing a single sample with general theoretical expectations drawn from classical theory. Therefore, by assuming that contemporary Canadian society tends toward one of the theoretical ideal-types, evaluation of the theorist's projected direction of social change is facilitated.

10.4.1 Comte, Durkheim and Toennies

The results of the data analysis reveal little support for an expectation of social change that posits either the isolation or extinction of transempirical religion in modern society. The theories of Comte, Durkheim and Toennies, reflecting the perspective that the appropriateness of supernatural religious orientations

decline with the movement toward a positive, organic, or Gesellschaft social system, are not sustained by the present assessment of the religious factor in contemporary Canadian political life. Apparently, the effect of positivism for Comte, the division of labour and advance of science for Durkheim, and the shift to a rational will based on public opinion for Toennies, has been significantly overestimated.

In the case of Comte, there is no evidence to suggest that a religion of humanity has replaced supernatural religion. With all but 9.5% of a representative sample of Canadians claiming a religious affiliation and 70% exhibiting a fairly or very religious self-perception, it is obvious that theological meaning systems still abound. Furthermore, that religious preference outdistances all other social background variables, including education, on many political life indicators and proves to be significant for the most number of items, indicates the importance of the religious factor in contemporary society. The outdistancing of education, a key component to the advance of Comte's positive society, reflects the sway that the transempirical holds in the assessing of current affairs.

Although, inferential, it is interesting to consider the attitudinal and behavioural configuration of a society where a secular meaning system is dominant. Would

Comte's system of positive polity be realized in a social system devoid of supernatural religion? Recognizing the shortcomings in allowing the Religious None to reflect a profile of religionless society, it is, nonetheless, interesting to infer what its dominant characteristics might be. Based on the findings of this study, displaying the Religious None as less efficacious and trusting of government, morally liberal, and cool toward institutions and elites, one is left to ponder the stability of a social system where either functional religious surrogates are operative, or religious meaning systems are entirely absent.

As in the case of Comte, the general expectations of religion's diminished role or the substitution of alternatives, drawn from Durkheim's theory of social change, is not empirically supported in the case of Canadian society. Apparently, adaptation, more than isolation, has been the response of religion to the advance of the division of labour. While the institutional function of religion in speaking authoritatively has, perhaps, declined through the division of political, economic, scientific and religious functions, the translation of institutional segmentation to the individual identity does not appear to have occurred. Clearly, the complex identity of an individual is not as amenable to compartmentalization as are the institutions of

contemporary society. Moreover, a diminished religious institutional effect does not entail a lessened effort in pronouncing on the political, social and economic conditions of the day. In fact, the decline in ecclesiastical power at the institutional level, may serve as a catalyst to renewed efforts at impacting the values of the general social system.

Implicated with the lack of evidence for the theoretical extrapolations from Comte and Durkheim, is Toennies' view that religion is supplanted by public opinion in Gesellschaft society, as an expression of the shift from natural to rational will. In making this assertion, Toennies may be overlooking that religion can serve the function of informing public opinion, rather than being displaced by it. The findings of this study have shown the strong significant effect of religious orientation in explaining the variance in public opinion on political matters. This is not to suggest that all issues of belief and action are religious matters, but that religious perspective functions as a value context from which reason proceeds.

10.4.2 Weber and Sorokin

The two theorists who do not abandon a transempirical definition of religion in their theories of social change, are Max Weber and Pitirim Sorokin.

Like Lenski's study, we have found ample support

for the Weberian assumption that a distinct ethos may correspond to specific theological systems, and, consequentially, exercise an influence in the shaping of an orientation toward human activity (Lenski, 1961:357). While we have not specifically tested Weber's temporally relevant theory, concerning the relationship of Protestant asceticism and the development of a rational economic ethic, it is clear that the political value configurations of various religious preference types are significantly different from each other. The affinity between religious affiliate types, each assumed to reflect some degree of belief homogeneity, and the lived experience of respondents, has been proposed through the relative designation of religious preference types as either culturally dominant or nondominant.

Attending to religious preference differences has proved to be more valuable to the explanation of political life, than any other operationalization of the religious factor. Weber's appreciation of the role of the religious association and socialization practices in promoting and sustaining a religious world-view, is valuable to the development of a theory of religious identity. Furthermore, Weber's master process of rationalization does not lead to an abandonment of supernatural belief and religious practice, but the modification of religion to the lived experiences of religious adherents.

Sorokin's recognition that the truth of faith may diminish in the face of increased sensory emphasis, but at no point does it cease to exist, is, potentially, a valuable explanation of the findings showing a strong association between religion and political life. This acknowledgement, based on the distinction between the truth of: faith, senses and reason, has several important implications for interpreting the findings, as well as future research. The first implication is that what may be true of the Canadian cultural supersystem, need not be reflected in specific religious subsystems. Hence, while the systematization of empirical reality proceeds through the application of scientific principles at the institutional level, the truth of faith may provide meaning at the associational or individual level. Moreover, if Canadian society reflects a generally idealistic cultural mentality, then we would expect the affirmation of both faith and the senses, welded by reason into an organic whole. Therefore, the pronounced effect of the religious factor in Canadian society is not unexpected, and further, represents no contradiction between truth systems.

A second implication that may be drawn from Sorokin is the recognition of the role of multiple group involvements to the shaping of identity. While we have found that, in addition to the religious factor, other social background variables, such as, organizational

involvement, community size, region, gender, age and education, are also significant to the explanation of political attitudes and behaviour, research attending to the dimensions of social interaction in each area is clearly needed (Sorokin, 1937, III:1-41). Moreover, future research into the shaping of political values and participation needs to extend further the multiple reference identifications that ego is anchored by in a pluralistic society. In retrospect, it is clear that attending directly to ethnic origin and degree of attachment to ethnicity as a reference category, may be important to the unraveling of ethnic-religious effects.

Finally, a methodological issue is raised with the positing of distinct truth systems. One might speculate as to the appropriateness of assessing the effects of one truth system, by utilizing the tools of another. On the other hand, this may represent the methodology of an idealistic system that seeks to wed the truth of faith and science into a working unity.

10.5 A FINAL CONSIDERATION

Throughout this study an endeavour has been made to explain and interpret the association of religious dimensions to the political life. It has been argued that the reference group concept is central to the development of an adequate explanatory model. The significance of the


reference concept is that it provides an avenue by which the individual can be linked to the society at large, that is, its institutions and processes. While this research has been limited to one particular association, the reference group concept has potential application for interpreting many aspects of the social world. Voluntary association involvement, social movement activity, ethnic identity, professionalization, to name a few, all suggest an explanation that attends to the way the individual psychologically experiences self in relationship to some group or groups.

Despite the apparent value of research into the dimensions of the reference concept, few have explicitly utilized it (Schmitt, 1972:40). Perhaps, the under-employment of reference group research is due to the perception that it is so universally applicable, there is no point to its specific consideration. However, a concept with such heuristic promise as that of reference group should not be abandoned, but be specified and elaborated into dimensions that give evidence of variation. Indeed, the present research attempts to determine and assess the association of religion and political life through the extension of reference group functions into preference, reference and deference dimensions. While more precise operationalization, especially of the deference dimension, is requisite to further theoretical development, hopefully,

this study has advanced reference research at least in one specific area.


This study, however, is only a beginning, and more explicit assessment needs to occur, perhaps, proceeding through qualitative field research within specific religious reference groups, coupled with survey analyses that include questions directly designed to tap the association of religion and political life. Furthermore, the extension of the reference concept into other areas of enquiry, such as ethnicity, is paramount, if this valuable concept is to ever be anything other than a theoretical diamond in the rough.

DIAGRAM 1: THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN POLITICAL LIFE -
A VALUE-ADDITIVE MODEL



APPENDIX A:
DIAGRAMS

DIAGRAM 2: THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AS A FUNCTIONING PERSPECTIVE



APPENDIX B:

TABLES

TABLE 1: RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE BY RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE

ATTENDANCE:	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yearly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	TOTAL	
	%	%	%	%	%	(n)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:						
None	76.8	20.3	.6	2.3	100	(306)
Eng. Catholic	7.8	33.9	19.9	38.4	100	(840)
Fr. Catholic	9.9	39.7	15.5	34.9	100	(766)
United	17.6	49.7	16.0	16.7	100	(472)
Cons.Mainline	16.2	44.3	18.5	21.0	100	(533)
NonMainline	8.1	26.8	10.9	54.1	100	(228)
Other	16.1	32.6	14.1	37.2	100	(171)
	-----	-----	-----	-----	---	-----
TOTAL	%				100	
	(n)	(592)	(1237)	(512)	(975)	(3316)

TABLE 2: RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE BY SELF-PERCEIVED RELIGIOSITY

SELF- PERCEPTION:	<u>Not Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>	TOTAL	
	%	%	%	%	(n)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:					
None	74.4	19.9	5.7	100	(309)
Eng. Catholic	23.0	64.3	12.7	100	(837)
Fr. Catholic	9.5	46.9	43.6	100	(775)
United	38.3	55.4	6.3	100	(473)
Cons.Mainline	36.5	52.0	11.5	100	(529)
NonMainline	18.2	43.6	38.2	100	(226)
Other	37.7	38.9	23.4	100	(170)
	----	----	----	----	-----
TOTAL %	29.4	50.1	20.5	100	
(n)	(977)	(1664)	(678)		(3319)

TABLE 3: RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE BY SELF-PERCEIVED RELIGIOSITY

SELF- PERCEPTION:	<u>Not Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>	TOTAL	
	%	%	%	%	(n)
SERVICE ATTENDANCE:					
Never	63.3	27.7	9.0	100	(587)
Yearly	41.6	47.2	11.2	100	(1239)
Monthly	10.9	72.3	16.8	100	(510)
Weekly	3.1	55.7	41.1	100	(968)
	----	----	----	----	-----
TOTAL %	29.4	50.1	20.5	100	
(n)	(973)	(1655)	(676)		(3304)

Gamma = .641 (p=.000)

Pearson r = .496 (p=.01)

TABLE 4: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY GENDER

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

SEX:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>
N=	% (3380)	% (1727)	% (1653)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:			
None	9.5	7.6	11.6
Engl. Catholic	25.3	25.4	25.1
French Catholic	23.3	24.1	22.5
United Church	14.2	15.3	13.1
Cons. Mainline	16.0	16.6	15.3
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	6.7	6.9
Other	5.1	4.6	5.7
	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	100.3	100.2
RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:			
Never	18.0	15.0	21.2
Yearly	37.3	34.3	40.5
Monthly	15.4	17.2	13.4
Weekly	29.3	33.4	24.9
	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	99.9	100.0
RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION:			
Not Religious	29.5	23.0	36.3
Fairly Religious	50.1	54.3	45.8
Very Religious	20.4	22.7	17.9
	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 5: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY AGE

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

AGE:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30- 39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-64</u>	<u>65+</u>
	%	%	%	%	%	%
N=	(3380)	(1030)	(710)	(490)	(710)	(379)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:						
None	9.5	11.5	11.7	10.9	4.8	6.6
Engl. Catholic	25.3	28.5	23.4	23.3	27.8	17.5
French Catholic	23.3	24.6	23.2	25.4	24.0	16.1
United Church	14.2	10.3	15.6	16.1	14.8	18.8
Cons. Mainline	16.0	13.4	13.2	14.1	18.3	25.9
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	7.2	8.3	5.7	6.3	6.3
Other	5.1	4.5	5.0	4.4	4.7	8.8
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	100.0	100.4	99.9	100.7	100.0

RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:

Never	18.0	19.3	21.8	19.8	12.6	15.6
Yearly	37.3	46.9	37.8	36.9	30.2	25.2
Monthly	15.4	13.4	10.1	13.1	14.9	18.1
Weekly	29.3	20.4	22.3	30.2	42.3	41.1
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Gamma .202 p=.000

RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION

Not Religious	29.5	37.0	28.9	27.8	23.6	24.5
Fairly Religious	50.1	47.4	52.6	49.3	49.9	52.6
Very Religious	20.4	15.6	18.4	22.8	26.9	22.9
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.4	100.0

Gamma .157 p=.000

TABLE 6: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY EDUCATION

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

EDUCATION:	Nat'l	Elem	HS	Tech	Univ
	%	%	%	%	%
N=	(3380)	(459)	(1580)	(602)	(737)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:					
None	9.5	5.8	8.2	8.1	15.8
Engl. Catholic	25.3	27.5	26.2	21.9	24.6
French Catholic	23.3	31.5	22.6	30.7	13.7
United Church	14.2	10.3	14.5	16.6	14.3
Cons. Mainline	16.0	12.0	17.4	13.1	17.7
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	10.5	6.8	6.6	4.8
Other	5.1	3.7	4.4	3.1	9.2
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	101.3	100.1	100.1	100.1
RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:					
Never	18.0	13.8	18.2	14.9	22.8
Yearly	37.3	25.8	38.9	44.3	35.6
Monthly	15.4	20.3	14.9	15.1	13.7
Weekly	29.3	40.1	28.1	25.7	27.9
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION					
Not Religious	29.5	19.4	28.8	28.9	37.9
Fairly Religious	50.1	51.2	52.0	52.0	46.1
Very Religious	20.4	29.4	19.0	19.0	16.1
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	99.8	99.9	100.1

TABLE 7: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY COMMUNITY SIZE WHILE GROWING UP

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

COMM.SIZE:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Vill/Town</u>	<u>Suburb</u>	<u>City</u>
	%	%	%	%	%
N=	(3380)	(873)	(944)	(303)	(1251)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:					
None	9.5	6.7	7.0	12.3	12.6
Engl. Catholic	25.3	23.9	25.4	19.2	27.5
French Catholic	23.3	19.6	31.9	16.3	21.2
United Church	14.2	19.7	11.8	17.7	11.4
Cons. Mainline	16.0	16.6	12.8	24.2	15.9
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	9.8	7.9	5.4	4.2
Other	5.1	3.6	3.5	4.9	7.5
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	99.9	100.3	100.0	100.3

RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:

Never	18.0	13.7	16.7	20.5	21.4
Yearly	37.3	31.5	36.3	49.0	39.5
Monthly	15.4	16.9	17.2	10.0	14.2
Weekly	29.3	37.9	29.9	20.5	24.9
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0

Gamma $-.162$ $p=.000$

RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION

Not Religious	29.5	26.2	23.9	46.4	32.1
Fairly Religious	50.1	54.6	52.9	35.7	48.5
Very Religious	20.4	19.3	23.3	18.0	19.5
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.1	100.1

Gamma $-.071$ $p=.001$

TABLE 8: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY COMMUNITY SIZE

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

COMM.SIZE:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>1-30M</u>	<u>30-500M</u>	<u>OVER500M</u>
N=	(3380)	(295)	(906)	(1213)	(576)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:					
None	9.5	5.1	6.7	10.8	12.3
Engl. Catholic	25.3	19.8	24.1	30.9	26.2
French Catholic	23.3	23.9	27.4	16.7	24.5
United Church	14.2	18.5	17.6	13.5	11.0
Cons. Mainline	16.0	17.6	13.7	17.5	15.2
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	11.3	6.6	7.6	4.1
Other	5.1	3.9	3.9	3.1	7.1
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.4

RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:

Never	18.0	16.5	14.6	16.0	20.8
Yearly	37.3	33.8	34.9	37.0	40.3
Monthly	15.4	16.2	15.5	17.4	14.0
Weekly	29.3	33.5	34.8	29.6	24.9
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.0	100.0

Gamma $-.120$ $p=.000$

RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION

Not Religious	29.5	26.0	24.0	27.5	34.2
Fairly Religious	50.1	54.6	53.4	53.2	45.2
Very Religious	20.4	19.4	22.7	19.2	20.6
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0

Gamma $-.074$ $p=.001$

TABLE 9: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY REGION
 (%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

REGION:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>Marit.</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Ont.</u>	<u>Prairies</u>	<u>B.C.</u>
N=	(3380)	(295)	(906)	(1213)	(576)	(390)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:						
None	9.5	3.1	2.2	11.7	9.8	24.1
Engl. Catholic	25.3	34.8	5.3	35.8	31.5	23.1
French Catholic	23.3	8.0	82.3	1.0	0.0	0.0
United Church	14.2	18.8	2.4	17.5	23.0	15.4
Cons. Mainline	16.0	14.7	4.8	22.1	20.7	17.1
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	17.9	1.8	6.2	8.1	10.6
Other	5.1	2.9	1.3	5.8	6.9	11.4
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	100.2	100.1	100.1	100.0	101.7
RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:						
Never	18.0	11.2	11.9	19.5	15.4	36.5
Yearly	37.3	31.5	41.3	36.1	38.9	34.2
Monthly	15.4	16.8	13.8	17.4	19.0	6.5
Weekly	29.3	40.6	33.0	27.1	26.7	22.8
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION						
Not Religious	29.5	27.3	14.9	33.6	32.9	47.8
Fairly Religious	50.1	56.7	45.6	52.5	54.5	50.1
Very Religious	20.4	16.1	39.5	13.9	12.7	10.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0

TABLE 10: RELIGIOUS MEASURES BY A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION INVOLVEMENT INDEX

(%'s may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding)

ORGAN. ACTIVITY:	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Inactive</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Highly</u>
N=	(3380)	(1145)	(284)	(445)	(775)	(710)
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION:						
None	9.5	7.2	9.4	11.3	10.3	10.8
Engl. Catholic	25.3	25.3	20.7	24.4	26.7	26.1
French Catholic	23.3	31.2	23.1	25.3	17.2	15.8
United Church	14.2	11.1	17.9	11.7	16.5	17.2
Cons. Mainline	16.0	14.5	14.2	16.1	16.7	18.0
Prot. NonMain.	6.8	7.1	9.0	7.6	6.3	5.8
Other	5.1	3.9	5.7	3.7	6.4	6.4
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.2	100.3	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.1
RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE:						
Never	18.0	19.7	25.7	18.8	16.9	13.3
Yearly	37.3	37.3	38.4	36.7	40.4	33.8
Monthly	15.4	14.5	14.8	16.2	13.2	19.0
Weekly	29.3	28.5	21.1	28.3	29.5	34.0
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
Gamma .082 p=.000						
RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION						
Not Religious	29.5	27.8	33.7	29.8	35.3	25.0
Fairly Religious	50.1	45.3	47.6	48.0	47.9	55.8
Very Religious	20.4	22.9	18.7	22.3	16.8	19.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1
Gamma -.029 p=.178						

TABLE 11: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:				Eng.	Fr.	United	Cons.	Prot.	
(n=)	None (319)	Yes (3035)	None (319)	Eng. Cath (845)	Fr. Cath (780)	United (476)	Cons. Main (534)	Prot. NonMain (228)	Other (172)
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>									
(1) HP'S LOSE TOUCH (2.23)	.02 (.06)	.00 (-.01)	.02 (.06)	-.05 (-.05)	-.02 (-.06)	.09 (.11)	.05 (.08)	-.05 (-.11)	-.06 (-.01)
eta/beta=	.02/.01			.06/.05					
signif.=	.739			.393					
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE (2.57)	-.16 (.01)	.02 (.00)	-.16 (.01)	.02 (.02)	.03 (-.04)	-.04 (-.05)	.07 (.08)	-.06 (-.17)	.04 (.18)
eta/beta=	.00/.04*			.05/.05					
signif.=	.037			.359					
<u>EXT. EFFICACY INDEX</u>									
(1+2) [2.22]	-.06 (.04)	.01 (.00)	-.06 (.04)	.00 (.00)	-.02 (-.05)	.01 (.00)	.09 (.10)	-.07 (-.15)	-.02 (.06)
eta/beta=	.01/.02			.06/.04					
signif.=	.284			.459					
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>									
(1) POLITICS COMPLEX (2.54)	.12 (.35)	-.01 (-.04)	.07 (.35)	-.12 (-.12)	.18 (.01)	-.06 (-.03)	.00 (.04)	-.16 (-.29)	.00 (.22)
eta/beta=	.08/.03			.11/.08*					
signif.=	.111			.049					
(2) NO SAY (2.56)	.14 (.33)	-.01 (-.03)	.18 (.33)	.03 (.03)	-.22 (-.26)	.02 (.02)	.12 (.11)	.06 (-.08)	-.03 (.09)
eta/beta=	.07/.03			.12/.09					
signif.=	.080			.108					
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER (4.17)	-.17 (-.10)	.02 (.01)	-.16 (-.10)	-.04 (-.05)	-.06 (-.17)	.12 (.21)	.09 (.16)	.19 (.11)	-.12 (-.03)
eta/beta=	.02/.04*			.10/.07**					
signif.=	.021			.009					
<u>INT. EFFICACY INDEX</u>									
(1+2) [2.30]	.10 (.30)	-.01 (-.03)	.10 (.30)	-.04 (-.03)	.01 (-.12)	-.03 (-.01)	.05 (.08)	-.04 (-.16)	-.03 (.14)
eta/beta=	.09/.03			.11/.04					
signif.=	.075			.382					

TABLE 11 : (CONTINUED)

	None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Fr. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other
POLITICAL TRUST									
(1) FEDS DISHONEST									
[3.20]	-.05	.01	-.03	-.09	-.11	.27	.15	-.17	-.05
	(.06)	(-.01)	(.06)	(-.15)	(-.06)	(.25)	(.16)	(-.31)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.12/.11***				
signif.=	.523				.000				
(2) FEDS WASTE MONEY (1.88)	.08	-.01	-.01	-.12	.41	-.10	-.18	-.18	-.06
	(.05)	(-.01)	(.05)	(-.13)	(.43)	(-.13)	(-.19)	(-.22)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.01/.02				.21/.20***				
signif.=	.203				.000				
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING									
[3.25]	-.07	.01	-.03	.13	-.17	.12	.01	-.14	-.02
	(-.14)	(.01)	(-.14)	(.10)	(-.04)	(.09)	(-.01)	(-.14)	(-.09)
eta/beta=	.04/.02				.07/.10**				
signif.=	.331				.010				
(4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T									
[3.41]	-.18	.02	-.17	.09	-.04	-.03	.03	.03	.00
	(-.32)	(.03)	(-.32)	(.01)	(.28)	(-.12)	(-.04)	(-.03)	(-.15)
eta/beta=	.09/.05**				.14/.06				
signif.=	.007				.091				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
[Grand Mean]

TABLE 12: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP ATTENDANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

ATTENDANCE
LEVEL:

	(n=)	Never (600)	Yes (2731)	Never (600)	Yrly (1244)	Mthly (512)	Wkly (975)
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>							
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH [2.23]		-.02 (-.04)	.01 (.01)	-.03 (-.04)	-.06 (-.06)	-.02 (-.01)	.11 (.11)
eta/beta=		.02/.01				.06/.06**	
signif.=		.580				.009	
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE [2.57]		-.12 (-.08)	.03 (.02)	-.13 (-.08)	-.06 (-.03)	.04 (.01)	.14 (.08)
eta/beta=		.03/.04*				.04/.08***	
signif.=		.015				.000	
<u>EXT.EFFICACY INDEX</u>							
(1+2) [2.22]		-.08 (-.06)	.02 (.01)	-.09 (-.06)	-.06 (-.04)	.01 (.00)	.13 (.09)
eta/beta=		.03/.04*				.06/.09***	
signif.=		.041				.000	
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>							
(1) POLITICS COM- PLEX [2.54]		.06 (.14)	-.01 (-.03)	.06 (.14)	-.03 (.01)	-.04 (-.09)	.02 (-.05)
eta/beta=		.05/.02				.05/.03	
signif.=		.242				.505	
(2) NO SAY [2.56]		.00 (.05)	.00 (-.01)	.00 (.05)	-.08 (-.06)	-.02 (-.03)	.11 (.06)
eta/beta=		.02/.00				.04/.05*	
signif.=		.942				.042	
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER [4.17]		-.10 (-.10)	.02 (.02)	-.10 (-.10)	-.03 (-.04)	.07 (.07)	.07 (.08)
eta/beta=		.04/.04*				.05/.05	
signif.=		.046				.055	
<u>INT.EFFICACY INDEX</u>							
(1+2) [2.30]		.01 (.07)	.00 (-.02)	.01 (.07)	-.05 (-.02)	-.01 (-.04)	.06 (.01)
eta/beta=		.03/.01				.03/.04	
signif.=		.791				.164	

TABLE 12:(CONTINUED)

	Never	Yes	Never	Yrly	Mthly	Wkly
<u>POLITICAL TRUST</u>						
(1) FEDS DISHONEST						
[3.20]	-.16	.04	-.16	.05	.05	.00
	(-.11)	(.02)	(-.11)	(.07)	(.00)	(-.02)
eta/beta=	.04/.06**				.05/.06*	
signif.=	.003				.025	
(2) FEDS WASTE						
MONEY [1.88]	.01	.00	.00	-.07	-.01	.10
	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(-.03)	(-.03)	(.08)
eta/beta=	.01/.00				.04/.06**	
signif.=	.870				.010	
(3) TRUST FEDS TO						
DO RIGHT THING						
[3.25]	-.10	.02	-.10	-.04	.02	.10
	(-.13)	(.03)	(-.13)	(-.06)	(.03)	(.14)
eta/beta=	.05/.04*				.08/.06*	
signif.=	.048				.015	
(4) SMART PEOPLE						
RUN FED.GOV'T						
[3.41]	-.07	.01	-.07	-.03	.07	.05
	(-.15)	(.03)	(-.15)	(-.02)	(.08)	(.09)
eta/beta=	.06/.03				.07/.04	
signif.=	.168				.190	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
 [Grand Mean]

TABLE 13: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY:				<u>Not</u>		
(n=)	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>	
	(985)	(2352)	(985)	(1673)	(679)	
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>						
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH [2.23]	-.08 (-.06)	.03 (.03)	-.08 (-.06)	.05 (.05)	-.02 (-.04)	
eta/beta=	.03/.04*					.05/.05*
signif.=	.018					.024
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE [2.57]	-.09 (-.01)	.04 (.01)	-.09 (-.01)	.02 (.00)	.10 (.03)	
eta/beta=	.01/.04*					.01/.05*
signif.=	.016					.026
EXT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.22]	-.09 (-.03)	.04 (.01)	-.09 (-.03)	.03 (.02)	.06 (.01)	
eta/beta=	.02/.05**					.02/.06*
signif.=	.004					.013
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>						
(1) POLITICS COM- PLEX [2.54]	-.05 (.07)	.02 (-.03)	-.05 (.07)	-.04 (-.08)	.17 (.08)	
eta/beta=	.03/.02					.05/.06***
signif.=	.215					.001
(2) NO SAY [2.56]	-.06 (.03)	.02 (-.01)	-.06 (.03)	.00 (-.01)	.09 (-.02)	
eta/beta=	.02/.03					.02/.03
signif.=	.159					.163
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER [4.17]	-.10 (-.07)	.04 (.03)	-.10 (-.07)	.07 (.07)	-.03 (-.07)	
eta/beta=	.04/.05**					.05/.05**
signif.=	.007					.009
INT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.30]	-.06 (.04)	.03 (-.02)	-.06 (.04)	-.01 (-.03)	.11 (.02)	
eta/beta=	.02/.03*					.03/.05**
signif.=	.048					.009

TABLE 13:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Not</u> <u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>
POLITICAL TRUST					
(1) FEDS DISHONEST					
[3.20]	-.06	.02	-.05	.05	-.04
	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.07)
eta/beta=	.00/.03				.02/.04
signif.=	.150				.152
(2) FEDS WASTE					
MONEY [1.88]	-.03	.01	-.04	-.03	.12
	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.06)	(-.04)	(.20)
eta/beta=	.04/.02				.09/.05*
signif.=	.310				.016
(3) TRUST FEDS TO					
DO RIGHT THING					
[3.25]	-.08	.03	-.08	.05	.00
	(-.10)	(.04)	(-.10)	(.05)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.05/.04*				.05/.04
signif.=	.027				.062
(4) SMART PEOPLE					
RUN FED.GOV'T					
[3.41]	-.03	.01	-.03	.01	.02
	(-.11)	(.05)	(-.11)	(.01)	(.12)
eta/beta=	.06/.01				.07/.02
signif.=	.423				.720

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

[Grand Mean]

TABLE 14: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY THREE MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITHOUT AND WITH SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>		
	(n=)	<u>None</u> (719)	<u>Yes</u> (3035)	<u>Never</u> (600)	<u>Yes</u> (2731)	<u>Low</u> (985)	<u>High</u> (2352)
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>							
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH [2.23]	.05 (.04)	-.01 (.00)	.00 (-.04)	.00 (.01)	-.09 (-.07)	.04 (.03)	
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.02/.00		.04/.05**		
signif.=	.493		.998		.010		
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE [2.57]	-.06 (.03)	.01 (.00)	-.05 (-.05)	.01 (.01)	-.07 (-.01)	.03 (.01)	
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.02/.02		.01/.03		
signif.=	.524		.433		.085		
EXT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.22]	.00 (.04)	.00 (.00)	-.03 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.08 (-.04)	.03 (.02)	
eta/beta=	.01/.00		.02/.02		.02/.05*		
signif.=	.964		.477		.012		
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>							
(1) POLITICS COM- PLEX [2.54]	.16 (.38)	-.02 (-.04)	.05 (.15)	-.01 (-.03)	-.08 (.07)	.03 (-.03)	
eta/beta=	.08/.04		.05/.02		.03/.04*		
signif.=	.065		.585		.047		
(2) NO SAY [2.56]	.18 (.32)	-.02 (-.03)	-.01 (.06)	.00 (-.01)	-.07 (.04)	.03 (-.01)	
eta/beta=	.07/.04		.02/.00		.02/.03		
signif.=	.057		.891		.088		
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER [4.17]	-.07 (-.08)	.01 (.01)	-.05 (-.05)	.01 (.01)	-.07 (-.07)	.03 (.03)	
eta/beta=	.02/.02		.04/.02		.03/.03		
signif.=	.375		.439		.076		
INT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.30]	.16 (.31)	-.02 (-.03)	.00 (.08)	.00 (-.02)	-.08 (.04)	.03 (-.02)	
eta/beta=	.09/.05*		.03/.00		.02/.04*		
signif.=	.019		.966		.017		

TABLE 14: (CONTINUED)

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
<u>POLITICAL TRUST</u>						
(1) FEDS DISHONEST						
[3.20]	.11	-.01	-.18	.04	-.03	.01
	(.07)	(-.01)	(-.11)	(.02)	(.01)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.02/.03		.04/.06**		.00/.02	
signif.=	.230		.005		.461	
(2) FEDS WASTE MONEY						
[1.88]	.12	-.01	-.02	.00	-.05	.02
	(.06)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.06)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.02/.03		.01/.01		.04/.03	
signif.=	.114		.765		.154	
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING						
[3.25]	-.01	.00	-.07	.01	-.07	.03
	(-.14)	(.01)	(-.12)	(.03)	(-.11)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.04/.00		.05/.03		.06/.04	
signif.=	.234		.874		.069	
(4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T						
[3.41]	-.15	.01	-.02	.01	.00	.00
	(-.31)	(.03)	(-.16)	(.03)	(-.11)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.08/.04		.06/.01		.06/.00	
signif.=	.070		.658		.922	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
 (Grand Mean)

TABLE 15 : POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY COMPOSITE RELIGIOUS INDICES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOSITY LEVEL:	(n=)	Index of 3 Dichotomies				Index of 2 Trichotomies				
		Low 0	1	2	High 3	Low 0	1	2	3	High 4
		(177)	(285)	(743)	(2085)	(371)	(716)	(835)	(934)	(448)
EXTERNAL EFFICACY										
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH [2.23]		.09 (.11)	-.19 (-.17)	-.05 (-.05)	.04 (.03)	-.07 (-.06)	-.06 (-.04)	-.02 (-.02)	.08 (.06)	.04 (.04)
eta/beta=		.06/.06*				.04/.05				
signif.=		.011				.156				
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE [2.57]		-.02 (.15)	-.22 (-.14)	-.07 (-.05)	.06 (.02)	-.12 (-.02)	-.06 (-.02)	-.08 (-.06)	.09 (.02)	.17 (.12)
eta/beta=		.04/.06**				.04/.07**				
signif.=		.006				.003				
EXT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.22]		.01 (.12)	-.19 (-.14)	-.05 (-.04)	.05 (.02)	-.11 (-.05)	-.05 (-.02)	-.08 (-.06)	.09 (.04)	.13 (.10)
eta/beta=		.05/.07**				.05/.09***				
signif.=		.002				.000				
INTERNAL EFFICACY										
(1) POLITICS COMPLEX [2.54]		.09 (.33)	.07 (.20)	-.07 (-.04)	.01 (-.04)	.02 (.17)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (-.03)	-.03 (-.13)	.19 (.12)
eta/beta=		.07/.03				.07/.05*				
signif.=		.315				.039				
(2) NO SAY [2.56]		.14 (.31)	.04 (.12)	-.13 (-.10)	.03 (-.01)	.04 (.13)	-.12 (-.05)	.02 (.01)	-.05 (-.10)	.22 (.14)
eta/beta=		.06/.05*				.06/.07**				
signif.=		.036				.003				
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER [4.17]		-.11 (-.07)	-.12 (-.08)	-.10 (-.09)	.06 (.05)	-.10 (-.08)	-.10 (-.07)	.04 (.02)	.06 (.06)	.04 (.04)
eta/beta=		.05/.06*				.04/.05				
signif.=		.012				.083				
INT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2) [2.30]		.11 (.29)	.02 (.11)	-.09 (-.06)	.02 (-.02)	.00 (.11)	-.07 (.01)	-.02 (-.02)	-.02 (-.09)	.18 (.11)
eta/beta=		.07/.05*				.07/.07**				
signif.=		.040				.004				

TABLE 15 : (CONTINUED)

POLITICAL TRUST		Low				High				
		Q	1	2	3	Q	1	2	3	4
(1) FEDS DISHONEST	{3.20}	-.03	-.17	-.06	.05	-.13	-.03	.07	.00	.03
		(.08)	(-.10)	(-.03)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.02)	(.06)	(-.05)	(.01)
eta/beta=		.03/.05				.03/.04				
signif.=		.059				.250				
(2) FEDS WASTE MONEY	{1.88}	.15	-.07	-.07	.02	.05	-.09	-.04	-.03	.23
		(.13)	(-.09)	(-.11)	(.04)	(.03)	(-.13)	(.01)	(-.07)	(.29)
eta/beta=		.07/.05				.11/.09***				
signif.=		.052				.000				
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING	{3.25}	-.02	-.27	.01	.04	-.16	.00	-.04	.07	.06
		(-.10)	(-.28)	(.00)	(.05)	(-.19)	(-.01)	(-.06)	(.10)	(.09)
eta/beta=		.08/.07**				.08/.06*				
signif.=		.003				.041				
(4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T	{3.41}	-.21	-.04	.02	.02	-.10	.03	-.04	.03	.06
		(-.39)	(-.10)	(-.03)	(.06)	(-.22)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(.06)	(.15)
eta/beta=		.09/.04				.08/.04				
signif.=		.128				.301				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
 (Grand Mean)

TABLE 16: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF POLITICAL EFFICACY/TRUST ITEMS WITH THE RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE INDEX, FOR EACH RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		None	Eng. Cath	Ev. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other	All
(n=)		(719)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)	(3380)
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>									
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH	-.0935	.0498	.0835*	.1119*	.0831	.0803	.1004	.0405*	
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE	-.1463*	-.0060	.0799*	.0430	.1043*	.1414*	-.0774	.0279	
EXT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2)	-.1135	.0199	.1089*	.0908	.1135*	.1294	-.0255	.0383*	
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>									
(1) POLITICS COMPLEX	.0050	-.0499	-.0251	-.0440	.0699	.1629*	.1242	-.0320	
(2) NO SAY	-.0568	.0379	-.0345	.0604	.1378**	.1821**	-.0325	-.0061	
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER	-.0691	.0684	.0150	.1035*	.0621	.2257**	-.0867	-.0312	
INT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2)	-.0553	.0032	-.0371	.0217	.1254**	.2121**	-.0455	-.0279	
<u>POLITICAL TRUST</u>									
(1) FEDS DISHONEST	-.0242	.0738*	.1048**	.0516	.0490	.0485	-.3363**	-.0027	
(2) FEDS WASTE MONEY	-.0800	.0244	.1078**	.0752	.0498	.1046	.0219	.0593**	
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING	-.0610	.1278**	.1699**	.1278**	-.0630	.0486	-.0937	.0668**	
(4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T	.0648	.0282	.0682	.0125	-.0274	.0373	-.0156	.0775**	

P=.05* P=.01**

TABLE 17: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY TWO REFINED MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITH AND WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:		<u>Relig.</u> <u>Prof.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
<u>EXTERNAL EFFICACY</u>			
(1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH	e/b= p=	.06/.07* .042	.04/.07* .028
(2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE	e/b= p=	.06/.04 .138	.04/.07** .005
EXT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2)	e/b= p=	.06/.06 .154	.05/.10*** .000
<u>INTERNAL EFFICACY</u>			
(1) POLITICS COM- PLEX	e/b= p=	.11/.08* .031	.07/.06* .013
(2) NO SAY	e/b= p=	.11/.11* .027	.06/.08*** .001
(3) VOTE DOESN'T MATTER	e/b= p=	.10/.07* .019	.04/.05 .115
INT.EFFICACY INDEX (1+2)	e/b= p=	.11/.07 .057	.07/.08*** .000
<u>POLITICAL TRUST</u>			
(1) FEDS DISHONEST	e/b= p=	.12/.13*** .000	.03/.07* .025
(2) FEDS WASTE MONEY	e/b= p=	.21/.19*** .000	.11/.09*** .000
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING	e/b= p=	.07/.11** .009	.08/08* .011
(4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T	e/b= p=	.14/.05 .449	.08/.03 .546

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 18: POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST BY SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS
CONTROLS FOR THESE VARIABLES

EXT. EFFICACY (1) (2.23)	Relig. Pref.	Relig. Index	Defec. Index	Gender		Age				Educ.				
				EM	M	10	10-19	40-49	50-64	65+	ELEM.	HS	TECH	UNIV
eta/beta=.06/.05	.06/.06	.04/.05		.01	-.01	.03	-.05	-.05	-.02	.09	-.07	-.09	.00	.24
signif.= .393	*.011	.156		(.01)	(-.01)	(.05)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(-.03)	(.03)	(-.09)	(-.10)	(.00)	(.25)
				.01/.01				.03/.04					.12/.11	
				.581				.330					***.000	
(2) (2.57)				-.05	.05	.12	-.01	-.09	-.12	.02	-.26	-.18	.05	.48
eta/beta=.05/.05	.04/.06	.04/.07		(-.06)	(.06)	(.16)	(.03)	(-.09)	(-.15)	(-.10)	(-.36)	(-.21)	(.09)	(.57)
signif.= .359	**0.006	**0.003		.04/.04				.09/.07					.24/.20	
				.032				**0.007					***.000	
Indx (2.22)				-.03	.03	.10	-.03	-.08	-.07	.01	-.14	-.15	.03	.38
eta/beta=.06/.04	.05/.07	.05/.09		(-.03)	(.03)	(.12)	(.00)	(-.08)	(-.09)	(-.07)	(-.22)	(-.17)	(.05)	(.43)
signif.= .459	**0.002	***.000		.03/.03				.08/.07					.24/.20	
				.116				**0.007					***.000	
INT. EFFICACY (1) (2.54)				-.15	.16	-.05	.09	-.01	.00	-.03	-.58	-.25	.17	.75
eta/beta=.11/.08	.07/.03	.07/.05		(-.18)	(.18)	(.06)	(.18)	(.00)	(-.11)	(-.28)	(-.66)	(-.31)	(.20)	(.89)
signif.= .049	.315	*.039		.13/.11				.10/.04					.37/.32	
				***.000				.331					***.000	
(2) (2.56)				-.01	.01	.03	.08	.00	-.04	-.15	-.34	-.16	.08	.48
eta/beta=.12/.09	.06/.05	.06/.07		(-.02)	(.02)	(.07)	(.13)	(.03)	(-.10)	(-.29)	(-.50)	(-.20)	(.12)	(.63)
signif.= .108	*.036	.003		.01/.01				.09/.04					.25/.19	
				.765				.201					***.000	
(3) (4.17)				.03	-.03	-.20	.01	.01	.19	.17	-.45	-.03	.15	.21
eta/beta=.10/.07	.05/.06	.04/.05		(.03)	(-.03)	(-.15)	(.07)	(.02)	(.13)	(.02)	(-.42)	(-.05)	(.11)	(.26)
signif.= **0.009	*.012	.083		.02/.02				.08/.12					.15/.15	
				.220				***.000					***.000	
Indx (2.30)				-.08	.08	-.02	.08	.00	.01	-.10	-.42	-.18	.10	.55
eta/beta=.11/.04	.07/.05	.07/.07		(-.09)	(.09)	(.04)	(.14)	(.02)	(-.07)	(-.27)	(-.53)	(-.22)	(.13)	(.68)
signif.= .382	*.040	**0.004		.08/.07				.11/.05					.36/.29	
				***.000				.114					***.000	
POLITICAL TRUST (1) (3.20)				-.10	.10	-.17	-.03	.08	.18	.05	-.45	-.13	.09	.44
eta/beta=.12/.11	.03/.05	.03/.04		(-.10)	(.10)	(-.09)	(.04)	(.09)	(.08)	(-.14)	(-.41)	(-.16)	(.08)	(.48)
signif.= ***.000	.059	.350		.07/.07				.06/.10					.22/.21	
				***.000				***.000					***.000	
(2) (1.88)				-.01	.01	.10	.02	.02	-.11	-.11	-.06	-.11	.08	.20
eta/beta=.21/.20	.07/.05	.11/.09		(-.01)	(.01)	(.12)	(.03)	(.02)	(-.10)	(-.19)	(-.11)	(-.12)	(.13)	(.22)
signif.= ***.000	.052	***.000		.21/.01				.09/.08					.13/.11	
				.572				**0.004					***.000	
(3) (3.25)				.00	.00	-.02	-.09	-.10	.07	.22	.00	.03	.00	-.06
eta/beta=.07/.10	.08/.07	.08/.06		(.01)	(-.01)	(-.06)	(-.09)	(-.09)	(.10)	(.26)	(.12)	(.03)	(-.03)	(-.11)
signif.= **0.010	**0.003	*.041		.20/.00				.10/.08					.06/.03	
				.877				***.001					.476	
(4) (3.41)				-.02	.02	.07	-.04	-.20	.00	.15	.00	-.01	.01	.02
eta/beta=.14/.06	.09/.04	.08/.04		(-.02)	(.02)	(.05)	(-.05)	(-.20)	(.03)	(.16)	(.11)	(-.01)	(.01)	(-.07)
signif.= .091	.128	.301		.02/.02				.08/.08					.04/.01	
				.335				***.000					.975	

EXT. EFFICACY: (1) MP'S LOSE TOUCH (2) GOV'T DOESN'T CARE WHAT RESPONDENT THINKS, P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
INDX=(1+2); INT. EFFICACY: (1) POLITICS COMPLICATED (2) NO SAY (3) VOTE DOESN'T [Grand Mean]
MATTER, INDX=(1+2); POLITICAL TRUST: (1) FEDS DISHONEST (2) FEDS WASTE MONEY
(3) TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING (4) SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOVT.

TABLE 18:(CONTINUED)

	Size Growth			Comm. SizeNow			
	RURAL TOWN	SUB.	CITY	RURAL	1-10T	10-500T	500T+
<u>EXT.EFFICACY</u>							
(1) (2.23)	-.03	-.02	.10	.01	-.07	.13	.03
	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.10)	(.02)	(-.09)	(.09)	(.03)
eta/beta=		.04/.03			.05/.05		
signif.=		.404			.053		
(2) (2.57)	-.03	-.05	.10	.04	-.10	-.05	.00
	(-.16)	(-.10)	(.24)	(.13)	(-.23)	(-.15)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.11/.04			.13/.05		
signif.=		.292			.097		
Indx (2.22)	-.04	-.03	.06	.04	-.06	.02	.02
	(-.11)	(-.06)	(.12)	(.02)	(.17)	(-.04)	(.03)
eta/beta=		.09/.04			.10/.03		
signif.=		.325			.382		
<u>INT.EFFICACY</u>							
(1) (2.54)	-.01	.05	.15	-.06	-.16	-.15	.05
	(-.23)	(-.05)	(.40)	(.10)	(-.33)	(-.25)	(.05)
eta/beta=		.12/.05			.17/.09		
signif.=		.056			***.000		
(2) (2.56)	.08	.02	.00	-.07	-.23	-.06	-.07
	(-.12)	(-.05)	(.19)	(.08)	(-.30)	(-.13)	(-.04)
eta/beta=		.07/.04			.15/.11		
signif.=		.241			***.000		
(3) (4.17)	-.04	-.01	.26	-.03	-.01	.07	.08
	(-.06)	(-.04)	(.25)	(.01)	(-.11)	(.02)	(.09)
eta/beta=		.06/.06			.05/.04		
signif.=		***.006			.150		
Indx (2.30)	.02	.05	.04	-.06	-.18	-.10	-.01
	(-.16)	(-.04)	(.24)	(.08)	(-.29)	(-.18)	(.00)
eta/beta=		.11/.04			.19/.11		
signif.=		.162			***.000		
<u>POLITICAL TRUST</u>							
(1) (3.20)	-.09	-.06	.30	.04	.02	-.02	-.02
	(-.17)	(-.10)	(.38)	(.10)	(-.14)	(-.14)	(-.02)
eta/beta=		.12/.08			.09/.01		
signif.=		***.001			.936		
(2) (1.88)	-.07	-.01	.03	.04	-.01	.02	.03
	(-.15)	(.01)	(.09)	(.07)	(-.10)	(-.04)	(.00)
eta/beta=		.08/.04			.06/.02		
signif.=		.284			.793		
(3) (3.25)	.05	.08	-.04	-.09	-.04	-.01	.03
	(.06)	(.08)	(-.08)	(-.09)	(.02)	(.05)	(.04)
eta/beta=		.06/.06			.03/.02		
signif.=		*.032			.815		
(4) (3.41)	.05	.08	-.04	-.10	-.04	.18	.09
	(.02)	(.14)	(-.06)	(-.08)	(-.01)	(.22)	(.07)
eta/beta=		.08/.06			.09/.03		
signif.=		*.029			***.001		

EXT.EFFICACY:(1)IMP'S LOSE TOUCH (2)GOV'T DOESN'T CARE WHAT RESPONDENT THINKS,
 INDX=(1+2); INT.EFFICACY:(1)POLITICS COMPLICATED (2)NO SAY (3)VOTE DOESN'T
 MATTER, INDX=(1+2); POLITICAL TRUST:(1)FEDS DISHONEST (2)FEDS WASTE MONEY
 (3)TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING (4)SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T.

TABLE 18: (CONTINUED)

EXT. EFFICACY	HABIT	QWE	Region				Organiz.			Mult.R Sq.	
			QNT	PP	B.C	NCNE	1	2	3		
(1) (2.23)	-.14 (-.14)	-.01 (-.03)	.01 (.01)	.11 (.13)	-.07 (-.05)	-.08 (-.13)	.15 (-.16)	.05 (.04)	.04 (.06)	.10 (.17)	
eta/beta=			.06/.06					.10/.07			.031
signif.=			*.036					**0.006			
(2) (2.57)	-.18 (-.28)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.04 (.06)	-.01 (-.01)	-.05 (-.16)	-.05 (-.06)	-.01 (-.02)	.00 (.03)	.11 (.24)	
eta/beta=			.07/.04					.11/.05			.077
signif.=			.263					.171			
Indx (2.22)	-.14 (-.19)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.00)	.10 (.12)	-.04 (-.04)	-.06 (-.14)	-.09 (-.10)	.02 (.00)	.03 (.06)	.09 (.19)	
eta/beta=			.07/.06					.12/.06			.076
signif.=			*.044					*.043			
INT.EFFICACY											
(1) (2.54)	-.08 (-.27)	.07 (.04)	.00 (.02)	-.09 (-.03)	.03 (.09)	-.19 (-.37)	.11 (.11)	.02 (.02)	.07 (.15)	.17 (.36)	
eta/beta=			.06/.04					.20/.10			.173
signif.=			.248					***.000			
(2) (2.56)	-.04 (-.23)	-.15 (-.14)	.11 (.11)	.02 (.10)	-.02 (.02)	-.18 (-.31)	-.05 (-.07)	-.05 (-.05)	.10 (.14)	.23 (.38)	
eta/beta=			.09/.07					.18/.11			.093
signif.=			**0.004					***.000			
(3) (4.17)	-.09 (-.13)	-.09 (-.12)	.08 (.08)	-.01 (.04)	.02 (.07)	-.25 (-.33)	.17 (.15)	.02 (.01)	.11 (.14)	.20 (.30)	
eta/beta=			.07/.06					.19/.14			.070
signif.=			*.048					***.000			
Indx (2.30)	-.05 (-.23)	-.05 (-.06)	.07 (.07)	-.03 (.03)	.00 (.04)	-.17 (-.31)	.01 (-.01)	.00 (.00)	.09 (.14)	.17 (.33)	
eta/beta=			.08/.05					.22/.12			.166
signif.=			.108					***.000			
POLITICAL TRUST											
(1) (3.20)	-.13 (-.21)	.04 (.04)	.02 (.03)	-.03 (-.02)	.00 (.01)	-.05 (-.17)	.01 (.02)	-.13 (-.14)	.02 (.07)	.12 (.25)	
eta/beta=			.05/.03					.12/.06			.072
signif.=			.544					.056			
(2) (1.88)	-.13 (-.17)	.32 (.34)	-.12 (-.12)	-.07 (-.08)	-.13 (-.13)	.03 (.01)	-.10 (-.10)	.01 (.02)	-.06 (-.07)	.06 (.08)	
eta/beta=			.18/.17					.05/.05			.068
signif.=			***.000					.133			
(3) (3.25)	.11 (.16)	-.02 (-.01)	.07 (.06)	-.14 (-.13)	-.05 (-.09)	-.03 (.00)	.11 (.09)	.00 (.00)	-.02 (-.03)	.02 (-.01)	
eta/beta=			.07/.07					.03/.03			.022
signif.=			*.011					.578			
(4) (3.41)	.03 (.14)	.28 (.28)	-.03 (-.05)	-.20 (-.19)	-.27 (-.29)	.05 (.10)	-.12 (-.12)	-.03 (-.03)	-.02 (-.04)	.01 (-.04)	
eta/beta=			.16/.16					.06/.04			.048
signif.=			***.000					.327			

 EXT.EFFICACY:(1)MP'S LOSE TOUCH (2)GOV'T DOESN'T CARE WHAT RESPONDENT THINKS,
 INDX=(1+2); INT.EFFICACY:(1)POLITICS COMPLICATED (2)NO SAY (3)VOTE DOESN'T
 MATTER, INDX=(1+2); POLITICAL TRUST:(1)DS DISHONEST (2)FEDS WASTE MONEY
 (3)TRUST FEDS TO DO RIGHT THING (4)SMART PEOPLE RUN FED.GOV'T.

TABLE 19: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Ev. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prof. NonMain	Other
(n=)	(319)	(3035)	(319)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)	
ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST										
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST	(1.98)	-.08	.01	-.05	.06	-.13	.11	.04	.04	-.09
		(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(-.16)	(.17)	(.08)	(-.07)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.00/.03				.11/.09**				
signif.=		.101				.010				
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS	(.78)	.13	-.01	.16	.04	-.17	.02	.06	.01	.02
		(.14)	(-.01)	(.14)	(-.02)	(-.12)	(.05)	(.08)	(-.07)	(.08)
eta/beta=		.06/.06***				.12/.14***				
signif.=		.001				.000				
POLITICAL STIMULI										
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS	(2.06)	.11	-.01	.17	-.01	-.24	.10	.19	-.06	.05
		(.22)	(-.02)	(.22)	(-.06)	(-.24)	(.14)	(.23)	(-.20)	(.16)
eta/beta=		.07/.04*				.19/.16***				
signif.=		.023				.000				
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS	(1.89)	.08	-.01	.07	-.01	.00	.05	-.06	.01	-.05
		(.07)	(-.01)	(.07)	(-.05)	(-.06)	(.13)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.05)
eta/beta=		.02/.03				.07/.04				
signif.=		.131				.398				
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS	(1.73)	.04	.00	.04	.00	-.03	.04	.05	-.15	.00
		(.16)	(-.02)	(.16)	(-.02)	(-.10)	(.09)	(.07)	(-.21)	(.12)
eta/beta=		.05/.01				.10/.05				
signif.=		.488				.224				
POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3)	(2.63)	.11	-.01	.13	-.01	-.09	.06	.07	-.13	.02
		(.21)	(-.02)	(.21)	(-.06)	(-.17)	(.14)	(.13)	(-.22)	(.18)
eta/beta=		.06/.03*				.14/.07*				
signif.=		.039				.029				
POLITICAL ACTIVITY										
(1) CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE	(.61)	.05	.00	.01	-.03	.14	-.13	-.07	.08	-.04
		(.13)	(-.01)	(.13)	(.00)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(-.03)	(.08)	(.08)
eta/beta=		.04/.02				.07/.10*				
signif.=		.350				.013				

TABLE 19:(CONTINUED)

		None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Pr. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other
(2) ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY	[.53]	.12	-.01	.10	-.02	.06	.01	-.07	-.07	-.07
		(.12)	(-.01)	(.12)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(.09)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.03)
eta/beta=		.04/.05**				.07/.07*				
signif.=		.008				.046				
(3) WORK FOR PARTY	[.64]	.10	-.01	.05	-.13	.17	.01	-.05	-.01	-.09
		(.15)	(-.02)	(.15)	(-.08)	(-.05)	(.12)	(.03)	(-.03)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.05/.04*				.09/.12***				
signif.=		.031				.000				
(4) GIVE \$ TO PARTY	[.37]	.06	-.01	.03	-.02	.12	-.04	-.04	-.16	-.06
		(.06)	(-.01)	(.06)	(.00)	(.00)	(.03)	(.02)	(-.18)	(.01)
eta/beta=		.03/.02				.07/.10*				
signif.=		.175				.013				
(5) CONTACT POLITICIANS	[.39]	.04	.00	.03	.01	.03	.03	.00	-.12	-.16
		(.05)	(-.01)	(.05)	(-.01)	(-.02)	(.08)	(.04)	(-.18)	(-.07)
eta/beta=		.02/.02				.08/.07*				
signif.=		.318				.027				
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX (1+2+3+4)	[.85]	.00	.00	-.03	-.01	.11	-.05	-.05	-.01	-.11
		(.05)	(-.01)	(.05)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.02)	(.01)	(-.04)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.02/.00				.03/.08				
signif.=		.973				.245				
OTHER INTENSITY OF PARTY ID	[1.05]	-.06	.01	-.06	.03	-.02	-.04	.01	.04	.09
		(-.12)	(.01)	(-.12)	(.03)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(.04)	(.05)	(.07)
eta/beta=		.05/.03				.07/.05				
signif.=		.126				.283				
VOTE '84	[.85]	-.03	.00	-.04	-.01	.05	.02	-.01	-.03	-.12
		(-.03)	(.00)	(-.03)	(-.01)	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(-.05)	(-.08)
eta/beta=		.02/.02				.09/.11***				
signif.=		.176				.000				
VOTE INDEX ('79+'80+'84)	[2.78]	-.11	.01	-.15	.04	.13	.06	-.03	-.12	-.43
		(-.09)	(.01)	(-.09)	(.06)	(.04)	(.09)	(.01)	(-.16)	(-.38)
eta/beta=		.05/.06*				.19/.22***				
signif.=		.012				.000				
VOTE CONSISTENCY ('79+'80+'84)	[.68]	.02	.00	.04	-.05	-.08	.04	.07	.11	.02
		(.03)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.03)	(-.16)	(.05)	(.10)	(.16)	(.04)
eta/beta=		.02/.01				.21/.14**				
signif.=		.589				.003				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 20: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP ATTENDANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

ATTENDANCE
LEVEL:

(n=)	Never (600)	Yes (2731)	Never (600)	Yrly (1244)	Mthly (512)	Wkly (975)
<u>ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST</u>						
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST [1.98]						
	-.15 (-.14)	.03 (.03)	-.15 (-.14)	.01 (-.01)	.04 (.03)	.06 (.08)
eta/beta=	.07/.08***				.08/.08***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS [.57]						
	.04 (.03)	-.01 (-.01)	.04 (.03)	-.04 (-.07)	-.01 (-.01)	.03 (.07)
eta/beta=	.02/.03				.08/.05*	
signif.=	.121				.040	
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI</u>						
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS [2.06]						
	.02 (.04)	.00 (-.01)	.02 (.04)	-.02 (-.04)	.01 (-.01)	.01 (.03)
eta/beta=	.02/.01				.04/.02	
signif.=	.613				.800	
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS [1.89]						
	-.04 (-.07)	.01 (.02)	-.05 (-.07)	-.04 (-.09)	.12 (.12)	.03 (.09)
eta/beta=	.03/.02				.09/.06**	
signif.=	.199				.005	
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS [1.73]						
	-.04 (.00)	.01 (.00)	-.04 (.00)	-.01 (-.01)	.03 (-.01)	.03 (.02)
eta/beta=	.00/.02				.01/.03	
signif.=	.280				.484	
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3) [2.63]</u>						
	.01 (.03)	.00 (-.01)	.00 (.03)	-.03 (-.06)	.05 (.03)	.01 (.04)
eta/beta=	.01/.00				.04/.03	
signif.=	.861				.421	
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u>						
(1) CONVINCING FRIENDS VOTE [.61]						
	.01 (.03)	.00 (-.01)	.01 (.03)	-.04 (-.04)	.05 (.03)	.02 (.01)
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.03/.03	
signif.=	.776				.304	

TABLE 20:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yrly</u>	<u>Mthly</u>	<u>Wkly</u>
(2) ATTEND POLITICAL						
RALLY [.53]	.02	.00	.02	-.02	.05	-.01
	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.03)	(-.06)	(.07)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.07/.03	
signif.=	.474				.319	
(3) WORK [.64]						
FOR PARTY	.03	-.01	.03	-.02	.04	-.02
	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.06)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.00/.02				.04/.03	
signif.=	.301				.390	
(4) GIVE \$ [.37]						
TO PARTY	.00	.00	.00	.00	.04	-.02
	(-.04)	(.01)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.06)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.03/.00				.04/.03	
signif.=	.990				.455	
(5) CONTACT [.39]						
POLITICIANS	.00	.00	.00	.03	.04	-.06
	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.00)	(.04)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.02/.00				.03/.05*	
signif.=	.974				.042	
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY						
INDEX(1+2+3+4)	-.06	.01	-.06	-.03	.11	.02
[.85]	(-.07)	(.02)	(-.07)	(-.05)	(.10)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.04/.03				.08/.07**	
signif.=	.051				.002	
OTHER						
INTENSITY OF PARTY						
ID [1.05]	-.05	.01	-.05	-.02	.01	.05
	(-.09)	(.02)	(-.09)	(-.03)	(.03)	(.08)
eta/beta=	.06/.03				.09/.05	
signif.=	.079				.051	
VOTE '84 [.85]						
	-.06	.01	-.06	.00	.03	.02
	(-.07)	(.01)	(-.07)	(-.01)	(.03)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.09/.08***				.10/.08***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
VOTE INDEX						
('79+'80+'84)	-.09	.02	-.09	.01	.06	.00
[2.78]	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.10)	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.08/.07**				.08/.08**	
signif.=	.002				.008	
VOTE CONSISTENCY						
('79+'80+'84)	-.01	.00	-.01	-.02	.07	.00
[.68]	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.09)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.00/.01				.08/.07	
signif.=	.698				.092	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 21: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS SELF PERCEPTION, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY:	(n=)	Low (985)	High (2352)	Not		
				Very (985)	Fairly (1673)	Very (679)
<u>ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST</u>						
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST [1.98]		-.07 (-.04)	.03 (.02)	-.07 (-.04)	.02 (.01)	.05 (.02)
eta/beta=		.03/.05**		.03/.05*		
signif.=		.006		.016		
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS [1.78]		-.01 (.00)	.01 (.00)	-.02 (.00)	-.02 (-.02)	.08 (.07)
eta/beta=		.00/.01		.05/.06**		
signif.=		.493		.005		
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI</u>						
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS [2.06]		-.03 (.02)	.01 (-.01)	-.02 (.02)	.03 (.02)	-.04 (-.09)
eta/beta=		.02/.02		.04/.03		
signif.=		.300		.187		
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS [1.89]		-.07 (-.08)	.03 (.03)	-.07 (-.08)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.03)
eta/beta=		.05/.05**		.05/.05**		
signif.=		.005		.017		
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS [1.73]		-.07 (-.01)	.03 (.00)	-.07 (-.01)	.04 (.02)	.01 (-.05)
eta/beta=		.01/.03**		.03/.05*		
signif.=		.007		.023		
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3)</u>						
[2.64]		-.06 (-.01)	.03 (.00)	-.06 (-.01)	.04 (.03)	-.01 (-.06)
eta/beta=		.01/.04*		.03/.04*		
signif.=		.025		.043		
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u>						
(1) CONVINCING FRIENDS VOTE [.61]		.01 (.05)	-.01 (-.02)	.01 (.05)	-.02 (-.03)	.03 (.00)
eta/beta=		.03/.01		.04/.02		
signif.=		.600		.432		

TABLE 21:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Not</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>
			<u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>
(2) ATTEND POLITICAL					
RALLY [.53]	.01	.00	.01	.01	-.04
	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.03/.03		
signif.=	.768		.288		
(3) WORK [.64]					
FOR PARTY	-.03	.01	-.03	.01	.01
	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.03)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.02/.02		.03/.02		
signif.=	.170		.388		
(4) GIVE \$ [.37]					
TO PARTY	-.04	.02	-.04	.03	-.01
	(-.06)	(.02)	(-.06)	(.03)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.05/.02*		.05/.04		
signif.=	.051		.099		
(5) CONTACT [.39]					
POLITICIANS	.00	.00	.00	.01	-.04
	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)	(-.02)
eta/beta=	.01/.00		.02/.02		
signif.=	.904		.368		
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY					
INDEX(1+2+3+4)	-.05	.02	-.05	.04	-.02
[.85]	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.04)	(.03)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.03/.04*		.04/.05*		
signif.=	.017		.017		
OTHER					
INTENSITY OF PARTY					
ID [1.05]	-.04	.02	-.04	-.02	.10
	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.06)	(-.01)	(.11)
eta/beta=	.06/.03		.08/.07***		
signif.=	.082		.001		
VOTE '84 [.85]					
	-.04	.02	-.04	.02	.02
	(-.05)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.02)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.08/.08***		.08/.08***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
VOTE INDEX					
('79+'80+'84)	-.02	.01	-.02	.02	-.02
[2.78]	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.02)
eta/beta=	.02/.02		.03/.03		
signif.=	.453		.399		
VOTE CONSISTENCY					
('79+'80+'84)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
[.68]	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.02/.00		.05/.00		
signif.=	.969		.996		

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 22: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY THREE MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITHOUT AND WITH SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>		
	(n=)	<u>None</u> (719)	<u>Yes</u> (3035)	<u>Never</u> (600)	<u>Yes</u> (2731)	<u>Low</u> (985)	<u>High</u> (2352)
<u>ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST</u>							
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST [1.98]	.01	.00	-.13	.03	-.04	.02	
	(-.03)	(.00)	(-.12)	(.03)	(-.03)	(.00)	
eta/beta=	.01/.00		.06/.06***		.02/.03		
signif.=	.838		.001		.137		
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS [.78]	.14	-.01	.00	.00	-.04	.02	
	(.13)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.00)	
eta/beta=	.06/.06***		.02/.00		.01/.03		
signif.=	.001		.891		.068		
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI</u>							
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS [2.06]	.14	-.01	-.01	.00	-.04	.02	
	(.20)	(-.02)	(.04)	(-.01)	(.02)	(-.01)	
eta/beta=	.06/.05*		.02/.01		.01/.03		
signif.=	.018		.776		.104		
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS [1.89]	.16	-.02	-.07	.02	-.08	.03	
	(.05)	(.00)	(-.08)	(.02)	(-.08)	(.03)	
eta/beta=	.02/.05**		.04/.03		.05/.05**		
signif.=	.007		.079		.004		
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS [1.73]	.10	-.01	-.04	.01	-.08	.03	
	(.15)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	
eta/beta=	.05/.03		.00/.02		.00/.05**		
signif.=	.118		.407		.008		
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3)</u>							
[2.63]	.16	-.02	-.02	.00	-.08	.03	
	(.19)	(-.02)	(.02)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)	
eta/beta=	.06/.05*		.01/.01		.01/.05**		
signif.=	.015		.698		.006		
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u>							
(1) CONVINCING FRIENDS VOTE [.61]	.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	
	(.11)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.02)	
eta/beta=	.04/.01		.02/.00		.03/.00		
signif.=	.502		.982		.969		

TABLE 22:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
(2) ATTEND (.53)	.11	-.01	-.01	.00	.00	.00
POLITICAL RALLY	(.09)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.04*		.01/.01		.01/.00	
signif.=	.035		.729		.848	
(3) WORK (.64)	.13	-.01	.01	.00	-.05	.02
FOR PARTY	(.15)	(-.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.05/.05*		.00/.01		.02/.04*	
signif.=	.019		.752		.041	
(4) GIVE \$ (.37)	.09	-.01	-.01	.00	-.05	.02
TO PARTY	(.05)	(-.01)	(-.04)	(.01)	(-.05)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.02/.03		.02/.00		.05/.04*	
signif.=	.084		.878		.031	
(5) CONTACT (.39)	.04	.00	-.02	.00	.00	.00
POLITICIANS	(.03)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.01/.02		.02/.01		.01/.00	
signif.=	.403		.628		.831	
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY						
INDEX(1+2+3+4)	.06	-.01	-.05	.01	-.05	.02
[.85]	(.04)	(.00)	(-.07)	(.01)	(-.04)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.01/.02		.04/.03		.03/.04*	
signif.=	.261		.132		.029	
OTHER						
INTENSITY OF PARTY						
ID [1.05]	-.03	.00	-.03	.01	-.03	.01
	(-.13)	(.01)	(-.09)	(.02)	(-.06)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.06/.01		.06/.02		.06/.03	
signif.=	.523		.353		.203	
VOTE '84 [.85]	.02	.00	-.05	.01	-.04	.01
	(-.03)	(.00)	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.05)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.03/.02		.08/.07***		.08/.06***	
signif.=	.283		.001		.001	
VOTE INDEX						
('79+'80+'84)	-.09	.01	-.06	.01	.00	.00
[2.78]	(-.12)	(.01)	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.06/.05		.08/.05		.02/.00	
signif.=	.079		.069		.863	
VOTE CONSISTENCY						
('79+'80+'84)	.06	.00	-.03	.01	.00	.00
[.68]	(.04)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.04		.00/.03		.02/.00	
signif.=	.227		.397		.953	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 23: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY COMPOSITE RELIGIOUS INDICES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOSITY LEVEL:	Index of 3 Dichotomies				Index of 2 Trichotomies					
	(n=)	Low 0 (177)	1 (285)	2 (743)	High 3 (2085)	Low 0 (371)	1 (716)	2 (835)	3 (934)	High 4 (448)
ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST										
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST [1.98]		-.07 (.00)	-.19 (-.17)	-.04 (-.03)	.05 (.03)	-.14 (-.12)	-.06 (-.02)	.03 (-.01)	.02 (.01)	.12 (.13)
eta/beta=		.06/.08***				.07/.08***				
signif.=		.000				.001				
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS [.78]		.16 (.16)	-.01 (-.01)	-.06 (-.05)	.01 (.00)	.07 (.07)	-.06 (-.04)	-.03 (-.07)	-.02 (-.01)	.12 (.15)
eta/beta=		.06/.07***				.10/.08***				
signif.=		.001				.000				
POLITICAL STIMULI										
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS [2.06]		.08 (.16)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.00)	.00 (-.02)	-.01 (.03)	.03 (.08)	-.04 (-.09)	.03 (.02)	-.04 (-.04)
eta/beta=		.04/.02				.06/.03				
signif.=		.611				.369				
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS [1.89]		.07 (.06)	-.09 (-.13)	-.10 (-.09)	.04 (.04)	-.02 (-.05)	-.10 (-.09)	.01 (-.04)	.04 (.06)	.07 (.13)
eta/beta=		.07/.07***				.08/.06*				
signif.=		.001				.018				
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS [1.73]		.06 (.19)	-.09 (-.04)	-.09 (-.06)	.04 (.01)	-.03 (.04)	-.07 (-.02)	.01 (-.01)	.03 (.00)	.05 (.02)
eta/beta=		.05/.06**				.02/.04				
signif.=		.006				.231				
POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3) [2.63]		.10 (.20)	-.04 (-.02)	-.09 (-.06)	.03 (.01)	.02 (.05)	-.05 (-.01)	-.01 (-.06)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.04)
eta/beta=		.05/.05*				.04/.03				
signif.=		.018				.469				
POLITICAL ACTIVITY										
(1) CONVINCING FRIENDS VOTE [.61]		.16 (.24)	-.07 (-.06)	-.03 (.00)	.00 (-.01)	.06 (.09)	-.06 (-.03)	.02 (.00)	-.04 (-.06)	.10 (.09)
eta/beta=		.06/.05*				.06/.06*				
signif.=		.044				.011				

TABLE 23 : (CONTINUED)

	Index of 3 Dichotomies				Index of 2 Trichotomies				
	Low	1	2	High	Low	1	2	3	High
	0			3	0				4
(2) ATTEND [.53]	.16	-.05	.00	-.01	.04	-.02	-.01	.02	-.04
POLITICAL RALLY	(.13)	(-.10)	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(-.04)	(.05)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.05/.05*				.05/.03				
signif.=	.048				.513				
(3) WORK [.64]	.08	.00	-.02	.00	.02	-.03	.04	-.02	.00
FOR PARTY	(.09)	(-.01)	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.02				.02/.04				
signif.=	.571				.350				
(4) GIVE \$ [.37]	.16	-.13	-.05	.02	.01	-.06	.03	.01	.00
TO PARTY	(.13)	(-.15)	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.04)	(-.06)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.09/.08***				.05/.04				
signif.=	.000				.233				
(5) CONTACT [.39]	.10	-.08	.00	.00	.02	-.01	.04	.00	-.07
POLITICIANS	(.08)	(-.10)	(-.01)	(.01)	(-.01)	(-.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.05/.04				.02/.04				
signif.=	.101				.199				
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY									
INDEX(1+2+3+4)	.07	-.14	-.07	.04	-.02	-.11	.04	.04	.03
[.85]	(.12)	(-.14)	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.01)	(.04)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.08/.08***				.06/.07**				
signif.=	.000				.002				
OTHER									
INTENSITY OF PARTY									
ID	(1.05)	-.06	-.05	-.04	.03	-.05	-.05	-.01	.02
		(-.15)	(-.09)	(-.04)	(.04)	(-.11)	(-.05)	(-.02)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.08/.05				.10/.07**				
signif.=	.068				.008				
VOTE '84 [.85]	-.04	-.06	-.04	.03	-.06	-.05	.02	.03	.01
	(-.05)	(-.07)	(-.04)	(.03)	(-.07)	(-.04)	(.01)	(.04)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.10/.10***				.11/.10***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
VOTE INDEX									
('79+'80+'84)	-.12	-.08	-.02	.02	-.10	.00	.00	.05	-.04
[2.78]	(-.11)	(-.08)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.10)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.05)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.07/.07*				.08/.07*				
signif.=	.041				.025				
VOTE CONSISTENCY									
('79+'80+'84)	.04	-.05	.02	.00	-.04	.01	-.02	.02	.00
[.68]	(.04)	(-.04)	(.04)	(-.01)	(-.04)	(.03)	(-.02)	(.03)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.06/.04				.07/.05				
signif.=	.573				.550				

p=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 24 : CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ITEMS WITH THE RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE INDEX, FOR EACH RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		Eng.	Fr.	United	Cons.	Prot.	Other	All	
	(n=)	None	Cath	Cath	United	Main	NonMain	Other	All
		(319)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)	(3380)
<u>ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST</u>									
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST		-.0646	.1428**	.0739*	.0643	.1570**	.2032**	-.1037	.0597**
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS		.0019	.1058**	.0820*	.0657	.1624**	.1548*	.0862	.0351*
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI</u>									
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS		-.0056	.0323	-.0257	.1374**	.1316**	.2040**	-.1685**	-.0236
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS		-.0339	.1161**	.0564	.2091**	.1888**	.0409	.0155	.0713**
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS		-.0984	.0496	-.0134	.1503**	.1625**	-.0301	-.0937	-.0012
POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3)		-.0548	.0767**	-.0130	.1977**	.1647**	.0284	-.0713	.0036
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u>									
(1) CONVINC FRIENDS VOTE		-.1493*	.0562	.0054	-.0182	.0530	-.0246	-.0050	-.0069
(2) ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY		-.0448	.1200**	.0877*	.0081	.1360**	.0276	-.0595	.0332
(3) WORK FOR PARTY		.0815	.0681*	.0103	.0067	.1387**	-.0833	.0486	.0021
(4) GIVE \$ TO PARTY		-.1150*	.1385**	.0471	-.0014	.1446**	.0089	.0961	.0422*
(5) CONTACT POLITICIANS		-.0598	.1289**	.0597	-.0222	.0211	-.0944	-.0222	.0085
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX(1+2+3+4)		-.1169*	.1470**	.0655	-.0107	.1155**	-.0271	-.0309	.0243
<u>OTHER</u>									
INTENSITY OF PARTY ID		.0027	.0346	.1416**	.0384	.1737**	.0146	.0207	.0917**
VOTE '84		-.0213	.2393**	.0820*	.0879	.1573**	.0254	-.1666*	.0961**
VOTE INDEX ('79+'80+'84)		.0259	.2211**	.1211**	.1136*	.1059*	.0977	-.1960*	.0965**
VOTE CONSISTENCY ('79+'80+'84)		-.0456	.0092	.0707	.0243	.1877**	-.0370	.0924	-.0089

P=.05* P=.01**

TABLE 25: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY TWO REFINED MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITH AND WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:		<u>Relig.</u> <u>Pref.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
<u>ELECTION ATTENTION AND INTEREST</u>			
(1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST	e/b= p=	.12/.12** .002	.06/.09*** .001
(2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS	e/b= p=	.12/.16*** .000	.10/.09*** .000
<u>POLITICAL STIMULI</u>			
(1) READ ABOUT POLITICS	e/b= p=	.19/.17*** .000	.06/.06 .054
(2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS	e/b= p=	.07/.06 .125	.08/.08** .003
(3) DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS	e/b= p=	.10/.07* .037	.02/.06* .032
POLITICAL STIMULI INDEX (1+2+3)	e/b= p=	.14/.10** .003	.04/.06 .056
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u>			
(1) CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE	e/b= p=	.06/.10 .051	.06/.06* .037
(2) ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY	e/b= p=	.07/.06 .171	.05/.03 .672
(3) WORK FOR PARTY	e/b= p=	.10/.12*** .000	.02/.04 .272
(4) GIVE \$ TO PARTY	e/b= p=	.07/.10* .012	.05/.04 .223
(5) CONTACT POLITICIANS	e/b= p=	.08/.06 .073	.02/.03 .435

TABLE 25:(CONTINUED)

		<u>Relig.</u> <u>Prof.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY			
INDEX(1+2+3+4)	e/b=	.03/.06	.06/.07**
	p=	.508	.004
<u>OTHER</u>			
INTENSITY OF PARTY ID			
	e/b=	.07/.06	.10/.07*
	p=	.483	.026
VOTE '84	e/b=	.09/.10***	.10/.11***
	p=	.000	.000
VOTE INDEX			
('79+'80+'84)	e/b=	.19/.21***	.08/.05
	p=	.000	.395
VOTE CONSISTENCY			
('79+'80+'84)	e/b=	.21/.17***	.07/.09
	p=	.000	.082

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 26: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES, WITH AND WITH OUT CONTROLS FOR THESE VARIABLES

ELECTION_ATTENTN. (1) (1.98)	Relig. Pres. Index		Deter. Index		Gender M F		Age 19-33 40-49 50-64 65+					Educ. HS TECH UNIV					
	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	eta/beta	signif.	
(1) 1.98	.11/.09	**0.010	.06/.08	***.000	.07/.08	***.001	-.09	.09	-.31	-.02	.11	.27	.24	-.34	-.10	-.16	.29
							(-.09)	(.09)	(-.26)	(.03)	(.17)	(.23)	(.11)	(-.22)	(-.13)	(.10)	(.32)
eta/beta=	.11/.09		.06/.08		.07/.08		.10/.10			.20/.25				.21/.22			
signif.=	**0.010		***.000		***.001		***.000			***.000				***.000			
(2) 1.78	.12/.14	***.000	.06/.07	***.001	.10/.08	***.000	-.10	.11	-.30	-.02	.06	.27	.28	-.19	-.06	.11	.15
							(-.10)	(.11)	(-.27)	(.01)	(.07)	(.23)	(.20)	(-.05)	(-.08)	(.04)	(.18)
eta/beta=	.12/.14		.06/.07		.10/.08		.15/.15			.28/.32				.15/.16			
signif.=	***.000		***.001		***.000		***.000			***.000				***.000			
POL_STIMULI (1) 12.06	.19/.18	***.000	.04/.02	.611	.04/.03	.369	-.12	.13	-.34	-.03	.11	.29	.33	-.50	-.07	.12	.36
							(-.12)	(.13)	(-.27)	(.05)	(.11)	(.19)	(.14)	(-.38)	(-.11)	(.04)	(.43)
eta/beta=	.19/.18		.04/.02		.04/.03		.13/.13			.19/.27				.26/.26			
signif.=	***.000		***.000		***.000		***.000			***.000				***.000			
(2) 11.89	.07/.04	.398	.07/.07	***.001	.08/.05	*.018	-.10	.11	-.36	-.03	.09	.31	.37	-.11	-.10	.14	.17
							(-.10)	(.10)	(-.34)	(.00)	(.10)	(.28)	(.29)	(.06)	(-.13)	(.06)	(.18)
eta/beta=	.07/.04		.07/.07		.08/.05		.11/.11			.26/.29				.13/.13			
signif.=	.398		***.001		*.018		***.000			***.000				***.000			
(3) 11.73	.10/.05	.224	.05/.04	**0.006	.02/.04	.231	-.12	.13	-.34	-.04	.08	.11	.02	-.34	-.08	.08	.32
							(-.12)	(.13)	(-.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.04)	(-.10)	(-.34)	(-.11)	(.06)	(.40)
eta/beta=	.10/.05		.05/.04		.02/.04		.13/.13			.09/.10				.24/.21			
signif.=	.224		**0.006		.231		***.000			***.000				***.000			
Indx 12.63	.14/.07	*.079	.03/.04	*.018	.04/.03	.469	-.16	.17	-.39	.01	.13	.32	.30	-.42	-.11	.16	.36
							(-.17)	(.17)	(-.33)	(.08)	(.15)	(.23)	(.13)	(-.29)	(-.15)	(.08)	(.43)
eta/beta=	.14/.07		.03/.04		.04/.03		.16/.16			.21/.27				.24/.23			
signif.=	*.079		*.018		.469		***.000			***.000				***.000			
POL_ACTIVITY (1) 1.61	.07/.10	*.013	.06/.05	*.044	.06/.06	*.011	-.13	.13	-.06	.01	.07	.06	-.08	.01	-.04	-.03	.11
							(-.13)	(.13)	(-.07)	(.03)	(.09)	(.05)	(-.09)	(-.04)	(-.08)	(-.03)	(.21)
eta/beta=	.07/.10		.06/.05		.06/.06		.14/.14			.07/.06				.12/.06			
signif.=	*.013		*.044		*.011		***.000			*.013				**0.005			
(2) 1.53	.07/.07	*.044	.05/.05	*.048	.05/.03	.513	-.01	.01	-.20	-.03	.07	.18	.17	-.10	-.06	.03	.17
							(-.01)	(.01)	(-.20)	(.01)	(.10)	(.16)	(.09)	(-.06)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(.23)
eta/beta=	.07/.07		.05/.05		.05/.03		.07/.07			.17/.18				.15/.12			
signif.=	*.044		*.048		.513		.448			***.000				***.000			
(3) 1.64	.05/.17	***.000	.03/.02	.571	.02/.04	.350	-.05	.05	-.15	.07	.10	.08	.02	-.24	-.06	.08	.22
							(-.05)	(.05)	(-.13)	(.12)	(.12)	(.04)	(-.11)	(-.27)	(-.08)	(.04)	(.31)
eta/beta=	.05/.17		.03/.02		.02/.04		.26/.24			.13/.12				.21/.17			
signif.=	***.000		.571		.350		***.001			***.000				***.000			
(4) 1.37	.07/.10	*.013	.05/.06	***.000	.05/.04	.233	.02	-.02	-.09	-.03	.02	.12	.08	-.09	-.05	.00	.15
							(.02)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.01)	(.04)	(.10)	(.08)	(-.11)	(-.07)	(-.02)	(.23)
eta/beta=	.07/.10		.05/.06		.05/.04		.02/.02			.09/.10				.16/.11			
signif.=	*.013		***.000		.233		.211			***.000				***.000			
(5) 1.39	.08/.07	*.027	.05/.04	.101	.02/.04	.199	-.03	.03	-.17	-.05	.06	.19	.13	-.13	-.05	.00	.20
							(-.04)	(.04)	(-.16)	(-.01)	(.08)	(.16)	(.04)	(-.09)	(-.07)	(-.03)	(.23)
eta/beta=	.08/.07		.05/.04		.02/.04		.05/.04			.15/.18				.16/.14			
signif.=	*.027		.101		.199		*.032			***.000				***.000			
Indx 1.85	.03/.08	.245	.08/.08	***.000	.06/.07	***.002	-.07	.07	-.18	-.03	.09	.19	.06	-.12	-.08	.02	.22
							(-.07)	(.07)	(-.17)	(.02)	(.11)	(.16)	(-.02)	(-.12)	(-.11)	(.00)	(.30)
eta/beta=	.03/.08		.08/.08		.06/.07		.09/.09			.15/.17				.20/.15			
signif.=	.245		***.000		***.002		***.000			***.000				***.000			
OTHER (1) 11.05	.07/.05	.283	.08/.05	.068	.10/.07	***.008	-.04	.04	-.10	.01	.01	.05	.15	.04	.03	.03	-.11
							(-.03)	(.03)	(-.12)	(.00)	(.01)	(.07)	(.18)	(.11)	(.02)	(.00)	(-.11)
eta/beta=	.07/.05		.08/.05		.10/.07		.04/.06			.14/.11				.10/.09			
signif.=	.283		.068		***.008		***.003			***.000				***.000			
(2) 1.85	.09/.11	***.000	.10/.10	***.000	.11/.10	***.000	-.01	.01	-.11	.02	.05	.07	.07	-.07	-.02	.06	.05
							(-.01)	(.01)	(-.10)	(.03)	(.06)	(.06)	(.03)	(-.04)	(-.03)	(.04)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.09/.11		.10/.10		.11/.10		.03/.04			.19/.22				.11/.12			
signif.=	***.000		***.000		***.000		*.038			***.000				***.000			
(3) 12.78	.19/.22	***.000	.07/.07	*.041	.08/.07	*.025	-.01	.01	-.12	.05	.05	.06	.06	-.04	-.02	.07	.03
							(.00)	(.00)	(-.10)	(.06)	(.05)	(.01)	(.01)	(-.07)	(-.02)	(.08)	(.05)
eta/beta=	.19/.22		.07/.07		.08/.07		.01/.01			.11/.13				.09/.06			
signif.=	***.000		*.041		*.025		.619			***.000				.100			
(4) 1.68	.21/.14	*.003	.06/.04	.573	.07/.05	.550	-.02	.02	-.02	.01	-.04	-.01	.06	.09	.00	-.02	-.05
							(-.02)	(.02)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.09)	(.11)	(.00)	(-.05)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.21/.14		.06/.04		.07/.05		.03/.03			.10/.07				.11/.10			
signif.=	*.003		.573		.550		.201			.098				*.015			

ELECTION_ATTENTN.: (1) READ ABOUT POLITICS (2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS (3) DISCUSS POLITICS (Grand Mean)
 WITH OTHERS, INDX=(1+2+3); POL_ACTIVITY: (1) CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE (2) ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY (3) WORK FOR PARTY (4) GIVE \$ TO PARTY (5) CONTACT POLITICIANS, INDX=(1+2+3+4); OTHER: (1) INTENSITY OF PARTY ID (2) VOTE '84 (3) VOTE INDEX ('79-'80-'84) (4) VOTE CONSISTENCY ('79-'80-'84).

TABLE 26: (CONTINUED)

ELECTION ATTENT.	Size				Comm.			
	RURAL	TOWN	Sub Growth	CITY	RURAL	1-107	10-1007	1007+
(1) (1.98)	-.03 (-.01)(-.03)	.01 (.03)	.11 (.12)	-.02 (.00)(-.02)	.00 (-.08)(-.04)	-.01 (.00)	.01 (.06)	.00 (.06)
eta/beta=	.04/.05				.06/.01			
signif.=	*.047				.979			
(2) (1.78)	-.04 (.01)(-.04)	.00 (.03)	.06 (.02)	.01 (.02)(-.02)	.03 (-.05)(-.01)	-.03 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.04				.05/.03			
signif.=	.255				.457			
<u>POL. ACTIVITY</u>								
(1) (2.06)	-.07 (-.07)(-.08)	-.01 (.13)	.10 (.07)	.03 (-.11)(-.14)	.01 (.04)	-.07 (.09)	.03 (.09)	.00 (.09)
eta/beta=	.08/.05				.10/.03			
signif.=	.057				.290			
(2) (1.89)	-.06 (.04)(-.03)	.00 (.04)	.11 (.02)	.01 (.04)(-.05)	.09 (-.05)	-.05 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.04 (.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.05				.03/.06			
signif.=	.078				*.010			
(3) (1.73)	.01 (-.03)(.05)	-.01 (.17)	.10 (.02)	-.03 (-.10)(-.06)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.09)	-.04 (.09)	.04 (.09)
eta/beta=	.06/.04				.08/.04			
signif.=	.204				.230			
Indx (2.63)	-.05 (-.02)(-.06)	.00 (.11)	.10 (.02)	.01 (.07)(-.10)	.03 (.01)	-.06 (.00)	.01 (.07)	.00 (.07)
eta/beta=	.05/.04				.07/.03			
signif.=	.207				.474			
<u>POL. ACTIVITY</u>								
(1) (1.61)	-.01 (-.01)(-.04)	-.01 (.08)	.04 (.01)	.01 (-.01)(-.04)	-.05 (-.06)	-.07 (.01)	.01 (.05)	.05 (.05)
eta/beta=	.03/.01				.05/.05			
signif.=	.865				.063			
(2) (1.53)	.03 (.06)(-.03)	-.02 (.04)	.06 (.03)	-.02 (.01)	.01 (.05)	-.05 (.04)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
eta/beta=	.05/.03				.03/.04			
signif.=	.249				.245			
(3) (1.64)	-.01 (-.01)(-.03)	.01 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.00 (.01)(-.08)	.08 (.04)	-.03 (.00)	.02 (.06)	-.04 (.00)
eta/beta=	.03/.01				.04/.06			
signif.=	.945				*.026			
(4) (1.37)	-.03 (-.04)(-.03)	-.02 (.13)	.13 (.02)	.00 (.07)(-.06)	-.01 (-.01)	.02 (.05)	.03 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
eta/beta=	.06/.06				.05/.02			
signif.=	*.018				.682			
(5) (1.39)	.01 (.03)(-.04)	-.01 (.06)	.07 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.06 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.06 (.07)	-.01 (.03)
eta/beta=	.04/.03				.05/.05			
signif.=	.356				.068			
Indx (1.85)	-.01 (.00)(-.06)	-.05 (.10)	.10 (.03)	.02 (.05)(-.01)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)
eta/beta=	.06/.05				.04/.01			
signif.=	.058				.923			
<u>OTHER</u>								
(1) (1.05)	.02 (.07)(-.01)	-.01 (.08)	-.02 (.00)	-.02 (.06)	.02 (.00)	-.03 (.00)	-.01 (.00)	.00 (.03)
eta/beta=	.07/.02				.05/.02			
signif.=	.894				.749			
(2) (1.85)	-.02 (-.01)(-.01)	-.01 (.03)	.04 (.02)	.01 (.02)(-.02)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)
eta/beta=	.04/.06				.04/.03			
signif.=	*.021				.474			
(3) (2.78)	-.06 (-.06)(.00)	.00 (.03)	.06 (.04)	.04 (.04)(-.04)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
eta/beta=	.07/.08				.04/.01			
signif.=	*.024				.976			
(4) (1.68)	-.03 (.04)(.01)	.01 (-.02)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.09)	.07 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.04 (.02)	-.03 (.05)
eta/beta=	.06/.04				.12/.03			
signif.=	.657				*.019			

 ELECTION ATTENT.: (1) '84 ELECTION INTEREST (2) ATTENTION TO POLITICS; POLITICAL
 STR.: (1) READ ABOUT POLITICS (2) WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS (3) DISCUSS POLITICS
 WITH OTHERS, INDX=(1+2+3); POL. ACTIVITY: (1) CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE (2) ATTEND
 POLITICAL RALLY (3) WORK FOR PARTY (4) GIVE \$ TO PARTY (5) CONTACT POLITICIANS,
 INDX=(1+2+3+4); OTHER: (1) INTENSITY OF PARTY ID (2) VOTE '84 (3) VOTE INDEX
 ('79+'80+'84) (4) VOTE CONSISTENCY ('79+'80+'84).

TABLE 26: (CONTINUED)

ELECTION ATTENT.	Region								MULT_2 SM.	
	MARIT.	QUE.	ONT.	P.E.	P.C.	NDNF	1	2		3
(1) (1.36)	-.15	-.07	.01	.10	.08	-.15	-.03	.00	.05	.20
	(-.20)(-.08)	(.01)	(.14)	(.10)	(-.26)	(-.01)	(.09)	(.33)		
eta/beta=		.11/.08						.24/.14		
signif.=		***.000						***.000		.151
(2) (1.20)	-.06	-.03	.03	-.03	-.01	-.12	.03	-.05	.02	.18
	(-.11)(-.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.04)	(-.18)	(.07)	(-.05)	(.04)	(.24)	
eta/beta=		.07/.04						.22/.15		
signif.=		.141						***.000		.173
POL.STIMULI										
(1) (2.04)	-.11	-.06	.04	.02	.04	-.18	-.02	-.06	.07	.24
	(-.19)(-.12)	(.06)	(.08)	(.10)	(-.29)	(.02)	(-.08)	(.13)	(.37)	
eta/beta=		.11/.05						.26/.16		
signif.=		*.041						***.000		.165
(2) (1.89)	.03	-.01	-.05	.07	.05	-.16	-.07	-.06	.09	.22
	(.01)(-.03)	(-.06)	(.11)	(.08)	(-.22)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.10)	(.30)	
eta/beta=		.07/.05						.20/.15		
signif.=		.059						***.000		.143
(3) (1.73)	-.02	-.04	-.03	.05	.11	-.12	-.07	-.09	.03	.24
	(-.10)(-.06)	(-.03)	(.11)	(.14)	(-.23)	(-.05)	(-.09)	(.07)	(.35)	
eta/beta=		.08/.05						.22/.14		
signif.=		.075						***.000		.114
Indx(2.63)	-.06	-.05	-.02	.08	.11	-.19	-.07	-.10	.08	.30
	(-.14)(-.10)	(-.02)	(.14)	(.17)	(-.32)	(-.12)	(-.12)	(.13)	(.44)	
		.10/.06						.27/.18		
		*.023						***.000		.190
POL.ACTIVITY										
(1) (1.61)	-.10	-.02	-.01	-.04	.08	-.12	-.12	-.08	.06	.23
	(.03)(-.03)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.11)	(-.15)	(-.10)	(-.07)	(.07)	(.25)	
eta/beta=		.05/.05						.17/.15		
signif.=		.094						***.000		.065
(2) (1.53)	.12	.07	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.22	-.12	-.06	.05	.39
	(.07)(-.04)	(-.03)	(.07)	(.04)	(-.26)	(-.10)	(-.08)	(.06)	(.44)	
eta/beta=		.06/.05						.31/.27		
signif.=		.110						***.000		.134
(3) (1.64)	.00	-.03	.09	-.04	-.15	-.22	-.09	-.03	.02	.38
	(-.05)(-.09)	(.09)	(.04)	(-.11)	(-.28)	(-.08)	(-.04)	(.04)	(.45)	
eta/beta=		.10/.05						.31/.25		
signif.=		***.000						***.000		.139
(4) (1.37)	.06	.02	.04	-.10	-.09	-.18	-.13	-.08	.03	.35
	(.02)(-.02)	(.05)	(-.04)	(-.06)	(-.18)	(-.13)	(-.09)	(.03)	(.38)	
eta/beta=		.05/.08						.28/.25		
signif.=		***.000						***.000		.107
(5) (1.39)	-.12	.05	-.01	.05	-.06	-.17	-.06	.01	.04	.25
	(-.13)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.12)	(-.02)	(-.22)	(-.04)	(.00)	(.05)	(.30)
eta/beta=		.09/.07						.24/.20		
signif.=		***.005						***.000		.105
Indx (1.85)	.06	.00	-.02	-.03	.05	-.21	-.13	-.04	.10	.30
	(-.01)(-.03)	(-.02)	(.04)	(.08)	(-.27)	(-.11)	(-.05)	(.12)	(.37)	
eta/beta=		.04/.04						.29/.23		
signif.=		.369						***.000		.136
OTHER										
(1) (1.05)	.05	-.03	.05	.02	-.15	-.02	-.03	-.11	.02	.08
	(.06)(-.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(-.16)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(-.11)	(.02)	(.07)	
eta/beta=		.09/.05						.07/.08		
signif.=		***.000						***.001		.048
(2) (1.85)	.03	.00	.00	-.02	-.02	-.06	.00	.00	.04	.06
	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(-.08)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.05)	(.08)
eta/beta=		.02/.03						.18/.14		
signif.=		.478						***.000		.093
(3) (2.78)	.01	.03	-.01	-.01	-.09	-.14	-.01	-.02	.10	.10
	(-.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.07)	(-.15)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.10)	(.10)
eta/beta=		.05/.06						.18/.18		
signif.=		.146						***.000		.065
(4) (1.68)	.04	-.15	.03	.10	.04	.02	-.01	-.02	-.01	.00
	(.08)(-.16)	(.03)	(.10)	(.07)	(.01)	(-.01)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.00)	
eta/beta=		.20/.20						.02/.03		
signif.=		***.000						.916		.069

ELECTION ATTENT.: (1)'84 ELECTION INTEREST (2)ATTENTION TO POLITICS; POLITICAL STIMULI: (1)READ ABOUT POLITICS (2)WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS (3)DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS, INDX=(1+2+3); POL.ACTIVITY: (1)CONVINCE FRIENDS VOTE (2)ATTEND POLITICAL RALLY (3)WORK FOR PARTY (4)GIVE \$ TO PARTY (5)CONTACT POLITICIANS, INDX=(1+2+3+4); OTHER: (1)INTENSITY OF PARTY ID (2)VOTE '84 (3)VOTE INDEX ('79+'80+'84) (4)VOTE CONSISTENCY ('79+'80+'84).

TABLE 27: POLITICAL ISSUES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		None	Yes	None	Engl. Cath	Ex. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other
(n=)	(319)	(3035)	(319)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)	
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY										
(1) GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING										
	[3.88]	-.06	.01	-.08	.04	.11	-.19	.03	-.10	.02
		(-.17)	(.02)	(-.17)	(.02)	(.36)	(-.32)	(-.07)	(-.14)	(-.10)
		eta/beta= .04/.02				.18/.08*				
		signif.= .373				.015				
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING										
	[4.22]	-.12	.01	-.06	.17	-.23	.04	.01	.06	.11
		(-.21)	(.02)	(-.21)	(.11)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(.11)	(.00)
		eta/beta= .05/.03				.08/.12**				
		signif.= .070				.003				
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG										
	[3.84]	.05	-.01	.07	.11	-.10	-.01	-.03	.08	-.23
		(-.16)	(.02)	(-.16)	(.08)	(.11)	(-.05)	(-.08)	(.17)	(-.43)
		eta/beta= .04/.01				.11/.08*				
		signif.= .454				.023				
(4) GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED										
	[2.51]	.07	-.01	-.01	-.19	.32	.04	-.06	-.26	-.09
		(.06)	(-.01)	(.06)	(-.17)	(.12)	(.11)	(.04)	(-.24)	(.02)
		eta/beta= .01/.02				.09/.14***				
		signif.= .371				.000				
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH										
	[4.04]	.09	-.01	.17	.13	-.37	.07	.08	.21	-.07
		(.13)	(-.01)	(.13)	(.14)	(-.40)	(.09)	(.11)	(.25)	(-.09)
		eta/beta= .03/.02				.18/.16***				
		signif.= .188				.000				
(6) GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED										
	[4.64]	.00	.00	.02	.08	-.09	-.06	.01	.05	.01
		(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.09)	(-.03)	(-.10)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.03)
		eta/beta= .00/.00				.08/.09*				
		signif.= .973				.012				
(7) GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS										
	[3.92]	.12	-.01	.18	.16	-.27	.05	.02	-.15	.11
		(.06)	(-.01)	(.06)	(.12)	(.02)	(-.07)	(-.08)	(-.22)	(-.05)
		eta/beta= .02/.03				.08/.14***				
		signif.= .083				.000				

TABLE 27: (CONTINUED)

	None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Ex. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other	
MORAL										
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT	-.27	.03	-.21	.04	-.21	.16	.11	.12	.16	
{3.75}	(-.36)	(.04)	(-.36)	(.05)	(-.10)	(.12)	(.09)	(.20)	(.01)	
eta/beta=	.08/.06***				.10/.10**					
signif.=	.001				.003					
(2) CENSOR PORN	-.47	.05	-.41	.15	-.19	.04	-.05	.42	.29	
{3.92}	(-.65)	(.07)	(-.65)	(.09)	(-.11)	(.13)	(.01)	(.43)	(.23)	
eta/beta=	.15/.11***				.18/.16***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT	.63	-.07	.64	-.24	-.13	.38	.29	-.80	-.35	
{3.86}	(.62)	(-.06)	(.62)	(-.30)	(.12)	(.26)	(.21)	(-.92)	(-.40)	
eta/beta=	.13/.14***				.25/.25***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS	{2.85}	.57	-.06	.57	-.05	-.10	.07	.20	-.54	-.43
	(.80)	(-.08)	(.80)	(.00)	(-.18)	(.01)	(.16)	(-.64)	(-.30)	
eta/beta=	.16/.12***				.20/.17***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
OTHER										
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES	-.37	.04	-.37	-.07	.03	.21	.06	-.07	.23	
{3.51}	(-.51)	(.05)	(-.51)	(-.15)	(.26)	(.15)	(.02)	(-.08)	(.16)	
eta/beta=	.11/.08***				.15/.11***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS	{3.25}	.21	-.02	.13	.04	.31	-.33	-.16	-.03	-.35
	(.13)	(-.01)	(.13)	(.06)	(.38)	(-.40)	(-.19)	(-.05)	(-.42)	
eta/beta=	.03/.04*				.17/.14***					
signif.=	.019				.000					
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT	{2.95}	-.32	.04	-.22	.01	-.48	.43	.26	.42	-.10
	(-.16)	(.02)	(-.16)	(.10)	(-.73)	(.49)	(.33)	(.52)	(-.07)	
eta/beta=	.04/.07***				.29/.22***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR.	{2.31}	-.30	.03	-.27	-.07	-.09	.01	.21	.29	.19
	(-.25)	(.03)	(-.25)	(.00)	(-.33)	(.09)	(.30)	(.33)	(.28)	
eta/beta=	.06/.07***				.16/.11***					
signif.=	.000				.000					

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 28: POLITICAL ISSUES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP ATTENDANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

ATTENDANCE LEVEL:	(n=)	Never (600)	Yes (2731)	Never (600)	Yrly (1244)	Mthly (512)	Wkly (975)
<u>SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY</u>							
(1) GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING	[3.88]	.09 (.03)	-.02 (-.01)	.09 (.03)	-.03 (.00)	-.02 (-.02)	-.01 (-.01)
eta/beta=		.01/.03				.01/.04	
signif.=		.052				.262	
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING	[4.22]	-.04 (-.05)	.01 (.01)	-.04 (-.05)	.00 (-.02)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.04)
eta/beta=		.02/.01				.03/.01	
signif.=		.444				.883	
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG	[3.84]	.10 (.00)	-.02 (.00)	.10 (.00)	-.05 (-.08)	.06 (.10)	-.02 (.05)
eta/beta=		.00/.04*				.05/.05	
signif.=		.037				.060	
(4) GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED	[2.51]	-.02 (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.12 (-.13)	.05 (.05)
eta/beta=		.00/.01				.04/.04	
signif.=		.729				.180	
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH	[4.04]	-.01 (.03)	.00 (-.01)	-.01 (.03)	-.03 (-.06)	.10 (.11)	-.01 (.00)
eta/beta=		.01/.00				.05/.04	
signif.=		.853				.267	
(6) GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED	[4.64]	.02 (.02)	.00 (.00)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.01)	-.05 (-.04)	.01 (.00)
eta/beta=		.01/.01				.03/.03	
signif.=		.510				.391	
(7) GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS	[3.92]	.11 (.07)	-.02 (-.02)	.12 (.07)	.08 (.09)	-.06 (-.03)	-.15 (-.15)
eta/beta=		.03/.04*				.09/.09***	
signif.=		.018				.000	

TABLE 28:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yrly</u>	<u>Mthly</u>	<u>Wkly</u>
MORAL						
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT [3.75]	-.09 (-.11)	.02 (.03)	-.08 (-.11)	.11 (.09)	-.04 (-.01)	-.07 (-.04)
eta/beta=	.04/.03				.05/.06*	
signif.=	.111				.012	
(2) CENSOR PORN [3.92]	-.26 (-.38)	.06 (.08)	-.28 (-.38)	-.17 (-.27)	.08 (.16)	.35 (.49)
eta/beta=	.13/.09***				.26/.18***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT [3.86]	.58 (.59)	-.13 (-.13)	.63 (.59)	.38 (.38)	-.14 (-.14)	-.81 (-.80)
eta/beta=	.19/.18***				.37/.38***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS [2.85]	.51 (.60)	-.11 (-.13)	.52 (.60)	.04 (.09)	-.04 (-.05)	-.36 (-.45)
eta/beta=	.18/.15***				.23/.19***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
OTHER						
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES [3.51]	-.12 (-.19)	.03 (.04)	-.12 (-.19)	.05 (.03)	.01 (.00)	.01 (.09)
eta/beta=	.06/.04*				.07/.04	
signif.=	.029				.152	
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS [3.25]	.11 (.10)	-.03 (-.02)	.12 (.10)	.03 (.05)	.04 (.04)	-.13 (-.15)
eta/beta=	.03/.03				.06/.06*	
signif.=	.062				.021	
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT [2.95]	-.20 (-.13)	.05 (.03)	-.19 (-.13)	.07 (.05)	-.01 (.00)	.04 (.01)
eta/beta=	.04/.06***				.04/.06**	
signif.=	.001				.008	
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR. [2.31]	-.04 (-.02)	.01 (.00)	-.04 (-.02)	.03 (.00)	-.07 (-.06)	.02 (.04)
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.02/.03	
signif.=	.458				.540	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 29: POLITICAL ISSUES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY:					
(n=)	Low (985)	High (2352)	Not Very (985)	Fairly (1673)	Very (679)
<u>SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY</u>					
(1) GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING {3.88}	.01 (-.05)	.00 (.02)	.01 (-.05)	-.01 (-.02)	.01 (.12)
eta/beta=	.03/.00				.05/.01
signif.=	.796				.913
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING {4.22}	.06 (.02)	-.03 (-.01)	.07 (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.09 (-.05)
eta/beta=	.01/.03				.02/.05
signif.=	.065				.052
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG {3.84}	-.01 (-.12)	.01 (.05)	-.01 (-.12)	.03 (.06)	-.06 (.04)
eta/beta=	.06/.01				.06/.03
signif.=	.731				.352
(4) GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED {2.51}	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (-.03)	.04 (.05)
eta/beta=	.00/.00				.02/.01
signif.=	.937				.720
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH {4.04}	.01 (.05)	-.01 (-.02)	.02 (.05)	.00 (.02)	-.03 (-.12)
eta/beta=	.02/.01				.05/.01
signif.=	.687				.842
(6) GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED {4.64}	.04 (.03)	-.02 (-.01)	.04 (.03)	-.02 (-.02)	.00 (.00)
eta/beta=	.03/.03				.03/.03
signif.=	.079				.180
(7) GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS {3.92}	.09 (.05)	-.04 (-.02)	.10 (.05)	.04 (.05)	-.26 (-.20)
eta/beta=	.03/.05**				.08/.11***
signif.=	.007				.000

TABLE 29:(CONTINUED)

RELIGIOSITY:	Low	High	Not Very	Fairly	Very
MORAL					
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT [3.75]	.01 (-.04)	-.01 (.02)	.02 (-.04)	.05 (.08)	-.16 (-.14)
eta/beta=	.02/.01		.06/.06**		
signif.=	.777		.008		
(2) CENSOR PORN [3.92]	-.27 (-.40)	.12 (.17)	-.28 (-.40)	.07 (.12)	.25 (.30)
eta/beta=	.19/.13***		.19/.14***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT [3.86]	.55 (.50)	-.24 (-.21)	.58 (.50)	-.03 (-.04)	-.80 (-.66)
eta/beta=	.22/.24***		.27/.32***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS [2.85]	.30 (.38)	-.13 (-.16)	.31 (.38)	-.05 (-.07)	-.32 (-.40)
eta/beta=	.16/.12***		.18/.14***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
OTHER					
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES [3.51]	-.07 (-.14)	.03 (.06)	-.07 (-.14)	.03 (.03)	.02 (.14)
eta/beta=	.06/.03		.07/.03		
signif.=	.098		.250		
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS [3.25]	.02 (-.02)	-.01 (.01)	.03 (-.02)	.05 (.03)	-.16 (-.04)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.02/.05*		
signif.=	.609		.026		
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT [2.95]	-.05 (.07)	.02 (-.03)	-.05 (.07)	.03 (.04)	.01 (-.21)
eta/beta=	.03/.02		.07/.02		
signif.=	.292		.557		
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR. [2.31]	-.02 (.03)	.01 (-.01)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (-.01)	.07 (-.03)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.01/.02		
signif.=	.726		.494		

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 30: POLITICAL ISSUES BY THREE MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY,
WITHOUT AND WITH SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE
MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:	Preference		Attendance		Identity		
	(n=)	None (719)	Yes (3035)	Never (600)	Yes (2731)	Low (985)	High (2352)
<u>SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC</u>							
<u>INEQUALITY</u>							
(1) GOV'T ENSURE							
ADEQ. HOUSING		-.13	.01	.13	-.03	-.01	.00
[3.88]		(-.15)	(.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(-.05)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.04/.03		.01/.05*		.03/.00	
signif.=		.110		.017		.870	
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA							
BILLING		-.17	.02	-.02	.00	.09	-.04
[4.22]		(-.21)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.01)	(.03)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.05/.04*		.02/.01		.01/.05*	
signif.=		.038		.688		.014	
(3) RICH/POOR GAP							
TOO BIG		.00	.00	.11	-.02	-.03	.01
[3.84]		(-.16)	(.02)	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.12)	(.05)
eta/beta=		.04/.00		.00/.04		.06/.02	
signif.=		.994		.054		.356	
(4) GOV'T NOT							
RESPONSIBLE FOR							
UNEMPLOYED		.14	-.01	-.07	.02	.00	.00
[2.51]		(.08)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)
eta/beta=		.02/.03		.00/.02		.00/.00	
signif.=		.137		.297		.943	
(5) MORE TAXES FOR							
RICHES		.13	-.01	-.05	.01	.01	.00
[4.04]		(.12)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.02)
eta/beta=		.03/.03		.01/.02		.02/.00	
signif.=		.122		.354		.866	
(6) GOV'T ENSURE \$							
FOR AGED		-.01	.00	.01	.00	.03	-.01
[4.64]		(.01)	(.00)	(.02)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.00/.01		.02/.01		.02/.03	
signif.=		.756		.721		.141	
(7) GOV'T INCREASE							
WOMEN'S JOBS		.03	.00	.07	-.02	.07	-.03
[3.92]		(.06)	(-.01)	(.07)	(-.02)	(.04)	(-.02)
eta/beta=		.02/.01		.03/.03		.02/.04	
signif.=		.699		.194		.059	

TABLE 30:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
MORAL						
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT	-.23	.02	-.02	.00	.06	-.03
[3.75]	(-.31)	(.03)	(-.09)	(.02)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.07/.05*		.03/.01		.01/.03	
signif.=	.018		.744		.165	
(2) CENSOR PORN	-.23	.02	-.08	.02	-.23	.10
[3.92]	(-.60)	(.06)	(-.36)	(.08)	(-.40)	(.17)
eta/beta=	.14/.05**		.12/.03		.19/.11***	
signif.=	.008		.175		.000	
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT	.10	-.01	.36	-.08	.46	-.20
[3.86]	(.60)	(-.06)	(.59)	(-.13)	(.50)	(-.21)
eta/beta=	.12/.02		.18/.11***		.22/.20***	
signif.=	.307		.000		.000	
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS	.15	-.01	.38	-.08	.20	-.08
[2.85]	(.77)	(-.08)	(.61)	(-.13)	(.39)	(-.16)
eta/beta=	.15/.03		.18/.11***		.16/.08***	
signif.=	.152		.000		.000	
OTHER						
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES	-.38	.04	-.02	.00	-.01	.00
[3.51]	(-.52)	(.05)	(-.21)	(.04)	(-.14)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.11/.08***		.07/.01		.06/.00	
signif.=	.000		.813		.806	
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS	.15	-.02	.10	-.02	-.02	.01
[3.25]	(.12)	(-.01)	(.12)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.02/.03		.04/.03		.01/.01	
signif.=	.145		.181		.681	
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT	-.27	.03	-.10	.02	.01	-.01
[2.95]	(-.19)	(.02)	(-.12)	(.03)	(.06)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.04/.06**		.04/.03		.03/.01	
signif.=	.009		.149		.765	
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR.	-.30	.03	.06	-.01	.01	-.01
[2.31]	(-.21)	(.02)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.05/.07**		.00/.02		.02/.01	
signif.=	.003		.408		.777	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 31: POLITICAL ISSUES BY COMPOSITE RELIGIOUS INDICES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOSITY LEVEL:	Index of 3 Dichotomies					Index of 2 Trichotomies				
		Low		High		Low		High		
	(n=)	0 (177)	1 (285)	2 (743)	3 (2085)	0 (371)	1 (716)	2 (835)	3 (934)	4 (448)
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY:										
(1) GOV'T ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING [3.88]										
		-.05 (-.18)	.10 (.06)	.02 (-.02)	-.02 (.01)	.06 (-.01)	.03 (-.03)	-.06 (-.02)	.02 (.02)	-.02 (.04)
eta/beta=		.04/.03				.02/.03				
signif.=		.421				.478				
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING [4.22]										
		-.01 (-.08)	-.04 (-.09)	.04 (.03)	-.01 (.01)	.06 (.02)	.03 (.00)	-.05 (-.07)	.03 (.07)	-.06 (-.03)
eta/beta=		.03/.02				.04/.04				
signif.=		.752				.404				
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG [3.84]										
		.01 (-.23)	.08 (-.05)	.02 (-.02)	-.02 (.03)	.05 (-.11)	.00 (-.07)	-.04 (-.04)	.09 (.17)	-.15 (-.07)
eta/beta=		.05/.02				.09/.06*				
signif.=		.646				.013				
(4) GOV'T NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED [2.51]										
		.17 (.17)	-.10 (-.09)	-.02 (-.01)	.00 (.00)	.03 (.06)	-.02 (-.01)	-.02 (-.04)	-.01 (-.01)	.07 (.08)
eta/beta=		.03/.04				.03/.02				
signif.=		.263				.843				
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH [4.04]										
		.10 (.13)	-.02 (.00)	-.01 (.04)	.00 (-.02)	.02 (.05)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (-.07)	.03 (.05)	-.01 (-.07)
eta/beta=		.03/.02				.04/.02				
signif.=		.737				.911				
(6) GOV'T ENSURE \$ FOR AGED [4.64]										
		.00 (-.01)	.01 (.01)	.06 (.06)	-.02 (-.02)	.01 (.01)	.04 (.04)	-.03 (-.02)	-.02 (-.02)	.01 (.00)
eta/beta=		.05/.05				.03/.04				
signif.=		.080				.363				
(7) GOV'T INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS [3.92]										
		.13 (.03)	.15 (.12)	.06 (.03)	-.05 (-.03)	.17 (.09)	.05 (.02)	.12 (.15)	-.09 (-.06)	-.28 (-.25)
eta/beta=		.04/.06*				.11/.12***				
signif.=		.017				.000				

TABLE 31: (CONTINUED)

	Low	1	2	High	Low	1	2	1	High
	0			1	0				1
MORAL									
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT	-.37	-.03	.19	-.03	-.28	.26	.04	-.04	-.17
[3.75]	(-.48)	(-.08)	(.21)	(-.02)	(-.37)	(.26)	(.03)	(.02)	(-.18)
eta/beta=	.11/.09***				.13/.12***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(2) CENSOR PORN	-.43	-.33	-.18	.15	-.36	-.24	-.06	.17	.43
[3.92]	(-.59)	(-.46)	(-.25)	(.20)	(-.48)	(-.32)	(-.12)	(.30)	(.54)
eta/beta=	.20/.15***				.25/.18***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT	.85	.53	.47	-.32	.76	.58	.13	-.31	-1.22
[3.86]	(.74)	(.50)	(.43)	(-.29)	(.66)	(.50)	(.17)	(-.29)	(-1.11)
eta/beta=	.26/.28***				.36/.40***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS [2.85]	.80	.47	.11	-.17	.69	.15	-.06	-.06	-.60
	(.99)	(.59)	(.11)	(-.21)	(.81)	(.16)	(.01)	(-.13)	(-.69)
eta/beta=	.21/.18***				.25/.21***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
OTHER									
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES	-.36	-.22	.06	.04	-.20	.00	.09	-.02	.04
[3.51]	(-.46)	(-.31)	(.02)	(.07)	(-.29)	(-.06)	(.00)	(.02)	(.16)
eta/beta=	.10/.08***				.08/.06*				
signif.=	.001				.045				
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS [3.25]	.19	.15	-.02	-.03	.14	.00	.12	-.04	-.25
	(.08)	(.13)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.07)	(-.04)	(.14)	(-.04)	(-.19)
eta/beta=	.03/.04				.07/.08**				
signif.=	.145				.002				
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT [2.95]	-.40	-.05	-.02	.05	-.21	.00	.05	.02	.06
	(-.25)	(.04)	(.08)	(-.01)	(-.12)	(.13)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.10)
eta/beta=	.05/.07**				.05/.05				
signif.=	.004				.107				
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR [2.31]	-.17	-.11	.06	.01	-.10	.03	.03	-.07	.12
	(-.14)	(-.07)	(.12)	(-.02)	(-.08)	(.10)	(-.03)	(-.05)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.05/.04				.05/.05				
signif.=	.218				.166				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 32: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF POLITICAL ISSUES WITH THE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE INDEX, FOR EACH RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		Eng.	Pr.	United	Cons.	Prot.	Other	All
(n=)	None	Cath	Cath	United	Main	NonMain	Other	All
	(319)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)	(3380)
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY								
(1) GOVT ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING	.0135	-.0141	.0172	-.0728	-.0505	-.0749	-.1742*	.0189
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING	-.0761	.0096	.0526	-.0963*	-.0455	-.0889	-.0937	.0016
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG	.0899	-.0103	.0871*	.0375	-.0373	-.1070	.0267	.0473**
(4) GOVT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED	-.0674	.0228	.0160	.0230	.0523	-.0294	.0335	.0003
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH	-.0712	-.0188	.0204	.0957*	.0416	-.0552	.1082	-.0162
(6) GOVT ENSURE \$ FOR AGED	.0686	-.0171	-.0416	-.0209	-.0719	-.0936	.0536	-.0187
(7) GOVT INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS	-.0128	-.0073	-.1413**	-.0005	-.0775	-.2539**	-.2281**	-.0740**
MORAL								
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT	.0639	-.0909*	.1164**	-.0936**	-.1713**	-.0825	.0455	-.0076
(2) CENSOR PORN	.0422	.1972**	.2663**	.1881**	.2340**	.2647**	.4567**	.2444**
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT	-.1462*	-.3206**	-.2564**	-.2881**	-.2958**	-.4643**	-.5017**	-.3463**
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS	-.1249*	-.1618**	-.2439**	-.0328	-.1397**	-.2059**	-.3471**	-.2339**
OTHER								
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES	.0409	-.0121	.0876*	.0088	.0879*	-.0221	-.0260	.0749**
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS	.0499	-.0610	-.1461**	-.0604	-.0904*	-.0918	.0122	-.0343
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT	.0042	.0582	.0779	.0251	-.0039	.0168	-.1010	-.0126
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR.	-.0648	.0798*	.0188	-.0624	-.0414	.0070	.0171	.0000

P=.05* P=.01**

TABLE 33: POLITICAL ISSUES BY TWO REFINED MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITH AND WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:		<u>Reliq.</u> <u>Pref.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
<u>SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUAL.</u>			
(1) GOVT ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING	e/b= p=	.18/.09** .007	.02/.05 .277
(2) OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING	e/b= p=	.08/.12*** .000	.04/.06 .082
(3) RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG	e/b= p=	.11/.07* .030	.09/.06* .019
(4) GOVT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED	e/b= p=	.09/.13*** .000	.03/.03 .664
(5) MORE TAXES FOR RICH	e/b= p=	.18/.17*** .000	.04/.02 .842
(6) GOVT ENSURE \$ FOR UNEMPLOYED	e/b= p=	.09/.09** .006	.03/.05 .199
(7) GOVT INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS	e/b= p=	.09/.12** .002	.11/.12*** .000
<u>MORAL</u>			
(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISH.	e/b= p=	.09/.08 .154	.12/.11*** .000
(2) CENSOR PORN	e/b= p=	.17/.14*** .000	.25/.16*** .000
(3) ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT	e/b= p=	.25/.13*** .000	.37/.37*** .000
(4) PERMIT GAY TEACHERS	e/b= p=	.20/.09*** .000	.25/.19*** .000
<u>OTHER</u>			
(1) OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES	e/b= p=	.15/.10*** .000	.09/.03 .553
(2) OPPOSE HIRING SCABS	e/b= p=	.17/.16*** .000	.07/.09*** .000
(3) INCREASE NATO SUPPORT	e/b= p=	.29/.22*** .000	.05/.04 .589
(4) SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIOR.	e/b= p=	.16/.10*** .000	.04/.03 .531
P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***			

TABLE 34: POLITICAL ISSUES BY SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR THESE VARIABLES

SOCIAL & ECON. (1) (3.88)	Relig. Index		Deter. Index		Gender		Age					EDUC.			
	beta	SE	beta	SE	M	F	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+	ELMH.	HS	TECH	UNIV
eta/beta=.18/.08	.04/.03	.02/.03	.03/.02	.0178	.03	-.03	.23	-.02	-.17	-.14	-.14	.32	.02	-.03	-.16
signif.= * .015	.421	.478			(.03)	(-.03)	(.19)	(-.06)	(-.18)	(-.06)	(-.06)	(.24)	(.02)	(-.03)	(-.17)
(2) (4.22)					.05	-.05	-.02	-.05	-.12	.11	.10	.04	.11	-.07	-.21
eta/beta=.08/.12	.03/.02	.04/.04			(.06)	(-.06)	(-.04)	(-.07)	(-.13)	(.13)	(.17)	(.17)	(.13)	(-.10)	(-.31)
signif.= ** .003	.752	.404			.05/.04				.08/.07				.15/.11		***.000
(3) (3.84)					.09	-.09	.00	.00	-.03	.06	-.08	.33	.13	-.11	-.39
eta/beta=.11/.08	.05/.02	.09/.06			(.10)	(-.10)	(-.07)	(-.05)	(-.02)	(.14)	(.06)	(.43)	(.16)	(-.14)	(-.49)
signif.= * .023	.646	*.013			.08/.07				.07/.03				.24/.19		***.000
(4) (2.51)					-.04	.04	-.19	.09	-.09	.09	.30	-.20	-.01	.07	.09
eta/beta=.09/.14	.03/.04	.03/.02			(-.04)	(.04)	(-.16)	(.10)	(-.09)	(.07)	(.24)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.04)
signif.= ***.000	.263	.843			.03/.03				.09/.11				.02/.06		*.030
(5) (4.04)					-.13	.13	-.19	.00	.04	.15	.19	.16	.04	.01	-.19
eta/beta=.18/.16	.03/.02	.04/.02			(-.12)	(.12)	(-.21)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.14)	(.23)	(.23)	(.05)	(-.08)	(-.20)
signif.= ***.000	.080	.911			.09/.10				.11/.11				.12/.08		***.001
(6) (4.64)					.03	-.03	.06	.03	-.05	-.04	-.09	.13	.01	-.01	-.08
eta/beta=.08/.09	.05/.05	.03/.04			(.03)	(-.04)	(.05)	(.02)	(-.05)	(-.02)	(-.05)	(.08)	(.01)	(.00)	(-.07)
signif.= * .012	.090	.363			.05/.05				.05/.08				.06/.09		***.001
(7) (3.92)					.08	-.08	.12	.02	-.13	-.02	-.17	.07	.06	-.08	-.10
eta/beta=.08/.14	.04/.06	.11/.12			(.07)	(-.07)	(.14)	(.03)	(-.13)	(-.04)	(-.19)	(-.06)	(.06)	(-.03)	(-.07)
signif.= ***.000	*.017	***.000			.06/.07				.10/.09				.05/.06		*.019
MORAL (1) (3.75)					-.04	.04	-.07	.02	-.02	.04	.10	.41	.20	-.11	-.57
eta/beta=.10/.10	.11/.09	.13/.12			(-.03)	(.03)	(-.13)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(.09)	(.27)	(.47)	(.23)	(-.14)	(-.64)
signif.= ** .003	***.000	***.000			.02/.03				.09/.04				.26/.23		***.000
(2) (3.92)					.31	-.32	-.37	-.03	.04	.30	.45	.20	-.03	.05	-.10
eta/beta=.18/.16	.20/.15	.25/.18			(.34)	(-.35)	(-.46)	(-.08)	(.06)	(.41)	(.56)	(.51)	(.01)	(-.07)	(-.26)
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000			.25/.23				.27/.21				.16/.06		** .005
(3) (3.86)					.11	-.11	-.09	.06	.08	.04	-.04	-.04	.05	-.06	-.04
eta/beta=.25/.25	.26/.28	.36/.40			(.03)	(-.03)	(.03)	(.12)	(.08)	(-.10)	(-.12)	(-.21)	(.06)	(-.03)	(.02)
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000			.02/.07				.07/.05				.06/.03		.295
(4) (2.85)					.23	-.24	.23	.12	.03	-.24	-.46	-.23	-.13	.09	.36
eta/beta=.20/.17	.21/.18	.25/.21			(.18)	(-.18)	(.35)	(.18)	(.02)	(-.36)	(-.69)	(-.74)	(-.15)	(.18)	(.57)
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000			.11/.15				.22/.15				.25/.14		***.000
OTHER (1) (3.51)					-.02	.02	-.11	-.13	.00	.12	.34	.10	.02	.03	-.12
eta/beta=.15/.11	.10/.08	.08/.06			(.00)	(.00)	(-.13)	(-.16)	(.00)	(.17)	(.36)	(.30)	(.03)	(.01)	(-.24)
signif.= ***.000	***.001	*.045			.00/.01				.12/.11				.11/.05		.119
(2) (3.25)					-.02	.02	.03	.10	.06	-.04	-.27	.20	.04	-.12	-.10
eta/beta=.17/.14	.03/.04	.07/.08			(-.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.09)	(.05)	(-.05)	(-.25)	(.13)	(.04)	(-.08)	(-.10)
signif.= ***.000	.145	** .002			.01/.01				.06/.07				.05/.06		*.018
(3) (2.95)					-.23	.23	-.11	-.03	.00	.20	-.01	-.07	.05	.03	-.08
eta/beta=.29/.27	.05/.07	.05/.05			(-.22)	(.22)	(-.10)	(-.02)	(-.02)	(.16)	(.05)	(-.03)	(.05)	(-.06)	(-.03)
signif.= ***.000	** .004	.107			.14/.14				.06/.08				.03/.04		.228
(4) (2.31)					-.11	.11	-.22	-.07	.08	.26	.19	.03	.04	-.10	-.01
eta/beta=.16/.11	.05/.04	.05/.05			(-.11)	(.11)	(-.23)	(-.06)	(.07)	(.24)	(.22)	(.15)	(.04)	(-.17)	(-.02)
signif.= ***.000	.218	.166			.07/.07				.13/.11				.06/.03		.351

SOCIAL & ECON.: (1)GOVT ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING (2)OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING (3)RICH/POOR P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
 GAP TOO BIG (4)GOVT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED (5)MORE TAXES FOR RICH (Grand Mean)
 (6)GOVT ENSURE \$ FOR AGED (7)GOVT INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS; MORAL:(1) SUPPORT
 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2)CENSOR PORN (3)ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (4)PERMIT GAY
 TEACHERS; OTHER:(1)OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES (2)OPPOSE HIRING SCADS
 (3)INCREASE NATO SUPPORT (4)SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

TABLE 34:(CONTINUED)

SOCIAL & ECONOMIC	Region								MULTI-R	
	MARIT	QUE	ONT	PR	R.C.	NDNF	1	2		
(1) [3.88]	.09	.28	-.06	-.20	-.23	.11	-.05	-.06	-.01	-.10
	(.09)	(.32)	(-.06)	(-.25)	(-.24)	(.21)	(-.04)	(-.05)	(-.05)	(-.22)
eta/beta*		.19/.16						.13/.07		
signif.**		***.000						**.006		.074
(2) [4.22]	.18	-.02	-.09	.05	.12	.17	-.11	-.04	-.07	-.12
	(.26)	(-.01)	(-.10)	(.02)	(.10)	(.21)	(-.11)	(-.03)	(-.09)	(-.17)
eta/beta*		.08/.07						.13/.10		
signif.**		***.000						***.000		.047
(3) [3.84]	.07	.09	-.04	-.02	-.10	.07	-.08	-.10	.03	-.06
	(.26)	(.08)	(-.05)	(-.04)	(-.14)	(.19)	(-.09)	(-.11)	(-.02)	(-.18)
eta/beta*		.08/.05						.12/.05		
signif.**		.084						.054		.088
(4) [2.51]	-.17	.04	.07	-.13	-.01	.04	.07	.08	-.03	-.11
	(-.16)	(.05)	(.07)	(-.15)	(.01)	(.03)	(.09)	(.08)	(-.03)	(-.09)
eta/beta*		.07/.06						.04/.05		
signif.**		*.031						.231		.024
(5) [4.04]	.01	-.34	.16	.09	.13	.07	-.04	-.15	-.01	.01
	(.10)	(-.34)	(.16)	(.05)	(.13)	(.06)	(-.01)	(-.16)	(.00)	(.00)
eta/beta*		.16/.16						.05/.05		
signif.**		***.000						.052		.068
(6) [4.64]	.02	-.04	.04	-.04	-.01	.05	-.02	-.07	.00	-.02
	(.01)	(-.02)	(.05)	(-.06)	(-.02)	(.07)	(-.03)	(-.06)	(-.01)	(-.04)
eta/beta*		.06/.05						.08/.05		
signif.**		.075						.075		.023
(7) [3.92]	.12	.11	.01	-.09	-.26	.01	.02	-.06	-.03	.04
	(.09)	(.08)	(.03)	(-.09)	(-.21)	(.06)	(.05)	(-.06)	(-.05)	(-.03)
eta/beta*		.08/.10						.04/.03		
signif.**		***.000						.666		.014
(8) [3.75]	-.02	-.12	.00	.15	.06	.09	-.14	-.10	.08	-.10
	(.12)	(-.11)	(.01)	(.12)	(-.02)	(.16)	(-.12)	(-.12)	(.07)	(-.23)
eta/beta*		.06/.06						.11/.07		
signif.**		*.036						**.008		.099
(9) [3.92]	-.06	-.20	.06	.11	.14	.01	-.04	-.05	-.01	.03
	(.02)	(-.09)	(.00)	(.10)	(.04)	(.03)	(-.11)	(-.08)	(-.04)	(.09)
eta/beta*		.05/.09						.05/.07		
signif.**		***.000						.874		.183
(10) [2.86]	-.29	.37	-.08	-.10	-.25	.00	.07	-.01	-.01	-.01
	(-.37)	(.17)	(.01)	(-.10)	(.00)	(.06)	(.19)	(-.06)	(.00)	(-.12)
eta/beta*		.10/.16						.06/.01		
signif.**		***.000						.939		.171
(11) [2.85]	-.05	.01	.00	.01	.00	-.14	.17	-.09	.17	.00
	(-.32)	(-.11)	(.08)	(.02)	(.19)	(-.20)	(.19)	(-.09)	(.20)	(.06)
eta/beta*		.09/.01						.11/.08		
signif.**		.987						***.000		.173
OTHER										
(1) [3.51]	-.05	.22	-.14	-.01	-.02	.10	-.24	.08	-.09	-.01
	(-.01)	(.25)	(-.16)	(.00)	(-.08)	(.15)	(-.21)	(.09)	(-.12)	(-.06)
eta/beta*		.11/.10						.09/.07		
signif.**		***.000						**.004		.047
(2) [3.25]	.03	.29	.02	-.34	-.25	.12	-.01	-.03	-.03	-.12
	(.03)	(.30)	(.04)	(-.40)	(-.24)	(.19)	(.02)	(-.03)	(-.06)	(-.21)
eta/beta*		.15/.14						.10/.04		
signif.**		***.000						.070		.044
(3) [2.95]	.51	-.63	.22	.20	.09	-.05	-.02	.05	-.04	.10
	(.52)	(-.62)	(.22)	(.21)	(.06)	(-.13)	(-.03)	(.04)	(.02)	(.14)
eta/beta*		.26/.26						.07/.04		
signif.**		***.000						.374		.096
(4) [2.31]	.23	-.33	.12	.16	-.02	-.03	.07	.03	.03	-.03
	(.21)	(-.31)	(.12)	(.15)	(-.04)	(-.07)	(.07)	(.02)	(.04)	(.01)
eta/beta*		.13/.14						.04/.02		
signif.**		***.000						.826		.044

SOCIAL & ECONOMIC: (1)GOVT ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING (2)OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING FOR RICH (3)RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG (4)GOVT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED (5)MORE TAXES FOR RICH (6)GOVT ENSURE \$ FOR AGED (7)GOVT INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS; MORAL:(1)SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2)CENSOR PORN (3)ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (4)PERMIT GAY TEACHERS; OTHER:(1)OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES (2)OPPOSE HIRING SCABS (3)INCREASE NATO SUPPORT (4)SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

TABLE 34:(CONTINUED)

SOCIAL & ECONOMIC (1) (3.88)	Size				Class			
	RURAL	TOWN	Sub.	CITY	RURAL	1-300	10-500	500+
eta/beta=	-.06	.03	-.05	.03	-.18	.16	.07	.04
signif.=	(-.14)	(.10)	(-.04)	(.03)	(-.17)	(.17)	(.01)	(.07)
	.07/.03				.09/.09			
	.268				***.000			
(2) (4.27)	.04	.04	-.05	-.05	.04	.02	-.04	-.01
eta/beta=	(.11)	(.07)	(-.12)	(-.10)	(.14)	(.07)	(-.05)	(-.08)
signif.=	.08/.04				.08/.02			
	.357				.671			
(3) (3.84)	.05	.07	-.08	-.06	.16	.04	.08	-.13
eta/beta=	(.19)	(.12)	(-.23)	(-.17)	(.28)	(.14)	(.06)	(-.23)
signif.=	.13/.05				.17/.15			
	.100				***.000			
(4) (2.51)	-.02	.01	.10	-.02	.13	-.18	-.04	.01
eta/beta=	(-.01)	(-.02)	(.12)	(-.00)	(.08)	(-.22)	(-.04)	(.05)
signif.=	.03/.02				.07/.07			
	.620				**.004			
(5) (4.04)	-.10	.03	.06	.03	.10	.04	.09	-.11
eta/beta=	(-.06)	(.02)	(.06)	(.04)	(.12)	(.07)	(.13)	(-.15)
signif.=	.03/.05				.10/.07			
	.254				**.004			
(6) (4.64)	-.02	.03	-.05	.01	-.06	.01	-.01	.03
eta/beta=	(-.05)	(.03)	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.04)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)
signif.=	.05/.04				03/.05			
	.246				.105			
(7) (3.97)	-.06	.00	-.16	.08	-.11	.11	.08	-.01
eta/beta=	(-.12)	(.03)	(-.14)	(.20)	(-.13)	(.09)	(.09)	(.00)
signif.=	.08/.06				.07/.07			
	*.019				*.011			
MORAL								
(1) (3.75)	-.05	.06	-.29	.06	.08	.10	.02	-.09
eta/beta=	(.14)	(.09)	(-.43)	(-.04)	(.20)	(.22)	(.01)	(-.19)
signif.=	.11/.07				.12/.05			
	**.002				.061			
(2) (3.92)	.12	.03	.01	-.11	.04	.05	-.05	-.02
eta/beta=	(.26)	(.06)	(.19)	(-.18)	(.14)	(.11)	(-.04)	(-.10)
signif.=	.13/.07				.08/.03			
	**.006				.543			
(3) (3.84)	-.17	.02	-.02	.11	.01	.10	-.01	-.03
eta/beta=	(-.27)	(.02)	(.04)	(.16)	(-.14)	(.00)	(-.06)	(.10)
signif.=	.11/.07				.07/.03			
	**.002				.484			
(4) (2.85)	-.10	.02	-.10	.08	-.22	-.16	.02	.17
eta/beta=	(-.41)	(-.07)	(.18)	(.28)	(-.40)	(-.33)	(.03)	(.31)
signif.=	.17/.05				.20/.11			
	.063				***.000			
OTHER								
(1) (3.51)	.11	-.04	-.04	-.04	.12	.10	-.15	.04
eta/beta=	(.18)	(-.02)	(-.10)	(-.09)	(.19)	(.06)	(-.20)	(.00)
signif.=	.08/.04				.09/.07			
	.180				**.004			
(2) (3.25)	-.08	.03	.04	.03	-.12	.04	.12	.00
eta/beta=	(-.17)	(.08)	(.06)	(.05)	(-.14)	(.04)	(.11)	(.07)
signif.=	.07/.03				.02/.05			
	.488				.061			
(3) (2.95)	-.08	-.03	.13	.04	.06	.00	.01	-.04
eta/beta=	(.07)	(-.07)	(.06)	(.01)	(.12)	(.01)	(.09)	(-.11)
signif.=	.04/.04				.07/.02			
	.259				.707			
(4) (2.31)	-.05	.02	.06	-.00	.01	.00	-.09	.03
eta/beta=	(.06)	(-.01)	(-.02)	(-.03)	(.05)	(.01)	(-.06)	(-.01)
signif.=	.02/.02				.07/.03			
	.771				.435			

SOCIAL & ECONOMIC: (1)GOVT ENSURE ADEQ. HOUSING (2)OPPOSE EXTRA BILLING FOR RICH (3)RICH/POOR GAP TOO BIG (4)GOVT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYED (5)MORE TAXES FOR RICH (6)GOVT ENSURE \$ FOR AGED (7)GOVT INCREASE WOMEN'S JOBS; MORAL:(1) SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2)CENSOR PORN (3)ABORTION WOMAN'S RIGHT (4)PERMIT GAY TEACHERS; OTHER:(1)OPPOSE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES (2)OPPOSE HIRING SCABS (3)INCREASE NATO SUPPORT (4)SUPPORT U.S. NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

TABLE 35: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE

TYPE:

	None (n=)	Yes (319)	None (3035)	Eng. Cath (845)	Ev. Cath (780)	United (476)	Cons. Main (534)	Prot. NonMain (228)	Other (172)
POWER ITEMS									
#OP POWER GROUPS	.00	.00	.00	-.07	-.01	.06	.03	.05	.08
{2.12}	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(-.08)	(.03)	(.04)	(.02)	(.05)	(.05)
eta/beta=	.01/.00				.07/.07				
signif.=	.960				.078				
EXTENT OF POWER:									
(1) LAB UNIONS	-.11	.01	-.10	-.02	-.05	.10	.06	.01	.00
{2.62}	(-.11)	(.01)	(-.11)	(-.05)	(.00)	(.10)	(.06)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.06/.06***				.11/.10***				
signif.=	.001				.000				
(2) FED.GOV'T	-.01	.00	-.03	-.03	.06	-.02	.00	-.05	.07
{2.24}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(-.04)	(.02)	(.03)	(-.04)	(.10)
eta/beta=	.00/.01				.06/.07				
signif.=	.692				.214				
(3) LARGE CORP.	.03	.00	.06	.03	-.15	.07	.06	.03	-.04
{2.58}	(.05)	(-.01)	(.05)	(.04)	(-.17)	(.09)	(.07)	(.03)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.03/.02				.17/.15***				
signif.=	.369				.001				
(4) PROV.GOV'T	.04	.00	.10	.09	-.26	.04	.09	.03	.09
{2.05}	(.09)	(-.01)	(.09)	(.03)	(-.11)	(-.02)	(.06)	(-.03)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.04/.02				.10/.22***				
signif.=	.241				.000				
(5) NEWSPAPERS	-.06	.01	-.08	-.03	.06	-.02	.01	.10	-.04
{2.21}	(-.03)	(.00)	(-.03)	(-.01)	(-.06)	(.02)	(.04)	(.09)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.02/.04*				.08/.09*				
signif.=	.039				.014				
(6) T.V.	-.02	.00	-.01	-.02	-.03	.03	.00	.16	-.04
{2.25}	(.02)	(.00)	(.02)	(-.01)	(-.09)	(.05)	(.02)	(.15)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.11/.09**				
signif.=	.547				.002				
(7) CHURCHES	.30	-.03	.33	.00	-.13	.09	-.02	-.21	.07
{1.84}	(.38)	(-.04)	(.38)	(.02)	(-.18)	(.09)	(-.01)	(-.22)	(.10)
eta/beta=	.19/.15***				.25/.21***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(8) SCHOOLS	.01	.00	-.01	-.07	.08	.08	-.01	.00	-.12
{1.70}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.04)	(-.05)	(.13)	(.04)	(.02)	(-.08)
eta/beta=	.00/.00				.10/.10***				
signif.=	.798				.001				

TABLE 35:(CONTINUED)

	None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Pr. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>									
(1) SENSE BELONG	-.02	.00	-.06	-.05	.15	-.05	-.05	-.02	.00
[.51]	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.05)	(.18)	(-.09)	(-.07)	(-.08)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.00/.01				.21/.17***				
signif.=	.403				.000				
(2) SUBJECTIVE									
LOCATION	-.03	.00	-.07	-.07	.17	-.03	.00	-.12	-.07
[2.69]	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.18)	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.22)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.01/.02				.16/.14***				
signif.=	.371				.000				
(3) CONFLICT									
INEVITABLE	.03	.00	.07	.06	-.18	.07	.04	.04	.02
[.49]	(.08)	(-.01)	(.08)	(.06)	(-.16)	(.06)	(.02)	(.05)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.05/.02				.18/.20***				
signif.=	.315				.000				
<u>LEFT-RIGHT THINKING</u>									
(1)SELF LOCATION	-.31	.04	-.30	.04	-.04	.04	.09	.02	.12
[2.22]	(-.31)	(.04)	(-.31)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.04)	(.09)	(.01)	(.12)
eta/beta=	.15/.15***				.16/.15***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(2) LIB.PARTY	.02	.00	-.01	.06	.14	-.09	-.15	-.10	.06
[2.07]	(-.05)	(.01)	(-.05)	(.01)	(.37)	(-.16)	(-.20)	(-.16)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.02/.01				.24/.12**				
signif.=	.771				.003				
(3) P.C. PARTY	.11	-.01	.13	.01	-.13	-.03	-.02	.11	.07
[2.62]	(.17)	(-.02)	(.17)	(-.03)	(-.07)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.04)	(.11)
eta/beta=	.09/.06**				.11/.12*				
signif.=	.008				.011				
(4) N.D.P.PARTY	-.19	.02	-.21	.00	.14	.00	-.03	-.03	.06
[1.48]	(-.27)	(.04)	(-.27)	(.02)	(.22)	(-.01)	(-.05)	(.01)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.13/.09***				.18/.13**				
signif.=	.000				.002				
<u>PARTY PLACEMENT</u>									
CONSISTENCY	.14	-.02	.17	.02	-.20	-.03	.07	.00	.05
[.43]	(.22)	(-.03)	(.22)	(.01)	(-.22)	(-.03)	(.09)	(-.05)	(.11)
eta/beta=	.16/.10**				.27/.22***				
signif.=	.008				.000				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 36: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP ATTENDANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

ATTENDANCE LEVEL:		Never	Yes	Never	Yrly	Mthly	Wkly
(n=)		(600)	(2731)	(600)	(1244)	(512)	(975)
POWER ITEMS							
#OF POWER GROUPS		.01	.00	.01	.01	-.01	-.01
	[2.12]	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)
	eta/beta=	.00/.01				.01/.01	
	signif.=	.772				.963	
EXTENT OF POWER:							
(1) LAB. UNIONS		-.06	.01	-.06	-.01	-.02	.06
	[2.62]	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.06)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(.07)
	eta/beta=	.05/.05*				.08/.07**	
	signif.=	.013				.004	
(2) FED. GOVT		.02	.00	.02	.02	.01	-.05
	[2.24]	(.03)	(-.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.01)	(-.06)
	eta/beta=	.02/.02				.06/.05*	
	signif.=	.376				.045	
(3) LARGE CORP.		.03	-.01	.03	.02	.02	-.06
	[2.58]	(.03)	(-.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(-.05)
	eta/beta=	.02/.02				.06/.07**	
	signif.=	.225				.003	
(4) PROV. GOVT		-.01	.00	-.01	.01	-.03	.01
	[2.05]	(.02)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(-.05)	(.00)
	eta/beta=	.02/.01				.03/.03	
	signif.=	.624				.574	
(5) NEWSPAPERS		-.03	.01	-.02	.02	-.01	.00
	[2.21]	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.01)
	eta/beta=	.02/.02				.02/.03	
	signif.=	.246				.501	
(6) T.V.		-.02	.00	-.02	-.01	-.02	.04
	[2.25]	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(-.01)	(.05)
	eta/beta=	.01/.01				.06/.04	
	signif.=	.451				.140	
(7) CHURCHES		.24	-.05	.26	.08	-.10	-.21
	[1.84]	(.29)	(-.06)	(.29)	(.08)	(-.11)	(-.22)
	eta/beta=	.21/.18***				.29/.27***	
	signif.=	.000				.000	
(8) SCHOOLS		.05	-.01	.05	-.01	.01	-.03
	[1.70]	(.04)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.02)	(.01)	(.00)
	eta/beta=	.03/.04				.04/.04	
	signif.=	.055				.199	

TABLE 36:(CONTINUED)

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yrly</u>	<u>Mthly</u>	<u>Wkly</u>
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>						
(1) SENSE BELONG	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	.03	.00
[.51]	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.02)
eta/beta=	.01/.00				.03/.03	
signif.=	.777				.370	
(2) SUBJECTIVE						
LOCATION	-.03	.01	-.03	.00	.02	.01
[2.69]	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.06)	(.01)	(.00)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.04/.02				.04/.03	
signif.=	.195				.531	
(3) CONFLICT						
INEVITABLE	.02	.00	.02	.02	-.01	-.03
[.49]	(.04)	(-.01)	(.04)	(.03)	(-.01)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.04/.02				.08/.05	
signif.=	.308				.108	
<u>LEFT-RIGHT THINKING</u>						
(1) SELF-LOCATION	-.22	.05	-.22	.00	.00	.14
[2.22]	(-.22)	(.05)	(-.22)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.13)
eta/beta=	.14/.14***				.16/.16***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(2) LIB. PARTY	-.04	.01	-.04	.02	-.01	.00
[2.07]	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.03/.02				.04/.03	
signif.=	.360				.728	
(3) P.C. PARTY	.04	-.01	.04	.01	-.01	-.02
[2.62]	(.07)	(-.02)	(.07)	(.01)	(-.04)	(-.04)
eta/beta=	.05/.03				.06/.03	
signif.=	.257				.592	
(4) N.D.P.	-.05	.01	-.05	-.02	.06	.03
[1.48]	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.10)	(-.01)	(.08)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.06/.03				.08/.05	
signif.=	.207				.251	
<u>PARTY PLACEMENT</u>						
CONSISTENCY	.06	-.02	.06	-.01	-.03	-.02
[.43]	(.11)	(-.03)	(.11)	(-.01)	(-.04)	(-.04)
eta/beta=	.10/.06**				.11/.07*	
signif.=	.006				.048	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 37: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY:				<u>Not</u>		
(n=)	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>	
	(985)	(2352)	(985)	(1673)	(679)	
POWER ITEMS						
#OF POWER GROUPS	.02	-.01	.02	-.01	.00	
{2.12}	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.02)	
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.01/.01			
signif.=	.516		.801			
EXTENT OF POWER:						
(1) LAB. UNIONS	-.04	.02	-.04	.02	.02	
{2.62}	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.04)	(.02)	(.03)	
eta/beta=	.05/.05*		.05/.05*			
signif.=	.011		.038			
(2) FED. GOVT	.03	-.01	.03	-.01	-.02	
{2.24}	(.03)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(-.04)	
eta/beta=	.04/.03		.04/.03			
signif.=	.083		.211			
(3) LARGE CORP.	.01	.00	.01	.02	-.08	
{2.58}	(.02)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(-.12)	
eta/beta=	.02/.01		.10/.07***			
signif.=	.688		.001			
(4) PROV. GOV'T	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.01	
{2.05}	(.02)	(-.01)	(.02)	(-.01)	(-.02)	
eta/beta=	.02/.00		.02/.01			
signif.=	.812		.923			
(5) NEWSPAPERS	-.03	.01	-.03	.00	.04	
{2.21}	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.01)	(.02)	
eta/beta=	.03/.04		.03/.05			
signif.=	.055		.058			
(6) T.V.	-.03	.01	-.04	-.01	.07	
{2.25}	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.04)	
eta/beta=	.03/.04*		.04/.07***			
signif.=	.030		.001			
(7) CHURCHES	.18	-.08	.19	-.04	-.17	
{1.84}	(.22)	(-.09)	(.22)	(-.04)	(-.20)	
eta/beta=	.22/.19***		.24/.21***			
signif.=	.000		.000			
(8) SCHOOLS	.00	.00	.00	-.01	.03	
{1.70}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)	
eta/beta=	.00/.00		.01/.02			
signif.=	.925		.473			

TABLE 37:(CONTINUED)

	Low	High	Not Very	Fairly	Very
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>					
(1) SENSE BELONG	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
[.51]	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.04)
eta/beta=	.00/.00		.04/.01		
signif.=	.831		.920		
<u>(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION</u>					
(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION	-.04	.02	-.04	.00	.07
[2.69]	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.11)
eta/beta=	.04/.04*		.08/.06**		
signif.=	.033		.008		
<u>(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE</u>					
(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE	.04	-.02	.04	.00	-.06
[.49]	(.07)	(-.03)	(.07)	(.00)	(-.11)
eta/beta=	.09/.05**		.12/.07***		
signif.=	.004		.001		
<u>LEFT-RIGHT THINKING</u>					
(1) SELF-LOCATION	-.14	.07	-.14	.03	.17
[2.22]	(-.13)	(.06)	(-.13)	(.03)	(.15)
eta/beta=	.12/.13***		.13/.15***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
(2) LIB. PARTY	-.03	.02	-.03	.01	.03
[2.07]	(-.07)	(.03)	(-.07)	(-.01)	(.13)
eta/beta=	.06/.03		.06/.03		
signif.=	.259		.476		
(3) P.C. PARTY	.02	-.01	.02	-.01	-.01
[2.62]	(.05)	(-.02)	(.05)	(-.02)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.05/.02		.05/.02		
signif.=	.473		.766		
(4) N.D.P.	-.06	.03	-.07	.02	.07
[1.48]	(-.11)	(.05)	(-.11)	(.03)	(.13)
eta/beta=	.11/.06*		.12/.07*		
signif.=	.011		.019		
<u>PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY</u>					
(4) PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY	.08	-.04	.08	-.04	-.05
[.43]	(.13)	(-.06)	(.13)	(-.04)	(-.11)
eta/beta=	.18/.12***		.19/.12***		
signif.=	.000		.000		

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 38: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY THREE MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITHOUT AND WITH SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:	Preference		Attendance		Identity		
	(n=)	None (319)	Yes (3035)	Never (600)	Yes (2731)	Low (985)	High (2352)
POWER							
#OF POWER GROUPS		.02	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00
[2.12]		(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)
eta/beta=		.00/.01		.00/.00		.01/.01	
signif.=		.708		.937		.670	
EXTENT OF POWER:							
(1) LAB.UNIONS		-.08	.01	-.02	.00	-.03	.01
[2.62]		(-.11)	(.01)	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.04)	(.02)
eta/beta=		.06/.05*		.05/.02		.05/.03	
signif.=		.035		.472		.112	
(2) FED.GOV'T		-.06	.01	.03	-.01	.03	-.01
[2.24]		(-.01)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.00/.03		.02/.02		.04/.03	
signif.=		.152		.320		.110	
(3) LARGE CORP.		.02	.00	.02	-.01	.00	.00
[2.58]		(.06)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.02)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.04/.01		.03/.02		.03/.00	
signif.=		.537		.339		.843	
(4) PROV. GOV'T		.05	-.01	-.03	.01	.00	.00
[2.05]		(.07)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)
eta/beta=		.04/.03		.01/.02		.02/.00	
signif.=		.209		.275		.904	
(5) NEWSPAPERS		-.05	.01	.01	.00	-.02	.01
[2.21]		(-.03)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=		.02/.03		.02/.00		.02/.02	
signif.=		.152		.840		.287	
(6) T.V.		-.01	.00	.00	.00	-.03	.01
[2.25]		(.02)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.01)
eta/beta=		.01/.00		.01/.00		.02/.04	
signif.=		.852		.960		.071	
(7) CHURCHES		.12	-.01	.16	-.03	.13	-.05
[1.84]		(.38)	(-.03)	(.30)	(-.06)	(.22)	(-.09)
eta/beta=		.18/.06**		.22/.12***		.22/.14***	
signif =		.006		.000		.000	
(8) SCHOOLS		-.04	.00	.07	-.02	-.02	.01
[1.70]		(-.01)	(.00)	(.05)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)
eta/beta=		.01/.02		.03/.05*		.00/.02	
signif.=		.315		.018		.411	

TABLE 38: (CONTINUED)

	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>						
(1) SENSE BELONG	-.06	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00
[.51]	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.02/.04		.01/.01		.00/.01	
signif.=	.072		.625		.602	
<u>(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION</u>						
(2.69)	-.01	.00	-.02	.00	-.04	.01
[2.69]	(-.03)	(.00)	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.04)	(.02)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.04/.01		.04/.03	
signif.=	.786		.509		.077	
<u>(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE</u>						
(.49)	.01	.00	.00	.00	.04	-.02
[.49]	(.08)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.01)	(.07)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.05/.01		.03/.00		.09/.05**	
signif.=	.780		.869		.009	
<u>LEFT-RIGHT THINKING</u>						
(1) SELF-LOCATION	-.22	.03	-.10	.02	-.08	.04
[2.22]	(-.34)	(.04)	(-.22)	(.05)	(-.13)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.15/.10***		.14/.06*		.12/.07**	
signif.=	.000		.028		.004	
(2) LIB. PARTY	.04	-.01	-.04	.01	-.03	.02
[2.07]	(-.07)	(.01)	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.07)	(.03)
eta/beta=	.03/.02		.04/.02		.06/.03	
signif.=	.525		.405		.294	
(3) P.C. PARTY	.13	-.02	-.02	.00	.00	.00
[2.62]	(.17)	(-.02)	(.07)	(-.02)	(.05)	(-.02)
eta/beta=	.09/.07*		.05/.01		.05/.00	
signif.=	.015		.671		.906	
(4) N.D.P.	-.20	.02	.05	-.01	-.05	.02
[1.48]	(-.26)	(.03)	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.11)	(.05)
eta/beta=	.12/.09***		.06/.03		.10/.04	
signif.=	.001		.234		.096	
<u>PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY</u>						
(.43)	.12	-.01	-.02	.00	.07	-.04
[.43]	(.22)	(-.03)	(.11)	(-.02)	(.13)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.15/.08**		.10/.02		.19/.10***	
signif.=	.002		.549		.000	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 39: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY COMPOSITE RELIGIOUS INDICES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOSITY LEVEL:	Index of 3 Dichotomies				Index of 2 Trichotomies					
	(n=)	Low 0 (177)	1 (285)	2 (743)	High 3 (2085)	Low 0 (371)	1 (716)	2 (835)	3 (934)	High 4 (448)
POWER ITEMS										
#OF POWER GROUPS		.01	.03	.01	-.01	.01	.02	.03	-.06	.04
[2.12]		(-.01)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.05)	(.06)
eta/beta=		.01/.01				.05/.05				
signif.=		.910				.139				
EXTENT OF POWER:										
(1) LAB. UNIONS		-.14	-.09	.02	.02	-.12	.01	-.01	.03	.06
[2.62]		(-.12)	(-.09)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.11)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.03)	(.07)
eta/beta=		.07/.08***				.09/.09***				
signif.=		.001				.000				
(2) FED. GOVT		-.03	.06	.02	-.01	.04	.03	.00	-.02	-.05
[2.24]		(-.02)	(.07)	(.03)	(-.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.00)	(-.02)	(-.07)
eta/beta=		.05/.04				.06/.05				
signif.=		.134				.140				
(3) LARGE CORP.		.01	.07	.00	-.01	.03	.02	.03	-.01	-.09
[2.58]		(.02)	(.08)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.01)	(.00)	(-.11)
eta/beta=		.05/.04				.08/.07**				
signif.=		.166				.009				
(4) PROV. GOV'T		-.01	.06	-.03	.00	.01	-.01	.01	.01	-.04
[2.05]		(.05)	(.08)	(-.03)	(-.01)	(.05)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(-.05)
eta/beta=		.05/.04				.04/.03				
signif.=		.264				.712				
(5) NEWSPAPERS		-.03	-.06	.00	.01	-.05	-.03	.01	.04	-.01
[2.21]		(-.01)	(-.05)	(.00)	(.01)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.04)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.03/.04				.05/.06				
signif.=		.191				.084				
(6) T.V.		.02	-.06	-.03	.02	-.02	-.06	-.01	.05	.05
[2.25]		(.06)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(.01)	(.00)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(.04)	(.04)
eta/beta=		.05/.05				.07/.07**				
signif.=		.074				.004				
(7) CHURCHES		.38	.27	.11	-.10	.31	.15	.00	-.10	-.27
[1.84]		(.43)	(.30)	(.13)	(-.12)	(.34)	(.17)	(-.02)	(-.10)	(-.29)
eta/beta=		.28/.24***				.30/.27***				
signif.=		.000				.000				
(8) SCHOOLS		.05	-.01	.01	.00	.05	-.02	.00	.00	-.02
[1.70]		(.03)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.01)	(.03)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.01)
eta/beta=		.02/.02				.03/.03				
signif.=		.802				.658				

TABLE 39:(CONTINUED)

	Low				High				
	0	1	2	High 1	Low 0	1	2	1	High 1
SOCIAL CLASS									
(1) SENSE BELONG	.01	-.03	.00	.00	.01	-.02	.00	.00	.02
[.51]	(.02)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.03)	(-.03)	(.05)
eta/beta=	.03/.02				.06/.03				
signif.=	.723				.676				
(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION									
[2.69]	.01	-.09	-.05	.03	-.02	-.08	.05	-.02	.08
	(.02)	(-.08)	(-.06)	(.03)	(-.02)	(-.09)	(.06)	(-.04)	(.13)
eta/beta=	.07/.06*				.11/.08***				
signif.=	.011				.000				
(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE									
[.49]	.07	-.01	.04	-.02	.04	.04	-.01	-.02	-.06
	(.12)	(.01)	(.05)	(-.03)	(.07)	(.07)	(.00)	(-.03)	(-.10)
eta/beta=	.09/.06*				.11/.07*				
signif.=	.023				.013				
LEFT-RIGHT THINKING									
(1) SELF-LOCATION	-.33	-.24	-.06	.09	-.28	-.06	-.01	.07	.22
[2.22]	(-.32)	(-.24)	(-.04)	(.08)	(-.27)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.07)	(.20)
eta/beta=	.17/.18***				.17/.18***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(2) LIB. PARTY									
[2.07]	-.05	-.03	-.01	.02	-.05	-.03	.02	.02	.02
	(-.09)	(-.07)	(-.04)	(.04)	(-.07)	(-.07)	(.03)	(.02)	(.09)
eta/beta=	.06/.03				.07/.03				
signif.=	.744				.800				
(3) P.C. PARTY									
[2.62]	.12	.07	-.05	-.01	.09	-.04	.03	-.04	.00
	(.19)	(.10)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.14)	(-.03)	(.02)	(-.06)	(-.01)
eta/beta=	.10/.07*				.10/.07				
signif.=	.050				.099				
(4) N.D.P. PARTY									
[1.48]	-.18	-.03	-.04	.04	-.06	-.06	.01	.06	.04
	(-.27)	(-.07)	(-.06)	(.07)	(-.13)	(-.09)	(.02)	(.09)	(.07)
eta/beta=	.13/.08**				.11/.07				
signif.=	.010				.093				
PARTY PLACEMENT -- CONSISTENCY									
[.43]	.21	.05	.03	-.04	.14	.03	-.02	-.07	-.01
	(.29)	(.09)	(.05)	(-.07)	(.20)	(.05)	(-.03)	(-.09)	(-.05)
eta/beta=	.20/.13***				.18/.13***				
signif.=	.000				.000				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 40: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF POWER, SOCIAL CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT ITEMS WITH THE RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE INDEX, FOR EACH RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:			Eng.	Fr.		Cons.	Prot.		All
(n=)	Non.	Cath	Cath	United	Main	NonMain	Other		(3380)
	(319)	(845)	(780)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)		
POWER									
#OF POWER GROUPS	-.0263	.0102	.0300	.0646	.0281	.0404	-.1942*		.0067
EXTENT OF POWER:									
(1) LAB. UNIONS	.0326	.0413	.1157	.0757	.0977*	.2169**	-.0360		.0749**
(2) FED.GOV'T	.0837	.0126	-.1290**	-.0319	-.0967*	-.0656	-.0393		-.0593**
(3) LARGE CORP.	.1123	.0282	-.1681**	.0250	.0308	-.0262	.0136		-.0631**
(4) PROV.GOV'T	.0654	-.0024	.0515	-.0216	-.0604	.0078	.0179		-.0293
(5) NEWSPAPERS	.0797	.0619	-.0727	.0853	.1013*	.1322	-.0913		.0322
(6) T.V.	.0077	.1046**	-.0773*	.1623**	.1131*	.2408**	.1090		.0496**
(7) CHURCHES	-.1760**	-.1653**	-.1665**	-.2203**	-.2976**	-.3713**	-.2792**		-.2946**
(8) SCHOOLS	-.0228	.0337	.0667	.0164	-.0708	-.0130	-.0115		-.0059
SOCIAL CLASS									
(1) SENSE BELONG	-.1524**	-.0115	-.1451**	-.0087	-.0055	.2213**	-.1646*		.0152
(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION	-.0260	.0511	-.0062	.1068*	.1237**	.0823	-.0763		.0550**
(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE	-.1321**	-.0356	-.1320**	.0370	-.1183**	-.0209	.0042		-.1083**
LEFT-RIGHT THINKING									
(1) SELF LOCATION	-.0588	.1624**	.2984**	.0873	.0514	-.0151	.0766		.1646**
(2) LIB.PARTY	.0882	.0964**	-.0146	.0154	-.0629	-.2283*	.0970		.0586*
(3) P.C. PARTY	-.0057	-.0446	-.0394	-.0039	-.0910	-.0487	.1535		-.0645**
(4) N.D.P.PARTY	.0226	-.0780	.0428	.2045**	.0457	-.0376	.1610		.1057**
PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY	.1487*	.0059	.0240	-.2015**	-.1902**	.0326	-.0962		-.1626**

P=.05 P=.01**

TABLE 41: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY TWO REFINED MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITH AND WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:		<u>Relig.</u>	<u>Defer.</u>
		<u>Pref.</u>	<u>Index</u>
<u>POWER ITEMS</u>			
#OF POWER GROUPS	e/b= p=	.07/.06 .143	.05/.04 .309
<u>EXTENT OF POWER:</u>			
(1) LAB.UNIONS	e/b= p=	.11/.11*** .000	.09/.09*** .001
(2) FED.GOV'T	e/b= p=	.06/.09 .092	.06/.06 .069
(3) LARGE CORPS.	e/b= p=	.17/.13** .010	.08/.06 .055
(4) PROV.GOV'T	e/b= p=	.10/.22*** .000	.04/.03 .692
(5) NEWSPAPERS	e/b= p=	.08/.09* .027	.04/.05 .206
(6) T.V.	e/b= p=	.12/.09*** .001	.07/.08** .006
(7) CHURCHES	e/b= p=	.25/.11*** .000	.30/.24*** .000
(8) SCHOOLS	e/b= p=	.10/.11*** .000	.03/.03 .629
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>			
(1) SENSE BELONG	e/b= p=	.21/.18*** .000	.06/04 .450
(2) SUBJECTIVE LOCATION	e/b= p=	.17/.14*** .000	.11/.08*** .000
(3) CONFLICT INEVITABLE	e/b= p=	.18/.19*** .000	.11/.06 .109
<u>LEFT-RIGHT THINKING</u>			
(1) SELF-LOCATION	e/b= p=	.16/.14*** .000	.17/.16*** .000
(2) LIB.PARTY	e/b= p=	.24/.12** .004	.07/.02 .931

TABLE 1: (CONTINUED)

		<u>Relia.</u> <u>Prof.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
(3) P.C. PARTY	e/b=	.11/.11*	.10/.05
	p=	.046	.387
(4) N.D.P.	e/b=	.17/.12*	.11/.05
	p=	.023	.368
PARTY PLACEMENT CONSISTENCY	e/b=	.26/.19***	.18/.09*
	p=	.000	.012

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 42: POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING BY SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR THESE VARIABLES

POWER ITEMS (1) (2.12)	Relig. Index	Relig. Index	Refer. Index	Gender		Age					Educ.			
				EM	M	20	10-19	10-19	20-24	25	ELEM.	HS	TECH	UNIV
eta/beta=.07/.07	.01/.01	.05/.05		.05	-.04	-.03	.06	.03	-.01	-.07	.09	-.02	-.11	.06
signif.= .078	.310	.139		(.04)	(-.04)	(-.04)	(.07)	(.03)	(.00)	(-.06)	(.09)	(.00)	(-.11)	(.05)
EXTENT OF POWER: (1) (2.62)				.05/.06	-.003		.06/.05	.087				.09/.08	-.001	
eta/beta=.11/.10	.07/.08	.09/.09		.00	.00	-.04	-.06	.03	.03	.13	-.06	.00	.05	.00
signif.= ***.000	***.001	***.000		(.00)	(.00)	(-.04)	(-.06)	(.03)	(.04)	(.12)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.05)	(-.02)
(2) (2.24)				.00/.01	.754		.10/.10	***.000				.04/.05	.062	
eta/beta=.06/.07	.05/.04	.04/.05		.01	-.01	-.03	.04	-.01	.03	-.02	-.08	.01	.04	-.01
signif.= .214	.134	.140		(.02)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.06)	(-.09)	(.02)	(.04)	(-.01)
(3) (2.58)				.03/.03	.175		.05/.05	.089				.07/.06	-.018	
eta/beta=.17/.15	.05/.04	.08/.07		-.01	.01	-.05	.01	-.03	.10	-.01	-.08	.01	.08	-.03
signif.= ***.001	.166	***.009		(-.01)	(.01)	(-.04)	(.02)	(-.03)	(.07)	(-.02)	(-.07)	(.01)	(.06)	(-.02)
(4) (2.05)				.01/.01	.557		.04/.10	***.000				.06/.08	-.001	
eta/beta=.10/.22	.05/.04	.04/.03		-.02	.02	-.06	.01	.04	.04	.04	.02	.00	.05	-.04
signif.= ***.000	.264	.712		(-.02)	(.02)	(-.06)	(.01)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.03)
(5) (2.21)				.03/.03	.080		.10/.10	***.000				.09/.08	-.001	
eta/beta=.08/.09	.03/.04	.05/.06		-.02	.02	-.05	-.05	.04	.08	.04	.01	-.04	.00	.07
signif.= *.014	.191	.084		(-.02)	(.02)	(-.06)	(-.04)	(.05)	(.08)	(.04)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.00)	(.08)
(6) (2.25)				.00/.00	.986		.07/.06	***.000				.14/.13	-.000	
eta/beta=.11/.09	.05/.05	.07/.07		.00	.00	-.02	-.02	.05	.04	-.03	.02	-.07	.01	.12
signif.= **0.002	.074	**0.004		(.00)	(.00)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.06)	(.05)	(-.02)	(.02)	(-.07)	(.00)	(.13)
(7) (1.84)				.05/.01	.594		.07/.09	***.000				.06/.02	.703	
eta/beta=.25/.21	.28/.24	.30/.27		-.01	.01	-.05	.03	.00	.08	-.04	-.03	.00	.00	.02
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000		(-.01)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.05)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.11)	(-.09)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.05)
(8) (1.70)				.07/.07	***.000		.14/.13	***.000				.10/.06	-.018	
eta/beta=.10/.10	.02/.02	.03/.03		-.05	.04	-.09	-.04	.03	.12	.08	.05	.03	-.07	-.03
signif.= ***.001	.802	.658		(-.05)	(.05)	(-.09)	(-.04)	(.03)	(.13)	(.10)	(.12)	(.03)	(-.09)	(-.05)
SOCIAL CLASS (1) (1.31)				.02/.02	.723		.16/.12	***.000				.21/.13	-.000	
eta/beta=.21/.17	.03/.02	.08/.03		-.01	.01	.07	.02	.00	-.05	-.13	-.03	-.06	.04	.10
signif.= ***.000	.723	.676		(-.01)	(.01)	(.08)	(.03)	(.00)	(-.05)	(-.18)	(-.12)	(-.07)	(.09)	(.15)
(2) (2.69)				.03/.02	.303		.16/.12	***.000				.21/.13	-.000	
eta/beta=.16/.14	.07/.06	.11/.08		.03	-.03	-.01	-.06	.02	-.02	.16	-.25	-.12	.06	.34
signif.= ***.000	*.011	***.000		(.02)	(-.02)	(.04)	(-.02)	(.03)	(-.06)	(.01)	(-.27)	(-.14)	(.08)	(.38)
(3) (1.49)				.03/.04	.026		.05/.09	***.000				.32/.29	-.000	
eta/beta=.18/.20	.09/.06	.11/.07		.01	-.01	.04	-.01	-.05	-.16	-.02	-.02	.01	.04	
signif.= ***.000	*.023	*.013		(.01)	(-.01)	(.04)	(-.01)	(-.07)	(-.17)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(.01)	(.06)	
LEFT-RIGHT THINKING (1) (2.22)				.01/.03	.126		.16/.13	***.000				.09/.05	.112	
eta/beta=.16/.15	.17/.18	.17/.18		-.08	.07	-.01	-.04	-.01	.04	.04	.04	.06	.00	-.03
signif.= ***.000	***.000	**0.000		(-.06)	(.05)	(-.03)	(-.07)	(-.02)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.05)	(.01)	(-.10)
(2) (2.07)				.07/.08	***.001		.04/.04	.490				.10/.08	-.010	
eta/beta=.24/.12	.06/.03	.07/.03		.07	-.06	.05	-.02	-.04	-.01	-.01	.07	-.07	.03	.02
signif.= ***.001	.744	.800		(.08)	(-.06)	(.04)	(-.03)	(-.05)	(.02)	(-.04)	(.07)	(-.08)	(.14)	(.01)
(3) (2.62)				.08/.08	***.001		.04/.04	.490				.10/.08	-.010	
eta/beta=.11/.12	.10/.07	.10/.07		-.03	.02	-.03	-.02	.05	.02	.03	-.12	-.06	.01	.11
signif.= *.011	*.050	.099		(-.03)	(.02)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.05)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(-.12)	(-.07)	(.01)	(.12)
(4) (1.48)				.03/.04	.083		.07/.05	.461				.14/.12	-.000	
eta/beta=.18/.13	.13/.08	.11/.07		.09	-.07	.12	-.02	-.02	-.10	-.06	.16	.11	-.06	-.14
signif.= ***.002	**0.010	.093		(.10)	(-.08)	(.08)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.13)	(.11)	(-.03)	(-.16)
CONSISTENCY (1.43)				.11/.11	***.000		.07/.12	***.000				.16/.16	-.000	
eta/beta=.27/.22	.20/.13	.18/.13		-.05	.04	-.06	-.02	.00	.06	.06	-.11	-.06	-.02	.11
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000		(-.05)	(.04)	(-.06)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(-.12)	(-.07)	(.14)

POWER ITEMS: (1)NUMBER OF POWER GROUPS; EXTENT OF POWER: (1)LABOUR UNIONS P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***
 (2)FED.GOV'T (3)LARGE CORPORATIONS (4)PROV.GOV'T (5)NEWSPAPERS (6)T.V. (7)CHURCHES (Grand Mean)
 (8)SCHOOLS; SOCIAL CLASS: (1)SENSE BELONGING (2)SUBJECTIVE LOCATION (3)CONFLICT
 INEVITABLE; LEFT-RIGHT THINKING: (1)SELF-LOCATION (2)LIB.PARTY (3)P.C.PARTY
 (4)H.D.P.PARTY; CONSISTENCY OF PARTY PLACEMENT.

TABLE 42:(CONTINUED)

POWER ITEMS	Region										MULTI-R IN.
	MARIT.	QUE.	ONT.	P.E.	P.C.	MONTE	1	2	3	HIGH	
(1) 12.171	.00	.04	-.03	-.02	-.04	.03	.04	.03	-.06	-.01	
	(.04)	(.03)	(-.03)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.01)	(-.07)	(.01)	
eta/beta=			.03/.03					.05/.04			
signif.=			.688					.262			.021
EXTENT OF POWER											
(1) 12.671	-.16	.07	-.04	.05	.12	-.04	-.02	-.02	.04	.03	
	(-.15)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.07)	(.10)	(-.05)	(-.02)	(-.02)	(.04)	(.05)	
eta/beta=			.12/.12					.08/.06			
signif.=			***.000					*.041			.041
(2) 12.241	-.04	-.05	.02	.09	-.04	.03	-.04	.01	-.01	-.03	
	(-.05)	(-.06)	(.03)	(.07)	(-.03)	(.02)	(-.04)	(.01)	(-.01)	(-.01)	
eta/beta=			.08/.09					.03/.05			
signif.=			***.000					.213			.023
(3) 12.581	-.02	-.12	.07	.04	.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	.02	.05	
	(-.02)	(-.14)	(.07)	(.06)	(.03)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(-.03)	(.04)	(.06)	
eta/beta=			.15/.14					.08/.06			
signif.=			***.000					.057			.048
(4) 12.051	-.12	-.04	.04	-.08	.15	.03	-.01	-.04	-.03	.01	
	(-.14)	(-.03)	(.05)	(-.09)	(.15)	(.03)	(.00)	(-.04)	(-.03)	(.01)	
eta/beta=			.13/.12					.04/.05			
signif.=			***.000					.159			.030
(5) 12.211	-.06	-.06	.03	.05	.01	-.06	.02	-.05	.06	.05	
	(-.07)	(-.06)	(.03)	(.07)	(.00)	(-.09)	(.02)	(-.05)	(.07)	(.08)	
eta/beta=			.09/.08					.13/.10			
signif.=			** .002					***.000			.043
(6) 12.251	-.05	-.08	.03	.04	.06	-.06	.02	-.02	.01	.08	
	(-.06)	(-.08)	(.02)	(.07)	(.06)	(-.09)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.02)	(.12)	
eta/beta=			.10/.10					.14/.09			
signif.=			***.000					***.000			.053
(7) 11.841	-.12	-.10	.05	.06	.07	.03	.00	-.03	.01	-.03	
	(-.14)	(-.14)	(.06)	(.07)	(.14)	(.00)	(.03)	(-.04)	(.03)	(-.03)	
eta/beta=			.18/.12					.04/.04			
signif.=			***.000					.358			.113
(8) 11.701	-.06	-.07	.03	.08	-.03	-.02	-.05	.07	.01	.00	
	(-.04)	(-.07)	(.03)	(.09)	(-.02)	(-.02)	(-.04)	(.07)	(.01)	(.00)	
eta/beta=			.09/.09					.05/.05			
signif.=			***.000					.124			.047
SOCIAL CLASS											
(1) 1.311	-.10	.17	-.04	-.08	-.06	-.03	-.06	.09	.01	.06	
	(-.14)	(.17)	(-.04)	(-.07)	(-.06)	(-.04)	(-.06)	(.01)	(.01)	(.06)	
eta/beta=			.22/.21					.08/.07			
signif.=			***.000					** .002			.118
(2) 2.691	.00	.18	-.04	-.10	-.13	-.06	-.10	.00	.01	.12	
	(-.11)	(.18)	(-.04)	(-.09)	(-.10)	(-.11)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.18)	
eta/beta=			.16/.17					.16/.11			
signif.=			***.000					***.000			.177
(3) 1.491	.02	-.11	.05	.06	.01	.01	-.01	.00	-.02	.01	
	(.03)	(-.12)	(.05)	(.07)	(.01)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.00)	(.03)	
eta/beta=			.15/.14					.03/.03			
signif.=			***.000					.733			.058
LEFT-RIGHT THINKING											
(1) 2.221	-.10	-.03	-.05	.15	.04	.02	.00	-.06	.00	.01	
	(-.07)	(.00)	(-.05)	(.14)	(.01)	(.02)	(-.03)	(-.03)	(.00)	(.01)	
eta/beta=			.09/.11					.02/.03			
signif.=			***.000					.777			.059
(2) 2.071	.01	.30	-.12	-.18	.00	.02	-.01	-.04	.02	-.03	
	(-.03)	(.32)	(-.12)	(-.19)	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.05)	
eta/beta=			.24/.22					.05/.03			
signif.=			***.000					.739			.075
(3) 2.671	-.23	-.01	-.01	.03	.11	.01	-.06	.01	-.04	.04	
	(-.29)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.04)	(.13)	(-.03)	(-.05)	(.01)	(-.03)	(.07)	
eta/beta=			.14/.11					.07/.05			
signif.=			***.000					.285			.053
(4) 11.481	.04	.16	-.05	-.01	-.15	.02	.02	-.06	.03	-.03	
	(.11)	(.14)	(-.04)	(-.01)	(-.19)	(.08)	(.00)	(-.05)	(.01)	(-.07)	
eta/beta=			.14/.13					.08/.05			
signif.=			***.000					.404			.082
CONSIST.	-.05	-.13	.06	.02	.07	-.04	.02	.03	-.02	.03	
	(.43)	(-.15)	(-.13)	(.07)	(.02)	(.10)	(-.08)	(.03)	(.03)	(.00)	(.05)
eta/beta=			.19/.16					.10/.06			
signif.=			***.000					.072			.133

POWER ITEMS: (1)NUMBER OF POWER GROUPS; EXTENT OF POWER: (1)LABOUR UNIONS (2)FED.GOV (3)LARGE CORPORATIONS (4)PROV.GOV (5)NEWSPAPERS (6)T.V. (7)CHURCHES (8)SCHOOLS; SOCIAL CLASS: (1)SENSE BELONGING (2)SUBJECTIVE LOCATION (3)CONFLICT INEVITABLE; LEFT-RIGHT THINKING: (1)SELF-LOCATION (2)LD.PARTY (3)P.C.PARTY (4)N.D.P.PARTY; CONSISTENCY OF PARTY PLACEMENT.

TABLE 43: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:									
(n=)	None (319)	Yes (3035)	None (319)	Eng. Cath (845)	Ev. Cath (780)	United (476)	Cons. Main (534)	Prot. NonMain (228)	Other (172)
AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS									
(1) LEFT-WINGERS (2.52)	.16 (.22)	-.02 (-.03)	.15 (.22)	-.05 (.02)	.07 (-.10)	-.07 (-.05)	.01 (.03)	-.19 (-.15)	.01 (.05)
eta/beta=	.08/.06*				.11/.09				
signif.=	.016				.108				
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS (2.48)	-.31 (-.28)	.04 (.04)	-.31 (-.23)	.10 (.14)	.04 (.02)	-.03 (-.06)	.05 (.03)	.06 (.08)	-.06 (-.06)
eta/beta=	.10/.11***				.12/.12***				
signif.=	.000				.001				
(3) FRENCH CDNS. (2.59)	.10 (-.13)	-.01 (.01)	.01 (-.13)	.07 (-.04)	.30 (.63)	-.24 (-.35)	-.24 (-.32)	-.09 (-.24)	-.34 (-.42)
eta/beta=	.04/.03				.42/.24***				
signif.=	.064				.000				
(4) ENGLISH CDNS. (2.50)	-.02 (-.02)	.00 (.00)	.05 (-.02)	.14 (.13)	-.28 (-.24)	.06 (.07)	.13 (.15)	.11 (.07)	-.19 (-.21)
eta/beta=	.01/.00				.16/.17***				
signif.=	.803				.000				
(5) JEWS (2.53)	.11 (.15)	-.01 (-.01)	.19 (.15)	.06 (.03)	-.32 (-.22)	.11 (.09)	.02 (.02)	.18 (.06)	.21 (.20)
eta/beta=	.05/.04*				.15/.21***				
signif.=	.045				.000				
(6) WHITES (2.73)	-.11 (-.25)	.01 (.02)	-.14 (-.25)	.06 (.05)	.12 (.22)	-.11 (-.13)	-.02 (-.04)	-.02 (-.07)	-.23 (-.30)
eta/beta=	.07/.03				.14/.09*				
signif.=	.103				.012				
(7) NONWHITES (2.65)	.08 (.04)	-.01 (.00)	.09 (.04)	.03 (.01)	-.05 (.04)	-.03 (-.07)	-.01 (-.04)	.12 (.06)	-.07 (-.11)
eta/beta=	.01/.03				.06/.07				
signif.=	.131				.149				
(8) WOMEN (2.59)	.15 (.10)	-.01 (-.01)	.21 (.10)	.21 (.17)	-.28 (-.04)	.04 (-.05)	.00 (-.08)	-.16 (-.21)	-.05 (-.16)
eta/beta=	.03/.05*				.12/.19***				
signif.=	.015				.000				

TABLE 43: (CONTINUED)

	None	Yes	None	Eng. Cath	Ev. Cath	United	Cons. Main	Prot. NonMain	Other
<u>AFFECT TOWARD ELITES</u>									
(1) CHURCH	-.72	.07	-.79	.16	.32	-.20	-.15	.18	-.31
(2.55)	(-.89)	(.08)	(-.89)	(.18)	(.30)	(-.17)	(-.11)	(.18)	(-.35)
eta/beta=	.26/.21***				.32/.31***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(2) SCHOOL	-.27	.03	-.29	.11	.13	-.10	-.12	.02	-.06
(2.57)	(-.41)	(.04)	(-.41)	(.09)	(.25)	(-.11)	(-.14)	(.00)	(-.14)
eta/beta=	.15/.10***				.22/.16***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(3) UNION	.00	.00	-.04	.11	.17	-.15	-.11	-.11	-.31
(2.55)	(-.09)	(.01)	(-.09)	(.14)	(.19)	(-.18)	(-.12)	(-.11)	(-.36)
eta/beta=	.03/.00				.17/.14***				
signif.=	.989				.000				
(4) FED.GOV'T	-.24	.03	-.27	.01	.15	-.06	-.04	-.03	.06
(2.57)	(-.41)	(.04)	(-.41)	(-.01)	(.28)	(-.09)	(-.05)	(-.07)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.13/.08***				.19/.11***				
signif.=	.000				.001				
(5) BIG CORP.	-.17	.02	-.26	-.17	.39	-.14	-.04	-.05	.07
(2.40)	(-.30)	(.03)	(-.30)	(-.17)	(.42)	(-.16)	(-.03)	(-.08)	(.07)
eta/beta=	.10/.06**				.25/.23***				
signif.=	.004				.000				
(6) PROV.GOV'T	-.14	.01	-.24	-.12	.43	-.18	-.13	.00	-.13
(2.51)	(-.21)	(.02)	(-.21)	(.04)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.10)	(-.03)
eta/beta=	.07/.05*				.08/.27***				
signif.=	.012				.000				
(7) NEWS	-.19	.02	-.23	.04	.18	-.08	-.02	-.19	-.08
(2.52)	(-.27)	(.03)	(-.27)	(.05)	(.19)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(-.16)	(-.11)
eta/beta=	.09/.06***				.14/.13***				
signif.=	.001				.000				
(8) T.V.	-.28	.03	-.32	.05	.18	-.08	-.02	-.19	-.08
(2.51)	(-.40)	(.04)	(-.40)	(.04)	(.27)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(-.14)	(-.27)
eta/beta=	.14/.10***				.21/.16***				
signif.=	.000				.000				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 44: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP ATTENDANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

ATTENDANCE LEVEL:		Never	Yes	Never	Yrly	Mthly	Wkly
(n=)		(600)	(2731)	(600)	(1244)	(512)	(975)
<u>AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS</u>							
(1)	LEFT-WINGERS	.07	-.02	.07	.01	.09	-.11
	[2.52]	(.11)	(-.03)	(.11)	(.00)	(.10)	(-.13)
	eta/beta=	.06/.04				.10/.08*	
	signif.=	.165				.023	
(2)	RIGHT-WINGERS	-.09	.02	-.09	-.03	.04	.08
	[2.48]	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.10)	(-.02)	(.05)	(.06)
	eta/beta=	.05/.04				.06/.06	
	signif.=	.105				.139	
(3)	FRENCH	.03	-.01	.03	-.06	.01	.06
	[2.59]	(-.07)	(.02)	(-.07)	(-.05)	(.00)	(.11)
	eta/beta=	.04/.02				.08/.05*	
	signif.=	.381				.022	
(4)	ENGLISH	.00	.00	.00	-.01	.01	.01
	[2.50]	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.02)	(-.03)	(.04)	(.03)
	eta/beta=	.01/.00				.03/.01	
	signif.=	.993				.984	
(5)	JEWS	.00	.00	.00	-.01	-.07	.04
	[2.53]	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(-.01)	(-.06)	(.04)
	eta/beta=	.01/.00				.04/.04	
	signif.=	.904				.176	
(6)	WHITES	-.03	.01	-.04	-.01	.04	.02
	[2.73]	(-.12)	(.02)	(-.12)	(-.02)	(.07)	(.06)
	eta/beta=	.05/.01				.06/.02	
	signif.=	.473				.734	
(7)	NONWHITES	.04	-.01	.04	-.02	-.01	.00
	[2.65]	(.02)	(.00)	(.02)	(-.02)	(.01)	(.01)
	eta/beta=	.01/.02				.02/.03	
	signif.=	.225				.641	
(8)	WOMEN	.07	-.02	.08	.04	-.04	-.08
	[2.59]	(.04)	(-.01)	(.04)	(.04)	(-.01)	(-.07)
	eta/beta=	.02/.03				.05/.06*	
	signif.=	.082				.014	

TABLE 44:(CONTINUED)

<u>AFFECT TOWARD ELITES</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yrly</u>	<u>Mthly</u>	<u>Wkly</u>
(1) CHURCH {2.55}	-.59 (-.70)	.12 (.14)	-.62 (-.70)	-.18 (-.19)	.19 (.22)	.46 (.50)
eta/beta=	.30/.25***				.41/.37***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(2) SCHOOL {2.57}	-.29 (-.37)	.06 (.08)	-.30 (-.37)	-.05 (-.05)	.12 (.14)	.17 (.21)
eta/beta=	.19/.15***				.23/.19***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(3) UNION {2.53}	-.01 (-.07)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (-.07)	-.03 (-.02)	.02 (.05)	.03 (.05)
eta/beta=	.03/.01				.04/.03	
signif.=	.728				.580	
(4) FED.GOV'T {2.57}	-.20 (-.31)	.04 (.07)	-.21 (-.31)	-.04 (-.05)	.07 (.12)	.14 (.19)
eta/beta=	.14/.10***				.18/.12***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(5) BIG CORP. {2.40}	-.14 (-.21)	.03 (.05)	-.14 (-.21)	.01 (.01)	-.06 (-.04)	.12 (.15)
eta/beta=	.10/.07***				.12/.09***	
signif.=	.000				.000	
(6) PROV.GOV'T {2.51}	-.10 (-.16)	.02 (.03)	-.11 (-.16)	-.08 (-.09)	.08 (.13)	.14 (.15)
eta/beta=	.08/.05**				.14/.11***	
signif.=	.007				.000	
(7) NEWS {2.52}	-.06 (-.10)	.01 (.02)	-.06 (-.10)	.03 (.03)	-.02 (-.02)	.02 (.04)
eta/beta=	.05/.03				.05/.04	
signif.=	.109				.329	
(8) T.V. {2.51}	-.11 (-.17)	.02 (.04)	-.11 (-.17)	.04 (.05)	.05 (.06)	-.01 (.01)
eta/beta=	.09/.05**				.09/.06*	
signif.=	.004				.017	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 45: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS SELF-PERCEPTION, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY:					
(n=)	Low (985)	High (2352)	Not Very (985)	Fairly (1673)	Very (679)
<u>AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS</u>					
(1) LEFT-WINGERS [2.52]	.12 (.14)	-.06 (-.07)	.12 (.14)	.00 (.00)	-.18 (-.22)
eta/beta=	.10/.09***		.14/.11***		
signif.=	.001		.000		
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS [2.48]	-.12 (-.13)	.06 (.06)	-.13 (-.13)	.05 (.06)	.08 (.06)
eta/beta=	.09/.08***		.09/.09**		
signif.=	.001		.004		
(3) FRENCH CDNS. [2.59]	-.12 (-.24)	.05 (.10)	-.13 (-.24)	.00 (-.02)	.20 (.41)
eta/beta=	.17/.09***		.25/.12***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
(4) ENGLISH CDNS. [2.50]	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.06 (-.04)	.15 (.09)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.05/.08***		
signif.=	.666		.000		
(5) JEWS [2.53]	-.04 (-.02)	.02 (.01)	-.05 (-.02)	-.03 (-.02)	.13 (.07)
eta/beta=	.01/.03		.04/.08***		
signif.=	.135		.001		
(6) WHITES [2.73]	-.07 (-.16)	.03 (.06)	-.08 (-.16)	-.02 (.00)	.15 (.22)
eta/beta=	.09/.04*		.12/.07***		
signif.=	.037		.001		
(7) NONWHITES [2.65]	-.10 (-.12)	.04 (.05)	-.10 (-.12)	-.01 (.00)	.18 (.18)
eta/beta=	.09/.08***		.13/.12***		
signif.=	.000		.000		
(8) WOMEN [2.59]	.04 (.01)	-.02 (.00)	.05 (.01)	.04 (.05)	-.17 (-.14)
eta/beta=	.01/.03		.07/.09***		
signif.=	.191		.000		

TABLE 45: (CONTINUED)

<u>AFFECT TOWARD ELITES</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Not Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Very</u>
(1) CHURCH [2.55] eta/beta= signif.=	-.48 (-.57)	.19 (.22)	-.50 (-.57)	.10 (.11)	.41 (.48)
	.34/.29***		.37/.32***		
	.000		.000		
(2) SCHOOL [2.57] eta/beta= signif.=	-.21 (-.28)	.09 (.12)	-.21 (-.28)	.07 (.08)	.13 (.22)
	.21/.15***		.22/.15***		
	.000		.000		
(3) UNION [2.53] eta/beta= signif.=	-.07 (-.11)	.03 (.05)	-.06 (-.11)	.05 (.05)	-.03 (.04)
	.07/.04*		.07/.05*		
	.024		.023		
(4) FED.GOV'T [2.57] eta/beta= signif.=	-.14 (-.24)	.06 (.10)	-.15 (-.24)	.02 (.03)	.16 (.26)
	.16/.09***		.18/.11***		
	.000		.000		
(5) BIG CORP. [2.40] eta/beta= signif.=	-.08 (-.16)	.03 (.07)	-.08 (-.16)	.00 (-.01)	.13 (.25)
	.10/.05**		.14/.07***		
	.008		.001		
(6) PROV.GOV'T [2.51] eta/beta= signif.=	-.08 (-.10)	.03 (.04)	-.08 (-.10)	-.01 (.02)	.13 (.09)
	.07/.05**		.08/.08***		
	.005		.000		
(7) NEWS [2.52] eta/beta= signif.=	-.02 (-.06)	.01 (.02)	-.03 (-.06)	.00 (.00)	.03 (.08)
	.04/.02		.05/.02		
	.409		.593		
(8) T.V. [2.51] eta/beta= signif.=	-.01 (-.08)	.00 (.03)	-.01 (-.08)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.09)
	.06/.01		.07/.01		
	.701		.910		

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 46: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY THREE MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITHOUT AND WITH SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

	<u>Preference</u>		<u>Attendance</u>		<u>Identity</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
(n=)	(319)	(3035)	(600)	(2731)	(985)	(2352)
<u>AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS</u>						
(1) LEFT-WINGERS	.14	-.02	-.04	.01	.10	-.05
[2.52]	(.23)	(-.03)	(.10)	(-.02)	(.14)	(-.07)
eta/beta=	.08/.05		.05/.02		.10/.07**	
signif.=	.094		.518		.009	
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS	-.37	.05	.11	-.02	-.11	.05
[2.48]	(-.32)	(.04)	(-.10)	(.02)	(-.14)	(.06)
eta/beta=	.11/.13***		.05/.05		.09/.07**	
signif.=	.000		.099		.009	
(3) FRENCH CDNS.	.11	-.01	.05	-.01	-.15	.06
[2.59]	(-.15)	(.01)	(-.07)	(.02)	(-.25)	(.10)
eta/beta=	.05/.04		.04/.03		.18/.11***	
signif.=	.059		.198		.000	
(4) ENGLISH CDNS.	-.03	.00	.01	.00	.01	-.01
[2.50]	(-.02)	(.00)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.01/.01		.01/.00		.00/.01	
signif.=	.687		.863		.702	
(5) JEWS	.13	-.01	-.01	.00	-.05	.02
[2.53]	(.13)	(-.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(-.01)	(.01)
eta/beta=	.04/.04		.01/.00		.01/.04	
signif.=	.054		.885		.092	
(6) WHITES	-.12	.01	.03	-.01	-.07	.03
[2.73]	(-.27)	(.02)	(-.12)	(.02)	(-.16)	(.07)
eta/beta=	.07/.03		.05/.01		.09/.04	
signif.=	.148		.628		.074	
(7) NONWHITES	.09	-.01	.06	-.01	-.12	.05
[2.65]	(.03)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(-.12)	(.05)
eta/beta=	.01/.03		.01/.03		.09/.09***	
signif.=	.132		.131		.000	
(8) WOMEN	.13	-.01	.02	.00	.01	.00
[2.59]	(.11)	(-.01)	(.03)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.00)
eta/beta=	.03/.04		.01/.01		.00/.01	
signif.=	.057		.680		.763	

TABLE 46:(CONTINUED)

AFFECT TOWARD ELITES	Preference		Attendance		Identity	
	None	Yes	Never	Yes	Low	High
(1) CHURCH [2.55]	-.29 (-.91)	.03 (.08)	-.35 (-.70)	.07 (.13)	-.38 (-.58)	.15 (.22)
eta/beta=	.26/.08***		.29/.15***		.34/.23***	
signif.=	.000		.000		.000	
(2) SCHOOL [2.57]	-.03 (-.41)	.00 (.04)	-.21 (-.37)	.04 (.08)	-.16 (-.28)	.07 (.12)
eta/beta=	.14/.01		.19/.11***		.21/.11***	
signif.=	.621		.000		.000	
(3) UNION [2.53]	.01 (-.11)	.00 (.01)	.02 (-.07)	.00 (.01)	-.08 (-.12)	.03 (.05)
eta/beta=	.04/.00		.03/.01		.08/.05*	
signif.=	.855		.747		.018	
(4) FED.GOV'T [2.57]	-.09 (-.40)	.01 (.04)	-.13 (-.30)	.03 (.07)	-.10 (-.23)	.04 (.10)
eta/beta=	.13/.03		.14/.06**		.15/.06**	
signif.=	.191		.005		.002	
(5) BIG CORP. [2.40]	-.10 (-.31)	.01 (.03)	-.09 (-.21)	.02 (.05)	-.04 (-.15)	.02 (.06)
eta/beta=	.10/.03		.10/.04*		.10/.03	
signif.=	.159		.048		.198	
(6) PROV.GOV'T [2.51]	-.07 (-.22)	.01 (.02)	-.07 (-.17)	.01 (.04)	-.06 (-.11)	.02 (.04)
eta/beta=	.07/.02		.08/.03		.07/.04	
signif.=	.282		.128		.052	
(7) NEWS [2.52]	-.20 (-.28)	.02 (.03)	.00 (-.11)	.00 (.02)	.00 (-.07)	.00 (.03)
eta/beta=	.09/.07**		.05/.00		.05/.00	
signif.=	.004		.947		.886	
(8) T.V. [2.51]	-.29 (-.41)	.03 (.04)	-.03 (-.17)	.01 (.04)	.03 (-.09)	-.01 (.02)
eta/beta=	.14/.10***		.09/.02		.06/.02	
signif.=	.000		.464		.281	

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** [Grand Mean]

TABLE 47: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY COMPOSITE RELIGIOUS INDICES, WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOSITY LEVEL:	Index of 3 Dichotomies				Index of 2 Trichotomies					
		Low		High	Low				High	
	(n=)	0 (177)	1 (285)	2 (743)	3 (2085)	0 (371)	1 (716)	2 (835)	3 (934)	4 (448)
<u>AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS</u>										
(1) LEFT-WINGERS	.21	.04	.08	-.06	.11	.13	-.06	.00	-.20	
[2.52]	(.31)	(-.05)	(.08)	(-.07)	(.17)	(.12)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(-.24)	
eta/beta=	.11/.09*				.13/.11***					
signif.=	.012				.001					
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS	-.37	-.04	-.10	.08	-.15	-.09	.03	.03	.17	
[2.48]	(-.33)	(-.04)	(-.10)	(.08)	(-.15)	(-.09)	(.05)	(.03)	(.14)	
eta/beta=	.11/.12***				.09/.09*					
signif.=	.000				.013					
(3) FRENCH	.10	-.06	-.14	.05	.00	-.15	-.01	.05	.16	
[2.59]	(-.13)	(-.16)	(-.23)	(.11)	(-.13)	(-.26)	(.03)	(.07)	(.33)	
eta/beta=	.17/.09***				.20/.11***					
signif.=	.000				.000					
(4) ENGLISH	.03	.02	-.02	.00	.04	-.03	-.04	-.02	.13	
[2.50]	(-.02)	(.01)	(-.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(-.01)	(-.05)	(.01)	(.10)	
eta/beta=	.01/.01				.05/.06					
signif.=	.939				.063					
(5) JEWS	.10	.04	-.09	.02	.03	-.07	-.02	-.01	.14	
[2.53]	(.12)	(.07)	(-.09)	(.01)	(.05)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(-.01)	(.11)	
eta/beta=	.06/.06*				.06/.07*					
signif.=	.018				.011					
(6) WHITES	-.10	-.08	-.05	.04	-.05	-.09	.02	-.01	.15	
[2.73]	(-.27)	(-.16)	(-.10)	(.08)	(-.17)	(-.14)	(.04)	(.03)	(.21)	
eta/beta=	.10/.05				.11/.06*					
signif.=	.154				.036					
(7) NONWHITES	.09	-.02	-.11	.03	.01	-.11	.03	-.02	.15	
[2.65]	(.04)	(-.04)	(-.13)	(.05)	(-.01)	(-.13)	(.04)	(-.01)	(.16)	
eta/beta=	.09/.07**				.11/.09***					
signif.=	.002				.000					
(8) WOMEN	.21	.03	-.01	-.02	.14	-.02	.10	-.03	-.21	
[2.59]	(.13)	(.00)	(-.03)	(.00)	(.08)	(-.04)	(.11)	(-.01)	(-.19)	
eta/beta=	.03/.05				.10/.11***					
signif.=	.078				.000					

TABLE 47: (CONTINUED)

AFFECT TOWARD ELITES	Low				High				
	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	2	1
(1) CHURCH {2.55}	-.79 (-.94)	-.79 (-.87)	-.30 (-.35)	.26 (.29)	-.81 (-.90)	-.38 (-.42)	-.03 (-.02)	.29 (.31)	.61 (.67)
eta/beta=	.41/.36***				.44/.40***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(2) SCHOOL {2.57}	-.35 (-.50)	-.32 (-.39)	-.13 (-.16)	.12 (.15)	-.38 (-.48)	-.12 (-.17)	.01 (.03)	.10 (.14)	.26 (.32)
eta/beta=	.24/.19***				.26/.20***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(3) UNION {2.53}	-.04 (-.15)	.03 (-.01)	-.11 (-.13)	.04 (.06)	.02 (-.06)	-.08 (-.11)	.01 (.02)	.04 (.06)	.00 (.05)
eta/beta=	.09/.06*				.07/.04				
signif.=	.018				.267				
(4) FED.GOV'T {2.57}	-.21 (-.39)	-.31 (-.40)	-.07 (-.11)	.08 (.13)	-.27 (-.39)	-.09 (-.15)	-.03 (-.02)	.11 (.15)	.21 (.30)
eta/beta=	.19/.13***				.20/.14***				
signif.=	.000				.000				
(5) BIG CORP. {2.40}	-.18 (-.32)	-.11 (-.17)	-.08 (-.13)	.06 (.10)	-.16 (-.25)	-.04 (-.10)	.00 (.03)	-.01 (.00)	.22 (.32)
eta/beta=	.13/.08***				.16/.10***				
signif.=	.001				.000				
(6) PROV.GOV'T {2.51}	-.18 (-.28)	-.09 (-.12)	-.07 (-.06)	.05 (.06)	-.11 (-.18)	-.12 (-.10)	-.01 (-.01)	.04 (.06)	.22 (.19)
eta/beta=	.10/.08***				.12/.11***				
signif.=	.001				.000				
(7) NEWS {2.52}	-.25 (-.33)	-.07 (-.04)	.04 (.02)	.01 (.03)	-.12 (-.16)	.05 (.02)	.02 (.03)	-.03 (-.02)	.04 (.08)
eta/beta=	.09/.07**				.07/.05				
signif.=	.009				.090				
(8) T.V. {2.51}	-.34 (-.47)	-.08 (-.13)	.07 (.02)	.02 (.05)	-.12 (-.21)	.04 (-.02)	.04 (.07)	-.03 (-.01)	.02 (.04)
eta/beta=	.13/.09***				.09/.02*				
signif.=	.000				.050				

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001*** (Grand Mean)

TABLE 48: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES WITH THE RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE INDEX, FOR EACH RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE TYPE:		Eng.	Pr.		Cons.	Prot.		All	
	(n=)	None	Cath	United	Main	NonMain	Other	(3380)	
		(319)	(845)	(476)	(534)	(228)	(172)		
<u>AFFECT TOWARDS GROUPS</u>									
(1) LEFT-WINGERS		-.1003	-.2138**	-.1051	-.0365	.0108	.1366	-.1524	-.1216**
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS		-.0299	.0982	.1346*	-.1440*	.0610	.0646	-.1766	.0825**
(3) FRENCH CDNS.		.0130	.1231**	.0527	-.0409	.1128*	.2651**	.0043	.1757**
(4) ENGLISH CDNS.		.0333	.0160	.1735**	.0225	-.0148	-.0323	.0745	.0208**
(5) JEWS		-.0496	.0278	.1213**	.0508	**.1249	.0928	-.0193	.0220
(6) WHITES		.0036	.0014	.1525**	.0462	.0652	-.0782	.0439	.0963**
(7) NONWHITES		.0490	.0026	.1478**	.0256	.1188*	.0211	.0577	.0667**
(8) WOMEN		-.0153	-.0493	.0178	-.0031	-.0249	-.2810**	-.1271	-.0525**
<u>AFFECT TOWARDS ELITES</u>									
(1) CHURCH		.1668*	.3537**	.4270**	.3071**	.3979**	.1570*	.4609**	.4370**
(2) SCHOOL		.0740	.1595**	.2164**	.1339**	.2601**	-.0898	.2859**	.2472**
(3) UNION		.0635	.0438	.0469	.0123	-.0449	-.1945**	.0232	.0529**
(4) FED.GOV'T		-.0354	.1223**	.2460**	.1649**	.1072*	.0541	.0659	.1984**
(5) BIG CORP.		-.0546	.0354	.2208**	.0106	-.0034	.0564	-.0224	.1386**
(6) PROV.GOV'T		.0469	.0992**	.0535	.0933	.1906**	.0049	.1504	.1163**
(7) NEWS		.0540	-.0985**	.1133**	-.0218	.0225	-.1821*	.0041	.0426*
(8) T.V.		.0518	-.0805*	.1096**	-.0010	-.0562	-.2117**	-.0127	.0647**

P=.05* P=.01**

TABLE 49: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY TWO REFINED MEASURES OF RELIGIOSITY, WITH AND WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS CONTROLS FOR THESE MEASURES AND FOR SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS MEASURE:		<u>Relig.</u> <u>Pref.</u>	<u>Defer.</u> <u>Index</u>
<u>AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS</u>			
(1) LEFT-WINGERS	e/b= p=	.11/.09 .399	.13/.10** .005
(2) RIGHT-WINGERS	e/b= p=	.13/.13** .003	.09/.06 .227
(3) FRENCH CDNS.	e/b= p=	.42/.22*** .000	.20/.09*** .000
(4) ENGLISH CDNS.	e/b= p=	.16/.19*** .000	.05/.07* .011
(5) JEWS	e/b= p=	.15/.23*** .000	.07/.08** .002
(6) WHITES	e/b= p=	.15/.09* .011	.11/.06 .083
(7) NONWHITES	e/b= p=	.06/.07 .284	.10/.09*** .000
(8) WOMEN	e/b= p=	.13/.18*** .000	.10/.09*** .000
<u>AFFECT TOWARD ELITES</u>			
(1) CHURCH	e/b= p=	.32/.16*** .000	.44/.35*** .000
(2) SCHOOL	e/b= p=	.22/.08* .019	.25/.18*** .000
(3) UNION	e/b= p=	.17/.14*** .000	.07/.03 .614
(4) FED. GOVT	e/b= p=	.19/.07 .339	.20/.13*** .000
(5) BIG CORP.	e/b= p=	.26/.21*** .000	.15/.08** .004
(6) PROV. GOVT	e/b= p=	.08/.24*** .000	.12/.09*** .001
(7) NEWS	e/b= p=	.15/.14*** .000	.07/.05 .125
(8) T.V.	e/b= p=	.21/.17*** .000	.10/.05 .093

P=.05* P=.01** P=.001***

TABLE 50: AFFECT TOWARD GROUPS AND ELITES BY SEVEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR THESE VARIABLES

GROUP AFFECT	Relig. Pref.	Relig. Index	Refer. Index	Gender		Age					Educ.			
				M	F	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	HS	TECH	UNIV
(1) (2.52)				.08	-.06	.08	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.13	-.15	-.07	.03	.11
eta/beta=.11/.09	.11/.09	.13/.11		.06/.08		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
signif.= .108	*.012	***.001		** .002				.08/.07	.158			.12/.09	*.012	
(2) (2.48)				-.08	.06	.09	.00	-.09	-.05	.01	-.05	.07	.10	-.13
eta/beta=.12/.12	.11/.12	.09/.09		.06/.07		1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
signif.= ***.001	***.000	*.013		** .008				.05/.06	.176			.16/.10	** .003	
(3) (2.59)				.04	-.04	-.07	.00	.06	.06	.00	-.06	-.01	-.01	.06
eta/beta=.42/.24	.17/.09	.20/.11		.06/.04		1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000		*.022				.08/.06	*.031			.03/.04	.212	
(4) (2.50)				.06	-.05	-.07	-.05	.05	.07	.09	-.05	.02	.06	-.06
eta/beta=.16/.17	.01/.01	.05/.06		.06/.06		1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
signif.= ***.000	.939	.063		** .003				.07/.07	*.016			.03/.05	.103	
(5) (2.53)				.08	-.07	-.10	-.01	.02	.14	-.02	-.20	-.02	.03	.14
eta/beta=.15/.21	.06/.06	.06/.07		.09/.09		1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03
signif.= ***.000	*.018	*.011		***.000				.08/.10	***.000			.14/.11	***.000	
(6) (2.73)				.07	-.07	-.02	-.02	.03	.04	-.01	.08	.02	.05	-.14
eta/beta=.14/.09	.10/.05	.11/.06		.08/.06		1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03
signif.= * .012	.154	*.036		** .002				.04/.02	.875			.07/.07	*.013	
(7) (2.65)				.08	-.08	-.02	.06	.02	.03	-.13	-.05	.07	-.03	.01
eta/beta=.06/.07	.09/.07	.11/.09		.11/.10		1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
signif.= .149	** .002	***.000		***.000				.07/.06	*.027			.04/.03	.300	
(8) (2.59)				.07	-.07	.07	-.01	-.05	-.06	-.02	.05	.03	-.05	-.05
eta/beta=.12/.19	.03/.03	.10/.11		.07/.07		1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07
signif.= ***.000	.078	***.000		***.000				.06/.04	.099			.03/.04	.210	
ELITE AFFECT														
(1) (2.55)				.06	-.06	-.01	-.05	.01	.01	.09	.20	.02	-.01	-.15
eta/beta=.32/.31	.41/.36	.44/.40		.12/.06		1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000		***.001				.17/.04	.364			.15/.10	***.000	
(2) (2.57)				.05	-.05	-.01	.00	-.05	.00	.08	.07	.01	.01	-.07
eta/beta=.22/.16	.24/.19	.26/.20		.09/.06		1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.11	1.15	1.01	1.02	1.11
signif.= ***.000	***.000	***.000		***.001				.07/.04	.429			.09/.05	.137	
(3) (2.53)				.06	-.05	.15	-.06	-.06	-.04	-.15	.24	.02	-.11	-.08
eta/beta=.17/.14	.09/.06	.07/.04		.06/.05		1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11
signif.= ***.000	*.018	.267		** .004				.08/.11	***.000			.09/.11	***.000	
(4) (2.57)				.05	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.06	.05	.18	.12	-.01	.03	-.06
eta/beta=.19/.11	.19/.13	.20/.14		.07/.03		1.08	1.08	1.08	1.13	1.19	1.23	1.02	1.03	1.12
signif.= ***.001	***.000	***.000		*.014				.10/.07	*.008			.10/.05	.079	
(5) (2.40)				-.02	.01	.00	-.05	-.04	-.02	.19	.11	-.01	-.02	-.03
eta/beta=.25/.23	.13/.08	.16/.10		.01/.02		1.01	1.01	1.01	1.04	1.18	1.18	1.02	1.00	1.05
signif.= ***.000	***.001	***.000		.427				.07/.07	*.013			.07/.04	.253	
(6) (2.51)				.03	-.03	-.01	-.05	.00	-.01	.10	-.02	.03	.03	-.08
eta/beta=.08/.27	.10/.08	.12/.11		.05/.04		1.02	1.02	1.02	1.11	1.03	1.04	1.01	1.00	1.10
signif.= ***.000	***.001	***.000		.053				.06/.04	.324			.06/.05	.068	
(7) (2.52)				.05	-.05	.05	-.07	-.07	-.02	.12	.01	.00	.02	-.02
eta/beta=.14/.13	.09/.07	.07/.05		.05/.05		1.06	1.06	1.06	1.07	1.12	1.06	1.01	1.01	1.08
signif.= ***.000	** .009	.090		** .008				.07/.07	*.014			.05/.02	.899	
(8) (2.51)				.09	-.09	.09	-.09	-.07	.00	.06	.04	.02	.05	-.11
eta/beta=.21/.16	.13/.09	.09/.06		.10/.10		1.08	1.08	1.08	1.02	1.05	1.08	1.01	1.01	1.14
signif.= ***.000	***.000	*.050		***.000				.08/.07	** .003			.10/.07	*.014	

GROUP AFFECT: (1) LEFT-WINGERS (2) RIGHT-WINGERS (3) FRENCH CONS. (4) ENGLISH CONS. P=.05 P=.01** P=.001***
 (5) JEWS (6) WHITES (7) NONWHITES (8) WOMEN; ELITE AFFECT: (1) CHURCH (2) SCHOOL (Grand Mean)
 (3) UNION (4) FED. GOVT (5) BIG CORP. (6) PROV. GOVT (7) NEWS (8) TV.

TABLE 50: (CONTINUED)

GROUP AFFECT	Size				Comm.			
	RURAL	TOWN	SUB.	CITY	RURAL	1-10T	10-500T	500T+
(1) (2.52)	.09 (-.02)	.04 (.00)	-.13 (-.04)	-.03 (.02)	-.05 (-.06)	-.18 (-.22)	-.05 (-.05)	.07 (.08)
eta/beta=		.02/.07				.11/.09		
signif.=		.080				*.012		
(2) (2.48)	.10 (.10)	.06 (.04)	-.34 (-.37)	.03 (.01)	-.07 (-.03)	-.15 (-.08)	.07 (.03)	.04 (.02)
eta/beta=		.13/.13				.04/.07		
signif.=		***.000				.075		
(3) (2.53)	-.04 (-.12)	.03 (.15)	-.01 (.00)	.00 (.02)	-.02 (-.07)	.04 (.04)	-.11 (-.16)	.05 (.10)
eta/beta=		.09/.03				.11/.07		
signif.=		.412				**0.002		
(4) (2.50)	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (-.03)	.05 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.05 (-.04)	.05 (.03)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.00)
eta/beta=		.02/.02				.03/.03		
signif.=		.819				.441		
(5) (2.53)	-.06 (-.11)	.00 (-.02)	.12 (.12)	.01 (.06)	-.08 (-.14)	.02 (-.03)	-.05 (-.02)	.05 (.09)
eta/beta=		.09/.05				.11/.06		
signif.=		.093				*.028		
(6) (2.73)	-.03 (-.03)	.00 (.03)	-.04 (-.09)	.03 (.02)	-.01 (-.01)	-.01 (-.01)	.02 (.02)	.00 (-.01)
eta/beta=		.03/.02				.01/.01		
signif.=		.760				.961		
(7) (2.65)	-.06 (-.09)	.00 (.01)	-.04 (-.04)	.05 (.06)	-.04 (-.07)	.02 (.00)	.00 (.02)	.02 (.03)
eta/beta=		.07/.05				.05/.03		
signif.=		.125				.559		
(8) (2.59)	-.02 (-.07)	.09 (.10)	-.11 (-.08)	-.03 (-.01)	-.07 (-.06)	.03 (.06)	-.01 (.01)	.03 (.01)
eta/beta=		.07/.06				.04/.04		
signif.=		*.014				.267		
ELITE AFFECT								
(1) (2.55)	-.08 (.02)	.04 (.10)	.12 (-.04)	.00 (.01)	-.03 (.01)	.07 (.16)	.03 (.03)	-.02 (-.08)
eta/beta=		.07/.06				.08/.03		
signif.=		*.027				.281		
(2) (2.57)	-.02 (.00)	.07 (.12)	-.01 (-.11)	-.04 (-.06)	-.09 (-.05)	.06 (.13)	.06 (.04)	.00 (-.04)
eta/beta=		.09/.05				.07/.06		
signif.=		*.045				*.013		
(3) (2.53)	-.03 (-.06)	.07 (.11)	-.01 (-.02)	-.03 (-.03)	-.08 (-.05)	.08 (.12)	-.02 (-.01)	.02 (.01)
eta/beta=		.07/.04				.05/.05		
signif.=		.159				*.050		
(4) (2.57)	-.03 (-.01)	.08 (.12)	-.01 (-.09)	-.03 (-.06)	-.03 (-.01)	.06 (.10)	-.03 (-.03)	.01 (-.01)
eta/beta=		.08/.05				.05/.03		
signif.=		.067				.382		
(5) (2.40)	-.05 (-.06)	.01 (.06)	-.03 (-.07)	.03 (.01)	-.05 (-.06)	.06 (.09)	-.03 (-.06)	.02 (.03)
eta/beta=		.05/.04				.05/.04		
signif.=		.380				.277		
(6) (2.51)	.00 (.05)	.10 (.09)	-.03 (-.09)	-.06 (-.08)	.03 (.08)	.01 (.03)	-.08 (-.05)	.01 (-.03)
eta/beta=		.09/.07				.05/.04		
signif.=		**0.004				.183		
(7) (2.52)	.02 (-.02)	.03 (.07)	-.03 (-.02)	-.03 (-.03)	-.07 (-.04)	.06 (.09)	-.04 (-.04)	.04 (.01)
eta/beta=		.04/.03				.06/.05		
signif.=		.511				.073		
(8) (2.51)	-.04 (-.07)	.04 (.09)	.01 (.00)	-.01 (-.02)	-.03 (-.03)	.11 (.12)	-.06 (-.08)	.01 (.01)
eta/beta=		.07/.03				.06/.06		
signif.=		.375				.036		

GROUP AFFECT: (1) LEFT-WINGERS (2) RIGHT-WINGERS (3) FRENCH CDNS. (4) ENGLISH CDNS.
 (5) JEWS (6) WHITES (7) NONWHITES (8) WOMEN; ELITE AFFECT: (1) CHURCH (2) SCHOOL
 (3) UNION (4) FED. GOVT (5) BIG CORP. (6) PROV. GOVT (7) NEWS (8) T.V.

TABLE 50:(CONTINUED)

GROUP AFFECT	Region						Organiz.				Mult.R sq.
	MARIT.	QUE.	ONT.	PR.	P.C.	HOME	1	2	1	HIGH	
(1) [2.52]	-.01	-.11	.07	-.06	.14	.12	-.01	-.03	-.15	.02	
	(-.07)(-.11)	(.07)(-.04)	(.14)(.07)	(-.02)	(.04)(-.12)	(.03)					
eta/beta=		.10/.05				.08/.10					
signif.=		*.012				**0.002					.062
(2) [2.48]	-.27	-.02	-.02	.21	.02	-.01	-.01	-.05	.04	.00	
	(-.38)(.00)	(-.03)	(.24)(-.05)	(-.02)	(-.03)	(.00)	(.03)	(.00)	(.03)	(.00)	
eta/beta=		.14/.13				.02/.03					
signif.=		***.000				.84)					.062
(3) [2.59]	-.12	.55	-.14	-.38	-.29	.03	-.03	-.01	-.03	.01	
	(-.17)(.60)	(-.16)(-.40)	(-.31)	(.10)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(-.10)	(-.04)	(-.04)	
eta/beta=		.43/.39				.08/.03					
signif.=		***.000				.636					.201
(4) [2.50]	.08	-.18	.12	.07	-.10	-.04	-.01	-.07	.02	.09	
	(.05)(-.17)	(.11)(.07)	(-.08)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(-.07)	(.02)	(.11)			
eta/beta=		.12/.13				.07/.06					
signif.=		***.000				.072					.032
(5) [2.53]	-.06	-.11	.10	.00	-.01	-.06	.11	-.08	.02	.08	
	(-.14)(-.11)	(.10)(.01)	(.02)	(-.12)	(.10)	(-.07)	(.03)	(.15)			
eta/beta=		.11/.10				.12/.08					
signif.=		***.000				**0.003					.066
(6) [2.73]	.08	.15	.01	-.14	-.25	.00	-.01	-.15	-.02	.12	
	(.07)(.19)	(.00)(-.15)	(-.28)	(.06)	(-.01)	(-.14)	(-.06)	(.07)			
eta/beta=		.14/.12				.17/.07					
signif.=		***.000				*.012					.037
(7) [2.65]	.06	.03	.02	-.10	-.04	-.03	.07	-.07	.00	.05	
	(.02)(.07)	(.02)(-.11)	(-.05)	(-.01)	(.06)	(-.06)	(-.02)	(.06)			
eta/beta=		.08/.07				.05/.05					
signif.=		*.075				.120					.039
(8) [2.59]	.16	.04	.04	-.13	-.14	-.04	-.10	-.02	.02	.09	
	(.13)(.02)	(.04)(-.11)	(-.11)	(.01)	(-.08)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.04)			
eta/beta=		.08/.09				.07/.06					
signif.=		***.000				.067					.033
ELITE AFFECT											
(1) [2.55]	.12	.06	-.03	-.01	-.14	-.05	-.04	.02	.01	.07	
	(.17)(.22)	(-.08)(-.07)	(-.35)	(.00)	(-.13)	(.03)	(-.04)	(.07)			
eta/beta=		.17/.07				.05/.05					
signif.=		**0.010				.184					.217
(2) [2.57]	.11	.15	-.10	.02	-.17	-.02	.06	-.08	.00	.06	
	(.13)(.21)	(-.12)	(.01)(-.29)	(.02)	(.03)	(-.09)	(-.03)	(.05)			
eta/beta=		.19/.14				.05/.05					
signif.=		***.000				.112					.098
(3) [2.53]	.09	.11	.03	-.13	-.20	.03	-.05	.01	-.04	.01	
	(.09)(.14)	(.01)(-.15)	(-.22)	(.10)	(-.06)	(.07)	(-.07)	(-.06)			
eta/beta=		.13/.11				.07/.03					
signif.=		***.000				.658					.044
(4) [2.57]	.00	.18	-.02	-.07	-.31	-.03	-.05	.09	-.04	.05	
	(.02)(.24)	(-.04)(-.08)	(-.37)	(.03)	(-.06)	(.07)	(-.08)	(.02)			
eta/beta=		.18/.14				.05/.05					
signif.=		***.000				.148					.077
(5) [2.40]	.05	.29	-.12	-.11	-.23	-.02	-.07	.10	-.07	.05	
	(.03)(.33)	(-.13)(-.13)	(-.26)	(.04)	(-.01)	(.11)	(-.11)	(.01)			
eta/beta=		.22/.20				.07/.06					
signif.=		***.000				.052					.073
(6) [2.51]	.06	.18	.18	.11	-.32	.00	.03	.04	-.04	.01	
	(.08)(.13)	(.15)(.10)	(-.16)	(.11)	(.07)	(.04)	(-.05)	(.04)			
eta/beta=		.18/.20				.04/.03					
signif.=		***.000				.609					.064
(7) [2.52]	.17	.10	-.02	-.11	-.15	.07	.05	.04	.05	-.09	
	(.17)(.13)	(-.03)(-.12)	(-.17)	(.11)	(.05)	(.05)	(-.06)	(-.11)			
eta/beta=		.12/.10				.10/.07					
signif.=		***.000				*.012					.034
(8) [2.51]	.04	.18	-.03	-.11	-.21	.06	-.04	.07	-.04	-.06	
	(.04)(.22)	(-.04)(-.13)	(-.23)	(.12)	(-.04)	(.08)	(-.07)	(-.13)			
eta/beta=		.16/.14				.11/.06					
signif.=		***.000				.059					.062

GROUP AFFECT:(1)LEFT-WINGERS (2)RIGHT-WINGERS (3)FRENCH CDNS. (4)ENGLISH CDNS. (5)JEWS (6)WHITES (7)NONWHITES (8)WOMEN; ELITE AFFECT:(1)CHURCH (2)SCHOOL (3)UNION (4)FED.GOV'T (5)BIG CORP. (6)PROV.GOV'T (7)NEWS (8)T.V.

TABLE 51: NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL LIFE INDICATORS BY MEASURES OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

RELIGIOUS FACTOR: POLITICAL LIFE DIMENSION:	(n)	Preference		Reference		Deference		Value-Additive	
		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST									
External Efficacy	(2)	1	0	1	2	3	3	2	1
Internal Efficacy	(3)	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2
Political Trust	(4)	1	3	2	3	1	1	1	2
	(9)	3	5	4	6	5	6	5	5
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION									
Election Attention and Interest	(2)	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
Political Stimuli	(3)	1	1	0	1	2	2	2	1
Political Activity	(5)	2	5	0	1	1	0	3	1
Other	(4)	1	3	2	3	1	2	2	3
	(14)	5	11	3	7	5	6	9	7
POLITICAL ISSUES									
Social and Economic Inequality	(7)	0	7	3	1	1	1	1	2
Moral	(4)	4	4	3	4	3	4	4	4
Other	(4)	4	4	2	2	0	1	2	2
	(15)	8	15	8	7	4	6	7	8
POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING									
# of Power Groups	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Extent of Power	(8)	3	7	2	4	3	4	2	4
Social Class	(3)	0	3	0	0	2	2	2	2
Left-Right Thinking	(5)	4	5	2	2	3	3	4	2
	(17)	7	15	4	6	8	9	8	8
GROUP AND ELITE AFFECT									
Group Affect	(8)	4	6	0	3	5	8	5	7
Elite Affect	(8)	7	8	6	6	6	6	8	6
	(16)	11	14	6	9	11	14	13	13
TOTAL n=	(71)	34	60	25	35	33	41	42	39
%		48	85	35	49	46	58	59	55

(For measures of the religious factor: 1=dichotomy, 2=refined, 3=index of three dichotomies, and 4=index of two trichotomies)

TABLE 52: NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL LIFE INDICATORS BY MEASURES OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONTROLLING FOR EACH MEASURE AND SEVEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

RELIGIOUS FACTOR:	(n)	Preference Dichotomy	Reference Dichotomy	Reference Dichotomy	Refined Prefer.	Value-Additive
<u>POLITICAL LIFE DIMENSION:</u>						
POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST						
External Efficacy	(2)	0	0	1	1	2
Internal Efficacy	(3)	0	0	1	3	2
Political Trust	(4)	0	1	0	3	3
		---	---	---	---	---
	(9)	0	1	2	7	7
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION						
Election Attention and Interest	(2)	1	1	0	2	2
Political Stimuli	(3)	2	0	2	2	2
Political Activity	(5)	2	0	2	3	1
Other	(4)	0	1	1	2	2
		---	---	---	---	---
	(14)	5	2	5	9	7
POLITICAL ISSUES						
Social and Economic Inequality	(7)	1	1	1	7	2
Moral	(4)	2	2	3	3	4
Other	(4)	3	0	0	4	1
		---	---	---	---	---
	(15)	6	3	4	14	7
POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING						
# of Power Groups	(1)	0	0	0	0	0
Extent of Power	(8)	2	2	1	7	3
Social Class	(3)	0	0	1	3	1
Left-Right Thinking	(5)	4	1	2	5	2
		---	---	---	---	---
	(17)	6	3	4	15	6
GROUP AND ELITE AFFECT						
Group Affect	(8)	1	0	4	6	6
Elite Affect	(8)	3	4	4	7	5
		---	---	---	---	---
	(16)	4	4	8	13	11
TOTAL n=	(71)	21	13	23	58	38
%		30	18	33	82	54

(The value-additive measure is the index of two trichotomies)

TABLE 53: NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL LIFE INDICATORS FOR MEASURES OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AND SEVEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

SOCIAL VARIABLE:	(n)	Religious Factor				Gender	Age	Educ	Size Group	Comm. Size	Region	Organiz. Index
		1	2	3	4							
POLITICAL LIFE DIMENSION:												
POLITICAL EFFICACY AND TRUST												
External Efficacy	(2)	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	1	1
Internal Efficacy	(3)	2	2	2	3	1	1	3	1	2	2	3
Political Trust	(4)	3	1	2	3	1	4	2	3	1	3	0
	(9)	5	5	5	8	3	6	7	4	3	6	4
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION												
Election Attention and Interest	(2)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	1	2
Political Stimuli	(3)	1	2	1	3	3	3	3	0	1	1	3
Political Activity	(5)	5	3	0	5	3	5	5	1	1	3	5
Other	(4)	3	2	3	4	2	3	3	2	1	2	3
	(14)	11	9	6	14	10	13	13	4	3	7	13
POLITICAL ISSUES												
Social and Economic Inequality	(7)	7	1	2	7	5	6	7	1	5	5	2
Moral	(4)	4	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	1	3	2
Other	(4)	4	1	1	4	2	4	1	0	1	4	1
	(15)	15	6	7	15	10	12	11	4	7	12	5
POWER, CLASS AND LEFT-RIGHT THINKING												
% of Power Groups	(1)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Extent of Power	(8)	7	2	4	7	2	7	5	0	2	8	3
Social Class	(3)	3	2	2	3	1	3	2	1	2	3	2
Left-Right Thinking	(5)	5	3	2	5	4	2	5	0	1	5	0
	(17)	15	7	8	15	8	12	13	1	5	16	5
GROUP AND ELITE AFFECT												
Group Affect	(8)	6	5	7	8	8	4	4	2	3	8	3
Elite Affect	(8)	8	8	6	8	6	5	3	3	3	8	1
	(16)	14	13	13	16	14	9	7	5	6	16	4
TOTAL n=	(71)	60	40	44	68	45	52	51	18	24	57	31
%		84	56	62	96	63	73	72	25	34	80	47

(For measures of the religious factor: 1=refined preference, 2=index of three dichotomies, 3=index of two trichotomies, and 4=either/and 1,2 or 3.)

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